Regionalism in Brazilian National Politics
Xiaoshan Cheng

“Kremlin”-ization of the Open Internet
Liana Sherman

The Dilemma of Aid
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Gaps in Downward Accountability
Isabelle Hazel
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Dear Globe Readers,

I am pleased and honored to present The Globe’s Fall 2015 issue, featuring four insightful pieces on both current and historical international affairs topics. Written and peer reviewed by GW undergraduates, The Globe provides an outlet for GW students to voice their thoughts and promote their academic scholarship. I hope the essays in this issue are found to be engaging works that shine light on not only the work of GW students, but also on important and intriguing international affairs topics.

In “Regionalism in Brazilian National Politics,” Xiaoshan Cheng presents a strong and compelling argument on how Brazilian states dictate politics at a federal level. Through an examination of Brazil’s political history and recent trends, Cheng uncovers why a country characterized by federalism is now dominated by regionalism.

With Russia consistently dominating headlines today, Liana Sherman’s “Kremlin-zation of the Open Internet” is a timely piece on Russia’s Internet governance policies. Through a detailed examination of the Kremlin’s policies and their impacts, Sherman concludes that Russia’s increased governance over the Internet is more detrimental than beneficial.

In her piece, “The Dilemma of Aid: China in Angola and its Impact on Economic Growth and Democratization,” Erin McDevitt analyzes the economic relationship between China and Angola. She argues that as a relatively new partnership, Chinese investments into Angola have had countless impacts on Angola thus far, but it is too early to determine what the long term impact of China’s presence will be on Angolan democratization and economic growth.

Isabelle Hazel reflects back on the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and the ensuing outbreak of cholera in her piece, “Gaps in Downward Accountability: the UN and the Cholera Outbreak in Haiti.” Focusing on the UN’s poor response to the cholera outbreak and a lack of downward accountability, Hazel argues that the UN must acknowledge its responsibility in the outbreak in order to establish positive normative behavior for future international development work.

I would like to congratulate all the published authors in this edition, as well as thank the countless others who submitted pieces for consideration in this semester’s issue. Of course, this journal would not be possible without the hard-work of The Globe’s staff, and I cannot thank them enough for their tireless contributions throughout the semester. Enjoy reading!

Sincerely,

Rohan Bhargava
Editor-in-Chief

Rohan Bhargava is a senior in the Elliott School double-majoring in International Affairs and Geography, with a concentration in International Environmental Studies. Rohan joined The Globe during his sophomore year as an Associate Editor, and managed The Globe’s blog and print editing before becoming Editor-in-Chief. Originally from Oakland, New Jersey, Rohan loves to spend his free time biking, watching movies, and volunteering around D.C.
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FEATURED ESSAYS

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Introduction

The political system of Brazil is characterized by federalism. States and municipalities are given power to govern their own affairs, but there is a strong federal government that constrains local powers and makes key decisions. In this seemingly centralized federal system there exists, however, a significant influence of regionalism in federal-level politics. Subnational-level regionalism can be broadly defined as practicing and having consciousness of loyalty to a distinct region rather than to a political party.¹ Regionalism in Brazil is mostly displayed in electoral patterns and congressional voting, but the deeper causes of regionalism are fragmentation of regional interests, mal-appropriation in Congressional representation, presidential power and limits, politicians’ personal incentives to obtain future electoral support, and personal-based constituency and patronage culture. This paper will first provide historical background of regionalism in the Brazilian context, then discuss current phenomena, and finally explore some institutional and social causes for it.

Historical Background of Brazilian National Politics

Brazil’s current era of democracy began in 1985, but regionalism has permeated Brazilian national politics throughout history, from the autonomy-seeking exaltados during the reign of Pedro II to the present struggle for federal benefits. An important example is the system of alternating presidents between São Paulo and Minas Gerais during the República Velha era (1890-1930) referred to as “café com leite” (the two main products of the two states).² This system illustrates the dominance of key states in national politics that created a clientele culture that survives to this day wherein politicians take offices to benefit their own families, clans, and regions.

Centrifugal powers have been driving various decentralization processes and resisting centralization attempts. One of the most significant decentralization processes, brought forth by the 1891 Constitution, marked the beginning of the República Velha. As the first Brazilian constitution after the abolition of the monarchy, it rejected the previous empire’s centralization of power and turned provinces into states. It provided states with extensive power including direct election, independent legislature, and authority to contract foreign loans, levy interstate tariffs, and even maintain militia.³ The unprecedented degree of autonomy gave rise to regionalism, and caused states (especially more economically developed ones such as São Paulo) to act according
to their own interests while neglecting the overall effect on the country. Later on in the 1930s, when President Getúlio Vargas tried to centralize fiscal policy and political control, Paulistas—natives of São Paulo—revolted against the federal government. The failed revolt not only demonstrated Paulista elites’ strong resistance against federal control, but also reaffirmed São Paulo’s image as “always [putting] its own interests ahead of the nation” in other regions.\(^4\) Therefore, regionalism is not a new phenomenon in Brazilian national-level politics.

**Current Patterns in Presidential Election and Congressional Voting**

The 2014 presidential election was widely characterized by polarization and regional division. However, this pattern is a relatively recent development, having only been noted since 2006. Election maps of 1994,\(^5\) 1998,\(^6\) and 2002\(^7\) indicate nation-wide victories where elected presidents lost no more than three states. In 1994 and 1998, Fernando Enrique Cardoso won the elections in the first round of voting, with 54% and 53% of votes respectively; in 2002, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) won election in the second round with 61.3% of votes (Figure 1).\(^8\) Neither the victory in first rounds with nation-wide support by Cardoso nor the gaining of high percentage of votes across the country by Lula indicate regional divisions in political support.

On the contrary, more recent election maps of 2006,\(^9\) 2010,\(^10\) and 2014\(^11\) suggest electoral support is divided by regions, and the division is increasing over time. As candidates of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, “The Workers’ Party”), Lula and Dilma claimed all states in the Northeast, most states in the North, few in the Southeast and none in the South. This is not a surprising result, given that since Lula’s first term, the PT has been focusing on the poor, and has redistributed resources from richer states in the Southeast and the South to poorer states in the Northeast and the North. Lula only lost one state in his first election in 2002, but his policies cost him seven states in his second run in 2006. In 2010, Dilma further lost four states for the PT, and one more in 2014, making the situation more divided. When Lula won in the second round in 2006, he obtained 60.8% of votes; yet, Dilma only managed to win 56% of votes in the second round in 2010 and 51.65% in 2014.\(^12\) Although Lula was able to win 60.8% of votes in the second round, the election map (Figure 2) shows that his nation-wide victory in 2002 is replaced by divided opinions, losing all states in the South, two in the Center-West, one in the Southeast and another in the North. This marks the beginning of regional division of public opinion in national politics. In Dilma’s run for re-election, she managed to get 79% of the vote in the poorest state of Maranhão, yet “failed to carry a single municipality” in six other states.\(^13\) Clearly, the situation has become extremely polarized.

Cardoso’s first round victory in two presidential elections has never occurred again and the percentage of votes obtained by the president-elect has decreased to barely over 50%. This shows that recent presidents-elect are facing more challenges in gaining unified support from all regions. The region-concentrated support and mostly stable division over four to eight years indicates sustained regional differences in political preferences. As a result, presidents shape their policies and preferences to benefit states based on the strength of support he or she receives from the particular region. Overall, differences in political benefits and preferences caused the electoral division according to regions.

Within the Brazilian Congress, studies by Ames (1995), Samuels (2002), and Duke (2008) have shown that legislators often vote on a regional basis instead of along party lines.\(^14\) Because
of huge regional development gaps, poorer regions such as the North and the Northeast are naturally more reliant on federal transfers than richer regions. Thus, federal representatives from these areas tend to form alliances within the Congress. To ensure the function of this system, Northeastern governors hold regional meetings more frequently than those of other regions, while their federal deputies and senators are “strategically positioned on the key congressional committees, especially those with fiscal and tax matters and infrastructural concerns, and on the joint budget committee of the two houses.”

Why is regional polarization of political preference so prominent? What causes federal representatives to vote according to regional interests? Among a wide range of causes and contributing factors, regional disparity in economic development and income levels, existing from colonial history until today, is the major focus of academic literature and media. However, this paper will focus instead on institutional and social factors.

