

THE ELEANOR ROOSEVELT PROJECT

January 18, 1951

Description: In the opening segment, ER and Elliott Roosevelt respond to a listener's question about the USSR's representation in the United Nations and the Soviet's apparent abuse of veto power. In the interview segment, ER's guest is Edgar Ansel Mowrer, journalist and author of the book *Challenge and Decision*.

Participants: ER, Elliott Roosevelt, Edgar Ansel Mowrer

[ER:] Well, Elliott, is there anything in the mail you wanted to discuss?

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Yes there is, Mother. There's a letter from uh Miss Ethel T. Hagar of Detroit, Michigan. "Why is Russia's representative apparently the only person or nation who is allowed to veto any and everything and thus block everything which could possibly end all of our present warring strife? And why is Russia allowed to stay in the United Nations? [ER laughs] Thus wasting the whole month of August and causing the United States untold harm in so many ways." I might add that the month of August has been quite a few more months than that [Elliott Roosevelt laughs].

[ER:] Well, uh to go to the first part first, um Russia is not the only nation. The big nations all have the veto power. But uh I hadn't uh --right at hand this moment I have an analysis of all the vetoes. And, of course, Russia has used her veto uh far more often than any other country where the others [Elliott Roosevelt: Has--] have used two and three at most. Russia has used, oh, any number of vetoes.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] I'm interested, uh has the United States used the veto?

[ER and Elliott Roosevelt overlap]

[ER:] I think we used it uh I'm not sure. I'm not sure, but --

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Uh, England, France, the United States, and China are the countries that can use the veto, [ER: Yes.] besides Russia. [ER: Yes.] And uh to your uh knowledge, uh or rather, you remember uh of a few instances where they have been used by other nations?

[ER:] Oh yes, oh yes. There are uh cases where the others have used uh one or two vetoes. [Elliott Roosevelt: Mhm.] But Russia has used it over and over again and that's why everybody feels that only Russia uses the veto. But it's not a right exclusively of Russia's. It's just that she has used it and frequently for purposes that the other nations feel the veto was never intended to cover, because when it was considered originally, it was intended to cover cases where um a nation felt there was interference with internal affairs of that nation. [Elliott Roosevelt: Mhm.] And um Russia has always made it--said that she felt that whatever she used it for or infringed on her internal affairs, but she can twist that quite a good deal [Elliott Roosevelt: Well uh--] but there's no way of taking it away from her because the others have it too. [Elliott Roosevelt: Well let me ask--] And unless everyone is willing to give it up, [Elliott Roosevelt: Let me ask you--] she isn't going to give it up.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Uh, of course, in the case of China, I discount uh the Chinese Nationalist government's uh right to a veto because uh actually there is considerable question in-in many people's minds as to whether they represent all of China or not. But taking the other nations, the other three nations

which have the veto power--namely France, England, and the government of the United States--in your opinion, would those three countries be willing to forego and give up the veto power?

[ER:] I think now they--they perhaps might. I'm not sure because you would have to take that up with the Senate, and uh I'm not sure what an argument in the Senate would bring out. I think there was a time when we were almost prepared to give up the veto power, but you must remember that it was put there originally because we didn't think we could get the United Nation's Charter through the Senate without it. And um that was --

[ER and Elliott Roosevelt overlap]

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Was --originally, was the veto the idea of the United States?

[ER:] Oh, I'm not sure whether it--yes, I think it was because uh--or at least, we were one uh among those who wanted something of the kind because, you remember, we turned down the League of Nations. And when it came to joining in the United Nations, or framing the United Nations, we tried to avoid the things which had defeated the League of Nations in this country. And one of those things um was the granting of a veto to the big nations, and um that being the case I don't know um exactly what um--just how the Senate would feel. Now, I personally would be glad to see all of us give up the veto.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Mhm. Well really uh what bothers me today is that we have uh supposedly found a--an avenue--the veto is used in the Security Council, if I'm not mistaken.

[ER and Elliott Roosevelt overlap]

[ER:] That's all, it's only in the Security Council [Elliott Roosevelt: Uh, we have supposedly --] there's no veto in the General Assembly.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] No, but [ER: That's what we tried to--] we have supposedly found a manner of bypassing [ER: Yes.] the Security Council and its veto. [ER: Mhm.] Uh I'm interested in your feeling as to whether that effectively deals with the problem of the use of the veto.

