DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES (DSCA): WHAT EMERGENCY MANAGERS NEED TO KNOW

By Larry A. Porter

B.Mus.Ed., June 1970, Lowell State College, MA
M.Ed., May 1988, University of Maine, Orono, ME

A Dissertation submitted to

the Faculty of
The School of Engineering and Applied Science
of The George Washington University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

16 May 2010

Dissertation directed by

John R. Harrald
Professor of Engineering Management

The school of Engineering and Applied Science of The George Washington University certifies that Larry A. Porter has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of 20 April 2009. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation.

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES (DSCA):
WHAT EMERGENCY MANAGERS NEED TO KNOW

Larry A. Porter

Dissertation Research Committee:

John R. Harrald, Professor of Engineering Management, Dissertation Director

Joseph A. Barbera, Associate Professor of Engineering Management and Systems Engineering, Committee Member

Marvine P. Hamner, Professorial Lecturer in Engineering, Committee Member

© Copyright 2010 by Larry A. Porter
All rights reserved

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my loving wife, Billie. She has been my editor and my rock, consistently urging me toward success.

Acknowledgements

Jack Harrald, Ph.D., and my secondary advisor and research committee member Dr. Joseph Barbera, M.D. guided me through the research process. I also thank Marvine Hamner, D.Sc., for her participation in my research committee, and Greg Shaw, D.Sc., for encouragement and participation in committee work. All are faculty of The George Washington University. Finally, I express my appreciation for encouragement toward this degree by Burt Clark, Ed.D., a friend at FEMA's National Emergency Training Center (NETC) in Emmitsburg, MD.

Many state emergency managers and Louisiana parish emergency managers, present and past, who I interviewed and surveyed during data gathering contributed to my research process. I continue to pray for the recovery of lives and property damaged by Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita, which afforded me, in the words of my advisor, "fertile research territory."

I also acknowledge and praise the efforts of the National Guards of the United States in their ongoing efforts toward disaster relief, in its many forms, in the states and territories across the nation, and the District of Columbia; and the efforts of the Department of Defense as it seeks to improve its readiness for the domestic disaster mission in time of great catastrophe.

Lastly, to the members of my family, church, and community who waited patiently as I put my life on part-time hold over the several years it has taken to bring this degree to fruition, I offer my thanks.

Abstract of Dissertation

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES (DSCA): WHAT EMERGENCY MANAGERS NEED TO KNOW

Unlike other nations around the world, where the national military has a central role in providing assistance to civilian communities in time of emergency of disaster, the active component of the United States military prefers a role of capable supporter in time of great domestic need. The Department of Defense (DOD) is a supporting agency to 14 of the Emergency Support Functions in the National Response Framework (NRF, January 2008), and a primary agency for the 15th ESF. The military performs these missions, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, utilizing its military assets and personnel as best it can, but is generally prohibited by DOD policy from purchasing non-military equipment. The U.S. military has been called to support duty many times over the years to assist people in time of great need. The military has the organization, the training and discipline, usable assets, and in some cases critical supplies that can be quickly and efficiently brought to bear on a disorganized environment that disasters frequently create. The process of requesting and properly integrating military support into a civilian environment, in times of disaster and emergency, however, has at times been fraught with misunderstanding, awkwardness, and error. State National Guard support is common in most states, but DOD showing up in support is a much rarer occurrence. Many emergency managers desiring military support do not have an adequate understanding of the correct requesting processes, or an adequate understanding of proper response integration or employment techniques, as different from National Guard support. The

research revealed a set of competencies, and a body of knowledge that should be incorporated into training classes or publications that the DOD could generate for working emergency managers, including first responders, and for students of emergency management. The qualitative research methods included case study (archive document review), interview, and survey.

Table of Contents

Dedication iv

Acknowledgements v

Abstract of Dissertation vi

Table of Contents viii

List of Figures xi

Glossary of Acronyms and Terms xii

Chapter One — Introduction 1

1.0 Introduction 1
1.1 Statement of the Research Problem, Background, and Research Objectives 4
1.2 Research Objectives 11
1.3 The Importance of the Study 18
1.4 The Research Question and Sub-questions 21
1.5 Variables and Relationships 22
1.6 Scope… 23
1.7 Assumptions 24
1.8 Delimitations and Limitations 24
1.9 Dissertation Overview 25

Chapter Two — Literature Review 29

2.0 Introduction 29
2.1 Historical Background 29
2.2 Current Literature 36
2.3 Summary of the Literature Review 57

Chapter Three — Research Methodology 59

3.0 Introduction 59
3.1 The Research Environment 59
3.2 Qualitative Research Data Gathering Methodology 60
3.3 Interview Subject Selection Criteria 63
3.4 The Invitation to Participate in the Interview Research 64
3.5 Informed Consent 65
3.6 The Structured Interview Instrument 65
3.7 Interview Data: Data Processing and Analytic Methodology 67
3.8 The Survey Methodology and Subject Selection Criteria 68

3.9 The Invitation to Participate in the Survey Research 69
3.10 The Survey Instrument 70
3.11 Survey Data: Data Processing and Analytic Methodology 72
3.12 Aggregating and Analyzing the Research Data 74
3.13 Approval of the Research Design 75

Chapter Four — The Research Experience 76

4.1 Preparation for Conducting the Research 76
4.2 The Interview Experience 79
4.3 The Survey Experience 81

Chapter Five — Research Results 85

5.1 Research Size 85
5.2 Results of the Interviews 85
5.3 Summary of the Interviews 98
5.4 Difficulties with Completing the Interview Schedule 101
5.5 Long Answer Responses From the Interviews 102
5.6 Survey Returns 104
5.7 Results of the Surveys 106
5.8 Summary of the Surveys 112
5.9 Difficulties With Completing the Surveys 116
5.10 What Should Emergency Managers Know About the Military? 116
5.11 Principal Focus of the Research I 118
5.12 Principal Focus of the Research II 119
5.13 Long Answer Responses From the Surveys 121
5.14 Comparison of Data Between Interview Results and Survey Results 126

Chapter Six — Discussion and Conclusions 127

6.1 Validity of the Research 127
6.2 Study Limitations 128
6.3 Research Venues 129
6.4 Arrival of DOD Military Support 130
6.5 Military Coordination 130
6.6 Employing the Military for Response; Requesting Military Support 131
6.7 Differences Between Employing NG and DOD Support 131
6.8 Duration of Support 132
6.9 Success in Achieving the Research Objectives 133
6.10 Improvements by the DOD in Domestic Support in Recent Years 134
6.11 Recommendations 136
6.12 Recommendations for Further Research 141
6.13 Final Thoughts by the Researcher 144

References 146

Appendices 155

Appendix A — Data Collection Tools 156
Tab A Letter of Invitation to Participate in the Interview 156
Tab B Questions for Structured Interview 158
Tab C1 Letter of Invitation to Participate in the Survey 161
Tab C2 Letter of Invitation to Participate in the Survey 163
– Email Version (followed by a mailed survey)
Tab C3 Letter of Invitation to Participate in the Survey 165
– Email Only (no mailed survey)
Tab D1 Survey Questionnaire – IRB-approved Original 167
Tab D2 Survey Questionnaire -- Mail Version (Modified) 171
Tab D3 Survey Questionnaire – Email Version 178

Appendix B — Informed Consent Form 183

Appendix C — Interview Data 186

Appendix D — Survey Data 211

List of Figures

Figure 1 Components of Data Analysis: Interactive Model..... 68

Figure 2 Interview Subject Job Experience..... 86

Figure 3 Survey Questions About an Understanding of Military Forces..... 107

Figure 4 National Guard Adjutant General Roles 108

Glossary of Acronyms and Terms

AAR	After Action Report
AC	Active Component. Service components on active duty, e.g., Army, Navy, etc., as differentiated from the Reserve Component (RC)
AFDD	Air Force Doctrine Document
AFI	Air Force Instruction
ANG	Air National Guard
AR	Army Regulation, a Department of the Army policy and organization publication
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARNORTH	U.S. Army North, a headquarters unit, formerly Fifth Army, now assigned under U.S. NORTHCOM with a domestic disaster response mission
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, [High Yield] Explosive
CD	Civil Defense
CGSC	Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CLAMO	Center for Law and Military Operations, Charlottesville, VA Affiliated with the U.S. Army's Judge Advocate General School
CMH	Center for Military History
CONPLAN	Concept Plan

CRS	Congressional Research Service
DA PAM	Department of the Army Pamphlet
DCO	Defense Coordinating Officer
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DOD Military	The author intends this phrase to mean active component military units as differentiated from National Guard military forces.
DODD	Department of Defense Directive. A DOD Directive establishes policy and assigns responsibilities. Subordinate services (Army, Navy, etc.) issue service-specific policy and doctrine.
Domestic	In this study, "domestic" will refer to the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, U.S. Territories (American Samoa, Guam, and the Virgin Islands), and U.S. possessions and protectorates (the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands)
DOMS	The Director Of Military Support. The Department of Defense (DOD) has given the Secretary of the Army Executive Agency authority for Military Assistance to Civil Authority (MACA). The Secretary of the Army has designated the DOMS as the Action Agent for planning and executing MACA. Such authority gives the DOMS the ability to task DOD components, on behalf of the

	Secretary of Defense, to plan and to commit DOD resources in response to requests for MACA. (Note: The use of the acronym "DOMS" may also refer to the operational office under the Director.) ** **See also JDOMS**
DSCA	Defense Support of Civil Authorities, formerly called MACA
EM	Emergency Management; Emergency Manager(s)
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact, a program of support involving state-to-state mutual aid. (Website: www.emacweb.org)
EMD	Emergency Management Director (Parish – PEMD, State – SEMD)
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EPLO	Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (DODD 3025.16 establishes policy for EPLOs. Each service manages its own pool of EPLOs.)
ESF	Emergency Support Function, as described in federal plans (FRP, NRP, and NRF)
FCO	Federal Coordinating Officer
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FM	Field Manual, a Department of the Army doctrine publication
FOUO	For Official Use Only, a document classification indicating that the contents are not open to the public at large.

FRP	Federal Response Plan (published by FEMA in April 1992), superseded by the NRP
HD (or HLD)	Homeland Defense
HS (or HLS)	Homeland Security
Immediate Response	Under the provisions of the DODD 3025.15 (and DODD 3025.1) military commanders may authorize the use of military equipment and personnel to respond to a civilian authority's request for assistance to "save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage." Such employment of military assets is intended for short duration, emergency needs (DOD, 1997, 4).
HLD (or HD)	Homeland Defense
HLS (or HS)	Homeland Security
IAEM	International Association of Emergency Managers, an organization with a wide base of EM interest. (Website: www.iaem.com)
IRB	[The George Washington University] Institutional Review Board
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDOMS	Joint Department of Military Support, the revised organization of DOMS, now under the office of the Joint Staff J3, Operations **** See also DOMS**
JFSC	Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA
JPub	Joint Publication, usually under the auspices of the CJCS
LFA	Lead Federal Agency, a federal agency leading the response, as discussed in the FRP, NRP, and NRF.

LNO	Liaison Officer
MACA	Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (DOD publication DODD 3025.15), the primary guidance document for military assistance to civil authorities, including special support requests for civil disturbances, protection of key assets, response to civil emergencies, acts or threats of terrorism, and request for aid to civil law enforcement authorities (DOD, 1997).
MACDIS	Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (DOD publication DODD 3025.12), governs planning and response by DOD components in time of civil disturbances and disorder.
Milestone Event	A disaster event in which the DOD was tasked to respond which either required significant assets, or from which the DOD learned lessons ultimately affecting policy, doctrine, or organizational structure.
MSCA	Military Support to Civil Authorities (DOD publication DODD 3025.1), governs planning and response by DOD components in time of disaster-related civil emergencies.
MSCLEA	Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Authorities. (DOD publication DODD 5525.5) Governs DOD policies and procedures, and assigns responsibilities to be followed with respect to support provided to Federal, State, and local civilian law enforcement efforts.

MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War, while war encompasses large-scale, sustained combat operations, MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities to achieve national objectives or to protect national interests. MOOTW operations include arms control, combating terrorism, DOD support to counterdrug operations, enforcement of sanctions/maritime intercept operations, enforcing exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities, nation assistance/support to counterinsurgency, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations, protection of shipping, recovery operations, show of force operations, strikes and raids, and support to insurgency. (Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, 1995, iv)
NEMA	National Emergency Management Association, the professional association of and for emergency management directors from all 50 states, eight territories and the District of Columbia. The primary purpose of NEMA is to be the source of information, support and expertise for emergency management professionals at all levels of government and the private sector who prepare for, mitigate, respond to, recover from and provide products and services for all emergencies, disasters and threats to the nation's security. (Website: www.nemaweb.org)

NG	National Guard
NG-CST	National Guard Civil Support Team, a response unit organized to assess Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) effects of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) causes.
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NORAD	North American Air Defense Command
NORTHCOM	U. S. Northern Command, one of the DOD Unified Commands, given responsibility for certain geographic and/or mission areas. In NORTHCOM's case, the continental United States.
NRF	National Response Framework (published by DHS in January 2008)
NRP	National Response Plan (published by DHS in December 2004) Superseded by the NRF
OASD/HD&ASA	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs
OASD/RA (M&P)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs, Manpower and Personnel
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD/RA	Office of the Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs
PEMD	(Louisiana) Parish Emergency Management Director
POMSO	[National Guard] Plans, Operations, Military Support Officer (Now called Joint Domestic Operations Military Support officer)

RC	Reserve Component. Units/personnel in a part-time service status, e.g., Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, etc. This would include the National Guard.
SAD	State Active Duty, National Guard paid duty under state control
SAMS	School of Advanced Military Studies, (U.S. Army) Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS
SCO	State Coordinating Officer
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense
SEMD	State Emergency Management Director
USAF	United States Air Force
USAWC	U. S. Army War College
WMD	Weapon(s) of Mass Destruction

Chapter One — Introduction

"The U.S. military may be the planet's biggest hammer,
but not every problem is a nail" (Freedberg, 2005)

1.0 Introduction

In some respects the content of this thesis is a report on the post-Hurricane Katrina (and Rita) support received at the parish (county) level from the military (i.e., Department of Defense, as differing from National Guard on State Active Duty).

Although the United States military has come to the aid of the people of this nation many times in times of disaster and special needs, such aid is not a principal mission of the armed forces.[1] The predominant focus of the military is on warfighting:

> The core responsibility of the Department of Defense is to defend the United States from attack upon its territory at home and to secure its interests abroad (DOD, 2008, 6). National security and domestic resources may be at risk, and the Department must help respond to protect lives and national assets (DOD, 2008, 7).

Unlike other nations around the world, where the national military has a central role in providing assistance to civilian communities in time of disaster, the U.S. military maintains the role of capable supporter in time of domestic need. The Department of Defense (DOD) is a supporting agency to nearly all (14 of 15) Emergency Support Functions (ESF) under the National Response Framework (NRF), and a primary agency for the 15th: ESF #9, Search and Rescue (DHS, 2008). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has the lead, i.e., Primary Agency and ESF Coordinator, for ESF #3. The military performs these missions, utilizing its military assets and personnel according to its capabilities.

[1] Discourse in this dissertation makes a distinction between the National Guards of the States and Territories, and the Federal military—active component forces and their non-National Guard reserves. The distinction will be explained in the text.

With few exceptions, the military is prohibited by DOD policy from purchasing non-warfighting equipment or capabilities.[2] The current National Defense Strategy states:

> …the Department must also maintain the capacity to support civil authorities in times of national emergency such as in the wake of catastrophic natural and man-made disasters. The Department will continue to maintain consequence management capabilities and plan for their use to support government agencies. Effective execution of such assistance, especially amid simultaneous, multi-jurisdictional disasters, requires ever-closer working relationships with other departments and agencies, and at all levels of government. To help develop and cultivate these working relationships, the Department will continue to support the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is responsible for coordinating the Federal response to disasters. DOD must also reach out to non-governmental agencies and private sector entities that play a role in disaster response and recovery (DOD, 2008, 7).

The 2004 National Military Strategy reemphasizes this mission set:

> …our first priority is to protect the United States. Joint forces help to secure the United States from direct attack through military activities overseas, planning and execution of homeland defense and support to civil authorities….When directed, the Armed Forces provide military support to civil authorities, including capabilities to manage the consequences of an attack (DOD, 2004, 9-10).

Recognizing the wide distance between the civilian and military communities, and the reduction over the decades of widespread military service by citizens of this nation, it is not surprising that civilian leaders and emergency managers may have a limited understanding of the active component military and what the military can provide to civilian response efforts in time of need.

The military's principal focus, especially during the Cold War decades, has been on warfighting—predominantly overseas—with comparatively little effort expended on training or preparing troops and leaders to operate within the country's borders. The events of 11 September 2001, and especially changes in the federal government since that event—notably the creation of the Department of Homeland Security—have made for a significant shift in the philosophy of defense of the homeland and the military's role in

[2] Army policy is stated in "How The Army Runs," paragraph 22-5e: "DOD Components shall not procure or maintain supplies, materiel or equipment exclusively for providing DSCA unless set forth in law or directed by the Secretary of Defense."

support to homeland security and to civil support. The culminating event was the military's response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Many mistakes were made by military leaders and units unfamiliar with the domestic environment and civilian emergency management.

More recently, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita called for massive military support—greater than 50,000 National Guard and 22,000 Active Component military personnel—in response to dire civilian need (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006, 202). In many cases of DOD military (The use of the phrase "DOD military," in this dissertation, will refer to active component military personnel or forces, as differentiated from National Guard military personnel or forces) support to states and local communities, such aid was the first occurrence of military support in recent memory.

The purpose of the research was to determine what emergency managers need to know—education, training, briefings, exposure, exercises, processes, etc.—in order to effectively understand what they are getting when the DOD military shows up, and how to effectively integrate the assistance provided into the emergency response effort.

The quantification of this knowledge will facilitate an understanding not only by the civilian emergency management community, but also by the military community.

A retired U.S. Army National Guard (NG) colonel, the researcher's retirement assignment was as the National Guard Liaison Officer to FEMA headquarters in Washington, DC. Experience gained during several prior assignments had led the ARNG command and the officer assignments personnel to recommend him for the new assignment (May 2000). FEMA had been requesting the assignment of an officer for several years.

Informed opinions expressed in this dissertation are based on a NG officer history of work in the military support arena during assignments to the following:

1) Army National Guard (ARNG) headquarters divisions (1997–1999), as Executive Officer for the short-lived ARNG Military Support Division (NG-ARM), and then Deputy Division Chief for the ARNG Operations Division (NG-ARO), both of which were involved in the training of state POMSOs, and overwatched the work of NG personnel on SAD. NG-ARM and NG-ARO were closely involved in the standup of National Guard Civil Support Teams (NG-CST), which are trained to assess and report on domestic disasters possibly caused by CBRNE- or WMD-related events;

2) U.S. Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), which then became U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) in 1999, as NG Liaison Officer to the command; then to the standup of Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS), responsible for planning for military command and control issues and response following a WMD event in the U.S.; and

3) FEMA (2000–2003), as NG LNO working to round out military support to FEMA, educating FEMA and other audiences about FEMA and military response post-disaster, and responsible for the military support function in the FEMA Operations Center during events warranting the standup of the EOC.

1.1 Statement of the Research Problem, Background, and Research Objectives

1.1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

1.1.1.1 The Civilian Need

There is no existing description of the knowledge set, or competencies, that civilian emergency managers need to be familiar with on 1) how the active component military functions, as different from the state National Guard; 2) the kinds of aid possible by the

military; 3) how to specifically request aid from the military; and 4) methods of integration into the response in the event of disaster.

1.1.1.2 The Military Need

The explanation of a civilian knowledge set about military assistance to civil authorities would assist military commanders and planners on how to better train for and prepare for assistance to civilian disasters. There are limited guides or handbooks available to military personnel. In May of 2006, The U.S. Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), a component of the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), published document number 06-8, "Catastrophic Disaster Response Staff Officer's Handbook: Techniques and Procedures," a guide for military personnel performing civil support (USArmy, 2006b). The document has recently (2008) been declassified, and is now available for open distribution. The document carries the note: "This information was deemed of immediate value to forces engaged in the Global War on Terrorism and should not be necessarily construed as approved Army policy or doctrine." (USArmy, 2006b, ii) The document may be found at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/06-08/toc.asp (Accessed 25 Sep 08). There are virtually no informational texts available to the civilian emergency manager about military civil support. Barbara Schading's "A Civilian's Guide to the U.S. Military" comes close, but does not cover civil support operations by military forces (Schading, 2007).

1.1.2 Background

1.1.2.1 Military Response to Civilian Disasters

There have been many occasions where state[3] National Guard forces responded to requests for assistance by civil government and citizens in need in time of emergency and disaster. The occasion for the federal military to be requested for domestic support has been very rare; however, developments in civil support, beginning in 2008, by U.S. NORTHCOM, now include plans for training up to 20,000 troops in domestic disaster response (U.S. NORTHCOM, 2008).

1.1.2.2 Hurricane Andrew

Until Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (2005), the milestone event for domestic (see the Glossary / Acronyms and Definitions of Terms) federal military support during the last 15–20 years (1990–2008) was Hurricane Andrew (1992).

1.1.2.2.1 The Magnitude of Hurricane Andrew

Kate Hale, the Dade County, Florida, emergency manager, went before the national media with an emotional plea for assistance. She demanded "Where the hell is the cavalry on this one?" (McDonnell, 1993, 5). After prompting Governor Chiles to formally request them on August 27th (Day Three), President George H. W. Bush committed federal troops. That evening a 30–40 person logistics advance party departed for Florida. The next morning the first C-5A cargo plane landed at Homestead AFB. The June 1993 General Accounting Office (GAO) report, "DISASTER ASSISTANCE: DOD's Support for Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki and Typhoon Omar," indicated that

[3] Throughout this text, the use of the term "state" will refer to states and commonwealths (i.e., the 50 states), territories (Guam, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the U.S. Virgin Islands), or the District of Columbia.

> As of September 14,1992, DOD reported about 22,800 active-duty personnel in south Florida and Louisiana, 1,800 in Hawaii, and about 700 in Guam. National Guard forces were activated by each governor and played major roles in all four disaster areas. As of the same date, there were about 5,700 in Florida, 300 in Louisiana, 400 in Hawaii, and 27 in Guam. In addition, about 800 Army reservists volunteered for duty and assisted in South Florida (Hinton, 1993, 2).
>
> In total, the level of assistance provided by DOD and the Corps of Engineers from August 27 to October 21, 1992, consisted of a variety of humanitarian assistance services, to include (1) providing over 1 million Meals-Ready-To-Eat and serving an additional 900,000 meals, (2) providing medical care for 67,190 civilian patients, (3) establishing and operating four tent cities, (4) providing mass care for an average of 2,400 disaster victims a day, (5) moving over 100,000 tons of cargo by ground and air, (6) removing 6.2 million cubic yards of debris, and (7) repairing 98 damaged schools (Hinton, 1993, 22).

1.1.2.2.2 Why DOD?

Due to slow federal response assistance to citizen and community needs in south Florida after Hurricane Andrew,

> On August 27, 1992, the President [George H. W. Bush] directed greater DOD involvement because the situation called for a rapid response and only DOD had the resources (personnel and materiel) and transportation capability to do that. For example, DOD provided much of the food, water, sheltering, transportation, and medical care, even though the Federal Response Plan assigns those responsibilities to other agencies (Hinton, 1993, 15).

1.1.2.2.3 Military Purchasing Limitations

In accordance with long-standing DOD policy, with only specific special exceptions, all purchases and acquisitions by the Department of Defense must be for the sole purpose of supporting its warfighting capabilities. When disaster strikes, however, the military can and does come to the aid of Americans in need. Many times throughout the history of this nation the military has responded in non-warfighting support of civil government and agencies, sending its trained organizations and utilizing its military equipment to the best of its abilities for the tasks at hand. Military forces and equipment have responded to fill sandbags for shoring up levees, to fight wildfires, and to remove hurricane debris, to name just a few missions. When military supplies, e.g., MREs (Meals Ready to Eat) are used for disaster response, FEMA purchases these items.

1.1.2.2.4 Lessons Learned

The lessons learned by the military from participating in the response for Hurricane Andrew were many. Notably, during the standup of an ad hoc Task Force (TF Andrew), the DOD quickly learned that a large-scale active component military response to a domestic, non-warfighting event, was not something that military personnel were adequately prepared to do. In spite of the existence of published doctrine, notably Field Manual 100-19, Domestic Support Operations (USArmy, 1993), there was little training by common military units in Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA). MACA support is very different from warfighting, and from operations in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)—which include Peace Operations (Support to Diplomacy, i.e., peacemaking, peace building, and preventive diplomacy; Peacekeeping; and Peace Enforcement). Much of warfighting's operational and tactical control, training, and skills did not translate well to the domestic environment. In short, the military's conduct of support for Hurricane Andrew was rough at the outset, but improved quickly. A DOD "Manual for Civil Emergencies," DOD Manual 3025.1-M, was issued in June 1994, post-Hurricane Andrew support. The document "provides guidance for the preparation, coordination and execution of military support to civil authorities during civil emergencies within the United States, its territories, and possessions" (DOD, 1994).

1.1.2.3 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

The military was the most ready responder for Hurricane Katrina, and Rita which followed so quickly on the heels of Katrina:

> On August 30, 2005, the Deputy Secretary of Defense authorized the Joint Chiefs of Staff and USNORTHCOM to make available all necessary DoD resources to FEMA for relief efforts. To support this mission, USNORTHCOM established and activated JTF-Katrina to provide military forces. From August 30, 2005, to October 13, 2005, JTF-Katrina forces saved lives,

> minimized human suffering, and restored critical services in coordination with Federal, State, and local agencies (DOD-OIG, 2006, 5).
>
> The overall deployment of DoD assets in support of Hurricane Katrina disaster relief was the largest use of DoD military and civilian personnel performing a civil support mission in the continental United States. DoD Title 10 personnel provided the support to the primary Federal agencies that FEMA requested through the mission assignment process. Our review of DoD mission assignments, including DoD support to FEMA and civil authorities, showed that DoD effectively supported all 15 ESFs in the NRP during the disaster relief efforts (DOD-OIG, 2006, 7).

1.1.2.3.1 Requesting Military Support for Hurricane Andrew

Response by the DOD military to Hurricane Andrew was precipitated by direction from President George H.W. Bush to the Secretary of Defense. Active duty units then deployed to the disaster area. Military commanders directed units and troops to disperse and assist where needed. This process, "push" rather than "pull," that is, the military response was pushed out rather than as a result of local-to-state-to-federal requests, was contrary to the Federal Response Plan system of support.

1.1.2.3.2 Katrina response

The DOD military response to Hurricane Katrina was effected in a similar manner, contrary to the National Response Plan (NRP), in effect at that time. On seeing large-scale delay in getting aid to many people in need, President George W. Bush directed the Secretary of Defense to deploy DOD military support. Once again, the military pushed out in support, contrary to the NRP organized system of requests from local and state emergency managers up through FEMA for federal support.

> Lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina identified that USNORTHCOM did not coordinate with FEMA on using military assets according to their capabilities; did not coordinate deploying and integrating Title 10 forces with National Guard forces' capabilities; and did not explain the appropriate use of Title 10, Title 32, and State Active Duty forces (DOD-OIG, 2006, 8).

The quantity of military support provided to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita became the largest domestic deployment of the military (DOD and NG) since the Civil War. "The

Army committed more forces to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita relief than to any previous domestic disaster relief operation" (Ferguson, 2007).

1.1.3 The Louisiana Military Support Model

Normal military response to local communities, in the event of a disaster or other emergency, is usually in the form of state National Guard forces—frequently in a State Active Duty (SAD) work status. In Louisiana, the NG assigns a liaison officer (LNO) to the parish. In the case of the higher frequency disaster-prone parishes, the southernmost or coastal parishes, the assignment is singular—the parish gets its own LNO, whose domestic focus is entirely on the parish. For other parishes around the state, the LNO may have two or more parishes assigned.

The duties of the LNO include educating and informing the parish emergency management director (PEMD) and staff about the capabilities and readiness of the state NG to come to its aid. The LNO also becomes a key participant within the parish emergency management organization, participating in the organization's preparedness for disaster, including planning, exercises, and other events. The LNO is encouraged to train and exercise with the organization and to serve as a ready military advisor resource to the PEMD.

1.1.4 The Military's Domestic Support Mission

In this respect, with few exceptions among the states, state NG organizations are familiar with their domestic mission. And, having come to the aid of the people of their states many times over the years, the NG is fairly comfortable utilizing their military equipment in the performance of civilian-oriented tasks. Concomitantly, the people within the state are accustomed to these NG military personnel operating in their

communities. Local emergency managers are also fairly familiar with NG units performing these domestic missions. Having that history of operating domestically, the states' NG overall has a good understanding of the capabilities and limitations of what they can and cannot do legally.

Most DOD units, though, seldom train for a domestic mission. With certain exceptions, notably homeland security units and command and control headquarters and units assigned to NORTHCOM and ARNORTH, DOD units concentrate on training for the warfight.

DOD response to DSCA missions is usually on a special case basis, with missions requested through the office of the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS). The JDOMS validates and coordinates the request, providing advice to the SECDEF. Approval authority for all requests for support lies with the SECDEF.

1.2 Research Objectives.

The Proposed Research had Five Objectives:

1.2.1 Objective One: to examine the recent history (approximately 10–15 years) of Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) for domestic emergency response. (DSCA was formerly called MACA, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities. The updating of military doctrine and training publications lags behind the incorporation and use of the new term, however. The MACA policy is contained in DOD Directive 3025.15; [DOD, 1997].) More importantly, to examine in detail the recent (post-Hurricanes Katrina and Rita) quantity of military support. To interview state and County/Parish operational leaders about their experiences with National Guard and Active Component military support.

Document research essentially began with what the researcher came to understand was the start of the "modern era of emergency management:" the release of FEMA's new Federal Response Plan in April 1992. The Adams County Office of Emergency Management's article on the "History of FEMA," though, argues that "the modern era of emergency management began with the Civil Defense Act of 1950."[4]

Although widely coordinated, by the time that Hurricane Andrew appeared (August 1992), the plan had really not been thoroughly exercised on a real-world disaster. Added to the larger response by governmental aid in general, the military had its own problems. Readings, observations, and conversations with military and emergency management personnel disclosed that the overseas-focused warfighting, active component military, now operating in a domestic environment, led by essentially uninformed military leaders, was not very proficient at DSCA—in spite of lessons learned from Hurricane Andrew. The researcher examined reports, articles, and studies from civilian and military participants in this event, as well as other events of some size, for which the military (DOD or NG) responded to assist.

1.2.2 Objective Two: to describe the key issues in the current state of DSCA, including the current doctrine for training and use of the military and the processes for interface between civil authorities and the military in time of disaster.

1.2.2.1 Fifty-four Kingdoms

National Guard Bureau staff members, and Army National Guard and Air National Guard Headquarters staffs, are very aware that they have to deal with 54 distinct governmental entities, one in each of the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and the

[4] Website: www.co.adams.co.us/index.cfm?d=standard&b=1&c=20&s=99&p=219. Accessed: 16Mar07.

Territories of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. States are empowered by the U.S. Constitution to create and maintain state military organizations: "…reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress…." (U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, 1787). NG units responding within state borders, and under the serving status of State Active Duty (SAD), do so under the authority of state statutes and laws. Different states have different philosophies, different funding capabilities and procedures, and different histories of state NG service for disasters and emergencies. The governor of the state is the Commander in Chief of the state NG, and has absolute control (sometimes in coordination with the state legislature) over the decision to call units to state military duty.

1.2.2.2 First Military Responders

At the local and state level, the NG is usually the first military responder. In the event of need, outside of the provisions of Immediate Response, a local government official (e.g., the Mayor or a Fire Chief) may make a request to the Governor for activation of NG units for assistance. In most cases, according to various state statutes, the Governor must first declare a state of emergency. With over 4,000 units in over 2,800 communities, the NG is spread across the whole United States, including Puerto Rice, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam. Every NG unit and service member understands the additional service requirement to come to the aid of fellow citizens in time of great need. Such response, though, is fully at the expense of the state. (Unless the event is declared a Federal Emergency or Major Disaster and federal disaster assistance [Robert T. Stafford Disaster

Relief and Emergency Assistance Act] funds become available and reimburse state costs.)

1.2.2.3 Federal Military Assistance

The provisions of the tenets of Immediate Response are outlined in DOD Directive 3025.1, which describe the permissive situations where ANY military individual or unit, upon request by a local official, may respond in an emergency to "save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage" (DOD, 1993, Sec. D, Para. 5). Such support does not require permission by higher military headquarters, nor does it require obtaining a guarantee of reimbursement for costs incurred before responding (DOD, 1993). Otherwise federal military assistance must await the designation of the event as a Presidentially-declared Emergency or Major Disaster. Statute changes to Title 10, effective Fiscal Year 2000 (01 October 1999), now allow a Presidential Reserve Call-Up of up to 25,000 Federal Reserve Component (RC) personnel to respond to a Weapons of Mass Destruction event. This is the only possibility of domestic (non-warfighting) activation of federal RC personnel/units (other than use of RC units in Annual Training status). Under the provisions of the National Response Framework (NRF), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) leadership, the DOD, as one of 26 federal departments and agencies and the American Red Cross, must provide requested assistance (DHS, 2008). In certain situations, DOD provides assistance while assuming costs, but the majority of the time, reimbursement funds are provided under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (PL100-707, 1988). As signatory to the NRF, the DOD may decline support only when warfighting requirements take a higher precedence.

1.2.3 Objective Three: to determine specifically those competencies (i.e., training, education) needed by civil emergency managers and planners to better understand the National Guard and the Department of Defense services to identify and highlight existing military policies regarding DSCA.

1.2.3.1 Structured Interviews

The researcher requested of the Louisiana Director of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness a list of parishes that received DOD support post-Hurricane Katrina or Hurricane Rita. A set of structured interview questions was developed to be asked of parish emergency management directors, and a survey was prepared to be sent to all state emergency management directors. The purpose of the interviews was to determine the following: 1) Quantify an information set about what those managers were not aware of about the military prior to the event, then determine the information that those managers learned about the military as a result of receiving and integrating that military assistance; and 2) Determine what emergency managers would recommend be taught to their peers or prospective emergency managers about the military, to improve their readiness to receive future military support.

1.2.3.2 Survey of State Civil Emergency Managers

The survey was to be both mailed and emailed, and sent to all state, territory, and U.S. Possession Emergency Managers. The survey instrument sought to examine the level of knowledge and understanding about the NG, and about the federal military, possessed by civilian emergency managers at the state level—the point at which a request is made for support beyond the capabilities or assets within the state. All states now extensively use the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) for requesting

state-to-state Mutual Aid support. (See information on the EMAC website: www.emacweb.org.) The goal was to query these senior persons, who very likely would have a depth of experience and a history of events in their state, about their history of interaction with the military communities, and specifically what and how they learned about the military.

1.2.3.3 Emergency Management Training

As a result of the proliferation in recent years of emergency management academic courses and certificate and degree-granting programs in colleges and universities across the nation, members of the emergency management community are more frequently beginning new employment having been trained or educated about the field. Many emergency managers probably have had no direct experience with the military due to the relatively small numbers of people serving in the military in the recent past. It is probably a safe assumption that most do not even understand important differences between the NG (serving in a SAD status) and the DOD military.

1.2.3.4 Approval for Human Subject Research

The proposed research was approved by The George Washington University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) on 12 July 2007.

1.2.4 Objective Four: to address knowledge deficits, relative to instruction about the military for emergency managers, in current educational offerings.

1.2.4.1 Knowledge of the Military

Limited investigation of publicly available course syllabi showed that there is not sufficient educational content present about the military in many civilian courses of emergency management programs nationwide.