**Mal-appropriation in Congress**

The most important institutional factor that contributes to regionalism is mal-appropriation of Congressional representation. Under the current constitution, all states and the federal district have three representatives in the Senate. The number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies ranges from eight to seventy, and is proportional to the size of population of states and the federal district. This was originally designed to avoid dominance of large states such as São Paulo and Minas Gerais. Interestingly, it has now become a source of dominance for small states that are over-represented. Whether it is more or less democratic and rational to ensure small states not be overwhelmed by large ones is not the focus here. Rather, the goal is to prove that this mal-appropriation makes regionalism in Congress possible and likely.
Given that there are not many recent academic articles on this issue, a calculation based on the most recent population census data (2010) and current seat allocation in the Congress is necessary. When looking at population represented by each representative at the Congress, it is hard to ignore the huge differences in representations between the two extremes. At national extremes of under- and over-representation, each federal deputy of São Paulo represents 10 times the population than that of Roraima, and the North is over-represented by 1.8 times in comparison to the Southeast. As a result of clear under- and over-representation among states and regions, it is much easier for small states in the North than for large states in the Southeast to form effective coalition in Congress to seek their own interests. Given the existing income disparity, representatives from the poorer North and Northeast can capitalize on this advantage. One might find the over-representation of the Center-West as an outlier to traditionally believed North-Northeast alliances, but in Selcher’s study, he found the Center-West often joins the other two in forming alliances on crucial budget-oriented issues. If these three regions join their representatives together, they form a slight majority in Chamber of Deputies (50.10%) and clear majorities in both the Senate (74.07%) and overall Congress (53.37%). Therefore, members of Congress from these regions have incentives to seek regional interests and have the abilities to pass favorable legislation.

Besides influencing Congressional voting patterns, this mal-appropriation also plays a role in a president’s calculation when he or she decides to exchange distribution of federal resources for legislative support. A study done by Arretche and Rodden shows that as an effect of presidents’ goal of forming “a stable, low-cost legislative coalition...states with greater legislative representation per capita receive significantly larger grants per capita,” but those states are “not necessarily particularly poor.”

Figure 2: Visual representation of 2006 election between Lula and Alckmin (Source: www.electoralgeography.org).
Presidential Power and Limits

Federalism normally implies decentralization. Yet, federalism in Brazil involves a strong federal government with substantial power in fiscal budget control, tax revenue collection, and legislation. As the head of the executive branch, the president is granted a large amount of power in the budget process. Nevertheless, the president’s power is greatly limited by the difficulty of passing a legislative agenda in a highly fragmented Congress that currently has 28 parties. The presidential party’s lack of full control forces him or her to seek coalitions to pass agendas. This difficulty is shown through PT’s vote-buying scandal Mensalão during Lula’s tenure, when the president’s party (though not the president himself) had to govern by bribery. It could be predicted that this combination of substantial presidential power in the budget process and the need of a coalition to pass legislation produces the “exchange of targeted expenditures for legislative support.” This kind of transfer is not obvious in constitutional transfers, but in “voluntary” transfers such as “urban development loans”, over which the “president’s administration has a great deal of discretion.”

A cyclical phenomenon is occurring here. The president provides funds and benefits to regions in exchange for legislative support, which leads to voters’ preference towards those elected officials. This is seen in the ensuing election, where voters support this president to guarantee their continuous benefits. Then, states that provided more votes for the president in the most recent election receive larger per capita transfers. Therefore, the legislators are able to capitalize the high federal transfer in their next election (either at federal or local levels), and continue their cooperation with the president in the coalition. As a result, the centralized federal system both reinforces and is driven by decentralized regional interests.

Governor and Member of Congress: A Revolving Door?

On an individual level, because a large number of congressional members run for the governorship and vice-versa, they have strong incentives to act according to regional instead of national interests in order to gain local support. Data collected from the 2014 gubernatorial and congressional elections suggests that although former congressional members rank second after lawyers in number of candidates in gubernatorial elections, the former’s chance of being elected is 29.32% higher than the latter, only behind incumbent governors. In addition, former congressional members account for 11.52% of the total number of candidates, but 26.83% of the total number of governors-elected. This shows that a large number of former congress members run in gubernatorial elections and have a much higher chance of success than others (except for incumbent governors). In addition, 68.52% of Top 2 candidates for governors have congressional experience, and they account for 85.19% of governors-elects. On the other hand, a high number of candidates and percentage of senators-elected have been a governor or a state deputy.

Overall, this data suggests a strong tendency and high success rate for former congressional members to run for state governors, maybe not immediately, but later on in their careers. Therefore, it is rational for congressional members to seek regional interests and try to maximize resources from the federal government (especially those that lead to immediate results). With these credits at national level politics, they will be able to rally for more support at local level elections.

Political Culture

An important reason for regionalism at the national level is the lack of strong party affiliation and loyalty in Brazil, which is not helpful for the formation of national unity even within parties. Brazilians’ party identification in 2002 was at 35.20%, only slightly lower than average in comparison to other countries. In reality, when one disaggregates this national-level figure, it is clear that this number is a misrepresentation driven by PT’s exceptional level of political followers. In 2002, PT accounted for 23.1% of a total of 35.2% of party identification, while no other
party had a number of more than 4%. Therefore, outside of PT, there was and continues to be no strong party loyalty among voters, providing candidates more freedom to seek their own interests instead of following a nation-wide party strategy. It is also common for politicians to switch parties, making this tie even more fragile. Thus, candidates need to rally for local support largely on their own, which increases their incentives to seek regional benefits when they have a place in Congress.

Political culture is often linked to general social norms. In the case of political clientele culture, it is also the norm to seek benefits for one’s own family, clan, and therefore region. A successful person is expected to provide opportunities and help his or her family and friends. For public officials, they are expected by their family and friends to provide extra benefits by using their public power, often not legally. This tendency leads to two results: the exchange of favors that often leads to corruption, and the assumed responsibility to seek benefits for one’s own group, which could lead to regionalism. According to Selcher, “patronage is a major source of jobs in the three less-developed regions.” In the late 1990’s, public employment accounted for 39%, 34% and 30% of total employment in the North, the Northeast and the Center-West respectively. Moreover, the then poorest state, Piauí, had 52% of the workforce in public sector. This patronage and clientele culture provide pressures for federal representatives to seek as much federal transfer as possible to support public sectors that are important to their own circles. It also creates higher solidarity among those who are elected.

Conclusion

Highly divided presidential results demonstrate the polarization of regional interests and political preferences. In Congress, federal deputies and Senators form alliances based on and vote according to their regional interests more often than along party lines. These phenomena are clear indicators of regionalism in national politics. Besides often discussed economic factors, there exist many institutional and social factors to regionalism. Mal-appropriation in Congress gives small states much greater power per capita than larger ones, allowing them to form majorities and pass favorable legislation. It also influences presidents’ calculation in exchange of fed-

Figure 3: Members of Congress often use their time in Brasilia as an opportunity to further their political opportunities in their state (Source: www.commons.wikimedia.org).
eral transfer for legislative support. The centralized presidential power in the budget process and the lack of it in legislative agenda “force” presidents to conduct expenditure-legislation exchange that benefit smaller states. As Senators and federal deputies often run for state governors later on in their career, they have high personal incentives to seek regional interests in order to gain future electoral support. The lack of party loyalty that forces candidates to rally personal support provide them incentives to benefit local constituency instead of following national party strategies. Lastly, political clientele and patronage culture further pressures federal Congressional representatives to act on behalf of their own regions. Overall, these factors create a national government that derives its power from catering to regionalism, thus reinforcing decentralized regional interests, while at the same time maintaining a centralized federal system.

Endnotes

3. Ibid., 80.
4. Ibid., 111-112.
16. Ibid., 27-33.
19. Numbers calculated from Appendix A.
29. Samuels, 1-27.
32. Ibid.
Introduction

Ever since the Internet gained a global presence, the issue of Internet governance has proven significant to every country, regardless of their system of governance. However, the Russian Federation has acted in a unique and strategic manner to strengthen its control over the Internet through censorship and surveillance on various websites and social media sites. Rational arguments supporting such actions include a desire to further protect the state after witnessing deleterious events ranging from the Snowden Affair to the Arab Spring. When evaluating the pros and cons of Russia’s control of the Internet, it can be assessed that the consequences of Russia’s actions far outweigh the benefits in the long run.