[ER:] Well, it's not quite as quick, of course, uh as um the Security Council would be. But um I don't know uh what one um--I don't think it would delay so much uh that it would be detrimental to a question that came up. I think it's a very good way around, and it does make it possible for the nations, all of them together, to act, which perhaps in a case where the veto might have been used is advisable because it gives the whole--all the members, [Elliott Roosevelt: Mhm.] a chance to vote on the subject.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Well, Mother, um I just uh had a little note slipped to me to me by uh Hal Snyder, our engineer, and he thinks that there's a lot of people in our audience who don't really know what the veto is, and that it might be very good at this point in the discussion if you just took a few seconds to explain what the veto is [ER: Well, the veto--] and what its power entails.

[ER:] The veto is the right of a nation to refuse to have a question discussed in the Security Council uh because they consider that that question deals primarily with questions that affect their interior security as a nation. [Elliott Roosevelt: Mhm.] And, therefore, they simply say uh, "We will have nothing to do with this and you can't go on discussing it. [ER laughs] It-it just stops right here." Well now, the idea that has been brought forward -- was brought forward in Secretary Acheson's speech at the beginning of the last General Assembly and was adopted--is that when that happens, there can be a call, a special call, for the General Assembly to meet within twelve hours, and that same question can then be brought up in the General Assembly where there is no veto. [Elliott Roosevelt: Mhm.] No nation can veto any question in

the General Assembly. [Elliott Roosevelt: I see.] That would mean a full discussion of the question before all the nations and a final vote. Now, in the General Assembly there is one thing, namely if a question is considered, a question of vital importance, the vote on it can be decided to be a two-thirds vote instead of a majority vote. [Elliott Roosevelt: Mhm.] But they have to vote first that it is a question of extreme importance [Elliott Roosevelt: I see.] before it is of anything but a majority vote. Otherwise, it's always a majority vote. Now we ought to come to the second part of this question.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] All right, the second part of this question is why is Russia allowed to stay in the United Nations?

[ER:] Because there is no way of putting Russia out because of the veto. You see, it has to come up in the Security Council, the question of expulsion, and the Security Council has to vote to expulse a nation, and any one of the big nations, having the right to veto, can veto that. All Russia has to do is say--is use her veto and she can't be put out.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Well, on that-[ER laughs] on that ground, I have a question to ask. In-in the opinion of most uh small people like myself, sitting and watching the happenings that are going on in the world, the Soviet Union is definitely [ER: Violent.] an aggressor that is planning a uh a whole world conquest or at least a large portion of the Earth's surface. They are bringing one portion of the Earth after another under their complete domination and control. Why is that not considered by the UN as a question of vital consideration that should be taken up over the Soviet Union's veto to bring about an expulsion by the whole body by two-thirds vote?

[ER:] In the General Assembly. Well now, I don't know that could be done, of course, could be brought up in the General Assembly. But I think the feeling uh is the same feeling that I would have, namely, that though I consider Russia has violated in many ways, though I consider that Russia has not lived up to her commitments, nevertheless, the UN is the only bridge through which we talk to Russia, and it's the only bridge the rest of the world talks to her also. And the only bridge where she may learn, and I'm not sure that it isn't more valuable to us to keep that bridge open than it is to throw her out and put her behind an iron curtain and let her go ahead without having any way of knowing about anything that happens.
(10:15)

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Well, my question is- is that bridge uh mainly one whereby she can learn, to our detriment, and for the use the -- learning the-the things of value to use those against us?

[ER and Elliott Roosevelt overlap]

[ER:] Will she learn bad things about us? Of course. And--but also, she can learn the good things.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Well, I'm not thinking in the--but I'm not thinking of just the-the uh the ideals and the practices of democracy. I'm thinking of the things that she learns about us as a uh--from a standpoint of uh of uh war uh, the things she' learns about our--

[ER:] She'd be learning those anyway, darling, because those are learned by espionage and espionage is the thing that we really should be afraid of.

[ER and Elliott Roosevelt overlap]

[Elliott Roosevelt:] No, a great many things that she learns come through her knowledge that we submit to the UN as to our ability to carry on uh in uh our part, which is the major part of the UN police force

actions and uh our disposition of troops. She doesn't need any espionage; she learns it right there in the UN.

[ER:] That's true, of course, she learns a good many things. But she doesn't uh--she probably could find those out in any -any case. And I think the-the good--it's one of those difficult questions when you weigh the good against the bad, and on the whole I think it's a greater advantage to keep her with the nations of the world than to have her become an outlaw.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] I'm not sure I agree, but I'll [ER: All right.] let it go at that [Elliott Roosevelt and ER laugh].

