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Cities and State Legislatures: Changing Coalitions and the Metropolitan Agenda

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Cities and State Legislatures:

Changing Coalitions and the Metropolitan Agenda

A Report to

The Brookings Institution

Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy

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INTRODUCTION

Throughout American history cities have lobbied their states in order to obtain funding and to protect or enhance their legal authority. States are responsible for the foundational legislation that determines city powers and resources; likewise issues crucial to the fate of cities are fought out each year in state legislatures. The importance of state decision making for cities increased with the new federalism of the 1970s and it has continued to grow as the federal government has delegated more responsibility to state governments in recent decades. However, the enhanced importance of states comes at a time when cities have lost political strength in state legislatures. Once reliable urban strategies such as logrolling, coalitions with legislators from other distressed areas of the state, and control of the Democratic Party caucus are less effective in state legislatures as cities have lost population and as urban delegations have become less cohesive. As urban political strength has ebbed, a growing chorus of analysts has argued that cities can no longer go it alone and must engage in broader regional strategies in order to thrive.

Our study examines whether cities have embraced these new ideas as they formulate their strategies in state politics. We ask two questions: First, what do cities want out of their state governments, i.e., what issues are at the top of their lobbying agenda? Second, what methods or coalitional strategies do they use to achieve their political goals? Focusing on politics in Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and New York over the past decade we show that cities set defensive and reactive legislative priorities designed largely to preserve existing arrangements; urban leaders, especially mayors, showed little initiative in pressing for new regionalist ideas in these state legislatures. City leaders continued to rely heavily on older political strategies of logrolling and party caucus alliances. But as such strategies have become less dependable cities have looked to a much broader range of political alliances to win desired legislation. Their limited success suggests the need for more creative approaches to defining urban priorities in state legislatures and for more vigorous efforts to build common interests across geographical boundaries.

CITIES IN STATE POLITICS

The Dependence of Cities on States

Legally, cities are creatures of state governments and therefore state laws powerfully impact what cities can and cannot do. According to Dillon’s Rule, first enunciated in 1868 by Iowa Supreme Court Judge John F. Dillon, “Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the legislature.” Beginning with the City of St. Louis in 1875, a home rule movement swept the United States, giving cities substantial autonomous powers to govern themselves as they saw fit. Home rule suggests that cities do not need to be as concerned because they are no longer being micromanaged by state legislatures. However, the idea that home rule withdrew the states from interfering in cities is misleading. Despite home
rule, Gerald Frug argues that cities are still relatively powerless, requiring state permission to exercise essential governmental powers (Frug, 1980; 1999, ch. 2). According to David Barron, home rule does not simply mean a hands-off approach by states but rather an effort by states to empower some functions of cities and restrict others (Barron, 2003). Frug and Barron may be exaggerating city “powerlessness” (Krane and Rigos, 2000), but it is clear that states still exercise substantial authority over the legal affairs of cities.

Not only do cities depend on states for their legal powers, they also depend on states for the resources necessary to meet their responsibilities. State laws determine what services cities must provide and cities require the permission of states to impose many taxes, even on their own citizens. Research on the fiscal condition of cities provides ample evidence of the importance of states for cities. In their definitive analysis of urban fiscal conditions, Ladd and Yinger (1989) differentiate between the fiscal health of cities based on their socioeconomic condition and their “actual” fiscal health taking into account fiscal institutions, which are mostly determined by state laws. With regard to revenue-raising capacity, the ability of cities to export some of their tax load is shaped by whether the state allows them to impose certain taxes, such as a commuter tax. Similarly, states can impose limits on local tax collections, such as Proposition 13 in California or Proposition 2 ½ in Massachusetts. On the expenditure side, Ladd and Yinger observe, “the scope of a city’s service responsibility is outside its control.” State governments determine what services a city must provide, including the nonfederal portion of expensive social welfare programs, such as Medicaid. In short, both the revenue-raising capacity and the expenditure needs of cities are powerfully shaped by state policies.

Changes in American federalism since the 1970s have made cities even more dependent on states. First, federal aid to cities has fallen precipitously. At the peak, in 1978, about 15 percent of city revenues (over 25 percent in some big cities) came from federal aid; by 1999 federal aid was less than 3 percent of city revenues (Kincaid, 1998: 136; see also Judd and Swanstrom, 2004, p. 323). General Revenue Sharing for cities was allowed to lapse entirely in 1986. With looming federal deficits and both houses of Congress controlled by Republicans, there is little prospect for increased federal aid. Cities must turn to the states.

Devolution of federal programs also makes cities more dependent on states. The conversion of welfare from a national entitlement to a state block grant under TANF means that during recessions, as the need for welfare spending soars, cities cannot count on additional funding; it will be up to state legislatures to provide it (Chernick and Reschovsky, 2001). With most states now facing huge deficits, it is unlikely they will be generous. As people have moved off of welfare and into jobs, the welfare caseload has become increasingly concentrated in cities (Allen and Kirby, 2000). Those least able to succeed in the job market are disproportionately concentrated in cities. These vulnerable populations put additional expenditure pressures on city governments.

In short, there is ample evidence that the fates of cities depend crucially on the actions of their states and recent scholarly research on devolution suggests that cities
are becoming even more dependent on state policies. Given the importance of states for cities, what strategies have cities used to influence their state governments?

THE CONTEXT: DECLINING CITY POPULATION AND REPRESENTATION

Since the 1970s, the political clout of cities in state legislatures has eroded as cities have lost population and representation. Most central cities have suffered a substantial decline as a share of their state’s population over the past decades (see Table 1). In 37 states, the largest city declined as a share of the state population. The drop was particularly precipitous in some states. Chicago, for example, declined from 35.2% of Illinois’ population in 1960 to 23.3% in 2000, Baltimore from 30.3% of Maryland’s population to 12.3%, Detroit from 21.3% of Michigan’s population to 9.6%, and Denver from 28.2% of Colorado’s population to 12.9%.

We also calculated the change in percent of the state population for all large cities (over 250,000 population) in the state. Many states with more than one large city also experienced substantial relative declines in the population of their large urban areas. Ohio’s large cities declined from 28.0% of the state’s population in 1960 to 16.2% in 2000, Missouri’s from 28.4% to 14.1%, Minnesota’s from 23.3% to 13.6%, and Pennsylvania’s from 23.0% to 15.1%.

As the table shows, even in 1960, most central cities were not close to a majority of their state’s population. To create majorities in state legislatures, large cities have always needed to add votes from representatives of other geographic areas. The reduction in city representatives since the 1960s has made efforts to construct majority coalitions even more challenging.

What are the possible strategies cities can employ to move from a minority situation in the legislature to create legislative majorities in support of city interests? How have they done so, what problems have the decline in city population caused, and how have cities responded?

CREATING MAJORITY LEGISLATIVE COALITIONS TO SUPPORT CITY INTERESTS:
THE CALCULUS OF COALITIONS

As noted above, central cities have always faced a fundamental political weakness when lobbying their states: they do not represent a majority of votes in the state legislature. With the exception of New York City, which had a majority of the population of the state for a short period, central cities have rarely constituted a majority of votes and almost never a majority of seats in both houses of the state legislature. The minority status of cities was exacerbated by the under-representation of urban areas prior to Baker v. Carr in 1962. The implementation of “one man – one vote” came at a time when most cities were losing population to their suburbs and therefore probably benefited suburbs more than cities (Reichley, 1970; see also Burns, et al., 2002). As we showed, the minority status of central cities in state legislatures has gotten considerably worse in recent years. (Weir, 1996)
Not only have central cities lacked a majority in state legislatures, many rural and small town legislators have mobilized their supporters by running against cities. Cities are depicted as dens of corrupt machine rule and homes of foreigners, immigrants, Jews, Catholics, and racial minorities – all to one degree or another charged with standing outside mainstream American values. The literature on the urban-rural divide in American politics is vast. (For studies of urban-rural splits in state legislatures, see Derge, 1958 and Broach, 1972.) In his American State Politics (1956) V. O Key observes that the metropolitan-non-metropolitan electoral divide is greatest in states where one large city seems to dominate the state. Two examples are amply documented in the literature: New York and Illinois (Benjamin and Brecher, 1988; Nardulli, 1989). Urban-rural conflicts complicate the coalitional efforts of cities.

If cities never had a majority and they were viewed with hostility by many rural and small town legislators, then how did cities manage to achieve any successes in state legislatures?

Party-Imposed Coalitions: The first, and historically the leading strategy, has been for representatives of the dominant party in the city (usually Democratic) to persuade the party’s legislative caucus to impose party discipline to support the city’s interests. This type of alliance generally involves logrolling among party members from different regions. But often a shared interest in an active or generous state role unites such coalitions, even if the specifics of what coalitional partners want are different. Traditionally, such party-based coalitions have joined central city representatives and those from distressed rural and small town areas on issues related to poverty, economic development, and education funding. Such coalitions may be difficult to maintain when cities cannot dominate the party caucus, when party discipline cannot be enforced or when the broad interests of the city and distressed areas begin to diverge.

Governor-Brokered Coalitions: A second type of coalition relies on the governor to bring legislators together across party lines. Governors (including Republican Governors) often play a key role in winning legislative support for urban priorities. This is especially true for major infrastructure projects that require legislative approval. Several factors prompt governors to support some urban priorities regardless of partisanship. Governors recognize that they are elected statewide and that a vote from the city counts as much as a vote elsewhere, even though Republican gubernatorial candidates in some states may not get many votes from cities. Moreover, governors are responsible for the entire state and are aware that even fiscally stressed cities play an important economic role in the state. This does not mean that governors necessarily favor city interests but rather that they protect cities against possible adverse initiatives by legislators with narrower geographic interests. Finally, in many cases, major corporate interests that donate heavily to campaign coffers are urban-based. Governors are especially attentive to the priorities of these interests.

Interest-Based Coalitions: Shared interests form the basis for a third kind of coalition. Interest-based coalitions can take several forms. Large cities can unite with depressed rural areas or with smaller-sized central cities. In states where there are other large and/or medium sized cities, such coalitions may cooperate on a wide range of issues that go beyond fiscal concerns. Representatives from different metropolitan
areas may also join forces around common concerns in state legislatures. On some kinds of issues (e.g., large capital projects) central city and suburban representatives may readily perceive a common metropolitan interest and enter into coalitions in pursuit of that. Cities may also unite with a subset of their suburbs, such as Myron Orfield’s proposal to link cities and fiscally stressed suburbs around common fiscal interests.

**Ad Hoc Logrolling Coalitions:** A fourth kind of coalition is held together by logrolling pure and simple. In these cases, there is little common interest base or party connection among coalition partners. Rather allies unite in order to pursue their narrow interests. Such opportunistic coalitions are likely to be short-lived and constructed on a case-by-case basis.

**Ideological Coalitions:** Finally, cities may join coalitions that are united around shared ideological commitments. These concerns may either be substantive, reflecting common views on an issue or they may be procedural with respect to the role of state and/or federal governments relative to that of local governments. Liberal groups from across the state, for example, may ally with cities to press for greater welfare spending.

**THE SEARCH FOR NEW POLITICAL STRATEGIES**

The trends we discussed above, such as declining central city representation and influence within the Democratic Party, have required cities, out of necessity, to look for new coalitional partners. Despite the historical differences in city and suburban political leanings, many analysts have begun to argue that the best strategy is for cities is to build new interest-based coalitions with their suburbs.

As cities have declined, suburbs have grown in political importance. Since the 1960s, suburbs have gained tremendously in population and in representation in state legislatures at the expense of cities and rural areas. Place does make a difference in voting behavior. Research shows that suburbanites vote differently from urban dwellers, even after controlling for individual variables. (See Schneider, 1992 Gainsborough, 2001.) Also, city representatives vote differently in Congress from suburban and rural representatives, once again, even after controlling for various characteristics of the districts. (See Wolman and Marckini, 1998, 2000.) Overall, however, the differences between city and suburban legislative voting records, at least in Congress, are not as great as between city and non-metropolitan representatives. The fact that cities and suburbs are not as different from each other, culturally, economically, and politically as cities and rural areas suggests the possibility of city-suburban coalitions.

