

Congress and the Politics of Foreign Aid

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Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my husband Geoff, for his incredible support and patience throughout my many years in graduate school, and for his wit and sarcasm that kept me sane. I also dedicate this dissertation to my son Joshua, whose many naps allowed me to complete my research, and whose amazing personality provided much-needed comic relief along the way.

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Abstract of Dissertation

Congress and the Politics of Foreign Aid

Foreign aid has become a fundamental component of the international affairs budget and an essential instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Consequently, the last two decades have seen a surge of research investigating American foreign aid policy. Still, few studies have focused on Congress's role in foreign aid or have sought to determine why legislators support foreign assistance. As a result, political scientists have not answered the question: Why do members of Congress support measures to extend foreign aid? Similarly, they have yet to explain the variation over time in Congress's willingness to support foreign aid. In this dissertation, I develop a framework to understand the conditions under which foreign aid bills pass, and why legislators vote for them.

I argue that we lack a theory of legislative decision making on foreign assistance. Although scholars have studied foreign aid at the international level, and decision making is one of the more theoretically developed areas within the field of legislative behavior, very little research has been done to connect these two fields. In this dissertation, I make that connection. I draw from theories of legislative decision making to explain variation over time in the willingness of Congress and its members to support foreign aid.

In a two-part empirical study, I find that partisan forces shape Congress's decision making on foreign aid, while legislators' ideology and party commitments affect how they vote on foreign aid bills. I also find evidence that foreign-born constituencies in members' states and districts also shape their votes on foreign aid. These findings suggest that some of the forces scholars have argued affect Congress's decision making

regarding domestic policies also influence foreign aid decision making. They also affirm the importance of domestic and individual factors in foreign policy decision making.

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Chapter 1

Congress and the Politics of Foreign Aid

Foreign aid has become a fundamental component of the international affairs budget and an essential instrument of U.S. foreign policy. The concept of aid has transformed from a hotly debated topic during the beginning of twentieth century, to a widely accepted part of the American foreign policy agenda. As such, the last two decades have seen a surge of research investigating American foreign aid policy. This work has focused on an array of issues, from the links between United States foreign assistance and human rights, to whether recipient nations are democracies or have favorable trade relationships with America, or whether the distribution of aid is of strategic interest to the United States. Apart from some work comparing foreign assistance policies of different administrations, little has been done to study what factors influence policy makers, especially in the legislative branch.

Because of the “backwater” status of the study of Congress and foreign policy (Lindsay 1994), political scientists have a weak understanding of what influences foreign aid policy, and why legislators support or oppose it. For instance, political scientists cannot answer whether membership of either major political party determines a vote on a foreign aid bill, or perhaps if ideology is more dominant. Likewise, whether special interests influence votes on foreign aid legislation, or if a legislator’s constituency is

more important, is also unclear. In addition, political scientists cannot explain the variation between those foreign aid bills that pass, and those that fail. In my research, I develop a research design to first, understand the circumstances under which a foreign aid bill will pass, and second, understand why legislators support foreign aid legislation. For it is equally important to know why a member of Congress would vote for the bill, and also understand what external factors contribute to whether it passes.

Foreign Aid: Beyond the Marshall Plan

The idea of American moralism and exceptionalism started long before the first debates over foreign aid (Schelsinger 1978; Hunt 1987). Massachusetts Bay Governor John Winthrop stated in 1630, “We shall be as a City upon a Hill, the eyes of all people are upon us” (Forsythe 1998). Many proponents of foreign aid turn to such idealism to support their cause. But the actual practice of foreign assistance is a modern innovation (Morgenthau 1962), first becoming an important tool of American foreign policy under the Truman administration. The Marshall Plan was enacted just after World War II with the dual aim of rebuilding Western Europe and curbing Soviet expansionism, and is often considered the first great foreign aid program (Radelet 2003).¹ Since then, the United States has provided economic and military aid to developing, and developed nations throughout the world, and foreign assistance has become a fundamental component of the international affairs budget and an essential instrument of U.S. foreign policy (Tarnaff and Nowels 2004).

¹ The United States provided aid for Turkey and Greece prior to the Marshall Plan, but it also had the goal of stemming Soviet influence in Europe (Lancaster 2007).

The most significant permanent foreign aid authorization laws passed in the last century are: the Bretton Woods Agreement Act (1945), authorizing U.S. participation in multilateral development banks (P.L. 79-171), the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, also known as Food for Peace (P.L. 480), covering food aid (P.L. 83-480), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, covering most bilateral economic and security assistance programs (P.L. 87-195), and the Arms Export Control Act (1976), authorizing military sales and financing (P.L. 90-629).² It is the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) on which this dissertation will focus. The FAA reorganized aid from the ad hoc manner in which it was managed after the end of the Marshall Plan, into a long-term effort requiring a commitment of resources on a multi-year, programmed basis. In addition, the FAA continues to be the way in which Congress legislates foreign aid.

Beyond just drafting major legislation, Congress has the potential to be heavily involved in many aspects of foreign policy, including aid policy (Ripley and Franklin 1987). This is especially true since the 1970s. After Vietnam, Cambodia and Angola, Congress realized that conflicts over interpretations of Constitutional authority could not become the standard pattern for making foreign policy. A better system was needed to permit early and thorough consultation, and a sharing of the decision-making process: a system of policy codetermination (Franck and Weisband 1979). This led to the creation of an entirely new framework of rules for power sharing among branches of government; preeminent among these was the War Powers Resolution of 1973. While the Constitution assigns to the president the duty to “take care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”

² Congress usually debates omnibus foreign aid bills that amended these permanent authorization measures every two years.

Congress realized it needed to devise ways to ensure the execution of the laws is carried out faithfully.

The trauma of both Vietnam and Watergate also caused the Congress to assert itself on foreign aid and human rights policy (Forsythe 1987). Rep. Donald M. Fraser (D-Minn), chair of the obscure Subcommittee of International Organizations and Movements, began systematic hearings in 1973 on human rights; this had a major effect on the agenda of U.S. foreign policy. In addition, Congress started using the budget as a battleground. This is fitting since it is in the budget where many of the most significant debates are fought; including those over foreign aid (Canes-Wrone et al 2008).

Throughout the Cold War, foreign aid was seen as a tool to curtail Soviet influence throughout the world. Though presidents such as Dwight Eisenhower aimed to curtail foreign aid, time and again it provided too useful a diplomatic tool to eliminate. By the end of the presidencies of Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter, the U.S. had a truly dualistic aid program, with a strong diplomatic orientation combined with a significant developmental purpose (Lancaster 2007). Congress provided perennial support for aid throughout the 1960s and 1970s. What began as an instrument of Cold War diplomacy had become a permanent element of relations between states.

With the end of the Cold War, one of the key rationales for aid giving was eliminated: the United States no longer had to worry about protecting certain parts of the globe from Soviet influence. Despite this loss, it was soon replaced by other important factors, and the amount of foreign aid rose modestly in the 1990s. It also enjoyed renewed support from Congress as a whole. Though this increase was initially for emergency assistance, debt relief, and education, it signaled resurgence in foreign aid.

Foreign aid also garnered attention under the George W. Bush administration, as he led the United States to join in the Millennium Development Goals, which aimed to eradicate extreme poverty, reduce child mortality rates, fight AIDS, and develop a global partnership for development. In addition, he also made foreign aid one of his top foreign policy priorities after the September 11, 2001 terror attacks.

Despite this resurgence, Congress has not enacted a major foreign assistance authorization into law since 1985. While authorization bills passed easily in the 1960s, they often came under attack during the 1970s and early 1980s. Since 1985, foreign aid bills have frequently stalled at some point in the debate because of controversial issues, a tight legislative calendar, or executive-legislative foreign policy disputes. This paradox of a foreign aid resurgence juxtaposed with the fact that foreign aid authorizations have not passed in over a quarter of a century, further highlights the puzzle of foreign aid. It also highlights the need to understand why legislators have either supported or opposed foreign assistance throughout the last 60 years.

Literature Review

A great deal of literature has been completed studying foreign aid; a significant portion of which has focused on the goals of donor countries and the reasons they may give certain types of aid to specific countries. Except for studies comparing the aid policies of different presidential administrations, this work tends to “black box” the state. Very little of the analysis has focused on the decision-makers, especially at the legislative level. Questions remain about the effects of party, presidential influence, region, public opinion, and interest groups on foreign aid policy.

Foreign aid

Literature on foreign aid can be divided into two groups, effectiveness and allocation. Since this paper's focus is on the support of funding for foreign aid, this literature review will concentrate on the latter. After World War II, theorists argued that American foreign aid was allocated according to Cold War strategic and ideological interests (Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998; Meernik, Krueger and Poe 1998). Since then, many foreign policy analysts argue that the end of the Cold War has released the U.S. government from the need to direct every international action toward the pursuit of national security, and that policy makers may now devote greater attention and resources to the international promotion of U.S. ideological values, such as democracy and human rights (Allison and Beschel 1992; Clad and Stone 1993; Deibel 1992; Diamond 1992; Gaddis 1992; Hehir 1992; Jervis 1991-1992; 1992; Kegley 1993). Indeed, Meernik et al (1998) argue that the U.S. is increasingly rewarding democratic states with foreign aid, while reducing assistance to other strategically important nations; signaling that ideological goals have become more critical than security driven goals.

Systemic approaches like those mentioned above seek to identify the primary determinant of state behavior in the arena of international relations.³ These studies have focused on American foreign aid policy as well as other countries, and have all come to similar conclusions and have had similar failures. Schraeder et al (1998) find that Japanese foreign aid is driven by the economic self-interest of the state, Swedish foreign

³ Meernik et al (1998) also address two other approaches. The societal approach is rooted in the study of domestic politics, focusing on the foreign policy goals of the most political and powerful interests. The statist approach holds that the goals of the state are most important. However, these approaches have been highly neglected in the study of foreign aid, in addition, they still do not delve as deeply into this issue as does this dissertation.

aid can be explained by the “middle power theory,”⁴ and French foreign aid promotes the spread of French culture and is affected by cultural similarities between donor and recipient. Similarly, Alesina and Dollar (2000) found that colonial pasts and political alliances were major determinants of foreign aid. Finally, Lebovic (2005) showed that traditional models fail to account for a theoretically important variable, a windfall profit that countries receive from their primary donors. According to his data, indirect effects of primary donor relationships linked to donor interests exerted substantial upward pressure on the foreign aid budgets of the U.S., Japan, France, and Britain from 1970 to 1995.

While each of these studies acknowledged the importance strategic interests play in whether and why states provide foreign aid, none of them addressed whether individual decision makers could influence these decisions, or what factors could affect what decisions they make. A recent article has applied opposing international relations theories to the topic of U.S. foreign policy, specifically, to foreign trade and aid (Milner and Tingley 2011). They studied votes on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1979 to 2004 to assess the impact of domestic factors such as political economy and ideological preferences as opposed to foreign policy pressures. They concluded that aid preferences are as affected by domestic political and economic factors as are trade preferences, though presidential preferences only affected trade issues, while having little to no effect on aid ones. Finally, aid preferences are shaped more by ideological factors than are trade ones. This research marks an important addition to aid research. While it still addresses the statist policies of international relations, it also studies domestic factors and individual decision makers. Another segment of political science literature has

⁴ Sweden’s status as a “middle power” limits its aid budget, thus limiting it to one region – Southern Africa.

focused on the effect of individual policy makers, specifically, on the differences between the foreign aid policies of American presidential administrations.

Presidential Influence

Political scientists have compared the different foreign aid strategies of presidents from Harry Truman to George H. W. Bush, though only limited work exists studying the presidencies that came before Jimmy Carter.⁵ Indeed, much of the literature focuses on the comparison between presidents Carter and Reagan. Perhaps political scientists focused on these presidencies because there was such a sharp distinction between the rhetoric of their foreign aid policies (Carleton and Stohl 1985). Under Carter, human rights abroad became an important professed political objective and foreign aid hinged on 'basic human needs' and development planning. Reagan however asserted the primacy of Cold War issues, preeminent among them being the struggle against communism. Despite the gap between the rhetoric of these two administrations, there was also a gap between their rhetoric and reality. Research has shown that political and military considerations predominated the foreign assistance policy of both the Carter and Reagan administrations (Carleton and Stohl 1985; Lebovic 1998).

Apodaca and Stohl (1999) furthered the inquiry into how different administrations can affect foreign aid. They found that, rhetoric aside, human rights considerations did play a role in determining whether or not a state received military aid during both the Reagan and Bush administrations, but not in the Carter or Clinton administrations. In addition, human rights violations reduced the odds of receiving economic aid for every

⁵ Radelet (2003) addressed Truman's influence on post-World War II policy, and Drezner (2000) wrote of Kennedy's influence on "missionary institutions" such as the State Department Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and the Peace Corps.

administration except Clinton's. Though the authors found that human rights did influence whether and how much economic aid a country received.

Beyond the focus on rhetoric, scholars have also studied the power presidents have over foreign policy in general. In 1966, Aaron Wildavsky published an article titled "The Two Presidencies." In it, he provided quantitative evidence showing that presidents exercise greater influence over foreign affairs than they do over domestic affairs. In other words, they have a "free hand" regarding foreign policies. A key reason for this is the considerable amount of information presidents have regarding foreign affairs (Cane-Wrone et al 2008). In addition, presidents are held accountable for both domestic and foreign policy during reelection.⁶ Though Wildavsky published his theory more than 40 years ago, recent work corroborates his findings (Cane-Wrone et al 2008). In addition, Norman Ornstein wrote that the two presidencies were in "full force" in the George W. Bush administration and with "real and direct" policy implications (2001).

Not all scholars accept the two presidencies hypothesis. Sigelman (1979) showed that between 1957 and 1978, a two presidencies effect did not exist on roll call votes that the Congressional Quarterly coded as key votes. Zeidenstein (1981) corroborated this, although he found a two presidencies effect on key votes in the Senate for Republican presidents. Schraufnagel and Shellman (2001) found it to be a time-bound theory, and argued that analyses of roll call votes in the modern era offer no support for the two presidencies hypothesis. Fleisher et al (2000) similarly established that foreign policy has become less bipartisan over time. Clearly, Congress can also influence foreign policy, as is evidenced by some of the major legislation it has passed in this arena.

⁶ Despite the fact that research shows that foreign policy has low public salience, research also indicates it is persistently a factor in presidential elections (Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida, 1989).

Though these studies delved further into the differences of individual administrations and their foreign aid policies, they still did not address what factors influence what type of foreign aid policy a president will pursue. Nor did they attempt to answer what influences legislators could wield or why they would choose to.

Human Rights

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. wrote, “The United States was founded on the proclamation of ‘unalienable’ rights, and human rights ever since have had a peculiar resonance in the American Tradition” (1978). Despite this, the U.S. did not show significant interest in international human rights until the mid-1970s.⁷ Between 1973 and the end of the first Reagan administration, Congress placed a number of human rights laws on the books. In addition, it made numerous attempts to rollback aid payments that had been made to human rights violators, and on several occasions, they succeeded (Forsythe 1987). During the 1980s and mid 1990s, a bipartisan majority in Congress frequently challenged presidential human rights policies through legislation (Forsythe 1990). In so doing, it altered aspects of U.S. foreign policy in such places as South Africa, Chile, Guatemala, and sporadically in El Salvador and Nicaragua.

A significant amount of the human rights literature has focused on a study published by Cingranelli and Pasquarello in 1985. They suggested that the decision to provide foreign aid involves a two-stage decision-making process: the gate-keeping stage, in which it is decided whether or not a country is to be given aid; and a second

⁷ The United States had shown contempt for human rights before this. Congress compelled the Truman administration to retreat from a partially supportive position in the development of international human rights regimes. In this matter, it codetermined foreign policy, and should claim some of the responsibility for the subsequent collapse of human rights policy during the Eisenhower administration (Forsythe 1990).

stage in which it is determined how much aid countries will receive.⁸ The more controversial part of their research hinged on the argument that Congress considered whether or not a state was a human rights violator when determining whether to grant or withhold aid, especially in Latin America (1985). Further analysis of their research has put these findings in doubt. Carleton and Stohl (1985; 1987) found a lack of robustness in the original results. Similarly, research completed by McCormick and Mitchell (1988) also found the original results were problematic, and questioned the importance human rights play in U.S. foreign aid policy.

Additional research has found a more nuanced answer to the question of whether human rights can effect the distribution of aid dollars. In his study focusing on aid allocation to Western Hemisphere countries and to a sample of countries from around the world, Poe (1992) found that human rights considerations were important in determining the outcome of economic aid decisions. In other words, legislators had serious reservations about granting aid to states that were human rights violators. Poe also noted that human rights considerations are not of unsurpassed importance, but rather are melded with a variety of political and strategic concerns in addition to recipient need in determining the eventual outcomes of foreign aid decision-making processes. This was confirmed by Apodaca and Stohl (1999) who acknowledged that, rhetoric aside, human rights considerations did play a role in determining whether or not a state received military aid during the Reagan and Bush administrations, though it did not have an absolute role. While human rights considerations may help shape policies, especially

⁸ The two-stage hypothesis is supported by many political scientists, including Poe (1991; 1992) and Poe and Tate (1994).

post-Cold War policies, past limitations still constrain the amount of influence any one President or Congress can wield (Dietrich 2006; Moore 1998).

This literature, much like the other work done about foreign aid policy, only focuses on the overall policy aims, and not on the policy makers. It does not answer why American foreign policy, though long characterized by *machtpolitik*, took a turn to more ethical traditions; a change that was started by Congress in the 1970s (Forsythe 1980).⁹ Additionally, it does not explain why members of Congress voted to pass a series of bills linking foreign aid and trade benefits to the status of human rights in foreign countries (Apodaca and Stohl 1999).¹⁰ Clearly, there exists a need to improve our knowledge of why legislators support or oppose foreign aid.

Congress and Foreign Policy

Congressional scholars have not focused on foreign aid, but have addressed the effects of such issues as party, public opinion and interest groups in relation to foreign policy. In his analysis of national security policy, Almond (1956) noted that any thoroughgoing analysis of national policy making is made of five elements: the formal government agencies, the media, interest groups, the attentive public, and the massive public. Though Almond noted this in the 1950s, it was not until the 1970s that political scientists earnestly began to study foreign policy in this manner; the lack of interest by

⁹ From 1977 to 1980 the U.S. terminated military assistance to Uruguay, Argentina, and The Ethiopian Marxist government. Later, direct military and economic assistance was barred to the Central African Empire, Chile, Mozambique, Angola, and Vietnam. Aid was also restored to South Korea, Philippines, and Cambodia.

¹⁰ Notably, the Harkin Amendment (Section 116) of the International Development and Food Assistance; Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act; The international Security and Arms Export Control Act; the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Reform Act, and Section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act.

scholars mirrored that of legislators. Foreign aid and human rights policy garnered only limited support from 1945 until the end of the Korean War. From 1953 until the mid-1970s, this component of foreign policy experienced a great deal of neglect from policy makers and Congress (Forsythe 1990).

Senator Robert Taft stated in 1951 that “members of Congress...have a constitutional obligation to reexamine constantly and discuss the foreign policy of the United States” (Taft and Wunderlin 2006, 231), but Congress saw its power to do so greatly diminish in the 1950s and 1960s as the power of the President increased. Indeed, it did not inject itself into the Korean conflict until April of 1951, after Truman had fired General MacArthur, and nearly a year after hostilities had started (Crabb and Holt 1984). Yet, with the passage of the War Powers Act of 1973, Congress attempted to reassert its power in military policy by transforming the process by which the United States could be drawn into military hostilities.

With Congress’ greater involvement with foreign policy, especially that which focused on military conflict came analysis of these policies by political scientists. This analysis has focused on several of the major issues Almond outlined, the first of which is the effect of public opinion on military policy. Burstein and Freudenburg (1978) studied how long-term changes in public policy come about, applying their approach to the aggregate change of mind by the U.S. Senate as it moved from support of the Vietnam War to opposition of it. They found that although public opinion and war costs were so tightly correlated they could not include both types of variables in the equation, either type individually had a strong and consistent predictive effect on Senate voting throughout the Vietnam War. On a different note, the Chicago Council on Foreign

Relations study of foreign policy attitudes of Americans has tracked the importance of domestic and foreign policy to American voters (Reilly 1987).

Another major area of foreign policy literature focuses on the effect of interest groups. Indeed, interest groups have long been a part of American politics and foreign policy, from the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom aimed to keep the U.S. out of World War I, to the Committee of One Million in the 1950s and 1960s, which pressed to keep the U.S. committed to the defense of Nationalist China (Lindsay 1994). Analysts also point to many examples verifying the power of the defense lobby: the transition to the B-1 bomber (Kotz 1988); the close links between Pentagon procurement officials, private sector contractors, and members of the House and Senate (Ripley and Franklin 1987); and the increase of campaign donations from defense interest groups (Ripley and Franklin 1987), just to name a few. Beyond the defense lobby, political scientists also point to the power of ethnic lobbies on Capitol Hill. Specifically, Campbell, Rae and Stack (2003) described the success of the Armenian-American lobby to garner support and awareness of the needs of their compatriots overseas.

Finally, political scientists have also tried to measure the effect of ideology. McCormick (1985) compared the relative utility of ideology, party, presidential support, and regionalism in understanding congressional voting on several nuclear freeze proposals in 1982 and 1983. He found that both ideology and presidential support provide good explanations for freeze voting over these years, whereas region and party prove to be relatively less important. Bernstein and Anthony (1974) also found that legislators voted according to their ideological stances in their study on the adoption of the ABM issue in the Senate. Not all scholars think ideology and policy interests are

sacrosanct, and argue that legislators are also driven by the sense of duty (Lindsay 1994) and a desire to win reelection (Hall 1996).

Despite this important work, we still lack an in-depth knowledge of how legislators make decisions regarding foreign policy, especially regarding the puzzle of foreign aid. In order to increase this understanding, I will set forth several hypotheses to study the influence of not just interest groups and policy interests, but also of constituents, political party and institutions. These hypotheses will be drawn primarily from research on congressional behavior.

Competing Theories of Decision Making

Perhaps the element that is lacking most from analysis of foreign aid policy is a theory of individual decision making. This is an area that is extremely well developed in the study of Congress, and is starting to become more developed in the study of foreign policy. Because foreign policy decision making theorists have focused on the importance of rational choice and psychology as they apply to individuals (Goldgeier and Tetlock 2001; Mercer 2005; Tetlock 1999; Quattrone and Tversky 1989; Kahneman and Tversky 1979 and 1984; Farnham 1992; Rabin 1998), I will focus on the research completed by studying the American Congress.

Congressional decision making is one of the more theoretically developed areas within the field of legislative behavior (Rieselbach 1984). Research in this field began during the behavioral revolution of the 1950s, and scholars have since come to understand the importance of behavioral analyses in the study of legislators in general (Collie 1985). The multitude of subsequent studies have, to varying degrees, tried to

identify patterns of legislative voting to establish the determinants and implications of these patterns. These patterns have become even more important as congressional decision making has become more complicated, and as the amount of information available to legislators has increased (Matthews and Stimson 1970; Eulau 1967). Scholars have found that members of Congress alternatively are influenced by political parties, the executive branch, constituencies, colleagues within the legislature, interest groups and many other factors (Kingdon 1981). This work can be summarized into the following areas, upon which this dissertation will focus: partisan forces, political parties, constituents, individual policy preferences and organized interest groups.

