

THE ELEANOR ROOSEVELT PROGRAM

April 27, 1951

Description: In the opening segment, ER and Elliott Roosevelt respond to a listener's question about why the United States has switched from fighting the Japanese and working with the Soviet Union during World War II to fighting the Russians and working with the Japanese in the Korean War. In the interview segment, ER's guest is Marguerite Higgins, correspondent in Korea for the New York *Herald Tribune*.

Participants: ER, Elliott Roosevelt, Marguerite Higgins

[ER:] This is Eleanor Roosevelt speaking. Elliott and I are very happy to bring you this program each day from my living room here in the Park Sheraton Hotel in New York City. I hope you find the program we planned for today an interesting one. Elliott, would you tell us about it please?

[Elliott Roosevelt:] All right, I'd like to. It's about a young lady who has been doing a great deal of writing about other people in the past several years and she's now seeing a great deal written about herself. She is Miss Marguerite Higgins, *Herald Tribune* Correspondent in Korea. You've heard many columns she's written about the-- rather you've read many columns she's written about the fighting in Korea and today we're going to have an opportunity to get a behind the scenes picture of those columns. Mrs. Roosevelt will introduce uh Maggie Higgins immediately after a look at the mail and a message from the sponsors who make this recorded program possible.

[Break: 1:15-1:20]

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Today, Mother and I have an interesting letter from Mr. James C. Hunter of Los Angeles, California, which we will discuss, but first I'd like to read his letter to you. "After reading your column regularly and listening to your radio program occasionally, I wonder if you would care to comment on certain aspects of our own actions that puzzle me no end. It appears to me that powerful forces in America are banking heavily on the short memories of the American people and would now undo the work and nullify the sacrifices of World War II. They talk and act as though we were on the wrong side in that war and that our real enemy is our one time ally. Five years ago, the Soviet Union was our 'staunch ally,' in quotations, while today it is 'Public Enemy Number One.' Not long ago we were fighting the Japanese and trying to liberate the Chinese. We are now fighting the Chinese and begging the Japanese to rearm and help us. A few short years ago, we were sacrificing our treasure and our young men's lives, fighting Hitler and Nazism. We are now begging the Nazis to rearm and help us fight our former 'staunch ally,' Russia. Five years ago, Franco-Spain gave all out support to Hitler and fascism and Spanish ports were used by German submarines and their raids on our shipping. Yet today, we have an envoy there, who recently, figuratively, kissed the bloody hands of this butcher of Spanish democracy." He is uh quite colorful in his language. "I recall a message to MacArthur to Stalin, in which MacArthur said 'the hopes of civilization rest upon the victorious banners of the glorious Red Army.' What does he say now? Were we being sold a bill of goods then or are we being sold something now? It is foolish of course to say what President Roosevelt would do in the presidents-- in the present situation were he still alive and able to give leadership, but I believe things would be different. I cannot visualize him taking no unrealistic and untenable eh-a position as our present leaders are in their dealings with China. How is it possible to shut our eyes and ignore a half a billion people? Moreover I doubt, very much, that he would blame recent events in Asia on Russian aggression while completely ignoring the activities of Britain, France, Japan, and ourselves over the past century, which certainly is not blameless for the indescribable poverty and misery of the people in that part of the world. Why blame Russia for giving leadership to the

altogether just as-aspirations of the Chinese people. Why didn't we do it? Then too, do you think the dropping of jellied gasoline bombs on the wretched villages of the Korean peasantry will cause them to love us and hate the Russians? Sincerely and Respectfully, James C. Hunter. Los Angeles, California."

[ER:] That is quite a letter and quite a mixture of subjects. I think we better rule out right away trying to decide what um [Elliott Roosevelt coughs] Father would have done because um no one can—

[Elliott Roosevelt:] No one living can say what someone dead would have done—

[ER:] --can say what someone dead would do in the present circumstances, so we better deal with it as we see it uh ourselves. Now from my own point of view, I would be very averse to saying that where the Far Eastern question is concerned uh Great Britain, France, and ourselves did not have some blame for the conditions uh which brought about the possibility for uh a communism to get a real hold in China, um and which might easily bring about that same situation in other countries. But-- (5:55)

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Well I-I do think uh that the that we should qualify the only people uh that have actually uh entered and held a part of Chinese territory are the British with their holding of the ports of China and uh and that has been going on long before the United States became very active in uh international affairs.