(Break 11:45-11:59)

[Elliott Roosevelt:] How to solve the troubles of the world today, how to bring about peace, are uppermost in all our minds. But to many persons it is too complex to even attempt to think of a solution. It must be left to the statesmen of the world. Our guest today is not a statesman--I'll introduce him with his own words from his latest book, *Challenge and Decision*. I quote here, "At a time of deepest uncertainty and distress is a citizen's prescription for a desperate case." He is Mr. Edgar Ansel Mowrer and because what he has to tell us is so pertinent, I'm going to take a minute to tell you about him, well-known as he is. Mr. Mowrer has been a newspaper man for the past thirty-six years. In 1933, he won a Pulitzer Prize for journalism. As a war correspondent, Mr. Mowrer has seen something of five wars, including the First World War. As far back as 1936 he predicted that the Japs were intent on war. In his new book, Mr. Mowrer calls on all Americans to participate in the great policy that he believes can and will avoid World War Three, if we have the courage to undertake it. It gives me great pleasure to turn the microphone over at this time to Mother and Mr. Edgar Ansel Mowrer.

[ER:] I'm very glad to see you again, Mr. Mowrer.

[Edgar Ansel Mowrer:] Well, it's always a pleasure to see you, Mrs. Roosevelt, and I'm delighted that you two today are engaging in what I call the education of the American public at a time when we all know that only the public can take the ultimate decisions, and that unless the public thinks a little harder and knows a little more about the questions than it has done to date, the decisions might not be the right ones.

[ER:] Well, uh I entirely agree with you on that, and I think the education of uh all people everywhere is important, but the education of our own people is perhaps most important of all. So I want to ask you first of all: What is your definition of our challenge?

[Edgar Ansel Mowrer:] Well, I believe that we are faced, for the first time in our history, with a triple threat. There is a-a threat to us, us, USA, a physical extinction or, if you will, political extinction after physical half-extinction. In other words, we might be--get into a war, be atomized, and lose it. It would be peculiarly unpleasant because we would be beaten by an adversary with a political philosophy which would it impose, which I would call a [Edgar Ansel Mowrer coughs] form of spiritual death--I have lived in Russia. [ER: Mhm.] And finally, if this just goes on, year after year, and we don't show uh better judgment perhaps in handling it than we have to date, we shall find ourselves in a sort of moral strangulation; being forced for perfectly good reasons, one by one, to give up those basic liberties that make our country most worth defending. That seems to me the nature of the threat and I think it's a whopper. [Elliott Roosevelt: Mhm.]

[ER:] Well, [ER laughs] it certainly is a-a challenge! There's no question about that. What do you think is the most dangerous threat to us at the moment?

[Edgar Ansel Mowrer:] I suppose, ultimately, that you could say that the moral one was, but the most imminent is certainly the physical, and it's the one which is bothering most people properly.

[ER:] But can you um win the physical without consideration of the moral?

[Edgar Ansel Mowrer:] Presumably not, it all depends how much time you have before you. It seems to--

[ER:] Well, I was talking the other day um quite at length with one of our very uh fine uh men who served in the government in previous administrations and for whom I have the deepest respect. And his feeling was that at the present time, the threat of communism was so great that um we must accept all allies, regardless of what they stood for. And I've thought about it a great deal because at the time it worried me as um a decision to make. And um, I still wonder whether uh that isn't the moral decision and whether that isn't a difficult decision, because uh if you accept all allies regardless of whether uh they have your same conception for the future. If you happen to put down communism aren't you faced afterwards uh with people left in the world who still are going to demand um things that you again don't feel you can accept.

[Edgar Ansel Mowrer:] I am sure you do, and it is all a question of the imminence of the danger, Mrs. Roosevelt. Most of us do not like the philosophy of the Soviet Union, yet most of us were happy to have the Soviet Union as an ally [ER: Except--] in the last war [ER: Well that's why it has to be--] because we were on the spot [Elliott Roosevelt: Mhm.].

