CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING REGIME

By

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ABSTRACT

In the past, China analysts have accused Beijing of playing an overly conservative and cost-evading role in the U.N. peacekeeping regime. They complained that China would defend the concept of traditional peacekeeping against a more robust and intrusive way of keeping the peace and that it would send only a minimal number of Chinese peacekeepers abroad. Recently, however, Beijing has increased its contribution to U.N. peacekeeping operations despite the fact that their mandates authorized the use of force and interfered in the internal affairs of the host countries. By analyzing China’s voting behavior in the U.N. Security Council and the Chinese participation rate in certain missions, this study explores how and why China has become more involved in the U.N. peacekeeping regime in the past few years. It will argue that two interrelated developments of a socialization process have contributed significantly to China’s increasing participation in U.N. peacekeeping since 2000. On the one hand, Beijing has managed to adapt its normative position to the international standard during the 1990s and learned from its own experience in U.N. peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, the way U.N. peacekeeping missions are conducted has changed after the Brahimi Report in 2000, which made U.N. peacekeeping more agreeable to the Chinese leadership. Other important factors for China’s new engagement in U.N. peacekeeping were changes in its foreign and security policy: Beijing’s drive to shape its image as a responsible and peaceful great power, to balance against U.S. hegemony, to prevent emerging security threats from failing states, and to isolate Taipei diplomatically.
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOFORCE</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Force</td>
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<td>ECOMIL</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
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<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force East Timor</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>MIF</td>
<td>Multinational Interim Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINURCA</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic</td>
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<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>MNF</td>
<td>Multinational Force</td>
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<td>MONUA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Angola</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>MPF</td>
<td>Multinational Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>ONUB</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Burundi</td>
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<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in the Congo</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-5</td>
<td>permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNAVEM</td>
<td>United Nations Angola Verification Mission</td>
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<td>UNCRO</td>
<td>United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation</td>
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<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNIKOM</td>
<td>United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission</td>
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<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>United Task Force</td>
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<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
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<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor</td>
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<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia</td>
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<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNOMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNOTIL</td>
<td>United Nations Office in Timor-Leste</td>
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<td>UNPKO</td>
<td>United Nations peacekeeping operations</td>
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<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary-General</td>
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<td>UNSMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Support Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAES</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

As China is rising, political analysts are increasingly worried about its future role in the international system. They often portray the country as a growing economic and military power that could upset the world. Yet, they seem to overlook that China’s rise might actually help to keep the peace. If the Chinese leadership managed to fully embrace the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making process that define the U.N. peacekeeping regime, China could become one of the most resourceful contributors to U.N. peacekeeping operations (UNPKO).

During the 1990s, however, the Chinese representative in the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) frequently expressed his uneasiness about U.N. peacekeeping mandates, especially if they authorized the use of force or interfered in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. This behavior led critics to complain that Beijing would try to defend an outdated concept of state sovereignty against the changing realities of UNPKO on the ground. Moreover, China was accused of shying away from shouldering its responsibility as one of the five permanent members in the UNSC (P-5) since it had so far just sent a tiny force of military observers to a selected number of missions. Obviously, China had shown little support for the U.N. peacekeeping regime throughout the 1990s.

But now it seems as if a new trend in Chinese peacekeeping is emerging, which has been largely ignored by the rest of the world. In recent years, Beijing began to deploy more Chinese peacekeepers abroad than ever before despite the fact that the mandates of these UNPKO authorized the use of force and interfered in the internal affairs of the host
country. In order to assess whether China’s increasing participation in the U.N. peacekeeping regime constitutes a more sustainable trend, this study will explore two basic questions: First, to what extend has China’s attitude and contribution to UNPKO changed in the past? In particular, is Beijing today still playing the ascribed overly conservative and cost-evading role of the 1990s? Second, if China’s role in U.N. peacekeeping has indeed changed, what are the reasons for this development? In particular, were these changes brought about by modifications in China’s foreign and security policy or rather by the evolving concept of U.N. peacekeeping itself?

Unfortunately, the literature published in Chinese is not extremely instructive in this regard. Instead of analyzing China’s role in the regime, the vast majority of academic articles describe the changes of U.N. peacekeeping since the 1990s.\(^1\) At least some Chinese scholars and practitioners have shed light on China’s new interest in UNPKO.\(^2\) Yet, several studies on China’s participation in the U.N. peacekeeping regime have been published in English, though Chinese peacekeeping is often discussed in the larger context of

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Beijing’s behavior in multilateral settings. Earlier research traced China’s changing attitude towards UNPKO over the decades, defined major turning points, and identified Beijing’s normative concerns as key obstacles to its full participation. Yuan provided an overview about the Chinese debate on military interventions and state sovereignty. But only Fravel offered a thorough analysis of Chinese peacekeeping in the context of the changing nature of UNPKO. While Gill/Reilly discovered signs of a new Chinese flexibility at the end of 1999 and clarified Beijing’s decision-making process on U.N. peacekeeping issues, Tang and Pang discussed the new motivations behind China’s increasing participation in the U.N. peacekeeping regime.


6 Fravel, 104–115.

7 Gill/Reilly, 44–35.

However, the most recent papers on this subject lack a sound framework of analysis and a clear set of indicators to substantiate their arguments. More importantly, they focus almost entirely on changes in China’s foreign and security policy while largely ignoring the reforms that have been taken place in the U.N. peacekeeping regime itself. The present study aims at filling this gap. It will define different types of UNPKO and show when they were more prominent and how they affected Beijing’s comfort level. To this end, the study will analyze China’s voting behavior in the UNSC and its contribution of Chinese peacekeepers.

These two sets of data provide sound indicators for assessing China’s overall participation in the U.N. peacekeeping regime since both reflect a political decision made in Beijing. When the vote on a resolution is finally cast after behind-the-door negotiations, all members of the UNSC can not only express their views on the document presented before them by the show of hands but also in their public explanation issued before or after the vote is taken. The P-5—China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States—can thus qualify their support or abstention with a dissociating or sympathetic comment rather than vetoing the adoption of the draft resolution. In combination with its explanation of vote, China’s voting behavior on UNPKO can therefore indicate its support for the U.N. peacekeeping regime as a whole.

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9 Beijing is well aware of the different levels of support that can be conveyed in the U.N. Security Council: “In the course of consultations, though the countries concerned had accepted some of our principal views or had deleted certain contents at our request, we were still dissatisfied with the draft. Only after taking account of overall interests did we decide not to veto the draft resolution but to abstain from voting on it. Sometimes, even after the countries concerned had accepted all our views, we still found the draft resolution unacceptable to us as a whole. Given the fact that the countries concerned had agreed to our views, we decided to abstain from vote.” See Ambassador Shen Guofang quoted in Shi Jiangmin, “Ambassador Shen Guofang Speaks of ‘United Nations in New Century’ Held by www.people.com.cn on 6 January,” Beijing Renmin Ribao (Internet-Version) in Chinese, January 6, 2001, FBIS-CHI-2001-0108, January 6, 2001.
The same is true for Beijing’s contribution of Chinese peacekeepers. Whether or not they are sent to a specific mission is solely decided in the Chinese capital. While timing, mission requirements, and peacekeeping capabilities play a crucial role in determining the ultimate force level provided by the contributing country, it is always the country itself that has the final say on how many of its peacekeepers will actually serve in the mission in question. Thus, the number of Chinese peacekeepers contributed to specific missions does indicate China’s commitment to the U.N. peacekeeping regime itself.

These two indicators can only describe how, but cannot explain why, China’s participation has changed. In fact, the motives at the leadership level in Beijing are difficult to identify due to the lack of constant and cross-time access to decision-makers in the Chinese bureaucracy. Exploring China’s motives for its participation in UNPKO will therefore remain largely speculative and evidence anecdotal at best. This study will nevertheless suggest possible reasons based on Beijing’s official statements in the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) and Chinese documents, newspapers, and academic articles. Interviews with China experts as well as Chinese scholars and practitioners conducted in New York and Washington will backup this assessment.

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11 While the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York eventually decides whether or not to respond to an offer of peacekeepers on a first come, first served basis to fill the slots of a new mission, Beijing’s bid is usually fully accepted, probably because of the conviction among U.N. officials that major powers should have a prominent role in U.N. peacekeeping operations. In order to join an ongoing mission, however, China needs to wait for another country to withdraw from that mission in order fill the gap. See interview with Chinese official, New York.

12 The names of the two Chinese senior officials interviewed in New York and Washington have been withheld to maintain their anonymity.
Since the term “peacekeeping” has been used to designate a wide range of phenomena, it will be simply defined throughout this study as the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) does. As a result, two political missions under supervision of this department will be considered in the analysis of China’s contribution of peacekeepers although they comprise limited peacebuilding activities in Afghanistan and East Timor. Likewise, this paper will exclude those aspects of UNPKO which refer to embargos and other coercive measures that are non-military in nature since they involve another whole range of normative and practical issues.

In order to examine the pertinence of China’s alleged roles as a system defender and system exploiter in international regimes (chapter 2), the present study will first discuss the evolution of U.N. peacekeeping itself (chapter 3) before taking a new look at Chinese peacekeeping by analyzing China’s voting behavior in the UNSC and its contribution of peacekeepers to UNPKO (chapter 4). The remainder of this paper will explore possible reasons for the changes of China’s participation in the U.N. peacekeeping regime (chapter 5) and finally summarize the findings (chapter 6).
2. CHINA’S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

China’s growing economic and military power has generated uneasiness among analysts of international relations in the past few years. Pessimistic strategists maintain that emerging powers are inherently dissatisfied with the status quo and seek to upset the established international order. Just like imperial Germany and Japan posed a threat to the international system at the beginning of the 20th century, China’s rise would challenge existing institutions, norms, and the power distribution, thus bringing instability, conflict, and ultimately war.\(^{13}\) These skeptics doubt whether it is at all possible to socialize a dissatisfied power like China within international institutions so that it adheres to international norms. Various policy-makers and analysts in Washington have implied that Beijing has so far failed to participate constructively in the international community and to endorse the global norms of conduct. Rather, they portray China as a revisionist state that brings its radical interests in status quo institutions.\(^{14}\)

But has Beijing really acted as a revisionist power? There have been few empirical studies about China’s involvement in international regimes. While some scholars have examined Beijing’s participation in multilateral institutions in general, others have focused on specific international regimes such as nonproliferation and arms control, trade


and finance, environmental protection, and human rights. Among these authors, only Johnston et al. theorized about China’s participation in international regimes in a more systematic way. Johnston/Evans explored how the quantity and quality of participation has changed over time and how this affected China’s attitude towards multilateral forms of cooperation. As possible reasons for the increase in China’s participation, they suggested bureaucratic interests, reputation, social feedback, small-group socialization, and imposed constraints. They also introduced a set of indicators for measuring China’s commitment to international regimes such as its participation rates and the congruence of its voting behavior with other states in international decision-making bodies.

All these studies suggested that China is not an outlier anymore. Over the years, Beijing has become more integrated into and more cooperative within international institutions than ever before. By and large, it has accepted the overall decision-making procedure of these regimes and has done little to change the rules once it had joined the institutions. Besides its territorial claims to Taiwan, China can no longer be considered a dis-

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satisfied power.\textsuperscript{17} While China cannot be characterized as a revolutionary system transformer in international regimes like the United Nations anymore, it does not play the role of a liberal system reformer either. Instead, Beijing is regarded as a conservative system defender and system exploiter particularly in the U.N. peacekeeping regime.\textsuperscript{18}

China as a System Defender

Regarding the highly sensitive issue of states sovereignty and the use of force in international relations, China has not been suspected of being a revisionist power but, quite the opposite, of being too much of a status quo power, or more precisely, a status quo \textit{ante} power. Beijing is widely regarded as one of the strongest defenders of a more traditional notion of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{19} This concept, often referred to as the Westphalian norm of sovereignty, is based on the understanding that the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states is crucial for maintaining international peace.\textsuperscript{20}

While Westphalian sovereignty had largely defined the international system of the Cold War, the international debate of the 1990s gradually shifted from the sovereignty of the state to that of individuals. This emerging post-Westphalian concept of sovereignty suggests that only free, open, and pluralist societies will guarantee international peace and stability in the long run, and that the international community must therefore be con-


\textsuperscript{18}See Kim, 1999, 61.


\textsuperscript{20}Bellamy/Williams/Griffin, 21.
cerned with what happens within sovereign states—and may, under certain circumstances, even intervene with military force.\textsuperscript{21}

However, China has always insisted on the full respect of state sovereignty and the principle of noninterference in its official statements:

\begin{quote}
[T]he principle of respect for State sovereignty and non-interference in a country’s internal affairs must always be observed. The United Nations is an intergovernmental organization composed of sovereign States rather than a world government. […] Matters concerning a country should […] be settled by its own people, and those concerning a region by the countries in the region through consultations, in which the international community, including the United Nations, can play only a supplementary and promotive role.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

Its resistance against an emerging notion of state sovereignty centered on the wellbeing of individuals was clearly pronounced in the UNSC in 1999 after Western powers had militarily intervened in the Kosovo conflict to protect human rights:

\begin{quote}
Respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs are basic principles of the United Nations Charter. Since the end of the cold war, the international situation has undergone major changes, but those principles are by no means outdated. On the contrary, they have acquired even greater relevance. At the threshold of the new century, it is even more imperative for us to reaffirm those principles.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

This static understanding of sovereignty results partly from China’s historical experience in the 19th century when imperial powers tried to colonize the middle kingdom, and partly from its intention to forestall the likelihood of a multilateral intervention in its own territory, especially with regard to the issue of Taiwan and Tibet.\textsuperscript{24} In the assessment

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{21}Ibid., 27–28.
\end{footnotes}
of China analysts, these normative concerns have hindered Beijing to fully engage in the U.N. peacekeeping regime.\textsuperscript{25} Still clinging to the Westphalian concept of sovereignty, Beijing often seemed to act as a conservative system defender as it wanted to return to the traditional understanding of sovereignty that had dominated the Cold War world.

**China as a System Exploiter**

Some students of China’s behavior in international organizations have accused Beijing of cheating. China would reap the benefits and special rights as one of the P-5 in the UNSC but would fail to live up to the duties that come along with this preeminent power position.\textsuperscript{26} As the most pronounced critic in this regard, Kim argues that China seeks to maximize its leverage in the bargaining process prior to the adoption of a resolution in the UNSC while minimizing its normative costs and responsibilities.\textsuperscript{27} To him, China’s proclaimed normative principles are a mere pretext, designed to extract benefits from Western countries for not casting its veto against a resolution.\textsuperscript{28}

Indeed, nonparticipation or abstention in the vote of the UNSC has been a convenient Chinese tactic to reconcile Beijing’s conflict between its principles and interests particularly with regard to UNPKO. China could express its normative reservation

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\textsuperscript{26} Samuel S. Kim, “China as a Great Power,” *Current History* 96, no. 611 (September 1997): 249.

\textsuperscript{27} Kim, 1995, 419. However, this behavior is adopted by most states. See Kent, 135.

\textsuperscript{28} See Kim, 1995, 423. Kim always refers to the case of the Iraq intervention in 1991. In exchange for not vetoing the resolution that authorized the intervention, Beijing gained Washington’s approval for a loan of the World Bank, the first one after all financial support had been frozen in the wake of China’s brutal suppression of student protests in 1989. See also Choedon, 44; Kornberg/Faust, 218; Rawnsley, 85.
against interventions but also avoid obstructing the majority will especially if the missions were supported by Third World countries. Beijing’s “cooperation by acquiescence” remained deliberately ambiguous since it could be interpreted as both passive opposition to and passive support for U.N. interventions. As Kim asserted in 2003, “China’s voting behavior, particular its abstention on Chapter VII enforcement resolutions, is neither positive engagement nor destructive obstruction but one of pursuing the maxi-mini strategy in a situation-specific and self-serving way.”

As a result, China could free ride in the U.N. peacekeeping regime since Beijing could show its desire to play a more important role in high-profile multilateral institutions while minimizing its commitments. Given that China showed complete formal participation but a weak commitment to the institution of peacekeeping itself, Beijing has obviously played the role of a system exploiter in the U.N. peacekeeping regime.

Assessment

While empirical studies on China’s participation in international regimes have shown that China has integrated itself quite well in the international community, its limited participation in U.N. peacekeeping has nevertheless been subject to criticism. As a Chinese scholar concedes, “[b]y now [China] is regarded as a ‘status defender,’ and its image as a free-rider could not be neglected easily.” In order to evaluate whether these claims are still pertinent to China’s present participation in the U.N. peacekeeping regime, changes in the regime itself need to be identified first.

29 Choedon, 40; Johnston, China and International Institutions, 2003, 322; Kim, 1979, 209–211; Pang, 75; Zhang, 1996, 6. China used nonparticipation in the vote most extensively of all the veto powers of the U.N. Security Council. See Morphet, 156, 157, and note 6 in Morphet, 166. See also Kim, 1979, 188, 209.
30 Kim, 1979, 217.
32 Fravel, 1120; Kornberg/Faust, 220–221. See also Gill/Reilly, 46; Johnston, 1998, 77; Kim, 1999, 76, 80.
3. EVOLUTION OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING

The term “peacekeeping” is used in many different ways and current missions comprise different types of peacekeeping activities. A typology of UNPKO will help to better understand the evolution that the concept of U.N. peacekeeping had undergone over the decades.

