

Blueprinting Migration Analysis: Why Theoretical Applications of International
Migration Are Not One-Size-Fits-All

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Dedication

For Tom and Eliana

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Abstract of Dissertation

Blueprinting Migration Analysis: Why Theoretical Applications of International Migration Are Not One-Size-Fits-All

Researchers typically conceive international migration to be from a developing country to a developed country, which is often coined South-North migration. International migration is not confined, however, to migration from developing countries to developed countries. Rather, international migration also includes robust migration flows from developing countries to other developing countries, or South-South migration. South-South migration has occurred along with South-North migration over the last century, but until recently has been largely overlooked by Northern researchers. Armed with a set of theories and tools to understand South-North migration, researchers and policy makers have approached South-South migration with an unaltered tool belt during the past decade.

This dissertation examines how a migration analysis blueprint came to be and why it fails to hold in diverse environments. I demonstrate how and why policy makers rely on economic theories to understand migration processes. I then illustrate how the assumptions underlying migrant behavior in economic theory lead to analysis that does not capture the migration process across developing countries. I further argue that assumptions concerning the role of the state cause researchers to overlook the multi-dimensional nature of the migration process and the ability of developing countries to affect migration processes, which ultimately affects policy prescription. I conclude with a discussion of the implications for research and policy, and propose steps for a research and policy agenda that more accurately reflects migration practices.

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Introduction: All for One and One for All?

This dissertation evolved out of my personal observations growing up in a migrant-rich community in West Texas and my professional experience analyzing migration trends and policy. As a child, all aspects of my life were influenced by immigration. Socially, the large-scale immigration of Mexican citizens affected the company I kept, the food I ate, and the language I spoke. Economically, this immigration affected the availability of workers in my small oil town and my father's ability to hire help with his business. As a young child, I questioned why my friends' families chose to immigrate to this seemingly out-of-the-way town and how long they would stay. As the years passed and my immigrant friends began traveling on their own to this country, my questions changed to: what was their migrant experience like; did they find it difficult to leave their families behind; and did they have connections to help them become established in our town?

My inquisitiveness as a young child was shaped not only by my experience with friends, but by viewing others' perceptions of immigrants. The local and state governments were constantly concerned with immigrants crossing the border, legally and illegally. Local and state governments questioned immigrants' choice of destination and duration of residency to understand the magnitude of future immigrant in-flows. Who would pay for social services for immigrants entering the country illegally? What types of jobs would these immigrants fill? What was the "pull" to certain locations and what effect did this have on the residents of those communities? Were citizens receiving less income or having more difficulty finding jobs due to the influx of immigrants?

Many years later, as a Human Development Specialist at the World Bank, my concerns regarding migration shifted. I began analyzing migration trends to determine how and where formal cooperation in the migration process could enhance economic opportunities for both sending and receiving countries. Unlike my childhood preoccupations, which focused on immigration to a developed Northern nation,¹ I was now attempting to illustrate how intraregional migration in developing countries could be beneficial for the individual states, and the given region as a whole. However, I was constantly struck by how my interpretations as a child played into the analysis; how my understanding of migration carried a very particular bent. The concerns I felt as a child were not universal; rather, they were the apprehensions of those privileged to live in a country where income levels far exceed those of their neighbors, a country where the inflow of migrants far exceeds the outflow, and a country that believes it can regulate the flow of immigration.

Likewise, the tools at my disposal to analyze the migration process appeared to be skewed in some way. My recommendations for each country were based on an analysis that used theories and tools formed to explain internal migration or migration from a developing country to a developed one. In this manner, my analysis was largely ignorant of historical trends and institution building within the specific region, much less within individual countries. Why were the employed theories acceptable in explaining various processes? How could I provide sound policy recommendations based upon my

¹ In migration literature, the “North” is used to depict developed, often Western countries, while the “South” describes developing, often non-Western countries. With this terminology, the South is most often perceived as sending migrants to the receiving North. The use and derivation of this terminology will be specifically addressed in Chapter One.

seemingly limited information? These questions plagued my understanding of the immigration process and are at the core of this study.

To address these, I examine economic migration as opposed to forced migration. Forced migration is generally classified as “the movement of refugees and internally displaced people (those displaced by conflicts) as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects” (Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford Department of International Development, n.d.). While 11.5 million refugees and asylum seekers currently reside in countries outside their country of birth, the majority of forced migrants are displaced within the confines of their own country’s borders due to conflict, development projects and natural disasters. Although an important element of the migration equation, forced migration is beyond the purview of this paper due to its largely internal nature. Instead, the focus is economic migration, which is defined as the change of location for labor, shifting the production factor from the area of departure to the area of arrival (Bohning, 1981; Borjas, 1994; J. E. Taylor et al., 1996). Economic migration includes migration through legal channels by permit and/or visa and undocumented migration. An estimated 213 million people currently reside outside their country of birth, and changing location for labor is the dominant reason (The World Bank, 2010).

Foundation of the Argument

At the foundation of this dissertation are three interconnected concepts. The first is that perception affects reality: individuals “define, interpret, and give meaning to the world through their everyday actions and interactions” (Calcraft, 2004, p. 19). What is

taken for granted as reality is actually constructed through societal interchanges. As a central tenet of social constructionism, this argument may seem obvious to some. However, it is a basic building block for this dissertation. Social constructionism has its grounding in phenomenology (Schutz, 1974, 1974), ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967), and symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969; Mead, 1967). While rooted in sociology, the social constructionist movement spread across the social sciences,² and by the 21st century, scholars argued that concepts ranging from emotions to sexual orientation were socially constructed (Bohan & Russell, 2003; Lutz, 2003). Chapter One of this dissertation will explore the idea of social construction and its relevance to international migration.

Second, how we perceive the world affects research. A researcher's views and perceptions shape the terminology, tools, and methods s/he uses to examine an issue (Brettell, 2007; J.F. Hollifield & Brettell, 2007). Within the social sciences, researchers approach the same subject from different levels and perspectives. Even within a particular discipline, researchers may differ widely on their choice of methods and approach. For example, anthropologists are trained to study human life and its origin. Within the field of migration, anthropologists largely focus on how an individual migrant navigates the structures within the migration process (Brettell, 2003). In contrast, political scientists are trained to study government and politics. Within the field of migration, political scientists often concentrate on the role of the state (Freeman, 2005). In a given discipline, the tools scholars use to conduct research also vary depending on their understanding of truth and knowledge. Each researcher examines a different aspect of a

² Social constructionism has also been addressed in the natural sciences, but this is beyond the purview of this dissertation. For further discussion on its use and origins see (Hacking, 1999; Holstein & Gubrium, 2007).

phenomenon based on his particular epistemological and ontological views. If a researcher believes that the truth is a concrete fact, he will use tools and methods to acquire these facts. In contrast, if the researcher believes that there is not one discernible truth, but several alternative paths, his tools and methods will reflect this understanding. Chapter Two will explore how the various social science disciplines view migration, and how those differing views affect the theories used to frame our understanding of migration.

Finally, research can be a powerful policy tool. Theorists argue that policy makers face information constraints in a political context. Lindblom (1959) argues that the formulation of policy rarely followed a linear path, but instead analysts “muddled through” to determine the “best” policy. Simon (1946) explains decision makers as “administrative men,” who account for the most relevant alternatives at one time, but do not (and cannot) address all of the complexities within a problem. As such, decision makers are boundedly rational. Talbert and Potoski (2002) extend Simon’s concept of bounded rationality to argue that policy makers are bounded by cognitive and time limits, causing only a limited number of issues to be addressed during any legislative session.

Research helps to fill these gaps. A European Commission White Paper (2001) argued “...scientific and other experts play an increasingly significant role in preparing and monitoring decisions. From human and animal health to social legislation, the institutions rely on specialist expertise...” (p.19). Depending on the governmental system and policy-making process, research can assist in altering policy prescriptions (e.g., deregulation of US airlines (Gormley Jr., 2007)); assist policy makers in justifying or “substantiating” their position (e.g., repeated citing of commissioned reports by the

Labour government to justify labor migration policy reforms in the United Kingdom, circa 2002 (Boswell, 2012)), or assist policy makers in framing problems, solutions, and/or issues (three different reports on the impact of immigration on the UK labor market released within one week all seized upon by politicians with varying views on the issue to frame the argument and the solutions (The Migration Observatory, 2012a).

Chapter Breakdown

I argue that within migration analysis our choices in research frame our recommendations for policy and using the same frames across different contexts may not only be inappropriate, but in some circumstances detrimental. I am not calling for a metatheory, or to wholly discard the current framing, but instead I demonstrate how an economic understanding came to dominate, why it fails in particular circumstances, and how other disciplines can help in our understanding through supplementing our knowledge in the policy arena. The first chapter sets up the context of the dissertation, while the second chapter reviews the various approaches to international migration analysis. The third and fourth chapters address how various prominent theories may succeed in one context and not in another. Having established the existence of a blueprint model and argued against its application, the final chapter begins to consider the policy implications and alternatives.

Chapter One addresses the first foundational element within the dissertation: how perception affects reality, as related to international migration. The chapter discusses the blueprinting phenomenon and historical turn, before providing a brief overview of the social constructionist lens in order to illustrate how our construction of the social world

affects our approach to international migration. In particular, I argue that issues of citizenship and development arise out of our construction of international migration, which in turn hinge on our conception of nation and state. These conceptions shape the dominant perspectives within international migration research and policy (that are explored in Chapter Two).

Chapter Two tackles the second foundational element: perception affects research by considering the way various social science disciplines view the migration process. In light of this discussion, I review the prominent migration theories, dividing these into economic and culture/value theories. The chapter concludes by arguing how economic analysis has become the dominant paradigm in migration policy making.

Chapter Three then acts as a case study of sorts to analyze how particular elements of perception and research can obscure processes occurring in practice. Specifically, I examine how the economic theories addressed in Chapter Two view the individual and why this has been perceived as useful in aiding our understanding of migration between developing and developed countries. I address how migration decisions and patterns vary in a developing-to-developing-country context due to temporality and proximity issues; and why, given these variations, the current economic framework established in Chapter Two is not appropriate as the only mechanism for viewing decision-making in a developing-to-developing-country context.

Chapter Four continues to examine the interplay between perception and research before turning to how research affects policy. Given the assumptions of decision-making in economic theory, in Chapter Four I explore the role of the state; and address how under our current understanding, the role of the state is confined within an environment

that does not accurately reflect the migration process. Ultimately, this construction comes at the expense of a true understanding of the dynamic migration environment, and unduly limits policy prescriptions and options at the national and international levels.

Chapter Five brings the argument full circle, detailing the migration analysis blueprint and its relation to the foundational principles of the dissertation. I then begin to explore what this all means for migration analysis moving forward, its links to policy analysis, and why a call for a greater understanding of migration in varying contexts is important.

Chapter One: *Our* View of the World

It is men, who in developing their material inter-course, change, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. (Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe 1/5).

We each create our world by what we choose to notice, creating a world of distinction that makes sense to us. We then 'see' the world through the self we have created. (Wheatly & Kellner-Rogers, 1998, p. 49)

This dissertation first seeks to explain how and why international migration analysis has used a one-size-fits-all approach.³ Scholars and researchers have conceived international migration largely as migration from a developing country to a developed nation, or South-North migration (Kritz, Keely, & Tomasi, 1981). While explaining issues in both the sending and receiving country, scholars and researchers in the North developed theories to explain movement to developed nations (Bohning, 1981; Massey et al., 1993). Data limitations in developing countries have reinforced the focus on Northern receiving countries.

International migration is not confined, however, to migration from developing countries to developed nations. Migration between developing countries has occurred along with migration from developing countries to developed nations over the last century, but until recently has been largely overlooked by Northern researchers (Hatton

³ “International migration analysis” is used here to specifically detail analysis that is intended for and/or has been adopted for migration policy prescription. As will be argued in Chapter Two, this analysis is largely economic in nature.

& Williamson, 2008).⁴ As of 2010, approximately 43% of migrants from developing countries lived in other developing countries (The World Bank, 2011).⁵

However, armed with theories and tools to understand South-North migration, researchers and policy makers have approached South-South⁶ migration with this unaltered tool belt during the past decade. As the theories and tools were developed for a wholly different context and with heavily Northern perceptions, a disconnect exists between the theories and tools researchers and policy makers are using to frame their understanding of South-South migration and the actual migration process on the ground.

It is imperative to first discuss the effect of using theories established for a particular circumstance in a different context. In the development management literature, this phenomenon is often illustrated through the “blueprint model.” In using the blueprint model, project managers prescribe tasks, beginning at the planning/design phase and following throughout implementation to evaluation. The focus of a blueprint is the planning phase, as by the time a project is implemented, all of the important decisions have been made and managers follow the blueprint to determine the next steps (Brinkerhoff & Ingle, 1989). Functionalist social theory constitutes both the ontological and epistemological base of the blueprint model; this assumes that an objective truth

⁴ For example, international migration is not confined to migration from Mexico to the United States or Morocco to France, but also includes migration from Costa Rica to Mexico or Senegal to Morocco.

⁵ These numbers account for formal migration, however, informal migration amongst developing countries is expected to significantly increase this number.

⁶ The terms are used within the dissertation as “Northern” researchers commonly use them when discussing migration, and emphasize the blueprinting argument. Agencies such as the World Bank and United Nations use different criteria to define which countries are “developing” and “developed” and therefore which countries are considered Southern or Northern (discussed in more detail in Chapter Three). These discrepancies further highlight the breakdown of the blueprint, which will be discussed within the dissertation.

exists, while focusing on the functions of the project.⁷ By presupposing all of the nuances that may occur in a project/program, the blueprint model lacks flexibility to alter as situations change on the ground. Implementing a blueprint model takes the form of enacting wholesale the processes and plans of a successful project from one region in another region, without taking into consideration variations in the economic, social or political makeup of the regions. Here in lies the problem with a “one-size-fits-all” approach, as discrepancies at various levels remain unaddressed.

In the study of migration, scholars and researchers use a dominant Northern paradigm to explain migration processes, in essence, blueprinting migration analysis. This migration blueprint relies on a number of assumptions. First, the blueprint is predicated on the construction of the world into nation states, which creates international migration, and a number of accompanying dichotomies, as will be discussed later in this chapter. These have shaped the tools researchers and policy makers employ to understand migration processes. Second, the individual migrant within the blueprint is presumed to be rational and utilitarian, choosing to migrate based on perceived costs and benefits of potential destination(s). Moreover, the migrant is assumed to be able to discern the location with the greatest benefits. Third, migration is assumed to take place between countries with large income differentials. Fourth, the state is assumed to be a highly competent liberal democracy and is the focal point for analysis. These assumptions combine in such a way that research is analyzed and policy is designed to address migration processes from the perspective of the receiving state.

⁷ Functionalist social theory is the dominant paradigm in development management and the study of economic migration. According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), functionalism has its roots in positivism, which seeks to understand the regulation of the social order. Bond and Hulme (1999) claim that the objective rationality and reductionism found in blueprint modeling stems from the fields of engineering and construction.

Applying theoretical tools based on South-North migration to other migration trajectories can assist in framing our understanding of migration processes, which then affect and inform policy. However, these tools may also *misrepresent* migration processes or lead to the omission of important considerations, leading researchers and policy makers to inaccurate or inappropriate conclusions. For example, the assumption that income differentials between countries is a motivating factor for migration appears less significant in South-South migration, as two-thirds of migrants from low-income countries are residing in other low-income countries (Ratha & Shaw, 2007). In addition, less stringent border control between developing countries (as compared to developed countries) translates into significantly more back-and-forth migratory movement. As these crossings are often not registered, they are largely invisible to the researcher, affecting the researcher's ability to accurately use quantitative models to reflect migration processes. Moving away from a blueprint of migration analysis, and instead, combining approaches, can assist in creating more refined responses to the migration process.

The Historic Turn Applied to the Study of Migration

Durkheim (1974) argues that to understand a social issue, we must first understand how the issue came to be, and the role it plays in the social system. In concurrence with Pierson (2004) and Greif (2006), I argue that any fuller understanding must take into account the history of the social process, as every social science, in one regard or another, relies on economic, political, and social history. Claiming the importance of historical considerations is not new.

The “historical turn” in social sciences can be traced back to the behavioral revolution of the 1950s and 1960s, and specifically traced to Kuhn’s 1962 release of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. In it, he argues, “History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed” (p.1). Political science and sociology experienced a “historical turn” during the 1980s and 1990s. Largely in response to the prevalence of pluralist, ahistorical research, modeled on preference and competition similar to neoclassical economic models, researchers began focusing on structuralism⁸ and historical significance (Rast, 2012). More recently, institutional economists have called for addressing historical specificity in economic analysis. While historical specificity occupied the writing and thinking of 19th century German economists, in the 20th century, general theorizing became the predominant mode through Maynard Keynes in macroeconomics, Lionel Robbins in microeconomics, and Talcott Parsons in sociology (Hodgson, 2001).

Incorporating historical context can better assist policy makers in addressing the most pressing questions for their migration policies. The social, economic, and institutional background of a group affects how individuals view migration and how migration policies are designed. The ways in which individuals migrate and the patterns that develop affect policy formation. For example, recognizing the constant back-and-forth flow of migrants across the border, Thailand employs day passes as a migration policy tool. The ways in which states were formulated influence migratory behavior both individually and collectively. For example, arbitrary borders that divide an ethnic group

⁸ Structuralism is defined as the “belief that phenomena of human life are not intelligible except through their interrelations. These relations constitute a structure, and behind local variations in the surface phenomena there are constant laws of abstract culture” (Blackburn, 1996).

between two nations can alter individual and group desire to cross borders both temporarily and permanently. Having a more accurate understanding of the interaction of forces that shape migration can help policy makers determine how best to address the migration processes occurring—both with migrants entering their country and citizens migrating from it.

Developing countries are both senders of large numbers of migrants and potentially receivers of large numbers of migrants. This matters to how migrants and the state view migration in the developing country context. By failing to incorporate these issues into the current blueprinted migration analysis, researchers and policy makers miss important dimensions of the migration process in an intraregional context, which can result in failed policy opportunities. For example, before 2011, the General Law of Population governed Mexican immigration laws. The Mexican Government originally passed the law in 1974, but continued to revise it through 2008. Mexico tackled emigration and immigration distinctly, as the law addressed only the receiving country perspective.