As early as 1970 James Reichley observed that “Close-in suburbs are increasingly experiencing problems that are similar to those faced by inner cities,” and suggested that this offered an opportunity to overcome the political isolation of cities. The most prominent advocate of city-suburban coalitions today is former Minnesota State Senator Myron Orfield. Noting the increasing variation among suburbs, Orfield made the case for coalitions between central cities and suburbs based on common fiscal problems in his first book, *Metropolitics* (1997). (In our typology, this is an interest-based coalition.) Orfield’s argument is focused on the common fiscal interests of jurisdictions. Central cities, disproportionately the home for the metropolitan area’s
poor and with older housing and infrastructure, face high public service needs but an eroding revenue base due to outmigration of the middle class to the suburbs and loss of commercial and industrial taxpaying property. Many inner distressed suburbs are beginning to experience similar fiscal concerns as the same process extends to them. Many rapidly developing outer suburbs, because they have growing numbers of school-aged children and little commercial or industrial tax base, and thus depend almost completely on the residential tax base for revenue, suffer from fiscal stress as well. Sharing common fiscal concerns, Orfield argues, these types of jurisdictions have the potential to form coalitions to advance and protect those interests.

In his latest book, *American Metropolitics* (2002), Orfield amends his hypothesis about coalitions in state legislatures among different parts of metropolitan areas, arguing that “affluent job centers” are also among the strongest supporters of metropolitan reforms. Their support is motivated not by a fear of fiscal stress but by the fear that present patterns of development will damage the environment and undermine the quality of their lives, especially by generating traffic congestion and paving over green space (Orfield, 2002, 44-46).

There have been few systematic efforts to test Orfield’s hypotheses. Steinacker (2001) examined voter support for seven statewide propositions in support of metropolitan reforms in California. She found positive correlations between residence in distressed suburbs and support for metropolitan reforms, but the correlations were weak and “the specific demographic characteristics that are critical are not clear-cut” (Steinacker, 2001).

The main evidence for the Orfield hypothesis are case studies of successful coalitions in state legislatures among different parts of metropolitan areas, states that appear to have benefited from several unusual circumstances (Weir, 2000). The initial case is the enactment of tax base sharing in Minnesota in 1971. In this case central city representatives joined with representatives from distressed suburbs, including many Republicans, who felt their jurisdictions would not benefit from development trends under existing tax laws. (See Orfield, 1997, pp. 143-144.) The Minnesota example, however, is the only case of a successful coalition to enact metropolitan-wide tax base sharing. In 1990 Myron Orfield was elected to the Minnesota House of Representatives from Minneapolis, and over the years he successfully assembled central city/suburban coalitions behind a wide range of metropolitan reforms. These coalitions are described in his books and are documented by Rusk (1999, ch. 11). The coalitions behind metropolitan reforms in the Minnesota Legislature successfully united representatives from the central cities and the less prosperous suburbs. The legislative results would have been much more impressive in Minnesota if Republican Governor Arne Carlson had not vetoed many of the metropolitan reforms.

Portland, Oregon, is the other widely cited example of successful metropolitan reform in the United States. The statewide coalition in Oregon, however, was different from the coalition in Minnesota. The Oregon statewide land use law, the most progressive in the country, now is thirty years old and there is extensive literature on it. (See Abbott, 1983; 2000; Abbott, Howe and Adler, 1994; Nelson, 1996; Leo, 1998; Weir, 2000.) The Oregon case is interesting because the coalition that supported
改革并不主要在波特兰和郊区之间，而是在波特兰、环保主义者和农村代表之间。事实上，波特兰的成功可能在1973年郊区相对政治上较弱（Weir, 2000）的形势下部分得益。

另一个可能促成成功的原因是明尼苏达州和俄勒冈州的相对种族同质性。种族恐惧使得更难认识城市和郊区之间的共同利益。Thomas Byrne和Mary Edsall (1991) 认为，白人郊区和少数族群城市之间的鸿沟，尤其是那些有大量黑人“下层阶级”人群的城市，使得基于经济利益的联盟被分裂。Juliet Gainsborough表明，种族分歧越严重，城市和郊区居民的投票行为和态度的差距就越大（2001, p. 93）。选民研究暗示，在集中较穷少数族群的城市和拥有绝对多数白人的郊区，城市-郊区联盟将更加难以实现。

最后，值得注意的是，俄勒冈州和明尼苏达州的共和党州长（Tom McCall and Harold Levander）在制定上述广泛影响的都市改革时发挥了关键作用。

研究设计与方法论

我们的研究旨在探讨大都市如何在州议会中追求其利益，他们进入何种联盟，在何种情况下，以及城市受困于内城和外郊联盟（Orfield 所称的）是否发生在除明尼苏达州之外的其它州。我们将考察过去十年来城市在州议会中采取的战略。我们提出的核心问题是：城市想要从他们的州获得什么？他们选择优先事项和建立联盟时所经过的机构有哪些？他们在何处成功，又在何处失败？

我们选择了伊利诺伊州、密歇根州、俄亥俄州和纽约州作为探索性研究的四个州。这些州被选中是因为它们各自拥有受困于城市和郊区的内城和外郊联盟，但它们也各自在地理、经济、种族和政治特征上不同。伊利诺伊州、密歇根州和纽约州有单一的主导城市，而俄亥俄州则有三个城市（哥伦布、克利夫兰和辛辛那提），它们的大小和影响力大致相等。如图所示，在每一方面，州人口的百分比在这些大城市中在1960年到2000年间下降，底特律下降得最多，而芝加哥下降次之，俄亥俄州的城市相对较少下降，因为哥伦布市的扩张，大部分是通过吸收郊区实现的。纽约市还由于持续的移民而实际上增加了其在本州人口中的份额。
These population declines have translated directly into a loss of representatives from the central city delegations. In 1950, for example there were 33 legislators who represented some portion of the city of Detroit out of 110 members of the Michigan House of Representatives. Today there are 13. Prior to the redistricting following the 2000 Census, New York City had 61 of 150 House seats in New York state, Chicago had 30 of 118 in Illinois, and Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Columbus combined had 14 out of the 99 seats in the Ohio House. This decline in representation has not only reduced the proportion of votes from city representatives in the legislature, it has, perhaps more importantly, also reduced the influence of the city in the Democratic caucuses in the legislature.

In each state, we interviewed the lobbyist(s) of the major central city governments and asked them to name the issues before the state legislature over the past several years that had been or currently were of greatest concern to their city, either in terms of legislation they wanted passed or legislation they wanted blocked. We then asked the lobbyists how they had attempted to pursue their city’s interest in these issues before the state legislature, who were the legislators they depended upon to advance and protect these interests, what other legislators were important to gain the support of, what kinds of coalitions they attempted to put together and whether they were successful. In addition we interviewed close observers (including newspaper reporters covering the state house, academics, retired legislators), asking similar questions. We then interviewed some of the legislators named by the lobbyists and others as important on these issues. The objective in each case was to determine, on
the issues important to city government, what kind of coalitions had been put together under what circumstances and to what extent the kind of city-suburban legislative coalition suggested by Orfield occurred.

WHAT DO CITIES WANT FROM THEIR STATES?

In order to determine the policy agenda or chief goals of central cities in their state legislatures, we interviewed top staff of the mayor, chief lobbyists for the city, and consulted public pronouncements of city goals. It would be more accurate to say that what we researched was not what “cities” wanted from their states but what the chief executives, or mayors, of cities wanted from their states. (In the case of New York City, the City Council has a separate lobbying office in Albany, but there was a great deal of overlap between the lobbying agenda of the Mayor and the City Council.) For a detailed listing of city legislative priorities in four cities, see Appendix B.

While some issues were unique to a particular city or state, we found much overlap in what the mayors of the cities we studied sought from their states. At the most general level, the focus of city lobbying efforts was on the institution of city government, not on the people who live in the city or the region. Two main themes stand out: 1) cities want more legal autonomy from state interference or they want to preserve the autonomy they have; 2) cities want more money from the state, either directly in the form of state grants or indirectly in the form of state-funded capital projects that will enhance local tax collections. Often, the objectives of the city were reactive – designed to fend off threats from state legislation that would undermine their autonomy or cost them money. This suggests the limits of home rule: in many important areas cities do not possess general powers to govern themselves as they see fit; they are subject to state laws. Whether intentional or not, by keeping cities on a short leash and requiring them to come before the state legislature each session just to protect the status quo, leaders in the state legislature from outside cities create opportunities for favorable logrolls, exchanging their support of city-friendly legislation for city support of their own legislative priorities.

Funding: The goal of increasing state aid was a prominent feature on the policy agenda of our cities. Most state aid comes with strings attached, but most states also have retained some form of revenue sharing with cities. Cities are constantly lobbying to avoid cuts in state general aid, such as Detroit’s effort to block a change in the revenue sharing formula that would have eliminated the “tax effort” component, thus cutting Detroit’s share or Cincinnati’s effort to block a state freeze in the local government fund. For the most part, cities have been fighting a losing battle on revenue sharing. In New York the proportion of state revenues shared with localities fell by over three quarters between 1979 and 1994 (Fiscal Policy Institute, 1994: 19-20).

Nearly all our cities lobbied to have state infrastructure and other projects built in their city, presumably boosting city tax revenues. Thus, Cincinnati lobbied to keep a post office in the city, for park improvements, and for museum funding, and Chicago lobbied for renovation to a convention center and stadium and was a major supporter of a state transportation infrastructure initiative that would provide important benefits to the
city. Ohio cities lobbied actively for a share of the biannual state capital budget allocated to local projects. State brownfields legislation that would boost the local economy was a high priority for Detroit and Cincinnati. It is interesting to note that the lobbying for state project money was opportunistic; it was not part of any long-term plan for city or regional economic development.

Autonomy: The quest for city legal autonomy is closely tied to fiscal concerns. In the state of Ohio, as we noted, giving cities the legal authority to impose a commuter tax can substitute in many ways for state aid. Ohio cities lobby constantly to block efforts to pass legislation that would prohibit municipal income taxes. In 1999, New York City failed, losing its right to impose an income tax on commuters (loss of $475 million in 2000). The city has made restoring the commuter tax a high priority under both mayors Giuliani and Bloomberg.

Not only do cities want autonomy to impose taxes as they see fit, they also want freedom from state-mandated expenditures. Mayors of both New York and Chicago have lobbied to prevent state legislation from mandating additional spending on city pensions, for example. In other cases, cities have sought legal autonomy to increase the powers of the city, and by implication the mayor. For example, the mayor of Detroit opposed an effort by a regional water board to take over the city water authority. In three cases, mayors were not just reacting to threats to their autonomy but seeking substantial new authority over city public schools (Chicago, Detroit, and New York).

What Was Missing? It is worthwhile to note plausible priorities that were missing from the mayors’ lobbying agendas. First, the mayors did not make state legislation to address poverty and unemployment a high priority. The main exception to this is New York City, which as a city/county has responsibility for administering many social welfare programs. Giuliani did make additional funding for foster care a high priority, but this hardly represented an aggressive effort on the part of New York City to help the disadvantaged populations concentrated in the City. Efforts to directly help the poor were largely missing from the top policy agendas of the other cities.

The second large hole in city priorities was any effort to promote regional development or to establish a common agenda between the city and mature suburbs facing similar issues. The mayors seemed focused on the immediate fiscal well-being of city government. They did not make the policies of regional authorities, such as transit and sewer and water, high priority in their dealings with the state legislature. Addressing state and regional policies that might harm the city by subsidizing suburban sprawl did not capture significant policy attention. In this respect our research supports the findings of David Rusk who concluded that big city mayors, with few exceptions, were “missing in action” in leading regional coalition building (Rusk, 1999: 312-315).

CITY LEGISLATIVE COALITIONS

City legislators from the four states we studied created all five of the different types of coalitions we identified. But the two traditional strategies predominated: first, dependence on the Democratic caucus, which united urban legislators with their fellow Democratic legislators from relatively poor constituencies outside of the metropolitan
area and second, reliance on the governor, including Republican governors, to construct majority coalitions protecting city interests. As important as these traditional strategies remain, our case studies show that declining city political strength has made them less reliable than in the past.

The Democratic caucus remains the key forum for representing city interests in state legislatures. In both Illinois and Michigan, this alliance has traditionally joined the city with the declining rural areas of the state. In New York, where upstate declining rural areas are much more likely to be Republican, the Democratic caucus links NYC legislators with representatives from upstate cities and from the suburbs. However, as suburban Democrats have gained more clout in the New York Democratic Party, the Democratic caucus cannot always be counted on to place the city’s interest first. Detroit’s position in the caucus is much weaker than in the past, making the city much less able to drive the Democratic agenda. Chicago and NYC retain dominant status within the Democratic caucus, but even in these states the Democratic caucuses increasingly have interests that are distinct from those of the city. The need to appeal to suburban interests in order to maintain legislative power sometimes leads the caucus to take stands that go against the city’s interests. The alliance between cities and distressed areas is also more strained today than in the past. In both New York and Illinois, the increasing prosperity of the major city has begun to undermine the economic basis for cooperation.