Concepts of U.N. Peacekeeping

The concept of UNPKO was first formalized in the Suez Crisis of 1956, when U.N. Secretary-General (UNSG) Dag Hammerskjöld and his advisors organized the first armed military force of the United Nations, the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) I. The terms of reference for this mission defined the three principles for all subsequent UNPKO: more or less the voluntary consent of all conflicting parties to the activities of the mission, the impartiality of the peacekeepers in their relationship with the conflicting parties, and the minimum use of force, only as a last resort and only in self-defense. This “holy trinity” reflected the attempt of Hammerskjöld to prevent direct superpower confrontation within the limits set by the U.N. Charter and by the realities of the Suez Crisis.

Since the relations among member states of the United Nations are based on the principle of “sovereign equality” (Article 2 I), the sovereignty of the state is protected against interventions “in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” (Article 2 VII), let alone the “threat or use of force against the territorial integ-

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36 Bellamy/Williams/Griffin, 95.
rity or political independence” (Article 2 IV). Therefore, any deployment of U.N. peacekeeping forces requires the consent of the sovereign states concerned, which is most likely to be granted if the UNPKO promises to remain impartial and essentially peaceful. However, the Westphalian principle of state sovereignty “shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII” (Article 2 IV).

Under Chapter VII, the UNSC is authorized to take coercive measures against U.N. member states, which may (Article 42) or may not (Article 41) involve the use of force, if it determines “any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” (Article 39). But since an enforcement action under Chapter VII was impossible to implement, given that two of the P-5 were directly involved in the crisis, Hammerskjöld had to opt for a pragmatic approach mandated under Chapter VI, which allowed to “seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice” (Article 33 I). At their inception, UNPKO were conceived as a non-coercive ad hoc response to emerging crises rather than as a comprehensive blueprint for collective action.38

Lacking an explicit legal foundation in the U.N. Charter, the character of UNPKO has changed in the course of the following decades. In order to better analyze the role of international peacekeeping in world politics, most analysts prefer to identify types of UNPKO chronologically. While some distinguish broadly between a first generation of peacekeepers in the Cold War era and a second generation of “new peacekeepers” in the post-Cold War era,39 others count three, four, or up to six distinct generations.40 However,

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37 All articles mentioned refer to those of the U.N. Charter.
a chronological categorization of peacekeeping activities by generation is misleading as U.N. peacekeepers have performed multiple tasks simultaneously before and after the end of the Cold War and have moved between different types of activities within a mission.41

Therefore, other authors suggest more differentiated approaches. James distinguishes peacekeeping missions by its personnel, values, functions, and context.42 Durch classifies UNPKO in traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peace operations, humanitarian interventions, and peace enforcement.43 Findley identifies traditional peacekeeping, expanded peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and enforcement.44 Similarly, Bellamy/Williams/Griffin identify traditional peacekeeping, managing transition, wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace support operations.45 Goulding speaks of preventive deployment, traditional peacekeeping, implementation of a comprehensive settlement, protection of the delivery of humanitarian relief, deployment in failed states, and ceasefire enforcement.46 Diehl/Druckman/Wall come up with twelve categories, including collective enforcement, arms control verification, and intervention in support for


Alan James, Peacekeeping in International Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 1–8, 14–15.


Bellamy/Williams/Griffin, 5–6.

democracy. Obviously, the way of how peacekeeping is categorized depends on what the authors want to show. For the purpose of this study, a combination of typologies introduced by Bellamy/Williams/Griffin and Findlay serves best to describe five different but not mutually exclusive roles of UNPKO, especially with regard to the use of force:

**Traditional peacekeeping.** Traditional peacekeepers want to provide the political space necessary for warring states to reach an agreement. Rather than attempting to resolve a conflict themselves, they try to build confidence and facilitate political dialogue for others to do so. These peacekeepers are usually deployed after a ceasefire agreement between states has been reached. They adhere strictly to the three UNPKO principles.

**Transition management.** These multidimensional missions facilitate and then implement the political settlement agreed between the conflicting parties until the event of fair election or the independence of a new state. Such operations take on a wide range of responsibilities in order to transform states and societies: they supervise elections, build democratic institutions, conduct military and police training, promote post-conflict rehabilitation, and protect human rights. Rather than being deployed between states, peacekeepers operate within states after a ceasefire agreement has been reached. Peacekeepers managing transitions adhere strictly to the UNPKO principles.

**Wider peacekeeping.** Wider peacekeeping operations were originally intended as traditional peacekeeping missions after a ceasefire had been reached. But in a context of fragile interim ceasefires and ongoing violence, these missions have gradually expanded their mandate as they took on additional tasks, such as securing the delivery of humani-

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48 Bellamy/Williams/Griffin, 95–97, 101.
49 Ibid., 111–112.
tarian assistance and protecting civilians from imminent physical threats.\textsuperscript{50} While these peacekeepers claimed to uphold UNPKO principles, it was often unclear how to adhere to them in a hostile environment.\textsuperscript{51}

\textit{Peace enforcement.} Peace enforcement intends to coerce the conflicting parties to comply with a previously consented agreement by using military force under the authorization of the UNSC. Deployed within a hostile environment, peace enforcers interpret the UNPKO principles in such a way that they act impartially if they militarily penalize those groups who try to undermine the peace accord by violence.\textsuperscript{52} While applying military force, peace enforcement actions do not intend to militarily defeat the other party. This distinguishes them from pure enforcement actions, which are military operations mandated by the UNSC to impose the will of the international community on an enemy state by defeating it militarily.\textsuperscript{53}

\textit{Peace support operations.} This fairly recent type of multifunctional peacekeeping operation combines robust military force capable of peace enforcement actions with a strong civilian component that carries out civil administration, civilian policing, and humanitarian tasks. Peace support operations combine aspects of transition management, wider peacekeeping, and peace enforcement, but attempt to overcome the problems of each of them. Prepared to act in an environment of ongoing conflict, peace support operations adhere to the UNPKO principles in the sense that peace enforcement does.\textsuperscript{54}

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\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 128–130; Hillen, 147–148. In Findlay’s definition, expanded peacekeeping comprises everything that appears to be neither traditional peacekeeping nor peace enforcement. See Findlay, 2002, 5–6. \\
\textsuperscript{51} Findlay, 2002, 356–358. \\
\textsuperscript{52} Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, \textit{Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises} (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 21–24. \\
\textsuperscript{53} Findlay, 2002, 6–7; Hillen, 29–30. Bellamy/Williams/Griffin do not make this crucial distinction between peace enforcement and enforcement action. See Bellamy/Williams/Griffin, 146, 151–152. \\
\textsuperscript{54} Bellamy/Williams/Griffin, 165–166, 169.
\end{flushleft}
These five distinct roles of UNPKO will serve as a framework of analysis for this study. While traditional peacekeeping is primarily concerned with confidence-building between states, transition management attempts to tackle a wider range of issues. In contrast to wider peacekeeping and peace enforcement, which take place in a hostile environment, traditional peacekeeping and transition management adhere strictly to the three UNPKO principles. Peace support operations integrate elements of transition management, wider peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.

Changes in U.N. Peacekeeping

The five features of UNPKO—traditional peacekeeping, transition management, wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace support operations—have not been equally dominant over the past fifty years. Moreover, the three UNPKO principles have been interpreted differently at different points in time.

Cold War Era (1948–1987)

The original idea of UNPKO had been largely dictated by the context of the Cold War. UNSG Dag Hammerskjöld primarily intended to prevent direct confrontation between the superpowers rather than violent conflict per se.\(^{55}\) As a result, the principles of UNPKO were designed to accommodate the concerns of the conflicting parties but remained vague and often impractical, particularly with regard to the use of force.\(^{56}\) They were dramatically challenged, when the U.N. Operation in the Congo (ONUC) moved from traditional to wider peacekeeping and used peace enforcement and even enforcement actions in the secessionist province of Katanga.\(^{57}\) This provoked criticism by France and the Soviet Union so that several reforms were implemented including a separate

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\(^{55}\) Ibid., 99.

\(^{56}\) Findlay, 2002, 47–49.

\(^{57}\) Ibid., 71–81; Ratner, 103–105.
peacekeeping budget.\textsuperscript{58} As a lesson learned from ONUC, the subsequent UNPKO of the Cold War era remained strictly within the limits of traditional peacekeeping missions.

\textit{Post-Cold War Era (1988–1999)}

When the Cold War began to thaw, UNPKO underwent a substantial transformation. As the UNSC was no longer blocked by ideological rivalry and proxy wars came to an end, the number of UNPKO increased drastically between 1988 and 1993. While most of these missions remained small in size and largely traditional peacekeeping-type of operations, the UNSC also embarked on authorizing a new form of mission that operated in intrastate conflicts, carried out more complex tasks, and became more intrusive in nature.\textsuperscript{59} These wider peacekeeping operations often had to operate in a hostile environment but were still expected to adhere to the UNPKO principles.\textsuperscript{60} In his “Agenda for Peace” of 1992, UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali challenged the three principles when he defined peacekeeping as a “deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, \textit{hitherto} with the consent of all the parties concerned” and proposed to establish peace enforcement units to “restore and maintain the cease-fire.”\textsuperscript{61} This definition sparked criticism from diplomats, practitioners, and scholars, who feared a new spell of U.N. interventionism.\textsuperscript{62}

However, the catastrophes of Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia prompted the international community to reevaluate the role of UNPKO. In Somalia, U.S. soldiers were killed in combat against militias in 1993, which caused the United States and other troop contributors to withdraw from the mission.\textsuperscript{63} In Rwanda, several states retreated from the

\textsuperscript{59} Findlay, 1996, 2–3, 12–13; Ratner, 22–24; Thakur/Schnabel, 11–12.
\textsuperscript{60} Bellamy/Williams/Griffin, 75–79, 128; Hillen, 143.
\textsuperscript{61} U.N. Secretary-General Report, A/47/277-S/24111, June 17, 1992, paras. 20, 44. Emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{62} Findlay, 2002, 161–164.
\textsuperscript{63} Daniel/Hayes, 104–106; Findlay, 2002, 202–204.
mission when the fighting between Hutus and Tutsis restarted in 1994 so that only a tiny force was present by the time the genocide fully unfolded.\textsuperscript{64} In Bosnia, the United Nations were unable to protect the safe area of Srebrenica against ethnic cleansing by Serb troops in 1995.\textsuperscript{65} As a result of these humanitarian disasters, the UNSC became more reluctant to authorize new missions while the United States decided that it would be more favorable to enforce the peace outside the United Nations in coalitions of the willing or capable regional organizations.\textsuperscript{66} Given the rise of mandated peacekeeping missions that were not under U.N. command in the late-1990s, it seemed as if the United Nations would not continue to play a major role in international peacekeeping anymore.

In his “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace” submitted in 1995, UNSC Boutros-Ghali backtracked on his broad definition of peacekeeping and now reasserted the original UNPKO principles: “The logic of peace-keeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peace-keeping is intended to facilitate.”\textsuperscript{67} Many analysts and practitioners advised the United Nations to “go back to basics” and to refrain from peace enforcement.\textsuperscript{68} Yet, the original interpretation of the UNPKO principles did not any longer meet the realities of intrastate conflicts. In civil wars, consistent consent was often difficult to maintain since the loyalty of militias towards their warlords was frequently shifting.\textsuperscript{69} Impartiality was understood as being neutral to the conflict in-

\textsuperscript{64} Bellamy/Williams/Griffin, 82–83; Findlay, 2002, 278–280.
\textsuperscript{65} Weiss/Forsythe/Coate, 65.
\textsuperscript{66} Findlay, 2002, 316–317; Weiss/Forsythe/Coate, 68.
\textsuperscript{67} U.N. Secretary-General Report, A/50/60-S/1995/1, January 25, 1995, para. 34. This report did no longer distinguish between peace enforcement and enforcement action. See ibid., paras. 78–79.
\textsuperscript{68} See Findlay, 2002, 315–318.
\textsuperscript{69} Bellamy/Williams/Griffin, 109–110; Daniel/Hayes, 24–25. Moreover, consent has often been coerced before the mission was established. See Findlay, 2002, 17.
stead of ensuring that all parties adhere to the consented agreement. Most importantly, the authorization of the use of force had been unspecific from the outset. While the peacekeepers’ right of self-defense was extended to include the protection of U.N. personnel, it remained largely unclear to what extent peacekeepers could secure their freedom of movement and defend their mission. As UNSC resolutions authorized the U.N. peacekeepers to use “all necessary means” under Chapter VII without specifying the level of force to be used, it remained unclear whether this phrase was meant to authorize peace enforcement or simply to reassert the use of force for self-defense.

Post-Brahimi Era (since 2000)

In 1999, the number of U.N. peacekeepers surged again when the UNSC authorized four new missions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the Congo. Normative concerns and practical developments had contributed to this increase in UNPKO. With the controversial military intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Kosovo on humanitarian grounds lacking authorization of the UNSC, the idea of humanitarianism gained new support among Western states. UNSG Kofi Annan launched a debate about criteria for humanitarian interventions, asking “if, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide [in Rwanda], a coalition of States had been prepared to act in defence of the Tutsi population, but did not receive prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold?”

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72 Since the use of force in self-defense was already implicitly authorized under Chapter VI, permitting “all necessary means” under Chapter VII was superfluous. See Findley, 2002, 8–9.
73 Bellamy/Williams/Griffin, 85.
At the same time, a new pattern of UNPKO deployment was emerging in which command and control of peace enforcement actions were subcontracted to pivotal states or military alliances. This practice had already appeared in the 1990s when the peace in Bosnia was enforced by NATO in cooperation with the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR). NATO later deployed its Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) while the United Nations were only responsible for the police force of the U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). But since the deployment of the Australian-led International Force East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999, pivotal states have regularly been mandated to establish a secure environment, in which the subsequent UNPKO could then be fully deployed.

These developments coincided with the results of a larger debate about the lessons learned from wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and the failures in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. In 2000, UNSG Kofi Annan invited a high-level panel, chaired by the former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi, to review all aspects of UNPKO. The so-called Brahimi Report made four key recommendations: First, peacekeepers should be specifically mandated to use force to defend themselves, their freedom of movement, their mission, and civilians under imminent threat of attack more effectively. While the report embraced peace enforcement, it also drew a clear line to enforcement action. Second, the United Nations should not mandate a mission before it has the resources available to fulfill it. Although calling for enhanced rapid deployment capacities, the United Nations seemed to accept that pivotal states could be deployed first,

76 Bellamy/Williams/Griffin, 85–87.
77 Findlay, 2002, 326–332; Kühne, 103–104.
79 Ibid., paras. 50, 53. See also Findlay, 2002, 336–337.
to be followed by a U.N. force.\textsuperscript{81} Third, the report suggested a better consultation between the UNSC and the troop contributing countries.\textsuperscript{82} Finally, the panel encouraged the United Nations to pursue a multidimensional approach in peacebuilding as integral part of UNPKO, including the supervision of elections, training of police forces, strengthening the rule of law, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, and the protection of human rights.\textsuperscript{83}

As a result of these recommendations and the fresh experience made in Kosovo and East Timor, peace support operations emerged as a new form of UNPKO. Incorporating peace enforcement elements, these operations replaced the roles of transition management and wider peacekeeping. In fact, all newly established missions since 1999 were designed as peace support operations with the only exception of the U.N. Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), which operates under a traditional peacekeeping mandate.\textsuperscript{84} The UNPKO principles are now reinterpreted so that military force can be used to coerce conflicting parties to adhere to the originally consented agreement, though without conducting war-fighting.\textsuperscript{85} Pivotal states continue to play a crucial role in providing security for these missions and in enforcing the peace if a ceasefire should break down.\textsuperscript{86}

Assessment

Since the U.N. Charter provides no role for the United Nations in maintaining peace and security in case of superpower rivalry, UNPKO were invented as an ad hoc response to emerging crises and have evolved through practice ever since. Engaging in wider peacekeeping and peace enforcement during the 1990s, UNPKO faced the problem

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{81} Findlay, 2002, 334–335.
  \item \textsuperscript{82} U.N. Secretary-General Report, A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, para. 61.
  \item \textsuperscript{83} Ibid., paras. 37–43.
  \item \textsuperscript{84} Kühne, 104–105.
  \item \textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 108–110.
  \item \textsuperscript{86} Bellamy/Williams/Griffin, 211.
\end{itemize}
that the three principles of traditional peacekeeping were no longer practical in the hostile environment of ongoing internal conflicts. When individual states began to conduct peacekeeping actions outside the U.N. framework, the United Nations was pressed to revise its approach to UNPKO in order to regain the initiative.

The recommendations of the Brahimi Report in 2000 coincided with the new practice of peace support operations in Kosovo and East Timor. This sort of UNPKO carried out multifunctional peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks but did not refrain from applying military force to protect its mandate and compel belligerents to adhere to the agreed commitments. Moreover, peace enforcement was now performed by pivotal states, which were mandated by the UNSC but did not operate under the roof of the United Nations. Between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the new millennium, UNPKO has undergone a fundamental change from traditional peacekeeping to peace support operations, in which the United Nations redefined the use of force and its own role in the maintenance of international peace and security.
4. CHINA’S PARTICIPATION IN U.N. PEACEKEEPING

As the concept of U.N. peacekeeping has undergone a transformation from traditional peacekeeping over wider peacekeeping to peace support operations, so has Beijing’s attitude and contribution to the U.N. peacekeeping regime. An analysis of China’s voting behavior in the UNSC and of its contribution to UNPKO will show whether Beijing still plays the alleged role of a system defender and system exploiter.