[ER:] Oh yes, but I don't think that-that is not really uh the basic reason for unrest. The basic reason for unrest all over Asia is the very low standard of living of the people. And we know very well that in China, reforms had been overdue for a long time. That's when we—

[Elliott Roosevelt:] And Chiang Kai Shek failed to bring those reforms which he promised—

[ER:] Chiang Kai Shek failed to bring them about and before him many others, because this-this has been going on in China for a very long time. Many others failed and um I don't know that uh you can uh say that because you've failed to bring about reforms, you are to blame, but it's certainly is one of the reasons why the Chinese w-were ready to turn to communism. Now-- [ER coughs]

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Well, actually, though, I don't think that uh we can say that the United States, France, and Great Britain, and even Japan can be uh given credit for the fact that the-the people who ruled in China over many centuries, took advantage of the peasantry and kept them down and ruled in a feudal state.

[ER:] No, but certainly Japan's war on China [ER coughs] brought about um some of the suffering that um that brought about um Chiang Kai Shek's regime and um uh Chiang Kai Shek's regime failed to make the reforms um which might have helped the people. Now we do have to make one exception, namely, that there are two provinces which toward the very end of his regime, he had turned over the mass education movement and in those provinces some real forward movements were being taken and ha-there was evidence of what you could accomplish. Now those were not communist accomplishments. Those were accomplishments of the mass education movement and uh James Yen financed largely by American money. (8:44)

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Mhm.

[ER:] American private money in this country—

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Yes.

[ER:] --but um that has all stopped now under the communist regime. Um the leaders have been driven out and there is nothing going on of that kind at the present time. Now there's no doubt that what um India still has miserable people and Nehru is having a really hard time. I'm-- to hold his promises and-and make the reforms um—

[Elliott Roosevelt:] But I think there is another point [ER: quickly enough] that you brought up at this point, and that is uh-uh I saw with my own eyes in 1946 in the Soviet Union, conditions uh that certainly were the lowest type for living conditions and from what I can gather I saw only the best sections of the Soviet Union.

[ER:] Well—

[Elliott Roosevelt:] I'm sure the eastern half of Siberia, for instance, the living conditions are not so very high. (9:57)

[ER:] Well, what I was trying to point out was uh that um these conditions in the Far East um if-if it hadn't been communism it would certainly had to be something else um but um I would not say that we were not at all, that none of us were at all to blame. I think perhaps that we could have helped more had realized that we needed to help more. I don't think that the Koreans um love us for the destruction that we've had to bring about in order to preserve the whole world. Conception um of-of an aggressor not being given a free hand and the Koreans have suffered and I think that the only way that we can remedy that is by really helping set them back on their feet and I hope we will. I understand that we have already begun, but uh that's come down to the main question of the difference in allies. Um We were fighting a war against fascism, Nazism, and um at first Russia was against us and that made it almost sure either that the war for Europe would be lost or that the number of men that were going to die, I--and our men were included, was perfectly tremendous. So when Russia was attacked by Germany, we just accepted it as a gift from heaven and uh when Russia offered to be an ally and we realized what it meant, that we might preserve Western Europe, and the free peoples of the world, and that we might save hundreds of thousands of our young men. Why, we were thankful beyond words. And we tried to think that possibly we would win this ally to our side. We've learned, to our sorrow, that um it was not a fundamental uh liking for the same type of ideas that brought us together. It was just the law of self-preservation on both sides. Now, as far as taking allies that we never took, that we fought against in the last war, I feel very much the same that it's very hard to accept some of them, but you can't keep on thinking that people are going to stay static. You have to hope that the Japanese and the Germans are going to improve. As far as Franco-Spain goes, how good an ally we can count on, I am seriously wondering. (13:07)

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Well I think that answers as far as we can go today uh the letter from Mr. Hunter. I would like to add that I feel very strongly that the Soviet Union was an involuntary ally during the last war because they were attacked [Elliott Roosevelt laughs] by the Germans and certainly they were driven into our arms as our allies.