In addition, term limits have served to reduce the influence of city representative in the two of the four states we examined that had imposed term limits on state legislators – Michigan and Ohio. Cities particularly need long-term relationships that build the trust necessary for successful logrolls. Prior to term limits, Detroit representatives in the legislature had seniority (because they ran in what were essentially one-party districts and were immune to defeat), and they formed long-term relationships with representatives from other areas in the Michigan House. Since terms limits, the advantages of seniority have disappeared and the trust among representatives, who do not have time to build strong ties, has declined. As a consequence, representatives from Detroit have found it much harder to win support for city needs in the legislature.

The same dynamic appears to be taking place in Ohio with respect to the influence of cities, particularly Cincinnati. Ohio passed a term limit measure that both House and Senate members to eight years (four terms for House members; two terms for Senate members). Term limits, though not fully in effect at the time of our interviews, have, according to several respondents, increased the power of lobbyists and public relations firms in the political process and have also encouraged cities to hire contract lobbyists. One former legislator observed that “it used to be that legislators sat down directly with mayors and city managers – but that doesn’t happen as much now. Term limits and legislative redistricting have screwed this up. Lobby firms are growing in importance.” In addition, as one of our interviewees noted, term limits have also put a premium on fund raising because of the constant party need to raise funds for new candidates who have little or no name recognition. This has resulted in a relative shift
of power to the rapidly growing suburbs, “because that is where the money is and that is where the development interests are.”

As cities have become politically weaker, they have become more dependent on governors to assist them. For the reasons noted above, governors are often willing partners. But governors are not always reliable or effective allies. Alliances may be negotiated on the terms of the governor, rather than on the terms most favorable to the city. For example, former Governor Engler’s intervention in the state revenue sharing debate described below rescued Detroit from a potential disastrous defeat, but at the cost of both extending an inadequate status quo and reducing the city’s ability to tax suburbanites. In other cases, Republican governors may not be able to induce enough Republicans to support the alliances they are seeking to construct. In Illinois, for example, former Governor Edgar was unable to persuade legislative Republicans to support his proposal for school finance reform.

Detroit: Fighting Against Political Isolation: Who supports Detroit’s interests in the Michigan legislature? As one interviewee observed, “I don’t think it’s most accurately identified by geography. It’s almost never a good vote for you. But on a lot of issues it’s not really important electorally. It’s the ones more sympathetic to Detroit who will vote for it. Others simply don’t buy the idea that there should be special advantages for Detroit.”

Particularly on issues involving money and resource distribution, voting tends to be by region, with legislators (including Democrats) being less willing to support Detroit the further west they are in the State. In particular, the growing areas of the state (in the West) resent the disproportionately high share of resources going to Detroit through programs such as state revenue sharing. As one interviewee observed, “there is a feeling that Detroit is getting ‘too much’ and that it is inefficient.” On the other hand, there are some issues important to Detroit where the Democratic caucus takes a stance and virtually all Democrats hold to the party line. There are also issues, such as brownfields, where Republican representatives from other urban areas in the state support Detroit’s interests.

While the Detroit delegation itself usually votes as a group, it is too small now to make a major difference. How do legislative majorities in support of Detroit’s interest get structured?

We were able to find contested votes on four of the issues that had been identified as most important to the city of Detroit over the last several years. These votes reflected several different kinds of issues; they also reflected several different kinds of coalition patterns.

Party-Imposed and Interest-Based Coalitions: While most voting is structured by party membership, straight party-line votes on issues related to Detroit are rare. Historically the Detroit delegation had structured an alliance with Democratic members from distressed areas of northern Michigan and the Upper Peninsula (U.P.), particularly with respect to project-based decisions. This alliance was built around the collegial relationships between long-serving Democratic committee chairs, a relationship which, because of term limits, no longer exists. It also reflected the strong labor orientation of
members of both the Detroit and U.P. delegations. Frequently these alliances received party caucus support.

An example is legislation prohibiting local governments from enacting living wage laws. This bill was the subject of a series of votes, almost all of which were along party lines. Spurred on by a major campaign by organized labor, Detroit residents passed by referendum a living wage law to apply to city contractors, requiring wage levels substantially above the state minimum wage. The bill to prohibit cities from adopting livable wage laws was introduced and pushed by Republican legislators, at least partly to demonstrate that Democratic legislators were beholden to labor. According to reports, the city was put in a bind: the Mayor and his advisors actually were not in favor of the livable wage referendum, fearing it would put the city under serious fiscal pressure. On the other hand, neither he nor members of the city delegation could be seen to oppose it. The result was a series of votes in both houses that simply pitted Democrats from all areas of the state against Republicans from all areas of the state, though with a very high absentee rate among Democrats (on the first vote in the House, four of the 13 Democratic members of the city delegation were absent).

**Governor-Brokered Coalitions:** Former Mayor Archer, instead of depending upon the diminished Detroit delegation (many of whom were his political opponents) as previous Mayors had done, went directly to the legislative leaders and, more importantly, directly to the Republican Governor, John Engler. On several of the issues (e.g., brownfields, the school takeover, the changed revenue sharing formula) important to Detroit, Archer and Engler and their aides were able to work out an acceptable deal and the Governor then was able to convince enough Republicans to go along with it to create a majority.

Interestingly, despite the public’s perception, nearly all of the interviewees observed that Gov. Engler was willing to listen to Detroit’s needs and to negotiate with the Mayor to meet them (albeit on terms often far removed from the Mayor’s initial preferences), as long as the issue didn’t have obvious partisan implications and did not visibly move resources from other parts of the state to Detroit. In addition, one of those interviewed who is a close observer of the Mayor noted that, “the Governor’s tough attitude towards fiscal policy and support of privatization has allowed the Mayor to do some things he believes needed to be done and then blame it on the Governor.” As another Democrat noted, “The Governor takes these issues seriously. Most issues that affect Detroit affect the state. He knows that.”

The state revenue sharing program, which provides fiscally strapped Detroit with important discretionary revenues, illustrates the role of the Governor. When the program came up for reauthorization in 1998 the Republican-controlled legislature suggested reforms that would have sharply reduced Detroit’s payments and increased the payments to smaller cities and rural areas. However, Mayor Archer and Governor Engler brokered a compromise proposal that froze Detroit’s current payments of $334 million annually through 2007-2008. In return the city agreed to reduce its municipal income tax from 3% to 2% for residents and from 1.5% to 1.0% for non-residents who work in the city. This combined measure passed by a vote of 58-33 in the House with 17 Republicans joining 41 Democrats in favor. Within the metropolitan area, all 10 city
Democrats and 14 of the 16 suburban Democrats voted for the compromise; they were joined by eight of the 13 suburban Republicans. Outside of the Detroit metropolitan area the vote split 27 against and 26 for. Newspaper reports and our interviews make clear that the energetic efforts of Gov. Engler on behalf of the legislation were crucial to the affirmative votes of Republicans from the suburbs and from larger Western Michigan cities.

**Ideological Coalitions:** The city of Detroit has a law imposing residency requirements for city employees. A bill was introduced that would have prohibited all local governments from imposing such requirements. During the debate, Detroit unsuccessfully attempted to gain exemption from the prohibition. The final legislation applied to all local governments but was amended to permit them to impose restrictions requiring all city employees to live within 20 miles of the outer city limits. Clearly this was an issue that the city opposed, but which would be in the mild interest of surrounding suburban jurisdictions.

Unlike the previous two issues, this issue clearly resulted in a city-suburban split, but it also reflected an ideological divide about the role of governments. In the Senate the original bill (SB 198) passed by a vote of 23-14 with seven Democrats joining 16 Republicans in favor and seven Democrats and seven Republicans opposed. The Detroit metropolitan delegation was split with the five central city Democrats who voted all opposing and all 10 of the suburban Senators (four Democrats and six Republicans) voting in favor. (Part of the reason for the split in the Detroit area metropolitan Democratic delegation was the opposition to the measure by the traditionally Democratic police and fire unions, many of whose members on the Detroit force lived in the suburbs and commuted in to work.) Outside of the Detroit metro area both parties split slightly in favor (10 Republicans favoring along with three Democrats, while seven Republicans and two Democrats opposing). The two non-Detroit area Democrats who, along with the five Detroit city Democrats, opposed the bill were from Michigan’s medium-sized cities. They were joined, however, by five Republicans from rural and small-town districts whose opposition was clearly based on ideological grounds. The rationale was expressed clearly by Sen. Emmons, a Republican from such a district, who explained his opposition by noting “These decisions are to be made by the local people... I trust my local people to set conditions of employment that are good for me and my family.”

In the House the vote was similar. The final vote on the conference committee bill was 67 in favor and 43 opposed, with 20 Democrats joining 47 Republicans in favor and 31 Democrats and 12 Republican opposed. All 13 of the Detroit city representatives voted in opposition, but they were also joined by eight suburban Democratic representatives. The one Republican representative from Detroit city favored passage as did 18 of the 19 suburban GOP House members. Outside of the Detroit area, 13 Democrats and 28 Republicans favored the prohibition, while 10 Democrats and 11 Republicans opposed.

**Interest-Based City-Suburban Coalitions:** There were somewhat diverse views of the frequency of suburban representatives voting with city representatives. One interviewee noted that the toughest area to get legislative support for Detroit was
Macomb County. As another explained, “the Macomb County Democratic delegation is very wary about doing anything that looks like it is cooperating with Detroit. The outer Wayne County Democrats are more cooperative; there’s much less outright hostility, though they are still apprehensive.”

On the other hand, a Democratic state legislator said that “Democratic caucus members often vote against their own political interests to support Detroit – including Macomb County representatives. The Macomb County Democrats usually come from inner-ring suburbs with the same stresses as the city. The opposition comes from the northern part of Macomb County, which is represented by Republicans. Where we lose Democratic support is from western Wayne County and the Western part of the state.”

An example of a city-suburban voting coalition occurred on legislation to give special privileges to cities of greater than 750,000 in population instead of 1,000,000. Michigan legislation had more than 20 separate provisions in which Detroit was singled out for special treatment through a provision limiting the application of these exceptions to all cities in the state with more than one million in population, i.e., Detroit. By the late 1990s it was clear that Detroit would fall below the one million mark in population in the 2000 Census. The legislation to drop the figure to 750,000 was passed in the House in 1998. Like the revenue sharing issue discussed above, the House vote reflected a strong Detroit region versus rest of Michigan split among the Republican members. The vote in favor was 70-24 with 41 of the 44 Democrats voting in favor, joined by 14 of the 17 suburban Detroit Republican representatives. However, 18 of the 33 outstate Republicans opposed it, reflecting the outstate animosity against Detroit.

A particularly interesting example, because it was spawned at the grass-roots, involved a city-suburban coalition generated from within the region and taken to the legislature. The Catholic Church in the Detroit area was the instigator in setting up an interfaith organization with the acronym of MOSES (Metropolitan Organization Strategy for Mobilizing Strength). MOSES’ objective was to induce the religious organizations of various faiths, particularly in the city and inner suburbs, to mobilize their members politically to change state policies in the direction of greater social and economic justice. MOSES strongly believed that an interfaith coalition, uniting like-minded people in both city and suburbs, was necessary to accomplish this objective.

MOSES chose as its first issue the creation of a Detroit Area Regional Transportation authority (DARTA). The Detroit area has two separate transportation systems, one serving the city and one serving the suburbs, with minimal coordination. MOSES proposed creation of a single regional transportation authority. The Detroit area Chamber of Commerce soon lent its support and the Detroit mayor and elected political leaders of the three major counties (both Democrat and Republican) worked out a plan for the creation of such an authority, with start-up funding of $500,000 from the state and with a mandate, once DARTA was created, to work out a permanent funding source. The plan was presented to the state legislature, which approved it with strong bi-partisan support from the legislative delegations of the city and the three counties. Unfortunately, in virtually his last act as Governor, John Engler vetoed the legislation, apparently in retaliation for the legislature’s refusal to approve the creation of 15 additional charter schools in Detroit (Detroit Free Press, Jan. 3, 2003). Since the
incoming Democratic Governor, Janet Granholm, has announced support for the
measure. However, it has failed to pass the legislature this session, largely because of
opposition from legislators from the outer suburbs. Instead the Governor and DARTA
supporters in the Detroit area are exploring ways of creating it administratively.

The nearly successful DARTA effort, which, although instigated at the grass roots,
was structured by local political elites and then sent to state level political elites for
approval is a stark contrast to recent efforts to seek citizen approval for regional action.
In the last two elections, voters of both Oakland and Wayne County (of which Detroit is
a part) have been presented with a proposal that would have created a ½ mill property
tax increase ($50 on a house valued at $200,000) dedicated to the funding of art and
cultural institutions in the region. The referendum required passage in both counties in
order to take effect. In both cases the referendum passed in Wayne County but was
rejected in Oakland County, a suburban area containing both some older inner ring
suburbs and many middle and higher income suburbs.