China’s Voting Behavior in the U.N. Security Council

How China has voted on peacekeeping resolutions in the UNSC and how it explained these votes will indicate changes in China’s attitude towards the U.N. peacekeeping regime over time. In particular, its behavior will demonstrate to what extent Beijing defended the concept of traditional peacekeeping against more intrusive ways of UNPKO.

Reservation in the Cold War Era

During the Cold War, China’s attitude towards the United Nations and UNPKO was significantly impacted by the events of the Korean War. Not only was China branded as an aggressor in a resolution of the UNGA, it also became the target of the first U.S.-led enforcement mission authorized by the United Nations in 1951. As a consequence of this traumatic experience, Beijing regarded all subsequent U.N. interventions as being manipulated by the superpowers. Moreover, China did not clearly distinguish non-coercive peacekeeping from coercive enforcement actions in the coming years.

87 Choedon, 40; Yuan, 1998, 276.
In the ensuing bipolar world order of the Cold War, Beijing remained largely isolated from multilateral diplomacy since the Western powers recognized the regime in Taipei as the legitimate representative of China. Excluded from the United Nations, Beijing perceived UNPKO through the prism of its anti-imperialist ideology and superpower manipulation. China claimed that UNEF I would “allow US neo-colonialism to supersede British and French colonialism,” and ONUC was seen as “US imperialism operating under the UN flag,” which would “open a convenient door to US imperialist intervention in the Congo and establish an evil of encroachment upon the sovereignty of new independent nations in the name of the UN.” This hostile attitude towards UNPKO did not change when Beijing resumed China’s seat in the UNSC in November 1971. The Chinese representative in the UNSC declared that he would not participate in the votes on UNPKO since “China has always been opposed to the dispatch of the so-called ‘peacekeeping forces’. […] Such a practice can only pave the way for further international intervention and control with the superpowers as the behind-the-scenes bosses.”

Between 1971 and 1981, China did neither participate in any of the votes on UNPKO in the UNSC, nor did it pay for the peacekeeping expenses. The turning point of China’s attitude to UNPKO came in December 1981 when Beijing voted in favor of Resolution 495 on the extension of the ongoing U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus and agreed to pay its share of the UNPKO expenditure. China began to support every subsequent resolution on UNPKO between 1981 and 1990. This fundamental shift was the result of China’s “independent foreign policy” (duli zizhu waiguan zhengce), which was

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89 Quoted in Zhang, 1996, 4–5.
90 U.N. Security Council Verbatim Record, S/PV.1750, October 25, 1973. See also Choedon, 39; Fravel, 1104; Morphet, 157–158.
91 Kim, 1979, 233; Morphet, 158; Tzou, 108–110.
92 Choedon, 40; Fravel, 1104; Pang, 75; Yuan, 1998, 278; Tzou, 112.
93 Tzou, 112.
formulated at the 12th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in September 1982, when China embarked on its policy of economic reform and opening. This new policy reflected Beijing’s interest in a stable and peaceful environment in order to achieve its goal of economic development and modernization. To this end, China was eager to engage in international cooperation and multilateral diplomacy.\(^94\)

Although Beijing did not join the United Nations until 1971 and did not participate in UNPKO-related votes in the UNSC until 1981, China’s attitude towards UNPKO during the Cold War had three main characteristics which remained influential in the post-Cold War era: First, China’s experience in the Korean War explained its fierce opposition to any U.N. enforcement action and its cautious stance towards the use of force in UNPKO. In 1990, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen defended China’s reservation against the enforcement mission in Iraq with the fact that “the Chinese people still clearly remember that the Korean War was launched in the name of the United Nations.”\(^95\) Second, Beijing became wary of interferences by foreign powers in the internal affairs of weaker states. Third, China voted in favor of all UNPKO between 1981 and 1990, which were all traditional peacekeeping and transition management missions.

*Adaptation in the 1990s*

When the Cold War approached its ending, Beijing began to engage more actively in the decision-making and implementation of UNPKO. China joined the U.N. Special

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\(^94\) Choedon, 40; Fravel, 1104; Johnston/Ross, 291; Kim, 1995, 421; Pang, 75; Tzou, 111–112; Yuan, 1998, 279; Zhang, 1996, 6.

\(^95\) Quoted in Kim, 1995, 423. China’s resentment against the U.N. intervention in Korea had also been expressed prior to Qian’s statement: In 1965, Foreign Minister Chen Yi suggested that the United Nations “should cancel its resolution condemning China and the Democratic Republic of Korea as aggressors and adopt a resolution condemning the United States as the aggressor.” In 1985, Foreign Minister Huang Hua claimed that the Korean War was one of the “aggressive wars launched by superpowers in the name of the UN contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” Quoted in Zhang, 1996, 4–5. See also Yuan, 1998, 276.
Committee on UNPKO in November 1988, and its representative Yu Mengjia urged the international community in April 1989 almost enthusiastically to give “powerful support” to UNPKO, since they have proven to be an “effective mechanism” and an “integral part” of U.N. efforts to settle conflicts peacefully. In October 1989, Beijing announced that it would provide 20 civilian officials to the mission in Namibia and send its first 5 military observers to the Middle East in 1990. Yet, Beijing’s voting behavior regarding UNPKO became much less predictable in the 1990s than it was in the 1980s.

Opposing enforcement action. After Iraqi forces had invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the UNSC was about to authorize its second enforcement action of its history. The emerging crisis leading to the Gulf War of 1991 clearly tested the limits of China’s willingness to endorse the use of force in the name of the United Nations. While China supported most of the Chapter VII resolutions regarding Iraq prior to the U.S.-led enforcement mission, the Chinese diplomats in New York were eager to remove any reference to the use of military force from these resolutions. When Resolution 678 finally authorized the use of “all necessary means” under Chapter VII, China abstained from the vote to assert its opposition to this operation. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen cautioned the UNSC against “taking hasty action on such a major question as authorizing some Member States to take military action against another Member State.” However, these concerns did not prevent China from supporting and participating in the subsequent U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission, a traditional peacekeeping mission.

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98 Choedon, 43–44.
Supporting traditional peacekeeping and transition management. Throughout the 1990s, China voted in favor of all those missions which carried out traditional peacekeeping tasks and managed transitions.\textsuperscript{101} The Chinese statement on the U.N. Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) exemplifies Beijing’s support for traditional peacekeeping, established after a solid peace agreement with a passive role of the peacekeepers:

The experience of ONUMOZ has proved that as long as the two parties to the conflict are sincere about resolving their problems through negotiations and unswervingly implement the agreements reached by the parties, it is highly possible for them, with the help of the international community, to end yesterday’s suffering and open up a new vista.\textsuperscript{102}

The case of the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) demonstrates China’s pragmatism in supporting multifunctional missions that manage transitions but also its eagerness to forestall the incorporation of peace enforcement tasks. As one of the largest and most complex UNPKO at the time, UNTAC was responsible for overseeing political elections, supervising the civil administration, disarming local militias, promoting economic rehabilitation, and investigating human rights complaints.\textsuperscript{103} Although this broad mandate meant an intense interference in the domestic affairs of Cambodia, China voted in favor of UNTAC’s mandate and even provided for the first time a large military contingent of engineers and observers.\textsuperscript{104} Beijing’s support certainly marks an initial step away from its opposition to the interference in internal affairs,\textsuperscript{105} but Chinese diplomats resisted at the same time any attempt to authorize peace enforcement actions when one of

\textsuperscript{101} See Morphet, 160–161; Tzou, 112–115.
\textsuperscript{102} U.N. Security Council Verbatim Record, S/PV.3375, May 5, 1994. See also Choedon, 43; Fravel, 1107–1108.
\textsuperscript{104} Tzou, 114; Zhang, 1996, 9. The Chinese leadership had good reasons to engage in Cambodia. Not only was the mandate agreed upon by all conflicting parties, China was also a key member of the peace process, had a stake in the regional stability of Southeast Asia, and could improve its international reputation after the diplomatic isolation that followed the violent suppression of student protests on Tiananmen Square in 1989. See Choedon, 45; Fravel, 1110; Wang, 1999, 76.
\textsuperscript{105} Choedon, 45; Fravel, 1110; Wang, 1999, 77.
the parties to the conflict withdrew its support for the peace process.\textsuperscript{106}

\textit{Struggling with wider peacekeeping.} Chinese responses to the missions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia are particularly instructive since they show changes in China’s understanding of the use of force in UNPKO and its attitude towards peace enforcement carried out by pivotal states. Beijing’s changing voting behavior indicates that the Chinese diplomats were undergoing a learning process over the years, in which they tried to find the right balance between their humanitarian concerns and their normative reservations against the use of force.

In April 1992, the U.N. Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) I had been deployed into an environment of ongoing violence to monitor a cease-fire between warlords while humanitarian assistance was on its way to a population suffering from civil war and famine. Because humanitarian relief supplies remained vulnerable to attacks by various militias, the UNSC decided to authorize the mission under Chapter VII to use “all necessary means” in order to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{107} The task of securing a stable environment was delegated to the U.S.-led United Task Force (UNITAF). While China voted in favor of these resolutions, its representative insisted that these “prompt, strong and exceptional measures” would constitute an “exceptional action in view of the unique situation in Somalia,” namely the “long-term chaotic situation resulting form the present lack of a Government in Somalia.”\textsuperscript{108} He also expressed China’s reservation against the role of pivotal states that were not under close UNSC control.

After UNITAF had accomplished its tasks, China voted for the establishment of UNOSOM II under Chapter VII in March 1993, which was mandated to maintain a se-

\textsuperscript{106} Wang, 1999, 78. See also Findlay, 2002, 129.
cure environment in Somalia.\textsuperscript{109} The Chinese representative once again stressed the exceptional case of “strong, exceptional measures” in a failed state situation and demanded that the mission should “promptly resume its normal peace-keeping operations.”\textsuperscript{110} But when U.S. forces became involved in combat with Somali militias, the Chinese began to regret their initial support. In November 1993, a Chinese scholar wrote: “We should guard against large countries controlling the peacekeeping forces, and the sovereignty of small countries must be respected.”\textsuperscript{111} An editorial of \textit{Beijing Review} concluded: “The torturous experience in Somalia has taught the lesson that peace keeping must be limited to peace keeping. The internal affairs of one country can be solved only by the people of that country. The efforts of the international community can only be helpful or supplementary.”\textsuperscript{112} China’s representative Li Zhaoxing drew the lesson “that the fundamental and effective way to settle the Somali question is by peaceful means. Resort to coercive military actions will only serve to complicate matters.”\textsuperscript{113} In the Chinese assessment, the failure of UNOSOM was the result of deviating from traditional peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{114}

The failure in Somalia had caused a reluctance of the international community to intervene in the unfolding Rwandan genocide in April 1994. Both China and the United States resisted pressure from African countries to define the mass killing as genocide, though for different reasons.\textsuperscript{115} It was not until June 1994 that a French-led multinational force was authorized under Chapter VII to use “all necessary means” until the U.N. As-

\textsuperscript{110} U.N. Security Council Verbatim Record, S/PV.3188, March 26, 1993. See also Choedon, 47; Fravel, 1113.
\textsuperscript{111} Quoted in Tzou, 114.
\textsuperscript{112} Quoted in Fravel, 1114; Tzou, 114.
\textsuperscript{113} U.N. Security Council Verbatim Record, S/PV.3334, February 4, 1994. See also Choedon, 48; Fravel, 1113–1114.
\textsuperscript{114} Choedon, 48; Fravel, 1113.
\textsuperscript{115} Whereas Washington wanted to avoid its international obligation to send troops in the case of genocide, Beijing could not accept international criticism of the murders taking place. See Choedon, 50; Fravel, 1114; Kim, 1999, 64.
sistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) would be brought up to the necessary strength. Although this resolution stressed the “strictly humanitarian character” and “impartial and neutral fashion” of the operation as well as the “unique case which demands an urgent response by the international community,” China abstained from the vote. Its representative explained that the operation lacked the consent of all Rwandan factions. He also added that, given “the experience and lessons of the United Nations peace-keeping operation in Somalia,” resorting to force would only exacerbate the situation on the ground.

The frequently changing mandate of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and later Croatia is a prime example for wider peacekeeping—and for Beijing’s struggle with revising its lessons learned in Somalia and Rwanda. From the outset of the ethnic conflict in the Balkans, China was very reluctant to agree to any international involvement at all. In the following years, China supported the extension of UNPROFOR’s mandate to include the protection of the Sarajevo airport, the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and the establishment of Pink Zones to shelter ethnic Croats in Bosnia. At first, Beijing was consistent in its opposition to all those resolutions that either authorized the use of “all necessary measures” under Chapter VII or referred to other resolutions doing so: to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance by U.N. convoys, to enlarge UNPROFOR’s mandate in this regard, to ban flights over Bosnia, and to enforce these No-Fly Zones in

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119 See Tzou, 117.
cooperation with NATO.123 The Chinese representative explained that “to take all necessary means is tantamount to issuing a blank check. It may lead to the loss of control of the situation […]. Once military activities are in operation, the nature of the United Nations involvement will change, making it difficult for UNPROFOR to carry out its original mandate […].”124 China’s concern that the use of force could become uncontrollable made it impossible for Chinese diplomats to vote in favor of any resolution referring to the use of force, even if they shared the humanitarian motivation behind a resolution.125

However, China was not consistent in abstaining from those resolutions which authorized the use of force or altered UNPROFOR’s mandate.126 Since mid-1993, when the fighting between the ethnic groups in Bosnia intensified, Beijing was able to overcome its normative concern—even though with unease—and voted in favor of resolutions that allowed the peacekeepers the use of force in specific cases: to shield civilians from attacks in so-called safe areas, to protect the freedom of movement of the peacekeepers, and to defend themselves.127 While stating his reservation against the use of force, the Chinese representative in the UNSC pointed out that China would support these resolutions out of humanitarian considerations and because they had the consent of the host countries con-

126 This inconsistency is overlooked by Choedon and Fravel. See Choedon, 48; Fravel, 1111.
cerned. He clarified that military means would only be authorized “for self-defense, rather than for punitive purposes with the use of excessive force.”

After the most serious ground confrontation so far between UNPROFOR and Bosnian Serbs in May 1995, however, France, Great Britain and the Netherlands formed an additional robustly armed Rapid Reaction Force. When this unit was about to be integrated into UNPROFOR’s mandate under Chapter VII, Beijing saw the red line crossed that separated wider peacekeeping from enforcement action—and therefore abstained from the vote. The Chinese representative in the UNSC explained:

A United Nations peace-keeping operation, as the name indicates, is for the purpose of keeping peace rather than fighting. [...] The establishment of this force is for the purpose of enforcement actions and brings about a de facto change to the peace-keeping status of UNPROFOR. Once the force is put into operation, it is bound to become a party to the conflict, thus depriving UNPROFOR of its status as a peace-keeping force.

In November 1995, the Dayton Agreement concluded the war in Bosnia after a heavy air campaign by NATO forces had coerced the Bosnian Serbs back to the negotiation table. The UNSC decided that UNPROFOR should be replaced by the NATO-led multinational IFOR, which was authorized under Chapter VII to use “all necessary measures” in order to implement the Dayton Agreement, to control the airspace over Bosnia, to defend itself against attacks, and to assist in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR.

Though China voted in favor of this resolution, its representative pointed out that this was mainly because of the “urgent wishes of the parties concerned and the fact that this draft

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resolution calls for extraordinary action in extraordinary circumstances.”\textsuperscript{134} He added:

This does not mean however that China’s position has undergone any change: that is, China has all along disapproved of operations authorized by the Security Council when at every turn it invokes Chapter VII of the Charter and adopts mandatory measures. Still less can it approve the Security Council’s authorization of the unlimited use of force. We believe that the implementation force (IFOR), in carrying out its task, must maintain neutrality and impartiality and avoid wanton use of force so as to avoid damaging the image of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{135}

In the following year, Beijing also supported the replacement of IFOR by SFOR, also a NATO-led multinational force authorized under Chapter VII to take “all necessary measures” to ensure compliance with the Dayton Agreement.\textsuperscript{136} While expressing again China’s reservation against the use of force in UNPKO, its representative declared that China would vote in favor of this resolution because SFOR would accept the leadership of the UNSC and would act at the “requests of the parties concerned.”\textsuperscript{137}

Judging from China’s voting behavior regarding wider peacekeeping missions, Beijing had grudgingly drawn three conclusions by the end of the 1990s: First, the use of force in a UNPKO was acceptable if it was restricted to the defense of the peacekeepers, their freedom of movement, and civilians under imminent threat. Second, a division of labor seemed practical between multinational forces, which were mandated to conduct peace enforcement, and the actual U.N. mission, which would be limited to non-coercive peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{138} Third, China was obviously willing to condone UNPKO as long as two


\textsuperscript{137} U.N. Security Council Verbatim Record, S/PV.3723, December 12, 1996.