By saturating the legal system with legislation like the Internet Censorship Law and Article 282 of the Russian Penal Code, Russia has successfully established a legal method that justifies censorship and surveillance over the Internet. The Russian government also exercises influence over the Internet by bolstering relationships with either nations that possess similar ideologies, or those whom could be easily persuaded to support Russia’s idea on Internet governance. Developing such relationships has proven instrumental for Russia’s policy coordination with both regional and international organizations. Nevertheless, the more accessible cyber data is for the state, the higher the risk of security violations such as cyber attacks or leaks of confidential or private information. Such risks affect both Russia’s general population as well as its economy. Studying Russia’s historical conventions of freedom and persecution allows one to truly appreciate the impact of Internet controls and understand why Russia’s work to further such jurisdiction creates more problems for the government than it solves. In particular, it is critical to examine the influence of Russia’s history regarding the conflict of Internet freedom and the perception of privacy within the country.

The Significance of Domestic Actions Concerning the Internet

Surveillance and censorship are common themes that pervade Russian society, and the same can be said about the country’s governance of the Internet. A series of laws that have been passed by the State Duma in recent years have significantly increased the extent to which the Russian authorities and law enforcement are able to access or repress cyber data. For instance, the Internet Censorship Law, which produced the ‘Single Register’ policy, enables the blocking of both individual websites as well as IP addresses. Originally passed with the intention of banning

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websites involved with child pornography, suicide advocacy, the promotion of drug abuse, and lessons on how to manufacture drugs, ‘Single Register’ provides the opportunity for the Kremlin to block all sorts of online political speech that poses a threat to the current administration. Furthermore, it requires service providers to implement deep-packet inspection (DPI) technology, which could very well become a tool for spying on millions of Russians.\(^3\) When the State Duma passed this law, it took the national media, expert community, and opposition completely by surprise. Since the law went into effect on November 1, 2012, the Roskomnadzor, also known as the Agency for the Supervision of Information Technology, Communications and Mass Media, has been the main enforcement entity. This agency compiles and updates the ‘Single Register’ and instructs host providers to remove targeted URLs. If the provider fails to comply within 24 hours, the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) block access to the site.\(^4\)

This introduction of DPI on a nationwide scale has elicited concern from various privacy groups highlighting the intrusiveness of such technology. Eric King, the Deputy Director at Privacy International, has said none of the Western democracies have utilized a DPI surveillance system, “due to the crushing effect it would have on free speech and privacy...It can also compromise critical circumvention tools, tools that help citizens evade authoritarian Internet controls in countries like Iran and China.”\(^5\) Supporters of strict and nationalized Internet governance have argued that Western States such as the United States also possess systems that provide law enforcement with access to cyber data. However, unlike Russia, the United States’ requirements are much narrower and are only imposed on telecommunication systems.\(^6\)

An additional piece of important legislation is Article 282 of the Russian Penal Code. This article defines extremism in an extremely vague manner. Due to this ambiguous classification of extremism, many cases of persecution, restriction, and the closing of websites has taken place under the legal backing of this article.\(^7\) Article 282 is used by the Russian state along with SORM, Russia’s National System of Lawful Interception of All Electronic Utterances. Developed by the KGB in the late 1980s, SORM scours Internet traffic, focusing on key words and then collecting content that contains specified vocabulary. The data collected is provided for investigators, policemen, and prosecutors to make appropriate decisions.\(^8\) However, the problem is that for the most part, the curriculum in security services and academies for these various types of Russian law enforcement have changed little since Soviet times, when all forms of information were grouped together. Thus, much of it is still regarded as suspicious and it takes little evidence for the state to declare a website worthy of censorship or an individual deserving of prosecution.

The International Actions Regarding Internet Governance

The support of member states is crucial when submitting proposals in regional and international organizations. This is exemplified by Russia’s work in bolstering its relations with nations that share similar opinions on subjects such as Internet freedom and cyberspace governance. With such alliances, Russia is more likely to be able to shift the Western narrative over Internet governance through policy coordination. An example of Russia’s approach can be seen with the nation’s heightened participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The members of the SCO include China, Russia and all of the Central Asian republics excluding Turkmenistan, with both India and Pakistan joining in 2016. The SCO is a regional organization in which a range of economic, security, and ethnic concerns, including cyberspace polices, are seen as key for protecting the member states from “international norms of democracy and regime change.”\(^9\) The SCO has proven instrumental at a regional level for blending Russia and China’s perspectives on the destabilizing potential created by the spread of the Internet. Another avenue through which Russia has built strategic relationships is the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), cur-
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Currently comprised of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Created in 1992, this organization acts as an intergovernmental military alliance which serves as a counterpart to the NATO alliance. After the Arab Spring began in late 2010, the CSTO meetings have increasingly focused on cyber-related threats within Central Asia.10

Along with its work in building strategic alliances, Russia has also submitted proposals regarding authority over the Internet and cyber-related concerns to several organizations. To illustrate, in December 2012, Russia created proposals for a new set of International Telecommunications Regulations (ITRs) at the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) conference in Dubai. The main point of the proposal was to increasingly bring Internet governance supported by the United Nations, where nations would possess the control rather than private stakeholders.11 According to the proposal, web services would be required to develop the means for the Russian Secret Services to access any stored data.

In situations where telecommunication services are utilized to undermine sovereignty or disturbed domestic affairs, this new system of jurisdiction would also limit the right of access to the Internet. Although 89 nations signed in favor of the Russian proposals, it resulted in a stalemate due to 55 countries that chose not to sign. Those that did not sign included the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Western European nations.12 Another example worth mentioning is the proposal submitted to the UN General Assembly on September 12, 2011, by Russia with China, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan for an International Code of Conduct for Information Security. The acceptance of this proposal would have not only increased governmental power over the Internet, but also eliminated the multi-stakeholder dimension.13 With

Figure 1: The Kremlin is currently trying to work with other countries such as China, India, and Pakistan in order to bring internet governance (Source: www.carnegiecouncil.org).
such active participation in multiple regional and international organizations, the Russian government has clearly demonstrated its mission to acquire greater control over the Internet.\textsuperscript{14}

**Description of Historical and Political Justification for Further Control**

When looking at the conflict over Internet freedom, one area of concern is the traditional lack of freedom and excess of persecution found in Russia. The concept of privacy is viewed differently in Russia than in Western society. Throughout history, the Kremlin has possessed the executive power to make decisions that have gone unchecked by outside forces such as Parliament, the media, and the Internet. Scholars such as Richard Pipes have written on how Russia’s lack of freedom is due to the influence of centuries of Mongol occupation, which itself functioned under an unrestrained executive power.\textsuperscript{15} Furthermore, during the Soviet era, a hatred for capitalistic and open markets developed a popular sense of animosity that only worsened after the failure of political and economic reforms under Gorbachev.\textsuperscript{16} Thus, from the Russian perspective both today as well as throughout history, the context of privacy and freedom of speech is not and has not been seen as a fundamental right. This complicated framework of freedom is an influential factor regarding the Russian government wanting increased jurisdiction over the Internet.

Corruption within Russia’s government is another reason why the government is adamant about securing as much command as possible over the Internet. The Internet can be both used and abused for political purposes. By maintaining regulatory oversight of Internet content within the country, Russian authorities can reduce threats conjured up by political opponents. Additionally, since those who own the provider and content-generating companies are often oligarchs who conduct business with the Kremlin, the integrity of the confidentiality available in the Internet operations in Russia is most likely to stay repressed. Such relationships serve as the first line of defense for the state against the risk of democratization.\textsuperscript{17} Accordingly, nationalizing the Internet is mutually beneficial for the political officials and the cyber oligarchies dominating the Russian economy.