[Break: 13:35-13:50]

[ER:] My guest today is a very courageous young lady, courageous enough to work under fire in two wars: World War Two and the Korean War. It gives me great pleasure to introduce to you the *Herald Tribune* war correspondent, Miss Marguerite Higgins.

[Marguerite Higgins:] Thank you Mrs. Roosevelt, I am very glad to be here.

[ER:] First Miss Higgins will you tell our listeners something about your early life. How you became a foreign correspondent?

[Marguerite Higgins:] Well, I was born in Hong Kong and I have a French mother and I was bundled around the world quite a bit as a child and-and even as an adolescent. And I wanted very much to go overseas. In those days, I didn't uh think there was very much hope in the diplomatic field for women. I was proved to be wrong. And I decided that the only way I could go overseas was as a newspaper woman. When the war broke out and I was in New York working as a Columbia correspondent for the *Herald Tribune*, I got my chance and my knowledge of French and a few other languages helped me, I think, in getting the assignment.

[ER:] Well, of course I think the knowledge of languages must have been an enormous help in doing your work when you got over there. (15:04)

[Marguerite Higgins:] Well, in Korea of course, I don't speak any Korean—

[ER:] Well, not in Korea, but it must have been for World War Two, didn't it"?

[Marguerite Higgins:] Yes tremendously, in-in France and in Germany.

[ER:] France and Germany, it must have been a great help. Then of course, in Korea, you acknowledge that there was [ER laughs] that there were very few correspondents, I imagine, who knew much of that language. Uh when did you first go to Korea?

[Marguerite Higgins:] Well I had a peacetime preview of Korea. I went over there in time for the elections, May 30th, that's a month before-- approximately a month before the war broke out. I had a chance to look at the Korean government and the Korean economy before it was in a full-fledged war.

[ER:] Well, that-that was fortunate because then you really had a background for what was to follow, which must've been a help. Did you have difficulty in getting your original assignment because you were a woman?

[Marguerite Higgins:] No uh in Korea uh, I was the chief correspondent in the area and was expected to go there and as a chief Tokyo correspondent when a war broke out in my area, naturally my duty was to cover the greatest story in the world and get there as fast as I could.

[ER:] Eh well, I was really thinking uh beforehand, had you had a difficulty with being sent overseas as a woman in that area of the world?

[Marguerite Higgins:] Not in the Far East. I was assigned to the Far East with-without any um particular help. From me, I--my paper sent over there. There is no doubt that any woman has um a little bit of a persuasion job to do in getting an overseas assignment. Men are inclined to think that women as correspondents sometimes are more trouble than their worth and the word "temperament" always comes in and of course if a woman does something it's temperment, if a man does it it's sticking up for his rights.

[ER:] I see [ER laughs]. Well now, what were your uh--was the first uh place you went to in Korea um once the war broke? (17:08)

[Marguerite Higgins:] I went in, Mrs. Roosevelt, on the last evacuation plane. We were told that Seoul had fallen. All the headlines of the world carried the news that Seoul was gone and our plane was going in to try to rescue thirty Americans at Gimpo Airfield which is about seven or eight miles down from Seoul and which there was still a hope--we still hoped it was not in enemy hands. So I went in at Gimpo Airfield and that was my first landing in post in the-in wartime Korea.

[ER:] In wartime period. Well, what were your reactions with respect the conduct of war at that time?

[Marguerite Higgins:] Well, at that time, as you know, there were no Americans engaged officially in the war. We had only our Korean Military Advisory Group, which had been training South Koreans. And there was no doubt that the South Koreans were in a route. I walked south out of Seoul after escaping across the river and all around us, the soldiers were putting down their arms and trekking southward. It was very sad period.