\textsuperscript{138} This position was also apparent in January 1996, when the U.N. Security Council authorized the U.N. Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium under Chapter VII to take “all necessary measures, including close air support,” to defend itself with the support of the North Atlantic
conditions could be met: authorization by the UNSC and consent of the parties concerned. Whereas China still propagated the concept of traditional peacekeeping in theory, it had already embraced the necessity of peace enforcement in practice. However, this new flexibility in China’s approach to UNPKO did not mean a reduced concern about the interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

Resenting interferences in internal affairs. Beijing always had difficulties in agreeing to mandates that interfered in the domestic affairs of states, especially if this involved the use of force and state-building activities such as the training of police or military forces and the monitoring of human rights abuses. In September 1993, China had supported the U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), which was to create a new police force and to modernize the military in anticipation of the return of the ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. But when the UNSC mandated a U.S.-led multinational force under Chapter VII to use “all necessary means” to provide a secure environment for UNMIH, China abstained from the vote, cautioning that the use of force by a “certain group of states” would create a “dangerous precedent” for UNPKO. Wary of the U.S. role in the mission, China did also abstain from the vote when UNMIH took over from the U.S.-led

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139 In March 1995, the concept of traditional peacekeeping was for the last time propagated by a Chinese diplomat in the U.N. Security Council. See U.N. Security Council Verbatim Record, S/PV.3512, March 31, 1995.


141 U.N. Security Council Verbatim Record, S/PV.3413, July 31, 1994. See also Choedon, 50–51; Fravel, 1115.
forces in January 1995.\textsuperscript{142} Beijing’s persistent demand for reducing the military personnel of the mission suggests that the Chinese were concerned about U.S. influence in Haiti.\textsuperscript{143}

Other cases in which China cautioned against the interference in internal affairs were the missions in Somalia, Georgia, Angola, the Central African Republic, and Bosnia. In November 1994, the Chinese representative expressed Beijing’s reservation against the protection of human rights officers by UNAMIR, which should better be carried out by other U.N. agencies.\textsuperscript{144} In October 1996, the mandate of the mission in Georgia was extended to include the U.N. Human Rights Office in Abkhazia. China abstained since it felt that the office would exceed the “primary peacekeeping mandate.”\textsuperscript{145} In June 1997, the Chinese representative supported the establishment of the UNPKO in Angola but expressed his concern about the military component of the mission because “the Security Council should not get involved in matters that fall within the terms of reference of other United Nations bodies.”\textsuperscript{146} In December 1997, China voted for the extension of UNMIBH’s mandate but insisted that “judicial reform and economic matters involve sensitive and complex questions, and involve high stakes. The United Nations should therefore proceed with caution in this respect.”\textsuperscript{147} In February 1999, Beijing cautioned that the restructuring of the army in the Central Africa Republic should belong to “the internal affairs of


\textsuperscript{143} See U.N. Security Council Verbatim Record, S/PV.3496, January 30, 1995; S/PV.3676, June 28, 1996; S/PV.3721, December 5, 1996; S/PV.3806, July 30, 1997; S/PV.3837, November 28, 1997. While China had voted in favor of all successor missions to the U.N. Mission in Haiti, its representative always pointed out that this was only because of the “urgent request” of the Haitian government and the “exceptional case” of Haiti.


\textsuperscript{145} U.N. Security Council Verbatim Record, S/PV.3707, October 22, 1996.

\textsuperscript{146} U.N. Security Council Verbatim Record, S/PV.3795, June 30, 1997. This concern was repeated whenever this mandate was extended until the military component was withdrawn in 1998.

a country, and the Security Council should not intervene too much.”  

China regards military interventions on humanitarian grounds as one of the most aggressive form of interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. But Beijing is unlikely to obstruct a humanitarian intervention if the consent of the target country can be obtained as in the case of Albania, in which the UNSC authorized an Italian-led multinational force under Chapter VII to restore order and to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance in 1997. China viewed this intervention as “inconsistent with the provisions of the United Nations Charter,” but decided to abstain rather than veto the draft resolution since this multinational action had been requested by the Albanian government.

However, if the consent cannot be obtained as in the Kosovo crisis of 1998/1999, China is likely to cast a veto against a humanitarian intervention. Before NATO launched its air campaign against Belgrade, Beijing had tried to resist any U.N. involvement in the question of Kosovo. The Chinese representative explained in the UNSC: “The question of Kosovo is, in its essence, an internal matter of the Federal Republic. It should be resolved properly through negotiations between both parties concerned on the basis of the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” He warned against getting involved in ethnic disputes:

Ethnic issues are extremely complicated and sensitive, especially in the Balkans. On the one hand, the legitimate rights and interests of all ethnic groups should be protected; on the other, secessionist activities by various extremist elements should be prevented. Many countries in the region are multiethnic. If the Council is to get involved in a dispute without a request

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151 Choedon, 51; Gill/Reilly, 47.

from the country concerned, it may set a bad precedent [...].\textsuperscript{153}

When NATO intervened in the Kosovo conflict in March 1999 without seeking prior authorization of the UNSC, the Chinese representative strongly reemphasized:

\textit{We oppose the use or the threat of use of force in international affairs. We oppose the power politics of the strong bullying the weak. We oppose interference in the internal affairs of other States, under whatever pretext, in whatever form. [...] the question of Kosovo, being an internal matter of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, should be resolved by the parties concerned in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia among themselves.}\textsuperscript{154}

China’s general opposition to a U.N. involvement in Kosovo remained firm even after a peace agreement had been reached between the conflicting parties. In June 1999, Beijing abstained from the vote on the resolution that established the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as the first peace support operation of the United Nations and authorized the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) under Chapter VII to use “all necessary means” in order to implement the political settlement in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{155}

\textit{Acceptance since 2000}

After the creation of UNMIK in June 1999, the United Nations established three further peace support operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Congo by the end of 1999, which all included peace enforcement elements. While Beijing accepted quickly this new type of UNPKO, it still had reservations against humanitarian interventions as in Darfur, the western region of Sudan.

\textit{Familiarizing with peace support operations.} After a referendum in favor of East Timor’s independence from Indonesia, pro-Indonesian militias reacted with large-scale killing and looting in August 1999. The United States pressed Indonesia to consent to the

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid.
intervention by INTERFET, which was authorized under Chapter VII to restore peace and security in East Timor with “all necessary measures.” In the discussion leading to this operation, the Chinese representative had insisted that Beijing’s criteria for military interventions—consent of the target country and mandate of the UNSC—had to be met:

According to the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international and regional peace. The issue of East Timor must be solved through the United Nations. The deployment of any peacekeeping force should be at the request of the Indonesian Government and endorsed by the Security Council.

Now that Indonesia had agreed, China voted in favor of INTERFET’s mandate.

When stability had been largely restored in East Timor by October 1999, the UNSC established the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) as a peace support operation, authorizing it under Chapter VII to take “all necessary measures” to fulfill its broad mandate. Beijing expressed its full support for the mission and promised to send Chinese peacekeepers to East Timor: “China, Indonesia and East Timor are all in the same region.” While Beijing had been reluctant to engage in the process at first, it eventually grasped the opportunity to project its image as a responsible power, even more since it had already supported the referendum on East Timor’s independence.

China’s enthusiasm for UNPKO was fully developed when the UNSC decided to create a new mandate for the ongoing mission in Sierra Leone. After the conclusion of

156 U.N. Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1264 (1999), September 15, 1999, preamble, para. 3. The United States had told Indonesia that it would lose all financial support from international organizations if they would not permit the military intervention. See Findlay, 2002, 288.
158 Davis, 247. China’s concern with the respect for state sovereignty is also expressed in the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “We have noticed that the Indonesian President B. J. Habibie officially announced that he agreed to the United Nations sending peace-keeping troops to East Timor and sharing the responsibility for the security there together with Indonesian troops.” See “Foreign Ministry News Briefings,” Beijing Review, October 4, 1999, 11.
the Lomé Peace Agreement, the UNSC authorized the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to implement the DDR plan, to monitor the ceasefire, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to support the elections in Sierra Leone.\textsuperscript{162} In October 1999, UNAMSIL was specifically mandated to “take the necessary action” under Chapter VII to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and to protect “civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone.”\textsuperscript{163} The Chinese representative in the UNSC expressed Beijing’s full support for the mission and his satisfaction with the “comprehensive and balanced” draft resolution.\textsuperscript{164} China also voted in favor of extending UNAMSIL’s mandate when military force was permitted for the protection of key locations and the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and when UNAMSIL’s military component was strengthened after violence had broken out.\textsuperscript{165}

Beijing also supported all subsequent peace support operations in the Congo, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Haiti, Burundi, and Sudan—often without any explanation of its vote. For each of these missions, the authorization of the use of force was explicitly limited to the protection of U.N. personnel, their freedom of movement, and civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.\textsuperscript{166} In Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Haiti, pivotal states or alliances had taken the responsibility to ensure a stable environment for the mission

and to carry out peace enforcement tasks. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, French forces were even explicitly authorized to use “all necessary means” for providing general security, protecting civilians, and intervening on request of the U.N. mission against belligerent actions. As China voted for all of these resolutions and did not issue any dissociating comment, it had obviously fully endorsed the concept of peace support operations with limited peace enforcement tasks and pivotal states that carry them out.

Resisting interferences in internal affairs. Despite this new consensus in the UNSC regarding UNPKO, Chinese diplomats nonetheless insisted on obtaining the consent of the host country whenever human rights violations were concerned. This policy is best understood when comparing the cases of the Congo and Sudan. The UNSC had authorized the U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) under Chapter VII to take “the necessary measures” to improve the security conditions in the Ituri district and in North and South Kivu, where the UNSC registered “grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law.” China voted in favor of this resolution, obviously because it had the consent of the Congolese regime.

In contrast, China actively resisted any attempt to improve the security situation in the region of Darfur in Sudan where Arab militias are committing large-scale atrocities against civilians. Since the Sudanese leadership regards the situation in Darfur as its internal affair, the UNSC was only able to recognize the deployment of monitors by the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). China abstained from these resolutions on the

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grounds that pressure on Khartoum would only deteriorate the situation in Darfur.\textsuperscript{171}

While the U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) started to operate in southern Sudan with Chinese support in March 2005, AMIS remained responsible for Darfur. This example of the split mission in southern and western Sudan clearly shows China’s position on humanitarian interventions. Beijing will support peace support operations but will also resist interferences in internal affairs as long as the host country does not agree to the mission.

\textit{Summary}

China’s voting behavior in the UNSC regarding UNPKO has changed a great deal over the course of the past forty years. Due to its experience in the Korean War and its anti-imperialist ideology, Beijing demonstrated its dissociation from peacekeeping activities by not participating in the voting after joining the United Nations in 1971. When China opened up to the world in the early 1980s, Chinese diplomats began to take part in the consultations on UNPKO and to vote in favor of traditional peacekeeping and transition management missions. Yet, as UNPKO became more intrusive and more robust with the emerging concept of wider peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War, Beijing had difficulties to reconcile its normative concerns about the respect of state sovereignty with its interest to cooperate in the UNSC.

In the view of Beijing, three issues seemed particularly problematic in the 1990s: the use of force, the role of pivotal states, and the interference in internal affairs, especially if it concerned the violation of human rights. Over the years, however, China’s diplomacy became increasingly apt at dealing with each of these concerns. The most remarkable Chinese adaptation to the international standard occurred with regard to the first two issues (see Table 1). While voting against UNPKO resolutions authorizing the use of

force at first, China began to support those provisions since 1993, though not without a
dissociating explanation, if the use of force was restricted to the protection of the peace-
keepers, their freedom of movement, and civilians under imminent threat.

More challenging to Beijing were resolutions that mandated the use of force to
pivotal states or alliances. After the negative experience with peace enforcement carried
out by U.S. forces in Somalia, China abstained from resolutions that subcontracted such
tasks to pivotal states in the cases of Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia. But when IFOR and
SFOR were established as robust peace support operations in the Balkans, Beijing could
no longer afford to abstain from the process, even though these missions were largely run
by NATO. Because of its opposition to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo and the bombing
of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, China could not vote in favor of UNMIK and KFOR
on principled grounds. But it supported every peace support operation ever since, even
though they involved peace enforcement tasks carried out by pivotal states.

Integrating human rights monitors, judicial reform, police training, and military
restructuring into the remit of UNPKO remained a prickly issue for China as its voting
behavior in the cases of Haiti, Georgia, Angola, and Bosnia shows (see Table 2). Viewed
by Beijing, these interferences in internal affairs meant curtailing state sovereignty. Yet,
as those tasks became a standardized part of long-term peacebuilding activities with the
emergence of complex peace support operations, China had to accept them to remain in-
volved in the U.N. peacekeeping regime. Its voting behavior regarding human rights vio-
lations shows that China is likely to accept dealing with them if agreed upon by the host
country as in the Congo, but will resist a U.N. involvement if it is not as in Sudan.

Moreover, Beijing defined two preconditions for supporting military interventions
on humanitarian grounds: the endorsement by the UNSC and consent by the government
of the target country, which can be omitted in a failed state situation as in Somalia.\footnote{See also Davis, 244; Gill/Reilly, 44, 46; Kim, 2003, 70.} Though this policy was declared officially for the first time in the debate on INTERFET’s intervention in East Timor in 1999 and reiterated by Chinese officials later on,\footnote{See “China to Send Peacekeeping Troops to DR Congo in March,” Hong Kong Agence France Presse in English, February 10, 2003, FBIS-CHI-2003-0210, February 10, 2003.} its contours were discernible as early as at the establishment of SFOR in 1996. But when the consent of the target country was not obtained, China persistently resisted an international involvement in what it regards as belonging to the internal affairs of a sovereign state—see the cases of Kosovo in 1999 and now in Darfur.

Just as Gill/Reilly had predicted in 2000, China’s support for the mission in East Timor marked the beginning of a “positive evolution in Chinese cooperation.”\footnote{Gill/Reilly, 50.} Since then, China has voted in favor of every newly established UNPKO and provided Chinese peacekeepers to each one of them. With the exception of UNMEE, all of these new missions were peace support operations. Yet, the Chinese approval of the use of force by pivotal states in East Timor is not a precedent because such a pattern had already been condoned in the case of Somalia and more recently in Bosnia with IFOR and SFOR. What really makes China’s behavior unique is the fact that Beijing—for the first time in history—did not dissociate itself from a resolution that authorized the use of force. Beijing has never done so ever since, which suggests that China feels comfortable with the concept of peace support operations as it stands.

Three factors were crucial in accommodating China’s original concerns: First, the restriction of the use of force basically to the protection of the mission has been incorporated in every resolution with a standardized phrase since the establishment of UNAM-
SIL in 1999, though this tendency was apparent in UNPROFOR-related provisions as early as 1993. Second, subcontracting peace enforcement tasks to pivotal states has evolved into a common practice since the intervention in East Timor. Third, human rights concerns have become an integral part of any international response to complex emergencies. As a result, China had to support the whole package of peace support operations if Beijing did not want to be left out of the U.N. peacekeeping regime.¹⁷⁵

The fact that China already had a stake in the peace processes leading to the first U.N. peace support operations in East Timor and Sierra Leone certainly enhanced its familiarization with this type of UNPKO. In the case of East Timor, China had supported the referendum that led to the violence in the region. In the case of UNAMSIL, Chinese peacekeepers were already serving in a previous mission in Sierra Leone. Eventually, after a long learning process in the 1990s, it was the disappearance of wider peacekeeping and the emergence of complex peace support operations that helped China to overcome its concerns and to fully accept the concept of UNPKO in the new millennium. While Beijing still remains vigilant of any interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, its system-defending role in the U.N. peacekeeping regime has been diminished since the end of the 1990s. On the contrary, since 2000, Beijing has embraced the new design of UNPKO—given the prior consent of the host country.

China’s Contribution to U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

An analysis of Beijing’s contribution of Chinese peacekeepers to UNPKO will inform about its willingness to bear the costs of the U.N. peacekeeping regime. In particu-

¹⁷⁵ Garrett and Tang stressed the impact of peer pressure in the U.N. Security Council on China’s voting behavior. See interviews with Dr. Banning Garrett, Director of the Asia Program, Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C., conducted in Washington, D.C., February 17, 2006, and with Dr. James T. H. Tang, Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, conducted in Washington, D.C., February 27, 2006. See also Morphet, 151–152.
lar, a comparison between China’s quantitative and qualitative contribution in the 1990s and in the new millennium will show whether China still exploits the system today.

Changes in China’s Quantitative Contribution

China has often been accused of exploiting the U.N. peacekeeping regime. Instead of showing its full commitment to peacekeeping activities—so the general argument goes—Beijing has shied away from contributing to the costs of UNPKO. Three indicators are conceivable for measuring China’s willingness to share the burden of UNPKO: first its payments to the UNPKO budget, second the death toll of Chinese peacekeepers, and third the overall contribution of Chinese peacekeepers to the U.N. peacekeeping endeavor. However, this study will solely focus on the third as the most instructive indicator, given that the annual assessments for the peacekeeping budget are based on the economic capacity of each U.N. member state rather then on their willingness to contribute to U.N. peacekeeping and that the death toll mourned by a troop contributing country is obviously conditioned on the total number of peacekeepers deployed, among other factors.176

Absolute increase of China’s contribution. Since Beijing started to contribute personnel to UNPKO in 1990, Chinese peacekeepers have been serving in 22 peacekeeping missions by the end of 2005, including 2 peacebuilding missions in Afghanistan and East Timor (see Table 3). Over these past 16 years, Beijing deployed up to 1733 Chinese peacekeepers in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Caribbean. Yet, it was only in the new millennium that the size of China’s peacekeeping force has grown markedly in absolute

terms (see Table 4 and Chart 1). With the exception of sending a large contingent to Cambodia in 1992/1993, China had only provided a relatively small number of peacekeepers in the 1990s.