**The Justification for Further Control: Security Concerns**

One of the main rational arguments supporting Russia’s work on fortifying jurisdiction over the Internet is that Russia feels threatened in social, security, and economic sectors. Since preserving the state is a significant concern for the Russian authorities, obtaining as much influence as possible over the Internet is a crucial must. The government’s fear of a rebellion sparked by cyber-related activity is partly why Russia has sought greater authority over the Internet.\textsuperscript{18} The Arab Spring demonstrated the effectiveness of social media outlets inspiring revolutions and overthrowing repressive governments. These activities raised the level of concern for Russian government officials regarding the power of the Internet. A recent mobilization of Russian Internet users who become protestors and demonstrators has further heightened the concern.\textsuperscript{19} An example of Russian mobilization that has occurred largely due to the Internet and social networking sites is the Blue Buckets Society, a movement focused on combatting police abuses made on highways.\textsuperscript{20} Movements like this are a clear threat to Moscow and thus spur the government to increase Internet control.

Russia is also striving to gain more control over the Internet thanks to pressure it feels from recent actions taken by Western nations. Such actions that appear to threaten Russia’s core
strategic interests include NATO expansion. In 2008, NATO expressed interest in allowing Georgia and Ukraine to join, and although this did not begin the formal process leading to the membership of those nations, the statement supporting that goal was made.\textsuperscript{21} Since Georgia and Ukraine both share borders and have strong economic ties with Russia, the government viewed this action as being a potential threat to the state. Similarly, Russia has felt threatened by EU expansion in the form of the Eastern Partnership initiative.\textsuperscript{22} Moreover, the spread of Western values and promotion of democracy in Ukraine as well as other post-Soviet states has been viewed as a threat that Russia might be targeted next. This has been demonstrated in various ways, particularly through the funding of pro-Western organizations and individuals. For example, in December 2013, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Victoria Nuland, estimated that the United States had for the past 27 years invested over $5 billion in Ukraine in order to assist the nation in reaching “the future it deserves.”\textsuperscript{23} With such a noteworthy involvement in the evolvement of a post-Soviet buffer state of incredible tactical significance, Western nations such as the United States can accurately be seen as a threat to Russian interests.

Furthermore, the United States is viewed as possessing too much influence over cyberspace. Currently, the majority of the world uses applications and services produced in the United States, providing enormous leverage for American cyber-related businesses.\textsuperscript{24} For Russia, if the Internet becomes nationalized, then domestic companies will benefit from less competition and less information will likely spread outside of Russia. This assessment gained support within the government after events like the leakage of undisclosed information concerning U.S. government surveillance programs by Edward Snowden. Snowden’s actions “demonstrate the impact that can be inflicted by a single well-placed individual with wide network access.”\textsuperscript{25} Such demonstrations
of influence led Russian authorities to launch a campaign based off of the need to wield authority over the Internet, much like they already do with other facets of Russian life. By viewing the privacy policies implemented by transnational companies including Google, Facebook, and Twitter as a threat to the government’s digital sovereignty, Russia also sees such events as evidentiary support that cyberspace poses a danger for national security. This notion has fueled the Kremlin’s assumption that Western countries are able to assist in toppling undemocratic governments by utilizing the Internet to mobilize the masses against weak oppressors.

Nikolay Patrushev, the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, wrote, “there should be reasonable regulation in Russia, just as it is done in the United States, China and many other countries.” Although similar forms of regulation exist in countries such as the United States, the Western states prove less restrictive than their non-democratic counterparts such as Russia, China, and Turkey. For instance, in the majority of Western nations, law enforcement and intelligence agencies are required to obtain a court order prior to wiretapping, and the warrant must be disclosed to phone operators and Internet providers. In Russia, Federal Security Service (FSB) officers are not required by law to provide the warrant to anyone except their superiors. Consequently, telecommunication providers are unable to demand the FSB to show them any court order. Furthermore, Russia has threatened to ban Western technology firms such as Facebook, Skype, and Gmail due to situations classified under “anti-terror” data snooping laws passed in 2014. In the case of fellow authoritarian governments, Turkey has consistently cracked down on social media, blocking sites such as Twitter and YouTube prior to and during local elections in March 2014. This was when recordings were posted online that had allegedly insinuated the presence of corruption among the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s faction. Looking at the issue of Internet governance from the perspective of the Russian government, the repressive actions committed by other undemocratic governments provide a strong validation for strengthening Russia’s own power over cyberspace.

A Comparative Study of the Pros and Cons of Russia’s Actions

Although there are several blatant benefits for Russia’s control and actions regarding Internet governance, the consequences of these very same actions are long lasting and illustrate why Russia should not continue to strengthen its control over Internet activities. One might argue that if the state holds greater regulation online, it will strengthen economic ties with domestic companies involved with the Internet by eliminating much of the competition from foreign countries like the United States. While in theory an oligopoly over the cyber market appears ideal, in reality, blocking the presence of transnational competitors can lead to substantially stunted economic growth. Since a large part of economic growth occurs from innovations in science, technology, and business processes, having competition ensures that industries continually evolve and improve. Countries that require cyber-related technology and web services to be authorized by the government run the risk of stunting advancements in the products and services provided by the field of cyberspace. Thus, in the long-term, Russian profitability in this market is likely to suffer, as oligopolies do not have many business rivals to encourage competition and promote product improvement. This hurts both the Russian public as well as consumers and the government in the international arena, as the quality of the technologies available in other countries expands and surpasses those available in Russia’s cyber market.
"Kremlin"-ization of the Open Internet

The argument against the need for competition is that there are Russian equivalents and therefore foreign website applications are unnecessary. Examples include mail.ru, the Russian counterpart for Gmail, as well as RuTube, the Russian form of YouTube. People paid by those in Russia who are against business competition from web sources such as Facebook or Gmail often have connections with individuals in the government. There is a common practice of paying off officials to execute particular transactions or business affairs.

Another benefit Russia earns from fortifying its control online is the belief that it will help to protect Russia against the instigation of a rebellion or other form of threat against the state. This perspective fuels Russia’s desire to have larger regulation over the cyber data and information of its people and network community. As the popular Russian writer Viktor V. Yefeyev wisely stated, “On one hand, the Russian government says the Russian people are the best. On the other hand, it doesn’t trust the people.” This priority of using strengthened Internet censorship and surveillance is more for the protection of the state rather than the people.

The theoretical reward for protecting the public actually leads to several consequences for both the Russian government and Russian people. Amplified access would establish massed targets that could attract bad actors. For instance, if service providers implement such augmented access in an incorrect fashion, then the security of all of their users will be at risk of exploitation. Such access creates the risk of a negative impact on the functioning of many aspects of Russian economic, political, and public life if hackers or botnet herders proved successful in breaking into computer systems. Cyber attacks of such magnitude could result in disastrous damage. This scenario is similar to what almost occurred in the United States in 1997, with a proposal called the Clipper Chip. This proposal (which was eventually rejected) sought to require that all strong encryption systems possess government master keys. These keys would provide American law enforcement with the opportunity to gain access to encrypted communication. This danger is something that Russia may face if its law enforcement continues to have as much access to cyber data as they currently possess.

Another consequence to Russia gaining more control over the Internet is the additional censorship of Russian citizens. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, Russia is ranked as one of the world’s worst offenders for online oppression. This can inhibit potential partnerships that could form between the government and the Russia’s networked society. For instance, when Russia was experiencing damaging forest fires in 2010, people who were following Russian blogs and social media had evidence of the lack of response and/or accountability of the government. In response, platforms were created online to raise funds and organize groups of people interested in actually helping to put out the fires. Additionally, the Russian network society has created a crowdsourcing platform designed to map out all of the illegal online gambling sites. This platform was utilized by Russian law enforcement, thus assisting them in improving their effectiveness.

The significant rise in cases involving the intimidation and detention of bloggers and independent writers is a consequence of the increase in Internet governance by the state. With the presence of corruption evident in the Russian government, Russian authorities are able to utilize further control of the Internet to better target certain bloggers on Russian social media sites. According to a Data and Research Project conducted by the Committee to Protect Journalists, since 1992 there have been 56 journalists killed in Russia in which the motives have been confirmed. There is a high level of repression that takes place after expression of speech, making the Russian Internet a potentially dangerous place to write against the government. The Russian social media contributes to transparency and empowers the Russian network society, a group that the Kremlin would benefit more from operating with rather than censoring.
Conclusion

In order to heighten its control over the Internet, the Russian government has undertaken both domestic and international actions that have proven instrumental in achieving such a goal. Through a strategic blend of banning and censoring online material as well as nationwide surveillance, Russian law enforcement has acquired an authoritative mode that extends its realm of control over Russian cyberspace. Given the power of several of the pieces of legislation like Article 282 of the Russian Penal Code and the law establishing the “Single Register”, it can be concluded that Russia has been successful in attaining a legal method of censorship and surveillance. Multiple reasons, such as a different perspective on the definition of privacy as well as the desire for more protection of the state and stronger influence in international matters, help explain why the Russian government has felt the need to partake in such actions. Such motives span economic, political, and social spheres of influence.