The first line of thought that will be addressed is the argument that partisan forces can influence members' choices and strategies, and in so doing, can also have an effect on policy choices. Research has shown that the organization of Congress, and government in general, constrains and shapes members' options and decisions (Schwartz 1987); but it is the partisans operating in this structure that are so influential. This can come in the form of senior members wielding their influence over freshmen members (Matthew 1959), or leaders holding important influence over committee and caucus members (Binder, Lawrence, Maltzman 1999). This phenomenon was notable with the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations in the 1960s, also known as the "Passman Subcommittee," named after powerful Chair Otto E. Passman (D-LA). While a few of the subcommittee members were consistently for or against certain issues, the rest favored programs only when the White House was controlled by their same party (CQ Almanac 1961).¹¹

¹¹ Passman was actually one of the subcommittee members who was consistently against the mutual security funds requested by the executive branch, no matter which party was in power. Passman fought

There are also external constraints on Congress that effect decision making. Both the Senate and the Supreme Court constrain House members when they cast roll call votes (Martin 2001). As noted earlier, presidents also wield a high amount of influence over foreign policy, leading some scholars to refer to this as a “free hand.” Scholars have also noted that the increase in polarization of Congress has changed how this institution functions, and has had an effect on how, and if, policy is made (Binder 2003). Indeed, any study of what amounts to be policy gridlock would be remiss if it did not consider party polarization.

A second area that scholars have argued affects congressional decision-making is that of political parties. In their work *Legislative Leviathan*, Cox and McCubbins (1994a) compared parties to cartels, and argued that the majority party binds its members to support caucus decisions in the House on a variety of key structural matters. They furthered this statement by writing that the rules of the Democratic Caucus in the House dictate that all caucus members are bound to support caucus decisions if they wish to retain their membership (1994b). More substantively, they argue that to the extent that membership in the majority party’s caucus is valuable, it will affect policy decisions made by House members.

Many more political scientists have argued the importance of parties. Kingdon (1981) found that legislators engage in an extended search for information only rarely, but instead rely on cues provided by a number of sources: party leadership and ranking committee leaders being chief among them.¹² Binder, Lawrence and Maltzman (1999)

doggedly against foreign aid, and in a September 2nd, 1961 interview with Congressional Quarterly, he referred to foreign aid as “propaganda,” “self-defeating,” and that it was “bleeding the American people and dissipating our resources” (CQ 1961, 311-312).

¹² Though trusted colleagues and even the executive branch can also provide cues.

also established that the priorities and directives of the party in Congress trump personal preferences in floor voting.

Some international relations scholars have studied political parties and how they may influence foreign aid. These studies each compare various donor countries, and measure whether parties effect foreign aid policy. Louis M. Imbeau (1988; 1989) examined 17 countries from 1963 to 1981, using the percentage of votes obtained by each party as an indicator of party strength. He found that more left oriented countries give more aid...but the results were “fragile.” Similarly, Marijke Breuning (1995) suggests there is no simple, straightforward relationship between partisan analysis of parliamentary debates on foreign aid in Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK. Finally, in their analysis of the foreign aid policies of 16 OECD countries, Therien and Noel (2000) found that while political parties may not matter in the short run, they might have an indirect long-term influence over foreign aid policy.

The third area of importance is that of constituents. The classic textbook account of representative democracy is that representatives attempt to translate the public’s view into government action; the ideal view of which is that legislators represent and act on the interests of the electorate. A cursory examination of American politics reveals that this is not the reality of modern democracy. The relationship between elected representatives and their constituencies is complicated and multifaceted (Miller and Stokes 1963). One of the major difficulties with constituency influence over decision-making is the degree to which congressmen and senators accurately ascertain the preferences of their constituencies. It can be difficult for members of Congress to correctly assess the wishes and policy preferences of their constituents, and to accurately evaluate whether those

preferences will affect them in future campaigns and elections. Despite this, members still take the perceived opinions of their constituents, both present and potential, into account when making decisions (Fenno 1978). In addition, Arnold (1990) found that citizens, who have no opinions about a policy at the time it is being formed and considered, could still have a large effect on legislators' decisions. Indeed he found that collective goods and pork barrel projects are provided to these constituents with the hope that they will respond favorably by voting to reelect the member of Congress at a future point.

This may be especially salient in the area of foreign policy. While it is not generally considered to be a large factor in congressional elections (Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan 2002; Jacobson 1996), its potential to be a hot-button issue during an election may be an incentive for leaders to support such issues. It is perennially considered to be a "soap box" issue as well (Irwin 2000). Since the 1960s, the American people have become increasingly ambivalent about foreign policy. Indeed, throughout the 1990s, the public was largely concerned with domestic policy problems and perhaps even complacent about global issues (Campbell, Rae and Stack 2003). Despite this, crises such as famines or violence in developing countries have the potential to garner the attention of the American public. Political scientists know surprisingly little about contemporary public opinion toward human rights or foreign aid, or about its influence over policy (Welch and Forsythe 1983). While it has been argued that the American public wants a moral or human rights component in U.S. foreign policy (Yankelovich 1978), the effect of this remains unclear (Cohen 1978).

Understanding constituents' opinions and wishes can be an extremely difficult task; it can be time-consuming, expensive, and often risky. Scholars have found that constituent preferences affect congressional decision making, and can influence floor votes and the allocation of funds, but it is unclear whether this analysis also applies to foreign aid policy.

A fourth way congressional decision making can be influenced is by personal policy preferences. Many prominent political scientists have long argued that roll-call behavior is strongly influenced by personal policy preferences (Miller and Stokes 1963; Clausen 1973; Wilcox and Clausen 1991; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Kingdon (1981) argued that concentrating on the many influences in the legislative system should not obscure the fact that congressmen themselves hold their own beliefs and attitudes. This is also supported by Stewart (2001), despite his emphasis on the importance of institutions on legislative outcomes; he also highlighted the fact that strategic actors behave according to their preferences. Krehbiel (1995) also highlighted the importance of preferences, as he argues that a legislator's preference will trump the pressure applied by the party to vote in a specific manner.

Beyond acting upon their specific policy preferences, legislators can also be policy entrepreneurs. Elected officials look for policy windows as opportunities to advocate proposals, push pet projects or bring attention to specific problems (Kingdon 1995). In this theory, the policy decision-making process is likened to a "policy stream" in which proposals, alternatives and solutions float about, waiting to be discussed, revised and discussed again. Accordingly, legislators are active policy entrepreneurs, waiting to push their preferences when a policy window opens. Whiteman (1985) has also argued

that legislators use policy analysis to determine which policy is preferred and should be pursued. He writes that congressmen use strategic analysis to determine the best course of action.

As this review has shown, the major areas of influence political scientists have studied are: partisan forces, political party, constituents, and policy preferences. Each of these has an influence on decision making, and will serve as the base of the hypotheses that will be presented in the empirical chapters. In addition, the influence of organized interest groups may also play a part in decision making. The literature in this arena generally accepts that interest groups do not dominate congressional behavior, but their campaign contributions can have varying effects (Hall and Wayman 1990; Romer and Snyder 1994; Wright 1985). However, according to Vogelgesang (1980), human rights interest groups were sometimes the single most decisive factor in American policy on human rights, rivaling the effectiveness of the pro-Israel lobby. Welch and Forsythe (1983) also noted the cumulative influence human rights lobbies could wield.

The Puzzle of Foreign Aid

Foreign aid has become an important tool of American foreign policy, yet political scientists have not answered the question: Why do members of Congress support measures to extend foreign aid? Similarly, they have yet to explain the variation over time in Congress's willingness to support foreign aid. The classic answer that legislators are single-minded seekers of re-election holds little water here, since the public at large knows little about foreign policy and even less about foreign aid. Likewise, the influence of interest groups and other partisan forces over foreign aid legislation is still unknown.

In this dissertation, I develop a framework to understand the conditions under which foreign aid bills pass, and why legislators vote for them. By better understanding this, we will gain greater insight into not only American foreign policy, but also into what factors influence decision-makers in general.

Outline of the Dissertation

Chapter 2 presents a detailed history of foreign aid in the United States. It summarizes the legislation and debate that have addressed foreign aid in Congress throughout the past century. While the empirical chapters of this dissertation will focus on aid legislation from 1961 to present, the history chapter will take a broader view. Debate over foreign aid began in the nineteenth century, and the U.S. first started providing it in the early part of the twentieth century. After World War II, providing aid became an important part of American foreign policy, and the debates shifted from whether the U.S. should provide aid at all, to what types of aid and how much.¹³ This chapter will put the history of foreign assistance into the context of the larger American political picture and will also address whether there are any patterns of congressional behavior regarding foreign aid legislation.

Chapter 3 takes a macro look at Congress and foreign aid, analyzing why foreign aid legislation passes. In order to complete a longitudinal study of congressional decision making and foreign aid, I will focus on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and its annual authorizations and appropriations. It will explore further the research completed by scholars regarding congressional decision making, and will present several hypotheses

¹³ Though some legislators still debate whether aid should be provided, this is no longer the main focus of foreign aid debates.

to explain legislative behavior and how it applies to foreign aid legislation. This chapter will also explain the data, methodology and results of quantitative analysis I employ to study this matter. Finally, I will explain the results, and how they answer the central question of this chapter: why does foreign aid legislation pass?

Chapter 4 takes a micro look at Congress and foreign aid, focusing on why individual legislators support or oppose foreign aid. It will also employ the major theories of legislative behavior, focusing on roll call votes of the FAA and its annual appropriations and authorizations over eight congresses from 1961 and 2007. By studying FAA votes I will identify which factors are significant in whether a member of Congress votes for a bill.

Chapter 5 will synthesize the findings found in both the history chapter and the empirical chapters, and draw conclusions. It will also discuss the importance of these findings to the study of foreign policy in both international relations and American politics. Finally, I will address further avenues of research that would enhance the study of foreign aid and foreign policy.

Chapter 2

Foreign Aid in the U.S. Congress: Legislating the City Upon a Hill

The idea of American moralism and exceptionalism is older than the country itself. Proponents of foreign aid often refer to a speech given by Massachusetts Bay Governor John Winthrop in 1630 in which he said, “We shall be as a City upon a Hill, the eyes of all people are upon us.” References to statements like this, and the familiarity of foreign aid as a policy, make it easy to assume it has been a long-standing part of American foreign policy. However, the U.S. government did not begin providing foreign aid on a consistent basis until the twentieth century. Indeed, Hans Morgenthau wrote famously that foreign aid is among the “real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy” (Morgenthau 1962, 301). This chapter will provide an in-depth look into the history of foreign assistance in the United States, with a special focus on foreign aid legislation and the issues and politics within Congress regarding these issues.

Members of Congress first started debating foreign aid in the nineteenth century, but it did not become an important part of U.S. foreign policy until after World War II. The Marshall Plan was enacted shortly after the war, and was the first long-term foreign assistance plan in U.S. history. Since that time, the U.S. has provided foreign aid on an

annual basis to countries throughout the world, but the bills that have authorized and appropriated the funds have usually been hotly debated...and have not always passed. In fact, a large-scale authorization bill for foreign aid has not passed since 1985. Several major patterns help to explain the ups and downs of foreign aid legislation. First, as party polarization has increased, so has the likelihood that foreign aid bills would fail. Similarly, the increase of the foreign-born population has caused foreign aid bills to be embroiled in more controversy and be less likely to pass. Finally, several partisan factors have influenced foreign aid bill passage, most notably, the party and ideology of the president.

Early Debates over Foreign Aid

Modern foreign aid began in earnest after World War II, but the debate over it began long before. In the early- to mid-nineteenth century, providing aid for other countries was unacceptable to most people, and almost unheard of. For example, between 1845 and 1852, the Irish Potato Famine claimed an estimated one million lives, and the U.S. Congress debated whether to provide aid. The argument that giving charity to people outside of America's borders was an inappropriate use of public funds won the debate, and no aid was provided (Lancaster 2007, 26).

By the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, aid for disaster or humanitarian relief had become widely accepted and provided. In addition, the U.S. was actually providing assistance to improve public health, public works and education to countries that it occupied militarily, such as Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. But the idea that the U.S. should gift sizable amounts of

resources to another country (or to an international organization or nongovernmental organization) for a sustained amount of time was still unheard of (Lancaster 2007).¹⁴

After World War I, attitudes towards foreign aid began to shift. After more than four years of war had ravaged the European continent, it was clear that assistance to the displaced and dispossessed was necessary. During the war, the United States contributed to the Commission for Relief in Belgium, an international organization that provided food to German-occupied Belgium and northern France (Gay and Fischer 1929).¹⁵ After the war, President Hoover continued food distribution to European countries through the American Relief Administration. In addition, the U.S. Congress passed the Russian Famine Relief Act of 1921, joining several other European countries in providing food aid to the Soviet Union (Lancaster 2007, 26).

During World War II, the U.S. provided Latin American governments with small amounts of publicly financed technical assistance for development purposes.¹⁶ In 1942, the U.S. government created two corporations to manage this assistance: The Institute of Inter-American Affairs and the Inter-American Education Foundation. At the time, the major motivation in providing aid was the disruption in Latin American exports to Europe as a result of the war; however, it was also intended to help ease the impact of shrinking markets and to retain the loyalties of the governments in Latin America. In addition, it acted as an antecedent to public aid (Lancaster 2007).

¹⁴ Though there was no official public aid, some charitable foundations and religious organizations, such as missionary societies that operated schools in Africa and other areas, provided private aid.

¹⁵ The United States contributed \$387 million to the Commission, the French Treasury provided \$204 million, and the British government contributed \$109 million. An additional \$200 million was donated by non-governmental sources (Gay and Fischer 1929, Chapter IV).

¹⁶ This came on the heels of similar policies instituted by the French and British governments towards their colonies. Before that, they held the view that colonies should be self-financing, with development funded through private investment or the colonial governments themselves. However, in the mid-1920s, as the degree of poverty in the colonies became known, England and France shifted their views on how aid and development should be provided.

As the war was ending, the need for emergency relief in the war-torn countries of Europe and Asia was evident. To meet these needs, allied planners created the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) and the International Refugee Organization. Most of the funding came from the United States, and was mandated to be short-lived. Congress set termination dates for the aid: 1946 for Europe, and 1947 for Asia. True to its intent, UNRRA was ended in both regions in 1947. Another significant policy that effected foreign aid policy was the Bretton Woods Agreement Act (1945), which authorized U.S. participation in multilateral development banks. In addition, the international community established the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) on December 27, 1945.

In 1947, the United States provided aid for Greece and Turkey, signaling not just a shift in how aid was legislated and administered, but it was also the beginning of the Truman Doctrine. Indeed, the speech President Truman made to Congress appealing for aid to Greece and Turkey is what scholars and politicians cite as the beginning of the Truman Doctrine. In the speech, Truman stated that it would be "the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." He further argued, "I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time. One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion" (Truman 1947). Beyond the speech, White House documents show that Truman specifically focused on

the importance aid would have on building stronger democracies in Greece and Turkey, rather than on dollars and cents or on the fact that Great Britain had recently withdrawn aid from these two countries. Even going so far as saying that in the presentation of the plan to the public, “the concept of individual liberty is basic, and the protection of democracy everywhere in the world. It is not a matter of vague do-goodism, it is a matter of protecting our whole way of life and protecting the nation itself” (Jones 1947).

It is clear that the administration viewed the economic crises of Greece and Turkey as extremely important. One staff member even wrote that it was one of the “gravest problems of national security ever to confront the nation,” only less than an armed conflict because there was still time to work out a “program of peaceful salvation.” From this document, it is clear the administration viewed aid as an important tool to combat communism, especially with their proximity to the Soviet Union and the Middle East, these two countries were geographically important. Yet, later in the same document, the importance of helping countries survive the post-war chaos is highlighted, showing the dual aim of aid (Truman Staff 1947).¹⁷ It was policies like this that made up the Truman Doctrine, and underpinned American Cold War policy in Europe and around the world.

The Marshall Plan

In addition to short-term assistance policies, the United States recognized that a long-term plan was needed to deal with the substantial losses, both physical and

¹⁷ There was also an element of fear involved. In a speech given by Dean Acheson, he argued, “in such a period of economic disorganization, uncertainty, want and fear--extremism can not fail to grow (Acheson 1947).

economic, Europe suffered during the war. In response to the calls for assistance, Congress enacted the Economic Cooperation Act on April 2, 1948, or as it is more commonly known, the Marshall Plan. While the IMF and the World Bank were created as permanent institutions, the goal of the Marshall Plan was specific: to stabilize Europe, not as a permanent program for European recovery but as an emergency tool for assistance (USAID 2011).

Passage of the Marshall Plan was preceded by exhaustive debate in Congress, as lawmakers scrutinized every minute detail of the bill, and addressed not only the mechanics of its provisions and their relevance to U.S. economics and politics, but also the philosophies and doctrines involved (CQ Almanac 1949). Final approval was overwhelming, and Congressional action regarding the Marshall Plan was considered to be a great example of bipartisanship. In fact, the platforms of both parties at the time favored it.¹⁸

This support from Congress was carefully garnered, and strongly influenced by the president's strong pro-aid stance. It is reported that the administration had staff travel to France to work with the Europeans in the formulation of the recovery plan. The staff urged the Europeans to scale down drastically their early estimate of dollar requirements "to a figure which might be acceptable to the U.S. Congress" (Marshall 1952). In addition, Congress was also involved the formulation of the Marshall Plan. Rep. Mike Mansfield (D-MT) was a member of the Joint Senate-House Committee, which made a

¹⁸ The 1948 Democratic Party Platform stated: We pledge a sound, humanitarian administration of the Marshall Plan (www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29599#axzz1ReOzR9G4). The 1948 Republican Party Platform stated: Within prudent limits of our own economic welfare, we shall cooperate, on a basis of self-help and mutual aid, to assist other peace-loving nations to restore their economic independence and the human rights and fundamental freedoms for which we fought two wars and upon which dependable peace must build. We shall insist on businesslike and efficient administration of all foreign aid (<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25836#axzz1ReOzR9G4>).

visit to Europe to observe the humanitarian issues. He reported back about the crises of malnutrition, tuberculosis and drought, and argued strongly that temporary assistance was needed in Europe (Clifford Papers 1947).¹⁹

Though there was strong support for the Marshall Plan in Congress, information was still put forth to the public to try to garner support. President Truman had former President Hoover make a trip to Germany and Austria and write a report about the destruction. The report showed the public the dire need these countries had for assistance (German Agricultural and Food Requirements 1947). In addition, Secretary of State George Marshall, after whom the Marshall Plan is named, gave an address to the graduating class of Harvard University on June 5, 1947, in which he presented a rationale for U.S. aid. In the speech, he outlined the devastation of Europe, and made a plea for Americans to support the aid by stating, “The truth of the matter is that Europe’s requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products—principally from America—are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social and political deterioration of a very grave character.” Marshall went on to outline how not providing aid would actually hurt the United States, “Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbance arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the

¹⁹ Mansfield specifically wanted to build up the steel and coal production in the Ruhr Valley.

return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace.”²⁰

In an interview in 1952, Marshall admitted that the “cardinal consideration during the period from the end of the Moscow Conference until my Harvard speech was to time properly the offer of the U.S. assistance so as to assure domestic acceptance of the proposal” (Marshall 1952). He also recalled that they travelled so widely to drum up support for the Marshall Plan that it “almost seemed as though we were running for office.”

The administration and members of Congress also made efforts to argue that by providing foreign assistance, they would also be strengthening democracy throughout Europe. These efforts were not just made domestically. Rep. Mansfield wrote that an information program needed to be launched to counteract misinformation being spread by Soviets... so Western Europe knew of the source of U.S. aid (Clifford Papers 1947). Secretary Marshall also stated that the U.S. proposal was aimed at “hunger poverty, and chaos and not against any group and my inclusion of all Europe including the Soviet Union and her satellites” (1947).

The Marshall Plan was originally only formally authorized to run for one year, but the 81st Congress favored the program, and enacted legislation to extend it; authorizing all the funds that were requested by the agency. The extension passed easily in 1949, by a vote of 70-7 in the Senate, and 355-49 in the House (CQ Almanac 1949). In the end, the Marshall Plan was a large-scale, four-year, \$13 billion program that provided aid and

²⁰ Reception to this speech was very positive, and successfully brought the “discussion back to economic aid, where it rightly belonged (Acheson 1947).

stability to Europe; it is often considered the first great foreign aid program (Radelet 2003).

The Marshall Plan aid was mostly used for the purchase of goods from the United States. The European nations had all but exhausted their foreign exchange reserves during the war, and the Marshall Plan represented almost their sole means of importing goods from abroad. At the start of the plan these imports were mainly much-needed staples such as food and fuel, but later the purchases turned towards reconstruction needs as was originally intended. In the latter years, under pressure from the United States Congress and with the outbreak of the Korean War, an increasing amount of the aid was spent on rebuilding the militaries of Western Europe.

The Marshall Plan lasted four years, and is consistently regarded as a great success. By 1952 when the funding ended, the economy of every participant state had surpassed pre-war levels. For all Marshall Plan recipients, output in 1951 was at least 35 percent higher than in 1938 (Eichengreen 2008, 57). In the words of Carol Lancaster, “Foreign aid had commenced” (2007, 28).

The 1950s – post-Marshall Plan and pre-Foreign Assistance Act

When the Marshall Plan ended on June 30, 1951, Congress was in the process of piecing together a new foreign aid proposal designed to unite military and economic programs with technical assistance. This plan became a reality on Halloween when Congress passed the Mutual Security Act of 1951, and created the Mutual Security Agency. Congress spent the rest of the decade trying to reorganize foreign assistance, which mainly included creating and re-organizing agencies. In 1953, the Foreign

Operations Administration was established as an independent government agency outside the State Department, to consolidate economic and technical assistance on a worldwide basis. Its responsibilities were merged into the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) one year later.²¹

The Mutual Security Act of 1954 introduced the concepts of development assistance, security assistance, a discretionary contingency fund, and guarantees for private investments. The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 or as it is more commonly known, the Food for Peace program, was also implemented that year, introducing food aid.²² Congressional approval of a revised Mutual Security Act in 1957 led to the creation of the Development Loan Fund (DLF), which acted as the ICA's lending arm. The DLF's primary function was to extend loans of a kind that the Export-Import Bank and other donors were not interested in or prepared to underwrite - those repayable in local currencies. The DLF financed everything other than technical assistance but was most noteworthy for financing capital projects.

Neither the ICA nor the DLF addressed the need for a long-range foreign development program. The failure of these policies and consistent attempts to reorganize legislation began to wear on Congress and the White House. Opposition to foreign aid from both parties increased between 1952 and 1961 (Truman 1962). In addition, President Eisenhower attempted to “curtail foreign aid” as he and his staff were not

²¹ The ICA administered aid for economic, political and social development purposes. Although the ICA's functions were vast and far reaching, unlike USAID, ICA had many limitations placed upon it. As a part of the Department of State, ICA did not have the level of autonomy the USAID currently maintains. At the time, multilateral donors (such as those affiliated with the United Nations and the Organization of American States) were playing a greater role in foreign assistance.