This changed, however, in the new millennium when Beijing began to send police officers to East Timor, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Liberia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Sudan, and large troop contingents to missions in the Congo and Liberia, increasing the total number of deployed Chinese peacekeepers from 49 in 1999 to 1013 in 2005. As a result, China moved up on the list of the world’s top contributors to UNPKO from position 46 in May 2001 to position 15 in December 2005.\(^\text{177}\) Chinese officials and scholars therefore frequently boast that Beijing now provides more U.N. peacekeepers than any of the other four permanent members in the UNSC.\(^\text{178}\) However, this statement needs a qualifier: Among the P-5, China has become the most important contributor of peacekeepers within the United Nations only because the other permanent members are increasingly operating outside the U.N. framework in coalitions of the willing.\(^\text{179}\)

*Relative increase of China’s contribution.* This drastic increase of Chinese peacekeepers since 2000 could simply result from a general trend in UNPKO. In fact, the number of all peacekeepers deployed surged from 13,665 to 67,663 between 1999 and 2005 (see Chart 1). The yearly participation rate would provide a more accurate assessment of China’s contribution to UNPKO by setting the absolute number of Chinese peacekeepers in relation to the total number of all U.N. peacekeepers deployed in a given year. While


\(^{178}\) Interview with a Chinese senior official, Chinese Embassy, Washington, D.C., conducted in Washington, D.C., March 9, 2006. See also Thompson, Peacekeeping, 2005, 9. In contrast to most Chinese scholars, Tang acknowledges that “China’s participation in UNPKO is still low when compared with some other countries.” See Tang, 76.

\(^{179}\) See Bellamy/Williams/Griffin, 166.
remaining relatively stable in the late 1990s, China’s yearly participation rate surged from 0.25 percent to 1.50 percent between 2001 and 2005 (see Table 4 and Chart 2). This implies that the number of Chinese peacekeepers grew faster than the number of all U.N. peacekeepers deployed, at least since 2003. In 2004, for the first time, China’s yearly participation rate even surpassed the yearly participation rate of an average contributor to U.N. peacekeeping, which stood at 1.15 percent in that year. Therefore, Beijing has really contributed much more to UNPKO over the past three years than ever before.

Yet, the small yearly participation rate of 1.50 percent in 2005 also indicates that China is still far from becoming an irreplaceable peacekeeping force. Though Beijing now contributes more peacekeepers than any of the other P-5 or Japan to UNPKO, it could do much more in the future. To show the potential of China’s future contribution, India might provide a good benchmark, given its vast population, its status as a developing country, and its ambition to become a permanent member of the UNSC. But India’s yearly participation rate has not only been 22 times higher than that of Beijing in 2001, its number of peacekeepers has also almost quadrupled between 2001 and 2005, making India one of the largest contributors to UNPKO at a global scale with a yearly participation rate of 9.47 percent in 2005 (see Chart 2).180

Relevance of China’s overall contribution. In the new millennium, China’s contribution to UNPKO has not only increased in absolute and relative terms, Beijing became also a more relevant contributor to the entire peacekeeping activities than in the 1990s. The relevance could be measured by comparing China’s contribution of peace-

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180 See India’s figures in U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Monthly Summary of Contributions (Military Observers, Police and Troops),” http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/95-05.htm, Contributors (accessed April 2006). The Chinese official in New York rejected the idea of a competition with other troop contributing countries for higher participation rates. He also made clear that, while India’s engagement was largely financially driven, China would make its contributions to U.N. peacekeeping solely based on its capabilities. See interview with Chinese official, New York.
keepers relative to all U.N. peacekeepers deployed between different periods of several years. While providing only 0.18 percent of all peacekeepers to UNPKO in the last five years of the 1990s, China contributed 0.88 percent of all peacekeepers in the first six years of the new millennium so that its overall participation rate between 1995 and 2005 stood at 0.65 percent (see Table 4).

This suggests that China has indeed become more involved most recently. Between 1990 and 1999, Beijing participated in 9 peacekeeping missions but in additional 11 peacekeeping and 2 peacebuilding missions between 2000 and 2005. Of the entire peacekeeping force that China has sent abroad within the past 16 years, 72 percent have been deployed in the new millennium. China has participated in every new mission since the establishment of UNOMSIL in 1998, though it joined MONUC and UNMIK at a later stage. Now there are only 4 out of 18 current missions in which China does not take part, probably because of the countries involved, unease with the circumstances of their creation, or the absence of open positions: the missions at the Indian-Pakistani border, in Cyprus, on the Golan Heights, and in Georgia.181

However, UNPKO vary in size. Beijing could have sent its peacekeepers only to smaller missions, which are less relevant and thus less costly than other missions. In order to evaluate China’s choice of missions, their share of the entire peacekeeping force deployed has to be taken into account. To this end, two sets of data have to be compared with each other: the 52 missions to which China could have sent its peacekeepers and the 22 missions to which it has actually done so. Since China has joined only 22 missions representing 55 percent of the number of peacekeepers deployed in all 52 missions since

181 In March 2006, China filled positions in the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon with 85 troops as Ukrainian forces left the mission. See interview with Chinese official, New York.
1990, the thesis of China’s exploiting behavior in the U.N. peacekeeping regime cannot be entirely rejected (see Table 5). Between 1990 and 2005, China’s participation rate in the 22 missions that Beijing had actually joined stood at 1.26 percent, but in relation to all 52 missions of that period it was as low as 0.70 percent.

Yet, a closer examination of these participation rates will reveal that the thesis of Beijing’s cost-evading behavior has become less pertinent since 2000. During the 1990s, Chinese peacekeepers took part in 8 missions at a participation rate of 1.66 percent. Because these missions represented only a fifth of all peacekeepers deployed in 41 missions, China provided in reality only 0.34 percent of all the U.N. peacekeepers deployed during that period. This changed, however, in the new millennium when China participated in 17 missions, now representing 96 percent of all 24 ongoing missions since 2000. As a result, China’s participation rate of 1.17 percent in these 17 missions in which Chinese peacekeepers had actually participated came close to the real participation rate of 1.12 percent in all those 24 missions in which Chinese peacekeepers could have participated (see Table 5). This demonstrates that China’s contribution has indeed become more relevant recently. In the 1990s, Beijing sent just a tiny group of Chinese peacekeepers to a few missions representing only a small part of the whole U.N. peacekeeping endeavor at that time. But in the new millennium, China contributed a larger peacekeeping force to nearly every mission including those representing a large share of all U.N. peacekeepers deployed.

*Changes in China’s Qualitative Contribution*

Since 2000, China’s contribution to UNPKO has not only changed in quantitative terms but also in qualitative terms—regarding the composition of its peacekeeping force and the relevance of each component to a single mission. Save the case of troops sent to Cambodia, China provided only military observers to UNPKO during the 1990s. In the
new millennium, however, Beijing’s peacekeeping force became more diversified, now comprising military observers, civilian police, and troops (see Chart 3). Relative to all peacekeepers deployed in each of these three components, 67 percent of China’s troops, 55 percent of its observers, and 100 percent of its police have been deployed after 1999. Accordingly, China’s yearly participation rate in most of these three components has increased over the years (see Table 4 and Chart 4). Between 1999 and 2005, the share of Chinese police serving in UNPKO surged from nil to 3.01 percent, whereas the share of Chinese troops increased from nil to 1.29 percent between 2002 and 2005. Only the share of Chinese military observers decreased on average from 3.75 percent between 1995 and 1999 to 2.84 percent between 2000 and 2005.

As a result, the composition of China’s peacekeeping force reflects increasingly international needs. The share of observers among all Chinese peacekeepers decreased dramatically while the share of civilian police and troops was increased (see Chart 5). Whereas China’s peacekeepers were almost exclusively military observers until 1999, 75 percent of China’s peacekeepers were soldiers at the end of 2005, 19 percent policemen, but only 6 percent military observers. These changes make the composition of China’s peacekeeping force look more like that of the entire U.N. peacekeeping force, which comprises 87 percent of troops, 9 percent of police, and 4 percent of observers as of 2005 (see Chart 6). This suggests that Beijing is taking its role as an international peacekeeper seriously, striving to shape its peacekeeping force according to international demands.

Relevance of China’s contribution to certain missions. While China’s share in the whole U.N. peacekeeping endeavor remains relatively low, Chinese peacekeepers still matter to single missions of the United Nations, even if small in size (see Table 3). In its most extreme form, this is exemplified in the two peacebuilding missions in East Timor
and Afghanistan. Only seven Chinese policemen serve in the U.N. Office in Timor-Leste, but they make up for 9.59 percent of the whole mission and even for 12.07 percent of the deployed police corps. In the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Beijing provides only one single policeman, but he represents 4.76 percent of the whole U.N. mission and even 12.50 percent of the tiny U.N. police force. Chinese peacekeepers play also a relatively significant role in the U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) (7.59 percent) and the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) (5.66 percent) (see Chart 7). Chinese police officers are also relevant to the police force of the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (7.67 percent) and the U.N. Mission of Support in East Timor (6.86 percent) (see Chart 8). China’s military observers have a higher stake in the observer component of MINURSO (10.58 percent), UNOMSIL (6.25 percent), and UNTAC (5.26 percent) (see Chart 9). This implies that China has become a small, yet increasingly serious contributor to certain UNPKO.

Although joining every new UNPKO since 2000, Beijing has not done so indiscriminately but varied in the intensity of its peacekeeping engagement. Studying the total number of Chinese peacekeepers that have been sent to UNPKO suggests that Beijing has shown a stronger commitment to certain missions than to others. Most of all Chinese peacekeepers were deployed in Liberia, Cambodia, the Congo, Haiti, and East Timor (see Chart 10). China sent most of its policemen to Haiti and East Timor (see Chart 11), and most of its military observers to Cambodia, West Sahara, and Sudan (see Chart 12). At the first glance, this list of countries might appear rather arbitrary. A closer look at the pattern of China’s commitment to UNPKO suggest, however, that the Chinese do not participate entirely for altruistic reasons but focus their engagement carefully on those missions which best meet their specific concerns.
Management of specific concerns. Since 2000, China has become less picky as to which kind of UNPKO to join.\textsuperscript{182} During the 1990s, China committed peacekeepers only to traditional peacekeeping and transition management missions but avoided wider peacekeeping missions, except UNOMSIL in 1998. While sending more peacekeepers to peace support operations, Beijing nonetheless refrained from participating in missions that it had opposed in the past. It was only five years after the establishment of UNMIBH and four years after the creation of UNMIK that China sent peacekeepers to these missions. Without explaining this sudden U-turn, given that Beijing had fiercely resisted the intervention in Kosovo and abstained from the vote on UNMIK in 1999, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs simply stated: “China is willing to join hands with [the] international community to make its due efforts for handling properly the Kosovo issue.”\textsuperscript{183}

Whenever Beijing provided troops to UNPKO, it has been careful not to send any combat forces. This is not just because China wanted to avoid casualties,\textsuperscript{184} but also because Beijing was wary of appearing aggressive.\textsuperscript{185} “The Chinese military are prepared to sending units which are not fighting units [...] because of its fundamental position of non-intervention,” as a Chinese official held.\textsuperscript{186} Since China was not willing to deploy the required robust peacekeepers to the missions in East Timor and Haiti but desired nevertheless to show its commitment to both countries, Beijing provided relatively large contingents of police forces (see Chart 11). With its tiny contribution to the peacebuilding mission in Afghanistan, China can demonstrate its support for missions under the roof of the

\textsuperscript{182} See Pang, 81; Tang, 82.
\textsuperscript{184} Gill/Reilly, 52.
\textsuperscript{185} Pang, 82.
United Nations while staying away from the more robust and risky military operations of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in that country.

The Chinese dedication to missions in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and East Timor is evidently to show China’s responsibility as a regional power, but its substantial contribution to such places like Liberia, the Congo, and Haiti is less obvious. At least the relatively large number of Chinese peacekeepers in Liberia and Haiti could be explained by Beijing’s competition with Taipei for international recognition. Liberia has switched diplomatic relations between Beijing and Taipei for several times. For this reasons, Chinese officials in Liberia were eager to point out that China’s support for the mission will forge closer ties between Beijing and Monrovia.  

Taipei’s role in Beijing’s engagement in Liberia has also been observed by Zhu Feng, professor at the Institute of International Relations of Peking University: “Taiwan will be a major factor in the government’s decision. If there were Chinese troops as peacekeepers in Liberia, I think it would persuade its new government to drop its ties with Taiwan.”

Haiti is a unique case as it is the first time that Chinese peacekeepers serve in a country to which Beijing has never had diplomatic relations. In the past, China had threatened to veto several extensions of peacekeeping mandates in Haiti, especially when Taiwan’s Vice-President Li Yuan-Zu was invited to

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188 Quoted in Ray Cheung, “PLA Troops May Join UN Liberia Peace Force,” South China Morning Post, August 30, 2003, 5. See also interviews with Dr. Pang Zongying, Director of the Institute of Global Studies, Nankai University, Tianjin, conducted in Washington, D.C., April 22, 2006, and with Dr. Zhang Qingmin, Associate Professor at the Department of Diplomacy, China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, conducted via e-mail, March 5, 2006.

Haiti in January 1996. Though joining MINUSTAH, China nevertheless resisted extending the mandate for the required period in May 2005, obviously because of a scheduled visit of Haiti’s president to Taiwan.

In the past, China has frequently attempted to use its influence in UNPKO in order to isolate Taiwan diplomatically in the world. In January 1997, Beijing had vetoed the extension of a UNPKO in Guatemala, criticizing that the government “unscrupulously supported activities aimed at splitting China at the United Nations.” Guatemala had sponsored Taiwan’s bid for U.N. membership and just invited Taiwan’s foreign minister to attend an official ceremony. In February 1999, China had also cast its veto against extending the mandate of a mission in Macedonia. In his explanation, the Chinese representative did not refer to Taiwan, but China did obviously react to Macedonia’s diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in the previous month.

To be sure, isolating Taipei internationally has been a crucial motive for Beijing’s decision-making in the UNPKO regime. At least the cases of Liberia and Haiti suggest that Beijing now seems to have realized that its pressure on a former or current ally of Taipei promises to be more effective if it sends a large number of Chinese peacekeepers

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195 Pang, 84; Rawnsley, 87; Tzou, 122; Wang, 1999, 80, 81. See also interview with Zhang.
to that country. However, this is not to suggest that the Taiwan factor was the main driver for the increase of Beijing’s contribution to UNPKO since 2000. The yearly participation rate still increases if China’s contribution to the missions in Liberia and Haiti are excluded (see Chart 13). But it seems likely that Beijing will engage more actively in missions in those countries which have or had ties to Taipei. China has sent a much larger share of its entire peacekeeping force to Liberia than the world did (see Chart 14).

In the case of the Congo, however, the Taiwan factor provides a less convincing explanation for China’s engagement in MONUC, though diplomatic relations to Taipei are still an important concern in Beijing’s bilateral relations with African countries.\footnote{See “Full Text: China’s African Policy,” Beijing Xinhua in English, January 12, 2006, FBIS, January 12, 2006, Part III; Chris Alden, “China in Africa,” Survival 47, no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 151, 153; Nailene Chou, “Cross-Strait Tension Benefits Africa,” South China Morning Post, July 1, 2004, 5; Ian Taylor, “China’s foreign policy towards Africa in the 1990s,” Journal of Modern African Studies 36, no. 3 (September 1998): 456–459; Ian Taylor, “Taiwan’s Foreign Policy and Africa: The Limitations of Dollar Diplomacy,” Journal of Contemporary China 11, no. 30 (February 2002): 125–126; Drew Thompson, “China’s Emerging Interests in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges for Africa and the United States,” African Renaissance Journal 2, no. 4 (July/August 2005): 23–24; Thompson, Peacekeeping, 2005, 8. See also interviews with Dr. Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang, Deputy Representative, Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, Washington, D.C., conducted in Washington, D.C., March 8, 2006, and with Tang.} The Congo has never switched diplomatic relations and even closed the Taiwan Office in its capital in October 1998.\footnote{“China: PRC Welcomes Closing of Taiwan Office in Kinshasa,” Beijing Xinhua in English, October 30, 1998, FBIS-CHI-98-303, October 30, 1998.} It was probably the importance of the Congo for stability in the entire region and China’s desire to show its concern for African problems that compelled the Chinese leadership to send its second-largest peacekeeping force to that country.\footnote{See U.N. Security Council Verbatim Record, S/PV.4104, February 24, 2000. According to the Chinese official in New York, the mission in the Congo had just happed to be the first one that provided an opportunity to send troops abroad after the new leadership in Beijing identified U.N. peacekeeping as a priority of China’s foreign policy. See interview with Chinese official, New York. In the assessment of Ambassador Shinn, however, Chinese peacekeeping in Africa is largely driven by its hunger for raw material. See interview with Ambassador Dr. David Shinn, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., conducted in Washington, D.C., April 13, 2006.} Since 1999, Beijing had frequently urged the international community to engage
more in conflict resolution on the African continent. The Congo was a showcase to demonstrate that China was in fact ready to put its money where its mouth is.

In any case, it was Beijing’s engagement in the Congo, Haiti, and Liberia—the three of its largest contributions to UNPKO ever—, which caused the increase of China’s yearly participation rate in 2003 (see Chart 15). Only the future will tell whether the increase of Chinese peacekeeping is largely driven by Beijing’s interests in certain countries. Taking the changes of China’s voting behavior and of its participation in UNPKO since 2000 into consideration, however, it is safe to forecast that China’s engagement in the U.N. peacekeeping regime will remain sustainable.