Internet regulation is supported by the rational arguments related to the country’s security and political concerns. By applying internal, regional, and international approaches over Internet affairs, Russia has not only strengthened relationships with specific nations, but has also increased its involvement with organizations that work on cyber-related issues. There is a cost, however, for its actions. Continued regulations could increase the risk of hacked information, decrease economic competition, and harm industries like journalism. Taking into account both the costs and rewards that develop from Russia’s actions, it can be established that the impact of Russia’s work on both the general public as well as economic sectors does not provide as many long-term benefits as may be presumed. The consequences the Russian people and government must face for the actions committed to obtain greater cyber control far outweigh the benefits.

Endnotes


3. DPI is extraordinarily powerful as it is a way to inspect data packets that are transmitted from one computer to another over a network. This filtering enables the users to discover, distinguish, classify, reroute, or prohibit Internet traffic. In simple terms, it allows the state to view all of their citizens’ Internet traffic and read, copy or even alter emails and webpages. This adoption came as an international surprise, as Russian government officials had claimed for years that Russia would not adopt the Chinese and Central Asian approaches to Internet censorship. See Davidoff, Victor. “An Internet Censorship Law Right Out of ‘1984’” Editorial. The Moscow Times [Moscow] 27 Apr. 2014: n. pag. The Moscow Times, 27 Apr. 2014. Web. 9 July 2015. <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/an-internet-censorship-law-right-out-of-1984/498982.html>.


8. When it comes to collecting the data, SORM is split into three distinct categories: SORM-1 system obtains all communications made by telephones and cell phones, SORM-2 system is used to intercept Internet traffic, and SORM-3 collects information from all of these forms of communication, thus providing long-term storage of all the information and data on subscribers. Ibid.


10. The current members of the CSTO include Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Ibid, 123-4.


12. Ibid.

14. A report by the European Council on Foreign Relations studied Russia and China’s ability to attract votes at the United Nations. It noted that since the late 1990s, while support for Russian positions has grown from about 50% to 76% in 2011, support for the United States and the European Union has fallen from over 70% and 75% to around 50% and 30%, respectively. Tytynkova, Andrei P. “Preserving Influence in a Changing World: Russia’s Grand Strategy.” Problems of Post-Communism 58, no. 1 (2011): 28, accessed July 13, 2015.

15. This can be seen also in the Chinese model of an emperor and “power vertical” i.e. that the executive power is unchecked. See Fighting for Internet Freedom: Cyberspace and Civil Liberties in Russia.

16. The most popular of these reforms was perestroika, failed to bring the Soviet economy lasting and systematic change as an economic reform program. This was mostly because perestroika was not adequately attempted, since although Gorbachev had introduced at least ten radical plans for economic reconstructing between 1985 and 1991, none were ever implemented. See Boettke, Peter J. Why Perestroika Failed: The Politics and Economics of Socialist Transformation. London: Routledge, 1993. Taylor & Francis Group, 2003. Web. 22 July 2015. http://www.liberarianismo.org/livros/pjbwfpf.pdf, 1-6.

17. Ibid.


23. Part of that investment has been through the National Endowment for Democracy, which is a nonprofit foundation that has funded over 60 projects that have been designed to foster a Ukrainian civil society. Additionally, the illegal overthrow of Ukraine’s democratically elected and pro-Russian president has demonstrated credible threat to Russia. See Ibid.


32. Fighting for Internet Freedom: Cyberspace and Civil Liberties in Russia.

33. Ibid.


35. Abelson et al., 7-9.

36. Hackers are individuals capable of breaking into a computer system via a communications network from a remote location; botnet herders are hackers who are able to gain partial control over a vast number of computers so that they may utilize them, without the owners’ knowledge, to collect information. Organized crime organizations often hire botnet hackers for purposes of profit. Today, this is a serious concern as up to millions of computers are at risk. See Tabansky, Lior. “Basic Concepts in Cyber Warfare.” Military and Strategic Affairs 3.1 (2011): 75-92. Print.

37. This proposal was abandoned due to the fact that if an attacker gained access to the law enforcement’s keys, they would have guaranteed access to all of the decrypted information. See Ibid, 1-3.


39. Fighting for Internet Freedom: Cyberspace and Civil Liberties in Russia.

40. Giles, Keir. “Russia’s Public Stance on Cyberspace Issues.”

41. This does not include the 24 journalists murdered in which the motives have remained unconfirmed. See Committee to Protect Journalists.
Although China is still considered a developing country by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, its shift in recent years from recipient to donor reveals new ambitions on behalf of the government in Beijing to challenge existing leaders on the world stage and possibly create a new world order in favor of Chinese ambitions. In Angola particularly, Chinese presence has helped to spur an economic boom in a country that has been faced with challenges of development and democratic representation following a nearly thirty-year civil war. Angolan economic development and democratization are closely intertwined, and the inability of one to adapt to changing forces could result in a total institutional collapse. While aid to Angola has been significant in restructuring some parts of the economy, it may be too soon to tell if Chinese aid to the region could be beneficial or detrimental to Angola’s development and democratization.

Since the end of the Civil in 2002, Angola, under the leadership of José dos Santos and the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) has seen an unprecedented surge in production of natural resources, particularly in oil production, which has allowed Angola to become Sub-Saharan’s third largest economy and leading oil producer. This recent economic boom comes after a nearly thirty-year civil war where the Eastern-block backed MPLA was challenged by the Western-supported rebels UNITA ( União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola), led by Jonas Savimbi. Despite the fact that Angola’s oil production has nearly tripled since 2002, Angola is still classified as an Least Developed Country (LCD), and poverty remains a looming issue in the state as many remain deprived of even the most basic human resources.

In response to the failing infrastructure and crippling poverty, the MPLA government has embarked on a national construction and development project in the poorest areas in Angola, while seeking help from international actors in providing financial assistance to these endeavors. Although the United Nations has attempted to maintain a presence in the area in order to promote democratization, Angola turned to emerging countries like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) to support their internal goals.

In the past decade, China has stepped up its role as a foreign investor and has created close economic ties with several African states. Despite China’s status as a developing economy, its sizeable impact in terms of geographic presence, population, and effect on the world econo-