The General Law of Population stated that immigrants in Mexico could not upset national demographic equilibrium, must enhance economic or national interests, and must be physically and mentally able. In addition, illegal entry into the country was considered a felony, document fraud and marriage fraud were illegal with punishments of fines and imprisonment, and illegal reentry was punishable with up to ten years in prison. However, while implementing these laws, Mexico was also calling for improved rights and liberties for its citizens residing in the United States. By not considering emigration and immigration together, the country was open to significant criticism by legislators in

the United States who believed Mexico was asking for considerations it did not apply to its own immigrants. At the 2010 Global Forum on Migration and Development, President Calderon acknowledged this hypocrisy and announced the framework for a new law on migration (González-Murphy & Koslowski, 2011). This new law was passed in 2011 and came into effect in 2012, providing immigrants with greater rights and access to services, and simplifying criteria for entrance and residency.⁹ The new law considers immigration from a stronger human rights perspective than the previous law. The country is now addressing immigration with emigration as a consideration, which has greatly altered its national policy.

Rogers Smith (1996) argues that the concern is how researchers can provide people with greater insight into “what the driving forces in their affairs have been and how they can hope to influence them more constructively, when and if they can influence them at all” (p. 148). By employing specific constructions of the world and the role of international migration in it, researchers are not only failing policy makers, but also those intimately involved in the migration process. For example, migration dialogue occurs on a number of levels, from global to regional, bilateral to national. Assuming the receiving state as the source of analysis, and often of power, belies promising migration dialogue taking place. Bilateral agreements are often used among developing countries to address concerns that domestic policy cannot, such as workers’ rights. Developing countries are also using regional dialogue to frame migration discussions and forge trust between countries. This is counter to researchers’ and Northern policy makers’ assumption that Northern countries will continue to determine migration dialogue.

⁹ As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the passing of legislation does not necessarily equate to its implementation, and the successful implementation of Mexico’s new law is yet to be determined.

The effectiveness of any process largely depends on the interaction of the people with the institutional control structure. Toner and Franks (2006) argue that knowledge of the institutional structure of any system is necessary to understand the applicability of an intervention. The blueprinting of migration analysis fails to recognize the diversity of migration patterns, as well as states' and migrants' actions within the process. In particular, the migration blueprint misses historical trends in why migration patterns exist and how states and individuals promote or facilitate these. In a developing country context, many migration patterns are not due to mere economic differentials, as often assumed in the migration blueprint, but instead have historic language, ethnic, and/or colonial ties. For example, in West Africa, a migratory bond helped to develop the Huasa language, which connects people across the region. During the colonial era, South Africa attracted migrants from neighboring countries to work in the mines, and migrants from these neighboring countries continue to work in the mines today. This dissertation thus argues that a "historical turn" within the study of migration is necessary for a greater understanding of migration processes in an intraregional migration context. With a basic understanding of blueprinting and the historic turn, the next section reviews the social construction literature that acts as a basic building block for the argument in this dissertation.

The Social Constructionist's Lens

One of the central arguments of the social constructionist perspective is that people's shared perceptions constitute social reality. Social constructionism emphasizes that social objects and beliefs would not be possible if societal concerns, interests, and

values did not exist (Boghossian, 2001; Holstein & Gubrium, 2007). Societal concerns, interests, values are therefore perceptions. Thus, the manner in which people view their most basic activities will depend upon the views and values their society has placed on these activities.

By the mid-20th century, these ideas had filtered into the social sciences, altering how researchers viewed social phenomena, and how they viewed themselves in the conduct of their research. The idea came to prominence in Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality* (1974). Berger and Luckmann argue that knowledge is acquired from and reinforced by social interaction. As this knowledge filters through human interactions and structural processes, it is represented as objective reality. In this interpretation, the world and our place in it do not independently exist, but rather we create the world we inhabit. Berger and Luckmann extend this framework both to those who are intimately affected by the social facts, as well as to those who scientifically study them (Schutz, 1974).

Social construction appealed to researchers across the social sciences. Researchers, who previously questioned how a particular phenomenon came to be, found a plausible medium for explanation in social constructionism. Some focused on *how* the constructed social world affected common activities and rules; while others sought to bring to light the *what*, examining the previously unacknowledged realities of everyday life (Holstein & Gubrium, 2007). Scholars argued that concepts ranging from literacy to nature to serial homicide were socially constructed (Cook-Gumperz, 1986; Eder, 1996; Hacking, 1999; Jenkins, 1994).

While many researchers embraced this concept, social constructionism is not without its critics. Structural functional critics argue that social conditions are distinct from an individual's interpretation. Knowledge regarding the social condition may be obtained through scientific inquiry (G. Miller & Holstein, 2007). Social constructionism has also been accused of being irresponsibly relativist, ignoring scientific evidence (Best, 2007). Others claim that social constructionists assume that observable processes are separate from researchers' descriptions of them, and therefore social constructionism acts as a form of selective objectivism (G. Miller & Holstein, 2007; Woolgar & Pawluch, 1985). Questions concerning the relation of ontology to epistemology—concerns about whether social objects exist and our knowledge about their existence—are at the core of these critiques. A social constructionist believes that social objects are constituted by people's knowledge of them. In this manner, ontology follows epistemology (Harmon, 2012). Critics of social constructionism, however, argue that social objects exist independent of people's knowledge of them, and therefore that epistemology follows ontology.

Social constructionist research is often explicitly normative. In maintaining that existing social objects, institutions, and practices did not have to develop as they have, but are instead merely contingent outcomes of history, it is incumbent on the researcher to try to change them. In this estimation, societal members are not innocent bystanders merely watching as events occur. Rather, they are active participants in shaping reality. In research, the subjects are presumed to have the ability to alter their situation, and thus be of interest to study, but researchers also have the power to change how a particular

subject is viewed. By asserting the ability to describe the world, the researcher maintains a personal responsibility to defend claims about it (Weinberg, 2007).

Ultimately, social constructionist research examines how something that is taken for granted as inevitable and therefore impervious to the exercise of deliberate social influence or control is actually the product of social interaction in particular socio-historical processes. As my first presumption states and this literature explores, our perceptions affect how we interact with the world. This is valuable when looking at migration analysis on two different levels: first, how societal constructions create dominant ways of framing migration and second, and somewhat less obvious, how these constructions affect the ways in which researchers variously use theories in their analyses of migration (see Chapter Two). The next section will examine how society is constructed has affected the ways in which we approach migration.

Social Construction and its Relevance to International Migration

International migration is a social phenomenon. While migration involves the movement from one location to another, international migration exists due to the division of the world into sovereign nation states (Zolberg, 2008).¹⁰ This system presumes that unified political authorities preside over distinct territories (Benhabib, 2004). The borders of the distinct territories are determined through politics (wars, land acquisitions, treaties), natural boundaries (mountains, water, forests), and perceived shared history,

¹⁰ This division of the world into nation states is known as the Westphalian system, originating in 1648 with the signing of the Peace of Westphalia, whereby European countries agreed to respect territorial sovereignty.

culture, language, and community.¹¹ Within this system of discrete nation states, the protection of borders is a top priority. Nation states reserve the right to protect their sovereign identities by setting immigration policies (Spellman, 2008). International migration can then be defined as the “act of moving across international boundaries from a country of origin to take up residence in a country of destination” (Samers, 2009, pp. 9–10).

The sheer existence of sovereign nation states affects the way we think about international migration. Specifically, this division, caused by societal interaction, has created distinct categories surrounding citizenship at the individual level and development at the national level. These frame our understanding of international migration, and ultimately affect the tools used in migration analysis. Borders separating one country from another create an *us versus them* distinction that manifests itself through dichotomies such as inclusion/exclusion, legal/illegal, sending/receiving, and North/South.

Citizenship

The division of the world into nation states determines who is a citizen of the nation and who is not. Scholars most commonly discuss citizenship in terms of belonging and engagement, and status and rights. Belonging and engagement center citizenship around the idea of membership in a community—whether social or political. Status and rights concern the legal status that citizenship confers and its accompanying entitlements

¹¹ This shared consciousness may also exist without a state, and may then be the impetus for political independence movements within nation states.

and rights (Bosniak, 2006; Fox, 2005; R. M. Smith, 1999).¹² The state and the individual are intimately connected in either view.

The nation-state, with its rules and regulations for citizenship, is the gatekeeper of the inclusion/exclusion concept connected to belonging. Various norms and policies combine to determine what conditions must be met within a nation to be a member with specific rights and benefits. Citizenship is conferred either by birth within the nation (*jus solis*), descent (*jus sanguinis*), or nationalization, depending on the country (E.F. Cohen, 2007; Klusmeyer, 2000; S. Martin, 2005). Some countries offer a combination of the above for inclusion in the body politic, while others rely heavily on descent or birth, making nationalization extremely difficult.¹³

The crossing of the border into another nation is inherently political inasmuch as movement concerns not only physical placement, but also possible inclusion in a political community (Zolberg, 1999). By crossing the border into another nation, the individual could potentially be included in a shared history, culture, language, and community to which s/he previously held no connection. Does this inclusion correspond to belonging in a particular nation? And who is to determine belonging? Does the choice to migrate signify a desire to belong? The individual's acceptance of a new state structure does not necessarily mean members of the nation accept the individual.

¹² This is not intended to be a thorough discussion of the debates surrounding the understanding of citizenship or its meaning to nationalism. For a survey on defining citizenship see (Bosniak, 2010; Karst, 1991; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; D. I. Miller, 2000; Shafir, 1998; Tilly, 1996).

¹³ International migration creates the possibility that individuals may hold multiple citizenships. For example, an individual could be a citizen of one country by birth, and another by descent. This same individual could then migrate as an adult and become a citizen of a third country by naturalization. Situations such as these and a highly interconnected world have led some scholars to call for global citizenship, transnational citizenship, and cosmopolitan citizenship over national citizenship. See (Gilroy, 1997; Hall, 2000; Levitt, 2001; Miyoshi, 1993).

An individual can be considered out of place not because of legality, but because of differences in culture, socio-economic class, or race. All migrants, legal or illegal, generate a political and cultural presence in the country to which they migrate. Indigenous groups within the country may believe that newcomers threaten their shared culture and history. Groups with such beliefs construct an exclusionary boundary, claiming that the identity of the nation hinges on what it is and is not (often precisely what the newcomers *are*) (J.F. Hollifield, 2007; Klausen, 2008; Lamont, 2002). Citizens who construct this boundary and espouse an *us versus them* mentality not only confront migrants, but also fellow citizens. Citizens who reinforce a particular nativist identity often are afraid that migrants bring diversity in culture and history that will weaken the nation. However, other citizens may argue that this diversity will strengthen the nation, or at a minimum, not weaken society.

The international migrant moves across national borders. The migrant cannot freely cross those borders, but instead must have permission from the entering (and sometimes exiting) state. The state reserves the right to determine who crosses the border, how, and when. Common grounds for refusal of entry include national security concerns, lack of economic means, violations of immigration laws, criminal activity, and disease. States also require documentation—passport, visa, or travel documentation—for entry into the nation (D. A. Martin, 2003). The granting of permission determines whether the crossing itself is legal or illegal. While this categorization should then transfer to the status of the migrant, the categorization is transferred to the individual migrant—making the migrant legal or illegal.¹⁴

¹⁴ The migrant could also legally cross, but then overstay the allotted time permitted for the visit/residence and then become illegal.

A characterization of entry as legal confers upon the migrant a *degree* of acceptance or membership. This degree of acceptance is extended for as long as the migrant remains legally within the country (Zolberg, 1999). However, this degree of acceptance is variable, depending on the length of the migrant's stay and the rights afforded to members of the state, or citizens. The legal migrant is afforded some degree of civil and political rights. While variable, the legal migrant will likely have civil rights similar to those of a citizen, but without the political right to vote or govern at any level in the country. Thus, if citizens have the right to procedural fairness, the right to assemble, and the freedom of association, the migrant will have the same rights. Social and cultural rights include basic human rights, along with the rights to education and health. Legal migrants have access to state-provided services, and are extended these social and cultural rights. Finally, economic rights include the right to earn a living, as migrants who cross the border legally are often permitted to work.¹⁵ Overall, by obtaining permission from the state to cross the border, the legal migrant is awarded with a degree of acceptance from the state on multiple, but differentiated levels.

In contrast, any attempt to cross this border without the permission of the state is considered an infringement upon the state and an illegal crossing. The migrant is considered illegal and is restricted in all aspects of state provision. The state does not extend to the illegal migrant any political, social, cultural, or economic rights, despite the duration or intent of the migrant's stay. The migrant is considered to have waived his political, social, cultural, and economic rights by illegally crossing the border. This legal/illegal distinction is created by a system concerned with protecting its state through the regulation of its borders and immigration policy.

¹⁵ Permission to work depends on the type of permission or visa granted to the migrant at entry.

While the state has the right to protect itself and determine who enters and exits, the various Covenants coming out of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights increasingly afford individuals (including those who enter and exit a state) universal unalienable rights.¹⁶ These rights include the right to life, liberty and security; the right not to be held in slavery or servitude; the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. These international laws and rights are important for migrants as they navigate the rules and regulations of a state system. How we think about the role of the state and individual migrant choices within this system affect how researchers and policy makers think about migration more generally.

The assumption of required citizenship, couched in terms of belonging and rights, has affected the way in which we frame our understanding of international migration. The dichotomies of inclusion/exclusion, legal/illegal, and ultimately, citizen/foreigner all extend out of an *us versus them* construct. In each case, the state plays a distinct role, through laws and regulations, in determining who and what are included, and who and what are excluded—ultimately “constructing” who is a citizen and who is a foreigner.

¹⁶ States are only bound by human rights conventions if they have ratified the specific convention. The majority of states have ratified basic human rights conventions. The Covenants include the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which entered into force in 1969 and has been ratified by 175 states, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which entered into force in 1976 and has been ratified by 167 states and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which entered into force in 1976 and has been ratified by 160 states, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women which entered into force in 1981, and has been ratified by 187 states. International conventions specifically addressing international migration have been less successful in garnering signatories and ratification, as discussed in Chapter Four.

Development

Pick (2011) argues that the goal of the nation state is to increase its wealth. This desire for improved wealth has created a division of opinion surrounding the idea of development. Development first began to be described in economic terms from the standpoint of the nation state in the mid-20th century.¹⁷ The level of development within a country creates a distinction between those who are deemed economically developed and those who are not. This distinction is evidenced in international migration through dichotomies such as sending/receiving and North/South.

During his Presidential inaugural speech in 1949, Harry Truman claimed that America was obliged to use its technological and scientific know-how to assist underdeveloped regions. In his speech he propagated the term underdevelopment, which persisted for decades. Regions described as underdeveloped were therefore deficient, and it was presumed that they should develop in a direction that was already “known.” Economic growth was the means to reach this “known” direction and Keynesian economics was the primary economic theory promoted to achieve the goal. Keynesian economics theory advocates that the state play an active role in commercial activity, as private sector involvement in monetary and fiscal policy may lead to inefficient outcomes (Esteva, 1992).

Overall, this state-centered approach maintained a national frame of reference, concerned solely with economic and social trends inside a given country, while using

¹⁷ International migration analysis is situated within the larger discussion of development in policy discussions and it is therefore necessary to step back slightly to understand the larger field. In relation to the nation-state, Pick (2011) argues that the purpose of the nation state is to increase its wealth, and therefore improve its development.

models of transformation from developed countries as a blueprint.¹⁸ Development policies were associated with national objectives, and debate centered on *what* within policy needed to be changed, but not the *level* at which change should take place, as the national level was a given (Gore, 2000).¹⁹

By the 1970s, dissenting voices within the development community began to argue for a separation between social and economic factors. While still using a national framework, large donor agencies sought to adapt strategies relevant to particular local contexts rather than simply borrowing strategies from industrialized societies (Esteva, 1992). Critiques of the state were reaffirmed by the economic problems many countries faced.

Mainstream development thinking throughout the 1980s and 1990s focused on a market-oriented approach. This approach relied on laissez-faire economics whereby private ownership was preferred and the invisible hand of the market allocated resources and controlled growth.²⁰ But by the turn of the century, researchers and practitioners argued that policy should emanate from the community. Proponents of community-oriented approaches hold participation and partnership with communities as key factors and define development outcomes as the well being of the individual, not by any monetary factor (Fowler, 1997). This follows Amartya Sen's (1999) "capability" approach to development in which human capabilities directly contribute to wellbeing

¹⁸ Dependency theory ascended as a counter to common development perceptions at the time. Proponents argued that countries should adopt models of self-reliance to achieve national development, rather than rely on foreign aid and technology. Dependency theorists defined development through improved living standards, in opposition of the productivity and output of industrialization. In this estimation, outside forces were not the panacea; instead, outside forces with past colonial ties had caused the problem. However, dependency theory remained largely on the sidelines of development thinking, never taking a mainstream role.

¹⁹ This dissertation argues that international migration analysis follows much the same trajectory as early development policy, following models (theories) from developed countries as a blueprint.

²⁰ See (Williamson, 1993, 1997)

and indirectly affect social change. Empowerment is at the center of Sen’s capability approach, with political, economic, and social freedoms acting as both the means and ends of development. While debates concerning how to measure development in the last sixty years have shifted, approaches do not stray too dramatically from their roots of modernization theory first demonstrated in the state-oriented approach, and later in the market-oriented approach. While still conceiving of development as a transformational process, the measurable outcomes have moved from solely economic growth to encompass sustainability, empowerment, equity, and self-determination.

The framing of international migration in analysis and policy is closely aligned to development policy thinking as a whole. Derived from the construction of the world into nation states, each country has further been divided into sending/receiving, or Northern/Southern. Each term has a slightly nuanced definition, however, sending countries are presumed to be part of the South, and receiving countries part of the North. A sending country has a high level of emigration, while a receiving country has a high level of immigration. Faist (2008) argues that such a distinction is no longer relevant; as many countries traditionally considered sending countries are now transit and immigration countries.²¹ While these distinctions are becoming less useful, they still dominate the way researchers, particularly within international organizations and think tanks, frame migration issues. The terms “sending” and “receiving” also connote the (economic) development of a country, and in turn, a migrant. A receiving country is assumed to be economically wealthy or developed, while a sending country is assumed to be the type of country President Truman discussed in his 1949 speech—underdeveloped—or, in today’s terms, *developing*.