Ohio: Cooperation on a Limited Agenda: How do the large cities in Ohio form
legislative coalitions to pursue their interests? Unlike the other states we examined,
city-suburb conflicts in Ohio were not as dominant a part of the political landscape. One
important reason is that the cities’ agendas in the legislature are so strongly oriented
around obtaining support for capital projects. Every two years the legislature considers
the state capital budget. To streamline the process, the Governor and the legislature
effectively enforce regional cooperation by requiring each metropolitan area to come to
the legislature with proposals supported by the entire delegation. Apart from these
capital budget projects, Ohio cities pursue a largely defensive strategy in the legislature,
seeking to preserve their share of the local government fund but not pressing much
beyond preserving what they have.

In contrast to Detroit, Chicago and New York, where the lines between city and
suburban delegations are sharply drawn, in Ohio, these differences are less salient. For
example, Cincinnati’s lobbyist emphasized that he considers the Cincinnati delegation
to consist not simply of those House and Senate members who represent the city, but of
those who represent the Cincinnati suburbs as well. In Columbus, a city that has
grown dramatically due to annexation over the past thirty years, legislators from the city
saw little difference between city and suburb. Many parts of the city, they noted, were
similar to the suburbs.

Interest-Based City-Suburban Coalitions: City lobbyists in Cincinnati, Cleveland,
and Columbus emphasized that on many issues, particularly those involved with capital
projects, the delegation cooperated fully. Indeed, several of the respondents observed
that city and suburban state legislative members acted in concert on most capital
projects for the city (and the region), even across party lines. One observed that they
approached this process as “citi-states” that competed against one another for projects.
The cooperation is partly explained by the informally institutionalized process by which

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1 Thus, the delegation consists of three Senators and nine House members. Of these, five House members represent
at least part of the city (four Democrats and one Republican) and four represent the suburbs (all Republicans).
There is one city Senator (a Democrat) and two suburban Senators (both Republican).
the local projects part of the capital budget is allocated to state projects. (This apparently evolved from competition among cities for big projects such as the baseball stadium and basketball arena in Cleveland and the new baseball and football stadia in Cincinnati. Other parts of the region complained that their priorities were being ignored.) The Governor’s office and legislative leaders in effect demand that each region come to the process with an agreed upon set of priorities for capital projects. If there is not regional unity, as one interviewee observed, the legislative leaders simply say ‘screw you’ and the region doesn’t get its top projects.

This process of informally forced consensus relies heavily on the regional business and growth associations brokering and facilitating agreements among the local governments in the region. As one interviewee noted, the Growth Association typically convenes the powers that be – the Mayor, City Council, County Executives and Commissioners, and the business power structure. In Cincinnati the regional growth associations involved are the Cincinnati Business Committee (CEOs only) and the Chamber of Commerce. In Columbus, the Chamber of Commerce and a looseknit group of CEOs are key. Although the process appears to work smoothly, one Columbus area legislator worried that the departure of key business players from the area had left something of a vacuum in planning for the city’s future.

Much more than in other states in Ohio explicit regional coalitions are entered into for capturing state capital projects. On the other hand, it is not clear that such regional alliances in the legislature extend much beyond this. Several interviewees pointed to a few issues where city and suburban representatives seemed to vote together because of shared interests of their constituencies (The example used was opposition to legislation to permit the carrying of concealed weapons). On the other hand, most of the interviewees either saw little city-suburban coalition building in the state legislature or even out and out conflict. An interviewee noted that the inner suburbs are beginning to organize their own formal coalitions in Cleveland and Columbus because they feel that they “too often lose out to the central cities rather than because they think that they are ‘all in it together’” Another said that “There are not a lot of issues where the city and its suburbs link up.”

One recent exception to the relative amity between cities and some peripheral suburban areas was the decision to alter the state’s annexation laws. Unlike Cleveland and Cincinnati, which were landlocked early in the twentieth century, Columbus used Ohio’s annexation laws to capture suburban growth in the decades following World War II. As a consequence, Columbus is the largest city in Ohio and has a strong tax base. Although the old downtown has suffered the fate of many urban centers, growth on the periphery has benefited the city. In 2001, however, after several failed efforts, opponents succeeded in altering state law in ways that will make annexation more difficult. Even this issue, however, did not exhibit a clear city-suburb division. Because the existing annexation process promoted a predictable process of development, homebuilders and other suburban interests had little interest in changing the law. Moreover, established suburban municipalities wanted to preserve their own power to annex. As a result, suburbs were split on the changing the law. The impetus to make annexation more difficult came especially from rural and semi-rural townships.
concerned that they not be swallowed up (and deprived of tax revenues) by annexation. Although Columbus was not in favor of the change, the law that ultimately passed was a compromise that added new voices to the annexation process. Subsequent amendments have strengthened the hand of the pro-annexation forces.

*Interest-Based Large City Coalitions:* Ohio was selected as one of the four states for our case study partly because of the presence there of three large cities (the 3 Cs – Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Columbus) rather than a single dominant one as in the other three states. Do the 3Cs coordinate their strategy and form legislative coalitions? Interviewees said that there was no institutional mechanism for doing this but that such coalitions did form on an ad hoc basis.

The Cincinnati lobbyist stated that he is constantly trying to build coalitions in support of Cincinnati’s issues. He noted there are two kinds of issues, though with overlap. The first are issues that affect all or a large number of Ohio municipalities. For these issues Cincinnati works with and through the Ohio Municipal League, sometimes testifying on behalf of the League or coming with the League to express concerns: “If we can work under the umbrella of the Municipal League we do so and go to our delegation with them.” The other set of issues are those that are Cincinnati issues not shared by the entire class of cities. “There,” the lobbyist observed, “we try to find like cities – cities that have the same interests.” As an example, he discussed a successful effort to get the state to direct more state housing funds to cities where Cincinnati joined Cleveland, Columbus, and Toledo.

*Governor-Brokered Coalitions:* Ohio governors, according to several of those we interviewed, are, in general, aware of and responsive to the plight of the cities. This applies, even more than might be expected, to Republican governors. Governors, after all, run statewide; an additional vote from a city, even if they lose that city by 100,000 votes, counts just as much as a vote from a rural or suburban area where they might dominate. As one of Governor Taft’s policy aides observed, “The Governor gets involved in urban issues. There is a natural tension between the Governor as a statewide elected official and state legislators who are elected in a specific district. The Governor understands that the vitality of the cities is important to the state.”

The interest of Ohio governors in cities was evident in Republican Governor Bob Taft’s decision to create an Urban Revitalization Task Force in 1999 (Taft, 2000). Composed of mayors, state legislators, and directors of several state agencies, the task force oversaw a series of focus groups around the state that discussed policies for urban redevelopment. The major accomplishment was a voter-approved Clean Ohio Fund. The new fund provides resources for clean-up of brownfields as well as for farmland preservation. The legislative coalition that approved the implemented legislation for the Clean Ohio Fund joined urban and rural interests, both of which stood to gain from the package.

**New York: From Bipartisan Coalitions to Logrolling Alone:** To get its way in the legislature, New York City has moved from bipartisan coalitions with upstate cities to party-driven logrolling. Since 1994, party-driven logrolling has been disrupted by the election of Republican mayors, Giuliani and Bloomberg. As a result, NYC has had to
increasingly go-it-alone, forming coalitions based on logrolling specific to each issue. With his less polarizing personality, Bloomberg has won some important victories in the Legislature. However, the change from interest-based coalitions, to party-driven logrolls, to ad hoc log rolls as the dominant method of coalition building represents a general decline in the power of NYC to achieve its will in the state legislature.

**Bipartisan Interest-based Coalitions:** In the late 1960s Governor Nelson Rockefeller campaigned for revenue sharing, both at the federal and state levels. At the same time, Mayor John Lindsay led a coalition of the State’s six largest cities to win more financial support from the State. The fact that Lindsay was originally elected as a Republican in 1965 and some of the upstate mayors were Republicans facilitated passage by making it more difficult to view the issue through the usual upstate/downstate divide. The coalescence of Governor Rockefeller and the Lindsay-led mayors coalition succeeded in winning passage of New York State revenue sharing in 1971. Under the original legislation, the State committed to sharing 9 percent of its personal income tax revenues with New York’s 62 cities and 9 percent with all other local governments based on a formula partly reflecting fiscal need. In 1979, in an effort to slow the growth in the amount the State was required to share with localities, the Legislature changed the formula from 18 percent of personal income tax receipts to 8 percent of all State revenue. In any case, revenue sharing guaranteed a growing pot of money to be shared among local governments with few strings attached.

In the mid-1980s NYC worked effectively to increase revenue sharing, but after that revenue sharing was gradually gutted. Between 1988 and 1994 the amount of revenue shared with localities fell from over a billion dollars to less than $500 million. The portion of state revenues shared with localities dropped from 8 percent in 1979 to less than 2 percent by 1994 (Fiscal Policy Institute, 1994: 19-20). For New York City, unrestricted revenue as a proportion of own-source revenue fell from 9.0 percent in 1981-82 to 2.9 percent in 1991-92 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1982 and 1992). Part of this decline reflects the demise of federal revenue sharing but most of it was caused by the deterioration of NYS revenue sharing.

The decline of revenue sharing reflects the decline of bipartisan interest-based coalitions between NYC and upstate cities. Indeed, it is accurate to say that NYC now has no permanent coalitions with other cities that cross issue areas. If they join together at all, it is by issue. The decline of the NYC/upstate cities interest coalition partly reflects a divergence in their objective conditions and thus their policy interests. Upstate cities are still suffering from deindustrialization, have relatively little immigration, and are declining in population. By contrast, as a center of global capitalism, NYC has a prosperous fast-growing service economy. With the rise in immigration since 1965, NYC has become incredibly diverse and is growing in population. To cite but one example of a policy divergence, a major issue in many upstate cities is what to do with all the abandoned houses, while NYC faces a severe housing shortage.

Upstate cities do not view themselves as in the same boat as NYC and they are often jealous of NYC’s wealth and power. According to Rochester Mayor William Johnson, Giuliani arrived an hour late for a New York State Conference of Mayors
meeting a few years ago, and the press immediately focused on him. In fact, they asked only one question of the 25 other mayors in attendance. Upstate mayors view NYC as able to protect its interests on its own. Indeed, NYC has made little effort to forge a coalition with upstate cities. In 2000 the “Big Four” upstate cities, Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, and Albany, formed their own interest coalition, without NYC, and successfully lobbied the Legislature for an additional $65 million in state aid to address fiscal shortfalls in five upstate cities. (At the insistence of Senate Republicans, Yonkers was added at the last minute.)

Party-Imposed Coalitions: Over the years the main way that NYC has achieved its goals in the State Legislature has been through the Democratic Party. The NYC Democrats constitute a majority of the controlling Democratic caucus in the Assembly. So long as they are united, NYC Democrats can veto any statewide legislation. This puts the NYC delegation in an excellent position to engage in logrolling: we will not support your legislation unless you support ours. The method has generally served NYC well. In recent years, however, it has become increasingly problematic, as we shall see.

The NYS Legislature has had divided partisan control continuously since 1975: the Democrats control the Assembly and the Republicans control the Senate. Divided partisan control has persisted in New York longer than in any other state and it has now become thoroughly institutionalized. Every ten years, the Assembly Democrats and the Senate Republicans give each other total freedom to re-draw district lines as they see fit for their house. As a result, very few districts are competitive. The average difference between the winner and the loser rose to over 50 percent (Stonecash, 1998). In two recent elections, only one sitting lawmaker out of 389 lost – an astounding 99.7 percent re-election rate (Perez-Pena, 2002).

Power in the New York Legislature is remarkably concentrated in the hands of the Speaker of the Assembly and the Majority Leader of the Senate. One study ranked New York tied for 8th in the nation in the institutional powers of the Speaker (Hamm and Squire, 2001). The leaders control committee assignments and are not required to follow seniority. They also control legislative campaign committees that raise millions of dollars each year, targeting money on candidates in the few marginal districts. They also control staff allocations (other than the few automatically funded for each representative). This power is significant because the NYS Legislature has the largest staff of any state legislature in the nation.

Traditionally, Democratic NYC mayors have worked through the Democratic Speaker of the Assembly. The key to this strategy is for NYC to get its issues represented in the closed-door bargaining that takes place over the budget among the Speaker, the Majority Leader, and the Governor near the end of the legislative session. In the past this meant that the Speaker and his staff made sure that the issues that NYC cared deeply about were represented in these negotiations.