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The Dilemma of Aid

my has made many countries treat China as a developed country. In the last twenty years, China has been able to remove over 400 million individuals out of poverty and has emerged as a model of development for other Third World countries that wish to boost their country’s own economy without threatening the established regime. Because of its enormous growth in the last twenty years alone, there has been a noticeable shift taking place in China: they are transitioning from a position as an aid recipient to an aid donor. To mark this transition, China has begun to extend its influence in the international arena by providing aid to various Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as well as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). In October 2000, China held its first summit for the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in order to promote and strengthen economic and development ties between China and the African continent. Although China had established relationships with several African countries before FOCAC’s inception, the intense China-African talks that occurred during the FOCAC Summit represented a change in dynamic with how China chose to approach the global stage. The meeting reflected the need of the “Global South” to establish a fair international order as well as address the challenge of economic globalization in developing countries. Following the meeting in October of 2000, the Social Development and Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, and the Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development were adopted. A 27-member Chinese committee was also established, and an agreement was reached to hold a ministerial conference every three years. The agreements made at this initial conference represented the need for dialogue to strengthen cooperation and safeguard common interests as developing countries. Currently, China supplies its aid through immigration of laborers, trade, foreign direct investment, and condition-free loans. While aid has diversified in the last decade, China has been able to set parameters that provide a strategic position towards socio-economic development within the country. The strategic cooperation that Angola has created with China in the form of the “aid for oil strategy” has been used to finance reconstruction within the state and assist in the development of infrastructure. In recent years, Angola has expressed its commitment to approaching infrastructure reform in order to boost other sectors of the economy by addressing healthcare, education, housing, and other concerns that face the local population. Though creation of the “Long Term Development Plan” by dos Santos and the MPLA aims at combating the low levels of education and health and high levels of poverty within the country, little has been done to focus on these aspects of economic development. Before China entered the race for strategic partnerships, Western countries exploited the rich resources Angola and Africa had to offer, causing many of these countries to suffer what is commonly known as the “resource curse.” Angola deeply depends on oil exports to sustain its economy, and countries are concerned that the revenues and aid from oil production will jeopardize Angola’s chances of significant development. This concern has been compounded by China’s relationship with Angola, where early in the relationship, China began to offer oil-backed credits in production, which appeared to act as a method of exploitation. These oil-backed credit lines continue to serve as an advantage for both China and Angola in what is referred to as the “Angola-mode” form of development. It is argued that Chinese involvement and oil exports actually hinder internal economic development in sectors that are not directly related to the manufacturing sector or the extraction of natural resources, suggesting that Angola will continue to divert resources to the production of oil. The oil-backed credit lines may help funds flow into...
infrastructure development, but nearly 70% of the projects contracted are to Chinese enterprises, raising concerns that Chinese laborers and companies are edging out local competition.\textsuperscript{24} Quality control has also been an issue for projects unsupported by oil-backed credit lines. Weak monitoring and enforcement of quality on behalf of both Angola and China has contributed to crumbling infrastructure and unstable foundations in many buildings, such as the Luanda Hospital, contracted to Chinese construction companies.\textsuperscript{25} To many, it appears that the Chinese presence in Angola does not support infrastructure but rather damages local development as the Chinese quest to secure resources as well as new market and investment opportunities neglects other sectors of the economy.\textsuperscript{26} However, it is also argued that this type of infrastructure-for-oil swap in fact allows Angola to better mobilize its resources for development, which will alleviate the bottleneck of development caused by Western priorities.\textsuperscript{27} The Angolan government understands that it must have infrastructure in order to sustain development; however, the poor construction in many of the infrastructure plans and the focus on the manufacturing oil suggests that neither Angola nor China care for economic development and are in fact focused on maintaining a façade of the “aid for oil strategy.”

Along with the concerns over the quality and intentions behind Chinese support, many worry that the mounting debt that comes from these aid projects will affect governance in the country as well as impact any future attempts in development.\textsuperscript{28} Although China puts limited restrictions on its condition-free loans, LDCs and HIPCs are more likely to mismanage debt and actually increase the amount of loans, which could then lead to unfavorable market conditions and financial catastrophes.\textsuperscript{29} Angola has taken steps to reduce its external debt, which has been met with some success in the last ten years, and the government has announced that it is on schedule to meet the deadline for these debt repayments; however, Angola’s dependence on the oil-export economy raises doubts in their ability to repay debts, as the amount of debt taken on will only continue to steadily increase as they accept more of China’s aid.\textsuperscript{30} While dos Santos and the MPLA have given reassurances that the aid they receive from China will contribute to growing the non-oil sectors, the fact remains that Angola largely depends on their natural resources for revenues, and this in turn could lead to negative consequences for the Angolan government. China already has a policy of non-interference in a country’s internal affairs attached to their aid. China’s intentions intentions are implicitly stated that it really only cares for resource security and the new market and investment opportunities.\textsuperscript{31} Although this suggests that China worries little about whether or not there is development in the area as long as the resources they need are secured, much could be at stake for China as well if the resource curse Angola experiences leads to internal conflict and a collapse of the regime.

When the civil war ended in 2002, the MPLA understood quite clearly that it would not be able to unite the country without some form of external intervention. Enticing Western donors and the UN to maximize their contributions to a state riddled with corruption and human rights violations makes Western donors less than willing to contribute to Angola’s reconstruction.\textsuperscript{32} In order to meet their development agenda, dos Santos and his MPLA backed supporters needed a donor who was willing to overlook the neopatrimonial corrupt practices that the Angolan elite practiced, especially in regards to the oil revenues in the country, for which opaqueness in oil accounts had NGOs and IGOs wondering where the billions of dollars in foreign revenue had disappeared. The arrival of China in Angola represented the beginning of a transition away from dependence on Western donors and towards governments willing to work with the Angolan government without overreaching internal affairs and disrupting the government’s own agenda. With the rising presence of China in Africa, its statecraft actually gives hope to many African leaders that their country’s economic development can grow without the need to liberalize
Much of the aid that has come from the Western-backed IMF, UN, or OECD has often had the emphasis on liberalization and its focus on democratic peace building.\textsuperscript{33} As a non-OECD country, however, China is able to operate outside the rules of engagement and dissent from this Western emphasis on liberal reconstruction, which may have proved indispensable in preserving Angolan domestic autonomy.\textsuperscript{35} Indeed, China’s active support for development in certain countries has often been for those in which human rights records remain below the world standard.\textsuperscript{36} The aid that accompanies Chinese presence on the continent often comes without any conditionalities, an issue countries like Angola had to face when dealing with Western donors where neo-liberal requirements that targeted fiscal discipline and regime reform were often attached to aid.\textsuperscript{37} These conditionalities often have the negative effect of risking post-war reconstruction by demanding the Angolan government to conform to challenging reforms.\textsuperscript{38} The problem Angola faces is that it wants aid, but dos Santos and his regime have no desire to implement the reforms attached to the aid. As such, China has been instrumental as an international partner willing to deal with the Angolan government and its instabilities. An emerging power, China stands as a new promise that economic reform and development does not need to come at the cost of regime change and democratic transformation.\textsuperscript{39} While this does not ensure democratization, a hands-off approach by a foreign power may be what is needed for Angola to form a government that can provide economic stability for its population.

The biggest challenge the dos Santos regime faces is maintaining regime stability in a war-torn country. Although dos Santos has been in power since 1979, the MPLA legitimacy had been low in many parts of the country during the civil war; and, even in the post-war era,
popularity for the regime has not improved. Angolan elites are hopeful that Chinese aid will help increase their legitimacy. Chinese policy experts in foreign aid are depended on to provide Angola a way in which development can be exchange for civil liberties and human rights, as well as provide an answer in being able to maintain the status quo through a political-economic model. In Angola, like other African countries, dos Santos and his elites have created an “institutional nucleus,” where survival and prosperity are based on a system of neopatrimonialism sustained by the country’s natural resources. The redistribution of political and material resources has managed to co-opt any opposition while tolerating some sense of political opposition that reinforcing the MPLA’s regime, yet their leadership highlights the blatant disregard for civil liberties, rule of law, and poverty alleviation within Angola. China seems to offer the answers that Angola needs in order to continue its unpopular regime, and despite efforts from Western donors to promote neo-liberal values within the state, Angola has instead adopted a more authoritarian stance. China has made it clear, however, that its policies will not interfere with the Angolan government; their partnership with Angola is merely an economically-based relationship that promotes trade, resource security, and development assistance – perhaps at the cost of democratization and liberalization within the government.

China’s presence in Angola seems to have diverse effects on the country as a whole. The adopted “Angola-mode” aid for oil strategy has helped Angola become the fastest growing economy amongst developing countries from 2001-2010, with nearly 11.1% average growth in GDP. This unprecedented amount of growth seems to offer hope to the war-torn country, and Chinese aid would only appear to improve Angola’s stance as an LDC. Indeed, there seems to be a growing number of international figures that would prefer to forgo the conditionalities that have defined Western aid. Rising economic powers like China show they are more willing to allocate material and political support to post-conflict states unconditionally, in order to acquire the resources it needs. The West has had a disappointing record with democratizing previously authoritarian or illiberal regimes, suggesting that development doesn’t always arise from democratization. Angola itself provides an example of a different process of reconstruction where a non-democratic regime defines reconstruction in their post-war society. Liberalization and liberal agendas supported by the West are too expensive for poor and post-war states, suggesting these countries need development before any sort of democratization can take place. China’s insistence on aid for oil does not suggest Angola will democratize anytime soon, despite the lingering presence of Western influence, but the focus instead should be on economic development.