²² This program involved transferring U.S. agricultural surpluses abroad on concessional terms, to provide relief, encourage development, and expand markets for U.S. agricultural exports. This program has traditionally been very uncontroversial, having strong support from both U.S. farm organizations, NGOs and anti-hunger advocacy organizations.

convinced that it was an appropriate and effective use of public funds (Rostow 1985, 92). However, he soon realized it was too useful to eliminate, and focused more on aid to developing countries. It is even reported that he once offered to give up some of his own salary to meet foreign aid budgetary needs during a showdown with Congress over a foreign assistance bill in 1957 (Johnson 2006, 72). During this time, opposition from the public also increased, as did party polarization (USAID 2011; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006). All of this led to an even greater need for Congress to reorganize aid and create a permanent system that would address long-term needs.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

Controversy over foreign aid continued into the next decade, and became an issue in the 1960 presidential election (USAID 2011). After he was elected, President Kennedy addressed concerns over foreign aid in his first inaugural address. Touching both on the nation's weariness of being the main provider of aid throughout the world, but also on the important role the United States played internationally and how the close relationships aid has fostered are among our most powerful assets (Kennedy 1961). This foreshadowed the long-term plans he had in store for aid.

Kennedy made reorganization of, and recommitment to, foreign assistance a top priority. In a speech he gave to a joint session of Congress in March of 1961, he said, "We live at a very special moment in history. The whole southern half of the world - - Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia - - are caught up in the adventures of asserting their independence of modernizing their old ways of life." He argued that a major part of foreign aid needed "to help make a historical demonstration that in the

twentieth century, as in the nineteenth century - - in the southern half of the globe as in the north - - economic growth and political democracy can develop hand in hand” (CQ Almanac 1961, 297). Thus the primary tool of U.S. aid would be long-term development loans.

The emphasis of long-term development plans would require a new set of concepts and institutions and a unified administration of economic aid programs in a new federal agency. Congress would provide assurances of continuity in aid. More funds would be shifted to economic development purposes.²³ In addition, it was thought that to renew support for foreign assistance at existing or higher levels, to address the widely-known shortcomings of the previous assistance structure, and to achieve a new mandate for assistance to developing countries, the entire program had to be "new."

In 1961, Congress took action on this issue with the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), which sought to reorganize foreign aid, and separate military and non-military aid. The major fight with the bill was over the long-term financing of loans to developing countries. President Kennedy requested \$3.6 billion for military and economic aid in fiscal year 1962, plus the authority to borrow billions more for the following four fiscal years to finance long-term development loans (CQ Almanac 1961). In fact, this issue dominated the early debates over the bill.²⁴ This would have put billions of dollars under the control of the executive branch, and caused strong opposition in Congress as it was accused of being “backdoor spending.” Part of the backlash was

²³ Up until this time, JFK argued foreign aid programs were “bureaucratically fragmented, awkward and slow,” and their weaknesses have begun to undermine confidence in our effort both here and abroad (CQ Almanac 1961, 297).

²⁴ At this time, many foreign aid supporters had started to seek authority to extend economic aid on a multi-year basis. They argued that this permitted recipients to plan long-term development projects (CQ Almanac 1961).

also because it robbed Congress of its power of legislating and appropriating the foreign aid program. In the end, the FAA bills passed with large margins, and were signed into law on September 4th and September 30th, respectively.²⁵ In addition, they authorized and appropriated \$7.2 billion in loans in appropriations over five years, but the actual funds had to be provided through annual congressional appropriations bills.

In addition to authorizing funds, the final version of the bill did several things. Most notably, it separated economic and military aid. At the time, aid consisted of the Development Loan Fund, whose primary purpose was to foster plans and programs to develop economic resources and increase productive capacities (i.e., a significant amount of capital infrastructure). Also, the Development Grant Fund, which focused on "assisting the development of human resources through such means as programs of technical cooperation and development" in less developed countries.²⁶ On November 30th, as authorized by the passage of the FAA, President Kennedy abolished the Development Loan Fund and the International Cooperation Agency, and incorporated their personnel, record and functions into the Agency for International Development (USAID), within the State Department. The new direction of assistance policy stressed a dedication to development as a long-term effort requiring country-by-country planning and a commitment of resources on a multi-year, programmed basis.

²⁵ The authorization bill, S 1983, passed the Senate by a vote of 66-24, and the House 287-140. The appropriation bill, HR 9033, passed the House by a vote of 270-123, and then the Senate 62-17.

²⁶ Three other significant economic assistance programs were included in the new FAA. First, a guaranty program (now known as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation) that provided protection to American businesses against certain risks of doing business overseas. Second, a supporting assistance program (now the Economic Support Fund program) to support or promote economic or political stability. Third, it created an appropriated contingency fund.

The 1960s: Reorganizing Aid

Foreign aid bills passed every year for the remainder of the decade, but not without controversy. Each year between 1961 and 1970, Congress appropriated less than the president requested. This ranged from a 7 percent decrease from the presidential request in 1965, to nearly a 40 percent reduction in 1968 (Irwin 2000), in which Congress appropriated \$1.2 billion less than what was originally requested.

In 1963, foreign aid legislation received the “worst pummeling at the hands of Congress” since the program began in 1945 (CQ Almanac 1963). Congress reduced the original presidential appropriation request by over \$1.5 billion, and did not pass the bill until late December; it was actually signed into law after the year had ended, on January 6th, 1964. This “pummeling” has even been referred to as the “Foreign Aid Revolt of 1963” (Johnson 2006, 92). It also may be a sign of the power of the chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Otto Passman (D-LA), who said that his goal for 1963 was an “all-time record of percentage-wise cutting of a presidential request for funds” (Passman 1963).

In 1964 and 1965, FAA bills were passed with relatively small reductions. This could have been in part because Rep. George H. Mahon (D-TX) replaced Rep. Clarence Cannon (D-MO) as chair of the Appropriations Committee. Cannon had supported the efforts of Passman, who was stridently opposed to foreign aid.²⁷ In fact, it is even said Cannon refused to take the president’s calls (Irwin 2000). In addition, the administration

²⁷ Irwin (2000) notes that Passman’s opposition to foreign aid is quite ironic. He quotes a Kennedy administration official as saying, “Passman [for all his yearly blustering] was the greatest benefactor of foreign aid I’ve ever worked with...Every year, the foreign aid bill was about rice...rice and other exports from the state of Louisiana.”

submitted a much smaller request than in previous years, and argued successfully that it was a “pre-shrunk” foreign aid request (CQ Almanac 1964).

In 1967, Congress appropriated \$2.3 billion for foreign aid, the lowest amount in foreign aid history. The opposition to foreign aid was caused by two main factors. First, there was a growing mood of discontent over the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, particularly in regard to the Vietnam War. Second, there was a strong concern, especially in the House, over the growing budget deficit, the high level of war spending, and the threat of inflation in the domestic economy (CQ Almanac 1967). This trend continued in 1968 and 1969, as Congress appropriated less than \$2 billion for the first time in foreign aid history.

The 1970s: The Beginning of the End for Authorizations

Beyond just drafting major legislation, Congress has the potential to be heavily involved in many aspects of foreign policy, including aid. This was especially true during the 1970s. After Vietnam, Cambodia and Angola, members of Congress realized that conflicts over interpretations of Constitutional authority could not become the standard pattern for making foreign policy. In addition to legislation regarding war powers, examples of Congress re-asserting itself in foreign aid can be seen throughout the fights of assistance legislation throughout the 1970s.²⁸

The increased skepticism over foreign aid can be seen as a direct result of the trauma of Vietnam and Watergate (Forsythe 1987). Rep. Donald M. Fraser (D-Minn.),

²⁸ Discontent over Vietnam led to the creation of an entirely new framework of rules for power sharing among branches of government; preeminent among these was the War Powers Resolution of 1973. Although the Constitution assigns the president the duty to “take care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” Congress realized it needed to devise ways to ensure the execution of the laws was being carried out faithfully.

chair of the obscure Subcommittee of International Organizations and Movements, began systematic hearings in 1973 on human rights; this had a major effect on the agenda of U.S. foreign policy. In addition, Congress started using the budget as a battleground. This is fitting since it is in the budget where many of the most significant debates are fought, such as those for military procurement, environment protection, and Medicare are all budgetary programs, as are foreign aid, social security and Pell grants (Canes-Wrone et al 2008).

Congress also passed a string of amendments regarding foreign policy during this time, further asserting itself in this realm of governing. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment (1974) was passed in response to limitations posed by the Soviet Union on emigration, and denied most favored nation status to certain countries with non-market economies that restricted emigration rights. The Case-Zablocki Act (1974) required the Secretary of State to transmit the text of all international agreements, other than treaties, to Congress. The Nelson-Bingham Amendments (1974) tightened the restrictions of arms sales to foreign countries, and the Hughes-Ryan Amendment (1974) curtailed the power of the CIA and the Defense Department to engage in covert action. Finally, the Harkin Amendment (1975) gave the Congress supervisory power over the application of human rights standards in decisions about foreign economic aid.²⁹

In addition to these acts, Congress made historic moves in authorizing and appropriating foreign aid. In 1971, the Senate rejected a foreign assistance bill

²⁹ Carter and Scott (2009) point out several lesser known examples of Congressional foreign policy impact during the 1970s, including: improving relations with Mexico, banning military assistance to the Pinochet regime in Chile, aiding the Afghan mujaheddin, providing relief for refugees and pressuring American citizens to stop funding the Irish Republican Army.

authorizing funds for fiscal years 1972 and 1973.³⁰ The defeat of this bill represented the first time that either chamber had rejected a foreign aid authorization since the program began in 1947 with the Marshall Plan. Several themes merged to cause the defeat of the bill: first, opposition to the increasingly unpopular Vietnam War; second, concern that aid was too concerned with short-term military considerations;³¹ and third, concern that aid, particularly development aid, was a giveaway program producing few foreign policy results for the United States. In the end, the Senate adopted a two-bill package that authorized economic and military assistance, but the rejection of the original authorization marked the beginning of increased tension and disputes over foreign aid bills. In addition, it was passed in an unusual procedure. The House passed the FAA appropriation bill in early December, while the authorizing legislation was still pending in a Senate-House conference committee.³²

The following year, Congress failed to pass an FAA authorization altogether. Part of the reason the bill failed was because of a controversial End-The-War Amendment that called for all troops to be withdrawn from Vietnam within six months (CQ Almanac 1972). In addition, though an authorization did pass both chambers, House and Senate conferees were stymied over what they saw as major House-Senate differences regarding military aid funds, and abandoned efforts in mid-October to draw up a compromise bill (CQ Almanac 1972). Despite this, Congress passed a resolution that provided continuing appropriations for foreign aid and other programs in February of 1973.

³⁰ The Senate rejected HR 9910 by a vote of 27-41 on October 29, 1971.

³¹ Congress had started making provisions to ensure that aid went to those in need, and was under no circumstances to be used by U.S. troops who may be in the region. For instance, the FY 1971 FAA bill contained a restriction on the use of aid and troops in Cambodia (CQ 1970).

³² Conferees did not agree on a compromise on S2819 and S2820 until mid-December, and the House did not take final action on the conference report until 1972. The bill finally became law (PL 92-226) on January 25, 1972.

In both 1973 and 1974, Congress succeeded in passing the FAA authorization in a timely manner, but it was not able to pass the FY 1974 appropriation until early 1974. This was typical of the rest of the decade, with Congress either not passing authorizations, or passing appropriations when already well into the fiscal year, or in the case of FY 1975, when only a few months remained.

In 1976, another milestone occurred; a foreign aid authorization was vetoed for the first time in history. This was in no doubt vetoed by President Ford because the 1976 foreign military aid bill contained provisions that gave Congress greater authority to control the sale of military weapons and equipment to other countries.³³ The Ford administration felt this amounted to a congressional veto on arms sales, and disagreed with language in the bill that barred military aid to Angola and Chile and partially lifted a ban on trade with Vietnam. In addition, there was strong opposition to this bill from the Arms Industry as well as from conservatives who opposed the new Africa policy that supported the Black Nationalist movements. Congress did not attempt to override the veto, and was forced to consider a new version of the bill.

Throughout the rest of the 1970s, aid authorizations passed routinely each year, with a separate bill for military aid and economic aid, as had been the practice since 1975 when both chambers agreed to authorize aid in such a manner. This trend lasted until 1979, when the fiscal 1980 foreign aid appropriations bill was stalled in a House-Senate conference committee at the end of the year. Conferees were unable to agree on a compromise, so in lieu of final action on the bill, existing foreign aid programs were continued under an emergency funding resolution, which was passed in late November.

³³ S 2662 gave Congress 30 days in which to veto most arms sales and contracts.

Beyond debates over appropriations, Congress made several efforts to reform foreign aid in the 1970s as well, particularly the economic assistance program. These efforts were led by members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and aimed to replace the old categories of technical assistance grants and development loans with new functional categories aimed at specific problems such as agriculture, family planning, and education. The aim of this was to concentrate on sharing American technical expertise and commodities to meet development problems, rather than relying on large-scale transfers of money and capital goods, or financing of infrastructure. The structure of the FAA remains today much the way it was following these 1973 amendments.

In 1978, Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) introduced a bill that would reorganize the foreign assistance management structure. He wanted to establish an International Development Cooperation Agency to coordinate foreign assistance activities as they related to bilateral programs administered by USAID, multilateral programs of international lending institutions then under the purview of the Department of the Treasury, voluntary contributions to United Nations agencies then administered by the Department of State, food programs then administered by USAID, and the activities of OPIC. An International Development Institute would also be established within IDCA to address, among other things, private and voluntary organizations and with one of the Institute's constituent parts being the Peace Corps. This reform never came to fruition, as bureaucratic and political obstacles stopped the bill from passing (USAID 2011).

Beyond the controversy of Vietnam, Watergate, and the attempted re-assertion of congressional power, two other phenomena were occurring: both polarization and the foreign-born population were increasing. Between 1970 and 1980, the foreign-born

population was growing at an average-annual rate of nearly 15 percent (Gibson and Jung 2006). This is especially significant because for the previous half-century, the percent of the population that was foreign-born had consistently declined. In 1910, the foreign-born population made up nearly 15 percent of the total population, in 1970 it was just 4.7 percent, by 1980, it had increased to 6.2 percent. Party polarization in the House also increased during the 1970s. The increase of both foreign-born population and party polarization may have heightened the controversy over foreign aid, and made the passage of FAA bills more unlikely. These trends continued through the 1980s and 1990s. Polarization increased sharply in both decades, as did the foreign-born population. President George H. W. Bush signed the Immigration Act of 1990, which increased legal immigration by 40 percent. From 2000 to 2010, the number of legal immigrants in the United States increased by nearly 60 percent (U.S. Census Bureau). All of this affected the politics of foreign aid legislation in Congress, and influenced whether or not FAA bills passed.

The 1980s: FAA Authorizations End

Intense skepticism over aid continued throughout the 1980s. For the second year in a row, Congress failed to pass an FAA appropriation in 1980. This necessitated an emergency stopgap funding resolution to carry on the aid program in fiscal year 1981. Several Republican members of the House Appropriations Committee appended a lengthy attack on foreign aid programs in the committee report, which gave some insight into the dispute. They stated that while they supported some types of aid, like military

aid and the Peace Corps, they believed that “substantial sums of our foreign aid are literally being wasted” (CQ Almanac 1980).

In 1981, the FAA authorization and appropriation bills both passed with little controversy, likely due to the backing given by President Reagan to foreign aid that year. The following year, Congress once again failed to complete work on legislation authorizing the funding for foreign aid. In fact, neither of the two authorizing bills even received floor consideration in either chamber. This inaction was blamed in part on the disagreement over the balance between military and development aid, and the traditional reluctance of members of Congress to deal with foreign aid issues in election years (CQ Almanac 1982). In addition, neither chamber voted on a regular foreign aid appropriations bill for fiscal year 1983. Instead, it was funded through a continuing resolution. A similar pattern repeated in 1983, with no floor action on an authorization, and fiscal year 1984 foreign aid being appropriated through a continuing resolution. In 1984, the House passed an authorization bill, but the Senate took no action on it. Once again, a continuing appropriations resolution was used to fund foreign aid programs.

For the first time in four years, Congress passed a foreign aid authorization bill in 1985. The bill passed easily, clearing the House with a voice vote, and by a vote of 72-26 in the Senate. In addition, the bill gave President Reagan most of the economic and development aid he requested, and lifted several major foreign policy restrictions that Congress had enacted in recent years (CQ Almanac 1985). This bill is significant for another reason: it is the last time to date that Congress enacted a general foreign assistance authorization. Since that time, Congress has not passed a major FAA authorization bill. Half of the 27 FAA authorization bills introduced after 1985 did not

receive any floor action. Of those that did make it to the floor, most were passed by the House but then either failed in the Senate or the Senate took no action on them. Two bills actually did pass both houses, but one failed in Conference Committee, and President Clinton vetoed the other. From 1986 to 2007, there were 11 years in which an FAA authorization was not even introduced.

The year after this last authorization was passed, no such bill was even introduced. Despite the continued failure of authorizations throughout the rest of the decade, appropriation bills experienced a great deal of success, even being spared traditional election year cuts in 1986, and far-reaching government cuts in 1987 (CQ Almanacs 1986, 1987). In addition, Congress passed a freestanding appropriation bill in 1988 for the first time since 1981. In 1989, some of the traditional issues re-surfaced, and President Bush vetoed the original appropriations bill. He objected to two items: a mandated contribution to the U.N. Population Fund, and a clause intended to prevent the President from “leveraging” American aid in order to get foreign governments to take actions the U.S. government could not legally do itself (CQ Almanac 1989). After the veto, Congress drafted another appropriations bill that was exactly the same, except for those provisions with which the president had objections; this bill passed both houses easily (CQ Almanac 1989).

The 1990s: Strong Support Dissolves Over Abortion Disputes

As the Soviet bloc began to break apart in 1990, foreign aid enjoyed a brief bout of popularity. Lawmakers scrambled to support assistance for the fledgling democracies in Eastern Europe. Additionally, aid worldwide began to rise modestly in the 1990s.

Initially it was for emergency assistance, debt relief and education programs, and these increases signaled the beginning of a resurgence in the amount of foreign aid provided to developing countries (Lancaster 2007), and more specifically, an increase in developmental and humanitarian aid (Tarnoff and Larson 2011). This only lasted until the summer budget crunch in the United States, and then the customary skepticism returned. Both houses approved the FAA appropriations for fiscal year 1991, but with a conspicuous lack of enthusiasm. This was reflected both in the close vote in the House (188-162), and in the total amount of aid provided in the bill, which was \$129 million less than the president's request. It was also demonstrated by the passing of an amendment that raised the amount of tied-aid credits from \$50 million to \$300 million.³⁴

This cynicism continued throughout the next few years, especially amid a storm of "America First" politicking that argued domestic policies should take precedence over international ones.³⁵ Another important factor was the strong effort from both the Clinton Administration and Congress to decrease the federal deficit. Since foreign aid is a discretionary program, the budget could be reduced without authorizing legislation. In addition, there was disagreement between the Congress and the White House over Israeli loan guarantees.³⁶ In 1991, foreign aid had to be funded by a short-term bill (H Con Res 360), causing the State Department to improvise in allocating military and economic aid for individual countries. Congress did not appropriate the funds for the final six months of fiscal year 1992 until it was half over. Support for foreign aid was so weak in 1992

³⁴ Tied-aid credits are funds that, if used, had to be spent on U.S. goods and services. This amendment was offered by Senate Appropriations Committee Chair Robert C. Byrd (D-WV).

³⁵ Some of this "America First" movement was due to American's weariness with U.S. military interventions. The Gulf War had occurred in 1991 in Iraq, the U.S. had supported military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, and in 1993, the tragic "Black Hawk Down" event occurred in Mogadishu, Somalia, in which 19 Army Rangers were killed.

³⁶ President Bush pledged to veto any legislation that would provide loan guarantees without requiring Israel to restrict settlement construction in the occupied territories (CQ Almanac 1992).

that some lawmakers actually expected most aid programs to shut down when the original short-term bill expired on March 31st of that year. Rep David R. Obey (D-WI), who was a staunch supporter of humanitarian aid, said, “The most likely outcome is that come Tuesday night, our aid missions will close, and Peace Corps volunteers will not be paid” (CQ Almanac 1992, 609). In the end, Congress approved stop-gap funding on April 1st, funding the remaining six months of the fiscal year. But not before the Office of Management and Budget had prepared an order that would have required AID effectively to shut down, forcing more than 2,000 furloughs. Ironically, the fiscal year 1993 foreign aid bill passed later that year with only minimal debate, even appropriating an additional \$12.3 billion due to the International Monetary Fund quota. The following year, Congress also easily passed a massive foreign aid bill, overwhelmingly approving Clinton’s request for \$2.5 billion in aid to the former Soviet republics (CQ Almanac 1993). And for a third year in a row, the foreign aid appropriations bill encountered minimal opposition in 1994.³⁷

By the mid-1990s, the support for foreign aid began to dwindle. In the 1994 election, the Republicans gained a majority in the Congress for the first time since 1955, and as part of efforts to reduce the deficit and the overall size of government, the new Republican majority cut aid funding even further. In addition, some of the newly elected conservatives made foreign aid a battleground for the abortion debate. From 1995 to

³⁷ Though the appropriations bill passed easily, an attempt to reform foreign aid that was supported by President Clinton never even made it out of committee. The legislation would have done away with the original 1961 FAA, and replaced it with a proposal that would have linked foreign assistance more closely with identifiable goals such as promoting peace and democracy...goals that closely mirrored Clinton’s foreign policy objectives. While lawmakers agreed that the 36-year old law was out of date, there was little consensus on how it should be revamped. As Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.) said, “Everyone in the Congress wants to reform foreign aid, the problem is that everyone wants to reform it in a different way” (CQ Almanac 1994, 452). Because of this, and a busy legislative calendar that was full of domestic issues, the proposal to reorganize foreign aid received little attention.

1998, FAA appropriations were almost derailed over disputes regarding abortion. These focused on a narrow dispute over restrictions on funding for international population programs initiated by anti-abortion forces in the House. Because of these disputes, the appropriations for FY 1996, FY 1997 and FY 1999 had to be folded into either temporary funding bills or omnibus spending measures, though FY 1998 was funded through a traditional foreign operations appropriation bill.³⁸

The 2000s: Foreign Aid Resurgent

In 2000, Congress actually passed three small authorizations for foreign aid. Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-RI) attempted to put forward an authorization that would cover all of foreign aid, but the bill never made it out of committee. Instead of accepting defeat, Helms successfully moved parts of it as separate legislation. The pieces included bills for overseas military assistance, loans for microenterprise, and a World Bank trust fund to combat HIV/AIDS (CQ Almanac 2000). This allowed him to avoid such controversial issues as aid to Israel and basic development assistance to Russia. Interestingly, Helms had previously been known as one of the most strident opponents of foreign aid, once even claiming he had never voted to send money down the “rat hole” of foreign assistance. His change of heart allowed him to successfully navigate through the difficult waters of foreign aid authorizations, if only for one year and on a limited basis.

³⁸ FY 1996 funding was appropriated by HR 1868, which provided temporary funding. FY 1997 funding became one of six appropriations bills that had to be folded into an omnibus spending measure (HR 3540). The original FY 1999 spending bills (HR 4569 and S 2334) were folded into the omnibus spending bill (HR 4238).

Beyond the debate over foreign aid legislation in the United States, an important development occurred at the international level that same year. The United Nations convened a special Millennium Assembly, and set the Millennium Development Goals, to be achieved by 2015. The goals were to: halve the proportion of people whose income is less \$1 per day, have the proportion of people living with insufficient food, achieve universal primary education, eliminate gender disparities at all levels of education, reduce child mortality by two-thirds, reduce maternal mortality by three-quarters and achieve universal access to reproductive health, halt and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other major diseases, ensure environmental sustainability and reverse the loss of environmental resources, halve the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe-drinking water, achieve significant improvement in the lives of slum dwellers by 2020, and develop a global partnership for development (United Nations 2000).³⁹

Whether these ambitious goals could be realized or not, the international consensus represented a renewed commitment to development. In addition, it had an effect on aid policy in the United States.