The politics of partisan logrolling is filtered through the upstate/downstate divide. Downstate (the City) is Democratic while upstate is strongly Republican. Both sides mobilize their supporters by running against the other. The Senate Republicans project themselves as protecting upstate taxpayers from spendthrift New York City liberal
Democrats who have turned NYC into an bottomless sump for social welfare spending. Similarly, the NYC Democrats run against upstate, crying that the City provides most of the tax revenues and is being shortchanged on spending. Their complaint is reminiscent of Tammany Hall pol George Washington Plunkitt’s lament that New York City was “pie for the hayseeds.” Even though legislators use the rhetoric of the upstate/downstate divide to mobilize their voters, once inside the Capitol building they usually lower the rhetoric and cut deals in order to keep the machinery of government moving.

Although the City has generally been able to defend its interests through party-orchestrated logrolls, this method has disadvantages. Basically, upstate Republicans have a motive to keep the City on a short leash, thereby multiplying opportunities for advantageous political trades. Revenue sharing, by entitling New York City to certain funds, takes away some of this political leverage. There is a certain political logic, therefore, to cutting revenue sharing. By cutting revenue sharing, putting conditions on State grants, and requiring periodic Legislative approval of local sales and other taxes, upstate legislative leaders force NYC to come to the Legislature each year to conduct basic governmental functions. To a certain extent Assembly Democrats also have a motive to keep the City on a short leash. The interests of the City delegation are sometimes different from the mayor’s. They may have strong union support, for example, and favor cost-of-living adjustments for retirees, whereas mayors view this as a budget buster. By holding the City hostage on certain issues, Assembly Democrats can sometimes trade their political support for favors from the City administration for their districts, such as park and road improvements.

The overall result of relying upon party-orchestrated logrolls is that relations between the City and the State have become highly politicized. The City is forced to continuously negotiate in the State Legislature -- even to maintain the status quo. As a top aide to the Senate Majority Leader put it: “New York City is constantly in the position of being a supplicant.” Or in the words of a longtime lobbyist: “Home rule in New York is a joke.” To illustrate this point, the chief correspondent for the New York Times at the Capitol noted that NYC requires permission of the state legislature to put speed bumps on its streets.

With a Republican in the Mayor’s Office since 1994, the game in Albany has changed, weakening the City’s bargaining position. As a Republican, Mayor Giuliani was forced to adopt a different strategy than his predecessors. Instead of relying upon the Speaker of the Assembly, Giuliani worked through Republican Senate Majority Leader, Joseph Bruno. According to the Chief Lobbyist for the City, Giuliani and Bruno were close, talking frequently on the phone. However, the Republican-controlled Senate was a less reliable ally for the City because only 5 out of 36 Republicans in the Senate were from NYC. Because the Republican margin in the Senate was fairly narrow (six seats changing parties would give control to the Democrats), the Republican leadership moderates its views to protect its urban members. In the battle over repealing rent control, for example, some Senate Republicans from the City supported rent control. So did Governor Pataki, mostly, it seems, to protect the Republican majority in the Senate. Nevertheless, the Republican majority in the Senate is less of a
reliable ally for the City than the Democratic majority in the Assembly, where 59 out of 99 were from NYC in 2001.

Giuliani was also hampered by the fact that he did not get along well with Governor Pataki, even though they are both Republicans. The problems stemmed initially from Giuliani’s endorsement of Cuomo in Pataki’s first run for governor in 1994. In that election, Pataki won only 28 percent of the City vote (an historic low for a winning gubernatorial candidate). An especially high turnout upstate catapulted Pataki into office. Pataki did not owe his election to City voters and his behavior showed it: he consistently favored upstate and the suburbs over the City. For example, Pataki diverted money from a tax on petroleum away from mass transit for the City and successfully supported the elimination of the Stock Transfer Tax Incentive Aid, failing to replace these funds with State aid.

In general, the ability of the Democratic Party to protect the interests of the City has been hampered by the decline of the County party organizations. The web of party connections that tied legislators to city government has atrophied. At one time, legislators owed their election to powerful county bosses, like Ed Flynn in the Bronx and Carmine DeSapio in Manhattan. These leaders were concerned that city patronage not be harmed by actions of the state legislature, and they could deliver their delegations to insure that this did not happen. Beginning in the 1960s reform decimated the power of county Democratic machines in New York City (Shefter, 1985). Now, state legislators are much more independent of the local party and its connections to city government (Stonecash, 1998, p. 76). Legislators rely more on money than on party workers to get re-elected. They raise their own money from nonplace-based special interests. New York City was ranked as the 10th largest lobbying operation in Albany (Roy, 2001), but that is deceptive because NYC cannot make campaign contributions like the other lobbying groups. If Democratic members of the Assembly are dependent on anybody, it is the Speaker, who hands out substantial cash through Democratic Assembly Legislative Campaign Committees, which mostly goes to marginal upstate districts, as well as key perks in the Legislature, like committee assignments and staff. And as the example of the repeal of the commuter tax shows, the Speaker is often committed to preserving and enhancing his power, not defending the interests of New York City.

Repealing the Commuter Tax: The Failure of Party-led Logrolling. The repeal of NYC’s commuter tax shows the weakness of relying upon party-led logrolls to protect the interests of NYC. The commuter tax raised about a half a billion dollars a year. This may seem small in a budget of approximately $44 billion, but this was money with no strings attached, and it enabled NYC to export some of its crushing tax burden to suburban commuters who place service demands on city government. Normally, the Assembly Democrats would be expected to defend the commuter tax, but the Speaker sacrificed it in a vain attempt to take a Senate seat from the Republicans in a swing suburban district. The Democratic leadership in the Assembly felt little remorse in harming the fiscal situation of a Republican mayor. Giuliani had promised to cut taxes – so why shouldn’t they (Assembly Democrats) be in the position to choose which taxes were cut and take political credit for it? The commuter tax was sacrificed, in short, to narrow partisan advantage. As an editorial in Newsday (April 7, 2000) put it: “This is

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like ripping a load-bearing beam from your house to toss on a pep-rally bonfire.” (4/7/00)

The NYC commuter tax was initially passed in 1966 and was gradually increased over the years. By the end it was still a modest .45 percent tax on incomes earned in the City. Someone making $70,000 paid $315. Nevertheless, the tax raised a significant amount of revenue because about 450,000 people commute into the City each day to work and in 1998 the average commuter earned $99,400 (compared to only $33,700 for the average city resident) (Chen, 2002). The city enjoyed an 80 percent surge in earnings from the income tax between 1994 and 1997, mainly because of the boom on Wall Street (Forgette and Pagano, 2001). The City’s Independent Budget Office projected that repeal of the commuter tax cost the City $475 million in 2000 (cited in Haberman, 2000).

The story of the repeal of the commuter tax begins with the planned retirement of a Republican Senator from a district in Rockland and Orange counties, one of the few potential swing districts in the state. Suburban sprawl of New York City north of Westchester County meant that this district now had many commuters into the City. With an edge in registered voters, the Democrats figured they had a good chance to cut into the Republican Senate majority. Republican Majority Leader Bruno persuaded the incumbent to retire early so that the election would be during an off year. A lower turnout, he shrewdly calculated, would increase the Republican’s chances of victory.

At one point in the campaign, three suburban Democrats in the Assembly held a news conference with the Democratic Senate candidate calling for a repeal of the commuter tax. According to one of the three members, they did not think the repeal would ever happen because Democratic Speaker Silver would never permit it. The Republicans jumped on the issue: their candidate not only supported repeal but promised that the Senate would actually pass such legislation, which they promptly did. To everyone’s surprise, Silver called the Republicans’ bluff and came out in support of repeal. Former mayor Ed Koch charged Silver with “treason of the highest magnitude” (quoted in Haberman, 2000). According to a top adviser to the Senate Majority Leader, the White House may have pressured Silver to support repeal as a way of helping Hillary Clinton’s Senate race by increasing Democratic appeal to suburban voters. Silver dismissed the cost to the City as “a pittance” (quoted in Murphy, 1999), and said that if Giuliani wanted to stop the repeal, he should have talked to Bruno.

Giuliani lobbied furiously but he failed to stop the repeal. He could not count on the Republican-controlled Senate to protect the City’s interests. The five Republicans from NYC voted against repeal, but every Republican Senator outside of New York City voted for repeal. Together with the five non-New York City Democrats, a firm majority was put together in the Senate for repeal. The key to repeal of the commuter tax, however, was the twenty-one New York City Assembly Democrats who voted for repeal. They were pressured to vote for repeal by Democratic Speaker Silver, who was more concerned about a swing district in the suburbs than he was about the fiscal well-being of New York City. Together with the Assembly Republicans and Democrats from outside NYC, New York City Democratic votes pushed repeal over the top in the Assembly. Giuliani had little leverage over Assembly Democrats. The Mayor punished the members of the City delegation who voted for repeal by not inviting them to the
Yankees World Series victory celebration on the steps of City Hall -- hardly a potent form of political retribution. The key to repeal was the Speaker’s support, which divided the NYC Democrats. The Speaker, who is from Manhattan, was willing to sacrifice the interests of the City in order to embarrass a Republican Mayor and have a chance to steal a Senate seat from the Republicans. Parenthetically, the effort failed; the Republicans won the seat anyway.

_The Missing Regional Agenda._ Clearly, it is possible to appeal to the shared interests of central city and suburban voters. In fact, the commuter tax was defended partly on the grounds that suburbanites should be concerned with the fiscal well being of New York City, the economic engine of the region. However, the connection between the tax and the well being of the region seemed remote to voters, especially when NYC seemed to be awash in money. Mayor Giuliani made few other efforts to forge regional coalitions that would unite the interests of NYC with the suburbs. The main reason is that he was preoccupied with the short-term fiscal well being of the institution that he controlled, city government.

When Giuliani first became mayor, he tried to form a coalition with the suburbs of NYC – Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester counties, whose county executives at the time were all Republicans. The effort never got off the ground, however. Suburban politicians were reluctant to appear to be too close to NYC. After all, many of their supporters had moved to the suburbs to flee the crime and corruption of the City. In addition, NYC was perceived, as the 800-pound gorilla. According to a former City Budget Director, other local governments feared that in any regional coalition their interests would be subordinated to the interests of the City.

The obvious place for a regional agenda to arise would be around the regional authorities that run the crucial transportation network that knits together the region. Even here, however, Mayor Giuliani made little effort to put together a regional coalition to support increased funding for the regional authorities that benefited NYC. According to a top Senate aide, the main reason was that Giuliani “dislike[d] the authorities intensely” because he didn’t control them.

In short, New York City has made little systematic effort in recent years to form coalitions with its surrounding suburbs. For the most part, its agenda has centered on the fiscal well-being and autonomy of city government. It might make sense to enact regional policies to slow the migration of the white middle class out to the suburbs and increase funding for mass transit, but the mayor is much more concerned with state aid and mandates that will immediately affect the bottom line of city government. As much as possible, the city engages in logrolls on specific issues, exchanging its support for support of its own goals. However, there is evidence that these ad hoc coalitions give the City less and less power over the legislature compared to earlier coalitions based on strong party cohesion and interest-based coalitions with other central cities.

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Towers, the new Republican Mayor Michael Bloomberg has faced the worst budget crisis since the mid-1970s, with multi-billion dollar budget shortfalls in each of his first two years in office. Having a far less polarizing personality than his predecessor, Giuliani, Bloomberg has been able to win significant victories in the Legislature by reaching out to Democrats
and minorities. Bloomberg’s success shows the importance of personal skill and a crisis atmosphere for legislative success over the short term. Over the long term, however, these factors are less reliable than strong parties and durable interest-based coalitions.

The best example of Bloomberg’s skill with the Legislature is his victory in winning control over the New York City school system, the largest system in the country with 1.1 million students. In response to calls by minorities for neighborhood control, in 1970 the Legislature had divided NYC schools up into 32 local school boards. The mayor made appointments but did not control the central Board of Education, which had limited power over the local school boards in any case. Mayors Koch, Dinkins, and Giuliani all lobbied for mayoral control of the public schools, arguing that it would make them more efficient and accountable. Giuliani called his failure to win control of the schools his one regret as mayor. In an atmosphere of soaring public dissatisfaction with the schools, Bloomberg lobbied successfully to appoint a majority to the School Board and to appoint the Chancellor, who in turn will have the power to appoint Local School Superintendents. The key to Bloomberg’s victory was winning the support of the New York City Black and Puerto Rican Assembly Democrats, who had successfully blocked Giuliani’s effort. Whereas Giuliani never met with the Black, Puerto Rican, and Hispanic Legislative Caucus, Bloomberg met with them frequently as a group and individually.