²¹ For example, Turkey and Ecuador.

The continued framing of migration processes in these terms fails to address the dynamism of the migration process whereby a country may have significant levels of temporary emigration for purposes of transit, temporary and permanent emigration and immigration. This is important for policy prescription, as the interests of a country considering all dimensions of migration will vary from a country concerned primarily with one dimension. The failure of international organizations and think tanks, that advise countries on migration policy issues, to shed the defining constructions may create policy prescriptions that are inappropriate and/or ineffective.

Similarly, the North/South distinction is not just a geographic division, but also denotes a socio-economic and political divide. While the majority of nations comprising the North are geographically located in the Northern Hemisphere (and the majority in the South are in the Southern Hemisphere), location is not a requirement for inclusion. Rather, the South usually consists of countries formerly colonized, while the North are advanced industrialized nations (Preece, 2009). The term is a proxy for economic development. The term originates from the Cold War division of the First (Western) world, Second (Eastern) world, and Third (less developed and non-aligned states) world. With the end of the Cold War, the First world was coined the North, and the Third world was coined the South (Reuveny & Thompson, 2007). Thèrien (1999) argues that the North-South divide was intimately connected to the explanation of poverty for over a generation, fueling policy makers and scholars. However, similar to Faist's argument that the sending/receiving dichotomy is outdated, Thèrien claims that the North-South divide has little relevance to practical experience in the international community. The North-South divide also still frames the international migration discussion. As discussed

previously, in the development discourse, international migration is divided along these lines: South-North, South-South, and North-North. The construction of North and South as used by the World Bank and the United Nations has pure economic connotations, and a country's categorization changes as a country's economic standing improves (or declines). Thus, a migration process that was considered South-South five years ago could be considered South-North today if one of the countries' economic standing improved. This change in categorization, however, is unlikely to affect the migration processes on the ground to the same degree as the distinction is perceived. Moreover, for the sake of accuracy of present and future analysis, researchers must be aware of past categorizations, and the effect changes have on their assumptions and results.

Castles (2007) argues that principal ideas about international migration and its consequences for society are derived from specific historical experiences, which assist in shaping attitudes and approaches to migration. He further argues that these “affect even the most critical researcher” (p. 357). The above constructions affect how research is conducted and the dominant lens researchers and policy makers use in an attempt to understand migration processes. The ideas of inclusion/exclusion, legal/illegal, sending/receiving, and North/South have emerged out of the construction of the nation state and affect the most critical researcher. These terms assist in framing who is deserving and what the role of the state should be. Chapter Two will examine how these various perceptions play into the theories that Northern researchers employ.

Chapter Two: Current Approaches to Migration Analysis

On November 6, 2010, the *New York Times* reported on the changing face of Venezuela. Hundreds of thousands of middle and upper class Venezuelans, known as “balseros del aire,” or rafters of the air, were steadily leaving the country. The term was coined to demonstrate that these emigrants not only fled the country, but also possessed the means to flee by airplane. However, Venezuela was not experiencing a declining population. During the same period, low-skilled laborers were entering the country from Colombia, Haiti, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria (Romero, 2010). The article largely describes the socio-economic and skill level of migrants entering and leaving the country, but does not seek to explain the conditions, historical or structural, that affect this migration. By narrowly focusing on specific characteristics of the migrants, the article uses an economic perspective to frame the migration process.

Similarly, on June 6, 2010, the national paper of Argentina, *La Nación*, attempted to explain why a significant percentage of Argentine citizens were marrying foreigners residing within Argentina. *La Nación* argues that many economic opportunities exist in Argentina that attract foreigners, and that countries receiving migrants across the world are experiencing the same influx because of these opportunities (Costa, 2010). These descriptions of immigration and emigration are framed in one particular perspective, the idea that migration can be understood by examining the flows of migration and how policy shapes these flows. This explanation of migration, which the media largely embraces, is an economic and political science view of migration. As will be discussed in this chapter, this view of migration relies on quantifiable measures that allow for

researchers, policy makers, and in this case, the media, to readily “explain” migration processes and migrant behavior.

This view of migration, while dominant, as will be illustrated later in the chapter, is not the only perspective researchers use to examine migration. By the early 1990s, international migration levels were higher than ever before and scholars began to introduce new theories to explain how and why migration starts and endures. Specifically, they examined the “population flows from sources and destinations, vastly reduced costs of transportation, cheaper and more rapid communications, rising government intervention and greater circularity of movements” (Massey, 1999, p. 35).

Policy makers, using commissioned and non-commissioned research from scholars in political science and economics as well as from international organizations and think tanks, often assume that by understanding the root causes of migration, the process can be effectively controlled. This understanding is then offered as the answer to all migration-related policy concerns. The idea is that if a policy maker knows what is causing a migrant to move into the country, or why a destination is chosen, or who chooses to migrate, then the policy maker can implement policies to alter these decisions. However, social scientists would be better advised to seek answers to how greater mobility can benefit the origin country, transit country, destination country, and individual migrants (Castles & Miller, 2009; Samers, 2009).

This chapter examines specifically how perception affects research by explicating three specific issues. First, the chapter briefly describes how various social science disciplines approach international migration to demonstrate how varying perspectives affect the approach to migration. Second, the chapter reviews dominant theories within

migration analysis, before finally linking economic theory to policy making. While the literature is explicit regarding the connection between policy makers and the use of economic theory to justify and legitimize migration policy, current literature does not discuss *why* economic literature remains dominant. An examination of the policy analysis literature aids in understanding why economic theory dominates the migration policy arena. The chapter therefore concludes by arguing why economic literature is dominant within the policy arena, and how current migration analysis in policy making relies primarily on the economic assumption of the migration process and statist assumptions of control.

Migration Theories within the Social Sciences

Several disciplines within the social sciences have begun to address why people begin to migrate, who is migrating, and the results of migration in receiving and sending countries. In addition to economists and political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, and geographers ponder issues concerning economic migration, which is defined as the change of location for labor, shifting the production factor from the area of departure to the area of arrival.²² Initially, research centered on using “assimilation, amalgamation, melting pot, and cultural pluralism,” among other concepts to interpret migration movement (Portes, 1999, p. 21). In these studies, the structural forces of migration often were secondary to more superficial elements, such as language, spatial patterns and culture. Today, social scientists not only examine social networks, community and

²² This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of social scientists that study migration, but rather provides a representative sample. Similarly, approaches described within each discipline are designed to act as an overview; outlying researchers within a discipline may not pursue the mainstream research of the discipline.

household expectations and strategies, but also the continual demand for labor, support systems created by migrants across state borders, and issues stemming from the desire of nation states to control movement (Portes, 1999).

Each discipline approaches economic migration using a different lens and at a different level. Is the receiving country or the sending country the area of focus? Who is responsible for migration? Is economic migration best understood by analyzing the individual, the structures under which migrants operate, or the contextual issues concerning flows of migrants? Should migration be regulated and if so, how? The theories employed to explain why particular individuals migrate and the effect of their migration largely determine the answers to these questions.

Anthropologists often address the issue of migration at each end of the process. They begin in the sending country by attempting to understand why individuals or groups migrate, and frequently follow these migrants to the receiving country to determine their activities and whether they maintain connections with the homeland. In this sense, anthropologists tend to focus more directly on migrants and their ability to navigate the structures in which they operate. These structures include the historical and contextual environment in which migrants live and actively make choices, including whether or not to migrate. When examining the situation from a higher level, anthropologists largely rely on theories that affirm an exploitative relationship between developing and developed countries through global capitalism, such as dependency theory and dual labor market theory (Brettell, 2003).²³

²³ Dependency theory ascended as a counter to common development perceptions in the 1960s, developed in light of failures of industrialization. Dependency theorists defined development through improved living standards, in opposition of the productivity and output of industrialization (So, 1990). In this estimation, outside forces were not the panacea; instead, outside forces with past colonial ties had caused the problem,

While sociologists have tended to approach migration largely from the perspective of the receiving country, research in the last few years has begun to concentrate on the interactions of migrants through the migration process, from origin to transit to destination, focusing particularly on the various structures with which migrants interact. These structures include institutions, community expectations, and relationships such as social networks that affect migration choices and outcomes. Sociologists also examine the converse, exploring how migration itself affects the structures in which migrants negotiate (Castles, 2007; Portes, 2000).

Sociologists studying migration do not possess an overarching theory for understanding the phenomenon; instead they employ a number of theories according to specialty and location. For example, cultural sociologists (often Americanists) view the “dynamics of meaning-making and boundary construction” within a nation for understanding migrant behavior, while transnational migration scholars (often studying comparative migration processes) believe these issues transcend national boundaries and involve numerous cultural influences (Heisler, 2000; Levitt, 2005, p. 49). Thus, researchers represent competing schools of thought, depending on the nation in which they reside and research. According to sociologists, regulation of migration by the state is often unsuccessful because policy makers fail to view migration processes as linked to more general social transformations.

While sociologists have struggled with the issue of space in the migration context, geographers studying migration explicitly address space concerns, exploring “spatial concepts or metaphors such as place, node, friction of distance, territory, and scale”

and ideas brought back by migrants to their home country aids in underdevelopment. Dual labor market theory argues that labor demands of industrial countries are a cause of migration.

(Samers, 2009, p. 1). Specifically, geographers are concerned with the cultural geography of immigrant populations, settlement patterns, and segregation at destination.

Geographers view social networks as a means to valuing specific migrant destinations, and determining destinations with real and imagined opportunity. Dichotomous distinctions of space, such as immigration and emigration countries, origin and destination, are no longer valid, as traditional emigration countries transform into transit and immigration countries (Kivisto & Faist, 2009). Moreover, as nations continue to determine entry into the country, regulation occurs at specific locations. For geographers, the interactions between guards and migrants at these sites create local enforcement geography that often shapes migratory systems (Brettell, 2003; Samers, 2009).

While geographers address spatial issues that affect the individual and structural processes, political scientists are concerned with “explain[ing] and predict[ing] the role of state regulation of migration, the dynamics of the politics of immigration, the conditions of immigrant political incorporation across a variety of national cases, and the role of migration in international relations” (Freeman, 2005, p. 112). In the last 60 years, the nation-state and internal political powers have called for increased border closure, while international economic forces have pushed for increased openness (James F. Hollifield, 2004). Political scientists explore this tension in state actions and agreements to better understand how migration regulation is affected.

Economists employ various theories to explain who chooses to move, why they move, and the economic effect of mobility on sending and receiving countries. One variation argues that international migration is caused by geographic variations in labor

supply and demand (W. A. Lewis, 1954; Ravenstein, 1885; M. P. Todaro, 1969). The assumption is that wage differentials create migratory movement and that the elimination of differentials will eliminate movement. Governments can influence this movement through labor market regulation (Massey et al., 1993). Alternative theories acknowledge the role of the individual and the household in the migration process, whereby individuals and/or households use cost-benefit calculation to decide whether to move (Lee, 1969; Sjaastad, 1962; Stark & Bloom, 1985; E. J. Taylor, 1999; M. P. Todaro, 1969). Governments affect migration flows through influencing expected earnings in both sending and receiving countries, and creating policies directed at diversifying household risk, such as insurance and capital markets, which can affect migration flows.²⁴

Each discipline adds an important piece to the puzzle of understanding migration processes. Bridging the gap between these disciplines to find common ground and create a more complete picture of the migration process is a challenge. Recently, literature has begun to bridge this gap (Sorenson, Van Hear, & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003; Vertovec, 2004), but due to the lack of collaboration between the disciplines, and a significant perspective divide; the larger picture is rarely seen. While today's migration flows are relatively well understood, issues such as why migration patterns exist, what alters these patterns, and how changes occur are less likely to be incorporated into analysis and policy considerations.

²⁴ Economists examine not only expected wages, but also the overall discounted expected value of utility, which includes social insurance, health coverage and other social benefits as determinants of migration.

Prominent Migration Theories

In order to comprehensively explain migration theories, the theories themselves have been categorized in myriad ways. Boyle, Halfacree and Robinson (1998), along with Samers (2009), divided migration theories between those that determine migration behavior and patterns, and those that integrate multiple conceptual ideas. In this manner, they focus on the socio-theoretical foundations of each theory. In contrast, Massey et al (1998) separate theories that attempt to describe or explain the initiation of migration from those that address why flows continue across time and space. Money (1999) applies a third distinction in migration theories, dividing theories between those that address the economic concerns behind the initiation and continuation of migration (both for the migrants and the state), those theories that explicate the culture and values behind migrant choices and state policies, and those that address the tension between economics and culture. Building from Money's work, this chapter will use the distinction between economic and culture/value theories. This separation best addresses the differences in the type of methods used to understand migration, which ultimately affects the use of one kind of theory over another in informing policy decisions.²⁵

Economic Theories

In developing the human capital migration model, Sjaastad (1962) argues that economists are concerned with the effectiveness of migration in “equalizing” labor earnings across regions, and with the direction and size of migrant response to earnings across time and space. The economic concerns of migration have not changed

²⁵ The theories discussed are not representative of all theories in the field, but rather the theories most commonly used or cited.

significantly in the last sixty years.²⁶ Economic theories largely seek to determine the causes of migration, so that policy makers can derive solutions to regulate and/or restrict movement.

Migration theory originated with push-pull models to explain internal migration, and was eventually adapted to explore international migration. Neoclassical economics, both macro- and microeconomics, was then applied to the concept of migration. Researchers dissatisfied with the limitations of decision-making described within neoclassical economics turned to the new economics of migration to understand why individuals migrate. Disagreeing with the motivations for migration described in these theories, other researchers sought to explain migration through the existence of segmented labor markets around the world. While these newer theories are altering the determinants of migration, the core ideals remain intact.

The reasons for migration were first conceptualized in 1885. Ravenstein was interested in explaining the internal migration phenomenon he observed during the industrial revolution. In order to describe what he witnessed, Ravenstein developed seven laws of migration: 1) the majority of migrants relocate only a short distance and to major cities; 2) rapidly growing cities tend to have substantial migrant communities from nearby rural areas, but, lacking large proximate rural populations, migrants travel farther distances to cities; 3) migration away from rural areas is inversely related to migration to urban areas; 4) a large migration upsurge will create an offsetting counter-surge; 5) migrants traveling a long distance tend to settle in cities; 6) urban residents are less likely to migrate than rural residents; and 7) men are less likely to migrate than women

²⁶ Immigration trends are often separated by pre- and post-1960, as migration largely declined during the World Wars, and only resumed in substantially in the 1960s.

(Bodvarsson & van den Berg, 2009; Greenwood, 1997; Ravenstein, 1885). This initial theorizing of migration was the starting point for future economic migration theorists.

In the last sixty years, internal migration theory has evolved to explain migrants as suppliers, consumers, and household producers (Bodvarsson & van den Berg, 2009). Human capital theory argues that providing workers with knowledge and skills through education and training not only increases productivity, but also increases the lifetime earnings of workers by improving their future income (Schultz, 1961). Becker (1962) further argued that labor was an investment in human capital. Sjaastad (1962) connected these theories of human capital with migration, claiming that the choice to migrate was an investment in one's human capital, and that migrants actively weigh the opportunity cost at one destination compared to another, and opt for the market with the highest possible return. The model does not explain multiple migration choices, but instead looks at a single point. In this context, migrants are suppliers of labor to origin and destination locations.

When the human capital migration model continually failed to illustrate earnings and wages as migration determinants, economists began employing equilibrium models to migration (Bodvarsson & van den Berg, 2009). These models claim that migrants alter their consumption patterns based on changes in life, including but not limited to income, prices, and supply of goods and services. Significantly, these models introduce the provision of goods and services as a major factor in destination choice (Tiebout, 1956), with migrants acting as consumers.

Finally, migrants are also viewed as household producers, who choose destinations that provide the best combination of goods and services, thus emphasizing

the importance of facilities and services (Shields & Shields, 1989). This also works in tandem with the new economics of migration theory, which will be discussed below.

The ideas and concepts used to explicate how we think about internal migration have been adapted to explain international migration through a neo-classical economic lens, with both macro- and microeconomic theories. Macroeconomic theory argues that international migration is caused by geographic variations in labor supply and demand, stemming from work on internal migration (W. A. Lewis, 1954; Tiebout, 1956; M. P. Todaro, 1969). Implicit in macroeconomic theory is the assumption that wage differentials create migratory movement and that the elimination of differentials will eliminate movement.²⁷ Governments can influence this movement through labor market regulation (Massey et al., 1993).

Microeconomic theory is distinguished from macro theory through its acknowledgement of the role of the individual in the migration process. Microeconomic theory argues that individuals are rational, using a cost-benefit calculation in which they expect positive returns in order to decide whether to migrate (Lee, 1969; Sjaastad, 1962; M. P. Todaro, 1969). The microeconomic approach recognizes that individuals at origin and destination do not all maintain the same skill set and knowledge, distinguished instead by varying abilities, education, and unique characteristics. The decision to migrate then is determined by how an individual with specific characteristics views his/her potential gains and losses through migrating to a destination with a given labor force as compared to another destination with different labor force characteristics. In this explanation, the wage differential across countries is not the determining factor in the

²⁷ According to neoclassical economic theory, the absence of legal barriers would create continuous migration until the wage differential is closed, however migration flows often cease before the gap actually disappears.

migration decision, only one factor among several. In addition, individuals consider their role within the labor market (Borjas, Freeman, & Katz, 1996; Borjas, 1988, 1994).

Researchers employing microeconomic theory thus view migration as an investment in human capital. Additional determinants, such as non-monetary costs and immigration restrictions have extended the model (Hatton & Williamson, 2002). Individual characteristics that reduce the cost of migration, increase the benefit, or reduce the risk of the migration income stream will heighten the probability of migration. Governments affect migration flows through influencing expected earnings in both sending and receiving countries.