At the UN Conference on Financing Development in 2002, President George W. Bush promised to increase U.S. aid by \$5 billion by 2006, and to make this a permanent increase. In addition, in 2003 he promised \$15 billion in foreign aid over five years to fight HIV/AIDS. The United States also created an entirely new agency, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which was focused exclusively on development aid.

What caused greater acceptance of aid? The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 may have been influential in making the American public and politicians more accepting of aid. One argument for this is that as reports were made about the conditions

³⁹ All goals (except where noted) are for 2015, the base year for measuring progress is 1990.

in Afghanistan, Americans became more aware of the extreme poverty and inequalities in the world. Though few of the terrorists came from poor families in poor countries, the perception that they did was strong (Lancaster 2007). Perhaps a more accurate take on this is that Americans became aware that poverty and poor governance often went hand in hand, and could become breeding grounds for extremism. While some of these issues had once seemed foreign and having little impact on America, the U.S. public now realized that problems abroad could harm U.S. security at home. Rep. Jim Kolbe (R-AZ), who was chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, even said, “Since 9/11, there is an opportunity to do more. There is a plurality in my district who favor increasing foreign aid. We have never had that before (Lancaster 2007, 92).

Americans were forced to realize that many in the world had a negative perception of the United States, and aid was seen as a way of spreading good will (Lancaster 2007). Perhaps this was also propagated by George W. Bush’s assertion that he was a “compassionate conservative,” and that several staunch conservatives who had previously been aid’s biggest opponents, suddenly became strong supporters of it. In 2002, Senator Jesse Helms urged a major aid effort to fight HIV/AIDS and even wrote an editorial for the Washington Post (2002) to encourage support.⁴⁰ In the article, he outlined the humanitarian crisis that HIV/AIDS had created, and wrote “I know that, like the Samaritan traveling from Jerusalem to Jericho, we cannot turn away when we see our fellow man in need.” Senator Helms was also instrumental in pushing House conservatives to shift their positions on debt relief to poor countries, as he redefined the

⁴⁰ Senator Bill Frist (R-TN), also very conservative, co-sponsored this legislation.

problem from one arising from irresponsible behavior by foreign governments to one of depriving impoverished children access to food (Lancaster 2007).

One year after the September 11th attacks, the Bush administration published the *National Strategy for the United States of America* (2002). Though most of the attention this new strategy received was over the assertion that the U.S. would use preemptive force to counter threats to its security, there was another element that was important to foreign aid. The document named the three top priorities of U.S. foreign policy: defense, promoting democracy abroad, and foreign aid. This signaled a promotion for aid in overall U.S. strategy (Lancaster 2007).

This redefined commitment did not take effect immediately. In 2001, the foreign operations appropriation was passed after the September 11th attacks, but was drafted before it, and thus emphasized long-standing foreign policy priorities, like anti-drug aid in South America and combating HIV/AIDS overseas. Congress passed this bill with the understanding that the need to assist the post-September 11th global coalition against terrorism would be addressed in separate supplemental spending bills or in the following year.⁴¹ Despite that commitment, the same issues were troublesome in 2002, as it was again delayed by abortion, and stopped by a broader dispute between Congress and the White House over non-defense spending. By September, Congress finally approved a continuing resolution to fund foreign aid at fiscal year 2002 levels until January 11th,

⁴¹ The debate over the 2001 bill (HR 2506) focused on perennial controversies, especially anti-drug aid and international family planning. Final action on this bill was once again delayed until the end of the session because of the abortion dispute. During this debate, the main flashpoint was over the return of a Reagan-era abortion restriction known as the “Mexico City policy” that prohibited aid to international family planning organizations that performed or promoted abortions, even if they used their own funds to do so. The Republican-controlled House supported Bush’s decision to reinstate this policy, but the Democratic-controlled Senate voted to overturn it, prompting a veto from the White House. Eventually, Senate Democrats agreed to drop the provision, but insisted on a 50 percent increase to aid for family planning efforts.

2003.⁴² When action on this funding was addressed after the January deadline, it was relatively trouble-free. The bill passed as part of the fiscal year 2003 omnibus spending package, and was signed into law on February 20th. This was a marked contrast from previous years, as there was no heated dispute over abortion or military aid to Colombia (CQ Almanac 2003). That same year, Congress included the fiscal year 2004 aid funding into the year-end omnibus appropriations package. This bill funded increased funding for HIV/AIDS foreign aid, as well as funds for the Millennium Challenge Account, and passed both chambers easily.⁴³

The foreign aid appropriation bill in 2004 also passed easily, and rewarded U.S. allies in the war on terror, including Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Lawmakers also continued to fund HIV/AIDS assistance as well as the Millennium Challenge Account. In 2005, foreign aid enjoyed an unexpected boost, increasing by 13 percent, even before accounting for supplemental funds for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is especially significant since there was little or no growth in most non-defense appropriations. That same year, the House actually passed an omnibus foreign affairs authorization, however, no action was taken on the bill in the Senate. The legislation once again unraveled due to the abortion issue and differences over the Mexico City policy.

The popularity of foreign aid floundered in 2006, as lawmakers in both chambers planned to make significant cuts to the amount President Bush requested for foreign aid

⁴² This was part of a larger trend occurring in that year, as Congress failed to produce a fiscal year 2003 budget resolution. This was only the second time this had occurred since the modern budget process was created in 1974. This forced a lame-duck session, and ultimately a continuing resolution to keep the government operating until the differences could be resolved in 2003 (CQ Almanac 2002).

⁴³ While the appropriation was able to pass without the usual debates, these did occur in an attempt to pass an FAA authorization. Two different authorizations were introduced (HR 1950 and S 925), but little action was taken on them because both bills faced veto threats over abortion language (CQ Almanac 2003).

programs in his fiscal year 2007 budget. They were never able to make those cuts though, as the foreign operations spending bill was one of nine appropriations measures left unfinished when the 109th Congress adjourned.⁴⁴ With the 2006 midterm election dominating much of the discourse on Capitol Hill, members preferred to focus on domestic issues, and there was little pressure to finish the foreign aid bill in the regular session. When lawmakers returned after the election in November, the nine unfinished appropriation bills remained untouched; left for the new Democratic majority to deal with in the next Congress.

Authorizations: Passage and Failure

One of the most prominent patterns in the history of the Foreign Assistance Act is the consistent passage of authorizations throughout the first decade of this legislation's life, the many battles over authorizations in the 1970s and early 1980s, and the failure of any major authorization to pass since 1985. This begs several questions. First is the broadest question, why do foreign aid bills pass at all? Second, why did FAA authorizations pass in the 1960s and 1970s? Finally, why don't FAA authorizations pass anymore?

Modern foreign aid began in earnest after World War II with the passage of legislation to provide aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947, and the Marshall Plan shortly thereafter. This also marked the beginning of the Truman Plan. While it is clear that the administration viewed the economic and humanitarian crises of Greece and Turkey as extremely important, White House documents show that Truman also focused on the

⁴⁴ Congress did pass a separate bill to fund bilateral aid to Iraq and Afghanistan (and other accounts related to the wars) as part of a \$94.5 billion emergency supplemental spending bill (P.L. 109-234).

importance aid would have on building stronger democracies in Greece and Turkey. The combination of these justifications suggests that the United States had dual purposes in providing aid. First, the United States was responding to the humanitarian disaster from World War II in Europe, but another goal of the Marshall Plan was to stabilize Europe, something that benefited the United States both economically and politically.

When the Foreign Assistance Act was passed in 1961, the U.S. had already been providing aid to foreign countries for 15 years. After the success of the Marshall Plan, the U.S. continued to provide aid throughout the 1950s. During this decade, several attempts were made to reorganize aid in order to create a permanent system that would address long-term needs. Proponents also had to deal with increasing opposition at this time as the public became increasingly fatigued with providing foreign assistance. Despite this opposition, strong support for aid from the White House and proponents in Congress were able to focus the debate on why aid was necessary and how it should be reorganized. In addition, as aid continued to be administered each year, it became more ingrained as a part of U.S. foreign policy, and more of a norm for the debate to shift from whether aid should be provided, to how much and where. This was shown with the passage of the FAA, which received strong bipartisan support.

The success of foreign aid supporters to focus on how aid should be administered with strong White House support explains why aid passed so consistently in the 1960s. President Kennedy was a very strong proponent of aid, and had been since he had served in the U.S. Senate. Additionally, many of the debates in the 1960s revolved around how much aid should be authorized and appropriated, and not whether aid should even exist.

In the 1970s, several things contributed to increased conflict over foreign aid authorizations. The increased skepticism over foreign aid can be seen as a direct result of the trauma of Vietnam and Watergate (Forsythe 1987). Another trend that proved to be quite significant and that continued in the coming decades was that Congress started using the budget as a battleground. With increased concern over the deficit, debates over the budget intensified, and members of Congress used it to wage battles over other issues. Despite this, authorizations actually passed easily in the late 1970s, and intermittently in the early 1980s. In 1985, the last major FAA authorization was passed.

The inability of Congress to pass a major FAA authorization in the past quarter-century can be explained by several major factors. First, as the budget continued to be used to debate other issues, FAA authorizations began to be used as a battleground over abortion and family planning policy in the 1990s. This not only added a new dimension to the debate and an added area for contention, but since Republicans won these disputes, the support FAA bills had enjoyed for decades from Democratic members of Congress began to dissolve. This reversal of support continued through the 2000s, as foreign aid suddenly became an integral part of President George W. Bush's foreign policy, and other conservative members of Congress that had once been strident opponents, began to become strong supporters. However, the Republican supporters were not successful in marshalling a large enough majority from their fellow party members to counteract the loss of Democratic support.

Second, there were two important domestic factors that coincided with the failure of FAA authorizations to pass: increased party polarization and two decades of divided government (refer to Figure 2.2). Research has shown that increased party polarization

slows down the passage of budget bills (Binder 2003), and this phenomenon is clearly at play with foreign aid authorizations. Another element that added to the gridlock to passage of FAA authorizations was the 20-year span of divided government during the 1980s and 1990s. This element is especially interesting, since the United States is the only fully presidential system of the major aid-giving countries, meaning that the executive and legislative branches are politically autonomous of one another. Other countries do not have to deal with the prospect of divided government as a source of conflict, but in the American system, it has proven to be detrimental to the passage of FAA authorizations.

A final factor that has been very influential has been the U.S. Senate. Of the 27 authorizations that were introduced after 1985, 18 of them failed because of Senate inaction (refer to Table 2.2). Of the bills that failed in the Senate, seven passed a floor vote in the House but no action was taken in the Senate, one died in the Senate committee, and 10 were reported to the Senate, but no further action was taken. This trend suggests that the Senate has acted as a “cooling saucer” to attempts to pass FAA authorizations. It is also consistent with the traditional role the Senate has played regarding legislation in general, as James Madison wrote in Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, “The use of the Senate is to consist in its proceedings with more coolness, with more system and with more wisdom, than the popular branch.”

Conclusion

The history of foreign aid in the United States reflects the roller-coaster ride of its popularity. Historians and policy makers have offered opinions of why foreign aid

policies passed easily some years, and unraveled in others, but much of this is conjecture. This chapter has highlighted several major patterns that explain the ups and downs of foreign aid legislation. First, as party polarization increased, so have the number of times foreign aid bills have failed. Similarly, the increase of the foreign-born population has caused FAA bills to be embroiled in more controversy and be less likely to pass. Finally, several partisan factors have influenced FAA bill passage, most notably, the party and ideology of the president; several cases throughout history have shown that when presidents have strongly supported aid packages, Congress has responded in kind. The pattern of authorization passage until 1985 and none thereafter will also be revisited in each of the empirical chapters, as will each of the explanations for this trend. The following chapters will also provide additional analysis of the features of Congress and the nation to try to explain when foreign aid bills pass and why.

Figure 2.1 Foreign Aid Package Label




Table 2.1 Foreign Aid Budget Requests and Appropriations, 1948-2007

Fiscal Year	Original Presidential Request (in \$Millions)	Final Foreign Aid Appropriations (in \$Millions)	Difference (in \$Millions)	Percent Reduction
1948-49	7,370.0	6,450.0	-920.0	-12.5%
1950	5,680.0	4,940.0	-740.0	-13.0%
1951	8,170.0	7,490.0	-680.0	-8.3%
1952	8,500.0	7,280.0	-1,220.0	-14.4%
1953	7,920.0	6,000.0	-1,920.0	-24.2%
1954	5,830.0	4,530.0	-1,300.0	-22.3%
1955	3,480.0	2,780.0	-700.0	-20.1%
1956	3,266.6	2,703.3	-563.3	-17.2%
1957	4,860.0	3,766.6	-1,093.4	-22.5%
1958	3,386.9	2,768.8	-618.1	-18.2%
1959	3,950.1	3,298.1	-652.0	-16.5%
1960	4,430.0	3,225.8	-1,204.2	-27.2%
1961	4,275.0	3,716.4	-558.7	-13.1%
1962	4,775.5	3,914.6	-860.9	-18.0%
1963	4,961.3	3,928.9	-1,032.4	-20.8%
1964	4,525.3	3,000.0	-1,525.3	-33.7%
1965	3,516.7	3,250.0	-266.7	-7.6%
1966	3,459.5	3,218.0	-241.5	-7.0%
1967	3,386.0	2,936.5	-449.5	-13.3%
1968	3,250.5	2,295.6	-954.9	-29.4%
1969	2,920.0	1,755.6	-1,164.4	-39.9%
1970	2,710.0	1,812.4	-897.6	-33.1%
1971	2,200.0	1,940.0	-260.0	-11.8%
1972	3,090.0	2230	-860.0	-27.8%
1973	3,120.0	2,230.0	-890.0	-28.5%
1974	2,501.7	1,916.1	-585.6	-23.4%
1975	4,191.1	2,529.8	-1,661.3	-39.6%
1976	3,728.1	3,229.4	-498.7	-13.4%
1977	3,692.98	3,411.23	-281.75	-7.6%
1978	4,147.73	4,025.35	-122.38	-3.0%
1979	10,387.76	9,135.03	-1,252.73	-12.1%
1980	9,342.00	7,639.00	-1,703.00	-18.2%
1981	7,747.43	5,885.33	-1,862.10	-24.0%
1982	11,096.10	11,469.22	373.12	3.4%
1983	11,240.39	11,231.73	-8.66	-0.1%
1984	11,637.43	11,468.40	-169.02	-1.5%
1985	18,271.02	18,190.37	-80.65	-0.4%
1986	15,032.24	15,025.32	-6.92	0.0%
1987	15,474.53	13,428.25	-2,046.29	-13.2%
1988	15,782.61	13,598.75	-2,183.87	-13.8%

1989	14,307.97	14,290.03	-17.94	-0.1%
1990	15,157.93	14,643.81	-514.11	-3.4%
1991	15,518.83	15,389.40	-129.43	-0.8%
1992	15,868.54	14,130.03	-1,738.52	-11.0%
1993	27,425.66	26,257.38	-1,168.28	-4.3%
1994	14,425.99	12,982.67	-1,443.33	-10.0%
1995	14,074.96	13,828.24	-246.72	-1.8%
1996	14,773.91	12,379.54	-2,394.37	-16.2%
1997	12,927.91	12,311.12	-616.79	-4.8%
1998	16,888.17	13,190.97	-3,697.20	-21.9%
1999	31,985.00	33,330.39	1,345.39	4.2%
2000	14,919.54	16,453.44	1,533.90	10.3%
2001	15,829.43	15,021.17	-808.26	-5.1%
2002	15,212.63	16,586.78	1,374.15	9.0%
2003	16,492.90	16,237.16	-255.73	-1.6%
2004	18,932.59	17,504.42	-1,428.17	-7.5%
2005	21,360.83	18,685.34	-2,675.50	-12.5%
2006	22,867.95	20,766.37	-2,101.57	-9.2%
2007	23,726.07	21,827.07	-1,899.00	-8.0%

Source: CQ Almanac 1975-2007

Figure 2.2: Polarization and the Foreign-Born Population



Source: U.S. Census Bureau; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (www.voteview.com)

Table 2.2 Final Status of Foreign Assistance Authorization Bills

	Became Law	Passed both Houses, Conf. Report Failed	Vetoed by President	Passed House, No Senate Action	Passed Senate, No House Action	Failed in House Floor Vote	Failed in Senate Floor Vote	Died in House Comm.	Died in Senate Comm.	Reported to House, No Vote Taken	Reported to Senate, No Vote Taken	Total
All Authorizations	28	3	2	11	0	1	2	1	1	4	11	64
Post-1985 Authorizations	3	1	1	7	0	1	0	1	1	2	10	27
Democratic Majority	25	3	1	8	0	1	2	1	0	4	5	50
Republican Majority	3	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	6	14

Chapter 3

A Macro Look at Congress Foreign Aid Decision Making

In Chapter 1, I detailed the research that has been completed regarding foreign aid. As I argued, most of work has ignored policy makers, focusing instead on the systemic or state characteristics that determine where aid is given. Apart from some work comparing foreign assistance policies of different administrations, little has been done to study what factors influence policy makers, especially in the legislative branch. Because of the “backwater” status of the study of Congress and foreign policy (Lindsay 1994), political scientists have a weak understanding of what influences foreign aid policy, more specifically, they cannot account for the variation between those foreign aid bills that receive support and those that do not, and the circumstances under which they do or do not pass.

In this chapter, I present several hypotheses that can explain legislative behavior, and apply them to foreign aid legislation. I also explain the data, methodology and results of the quantitative analysis I employ to study this matter. Finally, I will explain the results, and how they answer the central question of this dissertation: why do legislators support foreign aid?

Hypotheses: Competing Theories of Decision Making

Perhaps the element that is lacking most from analysis of foreign aid policy is a theory of decision making. While scholars have studied foreign aid at the international level, and decision making is one of the more theoretically developed areas within the field of legislative behavior (Rieselbach 1984), very little research has been done to connect these two fields. This research seeks to make that connection. Accordingly, theories of legislative decision making will be used to formulate hypotheses and explanatory variables.

The multitude of studies on legislative behavior have, to varying degrees, tried to identify patterns of legislative voting to establish the determinants and implications of these patterns. These patterns have become even more important as congressional decision making has become more complicated, and as the amount of information available to legislators has increased (Matthews and Stimson 1970; Eulau 1967). Scholars have found that members of Congress alternatively are influenced by political parties, the executive branch, constituencies, colleagues within the legislature, interest groups and many other factors (Kingdon 1981). This work can be summarized into the following areas, upon which this paper will focus: partisan forces, political parties, constituent constraints, individual policy preferences and organized interest groups.

The first line of thought that will be addressed is the argument that partisan forces can influence members' choices and strategies, and in so doing, can also have an effect on policy choices. Research has shown that the organization of Congress, and government in general, constrains and shapes members' options and decisions (Schwartz

1987). But it is the partisans operating in this structure that are so influential. This influence can come in the form of senior members wielding their influence over freshmen members (Matthews 1959), or leaders holding important influence over committee and caucus members (Binder, Lawrence, Maltzman 1999). This phenomenon was notable with the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations in the 1960s, also known as the “Passman Subcommittee,” named after powerful Chair, Otto E. Passman (D-LA). While a few of the subcommittee members were consistently for or against certain issues, the rest favored programs only when the White House was controlled by their same party (CQ Almanac 1961).⁴⁵

There are also external constraints on Congress that effect decision making. Both the Senate and the Supreme Court constrain House members when they cast roll call votes (Martin 2001). As noted earlier, presidents also wield significant influence over foreign policy, leading some scholars to refer to this as a “free hand.” Scholars have also noted that the increase in polarization of Congress has changed how this institution functions, and has had an effect on how, and if, policy is made (Binder 2003). Indeed, any study of what amounts to be policy gridlock would be remiss if it did not consider party polarization. Other examples of partisan forces that may be influential are: presidential position on a bill, party of the president, divided government, majority party sponsorship, bipartisan sponsorship, etc. In accordance, we can now identify our first hypothesis.

⁴⁵ Passman was actually one of the subcommittee members who was consistently against the mutual security funds requested by the executive branch, no matter which party was in power. Passman fought doggedly against foreign aid, and in a September 2nd, 1961 interview with Congressional Quarterly, he referred to foreign aid as “propaganda,” “self-defeating,” and that it was “bleeding the American people and dissipating our resources” (CQ 1961, 311-312).

Partisan Hypothesis: Partisan forces such as presidential preferences, divided government and bill sponsorship influence legislative support on foreign aid bills.

A second area that scholars have argued influences congressional decision making is that of political parties. In their work *Legislative Leviathan*, Cox and McCubbins (1994a) compared parties to cartels, and argued that the majority party binds its members to support caucus decisions in the House on a variety of key structural matters. They furthered this statement by writing that the rules of the Democratic Caucus in the House dictate that all caucus members are bound to support caucus decisions if they wish to retain their membership (1994b). More substantively, they argue that to the extent that membership in the majority party's caucus is valuable, it will effect policy decisions made by House members.

Many other political scientists have argued the importance of parties. Kingdon (1981) found that members of Congress engage in an extended search for information only rarely, but instead rely on cues provided by a number of sources: party leadership and ranking committee leaders being chief among them.⁴⁶ Binder, Lawrence and Maltzman (1999) also established that the priorities and directives of the party in Congress trump personal preferences in floor voting.

Party Hypothesis: Legislators will be more likely to vote along party lines on foreign aid bills.

The third area of importance when studying congressional decision making is that of constituents. The classic textbook account of representative democracy is that representatives attempt to translate the public's view into government action; the ideal view of which is that legislators represent and act on the interests of the electorate. A

⁴⁶ Though trusted colleagues and even the executive branch can also provide cues.

cursory examination of American politics reveals that this is not the reality of our modern democracy.

The relationship between elected representatives and their constituencies is complicated and multifaceted. One of the major difficulties with constituency influence over decision making is the degree to which members accurately ascertain the preferences of their constituencies. It can be difficult for legislators to correctly assess the wishes and policy preferences of their constituents, and to accurately evaluate whether those preferences will affect future campaigns and elections. Despite this, members still take the perceived opinions of their constituents, both present and potential, into account when making decisions Fenno (1978). In addition, Arnold (1990) found that citizens, who have no opinions about a policy at the time it is being formed and considered, could still have a large effect on legislators' decisions. Indeed he found that collective goods and pork barrel projects are provided to these constituents with the hope that they will respond favorably by voting to reelect the members of Congress at a future point.

This may be especially salient in the area of foreign policy. While it is not generally considered to be a large factor in congressional elections (Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan 2002; Jacobson 1996), its potential to be a hot-button issue during an election may be an incentive for leaders to support such issues. Since the 1960s, the American people have become increasingly ambivalent about foreign policy. Indeed, throughout the 1990s, the public was largely concerned with domestic policy problems and perhaps even complacent about global issues (Campbell, Rae and Stack 2003). Despite this, crises such as famines or violence in developing countries have the potential to garner the

attention of the American public. Political scientists know surprisingly little about contemporary public opinion toward human rights or foreign aid, or about its influence over policy (Welch and Forsythe 1983). While it has been argued that the American public wants a moral or human rights component in U.S. foreign policy (Yankelovich 1978), the effect of this remains unclear (Cohen 1978).

Understanding constituents' opinions and preferences can be an extremely difficult task; it can be time-consuming, expensive, and often risky. Though scholars have found that constituent preferences influence congressional decision making, and can influence floor votes and the allocation of funds, it remains to be seen whether this analysis also applies to foreign aid policy.