To deal with the budget crisis, Bloomberg succeeded in getting Legislative approval for a three-year increase in the resident income tax and an increase in the sales tax. Bloomberg cut a deal with Bruno and Silver, even overcoming the opposition of Governor Pataki. His most significant fiscal accomplishment was persuading the state to refinance $2.5 billion in debt left over from the 1970s fiscal crisis and have state taxpayers take over payments. This will save New York City approximately $500 million a year for five years. Republican Governor Pataki vetoed the takeover of the bonds but was overridden by the Legislature. Pataki also sued to stop the sale of the bonds but lost in the New York Supreme Court.

Bloomberg has been relatively successful at persuading the Legislature to help the City address its immediate crisis -- with temporary three-year tax increases and a five-year bond deal. But he has not succeeded in enacting legislation to address New York City’s long-term structural deficits. The limits of Bloomberg’s effectiveness are revealed by his failure to enact his top priority – re-enactment of the commuter tax. With the opposition of Governor Pataki and the Senate Republicans’ need to please suburban constituencies, there is little, if any, chance that the commuter tax will be reinstated in the near future.

Chicago: Clout in Check: Historically, Chicago relied on three coaltional strategies to pass legislation in the Illinois legislature. First and foremost was Chicago’s power in the Democratic caucus. Chicago traditionally worked through its tightly organized legislative delegation to pursue its interests and Chicago’s storied political machine gave its Democratic state legislative delegation unusual cohesion in the Illinois legislature.²

² Until their elimination in 1983, Illinois had multi-member districts that ensured Republican representation from the city.
During the long reign of Richard J. Daley (1955-1976), the Chicago mayor was the undisputed leader of the city’s and Cook County’s legislative delegation. The large size of Chicago’s delegation and the mayor’s power in the state central committee of the Democratic Party made it easy for the city to dominate the Democratic legislative caucus. The city’s major coalition partners within the Democratic caucus were downstate Democrats, representing distressed coal and agricultural communities. Chicago’s strategy of logrolling with downstate Democrats was facilitated by the underlying common interest of both regions in getting more resources from the state. This Chicago-downstate alliance benefited from the political weakness of Republicans from the five suburban “collar counties” outside Chicago; in alliance, Chicago and the downstate Democrats could make the Republican suburbs foot the bill for their legislative initiatives. The third strategy that Chicago traditionally relied on was cross-party coalitions brokered by the governor. Chicago has a long history of working with governors of both parties (Banfield, 1961).

Together these three coalitional strategies made Chicago relatively effective in getting what it needed from the state. After 1970, the city's dependence on the state declined with the passage of a very strong home rule statute that gave the city substantial legal autonomy (Fossett and Giertz, 1989; Fuchs, 1992). As noted above, preserving the benefits of home rule remains one of Chicago’s chief objectives in the legislature. But even after home rule, the city continued to need state support for major economic development projects, school finance problems, and some social welfare issues.

Influence within the Democratic caucus and logrolling with downstate Democrats are still the foundation of Chicago’s power in the legislature. But, as we show below, each of these strategies is weaker and less reliable than in the past. Chicago’s power in the General Assembly for the last twenty years has rested in the hands of the Democratic Speaker (or minority leader, when Democrats were out of power) Michael Madigan, a Chicago Democrat, who nonetheless has a power base independent of the mayor. The rise of the anti-Chicago suburban Republicans in the legislature, and particularly Republican control of the state Senate after 1992, made coalitions brokered by the governor even more important for Chicago. As we examine these coalitions over the past decade, it is clear that gubernatorial support can provide the crucial edge to pass favorable legislation, but it is also evident that reliance on the governor does not always produce unmitigated legislative success for the city nor do governors always support the city. The Democratic sweep of both houses of the legislature and the governor’s mansion in 2002 vastly improves Chicago’s political fortunes, but even under such favorable circumstances the city’s reduced presence in the legislature will ensure that compromise remains the order of the day.

Chicago and the Democratic Caucus After Daley’s death in 1976, it became clear that Chicago’s ability to count on a cohesive Democratic delegation in legislature was not automatic. Open fissures began to emerge among Chicago’s Democrats in 1983, when Chicago’s first black mayor, Harold Washington, took office (Fossett and Giertz, 1989; Gove, 1982). As some white Chicago legislators opposed the mayor in the legislature, it became apparent that a united city Democratic delegation could no
longer be taken for granted. Under the current mayor, Richard M. Daley, racial splits have been less prominent and Chicago once again works through its legislative delegation. However, Daley's power is not as extensive as his father's was because in the intervening decades state legislative leaders have built independent power bases. This is in part a result of institutional reforms. The elimination of multi-member districts, for example, made legislators more dependent on the legislative leaders who “could draw their district boundaries, sponsor their candidacies, raise cash to run their campaigns. And dictate their legislative agendas” (Pearson, 1997). The increasing importance of money in campaigns has also increased the independent power of legislative leaders, who now amass campaign war chests, which they distribute at their discretion. The declining weight of the city's delegation among Democrats has likewise given the Democratic leaders greater independence. As a result, the mayor is more likely to confront current Democratic House Speaker Michael Madigan (a Chicago-bred politician whose district now straddles Chicago and its suburbs) on equal terms, rather than as undisputed leader of the state party.

For the most part, the Speaker has supported Chicago's priorities in the legislature. On occasions, when his views differ from those of the mayor -- as they did around the city's proposed 1992 World's Fair -- the Speaker will pursue his own course and win. In addition, the decline in Chicago's political strength in the Democratic caucus, nearly half of which comes from outside Chicago, means the Speaker cannot always place Chicago's interests first. Despite the tensions between the Democratic leadership and the mayor, Chicago continues to be the main organized force in the Democratic caucus. The unity of the city's delegation on major economic development projects and the continuing weight of the city's representatives mean that the city finds support for most of what it wants from the Democratic leadership in the legislature.

*Chicago and Downstate Interest-based Logroll:* The alliance with downstate Democrats also continues to be a key power resource for Chicago. This alliance is somewhat less powerful as downstate areas have lost population and representatives. Moreover, the interests of downstate and Chicago have diverged as Chicago became more economically prosperous and downstate languished during the 1990s. For example, on educational finance issues, the city-downstate alliance has become more strained. Several interviewees noted that in the past school funding formulas made it easy for the city to align with downstate areas, as both areas had low property values. In the words of one interviewee: “Downstate superintendents would say that if it is good for Chicago, it is good for us.” As the city's property tax base climbed and downstate property values stagnated, and as downstate school enrollments have declined, the interests of the city and downstate on school finance diverge more than they did in the past. Yet these differences do not appear fatal for the city. One Democratic legislator from the city indicated that downstaters often grumbled about supporting Chicago-specific economic projects. The legislator went on to note, however, that strong rhetoric was not matched by action and the city could generally rely on downstate Democratic votes in the legislature.

On some issues, the city cannot hope to logroll with downstate because interests are so different. A classic instance is gun control, which the city has championed and
downstate Democrats strongly oppose. The Chicago-downstate alliance rests on mutual support for traditional “pork” projects, which are critically important to both regions.

**Governor-Brokered Coalitions** Cooperation with Republicans, always an element of the city’s strategy in Springfield, became more important in the 1990s, when Republicans took over the Illinois Senate. For example, the package of taxes and spending in Illinois First, a major transportation infrastructure bill passed in 1999, was negotiated informally between the mayor and the governor before it went to the legislature. With one-third of its spending dedicated to mass transit, the bill provided substantial benefits to Chicago at the same time that it boosted spending for roads throughout the state. The vote on the four bills that secured financing for the projects revealed strong support from the city, and from Democrats all over the state: 24 of the 30 legislators from the city supported all four bills and 39 of the 62 Democrats supported all four bills. But reflecting the brokered bipartisan support, the bill also captured critical suburban Republican support: 19 of the 40 suburban representatives voted in support of all four measures. This included 16 votes from suburban Republicans, including the minority leader of the state Assembly. Illinois First exhibited the hallmarks of governor-brokered coalitions: such coalitions are most successful when organized around large spending programs that offer distributive benefits (and the patronage that comes with them) to Republicans and Democrats alike. (Joens, 2000).

On other issues, city-suburban differences make it more difficult for the governor to play the role of broker. In Illinois, educational finance is one such issue. In 1997, Republican Governor Jim Edgar proposed an educational finance package that would reduce the state’s heavy reliance on the local property tax to finance schools. The bill proposed to increase the state income tax and the state’s share of school finance. The new finance scheme would have benefited districts where lower property values mean less money for schools – primarily downstate rural areas and Chicago. But for many affluent suburban residents, the proposal was a Robin Hood plan that would take money from educationally-minded affluent areas and redistribute it elsewhere in the state. (Doubek, 1997) The governor’s proposal had the strong backing of Chicago’s mayor and of the Democratic leadership in the legislature. However, Republican leaders in the legislature, both suburban Republicans, worked hard to defeat the bill. The bill narrowly passed the Democratic-controlled House, despite the all-out opposition of the Republican leadership. It died when the suburban Republican leader of the Senate, Pate Philip, simply refused to allow a vote on the measure. The governor’s most important legislative initiative fell victim to the city-suburban divide and the extraordinary power of legislative leaders to control the legislative agenda in Illinois. (McDermott and Rogers, 1997)

Another limitation of governor-brokered compromises is that governors may not support many initiatives that cities view as key priorities. Republican Governor Jim Edgar, who governed the state for most of the 1990s was often unsympathetic to the city’s goals in the legislature. And on some issues, all Republican governors have proven unwilling to help the city. For example, as Chicago’s major airport, O’Hare, became congested, the city sought first to build a new airport within city boundaries and
later to expand the capacity at O'Hare. In this decade-long battle over airport expansion, Republican governors have not been reliable allies for the city.

**Interest-based Coalitions:** The traditional distrust between Chicago and its suburbs has meant that there are few interest-based coalitions joining these regions apart from major distributive packages that spread benefits widely, such as Illinois First. Yet our interviews did reveal areas of common interest that may support future interest-based city-suburb coalitions. For example, some suburban Republican legislators cited development of rapid light rail transit as a possible area for future suburban-city alliances. Although the current Republican leadership opposed light rail, one legislator noted that there were significant divisions among suburban Republicans on the issue. On some equity issues, such as education and social services, the less affluent suburbs represented by Democrats already routinely support the city. Among these suburbs are the financially troubled south suburbs and rapidly changing near western suburbs. According to one interviewee, Republican legislators from less well-off suburbs are also often sympathetic with the city on such equity issues but have been prevented from supporting the city/Democratic alliance by the Republican leadership.

**Ideological Coalitions City-Suburb:** Ideological alliances between representatives from Chicago and its suburbs have formed around such social issues as gun control and gay rights. Suburban Republican legislators have split on the issue of gun control. While much of the old guard strongly opposed any restrictions on gun ownership, representatives from inner-suburban areas are much more supportive. Faced with rising gang activity and drug dealing, these representatives rank crime reduction and gun control as major priorities. On other social issues, such as gay rights, the city and affluent, socially liberal suburbs have formed effective coalitions. In addition, city representatives have found suburban Republican support for needle exchange legislation and legislation to prohibit racial profiling, both defeated in the legislature.

**OBSTACLES TO CITY-SUBURBAN STATE LEGISLATIVE COALITIONS**

Myron Orfield has suggested that the potential exists for large cities to structure effective coalitions in the state legislature based on the increasingly frequent shared common interests (particularly fiscal interests) of these cities, inner suburbs, and certain outer suburbs. As these four cases indicate, legislative coalitions between cities and suburbs based on their common interests do occasionally occur on issues of importance to the major cities. In Michigan, city legislators and suburban legislators (including a majority of suburban Republicans) joined to support a compromise brokered by the Governor to prevent a cut in Detroit’s state revenue sharing funds (but with the condition that they would not increase for ten years and that Detroit would reduce its income tax on both city residents and suburban residents who worked in the city). The same coalition supported legislation to protect many favorable provisions in state legislation that would have otherwise expired when Detroit dropped below a population of one million in the 2000 Census. In Ohio, as a result of state insistence, the large cities and their suburbs come to the legislature with a common list of capital projects they wish the state to fund, a process that has largely worked to the cities’
advantage. In Illinois, major distributive packages such as transportation and certain kinds of social issues such as gun control legislation and prohibition of racial profiling have generated city-suburban legislative coalitions across party lines.