Slightly newer theories, such as the new economics of migration, challenge the assumptions of neoclassical economic theory. Prior to the new economics of migration theory, when migration was viewed as a household choice, the whole family was thought to migrate, acting as a collective utility maximization (Samers, 2009). The new economics of migration argues that migration decisions for an individual are made collectively by households in order to minimize risks and loosen constraints associated with market failure (Katz & Stark, 1986; Stark & Bloom, 1985; E. J. Taylor, 1999). In this sense, wage differentials are not an imperative for migration. Instead, households may choose for specific family members to migrate in order to diversify risk. Not only the amount of income, but the source of income is important, as individuals have an incentive to invest in actions that could offer new sources of income, whether or not these sources add to the overall income. Households invest in migration, then, not only to increase overall income, but also to increase welfare relative to other households in the community. The rational individual in the new economics of migration theory is moving

temporarily to assist in coping with failures in capital and credit markets and insurance (Massey, 1999; Massey et al., 1993, 1998). Government policies directed at diversifying household risk, such as insurance and capital markets, can affect migration flows.

While neoclassical microeconomics and the new economics of migration differ regarding the origins and process of migration, both view migration from the micro level, allowing that people are the ultimate decision makers. In stark contrast, segmented labor market theory claims that migration is due to permanent labor demands of the modern industrial society, and individual decisions are largely irrelevant. Migration occurs because of the inescapable need for labor in developed countries, creating a pull for laborers in developing countries (Massey et al., 1993, 1998; Piore, 1975). All of the discussed economic theories view migrants as economic actors affecting economic actors in the receiving country.

Culture/Value Theories

Similar to economic theories, culture/value theories attempt to explain why migration occurs and what happens once migrants are in the destination country to explicate why and how policies and migration affect each other. However, culture/value theories do not begin with the concept that individuals are rational utility-maximizers. Instead, when exploring migration from the individual's standpoint, individuals are thought to satisfice in order to derive the perceived optimal solution (Boyle, Halfacree, & Robinson, 1998; Samers, 2009). However, culture/value theories more commonly address the perspective of the state and the collective bodies within to better frame our understanding of why and how migration policies are developed. Theories that address

culture and values include citizenship and identity theory, social network theory, transnational theory, and structuralist theory.

Economic models explain observable market behavior, such as people moving from one place to another and the migrant's skills, earnings, and remittances sent. As such, economic theories tend to define migration as a single occurrence in a single moment, focusing on the abbreviated period when relocation occurs. The assumption underneath this argument is that migration ceases at some point and assimilation and integration begin (Benmayor & Skotnes, 2005). However, within citizenship and identity theory, the moments of departure and arrival are not certain. Instead, to truly understand the powers at work, one must examine the language, history, and identity that are ever changing. To come from another place, rather than "here," translates to being both inside and outside, living at the crossroads of histories and memories, "experiencing both their preliminary dispersal and their subsequent translation into new, more extensive, arrangements along emerging routes" (Chambers, 1994, p. 6). Whereas, within economic theory, issues outside of the market, such as history, or that cannot be measured, such as identity, are taken as fixed.

Identity is commonly used to explain the individual's relation to the collective. Identity is constructed internally through one's own understanding of self and connection with others and externally by the powers-that-be who determine membership in formal and informal groups. If various processes that are maintained through social practice underlie identity, individuals then have various attachments that mold their self-perception and relation to the collective (Jones & Krzyzanowski, 2008). Migrants' identity is then formed through recognition of their assumed place in both the sending

country and the destination country, how they relate to both communities and how each community relates to the migrants.

However, the concepts of identity and citizenship do not only examine how the individual migrant views his place within society, but also how society views itself. The degree to which a country will accept migrants is associated with the country's own national mythology (Money, 1999; Stalker, 1994), as a constant belief exists that the values of one society could be weakened or altered by an influx of individuals who maintain varying values (Bhagwati, 1984; Money, 1999). Moreover, national mythologies help to define belonging, and therefore affect who is accepted and allowed in the country (Leitner, 1995; Money, 1999). Thus, countries have features that make the acceptance and/or integration of foreigners more or less likely.

Various scholars have defined national identity. Zolberg (1981) argues that the more homogenous a society, the greater the threat foreigners are perceived to hold. Leitner (1995) argues "principles of citizenship, as laid down in nationality laws are one expression of dominant national ideologies since they define what constitutes a nation and the relationship between state membership and nation membership" (p. 262). Others discuss the laws governing citizenship as a means for operationalizing identity (Elizabeth F. Cohen, 2010; Money, 1999). Is citizenship assigned via *jus sanguinis* (through bloodline) or via *jus soli* (through residency) or a combination of the two? The answer in each nation affects not only citizenship at birth, but also whether foreigners can become citizens of a country in which they have no blood ties. Ultimately, the answer also affects how individuals view themselves within a given society. In this sense, the citizenship distinguishes between those who belong and those who do not "by drawing a boundary

around the community” (Cole, 2009, p. 3). Finally, other scholars argue that countries with colonial ties typically have a special relationship with former colonies, which creates a greater acceptance of foreigners from these particular locations than would be expected otherwise (Mai, 2003; Mettam & Williams, 2001). Thus, with respect to identity, “the costs of immigration are diffuse, in the sense of a malaise pertaining to ‘threats to nationality,’ whereas the benefits are concentrated, in that certain ethnic groups increase their weight and hence ‘recognition’ and potential political power in the nation“ (Zolberg, 2008).

Citizenship theory within the migration discussion can take on several meanings, from citizenship as a right – an economic right, a political right, or a social right; citizenship as political participation; citizenship as belonging; to citizenship as a legal formality (Samers, 2009). Traditionally, these views assume that the citizenry within a given country can be delineated from illegal immigrants (Sadiq, 2009). In 1950, T. H. Marshall claimed that individuals receive the rights to free speech, fair trial, and unlimited movement before receiving the right to vote and finally, acquiring access to social programs.

In the 21st century, the order of the receipt of rights has significantly been turned around, with migrants often receiving access to social services while political rights remain heavily debated (Virginie Guiraudon, 2000; Samers, 2009). As states act as rights-givers, Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer (2002) argue that citizenship encompasses an agency by which “principles of fairness and justice in a polity are institutionalized and guaranteed” (p. 1). In this sense, how citizenship is administered reflects on the fundamental commitments of a state. Who is excluded from entry and who belongs

within the confines of the national border are decided by the state at every entry point (Sadiq, 2009). Thus, citizenship is often used to illustrate belonging, but belonging that is largely premised on an idea of community that is exclusive (Bosniak, 2006). The concept of citizenship as a legal formality contradicts occurrences in practice. The idea that citizenship is thought of as bestowing legal duties and rights is based on Northern (Western) nations' experience. In developing countries, migrants often access the rights and duties of citizenship without being citizens (Sadiq, 2009).

Due to all of these contradictory assessments, two schools of thought have emerged. The first would like to alter citizenship within the state, as the state alters and adjusts to its role within a global economy (Castles & Davidson, 2000; Palan, Abbott, & Deans, 1996). Meanwhile, the second school promotes citizenship beyond the state, calling for a regional or global citizenship, which recognizes the economic and cultural issues at play in today's society (Castles & Davidson, 2000; Ohmae, 1996).

Unlike citizenship and identity theory, structuralist theories generally derive from Marxist or neo-Marxist philosophy. Structuralist theories of migration examine the role of migrants vis-à-vis the structures in which they operate, largely focusing on the capitalist values that influence migration. These theories include systems theory and cumulative causation.

First conceptualized by Wallerstein (1974), world systems theory takes a historical view emphasizing the effects of capitalism and colonialism in peripheral states. As transportation and communication links increase, the culture brought by capitalist production infiltrates the periphery. Through new modes of production in agriculture and manufacturing, populations are uprooted and more likely to migrate (Hagen-Zanker,

2008). In this sense, migration is not caused only by a two-pronged labor system of the haves and have-nots, but by the build-up of capitalist economic systems in non-capitalist peripheral societies (Massey et al., 1993; Pryor, 1981).

Examining internal migration, Mabogunje (1970) identified various systems acting in the migration environment and how the interaction of these systems affects the process (economic, social, technological, governmental). Mabogunje imagined an open-dynamic migration system in which the flow of migrants were influenced by various institutions and their environment, which in turn influenced the institutions and environment. While the popularity of systems theories has diminished in discussions of migration, the theories still resonate, particularly with ideas that globalization of the market economy causes migration. As such, governments can affect migration flows through the regulation of overseas investment.

Cumulative causation theory seeks to explain how and why, once begun, migration is perpetuated. The structures, including environment, economics, and politics that assisted in causing migrants to move in the first place are altered to create smoother paths for further migration. Previous migration changes the socioeconomic setting and environmental structures that affect household decisions on migration. Migrants often return to the origin community with advances in agricultural methods that lower demand for labor, and the local distribution of income may increase migration returns. If more educated people migrate, the local community may languish, increasing migration returns (Hagen-Zanker, 2008; Massey et al., 1993). While migration from one community will eventually reach a saturation point, generally the greater the number of migrants from one area, the more migration is likely to continue.

Similar to cumulative causation theory, social network theory addresses a specific aspect propelling the perpetuation of migration. As all other theories categorized as culture/value theories, social network theory examines migration through a historical lens acknowledging economic, political, cultural, and social connections between sending and receiving countries. Social network theory attempts to connect the individual's choice to migrate with the societal reasons to migrate (Goss & Lindquist, 1995). Social networks are considered to link previous migrants, current migrants, and non-migrants with communities of origin and destination. An implicit level of trust is assumed within social networks due to a perceived sharing of culture and/or values. Social networks are thought to lower the cost and risk of migrating as compared to the cost that initial migrants endured. This cost reduction can come in the form of information, particularly with regard to accessing employment, shelter and health care, immediate entrance into religious and recreational organizations, and general emotional support (Levitt, 2001; Massey et al., 1993; Samers, 2009).

Transnationalism builds on the concept of social networks. Schiller, Basch and Blanc (1995) define transnational migration as “the process by which immigrants forge and sustain simultaneous multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (p. 48). Transnationalism theorists take a distinctly different view from structural and globalization arguments, claiming that state borders do not limit a migrant's social and economic livelihood. Instead, transnationalism focuses on culture with migrant's agency affecting migration decisions. This acts as an alternative to structural and globalization theories that often deny migrants their agency. Migrants are assumed to use all venues available, including political, civic and religious arenas, to

create and strengthen social relationships, earn an income, and assert their rights across borders. Migrants are then integrated into both the sending and receiving countries simultaneously to varying degrees (Levitt, 2001). In the receiving country, migrants become part of economic and political institutions, and cultural day-to-day standards of living. However, they do not necessarily relinquish their hold on the sending country, remaining active in institutions and maintaining connections within the home country. Often migrants will continue to conduct business in the sending country and affect local and national events (Schiller et al., 1995).

Within transnationalism, citizenship is not considered the only means to exercising rights or to identity formulation, as theorists argue that several forms of participation and representation are fluid and do not require residency or “full membership” within the community (Levitt, 2001). Bauböck (2003) argues that transnational migrants develop simultaneous memberships in different territories and polities, influencing “collective identities and conceptions of citizenship among the native populations in both receiving and sending societies” (p. 700).

Overall, culture/value theories seek to explicate how different cultures and values affect the migrant experience, the state’s actions, and the relationship between the two. The discussion surrounding culture/value theories and the methods used within these theories provide an important distinction from economic theories. The next section will illustrate how the methods used in each category affect their use in the greater policy arena.

Prominent Migration Theories and Policy

Economic theorists and culture/value theorists examine the migration process from the micro, meso, and macro levels. The nature of the methods used to understand the migration process largely dictates the prominence of theories within policy making. Economists deal with human and social interactions that are recorded in markets where prices and quantities are observed. Therefore economic models, with their distinct determinants, provide discrete answers to questions regarding movement across borders. In contrast, culture/value theorists examine human and social interactions in areas that have not been recorded historically and that are more difficult to measure. Therefore, culture/value models draw largely on in-depth examinations of groups that are then aggregated to explain situations in a larger context, and do not lend themselves to policy integration.

Two ideas have largely influenced migration policy formation: 1) neoclassical economic theory, which as discussed above assumes individuals are utility maximizing and will move (or not) based on a cost-benefit analysis; and 2) regulations on entry, exit, and residency affect migrant behavior (Castles, 2007). If one can determine why individuals move, governments will be able to restrict and/or regulate this movement through various mechanisms as desired.

Policy makers face opposing interests domestically and internationally. In many cases, citizens lash out verbally and physically regarding the presence of foreigners in their country. These foreigners are accused of taking work from citizens and lowering unskilled citizens' income (by accepting lower wages). These citizens are the constituents of policy makers and demand a voice in the migration policy arena.

Concurrently, business owners consistently lobby for greater access to skilled and unskilled migrant labor because migrant labor increases elasticity and reduces the unit cost (Zolberg, 2008).²⁸

Conflicting demands help to create an atmosphere in which policy makers require facts and numbers to justify their positions. Their need for daily information is suited to empirical research (Gormley Jr., 2007). Economic modeling of determinants provides data that can be interpreted as "hard" facts, making economic theories more attractive to policy makers than other theories, which provide more anecdotal evidence and "soft" facts. In this manner, economic theories dominate the information policy makers use to explain economic migration processes. While these theories focus on both the sending and receiving countries, empirical work relies heavily on data in receiving countries. For this reason, most research is performed in receiving countries, thus largely excluding the sending country in attempting to understand the various social, economic, and political dimensions of migration from a developing country perspective. Moreover, migration processes have a distinctly temporal dimension that is ignored in economic theory.²⁹

Culture/value theorists often directly address this temporal dimension, invoking historical analysis to elucidate specific case examples (whether at the individual, community, or state level). In this manner, theorists seek to inform our understanding of the migrant experience, the state response to migration, and the interconnections between the two. Despite extensive research on a given issue, the culture/value lens rarely permeates policy making. The qualitative nature of the research and its long-term focus does not translate to a rational choice policy making model, where decisions must be

²⁸ More recently, migrants themselves are also demanding to be heard.

²⁹ The consequences of this are addressed in Chapter 3.

made in a short time frame.

The dominant theories for explaining economic migration processes in policy are unsurprisingly, then, economic theories. While economic theorists attempt to tailor theories, assumptions such as scarcity, fixed preferences, and rationality remain applied to all socio-economic systems, foregoing historical and cultural concerns (Hodgson, 2001). While researchers have been using these economic theories to frame our understanding of migration initiation and perpetuation in the context of migration from developing to developed countries, they have more recently adapted these to migration in a developing to developing country context (often regionally based), permeating policy prescription. However, the blueprinting of this migration theory developed to explain particular circumstances is not wholly appropriate in the developing to developing country context as will be illustrated through the theories themselves in the next chapter.

Chapter Three unpacks how economic migration theories view the individual, the ramifications of this view in a South-North and South-South context, and begins to illustrate a breakdown of the current blueprint migration analysis. Chapter Four then examines the role of the state, the implications of this view in a South-North and South-South context, and further demonstrates a breakdown of the current blueprint migration analysis. With the relationship between the role of the state and migration firmly established, the final chapter suggests the implications of migration on policy formation in the South.

Chapter Three: The Individual and Applied Migration Theory

We must study not just the connectedness of things, but the things that connect, what happens when they connect, and what connection looks like from specific places and to specific people (Dirks, 2012).

The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families defines a migrant worker as “ a person who is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national” (United Nations, 1990). However, the very term conjures an image of a particular individual. What are the characteristics of this person, and from where has this image derived? In the United States, the public generally perceives a migrant worker as male, from a country geographically south of the United States, most likely, Mexico, and of limited resources. This migrant worker travels alone or with other migrant workers seeking low-wage work for an extended period of time. He intends to send the majority of his earnings back home, and may or may not ever return to his home country.³⁰

Economic theories of migration have sought to characterize the individual migrant, how he makes decisions, and why. With its “clear disciplinary prominence” (Abreu, 2012, p. 47), these theories have in turn helped to mold this image. While useful to varying degrees, these assumptions often break down when applied to contexts outside their original derivations. Given that economic theories largely focus on the individual or the individual household as the unit of decision-making, this chapter examines how dominant economic theories addressed in Chapter Two view individual decision-making within the migration process, why this has been perceived as useful, and where the application of these theories may break down in practice. The chapter will first examine

³⁰ Movies, television, and the media further propagate this public perception.

how terminology used within the migration discussion shapes our understanding of the issue before reviewing current migration trends. With this background in place, this chapter will then 1) discuss how the economic theories treat the individual within migration analysis, 2) address specific areas where migration decisions and patterns vary given the context, and 3) explain why given these variations, the current economic framework is not appropriate as the primary mechanism for viewing decision-making in a developing to developing country context.

The Utility of Categorical Distinctions

The use of particular terminology affects our understanding of the migration process and has limitations. As previously mentioned, migration research largely divides countries by development status, or North and South. This distinction plays a significant role in the underlying assumptions of the individual's decision-making process, and how these assumptions are assessed. It is therefore important to understand how countries are categorized as North or South, and migrants deriving from these countries as coming from the developed or developing world.

The United Nations categorization of countries, the United Nations Development Programme's human development index and the World Bank's classification of middle and low-income countries provide three different ways of computing countries comprising the "South." The United Nations recognizes 137 countries within five developing regions as the "South." These regions are Africa, Americas (minus North America), Caribbean, Asia (minus Japan), and Oceania (minus Australia and New Zealand). The "North" is then comprised of Europe, Northern America, and Australia,

New Zealand, and Japan (United Nations, 2012). The distinction of developing or developed is based on economic vulnerability, income and human capital levels (Bakewell, 2009).

The United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index characterizes countries as having a "very high", "high," "medium," or "low" index based on a series of human capital indicators. On a scale of zero to one, countries maintaining a ranking of .9 or higher are in the "very high" category and considered Northern. Countries below this ranking are considered Southern.³¹ In the 2011 Human Development Index, 47 countries of 187 countries ranked were classified as having a "very high" human development index.

Finally, the World Bank categorizes all low and middle-income countries as "Southern."³² This choice of breaking down countries by income classification excludes most of the Persian Gulf countries, as well as countries such as Hong Kong and Singapore. The majority of the data on South-South migration is derived from World Bank databases, and this categorization has become dominant in the literature.