1.2.4.2 The Impact of FEMA's Higher Education Project

Since approximately 1995, through the efforts of FEMA, specifically B. Wayne Blanchard, Ph.D., at FEMA's Emergency Management Institute in Emmitsburg, MD, there has been a strong push for the development of emergency management instruction nationwide through FEMA's Higher Education Project. There is now a robust program of EM instruction at the National Emergency Training Center, a principal source of formal emergency management education and training. Few courses in the list, though, appear to directly or thoroughly address emergency management and military support. From about 7 programs nationwide in the early 1990s, there are now more than 150 programs of instruction nationwide, mostly on college campuses, offering certificates and degrees from associate to doctorate in emergency management. (Information on FEMA's Emergency Management Institute Higher Education Project can be found at http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/. The College List is at http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/collegelist/ [Accessed: 14 July 2008]). There are also many more education programs on college campuses across the nation as a result of Dr. Blanchard's efforts. Information about most of these programs is accessible through FEMA's internet site, with many program descriptions and syllabi accessible.

1.2.5 Objective Five: to examine the need for an education course in DSCA to familiarize civilian emergency managers about the military (and the military way of doing things) and inform them about military's capabilities for responding to domestic emergencies and disasters.

1.2.5.1 What Do Emergency Managers Want to Know About the Military?

Both interview and survey participants were to be asked their opinion of what should be instructed or briefed about the military in order to adequately prepare emergency managers to deal effectively with the military. A fully developed course could be used to educate civilian emergency management students, emergency management staff, or first responders about the military, i.e., its capabilities and procedures for coming to aid civilian emergency management in time of disaster or emergency. Many first responders taking courses for job progression and self improvement do so at the community college level, so the course would be oriented at the associate's degree level. Given the lack of emergency management education in the military, a similar course may also be of interest to the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) community as an additional course for ROTC students, or adapted for use in other military learning institutions.

1.2.5.2 Instruction About the Military

The inclusion of instruction about the military into emergency management training can only serve to improve the knowledge base of civilians, thus facilitating improved DSCA requests and integration of that support into the event response. Instruction about civilian emergency management for military personnel could also facilitate an improved methodology for DSCA by the military.

1.3 The Importance of the Study

1.3.1 The Decline in the Number of Military Veterans in Society's Leadership Positions

There has been a decline in the number of persons serving in the military since World War II—especially on Active Duty—and particularly after the initiation of the All-

Volunteer Force model of the U.S. military—and the elimination of the draft—many non-veteran emergency management personnel are unfamiliar with the military. The military remains a detached segment of society, and yet is tasked to be ready to assist in the event of great need in a domestic setting. Few former military persons have yet moved into the many power seats of government or the senior levels of state management. Military members serving in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are years out from participating in leadership positions in local government and higher political offices.

1.3.2 Civilian Knowledge of Military Capabilities

It can also be easily shown that military personnel lack a good functional understanding about operating domestically (see definition of "Domestic" in the Glossary of Acronyms and Terms) and on disaster missions. It is also continually apparent that civilian emergency managers, from the lowest levels to the highest levels within the states lack a functional understanding of the DOD military, its organization, operating doctrine and methods, and capabilities, unless they have had personal military experience or service time. The focus of the research was on questioning emergency managers about gaps in knowledge about the military machine, and how DOD forces can better be utilized for an emergency or disaster event. While there are several training/ educational courses available to government personnel, notably federal and state civilian and a small segment of the military, there is lesser training available to state and local emergency personnel or students of emergency management.

1.3.3 Time Frame

While there were several notable disastrous events and other occasions to call out the military in response to domestic events in the first half of the twentieth century worthy of

study, this research will concentrate on the military of post-World War Two. The most significant legislation written during the beginning of that era was the Civil Defense Act of 1950, which began to focus the efforts of the federal government—including the military—toward emergency and disaster response support to the states and territories. While the prime focus of effort was toward Civil Defense against threats of the Cold War, much of the documentation and training did relate to other, non-warfighting tasks of the supporting military. The Civil Defense Act of 1950 began to formalize operational policies of military assistance to civil authorities not related to war-related defense of the country. Remnants of the CD Act continue as foundations to military support policy (PL 81-920, 1951).

1.3.4 Influence From the Events of 11 September 2001 on the Selection of a Time Frame

It is impossible to ignore the United States' events of 11 September 2001 (9–11), and the many changes in laws, documentation, and focus by myriad components of government since that time. Although several years have passed since that disastrous day, much remains in flux. Many after-action reports have been released from that event, and much has been learned. What remains unaccomplished, however, are changes to doctrine and the resultant changes to training from examination of those reports. Much of the current focus is on the much wider arena of Homeland Security and Homeland Defense, of which all-hazards response is an integral part. Regardless of the lack of finality in changes to our government and to American society as a whole as a result of 9-11, a closure date for this research had to be selected, and the end of calendar year 2008 was chosen.

1.3.5 Contribution to the Body of Knowledge

Any improvement in disaster response is an improvement in the quality, safety, and preservation of life. The researcher proposes that the information written here, especially the proposed educational material, will be of interest to the emergency management field and to the Department of Homeland Security and to the Department of Defense. As stated before, it is also perceived that the military educational institutions will find value in understanding what civilian emergency managers and workers need to know about the military. Military leaders and unit members also need better education about domestic emergency management and the military's possible roles and operating processes in domestic emergency response. Results of the study may also be shared with principal military historians for reliability checks or for contribution to their libraries.

1.4 The Research Question and Sub-questions

1.4.1 Knowledge About the Military

What do emergency managers need to know about the military in order to effectively request and integrate military support into disaster response?

1.4.1.1 Do emergency managers need to be educated about military organizations and/or services, rank structure, capabilities, and operational methods?

1.4.1.2 Will instruction/education about the military benefit emergency managers, resulting in improved requests and/or use of the military in disaster response?

1.4.1.3 Does an emergency manager's prior military experience (i.e., service in the armed forces) benefits his/her performance in the job? Does a military background result in a state's use of National Guard and/or active component military assets more frequently than if an emergency manager has not served?

1.4.1.4 Did emergency managers who have experienced disasters that incorporated DOD military support gain knowledge about the military that, in retrospect, would have benefited them or improved the disaster response situation because they had been knowledgeable beforehand?

1.4.1.5 Can knowledgeable, experienced emergency managers quantify that body of knowledge or experience (referring to item 1.4.1.1 above)?

1.5 Variables and Relationships

1.5.1 Variables

There were six variables considered: 1) Emergency managers who have no prior service, and therefore have no firsthand knowledge about the military, 2) Emergency managers who have prior military service, 3) Emergency managers who have become knowledgeable about the military over time, 4) Disaster events that had no significant amount of military support, 5) Disaster events that had a significant amount of military support that went well, and 6) Disaster events that had a significant amount of military support that did not go well.

1.5.2 Relationships

Research will attempt to determine if: 1) Emergency managers who know about the military effectively request and integrate military support into disaster response—this will constitute a positive relationship; and 2) Emergency managers who do not know about the military do not effectively request and integrate military support into disaster response—this will constitute a negative relationship.

1.6 Scope

The scope of this research, also delineated by the limitations and delimitations below (paragraph 1.8), was focused on interviewing emergency managers who had experienced DOD support post-disaster. While there is a near continual flow of requests to DOD for DSCA support, particularly following any presidentially-declared disaster, there is no regular report nor central repository for DSCA activity. Thus it is not easily possible to determine where DOD support has been applied.

The occurrence of DOD support following Hurricane Andrew and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was well known, and in many respects well documented and reported. The research attempted to directly investigate firsthand knowledge of interaction between civil emergency managers and DOD units supporting post-Katrina (and Rita) disaster response events.

A query was made to the states affected by Hurricane Katrina. While there was a single occurrence of DOD support by a Naval Reserve Seabee battalion in one state (as an Immediate Response mission), only Louisiana received large amounts of DOD unit support, so the research was concentrated in that state alone.

The scope of research, then, was quite narrow, considering the vast numbers of county-level emergency managers across the nation; a number fewer than two dozen. It would be tenuous, then, to presume that data gathered and analysis conducted on that data would be representative of emergency management situations nationwide. The scope was narrow owing only in fact to the absence of other significant-scale situations: the causal event would have to have affected a multiple county area, and DOD units to have arrived

in support of that event. None existed during the past ten or so years, save Hurricane Katrina.

The scope of this research is, in essence, an examination of DOD assistance to a very large-scale disaster event.

1.7 Assumptions

1.7.1 Obtaining Interviews

It was assumed that sufficient personnel would be reachable from the pool of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita emergency management personnel and military personnel. Snowball referrals (one person leading to, or recommending another for interview) were highly likely.

1.7.2 Unclassified Documentation

It was assumed that all, or nearly all, documents associated with MACA and DSCA are unclassified and open source accessible. A very few documents were FOUO (For Official Use Only), and are not releasable in part or whole.

1.8 Delimitations and Limitations

1.8.1 Delimitations

The study concentrated on approximately the last decade and a half, i.e., roughly 1992 (publication of the Federal Response Plan in April 1992) through 2007 (response to the events of September 11th and major changes to the federal government, including the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, and response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita). Generally, the study focused on the military's non-warfighting assistance to civil authorities in support of emergency response in time of disaster. The study included the military's contributions during the development of the modern system of emergency

management, as promulgated by the FRP (FEMA, 1992), the NRP (DHS, 2004), and the NRF (DHS, 2008); and FEMA's use of the four principles or phases of emergency management (Preparedness, Response, Recovery, and Mitigation), and modern incident management—NIMS (the Incident Management System (IMS), the Incident Command System (ICS), and Unified Command (UC)).

1.8.2 Limitations

The research considered only domestic military response, i.e., National Guard (under State Active Duty status) and federal (DOD) military operations in the 50-plus States, Territories, Possessions, Protectorates, and Trusts. The DOD doctrinal and operational domain that DSCA falls into is Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). MOOTW focuses on "deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises" (DOD, 1995, I-1). Although the research concentrated on the operational arena of MOOTW, it did not consider Peace Operations (Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, Counterterrorism, etc.) or Civil Affairs, because they relate to non-domestic operations and to warfighting.

1.9 Dissertation Overview

This document is organized in conformity with dissertation guidance provided by The George Washington University (GWU) School of Engineering and Applied Sciences (SEAS) Dissertation Format Guidelines, published in February 2008.

The first chapter describes how the researcher came to be interested in the subject matter, military support. The researcher served both part-time service (M-Day, or mobilization day reservist, as they are called) and active duty National Guard service (Active Guard/Reserve, AGR, Title 10—federal active duty service. Title 10 service is

not the same as Title 32 service, nor as State Active Duty service. T10 NG service does not require or permit assignment to a NG unit, nor require weekend drills.)

Several military assignments put the researcher in direct proximity to NG domestic disaster response programs. The FEMA assignment involved work with active component disaster response programs (including work with the DOMS office), and distinct differences in processes, policies, and programs became apparent.

Chapter 1, then, lays the groundwork of describing how the NG and the DOD responds to disaster events; the NG continually, to many small, in-state disaster events; and the DOD on a small scale frequently, but in large scale only after catastrophes. When the researcher began his EM education and research efforts, the military support field was predominantly U.S. Army-based (under direction of the Army's Director of Military Support – DOMS), and the field was called Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA). During the mid 2000s, with the advent of U.S. NORTHCOM and continued moves in the U.S. military toward "jointness" (multi-service operations, i.e., Army, Navy, and Air Force, etc.), the mission was transferred to a joint command (Joint Director of Military Support – JDOMS), under U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the field is now called Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).

Chapter 1 also describes some of the research proposal background and research planning including research objectives and questions, and the basic elements of the proposed project. Chapter 1 concludes with a description of the delimitations and limitations—what the researcher attempted to stay away from.

The basic question is whether there are differences between the components (NG and DOD) and how they conduct the disaster response process at the local emergency

manager level—the county (or parish, in the case of Louisiana). If there are differences, recommendations will be made to what the local emergency manager should know in advance about DOD support.

Chapter 2, the literature review, investigates past and current documents describing programs, policies, and procedures for the military to provide support to the civilian community in time of disaster. The focus during document inquiry and review was on discerning differences between the NG's ways of conducting military support and the DOD's ways of providing support.

Since the DOD responds in large scale only when requested for a significant need, there are principally two milestone events to consider: Hurricane Andrew (1992) and Hurricane Katrina (2005). Since Hurricane Rita affected some of the same geography soon after Katrina, many times the researcher includes Rita documents.

Chapter 3 presents the research design and methodology used in performing the study; how the proposed research information can be used in solving the problem; and the methods of analysis applied to the thesis research.

Chapter 4 presents the conduct of the research step-by-step: the research experience and data collection process, and variances from the original research plan. The researcher did a series of structured interviews, then modified the original survey form—after learning from the interview process—then conducted a survey. The researcher sought to find consistent data between the interview results and survey results.

Chapter 5 examines the interview and survey results in detail, especially noting data consistency and successes in achieving planned objectives. The chapter also discusses problems encountered during the study.

Chapter 6 offers conclusions drawn from the research (data into information) that confirm or refute the researcher's hypotheses. Discussion also takes place on why some of the study was not as successful as hoped for. Chapter 6 concludes with informed recommendations for improving DSCA and suggestions for further research and study.

Chapter Two — Literature Review

2.0 Introduction

The focus of the Literature Review was to a) determine if similar research had already been accomplished, b) gather a wide range of facts and information about the research area (domestic military assistance to civil authority), and c) enrich the researcher's body of knowledge about the many facets of domestic military support and some of the history of that support in times of need.

2.1 Historical Background

2.1.1 Assistance in Time of Need

The responsibility for disaster response—assistance to citizens in time of need—is inherently a local and state problem. The founding documents of this nation, seeking to create a national government of limited powers, stipulated that states have very direct responsibilities:

> The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State (Madison, 1788).

2.1.2 Federal Assistance

Historically, federal disaster relief has been ad hoc, and principally, until the passage of the federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950, required special appropriations for financial assistance to the affected areas. The result was that federal assistance arrived well after the event and provided little practical assistance to the affected people and governmental jurisdictions, other than reimbursement. The 1950 act

> …marked the beginning of a half-century of federal laws, programs, and policies intended to soften the financial and social impacts of natural disasters on the American people and their communities (Platt, 1999, 9).

The passage of the federal Disaster Relief Act of 1970 gave the federal government a "permanent role as the primary source of funds and expertise to deal with major and some not-so-major disasters" (Platt, 1999, 15), although until 1969 "federal assistance was directed primarily to public units of government" (Platt, 1999, 16). The 1969 act, response to devastation by Hurricane Camille, initiated formalized individual assistance programs.

The 1988 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Assistance and Emergency Relief Act opened the flood gates of federal assistance dollars, better formalizing the requesting process for Presidential Declarations of federal support, and, in some ways, setting the stage for the creation of a Federal Response Plan for response to all types of disasters (PL 100-707, 1988).

2.1.3 Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)[5]

The practice of the military, principally the Army, providing support in time of disasters or great civil need, goes back many years in the history of this nation.

> As early as 1792, Congress sanctioned the Army's involvement in such matters. Between 1868 and 1898, the Army participated in more than 17 disaster relief operations, the most significant involving the Chicago fire of 1871.
>
> Perhaps the Army's greatest disaster relief operation involved the San Francisco earthquake of April 1906….
>
> At one point more than ten percent of the Army's active strength was committed directly to the relief effort, which lasted for more than five months (Sullivan, 1993, 18).

In a collection of policy documents (DOD Directives), the DOD sets forth policies that are then further explained in the several military services' doctrinal and operational instructions.

[5] The acronym MACA (Military Assistance to Civil Authorities) was the term used for many years, beginning in the early 1990s. Under the MACA umbrella were several other, more specific policies: MSCA (Military Support to Civil Authorities), MSCLEA Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies), MACDIS (Military Assistance to Civil Defense), etc. DSCA replaced MACA in the early-mid 2000s.

2.1.4 National Guard Assistance to States

The National Guard is a unique component of the federal military reserve. It has a dual mission role: 1) federal: "to serve as the primary combat reserve of the Army and Air Force," and 2) state: "to fulfill a peacetime state mission of ensuring public safety, protecting property and maintaining public order" (Watt, 1997, xi). This is further explained in the succeeding paragraphs.

2.1.5 Legislation

By constitutional authority, the states are empowered to raise Militia, including the commissioning of officers, and to train the Militia according to federal standards (U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, 1787). Passage of the Militia Act of 1903 (which transformed all State Militias into organized regiments and companies of the National Guard) provided for the flow of federal funds and equipment to the National Guard in order to standardize military components (Doubler & Listman, 2003, 53). The equipment is transferred to state control in exchange for the state's organizing and maintaining units, trained according to federal standards, then made available for federal warfighting missions. The various acts and laws allowed the use of any and all federal equipment by the state National Guards to perform aid and assistance to citizens of the state in time of need, on order from the Governor. States are required to restore equipment to federal mission readiness following state use.

2.1.6 State Active Duty

The National Guard has a long history of coming to the aid of the citizens of their state in time of disaster or great need. In many cases, people do not consider the event a disaster unless the National Guard has been called out. Constitutional authority for

calling state National Guard forces to State Active Duty is rooted in 32 U.S. Code . It is a prerogative of the Governor of the State, as Commander in Chief of the State Militia (National Guard). In doing so, the Governor assumes all fiscal responsibility, tort liability, and costs for use of military assets and their restoration to federal readiness. Most states now pay a rate at least equitable to federal military pay for personnel. Particulars rest in state laws and statutes. Some or all of the costs incurred may be reimbursable if a Presidential Emergency or Disaster Declaration is made for the event.

An examination of NG support to states during Fiscal Year 2008[6] (from a For Official Use Only [FOUO] report supplied to the researcher by NGB J3-DO-CS [Domestic Operations, Civil Support]) revealed much activity by the states:

- There were 351 missions performed by states for Natural Disasters, Law Enforcement Support, Crisis Response, Key Asset Protection, and Other. The average for the past ten years is just short of 300 call-ups per year.
- Natural disaster support missions included response to Winter & Spring Storms, Fires, Tornados, Hurricanes & Tropical Storms, Earthquakes, Volcanoes, and supplying Water Purification.
- Total manpower expended (both SAD and Title 32 status) was 728,593 mandays. (A manday is one guardsman on duty for one day. Mandays and pay statuses are very closely tracked by states and NGB.) The average manday usage over the past ten years (with large usage for Hurricane Katrina skewing the average) is over 800,000 per year.

[6] The DOD fiscal year 2008 runs from 01 October 2007 through 30 September 2008.

2.1.7 DOD Policy and Doctrine Publications

By statute,[7] DOD is required to render assistance to civil authorities upon direction of the President to the Secretary of Defense. The focus of the work is on disaster response (short term), not recovery (long term), and such work should not be in conflict with private enterprise. Policy guidance to components of the federal armed forces is issued in the 3025 series of DOD Directives. *Responsibilities for Civil Defense and Other Domestic Emergencies* (DODD 3025.1, dated 14 July 1956) was one of the first. The umbrella directive at the present time is *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities* (MACA) (DODD 3025.15, dated 18 February 1997). The MACA directive provides the basic guidance on request and use of DOD military support (principles), and points to other, subordinate, directives for more detail on other military assistance support (MSCA), such as for civil disturbances (MACDIS), counterdrug, sensitive support, counterterrorism, and law enforcement (MSCLEA); (DOD, 1997). Several other DOD publications relate, both directly and indirectly, to MACA and homeland security (HS). In light of the recent terrorism disasters, and the change in terms from MACA to DSCA, several directives and other publications are under revision. Each of the military services is continuing the process of evaluating its direct and indirect support to HLS efforts, both as part of DOD's command, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and separately.

[7] 42 US Code: *Public Health and Welfare*, Subchapter IV, Major Disaster Assistance Programs, Chapter 68, Disaster Relief: Sec. 5170b"(c) Utilization of DOD resources, (1) General rule. During the immediate aftermath of an incident which may ultimately qualify for assistance under this subchapter or subchapter IV-A of this chapter, the Governor of the state in which such incident occurred may request the President to direct the Secretary of Defense to utilize the resources of the Department of Defense for the purpose of performing on public and private lands any emergency work which is made necessary by such incident and which is essential for the preservation of life and property. If the President determines that such work is essential for the preservation of life and property, the President shall grant such request to the extent the President determines practicable. Such emergency work may only be carried out for a period not to exceed 10 days" (A/O: January 2001).

2.1.8 Official Reports

In June of 1993, Frank C. Conahan, the Assistant Comptroller General of the General Accounting Office (GAO), issued a report (Hinton, 1993) to the Subcommittee on Readiness, The House Committee on Armed Services. The Subcommittee had requested that the GAO determine the effects on the Department of Defense from providing humanitarian services support during the aftermath of several significant 1992 hurricanes: Andrew (Florida, 24 August, and Louisiana, 26 August), Iniki (Kauai, Hawaii, 11 September), and Typhoon Omar (Guam, 28 August). Specifically, Congress asked that the GAO address the following:

> (1) identify the roles and missions of the active military and National Guard forces that provided the assistance;
> (2) determine whether there were problems affecting their delivery of assistance;
> (3) determine whether the military needs to reorient its roles, training, equipment, and doctrine for this type of operation; and
> (4) identify the costs and sources of funding associated with the military's participation in disaster assistance operations (Hinton, 1993, 1).

This report identified more problems with FEMA's untested Federal Response Plan, dated April, 1992, and its use as an administrative tool, than with DOD's response to the event(s). One point brought out was that short-term use of the military for disaster response was not inappropriate to its training and equipment, but that long-term use would degrade warfighting training and preparedness. Increased use of non-National Guard reserves would also require changes in federal laws and statutes. These statutes were written to prevent too-frequent use of reserve personnel, which might begin to affect their civilian employment situations.

Some in the federal government continue to recognize the contribution that well-prepared DOD forces could be to disasters. As an outgrowth of examinations of domestic federal capabilities, in July 2003 the GAO released a report suggesting that DOD

evaluate and assess its force structure. It noted that "DOD's force structure is not well tailored to perform domestic military missions" (Decker, 2003, 3 & 14). The DOD continues its policy of supporting the National Guard as principal military responder in time of disaster, and concentrating instead on support to catastrophic disaster.

The White House report "Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned" states that "efforts should be made to leverage Reserve civilian skills in disaster relief efforts" (White House, 2006, 95). This statement mainly refers to civilian skills that members of the reserve component (RC) possess, and that if RC units can be authorized to participate in domestic emergencies, these skills enhance capabilities that the DOD can bring to the disaster response.

The January 2008 third and Final Report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) makes a formal recommendation (#3 of 95):

> Congress should mandate that the National Guard and Reserves have the lead role in and form the backbone of DOD operations in the homeland. Furthermore, DOD should assign the National Guard and Reserves homeland defense and civil support as a core competency consistent with their required warfighting taskings and capabilities (CNGR, 2008, 96).

There are many reasons cited in support of using RC forces for domestic missions, but until statutes are changed, such use is not possible.

2.1.9 Military Response to Hurricane Andrew

Immediately after President George H.W. Bush's 27 August 1992 request, the Active Component (AC) military began arriving in the disaster area and performed four principal missions: "(1) establishing and operating tent cities, (2) providing medical services, (3) providing and distributing food and water, and (4) removing debris and performing other contracting and construction services" (Hinton, 1993, 2–3). The National Guard, having provided initial humanitarian assistance, then transitioned to performing mainly law

enforcement missions, which the AC are prevented from doing under the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act (18 USC Sec. 1385, DOD policy guidance, and many writings). In other disaster areas (such as Louisiana) the Guard performed mainly humanitarian service missions, which the AC also did on a smaller scale.

2.2 Current Literature

2.2.1 Homeland Security

Much changed as a result of the events of September 11, 2001. Part of the immediate aftermath of the events of 9–11 was the immediate creation of an Office of Homeland Security, culminating with the establishment of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS). As part of this major reorganization of significant parts of the federal government, FEMA was incorporated into the DHS. Consequently, articles and reports that formerly dealt with disasters and FEMA now frequently deal with DHS. Thus emergency management has been included under the umbrella of homeland security.

In spite of relatively recent changes in the Department of Defense in the past few years, the basic functionality of DOD's DSCA remains unchanged. U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) was created and given the responsibility for Homeland Security, which includes Homeland Defense and Civil Support. In the Secretary of Defense's office an Assistant Secretary of Homeland Defense was also created.

The expansion of "jointness"[8] in the DOD has also meant that the Army's mission responsibility of MACA, under the Director of Military Support (DOMS), has been reassigned to a joint office, the JDOMS (Joint Director of Military Support). With these

[8] The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433) played a large part in the growth of joint, or combined services positions and duties. It strongly promoted inter-service cooperation, communication, and coordination, reducing inter-service rivalry. Jointness continues to grow.

changes ultimately comes the requirement to reorganize, revise, and update existing operational plans, documentation, and doctrine (SECDEF Order, 2003).

2.2.2 Related Fields

The military places its domestic support mission and doctrine under the operational program of noncombat missions, specifically Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). The two principal components of MOOTW are "Deter War and Resolve Conflict" and "Promote Peace and Support U.S. Civil Authorities" (DOD, 1995, Fig. I-1, I-2). To help clarify missions, the military is careful to use the word "domestic" to describe homeland or noncombat-related support. Peace Operations, Humanitarian Support, and Civil Affairs missions are not generally related to the domestic MACA mission set (see also the definition of MOOTW in the Glossary of Acronyms and Terms).

2.2.3 Military Studies, Research Reports, and Theses

Every year many students pass through the doors of military educational institutions: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Army War College, National War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Air War College, Naval War College, etc. Many pursue an advanced degree, researching a topic of interest to the military, and prepare a report or thesis dissertation. Each institution maintains a collection of these papers, most of which are graded and not published. Others become the source of interesting articles or are published in other formats. Many students have researched DSCA topics, most related to specific events, frequently providing an analysis of DOD support or contributions, and recommendations for how DOD might change to effect better future support. Many of these reports and theses provided a good source for other reference material.

2.2.4 Congressional Hearings

Especially since September 11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina, Congressional committees and subcommittees have been active in inquiring about emergency preparedness and about the role that the DOD and the NG play in response to domestic disasters.

On 20 October 2005, the U.S. House Committee on Government Reform held a hearing to discuss *The Critical Role of the National Guard at Home and Abroad*. The purpose of the hearing was to "examine the Department of Defense policies and actions affecting the future of the National Guard, as well as hearing the critical needs of States for National Guard manpower and resources" (U.S. House Cmte. 2005a, 1–2).

In November 2005, the House Armed Services Committee's Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee and the Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Committee held a joint hearing on *Responding to Catastrophic Events: The Role of the Military and National Guard in Disaster Response*. This hearing investigated whether enhancing, in the words of the committee chair, Honorable Dave Reichert,

> …the role for the military in responding to disasters and emergencies may undermine federalism, and may even encourage some already financially strapped state and local governments from using their own scarce resources for something that they might expect the federal government and the military to handle (U.S. House Cmte, 2005b, 2).

Concern was also expressed that

> …an enhanced role for the military and the National Guard in responding to domestic catastrophes could undermine our nation's defense capabilities. The military's principal responsibility is to protect the United States from direct attack, not to respond to disasters and emergencies (U.S. House Cmte, 2005b, 2).

The U.S. Senate began its investigation into Hurricane Katrina failures in a hearing by the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Hurricane Katrina:*

The Defense Department's Role in the Response, on 09 February 2006. Committee Chair Senator Susan Collins announced that the hearings were conducted to

> …scrutinize the performance of the U.S. military, both National Guard and active duty forces, in the response… (U.S. Senate, 2006, 1).

and

> …what problems they encountered in melding two forces into one cohesive effort, the challenges they faced in trying to establish a clear and effective chain of command, and the difficulties in the relationship between DOD and FEMA (U.S. Senate, 2006, 2).

Three hearings by the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, in April and May 2007, examined military support. Specifically, from committee chair Honorable Bernie Thompson, Congress wanted

> …to examine the relationship between military organizations such as the National Guard and the homeland security missions they are increasingly being relied on to support. Friends, the National Guard today finds itself at a very tough crossroad, pursuing two very important and very different missions, one overseas, and one here at home (U.S. House Cmte, 2007a, 1).

The first hearing, by the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response was on *Examining the Military's Support of Civil Authorities During Disasters* (U.S. House Cmte, 2007a). The second, by the Subcommittee on Management, Investigation, and Oversight, was on *Examining the Impact of Equipment Shortages on the National Guard's Readiness for Homeland Security Missions* (U.S. House Cmte, 2007b). The third hearing, by the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response was *Practicing Like We Play: Examining Homeland Security Exercises* (U.S. House Cmte, 2007c).

The hearings disclosed the difficulty that the military has in being ready to respond to a domestic disaster, notably when engaged in a major conflict overseas (the military's primary responsibility), and shortages of National Guard equipment and personnel—and thereby their readiness—to respond within their state.

The U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs held two hearings: *The Military's Role in Disaster Response: Progress Since Hurricane Katrina* (U.S. Senate Cmte, 2007); and *The Defense Department's Homeland Security Role: How the Military Can Should Contribute* (U.S. Senate Cmte, 2008). Co-Chair Senator Collins noted, in her opening statement for the February 2008 hearing, that

> Defeating armed threats to the nation will always be the military's first mission. But the breadth of our military's skills and its deployment across the nation demand that we ensure that America's military is prepared to effectively augment civilian responses when catastrophe strikes in the homeland (U.S. Senate Cmte, 2008, 8).

A number of formal reports were issued by various federal entities post-Hurricane Katrina, some as a result of congressional hearings:

1) The White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*, February 2006 (White House, 2006).

2) U.S. House of Representatives, *A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina*, February 2006 (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006).

3) Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report GAO-06-442T, *Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness, Response, and Recovery*, March 2006 (Walker, 2006).

4) U.S. Senate, *Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared*, May 2006 (U.S. Senate, 2006).

Both the House and Senate reports contained full chapters on military support to the disaster: *A Failure of Initiative* contained a 37-page chapter "The Military," (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006, 201), and *A Nation Still Unprepared*, contained an 82-page chapter "Military Operations" (U.S. Senate, 2006, 467). Both documents discussed

National Guard and Department of Defense forces supplied in support of the disaster—including the Coast Guard.

The House report, *A Failure of Initiative*, reveals a statement crucial to this research effort:

> The process for requesting DOD active duty forces has several layers of review and is understandably not well understood or familiar to state officials who rarely would need to request DOD support. Even though state officials do not routinely work with DOD, requests for DOD assistance are generated at the state level (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006, 204).

2.2.5 CRS Reports

A 2005 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, *Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response*, explains that the DOD's response is appropriately postured for all but catastrophic events:

> With regard to DOD particularly, the fundamental principle that it is almost always a supporting agency and the resource of last resort may serve to encourage a reactive rather than proactive mode of operation. This principle exists because, for DOD, disaster relief is secondary to its primary mission of national defense, and there has been a traditional concern that any greater emphasis on essentially civilian or non-military operations would detract from its preparedness for its primary mission. Nevertheless, absent the development of greater civilian capabilities in disaster response, the expectation will remain that DOD will provide substantial, if not massive, assistance in instances of catastrophic disasters. Current doctrine requires that state, local, and other federal agencies be "overwhelmed" before DOD resources are requested. The question then arises, whether the agencies and authorities that have been overwhelmed are indeed capable of making the incident assessments and informed resource requests necessary to obtain DOD assistance (Bowman et al, 2005, 13–14).

In October 2005 DOD took a more proactive role, by organizing Army North (ARNORTH) under NORTHCOM. The organization was formerly Fifth Army, primarily responsible for training and evaluating reserve component units, with a tertiary mission of preparedness for domestic disasters (DSCA). With the reassignment, ARNORTH began a strong focus on DSCA. ARNORTH is also responsible for the assignment of Defense Coordinating Officers (DCO), and a supporting element (DCE, Defense Coordinating Element) to each FEMA region (Bowman & Crowhurst, 2006, 2).

Following is a list of Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports dealing with DSCA issues since Hurricane Andrew:

CRS# DATE AUTHOR TITLE

CRS# Unpublished Draft Date: 16Nov92 Bea, Keith
Federal Disaster Relief: Issues and Options After Hurricane Andrew (DRAFT)

CRS# RL30938 Date: 19Apr01 Brake, Jeffrey D.
Terrorism and the Military's Role in Domestic Crisis Management: Background and Issues for Congress

CRS# RL31615 Date: 18Oct02 Bowman, Steve
Homeland Security: The Department of Defense's Role

CRS# RL30938 (Updated) Date: 27Jan03 Brake, Jeffrey D.
Terrorism and the Military's Role in Domestic Crisis Management: Background and Issues for Congress_Updated

CRS# RS21322 (Updated) Date: 14May03 Bolkcom, Christopher; DeSerisy, Lloyd; & Kapp, Lawrence
Homeland Security: Establishment and Implementation of the United States Northern Command

CRS# RL31615 (Updated) Date: 14May03 Bowman, Steve
Homeland Security: The Department of Defense's Role

CRS# RS21322 (Updated) Date: 10Feb05 Shepherd, Scott & Bowman, Steve
Homeland Security: Establishment and Implementation of the United States Northern Command

CRS# RS21012 (Updated) Date: 27May05 Doyle, Charles, & Elsea, Jennifer K.
Terrorism: Some Legal Restrictions on Military Assistance to Domestic Authorities Following a Terrorist Attack

CRS# RL33095 Date: 19Sep05 Bowman, Steve; Kapp, Lawrence;
Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response *& Belasco, Amy*

CRS# RS22443 Date: 23May06 Vina, Stephen R.
Border Security and Military Support: Legal Authorizations and Restrictions

CRS# RS22266 (Updated) Date: 14Aug06 Elsea, Jennifer K.
Use of Federal Troops for Disaster Assistance, The: Legal Issues (Updated)

CRS# RS22266 Date: 16Sep06 Elsea, Jennifer K.
Use of Federal Troops for Disaster Assistance, The: Legal Issues

CRS# RL21322 Date: 16Nov06 Bowman, Steve & Crowhurst, James
Homeland Security: Evolving Roles and Missions for United States Northern Command

CRS# RL34342 Date: 28Jan08 Knight, William
Homeland Security: Roles and Missions for United States Northern Command

CRS# RL34342 Date: 03Jun08 Knight, William
Homeland Security: Roles and Missions for United States Northern Command

2.2.6 GAO Reports

The GAO (for many years the Government Accounting Office, and in July 2004 renamed to the Government Accountability Office) inquires into a variety of topics, resulting in a number of reports each year. The GAO has broached the subject of military support frequently. In July of 1983 Ronald Lauve testified to Congress about a GAO

report on federal Drug Interdiction, and the military's assistance to the effort: "Coordination is critical in this area because military assistance is costly, not only from a financial point of view, but also because of the potential impact on national security" (Lauve, 1983, 2).

Conversely, in a series of testimonies post-Hurricane Andrew (GAO Reports: GAO/T-RCED-93-4, 27Jan93; GAO/T-RCED-93-13, 02Mar93; GAO/T-RCED-93-20, 18May93; and GAO/T-RCED-93-46, 25May93; are all titled "DISASTER MANAGEMENT: Recent Disaster Demonstrate the Need to Improve the Nation's Response Strategy"), the GAO reported that DOD is the only federal agency with the capability to provide, transport, and distribute sufficient quantities of the items that disaster victims immediately need. In fact, "Hurricane Andrew demonstrated the effectiveness of the military in bringing to bear a variety of supplies and services and establishing the infrastructure necessary to restore order and meet immediate needs of victims" (Peach, 1993b, 9).

The DOD continues, to this day, to defer to other federal agencies the primary responsibility for responding to disaster. In the same report the GAO reported,

> The fact that DOD possesses the capability to respond to mass care needs does not mean that it should be given responsibility for planning, directing, or managing this response function. Military officials told us that the DOD is willing to respond to whatever requests it receives from disaster relief authorities. The military officials further stated that the requests should always come from authorities outside DOD so that the public does not perceive that the military is trying to inject itself into domestic policy decisions (Peach, 1993b, 9).