Scholars argue that the long-term disasters of Chinese presence in Angola can outweigh the apparent short-term benefits of infrastructure support for economic development. Ignoring the policies practiced by the current Angolan government can eventually reverse the progress and prosperities, hindering any plans for reconstruction in the long term. It is quite clear that China has no intentions of changing the regime within Angola, and its presence as a non-democratic state may give Angola the proof it needs to continue its authoritarian regime. Even so, Chinese aid seems to have little impact on the economic development aside from the oil sector, and increasing dependence on oil production could be disastrous for Angola in the future. The exploitation of natural resources can lead to domestic unrest and armed conflict if Angola continues its “Angola-mode” development. China may provide the means of infrastructure development, but it is up to the discretion of the Angolan government for how these resources are distributed, and if a degree of neopatrimonialism still persists among the elite and China remains passive, then these resources may be useless in development.
China’s significant presence in Angola is barely older than a decade, and it could be too soon to tell what the actual effect of China’s presence on the local economy and democratization will be in Angola. It is true that their arrival on the African continent brings with it a new hope in development, but the continued dependence on resources also brings new challenges. While Angola has made great strides to appeal to foreign investors in order to obtain aid for internal reconstruction, the dubious nature of the government has many ‘democratic’ Western nations pulling away and has given potential ‘non-democratic’ governments a stake in Angola’s future. The neo-liberal approach has had a failing record, and perhaps it is the Chinese that can offer an answer to Angola’s problems. However, without proper utilization of Chinese aid, these new opportunities could negate long-term prosperity, and Angola could face more problems in the future.

Endnotes
2. Ibid., pg. 290
4. de Oliveira, “Illiberal Peacebuilding in Angola,” pg. 290
5. Kiala, “China–Angola aid relations: strategic cooperation for development?” pg. 316
6. Ibid., pg. 317
14. Ibid., pg. 85
15. Kiala, “China–Angola aid relations: strategic cooperation for development?” pg. 316
16. McCormick, Dorothy, “China & India as Africa’s New Donors: The Impact of Aid on Development,” pg. 86
17. Kiala, “China–Angola aid relations: strategic cooperation for development?” pg. 320
18. de Oliveira, “Illiberal Peacebuilding in Angola,” pg. 243
20. Ibid.
21. McCormick, “China & India as Africa’s New Donors: The Impact of Aid on Development,” pg. 83
24. Kiala, “China–Angola aid relations: strategic cooperation for development?” pg. 316
25. de Oliveira, “Illiberal Peace Building in Angola,” pg. 294
26. Alden, “China in Africa,” pg. 48
29. Ibid., pg. 324
30. Ibid., pg. 324
32. de Oliveira, “Illiberal Peacebuilding in Angola,” pg. 299
34. de Oliveira, “Illiberal Peacebuilding in Angola,” pg. 308
35. Ibid., pg. 306
36. McCormick, “China & India as Africa’s New Donors: The Impact of Aid on Development,” pg. 85
37. Ibid., pg. 80
38. de Oliveira, “Illiberal Peacebuilding in Angola,” pg. 300
40. de Oliveira, “Illiberal Peacebuilding in Angola,” pg. 291
41. Ibid., pg. 299
42. Habiyaremye, “‘Angola-Mode’ Trade Deals and the Awakening of African Lion Economies,” pg. 637
43. de Oliveira, “Illiberal Peacebuilding in Angola,” pg. 305
44. Ibid., pg. 307
46. Habiyaremye, “‘Angola-Mode’ Trade Deals and the Awakening of African Lion Economies,” pg. 645
Introduction

The idea of accountability is increasingly becoming integrated into the dialogues of international development and humanitarian assistance organizations. When assessing this topic, there are a number of scholars and professionals working in the field of international development and crisis management who utilize the United Nations as a case study. This is due to the UN's historical 1945 establishment as a forum in which member states could collaborate, “to keep peace throughout the world…encourage respect for each other’s rights and freedoms... [and] be a [center] for harmonizing the actions of nations.” At its birth, the UN was intended to be an international governance institution, and this legacy has established its principles and practices as a model for other international organizations.

However, the organization’s history is not free from controversy, and there are cases of human rights violations conducted at the hands of UN peacekeepers in regions like Kosovo and East Timor. Cases such as these have called into question the nature of accountability in international development and its role in legitimizing international organizations. The UN’s status as an international governance organization accords it the responsibility of establishing normative behavior and practices. This paper examines the shortcomings in the UN’s response to the cholera outbreak in Haiti following the 2010 earthquake. Employing this case study, the paper then discusses the pressing need for greater downward accountability in international development work so that international organizations’ objectives may be fully realized. Due to its historical charters and treaties, the UN has the power to establish normative behavior in the field of international development; and the field’s current gap in downward accountability can begin to be remedied if the UN accepts responsibility for its role in the Haitian cholera outbreak.

Cholera Outbreak in Haiti and Shortcomings of the UN Response

In 2004, the UN Security Council resolution 1542 established the Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilization en Haiti (MINUSTAH), a peacekeeping mission aimed at restoring order in the aftermath of a coup that ousted then president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, from power. As a UN peacekeeping force, MINUSTAH is comprised of military and police personnel provided by about 50 of the member states, including Brazil, Canada, Philippines, and Kyrgyzstan to name a few.

On January 12, 2010 at 4:53 PM EST, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck about 10 miles...
away from Haiti’s capital Port-au-Prince. This natural disaster killed between 230,000 to 316,000 Haitians, injured 300,000 and displaced close to 1.5 million. The United Nations itself lost 96 of its peacekeeping soldiers who had been working in the country. As a result of the chaos and instability caused by the 2010 earthquake, the UN Security Council resolution 1908 increased the number of MINUSTAH forces operating in the nation from 6,940 military personnel and 2,211 police to support of up to 8,940 military personnel and 3,711 police.

Within ten months of the earthquake, 7,000 Haitians became infected with cholera by way of the Artibonite River. An investigation carried out by The Associated Press claimed that the epidemic most likely spread due to a sewage leak at a base for Nepalese MINUSTAH forces in Mirebalais, a town resting alongside a tributary of the Artibonite River. As epidemiologists began to confirm that the strain of cholera matched a strain that had been infecting the nation of Nepal, The Associated Press’ initial accusation gained credence. However, the UN was and remains hesitant to confirm the link between the negligence of its peacekeeping forces and the outbreak of this devastating epidemic. A pending lawsuit filed in the New York District Court by 5,000 individuals affected by the outbreak outlines the UN’s wrongdoings as such:

The UN did not adequately screen and treat personnel coming to Haiti from cholera stricken regions. It did not adequately maintain its sanitation facilities or safely manage waster disposal. It did not properly conduct water quality testing or maintain testing equipment. It did not take immediate corrective action in response to the cholera outbreak.

While the negligence of the Nepalese MINUSTAH forces are inherently inflammatory topics, the United Nations’ failure to acknowledge its own shortcomings and accept partial (if not all) responsibility in this calamity is unsettling and immoral. The international governance institution has made efforts to hedge the spread of the epidemic by distributing potable water and water purification tablets, utilizing radio stations to educate local populations on disease prevention, and providing latrines to the Artibonite Department. While these efforts are certainly meritorious, they are undercut by the UN’s simultaneous efforts to put distance between itself and the origins of the epidemic. Should the United Nations acknowledge their role in introducing cholera to Haiti and allowing the disease to continue to spread through its passive actions, the international governance institution can then take steps forward by offering reparations such as funding for proper water infrastructure in the Artibonite Valley. Rather than engage in dialogues in which it is critiqued, the United Nations has chosen to preserve its reputation as an institution that upholds the “dignity and worth of the human person” by distancing itself from the epidemic and offering minimal assistance.

The duplicitous and contradictory actions of the United Nations in handling the cholera outbreak in Haiti illuminate the complexities of a larger theme of accountability in international aid work. International organizations are accountable to multiple entities, including donors, other organizations operating within their field, and beneficiaries of their services and programming. The politics of the field usually place higher priority on accountability to donors because it is largely their resources that fund projects and keep the international organization operating. More often than not, accountability to beneficiaries becomes an afterthought, in part because international organizations may presume that beneficiaries’ objectives align with their own. Another factor that may be contributing to lack of accountability to beneficiaries is more reflective of the issues brought up by the cholera outbreak in Haiti. When missteps occur, international organizations may be disinclined to recognize their role in bringing harm to beneficiaries because they believe it will disintegrate their credibility and lead to their own demise as donors withhold

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resources, beneficiaries refuse their help, and other international organizations take their place. However, there are greater pitfalls at stake should international organizations, especially the UN, continue to neglect downward accountability, or accountability to beneficiaries. Should international organizations cause harm and not accept responsibility, the missions and ideologies they uphold will become invalid. Looking back at the case study, the United Nations states that it upholds a set of humanitarian principles that include doing no or minimal harm when carrying out projects. As discussed before, the United Nations holds a critical position in international aid work and has the power to establish normative practices. In refusing to recognize its role in activating the cholera outbreak in Haiti, the UN is perpetuating contradictory business practices and a lack of downward accountability. The UN is violating its own principles as well as the human right to clean water and sanitation as stipulated by international law.