Each of these categories is time sensitive. Countries that are currently categorized as South, using any of the definitions – whether in a developing region, have a high HDI,

³¹ Through the 2007/2008 Human Development Report, countries were divided into three categories, with those in the highest category considered "Northern," and those in the other two categories, "Southern" in migration discussions. However, many countries (e.g., Mexico, Uruguay, Brazil, Belarus, and Malaysia) typically considered Southern in migration dialogue and in other analyses were categorized as Northern in this estimation (United Nations Development Programme, 2007). Due to these discrepancies, the UNDP introduced the "very high" category in its 2009 report, and re-classified the "North" as only those falling into this new category, scoring above .9 on the HDI (Bakewell, 2009). However, the 2011 HDI still categorized countries such as Argentina, Chile, and Latvia as "very high," while they would be considered "Southern" countries in most migration dialogue (United Nations Development Programme, 2011).

³² The World Bank determines low- and middle-income status by calculating gross national income per capita "based on a moving average of official exchange rates adjusted for inflation relative to the G5 countries" (Ravallion, 2012). Between 2008 and 2011, 21 countries changed income level status, and seven more were added to the World Bank's country classifications (The World Bank, 2011). This highlights the arbitrary nature of these categorizations.

or are middle income - may alter in the coming years to be categorized as Northern by the same calculations. As such, comparing migration processes over time by South-North or South-South may not be comparing the same migration processes, even when using the same definition.

Bakewell (2009) calculated migration stocks using 2007 data, and each categorization. He found that South-South migration as a percentage of overall migration varied by 12 percent between the United Nations developing country categorization and the categorization using the HDI (33 percent of overall migration compared to 45 percent), with the World Bank categorization closely aligning with the HDI category at 43 percent. He further found that South-North migration varied between 34 percent using the development status category, 37 percent with the HDI categorization and 39 percent with the income-level designation (See Table 3.1)

Table 3.1 Migration Levels by Varying Definitions of South and North

	S-S migration	S-N migration	Other (N-S and N-N)
UN by developing country	33%	34%	33%
UNDP by HDI	45%	37%	18%
World Bank by income level	43%	39%	20%

Source Adapted from calculations by Bakewell (2009) based on 2007 figures.

The different categorizations illustrate how lumping countries into one designation or another can alter the perceived significance of a particular type of migration. By the developing country categorization, the level of migration from South to North, from South to South, and from Northern countries to South and North, are approximately equal. In the other two categorizations, the percentage of Southern migrants migrating to other Southern nations is greater than any other type of migration. Thus, the choice of categorization affects how and whom we think of as Southern and

Northern ad hoc, and these calculations illustrate that arbitrary groupings may incorrectly influence the way in which we view the migration phenomenon. Nonetheless, the importance of migration in the South is apparent from these calculations, no matter the definition chosen. Moreover, these terms are consistently used in migration dialogue, and frame current research and policy discussions.

Given limitations of definition, Bakewell et al (2009) ask why South-South migrants should share commonalities separate from their South-North counterparts, and why we should assume that migration processes in a South-South context should be any different from migration in a South-North context. The authors note that while extensive literature on the economic, social and political factors of migration to the North exists, no such body of literature specifically focuses on South-South migration. The authors thus conclude that absent material demonstrating a fundamental distinction, such a distinction may not exist beyond that which is predicated and defined. However, researchers and policy makers largely frame migration issues using this dichotomy. This framing interacts with differentials regarding the migration process itself to provide an argument for not using the same theoretical treatments for all types of migration. Moreover, migration analysis in the future will have to be sensitive not only to the migration process, but how these processes were classified. The next section will outline the general migration trends in the varying contexts and begin to illustrate why theoretical treatments are not a one-size-fits-all solution.

Migration Trends

The modern migration era is often cited as beginning in the middle of the 20th century, after World War II and before the oil crisis of 1973 (Keeley, 2009; Koser, 2007). Massey (1999) divides modern international migration history into four periods, starting in the 1500s and continuing into the twenty-first century. He identifies the post-industrial migration period, beginning in the 1960s as the fourth and latest migration era. In this interpretation, migration only began to occur on a global scale within the last fifty years—as opposed to the previous period where the majority of migrants originated from Europe, immigrants now move from countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, or the developed world. Elliott, Mayadas & Segal (2010) argue that a fifth period is developing at the turn of the 21st century. While immigrants still originate from across the globe, increasing economic interdependence has widened the gulf between the rich and the poor, causing developed countries to tighten immigration policies. This has both direct and indirect effects on individual decision-making, and will be discussed in the next section.

By 2010, an estimated 215 million people, or 3 percent of the world’s population lived outside their country of birth (The World Bank, 2011).³³ Approximately, 73 million were born and living in the South, 74 million were born in the South and living in the North, 53 million were born and living in the North, and an additional 13 million were born in the North and residing in the South (United Nations, 2012). By 2010, migration within the South was greater than migration from the South to high-income OECD³⁴

³³ The United Nations Refugee Agency estimated that approximately 10.55 million of these persons were refugees and up to 12 million were stateless (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2011).

³⁴ As the successor to the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development was formed in 1961, and consists of 34 countries. The OECD is designed to assist member states address economic, social and governance issues (“About the OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,” n.d.).

countries. However, high-income non-OECD countries, such as the Gulf States,³⁵ were popular destinations for immigrants, and saw significant increases in immigrant populations between 2005 and 2010. Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom also experienced significant surges in immigrant flows during this time period, while the United States experienced the greatest inflow of immigrants (The World Bank, 2011). Altogether, migration from the South to the North increased at twice the rate of international migration overall between 1990 and 2010 (85 percent compared to 38 percent).

Despite this dramatic increase in South-North migration, South-South migration remains an integral piece of the international migration picture. In 2010, the majority of international migrants born in Asia, Africa, Oceania, and Europe remained in their region of birth. Additionally, the majority of migrants living in Latin America, Africa, and Asia were born in their region of residence (United Nations, 2012). While African migration to Europe is commonly referenced, estimates suggest that migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa more frequently migrate to Northern Africa as their final destination (Schapendonk, 2009). Ratha and Shaw (2007) find that nearly 80 percent of recorded migration within the South occurs along contiguous borders, compared with only 20 percent of South-North migration. For noncontiguous migration between developing countries, the majority of migrants remain in the region of origin.

Moreover, the global economic crisis that struck in 2008 slowed the increase of migration to the North, as economies in developed countries stagnated or declined.

Migration between developing countries has risen in the last four years as economies in

³⁵ Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates make up the Gulf Cooperation Council.

emerging markets and in developing nations were either quicker to recover or generally less affected. For example, countries such as Brazil have experienced a significant increase in migrant flows. Many Haitian migrants who may have once chosen to migrate to the United States are now trekking across the Amazon region. In addition, Peruvian, Bolivian, and returning Brazilian migrants are seeking work in the country (Migration Policy Institute, 2012; Picq, 2012).

How do the dominant economic theories and their perspective on individual decision-making aid in our understanding of these observed migration trends and flows throughout the world? The next section will examine precisely how these theories view individual decision-making processes, before analyzing where and how they are successful in addressing the decision-making process of migrants and where and why these theories may falter.

The Economic Migrant Theorized

Many have argued that the reductionist nature of functionalist theories render them insufficient for understanding complex social phenomena like migration (e.g., Boswell, 2007; Castles, 2007; de Haas, 2009; Portes & DeWind, 2004). However, the economic perspective of the individual, grounded in functionalist theory, remains a dominant perception within migration research, seeking to explain what the individual's decision-making process means (or does not) for the larger migration process.

While economic theories of migration are vast and continue to evolve, neoclassical economics and new economics of migration (NEM) influence messages both within and outside policy arenas. While macro economic theory largely ignores the role

of the individual in the migration process, micro economic theory and NEM focus specifically on the decisions of the individual and the household respectively.

In macro economic theory, the individual's decision-making process has little or no bearing on the ultimate migration drivers; instead, wage differentials between areas spur movement. In contrast, within micro economics, an individual is the locus of decision-making, and chooses whether to migrate, based on a rational ability to determine whether or not migration would maximize his/her monetary or human capital (Borjas, 1994; Gubhaju & De Jong, 2009; Massey et al., 1993; M. Todaro, 1980).³⁶ This decision-making process can be described in terms of the marketplace, whereby information is exchanged and options are compared in the marketplace. Individuals then determine from this information whether it is more beneficial monetarily to remain in their place of birth or migrate elsewhere (Borjas, 1994). As mentioned in Chapter Two, this theory has been criticized for its assumption that individuals have complete control over their decision to migrate, ignoring any household dynamic at play.

Meanwhile, the new economics of migration theory has been considered a “fundamental departure from past migration research” (E. J. Taylor, 2001, p. 181), in large part due to its approach to the individual.³⁷ The new economic migration theory transfers decision-making ability from the individual to the household, claiming that the household is the appropriate unit of analysis. In this estimation, people act collectively to maximize income and minimize risk (Massey, 1999; Stark & Bloom, 1985). Various authors have argued that this latter approach is more appropriate in a developing country

³⁶ Mehta (2007) argues that neoclassical economics dominates contemporary Anglo-American economics, and its predominance can create the impression outside the discipline that it defines the discipline.

³⁷ Taylor (2001) makes this distinction due to the explicit connection between determinants and the effects of migration within NEM.

context, where access to institutions to minimize risk may be weak or non-existent, and an individual may be motivated by the survival of their household, rather than solely self-survival (Lauby & Stark, 1988; Massey et al., 1998; Stark & Bloom, 1985).³⁸

This dominant approach of neoclassical economics can be summarized by its adherence to three specific features that enable researchers to create and employ “relatively robust models of individual and group behavior”: methodological individualism, a utilitarian ontology of self, and rationality (Boswell, 2008, p. 553). While new economics of migration theory maintains slightly looser ties to these features, these features remain key elements within NEM theory as well. NEM therefore does not represent a “fundamental” departure from neoclassical economics, but rather an extension of it, acting as an important piece of the dominant paradigm.

First, methodological individualism is the idea that explanations for social behavior lie in individual preferences and structures created due to interaction with the individuals, rather than institutions, culture, or intersubjective meanings. Thus, methodology centers on analysis of individual behavior. Neoclassical microeconomists seek to understand the individual migrant’s decision-making process in order to better understand how to shape migration patterns and movements (Boswell, 2008). This can be extended to household behavior, as well, as the analysis remains on the behavior of individuals within the context of the household, rather than their relation with institutions, culture, or intersubjective meanings between them.

Second, a utilitarian ontology of self is derived from the political philosophy tradition of utilitarianism, and is the assumption that individuals are predisposed to

³⁸ Critics of this approach in developing countries have argued that it is simplistic to claim that all members within a household are driven by the same goals or desires (Gelderblom, 2006; Gubhaju & De Jong, 2009).

promote their own well-being. Likewise, within the new economics of migration, the assumption is that the individual's well-being is best promoted through the well being of the household, shifting the loci for well-being. Thus, this feature is fundamental in both economic theories.

The final assumption is that individuals will always choose to maximize their utility, and will act in such a manner given external constraints and information (Boswell, 2008). Such rationality implies that an individual who migrates anticipates earning more at the destination than the individual who remains at the origin (Tunali, 2000). Within new economics of migration theory, individuals choose to maximize the utility of the household by diversifying risk given incomplete information, thus extending the assumption, but still acting in a uniformly rational manner. This would apply whether the individual is concerned solely for himself/herself, or for the entire household.

Utilitarianism and rationality assumed within dominant economic migration theories characterize the ideal "economic migrant"³⁹ as an individual who will migrate only where his/her best interests are held, and can identify this location. Combined with methodological individualism, these three features aid in reducing societal connections and explanations into generalizable propositions, which can be predicted and tested by observing the behavior of individuals (Boswell, 2008). Such generalizable propositions are easy for policy makers to grasp onto when arguing for a particular policy, and facilitate the formation of a blueprint in migration analysis. The blueprint developed within migration analysis and seized upon by researchers and policy makers assumes that the economic migrant's decisions possess specific proximity and temporal dimensions.

³⁹ The term applies the notion of Economic Man specifically to the labor migrant. While first used by critics of John Stuart Mill in the 19th century, today, Economic Man is commonly used to portray the rational utilitarian individual assumed within neoclassical economics.

Proximity to a migration destination is not only its nearness of location, but also its accessibility to the migrant. Physical barriers, paperwork, and/or finances can be costs to migration and affect the perceived proximity of a location. Physical barriers include geography, such as mountains or bodies of water separating countries, or manmade barriers like walls or fences. Paperwork can be extraordinarily onerous to migrants wishing to enter a country legally. Applications for temporary or permanent residency may take intense negotiation with consulates, and require a working knowledge of the administrative system, as well as another language and culture. Finally, migrants must have enough money to travel to their destination, and often prove that they will be self-reliant once in the new country.

The economic migrant weighs the costs and benefits of moving from the origin, and migrates to the destination that is most beneficial for the migrant and/or the household. Armed with full information, the rational utilitarian individual will not need to migrate multiple times, but can migrate initially to the place that is most beneficial. Adapted to international migration from analysis of internal migration (see Pessino, 1991; Vishwanath, 1991), the economic migrant may therefore only choose to move sequentially as a corrective measure when expectations are not realized or the information set is updated. In this manner, migration is most often considered a one-time event. As such, analysis of migration is largely a snapshot of events, whereby an individual is surveyed one time at the destination. The concept of permanency (or semi-permanency) due to a migrant's knowledge of the migration process and subsequent cost-benefit analysis forms the backbone of the migration blueprint. In other words, the assumptions behind the economic migrant form the backbone of the migration blueprint.

The Economic Migrant Realized

The assumptions tied to the economic migrant often fit nicely within the framework of migration from developing to developed countries, or between countries with large income differentials. The predominant assumption is that migrants choose to migrate due to differentials between sending and receiving countries. This differential may come from the income level of countries, as well as skill and education characteristics in origin and destination countries.

Overall, international migration is assumed to largely occur from poorest to wealthiest countries, with distance being a factor in the chosen destination. Therefore, under equilibrium conditions, individuals would not choose to migrate (de Haas, 2010).⁴⁰ Such a depiction of the individual within the migration process has been used to aid our understanding of migration determinants (largely from developing to developed countries), and more recent research largely focuses on how this knowledge can be used in the policy arena to aid in development of sending country economies.

Migration from developing to developed countries accounts for a considerable portion of international migration, and has often been treated within the literature as international migration as a whole. When migrating from South-to-North, individuals often face significant barriers in attempting to enter developed countries that help to frame their migration decisions.⁴¹ Such barriers may lead to more permanent migration, making one-shot analysis appropriate.

⁴⁰ While many have argued against this strict interpretation of the migration process (Castles & Miller, 2009; Stark, 1991), it remains the dominant basis for policy making (Castles, 2004).

⁴¹ Specifics on how institutions and administration affect the migration process will be discussed in the next chapter, however it is important to consider how barriers affect individual decision-making processes as well.

For example, barriers erected by strict migration policies restrict a migrant's choices regarding movement patterns, and ultimately inhibit circular migration, increasing duration at the destination. In the United States, Mexican labor migrants stayed an average of three years in the early 1980s. With more restrictive border control and migration policies in general, by the end of the century, the average migrant stayed an average of nine years, was less likely to circularly return, and more likely to bring his family (Constant & Zimmermann, 2007). While Mexico and the United States are geographically close, migration policies that increased border control and restrictions on entering the United States created barriers that added significant costs to initial immigration and multiple entries into the United States.

Migration policies can also act as unintended barriers to return. In the early 1970s when the German guestworker program was abolished, many Turkish migrants chose to remain in Germany due to the lack of opportunities in Turkey. As a result, Germany experienced a substantial rise in family reunification (Constant & Zimmermann, 2007; Zimmermann, 1996). In both cases, the economic migrant chose to remain in the destination country for an extended period of time. This continual choice to remain at the destination reinforces the use of a one-shot analysis, whereby the migration process and migrant decision-making is analyzed as a one-time event at the destination, ultimately aiding in the formation of a migration analysis blueprint.

In a globalized environment, scholars who previously applied assumptions of the economic migrant to understand migration from developing countries to developed countries have now transmitted these same assumptions to frame their understanding of migration between developing countries. However, fundamental assumptions made,

including issues of proximity and temporality do not fit into the one-size fits all equation offered through the lens of the economic migrant.

The assumption that migration takes place between countries with large economic differentials fails to hold in the developing country context. While income differentials appear to play some role, as middle-income countries attract large numbers of migrants from neighboring low-income countries (e.g. Indonesians to Malaysia; Bolivians, Paraguayans and Peruvians to Argentina), income differentials do not have the same significance as found in South-North migration. Ratha and Shaw (2007) found that income differences had a marginal effect on migration destination between developing countries, as over two-thirds of migrants from low-income countries were residing in neighboring low-income countries.⁴²

As previously mentioned, almost 80 percent of migration considered to be South-South occurs across countries with a common border, and a significant share of the remaining 20 percent occurs between countries in the same region (Ratha & Shaw, 2007).⁴³ Scholars have therefore assumed that proximity is a key factor in shaping migration within the South. However, as described above, proximity is not limited to spatial geography. The reasons for such choices in this context include geography tied to location, weather, and technology, but also historical and colonial ties, and limited physical barriers, at entry, exit, and while in residence. These have significant implications for the assumptions underlying the economic migrant, and ultimately the economic migration blueprint.

⁴² Bakewell (2009) argues that this is largely an issue of degree rather than a fundamental difference.

⁴³ As will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 4, irregular migration is more likely to take place amongst developing countries due to porous borders and weak enforcement of immigration laws. Moreover, data on migrant movement is scarce in the majority of developing countries, and less likely to accurately account for movement.

The opportunities afforded by choosing to move to a country close by are referred to as the “neighborhood effect,” allowing for easier emigration and integration (Gagnon & Khoudour-Casteras, 2012). Language can unite migrants and location. For example, many Laotians seek work in Northern Thailand where language and culture are similar. However, language can also evolve on the migration route. The Huasa language and Islam help to unite people over a large swath of West Africa, and facilitate trade relations. Migration is so inherently integrated into everyday life, that anthropologist Harold Olfson identified 24 terms in Hausa referring to circular migration with different intentions and durations (Newland, Agunias, & Terrazas, 2008). In this case, it is not a national language that connects migrants, but rather an intraregional migratory bond through which the language developed.