Another known factor relating to DOD's capability of supporting an event, continuing to the present,

> The DOD officials also cautioned that, while responding to a catastrophic disaster will not adversely affect short-term military readiness, the extent to which DOD can respond will depend on other world events at the time of the disaster. For example, if Hurricane Andrew had occurred during Operation Desert Storm, the DOD would not have been able to provide

> as much airlift to transport personnel, equipment, and relief supplies to the disaster area. It also is questionable whether it could have provided the same number of personnel to assist in disaster relief efforts (Peach, 1993b, 9).

A common perception, echoed in many publications, is offered post- Hurricane Andrew, "…the military has the capability to respond to the immediate needs of disaster victims in a highly effective manner" (Peach, 1993c, 1). "Hurricane Andrew demonstrated the effectiveness of the military in bringing to bear a variety of supplies and services and establishing the infrastructure necessary to restore order and meet immediate needs of victims (Peach, 1993c, 9). Often proposed over the years—particularly following a catastrophic disaster event—is for the DOD military to take on a primary role in disaster response. "For catastrophic disasters affecting large numbers of people, the military possesses a unique capacity to bring substantial resources and expertise to bear" (Peach, 1993c, 13).

The DOD is a willing responder, when requested by other federal departments and agencies.

> The roles, training, and doctrine military forces employ during disasters are similar to what they employ in performing their national security missions. DOD officials told us that they have the resources, equipment, personnel, and capability to respond rapidly to disasters. Furthermore, they are willing to provide any assistance they are called upon to provide (Hinton, 1993, 7).

Following September 11, 2001, the GAO created a Special Collections category of reports called Homeland Security (with subcategories of Combating Terrorism, Homeland Security, Homeland Defense, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and other various title categories), and has released more than 466 Homeland Security reports since that date. The GAO reports frequently spur discussion, especially at the congressional level, and, ultimately, prompt changes in governmental organizations and policies. Many

of the reports deal with military-related issues in conjunction with homeland security, including DSCA topics.

In mid-2003 the GAO noted that the DOD was still in need of posturing forces for the domestic mission. The GAO's report to a U.S. House subcommittee, *HOMELAND SECURITY: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions* reported,

> We are making a recommendation that DOD assess domestic military mission requirements and determine what steps should be taken to structure U.S. forces to better accomplish domestic military missions. DOD generally concurred with the need to do an assessment that is expressed in our recommendation (Decker, 2003, 4).

Following is a list of reports issued, covering the period of Hurricane Andrew to the present, that either directly or indirectly address the issue of military support:

GAO # DATE AUTHOR
TITLE

GAO/NSIAD-93-180 (93/06/18) Hinton, Henry L., Jr.
Disaster Assistance: DOD's Support for Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki and Typhoon Omar

GAO/RCED-93-186 (93/07/23) Peach, J. Dexter
Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's Response to Catastrophic Disasters

GAO-01-9 (01/01/26) Hinton, Henry L., Jr.
Military Personnel: Full Extent of Support to Civil Authorities Unknown but Unlikely to Adversely Impact Retention

GAO-03-677T (03/04/29) Decker, Raymond J.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on How Overseas and Domestic Missions Impact DOD Forces

GAO-03-670 (03/07/11) Decker, Raymond J.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions

GAO-05-21 (04/11/10) St. Laurent, Janet A.
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions

GAO-06-170T (05/10/20) Walker, David M.
Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reexamined

GAO-06-365R (06/02/01) Walker, David M.
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

GAO-06-643 (06/05/15) Pickup, Sharon L.
Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters

GAO-06-808t (06/05/25) Pickup, Sharon L.
Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Need to Guide the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters

GAO-06-111 (06/10/04) St. Laurent, Janet A.
Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives

GAO/GGD-07-60 (07/01/26) St. Laurent, Janet A.
Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness

GAO-07-696 (07/06/20) D'Agostino, Davi M.
Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands' Preparedness Efforts Could Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk Mitigation

GAO-08-251 (08/04/16) D'Agostino, Davi M.
Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues

GAO-08-252 (08/04/16) St. Laurent, Janet A.
Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern Command's Coordination with States and the National Guard Bureau, but Gaps Remain

GAO-08-311 (08/04/16) D'Agostino, Davi M.
Homeland Security: Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil Support Missions May Depend on DOD's Implementation of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act

Many of the preceding reports discuss how the DOD has performed its requested disaster response mission. The DOD is seldom criticized for slow response, but is cited as reluctantly reactive, rather than actively proactive.

Several GAO reports comment on the need for better access to military equipment, which is continually proven to be rugged and adept in post-disaster situations, such as their high mobility capabilities. When DOD units, and especially NG units, are deployed overseas for wartime conflicts, much disaster-usable equipment is sent with them. The usual DOD policy for re-deploying units is to leave the equipment behind. On return stateside, the units—and thus states—are then without many disaster-usable pieces of equipment. The shortage of equipment usually extends for many months, and military units are handicapped when attempting to respond to disasters within their state, or for EMAC. State governors continually complain to the DOD and Congress about more rapid replacement of this equipment, an expensive situation. (See also the GAO reports GAO-06-170T, "*Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reexamined*" [Walker, 2005] and GAO/GGD-07-60 "*Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness*" [St. Laurent, 2007]).

2.2.7 Military Units

The DOD units best suited for rapid disaster response are frequently overtaxed from their wartime deployment schedule, and in-country disaster deployments take military personnel away from their homes and needed training yet again.

Many governors, given the choice between seeing their state NG units (and their equipment) deploy for wartime missions versus being available for in-state disaster

response, would easily choose keeping their units home to serve the needs of their citizens. More than one governor has tried to prevent NG units from deploying to a theatre of war or has requested their early re-deployment due to in-state needs. Immediately after Hurricane Katrina (Friday, September 2nd) the governor of Louisiana requested that as quickly as possible the DOD redeploy (send home from duty in Iraq) and release from active duty the Louisiana NG unit (the 256th Brigade Combat Team, a force of about 5,000 personnel) so that the state could better handle post-hurricane response. Elements of the 256th spent as much as an additional five months on SAD following their release from active duty (Governor of Louisiana, 2005, 11).

A couple of the GAO reports advocate that the DOD become the lead federal agency (LFA, a FEMA term), especially in the case of catastrophic disaster, thus being the controlling entity. (See GAO/RCED-93-186, "*Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's Response to Catastrophic Disasters*" [Peach, 1993a] and GAO-03-670, "*Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions*" [Decker, 2003]). This leadership role for the military has been suggested several times over the years. During a visit to the Katrina-devastated area in September 2005, President George W. Bush considered such a role:

> Bush said on Sunday that Congress ought to consider giving the U.S. military the lead role in responding to natural disasters, as he heard one general describe the Hurricane Katrina rescue effort as a "train wreck." … Bush said Congress would have to consider under what circumstance the Department of Defense should become the lead agency in coordinating and responding to a disaster. … Putting the military in a lead role would sideline FEMA, which now works with local and state officials to coordinate disaster response (Bohan, 2005).

The DOD continues to firmly resist this move, all the while constructing comprehensive plans for military assistance after a catastrophic event.

Yet another DOD-NG point of disagreement lies in the command and control issue. The presence of two (or more) different kinds of military support in a disaster response geographic area makes for a high need for coordination of effort. There has been prolific discourse and writing about the highly fragmented emergency response efforts by all types of military response assets, from NG to DOD, Coast Guard (only a DOD component in time of declared war), civilian, and any of the other services (Navy, Air Force, Marines, etc.). Just relating to aircraft (fixed wing and rotary wing), multiple jurisdictions and services deploying aircraft assets in emergency response make for dangerous skies. The DOD has frequently been called to quickly set up air traffic control to avoid mishaps.

The command and control issue comes to a head when both NG and DOD units deploy to a disaster area. The NG (under state control) has no requirement to coordinate its activities to anyone outside the state, although state NG, responding to an event in-state, in State Active Duty status, is requested to report their activity to the National Guard Bureau (NGB) Joint Director of Military Support (NGB-JDOMS), who tracks the activity and reports it to the DOD JDOMS. Other military response units must obtain permission to deploy within the state, usually given in conjunction with disaster requests made through FEMA or EMAC. DOD units will not normally respond within a state unless there has been a federal emergency or disaster declaration and the assignment of a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), who is charged with coordinating and controlling DOD military response. Thus there is a NG chain of command for NG units, and a DOD chain of command for all others. Further discussion of the command and control issues is beyond the focus of this research, so will not continue here.

2.2.8 Articles

Much of what has been written about DSCA-related subjects over the past decade has been historical reporting of an event or is event-related. A large portion of the volume of official publications (federal government, e.g., the GAO; and reports and papers by special interest centers and research groups) has been in the form of criticism and analysis of events. Numerous periodical articles have highlighted specific unit involvement in an event, usually in the manner of story-telling, special interest articles, or hometown reporting.

A flurry of media articles follows a disaster, about both civilian and military participation in the response. This researcher could not hope to encompass the vast number of newspaper articles about military response following just one disaster event of any size. The researcher did seek to find articles relating to issues of military support pertaining to process or procedure, but was not concerned with hometown news reporting.

National-level military magazines and journals especially were searched for articles relevant to the research question. More military people than civilians seem interested in military response reporting and issues. The interest of the military people lies more with ensuring that the mission can be done better the next time (lessons learned), than with simply reporting activity. Although most of the publication investigation focused on Hurricane Andrew and later, there were some articles of significance reporting on historical DSCA activities—military response to notable disaster events in U.S. history, especially after the Civil War. The President and U.S. Congress increasingly turned to the

organized, and well stockpiled, military (i.e., the U.S. Army) for disaster relief from fires, epidemics, floods, storms, tornadoes, and even locusts (Osborne, 2006).

Many focused articles in newspapers, magazines, and journals concerned some catastrophic or milestone events. A small sampling of major events, in which the military participated, include:

1871	Great Fire of Chicago
1889	Johnstown, PA, flood
1900	Hurricane, Galveston, TX
1906	San Francisco earthquake and fire
1912 & more	Mississippi River flooding
1964	Anchorage Alaska earthquake

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, although not directly considered to be a military DOD entity, has a long history of participating in major flooding events in this nation.

With the growth in size and capability of the American Red Cross, by the end of the 1930s the nation's almost sole dependency on the military for disaster response had begun to decline (Foster, 1983; and Osborne, 2006). Attempts at developing a civilian (federal) relief agency (origins of FEMA) began in 1947 and 1950 with passage of Public Law 233, Surplus Property Law (1947), and the Federal Disaster Act of 1950 which paved the way for the creation of FEMA in 1979 (Foster, 1983).

While not retaining a primary disaster response role, the DOD military was still on the hook for preparedness to respond to catastrophic events: the Anchorage (AK) earthquake in 1964, and Hurricane Camille in 1969, for example. With the Army as the principal military agent for disaster relief activity, the DOD created the organization Director of Military Support (DOMS), in 1968, which continues the mission today as JDOMS (Joint Director of Military Support).

2.2.9 Public Opinion

Major events and disasters in the United States prompt a clamor for action. Post-Hurricane Katrina discussion has focused on whether the U.S. military should take on the principal responsibility for action. It has also been proposed that either (or both) the DOD military and National Guard create disaster response units and stockpiles. (See Schmitt & Shanker, "Military May Propose an Active-Duty Force for Relief Efforts" [Schmitt & Shanker, 2005]; and Murphy, "Katrina Changed Guard's Goals" [Murphy, 2006].)

This research finds little change in American sentiment from William Anderson's social science research in 1969:

> …the pattern of military involvement in natural disaster operations in the United States is a reflection of the structure of American society. In this society, the military, along with other non-local organizations, is expected to play a supportive role during natural disasters, with local institutions functioning as the first line of defense against such events. … That is, by and large, the military in this country has worked in support of and under the authority of local officials and agencies during disaster rather than assuming the leadership (Anderson, 1969, 244).

When considering employment of DOD forces for domestic disaster events, posse comitatus is in the forefront of discussion. Many articles have been written discussing elimination of posse comitatus restrictions placed on DOD, especially during disaster situations. (See Peckinpaugh, 2002; Block & Fields, 2004; Moniz & Kelly, 2005; and Bradley et al, 2007.) Many more papers (theses and strategic studies monographs/essays) by military students have focused on this topic as well.

2.2.10 Dissertations on This Subject

A search of dissertations, both masters and doctoral degree, via GWU's Gelman Library access to dissertation searching, did not reveal any research related to military support and emergency management.

As happened after the large DOD response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992, many degree students—especially at military colleges—have written about the DOD response to Hurricane Katrina. Many master's degree thesis papers have been generated relating to Katrina and the National Guard and DOD response. Few authors, though, have published their findings or opinions in magazines or journals.

One set of two articles close to this research topic was written for the *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management*: "An Exploratory Study of Local Emergency Managers' Views of Military Assistance/Defense Support to Civil Authorities (MACA/DSCA)" (Milliman, Grosskopf, and Paez; 2006a); and "Emergency Managers' Views on Improving Defense Support/Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA/DSCA) Education Programs (Milliman, Grosskopf, and Paez; 2006b).

Milliman's research study methodology was conducted in two phases. Phase one involved conducting initial interviews with emergency managers to determine their knowledge of the MACA process. The interviews were conducted with officials in three states at multiple levels of government emergency management. The responses from phase one were used to develop a survey of local emergency managers to be used in phase two, which focused on MACA education and outreach. (Milliman, Grosskopf, and Paez; 2006a)

The principal difference between this researcher's effort and the Milliman study is that Milliman did not attempt to distinguish between DOD and NG military support. This researcher attempted to discern differences between types of support and operations of the DOD and the NG.

However, many of the suggestions from emergency managers in Milliman's study are highly similar to those discovered in this research:

> DELIVERY MODE OF MACA EDUCATION
> 1. Integrate MACA Education with Mainstream Educational Institutions.
> 2. Provide MACA Education "Before and After Drills."
> 3. Take a Marketing Approach.
> 4. MACA Education Needs to be On-going.
> 5. Provide MACA Education to all Involved in Emergency Response.
>
> CONTENT OF MACA EDUCATION
> 1. Describe the Agencies and Process Involved in MACA.
> 2. Educate Emergency Managers on how to Request Military Assistance.
> 3. Educate Emergency Managers on what Assistance the Military can Provide.
> 4. Address Communication Issues.
> 5. Clarify Funding Implications.
> 6. Customize MACA Education.
>
> …it is important to recognize that the survey write-in comments indicated that some of the respondents did not clearly differentiate between the use of military forces under Title 10 (Federal control) versus Title 32 (State control) (Milliman, Grosskopf, and Paez; 2006b, 10).

2.2.11 Federal/National Disaster Plans

The replacement of the National Response Plan (DHS, 2004) with the National Response Framework (DHS, 2008) has somewhat changed the operating procedures for disaster response and recovery in the U.S. The DOD has created an NRF Additional Resource, "Department of Defense Support to Domestic Incidents," which proactively explains DSCA.

This 5-page document succinctly explains how the DOD will provide support. It is organized into six sections:

Categories of Capabilities (*describing tasks the DOD can do*)

Requests for Assistance (*describing how to obtain DOD support*)

Criteria (*describing qualifiers and considerations for providing support*)

Request for Assistance Situations (*describing procedures for response prior to or after an emergency or disaster*)

Process (*describing steps involved in obtaining DOD support*)

Additional DOD Support (*describing special DOD support*)

Key DSCA Positions/Structures (*describing personnel and units assigned to the domestic disaster mission*)

(DHS, 2008)

Being only five pages in length, the document does not go into any real depth or disclose or propose any training, which is the principal subject of this research.

2.2.12 FEMA/EMI Higher Education Program

Since the mid 1990s, B. Wayne Blanchard, Ph.D. has worked diligently to increase the amount of educational products made available to EM educational entities, specifically college-level programs.

> A goal of FEMA is to encourage and support the dissemination of hazard, disaster, and emergency management-related information in colleges and universities across the U.S. We believe that in the future more and more emergency managers in government as well as in business and industry will come to the job with college education that includes a degree in emergency management. We also believe that in order to build disaster resistant and resilient communities a broad range of college students and professionals need courses that introduce them to hazards, risk, vulnerability, disasters, and what to do about them.
>
> In support of this effort, the Emergency Management Institute in Emmitsburg, Maryland, in 1994 developed the Emergency Management Higher Education Program with the aim of promoting college-based emergency management education for future emergency managers and other interested personnel. (From the website: www.training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/, Accessed: 14 July 2008.)

A major part of the effort has been the development of free college course content that can be downloaded from the website to use in teaching EM material (go to www.training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/completeCourses.asp, Accessed: 14 July 2008.) An examination of the 23 developed courses listed online reveals very little mention of the military in instructional sessions, and certainly no focus on an introduction to the military in disaster response. The researcher is very familiar with the FEMA/EMI program and the content of the many courses in the program, and expected to find at least

a single session about the contribution by the military—NG and DOD—but found nothing. Mention of the military exists in the contents of the some of the courses, usually related to military bases nearby to communities. There were a couple of instances of discussion about posse comitatus, but no comprehensive instruction about military support was written into any course.

2.2.13 Emergency Management Certification

The International Emergency Managers Association (IAEM) created the Certified Emergency Manager® (CEM®) program to raise and maintain professional standards. It is an internationally recognized program that certifies achievements within the emergency management profession. CEM® certification is a peer review process administered through IAEM's CEM® Commission that is composed of emergency management professionals, including representatives from allied fields, education, the military, and private industry. Information about the CEM® credential was obtained in various places on the IAEM website, www.iaem.com, and particularly in the section on CEM®, www.iaem.com/certification/generalinfo/intro.htm (Accessed 10 April 2009).

An investigation was made into recommendations for training or education about the military in the CEM® credential. Recommendations about preparation for the CEM® Examination include a Study Guide (October 2008) list of FEMA Independent Study (IS) courses. This list describes the expanse of emergency management knowledge suggested for applicants to the credential program.

A detailed examination of the content of the 36 Independent Study courses listed on the CEM® Study Guide found virtually no mention of military support.

2.3 Summary of the Literature Review

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the goal of the literature review was to determine if academic research had been performed in this area of study, and to broaden the researcher's scope of knowledge and awareness of the field.

The military is well known for its practice of preparing plans as steps toward preparedness for events and contingencies. Not all military plans for response to domestic disasters are public documents, but all convey the military's intent to support civilian authorities. The military has been an integral part of domestic disaster response for much of this country's history. The researcher determined that DOD policies on domestic assistance to civil authorities lag behind the times, but remain valid.

Official government reports, largely GAO and CRS documents, but also including publications by interested think tanks, such as the Heritage Foundation, the Rand Corporation, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, report largely on the impacts that domestic events have on the military's primary mission: warfighting. The GAO report, *Homeland Defense: DoD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions* (Decker, 2003) specifically addresses the topic. Even the White House Katrina Lessons Learned promoted efforts to "leverage Reserve civilian skills in disaster relief efforts" (White House, 2006, 95).

As with any high-visibility event, members of Congress become interested and involved in helping to examine the causes, and in determining if legislation can assist in prevention from or preparedness for a future event.

The events of September 11th, 2001, continue to impact disaster response planning, as do current events affecting the health and security of the United States. Terrorism

remains a concern, especially following the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. As this dissertation is being completed, there are concerns about a potential pandemic from a variation of Swine Flu. The DOD continues to be an active planning partner in preparedness for any and all of these events—again, in a supporting role.

The DOD continues to develop and increase capabilities and preparedness for the domestic mission, even in the face of major contingencies overseas. The creation of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and designation of units to become prepared to respond to the domestic mission are steps that can only facilitate improved DSCA.

It remains uncertain, however, that local emergency managers are prepared for DOD units arriving upon the local scene.

Chapter Three — Research Methodology

3.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the research design and procedures used in the conduct of the study. The research and analysis followed a qualitative methodology. The research protocol is outlined, including research questions, target data sources, and collection methods. The ontological perspective of this research is that reality exists in the perceptions of the individuals interviewed and surveyed—emergency managers working under stress in a rapid-fire decision-making environment. These managers do not have the time to study developing situations; they operate on their history of training and previous activity and familiarity with related situations. They also use shelved familiar reference texts and plans.

Briefly, the researcher's methodology was to case study material from Hurricane Andrew, then Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, for background and history of DSCA; then conduct interviews of local—parish, in this case—emergency managers who received DOD support; and finally, to survey all state emergency managers.

3.1 The Research Environment

In the past two decades, only two very large scale disasters (as defined in Chapter 1) have caused significant DOD participation in local response efforts: Hurricanes Andrew (1992) and Katrina (2005). Hurricane Rita, following on the heel of Katrina, somewhat exacerbated flooding difficulties in coastal Louisiana—primarily in parishes not as much affected from Katrina. Since DOD forces were already present within the state, responding to Katrina, they responded also to Rita. These were therefore the focus of the researcher's interview efforts. The researcher effort focused on interviewing local—

parish emergency managers in Louisiana—who experienced this DOD assistance after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Parish emergency management directors (PEMD) have familiarity with NG support, but—like most emergency managers across the nation at the local level—have little experience with DOD support.

3.2 Qualitative Research Data Gathering Methodology

The researcher read through many articles and reports about Hurricane Andrew (case study) to determine the manner in which the DOD provided post-disaster support. Much of the criticism about poor disaster support post-Andrew was directed toward the untested FRP. DOD's support, though, was also supplied contrary to plans. DOD arrived en masse in response to President George H. W. Bush's direction. The researcher attempted to determine, from readings, the positive and negative aspects of that support.

It was necessary to gather primary data from the people most directly associated with supplied DOD military support—local (PEMDs) and state (SEMDs). NG military support is requested through the state—in the case of Louisiana, facilitated by the parish NG LNO. DOD military support is supplied through decisions at the state level.

The researcher determined that the optimum research methodology would be gathering data through interviews. An interview research instrument was designed to be sufficiently structured to pass IRB review, yet flexible enough to allow detailed investigation of topics that would likely crop up during conversation. A structured interview format allows this kind of flexibility, with set questions and additional probes.

Marshall & Rossman state that

> Qualitative researchers rely quite extensively on in-depth interviewing. Kahn and Cannel (1957) describe interviewing as 'a conversation with a purpose' (p.149). …[Q]ualitative in-

> depth interviews are much more like conversations than formal events with predetermined response categories (Marshall & Rossman, 1999, 108).

Creswell outlines procedural steps in organizing for interviewing (bullets following are from Creswell, 1998, 123; the researcher's use of Creswell's guidance follows in the next paragraphs):

- Identify interviewees based on one of the purposeful sampling procedures (referring to Miles & Huberman, 1994, 28).

The researcher proposed to use Criterion-type sampling ("Cases that meet some criterion; useful for quality assurance" [Creswell, 1998, 119]).

- Determine what type of interview is practical and will net the most useful information to answer research questions.

It seemed that that the data would be best if gathered from firsthand sources through structured interviews. The structure facilitates a base set of questioning, and the probes and additional questions would add to the richness of the data.

- Plan for use of adequate recording procedures ("Whether conducting one-on-one or focus group interviews, I recommend the use of adequate recording procedures, such as a lapel mike for both the interviewer and interviewee or an adequate mike sensitive to the acoustics of the room" [Creswell, 1998, 124]).

The use of digital audio recording would completely capture the interview session, coupled with brief notes to be taken at the time of the interview.

- Design the interview protocol (the instrument to be used to conduct the questioning).

It was determined that little personal demographic information would be required. Basic demographic information would be needed to determine the history of education or training that PEMDs had experienced that might reveal prior familiarity with military support. This would include whether the subject had a personal experience with the military, such as through service in one of the armed forces, U.S. Coast Guard, or other uniformed service (including law enforcement).

The researcher intended to design questions that would help the interview subject recall knowledge about the military prior to the disaster event, and to reveal new knowledge gained as a result of experiencing post-disaster DOD support.

- Determine the place for conducting the interviews.

Interviews would be conducted in a place of the subject's choosing, in Louisiana, in sessions free of distractions and through a process that would encourage the subject to be open and freely discuss the events and activities which involved DOD support.

- Obtain consent from the interviewee.

The researcher desired that interview subjects have full knowledge of the Informed Consent process, including viewing the form in advance of the actual interview (See also section 3.5). The interview subjects also received a copy of the interview instrument prior to the researcher's arrival for the interview session.

- Follow an orderly interview procedure: "During the interview, stick to the questions, complete within the time specified, be respectful and courteous, and offer few questions and advice.

While keeping the interview time period to less than two hours of informal discussion, the researcher would endeavor to follow the layout of the questionnaire in order to ensure all questions were asked and to facilitate transcription.

3.3 Interview Subject Selection Criteria

The principal focus was to be on interviewing parish emergency managers about their experiences with DOD units and attempting to discern differences in the PEMD's understanding about DOD support versus the familiar NG support. The optimum situation would be in finding any EMDs without military background, who gained knowledge about the military as a result of having worked with the DOD military supplied in support of the disaster.

The secondary effort was to be targeted at the state level, seeking to confirm data gathered at the county (parish) level.

The intent was to actively interview parish emergency management directors (PEMD), as being the most likely to have had direct contact with the recent DOD post-hurricane support. The parish level, in Louisiana, is equivalent to the county level in other states, with a primary responsibility for emergency management (response, recovery, etc.) within the parish's geographic area. Only large cities have their own emergency management function, equivalent to parish EM responsibility.

The PEMD and staff, usually operating in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), organizes the pre- and post-disaster activities: preparedness (plans and exercises), response, and recovery. When there is insufficient capability to support the need within the parish, the PEMD contacts the state for assistance. Assistance supplied by the state flows to the PEMD and staff for deployment throughout the parish.

When a parish is supplied military support, the optimal situation is that a Liaison Officer (LNO), whether NG or DOD, is given missions by the PEMD. The LNO then transmits the mission to the military commander for execution.

The parish emergency manager, then, is much more likely to have direct interaction with supplied military support than the state emergency manager. The supposition was that the PEMD in the Hurricane Katrina-affected parishes should have experienced both NG and DOD support and would be aware of differences between how the NG and the DOD units performed their missions.

3.4 The Invitation to Participate in the Interview Research

A letter was prepared that invited parish emergency managers to participate in the research. The letter was shown to the Louisiana State Emergency Management Director (Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, GOHSEP). After being given a list of parishes that had been furnished DOD support, with contact information, the researcher began contacting the individuals. Depending on their stated preference—mailed letter or email—the Letter of Invitation, together with a copy of the interview questions, was sent to the potential interviewees. By furnishing the interview content in advance, the researcher hoped to better prepare participants.

All letters of invitation spelled out the process of maintaining privacy, as mandated by the Institutional Review Board (IRB), specifying the process of maintaining anonymity in this dissertation writing. All responses were given a code, and any evidence of the respondent's identity was removed from the working copy. Complete anonymity of respondents was maintained during the writing of the dissertation.

See the Letter of Invitation to Participate in the Interview at Appendix A, Tab A.

3.5 Informed Consent

The IRB also specified that all persons to be interviewed must agree to and complete a formal Informed Consent. Consent was obtained during the organizational portion of the interview, through a signature. The consent form had also been sent via email prior to meeting with the subject. During this pre-interview time, the researcher recapped some personal history, explaining his interest in the subject and work experiences along the way, followed by a brief recap of the interview request letter and preparation for recording the session.

See Appendix B for the Informed Consent form used in this research.

3.6 The Structured Interview Instrument

The Structured Interview instrument can be found at Appendix A, Tab B.

3.6.1 Sections I and II of the Structured Interview: Eliciting Pre-event Knowledge About Military Operations

A structured interview format was designed to:

1) gather limited demographic information about the interview subject: notably their pre-event knowledge about the military, their job role at the time of the disaster, duration in the position, and any training about the military they had for the position;

2) determine the subject's prior experience with the military, such as service in any component of the military, or in a military-related job;

3) determine the subject's depth of familiarity with the military as a result of working with the LNOs supplied by the Louisiana NG; and

4) determine any prior experience working with DOD units.

Section I focused more on the PEMD's training and education and personal knowledge and experience about the military. Section II investigated the PEMD's operational familiarity with the military, i.e., previous experiences with military support supplied for prior disaster events.

A key question asked in Section II was "Were you aware of the differences between NG and DOD pertaining to their ability to provide support to civil authorities?" Another important question was "Did you understand the methods/processes of integrating supplied military support into disaster response operations?" Both these questions would indicate differences between working with the NG and the DOD.

3.6.2 Section III: Eliciting Data About Military Support During the Incident (Post-disaster Support of the Response Effort)

Section III questions dealt with investigating how PEMDs dealt with any supplied military support post-event. Questions were to be asked about what units showed up in support, including how missions were passed to the unit, methods of integrating military support into the overall support missions, and any demonstrated capabilities of the military equipment as being better than civilian equipment.

Key questions were "What information about the active component military did you discover during the event that, on learning it, enabled you to more effectively work with the military for the duration of the event?" and "How did you discover that knowledge and assimilate it?" These questions were designed to detect differences between the style of NG support and the style of DOD unit support.

3.6.3 Section IV: Eliciting Post-Incident Reflections

Questions in Section IV asked PEMDs: 1) if they could "help quantify the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc." and 2) if they thought that "there are differences between NG and DOD military support (access, capabilities, integration, and command and control)?" These questions were designed to generate ideas about what education, training, and informational briefing content might be sought to better prepare emergency managers for receiving DOD military support in a future event.

3.7 Interview Data: Data Processing and Analytic Methodology

Digital recordings of the interviews were to be transcribed to capture the main points offered by the subjects. A decision about verbatim transcription would be made upon analysis based on the value of capturing all words versus capturing essential elements of the responses.

Transcription of the data from the recording to print also facilitated the removal of identifying information. Each transcribed file was identified only by a Q-Code.

Data gathered through the interview process was to be evaluated through a thematic analysis. Expected themes included topics such as the following: Capabilities (equipment, training, etc.), Types of Missions, Immediate Response, Differences Between NG and DOD Units, Training Needs or Recommendations, Military Liaison Officers, Exit Strategy, etc.

The interview responses were transcribed to spreadsheets, using one column for each interview subject. Putting the data in a spreadsheet format facilitated the data analysis between respondents. (The interview spreadsheets can be viewed at Appendix C.)

Repetition of themes from respondent to respondent would facilitate validation of the concepts.

> (Conclusion Drawing and Verification) From the start of data collection, the qualitative analyst is beginning to decide what things mean—is noting regularities, patterns, explanations, possible configurations, causal flows, and propositions (Miles & Huberman, 1994, 11).

Miles and Huberman display a graphic (Figure 1), which helps to explain the analysis process used here: "The researcher steadily moves among these four 'nodes' during data collection and then shuttles among reduction, display, and conclusion drawing/ verification for the remainder of the study" (Miles & Huberman, 1994, 12).



Figure 1
Components of Data Analysis: Interactive Model
(Miles & Huberman, 1994, 12)

3.8 The Survey Methodology and Subject Selection Criteria

When local emergency managers do not have sufficient capability to address the response to a disaster, including local mutual aid, they make a request to the next higher governmental jurisdiction. In this case, the parish EMDs made their request to the state EMD. The state emergency management director (SEMD) has access to state-level

mutual aid (under EMAC) and, if the incident has been declared a presidential emergency or disaster, federal resources become available, including DOD assistance.

In addition to interviewing local emergency managers who had experienced DOD unit support, the researcher wanted to investigate nationwide occurrences of DOD support. Although gathering data from SEMDs was desirable, the logistics and costs behind a similar interview effort made the project infeasible. The researcher endeavored to create a survey instrument as similar to the interview instrument as possible.

A list of SEMDs was obtained from the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) website. This information is also available to the public.

3.9 The Invitation to Participate in the Survey Research

As was done with the interviews, a mailed (U.S. Postal Service) letter to the SEMDs, explained the purpose of the research and invited their cooperation. The emailed survey invitation was slightly different, as were the few emailed-only invitations to participate.

The USPS-mailed letters and the email version, sent at the same time, informed participants that the other format was also being sent and that they could choose which format to respond to. The researcher wanted to facilitate ease of response, to generate as many responses as possible.

All letters of invitation spelled out the process for maintaining privacy, as mandated by the IRB. As was done with the interviews, a coding process was used to separate the respondent's identity from the response. Care was taken to ensure anonymity of respondents in the writing of the dissertation through the use of a code list.

The Letter of Invitation to Participate in the Survey can be found at Appendix A, in three formats: Tabs C1, C2, and C3. The three versions are slightly different based on

whether the survey was being mailed, emailed (following a mailed version), or emailed only.

3.10 The Survey Instrument

To ensure consistency of data, a research survey instrument was designed that was very similar to the research interview instrument. The survey was also designed to facilitate easy response. Much effort was put into the design of a data collection instrument that would be perceived as not taking much time to complete. SEMDs are generally very busy people, and the researcher wanted to obtain as much cooperation as possible.

There were numerous yes/no choices and multiple choice possibilities, and most questions had space for comments.

The survey instrument appears in two formats at Appendix A, Tabs D1 (hardcopy, USPS mail version) and D2 (email version). The shaded portions of the email version were a highlighted yellow on computer screen. The email version was designed to be completed easily on computer, through the use of check boxes and free-typing comment sections (see the arrows).

Consideration was given to the use of an online data gathering instrument (e.g., Survey Monkey, www.surveymonkey.com/), but the researcher decided that having an additional, external step to take or process to perform would complicate the response process. The emailed survey was an attachment that the recipient could open and fill in at the same time as reading. The respondent would then only have to save the file and return it via email.

3.10.1 The Principal Survey Question

The most significant question to be answered in the survey was a reply to the question "Has your State had an occurrence of DOD (not National Guard) support, i.e., active duty unit(s), arriving in State to respond to a disaster or emergency within the last ten or so years? (Yes or No)." The response to this question would immediately reduce the population of states potentially involved in further investigation. Based on preliminary investigation, it had already been determined that most states would reply No to this question. A No response, however, would not limit additional input from a SEMD.

A Yes response to the principal question then urged SEMDs to complete the first section of demographic questions similar to the interview research: the quantity and depth of prior military experiences that the SEMD had experienced prior to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

3.10.2 Demographic Information

One minor difference between the interviews and the surveys was in asking SEMDs to describe the event that they indicated enabled their state to receive DOD support. It was expected that these events were not Hurricanes Katrina or Rita-related. SEMDs were asked whether it was an event that was declared a presidential emergency or disaster, and whether an FCO and DCO had been assigned.

The survey continued by asking, similar to the interview questions, about the SEMD's job role, and asking about their military experience and familiarity with the military, both NG and DOD.

3.10.3 Survey Questions About Familiarity With Military Support

Survey questions followed, asking SEMDs about their familiarity with NG and DOD support capabilities, Pre-Event, During the Event, and Post-Event. Very similar to questions asked of interviewees, the survey asked about Pre-Event working knowledge of the military's organization, capabilities, rank, command and control; both of the state's NG and of any DOD experience.

If the SEMD had experienced DOD support for an event, they were asked to indicate any differences noted between NG support practices and DOD support practices.

SEMDs were asked whether they thought that military equipment was well suited to disaster response, and whether military equipment was better suited than civilian equipment.

3.10.4 Input Sought from State Emergency Management Directors

Regardless of whether a significant event had occurred in their state, federally declared or not, a solicitation for comments was made to the survey recipients: "Please help define the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event." The survey then went on to ask respondents to answer the question by completing the statement "I think that Emergency Managers need to know (should be briefed, trained, or educated):…."

3.11 Survey Data: Data Processing and Analytic Methodology

Upon receipt of all survey replies, the researcher transcribed the information to Q-Coded documents to remove any name identification from the data.

Data gathered from survey returns were to be analyzed in a similar manner as the interview data, by determining themes present, especially those confirming themes discovered during the interview process.