Summary

Compared to the international standard, China’s contribution of peacekeeping personnel may leave much to be desired. Its yearly participation rate is only a fraction of that of India; its troops have never included robust combat forces for peace enforcement tasks like those of Australia; and, unlike its Japanese counterparts, Chinese peacekeepers have never joined non-U.N. missions. Compared to its own performance in the previous decade, however, Beijing’s peacekeeping activities have changed markedly in the new millennium. Whereas the Chinese commitment to UNPKO had remained minimal and mainly restricted to traditional peacekeeping missions throughout the 1990s, China’s contribution of peacekeepers has increased in absolute terms since 2000 and in relative terms since 2003. Over the years, China’s peacekeeping force has become more involved, more diversified, and more relevant to the whole peacekeeping endeavor. Moreover, the lead-

ership in Beijing has become more pragmatic in overcoming previous concerns, more skillful in showing its commitment to multilateralism, and more effective in applying political pressure on Taipei’s allies. All this indicates that China has abandoned its system-exploiting behavior of the 1990s and is now adopting a less cost-evading role in UNPKO.

Assessment

Based on the findings of China’s voting behavior in the UNSC and its contribution to UNPKO, it seems that Beijing’s role in the U.N. peacekeeping regime has changed significantly. During the 1990s, Beijing wanted to return to the traditional peacekeeping of the Cold War era but arrived eventually in the reality of the post-Cold War era, now having become a real status quo power in the present peacekeeping system. At the same time, China abandoned its system-exploiting behavior and began to share the burden of maintaining international peace and security in a more serious fashion. Both voting behavior and contribution of personnel simultaneously mark the year 2000 as the turning point in China’s participation in the U.N. peacekeeping regime. Since then, China has voted with “yes” for every mission, refrained from issuing a dissociating comment, sent Chinese peacekeepers to every new mission, and increased the number of them in absolute, and by 2003 also in relative terms.

The present survey of China’s participation in the U.N. peacekeeping regime suggests that the changing nature of U.N. peacekeeping itself was a major factor for causing this perceptional shift in Beijing. As wider peacekeeping disappeared and peace support operations emerged in 2000, China’s previous concerns were now better met. The use of force was now restricted to the defense of the mission and limited peace enforcement tasks were carried out by pivotal states but with a clear mandate of the UNSC. At the same time, the complex and multifunctional design of peace support operations made it
more difficult for the Chinese to withhold their support without damaging their reputation among the developing countries.\footnote{200}

Yet, as this study has also shown, China eventually managed to adapt itself successfully to the evolving U.N. peacekeeping regime by the end of 1999. In practice, Beijing had accepted the need for robust peacekeeping and thus revised its understanding of the three UNPKO principles accordingly. Interestingly, this development has been largely ignored by Chinese scholars. Even recent articles seem to be stuck in the past, still upholding the concept of traditional peacekeeping and referring primarily to the peacekeeping literature of the early 1990s.\footnote{201}

Clearly, these changes in China’s behavior do not indicate a paradigmatic shift towards a post-Westphalian concept of sovereignty. Having redefined its preconditions for military interventions in the late-1990s, Beijing is still concerned about the interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states unless agreed upon by the country concerned. As the humanitarian tragedy in Darfur attests, China has so far been effective in forestalling direct U.N. involvement when consent was not obtained. Yet, China’s steady sponsorship for peace support operations in the new millennium nevertheless confirms at least the “slow erosion of its strict sovereign prerogatives” that Gill/Reilly had observed earlier.\footnote{202}

\footnote{200} The pressure of developing countries on China was a major factor for Beijing to increase its participation in U.N. peacekeeping. See interview with Chinese official, New York.


\footnote{202} Gill/Reilly, 41. See also Kent, 155; Pang, 81; Tang, 81–82.
5. CHINA’S REASONS FOR ITS INCREASING PARTICIPATION IN THE U.N. PEACEKEEPING REGIME

While the changing character of UNPKO has certainly helped to remove some of China’s normative reservations against U.N. peacekeeping, changes in Beijing’s foreign and security policy may provide another set of possible explanations for its increasing participation in the U.N. peacekeeping regime since 2000.

Chinese and foreign analysts have often argued that China’s interest in gaining international experience has been a key driver for its engagement in UNPKO. From a military perspective, Chinese soldiers could learn from the military doctrine, the technologically advanced equipment, and the management expertise of foreign armed forces.\(^{203}\) In fact, Chinese peacekeepers have used their presence to foster relations to the militaries of the host country and foreign defense attachés of other nations.\(^{204}\) From a civilian perspective, the Chinese riot police in Haiti can train their latest crowd control techniques, which will benefit domestic public order, especially in preparation of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing.\(^{205}\)

Clearly, the participation in UNPKO provides China with an excellent opportunity to expose its military and police forces to adverse conditions while expanding its


military diplomacy. But this basic motivation for China’s participation in the U.N. peacekeeping regime can hardly explain the sudden support for UNPKO and the augmented deployment of Chinese peacekeepers since 2000. More plausible explanations for China’s recent interest in U.N. peacekeeping are Beijing’s rising comfort level within the U.N. peacekeeping regime, its concern about its international reputation, its uneasiness about U.S. hegemony, and its shared security interests with the rest of the world.

Socializing in the U.N. Peacekeeping Regime

As suggested earlier, China has recently become more involved in the U.N. peacekeeping partly because the nature of UNPKO had changed in a way that made it more acceptable to Beijing to fully participate in it and partly because China adapted its behavior to the international standard. It could therefore be argued that Chinese peacekeepers, as they became increasingly engaged in the U.N. peacekeeping regime, gradually internalized the international norms and practices, making China in the end a fully socialized participant. In fact, Tang claims that “China has set itself into an adaptive learning course,” and Pang holds Beijing has now learned how to interact as a member of the international community. Yet, neither of the authors has so far provided any empirical evidence for such a learning and socialization process in Chinese peacekeeping.

While conducting such an empirical analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, some anecdotal evidence might nonetheless indicate that a socialization process had been

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206 Tang, 87; Tao Shelan, “Strengthening Practical Cooperation and Safeguarding World Peace: An Interview With a Responsible Person in the Foreign Affairs Office of the Ministry of National Defense,” Beijing Zhongguo Xinwen She in Chinese, May 19, 2005, FBIS, May 25, 2005. See also interviews with Garrett, Shinn, and Tang. Both Chinese officials confirmed that the participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations is financially attractive to China since the expenses are paid out of the U.N. peacekeeping budget in New York, to which Beijing contributes according to its general assessments. While China has increased its own budget for the training and initial deployment of its peacekeepers, these additional funds are tied to specific missions and not provided for U.N. peacekeeping activities in general. See interviews with Chinese officials, New York and Washington.

207 Tang, 82.

208 Pang, 82. See also interviews with Chinese officials, New York and Washington.
at work. In his studies on China’s behavior in regional security dialogues, Johnston has observed that these institutions have helped to create Chinese officials who were normatively committed to multilateral cooperation and even lobbied in Beijing for enhanced future participation. Moreover, their involvement had been affected by multilateral encouragement to contribute more to the discourse of the security dialogue.  

Essentially, Johnston suggested that China’s socialization in international regimes can be assumed if observers perceive “increasing comfort levels even as the process becomes more intrusive.”  

Similar elements of a socialization process may be identified with regard to Chinese peacekeeping.

Lobbying of Chinese participants and foreign encouragement. Chinese peacekeepers are possible agents of change in the peacekeeping bureaucracy if they promote an enhanced Chinese role in U.N. peacekeeping after returning from their mission. According to Chinese practitioners, these returnees are regularly asked to write reports about their lessons learned and to brief the next batch of Chinese peacekeepers that is to be sent abroad.  

A review of news reports about Chinese peacekeeping suggests that a small number of China’s peacekeepers in any mission have served in previous UNPKO. Moreover, Gill/Reilly found out that military officers in Beijing and New York had played a limited lobbying role in urging their superiors to increase China’s participation

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210 Johnston, Socialization in International Institutions, 2003, 122.

211 Qu/Li, 65. See also interview with Chinese official, Washington.

in UNPKO. For the same reason, they had also forged cross-bureaucratic alliances with like-minded colleagues.  

Today, however, such a lobbying role is no longer required as Chinese peacekeeping enjoys the highest priority in Beijing. According to a Chinese official in New York, this priority shift has mainly been caused by the generational change at the top of the leadership in 2002. While Beijing had acted like an “old man who is not realizing how the world has changed” during the 1990s, the ascendancy of a new generation of leadership fundamentally altered the mind set of China’s foreign policy. The director of the Department of Diplomacy at Peking University noted: “The Chinese leaders recognize that some international interventions can be positive.” At the first look, the generational argument seems to contradict China’s socialization within the U.N. peacekeeping regime. But the fact that the new Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing has served as the Chinese representative in the UNSC during the 1990s and has therefore familiarized himself with the intricacies of UNPKO might in fact indicate that some socialization process has been at work at the very top of the current Chinese leadership.

Recently, Chinese newspapers frequently quoted foreign diplomats who pushed Beijing to do more in U.N. peacekeeping. During his visits to China in 2001 and 2004, UNSG Kofi Annan had urged the Chinese to play a bigger role in the United Nations and

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213 Gill/Reilly, 51.
214 Interview with Chinese official, New York.
215 Ibid. See also interview with Pang.
216 Quoted in Nailene Chou, “Anti-Colonial Doctrine up for Review; The Core Thinking behind Much of Beijing’s Modern Diplomacy Is to Be Revisited,” South China Morning Post, June 12, 2004, 6.
217 This point has been highlighted by Ambassador Inderfurth, who had worked with Ambassador Li Zhaoxing during his service at the U.N. Security Council. See interview with Ambassador Karl F. Inderfurth, John O. Rankin Professor of the Practice of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., conducted in Washington, D.C., March 23, 2006.
to take on more responsibility in UNPKO. In an editorial for the Hong Kong-based *South China Morning Post*, which was also mentioned in Beijing’s *Renmin Ribao*, the Director of the U.N. Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit encouraged China to contribute more troops to UNPKO: “The Chinese military is well suited to keeping the peace in remote places. It is strong in light infantry. Its units are sustainable in the remote and low-tech, low-support environments in which the blue helmets operate.” This sentiment was echoed by European representatives, who reminded China of its peacekeeping responsibilities as a member of the P-5. The timing of these statements suggests, however, that this foreign encouragement has not been a reason for, but rather a reflection of, China’s increasing role in the U.N. peacekeeping regime.

*Rising of China’s comfort level.* The previous analysis of China’s voting behavior and its explanation in the UNSC had already suggested that China’s comfort level in the U.N. peacekeeping regime has risen significantly at the dawn of the new millennium. In October 1999, the Chinese representative in the UNSC expressed his satisfaction about the draft resolution authorizing UNAMSIL after “intensive consultations.” He almost enthusiastically stated: “It accommodates the requests of the Government of Sierra Leone and the African members and reflects the concerns of other Council members. It is com-

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prehensive and balanced and, to a certain degree, reflects the Council’s attention to and input on African issues. China appreciates this.”

A few days later, he was explicitly pleased that all Chinese amendments had been incorporated in the resolution that authorized UNTAET. Since all these resolutions involved sensitive sovereignty issues, the Chinese statements indicate that Beijing felt obviously more comfortable with the emerging concept of peace support operations. In 2002, China praised the missions in Sierra Leone, the Congo, Burundi, Angola, East Timor, and Afghanistan as successes.

As has been shown earlier on, Beijing felt particularly uncomfortable with the unlimited authorization of the use of force in UNPKO:

Since the end of the cold war there has been an increase in cases in which the Security Council, invoking Chapter VII of the Charter on flimsy grounds, resorts to, or authorizes a few countries to take, enforcement actions. […] We maintain that enforcement actions as set forth in Chapter VII of the Charter should only be used against acts of aggression that endanger and undermine peace. In case of necessity, they should have a clear-cut mandate as well as the political guidance of the Security Council and the unified command of the United Nations. Indiscriminate use of mandatory means will not help resolve problems.

In 2003, however, China indicated that its experience with UNPKO has caused a remarkable departure from the concept of traditional peacekeeping: “Given the growing complexity of operations, traditional operations were no longer suited for certain types of conflict; the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Liberia, for example, had highlighted the need for rapid, early and robust intervention.” Now Beijing explicitly supported the revision of peacekeeping mandates, “including the use of en-

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forcement measures where necessary.”

In 2004, China publicly recognized the importance of the military component in peace support operations: “[I]n conflict management, the roles of military action and that of the civilian elements are closely interrelated and predicated on one another. […] Military success guarantees the presence of a civilian role, which is an essential and indispensable element in any post-conflict reconstruction.”

This shift of China’s attitude towards robust peacekeeping is also evident in its new definition of the three basic principles of UNPKO. Whereas Beijing maintained in the past that the use of force was not permitted “except for self-defense,” military force should now be applied “only when necessary.”

China’s rising comfort level in the new millennium comes as no surprise, given that the Brahimi Report on the reform of U.N. peacekeeping has addressed many of China’s longstanding normative concerns in 2000. When the report proposed to restrict the use of force to the protection of the mission, it was reiterating a Chinese demand of the early 1990s. In fact, the emerging practice of limiting the authorized level of force in UNPKO-related resolutions was the product of a Chinese initiative—and reportedly called the “Chinese model.” Likewise, Beijing had been an early supporter of the rapid deployment capacity of the United Nations, of an enhanced cooperation between the

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231 See Wang, 2005, 166. See also note 44 in Wang, 2005, 192.
UNSC and troop contributing countries,\(^{233}\) and of a stronger involvement of neighboring countries and regional organizations in UNPKO, especially in African conflicts.\(^{234}\)

As indicated above, China’s concern about the intrusive nature of UNPKO has been mitigated with the emergence of peace support operations in the new millennium. In the mid-1990s, Beijing had criticized that U.N. peacekeeping activities “tend to be increasingly mixed up with those in the economic, social, development, humanitarian assistance and other areas”\(^{235}\) and demanded that the “relevant United Nations bodies should not confuse peacekeeping operations with peace-building activities; still less should they force extraneous elements into peacekeeping operations.”\(^{236}\) In 2000, China still insisted that the “international community can only play a promoting and facilitating role.”\(^{237}\)

At the end of 2001, however, Beijing began gradually to revise its position, recognizing that “peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention and peace-building activities had become increasingly intertwined.”\(^{238}\) But the host country should play a “dominant role” in solving the conflict.\(^{239}\) Though pointing out that the United Nations should refrain from “imposing a predetermined model of governance,” China had fully endorsed the concept of complex peace support operations by 2005:

\[ \text{[T]he rule of law and justice in law enforcement are necessary prerequisites for a peaceful transition. […] In areas emerging from conflict, ensuring the rule of law and justice should become an integral part of the overall effort to achieve peace and stability, protecting the fundamental interests of local populations and serving the overall interests of social stabil-} \]


In his speech before the UNSC, President Hu Jintao later embraced a “comprehensive strategy featuring prevention, peace restoration, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction.” These changes in China’s official statements confirm what has already been evident from its voting behavior in the UNSC—that Beijing had finally come to terms with the intrusive character of complex UNPKO. According to Johnston’s shorthand definition of state socialization, China’s comfort level has risen while the character of UNPKO became more intrusive. To be sure, a clear causal relationship between China’s increasing involvement in UNPKO and a socialization process within the regime cannot be easily drawn. But the coincidence of the changes in China’s normative position and the reforms of UNPKO suggests that a learning process may have been at work.

Shaping Its Image as a Responsible Great Power

Beijing has always shown a particular concern for its international status as a great power. Seeking international legitimacy, China was eager to fulfill the appropriate international standards of behavior and avoided to be singled out for disapprobation in multilateral venues. But international worries about China’s growing military budget combined with its assertive attitude vis-à-vis Taiwan and in the South China Sea tarnished its international reputation in the mid-1990s. In response to the emerging China Threat theory, Beijing desired to present itself as a cooperative, responsible, and peaceful

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243 Foot, 37–38; Johnston/Evans, 291.
member of the international community. In the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998, Premier Zhu Rongji declared for the first time publicly that China would act as a responsible power by not devaluing its currency and providing funds to the affected countries. Since then, Chinese scholars have urged Beijing to overcome China’s victimhood, to promote a “great power mentality” (daguo xintai), to embrace the responsibilities of a major power, and to increase its international influence. After a generational change of the Chinese leadership in 2002, Premier Wen Jiabao embraced the idea of China’s “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi), which had been proposed by the influential Chinese scholar Zheng Bijian in 2003. Refuting the China Threat theory, this concept underlined that Beijing would never seek regional hegemony and nothing more than a peaceful international environment that is conducive to its own economic development.