Many individuals migrate seasonally to take advantage of favorable weather patterns, and follow agricultural production. Every January men from rural communities in Niger participate in the Exode, seeking agricultural work in Nigeria, Togo, Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Benin during dry season due to regional variations in agricultural seasons. They then return to Niger at the end of the season in March (International Organization for Migration, 2010). Many Nepalese travel to India during harvest season (Khadria, 2005; Ratha & Shaw, 2007). The Ewe of Togo migrate seasonally to Ghana to work in cocoa plantations (Gagnon & Khoudour-Casteras, 2012). While seasonal migration may also occur in South-North migration, due to issues of greater intraregionality, a stronger reliance on agriculture, and weaker border control, which will be discussed later in this section, seasonal migration is far more prevalent between developing countries.

Advances in transportation and technology have also helped migrants and potential migrants in their decision-making processes. Most migrants moving among developing countries use land transport. The continual extension and pavement of road networks aids in reducing costs, both monetary and temporal. Satellite television provides individuals a view beyond their local borders. And the expansion of cell phone networks allow migrants to communicate with family and friends, who then learn about destinations and the process of relocating. In 2008, Libya became the first African country to reach 100 percent mobile phone penetration (Bakewell et al., 2009). While the connection between technology and migration among developing countries needs further exploration, these advancements likely affect individual migrant choices, and are associated with how individuals view geographic constraints.

Another important element affecting migration decision-making in many Southern countries is the migratory patterns established through European colonialism. As such, history within a region is connected to the modern migrant's decision-making process. In order to ensure labor was available where colonial powers needed and desired, migration was often forced or coerced. By charging hut and poll taxes and expropriating land for settlers, colonial powers ensured that villagers were forced to work for payment, stimulating large-scale movements across regions. For example, South Africa attracted hundreds of thousands from neighboring areas. Today, migrants from Mozambique continue to follow this migration pattern and maintain a large presence in South African mines (Bakewell et al., 2009; Bakewell, 2009). In addition, large enclaves of migrants from Swaziland, Botswana, and Lesotho are following the footsteps of their ancestors of the 19th and early 20th century, residing in South Africa (Ratha & Shaw,

2007; Solomon, 1996). In choosing to migrate, individuals are not only examining the immediate benefit, but also historical ties and networks associated with the destination.

The ability of migrants in the South to circularly migrate following weather patterns or trade routes and to take advantage of improving technologies is largely distinguished from the North due to the limited physical barriers in crossing international borders. As mentioned above, most Southern migrants travel overland. Many lack adequate documentation, but such documentation is rarely necessary. Formalities to enter neighboring countries can often be circumvented or ignored, as overburdened governments turn a blind eye to border issues (Gagnon & Khoudour-Casteras, 2012).⁴⁴ Borders can therefore be porous, with few formal border crossings. This allows for a robust circular migratory system, whereby migrants can continuously leave and return home. Moreover, once at the destination, migrants are more able to navigate a nebulous system, where the lines of citizenship are blurred, as weak enforcement or creation of documentation allows migrants to access rights and services associated with citizenship (Sadiq, 2009).⁴⁵

Southern migrants moving across countries at informal border locations are largely invisible to the economic researcher. Due to the lack of formality of these migrations, they are not systematically recorded. No state or international agency has public figures, and figures that can be found through local surveys and intelligence agencies are highly disorganized. Thus, research claiming to elucidate the decision-

⁴⁴ The role of the Government will be examined in Chapter 4.

⁴⁵ Note that this discussion is highly generalized. Integration is obviously not a given. In West Africa, borders and ethnic groups are not aligned; ethnic discrimination can be high, hindering migrant integration processes (Gagnon & Khoudour-Casteras, 2012).

making process of the economic migrant in the Southern context using official data, is likely missing a significant piece of the puzzle.

A key element of the migration analysis blueprint is its understanding of the individual. The explanation for social behavior lies in the individual's behavior and preferences. The decision-making process of the individual migrant is assumed to be rational and utilitarian. The economic migrant chooses to relocate by weighing the costs and benefits of relocation, and picking the perceived best option for well-being. This framing of the economic migrant leads to the assumption that migration is permanent or semi-permanent, and therefore surveying or performing analysis at the destination at one period can accurately portray the migration process. The image conjured in the United States of a migrant worker as discussed in the introduction fits nicely with the theoretical framing of the economic migrant. However, the migrant who travels across borders freely and frequently within a given region does not as readily fit into the economic migrant mold described earlier.

While theories are intended to frame our understanding of complex ideas, if they are overly simplified, generalized, or unable to fully identify what they intend to further, knowledge can actually be hindered, rather than advanced. The variations in the migration process for migrants traveling from developing countries to developed countries as compared to those traveling between developing countries suggests that the tools used to understand and analyze the migrant experience and decision-making process may need to also vary. The narrowly defined economic migrant simplifies the investigatory process. The assumptions comprising the economic migrant render the ensuing analysis suspect. Migrants in many contexts are not bound by the restrictions

assumed within its definition. While one may argue for a migrant's particular utility function or rationality, the assumptions of permanency that render analysis once at the destination, do not capture true migration patterns, processes, or individual decision-making in varying contexts.

In addition to the individual migrant, the state is an integral player in the migration process. The next chapter will examine the perceived role of the state in the dominant research, the assumptions held by researchers and policy makers, and how these play out across varying contexts. The chapter will then begin to link these assumptions with migration policies and dialogue across the world to begin to tease out the link between theory and policy.

Chapter Four: The State and Applied Migration Theory

This dissertation began by arguing that researchers and policy makers apply a dominant Northern paradigm, or blueprint, to frame our understanding of migration across varying types of migration contexts. The argument was then twofold: the manner in which the dominant paradigm views the individual and the state affects its application outside of its original context. Specifically, how researchers perceived the individual and the state was insufficient in explaining migration processes in a South-South migration context. This incomplete rendering of the migration process can then have significant impacts on the construction of migration policy.

Chapter Two examined various theories used to understand the migration process, and argued that policy makers predominantly rely upon economic theories due to their quantifiable nature. Chapter Three then illustrated how the assumptions underlying migrant behavior in economic theory leads to analysis that does not capture the migration process on the ground in the developing country context. In particular, the definition of the economic migrant combined with issues of proximity and temporality, central to economic theory of individual and household behavior, hinder our understanding of migration processes in varying contexts.

Chapter Four was designed to examine how researchers view the state and its effect on policy making. However, migration theories do not generally regard the state as a key player within the migration process. Within economic theory, state action is often thought to distort the migration market (Borjas, 1989; Massey, 1999), and is therefore excluded from modeling. Nonetheless, governments regularly act in an interventionist

manner, creating and enacting policies to affect migration processes.⁴⁶ Thus, combining an economic understanding of migration processes with an active governmental role. In 2012 alone, United States state legislators proposed 983 immigration-related bills and resolutions in 46 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Of these, 267 were passed.

Political scientists have stepped in to fill the gap in migration research regarding state involvement, but they have largely focused on the state's role in Northern migration receiving countries.⁴⁷ Within this Northern paradigm, the state is assumed to desire policies that alter the behavior of the economic migrant in order to control migration.⁴⁸ In other words, the state seeks to prevent entry and exit, and residency to foreigners through a series of direct and indirect policy directives. These consist primarily of legislation passed at one time, which the state expects to be adopted and implemented nationwide for an extended period of time. The success or failure of the control agenda is then largely explored through the lens of a liberal democratic state.⁴⁹

The predominant Northern blueprint, comprising a combination of economic theories explicating individual behavior and market forces and a particular role for the state in the migration process, does not correspond to the migration process in practice.

⁴⁶ In the early 1990s, political science scholars identified an increasing conformity in the policy instruments industrialized democracies employed to address migration, and an increasing difference between stated national goals and policy outcomes. This disparity between stated intention and outcome was referred to as the “gap hypothesis” (Cornelius, Martin, & Hollifield, 1994). From that point, researchers sought to determine to what degree the state truly controls entry and exit.

⁴⁷ For an extensive review of this literature, see (Boswell, 2007; J.F. Hollifield, 2007); for a political economy perspective, see (Facchini & Mayda, 2009; Freeman & Kessler, 2008; Freeman, 1995), and for an institutionalist perspective, see (Ögelman, 2003, 2005; Rosenblum, 2004; Schain, Zolberg, & Hossay, 2002).

⁴⁸ For a complete review of theory on immigration policy, see (Meyers, 2000).

⁴⁹ An alternative to this “control” agenda within migration policy is one of migration “management,” whereby migration is considered a normal social process and the state acts to organize migration processes for the benefit of all involved. For a thorough examination of migration management, see (Institut für Migrationsforschung und Interkulturelle Studien (IMIS) Universität Osnabrück, 2012).

The role prescribed for the state is based on a narrow and specific definition of the state that does not reflect all countries involved in receiving and sending migrants across the world, and particularly in developing countries.

This chapter will first explore the perception of the state within the migration process to illustrate why the perceived role of the state does not apply to all states. In particular, how assumptions of government structure, sovereignty and citizenship rights do not hold for many countries. The chapter will then analyze how these assumptions are used in migration dialogue at the national and supranational levels to begin to connect research and policy making. The chapter will demonstrate that the dominant view of how policy can affect the migration process plays out quite differently in a South-South context at both the national and supranational level, and researchers and policymakers can therefore not assume similarities.

Perception of the State

Within scholarly research of migration processes, the role of the state is predicated on the ideas of a liberal democracy exerting sovereignty and determining citizenship. In this construction of the state, the sovereign state has authority over its territory and people, but the state does not act in a monolithic nature. Instead, the government is characterized by varying branches and a separation of powers. Citizens participate in free elections of government figures, choose from multiple political parties, and maintain specific human and civil rights.

One of the main powers of the modern state remains determining the composition of the community inside its borders—determining who and what belongs and who and

what does not, and therefore who is entitled to the rights of membership, and who is not. Migration and citizenship laws act in concert to determine degrees of belonging, and states use these laws to reinforce borders and assert sovereignty (Dauvergne, 2009). States bestow varying degrees of status upon individual migrants from “illegal” granting no status to intermediate categories such as temporary and permanent resident, which provide a modicum of rights to full membership rights as a citizen.

As discussed in Chapter One, the construction of the state system created the international migration that the state now seeks to control. This construction further formulated the source of an individual’s rights as emanating from the state. As such, the state “makes” an individual free and therefore rights naturally cease at the border.⁵⁰ While individuals have always crossed through territory, the state’s legitimacy in permitting movement turned unauthorized movement into “illegal” movement, creating an entirely new category of movement, and migrant.

Role of State in Migration Policy Making

Researchers have approached the role of the state within the migration process from varying perspectives, however the overarching assumption is that the state desires to control migration. Theorists argue that the state takes on the role of controlling migration, but is affected by the power of interest groups, the distinct roles played by various bureaucracies, political parties, and legislative relationships within the process, or a

⁵⁰ Torpey (2000) argues that states achieved the legitimate authority in determining movement across borders through the establishment and institutionalization of the modern passport system. The state reinforced its supremacy over movement via a number of interconnected factors: 1) the international understanding that states are comprised of members; 2) laws codifying who may travel, how, when and where; 3) techniques for identifying each person and the state to which they belong; 4) bureaucracy to implement and scrutinize this documentation and ensure identities; and 5) legal norms to address individual claims for entry into territories.

combination of administrative and political dynamics. In countries where organized groups have power to pressure policy makers, the political economist perspective claims that policies will reflect the interests of those groups that have the most direct access to policy makers. In this model, the actual ability of the state to assert control policies is dependent on interest group strength (Freeman, 1995).

A significant amount of research assumes that policy is complex and outcomes cannot be narrowed to specific interest groups or preferences. Instead, in this view, the role of the state within migration policy can be affected by everything from political opportunity structures that shape organization (Ögelman, 2003, 2005) to conflict between agencies (Rosenblum, 2004) to political party persuasion (Freeman & Kessler, 2008; Schain, Zolberg, & Hossay, 2002). With all of these various influences, a state's proclaimed policy desires might differ dramatically from the final product. States are unlikely to have the power to set and enforce extreme control policies in this conception.

Others acknowledge a distinction between party politics that define political values, and a multi-agency administration with divergent goals and capacity that determines content and implements decisions (V. Guiraudon, 2003; James F. Hollifield, 2004; Joppke, 1998; Rudolph, 2003; Soysal, 1994). For example, Guiraudon (2003) examines the role of welfare bureaucracies and the judiciary in expanding rights for migrants. In this account, the state's interests cannot be reduced to societal interest, but rather are shaped by a network of institutional interests. Within migration policy, preferences are derived from the state's desire to secure legitimacy and the divergent interests of agencies. Restrictive migration policies then stem from the state's desire of

securing legitimacy through protecting the privileged status of its citizens (Boswell, 2007).

All of the above theories address *how* the state attempts to affect migration processes in a liberal democracy and why they succeed or fail. While the literature widely acknowledges the gains from these, it as widely acknowledges each theory's inability to fully address the state's role in the migration process by trading agency for institutional breadth or vice versa (Boswell, 2007; Freeman & Kessler, 2008; Spencer, 2011). However, more interesting for the purposes of our argument is that each of these theories assumes a desire to control migration processes within a liberal democratic framework whereby policy making equates to implementation. While both Freeman (1995) and Hollifield (2004) acknowledge alternatives, Hollifield argues that it is precisely these Northern liberal democracies that will be setting the agenda for the rest of the world. Rather than examining the heterogeneous goals and incentives of individual countries to determine how countries with varying systems choose to act, the influence and power of liberal democratic states is assumed to affect the decisions of non-liberal democracies. This presumption thus asserts the application of a Northern policy blueprint. This chapter will demonstrate that such a blueprint applied to actions at the state level does not accurately reflect ongoing practices.

Applying the Perceptions of the State

The assumptions within the blueprint cannot be applied in an assembly line fashion to developing countries wrestling with migration policy, as developing countries face a number of challenges in forming and implementing policy that are not addressed

within the current understanding.⁵¹ By some estimations, only three countries in the South are considered liberal democracies,⁵² and issues of state sovereignty and citizenship are far less defined in the developing country context. The assertion that liberal democratic countries will set the agenda, and therefore are the appropriate template for understanding the state's role in the migration process is weak when considering the significant number of developing countries that are receiving countries,⁵³ and act to set agendas in regional migration processes.

Historically, individuals living outside the region, usually colonizers, artificially created the borders of many developing countries, particularly in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. Such borders often divide ethnic groups across states or combined groups who shared little in common. The ability of these constructed nations to become sovereign nation states has varied dramatically. Many African rulers and capitals received what Van Der Veen (2004) coined “letterbox sovereignty” whereby major international institutions addressed letters to specific individuals and places, deeming them the ruling institutions post-colonization. This provided little foundation for solid rules and regulations to be developed around the border system, and little incentive for individuals to desire to remain within a given border.⁵⁴

Today, rules on migration are often unclear, and migration regulations are commonly drawn on executive decrees or administrative arrangements that are less well

⁵¹ Within the literature, developing countries are often assumed to be sending countries and policy issues center around remittances, economic development, brain drain, and the role of the diaspora. As discussed in previous chapters, developing countries now act not only as sending countries, but many have vibrant transit and immigrant communities.

⁵² McCormick (2010) classifies only 37 countries as liberal democracies. Of these countries, the World Bank classifies only Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Romania as “Southern.”

⁵³ As discussed in Chapter 3.

⁵⁴ For an analysis of the effects of border constructions, see (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Alesina, Matuszeski, & Easterly, 2011; Englebert, Tarango, & Carter, 2002).

defined than legislation. Moreover, the existence of a law does not necessarily equate to its implementation. Many governments in developing countries grapple with limited administrative capacity, and migration issues are often ignored for more pressing concerns (Gagnon & Khoudour-Casteras, 2012; Ratha & Shaw, 2007). Thus, the ability for a state to make and implement migration policies within a developing country context varies widely. The next section will examine how these core concepts play out in practice, and then argue that they are less salient within South-South migration contexts and should therefore not be relied upon for policy formation in developing countries.

Migration Policy Making

Assuming that the state has a particular role affects policy prescription and policy creation throughout the world. States attempt to address migration processes both unilaterally and through international cooperation. The assumption underlying national level engagement with migration processes is that the (receiving) state has the right and authority to manage entry, exit and integration within its borders.⁵⁵ At the national level, the state is largely assumed to be concerned with 1) control or regulation, which includes the entry and exit of migrants, and 2) incorporation, which focuses on migrant conditions, such as access to social systems of health, education, housing and labor conditions. At the supranational level, states cooperate bilaterally, regionally, and globally. States are still presumed to value sovereignty, while attempting to cooperate in a globalized setting.

⁵⁵ Literature at the turn of this century began to argue that the state's ability to remain sovereign and determine citizenship—in essence its authority in this domain—is dwindling in the face of globalization (Bosniak, 2000; Sassen, 1998; Soysal, 1994). This will be explored with regard to migration policy in the next section, which discusses the international dialogue on migration policy and the role of the state.

National Migration Policy

This section will examine the various policies states conjure to address migration processes at the national level, examine how they are used in a Northern and Southern context, and argue how assumptions regarding the state can affect policy prescription and creation.

To alter the ethnic, skill, and/or age composition of migrants, as well as the number of migrants crossing the border, states employ various tools (Anderson, 2006). These may be direct, such as documentation and identification including national passports and visas that authorize states to control movement across borders, border control by police or state military and the building of surveillance systems and fences, and the ability to retain and return migrants. Or policies may be indirect, such as tailoring foreign assistance to increase economic growth in sending countries, or using military or diplomatic channels to affect change.

For example, in an attempt to curb net migration from hundreds of thousands annually to “tens of thousands” by 2015, the United Kingdom is using a myriad of tools.⁵⁶ These range from revisions to visa qualifications for “legitimate” entry for family members, students and workers to enter the country to focusing on enforcement of borders and inter-agency collaboration (Conservative Party, 2010).