Repetition of themes from respondent to respondent would facilitate validation of the concepts. Repetition of themes discovered during the interview data analysis would provide research confirming evidence.

The researcher intended to analyze the data using the qualitative research analysis software tool ATLAS.ti. Christine Barry's 1998 text (online at www.socresonline.org.uk/3/3/4.html) "Choosing Qualitative Data Analysis Software: ATLAS/ti and NUDIST Compared," puts these two software programs at the top of the [qualitative research analysis tools] list. From the ATLAS.ti website: "ATLAS.ti is a powerful workbench for the qualitative analysis of large bodies of textual, graphical, audio and video data" (http://support.atlasti.com/).

After beginning a trial use of ATLAS.ti, the researcher discovered a much too steep learning curve compared to the quantity of data involved, and use of the software tool was abandoned.

The survey data would be analyzed in a manner virtually identical to that used with the interview data. This involved a spreadsheet format, with the data from each respondent aligned in a column that facilitated analysis. (The survey spreadsheets can be viewed at Appendix D.)

3.12 Aggregating and Analyzing the Research Data

3.12.1 Interviews

Themes discovered during interview data analysis were to be listed, and suggestions offered for improvement of the local EMD's preparedness for DOD military support were to be grouped into like subjects.

3.12.2 Surveys

In similar fashion, the survey data was to be analyzed, listing themes, and grouping suggestions for DOD instructional content.

3.12.3 Data Comparison

Yin discusses the advantage of using multiple sources of evidence (data)—in this case the use of interviews and surveys, coupled with the researcher's work background and the literature review—to promote the development of "converging lines of inquiry" (Yin, 1994, 92).

In similar fashion, the use of matrix evaluation—in this case through use of a spreadsheet formatting of the data—would facilitate the discovery of themes and patterns, contributing to the validity of the research analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994, 263, 156 & 242).

Miles and Huberman also speak to the strength of the data from firsthand collection of data in an informal setting, with the researcher alone with the interview subject (Miles & Huberman, 1994, 268).

Creswell compared analysis of strategies in his "General Data Analysis Strategies by Authors" (Table 8.1) as methods of "Reducing Information." The three authors cited called their processes:

- Sorting material into categories (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992)

- Noting patterns and themes (Miles & Huberman, 1994)
- Identifying patterned regularities (Wolcott, 1994b)

(Creswell, 1998, 141)

Themes discovered from the interviews would be compared to the surveys. Similar themes were expected, thus providing confirming data from differing means of inquiry.

The researcher also sought to discover strong similarities between the suggestions and recommendations made by the EMDs about the value of DOD educational outreach, including content of instruction.

3.13 Approval of the Research Design

All research design, i.e., methodology and data gathering instruments, was approved by The George Washington University Institutional Review Board (IRB) prior to the conduct of any data gathering.

Chapter Four — The Research Experience

4.1 Preparation for Conducting the Research

All disasters are local. When support beyond the capability of the local community is needed, the local emergency manager, in this case the parish director, makes a request of the next higher jurisdiction, the state. The state either sends support from its inventory of capabilities, or from assets borrowed from another state, or requests—if beyond the capabilities of the state and a Presidential Emergency or Disaster has been declared—support from the next higher jurisdiction, the federal government—specifically FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

FEMA is the manager of federal government disaster response and recovery. The National Response Framework (NRF) is the operations manual for the execution of federal assistance under Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 44, "Emergency Management and Assistance," and the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (as amended). A multitude of federal departments and agencies are required to provide the requested assistance, as spelled out in the NRF's List of Authorities and References (DHS, 2008).

It is entirely possible, then, that support requested by the local (parish) emergency manager is supplied with an element of the federal government, the Department of Defense (DOD), for example.

It is only in cases of a large-scale, or catastrophic, event that DOD supplies such assistance to the local level. There are two events of major significance in the past 20 or so years: Hurricane Andrew (1992) and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (in 2005) that generated large-scale DOD response. It is rare, then, that the average emergency

manager, or state emergency management director, even sees DOD forces participating in domestic civil support.

Support by National Guard forces, most often on State Active Duty status, is much more frequent. National Guard personnel can be brought into service, on State Active Duty status, in response to natural or man-made disasters. Normally, the Governor of a state must declare a State of Emergency before the Adjutant General activates soldiers/ airmen. There are many differences, state to state, on issues such as pay, benefits, retirement accrual, and injury/workman's compensation. State laws and statutes determine most of these points. Costs for State Active Duty are borne by the state, although may be reimbursed by the federal government, if the event gains Presidential Declaration status. Each state determines its own policy on using their NG for emergencies and disasters. State-to-state mutual aid may also use NG forces (see EMAC). In 2007, for example, there were 435 occurrences of support provided by NG forces for fires, floods, tornadoes, search and rescue, etc. (From a briefing supplied by National Guard Bureau, "FY2007 National Guard Support to America.")

It was observation of this relative unfamiliarity with DOD support, versus prolific NG support, that prompted the researcher to investigate whether there were distinct differences between the two. The other side of the equation is how prepared (training, doctrine, exercising, etc.) DOD forces are for the domestic mission. This other side is material for future research and not covered in much depth in this thesis.

The research initially proposed to study documents (case study research) from Hurricane Andrew. Boxes of after-action reports and other records from Hurricane

Andrew existed that would assist in the quest for what emergency managers would benefit knowing about the military in preparation for their arrival.

Before research could begin, Hurricane Katrina hit Louisiana. By themselves the winds and storm surge (coastal flooding) were probably sufficient to cause major damage, but it was the failure of levee berms that principally caused the catastrophic level of disaster that occurred. As the researcher's advisor (Dr. John Harrald) said, "Hurricane Andrew probably had sufficient data, but Hurricane Katrina came along and has provided you with ample research opportunity."

The research, principally oriented toward qualitative analysis, involved two levels of emergency management: the county level, except for cities with large capabilities, the lowest usual level of disaster response and management, and the state level.

The researcher proposed to interview Louisiana parish emergency management directors, preferably in place during the response period following Hurricane Katrina. It was felt that there would useful data in the question, "What do you know now (post-hurricane), about the DOD military, that you wish you had known about the DOD military before getting that support?" And, "Are there differences in dealing with the National Guard military versus the Department of Defense military: preparedness for the mission, command and control, mission integration, etc.?"

Prior to beginning any research, the Research Proposal outlined the data-gathering instruments. Following Proposal approval, the instruments were formally submitted to the GWU Institutional Review Board (IRB) for an expedited, non-medical research approval. The interview and survey forms were approved, as was the tailored Informed Consent form.

The IRB-approved Questions for Structured Interviews is at Appendix A, Tab B; the Survey instrument is at Tab D1; and the Informed Consent form is at Appendix B.

On the basis of information provided by Louisiana's state emergency manager, in the Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP), a target population of 15 parishes was identified. At the time of the interviews—during July 2007, almost two years after the hurricane—several of the parish emergency management directors (PEMD) had changed. The goal, then, was to find those personnel who had been in place, rather than to interview the current PEMD.

A flurry of emails and phone calls ferreted out contact information and locations, and appointment times were set, where possible, during a week-long in-state visit. The researcher traveled the breadth of the southern part of the state, also traveling across the Lake Ponchartrain Causeway to interview the PEMD of St. Tammany parish.

4.2 The Interview Experience

Prior to meeting interviewees, a welcome letter (Appendix A, Tab A) and the interview questionnaire (Appendix A, Tab B) were sent. An informed consent form was completed at the time of each interview. (The Informed Consent form used in this research is at Appendix B.)

Interviews were conducted in July 2007. The researcher stayed in a hotel in New Orleans, a city still showing flood damage, even downtown. One to three interviews were scheduled in a day. Continual attempts were made, while in the area, to contact non-responding interview subjects, with minimal success.

Each interview was completed face-to-face, in a quiet or relatively quiet setting. (Only one recording turned out to be difficult to understand, due to air handling

equipment in the room—an emergency operations center.) The interview began with background information about the researcher and the intended research. The Informed Consent form was then discussed and signed.

The formal portion of the interview began with the starting of a digital recorder. Interview questions were presented in order as much as possible. Questions and probes were skipped if the answers were obvious, such as further questions about military experience when the interviewee had never been in the military. The researcher took brief notes as the interview subjects talked, to assist in the later transcription process. Attempts were made to prevent note taking from slowing down the interview process.

All interview subjects were very willing to talk about the disaster and about military support. The subjects were usually very conversant, and each interview lasted more than an hour.

4.2.1 Unsuccessful Interviews

After returning home, attempts were made to contact those PEMDs that were not interviewed, for a phone interview. The researcher was unsuccessful at obtaining additional (phone) interviews, or convincing the individuals to return a survey (via email).

4.2.2 Data Processing

Each interviewee was assigned a confidentiality code (Q-code). Interview notes were coded, as were the recordings. Recordings were transferred from the digital recorder to the researcher's notebook computer, and the recording erased from the recorder. Transcriptions were made of the audio recordings, structured according to the format of the structured interview form. The researcher decided that little additional value would be

gained from a verbatim transcription. The transcriptions summarized responses to the questions and captured key points made by the interviewees.

4.3 The Survey Experience

4.3.1 Modification of the Survey Instrument

After completing the structured interviews, the researcher determined that the survey form, intended to be as much like interviews as possible, would not suffice as originally designed and approved.

1) The first change clarified that the research was focused on DOD support. (The change is highlighted – words added)

> For the purposes of this survey, "the event" refers to the occurrence of Department of Defense (DOD) support to a disaster in your state within the last ten or so years. If there was more than one "event," please describe either the earlier one or the more significant one.

2) The second change added three questions inquiring about any presidential declaration requested or made. Responses were Yes or No check boxes:

> 1d. Was there a presidential declaration of an emergency or a disaster?
>
> 1e. Was a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) assigned?
>
> 1f. Was a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) assigned?

3) The third change added technical references for Immediate Response:

> 2c. Are you aware of the capability of the military to respond to emergencies under the tenets of "Immediate Response," as defined by DOD (DOD Directives 3025.15 & 3025.1)?

4) The fourth change added item 4a, directly asking about perceived differences between DOD and NG support:

> 4a. Did you discover any differences between utilizing DOD support, versus NG support?

The survey instrument was modified, and approval was received from the IRB for the modification. The IRB-approved modified Survey Instrument is at Appendix A, Tab D2.

4.3.2 Conduct of the Survey

A welcome letter was sent to all state/territory emergency managers, both in hardcopy (Appendix A, Tab C1) and via email (Appendix A, Tab C2). Three exceptions occurred in the hardcopy mailing: the territory of Guam, and the U.S. possessions Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. It was determined that too much time would pass to ensure timely responses. In those three cases only an emailing occurred (Appendix A, Tab C3).

The hardcopy survey (Appendix A, Tab D1) and the emailed (Appendix A, Tab D2) version were identical in content, although a more electronic-friendly version was created for the emailed version. It was expected that the hardcopy version would be filled out by hand, and that the emailed version would be completed on computer. Responses in both formats were received back.

4.3.3 Additional Attempts at Data Gathering

Initial returns from the survey requests were sparse, prompting a subsequent attempt at generating responses. A second, reminder email was sent after approximately two weeks. The follow-up email requested SEMD cooperation in completing the survey, but also gave an out that the researcher hoped would spur additional responses. The second email asked SEMDs to at least respond to the initial question ("Has your State had an occurrence of DOD (not National Guard) support, i.e., active duty unit(s), arriving in State to respond to a disaster or emergency within the last ten or so years? (Yes or No)"). The email then asked SEMDs to provide input to the researcher's quest for the type of

information thought valuable for instruction about the military: "Please help define the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event. 'I think that Emergency Managers need to know (should be briefed, trained, or educated)'."

4.3.4 Termination of Survey Data Gathering

The initial mailing and email occurred during the last couple of days in December 2007. The reminder email went out during the middle of January. Following several days of no additional responses, the decision to terminate survey data gathering was made at the end of the first week of February 2008.

All survey respondents received an emailed expression of appreciation for participating in the research effort.

4.3.5 Data Processing and Analysis

All replies were saved in hardcopy format, in a file, and in softcopy format on the researcher's computer. The data from all surveys returned in hardcopy form were transcribed to a new document identified only by a Q-Code. The contents of electronic (emailed) returns were saved to a Q-Code numbered file in a directory on the researcher's computer. As the only connection to a name was the email message that conveyed the document, saving the document in a coded format removed any name connection. All analysis, then, was performed using documents that could not be aligned with any named individual.

As described in chapter 3, Research Methodology, the researcher originally intended to use a research analysis software tool ATLAS.ti (or ATLAS/ti), for the analysis of the data. A free demo version of the software was obtained, which allowed a somewhat small

amount of data input, and inputting raw data into the program was begun. The software program's learning curve quickly became an obstacle. The relatively small amount of research data obtained, versus the large and complex capabilities of the software program, also contributed to the decision not to pursue the full use of the program. One useful benefit of attempting to use the program was the discovery of coding or themes present in the data.

The researcher then converted to spreadsheet-style analysis. The interview data was consolidated, and the survey data was entered onto separate spreadsheet formats, with one column for each respondent. The matrix format helped to orient and present the data, especially visually, to facilitate discovery of similarities, patterns, and themes present in the data.

Almost none of the data lent itself to quantitative analysis. Only Interview Question I-1b, duration of EM experience data, was purely numerical. The chart at Figure 2 represents that data.

Chapter 5 discusses the analysis of the collected data through qualitative methodology.

Chapter Five — Research Results

5.1 Research Size

5.1.1 Interviews of Parish (County Level) Civil Emergency Managers

The researcher was advised of 15 parishes that had a post-hurricane DOD presence. Prior to arrival in the research area for interviews, contact was made (email or verbal reply) with 11 parish emergency management directors (PEMD). Successful interviews were accomplished with 10 parish EMDs and one city EMD[9], with one additional partial interview (operations staffer):

8 persons that had been PEMD at the time of the hurricane(s)

1 person that came to the PEMD position one month post-hurricane

1 person at the city EMD level (was supervisor of the PEMD)

1 person that worked on PEMD operations staff (partial interview)

5.1.2 Survey of Civil Emergency Managers

The researcher performed a survey of state emergency managers nationwide. The survey, in both hardcopy (mailed) and softcopy (emailed) was sent to all state, territory and U.S. possession emergency managers, aiming for at least a 50% return. (Three of the surveys were only emailed.) Only 19 responses were received back, a 35% return rate.

5.2 Results of the Interviews

Results of the parish (county-level emergency management) emergency management director (PEMD) interviews:

[9] As explained to the researcher: "The city is the parish; the parish is the city." Thus, the City EMD can be called a PEMD.

5.2.1 Section I, Pre-incident/event knowledge of the military

This section requested information about background and training (demographic data) of those interviewed.

5.2.1.1 Interview Question I-1b: Director position experience at the time of the event. Most of the PEMDs had been in their position for several years. One manager was new to the position by a couple of months at the time of the hurricane, and one manager had a tenure of about 50 years in the organization.



Figure 2
Interview Subject Job Experience

The average position tenure of the PEMDs was somewhat difficult to average. The average of all interviewed PEMDs was almost ten and a half years (10.42). Discounting the long tenure of the 50-year veteran, the average experience of the PEMDs was six years (6.02).

5.2.1.2 Interview Question I-1c: Emergency management (EM) training in the position. All PEMDs acknowledged training for or in the position. Most had worked up to the director level from staff jobs in the organization or the emergency management field. The state encourages PEMDs to get training, and some training is sponsored by the state. Other courses are federally (FEMA) sponsored.

One director said that on arrival in the position he inspected after-action reports from previous incidents and exercises and gained a good foundation regarding the position of the organization.

In the past (10 to 15 years or more ago), there was a state requirement that PEMDs become members of the Louisiana Emergency Preparedness Association (LEPA), a non-profit statewide organization of emergency preparedness and response practitioners with the common goal of improving public safety in emergencies. LEPA was founded in 1980, and still exists, offering training and state-level certification (www.lepa.org/what.htm, Accessed: 14 July 2008). The requirement for LEPA certification has faded, but most PEMDs indicated that they had attained the certification anyway.

Most PEMDs reported taking multiple FEMA Emergency Management Institute (EMI) Independent Study (IS) courses. These are self-directed courses, administered online. (Information about FEMA/EMI Independent Study courses can be found at www.training.fema.gov/IS/.) Material is studied; then an exam is taken. Passing the exam earns CEU credits and a certificate of training. Frequently EMI IS courses are prerequisites for other courses as well as for state and federal training. PEMDs were not generally directed to a specific list of courses, but were encouraged to fill in gaps in their knowledge.

5.2.1.3 Interview Question I-1d: Training about the military. Nearly all of the PEMDs indicated that there was little, if any, formal instruction about the military in the content of any of their courses. Even federally-sponsored training rarely mentioned military support. Education about the state National Guard, however, was more prevalent. Prior to the recommendation by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to incorporate homeland security into state emergency management departments, the state emergency management office was run by the National Guard. With the melding of EM and HS into Louisiana's Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (OHSEP), a civilian now manages the department. Due to the proximity of Guard personnel, and the usual practice of state National Guard integrally and rapidly responding to state-level emergencies and disasters, most PEMDs quickly became educated about National Guard military support.

The Louisiana National Guard has, for many years, assigned a National Guard officer as a liaison (LNO) to each of the southern parishes. The LNO becomes an integral part of the parish emergency management organization, responsible for informing and educating the PEMD and his/her staff about National Guard support. This person trains, exercises, and responds with the staff, acting as the PEMD's local military representative and conduit to the state National Guard. This practice has greatly influenced PEMDs and enhanced the types of request for National Guard support, as well as advising the PEMD and staff on the National Guard unit's activities when they arrive in support.

This level of familiarity with National Guard support, coupled with the constant and consistent military support staffing in the person of the liaison assigned to the parish, gave PEMDs a comforting sense of preparedness for military support in general. Liaison

and communication with responding DOD units and personnel were accomplished in one or more of the following ways:

1. Most frequently, the National Guard liaison acted as the intermediary between the PEMD and the DOD military support. This is not to imply that the National Guard member had any authority over DOD forces, but that the National Guard liaison acted as a translator between the two elements.

2. It was hoped that a liaison from the military unit would be assigned to the parish EOC. The DOD liaison would act to inform the PEMD about unit capabilities, recommend employment activities, and convey direction from the PEMD to the unit. The liaison would also report DOD unit progress on assigned missions.

3. In the midst of the fast-paced and overwhelming need environment post-Hurricane Katrina (and Rita), there were occasions where DOD military arrived in parish, but did not coordinate their presence or activities. In these instances, DOD units were responding to direction from state or federal missions. Requests for these support missions were placed by PEMDs or by state-level EMD staff. These requests would be handed from the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) to the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). The DCO and his staff would convey mission assignments directly to the DOD command and thus to the higher headquarters of the responding units. In these cases of general, wide-area missions, multiple parish support or parish border crossing activity took place.

Most PEMDs indicated that they could not learn much from the exposure to DOD forces (Interview question III-1a) because they were heavily engaged in activities in their Emergency Operations Centers (EOC), and that the DOD elements came un-requested and departed unannounced, for the most part. ("Many units in support. No recollection of

unit identities." And "It was a fluid theater.") Only two PEMDs reported being assigned a stable DOD liaison. These temporarily assigned liaisons came to the twice-daily EOC update meetings and directly received and passed information, provided coordination, and received missions.

5.2.1.4 Interview Question I-2a: Personal military experience. Three interview respondents reported National Guard experience (34, 25, and 6 years). Three reported a full career (to retirement) of active duty service. Two reported full careers (28 and 33—who also had the six-year NG experience) with law enforcement, and considered that background highly related to military experience. The remaining three had no military experience, although one grew up near an army base.

Three PEMDs had experience as a National Guard POMSO (Plans, Operations, and Military Support Officer). The POMSO is the principal state National Guard support person, i.e., the military person most knowledgeable about civil support capabilities. The POMSO advises the state emergency manager about National Guard capabilities, including mutual aid (EMAC[10]) National Guard support from other states. The POMSO also receives the missions from the state emergency manager and conveys the missions to the National Guard Adjutant General and commanders. To have POMSO experience is to be extremely familiar with civil support capabilities of military units and equipment.

As a result of Louisiana's practice of assigning a National Guard liaison officer (LNO) to each of the coastal parishes, PEMDs were extremely well informed and advised of National Guard civil support capabilities (Interview questions I-3b and -3c). This

[10] EMAC, Emergency Management Assistance Compact. EMAC is a program under the sponsorship of the National Emergency Managers Association, NEMA, an association of principally state emergency management directors and staffs. EMAC is a well-developed mutual aid system at the state level, including National Guard assets. Participation is voluntary, and reimbursement is the responsibility of the requesting state (which, if a presidentially declared emergency or disaster, is reimbursable by the federal government).

practice, then, imbued a relatively high degree of familiarity with other military units, especially Army units, such as DOD.

5.2.1.5 Interview Questions I-3d & 3e: The question was asked if a high army (state Army National Guard forces) or air force (state Air National Guard forces) familiarity was a hindrance when suddenly faced with another type of military service, e.g., Navy, Marine, or Coast Guard. (Interview questions I-3d & -3e). All reported that in many respects military was military. In general, much of the experience in dealing with National Guard personnel conveyed very well to any other type of military. The principal differences between services lay in the variety of equipment that could arrive to support the missions. However, those who had prior experience with the Marine Corps dealt more easily with the Coast Guard and the Navy.

5.2.1.6 Interview Question I-4a: Except for PEMDs with a military service background, the only history of prior DOD military support experiences was that of DOD forces supplied post-Hurricane (Ivan, 2004, or Audrey, 1957).

5.2.1.7 Interview Question I-4b: The interview question, "Did you know how to request military support?" had primarily an inferential purpose. PEMDs are not supposed to request military support as a solution to their emergency or disaster problem. When an event is larger than their capability of responding locally, the PEMD is to make the request of the next higher support entity, the state. The request for support should proceed as a request for any (unknown) capability that can satisfy the described problem. The answer or response, supplied by the state may be a military asset or civilian asset. There are a variety of factors involved in coming to the conclusion of what support to send to the requesting PEMS, and the state's National Guard military is only one. The PEMD

should not request support with a solution in mind, but work to thoroughly detail the situation in quantitative form.

It is, however, a somewhat common practice among many states for the city or county/parish EMD to recommend military assets as a solution. So the answers supplied to the researcher's question were mostly in the affirmative: nine yes, one no. These responses belie the familiarity with the state National Guard frequent response to events within the state, and the presence of the NG LNO within the parishes.

5.2.1.8 Interview Question I-4c: Immediate Response, "Do you understand the tenets of Immediate Response?" DOD Directive 3025.15, "Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA)," and DOD Directive 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)," address the principles of Immediate Response:

> Immediate Response. Requests for an immediate response (i.e., any form of immediate action taken by a DOD Component or military commander to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions) may be made to any Component or Command. The DOD Components that receive verbal requests from civil authorities for support in an exigent emergency may initiate informal planning and, if required, immediately respond as authorized in DOD Directive 3025.1 (DOD, 1997, paragraph 4.7.1).
>
> Imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency or attack may require immediate action by military commanders, or by responsible officials of other DOD Agencies, to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. When such conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials of other DOD Components are authorized by this Directive, subject to any supplemental direction that may be provided by their DOD Component, to take necessary action to respond to requests of civil authorities. All such necessary action is referred to in this Directive as "Immediate Response" (DOD, 1993, paragraph 4.5.1).

When asked, most (eight of ten) respondents did not know about Immediate Response as something available from DOD entities, notably installations or units. After an explanation of the concept or tenets, half (four of the eight) acknowledged an understanding. Unless a DOD base or unit was located near the parish, the option was not considered.

The next two questions dealt with personal familiarity with the military.

5.2.1.9 Interview Question I-5a, asked "How much, and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with military support entities? [specifically] state National Guard personnel – principally the POMSO (now DOMSO)." The POMSO is the principal person in the state's National Guard responsible for coordination regarding National Guard military support to civil authorities.

5.2.1.10 Interview Question I-5b, asked "How much, and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with military support entities? [Specifically] Active component (DOD) military, such as the DCO (Defense Coordinating Officer), Base Commander, Base emergency or disaster planners, or military units?"

Owing to either personal (National Guard) service experience, or to the Louisiana National Guard's policy of assigning liaison officers to each of the parishes, the PEMDs had a very high level of interaction or experience with National Guard forces and equipment.

Interaction with DOD forces, though, was very limited or non-existent. If the parish was near a military entity (Fort Polk, Naval Air Station, etc.), then some coordination had been effected.

5.2.1.11 Interview Question I-6, asked "Have you attended any courses about the military, such as the DOD Emergency Preparedness Course? If yes, what course(s)?"

Only one of the PEMDs had attended the primary DSCA course, the Emergency Preparedness Course, an offering available in many locations over the years by personnel from the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) office responsible for the program. The course was designed to teach emergency management, and the military's part in it,

principally to DCOs and EPLOs. Other types of students, mostly military (including National Guard) personnel were encouraged to attend in order to broaden the class environment.

Nearly all interviewed stated that there had been little, if any, instruction about the military's part in disaster response in their field education.

5.2.2 Section II: Pre-Event Knowledge of the Military

The research sought to determine the level of knowledge about military organization, command and control methodology, and equipment. An important distinction was any perception of differences between the way that National Guard operated and the way that active component forces did.

5.2.2.1 Interview Question II-1, asked "What did you know about the military, both National Guard (NG) and Department of Defense (DOD); i.e., organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc.?"

Two responded Extensive

One responded Significant

Two responded A good amount (a result of the familiarity with the NG)

One responded Sufficient

One responded Good (based on perceived relevance to his prior law enforcement knowledge

Two responded Limited

One responded Nothing

The responses, then, varied widely. Again, it was observed that the part that the Louisiana National Guard played in preparing PEMDs for military support was a good thing.

5.2.2.2 Interview Question II-2: When questioned about perceived differences—in advance of receiving military support—between how the NG responded and active component (DOD) forces would respond, "Were you aware of the differences between NG and DOD pertaining to their ability to provide support to civil authorities?"), six replied Yes, and four No. Two of the No group acknowledged some kind of understanding that Posse Comitatus was a factor, but didn't necessarily understand how and why.

All respondents understood the process for requesting military support—notably National Guard support—due to prior training by NG LNOs.

5.2.2.3 Interview Question II-3: "Did you understand the methods/processes of integrating supplied military support into disaster response operations?" Eight respondents replied Yes, although two indicated that their understanding was based on how their NG LNO had briefed them. Two said No. The most interesting aspect of these responses is that the four that said No or a qualified Yes had no prior military experience.

5.2.2.4 Interview Question II-4: To the final question in this section, "Did you understand the need to pre-define an ending point, and/or exit strategy for the military unit(s)?" nearly all responses showed that they understood the need for defining success, and that the military would need to withdraw from the support mission at some point.

This question concluded the Pre-Event information gathering. The next segment of questions to parish emergency managers dealt with military support during the disaster.

5.2.3 Military Support During the Incident

The researcher had hoped to question emergency managers who had experienced DOD military support in a disaster. As stated before, the use of DOD military support, in quantity, is rare. The two primary occurrences were Hurricane Andrew (1992) and Hurricane Katrina (and Hurricane Rita) in 2005. The principal problem with this support was that it was not requested as much as it was directed. In both cases, the President of the United States ordered the military to assist as soon as possible. This meant that a large unit—significant portions of the 18th Airborne Corps—was dispatched to a holding area for deployment to places needing assistance.

So what happened for the most part was that, in the face of great need, DOD units arrived in the parish, announcing themselves as ready and available for work. The PEMDs, though, work on a needs request mechanism, expecting that aid and resources arriving on scene will meet the parameters of the request for aid. This background explanation should provide additional clarity to the answers given to the following questions.

5.2.3.1 Interview Question III-1a: "What military support was assigned to assist you during the event? Describe the unit, its service component, assigned equipment, and how that equipment was able to assist."

Almost half (four of ten) replied that none was requested, but support arrived. There was some recollection of specific units arriving in support, e.g., the 101st Airborne Division (101st ABN), but in most cases there were many units in the area, no means of differentiating between units (or between National Guard and DOD—especially by sight), too numerous and fleeting to remember or document. One PEMD documented that

units in support were from the 101st ABN, NORTHCOM, and MARFORRES (Marine Forces Reserves).

Only one instance of support was provided by DOD in response to a specific request. With the disabling of banking facilities in the parish, a request was made for a finance unit to set up a banking center. DOD supplied a unit that established such an activity quickly and effectively, continuing until banks began to reopen.

The orders to the DOD military units, passed from the commander, a lieutenant general (three-stars), to his subordinate commanders, were "Save Lives, Protect Property, and Do the Right Thing" (Quoted by Interview Subject Q-9). Units were deployed across the State of Louisiana, with high density in the south and southeastern areas and with direction that the commanders, or a representative of the unit, contact the PEMD and offer assistance.

5.2.3.2 The next interview question (III-1b) asked, "How were missions passed to the military units?" There were a variety of answers from "DOD LNO in the EOC," to "DOD operated on its own." In two instances missions to the military were effected through the parish's National Guard LNO. Since command and control were not at issue, there was a comfortable level of familiarity involved for the PEMD to let the inside military person (NG LNO) help the PEMD with the interface.

5.2.3.3 The follow-on question (III-1c) was "How was the military integrated into the overall response mission?" While half reported no integration—the DOD military operated on its own, probably "doing the right thing," the other half reported that the integration was well done, or at least accomplished smoothly—in part due to the NG LNO's efforts and intervention.

5.2.3.4 Interview question III-1d: PEMDs unanimously agreed that military equipment was "better served to assist than a similar non-military piece of equipment." Most agreed that military equipment:

- Is more robust and hardened (stronger)
- Is more mobile and capable of high water operations
- Is capable of carrying more load
- Is more capable of extended operations
- Usually comes with communications capabilities built in
- Comes with its own logistics and maintenance "tail" (personnel, parts, and servicing)

The question was asked about dealing with military personnel and units (III-1e, "Describe working with military personnel"). "With civilians [especially when contracting out], you need to develop a scope of work and costing. Military does the mission [regardless of what they find during the process of accomplishing the mission.]" "Once [the military] got a mission, I didn't have to worry about it."

5.2.3.5 The responses to interview section four, "post-event reflections," will be discussed combined with survey results, below.

5.3 Summary of the Interviews

The researcher found consistent responses (data) from the interviews. Following is a review of the interviewees' answers to the research questions.

5.3.1 Sub-question 1, "Do emergency managers need to be educated about military organizations and/or services, rank structure, capabilities, and operational methods?" Interviewees indicated that, owing to the Louisiana National Guard's practice of

assigning a military liaison officer to each parish, they have a good understanding about the NG military. This practice, over time, has essentially educated these civilian PEMDs about the military. And each occasion of state military support in response to parish disaster emergencies or exercises has broadened that familiarity, or education. Rather than draw a conclusion about whether the method of assigning a LNO to counties is a best practice to emulate in other states, this researcher has data to conclude only that this practice has created well-prepared, military-familiar PEMDs in this state.

During Hurricane Katrina response, most PEMDs let their NG LNOs handle the new military personnel that showed up to support the parish. Given the very heavy load of response activities the PEMDs were handling, coupled with the short duration of the DOD presence in their parish, most PEMDs had no memorable contact with DOD support. "There were so many military units moving through the area it was impossible to determine who was who. It was a very fluid theater." And "NG units (under EMAC) were unified command players. DOD was not."

5.3.2 Sub-question 2, "Will instruction/education about the military benefit emergency managers, resulting in improved requests and/or use of the military in disaster response?" There was broad consensus among the PEMDs that the best preparedness that the DOD could offer them is a briefing or "Quick Reference" handbook about what the DOD could bring to the response. There is little familiarity about military capabilities that they don't already see in their own state.

One PEMD, a retired Marine Corps colonel, was not aware of nearby U.S. Navy assets that ultimately greatly assisted in the response: "Had not considered the USNS Cape Knox (a Military Sealift Command Fast Sealift Ship) capabilities: power generation

capacity, water generation, housing, etc. Did not know to ask the right questions. Was asking for specifics, instead of capabilities and [expressing] needs."

5.3.3 Sub-question 3, "Does an emergency manager's prior military experience (i.e., service in the armed forces) result in a state's use of National Guard and/or active component military assets more frequently than if an emergency manager has not served?" There was not sufficient depth of research about the quantity of military support for disasters within the parishes to address this question. Most of Louisiana's disasters are hurricane related, and the state military (NG) responds broadly across the state.

5.3.4 Sub-question 4, "Did emergency managers that have experienced disasters which incorporated DOD military support gain knowledge about the military that, in retrospect, would have benefited them or improved the disaster response situation because they had been knowledgeable beforehand?"

This question cannot be answered as formulated. What can be addressed is how PEMDs perceived differences between NG support and DOD support. One PEMD remarked that the DOD units were able to respond more quickly than state NG units. This occurred because, when the mission was being considered for support by the NG, the decision process was routed up to the state NG headquarters for tasking. In contrast, the DOD unit was in certain respects self-contained, thus did not have to submit the request to a higher headquarters and could respond much more quickly. (Each parish was sent its own battalion, which essentially operated autonomously under general guidance ("Save Lives, Protect Property, and Do the Right Thing"). Simply, the DOD support had a shorter decision tree.) Also, the proactive stance by DOD units in the area posed a tendency for mission creep: "What more can we do for you?"

5.3.5 Sub-question 5, "Can knowledgeable, experienced emergency managers quantify that body of knowledge or experience (referring to item 5.4.2 above)?"

Comments by PEMDs collectively agree that in order for them to be better prepared to receive and utilize DOD support, there needs to be an improvement in the amount and type of information about DOD domestic disaster response capabilities. Comments included: "There should be training [for EM personnel] or briefings about the general capabilities of the military," and that there is a desire for a course or some instruction about the military that would particularly help a non-military background person.

Two PEMDs mentioned that FEMA could develop an Independent Study (IS) course covering this content. FEMA's Emergency Management Institute (EMI) is responsible for resident and online instruction in emergency management. Independent Study courses are available online only: http://training.fema.gov/IS/. It would be better if it were a hands-on or resident course, but it is difficult for working EMs to get away or to be able to afford travel to a course through their budgets.

"Need a DOD-101 briefing on capabilities and assets."

"EM directors need to learn about DOD structure and organization and information about how assets can be applied to the response."

"[There needs to be a] training package, by DOD on capabilities, capacities, coordination, logistics, Immediate Response, and operational rules."

"[We] need information on availability of assets and capabilities."

5.4 Difficulties With Completing the Interview Schedule

Since the interviews were conducted less than two years after the disaster, several PEMDs—highly engaged in recovery efforts—were not available for an interview due to

their still busy schedules. Subsequent attempts to perform telephone interviews with these people were unsuccessful. No reasons other than scheduling conflicts were provided.

5.5 Long Answer Responses From the Interviews

Following is the list of long answer responses from the question posed to interviewees, Question #IV-1: "Can you help quantify the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event?" The information is also present in the full-data spreadsheets in Appendix C.

- There is a strong benefit to assigning a NG LNO to parish EM & HS Dir. Depend on that LNO to do the recommending, requesting, and coordinating.
- Limited information - enough to keep them out of trouble (private property issues, law enforcement issues, basic C2). [Command and Control]
- There should be training/briefing on a general knowledge of capabilities by the military.
- The military people need more training about operating domestically than do civilians about using them in their communities.
- There is/was a tendency for the military to 'creep' the mission. "What more can we do for you?"
- Respondent had a strong desire for a course or instruction on military that would help local (parish) emergency managers understand military, particularly for a non-military person -- taken from scratch, i.e., DOD 101.
- There is a need some sort of Quick Reference Handbook for civilian emergency managers, in the manner of DOD 101.