In order to convince the world of a rising China that will support the international system, Beijing embraced multilateralism, especially in the region. China and some of its neighbor countries agreed on confidence-building measures at a meeting in Shanghai in 1996, which developed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) by 2001. With the countries of the Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN), China held its

245 Deng, 59; Kim, 2003, 54.
246 Goldstein, 128–130; Kim, 2003, 63.
first informal summit in 1997, signed a code of conduct for resolving the territorial disputes in the South China Sea in 2002, and proposed to establish a new security mechanism in 2003. \(^{250}\) China’s new engagement in multilateralism was viewed as an effective tool to mitigate suspicion among its neighbors, to consolidate its regional role in a non-threatening fashion, and to shape its image as a responsible international power. \(^{251}\)

**Reflecting China’s responsible role.** China’s increasing participation in the U.N. peacekeeping regime is a direct reflection of its new desire to prove that it can live up to its global responsibilities in a peaceful way. \(^{252}\) This has been expressed in several official statements. While the Chinese military regarded its participation in UNPKO as evidence for “China’s peace-loving image,” \(^{253}\) senior officials of the Ministry of Public Security asserted that the contribution to MINUSTAH would strengthen the “peace-loving and responsible image of the country.” \(^{254}\) According to U.N. Deputy Secretary-General Chen Jian, the presence of Chinese peacekeepers in Haiti has shown that “China is an enthusiastic and responsible UN member, and it is ready to undertake more obligations,” thus demonstrating an “important step China has taken in its effort to improve its international status.” \(^{255}\) Chinese peacekeeping would show that “China is carrying out its peace com-

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\(^{250}\) Goldstein, 120–124; Medeiros/Fravel, 25; Wang, 2005, 170–171, 177.

\(^{251}\) Deng, 64; Kim, 2003, 59; Men, State Failure, 2005, 2, 5; Wang, 2005, 163, 167, 189.

\(^{252}\) Men, State Failure, 2005, 10; Pang, 73, 80–81; Qu/Li, 64; Thompson, Peacekeeping, 2005, 7–8; Zhang Huiyu, 2004, 32; Zhao, 149–150. See also interview with Tang. In contrast to his assessment of 2000, Gill now believes that China’s desire to shape its peaceful image was a key driver for its engagement in East Timor. See interview with Gill.


\(^{255}\) Quoted in Zou Dehao, “China’s International Status Becomes Increasingly Important: Interview,” Beijing Renmin Ribao (Internet-Version) in English, November 15, 2004, FBIS-CHI-2004-1116, November 15,
mitment to the international community and shouldering its responsibility as a great power for preserving world peace.”

In July 2005, an editorial in *Beijing Review* refuted the China Threat theory by stating: “China will actively take part in UN peacekeeping activities, but will never go into battle in other countries.”

Another article emphasized China’s responsibility to represent the developing world in U.N. peacekeeping:

The international community agrees that China’s contribution to UN peacekeeping has helped it build an image as a responsible power. However, it is far from enough when viewed under the new global situation. Therefore, China is called to expand its peacekeeping scope, make the world hear its voice in certain military and political arrangements and ensure that the UN peacekeeping efforts are more representative of developing countries.

Chinese analysts started to echo this sentiment after China’s contribution to U.N. peacekeeping has been mentioned as evidence for Beijing’s multilateral cooperation by Premier Wen Jiabao in September 2005 and in the White Paper on “China’s Peaceful Development Road” published in December 2005. A scholar at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations concluded that Chinese peacekeeping would show “China as a responsible big country.”

His colleague wrote in an editorial for *China Daily* that Beijing would now play an active role in international institutions, share its global duties such as peacekeeping, and contribute to the resolution of regional con-

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Only few Chinese scholars urged Beijing to contribute even more financial resources, material, and personnel to U.N. peacekeeping in order to fulfill its obligation as a major power and thereby to improve its international image.262

**Developing China’s peacekeeping capacities.** In the past few years, China has indeed strived to build up the necessary capacities to meet its obligations as a contributor to UNPKO. Whereas the military has been running classes for Chinese peacekeepers since 1989 at the International Relations Academy in Nanjing, the civilian police was trained at the Peacekeeping Civil Police Training Center, which is located at the Academy of the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force in Langfang near Beijing and sponsored by the Ministry of Public Security.263 At the suggestion of Nepal, China invested 25 million dollars to extend its training site in Langfang, now hosting the largest training center for UNPKO in Asia, in which 250 police officers can be instructed simultaneously.264

Chinese peacekeeping capabilities have also been improved with foreign assistance. China and Great Britain have conducted a number of two-day seminars on UNPKO since 2000, including an intensive training class for civilian police officers from several Asian countries.265 Moreover, Beijing hosted two international seminars in 1999 and 2000 for foreign peacekeepers on mine clearance operations.266 In 2004, the China Institute for International Strategic Studies and the Peacekeeping Office at the Ministry of

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262 Li Dongyan, 2004, 125; Tang, 83–85.
263 Gill/Reilly, 52.
266 Jiang, 2003, 64.
National Defense sponsored an international seminar on “Challenges of Peace Operations: into the 21st Century” with delegates of China’s peacekeeping bureaucracy.267

All this suggests that both China’s new determination to improve its image as a responsible power and its investment in the required capacities contributed to the recent increase of Chinese peacekeepers deployed abroad. Whether Beijing was either lacking the political will or simply the capacity to send more Chinese peacekeepers abroad until 2003 remains unclear. Though having already agreed to participate in the U.N. Standby Arrangement for the rapid deployment of peacekeepers back in 1997, it was not until 2002 that China was able to meet the standards required by the United Nations—exactly in the same year when the new Chinese leadership came into power.268 Both Chinese practitioners and scholars tend to explain China’s limited participation with capacity constraints in the past,269 but also suggest a deliberate effort of Beijing to increase the Chinese participation most recently.270 In any case, Beijing’s decision to provide explicitly a “non-combat unit” under this arrangement and a major training facility for civilian police does not only underline its long-term commitment to the U.N. peacekeeping regime but will also shape its peaceful image on the global stage.271

268 China provides one engineering battalion, one medical team, and two transport companies. See Ding, Zhitao, “In the Name of Peace,” Beijing Review, November 4, 2004, 16–17; Gill/Reilly, 52–53.
270 See “Keeping Peace,” Beijing Review, December 18, 2003, 7; Gao Xinman, “Cong Bohai Weihe Kan Woguo Weihe Jingcha de Peixun yu Guanli [Assessing the Training and Management of China’s Peacekeeping Police from Peacekeeping in Bosnia],” Journal of the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force Academy 20, no. 1 (February 2004): 49–51; Jiang, 2003, 63; Qu/Li, 64. According to the Chinese official in New York, it was clearly the political will of the new leadership in Beijing that had caused the increase of China’s participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations since 2003. See interview with Chinese official, New York.
271 U.N. General Assembly, Forth Committee, A/C.4/54/SR.11, November 30, 1999, para. 27. See also U.N. General Assembly, Forth Committee, A/C.4/57/SR.13, November 27, 2002, para. 21; Pang, 78. While China’s commitment of purely non-combat units was also highlighted by the Chinese official in Washington,
Balancing against U.S. Hegemony

After the end of the bipolar power structure of the Cold War era, China believed that the preponderance of the United States as the only remaining superpower was a transitional phenomenon.\(^\text{272}\) Convinced that the international system would inevitably transform from unipolarity to multipolarity, Chinese strategists promoted a “new international order” (guoji xin zhixu) through “multipolarization” (shijie duojihua), which would ensure political and socio-economic diversity.\(^\text{273}\) This vision of the world would eventually replace “hegemonism and power politics” (baquan zhuyi he qiangquan zhengzhi) and the “phenomena of the big bullying the small, the strong lording it over the weak and the rich oppressing the poor,” which China saw as characteristics of the international system.\(^\text{274}\)

However, NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo conflict without authorization of the UNSC did not only demonstrate to the Chinese leadership at the end of 1999 that “hegemonism and power politics have manifested themselves in new expressions,”\(^\text{275}\) but also that the U.S.-dominated power structure was unlikely to perish in the foreseeable future. Moreover, Beijing came to realize that it could lose any influence over the method and process of multilateral interventions if the authority of the United Nations and its UNSC would be further downgraded to a peripheral role in world politics.\(^\text{276}\) It was therefore in China’s security interest to show its full support for multilateral cooperation in the United Nations while advocating at the same time the “democratization of international

\(^{272}\) Kim, 1995, 428.
\(^{273}\) Wang, 1999, 91.
\(^{275}\) U.N. General Assembly Verbatim Record, A/54/PV.8, September 22, 1999.
\(^{276}\) Choedon, 51–52; Deng, 59; Gill/Reilly, 47–48; Tang, 87.
relations” (guoji guanxi de minzhuhua).\textsuperscript{277} Warning against Western dominance in the United Nations and insisting that the voice of developing countries must be heard, China began to regard multilateralism as an effective instrument to limit U.S. hegemony and unilateralism at the regional and global level.\textsuperscript{278}

*Strengthening the United Nations and the U.N. Security Council.* China’s concern about the diminishing role of the United Nations and the UNSC in peacekeeping issues became clear in several statements and initiatives. While always stressing the preeminent function of the UNSC in deciding on peace and security before and after the intervention in Kosovo,\textsuperscript{279} Beijing reiterated in September 1999 that

> only the Security Council can decide how and when to intervene and who should do it. The mandate to intervene does not lie with any individual country or military grouping […]. Only within the framework of the United Nations can small and weak countries have a sense of security, can their rights and interests be safeguarded and can hegemonism and power politics be checked.\textsuperscript{280}

When the UNSC authorized the mandate of MONUC in February 2000, the pre-amble of the resolution recognized explicitly the “purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security,” probably on Beijing’s initiative.\textsuperscript{281} Prior to the U.N. Millennium Summit in September 2000, China, for the first time ever, called a meeting of the UNSC in order to declare the “primary responsibility” of the UNSC for peace and security and its resolve to “strengthen the central role of the United Nations in

\textsuperscript{277} Wang, 2005, 164.
\textsuperscript{278} Kim, 2003, 59; Medeiros/Fravel, 23; Men, International Institutions, 2005, 9; Wang, 2005, 163, 188.
\textsuperscript{280} U.N. General Assembly Verbatim Record, A/54/PV.35, October 20, 1999.
In May 2004, China drew a direct connection between its support for U.N. peacekeeping and the authority of the United Nations: “By further strengthening peacekeeping operations we can help enhance the authority of the Council and the effectiveness of the collective security machinery, augment the role and impact of the United Nations and promote multilateralism.”

While President Hu Jintao urged all members of the UNSC to “uphold the Council’s authority by adhering to multilateralism,” Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing stressed in an article for *China Daily* in August 2005:

> China stands for stronger multilateralism, greater democracy and rule of law in international relations, and the establishment of a fair and rational international order. The United Nations is the core of international multilateral framework and the key forum of multilateralism. […] China has taken an active part in the work of the United Nations, upholding the authority and role of the world body and its Security Council, and conducting extensive international co-operation in such fields as counter-terrorism, arms control, peacekeeping, […].

*Preventing the predominance of Western powers.* Beijing was also concerned that Western powers could dominate the U.N. peacekeeping regime. While constant budget constraints limited an increase in U.N. personnel at the UNDPKO, some developed countries had seconded their officials to the United Nations in New York, which enhanced their influence in the U.N. bureaucracy. In November 1996, China therefore requested to “ensure more institutional participation by developing countries in the discussion, decision-making and implementation of peacekeeping operations, in order to prevent a small

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286 Pang, 78.
number of countries from dictating peacekeeping policies.” After the UNGA had demanded to replace these gratis personnel by March 1999, Beijing persistently urged the UNDPKO to pay special attention to those countries that had so far been underrepresented in the recruiting process. In the discussion on the reform of U.N. peacekeeping, the Chinese felt also uneasy about setting higher standards for troop contributors and leading positions in UNPKO, which developing countries might have difficulty to meet. China therefore called for providing developing countries and regional organizations in Africa with more training capabilities for UNPKO. China had also advocating the involvement of troop contributing countries in the formulation of peacekeeping mandates. In Beijing’s calculation, engaging more developing countries in the decision-making and implementation process while increasing its own contribution of peacekeepers would limit the U.S. predominance in U.N. peacekeeping in the future.

The circumstances of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 exemplify that China and the United States have adopted fundamentally opposed approaches to military interventions since the Kosovo conflict of 1999. While Washington was ready to intervene in Iraq unilaterally and thereby alienating some of its allies, Beijing insisted on a multilateral approach while carefully avoiding to be associated with Berlin, Moscow, and Paris,

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which had signaled their outright opposition to the U.S. initiative. In the end, China appeared as an integral part of the international community whereas the United States seemed to be the outlier. To be sure, Beijing’s embrace of multilateralism will hardly prevent Washington from acting unilaterally in the future. But if the United States continues to prefer acting militarily in coalitions of the willing outside the U.N. framework while China increases its participation within the U.N. peacekeeping regime, Beijing’s influence and legitimacy in this institution will increase relative to Washington’s.  

Sharing Common Security Concerns

Foreign observers have argued that U.N. peacekeeping increasingly coincides with Beijing’s security interests as China’s socio-economic interdependence with the rest of the world is growing. As demonstrated by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, failing states are a potential source of security threats to any nation. But UNPKO can bring some stability to these states, preventing them from sliding into chaos and becoming safe havens for international terrorists. China should have a vested interest in meeting the challenges of transnational security threats and in strengthening the U.N. peacekeeping regime. Since 2002, Beijing has promoted its New Security Concept with new vigor on various occasions after it had been first introduced in 1996. Based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which basically comprise the Westphalian principles of state sovereignty and noninterference, the concept stresses multilateral cooperation and dialogue in the security realm. More importantly, it now advocates a notion of compre-

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293 See also Kim, 2003, 67.
hensive security, which is no longer exclusively military-centered but highlights the importance of nontraditional security issues such as terrorism and drug trafficking.\textsuperscript{295}

\emph{Preventing terrorism with U.N. peacekeeping.} Although the Chinese leadership recently used its appearances before the UNGA to outline the New Security Concept, only few official statements and academic writings have drawn a direct link between nontraditional security concerns and China’s engagement in U.N. peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{296} In his speech at the 16\textsuperscript{th} National Congress of the CCP in 2002, then-President Jiang Zemin implied that “dramatic changes in international relations” had justified China’s new attitude towards U.N. peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{297} In 2005, Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan noted China’s participation in UNPKO as an example for its cooperative approach in nontraditional security issues.\textsuperscript{298} As some Chinese analysts have noticed, Beijing is beginning to realize that certain areas of the developing world are likely to continue to suffer from violent conflict as result of a larger nation-building process. These conflicts can spread over borders and thus destabilize entire regions, which will increase the demand for UNPKO in the near future.\textsuperscript{299} In order to prevent that from happening in Asia, Tang proposes that China should establish a “flexible and efficient regional peacekeeping regime,” preferably within the framework of the SCO or ASEAN.\textsuperscript{300}

\emph{Promoting military interventions in failing states.} A combination of security and humanitarian concerns has motivated a tiny number of Chinese scholars to deviate from

\begin{itemize}
\item See U.N. General Assembly Verbatim Record, A/59/PV.11, September 27, 2004; A/60/PV.5, September 15, 2005.
\item Quoted in Pang, 2005, 76.
\item Tang, 2003, 95. See also Zhang Lu, 2004, 75.
\end{itemize}
Beijing’s official position and to support military interventions in failing states: Men Honghua of the Central Party School proposes that Beijing should join other states in military action whenever

the prospect of weapons of mass destruction portends significant harm to civilian populations; when access to resources critical to the global economic system is imperiled; when a regime has demonstrated intent to do serious harm to the international community; and when genocide is occurring.\(^{301}\)

His colleague Yu Xiantian of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies points out that “strong-coercive military actions” could even be authorized by regional organizations.\(^{302}\) Professor Jia Qingguo at Peking University sees the possibility of multilateral military interventions “when a government practices blatant racism at home, collapses, and the country falls prey to uncontrolled domestic violence, or kills its own people en masse.”\(^{303}\) All these scholars urge Beijing to overcome its preference for the Westphalian notion of state sovereignty. While Yu maintains that “China must be realistic to the changing theory and practice of sovereignty and readjust its strategy and policy accordingly,”\(^{304}\) Tang warns that “being too sensitive to sovereignty will also reduce the margin of choice for a country”.\(^{305}\) “In some circumstances, the intervention in a nation’s domestic conflict may be inevitable.”\(^{306}\) And Men demands that “new norms or international regimes should be developed to meet the requirements of the current international reality.”\(^{307}\)

\(^{301}\) Men, State Failure, 2005, 6.
\(^{302}\) Yu, 14.
\(^{303}\) Jia, 25.
\(^{304}\) Yu, 13–14.
\(^{305}\) Tang, 82.
\(^{306}\) Ibid., 98.
Clearly, these opinions do not represent the current position of the Chinese leadership. As the debate about the protection of civilians in armed conflicts has revealed in 2005, China still feels uneasy with the post-Westphalian concept of sovereignty. The Chinese representative in the UNSC insisted that a military intervention without the consent of the target state would only be allowed in the event of “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” and after authorization by the UNSC on a case-by-case basis. Yet, the views of these few scholars show that security threats emanating from failing states have provoked new interventionist thinking, a development that had been unimaginable prior to the events of September 11. Nevertheless, although these ideas might become more prominent in the future Chinese discourse on state sovereignty, it is only a tiny minority which espouses them today, which makes it unlikely that these security concerns brought about China’s increasing participation in UNPKO.

Assessment

China’s image, anti-hegemonist, and security concerns are obviously interrelated and merge increasingly into one single concept in the Chinese discourse as attested by the White Paper on “China’s Development Road.” Since Beijing realizes that its national security interests increasingly overlap with those of the international community, multilateral security cooperation becomes more attractive. China’s embrace of multilateralism will then not only enhance its image and reputation among developing countries but may also increase its legitimacy to condemn U.S. unilateralism. China’s growing participation

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308 See also Garrett/Adams, 6.
310 This assessment is shared by Garrett, who met some of these scholars in his program on U.S.-China cooperation sponsored by the Atlantic Council in Washington. See interview with Garrett.
in UNPKO will serve any of these goals.