Constituent Constraint Hypothesis: Legislators will vote in accordance with their constituents' preferences.

A fourth way in which political scientists have argued congressional decision-making can be influenced, is by personal policy preferences. Indeed, many prominent political scientists have long argued that roll call behavior is strongly influenced by personal policy preferences (Miller and Stokes 1963; Clausen 1973; Wilcox and Clausen 1991; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). In addition, Kingdon (1981) also argued that concentrating on the many influences in the legislative system should not obscure the fact that members themselves are influenced by their own attitudes. This is also supported by Stewart (2001). Despite his emphasis on the importance of institutions on legislative outcomes, he also highlighted the fact that strategic actors behave according to their preferences. Krehbiel (1995) also highlighted the importance of preferences, as he argues that a legislator's preference will trump the pressure applied by the party to vote in a specific manner.

Beyond acting upon their specific policy preferences, legislators can also be policy entrepreneurs. Kingdon (1995) has argued that elected officials look for policy windows as opportunities to advocate proposals, push pet projects or bring attention to specific problems. In his theory, he likens the policy decision-making process as a “policy stream,” in which proposals, alternatives and solutions float about, waiting to be discussed, revised and discussed again. In this model, legislators are active policy entrepreneurs, waiting to push their preferences when a policy window opens. Whiteman (1985) has also argued that legislators use policy analysis to determine which policy is preferred and should be pursued. He writes that members use strategic analysis to determine the best course of action.

Policy Preferences Hypothesis: Legislators will vote in accordance with their own policy preferences.

As this review has shown, the major areas of influence political scientists have studied are: partisan forces, political party, constituent constraints, and policy preferences. Each of these has an influence on decision making, and has served as the base of each of my hypotheses. In addition, the influence of organized interest groups may also play a factor in decision making. The literature in this arena generally accepts that interest groups do not dominate congressional behavior, but their campaign contributions can have varying effects (Hall and Wayman 1990; Romer and Snyder 1994; Wright 1985). Indeed, according to Vogelgesang (1980), human rights interest groups were sometimes the single most decisive factor in American policy on human rights, rivaling the effectiveness of the pro-Israel lobby, which some argue has effectively lobbied its way into making aid for Israel about one-fifth of the foreign aid budget (CQ Almanac 1992). Welch and Forsythe (1983) also noted the cumulative influence human

rights lobbies could wield. As for interest groups regarding foreign aid, some argue that aid has no constituency, and thus no powerful interests for which to lobby, however, this contention is far too simplistic. Lancaster (2007) argues that they can be a pervasive and dynamic force, especially in a policy area such as this where public resources are involved. This can be very difficult to measure; while historical records show that a multitude of special interests testified to Congress regarding the Marshall Plan, their interests were so varied it is hard to say who had an effect on what.⁴⁷ Recently, Milner and Tingley (2011) evaluated congressional voting patterns on foreign aid and found strong evidence that organized interests were influential in foreign aid policy making.

Organized Interests Hypothesis: Organized interest groups will influence legislative support of foreign aid.

Regarding these five hypotheses, I believe that the first and the last will be most plausible. There is a disconnect between constituencies and their elected officials regarding foreign policy. The public at large is not well informed regarding this policy area, and is often apathetic as well. For this reason, its effect may be minimal. In addition, the issues of foreign aid and human rights seem to be those that cross party lines, so clues to our puzzle may not lay there either. There could quite likely be a connection between how a member of Congress votes on a foreign aid bill and whether he or she is a member of the presidential party. In addition, he or she may be less willing to challenge presidential policy (Forsythe 1987). Finally, scholars studying international relations have argued about the importance of non-governmental organizations in changing norms and international law (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink

⁴⁷ The items promoted by various witnesses to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding the Marshall Plan represented 124 items, ranging from “aloes to zippers, through farm equipment, pretzels and steam locomotives” (CQ Almanac 1949, 336).

2005; Klotz 1995). By studying organized interest groups in the United States, I hope to identify the influence they may have on individuals.

Empirical Analysis

In order to understand the decision-making process behind foreign aid, it is important to look at both the macro and micro levels. In other words, it is necessary to understand the makeup of the Congress and the external factors that are influencing the Congress when foreign aid bills are considered, as well as those factors that influence individual legislators. This chapter will focus on the macro level, identifying the makeup of Congress when foreign aid bills become law so we can better understand why these bills pass and are supported.

In order to complete a longitudinal study of congressional decision making regarding foreign aid, I will focus on the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, and its annual authorizations and appropriations. Before the FAA, foreign aid was seen as a tool to fight communism and deal with decolonization. Starting with the Marshall Plan in 1947, and throughout the 1950s, aid was distributed on a country-by-country basis, or in accordance with specific Cold War goals. In 1961, the passing of the FAA marked a shift in how foreign aid legislation was passed. Based on requests by President Kennedy, it made several major innovations. First, it replaced the existing Mutual Security Act. Second, it authorized future separation of military and economic aid budgets. Third, it gave the President power to abolish the existing Development Loan Fund and International Cooperation Administration in order to establish the Agency for International Development (CQ Almanac 1961). Perhaps most importantly, the emphasis

of the program was on long-term assistance. This shifted the focus from assisting specific countries or regions, to the general norm of providing aid to developing countries. Thus providing a framework from which future congresses could work. Instead of drafting new legislation each year, they could re-authorize the FAA and appropriate accordingly.

In the nearly 50 years since the FAA first passed, there have been many controversies and contentious votes regarding it. Even in 1961, the House refused to pass the original bill President Kennedy requested, and instead, limited the authorization to one year instead of five. Since then, there have been many close votes, many failed bills, and several years in which authorizations were not even introduced. Because of the variation this long-standing policy, this act provides a consistent measure by which to analyze legislative behavior regarding foreign aid.

Dependent Variable: FAA Passage

The dependent variable in the analysis that follows simply measures whether or not an FAA appropriation or authorization bill became law. Data has been collected on each FAA bill that was introduced in either the House or Senate from 1961 to 2007. This amounted to 141 bills, 64 of which were authorizations and 77 of which were appropriations; of these bills, 85 became law. For a more detailed account of what occurred with these bills, please see the table below.

Explanatory Variables

With the bills selected, we can now identify and estimate the effect of the explanatory variables, each of which is grouped according to the already laid out hypotheses.

Partisan Forces

As this hypothesis suggests, we should expect certain partisan forces to make an FAA bill more or less likely to become law. Accordingly, presidential support for the bill and a Democratic president are both executive factors that should help an FAA bill pass. I will use NOMINATE scores to test whether presidential ideology also has an effect on FAA bill passage. Conversely, accordingly to general beliefs on divided government, I expect this to have a negative effect. I also expect party polarization to have a negative effect. The final variable that will be used to test the power of institutions will be sponsorship. The effect of sponsorship will be measured by: whether the sponsor is a Democrat, how many Democrats co-sponsored the bill, how many Republicans co-sponsored, whether there is bipartisan sponsorship, and finally, whether the sponsor is of the majority party or the president's party. Data for each of these variables, except the NOMINATE scores, are from David Rohde's roll call voting data, and from historical Congressional Quarterlies (CQ). To test whether polarization makes an FAA bill less likely to pass, I will use the average polarization score for each Congress, as calculated by Poole and Rosenthal.

Party Constraints

Little work has been done examining the power of party over foreign policy. Scholars have identified a few areas over which parties influence foreign policy. For example, some have identified Republicans as being more focused on external or international issues (Saunders 2011). Similar patterns have been identified in how the United States deals with the “Third World” (1992). Scholars have also found that Democrats are more likely to vote for foreign aid bills (Kilby and Fleck 2001). According to this finding, and to party scholars, FAA bills should be more likely to become law when a Democratic majority exists in Congress. Indeed, the first FAA bill passed with a Democratic president, and both a Democratic Congress and Senate, and a cursory look at the data shows that of the 85 FAA bills that passed between 1961 and 2007, 69 of those were under a Democratic Congress. This dissertation will test whether this pattern is significant.

Constituent Opinion

Constituent opinion is a difficult variable to measure, especially in regard to an issue such as foreign aid, about which the general public knows little. For instance, when asked to estimate how much the United States spends on foreign aid, Americans usually drastically overestimate the amount. Despite this, Americans often have very strong opinions about foreign aid. To measure this, I will use the General Social Survey, which questions whether a person supports or opposes foreign aid. In addition, I will include economic data such as the size of the budget, the percentage the FAA budget in relation to both GDP and the budget, as well as the annual unemployment rate. For it seems that

years in which unemployment is up and the GDP is down, are also the years when people are more willing to cut or be against the FAA budget. Data for these variables is taken from Congressional Research Service, the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Policy Preferences

Similarly to the party constraint hypothesis, general belief is that the more liberal a legislator is, the more likely he or she will be to vote for foreign aid. Thus, a more liberal Congress is more likely to pass FAA legislation. To measure this, the average NOMINATE⁴⁸ (McCarty, Poole, Rosenthal 2010) score for each Congress will be used.

Organized Interest Groups

To measure the effect of organized interest groups, donation data from the Center for Responsive Politics will be used. Since we are interested in the entire Congress at this stage, the total amount of annual PAC donations by category will be used. The categories are Foreign and Defense Policy PACs, Pro-Israel PACs and Human Rights PACs. In addition, the total of these three groups will also be studied, and each can also be broken down into donations to Democrats and donations to Republicans.

Foreign-Born Population

There is an additional variable that may be of interest here: foreign-born population. It can be argued that a large foreign-born population could make legislators

⁴⁸ Average NOMINATE scores for each Congress are the average of the total sum of individual NOMINATE scores for each member of Congress.

either more sympathetic to the needs of developing countries, or if a rise in the foreign-born population is accompanied with controversy and xenophobia, it could make legislators less sympathetic. To test for this, I will use annual Census data that calculates the percentage of the total population that is foreign-born.

Methodology and Results

In order to capture the significance of the explanatory variables, I will perform a quantitative analysis that will consist of two models. The first will include all FAA bills from 1961 to 2007, including appropriations and authorizations. This will be a large-n analysis, in which I will use logistical regressions. The second model will include only FAA authorizations. Because there were 64 authorizations in that time period, I will employ standard regressions.

Results and Analysis

Partisan Forces

Statistical analysis of the partisan forces shows that they do influence whether or not an FAA bill becomes a law. It was revealed that the more liberal a president's ideology, the more likely the bill is to pass. This was supported by the smaller sample, in which presidential ideology was negative and significant in every model. Not surprisingly, in both the all-inclusive and the authorizations-only models, the Democratic president variable was positive and significant, meaning that FAA bills are more likely to pass when a Democrat is in the White House. Each of these results supports the

hypothesis that partisan forces affect foreign assistance bills. In addition, they also attest to the power the president has over foreign policy in general.

Another significant partisan factor was divided government, which had a negative impact on whether an FAA bill became law in both models. This result is expected, especially since the U.S. is the only fully presidential system of any major aid-giving countries. This means that the executive branch and legislative branch, as the two major institutions that determine aid budgets and policy, are politically autonomous of one another. This dynamic is highlighted by the fact that most aid-giving governments are parliamentary systems in which the prime minister is elected by the parliament, eliminating a major source of conflict that exists in the American system (Lancaster 2007).

Polarization also matters greatly in whether an FAA bill passes. Analysis showed that it was consistently negative and significant in each model, meaning that the more polarized the House or Senate is, the more unlikely it is that a foreign aid bill will pass. This is consistent with other findings that show polarization slows down the passage of budget bills (Binder 2003).

These three effects also provide an explanation for why FAA authorizations have not passed since 1985. Since that time, the White House has mostly been under a Republican administration, polarization has increased, and a divided government existed until 2000, all making it more difficult for authorizations to pass.

In the larger model, having a Democratic sponsor was not significant, neither was the total number of Democratic co-sponsors or Republican co-sponsors. However, in the smaller sample, the number of Democratic sponsors and Republican sponsors were both

positive and significant. Not surprisingly, bipartisan sponsorship was also positive and significant in the authorizations-only model.

Though the above results show that there are partisan effects in foreign aid legislation, not every variable was strongly significant. According to the logit regressions, if the president supports a bill, or at the least does not oppose it, it is more likely to pass. Analysis of only authorizations revealed that it was not significant. The final sponsorship variable, majority party sponsorship, was not significant in either the larger or authorization-only model.

Political Party

Whether the Democrats are the majority party in the Congress or Senate was not significant in the larger model. Analysis of the authorization-only model showed that a Democratic majority in House was negative and significant in several of the models. This may be a default of the historical makeup of Congress. The Democrats held control of the House from 1949 to 1994, the time period in which most FAA authorizations were introduced. From 1961 to 1994, 50 FAA authorizations were introduced, 25 of which passed. After 1994, 14 FAA authorizations were introduced, three of which passed.⁴⁹ During this same period, there were eight years in which no FAA authorizations were introduced. In comparison, between 1961 and 1994, there were only two years in which an authorization was not introduced. Because of the stark contrast between the period the

⁴⁹ The three bills were all part of the authorization for the 2001 fiscal year, and were passed separately to avoid such controversial issues as aid to Israel and basic development assistance to Russia.

Democrats held the majority to decade the Republicans did, this result may not hold as much explanatory power as the analysis assumes.⁵⁰

Constituent Opinion

As for the variables aiming to test constituent opinion, despite a systematic analysis that sought to cover a broad array of possibilities, they were consistently not significant in the larger model. Analysis of the authorizations however showed several patterns. First, the unemployment rate was negative and in the Senate, but the coefficients were very small; showing economic factors have a minimal effect on foreign aid legislation outcomes. Also, the coefficient for opinion was also small, negative and significant at the 85-99 percent confidence intervals, meaning that as the proportion of the population that thought the U.S. spends too much on foreign aid increased, the likelihood that FAA bills would become law decreased. The minimal level of importance constituent factors plays is especially interesting when one notes how the public can turn sharply against foreign aid. As a reporter once wrote, “it’s always open season on [foreign aid] (Belair 1962), especially during times of economic hardship. For instance, during the debates and public outcry regarding the deficit in 2011, foreign aid was often the number one thing the public felt should be reduced (Pew Research Center 2011). Despite the intensity of opinion the public can have, it does not play a significantly large role in the decision-making process behind foreign aid.

⁵⁰ Further analysis was completed that measured whether an FAA authorization passed for each fiscal year, rather than looking at the total number of authorizations. This allowed the analysis to account for the years that FAA authorizations were not introduced and showed that party was not significant.

Policy Preferences

The logit analysis revealed that NOMINATE scores were not significant in either model. This adds credence to the stipulation made previously that party might not hold as much influence over whether FAA bills pass as the statistical analysis suggested. If a Republican majority truly made FAA bills more likely to pass, then the same should be true with more conservative congresses.

Interest Groups

Because reliable interest group data can only be found to the late 1980s and early 1990s, a separate set of regressions was run to assess their significance. In addition, since no major FAA authorization has passed since 1985, I was only able to run the larger regression that included all authorizations and appropriations in the time period. The findings showed that though there were incidences of either negative or positive influence, none of the coefficients attained consistent statistical significance. The only variable that showed a pattern was contributions made by pro-Israel PACs, which were negative significant in the U.S. House of Representatives, but with low R-squared scores. In addition, with each of these models, there was a significant difference between the R-squared and the adjusted R-squared, signaling that the addition of the interest group variables detracted from the model.

Foreign-Born Population

The percentage of the population that is foreign-born had a negative and significant effect in both models. This is especially interesting since McCarty, Poole and

Rosenthal (2006) have noted the relationship between the rise of the foreign-born population in the United States and polarization. Not surprisingly, polarization also had a negative effect on passage of FAA bills.⁵¹

Conclusions

Foreign aid has become an important tool of American foreign policy, yet political scientists still understand very little about why elected officials support it, and when foreign aid bills become law. This chapter has identified several factors, namely partisan factors such as presidential party, presidential ideology and partisanship, as well as party polarization and foreign-born population as important elements that explain whether a foreign aid bill becomes law.

⁵¹ In order to ensure there was no bias against years in which authorizations were not introduced, statistical analysis was also completed studying whether or not FAA authorizations passed in any given year, rather than addressing all bills. Most the findings were consistent with those in the authorizations-only model, the coefficients for foreign-born population and polarization were negative and significant, sponsorship of bills remained significant, and unemployment was small and significant. No other significance was found.

Table 3.1 Final Status of all Foreign Assistance Act Bills												
	Became Law	Passed both Houses, Conf. Report Failed	Vetoed by President	Passed House, No Senate Action	Passed Senate, No House Action	Failed in House Floor Vote	Failed in Senate Floor Vote	Died in House Comm.	Died in Senate Comm.	Reported to House, No Vote Taken	Reported to Senate, No Vote Taken	Total
Appropriations	57	3	1	4	2	0	0	2	0	4	4	77
Authorizations	28	3	2	11	0	1	2	1	1	4	11	64
Total	85	6	3	15	2	1	2	3	1	8	15	141

Table 3.2 Macro Statistical Analysis, all FAA Bills 1961-2007

	All FAA Bills		Authorizations	
	House	Senate	House	Senate
	Partisan Factors			
Presidential Position	0.25*	0.31**	0.04	0.19+
Democratic President	0.90*	1.10**	0.31**	0.45**
Presidential Ideology	-0.65++	-0.82*	-0.25**	-0.36**
Divided Government	-1.07*	-0.99*	-0.31**	-0.39**
Democratic Sponsor	0.81	0.59	-0.26	-0.51+
# of Democratic Sponsors	-0.01	-0.02	0.01*	0.02*
# of Republican Sponsors	-0.03	-0.01	0.06*	0.07**
Presidential Party Sponsor	-0.86*	-0.86*	-0.34**	-0.36**
Majority Party Sponsor	-0.76	-0.55	-0.05	-0.34
Bipartisan Sponsorship	-0.67	-0.65	0.18++	0.22++
Polarization	-7.58**	-6.25*	-6.25*	-4.39**
Party				
Democratic Majority	-1.13	0.22	-0.92**	-0.34*
Constituent Factors				
Negative Opinion of Aid				
Unemployment Rate	-0.18	-0.20	-0.05	-0.13**
n	141	141	64	64
R-Squared	12.2	10.2	48.5	41.8

Note: Cell entries weighted least squares logit estimates (standard errors in parentheses). ** p < .01, * p < .05, ++ p < .10

Table 3.3 Effect of Public Opinion, FAA Bills 1961-2007				
	All FAA Bills		Authorizations	
	House	Senate	House	Senate
Opinion	-0.03*	-0.03+	na	na
n	55	55		
R-Squared	13.9	15.0		

Note: Cell entries weighted least squares logit estimates (standard errors in parentheses). ** p < .01, * p < .05, ++ p < .10

Table 3.4 Effect of Interest Groups, all FAA Bills 1961-2007				
	All FAA Bills		Authorizations	
	House	Senate	House	Senate
Pro-Israel PACs	-0.40*	-0.23	-0.56*	-0.56*
n	48	48	20	20
R-Squared	11.9	5.8	52.0	52.0

Note: Cell entries weighted least squares logit estimates (standard errors in parentheses). ** p < .01, * p < .05, ++ p < .10

Table 3.5 Effect of Foreign-Born Population, all FAA Bills 1961-2007				
	All FAA Bills		Authorizations	
	House	Senate	House	Senate
Foreign-Born Population	-0.38*	-0.28**	-0.21**	-0.17**
n	141	141	64	64
R-Squared	11.2	11.1	42.8	42.2

Note: Cell entries weighted least squares logit estimates (standard errors in parentheses). ** p < .01, * p < .05, ++ p < .10

Chapter 4

A Micro Look at Congress and Foreign Aid

In this chapter, I will apply the major theories of congressional decision making to examine roll call votes on foreign aid legislation. Whereas the previous chapter studied the conditions under which a foreign aid bill passes or fails, this chapter focuses on individual votes. In order to fully understand the decision-making process behind foreign aid, it is important to look at both the macro and micro levels of policy making. The macro level allows us to understand whether the makeup of Congress and other external factors can influence consideration of foreign aid bills. The micro level addresses those factors that influence individual legislators. By studying the votes on the Foreign Assistance Act appropriation and authorization bills in eight congresses between 1961 and 2007, I will establish which factors are significant in whether a member of Congress votes for a bill.

In this chapter, I present several hypotheses that can explain legislative behavior, and apply them to roll call votes on foreign aid legislation. I also explain the data, methodology and results of the quantitative analysis I employ to study this matter. Finally, I will explain how these results answer the central question of this dissertation: why do legislators support foreign aid?

Hypotheses: Competing Theories of Decision Making

As in the previous chapter, the theories of legislative decision making that have been created and studied by congressional scholars will be used to formulate hypotheses and explanatory variables. The hypotheses will be similar, still focusing on partisan constraints, party, constituents and policy preferences, but will be reworked to appropriately examine the voting behavior of individual legislators.

It should be noted that there is one hypothesis that was used in the previous chapter but has been omitted in this chapter for practical reasons. In Chapter 3, there were separate partisan and party hypotheses; in this chapter they are combined. This is because during the statistical analysis, it was quickly discovered that the party variable was highly correlated with the other partisan variables. Recognizing that party was an important part of this puzzle, I did not omit it entirely, but combined it with other partisan factors. In addition, this chapter will address a hypothesis that the previous one did not: the legislator characteristic hypothesis. This hypothesis will address whether certain characteristics of an individual legislator, such as race, gender, leadership position, or committee membership may sway whether he or she votes for a Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) bill.

The first line of thought that will be addressed is the argument that the partisan forces can influence members' choices and strategies, and in so doing, can also have an effect on policy choices. Research has shown that the organization of Congress, and government in general, constrains and shapes members' options and decisions (Schwartz 1987). But it is the partisans

operating within this structure that are so influential. This can come in the form of senior members wielding their influence over freshmen members (Matthews 1959), or leaders holding important influence over committee and caucus members (Binder, Lawrence, Maltzman 1999). Within the context of foreign aid policy, this phenomenon was apparent with the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations in the 1960s, also known as the “Passman Subcommittee” named after powerful Chair Otto E. Passman (D-LA). While a few of the subcommittee members were consistently for or against certain issues, the rest favored programs only when the White House was controlled by their own political party (CQ Almanac 1961).⁵²

There are also external constraints on Congress that can have an effect on decision making. Both the Senate and the Supreme Court constrain roll call votes of House members (Martin 2001). As noted earlier, presidents also wield a significant amount of influence over foreign policy, leading some scholars to refer to this as a “free hand.” Additionally, the increase of party polarization in the Congress has changed how this institution functions, and has had an effect on how, and if, policy is made (Binder 2003). Indeed, any study of what amounts to be policy gridlock would be remiss if it did not consider party polarization. Other examples of partisan forces that may be influential are: presidential position on a bill, party of the president, divided government, majority party sponsorship, and bipartisan sponsorship.

⁵² Passman was actually one of the subcommittee members who was consistently against the mutual security funds requested by the executive branch, no matter which party was in power. Passman fought doggedly against foreign aid, and in a September 2nd, 1961 interview with Congressional Quarterly, he referred to foreign aid as “propaganda,” “self-defeating,” and that it was “bleeding the American people and dissipating our resources” (CQ 1961, 311-312).

An additional example of a partisan force is that of political parties. In their work *Legislative Leviathan*, Cox and McCubbins (1994a) compared parties to cartels, and argued that the majority party binds its members to support caucus decisions in the House on a variety of key structural matters. They supported this statement by arguing that the rules of the Democratic Caucus in the House dictate that all caucus members are bound to support caucus decisions if they wish to retain their membership (1994b). More substantively, they argue that to the extent that membership in the majority party's caucus is valuable, it will effect policy decisions made by House members.