- Information about need for Exit Strategy and/or End Point.
- If the Parish EM was aware of DOD "mutual aid" assets nearby, s/he might be more inclined to request that type of support.
- A [military] advisor (like the FEMA advisor that arrived to help) could offer information on assets and capabilities. In a sense, EPLOs provided at the Parish level.
- Exposure to Military Operations processes.
- Communications and reporting chains [of command]. Need for a more centralized (fewer stovepipes) reporting chain for the multiple military units responding. "I believe in going through the chain of command up until the time it doesn't work anymore."
- There needs to be a (approximately 3-day) course, developed by the military.
- MOBDES program had good value - excellent! [Mobilization Designee System].
- Perhaps EPLOs need to expand their influence down to county level.
- Align Baker Presidential Declaration map with EPLO support.
- Need for a DOD 101. Could be a [FEMA/EMI] Independent Study course, but better as resident (hands-on). However, there is more difficulty in getting people TO a resident course.
- DOD 101 briefing on capabilities & assets.
- Immediate Response. How the military works (operations).
- Ending points and exit strategies.
- This training is necessary. DOD is very likely to become much more involved in catastrophic planning and response.

- EM directors need to learn about DOD structure and organization.
- Information about assets that can be applied to the response.
- The logistics and maintenance tail.
- Education to counter stereotypes.
- Interviewee suggests (agrees with proposal for) an Independent Study course about Military Support.
- Training package, by DOD, on capabilities, capacities, coordination, logistics, Immediate Response, operational rules.
- Training package ALSO needs to be developed that educates the political leadership.
- Need information on availability of assets and capabilities.
- Functional understanding of rank and structure.
- Information on differences between NG and AC.

5.6 Survey Returns

Fifty-three surveys were mailed and emailed to state emergency management directors (EMD). The source of the names and addresses was obtained thorough the researcher's membership in the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) directory. NEMA is the professional association of and for emergency management directors from all 50 states, eight territories and the District of Columbia. The primary purpose of NEMA is to be the source of information, support and expertise for emergency management professionals at all levels of government and the private sector who prepare for, mitigate, respond to, recover from and provide products and services for all emergencies, disasters and threats to the nation's security. (NEMA website:

www.nemaweb.org.) No special permission was required to utilize the mailing information.

Three of the surveys were only emailed, due to time and distance. These emailed surveys went to one U.S. territory and to two U.S. possessions.

Of the 56 surveys sent out, 19 were returned in one form or the other, or both, but predominantly via email. All returns were followed up with a thank you email.

10 replies by email
7 replies by mail
2 replies by both email and mail (identical content)
---
19 returns = 34%

During the process of waiting for survey returns, in an effort to prompt increased returns, the researcher sent a second email to those who had not yet responded asking them to at least address two of the researcher's questions that were identified as principal to the research:

1) "Has your state had an occurrence of DOD (not National Guard) support, i.e., active duty unit(s), arriving in state to respond to a disaster or emergency within the last ten or so years?" And

2) (survey question #5d) "Please help define the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event. I think that Emergency Managers need to know:" There were nineteen responses.

Thirteen EMDs replied with "No" to the principal survey question (#1, above), and six replied "Yes."

Of the thirteen:

Two of the respondents replied only to the question (with a "No").

Eight of the respondents, replying "No" to the question, also provided input to the second question.

Three of the respondents, replying "No" to the question, also provided input to the second question and answers to other survey items.

Six EMDs responded with full completion of the surveys. Of the six:

One respondent replied "No" to the principal question.

Five respondents replied "Yes" to the principal question.

Full survey data, then, is from only six participants. There was, however, a wealth of good input from the 17 participants who supplied comment answers to question 5d (number 2, above). That input is detailed below in discussion of the principal foci of the research.

5.7 Results of the Surveys

The average experience level of the six respondents (in their current position at the time of an event that supplied DOD response) was 4.4 years. (One respondent left the item blank.) Only two of the EMDs had any military experience; both were military retirees with service exceeding 20 years. And they were two of the three who had received education about the military's contribution to emergency management.

5.7.1 Question 3a & b, Pre-event understanding about the military Two questions (Likert-style responses) were asked to compare respondents' understanding of the military, both NG and DOD: (3a) "Did you have a good understanding (working knowledge) about the military's organization, capabilities, rank, command and control,

etc., relating to your State's National Guard (NG)?" And (3b) "Did you know about the military's organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc., relating to Department of Defense (DOD) or active component military?" All six responding EMDs had a high understanding of the NG, principally due to the frequency of state NG forces responding to events within the state (See Figure 3).

Survey Question	Respondents	1	2	3	4	5	6
3A. Understanding about NG	Yes, a lot	X	X		X	X	X
	Sufficient			X			
	Marginal or lacking						
	None						
3b. Understanding about DOD	Yes, equal to understanding of NG	X	X			X	X
	Assumed to be the same as NG			X			
	Marginal or lacking						
	No				X		

Figure 3

Survey Questions About an Understanding of Military Forces (#3a & 3b)

One EMD replied that his understanding of DOD was equal to that of the NG, but opined that success of DOD units was much more dependent on the commander's ability to understand the domestic environment and emergency management in general: "It is very clear what and how DOD assets will be integrated. However, [mission success is] dependent upon the [unit] commander and their orders from higher echelons. The success or failure of resource integration and mission assignments will predicate incident outcomes on a positive or negative note."

Four respondents said they had an equal understanding about the DOD and the NG (two of whom were retired active duty military), and one assumed there was little difference. Five of the six said that they fully understood (question 3c) "…the differences between NG and DOD, pertaining to their ability to provide support to civil authorities."

Five of the six reported regular, in one case daily, interaction with the state's NG (question 2b-1, "How much and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with [NG]"). In several states (17 as of July 2007 – see Figure 4, TAG Roles, below) the department of emergency management and the NG are co-located or fall under a single department head.

5.7.2 Roles of the State Adjutants General (TAG) A query to the National Guard Bureau returned a briefing slide, dated July 2007, which shows the relationship of The Adjutant General (TAG) to other state departments: Emergency Management (EM) and Homeland Security (HLS). See the following graphic about the interface between DHS and DOD at the state level.



Figure 4
National Guard Adjutant General Roles as: The Adjutant General (TAG), the Director of the state's office of Emergency Management (EM), and the Director of the state's office of Homeland Security (HLS)

Most state governors appoint these positions, and the apportionment of responsibilities, but not much changes from year to year. Changes do frequently occur when a new governor comes into office.

In seventeen states (as of July 2007) the adjutant general (TAG) is both the state military leader and the state's director of emergency management (9, indicated by blue/checkered shading, and 8, indicated by red/vertical stripe shading). In one state (Wisconsin), the TAG also manages the state's department of homeland security (but not the department of emergency management).

5.7.3 Question 2b-2, Pre-event contact or interaction with DOD Fewer respondents indicated regular contact with DOD entities "How much and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with [active military]", although one respondent indicated "significant interactions with both sets of military groups."

5.7.4 EPLOs While not proactively mentioned by any EMD, all state departments or agencies of emergency management are assigned three Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLO): an Army reservist, an Air Force reservist, and a Navy reservist. These senior officers (lieutenant colonels, navy commanders, colonels, or navy captains) serve as advisors to the state EMD about DOD presence within their state, and recommendations for DOD assets that could be requested and employed in an event. Since they are staff persons and advisors, they are generally not considered part of the DOD response assets.

5.7.5 Question 2c, Immediate Response mutual aid A question that the researcher felt was important to the emergency responder mutual aid effort was "Are you aware of the capability of the military to respond to emergencies under the tenets of

"Immediate Response," as defined by DOD (DOD Directives 3025.15 & 3025.1)?" All respondents replied "Yes." Such aid is generally a local event, not usually visible at the state level, and falls under the category of local mutual aid. Not included here is mutual aid at the state-to-state level under the provisions of EMAC (Emergency Management Assistance Compact, www.emacweb.org). (Also refer to the definition of Immediate Response in the Glossary of Acronyms and Terms.)

5.7.6 Question 2d, Training about the military Half of the responding EMDs reported attending a DSCA course, offered by the military, to help educate state EMDs about military support. The DSCA course, formerly the responsibility of the Army's Forces Command (FORSCOM), is now under the purview of NORTHCOM—specifically Army North (ARNORTH). The DSCA course is now a two-part course, with Phase I required to be taken online. After other prerequisites have been met, application is then made to attend the resident Phase II.

5.7.7 Question 3c, Perceived differences between NG and DOD support A question very important to this research asked "Were you aware of the differences between NG and DOD, pertaining to their ability to provide support to civil authorities?" Five of the six respondents (83%) replied "Yes," without comment. The one EMD that replied "No" also had no additional comment. One EMD succinctly stated that there should be "a single point of contact that will coordinate all military assets." The Louisiana model of assigned LNOs facilitates command and control.

5.7.8 Question 5a, Differences between NG and DOD (not considering posse comitatus) Closely related to 3c, this question was also critical to the research: "Do you agree with the researcher's premise that there are differences between integrating NG

and DOD military support (relating to techniques, not issues like Posse Comitatus)?" The answers by EMDs confirmed the researcher's opinion: five of the six replied "Yes." The sixth EMD said "Unknown," together with the comment "I have not experienced those differences. I would agree [that] they probably exist." An additional respondent, who did not provide a complete set of answers to the survey did address this one: "Yes but there shouldn't be. There are even differences between them in the OIF/OEF[11] deployments taking place today," referring to differences between NG and DOD units deploying to combat duty. Finally, one EMD commented that "Yes. This is a complex question whose answer needs much more discussion." This research was an effort to do that, but it also raises the prospect of a potential benefit of having a panel or open discussion in the future.

5.7.9 Question 5b, Emergency management capabilities of military equipment

Five of six EMDs agreed that military equipment is highly suited to disaster response. The sixth replied "No" without additional comment. Comments included: "They have assets that don't exist in the state." "Clearly [military forces] have items that are needed." "The expense is always a critical question." "In today's [wartime] mission ready configuration – [it is already] packaged for disaster response." One EMD mostly agrees: "Not entirely, but the state CSTs [NG Civil Support Teams] add tremendous value to the governor's arsenal. All states should have some engineering, commo [communications], information technology, medical, transportation and military police capability to better support the state governor."

[11] OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom, military operations in and around Iraq. OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom, military operations in and around Afghanistan.

5.7.10 Question 5c, Accessibility of military support to requesting emergency management directors

Responses to the question "Do you think that DOD military support was more accessible?" were mixed. Two EMDs said "Yes," with one commenting "Only because of [Hurricane] Katrina." The comment refers to the DOD's method of response to Hurricane Katrina (similar to what happened after Hurricane Andrew in 1992) by pushing forward large numbers of units and personnel to offer assistance without having been requested. Another EMD, the one that provided incomplete survey answers, commented "When they want to; NG is more accessible because DOD has it own missions to contend [with] and answer to their own generals." Three EMDs replied "No," with two commenting "Not more accessible than the National Guard, however the DOD asset was specialized (Navy Salvage Dive Team). Our National Guard did not have that capability," and "We always use Guard resources first before we elevate to the next level of support."

5.8 Summary of the Surveys

Although only a few (6) survey respondents submitted a complete set of answers, 17 of the 19 offered comments. The researcher found consistent opinions (data) between the surveys. Following is a revisit of the principal research question set addressed by the survey respondents' data.

5.8.1 Sub-question 1, "Do emergency managers need to be educated about military organizations and/or services, rank structure, capabilities, and operational methods?" One state EMD answered, "State emergency managers are typically quite familiar with the National Guard structure, resources, capabilities, etc." Another reported the need for and understanding of "the military system and chain of command. [EMDs] need to

understand the capabilities and the way the military operates from response, logistics, chain of command, etc. They also need to know how they will be integrated with the response and coordinate with the other military units assigned (National Guard)."

Another replied, "As each of the services, branches, units and installations have such widely different structures, operating capabilities, restrictions etc., the most important aspect is knowing how to request assistance and having access to the EPLOs and the local installation MSCA/Emergency Preparedness staffs." This comment lends credence to the value of the EPLOs and their mission of letting the state and FEMA Region EMDs know about DOD capabilities in their area. However, EPLOs do not reach down to the local (county) EM level.

Another EMD recommended that emergency managers "should understand what kinds of units are available and what support they can provide, how to obtain the support," and a rough idea of the "timeline between a request for support and the arrival of that support." This individual also is interested in the military's "organizational structure and their chain of command." Also, "how military units operate, i.e., organize and manage response, and how to interface with the military chain of command."

A common problem among emergency managers is their understanding of posse comitatus limitations on the employment of active duty units (i.e., other than the state National Guard) within their state. Two EMDs suggested information on "any legal constraints to employing Title 10 units as opposed to National Guard units." This was echoed by another who said, "There is a huge gap between civil authorities and military authorities in terms of what resources can the DOD bring to bear in a civil emergency."

It is clear to the researcher that, yes, there is a desire for information or education about military support to emergency managers, especially outside of their usual state National Guard support. They don't know what's out there, i.e., DOD capabilities. As one EMD put it, "The DOD needs to assess what type of equipment it should have on hand to assist the state with local disasters, whether typhoons, tsunamis, snow storms, ice storms, floods, etc."

5.8.2 Sub-question 2, "Will instruction/education about the military benefit emergency managers, resulting in improved requests and/or use of the military in disaster response?" Although offered as a response to the previous question, one EMD's response is again appropriate here: "As each of the services, branches, units, and installations have such widely different structures, operating capabilities, restrictions etc. *the most important aspect is knowing how to request assistance and having access* to the EPLOs and the local installation MSCA/Emergency Preparedness staffs." (Italics added)

The researcher sensed that if EMDs could get quantification of the potential types of support that the DOD could supply, it could help better formulate assistance requests—although it is not really proper to specifically request military support.

One EMD suggested that emergency managers should "take the Phase I of the DSCA course." S/he went on to say that "EMs need to understand the role of the NG in providing support to civilian authorities."

5.8.3 Sub-question 3, "Does an emergency manager's prior military experience (i.e., service in the armed forces) result in a state's use of National Guard and/or active component military assets more frequently than if an emergency manager has not served?" Only six of the responding state EMDs supplied information as to their prior

military experience or background, so it was not possible for the researcher to formulate an answer to this question. One EMD, though, expressed that if a newly hired EM had not been in the military prior to coming to the job, that s/he become familiar with the military.

5.8.4 Sub-question 4, "Did emergency managers that have experienced disasters which incorporated DOD military support gain knowledge about the military that, in retrospect, would have benefited them or improved the disaster response situation because they had been knowledgeable beforehand?" Only a couple of comments were supplied in survey responses: One EMD reported "the need for interface." This person's response to the question about observed differences between NG and DOD forces supplied the comment that there is a "need [for the DOD unit] to assign a liaison to the supported civilian agency." Another EMD commented that s/he now had a retired [active component] military person in his agency's senior management, and would now have DOD experience nearby if there were another event. One EMD noted the great differences in using the U.S. Coast Guard. A final opinion expressed by another EMD was that the potential for having the "federal military support in disaster operations was minimal."

5.8.5 Sub-question 5, "Can knowledgeable, experienced emergency managers quantify that body of knowledge or experience (referring to item 5.8.2 above)?"

As discussed in paragraph 5.7.8 above, nearly all survey respondents agreed that there are differences between NG support and DOD support, but the differences are not easy to quantify ("This is a complex question whose answer needs much more discussion."). The EMDs supplied many suggestions as to what the DOD could do to make its disaster

response potential known to EMs. The complete list of long answer responses can be found in Appendix B. The research has determined that there is much agreement between the feedback supplied in the interviews and in the surveys.

5.9 Difficulties With Completing the Surveys

The majority of state and territories have not experienced any disaster event significant enough to warrant DOD involvement in the response. The researcher believes that this fact explains the small number of survey returns. One of the 19 responses was a simple, one-word response—"No"—to the principal (initial) question of the survey: "Has your State had an occurrence of DOD (not National Guard) support, i.e., active duty unit(s), arriving in State to respond to a disaster or emergency within the last ten or so years?" The researcher believes that the 37 states that did not respond also had no occurrence of DOD support for disasters.

5.10 What Should Emergency Managers Know About the Military?

Interview participants were asked for input on what emergency managers should be educated or trained about the military (question IV-1): "Can you help quantify the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event?" All interviewees had input.

Survey participants were asked a similar question: (5d) "Please help define the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event. I think that Emergency Managers need to know (should be briefed, trained, or educated)…," and were provided plenty of space to contribute comments.

Comments were supplied by 17 of the 19 EMD respondents. Like the interviewees, the survey participants offered many suggestions on ways that the DOD could improve their outreach to the emergency management community.[12]

One parish emergency management director (PEMD) offered that "Emergency Managers need a better understanding of the procedures to request assets and their availability." Most all PEMDs agreed that it was more important to fully define the response need, not quantify what resource was desired. That is, the emergency manager should not specifically request military assets. The PEMD continued: "[There needs to be] a clear understanding of the current system of accessing DOD assets through FEMA and the DCO housed at the FEMA Region. Speaking direct with NORTHCOM or NORAD (DOD) would merely add another layer that doesn't seem necessary."

Others expressed that "There is a huge gap between civil authorities and military authorities in terms of what resources can the DOD bring to bear in a civil emergency." "There is a need [for] some sort of Quick Reference Handbook for civilian emergency managers." The DOD continues to resist putting too much information forward to emergency managers, because it does not want to encourage EMs to have the military in mind when requesting resources, nor to expect that such equipment will always be available (reference to the warfight priority). EMs said that they "need to know capabilities that are available."

Several respondents, both interview and survey, offered that EMs would benefit by an understanding of how the military works, i.e., organization, management, and operating methods." EMs would benefit by knowing about "current SOPs [Standard Operating

[12] The complete list of comments supplied by interviewees can be found at paragraph 5.5, and those by survey respondents at paragraph 5.13.

Procedures] that DOD assets operate under, and the reason for the DOD chain of command." EMs "need to understand the capabilities and the way the military operates from response, logistics, [to] chain of command, etc. They also need to know how they will be integrated with the response and coordinate with the other [NG] military units assigned."

Another PEMD offered that "EM directors need to learn about DOD structure and organization. Information about how assets can be applied to the response. The logistics and maintenance tail. Education to counter stereotypes." And another similar opinion: "Training package, by DOD, on capabilities, capacities, coordination, logistics, Immediate Response, operational rules, etc." A survey respondent added "the chain of command, however, needs to be understood by the civilian organizations."

5.11 Principal Focus of the Research I

A principal focus of the research was to determine what the emergency manager, regardless of personal prior military experience, needs to know about the military in advance (preparedness) of the military ever arriving in support. Many comments were made and suggestions offered that help describe a body of knowledge that should become part of an emergency manager's education for the job. (See paragraph 5.5 for the full list from interviewees, and paragraph 5.13 for the full list from survey respondents.) This information could also be a part of the set of briefings that many new emergency managers receive when moving into a new top position.

A simple way of describing the root component of this information was to call it DOD 101, or entry-level basic education. A 101 course is generally considered applicable to many college majors and is a wide-ranging view of the subject material or presentation

of a basic skill set. The emergency manager's desire is to find out what's out there for potential support capabilities (including equipment), and how that support might fit into the operational puzzle when needed (personnel and doctrine).

5.12 Principal Focus of the Research II

A second principal focus of the research was to determine if there are differences between National Guard support for disasters and DOD support. Some questions were designed to determine an EMD's military background and on-the-job training (survey questions beginning with 2, and through questions 3a, b, and c; and directly through questions 4a and 5a.)

Some obvious answers are the following:

1. To most observers—visually, that is—there is no discernable difference between a DOD and a NG (Army) soldier. There have been many efforts over many years to make it that way, so that there was a high degree of sameness, and there was no difference in treatment of the individual.[13] Thus, active duty and reservists would be treated alike. Both are issued the same uniforms and equipment. Other than in unit patches and vehicle markings, there is no difference at the tactical (unit) level.

2. There is much more history of NG support to disasters, which also varies by state. Some states use their NG units relatively frequently, and some states almost never. The DOD does not have that history of such support, and does not actively promote domestic emergency response training to the majority of its soldiers and sailors. This is fully

[13] For many years, before equal uniforms and equipment, there was a form of discrimination against reservists, as second class soldiers, that is. Adoption of full uniformity of active and reserve soldiers and equal training opportunities, as well as demonstration of wartime effectiveness has almost completely erased that stigma.

understandable due to the need to focus on warfighting as its principal mission, and the design and training of specialized units and commands for the domestic mission.

Survey question #4a asked "Did you discover any differences between utilizing DOD support, versus NG support?" One respondent replied, "Yes. Approval and commitment of DOD leadership up to and including SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] & POTUS [President of the United States] for resource allocations and mission taskings." This response alludes to how far up the chain of command a request for DOD forces seemed to need to go before getting approval for the support. The NG chain is much shorter, and thus much quicker.

Another reported that the structure of the DOD was different. And another reported that such difficulty was overcome (during Hurricane Katrina response) by having the DOD forces assign a LNO as a go-between.

The one "No" reply had no recognizable problem because s/he used the NG LNO to act as intermediary. Another EMD confirmed the need for interface between the unit and the EOC. The NG LNO serves that function for the Guard, and the previous paragraph describes how one PEMD resolved the issue.

Survey question #4b asked "What information about the DOD military did you discover during the event that enabled you to more effectively work with the military for the duration of the event?" Respondents that answered the question (4 of 19) offered no consensus other than reinforcement of the LNO concept that Louisiana utilizes.

A question that the researcher developed, during interviews, somewhat late in the interview process, had to do with military experience. Since it was not asked of all interviewees, results cannot be construed as firm data: "Is it better to hire a military-

background person for your job than a non-military person who needs to be educated about the military?" Four PEMDs provided input, all agreeing that it would be an advantage to the individual, and thus to the office. One cautioned that it would be better if the military person had not progressed too high in rank; that the junior officers better understood operations at the response level and an exposure to basic management. One attitude difficult to change in former military personnel is recognizing that civilians do not appreciate being bossed around like junior enlisted personnel.

William Waugh's college-level course for FEMA/EMI (see paragraph 2.2.12), "Public Administration and Emergency Management," specifically addressed and advocated this EM-military relationship in Unit 15, "The Professionalization of Emergency Management:"

> Therefore, many emergency managers are retired or former military personnel, although growing numbers are coming into the profession from environmental protection agencies, nonprofit disaster organizations, and community groups. The diversity of backgrounds is encouraging a broader perspective on the field. (Waugh, 2000, 11)

5.13 Long Answer Responses From the Surveys

(Question 5d) Similar to a query presented during the interview process, a request was made to all survey participants to **"**Please help define the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event. I think that Emergency Managers need to know (should be briefed, trained, or educated):" The information is also present in the full-data spreadsheets in Appendix D.

- State emergency managers are typically quite familiar with the National Guard structure, resources, capabilities, etc. While the active duty military has its differences, they are not significant enough to be of concern.

- Since State emergency management coordinates its resource/assistance requirements via their federal counterparts, the federal counterparts are the ones that need to have in-depth knowledge of the active duty military.
- We do have frequent informal interaction with the resident military installations and our emergency responders which gives all parties a reasonable understanding of the capabilities and needs of each.
- As each of the services, branches, units and installations have such widely different structures, operating capabilities, restrictions etc., the most important aspect is knowing how to request assistance and having access to the EPLOs and the local installation MSCA/Emergency Preparedness staffs. The rest of the ”nice to have” information could fill a doctoral dissertation.
- The decision-making process for obtaining resources and time frame required, current SOPs that DOD assets operate under, the reason for DOD chain of command, and their inability to be integrated into a State’s Incident Action Plan as an asset under State Command & Control mechanisms.
- The last time significant DOD support was in [this state] was for Hurricane Andrew in 1992.
- All of the above if the EM has never been in the military or knowledgeable of military operations. However, it is a requirement that the military per Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) become compliant with NIMS and the NICS. What this means is that it is the military, not civilian, entities must speak a “common” language in communicating with each other. Thus, all those unknown and constant usages of acronyms are required to conform to a usable common

language so that everyone is on the same sheet of music when responding to a disaster. Chain of command however needs to be understood by the civilian organizations.

- Organizational structure and the Chain of Command.
- Should understand what kinds of units are available and what support they can provide.
- How to obtain the support.
- Timeline between request for support and arrival of support.
- How military units operate, i.e., organize and manage response. C2. [Command and Control]
- Costs involved.
- How to interface with the military chain of command.
- Any legal constraints to employing Title 10 units as opposed to National Guard units.
- The "footprint" of regular units.
- The rank structure of the military.
- A clear understanding of the current system of accessing DOD assets through FEMA and the DCO housed at the FEMA Region. Speaking directly with NORTHCOM or NORAD (DOD) would merely add another layer that doesn't seem necessary.
- Emergency Managers need a better understanding of the procedures of how to request assets and their availability.

- DOD, i.e., DOD's reengineered and improved process for civil authorities to request imagery and analysis.
- EMs should take the Phase I DSCA course. (This is a reference to NORTHCOM's Army North (ARNORTH) education program, principally for DCOs and EPLOs. Website: www.usarnorth.org/public/)
- EMs need to understand the role of the NG in providing support to civilian authorities.
- The differences between the two organizations, their activations and how they are financed.
- Must be fully briefed on DOD's pre-scripted mission assignments.
- Must have regular interaction with the military leadership who will be interacting with the civil authorities.
- Must participate in exercises where the civil authority is called upon to a) identify a situation where DOD resources must be called upon; b) must file the appropriate request; c) must participate in whatever after-action activities are necessary to correct gaps identified in the exercise.
- Must understand the relationship between the TAG, National Guard Assets, and DOD assets and who provides what.
- Must understand mobilization time-frames.
- Must engage DOD liaisons in state EOCs within planning cells as resource requests are processed. [Emergency Operations Center]
- Many DOD personnel do not understand NIMS or civilian ICS and the converse is also true. This will be problematic during an actual response.

- There is a huge gap between civil authorities and military authorities in terms of what resources the DOD can bring to bear in a civil emergency. The military has recently begun to work towards fixing this problem but we have a long way to go. One issue is clear to me. Military planners appear far more thorough and practical in the methods they use to build plans. Civilian planning in many EM organizations is substantially lacking. (And this comes from a person who has had no military experience.)
- Be clear in the mission request. Specifically what is to be done, what type of equipment & personnel is required, and what are the support requirements.
- Ability to support ICS and work in an ICS environment.
- Immediate Response process.
- Role of NORTHCOM.
- Role of National Guard.
- Need to know capabilities that are available.
- A single point of contact that will coordinate all military assets.
- DSCA [Defense Support of Civil Authorities]
- Military mutual aid (military post/base – local).
- Capabilities.
- Current legal issues on the use of the military in disasters.
- Relationship of Coast Guard to disaster operations at state and local levels.
- Relationship of DHS & DOD organizations to disaster operations.
- National Guard Title 10, Title 32, State Active Duty.
- …and understand the military system and chain of command.

- They need to understand the capabilities and the way the military operates from response, logistics, chain of command, etc.
- They also need to know how they will be integrated with the response and coordinate with the other military units assigned (National Guard).
- EMs need to remind the military the state governor is in charge of disaster recovery missions. DOD/NG need to adjust to the governor's organizational structure based on ICS and ESF and not the other way around. DOD needs to assess what type of equipment it should have on hand to assist the state with local disasters, whether typhoons, tsunamis, snow storms, ice storms, floods, etc.

5.14 Comparison of Data Between Interview Results and Survey Results

There were few differences between data obtained by interview and by survey. The quantity of information received, as judged by the researcher, was much greater from interviewees owing to the ease of dissemination.

It was understood that most people use computers and that fact was behind the reason that email was heavily used and an electronic version of the survey was constructed. Fewer than half (7 of 19) of the surveys were manually completed. Most (12 of 19) survey replies were electronically generated, four by email message only. There was more content (words) supplied electronically (i.e., emailed message and/or electronic form) than manually (i.e., hand written, mailed responses).

The researcher was diligent in providing opportunities for interview and survey respondents to voice concerns about the military support process, and to offer opinions and recommendations about what EMs should learn about military support.

Chapter Six — Discussion and Conclusions

6.1 Validity of the Research

Yin discusses the advantage of using multiple sources of evidence (data), which promotes the development of "converging lines of inquiry" (Yin, 1994, 92). These converging lines are similar to triangulation, or the "use of multiple and different sources, methods, investigators, and theories to provide corroborating evidence" (Creswell, 1998, 202). The researcher's use of literature search, personal work experiences, interviews, and surveys all contribute to the validity of the research. The researcher's question set was fully understood by the interviewed and surveyed population is a measure of face validity. Additional validity was provided by prolific suggestions and recommendations by interview and survey participants about the content of DSCA education.

The consistency of the data—especially the suggestions by interview and survey respondents about what information they seek to learn in advance about the DOD's support—constitutes construct validity: "general agreement among ratings, gathered independently of one another, where measures should be theoretically related" (Writing@CSU, 2005).

In similar fashion, the use of matrix evaluation facilitated drawing conclusions through the discovery of themes and patterns, comparisons, and weighted evidence contributed toward the validity of the research analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994, 263, 156, & 242).

Miles and Huberman (1994, 268) also speak to the strength of the data from firsthand collection of data in an informal setting, with the researcher alone with the subject.

Context validity for this research is demonstrated on the following fronts:

- By the relationship to the investigative reporting by the GAO into DSCA capabilities by DOD units and levels of equipment support in the National Guard. Refer to paragraph 2.2.6 for a list and discussion GAO reports relevant to the DSCA arena.
- By the initiatives begun by the DOD in improving future DSCA in the past few years, including criticisms and lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. Planning efforts in multiple DOD commands and units are ongoing to better prepare for catastrophic disasters. Most significant is the designation of four army brigades for training and preparedness for the domestic mission, as discussed in paragraph 6.9.

6.2 Study Limitations

There are many obstacles to performing research on disaster events. In attempting to investigate a recent event, or one that is still in process, sometimes the people that are interview targets have little time to expend on work not related to the continuing disaster recovery.

In attempting to investigate a particular point, it may be that the population to query is quite small. In any survey, the return rate may be too small or skewed by insufficient spread to the sample.

The researcher experienced small return numbers due primarily to the small eligible research population. For the interviews, there were only 15 parishes that experienced DOD support post-Hurricane Katrina. For the surveys, while input was encouraged from any state emergency management director (SEMD), the majority of states have not experienced any disaster event that resulted in the DOD providing support. Suggestions

made to the researcher, as a response to the prompt, "Please help define the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military," were in large part based on the degree of unfamiliarity that SEMDs have with DOD capabilities for domestic disaster response.

As discussed in the scope of research (paragraph 1.6), the ability to perform research on DSCA is limited by the lack of reporting by JDOMS about support activity. In the past, some of the SECDEF's Annual Reports to the President and the Congress have mentioned support provided to civilians, but these reports listed only brief highlights, and did not offer details. A search of the internet found the DOD Office of the Executive Secretary, which had a link to a list of available reports: http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr_intro.html. The most recent report was for Fiscal Year 2005 (October 01, 2004 through September 30, 2005).

6.3 Research Venues

It was fortunate—for the researcher, not the hurricane victims—that Hurricane Katrina happened along. The original target of the research was Hurricane Andrew (1992), as the last incident requiring large scale DOD response. While much has been written about Hurricane Andrew, the primary goal was to talk with county emergency managers. Since at least 15 years had passed since Andrew, there was a perception that finding these individuals might be arduous. Hurricane Katrina's devastation, requiring substantial DOD response, made the post-Katrina Louisiana "fertile territory for research," in the words of the researcher's advisor.

A diligent attempt was made to interview all of the Hurricane Katrina-affected parish emergency management directors (PEMD). Hurricane Rita occurred quickly after Katrina

and affected some parishes again, and other parishes in the same manner as Katrina did. As DOD units were still deployed to Louisiana performing Katrina response missions, units were given orders to assist in mitigating the effects of Rita. In general terms, there was little difference between the two hurricanes.

6.4 Arrival of DOD Military Support

The principal problem with the DOD's response to Hurricane Katrina was that it was not supplied as a result of the NRP's[14] organized request process. When it was apparent that timely and sufficient aid was not getting to the affected area, President George W. Bush ordered the military to send units there. Lieutenant General Russel Honoré and his principal staff arrived quickly, well before any responding troops, to begin assessing potential DOD support missions. As the units began arriving in state, they were apportioned across the affected area according to perceived need. Their arrival, then, was not as a result of the bottom-up request process (local-to-state-to-federal), it was top-down directed.

6.5 Military Coordination

There were strong attempts at coordination between the military entities providing support. The principal military responders were the National Guard and the U.S. Army. There was some attempt at designating a single military commander, which gets into the status of service arena: State Active Duty (SAD), Title 32, and Title 10. In simple terms, Title 10 (active component) cannot command and control SAD personnel, and vice versa. A request was made to the governor of Louisiana to allow conversion of the NG from SAD to Title 10, but the governor and the NG were in strong opposition. NG units can be

[14] National Response Plan, the current national emergency response guidance at the federal level at the time of the hurricane. At the time of the release of this dissertation, the National Response Framework (NRF) is in effect.

ordered to active duty, but short of wartime need—in this case a domestic mission—the active component did not push the issue. Dual command remained in effect, with strong attempts at coordination.

DOD units did arrive at the local level, in this case, the parish. The parish emergency managers basically had requested large amounts of support, but the arrival of DOD units was not expected. The mission orders for DOD units, from LTG Honoré, were very basic and broad: "Save lives, prevent property damage, and do the right thing," as one interviewee reported to the researcher. Their arrival at the parish EOC, then, was unexpected, with the PEMD having to be informed about the capabilities that the DOD units brought.

6.6 Employing the Military for Response; Requesting Military Support

As most PEMDs reported, the most workable solution for determining what and how these military units could be employed was for the PEMD to turn to their familiar military support asset, the Louisiana NG Liaison Officer (LNO). In a few cases, the military supplied a LNO to work in the EOC, and the two LNOs then worked together to coordinate support.

When a military advisor, e.g., an assigned LNO, recommends to the PEMD that a military resource would meet a response need, the military advisor can also assist the PEMD in wording the request for support that would facilitate a military solution. It is primarily through such advice that resource assets can best meet the need.

6.7 Differences Between Employing NG and DOD Support

When DOD support arrived in the parish, PEMDs soon found that the routes for getting the two military types to perform missions differed greatly:

6.7.1 The NG Support Process

The NG LNO worked the PEMD's mission request by passing the request directly to the state JDOMS at state NG headquarters. The mission request was then put in the queue of all current requests for NG support. The NG response was then directed from state level. NG support arriving in the parish area was then directed by the LNO. In most cases, active participation by the PEMD was not required. NG units and personnel are usually very familiar with operating and providing support in the domestic arena.

6.7.2 The DOD Support Process

The DOD LNO passed the PEMD's mission request to the unit commander and staff, and orders were immediately issued to the unit(s) in the area, and the troops got to work. The level of unfamiliarity between the PEMD and the DOD support was generally high.

6.8 Duration of Support

The duration of support also differed greatly. When requests for support by the DOD units began to slack off, DOD autonomously began to phase down the quantity of support to the area. This process is rooted in the traditional policy of domestic support: DOD is to be used for response, not recovery purposes, and is generally limited to approximately ten days. Limits on DOD support are specified in DOD policy document Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). Paragraph 5.7.14 guides that "Emergency work by the Department of Defense under that provision may be carried out only for a period not to exceed 10 days" (DOD, 1993). NG support, whether from in state units or from EMAC-assisting units, is supplied as long as the need exists and the funds hold out.

As discussed in the survey analysis portion of this document, PEMDs agree that the system in place in Louisiana, the direct assignment of a NG LNO to the parish, who informs and educates the director and staff about what NG assets are available and advice on using them, works very well. Thus, short of outreach by DOD components such as by NORTHCOM or Defense Coordinating Officers (DCO), there is no comprehensive advance knowledge—by the local level EM director—of what the DOD has available, and could bring to the response effort.