[ER:] Well, that's the reason why it scares me a little now to find that same philosophy.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Well, we've been talking quite a bit of late about the fact that uh there are lots of people today that are um getting a cloak of respectability about them because they are joining in the anti-communist uh parade uh-uh, and yet they advocate practically the same thing in many ways. People, for instance, [ER: Only on the other side.] like uh [William Dudley] Pelley of the Silver Shirts [ER: Or Gerald K. Smith.] Organization. Gerald L. K. Smith. People like that who are definitely as bad in influence and stand for undemocratic principles just as much as the people of the Soviet Union do.

[Edgar Ansel Mowrer:] Well, that is perfectly true, but we have to admit that in the last war [coughs] we had on our side a lot of people against Hitler who also were not for what we wanted. [Elliott Roosevelt: That's correct.] [Edgar Ansel Mowrer coughs] The question is, are we near enough to the danger point? Whereas in a tavern brawl, we have to accept the aid of any sturdy thug who is on our side simply because the present danger is so great, or have we still the time in which we can pick and choose and try to put across long term as well as short term policy.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Well, you have a good example, and uh, for instance, our lining up at the present writing with Tito, for instance, who certainly stands for communism and has a totalitarian form of government in Yugoslavia, yet we still--

[ER:] Yes, or in lining up with uh Franco Spain.

[Edgar Ansel Mowrer:] Precisely, and I have very reluctantly come to the conclusion that we have to accept at least a limited partnership with both of them. [Elliott Roosevelt: Mhm.] And from my background, you can know that I don't like it at all.

[ER:] Well, I-I don't like it um for the reason that it looks to me um in some ways uh some ways I can accept the Tito almost more easily than the other um because--[Elliott Roosevelt: Why?] Well, for this

reason: I have a feeling that while I am convinced Yugoslavia is a communist state, that the mere fact that it has proved that it is first a nationalist state means that it--communism has not got the kind of communism that is today in the USSR, has not got the hold that um it has over neighboring countries.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] You mean it doesn't advocate the--in its form uh an international revolution?

[ER:] It doesn't advocate an international revolution, and I'm not sure that it advocates quite the wiping out of the right to think and to have uh ideas that uh is what I object to perhaps most strongly [Elliott Roosevelt: Well--] in the USSR. (20:24)

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Well, but that doesn't eliminate Franco then any more [ER: But--] because that definition which you have given would apply to Franco. [ER: Well, no, because-] He's not advocating a world fascist state.

[ER:] No, but my feeling uh where Franco is concerned, I know, is reminiscent of the last war, but I feel that he did to his people um--I have no objection to being allied-allied with the Spanish people. None! I just have an objection to finding Franco still at the head of the Spanish people, [ER and Elliott Roosevelt laugh] that's all. I am [Elliott Roosevelt: We haven't got -] delighted to be allied [Elliott Roosevelt: We haven't got much choice] with the Spanish people.

[Edgar Ansel Mowrer:] I believe that we should've in 1944, even at some military cost, have eliminated Franco. But since we did not do it, I have no more objection to Franco's sort of limited fascism than I have to Tito's [ER: Tito's--] limited communism [ER: Limited communism.]. I just don't like both of them.

[ER:] Well, you-you have the same feeling of the urgency that um uh a good many people now have. And I suppose I will accept it also, so um I'm going to come immediately to a question on your book. In the first chapter of *Challenge and Decision*, you make the statement that the American people are not afraid, perhaps not afraid enough. That was your observation when you wrote the book. Do you think it is still true today? Because my mail would seem to indicate that there is fear and the beginning of a public isolationist trend.

[Edgar Ansel Mowrer:] I am sure there's an isolationist trend and I am sure it is based on a kind of fear. Perhaps I should have said not that they are not afraid enough but that they are not enough aware of the imminence and the speed with which things might happen. For instance, I have a dreadful belief that it is quite possible that six months from now most of Southeast Asia could have gone under the red blight

[ER: Mhm.]. And that once that happened, India will not show the stamina to stand up and fight, but will seek some sort of compromise or ahimsa non-violence or something. In which case, I believe that the balance of power, which is still on our side--we still have two-thirds of mankind that are not ruled from Moscow--might be tipped so definitely against us that we could no longer hope to get out of this mess without a war. I still believe we can if we utilize all the means at our disposal but quickly.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] I'm afraid I have to break in at this point because I think we have to have a message from our sponsors here, but I know we want to get back as quickly as possible to this very interesting discussion.

(Break from 23:14-23:23)

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Now we are able to return to Mother's very interesting discussion with Mr. Edgar Ansel Mowrer.