As of June 2012, those wishing to bring a family member from outside the European Union into the country must earn a minimum income of £18,600.⁵⁷ The minimum income threshold increases if the individual has dependent children and

⁵⁶ Again, the issue here is not the debate surrounding the appropriateness of the policy or how it is made, but rather the state’s presumptive role and the assumed outcomes from the policy. For a thorough review of the migration policy making process in the United Kingdom see (Boswell, 2012; Spencer, 2011).

⁵⁷ Approximately \$28,825USD in 2012.

increases with each child (K. Lewis, 2012). The policy not only attempts to minimize the number of migrants entering the country through this channel, but also seeks to determine the composition of migrants through the socio-economic status of their sponsors. With such a minimum income threshold, 47 percent of Britons do not qualify to bring a family member into the country. This policy thus affects those who earn less; in the UK these are individuals living outside of London, women and people under 30 (The Migration Observatory, 2012b).

Policies regarding student visas similarly target skill and composition by increasing English language proficiency requirements prior to entry, requiring higher standards of educational institutions for sponsoring students, and closing opportunities for students to remain in-country without employment offers directly after education. While also lowering caps on workers allowed to enter the country annually, the UK has loosened restrictions for entrepreneurs and the most skilled workers. These include reducing English language proficiency requirements, extending acceptable lengths of residence and absence, and providing for work flexibility (Home Office, 2012). Similar to the family migration policy, the policies on student and worker visas attempt to directly affect both the number and composition of migrants.

In addition, the Government is attempting to consolidate border control firmly within the law enforcement paradigm to limit irregular migration.⁵⁸ An electronic surveillance system, E-borders, has been implemented throughout the country to monitor the entry of individuals, crosscheck their identity with watch lists, and record their conditions for entry. The system is expected to cover 100 percent of passenger

⁵⁸ Issues of trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime are also wrapped up in border security and should be acknowledged, but are beyond the purview of this dissertation.

movements by 2014. Furthermore, to capitalize on the law enforcement ethos of the Border Force, the organization was separated from the United Kingdom Border Agency (Conservative Party, 2013).

Once in-country, foreign nationals must maintain biometric identity cards to access jobs and services (Spencer, 2011). These act as a way to manage access to services, so that those without legal status have greater difficulty accessing labor and social services. In addition, the Government has clearly stated that those entering the country on a temporary basis do not have a pathway to citizenship. Using Prime Minister David Cameron's words, the overall assumption behind this grand migration policy strategy, is that "we [the United Kingdom] can control legal and illegal immigration" (Cameron, 2011).

The United States is embarking on a similar quest to control immigration within its borders through the pursuit of comprehensive immigration reform in early 2013. A bipartisan Senate committee has proposed a basic framework for immigration legislation that includes 1) a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants currently residing within the United States, but that is contingent on enhanced border security and programs to combat individuals who overstay visas; 2) improving legal immigration by providing more efficient systems for issuing professional and family visas, attracting skilled professionals, and providing greater opportunities for skilled professionals to enter and remain within the country; 3) improving employment verification systems; and 4) provide avenues for employment for low-skilled workers and secure workers' rights (Schumer et al., 2013).

At the core of this understanding of the state as migration controller is an assumption that the state has the capacity to control. Not to just conceive policy and pass laws, but to implement policies, that the laws passed equate to specific actions on the ground, which in turn, will have particular policy outcomes. In the UK example, the assumption is that tighter restrictions on qualification requirements for visas will result in agencies implementing those restrictions at embassies across the globe, and will ultimately result in fewer visas issued. And in fact, in 2012, issued student visas fell by 30 percent in the year following the enacted restrictions (Conservative Party, 2013). In the United States, the assumption is that the state can effectively distinguish illegal residents, set up a bureaucratic system by which they can register and pay penalties in a timely fashion, and then process applications for citizenship, while also processing applications from legal residents.

While several scholars examine the tools at the state's disposal to implement migration policy (Torpey, 2000; Vogel, 2000), a gap in the literature exists in terms of the ability of the state to implement this policy. Lines of research examine policy outputs and outcomes (James F. Hollifield, 2004; Money, 1999), but not state capacity to implement migration policy.⁵⁹ While policies may have unintended outcomes, or outputs that rise above or fall below target, capability is taken for granted in the Northern blueprint.

This is largely due to the understanding of capacity and the presumptions surrounding the Northern blueprint. State capacity is generally understood as a “function

⁵⁹ Scholars have extensively examined the capacity of the state to affect everything from economic development (Evans & Rauch, 1999; Hanson, 2007; Herbst, 2011; Migdal, 1988; North, 1990) to stability and conflict (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Skocpol, 1979; Charles Tilly, 2007).

of state bureaucracy, the state's relations with social actors, and its spatial and societal reach" (Soifer & Vom Hau, 2008). States are then classified on a low to high spectrum, with high capacity states having greater ability to provide public goods, enforce contracts, regulate institutions, and maintain a monopoly on violence. Advanced liberal democracies, like those presumed in the Northern blueprint, lie on the strong end of the state capacity spectrum. Thus, while analysis to date has been largely contradictory on the level of control states maintain, the idea that states can affect the behavior of the economic migrant, and therefore the entire migration process, continues to spur action among policy makers and fuel discussion among researchers. However, these assumptions largely break down in a developing country context.

As discussed in Chapter Three, South Africa has been a magnet for cross-border migrants seeking work for over a century. A combination of low administrative capacity and state inability to formulate policy has led to ad-hoc practices resulting in greater migration restrictions, but less state influence. At the administrative level, migration is given little priority. The Department of Home Affairs, in charge of migration issues, is also responsible for civic affairs. Budget and human resources have been directed away from migration and toward civic affairs, limiting the capability of administrators to perform their tasks. Moreover, the department remains disjointed, with local officials determining independently how to enforce laws.

While many national policy makers in the last decade have approached an understanding that a control-based system of migration is ineffective, lacking substantial directives from above, actions on the ground have focused on forcibly controlling migration. During this period, South Africa has become one of the most prominent

deporters of migrants, with police officers at a Zimbabwean border crossing spend more than 25 percent of their time searching for, arresting, and deporting migrants (Vigneswaran, 2011). The state then faces significant issues of capacity that affect its ability to steer the migration process.

Even where migration policies are intended to open borders, rather than specifically control the migration process, the gap between legality and actuality remains a hindrance to the migration policy process. For example, Argentina's open door policy has created opportunity for migrants in the region, but the implementation of the law has not been universal. Argentina was the first country to legally mandate migration as a human right (Piche & Morales, 2010). Despite laws providing access to health and education for all, institutions continue to request documentation proving legality before providing social services. Judges have significant discretion to misinterpret the law, affecting its efficacy and understanding among citizens, migrants and the legal community (Slater, 2011).

The formalities for entering and remaining in a country as discussed earlier—general border enforcement on the ground and identification systems—are easier to circumvent or are less absolute in developing countries. As discussed in Chapter Three, a significant portion of labor migration in developing countries is due to short-term cross-border circular migration. Such migration is often possible due to unmonitored borders, or areas where controls are overlooked.

Migrants in India, Pakistan, and Malaysia use documentation (real and false) to acquire rights normally reserved for citizens (Sadiq, 2009). In this manner, the state's ability to distinguish migrants from citizens, as assumed in the Northern paradigm, is

more fungible in a developing country context. Thus, a Government's ability to then determine who belongs and who does not, an integral element of state control, is threatened. Just as Torpey (2000) argues that the documentation system empowers the state, the system can also undermine state sovereignty within developing countries.

Migration policy at the national level assumes the presence of a sovereign [receiving] state with the capacity to control migration processes. The state then has a number of mechanisms at its disposal to affect the decision-making processes of the economic migrant, from direct practices to indirect policies. However, the assumption of a sovereign high-capacity receiving state is based on the idea of the receiving state as a Northern liberal democracy. This does not properly illustrate the complex array of receiving nations in the developing world. The assumption that states want to control migration processes through national policies does not reflect the situation on the ground in many developing countries. By basing policy prescriptions on such assumptions, policies are doomed at the onset, and expectations are created that policies can never achieve. The next section examines the role the state assumes in migration dialogue at the supranational level and how envisioning developing countries as receiving countries can alter the international dialogue.

International Cooperation

Given the nature of international migration, whereby individuals cross from one country into another, states cannot rely solely on unilateral migration policies to manage migration. States are increasingly cooperating with other states, both formally and informally, in a bilateral, regional, and global basis. This section will begin by briefly

reviewing the main mechanisms that states use for international cooperation⁶⁰ and address the degree to which cooperation at each level can affect the ability of the state to control migration within its borders. While Northern countries have most often led the framing of international agreements, the dynamics of the migration process illustrate that Southern countries, both senders and receivers of migrants, could potentially alter the potential for successful international migration cooperation.

Bilateral dialogue. Among the tools at the state's disposal at the international level, bilateral agreements, both formal and informal, are most closely connected to the goals states pursue unilaterally. While states often express concern that regional or global cooperation on migration will lead to diminished state power to address migration processes within their borders, bilateral agreements can be used to steer migration processes through shared responsibility and "win-win" situations that often integrate issues of liberalization, security and development. The success of bilateral agreements, however, is often contingent on the complexity of the agreements and the capacity of the negotiating states to uphold and implement the agreement terms. The more complex the agreement, the less likely are all elements of the agreement to be implemented, and the more likely a breakdown in trust and communication between the parties.

Northern immigration countries have sought bilateral agreements, both formal and informal, as a possible corrective measure to unilateral immigration law and the high skill biases of multilateral trade commitments. For example, France has entered into bilateral

⁶⁰ While it is important to address these, a thorough examination of each is not a value-added here, as these have been previously examined in detail. Please see (Hansen, Koehler, & Money, 2012; Kunz, Lavenex, & Panizzon, 2011; S. Martin, 2005; Newland, 2005; Trachtman, 2009).

agreements with several countries⁶¹ with which it shares historical ties and whose citizens have a history of overstaying entry visas or entering France illegally. These agreements typically arrange development aid, labor market access quotas, and reentry into source countries for unauthorized visitors.

Such bilateral agreements allow for receiving nations to continue to control who enters and exits the country, but under the guise of a “win-win” whereby sending countries receive token rewards for their acquiescence. This model continues to fit nicely within the Northern paradigm, where states can and should control migration, but has developed with recognition that affecting the behavior of the economic migrant may require multi-directional influence.

In Asia, bilateral dialogue is primarily driven by labor demand and focuses on temporary labor migration, the status of migrants, and the rights and obligations of destination countries in providing social services. The negotiation and implementation of such agreements has promoted increased dialogue between countries surrounding migration issues. For example, as a significant receiver of migrants within the Greater Mekong Subregion, Thailand has signed Memorandums of Understanding with Myanmar, Cambodia, and Lao PDR seeking mutual cooperation on issues of recruitment, employment and protection of workers, as well as repatriation and prevention of illegal border crossings. However, institutional limitations by both signatories appear to limit the implementation process and ultimately fail to meet the needs of the labor market (Chanda & Gopalan, 2012; Chantavanich, Vangsiriphisal, & Laodumrongchai, 2006; World Bank, 2006).

⁶¹ These include Brazil, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Mauritius, Senegal, Russia, and Tunisia.

In Africa, some countries have entered into formal and informal bilateral agreements that acknowledge migration practices on the ground. For example, Malawi and Mozambique maintain an informal agreement allowing individuals to cross their shared border on particular days of the week at locations without official ports of entry, and without the otherwise necessary paperwork. Regular border crossers between Lesotho and South Africa are issued border passes, allowing travel without having to report to entry authorities (Williams, 2012).

In theory, bilateral agreements, whether binding or not, should have greater flexibility to address the constraints and advantages of the two states within the agreement and could provide an important avenue for migration *management* between countries that share borders or have historical ties that create migration connections. As bilateral agreements are currently practiced, a state does not cede the power to determine issues around the migration process, but instead comes to an agreement with another state affected by the migration process. In Northern countries, these agreements often continue to be used as a source of control, with added incentives for sending countries. However, in a developing country context, these agreements appear to serve a more dynamic purpose. While elements of migration control are present, the agreements are also being actively used to address the rights of workers and the migration processes in practice that unilateral laws fail or cannot address. However, bilateral agreements in places such as the Greater Mekong Subregion demonstrate that capacity may be a significant stumbling block at this level as well.

Regional-level dialogue. At the regional level, dialogue transforms into a mixture of discussion on control and a more normative discussion on economic development.

Legally binding norms to address economic mobility exist in several regions, while informal non-binding processes and partnerships exist at the regional level across the world. Regional integration frameworks have evolved to formally liberalize migration within member states, while Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs) have formed to informally address migration management and migrants' rights.

The regional economic integration frameworks that address economic mobility and liberalization include the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) with five member states,⁶² the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) with 15 member states, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) also with 15 member states, and the European Union (EU) with 27 member states.⁶³ While each has discussed the free movement of persons as part of a larger economic integration process, the level to which each region has implemented such a plan varies. Individuals from EU member states enjoy the ability to move freely across the respective zone; individuals from MERCOSUR member states plus two associate member states may live and work within the region without visa restrictions; members of ECOWAS theoretically also have the ability to move freely among member states. However, many individuals remain irregular due to lack of proper documentation or understanding of ECOWAS policy by immigration officials; while member states have passed, but not ratified, a protocol that would provide for free movement between SADC countries (Adepoju, Boulton, & Levin, 2010; Keller, 2012; Williams, 2012). The hesitation in ratification of the SADC protocol

⁶² MERCOSUR has an additional 5 associate members who do not have full voting rights or complete access to markets associated with full membership.

⁶³ The North America Free Trade Agreement could also be included here as an economic integration framework, however, its intentions at the time of passing were to limit mobility rather than liberalize it, and nothing since its passage has altered this intention (no matter its ultimate achievements on this front, see (P. Martin, 2011).

portrays some of the challenges states face in addressing migration processes in the regional and developing country context.

The main principles behind the SADC include the promotion of 1) sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development and 2) common values and systems via effective and legitimate democratic institutions. With regard to movement across borders, member states attempt to balance individual state sovereignty with economic integration and movement of persons within the region. Two protocols have addressed the issue. The first, the Protocol on Transport, Communication, and Meteorology, addresses cross-border movement as it relates to economic activity and treatment of member state nationals at border crossings. The second, the Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in SADC, has yet to come into force. The main purpose of the protocol is to facilitate entry and temporary and permanent residence of individuals among member states without visa requirements (Southern African Development Community, 2013).

The draft Protocol recognizes that such movement is desirable, but its failure to be enacted also illustrates the difficulty in achieving regional cooperation. However, within the Northern assumption, the division between those states supporting and opposing the Protocol should fall along receiving/sending country lines. The argument would follow that those most likely to receive migrants due to economic opportunities within the country would most likely oppose liberalization: in this case, South Africa, Namibia and Botswana. In fact, all three countries have signed the Protocol,⁶⁴ instead, it is Angola, Mauritius, Malawi, and Zambia who withhold their signatures (Southern African Development Community, 2005). It is important to recognize that the majority of

⁶⁴ Though, they have not yet ratified it.

countries within SADC are both sending and receiving countries. As discussed in Chapter Three, migration in the region is as tied to social, cultural, historical dynamics, as it is to economic development. As such, the policy prescriptions for addressing the regional migration process must consider these issues and not rely on the theoretical understanding of the economic migrant.

Regional cooperation also takes important forms outside of formal binding frameworks. The UN World Economic and Social Survey on Migration concluded that “in the absence of an international migration regime for international migration, regional consultative processes of an informal nature have become a key component of migration management” (United Nations, 2004, p. 155). Given that most migration occurs regionally, RCPs provide an environment for non-binding discussion around a variety of migration issues outside of formal structures. Thirteen RCPs in the last decade have brought together countries within and across regions to address migration in an informal and non-binding environment. Ideally, the consultations can begin to frame understandings and could lead to more binding regional arrangements. However, to date, RCPs have been found to be most successful as tools for information exchange and trust building, rather than mechanisms for policy convergence (Kohler, 2011).

At the regional level, states are attempting to balance the desires to retain sovereignty and control over entry and exit of individuals within their territory with regional economic integration and the realities of the migration process on the ground. This has led to binding and non-binding agreements that expand the definition of a “legitimate” migrant often through regional economic trading blocs.

Global-level dialogue. At the global level, dialogue principally rests at the normative level, connecting issues of the migration process to concerns of economic development. As discussions of migration governance elevate to a supranational level, states become significantly more reticent about cooperating and ceding the power to control migration processes within their borders. Thus, while international cooperative dialogues with states at the forefront have exploded in the last decade, formal binding arrangements continue to stall.

An explosion of international cooperative dialogues with states at the forefront formed in the first decade of this century. The most prominent include the Berne Initiative, the Global Commission International Migration (GCIM), the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), and the UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development.

The Berne Initiative was launched by the Swiss Government in 2001 and brought together over 100 nations to discuss their migration policy priorities. The Initiative sought a better migration management system through State-led consultation, and yielded the adoption of the International Agenda for Migration Management (IAMM). The IAMM calls for effective partnerships in migration management to “reduce its negative impacts and maximize its beneficial impacts,” laying out the issues and structures for partnership (The Berne Initiative, 2005). The Initiative has greatly influenced cooperation at the regional level.

The other three initiatives are intertwined and directly link the migration process with economic development. The GCIM was set up by then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2003. A group of 32 states from all regions acted as a consultative body,

presenting a final report in October 2005. The report discussed the links between migration and development and principles for action on the issue. The following year, the UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development first met. At this meeting the UN Secretary General proposed the formation of the GFMD.⁶⁵ The GFMD is a non-binding informal process led by states. The forum meets annually and includes among its goals providing an environment for policy makers to discuss best practices, policy challenges and opportunities, and create partnerships along the migration-development nexus (Global Forum on Migration and Development, 2013). Subsequent meetings have addressed regional and thematic concerns (United Nations, 2013).

While states began to convene and discuss migration policy at the global level, formal binding instruments have reached little consensus. The Convention on the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers and their Families was adopted by the General Assembly in 1990, and brought to force in 2003 with only 37 states currently ratifying; however, it remains unsigned by any Northern migrant-receiving country. Similarly, only 42 states have ratified the International Labor Organization (ILO) convention on Migration for Employment (no. 97) and a paltry 18 countries have ratified the convention concerning the treatment of international migrants.