Although city-suburban coalitions exist in state legislatures, they tend to be ad hoc and based on special circumstances. More often, on the issues most important to cities, city-suburban interests, as indicated by the behavior of state legislators, seem to conflict. City-suburban conflict was paramount in city employee residency requirements in Michigan, the repeal of the commuter tax and the reduction of state revenue sharing to New York City in New York, and the battle over state fund distribution in Ohio, and education finance reform in Illinois. There was little evidence of cooperation over “lifestyle” issues, and the fiscal issues that Orfield suggests ought to provide the greatest potential for coalition building seemed to be the most divisive – the distribution of state funds in general and, in particular, state revenue sharing and permission of cities to tax suburban commuters.

Thus, while the potential for city-suburban coalitions exists based on common interests, that potential does not seem to have been realized in terms of state legislative coalitions, at least in the four states we examined. (The one important exception is in Ohio where the state government requires central city-suburban jointly agreed upon bids for major state funded infrastructure projects.) There are several reasons why effective city-suburban legislative coalitions across a series of issues have not emerged.

City–Suburban Distrust: First, there is the traditional city-suburban distrust, which appears to be shared both by political elites and by many voters. In Illinois, for example, the traditional animosity of Chicago’s suburbs to the city is legendary. One interviewee described the former State Senate leader James “Pate” Philip, a Republican vociferously opposed to all things Chicago, as “straight out of central casting” in his anti-urban, anti-minority views. A long time member of the Senate, Philip became leader when Republicans won control in 1992. His generation of DuPage County Republicans came to power as whites were fleeing Chicago for the suburbs. Philip used his new power as an opportunity for payback, routinely challenging Chicago’s priorities in the legislature. (Pearson, 1997) As one Republican legislator from an inner-suburb put it, “If Democrats propose something, the Republican Party is against it for strictly political reasons. Things they [legislators from districts like his] need to support, they can’t.” Philip blocked key Chicago initiatives, beginning with the city’s bid to construct a third airport within its boundaries. As we have already noted, Philip also defied the Republican governor when he thought the governor was insufficiently attentive to the interests of the suburbs, as on the 1997 education finance measure.

The tremendous power of the legislative leaders to control the state agenda – a power described as “papal in its dimensions” by one of our interviewees – greatly magnified city-suburb conflict in Illinois. By limiting the ability of individual legislators to explore common ground and hold hearings to promote alternative perspectives on issues, legislative leaders hostile to the city actively worked against potential coalition-building between city and suburbs. One legislator complained that the tight control of the legislative process made it difficult to launch debates that would educate the public.
and promote new ways of looking at problems. The power of legislative leaders is reinforced by their control over campaign funds, so critical in swing districts.

Yet some legislators we interviewed described a generational split among suburban Republicans. The older generation exemplified by former Senate President Pate Philip was not only reflexively anti-Chicago, it also had a limited suburban agenda that emphasized suburban development, highways, and the patronage associated with it. The newer generation from well-off affluent suburbs is more concerned with quality of life issues such as congestion and open space, the issues that Orfield identifies as points of city-suburb coalition-building. These younger Republicans are also less likely to view Chicago-suburban issues as zero-sum conflicts. As one interviewee noted, the new generation of suburban Republicans is not “running away from the city; their attitude toward the city is not inherently negative.” The recent failure of Republicans to retain control of the Senate may pave the way for this newer generation of suburban Republicans to compromise with the city.

Detroit has faced even sharper suburban animosity than Chicago. One interviewee noted that the toughest area to get support from legislators for Detroit from was Macomb County, a working class suburban county northeast of Detroit. As another explained, “In Macomb County, any hint of support for Detroit is used against them in elections.” Another observed “suburban legislators – even the Democratic ones - are a harder nut to crack than outstate legislators, although sometimes the suburban Democrats will support Detroit if the caucus takes a position.” Behind this antipathy to supporting Detroit on high profile issues of interest to the city, even when they do not appear to be in obvious conflict with suburban interests, is the obvious, but often unarticulated, racial animosity, concerns and fears that suburban legislators often believe their constituents hold for Detroit. In areas such as Detroit, racial concerns are never too far below the surface, despite whatever objective interests that city and suburbs share. The difficulty the Detroit area has experienced in passing a referendum establishing a regional tax to fund area cultural institutions, even with the support of many area political leaders, indicates the public animosity that exists between city and suburbs.

**Direct Issue Conflict** Second, in many cases issues are currently structured so that city and suburban interests appear to be in conflict. Issues related to concerns such as commuter taxes, residency requirements, state revenue sharing, and educational finance appear to place cities and suburbs in zero-sum relationships with each other. Indeed, the organization of the First Suburbs Consortium in the Cleveland and Columbus areas, although often cited as a development favorable to city-suburban coalitions, also reflects the traditional city-suburban divide. It appears that these inner suburban consortia see themselves primarily in competition with their central cities rather than as possible coalition partners; they want more for their own jurisdictions. One interviewee noted that the inner suburbs are beginning to organize their own formal coalitions in Cleveland and Columbus because they feel that they “too often lose out to the central cities rather than because they think that they are ‘all in it together’” The First Suburbs Consortium in Columbus, for example, is concerned that federal and state programs are targeted toward areas of slum and blight or some other requirement on
income targeting that generally left out suburbs – even inner-ring suburbs. Their organizing is primarily designed to counterbalance the power of central cities, not to lay the groundwork for coalitions with cities.

**Legislative Entrepreneurs** A third reason why these four states have not been able to forge successful city-suburban legislative coalitions such as those that Myron Orfield has described in Minnesota is that they lack a critical legislative mover – a political/policy entrepreneur – in the legislature to frame issues in a way that makes clear the common city-suburban interests and to structure coalitions around those common interests. This is a role that Orfield himself, a state legislator, has played in Minnesota. But it is unusual for a state legislator to play this role. Most individual legislators do not have the resources to engage in innovative policy research necessary to support alternative approaches to metropolitan problems. Moreover, in many states, legislators’ dependence on the legislative leadership for political support and campaign funds makes it difficult for them to introduce new ideas that are at odds with the leadership agenda.

**CREATING NEW POLITICS: THE EMERGING CITY-SUBURBAN RELATIONSHIP**

The difficulties in creating city-suburban alliances in state legislatures and the importance of entrepreneurs where such coalitions have emerged suggest that groups outside the legislature must play a central role in fashioning a new agenda that finds common ground between the city and some of its suburbs. In each of our states, such groups have already played important roles in promoting legislative alliances between city and suburb. They are currently actively working to frame regional issues in new terms designed to find common ground.

The importance of groups outside the legislature in facilitating city-suburb alliances was evident in the transportation measure Illinois First and in the effort to create a Detroit Area Regional Transportation Authority. Although the governor played a key role in promoting the cross-region alliance around transportation spending in Illinois, he received crucial support from metropolitan business leaders. Business support helped broker the compromise and bring along suburban Republicans. In Detroit, the impetus for a regional transportation authority grew out of a grassroots effort, which built support in the metropolitan business community and then brought local political leaders on board.

As these examples suggest, infrastructure is a promising issue for promoting city-suburb cooperation, much as Orfield suggests it should be. In recent years, concern about traffic congestion and the interest of suburban employers in facilitating movement of city workers to the suburbs has made transportation a particularly promising arena for alliance building. In each of our states, groups outside the legislature are now actively promoting regional agendas and searching for new ways to build alliances. In Chicago, business leaders have played a central role in provoking new interest in regionalism with the far reaching report “Chicago Metropolis 2020” issued in 1999 and the subsequent creation of an organization whose mission is to move a regional agenda. (Johnson, 1999 and Hamilton, 2002) The Metropolitan Planning Council in
Chicago initiated a campaign for sensible growth that resulted in the appointment of the Illinois Growth Task Force, composed of members of the legislature and a range of civic groups and interest groups from around the state. Holding hearings around the state, the task force highlighted public concern about existing patterns of growth and served as a sounding board for possible policy solutions. Although the very mild legislation proposed by the task force never made it out of the Senate, the task force served an important educational function, especially for the many legislators who had little background on growth issues.

In addition to the entrepreneurship of nongovernmental groups, the development of suburban consortia, even though at times opposed to city interests, may be a first step toward cooperation. Joined together, suburbs will no longer feel politically overwhelmed in alliances with central cities. These consortia link suburban governments in some metropolitan areas, but in most cases they have not yet resulted in significant alliances with cities. The Chicago area has several different conferences that connect mayors from different parts of the metropolitan area. These conferences attempt to identify areas of common concern and amplify the voice of suburban interests. They have not sought alliances with the city. The Metropolitan Mayors Caucus, formed in 1998, has received much attention. Convened by Chicago Mayor Daley, the caucus provides a regular venue for city and suburbs to meet. To date, the caucus has not taken on any controversial issues or proposed legislation. It mainly pursues efforts at efforts at voluntary cooperation on relatively consensual issues, although it has recently ventured into the political explosive field of affordable housing (Hamilton, 2002). Such slow and deliberate efforts to find common ground may be necessary steps towards building trust.

Ohio has now organized First Suburbs Consortiums (FSCs) in three metropolitan areas: Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Columbus. Altogether they join 34 inner suburban municipalities representing a total population of about 750,000. The Northeast Ohio (Cleveland) FSC, with 14 communities representing 449,000 people, is the largest and most active. Created in 1997, the Northeast Ohio FSC was formally organized in 2000 as a Council of Government (COG) under Ohio law. Besides lobbying county and state governments for policies more favorable to mature suburbs, the Northeast Ohio FSC also administers programs for housing and economic development. In 2000 the Consortium retained a part-time lobbyist in Columbus to push its issues in the state legislature. Many of the issues pushed by the Consortium overlap with the concerns of central cities like Cleveland. These include protecting and enhancing Ohio’s Local Government Fund (revenue sharing with cities) and its historic preservation tax credit program.

The recent experience in Michigan is particularly encouraging in showing how nongovernmental groups can promote regional legislation that helps cities. As described above, a church-based organization undertook a grass roots campaign, enlisted the support of a business association, the area Chamber of Commerce, to induce the area’s local political elites to sit down and develop an agreed upon plan for a regional transportation authority. They, in turn, used their influence to compel support of the state legislative delegations from the region. This success of this grassroots
strategy contrasts with the metropolitan reform strategy of going directly to the voters—a strategy that has repeatedly failed. As described by Altshuler et al. (2000, 107-109), “In general campaigns for metropolitan reforms are generated at the elite level in response to a specific problem of governance... furthermore metropolitan reform campaigns (by which the authors mean campaigns requiring referenda) are conducted in an environment of public apathy, ignorance, and misinformation... Most political scientists who have studied the politics of metropolitan consolidation are quite pessimistic about the political feasibility of adoption through the referendum process.” The Michigan experience noted above, as well as those of Portland and the Twin Cities, suggest that decisions by political elites at the state legislative level, particularly if they reflect agreement or near agreement among local political elites, are much more likely to lead to regional reform than are efforts to generate voter approval through referenda.

One major question about the current direction of city-suburb alliances is whether it is possible to build coalitions around equity issues that require spending. Cities and suburbs have had the most success in uniting around spending increases for infrastructure improvements where benefits are shared. But on issues such as social services, public assistance, health care, and education, it is much harder to build alliances across regional lines. As one legislator stated, non-city legislators have “less confidence that the city can solve these problems with more state assistance.” The role of race in shaping such judgments is “huge” in the words of one legislator. Several legislators in the Chicago area contended that racial antagonism in the suburbs continued to be a “major impediment” to taking regional approaches to poverty and affordable housing. However they also noted that as the city has sought to attract and retain the middle class, low-income residents have moved into declining inner suburbs. How this new geography will alter the politics of poverty and social assistance in the states is one of the most pressing questions for the future of regionalism.

CONCLUSION

At a time when central cities are more dependent on their states than ever, there is considerable evidence that their clout in state legislatures is eroding. The declining number of state representatives from cities means that cities have less power within the Democratic Party caucuses in the state legislature, historically the main protector of city interests. Increasingly, the Democratic Party aims to please the swing districts in the suburbs, figuring, usually correctly, that central city Democratic seats are secure. In addition, the weakening of party cohesion has hurt cities. County party organizations, with their patronage ties to city government, are not as important as they used to be for winning races for the state legislature. State legislators increasingly rely on money raised from special interests and from legislative campaign committees. Forbidden to make campaign contributions, the voices of cities are being drowned out by special-interest campaign contributions and the flood of lobbying money in state capitols.3

3 The Center for Public Integrity reports that lobbyists spent $570 million in 2000 lobbying state legislators, an increase of 91 percent from 1995 when fewer states reported (Dunbar and Rush, 2002).
The declining political power of cities in state legislatures suggests the need for new coalitional strategies and partners. The obvious direction to turn to is new coalitions with suburbs. Increasingly, suburbs experience the same problems as cities. Objectively, fiscally stressed cities and mature suburbs share an interest in needs-based state aid and in smart growth policies to slow suburban sprawl. Innovative leadership will be needed to build these coalitions. One of our most striking findings is that big city mayors are not leading the way in metropolitan reform. The mayors we studied were preoccupied with the immediate fiscal condition of city government. Long-term metropolitan land use issues were not high on their agendas. Most central cities have enjoyed new investment and growth in recent years, putting them in a different economic situation than most inner-ring suburbs. When mayors did reach out to politically to suburbs, the suburbs were often reluctant to join for fear of being dominated by city interests.