Many other political scientists have argued the importance of parties. Kingdon (1981) found that members of Congress engage in an extended search for information only rarely, but instead rely on cues provided by a number of sources: party leadership and ranking committee leaders being chief among them.⁵³ Binder, Lawrence and Maltzman (1999) also established that the priorities and directives of the party in Congress trump personal preferences in floor voting.

Partisan Hypothesis: Partisan forces such as presidential preferences, bill sponsorship, party unity and party membership influence legislative support on foreign aid bills.

Another factor that may affect congressional decision making is that of constituents. The classic textbook account of representative democracy is that representatives attempt to translate the public's view into government action; the ideal view of which is that legislators represent and act on the interests of the electorate. A cursory examination of American politics reveals that this is not the reality of our modern democracy.

⁵³ Though trusted colleagues and even the executive branch can also provide cues.

The relationship between elected representatives and their constituencies is complicated and multifaceted. One of the major difficulties with constituency influence over decision making is the degree to which members accurately ascertain the preferences of their constituencies. It can be difficult for legislators to accurately assess the wishes and policy preferences of their constituents, and to correctly evaluate how those preferences may influence campaigns and elections. Despite this, members still take the perceived opinions of their constituents, both present and potential, into account when making decisions (Fenno 1978). In addition, Arnold (1990) found that citizens, who have no opinions about a policy at the time it is being formed and considered, could still have a large effect on legislators' decisions. Indeed he found that collective goods and pork barrel projects are provided to these constituents with the hope that they will respond favorably by voting to reelect the members of Congress at a future point.

This may be especially salient in the area of foreign policy. In general, it is not considered to be a large factor in congressional elections (Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan 2002; Jacobson 1996). Since the 1960s, the American people have become increasingly ambivalent about foreign policy. Indeed, throughout the 1990s, the public was largely concerned with domestic policy problems and perhaps even complacent about global issues (Campbell, Rae and Stack 2003). Despite this, foreign policy has the potential to be a hot-button issue during an election, and this may be an incentive for leaders to support such issues. For example, crises such as famines or violence in developing countries have the potential to garner the attention of the American public.⁵⁴

In addition, strong constituency groups can influence a legislator's policy behavior

⁵⁴ Bauer, Pool and Dexter (1972) made a similar argument about opinion and foreign-trade policy. While most Americans know little about trade policy, international crises can influence and intensify their opinions.

(Carter and Scott 2009). Political scientists know surprisingly little about contemporary public opinion toward human rights or foreign aid, or about its influence over policy (Welch and Forsythe 1983). While it has been argued that the American public wants a moral or human rights component in U.S. foreign policy (Yankelovich 1978), the effect of this remains unclear (Cohen 1978).

Understanding constituents' opinions and wishes can be an extremely difficult task; it can be time-consuming, expensive, and often risky. Though scholars have found that constituent preferences influence congressional decision making, and can influence floor votes and the allocation of funds, it remains to be seen whether this analysis also applies to foreign aid policy.

Constituent Constraint Hypothesis: Legislators will vote in accordance with their constituents' preferences.

An additional manner in which political scientists have argued congressional decision-making can be influenced, is by personal policy preferences. Indeed, many prominent political scientists have long argued that roll call behavior is strongly influenced by personal policy preferences (Miller and Stokes 1963; Clausen 1973; Wilcox and Clausen 1991; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). In addition, Kingdon (1981) also argued that concentrating on the many influences in the legislative system should not obscure the fact that members themselves are influenced by their own attitudes. Krehbiel (1995) also highlighted the importance of preferences, as he argued that a legislator's preference will trump the pressure applied by the party to vote in a specific manner.

Beyond acting upon their specific policy preferences, legislators can also be policy entrepreneurs. Kingdon (1995) has argued that elected officials look for policy windows as opportunities to advocate proposals, push pet projects or bring attention to

specific problems. In his theory, he likens the policy decision-making process as a “policy stream,” in which proposals, alternatives and solutions float about, waiting to be discussed, revised and discussed again. In this model, legislators are active policy entrepreneurs, waiting to push their preferences when a policy window opens. Whiteman (1985) has also argued that legislators use policy analysis to determine which policy is preferred and should be pursued. He writes that members use strategic analysis to determine the best course of action.

Policy Preferences Hypothesis: Legislators will vote in accordance with their own policy preferences.

The influence of organized interest groups may also play a factor in decision making. The literature in this arena generally accepts that interest groups do not dominate congressional behavior, but their campaign contributions can have varying effects (Hall and Wayman 1990; Romer and Snyder 1994; Wright 1985). Indeed, according to Vogelgesang (1980), human rights interest groups were sometimes the single most decisive factor in American policy on human rights, rivaling the effectiveness of the pro-Israel lobby, which some argue has effectively lobbied its way into making aid for Israel about one-fifth of the foreign aid budget (CQ Almanac 1992; Mearsheimer and Walt 2007). Welch and Forsythe (1983) also noted the cumulative influence human rights lobbies could wield. As for interest groups regarding foreign aid, some argue that aid has no constituency, and thus no powerful interests for which to lobby. However, this contention is far too simplistic. Lancaster (2007) argues that they can be a pervasive and dynamic force, especially in a policy area such as foreign aid, where public resources are involved. This can be very difficult to measure. While historical records show that a multitude of special interests testified to Congress regarding the Marshall Plan, their

interests were so varied it is hard to say who had an effect on what.⁵⁵ Recently, Milner and Tingley (2011) evaluated congressional voting patterns on foreign aid and found strong evidence that organized interests were influential in foreign aid policy making.

Organized Interests Hypothesis: Organized interest groups will influence legislative support of foreign aid.

As this review has shown, the major areas of influence political scientists have studied are: partisan forces, political party, constituents, policy preferences and organized interest groups. Each of these has an influence on decision-making, and has served as the base of each of my hypotheses. The final line of thought this chapter will address is whether certain characteristics of an individual legislator can sway how he or she votes. Scholars have argued that characteristics such as race, gender, leadership position, or committee membership can influence roll call behavior. An interesting avenue of research regarding this issue has addressed whether race influences roll call votes.

In a study evaluating how minority legislators influence policy development in Congress, Katrina L. Gamble (2011) found that race has a substantive effect on members' policy priorities and their legislative activity within committees. Specifically, she found that black members participated at higher rates within committees than whites on both black interest and nonracial bills. Other research has found that blacks consistently express higher levels of satisfaction with their member of Congress or U.S. Senator when that

⁵⁵ The items promoted by various witnesses to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding the Marshall Plan represented 124 items, ranging from “aloes to zippers, through farm equipment, pretzels and steam locomotives” (CQ Almanac 1949, 336).

representative is black, even when controlling for other characteristics such as party (Tate 2001).⁵⁶

Other factors beyond personal characteristics may also influence legislative behavior regarding foreign policy. Carter and Scott (2009) found that the most active foreign policy entrepreneurs held seats on the foreign policy, armed services or intelligence committees. They suggested that entrepreneurs may seek out such assignments to improve their ability to pursue their policy interests.

While this is an interesting area of research, it is still relatively undeveloped. Many questions remain about whether race, gender and other personal characteristics influence policy preferences and ultimately, roll call votes. By examining this further, this dissertation will add to existing literature and help answer the question of whether personal characteristics can effect roll call behavior.

Legislator Characteristic Hypothesis: Personal characteristics of a legislator will influence support of foreign aid.

Regarding these five hypotheses, I believe that the partisan hypothesis will once again be most plausible. Partisan factors played a significant role in the macro-level analysis, and should in the micro-level analysis as well. Scholars studying international relations have argued for the importance of non-governmental organizations in changing norms and international law (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 2005; Klotz 1995). The macro analysis suggested that organized interest groups may play a

⁵⁶ While constituents may view the member of Congress more positively, Haynie (2002) found that black legislators are often judged more critically by lobbyists, journalists and other legislators.

role in foreign aid legislation, but the effect seemed rather small. It is expected that this trend will carry over into the micro analysis as well.

Empirical Analysis

In the previous chapter I sought to understand the makeup of the Congress and the external factors that influence the Congress when foreign aid bills are considered. In this chapter, I will take the next step in my dual approach, and focus on those factors that influence individual legislators. I will once again complete a longitudinal study of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 and its annual authorizations and appropriations. Instead of examining all 141 bills, I will focus only on those bills voted on in eight specific congresses. These congresses were each selected to ensure that major political and external factors were accounted for and did not create bias in the results. They include: a congress during the Cold War, a post-Cold War congress, a congress during the Vietnam War, and a pre- and post-Vietnam era congress. Included are congresses that were held under both Republican and Democratic presidents, Republican and Democratic majorities were included, as well as those that had either unified or divided governments. This was done to ensure these factors did not skew the data.

The congresses held during the Cold War that will be studied are: the 87th, 92nd, 95th and 97th congresses. The 87th Congress (1961-1963), held during the Cold War but before the Vietnam War, was presided over by a Democratic majority with John F. Kennedy in the White House, a Democratic president, thus

creating a unified government. It is appropriate and necessary that this Congress be included because it was the year the FAA was first enacted. The second Congress is the 92nd (1971-1973), held during both the Cold War and the Vietnam War, with a Democratic Congress, but with Republican President Richard Nixon, creating a divided government. Next is the 95th Congress (1977-1979), held during the Cold War, but two years after the Vietnam War ended. There was a unified government with a Democratic majority in Congress and Democrat Jimmy Carter as president. The final Cold-War era congress to be studied is the 97th (1981-1983), and was governed by a divided government, with a Democratic Congress and Republican President Ronald Reagan.

Additionally, four congresses that were held after the end of the Cold War will be studied: 102nd, 103rd, 104th and 108th. The first is the 102nd Congress (1991-1993), held as the Cold War was ending, with Republican George H. W. Bush as president, a Democratic Congress, and thus a divided government. Second is the 103rd Congress (1993-1995), still with a Democratic majority in Congress, but now with a unified government with Democrat President Bill Clinton. Next is the 104th Congress (1995-1997), while Clinton was still in the White House, the power in the House had shifted to a Republican majority, thus creating a divided government. The final Congress that will be studied is the 108th (2003-2005), presided over by a Republican majority, Republican George W. Bush as president, and thus a unified government.

By taking care to study congresses held under various circumstances, I will ensure that no one internal or external factor will overpower the results. This

is especially important because the topic of whether international or systemic factors influence foreign aid has been studied at length. Here the focus is on domestic factors and domestic actors, and the purpose is to understand what factors influence their voting behavior on foreign aid legislation.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in the analysis that follows measures whether or not a legislator voted for an FAA appropriation or authorization bill. Data has been collected on each FAA bill that was voted on in either the House or Senate in the eight congresses listed above. This amounted to 39 bills, 15 of which were authorizations and 24 of which were appropriations; of these bills, 29 became law.⁵⁷ For a more detailed account of what occurred with these bills, please see the table below.

Explanatory Variables

With the appropriate bills selected from the group of congresses that will be studied, we can now identify and estimate the impact of the explanatory variables, each of which is grouped according to the already laid out hypotheses.

Partisan Forces

As this hypothesis suggests, we should expect certain partisan forces to influence whether a legislator votes for or against an FAA bill. The first measure of this will be

⁵⁷ In addition, nine bills were reported to either the House or the Senate, but a vote was never taken. Of these bills, one was an appropriation, and eight were authorizations. It should be noted that FAA bills did not start to die before votes were taken until the early 1980s, and that these bills are more likely to be authorizations by a rate of two to one.

political party. At first glance, one could speculate that a Republican would be more likely to vote for foreign aid. It was a Republican-controlled House and Senate that first passed the Marshall Plan in 1948. However, Democrats were the majority party when foreign aid was reorganized and the first FAA bills passed. In addition, President Kennedy was in the White House at this time, and he was a proponent of foreign aid and organized the Peace Corps under his administration. Indeed, FAA bills did not begin to consistently fail until the 1980s and 1990s, when the House and Senate were more likely to be controlled by Republicans.

These statements only skim the surface of how party may play a role in determining votes on foreign aid legislation. Political science scholars have noted that party can influence foreign policy, and that Republicans who are more likely to be externally focused (Saunders 2011). By analyzing party and foreign aid, I will determine whether it actually does influence legislators in this arena, and whether members of one party or another are more likely to vote for FAA bills.

To assess whether there is partisan influence from the executive branch, I will test whether it matters if a legislator is of the same party as the president. In addition, whether a legislator represents a state or congressional district that supported the president in the last election will also be tested. There is a dual aim in having both of these factors. First, to ascertain whether a partisan constraint from the executive branch exists, but also to gain a greater understanding of the relationship between Congress and the Executive Branch on matters of foreign aid. In doing so, more light will be shed on the argument of whether there really are “two presidencies” (Wildavsky 1966).

Several partisan factors from within Congress will also be included. Whether a legislator is of the same party as the sponsor will be tested, as will the party unity score of each legislator (McCarty, Poole, Rosenthal et al 2010).⁵⁸ The final two partisan factors will be whether a legislator was an incumbent in their most recent race (Lublin 1997), and their length of service.

Policy Preferences

In the macro study of Congress and foreign aid, it was found that NOMINATE scores were not significant. Thus, it may be expected that a similar result will be found in the micro study, meaning ideology may not influence how a legislator votes for FAA bills. To measure this, the NOMINATE scores (McCarty, Poole, Rosenthal et al 2010) will be used.

Constituent Factors

In the previous chapter, survey data regarding public opinion on foreign aid was used to study whether there was a tie between FAA bill passage and public opinion. This data was accessible and reliable at the national level. However, the case is not so when studying individual states and congressional districts. For this reason, another factor will be considered to see if there is a tie between whether or not a legislator supports an FAA bill and constituent opinion. The factor that will be used is the percent of a state or congressional district that is foreign-born (Adler 87th, 92nd, 95th, 97th, 102nd, 103rd and

⁵⁸ Party unity score is a number between 0 and 100, where a score of 100 indicates that a member voted "with" the group on all analyzed votes.

104th congresses; U.S. Census Bureau).⁵⁹ Because foreign-born population was such a significant factor in the previous chapter, it is important to see if it also plays an important role in individual legislators' decision making. As with the previous chapter, this factor will be assessed to see if a large foreign-born population could make legislators either more sympathetic to the needs of developing countries, or if a rise in the foreign-born population is accompanied with controversy and xenophobia; it could make legislators less sympathetic.

In addition, focusing on foreign-born population will address two important questions. First, it will address the theory that small, but opinionated ethnic-groups can influence a legislator, as has been argued regarding Armenian groups (Campbell, Rae & Tack 2003). By including the foreign-born population, we may be able to capture whether there is an effect here. Second, it may also identify whether there is a larger issue at play. An oft-cited reason given to explain congressional behavior is that congressmen are "single-minded seekers of reelection" (Mayhew 1974). By testing whether there is a link between this important component of a state or district and support for FAA legislation, more light can be shed on the question of whether members truly are attentive to their constituents' opinions, especially on foreign policy and foreign aid.

In addition to foreign-born population, economic data will also be used. Though this was not a significant factor in the macro study, it is still important to control for a component that is often a major discussion point regarding budget issues. The two

⁵⁹ Several other factors were also used to test the constituent constraint hypothesis, including: region, black population, Hispanic population, farmer population, military population, number of veterans, church membership, and urban population. In order to keep the argument parsimonious, only foreign-born population will be included in the results section.

economic measures that will be used are the unemployment rate and median income (Adler 87th, 92nd, 95th, 97th, 102nd, 103rd and 104th congresses; U.S. Census Bureau).

Organized Interest Groups

To measure the effect of organized interest groups, data from the Center for Responsive Politics will once again be used. Instead of looking at total contributions to the entire Congress, contributions made by PACs to individual legislator will be used. The same categories that were used in the macro chapter will once again be studied: Foreign and Defense Policy PACs, Pro-Israel PACs and Human Rights PACs.⁶⁰ Because this data has only been available since 1990, it will only be included in the post-Cold War congresses.

Legislator Characteristics

A final factor that will be taken into account is whether a specific characteristic of an individual legislator may be significant. Whether a legislator is a member of a committee that deals with foreign policy and foreign aid may make him or her more likely to vote for FAA bills. To that end, I will test whether membership in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,⁶¹ or the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations influences whether a legislator will support an FAA bill (Nelson 87th, 92nd, 95th, 97th, and 102nd congresses; Stewart and Woon 103rd, 104th and 108th congresses).⁶² This

⁶⁰ Data are based on contributions from PACs and individuals giving \$200 or more.

⁶¹ The House Foreign Affairs Committee was renamed the House International Affairs Committee from 1995 to 2007.

⁶² Several other factors were also used to test the legislator characteristic hypothesis, including: membership of the Appropriations Committee, chairmanship of the either the House Foreign Affairs Committee or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, race (whether the member was black), ethnicity (whether the member was Hispanic), and gender (whether the member was female). In order to keep the

committee was chosen in part because since the House Appropriations Committee was historically hostile to foreign aid, members of the Foreign Affairs Committee acted as if obliged to defend it (Truman 1962).

Methodology

In order to capture the significance of the explanatory variables, I will perform a quantitative analysis of the eight designated congresses. For analysis of the House in each Congress, it will be a large-n analysis, in which I will use logistical regressions. In the Senate, standard regressions were used in most cases as not all senators participate in each vote, making the $n < 100$.⁶³

Results

Partisan Forces

One of the most consistent and significant factors was political party. In nearly every chamber in each Congress, being a member of the Democratic Party was positive and significant, meaning that Democrats were more likely to vote for FAA bills.⁶⁴ This runs counter to the theory that Republicans are more externally focused, and thus put more emphasis on foreign policy and are more likely to support foreign aid bills. It also supports the idea that parties can bind their members to support certain policies (Cox and McCubbins 1994a), and that members may be looking to the party for cues as to how they should vote (Kingdon 1981).

argument parsimonious, only membership of the House Foreign Affairs Committee or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will be included in the results section.

⁶³ In cases where the n was close to or at 100, both standard regressions and logistical regressions were run in order to ensure accuracy.

⁶⁴ The only case in which it was not significant was in the Senate in the 108th Congress.

It also provides further explanation for why FAA authorizations have failed to pass since 1985. Before that time the Democrats had succeeded in passing FAA bills, but apparently had a harder time marshalling a majority after that time. This was in part due to the loss of the majority in both houses to the Republican Party from 1995 to 2007. It was also because of the insertion of the abortion issue into debates of FAA authorization passage. This not only added a new dimension to the debate and an added area for contention, but since Republicans won these disputes, the support FAA bills had enjoyed for decades from Democratic members of Congress began to dissolve. This reversal of support continued through the 2000s, as foreign aid suddenly became an integral part of President George W. Bush's foreign policy, and other conservative members of Congress that had once been strident opponents, began to become strong supporters. However, the Republican supporters were not successful in marshalling a large enough majority from their fellow party members to counteract the loss of Democratic support.

In addition, presidential party and sponsorship party were also consistently significant, but were either positive or negative depending on the party of the president or sponsor, meaning that when the president or sponsor was a Republican, the coefficient was positive. Though these factors were statistically significant, it does not show that presidential or sponsor party actually mattered. Rather, it simply confirms that the party of the individual legislator is significant. If presidential party or sponsor party were truly significant, they should trump the party effect. However, neither does. There was no consistent pattern or significance with the remaining partisan factors: party unity, electoral votes, incumbency, or service length.⁶⁵ The lack of significance still reveals

⁶⁵ Party unity was positive and significant in the House in a few congresses, but the coefficient was extremely small. Electoral votes were negative and significant in the House several congresses at the 90-95

interesting points. If party unity were significant, it would add to the strength of the party hypothesis. It instead indicates that the level of unity within each party plays no role in foreign aid roll call votes. If incumbency or service length were significant, it may have indicated that the longer legislators stayed in office, the more comfortable they felt in voting according to their policy preferences. For instance, incumbents are usually very difficult to remove from office, and so they could theoretically vote according to their conscience with little fear of being voted out in the next election. However, neither of these variables were significant, indicating incumbency does not play a role in foreign aid legislation.

Policy Preferences

The coefficient for NOMINATE scores was consistently negative and significant in the House of Representatives in each Congress except the 104th, as seen in tables 4.3 and 4.4, meaning the more liberal a member of Congress was, the more likely he or she was to vote for foreign aid legislation. In the Senate, it was negative and significant in the 87th, 95th, 102nd and 103rd congresses. In the 104th and 108th congresses, it was actually positive and significant with appropriations (refer to tables 4.3 and 4.4).⁶⁶ Given that Democrats are more likely to support foreign aid bills, these results are not surprising.

To further understand the influence of policy preferences, I also performed statistical analysis of the roll call votes of each party. I found that NOMINATE scores

percent confidence interval. Incumbency was also negative and significant at the 90-99 percent confidence level in the House in several cases. There was no pattern with service length, and it was positive and significant in some cases, and negative in others, but the coefficient was small.

⁶⁶ There were no authorization votes in the Senate in either the 103rd Congress or the 108th Congress.

remained negative and significant from the 87th Congress until the 103rd Congress. This suggests that more liberal Democrats and more liberal Republicans were likely to vote for a foreign aid bill. A review of the average NOMINATE scores of the Democrats and Republicans supports this. As shown in Table 4.5, the average NOMINATE score for those supporting FAA bills is always more negative (or in the case of Republicans, less positive), than those opposing them. This means that aid is more likely to be supported by liberal Democrats and more liberal Republicans.⁶⁷

Saunders (2011, 101) referred to this when she described a speech on aid to India given by then-Senator John F. Kennedy (1958), who was seeking to score points with liberals, even though the overall policy was unpopular. Kennedy's intentions may have had a hidden and double meaning, because his speech would have influenced the "liberals" in both parties. One interesting pattern in the data that should be noted, is that NOMINATE score coefficients were usually larger in the House models than in the Senate, signaling that ideology may play more of a role in House votes.

Beginning with the 104th Congress, NOMINATE scores were not as consistently negative. While the coefficient for NOMINATE scores remained negative for Republicans, they were positive and significant for both Democrats voting on authorizations and appropriations in the 104th Congress. This pattern continued in the 108th Congress, with negative NOMINATE scores for Republicans, and positive scores for Democrats voting on FAA appropriations.⁶⁸ This reversal is interesting, and may be explained by various factors. In the 104th Congress, debates over family planning and abortion killed several FAA bills. Since Republicans held the majority of both the House

⁶⁷ This finding is consistent with the work done by Milner and Tingley (2008).

⁶⁸ It should be noted, that the R-squared scores in these congresses were significantly lower than in previous cases, signaling the models do not hold as much explanatory power.

and Senate at this time, they were able to influence the bills and either cut or delay funding for family planning. In addition, Rep. Sonny Callahan (R-Ala.) was appointed as the new chair of the House Foreign Operations, and he made a concerted effort to reduce spending while carving out extra aid for U.S. exporters. Democrats may have voted against the FAA bills in protest to these policy issues and changes (CQ Almanac 1996, 10-48).

In the 108th Congress, aid was no longer primarily controlled by the Democrats. President George W. Bush had made commitments to the Millennium Development Goals, and had also made foreign aid a core part of his foreign aid agenda. In addition, the House and Senate both had Republican majorities. Because of this, Democrats could have once again been protesting Republican policies by voting against FAA bills. Especially since debates over aid for Iraq reconstruction were a major issue during this Congress.