[ER:] Well, uh I gather that you feel this is such an immediate threat that we must accept um all allies. Uh in other words, you think that we've invited another Pearl Harbor, or worse, through our complacency so far, because of our position of the atom bomb. Pretty much, you have--

[Edgar Ansel Mowrer:] I think that our position of the atom bomb has given us a Maginot line complex, but I hope that Korea, and our defeat and humiliation there, has been our Pearl Harbor. And that in that sense, we have been fortunate in having it before the outbreak of an all-out war, which I still think what gives us the opportunity to pull ourselves together, to make the requisite effort somewhat more quickly than the administration seems bent on doing it, and thereby not only to prepare to win this war, but by creating suprema-uh preponderance of force. Convince the adversary that he has nothing to gain by starting it.

[ER:] I-I think, of course, that is a most important thing to do, but I wonder if you think there is any chance that um through this committee of mediation um in the United Nations uh there might be something worked out that would still um bring some kind of sense into the Chinese situation.

[Edgar Ansel Mowrer:] I don't think there is the slightest chance of it having any good result but one. I think it may convince the doubters and the hesitants and the convinced pacifists and those people who are still wishfully hoping that somehow or other there is an easy way out that there is no way out because Chinese communists are like Soviet communists, and today they are imbued with a crusading spirit of conquest. I read the monitored broadcasting from all the world five times a week. I have been appalled by the violence and the unrestrained ambition which these people are proclaiming over the air [ER: Yes, they speak just like-] I presume seven days a week.

[ER:] They speak just like the Russians.

[Edgar Ansel Mowrer:] And like Hitler before them.

[ER:] Yes, like Hitler before them. [Edgar Ansel Mowrer: Unhappily.] That's perfectly true. [Elliott Roosevelt: And Mussolini.] But it's the um it's the voice, of course, of the leaders. And um uh I-I still feel a uh a hope that it doesn't represent the whole Chinese people for whom we've had for years so much um friendly feeling. I hate to see it all destroyed in--by a few leaders who choose uh to follow the Soviet line. [Edgar Ansel Mowrer:] But that may be true of the Russian people as well, unhappily under this kind of totalitarian terroristic system. Look, Mrs. Roosevelt, we were told in 1946 that, after all, it wouldn't matter much even if communism got hold of China because they couldn't use the Chinese as soldiers. Are we still saying that they can't use the Chinese masses as good soldiers? (26:38)

[ER:] No, we certainly can't say that.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] And I believe also that there is uh a certain nationalistic pride that can be awakened in the Chinese through the victories of Chinese armies. I feel definitely that the Chinese would be willing to undergo a-a continuation of uh privation and hard-hard life. They've gone through it for many, many years. But if they have the hope held out that they're going to be the top dog in the world they're not certainly not going to hold back [ER: Well--] in their support of a new regime.

[ER:] I think that may be so, but I think that we have to consider that um we have got to convince a good many people who are not so sure that we are any better than the communists, as far as they are concerned. That if it's going to be an imperialism uh if one big power is going to hold over another big power, uh they-they see uh they-they are weighing rather carefully which--the communists, or the United States--uh uh is going to be um better for them. And I think sometimes we're a little complacent in thinking that they all are going to agree that we are um in the right and that the others are not. And I-I think that is one

reason why it is important that um our moral situation be absolutely secure and has been made understandable and clear to a great many people in the world. Because I-I feel, for instance, that um what you said about India is correct, but I think that um part of the reason is that India isn't really sure whether we actually um have much uh to offer, um and the same thing uh with our Near Eastern people and the same thing with uh some of the other peoples in that area of the world. We've got an awful lot of work to hold our friends.

[Ansel Edgar Mowrer:] Well, I am convinced that that is true. The only objection I have is that that is a long time job. [ER: That's--] It's like economic improvement. [Elliott Roosevelt: But, Mr.--] If you can guarantee that we have ten years or five years in which to carry out reforms in places where we will not merely be fattening more sheep for Joe's table, I would go along and support every one of them, but I have the fear we have got to do something quickly and erect a real wall behind which we can work.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Mr. Mowrer, do you think that the--that there is uh much strength to the uh feeling of a few people that I've talked to in Europe, who feel we are uh trying to drag uh the uh European nations into another war willy-nilly? That uh there is a lot of Soviet propaganda being put out, and uh it seemed to me that that was gaining a foothold in Europe that we were really trying to use these European divisions to fight our war for us again.