In international politics more generally, scholars have acknowledged the expansion of types of governance practices given the increasing “stagnation of international law” and the “emergence of new actors, new outputs, and new processes” (Pauwelyn, Wessel, & Wouters, 2012; Sell, 2013). Within migration, in the policy space where international conventions have stagnated, rich bilateral and regional governance structures have developed. However, these structures have the potential to grow

⁶⁵ The UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development plans to meet again in 2013.

significantly further. Although many have argued that the relevance of the nation state is eroding in an era of globalization, the sovereign state remains at the center of migration policy. Unlike other issues in the realm of globalization where supranational laws have formed to regulate international conduct, no such laws have evolved around migration processes.

Conclusion

The conception of the state as a liberal democracy with desires to control migration processes does not reflect the dynamism of governments across the world, their goals, incentives and actions with regard to migration issues, or the migration process as a whole. Migration control policy distinctly categorizes states as sending or receiving countries. At the national level, the Northern blueprint relies on notions of sovereignty and belonging. However, issues of sovereignty and belonging play out differently in a developing country context as compared to the developed country. The Northern paradigm takes administrative capacity and distinctions between nationals and foreigners for granted, but these distinctions are not as clear in Southern countries.

While issues of state sovereignty have largely shaped international cooperation (or lack thereof), migration governance is multilayered. Conceptions within the Northern paradigm must be reconceived to reflect regional migration dynamics, whereby sending countries are often also receiving countries. Through collaboration, states have the potential to recognize and address the fluid migration process, whereby migrants are entering and exiting borders. However, this type of migration management and collaboration requires an understanding of capacity issues, state concerns about

sovereignty, and individual migrant rights before an agreement to take measures to ensure the greatest gain for all can be achieved.

The next chapter will begin to reconcile the connections between perception, research, and policy within the migration context. In particular, the chapter will combine the understanding of the individual migrant within the developing country context as laid out in Chapter Three with the perceived role of the state discussed in this Chapter. The chapter will examine how to begin to pursue migration research and theory that more accurately reflects the multi-dimensional, complex social process of migration within the developing country context.

Chapter Five: The One-Size-Fits-All Model Revisited

This dissertation began with three interconnected ideas. First, perception affects the way we view the world, or what is considered common sense is actually constructed through societal interactions. These societal interactions then affect the way social scientists conduct research, as perception affects the terminology and methods researchers employ. Finally, this research can be used as an important policy tool, as policy makers use the knowledge generated from research to create and implement policy.

In the case of migration analysis, the dominant lens through which migration processes are conceived has a Northern bias. Researchers are working in an environment where specific historical and cultural understandings are not objective, but are derived from deeply rooted societal interactions and practices that have become “common sense” as time has passed. These historical and cultural understandings are shaped by industrialization and colonization and affect not only the researcher’s perspective, but also the tools used for research, where the tools are used, and at what level the migration process is explored. Ultimately, these assumptions affect policy prescriptions. Policy makers not only operate within this same environment, but then also use research to alter policy prescriptions, justify policy positions, and frame problems and solutions.

This chapter will first examine the various issues at play within the migration analysis blueprint to review how this blueprint came to be and why it fails to hold in diverse contexts. These include the level of analysis used, definitions employed, the understanding of the individual migrant and the role of the state. The second section

posits what this failure means for migration analysis and its link to policy, while the final section begins to offer a way forward for migration analysis within varying contexts.

Migration Analysis Blueprint

The blueprint used to conduct migration analysis was not designed as a blueprint, but instead has evolved to encompass particular attributes. Social scientists from varying disciplines have called for a new approach, or rather a re-examination of the blueprint. However, the use of the blueprint is not only persistent, but also has spread to the analysis of migration in contexts outside of its original intent. The migration analysis blueprint is then predicated on a particular level of analysis and understanding of the world's construction, which creates a specific conception of the role of the individual migrant and the state within this construction.

As discussed in Chapter One, the construction of the world into nation states created the international migration phenomenon, but also linked analysis of migration processes to the state level. Within this system, international migration does not concern one state, but by its very nature affects at least two states. However, research and policy often address the migration process from the perspective of the (receiving) state, rather than as a dynamic social process. Migration analysis is not the only field that has tackled whether to address concerns at the state or global level. This debate largely mirrors that within other areas of international politics, including intellectual property, climate change, and health.

Countries are defined and labeled as sending or receiving and Southern or Northern. However, this obscures the realities on the ground. As discussed in Chapter

Three, many countries classified as sending countries, particularly emerging economies and middle-income countries, are also receiving and transit countries for migrants. Countries lumped together with a brush of a pen as Southern are extraordinarily diverse, although assumed otherwise for the sake of generalization, presumed clarity, and quantification.

By analyzing migration processes at the state level, researchers have largely remained focused on Northern receiving countries. One not inconsequential reason for this has been that data are often easier to obtain in these countries. However, even when focusing on migration between developing countries, the level of analysis remains at the receiving country. This is primarily because the state is presumed to have the right to control who enters and exits its borders. The state system and the tidy dichotomies developed within it, North/South and sending/receiving, have shaped the tools and methods used by researchers and policy makers.

While most migration theory is affected by the above constructions, the migration blueprint is characterized by its interpretation of the individual migrant as explained in economic theory, and its understanding of the role of the state based on a highly competent liberal democratic system. Due to its inherent explanatory power, economic migration theory, in its many forms, has dominated the research used for migration policy analysis. The individual within the migration process is assumed to be rational and utilitarian. In economic theory, the economic migrant will choose the best destination for his well-being based on his perceived costs and benefits. As such, migration is then conceived as semi-permanent or permanent. Analysis of migration can therefore often be performed one time at the destination to capture the migration process.

The state is assumed to act largely within the framework of a liberal democracy. It seeks to ensure its legitimate sovereignty and this manifests in migration policy through maintaining control of entry, exit and residency regulations of foreigners. The migration process is viewed from the perspective of the sovereign state, and dialogue and policy hold the sovereignty of the state as paramount.

These assumptions do not reflect the migration process in varying contexts and applying these assumptions inaccurately represent migration processes across the world, particularly in a regional context. Rather than furthering our understanding, classifications such as North/South or sending/receiving reduce our insight of the influence social interactions have on decision-making processes, and the migration process more generally. By characterizing vast swaths of individuals and states, understanding heterogeneity is sacrificed for simplification.

As demonstrated in Chapter Three, the conception of the economic migrant and models of analysis developed around its conception miss important characteristics of many migrants within the developing country context. Many of these migrants do not face the same constraints as their counterparts migrating to Northern countries. Movement is often more fluid and less permanent. Data captured at one time in the destination country will likely not include a significant portion of temporary movement, nor the dynamism of the process, which may include several destinations. Policy recommendations stemming from the understanding of the economic migrant can therefore misinterpret the needs of both individual migrants and the countries involved.

By assuming that all states are sovereign, with the capacity and desire to control migration within their borders, researchers overlook the multi-dimensional nature of the

process and the ability of a given state to affect migration processes in varying environments. Migration does not affect solely the country where the migrant currently resides, but also the country where the migrant originated, and possibly the country where the migrant is traveling to next. Policies in one country are connected to the experiences of other countries. Creating policies in one country has ramifications for other countries. The migrants who are turned away at the border, or who are deported do not disappear, but must go somewhere. The presence of a migrant in a receiving or transit country means this person is not somewhere else.

The current framing of the role of the state, as migration controller, does not allow for a dynamic process, whereby multiple influences are at play. Instead, the current framing views the [receiving] state as arbiter of migration processes, concerned largely with controlling population within its borders. However, the receiving state is often also a sending state, and therefore has interests and concerns beyond those of receiver. The policies implemented as a receiving country can affect a country's citizens who choose to immigrate. These interlinking dynamics provide the potential for a more fluid policy landscape. Moreover, the assumption that the state can control migration neglects to address capacity issues, both within the formulation and implementation of policy.

These elements combined create a frame for understanding the migration process, a Northern blueprint, which rather than clarifying, obscures the migration process when applied to varying contexts. Portes (1999) has praised social scientists for grounding migration research in "its fundamental realities: the sustained demand for an elastic supply of labor, the pressures and constraints of sending 3rd world economies, the dislocations wrought by struggles for the creation and control of national states in less

developed regions, and the microstructures of support created by migrants themselves across political borders” (p.21). However, social scientists, especially economists and political scientists, have regularly neglected the inconsistencies in the “fundamental realities” as prescribed through theory and processes on the ground, particularly in the developing country context. What does the failure of the blueprint to capture ongoing dynamics mean for migration analysis and its link to policy moving forward? The next section begins to examine the factors that are important to consider as researchers continue to explore migration processes and influence policy prescriptions.

Moving Forward: Migration Analysis for the 21st Century

While a call for a more dynamic migration analysis approach is far from new, this dissertation is uniquely placed in its recognition of the systematic failures of current migration analysis within a developing country context, and its connection to policy. In any reconciliation of the current blueprint with practices on the ground, three intertwined factors must be considered. These include the importance of history, patterns, and social interactions in the migration process. By incorporating an understanding of these factors into analysis, policy analysis can more accurately address migration processes as they occur, rather than as a static assumption of how they occur. Armed with a greater understanding of the process, states can then act in a more responsive and proactive manner in addressing migration concerns.

First, as discussed in Chapters Three and Four, past migration and state formation affect current migration processes. For example, colonialism spawned migration to the plantations and mines of Ghana, Nigeria, and Côte d’Ivoire from Benin, Niger, Mali, and

Togo. In West Africa, these countries continue to act as receivers of large numbers of regional migrants. Colonial powers established urban settlements, which created a need for workers within the administration, and formed poles of power and influence mainly absent previously. Migration patterns then shifted toward these poles of power: a shift that continues today. Similarly, the formation of state borders across the continent after World War II created citizens and foreigners of individuals who previously may have traversed and invested in the land.

Migration policies are also affected by previous experiences, both within the migration process and the policy arena. For example, Argentina's open migration policy discussed in Chapter Four was not accidental. The policy was a result of political considerations, as the immigrant population opened the door for an entirely new support base, historical considerations as the country has a past rooted in migration, and human rights considerations, with the view that all individuals have basic rights. In the spirit of Pan-Africanism, policies in Libya supported open migration throughout the 1990s. However, recent pressure from Northern states that view Libya as a transit country has caused the Government to tighten migration policies (Bakewell, 2009). In this manner, the country is attempting to negotiate the concerns of its standing with Northern countries through domestic migration policies.

A greater understanding of how history affects present migration processes can aid in more constructive dialogue and policy creation. In the Northern blueprint, simplification, generality, and classification overtake historical considerations. However, historical specificity can shed light on individual decision-making processes, patterns of migration, and the role of the state within the migration process. By recognizing diverse

socio-economic systems in historical time and in geographic contexts, similarities and differences within the migration process can be addressed. Moreover, theories can begin to more directly reflect practice, as one size does not fit all.

Closely related to the consideration of history is the recognition of patterns within the migration process and policy response. The current blueprint does not account for cultural understandings (outside of the North) that shape preferences or structural factors, such as power inequality, social stratification, and market access that constrain decision-making. All of these factors create strong patterns within migration processes. Such cultural preferences can help determine who within a family or community moves and to where. Thus, incorporating patterns calls for an incorporation of structure and migrant agency.

The agency of undocumented migrants can be analyzed through the study of interaction: how influences interact with each other and how they affect and are affected by other forces (Narayan, 2005). As the migrant navigates societal rules, these in turn are reproduced through the migrants' actions. As a migrant navigates the resources and regulations of social institutions, social connections become migration networks and finally, migration institutions. For example, what may begin as a migrant choosing to move to a particular destination can evolve into entire villages having family members migrating to the same destination due to the original migrant's knowledge of the area and migration process. Having navigated the rules and regulations, migrants may then establish mechanisms to work within or around these to help other migrants. Ultimately, creating institutions that affect an individual migrant's decision-making and the migration process as a whole. This interaction influences both social structures and migrant agency,

providing a window of opportunity for migrants to affect policy formation, as one is influencing the other. As such and as iterated throughout this dissertation, migration is a dynamic, multi-directional process. By taking this into account, researchers and policy makers are better equipped to understand how migration patterns develop, and what can affect and alter the course of these patterns.

In order to further our understanding of this process in varying migration contexts, researchers influencing policy formation⁶⁶ need to combine an economic understanding of migration processes with structural aspects and migrant agency. Recognizing the migration process as a system of relationships across different levels and different actors can begin to aid in a stronger connection between theory, research, policy and practices. If theories can more accurately capture practices and these theories are used in research intended to inform policy, policies may be able to affect migration processes more faithfully. Past research affects future research, ultimately shaping attitudes. Models need to reflect processes on the ground, taking historical and social interactions into account. If these issues are embraced, one would expect research models to begin to integrate understanding of migration flows with knowledge of why migration patterns exist, what alters these patterns, and how changes occur.

One concrete method to approach this interconnectedness would be through integrating more qualitative analysis into empirical work. As addressed in Chapter Two, the current blueprint partly came to preeminence due to the explanatory nature of quantitative models within economic theory. Policy makers desire “facts” and “proof”

⁶⁶ These researchers may include, but are not limited to academic scholars, employees of international organizations such as the World Bank or the International Labor Organization, or fellows within prominent think tanks.

often generated through quantitative research. However, qualitative findings, while not generalizable to populations, are generalizable to theory (Yin, 2003), meaning they can help to expand our understanding, and be used in connection with quantitative analysis.

As discussed in earlier chapters, migrants and states face many options, constraints, and opportunities. However, policy concerns in developing countries are distinct from those of Northern receiving countries, and similar policy prescriptions are unlikely to aid policy makers. Policy prescriptions designed for Northern countries are predicated on the assumption of state desire and capacity to control migration processes. While the desire to control migration processes is not distinct to Northern countries, the capacity and migration interests are significantly different in developing countries. As discussed in Chapter Four, capacity issues may constrain migration policy options.

Moreover, migration interests in developing countries vary from those of Northern countries. As senders and receivers of migrants, many developing country policies must balance the concerns of their own citizens abroad with those of migrants in their own country. This balancing act may result in stricter border control, as in the case of Nigeria, or more humane migration policies, as in the case of Mexico. Nigeria negotiated with Northern countries to receive higher immigration quotas for their citizens in the North, in exchange for stricter border control in Nigeria to thwart migrants from other countries from transiting in Nigeria before heading to the North. Today, the majority of non-ECOWAS citizens must obtain a visa to enter Nigeria (Bakewell et al., 2009; de Haas, 2006).

This balancing act may also result in migration policies that address a migrant's human rights. As discussed in Chapter One, in late 2012, a national migration law went

into effect in Mexico, which sought to guarantee foreigners the civil rights and workplace protections it has advocated for its own citizens abroad (Papademetriou, Melssner, & Sohnen, 2013). These include equal protection under the law, access to education and health services, and judicial rights. Once the law in Mexico was passed, a key talking point within the Mexican Government became the desire for its citizens to be treated (by the United States) the way the state planned to treat its own migrants.

Scholars, international organizations and think tanks are now calling for combined theoretical approaches to address migration processes, and the bridging of disciplines is in its preliminary stages. For example, in April 2013, the World Bank established the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) to “generate and synthesize knowledge on migration issues for countries; generate a menu of policy choices based on multidisciplinary knowledge and evidence; and provide technical assistance and capacity building to sending and receiving countries for the implementation of pilot projects, evaluation of migration policies, and data collection” (The World Bank, 2013).

However, for researchers to understand migration processes, they cannot apply the same concepts across all contexts. Instead, understanding migration processes requires understanding varying contexts and adapting. A potential migrant in Mexico does not face the same options as a migrant in Ghana. Nor are the institutional structures within which the migrant must address these options the same: the rules and regulations of the sending, transit, and receiving countries, and the networks that aid in the migration process at the sending country, during transit, and at the final destination. The first step is acknowledging the unfortunately pervasive use of the Northern blueprint and its inability

to capture the migration process as laid out in this dissertation. The next step will be to find ways to more accurately capture the diverse elements, and structures involved in the process in varying contexts.

Why Now? Why Are Processes within Developing Countries Important?

Generally, migration researchers have not broken away from the Northern blueprint. However, ensuring that research reflects the complex factors within the migration process across migration experiences, especially in the developing world, is increasingly important for understanding the interplay of relationships and forces in society. Developing and emerging economies are quickly rising within the world system, and the assumptions previously held within the Northern blueprint do not further our understanding of migration processes today. Migration amongst developing countries is at least as common as migration from developing countries to developed countries, and over half of remittances into developing countries are now from other developing countries (United Nations Development Programme, 2013). The idea that large economic differentials between sending and receiving countries causes migration, and that these differentials will in turn produce significant remittances for sending countries from migrants in rich receiving countries does not hold in a developing country context. As discussed, income differentials between countries do not play as significant a role in South-South migration as economic migration theory presumes. Moreover, if migrants continue to choose regional destinations (temporarily or permanently) over Northern destinations, remittances in a given region have the potential to outweigh the remittances flowing from Northern countries. This is particularly important in policy discussions as

states are often concerned with the funds flowing into the country from other countries, and Northern countries often use this remittance income as bargaining power over developing countries. If fewer remittances are flowing from Northern countries than from other developing countries, the sway of Northern countries on decision-making regarding migration processes in developing countries lessens.

In addition, regional organizations and economic integration processes now include migration on their agendas. This is a critical point in migration management. Migration policy cannot be the eminent domain of the sovereign state, as migration affects multiple states at any given time. The use of bilateral agreements and regional dialogue are imperative in any true attempt to manage migration processes as a multidimensional process. However, these mechanisms require significant levels of mutual understanding and trust, which will take sustained commitment and prolonged action. For example, in ECOWAS countries, ensuring that citizens can acquire documentation to exercise their right to migrate within the region, that states implement the agreed upon ECOWAS policies, and that immigration officials understand these policies are important steps for furthering trust within the region—both at the state and individual level.

To truly connect research and policy, researchers and policy makers must acknowledge the fluidity of the migration process, combining previous Northern structures with arrangements that address the developing world context. This means taking advantage of multilateral mechanisms to address issues both migrants and states face at multiple points within the migration process.

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