The fact that the coefficients for NOMINATE scores were much larger than for those of party may also signal that ideology is more influential than party with foreign aid votes. This is in agreement with Krehbiel's (1995) argument that a legislator's preference will trump the pressure applied by the party to vote in a specific manner.⁶⁹ In addition, leaders with certain beliefs may be drawn to one party or another, irrespective of foreign policy beliefs, so though party may play a significant role, it may not be the most important. Indeed, scholars have noted that certain foreign policy beliefs have been identified with different parties over history, and that there are several foreign policy issues that transcend party altogether (Mead 2001; Nau 2008). Foreign aid may not be

⁶⁹ Though Krehbiel was not studying foreign aid bills, but rather was assessing party and preferences regarding a deficit-cutting bill. Binder, Lawrence and Maltzman (1999) later established that the priorities and directives of the party in Congress trump personal preferences in floor voting.

one of those issues that completely transcends party, but the results show that the power of ideology and policy preferences in this case is stronger than the power of the party cartel.

Constituent Factors

The only constituent factor that was significant was the percentage of foreign-born constituents in a legislator's state or district. The coefficient for foreign-born population was consistently positive and significant from the 87th through the 102nd congresses, though it was relatively small. This signifies that legislators representing districts with larger foreign-born populations were more likely to support FAA bills.⁷⁰ This is contrary to the findings in the previous chapter, in which the coefficient for foreign-born population was small and negative. In that chapter, this result was linked to research done by McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006), who have noted the relationship between the rise of the foreign-born population in the United States and polarization. As both polarization and foreign-born population have increased in recent decades, they could have had a negative effect on the passage of FAA legislation. In the earlier years of foreign aid, it appears this may not have been the case. Though the effect was small, the results signify that having a constituency with a larger foreign-born population actually may have induced legislators to favor foreign aid bills. This effect tempered in the 1990s, just after President George H. W. Bush signed the Immigration Act of 1990, which increased legal immigration by 40 percent. In that decade alone, the number of

⁷⁰ The same can be said for the other constituent factors that were tested: region, elderly population, black population, Hispanic population, military population, number of veterans, church membership, and urban population. Though there were cases of statistical significance, it was never consistent over time, and the coefficients were always very small.

legal immigrants in the United States increased by nearly 60 percent (U.S. Census Bureau). High immigration rates continued in the 2000s, and also became a hot political issue. This may have contributed to the lack of significance in foreign-born population on FAA legislation during this time, and perhaps to its negative effect in the macro level analysis as well.

To further understand whether constituent opinion influences votes on FAA legislation, several variables were tested to control for the economy. While median income was always positive and significant, the coefficient was so small it was basically equal to zero. In addition, the unemployment rate was never significant.

These results are in accordance with Mark Otter's argument that governments pay little attention to opinion regarding so-called elite policy areas such as foreign aid. He writes that foreign aid is an unlikely area of concern for governments to seek public opinion, as aid is seldom a domestic issue. In his words, "there are no votes in foreign aid" (2003, 115). In addition, polling data consistently shows that even when the American public expresses opinion regarding foreign aid, their knowledge of actual policy is most often incorrect. Not surprisingly, and just as with the previous chapter, there is little evidence that links public opinion to legislator's behavior regarding foreign aid policy.⁷¹

⁷¹ Some scholars have argued that legislators that push strongly for foreign aid do so at their own risk. JFK's enthusiasm for the third world and foreign aid was largely self-generated, and often evoked indifference and hostility (Dallek 2003). In fact, his constituent mail actually reflected hostility to foreign aid (Saunders 100).

Legislator Characteristics

Being a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs or the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was positive and significant in several congresses, but was not consistently so across time. As can be seen in tables 4.3 and 4.4, it was significant in the House in the 92nd Congress, and in both chambers in the 95th Congress. In the 97th Congress, it was positive and significant in both chambers, but only with votes on authorizations. It was only significant with appropriations in the Senate in the 102nd Congress, and in the House in the 103rd and 108th congresses.⁷² The fact that committee membership had such an inconsistent influence over voting behavior could be seen as quite surprising. It has been argued that legislators seek membership on committees in which they have an interest. Those would vote in favor of bills that those committees sent to the floor. However, it seems that this is not the case with foreign aid bills.

Organized Interest Groups

The results for interest groups were similar to those of constituent characteristics, in that when they were significant, the coefficient was so small it was basically equal to zero. There was consistent and positive significance on appropriation votes in each Congress tested (102nd, 103rd, 104th and 108th) with donations made to legislators from Pro-Israel interests, but the coefficients were extremely small (refer to Table 4.7). During the 102nd Congress, the results show that donations from Foreign Policy PACs and Human Rights PACs were significant on both appropriations and authorizations in the

⁷² There was no pattern with being a member of the Appropriations Committee, being a chair, being a black representative, a Hispanic representative (or being black or Hispanic was negative in several congresses), or being female.

House, but again, the coefficient was so small it was nearly equal to zero. No significance was found with PAC donations and votes in the Senate.

Conclusion

This analysis of factors that can influence legislator's voting behavior regarding foreign aid legislation has revealed several important patterns. First, both party and ideology play significant roles in determining whether a member of Congress votes for an FAA bill. It was found that Democrats were more likely to vote for FAA legislation, and members with more liberal ideologies were also more likely to favor these bills as well. Deeper analysis revealed that more liberal members of both parties are those most likely to vote for FAA bills, signaling that ideology and policy preferences may trump party in this policy arena. Beyond the partisan and policy preference factors, there were no other variables that were consistently significant. Characteristics of legislators' constituents or personal characteristics of each legislator did not play a role in determining votes. In addition, contributions made from organized interest groups played little role as well.

Table 4.1 Congresses Selected for Analysis			
Congress	Years	Range	Control
87th Congress	1961-1963	Cold War Pre-Vietnam	Democratic President Democratic Congress Unified Government
92nd Congress	1971-1973	Cold War Vietnam	Republican President Democratic Congress Divided Government
95th Congress	1977-1979	Cold War Post-Vietnam	Democratic President Democratic Congress Unified Government
97th Congress	1981-1983	Cold War Post-Vietnam	Republican President Democratic Congress Divided Government
102nd Congress	1991-1993	Post-Cold War Post-Vietnam	Republican President Democratic Congress Divided Government
103rd Congress	1993-1995	Post-Cold War Post-Vietnam	Democratic President Democratic Congress Unified Government
104th Congress	1995-1997	Post-Cold War Post-Vietnam	Democratic President Republican Congress Divided Government
108th Congress	2003-2005	Post-Cold War Post-Vietnam	Republican President Republican Congress Unified Government

Table 4.2 Final Status of Selected FAA Bills								
	Became Law	Passed both Houses, Conference Report Failed	Vetoed by President	Passed House, No Senate Action	Passed Senate, No House Action	Failed in House or Senate Floor Vote	Died in House or Senate Committee	Total Number of Bills
Appropriations	20	3	0	1	0	0	0	24
Authorizations	9	2	1	1	0	2	0	15
Total	29	5	1	2	0	2	0	39

Table 4.3 Micro Statistical Analysis, All Authorizations

	87th Congress (1961-63)		92nd Congress (1971-73)		95th Congress (1977-79)		97th Congress (1981-83)		102nd Congress (1991-93)		103rd Congress (1993-95)		104th Congress (1995-97)		108th Congress (2003-05)	
	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate
Partisan Factors																
Partisan Factors																
Party	1.98**	1.38*	0.42*	-0.87**	1.09**	0.79**	0.06	-0.17	1.28**	0.24**	na	na	-5.17**	-0.33**	1.22**	na
President's																
Party	1.98**	1.38*	-0.42*	0.78**	1.09**	0.88*	-0.06	0.17**	-1.27**	-0.24**			-5.12**	-0.33**	-1.23**	
Sponsor's Party	1.98**	1.38*	0.42*	-0.78**	1.09**	0.88*	-0.06	0.17**	1.26**	0.24**			5.17**	0.33**	-1.23**	
Party Unity	0.02*	0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.01*	0.01	0.01	0.01*	0.01	0.00			0.00	0.01**	0.05*	
Electoral Votes	-0.12	-1.20	-0.74**	-0.32	0.02	0.49	-0.03	0.15	-0.37	0.07			0.79**	-0.10	-0.42	
Incumbent	-0.23	-0.43	0.39**	-0.30	-0.01	-0.46	-0.44	-0.02	-2.05**	-0.14**			-2.22**	-0.05	-0.41	
Serv. Length	0.02	-0.06**	0.03**	-0.01	0.00	-0.06**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.06**	-0.01*			-0.07**	0.00	-0.03	
Policy Preference																
NOMINATE																
Score	-7.86**	-5.48**	-1.93**	0.61	-4.08**	-2.59**	-1.59**	-0.25	-2.49**	-0.45**			6.70**	0.51**	-2.71**	
Economy																
Median Income	0.00**	0.00	0.00**	0.00*	0.00**	0.00	0.00**	0.00	0.00	0.00			0.00**	0.00	0.00	
Const. Factors																
% For Born	0.10**	0.22*	0.06**	0.14**	0.10**	0.21**	0.10**	0.08**	0.08**	0.03*			0.00	0.00	0.02	
Leg. Factors																
FA Comm.	0.92	0.85	1.13**	0.86*	1.03**	1.58*	2.22**	0.32*	0.13	0.14			0.43	0.01	0.06	
n	839	174	1,168	399	1,583	327	404	73	411	92			414	98	424	
R-Squared	43.3	44.3	19.2	9.9	32.1	23.5	19.7	41.8	16.7	35.5			62.8	27.4	13.8	

Note: Represents the sum of all votes for authorizations in each Congress. For large-n data sets, such as those in the House, logisitical regressions were used. For small-n, standard regressions were used. In the 97th, 102nd, 103rd, 104th and 108th congresses, there was only one authorization vote.

Cell entries weighted least squares logit estimates (standard errors in parentheses). ** p < .01, * p < .05, ++ p < .10

Table 4.4 Micro Statistical Analysis, All FAA Bills

	87th Congress (1961-63)		92nd Congress (1971-73)		95th Congress (1977-79)		97th Congress (1981-83)		102nd Congress (1991-93)		103rd Congress (1993-95)		104th Congress (1995-97)		108th Congress (2003-05)	
	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate
Partisan Factors																
Party	1.87**	0.88	0.09	-0.90 ⁺⁺	1.18**	1.22*	1.44**	-0.63*	1.43**	1.15*	1.53**	1.32"	-0.98**	-1.24**	0.27	-4.29**
President's																
Party	1.87**	0.88	-0.09	0.73	1.18**	1.30*	-1.44**	0.71*	-1.43**	-1.15*	-0.01*	1.32 ⁺⁺	-0.95**	-1.24**	-0.25	4.35**
Sponsor's																
Party	1.87**	0.88	0.09	-0.73	1.18**	1.30*	1.42**	-0.59*	1.43**	1.15*	1.53**	1.32 ⁺⁺	-0.98**	-1.24**	-0.25	4.35**
Party Unity																
Electoral																
Votes	-0.49 ⁺⁺	-1.26*	-0.39*	-0.88*	0.01	1.01	-0.11	-1.35**	-0.47 ⁺⁺	0.33	0.21	0.23	-0.76**	-0.02	0.07	-0.01
Incumbent																
Service Length	-0.20	-0.20	-0.02	-0.51	-0.14	-0.54	0.16	0.35	-0.95**	-0.21	-0.67*	0.67	-0.12	0.43	-1.04**	-0.50
Service Length	0.01	-0.04	0.02*	-0.04	0.00	-0.08 ⁺⁺	0.01	0.02	-0.03*	-0.03	-0.05**	-0.05	-0.03*	-0.02	-0.02 ⁺⁺	-0.01
Policy Preference																
NOMINATE																
Score	-7.59**	-4.45**	-1.77**	-0.11	-4.44**	-4.46**	-3.24**	-0.13	-2.98**	-2.92**	-3.01**	-2.73**	1.15**	1.22 ⁺⁺	-0.58*	7.42**
Economy																
Median																
Income	0.00*	0.00	0.00**	0.00*	0.00**	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00**	0.00	0.00**	0.00	0.00 ⁺⁺	0.00	0.00	0.00 ⁺⁺
Constituent Factors																
% For Born	0.13**	0.29	0.07*	0.16 ⁺⁺	0.08**	0.43*	0.06**	0.11	0.06**	0.14	-0.01	0.65**	0.01	0.04	0.02*	-0.01
Legislator Factors																
FA Committee	0.65	0.33	1.01**	0.87	1.63**	2.23 ⁺⁺	0.08	0.19	0.24	1.58"	1.14 ⁺⁺	1.07	-0.05	0.13	-0.78**	-0.86
n	784	160	1,256	188	765	120	1,166	282	1,640	199	843	191	1,249	299	1,237	98
R-Squared	47.0	42.6	36.7	18.9	24.6	35.7	40.6	18.4	1.8	19.0	21.7	18.1	30.6	4.5	2.7	3.6

Note: Represents the sum of all votes for authorizations in each Congress. For large-n data sets, such as those in the House, logististical regressions were used. For small-n, standard regressions were used. In the 97th, 102nd, 103rd, 104th and 108th congresses, there was only one authorization vote.

Cell entries weighted least squares logit estimates (standard errors in parentheses). ** p < .01, * p < .05, ++ p < .10

Table 4.5 Micro Statistical Analysis, All FAA Bills by Party

	87th Congress		92nd Congress		95th Congress		97th Congress		102nd Congress		103rd Congress		104th Congress		108th Congress	
	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate
Authorizations																
Rep NOMINATE Score	-14.58**	-16.51**	-6.55**	-4.82**	-12.26**	-1.13**	-6.03**	-1.21**	-5.08**	-1.32**	No Auth	No Auth	-3.90"	na^	-6.36**	No Auth
n	335	64	501	177	537	117	181	39	156	41			135		223	
R-Squared	37.1	54.9	19.1	16.6	39.9	36.8	23.6	39.4	15.2	48.7			10.8		12.5	
Dem NOMINATE Score	-12.34**	-8.02*	-3.14**	-0.17	-7.02**	-4.97*	-6.53**	-1.80**	-4.00**	0.47			0.32**	1.34**	-3.31	
n	504	110	664	213	1,046	210	223	33	231	51			188	46	161	
R-Squared	51.5	54.1	24.4	8.7	33.0	25.7	30.5	60.3	18.5	15.2			7.9	15.7	14.6	
Appropriations																
Rep NOMINATE Score	-15.28**	-18.41*	-9.22**	-8.51**	-21.12**	-1.42**	-4.62**	-5.92**	-7.47**	-1.15**	-8.89**	-1.01**	-0.90	-6.92*	-8.95**	0.05
n	311	56	518	59	259	37	523	154	629	86	343	83	686	160	651	51
R-Squared	40.3	52.9	26.0	37.2	58.9	59.8	8.4	19.3	18.5	35.4	21.8	36.3	1.7	22.0	21.9	12.6
Dem NOMINATE Score	-11.79**	-6.64**	-4.13**	-0.10	-7.26**	-1.40**	-3.54**	-0.04	-4.76**	0.40	-4.89**	0.00	2.29**	4.22*	3.12*	1.64*
n	473	104	737	183	506	83	643	125	1,007	91	447	108	565	139	583	46
R-Squared	49.7	44.9	24.3	24.1	34.0	43.9	11.9	5.2	18.2	21.7	14.8	5.2	1.8	3.0	5.7	47.3

Note: Represents the sum of all votes for authorizations in each Congress. For large-n data sets, such as those in the House, logistitl regressions were used. For small-n, standard regressions were used. In the 97th, 102nd, 103rd, 104th and 108th congresses, there was only one authorization vote.
 Cell entries weighted least squares logit estimates (standard errors in parentheses). ** p < .01, * p < .05, ++ p < .10
 ^All Republican Senators voted in favor of the FAA authorization in the 104th Congress.

Figure 4.1: Average Nominate Scores in House FAA Votes




Figure 4.2: Average Nominate Scores in Senate FAA Votes




Table 4.6 Micro Statistical Analysis, All Authorizations by Party									
	102nd Congress (1991-93)		103rd Congress (1993-95)		104th Congress (1995-97)		108th Congress (2003-05)		
	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	
Foreign Policy PACs	0.00**	0.00	No Auth	No Auth	0.00	0.00	-0.00"		No Auth
Democrats	0.00**	0.00			0.00	0.00	0.00		
Republicans	0.00**	0.00			0.00	na	0.00		
Pro-Israel PACs	0.00**	0.00			0.0	0.00	0.0		
Democrats	0.00	0.00			0.0	0.00	0.0		
Republicans	0.00**	0.00			0.00	na	0.00		
Human Rights PACs	0.00*	0.00			0.0	0.00	0.0		
Democrats	0.00	0.00			0.0	0.00	0		
Republicans	0.00"	0.00			-0.00*	na	0.0		
Micro Statistical Analysis: All Appropriations by Party									
	102nd Congress (1991-93)		103rd Congress (1993-95)		104th Congress (1995-97)		108th Congress (2003-05)		
	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	
Foreign Policy PACs	0.00**	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00*	-0.00"	
Democrats	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Republicans	0.00"	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00**	0.00	
Pro-Israel PACs	0.00**	0.00	0.00**	0.00	0.00*	0.00	0.00*	-0.00"	
Democrats	0.00**	0.00	0.00**	0.00	0.00*	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Republicans	0.00*	0.00*	0.00**	0.00	0.00"	0.00*	0.00"	0.00	
Human Rights PACs	0.00*	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00*	0.00	
Democrats	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00*	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Republicans	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00"	0.00	0.00	0.00	
<p>Note: Represents the sum of all votes for authorizations in each Congress. For large-n data sets, such as those in the House, logisitical regressions were used. For small-n, standard regressions were used. In the 97th, 102nd, 103rd, 104th and 108th congresses, there was only one authorization vote. Cell entries weighted least squares logit estimates (standard errors in parentheses). ** p < .01, * p < .05, ++ p < .10</p> <p>^All Republican Senators voted in favor of the FAA authorization in the 104th Congress.</p>									

Chapter 5

Congress and the Politics of Foreign Aid Explained: Conclusions and Future Research

In the many years scholars have studied the American Congress, little work has been done to study foreign aid, or to explain why legislators would vote to send assistance to a foreign country. Scholars of international relations have made many attempts to explain foreign aid, but few have addressed the question from a domestic point of view. This dissertation has sought to bridge that gap, and has addressed the puzzle of why legislators support foreign aid. It has attacked the question from two levels. First, the macro level examined the larger political and economic landscape to explain the circumstances under which a foreign aid bill passes. Second, the micro level focused on the behavior of individual members of Congress, and studied why legislators support foreign aid legislation. This chapter will summarize and explain the answers found in the empirical chapters, and will also describe potential future research that could shed additional light on the puzzle of foreign aid.

Major Findings and Implications

The element that is most lacking from analysis of foreign aid policy is a theory of individual decision making, an area extremely well developed in the study of Congress

(Rieselbach 1984). The many studies on legislative behavior have, to varying degrees, tried to identify patterns of legislative voting to establish the determinants and implications of these patterns. Accordingly, this dissertation has applied the major theories of legislative decision making to the puzzle of foreign aid. I formulated six hypotheses to study what factors influence votes on and passage of foreign aid legislation, and found several major conclusions.

Partisan Factors

The first line of thought addressed is the argument that partisan forces can influence members' choices and strategies, and in so doing, can have an effect on policy choices. As this hypothesis suggested, certain partisan forces should effect votes on or passage of FAA legislation, and several did. The party and ideology of the president were both significant. Having a Democratic president in the White House made a Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) bill more likely to become law. Not surprisingly, having a more liberal president in office was also significant.

Several partisan factors made FAA bills less likely to pass. The presence of divided government had a negative impact on whether an FAA bill became law. This result was expected, especially since the U.S. is the only fully presidential system of any major aid-giving countries. This means that the executive branch and legislative branch, as the two major institutions that determine aid budgets and policy, are politically autonomous of one another. This dynamic is highlighted by the fact that most aid-giving governments are parliamentary systems in which the prime minister is elected by the parliament, eliminating a major source of conflict that exists in the American system

(Lancaster 2007). This conflict can be consequential in the United States, and it has been found that the federal budgetary process is more prone to gridlock during divided government. According to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Congress must pass a budget resolution every year that sets the framework for the upcoming fiscal year. When Congress and the White House are controlled by different parties, Congress is more prone to miss the federal budget deadline by a significant margin; taking about 40 days longer to pass than when government is unified (Binder 2003, 77). In addition, the 20-year span of divided government in the 1980s and 1990s helps explain why FAA authorizations have not passed since 1985. This dissertation showed that in addition to having an effect on the overall federal budget process, divided government also made it more difficult for foreign assistance bills to pass.

Party polarization also mattered greatly in whether an FAA bill passed. As expected, analysis showed that it was consistently negative and significant in each model, meaning that the more polarized the House or Senate is, the more unlikely it is that a foreign aid bill will pass. Scholars have noted that the increase in polarization of Congress has changed how this institution functions, and has had an effect on how, and if, policy is made. Just as divided government slowed down the federal budget process, so does polarization; more moderate Congresses take a shorter time to negotiate agreements (Binder 2003). Historically, FAA bills first started to fail in the early 1970s, but did not begin to have consistent problems until the mid-1970s. It was at this same time that polarization began to increase dramatically in the U.S. House of Representatives (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006). Analysis shows that this is no consequence, and

that polarization has had a significant and negative effect on whether FAA bills have become law.

Political Parties

A second area this dissertation has addressed is whether political parties influence congressional decision-making regarding foreign aid legislation. At first glance, one could speculate that since Republicans are more externally focused, they would be more likely to vote for and pass foreign aid bills. It was a Republican-controlled House and Senate that first passed the Marshall Plan in 1948. But on there has been important foreign aid policy made by legislators on the other side of the aisle. Democrats were the majority party when foreign aid was reorganized and the first FAA bills passed.

Analysis at the macro level showed that party did not influence whether all FAA bills passed. Additional analysis that included only FAA authorizations found that these bills were more likely to become law when Republicans were the majority of the House. This may be a default of the historical makeup of Congress. The Democrats held control of the House from 1949 to 1994, the time period in which most FAA authorizations were introduced. From 1961 to 1994, 50 FAA authorizations were introduced, 25 of which passed. After 1994, 14 FAA authorizations were introduced, three of which passed.⁷³ During this same period, there were eight years in which no FAA authorization was introduced. In comparison, between 1961 and 1994, there were only two years in which an authorization was not introduced. Because of the stark contrast between the period of

⁷³ The three bills were all part of the authorization for the 2001 fiscal year, and were passed separately to avoid such controversial issues as aid to Israel and basic development assistance to Russia.

time the Democrats held the majority compared to the decade in which the Republicans did, this result may not hold as much explanatory power as the analysis assumes.⁷⁴

The influence of party in the micro analysis tells a very different story. One of the most consistent and significant factors in the micro analysis of FAA legislation was that of political party. In each chamber in nearly every Congress between 1961 and 1995, being a member of the Democratic Party was positive and significant, meaning Democrats were more likely to vote for FAA bills. This runs counter to the theory that Republicans are more externally focused, and thus put more emphasis on foreign policy, making them more likely to support foreign aid bills. It also supports the idea that parties can bind their members to support certain policies (Cox and McCubbins 1994a), and that members may be looking to the party for cues as to how they should vote (Kingdon 1981).