Our research shows only inklings of the city-suburban legislative coalitions based on objective common interests. We do not conclude from this that such coalitions are impossible, but rather that they are difficult and will require new leadership. Where might such leadership come from? Our research suggests that state level actors – particularly Governors (including Republican Governors) - have a stronger and better understood interest in promoting regional cooperation than do many political actors within the region itself. This interest flows both from the policy concern for the performance of the state economy as a whole and also from their position as state officeholders with a statewide electorate. Advocates of regional cooperation should focus greater attention at this level.

In addition, much of the interest in regionalism is latent and varies considerably by issue area. Because many interests may not rank regionalism as a top priority, they are not active on these issues. This creates a vacuum in which opponents dominate the political arena. This suggests that coalitions are more likely to emerge around specific issue areas that have a regional dimension, such as transportation, public education, and fair-share housing. As we have seen, transportation is a particularly promising area. More redistributive policies, especially those that have a racial edge such as public education and fair share housing, face much greater difficulties in attracting supporters.

Finally, because the dynamics of state legislatures limit creative coalition building, venues outside the legislature are needed to promote regional perspectives. This includes efforts at coalition building both by local political elites (organizations such as the Metropolitan Mayors Caucus in Chicago may provide a forum for promoting regional perspectives) and by grassroots organizations within the region to encourage and induce local elites to come to agreement. In the late 1990s several networks of community organizations such as the Gamaliel Foundation and the Industrial Areas Foundation adopted regional equity as the centerpiece of their organizing work. We examined the impressive effort of one of these grassroots organizations, MOSES, to create a unified regional transportation authority in the Detroit area. These new efforts by groups that have a regional approach to inequities and that cross jurisdictional boundaries in their organizing are especially encouraging for the future of regionalism.
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REFERENCES


Appendix A
INTERVIEWS

NEW YORK

Anthony Piscitelli, Chief Lobbyist, Mayor’s Office of State Legislative Affairs

Abraham Lackman, Special Adviser to the Senate Majority Leader, Joseph Bruno

Richard Perez-Pena, New York Times Bureau Chief in Albany

Roman Hedges, Deputy Secretary, New York State Assembly Ways and Means Committee

Frank Mauro, Executive Director, Fiscal Policy Institute, Albany

Gerald Benjamin, Dean, SUNY-New Paltz and author of numerous books and articles on the New York Legislature

Diana Fortuna, President, Citizens Budget Commission, New York City

Steve Gorelick, Assistant to the President of CUNY

Cheryl Parsons Reul, Lobbyist with the firm of Nixon and Peabody

William Johnson, Mayor, City of Rochester

OHIO

Kevin O’Brien, Cleveland State University, Urban Center

Pat Sweeney, former Chair, House Finance Committee

John Magill, Ohio Department of Development

Fannie Nicholes, Deputy City Manager and Legislative Liaison, City of Cincinnati

Mary Anne Sharkey, Director of Communications, Office of Governor Taft

Sandy Theis, Statehouse Bureau Chief, Cleveland Plain Dealer (8/14/01)
Julia Carr Smyth, Reporter, Cleveland Plain Dealer (8/14/01)

Greg Browning, President, Capital Partners (former Budget Director for Gov. Voinovich)

Kevin Futryk, State Street Consultants and contract lobbyist for City of Cincinnati

Lee Leonard, Statehouse Reporter, Columbus Dispatch (8/15/01)

Chan Cochran, Cochran Public Relations, former Press Secretary, Governor James Rhoads (8/15/01)

Paoli DiMaria, Policy Director, Gov. Taft (8/15/01)

Dennis Keating, College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University (8/6/01)

Jay Westbrook, Cleveland City Council (former President of Council) (8/7/01)

Ken Montlac, Cleveland Heights City Council, Leader of First Suburbs Consortium (8/6/01)

Cheryl Davis, Greater Cleveland Growth Association, Legislative Liaison for the City of Cleveland, 1990-1995 (8/13/01)

Greg Lashutka, former Mayor, Columbus, Ohio (8/15/2001)

Mike Reese, lobbyist, city of Columbus, Ohio, (8/15/01)

George J. Arnold, H.R. Gray Associates (former Director of Development, City of Columbus and Chief of Staff for Mayor Lashutka) (8/15/01)

Tom Suddes, former reporter Cleveland Plain Dealer, Columbus Ohio (8/15/01)

Priscella Mead, State Senator (R. Columbus) (8/16/01)

Bill Habig, Director, Mid-Ohio Regional Planning Council, (8/16/01)

MICHIGAN

Paul Hillegonds, Director, Detroit Renaissance (former Republican Speaker of the House),

Nettie Seabrooks, Chief of Staff to Mayor Dennis Archer, Detroit

Chris Christoph and Dawson Bell, Detroit Free Press reporters, Lansing Bureau
Sen. Bob Emerson (D, Flint), Senate Minority Leader

Bill Ballinger, Editor, Inside Michigan Politics,

Mark Murray, State Treasurer (formerly Director, Office of Budget)

Rep. Buzz Thomas (D, Detroit), co-chair legislative Urban Caucus

Marge Malarney and Pat Laughlin, lobbyists, City of Detroit

Virgil Smith (by telephone) former Democratic floor leader (until 2000), Michigan Senate

Illinois

Mary Sue Barrett, President, Metropolitan Planning Council, Chicago, Ill. (4/19/01)

Sean Heffernan and William Luking, lobbyists for the city of Chicago, Springfield, Ill. (5/18/01)

Steve Rauschenberger, State Senator (R. Elgin), Elgin, Ill., 7/25/01

Rita Athas, Director of Regional Programs, City of Chicago, Chicago (7/25/01)

James Durkin, State Representative (R. Westchester) Chicago, 7/26/01

Barbara Flynn Currie, House Majority Leader (D. Chicago) (7/26/01)

Julie Hamos, State Senator, (D. Evanston), Evanston (7/27/01)

Barak Obama, State Senator, (D. Chicago) Chicago (7/30/01)

Miguel del Valle, State Senator, (D. Chicago) Chicago (7/30/01)
APPENDIX B
CITY PRIORITIES

DETROIT: Based on interviews with both the Mayor’s Chief of Staff and the Mayor’s two lobbyists

- Brownfields legislation making it easier for cities to clean up brownfields
- Legislation prohibiting the city from requiring its municipal employees to live in the city (an existing requirement).
- Blocking a change in the state revenue-sharing formula that would have reduced the amount for Detroit by eliminating the tax effort part of the distribution formula.
- The proposal that the elected Detroit School Board be abolished and that the Mayor appoint the School Superintendent (several interviewees indicated that Mayor Archer actually favored this proposal but could not publicly endorse it).
- The need to change nearly 30 existing laws that provided all cities over one million (i.e., only Detroit) with special advantages or privileges to all cities over 750,000 since Detroit’s population after the 2000 Census is below one million. (Many of these laws were passed at a time when the coalition of interests in the state legislature was much more favorable to Detroit; thus, in some cases, repassage involved important substantive concerns and was not simply pro forma.)
- Legislation prohibiting local governments from enacting living wage legislation but exempting Detroit from the prohibition (some interviewees suggested that the Mayor, in fact, did not want Detroit to be exempted, but could not publicly say so).
- Legislation setting up a regional water board to take over city water authority (Mayor opposes).

CINCINNATI: Cincinnati sets its state legislative priorities annually through a systematic review by the city manager and council and publishes them. Cincinnati’s top priorities for the 2001 and 2000 legislative sessions included:

- Obtain funding for Cincinnati from the $400 million recently passed low-interest loan and grant fund for locally approved brownfields and greenfields projects.
- Persuade the state legislature to replace, at least partially, the loss of funds that Cincinnati and other cities will suffer if the state goes ahead with the planned phase out and eventual elimination of the state estate tax, a portion of which is sent back to the local area from which the revenue is raised. Cincinnati has received an average of $17 million annually from this source over the past three years, about 5% of the city’s General Fund budget.
- Persuade the administration and state legislature to pass legislation necessary for the state to keep a major post office facility in Cincinnati after the US Post Office
announced that an existing facility in Cincinnati was outmoded and would be relocated from its present site.

- Oppose the Governor’s proposal to freeze the local government fund from which the city receives about 10% of its general fund budget. The city has come to expect a 3-4% increase annually in funds from this source.
- Support for funding for a variety of capital projects, including more than $1 million for the Central Riverside Park and for a variety of transportation projects.
- Opposition to a bill introduced by township interests to prohibit municipal income taxes (Ohio permits municipalities to impose an income tax on those who work in the city as well as residents).
- Opposition to legislation that would prohibit municipal residency requirements.
- Support additional funding for the Underground Railway Museum in Cincinnati.

NEW YORK: New York City devises a list of state legislative priorities annually which the Mayor announces to the Joint Legislative Fiscal Committees in Albany each January. On January 22, 2001 Mayor Giuliani stressed the following issues:

1. EDUCATION
   - Improved funding. (Giuliani testified that the City educated about 38 percent of State’s students but received only about 36 percent of State aid.)
   - More funding under Governor Pataki’s School Property Tax Relief (STAR) program. Because property taxes are low in the City, NYC did not receive proportionately as much tax relief under Pataki’s program to reduce property tax bills by sending state money to school districts in place of property taxes.
   - Abolition of the Board of Education and putting the schools directly under the mayor. (Presently, the mayor appoints two out of seven members of the Board of Education.)

2. TAXES
   - Reenactment of the commuter tax (repealed in 1999).
   - Elimination of sales tax on clothing purchases.
   - Reinstatement of Stock Transfer Incentive Aid. (In 1978 the State began to phase out the Stock Transfer Tax, promising to replace it with State aid. Pataki led in the elimination of this aid, costing the City $114 million.
   - Increase in unrestricted aid to NYC.

3. HEALTH CARE
   - Allocation to NYC of funds left over from the federal State Children’s Health Insurance Fund (total of $780 million, according to Giuliani, with NYC getting 10 percent).
4. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
   • Expansion of the State DNA data base by taking DNA from anyone convicted of a felony offense.
   • End parole “completely and absolutely.”
5. CHILD CARE
   • Increase State funding of foster care by $65 million.
6. ENVIRONMENT
   • $75 million from the Clean Water/Clean Air Bond Act to assist with the capping of the Fresh Kills Landfill.
7. STOP EXPENSIVE MANDATES
   • Stop the State-mandated cost-of-living adjustment for city retirees (estimated cost to City of $234 in first year).
   • Stop $172 million in state-mandated tax reductions.
   • Stop increases in State-mandated City contributions for administering Rent Regulation and Income Tax collection (Giuliani’s estimated cost $31 million).
8. TORT REFORM
   • Reduction in exposure of the city for personal injury actions that cost NYC $400 million a year.

CHICAGO: The mayor of Chicago draws up the priorities of the city in the legislature, often in consultation with the heads of boards and agencies whose interests are concerned. There is no formal announcement of the city’s priorities as in New York. Interviews with the Chicago lobbyists in the Illinois legislature revealed that among the most important issues for Chicago in every session are those related to preserving its autonomy, infrastructure and education spending. Other issues appear with less regularity.

   • Preserve home rule. The 1970 Illinois constitution gave Chicago very strong home rule powers and a central and ongoing priority for the city is to preserve this home rule autonomy.
   • Defeat state-mandated expenditures. Closely related to the preservation of home rule is the city’s ongoing desire to fend off state legislation that results in increased costs to the city. This issue arises in state decisions over public employee pensions, mandates in the state’s Occupational Health and Safety Administration, and health care mandates that increase local government costs for public employee health care.
   • Increase the level of state funding for public education and school capital infrastructure.
   • Increase state spending on transportation, including mass transit, roads, and bridges. In 1999, the city was a central force in passing a major infrastructure initiative called Illinois First.
• Secure support for major capital projects, such as renovation of McCormick Place convention center and Memorial Stadium.
• Crime. As crime rose in the 1990s, the city sought various measures designed to regulate gun sales and gun ownership.