[Edgar Ansel Mowrer:] There isn't any doubt of that. I spent twenty-six years, most of it in Europe, as a correspondent. I went back for the fifth time since the-the end of this war this summer and went through eight countries, asking particularly -- trying to find out how much we could count on these people as allies. Communist propaganda has convinced a lot of them that in saving them we are somehow doing something for ourselves. But the masses--well I spoke to two or three hundred, at least, people, everything from prime ministers down. And most of them, on the whole, will go along with us, provided, like the more timid two boys that are setting out exploring, they go together. [Elliott Roosevelt: Mhm, mhm.] I don't think that so many of them would stand up by themselves. (30:32)

[ER:] Well, uh--

[Elliott Roosevelt:] But you feel that it has to be an all-out effort on our part in order to convince them?

[Edgar Ansel Mowrer:] They have to feel that we are there. It is not so much whether we put twenty divisions into Germany, it seems to me, or whether we put five. It is the feeling that the United States is going to do everything we can to stand on the Elbe, if we decide to stand on the Elbe, and not after the first defeat, pick up our doll rags, save ourselves through some sort of new Dunkirk and retire to the western hemisphere. If we preach that, as Mr. Hoover and Senator Taft have advocated, I am convinced that whereas countries like the Norwegians, the British, West Berlin -- but not West Germany, Greeks, and Turks -- would fight under any circumstances. Too many of them would sag into a sort of complacency and fall under Russia just as Czechoslovakia did. Without a fight. And with Europe goes title to most Africa, our greatest source of supply for the A-bomb. [Elliott Roosevelt: Mhm.] I cannot understand those people who say we should retire and depend on air power and sea power when air power and sea power depend on the atom bomb. Who advocate giving up the source of uranium which alone can apparently allow us to keep our head start in those bombs?

[ER:] Well, they also would mean the loss of the Ruhr which would mean changing the balance of productive power, really, because you would have uh the German skill and-and the supply uh necessary, and uh that would be a very serious thing to change um uh productive--uh, the balance of productive capacity.

[Edgar Ansel Mowrer:] I couldn't agree with you more. West Europe, with Central Europe, is the greatest single source of trained technicians of the world. [ER: Exactly.] And giving them to Russia would be a form--deliberately giving them to Russia--would be a form of insanity.

[ER:] But you see, Senator [Homer] Capehart said on my television show that uh we must expect uh - we must expect Europe to provide 260 divisions. Now that seems to me fantastic and utterly unrealistic.

[Edgar Ansel Mowrer:] It won't at the beginning, but there are -- in West Europe, there are well over two-hundred million people. Given time, if the war broke out, I have no doubt that they could mobilize well over a hundred divisions. Because once an all-out war starts, people don't worry much about production anymore except war production. Until then, just as we are doing, they are worried about their delicate little economies that have been pulled pretty much out of a rut--uh-uh a rut and are not yet firm. They don't want to give them up, but if any sort of real war started and we could hold an enemy at the Elbe long enough to utilize this man power, it's tremendous. I-I'm not afraid of that.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Sir, would you uh advocate that the United States uh go beyond the present uh-uh emergency proclamations and declare itself completely 100 percent on an all-out war production basis to back up not only ourselves but our-our allies?

[Edgar Ansel Mowrer:] My own position was that we needed a little bit of both. In other words, that for a short spurt, we had to produce more power in being for, say, the next six or eight months. That -- having done that, we will not have to go on in an all-out war thing. What bothers me a little bit about the president's recent proclamation, which I favor, is that it seems to me he is taking too much of a chance that nothing will happen within the next six months. I would like to see the two combined if it is possible. First, get a real curtain. We have been caught in a terribly weak situation. I won't use the popular phrase.

[Elliott Roosevelt: Mhm.] And I would like to get over that very weak situation and then go ahead and build up solidly as the Pentagon seems to wish to.

[ER:] Well, that would be then the policy for the United States that you would advocate, building up all our strength in every way at the present time?

[Edgar Ansel Mowrer:] Building up considerable strength quickly, but then going on to a slower, if you like, a marathon pace that we would be able to keep up indefinitely. [ER: Now can--]

[Elliott Roosevelt:] I'm terribly sorry, Mother, [ER: Oh, dear.] but I see that our time has run out. Um I feel terrible at having to interrupt but we have to call this uh interview to a close.

[ER:] Well, thank you very much, Mr. Mowrer. [ER laughs] I wish we could go on.

(35:19)

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