The party effect was strong until the mid-1990s, when it began to dissipate, and in some cases Republicans were more likely to vote for FAA bills. This was likely because the abortion issue became a central part of the debates of FAA bills. This not only made floor debates very contentious, but since Republicans won these policy disputes, the support FAA bills had enjoyed for decades from Democratic members of Congress began to dissolve. This trend continued through the 2000s, especially since foreign aid became an integral part of President George W. Bush's foreign policy, and other conservative members of Congress that had once been strident opponents, began to become strong supporters. However, the Republican supporters were not able to marshal enough votes

⁷⁴ Further analysis was completed that measured whether an FAA authorization passed for each fiscal year, rather than looking at the total number of authorizations. This allowed the analysis to account for the years that FAA authorizations were not introduced and showed that party was not significant.

from their fellow party members to counteract the loss of Democratic support, and FAA authorizations continued to fail throughout this time.

Policy Preferences

Political scientists have also argued congressional decision making can be influenced by personal policy preferences. As argued earlier in this dissertation, many prominent political scientists have long argued that roll call behavior is strongly influenced by personal policy preferences (Miller and Stokes 1963; Clausen 1973; Wilcox and Clausen 1991; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). To study this, the average NOMINATE⁷⁵ score for each Congress from 1961 to 2007 was used to test whether ideology influenced FAA bill passage (McCarty, Poole, Rosenthal 2010). While a legislator's ideology is now closely aligned with his or her political party, this has not always been the case. Until the Civil Rights Movement, many conservative Southerners aligned themselves with the Democratic Party. Similarly, whereas liberal cities of the Northeast are now Democratic strongholds, this has not always been the case (Ware 2006). Additionally, historical analysis of roll call votes shows that legislators did not vote according to party lines as closely as they do now (Aldrich 1995). Because of this, it is important to understand the importance of party *and* ideology in foreign aid decision making.

The macro analysis revealed that the how conservative or liberal Congress was did not influence whether FAA bills passed. As with party, the micro analysis for policy preferences tells a different story. The coefficient for NOMINATE scores was

⁷⁵ Average NOMINATE scores for each Congress are the average of the total sum of individual NOMINATE scores for each member of congress.

consistently negative and significant in the House in each Congress except the 104th, signifying the more liberal a member of Congress was, the more likely he or she was to vote for foreign aid legislation. In the Senate, results signified that more liberal legislators voted to support FAA bills in the 87th (1961-1963), 95th (1977-1979), 102nd (1991-1993), and 103rd (1993-1995) congresses. Given that Democrats are more likely to support foreign aid bills, these results are not surprising. In the 104th (1995-1997) and 108th (2003-2005) congresses, it was actually positive and significant with appropriations.⁷⁶ This could also be due to the fact that the Republican Party was in the majority at this time, and foreign aid had become preferred policy of notable Republicans, including Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC) and President George W. Bush.

Further analysis of policy preferences showed that even within both parties, more liberal members of each party were more likely to support FAA bills. That is, more liberal Democrats and more liberal Republicans were likely to vote for a foreign aid bill. A review of the average NOMINATE scores of the Democrats and Republicans supports this. The average NOMINATE score for legislators who support FAA bills is always more negative (or in the case of Republicans, less positive), than those opposing them. This means that aid is more likely to be supported by liberal Democrats and more liberal Republicans.⁷⁷ Saunders (2011, 101) referred to this phenomenon when she described a speech on aid to India given by then-Senator John F. Kennedy (1958), who was seeking to score points with liberals, even though the overall policy was unpopular. Kennedy's intentions may have had a hidden and double meaning, because his speech would have influenced the "liberals" in both parties. One interesting pattern in the data that should be

⁷⁶ There were no authorization votes in the Senate in either the 103rd Congress or the 108th Congress.

⁷⁷ This finding is consistent with the work done by Milner and Tingley (2008).

noted, is that NOMINATE score coefficients were usually larger in the House models than in the Senate, signaling that ideology may play more of a role in House votes.

Beginning with the 104th Congress (1995-1997), NOMINATE scores were not as consistently negative. While the coefficient for NOMINATE scores remained negative for Republicans, but were positive and significant for both Democrats voting on authorizations and appropriations in the 104th Congress. This pattern continued in the 108th Congress, with negative NOMINATE scores for Republicans, and positive scores for Democrats voting for FAA bills.⁷⁸ This reversal is interesting, and may be explained by various factors. In the 104th Congress, debates over family planning and abortion killed several FAA bills. Since Republicans held the majority of both the House and Senate at this time, they were able to influence the bills and either cut or delay funding for family planning. In addition, Sonny Callahan (R-Ala) was appointed as the new chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, and he made a concerted effort to reduce spending while carving out extra aid for U.S. exporters. Democrats may have voted against the FAA bills in protest to these policy issues and changes (CQ Almanac 1996, 10-48).

As noted previously, by the 108th Congress (2003-2005), aid was no longer primarily controlled by the Democrats. President George W. Bush had made commitments to the Millennium Development Goals, and had also made foreign aid a core part of his foreign aid agenda. In addition, the House and Senate both had Republican majorities. Because of this, Democrats could have once again been

⁷⁸ It should be noted, that the R-squared scores in these congresses were significantly lower than in previous cases, signaling the models do not hold as much explanatory power.

protesting Republican policies by voting against FAA bills, especially since debates over aid for Iraq reconstruction were a major issue during this Congress.

In the micro analysis, it was noted that the coefficients for NOMINATE scores were much larger than for those of party. This may also indicate that ideology is more important than party with foreign aid votes. These findings support Krehbiel's (1995) argument that a legislator's preference will trump the pressure applied by the party to vote in a specific manner.⁷⁹ In addition, leaders with certain beliefs may be drawn to one party or another, irrespective of foreign policy beliefs, so though party may play a significant role, it may not be the most important. Indeed, scholars have noted that certain foreign policy beliefs have been identified with different parties over history, and that there are several foreign policy issues that transcend party altogether (Mead 2001; Nau 2008). Foreign aid may not be one of those issues that completely transcends party, but the results show that the power of ideology and policy preferences in this case is stronger than the power of the party cartel.

Foreign-Born Population

An additional variable was of interest in this dissertation: foreign-born population. It was argued that a large foreign-born population could make legislators either more sympathetic to the needs of developing countries. Or, if a rise in the foreign-born population is accompanied with controversy and xenophobia, it could make legislators less sympathetic. To test for this, annual census data which estimates the percentage of the population that is foreign-born was used. In the macro analysis, the percentage of the

⁷⁹ Krehbiel was not studying foreign aid bills, but rather was assessing party and preferences regarding a deficit-cutting bill. Binder, Lawrence and Maltzman (1999) later established that the priorities and directives of the party in Congress trump personal preferences in floor voting.

population that is foreign-born had a negative and significant effect for all FAA bills, as well as in the model that assessed only FAA authorizations.⁸⁰

The coefficient for foreign-born population in the micro analysis was consistently positive and significant from the 87th through the 102nd congresses (ie from 1961-1993), though it was relatively small. This suggests that legislators representing districts with larger foreign-born populations were more likely to support FAA bills.

This is contrary to the findings in the micro analysis, in which the coefficient for foreign-born population was small and negative. As was noted earlier, as both polarization and foreign-born population have increased in recent decades, so has the likelihood that foreign aid bills would fail. In the earlier years of foreign aid, it appears this may not have been the case.⁸¹ Though the effect was small, legislators with larger foreign-born constituencies were more likely to favor foreign aid bills. This effect tempered in the 1990s. President George H. W. Bush signed the Immigration Act of 1990, which increased the amount of legal immigrants that could enter the country. In that decade alone, the number of legal immigrants in the United States increased by nearly 60 percent (U.S. Census Bureau). High immigration rates continued in the 2000s, and also became a hot political issue. This may have contributed to the lack of significance in foreign-born population on FAA legislation during this time, and perhaps to its negative effect in the macro analysis.

⁸⁰ It is interesting to observe that McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006) have noted the rise of the foreign-born population in the United States has closely aligned the increase in party polarization. Not surprisingly, polarization and foreign-born population both had negative effects on passage of FAA bills.

⁸¹ This was confirmed by additional statistical analysis. When only the FAA bills from 1961-1985 were included in the model, before authorizations began to fail consistently, and before the foreign-born population began to increase, the coefficient for foreign-born was not significant.

Organized Interest Groups

Organized interest groups may also play a factor in congressional decision making. The literature in this arena generally accepts that interest groups do not dominate congressional behavior, but their campaign contributions can have varying effects (Hall and Wayman 1990; Romer and Snyder 1994; Wright 1985). To measure the effect of organized interest groups, donation data from the Center for Responsive Politics was used. In the macro analysis, the total amount of annual PAC donations was used for the following categories: Foreign and Defense Policy PACs, pro-Israel PACs and Human Rights PACs. Because data is only available since 1990, analysis of FAA bills is from 1990 to 2007. The macro results showed that the only variable that showed a consistent pattern was contributions made by pro-Israel PACs, which were consistently negative, but only significant at the 80-95 percent confidence interval levels with very low R-squared scores. In addition, with each of these models, there was a significant difference between the R-squared score and the adjusted R-squared, signaling that the addition of the interest group variables detracted from the model.

In the micro analysis, instead of looking at total contributions to the entire Congress, contributions made by PACs to individual legislator were used.⁸² Once again, because data is only available since 1990, it was only included in analysis of the post-Cold War congresses. The results for micro analysis showed that donations from pro-Israel PAC donations were often significant, but the coefficients were extremely small.⁸³

⁸² Data are based on contributions from PACs and individuals giving \$200 or more.

⁸³ There was consistent and positive significance on appropriation votes in each Congress tested (102nd, 103rd, 104th and 108th) with donations made to legislators from Pro-Israel, but the coefficients were extremely small.

Constituent Constraints

The classic textbook account of representative democracy is that representatives attempt to translate the public's views and interests into government action. Yet, the relationship between elected representatives and their constituencies is complicated and multifaceted, and difficult to measure. In the macro analysis, I used opinion data from the General Social Survey, which asks whether a person supports or opposes foreign aid. In addition, economic data was included, such as: the size of the budget, the percentage the FAA budget in relation to both GDP and the budget, as well as the annual unemployment rate. This economic data was included as a control variable to ascertain whether economic conditions effect constituent support, and thus legislative support. At the macro level, none of these variables were significant.⁸⁴ In the micro analysis, polling data was not available at the state and district level, so only the economic control variable could be used. Just as with the macro analysis, this variable played little role in influencing legislative behavior.⁸⁵

These results are in accordance with Mark Otter's argument that governments pay little attention to opinion regarding so-called elite policy areas such as foreign aid. He writes that foreign aid is an unlikely area of concern for governments to seek public opinion, as aid is seldom a domestic issue. In his words, "there are no votes in foreign aid" (2003, 115). In addition, polling data consistently show that even when the American public express opinion regarding foreign aid, their knowledge of actual policy is most often incorrect. Not surprisingly, and just as with the previous chapter, there is

⁸⁴ The coefficient for median income was actually positive and significant, but the coefficient was so small it was basically equal to zero.

⁸⁵ The coefficient for unemployment rate was significant, but the coefficient was again so small it was basically equal to zero.

little evidence that links public opinion to legislators' behavior regarding foreign aid policy.

Legislator Characteristics

The final line of thought that was addressed was whether certain characteristics of an individual legislator, such as race, gender, leadership position, or committee membership, can influence how he or she votes. Scholars have argued that such characteristics can affect roll call behavior. For the purpose of this dissertation, it is important to know whether a legislator is a member of a committee that deals with foreign policy and foreign aid would make him or her more likely to vote for FAA bills. Since this hypothesis only deals with individual legislators, it only applied to the micro analysis. To that end, it was tested whether membership in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,⁸⁶ or the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations influences whether a legislator will support an FAA bill (Nelson 87th, 92nd, 95th, 97th, and 102nd congresses; Stewart and Woon 103rd, 104th and 108th congresses).⁸⁷ This committee was chosen in part because historically the House Appropriations Committee was hostile to foreign aid, and members of the Foreign Affairs Committee acted as if obliged to defend it (Truman 1962).

Statistical analysis showed that being a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs or the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was positive and

⁸⁶ The House Foreign Affairs Committee was renamed the House International Affairs Committee from 1995 to 2007.

⁸⁷ Several other factors were also used to test the legislator characteristic hypothesis, including: membership of the Appropriations Committee, chairmanship of the either the House Foreign Affairs Committee or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, race (whether the member was black), ethnicity (whether the member was Hispanic), and gender (whether the member was female). In order to keep the argument parsimonious, only membership of the House Foreign Affairs Committee or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will be included in the results section.

significant in several congresses, but was not consistently so across time.⁸⁸ The fact that committee membership had such an inconsistent influence over voting behavior could be seen as quite surprising. While it has been argued that legislators seek membership on committees in which they have an interest, and would vote in favor of bills that those committees sent to the floor; it seems that this is not the case with foreign aid bills.

Contribution to Political Science

A great deal of literature has been completed studying foreign aid. Most of the work has been done by international relations scholars, and except for studies comparing the aid policies of different presidents, this work has tended to “black box” the state. Scholars of American political science have studied congressional decision making regarding foreign policy, but most of their work has focused on defense policy. This dissertation has bridged the gap between these areas of research, by focusing on the congressional decision-makers and foreign aid.

Within international relations scholarship, systemic and statist approaches have been used to identify the primary determinant of state behavior regarding foreign aid. Theorists have argued that American foreign aid, as well as assistance that comes from other countries, is allocated according to strategic and ideological interests. These studies acknowledged the importance strategic interests play in whether and why states provide foreign aid, but none of them addressed whether individual decision makers could influence these decisions, or what factors could effect the decisions they make. This

⁸⁸ There was no pattern with being a member of the appropriations committee, being a chair, being a black representative, a Hispanic representative (or being black or Hispanic was negative in several congresses), or being female.

dissertation does not argue that systemic factors are not important; rather, it contends that political scientists also need to consider the influence of domestic factors and individual decision makers.

Some scholars have studied decision makers, but much of the research has focused on comparing different foreign aid strategies of presidents from Truman to Bush, though only limited work exists studying the presidencies that came before Jimmy Carter. Some research has shown that preferences of presidents can influence foreign aid (Apodaca and Stohl 1999). In the macro analysis of this dissertation, the party and ideology of the president were both significant; having a Democratic and more liberal president in the White House made an FAA bill more likely to pass. Just as Apodaca and Stohl found that a president's view on human rights could effect foreign aid distribution, this dissertation finds that the ideology of a president can influence passage of foreign aid bills.

A recent journal article has applied opposing international relations theories to the topic of U.S. foreign policy, specifically, to foreign trade and aid (Milner and Tingley 2011). They studied House votes from 1979 to 2004 to assess the impact of domestic factors such as political economy and ideological preferences as opposed to foreign policy pressures. They concluded that aid preferences are as affected by domestic political and economic factors as are trade preferences, and aid preferences are shaped more by ideological factors than are trade ones. The research of this dissertation has also noted the importance of preferences, as measured by ideology, finding that more liberal legislators are more likely to support foreign assistance bills. In fact, ideology was one of the most consistent and significant of all the variables in the micro level analysis.

Scholars of American politics have addressed the effects of such issues as party, public opinion and interest groups in the area of foreign policy. Most of this research focused on military policy and defense spending and has become dated. This research has provided much needed insight into congressional decision making of not just foreign aid, but also of foreign policy. It also provides support to those scholars that argue for the importance of parties and preferences. Both of these variables were consistently significant, signifying they strongly influence legislators when they make decisions regarding foreign aid.

Conclusions and Future Research

This dissertation has provided much-needed insight into foreign aid decision making. It has shed light on the puzzle of why members of Congress would support foreign assistance bills, showing that party and ideology strongly influence floor votes, and can influence whether FAA bills pass as well. It has also shown the importance of looking at domestic politics to explain foreign aid. While many researchers have studied foreign aid, too many have overlooked the importance of individual decision makers, especially at the legislative level.

Additional analysis could shed further light on the influence of interest groups. While the donations of Defense Policy PACs and Human Rights PACs had no significant influence on the passage of FAA legislation, the coefficients for pro-Israel PACs were small, but consistently negative and significant at the 80-95 percent confidence intervals. Similar results were found in the analysis of floor votes. The coefficient for pro-Israel PACS was consistently significant, but was so small it was nearly equal to zero. These

results are contradictory to those who believe the Israel lobby is one of the most powerful in Washington (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007). Additional research could analyze whether pro-Israel PAC donations influence the amount of foreign aid given to Israel, or whether it is more influential at certain times, i.e. when it is perceived to be more important, such as during times of crisis in Israel or in the Middle East.

Another important issue scholars could research is whether the media can influence foreign aid legislation. Many politicians and scholars initially attributed America's humanitarian and military involvement in Somalia in the early-1990s to the "CNN Effect." This was followed by a significant amount of literature devoted to debunking this widely-held belief (Mermin 1997; Cohen 1994; Livingston 1997; Western 2002). Yet, scholars and statesmen alike cannot refute the media's effect on why the United States withdrew from Somalia suddenly and swiftly after the attack on the U.S. Army Rangers in early October of 1993. By studying whether there is a relationship to floor votes on foreign aid and the types and number of stories in the media about foreign aid, could contribute to the literature on the CNN effect, and also shed further light on the puzzle of foreign aid.

A final area that could be studied would be to examine whether legislators' perceptions influence their behavior on foreign aid legislation. The literature on foreign aid can be divided into two sub-groups, allocation and effectiveness. This dissertation has focused on allocation at the legislative level, but future research could study whether perceptions of effectiveness effect allocation. Researchers could study the language of floor debates to see if legislators focus on the effectiveness of foreign aid, and then

determine if there is a relationship to floor votes or the amount of foreign assistance allocated.

The politics of foreign aid in the U.S. Congress is an important area of research into which this dissertation has provided several contributions. This dissertation has established that partisan forces shape Congress's decision making on foreign aid, while legislators' ideology and party commitments affect how they vote on foreign aid bills. I also found evidence that foreign-born constituencies in members' districts also shape their votes on foreign aid. These findings suggest that some of the forces scholars have argued affect Congress's decision making regarding domestic policies, such as party, ideology and partisan forces, also influence foreign aid decision making. They also affirm the importance of domestic and individual factors in foreign policy. As congressional decision making becomes more complicated, and as the stakes of American foreign aid policy grow higher, this area of research will remain an important one that scholars should continue to study.

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Appendix: FAA Bills Used in Quantitative Analysis

FAA Authorizations Used in Macro-Level Analysis in Chapter 3

Congress	Year	Authorization	Congress	Year	Authorization
87	1961	S 1983	97	1982	S 2608
87	1962	S 2996	98	1984	HR 5119
88	1963	HR 7885	98	1984	S 2582
88	1964	HR 11380	99	1985	HR 1555
89	1965	HR 7750	99	1985	S 960
89	1966	HR 15750	100	1987	HR 1630
90	1967	S 1872	100	1987	HR 3100
90	1968	HR 15263	100	1987	S 1274
91	1969	HR 14580	100	1988	HR 4471
91	1970	HR 19911	100	1988	HR 5263
92	1971	HR 9910	101	1989	HR 2655
92	1971	S 2819	101	1989	S 1347
92	1971	S 2820	101	1990	HR 4445
92	1972	HR 16029	101	1990	HR 4610
92	1972	HR 3390	101	1990	HR 4636
93	1973	HR 9360	102	1991	HR 2508
93	1973	S 1443	103	1993	HR 2404
93	1973	S 2335	103	1993	S 1467
93	1974	HR 17234	104	1995	HR 1561
93	1974	S 3394	104	1995	S 1441
94	1975	HR 9005	104	1995	S 908
94	1976	HR 13680	104	1995	S 961
94	1976	S 2662	106	2000	HR 1064
95	1977	HR 6714	106	2000	HR 1143
95	1977	HR 6884	106	2000	HR 3519
95	1978	HR 12222	106	2000	HR 4919
95	1978	S 3075	106	2000	S 2382
96	1979	HR 3173	108	2003	HR 1950
96	1979	HR 3324	108	2003	S 925
96	1980	HR 6942	108	2004	S 2144
97	1981	S 1196	109	2005	HR 2601
97	1982	HR 6370	109	2005	S 600

FAA Appropriations Used in Macro-Level Analysis in Chapter 3

Congress	Year	Appropriation	Congress	Year	Appropriation
87	1961	HR 9033	98	1983	HJRes 413
87	1962	HR 13175	98	1984	HJRes 648
88	1963	HR 9499	99	1985	HJ Res 465
88	1964	HR 11812	99	1986	HR 5339
89	1965	HR 10871	99	1986	S 2824
89	1966	HR 17788	99	1986	HJRes 738
90	1967	HR 13893	100	1987	HJRes 395
90	1968	HR 19908	100	1988	HR 4637
91	1969	HR 15149	101	1989	HR 2939
91	1969	HR 15209	101	1989	HR 3743
91	1970	HR 17867	101	1990	HR 5114
91	1970	HR 19928	102	1991	HJRes 360
92	1971	HJ Res 1005	102	1991	HR 2621
92	1971	HR 12067	102	1992	HJRes 456
92	1972	HJRes 1331	102	1992	HR 5368
92	1972	HR 16705	103	1993	HR 2295
93	1973	HJRes 345	103	1994	HR 4426
93	1973	HR 11771	104	1995	HR 1868
93	1974	HJRes 1062	104	1996	HR3540
93	1974	HJRes 1167	104	1996	HR 3610
93	1974	HJRes 1178	105	1997	HR 2159
94	1975	HR 4592	105	1998	S 2334
94	1976	HR 12203	105	1998	HR 4328
94	1976	HR 14260	105	1998	HR 4569
95	1977	HR 7797	106	1999	HR 3194
95	1978	HR 12931	106	1999	HR 2606
96	1979	HJRes 440	106	2000	HR 4811
96	1979	HR 4473	107	2001	HR 2506
96	1979	HJRes 412	107	2002	S 2779
96	1980	HR 7854	107	2002	HR 5410
96	1980	HJRes 610	107	2002	HJRes 124
96	1980	HJRes 644	108	2003	HJRes 2
97	1981	HR 4559	108	2003	HR 2673
97	1982	HJRes 599	108	2003	HR 2800
97	1982	HJRes 631	108	2004	HR 4818
98	1983	HR 2992	109	2005	HR 3057
98	1983	S 1347	109	2006	HR 5522
98	1983	HR 2992	110	2007	HR 2764
98	1983	S 1347			

FAA Bills Used in Micro-Level Analysis in Chapter 4

Congress	Year	Authorization	Congress	Year	Appropriation
87	1961	S 1983	87	1961	HR 9033
87	1962	S 2996	87	1962	HR 13175
92	1971	HR 9910	92	1971	HJRes 1005
92	1971	S 2819	92	1971	HR 12067
92	1971	S 2820	92	1972	HJ Res 1331
92	1972	HR 16029	92	1972	HR 16705
92	1972	HR 3390	95	1977	HR 7797
95	1977	HR 6714	95	1978	HR 12931
95	1977	HR 6884	97	1981	HR 4559
95	1978	HR 12222	97	1982	HJRes 599
95	1978	S 3075	97	1982	HJRes 631
97	1981	S 1196	102	1991	HJRes 360
102	1991	HR 2508	102	1991	HR 2621
104	1995	HR 1561	102	1992	HJ Res 456
108	2003	HR 1950	102	1992	HR 5368
			103	1993	HR 2295
			103	1994	HR 4426
			104	1995	HR 1868
			104	1996	HR 3540
			104	1996	HR 3610
			108	2003	HJRes 2
			108	2003	HR 2673
			108	2003	HR 2800
			108	2004	HR 4818