Defining Accountability: Reconciling Aspirations with Realpolitik

For the purposes of this paper, an international organization has achieved accountability when it, “recognizes that it has made a promise to do something and accepted a moral and legal responsibility to do its best to fulfill that promise.” Should the organization fall short of its moral and legal responsibilities, it has the obligation to acknowledge its limitations so that all actors involved may move forward by determining the appropriate actions to amend the situation while considering lessons learned. International organizations’ accountability is separated into three levels—upward: the donor public, the media, taxpayers, ministers, parliaments, and other powerful public sector agencies who determine international aid policy; lateral: the common standards agreed by agencies; and downward: the beneficiaries of services and/or programming.

In theory, the objectives of all three levels should be granted equal weight when international organizations craft policy and programming. In reality, “international organizations are political creatures, set up by political actors for political reasons and in order to carry out political tasks.” The realpolitik of international organization accountability is that donors possess the resources to set policy into action. Their objectives are too often out of touch with the needs of beneficiaries and it is this juxtaposition that can impede sustainable development or appropriate recovery. The voices of beneficiaries become lost as their needs are dictated to them through the services and aid they receive. This notion of downward accountability negligence is bolstered by a survey conducted by Schmitz, Raggo and Bruno-van Vijfeijken in which they found that there is, “a gap between the rhetorical commitment to downward accountability and a persistent emphasis on financial accounting and donors.” The structure of their questions revealed that while there has been a normative shift towards considering the voices of beneficiaries, there have been few mechanisms put into place that ensure beneficiaries are involved in determining policy and programming; there are also few organizations that have methods of determining whether beneficiaries define these aid projects as useful and successful.

This widespread gap in downward accountability is a point of critical concern when harm is done at the hands of international organizations. As illuminated by the aforementioned survey, international organizations prioritize upward accountability and beneficiaries remain largely voiceless in the situation. Should missteps occur, beneficiaries do not have the capacity to express their grievances and upward accountability can prevent international organizations from acknowledging they have done harm because their credibility and funding (and consequently their existence) will be at stake.

In the case of the cholera outbreak in Haiti, it can be argued that the United Nations is reluctant to accept responsibility because the nature of the misstep will undermine the prin-
Gaps in Downward Accountability

The principles the organization upholds. However, there is something larger at stake should downward accountability to the affected Haitian people continue to be neglected. An international organization effectively trades accountability for support; by making itself accountable to the expectations of particular stakeholders, an international organization garners those stakeholders’ continued support. In neglecting downward accountability, the United Nations is sacrificing the support of the Haitian people—an outcome manifested in the fact that a group of nearly 1,500 Haitian cholera victims have filed a lawsuit against the UN.

Not Just a Blame Game: The Importance of Downward Accountability

There are competing arguments labeling the extensive work of epidemiologists, the reporting of journalists, and the calls for accountability by advocacy groups and academics as an unnecessary “blame game” that detracts from cholera response efforts. Others, including the United States Department of Justice, argue that because of the nature of the United Nations’ work and its treaties and charters, the international organization enjoys “absolute immunity.” As an international governance institution, the United Nations is expected to respond to any and all conflicts and natural disasters. It is expected to restore peace and stability to the area, and often complex situations warrant complex solutions. It is by this logic that the “absolute immunity” argument builds cogency.

However, in contaminating the water supply of millions of people and in introducing a strain of cholera that has affected 530,000 Haitians and killed 7,000 by April 2012, the United Nations violated these peoples’ right to water and ultimately their right to life. Arguments proposing that the UN possess “absolute immunity” because of its historical treaties and charters do not consider the fact that there are multiple instances where the UN’s charter states that the organization’s mission is to uphold human rights. The preamble to the UN charter states, “the people of the United Nations determined to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,” while Article 1 states the United Nations’ purpose is “to develop friendly relations among nations.
based on respect for the principle of equal rights.”

Declarations to prioritize human rights are found not only in the beginning of the charter, but they are also scattered throughout the document. The reiteration of this idea bolsters the notion that the respect and promotion of human rights is a primary objective of the United Nations. It is difficult, arguably impossible, for an organization whose primary objective is protecting human rights to be “absolutely immune” from being held responsible for human rights violations. While it can be argued that accepting fault in these situations will undermine international organizations’ credibility, not accepting fault is more detrimental to the future of the international organization because it will negatively affect the relationship between itself and the beneficiaries. International organizations will be met with resistance in the areas they are working, thereby making programming ineffective and ultimately wasting the resource of donors. There are also lateral implications because the legacy of missteps can cause beneficiaries to be distrustful of other international organizations in an effort to protect themselves from further harm.

Additional reasons why it is imperative for the United Nations to acknowledge its role in the Haitian cholera outbreak and establish downward accountability include the legacy of the HIV/AIDS stigma and the UN’s obligation as a leader in the field of international work to be a proponent of normative moral behavior in word and action. Neglecting to provide a definitive cause for the Haitian cholera outbreak will prove detrimental to social and emotional development of the Haitian people. If the UN refuses to inform the international community of its faults, the stigma of another disease will be attributed to the people of this nation. The Haitian people have been disempowered in the past when they bore the weight of the HIV/AIDS stigma. At the hands of the CDC, Haitians were deemed a “high-risk” group as carriers of the immunodeficiency disease until 1985. In being associated with the spread of the global pandemic, Haitians faced social prejudice as well as difficulty acquiring proper healthcare treatment because they were deemed inevitable victims of the disease. The legacy of disempowerment and victimization during this period could be seen as one motivating factor behind the Haitian families’ decision to sue the UN. Haitians have suffered under the stigma of one epidemic and refuse to be cited as the cause of another; the HIV/AIDS stigma has been one factor holding Haiti’s development back and allowing history to repeat itself is unwise.

Arguably the most critical reason for the UN to practice downward accountability also cites the nature of the UN’s work and its historical treaties and charters. The 1945 establishment of the United Nations as the world’s foremost international governance institution bestows on it the obligation to maintain morally sound business practices so that it may lead the field by example. As mentioned multiple times throughout this paper, the UN has the power to shape normative behavior in the field along with other key players like the International Federation of the Red Cross/Red Crescent and NATO. Not only is the credibility of the United Nations at stake, but should the gap in downward accountability remain the norm, the entire field of international aid and crisis response will come to a stalemate. Policy and programming decisions will continue to neglect the objectives of beneficiaries, mistakes will continue to be made, and beneficiaries will foster a culture of distrust thereby preventing program objectives from being fully realized. The ripple effects of the UN cholera outbreak can still be prevented if the UN accepts responsibility for the outbreak, thereby reinforcing the practice of downward accountability.

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The United Nations stands at a critical juncture in which it can decide to practice downward accountability by accepting responsibility in the Haitian cholera outbreak and compen-
sating the families of cholera victims. Neglecting to do so will prove detrimental to the United Nations as well as the entire field of international development and crisis response. The United Nations has the power to establish normative behavior in the field, and continuing to neglect downward accountability can potentially result in distrust among beneficiaries as well as ineffective programming and policies.

To prevent these outcomes, the Obama administration should place pressure on the Justice Department to revoke its statement that the United Nations possesses “absolute immunity” and call for a trial to occur. Upward accountability is a common practice of the UN, and a call for a trial by one of its most powerful member states may be effective. Similarly, if organizations like the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Cross Societies (IFRC) call for the trial, the UN will feel compelled by way of lateral accountability to change its stance on the topic. The UN has been negligent in Haiti and caused irreversible harm to many families in the nation. Downward accountability is key to repairing the relationship between the UN and the Haitian people so that all actors involved may move forward with development efforts.

Endnotes

6. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
25. Ibid.