This suggests that there is no monocausal explanation for Chinese peacekeeping. Rather, different motives have been more prominent than others at different points in time. While gaining experience in international settings has always been a basic motivation behind China’s engagement in UNPKO, it was probably the negative experience of NATO’s intervention in 1999 that prompted Beijing to send more peacekeepers than ever before to East Timor and all the following missions. China wanted to strengthen the role of the United Nations—and thereby to enhance its image as a responsible, peaceful, and cooperative great power. The new Chinese leadership, who came into power in 2002, regarded U.N. peacekeeping as an effective means to demonstrate China’s peaceful rise, expressed in an increasing yearly participation rate in UNPKO, the full participation in the U.N. Standby Arrangement, and new training facilities in Beijing. Though the attacks of September 11 surely sharpened Beijing’s focus on nontraditional security threats, the problem of failing states has not yet entered the mainstream security debate in China.

Moreover, China’s voting behavior and official statements in the UNSC imply that a learning and socialization process had been at work since the early 1990s, which resulted in the full Chinese endorsement of U.N. peacekeeping in the new millennium. This process had worked in two ways. On the one hand, China’s comfort level in the U.N. peacekeeping regime was rising as Beijing became more involved in the formulation of peacekeeping mandates in the UNSC since 1999 and as the implementation of the Brahimi Report in 2000 addressed some of its key normative concerns such as the unlimited use of force. On the other hand, China’s own experience with the new concept of peace support operations convinced Beijing that robust peacekeeping was indeed necessary in specific cases and that large-scale atrocities required an international response.
6. CONCLUSION

As China is rising, its role in U.N. peacekeeping has grown remarkably. While China was a reluctant sponsor and a minimalist contributor throughout the 1990s, it has become a staunch supporter of peace support operations and a reliable provider of personnel to the U.N. peacekeeping regime in the new millennium. It no longer plays the role of an overly conservative defender and cost-evading exploiter of the U.N. peacekeeping regime, of which it had been rightly accused in the 1990s. New motives behind China’s foreign and security policy may explain why Beijing recently deployed more peacekeepers abroad, but the changes of China’s normative position are best understood as result of the evolving nature of UNPKO and a Chinese learning and socialization process, which had already started in the early 1990s.

Since the end of 1999, the Chinese leadership has sent peacekeepers to every newly established mission thereby steadily increasing Beijing’s absolute and, since 2003, relative contribution to UNPKO. Over the years, China’s peacekeeping force has become more involved, more diversified, and more relevant to the whole U.N. peacekeeping endeavor. By the end of 2005, up to 1733 Chinese peacekeepers have participated in 22 missions on four continents. This allows Beijing to boast that it provides more military observers, civilian policemen, and troops to peacekeeping operations under the roof of the United Nations than any of the other four permanent members of the UNSC, which increasingly prefer to operate outside the U.N. framework.
The shock of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo without authorization of the UNSC has prompted Beijing to participate more actively in UNPKO since 2000. China’s peacekeeping role would not only strengthen the United Nations and delegitimize unilateralist actions by Western powers, it would also help the new Chinese leadership to shape China’s image as a responsible great power. On the whole, it seems that the generational change in Beijing in 2002 had a stronger impact on Chinese peacekeeping than the emerging new thinking of Chinese experts about nontraditional security threats in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. Beijing’s interest to isolate Taipei diplomatically may have motivated the Chinese leadership to deploy more peacekeepers to missions in Haiti and Liberia than to other host countries. However, this motive provides no exclusive explanation for China’s increasing participation in the U.N. peacekeeping regime.

Even more remarkable and widely overlooked are the changes in Beijing’s normative attitude towards UNPKO. Since the end of 1999, the Chinese representative in the UNSC has voted in favor of every newly established UNPKO and refrained from dissociating China from resolutions that authorized the use of force or mandated pivotal states to carry out enforcement actions. Given its military encounter with U.N. troops in the Korean War of 1951, China had restricted its commitment mainly to traditional peacekeeping and transitional management throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The emerging practice of wider peacekeeping in the 1990s challenged Beijing’s Westphalian understanding of state sovereignty and noninterference: these operations authorized the use of force, were dominated by pivotal states, and often interfered in the internal affairs of the host countries. Two interrelated developments explain why China finally managed to embrace the concept of UNPKO in the new millennium. On the one hand, Beijing tried to adapt its position to the international standard and learned from its participation in UNPKO. On
the other hand, the way UNPKO are conducted has changed since the reforms after the Brahimi Report in 2000, which made a new type of UNPKO more agreeable to China.

Already in the early 1990s, Chinese diplomats had been able to adapt their understanding of U.N. peacekeeping to the realities on the ground. Though grudgingly, China agreed to the use of force in UNPKO as long as this was restricted to the defense of the peacekeepers, their freedom of movement, and civilians under imminent threat since 1993; accepted the pattern of subcontracting necessary peace enforcement tasks to regional alliances since 1995; voted in favor of, rather than abstained from, resolution which comprised state-building activities; and seemed likely to support humanitarian interventions if the consent of the target country could be obtained. While not yet admitting it in public, Beijing had obviously begun to realize that the principles of traditional peacekeeping were no longer feasible in the hostile environment of ongoing violence.

The reform debate about U.N. peacekeeping led to the creation of a new type of UNPKO which sought to overcome the problems of wider peacekeeping while merging transitional management with robust peacekeeping. These so-called peace support operations carried out multifunctional peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks but did not refrain from applying military force to protect their mandate or to compel belligerents to keep the peace. Their peace enforcement tasks were regularly performed by pivotal states, which operated outside the U.N. framework. But peace support operations also accommodated some of China’s key concerns: they restricted the authorization of the use of force to the protection of the mission, limited the role of peace enforcing pivotal states by a clear mandate of the UNSC, and tried to address the root causes of conflict in a complex peacebuilding endeavor. At first, Beijing had no choice but to support the whole package of peace support operations if it wanted to remain influential in the U.N. peace-
keeping regime. But by 2003, China’s own experience with peace support operations convinced the Chinese leadership that robust peacekeeping was indeed necessary in specific cases.

These changes in China’s behavior and attitude, however, do not indicate a paradigmatic shift towards a post-Westphalian concept of sovereignty. Beijing still feels uneasy about international involvement in the internal affairs of sovereign states and resists military interventions unless the target state agrees to them. But China has clearly moved away from its strict Westphalian interpretation of state sovereignty and from promoting the traditional definition of the three UNPKO principles.

The number of Chinese peacekeepers currently deployed may shrink again once larger missions, such as MONUC, will come to an end. Yet, all indicators discussed in this study suggest that China can and will do more. Given China’s embrace of peace support operations, its ambition as a responsible and peaceful great power, its eagerness to strengthen the role of the United Nations, its recent investments in training capacities, and the enthusiasm of its peacekeepers, the world is likely to see a sustainable Chinese participation in the U.N. peacekeeping regime in the years to come.
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APPENDIX A

TABLES OF ANALYSIS

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<td>A</td>
<td>Against the use of force and lack of consent</td>
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<td>Haiti</td>
<td>S/RES/940</td>
<td>Establishment of stable environment</td>
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<td>A</td>
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<td>03/31/1995</td>
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<td>A</td>
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<td>S/RES/1088</td>
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Table 1: China’s Votes on Selected Resolutions Authorizing the Use of Force in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (Continued)

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<th>Country</th>
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<th>Purpose of Resolution</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Provisions*</th>
<th>Vote*</th>
<th>China’s Explanation of Vote</th>
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<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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* VII: “Acting under Chapter VII”; NM: “all necessary means”, “all necessary measures”, or “all necessary steps”; DF: Use of force is limited to the defense of U.N. personnel, of their freedom of movement, and of civilians under imminent threat; PS: Role of pivotal states or alliances; A: Abstention; Y: Yes.
** Non-U.N. Peacekeeping Operations
### Table 2: China’s Votes on Selected Resolutions Addressing Domestic Issues within U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Purpose of Resolution</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Vote*</th>
<th>China’s Explanation of Vote</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UNMIH</strong> Haiti</td>
<td>S/RES/975  01/30/1995</td>
<td>Establishment of UNMIH</td>
<td>Wider Peacekeeping</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Against the mandate and size of UNMIH</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UNMIH</strong> Haiti</td>
<td>S/RES/1048  03/29/1995</td>
<td>Final extension at reduced size of military component</td>
<td>Wider Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Incorporations of amendments and at request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNSMIH</strong> Haiti</td>
<td>S/RES/1063  06/28/1996</td>
<td>Maintenance of law and order and training of police</td>
<td>Wider Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Against the presence of U.N. military personnel, but at request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNOMIG</strong> Georgia</td>
<td>S/RES/1077  10/22/1996</td>
<td>Integration of Human Rights Office</td>
<td>Wider Peacekeeping</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Against the Human Rights Office</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MPF</strong> Albania</td>
<td>S/RES/1101  03/28/1997</td>
<td>Establishment of stability and security</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Against the interference in internal affairs and the invocation of Chapter VII, but at request</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MONUA</strong> Angola</td>
<td>S/RES/1118  06/30/1997</td>
<td>Replacement of UNAVEM III</td>
<td>Wider Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Against matters that fall within the terms of other U.N. bodies</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MIPONUH</strong> Haiti</td>
<td>S/RES/1123  30.07.1997</td>
<td>Training of police</td>
<td>Wider Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Against the extension of the peacekeeping mandate, but at request</td>
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<td>S/RES/1144  12/19/1997</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>Cautious about issues such as judicial reform and economic matters</td>
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<td><strong>OSCE</strong> Kosovo</td>
<td>S/RES/1199  09/23/1998</td>
<td>Monitoring of humanitarian situation</td>
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<td>A</td>
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<td><strong>OSCE</strong> Kosovo</td>
<td>S/RES/1203  10/24/1998</td>
<td>Call for compliance with OSCE observers</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Against the interference in internal affairs and NATO’s decision to use force</td>
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<td><strong>MINURCA</strong> Angola</td>
<td>S/RES/1230  02/26/1999</td>
<td>Extension of MINURCA</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>Against the interference in military restructuring</td>
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<td><strong>MONUC</strong> Congo</td>
<td>S/RES/1493  07/28/2003</td>
<td>Protection of civilians in Ituri and Kivu</td>
<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<td><strong>AMIS</strong> Sudan</td>
<td>S/RES/1556  07/30/2004</td>
<td>Authorization of international monitors in Darfur</td>
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<td>S/RES/1564  09/18/2004</td>
<td>Investigation of human rights violation in Darfur</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Against pressure, but support of African Union</td>
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*A: Abstention; V: Veto; Y: Yes.
**Non-U.N. Peacekeeping Operations
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<td>Iraq-Kuwait</td>
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Table 3: China’s Peak Contribution to U.N. Peacekeeping per Mission (1990–2005)
## Table 3: China’s Peak Contribution to U.N. Peacekeeping per Mission (1990–2005) (Continued)

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<th>Mission</th>
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<th>Duration</th>
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<th>U.N. Police (China)</th>
<th>U.N. Troop (China)</th>
<th>U.N. Total (China)</th>
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<td>%*</td>
<td>%*</td>
<td>%*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISET</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>May 2002–April 2005</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>6.86%</td>
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<td>May 2002–May 2005</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>1,108</td>
<td>5,082</td>
<td>6,312</td>
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<td>UNAM (PM)**</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>October 2003–Present</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.90%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>569</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>March 2004–Present</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>6,704</td>
<td>7,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>April 2004–Present</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>April 2004–Present</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.50%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.59%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>May 2004–Present</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>1,748</td>
<td>7,286</td>
<td>9,034</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.54%</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>7.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>June 2004–Present</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>113,097</td>
</tr>
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<td>5,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>May 2005–Present</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>4,009</td>
<td>4,765</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOTIL (PM)**</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>May 2005–Present</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12.07%</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>73</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,972</td>
<td>19,083</td>
<td>113,097</td>
<td>137,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>183</td>
<td>3.68%</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>1.83%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 4: China’s Yearly Participation Rate in U.N. Peacekeeping (1990–2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>U.N. Observer</th>
<th>U.N. Police</th>
<th>U.N. Troop</th>
<th>U.N. Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2,210</td>
<td>6,356</td>
<td>59,097</td>
<td>67,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60 2.72%</td>
<td>191 3.01%</td>
<td>762 1.29%</td>
<td>1,013 1.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1,999</td>
<td>5,486</td>
<td>49,868</td>
<td>57,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55 2.73%</td>
<td>83 1.52%</td>
<td>687 1.38%</td>
<td>824 1.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1,726</td>
<td>4,803</td>
<td>32,425</td>
<td>38,953</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46 2.66%</td>
<td>45 0.94%</td>
<td>170 0.52%</td>
<td>261 0.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1,794</td>
<td>6,833</td>
<td>35,982</td>
<td>44,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51 2.86%</td>
<td>77 1.12%</td>
<td>1 0.00%</td>
<td>126 0.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1,224</td>
<td>5,757</td>
<td>35,982</td>
<td>32,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36 2.94%</td>
<td>44 0.77%</td>
<td></td>
<td>129 0.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1,437</td>
<td>6,662</td>
<td>25,652</td>
<td>33,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47 3.27%</td>
<td>59 0.89%</td>
<td></td>
<td>106 0.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>3,068</td>
<td>9,664</td>
<td>13,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49 5.25%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49 0.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>2,917</td>
<td>10,329</td>
<td>14,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49 3.31%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49 0.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1,275</td>
<td>2,885</td>
<td>16,808</td>
<td>20,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48 3.76%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48 0.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1,422</td>
<td>2,356</td>
<td>22,254</td>
<td>26,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48 3.38%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48 0.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2,216</td>
<td>2,356</td>
<td>56,021</td>
<td>59,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48 2.17%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48 0.08%</td>
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</table>

Average

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Observer</td>
<td>3.75%</td>
<td>2.84%</td>
<td>3.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Police</td>
<td>1.39%</td>
<td>0.71%</td>
<td>1.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Troop</td>
<td>0.47%</td>
<td>0.88%</td>
<td>0.65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* China’s share of component

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Number of all Missions*</th>
<th>U.N. Peacekeepers*</th>
<th>Chinese Peacekeepers*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of China Missions**</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1990–1994</strong></td>
<td>25 Missions</td>
<td>125,476</td>
<td>0.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Years</td>
<td>7 Missions</td>
<td>31,360</td>
<td>24.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1995–1999</strong></td>
<td>28 Missions</td>
<td>49,944</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Years</td>
<td>5 Missions</td>
<td>2,222</td>
<td>4.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1990–1999</strong></td>
<td>41 Missions</td>
<td>155,999</td>
<td>0.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Years</td>
<td>8 Missions</td>
<td>31,572</td>
<td>20.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2000–2005</strong></td>
<td>24 Missions</td>
<td>111,499</td>
<td>1.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Years</td>
<td>17 Missions</td>
<td>107,222</td>
<td>96.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1990–2005</strong></td>
<td>52 Missions</td>
<td>248,763</td>
<td>0.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Years</td>
<td>22 Missions</td>
<td>137,152</td>
<td>55.13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* The number of missions and the total number of peacekeepers do not add up due to overlapping missions in different periods.

** Missions to which Chinese peacekeepers have actually been sent
## APPENDIX B

**CHARTS OF ANALYSIS**

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<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>109</td>
</tr>
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<td>2  Share of China’s Contribution to U.N. Peacekeeping in Comparison</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
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<td>3  China’s Contribution to U.N. Peacekeeping per Year (1995–2005)</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  China’s Share of U.N. Peacekeeping per Year (1995–2005)</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  Composition of China’s U.N. Peacekeeping Force per Year (1995–2005)</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  Composition of the U.N. Peacekeeping Force per Year (1995–2005)</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7  China’s Top Total Shares in U.N. Peacekeeping per Mission</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8  China’s Top Police Shares in U.N. Peacekeeping per Mission</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9  China’s Top Observer Shares in U.N. Peacekeeping per Mission</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 China’s Top Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping per Mission</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
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<td>11 China’s Top Police Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping per Mission</td>
<td>114</td>
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<td>12 China’s Top Observer Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping per Mission</td>
<td>114</td>
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<td>13 Impact of Taiwan Factor on China’s Share of U.N. Peacekeeping</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Share of Liberia in China’s Contribution to U.N. Peacekeeping</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Impact of Three Largest Missions on China’s Share of U.N. Peacekeeping</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chart 1: Total Number of U.N. Peacekeepers per Year (1995–2005)*

* Different scales are used for world contribution (left axis) and Chinese contribution (right axis).

Chart 2: Share of China’s Contribution to U.N. Peacekeeping in Comparison


Chart 7: China’s Top Total Shares in U.N. Peacekeeping per Mission

Chart 8: China’s Top Police Shares in U.N. Peacekeeping per Mission
Chart 9: China’s Top Observer Shares in U.N. Peacekeeping per Mission

Chart 10: China’s Top Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping per Mission
Chart 11: China’s Top Police Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping per Mission

Chart 12: China’s Top Observer Contributions to U.N. Peacekeeping per Mission
Chart 13: Impact of Taiwan Factor on China’s Share of U.N. Peacekeeping

Chart 14: Share of Liberia in China’s Contribution to U.N. Peacekeeping
Chart 15: Impact of Three Largest Missions on China’s Share of U.N. Peacekeeping