6.9 Success in Achieving the Research Objectives

The researcher believes that in spite of the limited data gathering, the results produced consistent material for analysis. There was a strong consistency between the great majority of respondents that there needs to be an increase in the amount of information about military support—especially the DOD military—for emergency managers at all levels. The researcher has observed, over several years of doctoral emergency management education and research, that there has been an improvement in the efforts that the DOD has made in its preparedness for the domestic disaster response arena. (Also see the next section, 6.10.)

There have been only two significant, i.e., large scale or catastrophic, disaster events in the past few decades that the DOD has responded to in quantity: Hurricane Andrew (1992) and Hurricane Katrina (2005)—compounded in a fashion by Hurricane Rita. Due to the length of time since Andrew, and the limited geography of the damage, there is not a large population of emergency managers who experienced DOD support to be investigated.

The lack of large scale events (a good thing, of course) across the nation requiring DOD response has also limited the research pool, leading to very limited survey results. Emergency managers, though, are not short on opinions and good ideas, always seeking to improve the preparedness and capabilities of disaster response entities.

6.10 Improvements by the DOD in Domestic Support in Recent Years

At the time of beginning this research (2004), little could be seen by the researcher that demonstrated a very proactive approach by the DOD military in terms of general preparedness for the domestic mission. There continued to be strong approaches toward preparedness against terrorism in the post-September 11th environment: specifically the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) mission, with the creation and growth of specialized units and commands such as Joint Task Force – Civil Support (JTF-CS), and the Marine Corps CBIRF (Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force), etc.

In October 2002, the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was established as a separate entity from NORAD (North American Defense, a U.S.-Canadian Joint Command). The command was given one principal mission: Homeland Security, which has two parts: Homeland Defense (primarily carried out by NORAD) and Civil Support.

In line with this mission, in May of 2003, the responsibility for military support of domestic disasters was transferred to NORTHCOM with the establishment of JDOMS – Joint Director of Military Support, a mission taken from the U.S. Army (DOD Joint Staff Order, 2003). Over the six years since being directly given the civil support mission, NORTHCOM has gradually made changes in orientation and focus toward the domestic (civil support) mission.

In September 2008 NORTHCOM announced that a civil support mission was being given to the first of what would be a total of four (Army) brigade-sized units. An army brigade is approximately 5000 personnel in size. The announcement was made that up to 20,000 military personnel would become trained and ready for the domestic response mission – over time: full readiness is projected to be in 2011. The expansion of the mission given to CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, High-Yield Explosives) Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF) would now include preparedness and training for domestic disaster response (NORTHCOM, 2008).

A December 1, 2008, story in the Washington Post indicated that "The U.S. military expects to have 20,000 uniformed troops inside the United States by 2011 trained to help state and local officials respond to a nuclear terrorist attack or other domestic catastrophe" (Hsu & Tyson, 2008, A01).

Gen (Ret.) Barry McCaffrey's After Action Report, following a visit to NORAD and NORTHCOM offered:

> NORTHCOM is most comfortable describing the considerable threat of national disaster…. There is no question that coordinated action by US military forces is vital to saving lives and resources with emergency civil action to protect the people (3).
>
> The American people rightly demand that civil public institutions not military forces exercise primacy in protection the US domestic population. However, the planning and emergency operational scale and power of the US Armed Forces simply must be placed at the service of civil authorities when major disaster strikes.
>
> The US Armed Forces are the most trusted institution in American society. The immediate and palpable sense of relief in New Orleans when the brave men and women of the Coast Guard and the Armed Forces were finally fully committed was powerful and inspirational. Never again can we allow human suffering on a massive scale to occur without immediately and effectively committing the full strength of our military forces.
>
> NORTHCOM is now in a position to promise effective and rapid domestic action in support of civil authorities. (McCaffrey, 2008, 5)

In December 2008, the SECDEF announced a new Unified Command Plan, signed by the President on 17 December 2008, which assigned "all combatant commanders responsibility for planning and conducting military support to stability, security,

transition, and reconstruction operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief" (SECDEF, 2008, 2). In short, all combatant commanders have already been advised of their responsibility to act as supporting commands to any lead command given a domestic support mission. The new directive gives warning that any command may be designated the lead in a domestic response mission. It is not just NORTHCOM that should be the most ready; all of DOD should be ready to support.

Nowhere in these announcements has there been any evidence of outreach—education or training efforts—aimed at the civilian emergency manager.

6.11 Recommendations

6.11.1 Answering the Research Question

The researcher concedes that the data has been gathered from a very small sample of local, i.e., county level, emergency managers (EM). The strength of that sample, though, is based on infrequent direct support by DOD units to that jurisdictional level. The reality is that a very small amount of local EMs nationwide have ever experienced DOD support. Such support occurs only in catastrophic situations (e.g., Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina), and thus has occurred rarely during the past few decades.

Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA): What Do Emergency Managers Need to Know? This research shows that EMs need to know what is possible for types and capabilities of response assets that the DOD owns. EMs need something that they can learn from—education, training, briefings, etc.—that they can file away in their personal memory. They also need reference material that they can pull off the shelf to re-familiarize themselves with those possibilities, and information that assists them in quantifying their requests for assistance that would be well served with a military

response. EMs also recommend exercising with these potential military assets, to promote the conversion of theory to practice.

State level EMDs have advisors—EPLOs and outreach contact by DCOs—that local emergency managers do not have.

6.11.2 Education About the DOD for Civil Emergency Managers

As discussed above and in Chapter 5, (section 5.11) SEMDs—and PEMDs especially—agreed that they would be better prepared for DOD support if a training or briefing package, or handbook could be designed for them that would educate them about just what the DOD could bring to the disaster response.

Since it is frequently difficult to get away from the job, both in terms of time available and finding funds for such training, interview and survey respondents recommended that any training courses developed might also include a distance learning component. Such a course might be online or on a DVD or CD, complete with reference materials, for self-study learning.

The following content is based on input to the researcher from the long answer responses by interviewees and surveys, and from the researcher's readings in the DSCA arena, particularly from content in GSA, CRS, and think tank documents. The content suggests how the Department of Defense can more proactively offer DSCA preparedness to the civilian community. Focus of any materials generated through this effort should be on support to the local emergency manager.

A handbook, guide, textbook, or reference manual should be created which will fully explain the concepts and procedures of DOD support, including capabilities of personnel, units, and equipment. This text would become a reference manual, to be filed with

operational plans, ready to be pulled when needed. This guidance should be written in non-technical style, versus a style common to military readers, as much as possible. Heavy use of acronyms, for example, would be discouraged. Probable chapter content follows.

- Explain the military's contribution to mutual aid and the tenets and procedures for Immediate Response.
- Prepare information on methods of requesting military support, or guidance on describing mission requests that will indicate that specific military support is desired.
- Provide information about limitations on employment of DOD units, such as Posse Comitatus.
- Provide a list of pre-scripted mission assignments and describe what the local emergency manager should know about DOD support for these missions.
- Prepare a list of special application DOD units and capabilities that would likely be directed to provide DSCA. Indicate opportunities for exercising and pre-event interface with DOD units likely to provide DSCA support.
- Prepare descriptions (including pictures) of military equipment capable of performing disaster response. Type or quantify these capabilities in a manner similar to DHS/FEMA's Mutual Aid Resource Typing initiative. Military equipment should be described in terms of what it can do, in higher or lower levels of capability.
- Describe unusual size and space requirements that specific units or equipment generate onsite.

- Describe support requirements that specific units and equipment come with, that the emergency manager should be aware of, e.g., number of civilian support personnel, fuel, water, consumables, trash generation or disposal, etc., if not self supporting.
- Prepare content (e.g., briefings, brochures, training packages) about the many components of DOD support, i.e., all service components (Army, Marine, etc.), including both active and reserve units. The Coast Guard, too, should be requested to prepare informative publications about support to civil authorities.
- Explain the structure and organization of military components and units, including uniforms, rank, and skill markings so civilians will understand them. (Barbara Schading's book "A Civilian's Guide to the U.S. Military" is a good example of educational material [Schading, 2007].)
- Prepare informative materials on countering stereotypes and preconceived notions about the military and its service components.
- Explain how to interface with the military chain of command. Plan for liaisons to the civilian organization being supported.
- Explain the true costs of doing business, both financial implications and impacts on wartime readiness.
- Describe timelines for providing support (time between requesting support and the arrival of supporting units), and explain any limitations on duration of support.
- Offer guidance on determining end points, to help quantify mission accomplishment and defining exit strategies.

- Describe relevant military training and educational offerings available to civilian emergency managers.
- Describe outreach and educational programs focused on local and state emergency managers. Offer advice on where and how to obtain more information.

6.11.3 Addition of Course Content About the Military in FEMA/EMI Programs

The researcher recommends the creation of instructional content about the military's contribution to the disaster response effort in both the FEMA/EMI Independent Study Program (www.training.fema.gov/IS/) and in the FEMA Higher Education Program: college-level course development. (www.training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/ and www.training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/collegecrsbooks.asp)

6.11.4 Addition of Content About the Military to Certification Education

The International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) Certified Emergency Manager® (CEM®) commission should add information about military support to the content of its recommended education for certification and to the CEM® examination. This recommendation is also valid when considering international education and examinations, as many countries use military and para-military forces for support to civil authorities in disaster response and recovery.

6.11.5 Education About the Military in FEMA/EMI Programs and Certification Programs

Content about the use of the military in disaster events is needed in the many programs that FEMA/EMI offers. The research shows that emergency managers want an introduction to how the military—both NG and DOD—plans for and contributes to preparedness and response to emergencies, disasters, and catastrophes. Whole or part-

sessions in college-level courses in the FEMA/EMI Higher Education Program should be added, and a FEMA/EMI Independent Study Program course should be developed. In addition, questions about military support should be subsequently added to the Certified Emergency Manager® examination.

6.12 Recommendations for Further Research

The researcher offers the following ideas for further research in the DSCA arena:

6.12.1 Large-scale Survey of Local Emergency Managers

This research was performed on a small segment of county-level emergency managers. Proponents of emergency management research, such as IAEM, NEMA, and specifically the DOD (probably NORTHCOM) should conduct a large-scale, i.e., nationwide investigation into the perceived need for domestic disaster support education by the DOD.

Since the DOD is poised principally to respond in time of great need, or for catastrophic events, as most emergency management pessimists say, it's not a question of if, but when such a disaster will occur. Many plans and efforts at preparedness exist that focus on certain, specific potential catastrophic disaster events: a New Madrid Seismic Zone earthquake, a massive Pacific Coast subsidence or a tsunami, a terrorism event such as a nuclear explosion in a large city, or another Andrew or Katrina. All are possible, or in some cases predicted, and any such occurrence will in all likelihood trigger large-scale DOD assistance. The principal problem continues to be response by the DOD in means contrary to existing plans. Regardless of the cause, or the method of DOD response, local EMs will experience DOD support, and research demonstrates they are not prepared for it.

This researcher does not expect that this limited investigation will prompt the DOD to implement recommended actions, but a major military command's investigative efforts would likely confirm this effort. As NORTHCOM is charged with the domestic civil support mission, it would be a principal candidate to sponsor additional research.

Reporting by the DOD about ongoing DSCA missions each year, at least in the SECDEF's Annual Reports, would also help researchers determine additional populations that have received DOD DSCA. Alternatively, a report by the NORTHCOM JDOMS, detailing DSCA support provided during the previous year, would provide the best clarity.

6.12.2 DOD Readiness for the Domestic Mission

The researcher recommends an examination of familiarity with the domestic support mission that DOD forces currently have. Even after recent actions to assign forces a domestic civil support mission, it is unclear whether DOD units are equal to the non-warfighting tasks as are NG forces, which perform domestic support missions much more frequently.

6.12.3 The DOD Education System – Domestic Response Curricula

This research supports a thorough, probably from the inside, examination of all training and education content related to the domestic mission in DOD training and education venues. This effort should involve all services (Army, Navy, etc.) and all ranks (officer, enlisted, and civilian). Officer training for the domestic mission should begin in officer training curriculum (service academies and ROTC); enlisted training should begin in basic NCO (Noncommissioned Officer) training; and aspects of non-warfighting

training should be placed in basic training for all military members. The researcher is not aware of any full-range studies in this arena.

6.12.4 Do Prior Military EMDs Request Military Support More Often Than Do Non-military EMDs?

The roots of emergency management leadership are in the history of civil defense (CD), and many CD leaders were military and former military. There were also large numbers of military veterans following World War II and the Korean Conflict, many of which transitioned to CD preparedness during the Cold War. As CD transitioned into the EM environment we know today, it still lends itself to the military mindset: a focus on plans, exercises, and command and control. The heavy use of NG assets for state disasters also promotes the need for familiarity with the military in EM settings.

As noted by the researcher about differences between states and their use of state NG forces for disaster events (some a lot, some very infrequently), an examination into any propensity of former military personnel to lean more heavily toward requesting and using military resources is a recommended research effort. The heavy or frequent use of state NG forces also has the potential for reducing potential income for private industry's participation and contracting for disaster response. Heavy reliance on state NG forces also is problematic when large portions of those forces transition to warfighting support for the active component (e.g., duty in Iraq or Afghanistan). State governors have no power to refuse activation orders, nor deployment orders, for NG units within their state called to the warfight.

6.13 Final Thoughts by the Researcher

The research indicates that local (parish/county/city) emergency managers do not generally expect DOD support to arrive in their jurisdiction unless a catastrophe or large-scale event occurs.

DOD response of specialized diving equipment to the I-35 bridge collapse over the Mississippi River in Minneapolis, MN, in August 2007 was facilitated by the presence of a U.S. Naval Reserve EPLO (Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer) who was aware of the DOD capability and recommended that it be requested. The DOD's response of supplying nine hyperbaric chambers to the Quecreek Mine Disaster rescue effort in Somerset, PA, in July 2002 was facilitated by a retired U.S. Navy doctor who knew about the equipment and their capabilities and recommended that they be requested. Many more examples of the use of specialized military assets to save lives are possible here. The requests for the use of DOD capabilities in these examples were possible only because of serendipitous circumstances. The creation of an outreach program by the DOD, down to the local level, would facilitate such opportunities for specialized support.

This research shows that, in spite of a small likelihood of need, local emergency managers—and state emergency managers—would very much like the DOD to proactively prepare an educational package that informs emergency managers about what and how the DOD can provide domestic disaster assistance in time of great need.

The research also shows that local emergency managers are insufficiently educated about the tenets of DOD's Immediate Response capability. Most have heard something about posse comitatus, but do not fully understand its implications for any DOD response in their jurisdiction.

These recommendations are not advocating an increase in requests for military support, only that if and when the solution to a specific problem might be military assets, the emergency manager would be better served if s/he was even aware of the possibilities. As the researcher's advisor, a retired U.S. Coast Guard Captain commented, "As an informed emergency manager, I know 1) what the [military] capability is, 2) I know who has it, and 3) I know how to ask for it. This knowledge is missing at the local EM level."

The researcher does not advocate that the DOD military expand its DSCA support, only that making information available on a wider basis would "save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage," as DOD's primary DSCA policy guidance stipulates (DOD, 1997, 4).

References

Anderson, W. A. 1969. "Social Structure and the Role of the Military in Natural Disaster." *Sociology and Social Research*. **53** pp. 242–253

Block, R. & Fields, G. 2004. "Is Military Creeping Into Domestic Spying and Enforcement?" *The Wall Street Journal*. 09 March 2004. pp.B1

Bohan, C. 2005. "Bush mulls lead role for military in disasters." *Reuters*. URL: www.redorbit.com/news/general/250726/bush_mulls_lead_role_for_military_in_disasters/index.html. Accessed 24 April 2009.

Bradley, L. M., Stephens, L. S., & Shaw, M. 2007. "The Posse Comitatus Act: Does It Impact the Department of Defense during Consequence Management Operations?" *The Army Lawyer*, (DA Pam 27-50-413). **413**. pp.68–74.

CNGR (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves). 2008. *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force*. Washington, DC.

Bowman, S. & Crowhurst, J. 2006. *Homeland Security: Evolving Roles and Missions for United States Northern Command*. Congressional Research Service. CRS Report RS21322.

Bowman, S.; Kapp, L.; Belasco, A. 2005. *Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response*. Congressional Research Service. CRS Report RL33095.

Creswell, J. W. 1998. *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Traditions*. SAGE Publications, Inc.: Thousand Oaks, CA.

Decker, R. J. 2003. *Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions*. U.S. General Accounting Office. GAO-03-670.

DHS (U.S. Department of Homeland Security). 2004. *National Response Plan*.

DHS (U.S. Department of Homeland Security). 2008. *National Response Framework*.

DOD (U.S. Department of Defense). 1993. *Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)*, DOD Directive 3025.1.

DOD (U.S. Department of Defense). 1994. *Manual for Civil Emergencies*, DOD Manual 3025.1.

DOD (U.S. Department of Defense). 1995. *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)*. Joint Publication 3-07.

DOD (U.S. Department of Defense). 1997. *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA)*, DOD Directive 3025.15.

DOD (U.S. Department of Defense). 2000. *Military Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) Program*. DOD Directive 3025.16.

DOD (U.S. Department of Defense) Joint Staff Order. 2003. *Transfer Of The Army Director Of Military Support To The Joint Staff*. (141916ZMay03).

DOD (U.S. Department of Defense). 2004. *National Military Strategy*. (Unnumbered)

DOD (U.S. Department of Defense). 2008. *National Defense Strategy*. (Unnumbered)

DOD-OIG (U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General). 2006. *Logistics: Use of DOD Resources Supporting Hurricane Katrina Disaster*. Report Number D-2007-002.

Doubler, M. D. & Listman, J. W. Jr. 2003. *The National Guard: An Illustrated History of America's Citizen-Soldiers*. Brassey's, Inc.: Washington, DC.

(Editor). 2007. "Defense Coordinating Element Provides Assistance in Minneapolis." *American Forces Press Service*. URL: www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47012. Accessed: 13 March 2009.

FEMA (U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency). 1992. *Federal Response Plan*. (Unnumbered)

Ferguson, T. 2007. "An Assessment of Army Forces Supporting Hurricane Katrina Relief." Fort Belvoir, VA: U.S. Army Center for Analysis (CAA).

Foster, G. M. 1983. *The Demands of Humanity: Army Medical Disaster Relief*, Army Historical Series, CMH Pub 40-3. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History.

Freedberg, Jr, S.J. 2005. "After Katrina – Beyond Federalism." *National Journal*. 08 October 2005. Vol. 37, Iss. 41.

Governor of Louisiana. 2005. *Overview of Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco's Actions in Preparation For and Response To Hurricane Katrina*.

Hinton, H. L. Jr. 1993. *Disaster Assistance: DOD's Support for Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki and Typhoon Omar*. U.S. General Accounting Office. GAO/NSIAD-93-180.

Lauve, R. F. 1983. *Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*. U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). (Unnumbered)

Madison, J. 1788. "The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered." *Federalist Papers*. Number 45. URL: http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_45.html. Accessed: 20 March 2008.

Marshall, C. & Rossman, G.B. 1999. "Designing Qualitative Research." 3rd Ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.

McCaffrey, GEN (Ret) B. R. 2008. "After Action Report: Visit To North American Aerospace Defense Command And United States Northern Command." Department of Defense. 14 October 2008.

McDonnell, J. 1993. "Hurricane Andrew: Historical Report." Fort Belvoir, VA: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Office of History.

Miles, B. & Huberman, A. M. 1994. *Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook*. SAGE Publications, Inc.: Thousand Oaks, CA.

Milliman, J., Grosskopf, J. W., & & Paez, O. E. 2006a. "An Exploratory Study of Local Emergency Managers' Views of Military Assistance / Defense Support to Civil Authorities (MACA/DSCA)." *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management*. **3**(1) Article 2. 19 pp.

Milliman, J., Grosskopf, J. W., & & Paez, O. E. 2006b. "Emergency Managers' Views on Improving Defense Support / Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (DSCA/MACA) Education Programs." *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management*. **3**(2) Article 6. 15 pp.

Moniz, D. & Kelley, M. 2005. "Military's role in disasters reconsidered." *USA Today*. URL: www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-09-18-katrina-military_x.htm. Accessed: 13 March 2009.

Murphy, P. F., JR. 2006. "Katrina changed Guard's goal." *AUSA News*, **29**(6) pp.21–22.

NORTHCOM (U. S. Northern Command). 2008. Press Release: *U.S. Northern Command gains dedicated response force*. 30 September 2008

Osborne, C. W. 2006. “The History of Military Assistance for Domestic Natural Disasters: The Return to a Primary Role for the Department of Defense in the Twenty-First Century?” *The Army Lawyer* (DA Pam 27-50-403). **403** pp. 1–18.

Peach, J. D. 1993a. *Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's Response to Catastrophic Disasters*. U.S. General Accounting Office. GAO/RCED-93-186.

Peach, J. D. 1993b. *Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need to Improve the Nation's Response Strategy*. U.S. General Accounting Office. GAO-T/RCED-93-4

Peach, J. D. 1993c. *Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need to Improve the Nation's Response Strategy*. U.S. General Accounting Office. GAO-T/RCED-93-13.

Peckinpaugh, C. 2002. “Is Posse Comitatus passé?” *Federal Computer Week*. p.39.

PL 81-920 (U.S. Public Law 81-920), as amended. 1951. *Civil Defense Act of 1950*. (Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended). U.S. Congress.

PL 100-707 (U.S. Public Law, 100-707), as amended. 1988. *Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act*. U.S. Congress.

Platt, R. H. 1999. *Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of Extreme Natural Events*. Washington, DC: Island Press.

Schading, B. 2007. *A Civilian’s Guide to the U.S. Military*. Cincinnati, OH: Writer’s Digest Books.

Schmitt, E., & Shanker, T. 2005. “Military May Propose an Active-Duty Force for Relief Efforts.” *New York Times* (nytimes.com): URL:

www.nytimes.com/2005/10/11/politics/11military.html?scp=1&sq=&st=nyt. Accessed: 12 March 2009.

SECDEF (Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense) Order. 2003. *Transfer of the Army Director of Military Support to the Joint Staff*. U.S. Department of Defense.

SECDEF (Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense). 2008. *Unified Command Plan*. U.S. Department of Defense.

St. Laurent, J. A. 2007. *Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness*. U.S. Government Accountability Office. GAO/GGD-07-60.

Sullivan, G. R. 1993. "Hurricane Andrew: An After-Action Report." *Army*. **43**(1) pp.16–22.

Tsu, S. S. & Tyson, A. S. 2008. "Pentagon to Detail Troops to Bolster Domestic Security." *Washington Post.com*. December 1, 2008. URL: www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/30/AR2008113002217.html. Accessed: 08 April 2009.

U.S. Constitution. 1787.

U.S. House Cmte (U.S. House of Representatives Committee Hearing). 2005a. *The Critical Role of the National Guard at Home and Abroad*. U.S. House Committee on Government Reform.

U.S. House Cmte (U.S. House of Representatives Joint Committee Hearing). 2005b. *Responding to Catastrophic Events: The Role of the Military and National Guard in Disaster Response*. U.S. House Armed Service Committee's Subcommittee on

Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology & U.S. House Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities.

U.S. House Cmte (U.S. House Committee Hearing). 2007a. *Examining the Military's Support of Civil Authorities During Disasters*. U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security; Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response.

U.S. House Cmte (U.S. House Committee Hearing). 2007b. *Examining the Impact of Equipment Shortages on the National Guard's Readiness for Homeland Security Missions*. U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security; Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight.

U.S. House Cmte (U.S. House Committee Hearing). 2007c. *Practicing Like We Play: Examining Homeland Security Exercises*. U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security; Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response.

U.S. House of Representatives. 2006. *A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina*. Washington, DC: U.S. Congress.

U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM Press Release), 2008. "U.S. Northern Command gains dedicated response force." URL: www.northcom.mil/News/2008/093008.html, Accessed: 03 October 2008.

U.S. Senate. 2006. *Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared*. Washington, DC: U.S. Congress.

U.S. Senate Cmte (U.S. Senate Committee Hearing). 2006. *Hurricane Katrina: The Defense Department's Role in the Response*. U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

U.S. Senate Cmte (U.S. Senate Committee Hearing). 2007. *The Military's Role in Disaster Response: Progress Since Hurricane Katrina*. U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

U.S. Senate Cmte (U.S. Senate Committee Hearing). 2008. *The Defense Department's Homeland Security Role: How the Military Can and Should Contribute*. U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

USArmy (U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army). 1993. *Domestic Support Operations*, Field Manual 100-19.

USArmy (U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army). 2006a. *How the Army Runs*.

USArmy (U.S. Department of Defense, Department of the Army). 2006b. *Catastrophic Disaster Response Staff Officer's Handbook: Techniques and Procedures*. Center for Army Lessons Learned. Publication Number 06-8.

Walker, D. M. 2006. *Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness, Response, and Recovery*. U.S. Government Accountability Office. GAO-06-442T.

Walker, D. M. 2005. *Reserve Forces: Army National Guard's Role, Organization, and Equipment Need to be Reexamined*. U.S. Government Accountability Office. GAO-06-170T.

Watt, G. W., Chair. 1997. "The Role of the National Guard in Emergency Preparedness and Response." *National Academy of Public Administration*: Washington, DC. xi.

Waugh, W. L., Jr. 2000. College course: "*Public Administration and Emergency Management*" (Session 15, pg 11). Emmitsburg, MD: FEMA Emergency Management Institute. URL: www.training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/paem.asp. Accessed: 07 May 2009.

White House. 2006. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington, DC.

Writing@CSU. 2005. Reliability *and Validity*. Colorado State University Department of English. (Contributors include: Jonathan Howell, Paul Miller, Hyun Hee Park, Deborah Sattler, Todd Schack, Eric Spery, Shelley Widhalm, and Mike Palmquist.) URL: http://writing.colostate.edu/guides/research/relval/. Accessed: 30 April 2009

Yin, R. K. 1994. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Second Edition*. SAGE Publications, Inc.: Thousand Oaks, CA.

APPENDICES

Appendix A — Data Collection Tools

Tab A Letter of Invitation to Participate in the Interview

School of Engineering and Applied Sciences
1776 G. St., N.W. (Suite 110) Washington, D.C. 20052
John R. Harrald, Ph.D. & Joseph Barbera, M.D., Co-Directors

06 July 2007

TO: Parish Emergency Managers

I am a doctoral candidate at The George Washington University, pursuing a Doctor of Science in Engineering Management program through the Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management. I have completed my academic requirements, and am now beginning my thesis research.

I have examined historical information about DOD participation/response to significant disaster events (hurricane, flood, wildfire, etc.) that occurred in this country over the past half century or so, but principally beginning with the inception of modern emergency management (as put forth in the April 1992 issuance of the Federal Response Plan) to the present.

My initial research, which included a great deal of reading in the subject area, that is, use of the military for domestic disaster response. I have focused on events of recent years, generally since 1992, and very specifically Hurricanes Andrew (1992) and Katrina (2005).

I am contacting you because of your experience in emergency management—and particularly your involvement in Hurricane Katrina. I was given your name by the Louisiana Director of Emergency Management, COL Jeff Smith, as having been involved in your Parish receiving DOD support post-Katrina. I would like to ask you questions, in an interview at your convenience, about certain aspects of the event, for my research. The focus of my research is Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), and how to best educate and inform the civilian emergency management community—management and staff; leaders and workers—about military support and optimal methods for requesting and employing that support.

I would prefer to interview you face-to-face. I have prepared a general format of questions to ask (included), but the interview will be only generally structured, requesting that you give expository answers and comments. If a face-to-face interview is not

possible, or you chose not to do so, I request that we conduct it over the telephone at a date and time of your choosing. As I said, I have attached a copy of the interview questions, in order that you might be prepared more fully.

For now, I request that you complete the enclosed questionnaire (survey) and return it to me in the envelope provided, or reply via email. While desirable for my data collection, your completion of the survey is not required.

Notice the code (Q-Code, upper left-hand corner) on the survey pages. A code is used to identify your response instead of by your name. This ensures privacy and confidentiality. Your name will not appear in the dissertation or in any subsequent publications.

I will want to record your interview to ensure accuracy of your responses to my questions. The interview tape/file will be destroyed after transcription to paper.

Please also read, sign, and date the Informed Consent form, and return it with the completed survey. Make a copy for your records, if you desire. An Informed Consent form will again be required at the time of the interview.

Thank you,

/ s /

Larry A. Porter
(Address)
(Telephone numbers)
(Email)

Appendix A —Data Collection Tools

Tab B Questions for Structured Interview

The George Washington University
School of Engineering and Applied Sciences
Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management
John R. Harrald, PhD, Co-Director

INTERVIEWS: TOPICS OF DISCUSSION
For Parish Emergency Managers

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Research entitled: Requisite Competencies Needed By Emergency Managers To Effectively Request And Employ Military Support During Response To A Domestic Emergency

Larry Porter, Sub-Principal Investigator
Doctoral Candidate

The purpose of the research is to determine what emergency managers need to know about domestic military support provided by active duty military units, in time of disaster. The research will attempt to: a) assess and characterize requirements for education, training, briefings, exposure, exercises, processes, etc., in order to effectively request military assistance, and b) how to effectively integrate that military assistance provided into the emergency response effort. The researcher maintains that there are distinct differences between National Guard military support, and military support provided by active duty units (DSCA – Defense Support of Civil Authorities). There is a much higher degree of familiarity with domestic National Guard support than with active duty unit domestic support. The researcher seeks to determine what emergency managers should know about that difference.

Please read and sign the enclosed Consent Form and return a copy with the survey.

For the purposes of this survey, "the event" refers to Hurricane Katrina, August 2005.

This interview will be audio recorded. The audiotape will then be transcribed and the recording destroyed. All personal and identifying information will be removed. Nothing you say will be aligned with you personally.

Interview Mechanics

Date, Time, and Place of Interview (Include a post-interview description of the setting and any distractions.)

Person Interviewed (Emergency Management position at the time of the event.)

Consent Form Signature (Must be signed before the interview can take place.)

Introduction

We will be discussing your role in emergency management during response to Hurricane Katrina, in which the military (National Guard and Active Component) was called to assist. I am going to concentrate on what you knew about the military prior to the event, and whether you gained useful knowledge about the military as a result of the event. Specifically, I expect to determine what practitioners and students of emergency management should learn about the military, especially the active component military, to make them better prepared to request and integrate military support in time of disaster. The information you provide today will be used for research purposes, but you will not be directly quoted without your permission (see the Consent Form).

Interview Questions

Section I. Pre-incident/event knowledge of the military

1. What was your role at the time of the disaster?
   Probes: How long had you been working in the position?
   Did you receive training for the position?
   Did the training include any training/education about the military, either National Guard or DOD?
   Any leadership role(s) in previous or subsequent significant events?

2. What personal military experience did you have prior to that time (service on active duty or in a reserve component)?
   Probes: Describe your military service experience (/service, e.g., Army, Navy, etc. Active or Reserve; officer, enlisted, civilian.)
   Was any of your military service in the emergency management area?

3. Had you worked with the State's National Guard in an event before this one?
   Probes: Was there an understanding of military command and control?
   Was there a familiarity with military equipment and capabilities, such as personnel, command and control, equipment?
   Was any familiarity restricted to one service (Army, Navy, etc.)?
   Was that familiarity a hindrance when working with a different service?

4. Had you worked with any DOD military support before this event?
   Probes: Did you know how to request military support?
   Do you understand the tenets of Immediate Response?

5. How much, and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with military support entities?
   a) State National Guard personnel – principally the POMSO (now JDOMS)
   b) Active component (DOD) military, such as the DCO, Base Commander, Base emergency or disaster planners, or military units?

6. Have you attended any courses about the military, such as the DOD Emergency Preparedness Course? If yes, what course(s)?

Section II. Pre-event knowledge of the military

1. What did you know about the military, both National Guard (NG) and Department of Defense (DOD); i.e., organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc.?

2. Were you aware of the differences between NG and DOD pertaining to their ability to provide support to civil authorities?

3. Did you understand the process of how to request military support?
4. Did you understand the methods/processes of integrating supplied military support into disaster response operations?

5. Did you understand the need to pre-define an ending point, and/or exit strategy for the military unit(s)?

Section III. Military support during the event

1. What military support was assigned to assist you during the event? Describe the unit, its service component, assigned equipment, and how that equipment was able to assist.

Probes: How were missions passed to the military units?
How was the military integrated into the overall response mission?
Was the military equipment better served to assist than a similar non-military piece of equipment?
Describe working with military personnel.

2. What information about the active component military did you discover during the event that, on learning it, enabled you to more effectively work with the military for the duration of the event?

3. How did you discover that knowledge and assimilate it?

4. Was the military able to respond to your request(s) for assistance? Was the support provided under the tenets of Immediate Response or a deliberate mission assignment?

Section IV. Post-event reflections

1. Can you help quantify the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event?

2. Do you think there are differences between NG and DOD military support (access, capabilities, integration, and command and control)?

Appendix A —Data Collection Tools

Tab C1 Letter of Invitation to Participate in the Survey

(The original was a one page letter)

School of Engineering and Applied Sciences
1776 G. St., N.W. (Suite 110) Washington, D.C. 20052
John R. Harrald, Ph.D. & Joseph Barbera, M.D., Co-Directors

28 December 2007

TO: **State*** Emergency Managers

I am a doctoral candidate at The George Washington University, pursuing a Doctor of Science in Engineering Management program through the Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management. I am currently conducting my thesis research and respectfully request your cooperation. I have developed a questionnaire to collect information regarding the cooperation between the Department of Defense and civil authorities in times of emergency or disaster.

If you choose to participate in this research you may choose to complete the enclosed questionnaire and return it in the accompanying self-addressed envelope. The questionnaire has also been forwarded to you in an email and may be completed using that (electronic) format on a computer, printed, and again returned in the envelope provided, or emailed back with the completed attachment.

A code (Q-Code, upper left hand corner of each page) is being used to ensure privacy and confidentiality (per university research protocol requirements). Your name will not appear in the dissertation or in any subsequent publications.

Please also read, sign, and date the Informed Consent form, and return it with the completed survey. If replying by email, the Informed Consent may still be printed and sent, or acknowledged by mentioning that you have read it and agree to the provisions.

This letter is being mailed to all State Emergency Managers, and some former State Emergency Managers for whom I have contact information. If you can help me to expand my research by putting me in contact with other former State-level Emergency Managers

* The word "State" is meant to be equivalent to Commonwealth, District (of Columbia), Territory, or Possession.

(with their consent to share said information), I would appreciate it. I suggest that you might pass on my email address and information about my research, or send me their email address.

PLEASE RETURN SURVEYS BY JANUARY 19th. Thank you for your time,

Larry A. Porter
D.Sc. (ABD), CEM, ABCP
(Address)
(Telephone numbers)
(Email)

Appendix A —Data Collection Tools

Tab C2 Letter of Invitation to Participate in the Survey – Email Version

The Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management
School of Engineering and Applied Sciences
The George Washington University
1776 G. St., N.W. (Suite 110) Washington, D.C. 20052
John R. Harrald, Ph.D. & Joseph Barbera, M.D., Co-Directors

28 December 2007

TO: State Emergency Managers
(Please note: The word "State" is meant to be equivalent to Commonwealth, District (of Columbia), Territory, or Possession.)

I am a doctoral candidate at The George Washington University, pursuing a Doctor of Science in Engineering Management program through the Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management. I am currently conducting my thesis research and respectfully request your cooperation. I have developed a questionnaire to collect information regarding the cooperation between the Department of Defense and civil authorities in times of emergency or disaster.

If you choose to participate in this research you may choose to complete the attached questionnaire and return the completed survey via email. The questionnaire is also being sent to you via postal mail, and may be completed manually and returned in an enclosed stamped envelope.

A code (Q-Code, upper left hand corner of each page) is being used to ensure privacy and confidentiality (per university research protocol requirements). Your name will not appear in the dissertation or in any subsequent publications.

Please also read, sign, and date the Informed Consent form and return it to me in the stamped envelope being mailed, or mail it directly. Alternately, if responding by email, you may simply acknowledge that you have read it and agree to the provisions, within the wording of your message.

This letter is being sent to all State Emergency Managers, and some former State Emergency Managers for whom I have contact information. If you can help me to expand my research by putting me in contact with other former State-level Emergency Managers (with their consent to share said information), I would appreciate it. I suggest that you might pass on my email address and information about my research, or send me their email address.

PLEASE RETURN SURVEYS BY JANUARY 19th. Thank you for your time,

/s/
Larry A. Porter
D.Sc. (ABD), CEM, ABCP
(Address)
(Telephone numbers)
(Email)

Appendix A —Data Collection Tools

Tab C3 Letter of Invitation to Participate in the Survey

– Email Without Sending Postal Mail Version

The Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management
School of Engineering and Applied Sciences
The George Washington University
1776 G. St., N.W. (Suite 110) Washington, D.C. 20052
John R. Harrald, Ph.D. & Joseph Barbera, M.D., Co-Directors

28 December 2007

TO: State Emergency Managers
(Please note: The word "State" is meant to be equivalent to Commonwealth, District (of Columbia), Territory, or Possession.)

I am a doctoral candidate at The George Washington University, pursuing a Doctor of Science in Engineering Management program through the Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management. I am currently conducting my thesis research and respectfully request your cooperation. I have developed a questionnaire to collect information regarding the cooperation between the Department of Defense and civil authorities in times of emergency or disaster.

If you choose to participate in this research please complete the attached questionnaire and return the completed survey via email.

A code (Q-Code, upper left hand corner of each page) is being used to ensure privacy and confidentiality (per university research protocol requirements). Your name will not appear in the dissertation or in any subsequent publications.

Please also read the Informed Consent form and, within the wording of your message, acknowledge that you have read it and agree to the provisions.

This letter is being sent to all State Emergency Managers, and some former State Emergency Managers for whom I have contact information. If you can help me to expand my research by putting me in contact with other former State-level Emergency Managers (with their consent to share said information), I would appreciate it. I suggest that you might pass on my email address and information about my research, or send me their email address.

PLEASE RETURN SURVEYS BY JANUARY 19th. Thank you for your time,

/s/
Larry A. Porter
D.Sc. (ABD), CEM, ABCP
(Address)
(Telephone numbers)
(Email)

Q Code: ____

Appendix A —Data Collection Tools
Tab D1 Survey Questionnaire – - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (First IRB-approved Version)

The George Washington University
School of Engineering and Applied Sciences
Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management
John R. Harrald, PhD, Co-Director

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
For All State Emergency Managers

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Research entitled: Requisite Competencies Needed By Emergency Managers To Effectively Request And Employ Military Support During Response To A Domestic Emergency

Larry Porter, Sub-Principal Investigator
Doctoral Candidate

The purpose of the research is to determine what emergency managers need to know about domestic military support provided by active duty military units in time of disaster. The research will attempt to: a) assess and characterize requirements for education, training, briefings, exposure, exercises, processes, etc., in order to effectively request military assistance, and b) determine how to effectively integrate that military assistance provided into the emergency response effort. The researcher maintains that there are distinct differences between National Guard military support, and military support provided by active duty units (DSCA – Defense Support of Civil Authorities). There is a much higher degree of familiarity with domestic National Guard support than with active duty unit domestic support. The researcher seeks to determine what emergency managers should know about that difference.

Please read and sign the enclosed Consent Form and return a copy with the survey.

For the purposes of this survey, "the event" refers to Hurricane Katrina, August 2005. If more room is needed for a response, please continue on a separate sheet (using the question number and letter to identify).

General:

1a. What was your role (Job Title, Position Responsibilities) at the time of the event?

_____

_____

Q Code: ____

1b. How long had you been serving in that position?

_____

Military service and/or experience:

2a. What military experience did you have prior to the event (e.g., service on active duty or in a reserve component)? (Leadership role(s) in previous and subsequent catastrophic events?)

_____

_____

2b. How much and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with 1) State National Guard personnel – principally the POMSO (Plans, Operations, Military Support Officer, now called DOMSO (Director of Operations, Military Support Officer), and/or 2) active military, such as the DCO (Defense Coordinating Officer), Base Commander (or Base emergency planners), or military units?

_____

_____

_____

2c. Are you aware of the capability of the military to respond to emergencies under the tenets of "Immediate Response?" ☐ Yes ☐ No

2d. Have you attended any courses about the military, such as the DOD Emergency Preparedness Course? ☐ Yes ☐ No

If yes, what course(s)?

_____

_____

Pre-Event:

3a. What did you know about the military's organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc., relating to your State's National Guard (NG)?

_____

_____

Q Code: ____

3b. What did you know about the military's organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc., relating to Department of Defense (DOD) or active component military?

_____

_____

3c. Were you aware of the differences between NG and DOD, pertaining to their ability to provide support to civil authorities? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(Comment)

_____

3d. Did you understand the process of how to request military support? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(Comment)

_____

3e. Did you understand the processes of integrating supplied military support into disaster response operations? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(Comment)

_____

3f. Did you understand the need to pre-define an ending point, and/or exit strategy for the military unit(s)?

(Comment)

_____

During the Event:

4a. What information about the military did you discover during the event that enabled you to more effectively work with the military for the duration of the event?

_____

_____

4b. How did you discover that knowledge?

_____

_____

Q Code: ____

4c. How did you assimilate, or use it?

_____

4d. Was the military able to respond to your request(s) for assistance? ☐ Yes ☐ No

4e. Was this assistance provided under "Immediate Response" or a deliberate FEMA Mission Assignment request? ☐ Immediate Response ☐ Mission Assignment

(Comment)

_____

Post-Event:

5a. Do you agree that there are differences between NG and DOD military support? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(Comment)

_____

_____

5b. Please help define the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event.

I think that Emergency Managers need to know:

_____

(*** LINES OMITTED FOR INCLUSION IN THE DISSERTATION***)

_____

(Response Continuation or Other Comments)

_____

(*** LINES OMITTED FOR INCLUSION IN THE DISSERTATION***)

_____

(It is not anticipated that any State emergency managers will be interviewed. However, if you believe you have specific information helpful to this research, and would like to be interviewed in more depth, please inform the researcher by direct contact or by including a note in these last pages. Someone will contact you to discuss your contribution.)

Date Completed: _____

Q Code: ____

Appendix A —Data Collection Tools
Tab D2 Survey Questionnaire – Mail Version (IRB-approved Modified Version)

The George Washington University
School of Engineering and Applied Sciences
Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management
John R. Harrald, PhD, Co-Director

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
For All State Emergency Managers

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Research entitled: Requisite Competencies Needed By Emergency Managers To Effectively Request And Employ Military Support During Response To A Domestic Emergency

Larry Porter, Sub-Principal Investigator
Doctoral Candidate

The purpose of the research is to determine what emergency managers need to know about domestic military support provided by active duty military units in time of disaster. The research will attempt to: a) assess and characterize requirements for education, training, briefings, exposure, exercises, processes, etc., in order to effectively request military assistance, and b) determine how to effectively integrate that military assistance provided into the emergency response effort. The researcher maintains that there are distinct differences between National Guard military support, and military support provided by active duty units (DSCA – Defense Support of Civil Authorities). There is a much higher degree of familiarity with domestic National Guard support than with active duty unit domestic support. The researcher seeks to determine what emergency managers should know about that difference.

Please read and sign the enclosed Consent Form and return a copy with the survey.

For the purposes of this survey, "the event" refers to the occurrence of Department of Defense (DOD) support to a disaster in your State[*]* within the last ten or so years. If there was more than one "event," please describe either the earlier one **or** the more significant one (your choice).

If more room is needed for a response, please continue on the last page, or a separate sheet (using the question number and letter to identify).

[*] The word "State" is meant to be equivalent to Commonwealth, District (of Columbia), Territory, or Possession.

Q Code: ____

Principal question: Has your State had an occurrence of DOD (not National Guard) support, i.e., active duty unit(s), arriving in State to respond to a disaster or emergency within the last ten or so years?

☐ Yes ☐ No

If Yes, please continue to complete the survey or, if you were not working in some principal position in your organization, please pass to someone at or near your job level who *was* working at that time.

If No, you are responding that your State has not had DOD support.

<u>General</u>:

1a. What was your role (Job Title, Position Responsibilities) at the time of the event?

_____

_____

1b. How long had you been serving in that position?

_____

1c. Please briefly describe the event (event name (if any), date, location, severity, etc.)

_____

_____

_____

1d. Was there a presidential declaration of an emergency or a disaster? ☐ Yes ☐ No

1e. Was a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) assigned? ☐ Yes ☐ No

1f. Was a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) Assigned? ☐ Yes ☐ No

<u>Military service and/or experience</u>:

2a. What personal military experience did you, if any, have prior to the event (e.g., service on active duty or in a reserve component)?

_____

_____

Q Code: ____

2b. How much and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with 1) State National Guard personnel – principally the POMSO (Plans, Operations, Military Support Officer), and/or 2) active military, such as the DCO (Defense Coordinating Officer), Base Commander (or Base emergency planners), or military units?

_____

_____

_____

2c. Are you aware of the capability of the military to respond to emergencies under the tenets of "Immediate Response," as defined by DOD (DOD Directives 3025.15 & 3025.1)?

☐ Yes ☐ No

2d. Have you attended any courses about the military, such as the DOD Emergency Preparedness Course or the ARNORTH DSCA course? ☐ Yes ☐ No

If yes, what course(s)?

_____

_____

Pre-Event:

3a. Did you have a good understanding (working knowledge) about the military's organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc., relating to your State's National Guard (NG)?

☐ Yes, a lot.

☐ Sufficient.

☐ Marginal or lacking.

☐ None.

(Comment)

_____

_____

Q Code: ____

3b. Did you know about the military's organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc., relating to Department of Defense (DOD) or active component military?

☐ Yes, equal to the level of NG understanding.

☐ Assumed to be the same as NG.

☐ Marginal or lacking.

☐ No.

(Comment)

_____

_____

3c. Were you aware of the differences between NG and DOD, pertaining to their ability to provide support to civil authorities? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(Comment)

_____

3d. Did you understand the processes of integrating supplied (NG or DOD) military support into disaster response operations? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(Comment)

_____

3e. Did you understand the need to pre-define an ending point, and/or exit strategy for the military unit(s)?

(Comment)

_____

<u>During the Event</u>:

4a. Did you discover any differences between utilizing DOD support, versus NG support? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(Describe and/or Comment)

_____

_____

Q Code: ____

4b. What information about the DOD military did you discover during the event that enabled you to more effectively work with the military for the duration of the event?

_____

_____

_____

4c. How did you discover that knowledge?

_____

_____

4d. How did you assimilate, or use it?

_____

_____

4e. Was the military able to respond to your request(s) for assistance? ☐ Yes

☐ No

4f. Was this assistance provided under "Immediate Response" or a deliberate FEMA Mission Assignment request? ☐ Immediate Response ☐ Mission Assignment

(Comment)

_____

Post-Event:

5a. Do you agree with the researcher's premise that there are differences between integrating NG and DOD military support (relating to techniques, not issues like Posse Comitatus)? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(Comment)

_____

_____

5b. Do you think that (NG and DOD) military equipment is highly suited to disaster response? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Q Code: ____

(Comment)

_____

_____

5c. Do you think that DOD military support was more accessible? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(Comment)

_____

_____

5d. Please help define the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event.

I think that Emergency Managers need to know (should be briefed, trained, or educated):

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

(SOME LINES WERE OMITTED FROM THE ORIGINAL)

Q Code: ____

(It is not anticipated that any State emergency managers will be interviewed. However, if you believe you have specific information helpful to this research, and would like to be interviewed in more depth, please inform the researcher by direct contact or by including a note in these last pages. Someone will contact you to discuss your contribution.)

Date Completed: _____

(Please remember to return a signed Consent Form with your survey.)

(Response Continuation or Other Comments)

_____

Q Code: ____

Appendix A —Data Collection Tools

Tab D3 Survey Questionnaire – Email version

The George Washington University
School of Engineering and Applied Sciences
Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management
John R. Harrald, PhD, Co-Director

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
(Email version, for input using computer)

Defense Support of Civil Authorities

Research entitled: Requisite Competencies Needed By Emergency Managers To Effectively Request And Employ Military Support During Response To A Domestic Emergency

Larry Porter, Sub-Principal Investigator
Doctoral Candidate

The purpose of the research is to determine what emergency managers need to know about domestic military support provided by active duty military units in time of disaster. The research will attempt to: a) assess and characterize requirements for education, training, briefings, exposure, exercises, processes, etc., in order to effectively request military assistance, and b) determine how to effectively integrate that military assistance provided into the emergency response effort. The researcher maintains that there are distinct differences between National Guard military support, and military support provided by active duty units (DSCA – Defense Support of Civil Authorities). There is a much higher degree of familiarity with domestic National Guard support than with active duty unit domestic support. The researcher seeks to determine what emergency managers should know about that difference.

Please read the attached Consent Form and (due to its nature as an official document), please print it out, sign it, and return it via postal mail to: Larry Porter, ### Xxxxxxx Xxxxxx, Xxxxxxxxxx, XX #####-####. Alternately, please acknowledge in the email message in which you return (attach) the completed survey that you agree to the terms of the Consent Form.)

For the purposes of this survey, "the event" refers to the occurrence of Department of Defense (DOD) support to a disaster in your **State*** within the last ten or so years. If there was more than one "event," please describe either the earlier one **or** the more significant one (your choice).

* The word "State" is meant to be equivalent to Commonwealth, District (of Columbia), Territory, or Possession.

Q Code: ____

This electronic format allows for as much room as you need for any answer. You are welcome to attach/enclose additional material if desired. Please start your written or comment answers at the arrows.

Principal question: Has your State had an occurrence of DOD (not National Guard) support, i.e., active duty unit(s), arriving in State to respond to a disaster or emergency within the last ten or so years?

☐ Yes ☐ No

If Yes, please continue to complete the survey or, if you were not working in some principal position in your organization, please pass to someone at or near your job level who *was* working at that time.

If No, you are responding that your State has not had DOD support. Please return the survey with page one completed, or convey this information to me expeditiously. I would still appreciate your input on the last question (5d), which can be found on the last page, though.

General:

1a. What was your role (Job Title, Position Responsibilities) at the time of the event?

➔

1b. How long had you been serving in that position? ➔

1c. Please briefly describe the event (event name (if any), date, location, severity, etc.)

➔

1d. Was there a presidential declaration of an emergency or a disaster? ☐ Yes ☐ No

1e. Was a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) assigned? ☐ Yes ☐ No

1f. Was a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) assigned? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Military service and/or experience:

2a. What personal military experience did you have, if any, prior to the event (e.g., service on active duty or in a reserve component)?

➔

Q Code: ____

2b. How much and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with 1) State National Guard personnel – principally the POMSO (Plans, Operations, Military Support Officer), and/or 2) active military, such as the DCO (Defense Coordinating Officer), Base Commander (or Base emergency planners), or military units?

➔

2c. Are you aware of the capability of the military to respond to emergencies under the tenets of "Immediate Response," as defined by DOD (DOD Directives 3025.15 & 3025.1)?

☐ Yes ☐ No

2d. Have you attended any courses about the military, such as the DOD Emergency Preparedness Course or the ARNORTH DSCA course?

☐ Yes ☐ No

If yes, what course(s)?

➔

Pre-Event:

3a. Did you have a good understanding (working knowledge) about the military's organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc., relating to your State's National Guard (NG)?

☐ Yes, a lot.

☐ Sufficient.

☐ Marginal or lacking.

☐ None.

(Comment) ➔

3b. Did you know about the military's organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc., relating to Department of Defense (DOD) or active component military?

☐ Yes, equal to the level of NG understanding.

☐ Assumed to be the same as NG.

☐ Marginal or lacking.

☐ No.

(Comment) ➔

Q Code: ____

3c. Were you aware of the differences between NG and DOD, pertaining to their ability to provide support to civil authorities? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(Comment) ➔

3d. Did you understand the processes of integrating responding (NG or DOD) military support into disaster operations? ☐ No ☐ Yes

(Comment) ➔

3f. Did you understand the need to pre-define an ending point, and/or exit strategy for the military unit(s)?

(Comment) ➔

During the Event:

4a. Did you discover any differences between utilizing DOD support, versus NG Support?

☐ Yes ☐ No

(Describe and/or Comment) ➔

4b. What information about the DOD military did you discover during the event that enabled you to more effectively work with the military for the duration of the event?

➔

4c. How did you discover that knowledge?

➔

4d. How did you assimilate, or use it?

➔

4e. Was the military able to respond to your request(s) for assistance? ☐ Yes ☐ No

4e. Was this assistance provided under "Immediate Response" or a deliberate FEMA Mission Assignment request? ☐ Immediate Response ☐ Mission Assignment

(Comment): ➔

Q Code: ____

Post-Event:

5a. Do you agree with the researcher's premise that there are differences between integrating NG and DOD military support (relating to techniques, not issues like Posse Comitatus)?

☐ Yes ☐ No

(Comment): ➔

5b. Do you think that (NG and DOD) military equipment is highly suited to disaster response?

☐ Yes ☐ No

(Comment): ➔

5c. Do you think that DOD military support was more accessible?

☐ Yes ☐ No

(Comment): ➔

5d. Please help define the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event.

I think that Emergency Managers need to know (should be briefed, trained, or educated):

➔

(Response Continuation or Other Comments)

➔

(If you have a specific recommendation as to who might additionally be surveyed or interviewed, which would helpful to this research, please inform the researcher by direct contact or by including a note in these last pages. Someone will contact you to discuss your contribution or recommendation.)

Date Completed: ➔

Appendix B — Informed Consent Form

Research Consent Form

DOD Military Support, Post-Hurricane Katrina

GW IRB number: 010615
Principal Investigator: John R. Harrald, Ph.D. Telephone number: (Omitted)
Sub-Investigator: Larry A. Porter (Doctoral Candidate) Telephone number: (Omitted)

Sponsor: *(None)*

---

1. Introduction

You are invited to participate in a research study under the direction of Dr. Jack Harrald, of the Institute for Crisis, Disaster and Risk Management (ICDRM), School of Engineering and Applied Sciences (SEAS), George Washington University (GWU). Taking part in this research is entirely voluntary.

2. Why is this study being done?

You are being asked to take part in this study because of an apparent lack of knowledge about Department of Defense (DOD) military support to states in time of disaster.
The purpose of this study is to determine a body of knowledge that emergency managers should know (could learn) in order to understand the DOD military, properly request that type of support, and properly integrate that support into the disaster response.
The research will be conducted at the following location(s): parishes (counties) in the State of Louisiana, and nationwide at the state departments/offices of emergency management.
A total of about 75 participants at the parish (county) and state levels will be asked to take part in this study.

3. What is involved in this study?

If you choose to take part in this study, you will be asked to complete a survey form, and also asked about the possibility of participating in a further interview session. The following activities are specifically research related: survey and interviews.
The total amount of time you will spend in connection with this study is likely to be less than: one half hour (survey), or one hour or less (interview).

4. What are the risks of participating in this study?

Participating in this study poses no risks that are not ordinarily encountered in daily life or your job. There are no physical risks associated with this study. There is, however, the possible risk of loss of confidentiality. Every effort will be made to keep your information confidential, however, this cannot be guaranteed. Some of the questions we will ask you as part of this study may make you feel uncomfortable. You may refuse to answer any of the questions and you may take a break at any time during the study. You may stop your participation in this study at any time.

5. Are there benefits to taking part in this study?

You will not benefit directly from your participation in the study. The benefits to science and humankind that might result from this study are: an improvement in the content of study materials that prepare you for your job, and, if ever needed, an improvement in the conduct of military support to a future disaster.

6. What are my options?

You do not have to participate in this study if you do not want to**.** Should you decide to participate and later change your mind, you can do so at anytime.

7. Will I receive payment for being in this study?

You will not be paid for taking part in this study.

8. Can I be taken off the study?

The investigator can decide to withdraw you from the study at any time. You could be taken off the study for reasons related solely to you (for example, not following study-related directions from the Investigator) or because the entire study is stopped.

9. How will my privacy be protected?

Your completed survey will not contain any reference that links you personally to the questionnaire. Each survey will be identified by a code instead of your name. Only the researcher (sub-investigator) will have access to the list that identifies who received which coded form. Having that list will enable the researcher to contact the person in the event that clarification is needed. At the conclusion of the research the list will be destroyed.
Interviews will be recorded and then used for transcribing to paper. The interview transcriptions will be identified by coding in the same manner as the surveys. After transcription the recording will be erased/destroyed.
If results of this research study are reported in journals or at scientific meetings or conferences, the people who participated in this study will not be named or identified. GW will not release any information about your research involvement without your written permission, unless required by law.

10. Problems or Questions

The Office of Human Research of George Washington University, at telephone number 202- 994-2715, can provide further information about your rights as a research participant. If you think you have been harmed in this study, you report this to the Principal Investigator of this study, John R. Harrald, Ph.D. at ###-###-####, or to the Office of Human Research. Further information regarding this study may be obtained by contacting Larry Porter (the sub-investigator), at telephone number ###-###-####, at any time.

*Please keep a copy of this document in case you want to read it again.

If you agree to participate in this study, please sign below:

11. <u>Documentation of Informed Consent</u>

I understand the information printed on this form. I have discussed this study, its risks and potential benefits, and my other choices with the sub-investigator, Larry Porter. My questions so far have been answered. My signature below indicates my willingness to participate in this study and my understanding that I can withdraw at any time.

_____	_____
Subject's Name (printed) and Signature	Date
_____	_____
Name (printed) and Signature of Person Obtaining Consent	Date
_____	_____
Principal Investigator's Signature	Date

Appendix C

INTERVIEW DATA

		QI-1	QI-2	QI-3
Section I. Pre-incident/event knowledge of the military				
I-1a	What was your role at the time of the disaster?	Parish HS & EM Dir.	Parish HS & EM Dir.	Parish HS & EM Dir.
I-1b	How long had you been working in the position? (years)	4.5	3.5	9
I-1c	Did you receive training for the position?	No	Yes	Yes, by state
I-1d	Did the training include any training/education about the military, either National Guard or DOD?	NA	No	Very little
I-1e	Any leadership role(s) in previous or subsequent significant events?	POMSO	Sheriff's Dept EMD	No
I-2a	What personal military experience did you have prior to that time (service on active duty or in a reserve component)?	34 yrs NG	28 yrs Law Enforcement	None
I-2b	Describe your military service experience (/service, e.g., Army, Navy, etc. Active or Reserve; officer, enlisted, civilian.)	11 yrs POMSO	None	Grew up near military base
I-2c	Was any of your military service in the emergency management area?	11 Yrs POMSO; LNO to OEP	NA	NA
I-3a	Had you worked with the State's National Guard in an event before this one?	Yes	Yes	Yes
I-3b	Was there an understanding of military command and control?	Yes	Yes, basic	Yes, by history

		QI-1	QI-2	QI-3
Section I. Pre-incident/event knowledge of the military				
I-3c	Was there a familiarity with military equipment and capabilities, such as personnel, command and control, equipment?	Yes	Yes, through NG LNO	Yes
I-3d	Was any familiarity restricted to one service (Army, Navy, etc.)?	Yes	No	Mostly Army
I-3e	Was that familiarity a hindrance when working with a different service?	No	NA	Some
I-4a	Had you worked with any DOD military support before this event?	No	Yes, Hurr. Ivan	Some
I-4b	Did you know how to request military support?	Yes	Yes	Yes
I-4c	Do you understand the tenets of Immediate Response?	Yes	Yes, after explanation	No
I-5a	How much, and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with State National Guard personnel – principally the POMSO (now DOMSO)?	Frequent (NG LNO)	Frequent (NG LNO)	Frequent (NG LNO)
I-5b	How much, and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with active component (DOD) military, such as the DCO, Base Commander, Base emergency or disaster planners, or military units?	Little	Some (nearby NAS & USCG)	Some (Ft. Polk outreach)
I-6	Have you attended any courses about the military, such as the DOD Emergency Preparedness Course? If yes, what course(s)?	Yes; EPC	No	No

		QI-1	QI-2	QI-3
Section II. Pre-event knowledge of the military				
II-1	What did you know about the military, both National Guard (NG) and Department of Defense (DOD); i.e., organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc.?	Extensive	Nothing	Limited
II-2	Were you aware of the differences between NG and DOD pertaining to their ability to provide support to civil authorities?	Yes	No	No (except PCA)
II-3	Did you understand the process of how to request military support?	Yes, NG LNO	Yes, NG LNO	Yes
II-4	Did you understand the methods/processes of integrating supplied military support into disaster response operations?	Yes	No	No
II-5	Did you understand the need to pre-define an ending point, and/or exit strategy for the military unit(s)?	Yes	Yes (but…)	No

		QI-1	QI-2	QI-3
Section III. Military support during the event				
	What military support was assigned to assist you during the event?			
III-1a	Describe the unit, its service component, assigned equipment, and how that equipment was able to assist.	None requested, but support arrived	Many units; no clues	None requested, but arrived
III-1b	How were missions passed to the military units?	Unk	Many bosses	DOD Operated on own
III-1c	How was the military integrated into the overall response mission?	Not integrated	Not integrated	Not integrated
III-1d	Was the military equipment better served to assist than a similar non-military piece of equipment?	Yes	Yes	Yes
III-1e	Describe working with military personnel.	AC units came in, but were assigned to others (e.g., Engineers assigned to USACE). No DOD support directly came to Parish. Believes that DOD support went to USACE. No DOD at discussion table for mission receipt.	A plethora of units in support. No recollection of unit identities. Political pressures (council members' needs) dictated missions. Autonomy of actions by many "leaders". Military equipment is bigger and better; more capable. Working with military personnel was easy. Very capable and responsive.	LTG Honoré; 82nd ABN. Operated autonomously. Parish did not pose any missions to DOD. Not aware of any assets arriving in Parish. Only in area two days. Aware of some SAR missions in Cameron Parish and offshore. It would have been preferable that the military worked with (at least info flow) the parish EOC. NG units (EMAC) were unified command players. DOD did not.

		QI-1	QI-2	QI-3
Section III. Military support during the event				
			Working with AC resulted in a more positive result. Requesting via NG incurred delays from a greater amount of bureaucracy. It may have taken longer for AC (to do a mission), but bureaucracy and politics did not come into play (to delay or deny mission success). This affected how and who was asked to do missions.	"Military can be deployed directly for disaster response."
III-2	What information about the active component military did you discover during the event that, on learning it, enabled you to more effectively work with the military for the duration of the event?			
III-3	How did you discover that knowledge and assimilate it?			
III-4a	Was the military able to respond to your request(s) for assistance?	NA	NA	Yes
III-4b	Was the support provided under the tenets of Immediate Response or a deliberate mission assignment?	NA	NA	IR

		QI-1	QI-2	QI-3
Section IV. Post-event reflections				
IV-1	Can you help quantify the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event?	There is a strong benefit to assigning a NG LNO to parish EM & HS Dir. Depend on that LNO to do the recommending, requesting, and coordinating. What does a community (sub-Parish) official need to know about military? Limited information – enough to keep them out of trouble (private property issues, law enforcement issues, basic C2). There should be training/briefing on a general knowledge of capabilities by the military. The military people need more training about operating domestically than do civilians about using them in their communities. There is/was a tendency for the military to 'creep' the mission. "What more can we do for you?"	He had a strong desire for a course or instruction on military that would help local (parish) emergency managers understand military, particularly for a non-military person -- taken from scratch, i.e., DOD 101.	There is a need some sort of Quick Reference Handbook for civilian emergency managers, in the manner of DOD 101. Information about need for Exit Strategy and/or End Point. If the Parish EM was aware of DOD "mutual aid" assets nearby, s/he might be more inclined to request that type of support. An advisor (like the FEMA advisor that arrived to help) could offer information on assets and capabilities. In a sense, EPLOs provided at the Parish level. Exposure to Military Operations processes. Communications and reporting chains [of command]. Need for a more centralized (fewer stovepipes) reporting chain for the multiple military units responding. "I believe in going through the chain of command up until the time it doesn't work anymore."
IV-2	Do you think there are differences between NG and DOD military support (access, capabilities, integration, and command and control)?			Yes. "NG is more suited for domestic disaster response because they are primarily civilians [and understand the environment]." "This is my home [or the homes of my friends and neighbors].

		QI-4	QI-5	QI-6
Section I. Pre-incident/event knowledge of the military				
I-1a	What was your role at the time of the disaster?	Parish HS & EM Dir.	Parish HS & EM Dir.	Parish HS & EM Dir.
I-1b	How long had you been working in the position? (years)	50	14	1
I-1c	Did you receive training for the position?	Yes	Yes	Yes
I-1d	Did the training include any training/education about the military, either National Guard or DOD?	No	Very limited	No
I-1e	Any leadership role(s) in previous or subsequent significant events?	Military command	POMSO	33 yrs Law Enforcement (Retired Col.)
I-2a	What personal military experience did you have prior to that time (service on active duty or in a reserve component)?	Active duty 35 yrs	25 yrs NG	6 yrs enlisted NG
I-2b	Describe your military service experience (/service, e.g., Army, Navy, etc. Active or Reserve; officer, enlisted, civilian.)	Active Army	M-Day & Mil Tech	NG '70-'76
I-2c	Was any of your military service in the emergency management area?	Yes, Pre-POMSO	POMSO, 5 yrs	Response to '75 Miss. Riv. Flooding w-NG
I-3a	Had you worked with the State's National Guard in an event before this one?	Yes	Yes	Yes
I-3b	Was there an understanding of military command and control?	Yes	Yes	Yes

		QI-4	QI-5	QI-6
Section I. Pre-incident/event knowledge of the military				
I-3c	Was there a familiarity with military equipment and capabilities, such as personnel, command and control, equipment?	Yes	Yes	Yes
I-3d	Was any familiarity restricted to one service (Army, Navy, etc.)?	No	ANG & ARNG	Most with ARNG
I-3e	Was that familiarity a hindrance when working with a different service?	NA	No	Some
I-4a	Had you worked with any DOD military support before this event?	Yes (Hurr. Audrey, '57)	No	No
I-4b	Did you know how to request military support?	Yes	Yes	NA
I-4c	Do you understand the tenets of Immediate Response?	Yes	Yes, after explanation	No
I-5a	How much, and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with State National Guard personnel – principally the POMSO (now DOMSO)?	Extensive	Extensive	Extensive
I-5b	How much, and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with active component (DOD) military, such as the DCO, Base Commander, Base emergency or disaster planners, or military units?	Continual	Little	Not aware of need for such
I-6	Have you attended any courses about the military, such as the DOD Emergency Preparedness Course? If yes, what course(s)?	Yes	No	No

		QI-4	QI-5	QI-6
Section II. Pre-event knowledge of the military				
II-1	What did you know about the military, both National Guard (NG) and Department of Defense (DOD); i.e., organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc.?	Extensive	Limited	Relevance to LEA job
II-2	Were you aware of the differences between NG and DOD pertaining to their ability to provide support to civil authorities?	Yes	Yes (Basic understanding of PCA)	Yes
II-3	Did you understand the process of how to request military support?	Yes	Yes	Yes
II-4	Did you understand the methods/processes of integrating supplied military support into disaster response operations?	Yes	Yes	Yes
II-5	Did you understand the need to pre-define an ending point, and/or exit strategy for the military unit(s)?	Yes	Yes	Yes

		QI-4	QI-5	QI-6
Section III. Military support during the event				
III-1a	What military support was assigned to assist you during the event? Describe the unit, its service component, assigned equipment, and how that equipment was able to assist.	None requested, but arrived	Rita: numerous	Many units; no clues
III-1b	How were missions passed to the military units?	NA	Through familiarity	NA
III-1c	How was the military integrated into the overall response mission?	Not integrated	Through familiarity	Not integrated
III-1d	Was the military equipment better served to assist than a similar non-military piece of equipment?	Yes	Yes	Yes
III-1e	Describe working with military personnel.	82nd ABN aviation support. About 48 hours – helicopter recovery, then departed. Better discipline, organization, and planning, as well as the equipment they bring. With civilians, you need to develop a scope of work and costing. Military does the mission [regardless of what they find during the process].	During Rita, requested high-water vehicles for SAR. Received a USMC Bn and a NG Engr Bn in response to request. Heli, Boat, and RT (Rough Terrain)	There were so many military units moving through the area, it was impossible to determine who was who. Fluid theater.

		QI-4	QI-5	QI-6
Section III. Military support during the event				
III-2	What information about the active component military did you discover during the event that, on learning it, enabled you to more effectively work with the military for the duration of the event?		Nothing significant. Had a history of military experiences and had no difficulty in communicating the need (defining the mission) nor arranging for the response. The proper type of support had been requested, supplied, and met the need.	No differences detected between services or ability to perform. There was never any awareness of differences between “green suiters” (NG or DOD).
III-3	How did you discover that knowledge and assimilate it?			
III-4a	Was the military able to respond to your request(s) for assistance?	Yes	Yes	NA
III-4b	Was the support provided under the tenets of Immediate Response or a deliberate mission assignment?	IR	MA	NA

		QI-4	QI-5	QI-6
Section IV. Post-event reflections				
IV-1	Can you help quantify the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event?	Office of Civil Defense (military mindset toward a too-narrow disaster focus: nuclear) There needs to be a (approximately 3-day) course, developed by the military. MOBDES program had good value – excellent! Perhaps EPLOs need to expand their influence down to county level. Align Baker Pres Decl map with EPLO support.	Need for a DOD 101. Could be an IS course, but better as resident (hands-on). However, there is more difficulty in getting people TO a resident course.	DOD 101 briefing on capabilities & assets.
IV-2	Do you think there are differences between NG and DOD military support (access, capabilities, integration, and command and control)?	Absolutely. NG is capable of providing instantaneous support. DOD is 72 hours away. NG can expand through EMAC much faster than DOD can respond. DOD is as capable, but bureaucracy hinders speed of response. Much of the success of the EM job is relationships (networking) with people and agencies that are going to help and be helped by your organization.	Yes. Due to a positive experience with DOD support, it is likely that there is a pro-DOD attitude.	Perception of quicker access and response by NG, since they live in the community. Accessible by virtue of proximity as well as response. Perception that DOD has more capabilities.

		QI-7	QI-8	QI-9
Section I. Pre-incident/event knowledge of the military				
I-1a	What was your role at the time of the disaster?	Parish HS & EM Dir.	Parish HS & EM Dir.	City/Parish Dir. of HS & EM
I-1b	How long had you been working in the position? (years)	10	0	2
I-1c	Did you receive training for the position?	Yes	No, except on own	Yes, military security & DoE Training
I-1d	Did the training include any training/education about the military, either National Guard or DOD?	Some	Little or none	No
I-1e	Any leadership role(s) in previous or subsequent significant events?	(NA)	No	Dir. Of security, fire & EM for SPR
I-2a	What personal military experience did you have prior to that time (service on active duty or in a reserve component)?	None, but in family	2 yrs enlisted NG, 20 yrs USMC	Retired O-6
I-2b	Describe your military service experience (/service, e.g., Army, Navy, etc. Active or Reserve; officer, enlisted, civilian.)	NA	Civil Affairs in USMC	USMC
I-2c	Was any of your military service in the emergency management area?	NA	No	No
I-3a	Had you worked with the State's National Guard in an event before this one?	Yes	No	Yes, while at SPR
I-3b	Was there an understanding of military command and control?	Yes	Yes	Yes

		QI-7	QI-8	QI-9
Section I. Pre-incident/event knowledge of the military				
I-3c	Was there a familiarity with military equipment and capabilities, such as personnel, command and control, equipment?	Yes	Yes	Yes
I-3d	Was any familiarity restricted to one service (Army, Navy, etc.)?	Most with NG, some with USMCR & USCG	No	Mostly USMC
I-3e	Was that familiarity a hindrance when working with a different service?	Not really	No	No
I-4a	Had you worked with any DOD military support before this event?	No	Yes	Coordination with NG
I-4b	Did you know how to request military support?	Yes	(NA)	Yes
I-4c	Do you understand the tenets of Immediate Response?	No	Yes, after explanation	Yes, after explanation
I-5a	How much, and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with State National Guard personnel – principally the POMSO (now DOMSO)?	Extensive (NG LNO)	Limited (not in position)	Significant, with NG
I-5b	How much, and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with active component (DOD) military, such as the DCO, Base Commander, Base emergency or disaster planners, or military units?	Some Navy & NAS coordination	Familiarity with EPLOs	Some
I-6	Have you attended any courses about the military, such as the DOD Emergency Preparedness Course? If yes, what course(s)?	No	No	Very limited amount in Mil schools

		QI-7	QI-8	QI-9
Section II. Pre-event knowledge of the military				
II-1	What did you know about the military, both National Guard (NG) and Department of Defense (DOD); i.e., organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc.?	Good understanding of NG; Assume DOD is same	Significant knowledge	Sufficient
II-2	Were you aware of the differences between NG and DOD pertaining to their ability to provide support to civil authorities?	No	Yes	Yes
II-3	Did you understand the process of how to request military support?	Yes	Yes	Yes
II-4	Did you understand the methods/processes of integrating supplied military support into disaster response operations?	Yes, through NG LNO	Yes	Yes
II-5	Did you understand the need to pre-define an ending point, and/or exit strategy for the military unit(s)?	Yes	Yes	Yes

		QI-7	QI-8	QI-9
Section III. Military support during the event				
III-1a	What military support was assigned to assist you during the event? Describe the unit, its service component, assigned equipment, and how that equipment was able to assist.	DOD Finance unit	101st Abn(?)	101st Abn, MARFORRES, NORTHCOM
III-1b	How were missions passed to the military units?	DOD Rep in EOC	BG arrived at EOC	Direct from Dir. to DOD POC
III-1c	How was the military integrated into the overall response mission?	EOC Rep: NG & DOD	Well	Well
III-1d	Was the military equipment better served to assist than a similar non-military piece of equipment?	Yes	Yes	Yes
III-1e	Describe working with military personnel.	DOD 101 briefing on capabilities & assets.	101st ABN(?) Some 101st BG arrived at EOC. Military equipment is much more capable: robust, high-water, aviation, load capabilities, etc.	82nd ABN Div, USMC – MARFORRES, NORTHCOM (Unified Cmd, O-6 & GO level) Missions from Director to DOD at twice-daily meetings. Military equipment more robust, mobile, self-contained, self-supporting, communications, 24/7 operations, more capacity, etc.

		QI-7	QI-8	QI-9
Section III. Military support during the event				
III-2	What information about the active component military did you discover during the event that, on learning it, enabled you to more effectively work with the military for the duration of the event?	"Once DOD got a mission, I didn't have to worry about it." That DOD units come with support (self-sustaining), and WILL perform assigned missions. (Not to infer that NG could/did not perform in a similar manner, but that the DOD units came from a higher capacity/capability pool. The State NG had a more complex coordination requirement.)	The public expected (in some cases feared that) the military would come in and run the show, rather than assist and/or enhance or plus-up.	Naval ship support. Had not considered (the Cape Knox) capabilities: power generation capacity, water generation, housing, etc. Did not know to ask the right questions. Was asking for specifics instead of capabilities – needs.
III-3	How did you discover that knowledge and assimilate it?			
III-4a	Was the military able to respond to your request(s) for assistance?	Yes	Yes	Yes
III-4b	Was the support provided under the tenets of Immediate Response or a deliberate mission assignment?	MA	NA	MA

		QI-7	QI-8	QI-9
Section IV. Post-event reflections				
IV-1	Can you help quantify the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event?	Immediate Response. How the military works (operations). Ending points and exit strategies. C2. This training is necessary. DOD is very likely to become much more involved in catastrophic planning and response.	EM directors need to learn about DOD structure and organization. Information about how assets can be applied to the response. The logistics and maintenance tail. Education to counter stereotypes. Interviewee is pro-DOD for Response (for catastrophic events). Recommends that FEMA handle Recovery and Mitigation. Interviewee suggests (agrees with proposal for) an Independent Study course about Military Support.	Training package, by DOD, on capabilities, capacities, coordination, logistics, Immediate Response, operational rules. Training package ALSO needs to be developed which educates the political leadership.
IV-2	Do you think there are differences between NG and DOD military support (access, capabilities, integration, and command and control)?	Yes, definitely.	Yes. DOD uses their equipment every day, and is thus more familiar with application to tasks at hand, where NG only drills monthly. NG, on the other hand, understands the civilian environment much more than DOD. NG personnel, too, frequently stay with their equipment for much longer periods of time, vs. DOD personnel. AC is much better at warfighting; reservists are more adept at rebuilding (pertaining to Civil Affairs). Reservists are able to bring their civilian skills to bear, whereas AC folks don't usually have other-than-warfighting skills.	

		QI-10
Section I. Pre-incident/event knowledge of the military		
I-1a	What was your role at the time of the disaster?	Parish HS & EM Dir.
I-1b	How long had you been working in the position? (years)	10
I-1c	Did you receive training for the position?	Yes
I-1d	Did the training include any training/education about the military, either National Guard or DOD?	Little
I-1e	Any leadership role(s) in previous or subsequent significant events?	No
I-2a	What personal military experience did you have prior to that time (service on active duty or in a reserve component)?	None
I-2b	Describe your military service experience (/service, e.g., Army, Navy, etc. Active or Reserve; officer, enlisted, civilian.)	NA
I-2c	Was any of your military service in the emergency management area?	NA
I-3a	Had you worked with the State's National Guard in an event before this one?	Yes
I-3b	Was there an understanding of military command and control?	Yes

		QI-10
Section I. Pre-incident/event knowledge of the military		
I-3c	Was there a familiarity with military equipment and capabilities, such as personnel, command and control, equipment?	Yes
I-3d	Was any familiarity restricted to one service (Army, Navy, etc.)?	NG, Army, USCG
I-3e	Was that familiarity a hindrance when working with a different service?	Not really
I-4a	Had you worked with any DOD military support before this event?	No
I-4b	Did you know how to request military support?	No
I-4c	Do you understand the tenets of Immediate Response?	No
I-5a	How much, and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with State National Guard personnel – principally the POMSO (now DOMSO)?	Significant due to NG LNO
I-5b	How much, and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with active component (DOD) military, such as the DCO, Base Commander, Base emergency or disaster planners, or military units?	Little
I-6	Have you attended any courses about the military, such as the DOD Emergency Preparedness Course? If yes, what course(s)?	No

		QI-10
Section II. Pre-event knowledge of the military		
II-1	What did you know about the military, both National Guard (NG) and Department of Defense (DOD); i.e., organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc.?	Good amount, due to NG LNO
II-2	Were you aware of the differences between NG and DOD pertaining to their ability to provide support to civil authorities?	No (No understanding of PCA)
II-3	Did you understand the process of how to request military support?	Yes
II-4	Did you understand the methods/processes of integrating supplied military support into disaster response operations?	Yes, through NG LNO
II-5	Did you understand the need to pre-define an ending point, and/or exit strategy for the military unit(s)?	Yes, in general

QI-10

Section III. Military support during the event

III-1a	What military support was assigned to assist you during the event? Describe the unit, its service component, assigned equipment, and how that equipment was able to assist.	None requested, but arrived
III-1b	How were missions passed to the military units?	Through NG LNO
III-1c	How was the military integrated into the overall response mission?	Well, due to NG LNO
III-1d	Was the military equipment better served to assist than a similar non-military piece of equipment?	Yes
III-1e	Describe working with military personnel.	No specific memory of what units arrived in support. Did not care what service (or NG or not), just that they were capable of providing the needed skills and support. All missions for military units were passed by the NG LNO. Has had good experiences with military equipment and has had not so good experiences, but in general has a high opinion of military equipment – capabilities and robustness.

		QI-10
Section III. Military support during the event		
III-2	What information about the active component military did you discover during the event that, on learning it, enabled you to more effectively work with the military for the duration of the event?	
III-3	How did you discover that knowledge and assimilate it?	
III-4a	Was the military able to respond to your request(s) for assistance?	Yes
III-4b	Was the support provided under the tenets of Immediate Response or a deliberate mission assignment?	MA

		QI-10
Section IV. Post-event reflections		
IV-1	Can you help quantify the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event?	Need information on availability of assets and capabilities. Functional understanding of rank and structure. Information on differences between NG and AC.
IV-2	Do you think there are differences between NG and DOD military support (access, capabilities, integration, and command and control)?	

Addtl Q:	**(QUESTION NOT POSED TO ALL SUBJECTS)** Is it better to hire a military-background person for your job than a non-military person who needs to be educated about the military? (OR Is it better to hire a military person for these types of EM jobs?)	**QI-3** Yes, a military person, but at the relatively junior level – up to captain (O-3) – because that level has a pretty good understanding and exposure to management, but is still mission-relevant. One large hurdle is getting a military person to understand that you cannot order civilians to do anything. The military person needs to understand motivation, etc., in order to persuade civilians to comply with the request. Need to lose the military lingo and mindset.	**QI-4** Yes, but military people are likely to have difficulty with the politics. Qualifications are more important than history or experience, but it is probably an advantage being military.
Addtl Q:	**(QUESTION NOT POSED TO ALL SUBJECTS)** Is it better to hire a military-background person for your job than a non-military person who needs to be educated about the military? (OR Is it better to hire a military person for these types of EM jobs?)	**QI-5** Better if you do, especially if there is a catastrophic event and DOD shows up. They will have a better on organizational concept.	**QI-6** Agreement that a military background (or LEA) is advantageous to the job.

Appendix D

SURVEY DATA

QUESTION #	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-1	QS-2	QS-3
Principal question:	Has your State had an occurrence of DOD (not National Guard) support, i.e., active duty unit(s), arriving in State to respond to a disaster or emergency within the last ten or so years?	(Y/N)	No	No	No
General:					
1a	What was your role (Job Title, Position Responsibilities) at the time of the event?	(INPUT)	**Only other response is to Q. 5d**		Governor's Authorized Representative (GAR) or State Coordinating Officer (SCO)
1b	How long had you been serving in that position?	(YEARS)			6
1c	Please briefly describe the event (event name (if any), date, location, severity, etc.).	(INPUT)			Floods, Tornado & Major Snow Storm
1d	Was there a presidential declaration of an emergency or a disaster?				Yes
1e	Was a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) assigned?				Yes
1f	Was a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) assigned?				No

QUESTION #	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-1	QS-2	QS-3
Military service and/or experience:					
2a	What personal military experience did you have, if any, prior to the event (e.g., service on active duty or in a reserve component)?	(INPUT)			None
2b-1	How much and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with State National Guard personnel – principally the POMSO (Plans, Operations, Military Support Officer, now called DOMSO (Director of Operations, Military Support Officer)?	(INPUT)			
2b-2	How much and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with active military, such as the DCO (Defense Coordinating Officer), Base Commander (or Base emergency planners), or military units?	(INPUT)		[State] has not had any direct DOD support during disasters(as contrasted with National Guard support) since I have been with the agency, some 28 years. We may have had some Army Reserves support for a disaster in 1976 but that was before my time and before easily retrievable records. There have been some disasters where military installations provided support under mutual aid for local jurisdictions, but that was pursuant to local commanders authority and with those local jurisdictions and not through state or federal channels.	
2c	Are you aware of the capability of the military to respond to emergencies under the tenets of “Immediate Response,” as defined by DOD (DOD Directives 3025.15 & 3025.1)?	(Y/N)			Yes
2d	Have you attended any courses about the military, such as the DOD Emergency Preparedness Course?	(Y/N)			No
2c	If yes, what course(s)?	(INPUT)			

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-1	QS-2	QS-3
Pre-Event:					
3a	Did you have a good understanding (working knowledge) about the military's organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc., relating to your State's National Guard (NG)?	(INPUT)			Yes, a lot.
	Did you know about the military's organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc., relating to Department of Defense (DOD) or active component military?	(INPUT)			Yes, equal to the level of NG understanding. It is very clear what & how DOD assets will be integrated. However, dependent upon the T/F (unit) commander & their orders from higher echelons, the success or failure of resource integration and mission assignments will predicate incident outcomes on a positive or negative note.
3b	Were you aware of the differences between NG and DOD, pertaining to their ability to provide support to civil authorities?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)			Yes
3c	Did you understand the processes of integrating supplied military support into disaster response operations?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)			Yes
3d	Did you understand the need to pre-define an ending point, and/or exit strategy for the military unit(s)?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)			Yes
3f					

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-1	QS-2	QS-3
During the Event:					
4a	Did you discover any differences between utilizing DOD support, versus NG Support?	(INPUT)			Yes. Approval and commitment of DOD leadership up to and including SECDEF & POTUS for resource allocations and mission taskings.
4b	What information about the DOD military did you discover during the event that enabled you to more effectively work with the military for the duration of the event?	(INPUT)			
4c	How did you discover that knowledge?				
4c	How did you assimilate, or use it?	(INPUT)			
4d	Was the military able to respond to your request(s) for assistance?	(Y/N)			No
4e	Was this assistance provided under “Immediate Response” or a deliberate FEMA Mission Assignment request?	(IM or MA) & (INPUT)			Mission Assignment. Both in [Hurricane] Katrina

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-1	QS-2	QS-3	
Post-Event:						
5a	Do you agree with the researcher's premise that there are differences between integrating NG and DOD military support (relating to techniques, not issues like Posse Comitatus)?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)				Yes
5b	Do you think that (NG and DOD) military equipment is highly suited to disaster response?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)				Yes
5c	Do you think that DOD military support was more accessible?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)				Yes

Q #	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-1	QS-2	QS-3
5d	Please help define the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event. I think that Emergency Managers need to know:	(INPUT)	State emergency managers are typically quite familiar with the National Guard structure, resources, capabilities, etc. While the active duty military has its differences, they not significant enough to be of concern. Since State emergency management coordinates its resource/assistance requirements via their federal counterparts, the federal counterparts are the ones that need to have in-depth knowledge of the active duty military.	As to 5d we do have frequent informal interaction with the resident military installations and our emergency responders which gives all parties a reasonable understanding of the capabilities and needs of each. As each of the services, branches, units and installations have such widely different structures, operating capabilities, restrictions etc. the most important aspect is knowing how to request assistance and having access to the EPLOs and the local installation MSCA/Emergency Preparedness staffs. The rest of the "nice to have" information could fill a doctoral dissertation.	The decision making process for obtaining resources and time frame required, current SOPs that DOD assets operate under, the reason for DOD chain of command, and their inability to be integrated into a State's Incident Action Plan as an asset under State Command & Control mechanisms.

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-4	QS-5	QS-6	QS-7	QS-8	
Principal question:	Has your State had an occurrence of DOD (not National Guard) support, i.e., active duty unit(s), arriving in State to respond to a disaster or emergency within the last ten or so years?	(Y/N)	No	No	No	No		Yes
General:								
1a	What was your role (Job Title, Position Responsibilities) at the time of the event?	(INPUT)	**Only other response is to Q. 5d**	**Only other response is to Q. 5d**	**Only other response is to Q. 5d**	**Only other response is to Q. 5d**	Branch Director, Response, Recovery & Mitigation	
1b	How long had you been serving in that position?	(YEARS)						
1c	Please briefly describe the event (event name (if any), date, location, severity, etc.).	(INPUT)					[Bridge Collapse]	
1d	Was there a presidential declaration of an emergency or a disaster?							Yes
1e	Was a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) assigned?							Yes
1f	Was a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) assigned?							Yes

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-4	QS-5	QS-6	QS-7	QS-8
Military service and/or experience:							
2a	What personal military experience did you have, if any, prior to the event (e.g., service on active duty or in a reserve component)?	(INPUT)					None
2b-1	How much and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with State National Guard personnel – principally the POMSO (Plans, Operations, Military Support Officer, now called DOMSO (Director of Operations, Military Support Officer)?	(INPUT)					We have regular contact & interaction with our POMSO & DCO/DCE staff.
2b-2	How much and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with active military, such as the DCO (Defense Coordinating Officer), Base Commander (or Base emergency planners), or military units?	(INPUT)					
2c	Are you aware of the capability of the military to respond to emergencies under the tenets of “Immediate Response,” as defined by DOD (DOD Directives 3025.15 & 3025.1)?	(Y/N)					Yes
2d	Have you attended any courses about the military, such as the DOD Emergency Preparedness Course?	(Y/N)					Yes
2c	If yes, what course(s)?	(INPUT)					Phase I DSCA on-line course completed [ARNORTH website]

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-4	QS-5	QS-6	QS-7	QS-8
Pre-Event:							
3a	Did you have a good understanding (working knowledge) about the military's organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc., relating to your State's National Guard (NG)?	(INPUT)					Yes, a lot.
3b	Did you know about the military's organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc., relating to Department of Defense (DOD) or active component military?	(INPUT)					Yes, equal to the level of NG understanding.
3c	Were you aware of the differences between NG and DOD, pertaining to their ability to provide support to civil authorities?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)					Yes
3d	Did you understand the processes of integrating supplied military support into disaster response operations?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)					Yes
3f	Did you understand the need to pre-define an ending point, and/or exit strategy for the military unit(s)?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)					Yes

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-4	QS-5	QS-6	QS-7	QS-8
During the Event:							
	Did you discover any differences between utilizing DOD support, versus NG Support?	(INPUT)					Yes, There was a little different structure, e.g., the DCO has a staff, EPLOs, etc.
4a	What information about the DOD military did you discover during the event that enabled you to more effectively work with the military for the duration of the event?	(INPUT)					
4b	How did you discover that knowledge?						
4c	How did you assimilate, or use it?	(INPUT)					
4c	Was the military able to respond to your request(s) for assistance?	(Y/N)					Yes
4d	Was this assistance provided under “Immediate Response” or a deliberate FEMA Mission Assignment request?	(IM or MA) & (INPUT)					The request for assistance took a somewhat unique route, e.g., County (to the) President (to the) Secretary of Transportation (to the) Secretary of the Navy
4e							

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-4	QS-5	QS-6	QS-7	QS-8
Post-Event:							
5a	Do you agree with the researcher's premise that there are differences between integrating NG and DOD military support (relating to techniques, not issues like Posse Comitatus)?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)					Yes
5b	Do you think that (NG and DOD) military equipment is highly suited to disaster response?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)					Yes
5c	Do you think that DOD military support was more accessible?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)					No. Not more accessible than the National Guard, however the DOD asset was specialized (Navy Salvage Dive Team). Our National Guard did not have that capability.

Q #	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-4	QS-5	QS-6
5d	Please help define the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event. I think that Emergency Managers need to know:	(INPUT)	The last time significant DOD support was in [state] was for Hurricane Andrew in 1992.	All of the above if the EM has never been in the military or knowledgeable of military operations. However, it is a requirement that the military per Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) become compliant with NIMS and the NICS. What this means is that it is the military, not civilian entities that must speak a "common" language in communicating with each other. Thus, all those unknown and constant usages of acronyms are required to conform to a usable common language so that everyone is on the same sheet of music when responding to a disaster. Chain of command however needs to be understood by the civilian organizations.	Organizational structure and the Chain of Command. Should understand what kinds of units are available and what support they can provide. How to obtain the support. Timeline between request for support and arrival of support. How military units operate, i.e., organize and manage response. Costs involved. How to interface with the military chain of command. Any legal constraints to employing Title 10 units as opposed to National Guard units. The "footprint" of regular units.

			QS-7	**QS-8**
5d	Please help define the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event. I think that Emergency Managers need to know:	(INPUT)	The rank structure of the military. A clear understanding of the current system of accessing DOD assets through FEMA and the DCO housed at the FEMA Region. Speaking direct with NORTHCOM or NORAD (DOD)would merely add another layer that doesn't seem necessary. Emergency Managers need a better understanding of the procedures to request assets and their availability DOD, i.e., DOD's reengineered and improved process for civil authorities to request imagery and analysis.	EMs should take the Phase I DSCA course. EMs need to understand the role of the NG in providing support to civilian authorities.

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-9	QS-10	QS-11	QS-12
Principal question:	Has your State had an occurrence of DOD (not National Guard) support, i.e., active duty unit(s), arriving in State to respond to a disaster or emergency within the last ten or so years?	(Y/N)	Yes	No	No	Yes
General:						
1a	What was your role (Job Title, Position Responsibilities) at the time of the event?	(INPUT)	I was the individual assistance officer and planning bureau chief	Only other response is to Q. 5d	Only other response is to Q. 5d	Assist Director / Operations Section Chief
1b	How long had you been serving in that position?	(YEARS)	6			1
1c	Please briefly describe the event (event name (if any), date, location, severity, etc.).	(INPUT)	Wildfires requiring extra hand crews to fight fires, 2000			Hurricane Floyd, September 1999, a Category 3 Hurricane, a major flooding event
1d	Was there a presidential declaration of an emergency or a disaster?		Yes			Yes
1e	Was a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) assigned?		Yes			Yes
1f	Was a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) assigned?		Yes			Yes

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-9	QS-10	QS-11	QS-12
Military service and/or experience:						
2a	What personal military experience did you have, if any, prior to the event (e.g., service on active duty or in a reserve component)?	(INPUT)	None			None
2b-1	How much and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with State National Guard personnel – principally the POMSO (Plans, Operations, Military Support Officer, now called DOMSO (Director of Operations, Military Support Officer)?	(INPUT)	We work with the Guard on a daily basis as our organization is a division of the [state] Department of Military Affairs			The [state] NG POMSO is (and was) a member of our State Emergency Response Team. I had a good working knowledge of [state] NG Operations.
2b-2	How much and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with active military, such as the DCO (Defense Coordinating Officer), Base Commander (or Base emergency planners), or military units?	(INPUT)				None
2c	Are you aware of the capability of the military to respond to emergencies under the tenets of “Immediate Response,” as defined by DOD (DOD Directives 3025.15 & 3025.1)?	(Y/N)	Yes			Yes, generally speaking, but not all [the] details.
2d	Have you attended any courses about the military, such as the DOD Emergency Preparedness Course?	(Y/N)	No			None
2c	If yes, what course(s)?	(INPUT)				

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-9	QS-10	QS-11	QS-12
Pre-Event:						
3a	Did you have a good understanding (working knowledge) about the military's organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc., relating to your State's National Guard (NG)?	(INPUT)	Sufficient			Yes, a lot. We communicate and exercise regularly with the NG.
3b	Did you know about the military's organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc., relating to Department of Defense (DOD) or active component military?	(INPUT)	Assumed to be the same as NG.			No, but I did know how to access DOD assistance through the FCO.
3c	Were you aware of the differences between NG and DOD, pertaining to their ability to provide support to civil authorities?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)	Yes			No
3d	Did you understand the processes of integrating supplied military support into disaster response operations?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)	Yes			Yes. We work with the [state] NG to accomplish that integration.
3f	Did you understand the need to pre-define an ending point, and/or exit strategy for the military unit(s)?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)	Yes			No. However, the [state] NG did understand this need.

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-9	QS-10	QS-11	QS-12
During the Event:						
	Did you discover any differences between utilizing DOD support, versus NG Support?	(INPUT)	Yes. The need arose to assign a liaison officer to facilitate the coordination between the military component and the civilian responding component			No. The [state] NG did our coordination – primarily rotary wind aircraft required for rescue operations and resource delivery.
4a	What information about the DOD military did you discover during the event that enabled you to more effectively work with the military for the duration of the event?	(INPUT)	The need for interface			I can't say that I improved my knowledge in this area as a result of Hurricane Floyd. I would still rely upon the [state] NG and I now have a retired military as senior management.
4b	How did you discover that knowledge?		Through the Northern Rockies Coordination Center			NA
4c	How did you assimilate, or use it?	(INPUT)	Made plans to bring on a liaison.			NA
4c	Was the military able to respond to your request(s) for assistance?	(Y/N)	Yes			Yes
4d 4e	Was this assistance provided under "Immediate Response" or a deliberate FEMA Mission Assignment request?	(IM or MA) & (INPUT)	Mission Assignment			Mission Assignment

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-9	QS-10	QS-11	QS-12
Post-Event:						
5a	Do you agree with the researcher's premise that there are differences between integrating NG and DOD military support (relating to techniques, not issues like Posse Comitatus)?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)	Yes			UNKNOWN. I have not experienced those differences. I would agree [that] they probably exist.
5b	Do you think that (NG and DOD) military equipment is highly suited to disaster response?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)	Yes. The expense is always a critical question.			Yes, in today's mission ready configuration – packaged for disaster response.
5c	Do you think that DOD military support was more accessible?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)	No. We always use Guard resources first before we elevate to the next level of support.			Unknown

Q #	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-9	QS-10	QS-11	QS-12
5d	Please help define the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event. I think that Emergency Managers need to know:	(INPUT)	The differences between the two organizations, their activations and how they are financed.	Must be fully briefed on DOD's pre-scripted mission assignments; Must have regular interaction with the military leadership who will be interacting with the civil authorities; Must participate in exercises where the civil authority is called upon to a) identify a situation where DOD resources must be called upon; b) must file the appropriate request; c) must participate in whatever after-action activities are necessary to correct gaps identified in the exercise. Must understand the relationship between the TAG, National Guard Assets, and DOD assets and who provides what. Must understand mobilization time-frames; Must engage DOD liaisons in state EOC's within planning cells as resource requests are processed. Many DOD personnel do not understand NIMS or civilian ICS and the converse is also true. This will be problematic during an actual response. There is a huge gap between civil authorities and military authorities in terms of what resources can the DOD bring to bear in a civil emergency. The military has recently begun to work towards fixing this problem but we have a long way to go. One issue is clear to me. Military planners appear far more thorough and practical in the methods they use to build plans. Civilian planning in many EM organizations is substantially lacking. And this comes from a person who has had no military experience.		Be clear in mission request. Specifically what is to be done, what type of equipment & personnel is required, and what are the support requirements.

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-13	QS-14	QS-15	QS-16
Principal question:	Has your State had an occurrence of DOD (not National Guard) support, i.e., active duty unit(s), arriving in State to respond to a disaster or emergency within the last ten or so years?	(Y/N)	Yes	No	No	Yes
General:						
1a	What was your role (Job Title, Position Responsibilities) at the time of the event?	(INPUT)	Director of Homeland Security & Emergency Management			State Recovery Manager / Deputy State Coordinating Officer
1b	How long had you been serving in that position?	(YEARS)	2			7
1c	Please briefly describe the event (event name (if any), date, location, severity, etc.).	(INPUT)	Spring flooding, eastern part of the state, 2005			Hurricane Isabel, 2003, Major Disaster, $2B in damages, 30+ Deaths
1d	Was there a presidential declaration of an emergency or a disaster?		Yes			Yes
1e	Was a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) assigned?		Yes			Yes
1f	Was a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) assigned?		No			Yes

Only other response is to Q. 5d

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-13	QS-14	QS-15	QS-16
Military service and/or experience:						
2a	What personal military experience did you have, if any, prior to the event (e.g., service on active duty or in a reserve component)?	(INPUT)	31 years military, with Armored Division, and 1.5 years as a DA civilian			24+ years on active duty
2b-1	How much and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with State National Guard personnel – principally the POMSO (Plans, Operations, Military Support Officer, now called DOMSO (Director of Operations, Military Support Officer)?	(INPUT)	NG HQ and the (HS&EM) agency HQ is located on the same complex. My sister is the POMSO, so very close. Very little on the DCO, but good with AC units in the state.			Minor interaction with POMSO, except during post-event recovery, when significant assistance used through NG Joint Operations Center.
2b-2	How much and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with active military, such as the DCO (Defense Coordinating Officer), Base Commander (or Base emergency planners), or military units?	(INPUT)				In my current job, Director of Operations (since 2004), I have significant interactions with both sets of military groups. This position has been historically more closely aligned with POMCO & DCO on a pre-event basis.
2c	Are you aware of the capability of the military to respond to emergencies under the tenets of “Immediate Response,” as defined by DOD (DOD Directives 3025.15 & 3025.1)?	(Y/N)	Yes			Yes
2d	Have you attended any courses about the military, such as the DOD Emergency Preparedness Course?	(Y/N)	Yes			Yes
2c	If yes, what course(s)?	(INPUT)	When I was the POMSO for the NG, I was trained.			DSCA course

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-13	QS-14	QS-15	QS-16
Pre-Event:						
3a	Did you have a good understanding (working knowledge) about the military's organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc., relating to your State's National Guard (NG)?	(INPUT)	Yes, a lot			Yes, a lot.
3b	Did you know about the military's organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc., relating to Department of Defense (DOD) or active component military?	(INPUT)	Yes, equal to the level of NG understanding.			Yes, equal to the level of NG understanding.
3c	Were you aware of the differences between NG and DOD, pertaining to their ability to provide support to civil authorities?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)	Yes			Yes
3d	Did you understand the processes of integrating supplied military support into disaster response operations?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)	Yes			Yes
3f	Did you understand the need to pre-define an ending point, and/or exit strategy for the military unit(s)?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)	Yes			Yes. State responsibility for NG; Feds for Federal forces.

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-13	QS-14	QS-15	QS-16
During the Event:						
	Did you discover any differences between utilizing DOD support, versus NG Support?	(INPUT)	Yes. We used the Coast Guard – [but] the mission approval process was different.			Yes. The chances of using Federal military support in disaster operations was minimal.
4a	What information about the DOD military did you discover during the event that enabled you to more effectively work with the military for the duration of the event?	(INPUT)	No real discovery here.			None
4b	How did you discover that knowledge?		NA			
4c	How did you assimilate, or use it?	(INPUT)	NA			
4c	Was the military able to respond to your request(s) for assistance?	(Y/N)	Yes			
4d	Was this assistance provided under “Immediate Response” or a deliberate FEMA Mission Assignment request?	(IM or MA) & (INPUT)	Immediate Response			My request would go to FEMA, [but] I did not see any [state-requested] missions which went to [Federal] military.
4e						

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-13	QS-14	QS-15	QS-16
Post-Event:						
5a	Do you agree with the researcher's premise that there are differences between integrating NG and DOD military support (relating to techniques, not issues like Posse Comitatus)?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)	Yes	Yes		Yes. This is a complex question whose answer needs much more discussion.
5b	Do you think that (NG and DOD) military equipment is highly suited to disaster response?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)	Yes. They have assets that don't exist in the state.	Yes. Clearly [military forces] have items that are needed.		No
5c	Do you think that DOD military support was more accessible?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)	No	Yes, Only because of [Hurricane] Katrina		(More accessible than what/when?)

Q #	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-13	QS-14	QS-15	QS-16
5d	Please help define the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event. I think that Emergency Managers need to know:	(INPUT)	Ability to support ICS and work in an ICS environment. Immediate Response process.	Role of NORTHCOM Role of National Guard Need to know capabilities that are available	A single point of contact that will coordinate all military assets.	DSCA Military mutual aid (military post/base – local) Capabilities Current legal issues on the use of the military in disasters Relationship of Coast Guard to disaster operations at state and local levels Relationship of DHS & DOD organizations to disaster operations National Guard Title 10, Title 32, State Active Duty

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-17	QS-18	QS-19
Principal question:	Has your State had an occurrence of DOD (not National Guard) support, i.e., active duty unit(s), arriving in State to respond to a disaster or emergency within the last ten or so years?	(Y/N)	No	No	Yes
General:					
1a	What was your role (Job Title, Position Responsibilities) at the time of the event?	(INPUT)	**Only other response is to Q. 5d**	**Only other response is to Q. 5d**	Chief of Staff, NG HQ
1b	How long had you been serving in that position?	(YEARS)			
1c	Please briefly describe the event (event name (if any), date, location, severity, etc.).	(INPUT)			Super Typhoon Ponsana, Dec. 02
1d	Was there a presidential declaration of an emergency or a disaster?				
1e	Was a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) assigned?				
1f	Was a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) assigned?				

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-17	QS-18	QS-19
Military service and/or experience:					
2a	What personal military experience did you have, if any, prior to the event (e.g., service on active duty or in a reserve component)?	(INPUT)			
2b-1	How much and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with State National Guard personnel – principally the POMSO (Plans, Operations, Military Support Officer, now called DOMSO (Director of Operations, Military Support Officer)?	(INPUT)			
2b-2	How much and what kinds of pre-event interaction did you have with active military, such as the DCO (Defense Coordinating Officer), Base Commander (or Base emergency planners), or military units?	(INPUT)			
2c	Are you aware of the capability of the military to respond to emergencies under the tenets of “Immediate Response,” as defined by DOD (DOD Directives 3025.15 & 3025.1)?	(Y/N)			
2d	Have you attended any courses about the military, such as the DOD Emergency Preparedness Course?	(Y/N)			
2c	If yes, what course(s)?	(INPUT)			

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-17	QS-18	QS-19
Pre-Event:					
3a	Did you have a good understanding (working knowledge) about the military's organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc., relating to your State's National Guard (NG)?	(INPUT)			
3b	Did you know about the military's organization, capabilities, rank, command and control, etc., relating to Department of Defense (DOD) or active component military?	(INPUT)			
3c	Were you aware of the differences between NG and DOD, pertaining to their ability to provide support to civil authorities?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)			
3d	Did you understand the processes of integrating supplied military support into disaster response operations?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)			
3f	Did you understand the need to pre-define an ending point, and/or exit strategy for the military unit(s)?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)			

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-17	QS-18	QS-19
During the Event:					
4a	Did you discover any differences between utilizing DOD support, versus NG Support?	(INPUT)			
4b	What information about the DOD military did you discover during the event that enabled you to more effectively work with the military for the duration of the event?	(INPUT)			
4c	How did you discover that knowledge?				
4c	How did you assimilate, or use it?	(INPUT)			
4d	Was the military able to respond to your request(s) for assistance?	(Y/N)			
4e	Was this assistance provided under “Immediate Response” or a deliberate FEMA Mission Assignment request?	(IM or MA) & (INPUT)			

QUESTION#	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-17	QS-18	QS-19
Post-Event:					
	Do you agree with the researcher's premise that there are differences between integrating NG and DOD military support (relating to techniques, not issues like Posse Comitatus)?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)			Yes but there shouldn't be. There are even differences between them in the OIF/OEF deployments taking place today
5a	Do you think that (NG and DOD) military equipment is highly suited to disaster response?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)			Not entirely but the state CSTs add tremendous value to the governor's arsenal. All states should have some engineering, commo, info technology, medical, transportation and military police capability to better support the state governor
5b	Do you think that DOD military support was more accessible?	(Y/N) & (INPUT)			When they want to; NG is more accessible because DOD has it own missions to contend to and answer to their own generals
5c					

Q #	QUESTION VERBIAGE	TYPE RESP	QS-17	QS-18	QS-19
5d	Please help define the body of knowledge which current and prospective emergency managers need to know about the military, i.e., rank, organization, capabilities, etc., pre-event. I think that Emergency Managers need to know:	(INPUT)	…and understand the military system and chain of command. They need to understand the capabilities and the way the military operates from response, logistics, chain of command, etc. They also need to know how they will be integrated with the response and coordinate with the other military units assigned (National Guard).		EMs need to remind the military the state governor is in charge of disaster recovery missions. DOD/NG need to adjust to the governor's organizational structure based on ICS and ESF and not the other way around. DOD needs to assess what type of equipment it should have on hand to assist the state with local disasters, whether typhoons, tsunamis, snow storms, ice storms, floods, etc.