[ER:] It must have been a very bad period and um [ER coughs] how um--now you say you walked--you walked when you landed there you walked to Seoul and stayed. [Marguerite Higgins: Yes, uh--] Now tell me a little about that. (18:30)

[Marguerite Higgins:] Well what happened is that we arrived at Gimpo and we found the Americans there alright and they were very anxious to get out but we found one American who was a surprise to us and that was Lieutenant Colonel Peter Scott of KMAG [Korean Military Advisory Group]. He informed us that Seoul was not yet in enemy hands, that the news bulletins had been premature that the enemy was perhaps in officially a part of Seoul suburbs but were not in the city itself, the heart of the city. And so we went with him into the city to cover this wonderful story and we stayed there exactly seven hours at which--during that period we were told the situation was, quote, "fluid." It was pretty fluid; the Red Tanks broke through at one o' clock in the morning. The South Koreans panicked and blew the bridge which was the only escape route as far as being able to take vehicles across and for many people it was the end of the war because they were not as lucky as we, and couldn't find a way out. The French correspondent, many of the British and French embassy people were trapped in Seoul. But we went down to the river and hailed some rafts and some uh ferries--little tiny boats, you couldn't really call them ferries. They were little rickety pieces of wood put together and despite the incoming fire they seemed to miss us and we got across alright and managed to walk out.

[ER:] And then you--how far did you walk from there?

[Marguerite Higgins:] Oh it must have been about fifteen miles across the mountains.

[ER:] And then what? You found um—

[Marguerite Higgins:] Oh we were very lucky, that was the--I think it must have been one of the sweetest moment of the war. We were very tired and walking across this mountain road where you'd never think a jeep could possibly come but a jeep filled with six South Koreans did come down the road, and I was put in it along with three other soldiers there--that eight of-nine of us in this little jeep and we were dispatched down to Suwon to try to get transportation for the rest of the very weary group.

[ER:] Did you succeed?

[Marguerite Higgins:] Yes-n-yes I did. (20:39)

[ER:] Oh that was wonderful. Well um uh in your um article um-- in the article rather about you, in the current issue of *Woman's Home and Companion* I was um uh interested in the story which you've just told us about your being trapped in Seoul, but um I want to know now um when actually United States troops were committed in Korea and-and um what you found that uh their ideas were?

[Marguerite Higgins:] Well the United States troops were committed after President--rather after the President had first sent in the naval and air support. That was not effective enough, and as you know General MacArthur made a flying visit to the Suwon front to see for himself what was needed to keep the communists from taking all of Korea. He was quite astonished himself at the reversal of the Chiefs of

Staff's point of view because as I believe is now well known, we had written off Korea strategically. But his assignment was to go there and bring back a factual uh story of what was needed to save South Korea as we had now decided to save it. He toured the front and it was evident to him as he put it "the situation needed an orderly injection of American strength." He said that the Korean G.I.'s were good as individuals, in good physical shape, they needed leadership and moral support. He went back and recommended that night to the President that if we wanted to save Korea we would have to commit American ground troops. I knew nothing of it, because I was on a plane back to Suwon, and at Suwon there was a panic that night and we jeeped for eight hours through the rain down to Daejeon, which became famous later. At Daejeon scarce--it was not yet--it was forty hours after my talk with MacArthur, walked in at six am, dripping and very cold to the room where General Church was presiding all by himself at the end of a table that had a bright green cover on it. And Church looked at us and said: "You may be interested to know that two companies of American troops were airlifted in Korea this morning." And that's how I first knew that our troops went into Korea.

[ER:] That's how you first knew. Well now when did you first get a uh um chance to talk to those men, or-or did you not talk to those, did you talk later to-- when more came?

[Marguerite Higgins:] No, the moment our troops arrived at the front, we went up with them and I was with our American soldiers, the first day which was--involved not a battle, but I'm afraid a strafing by our own plane, and that was our first casualty but it wasn't a fatal one. The soldiers were very surprised, very amazed, and certainly very green. There's no getting around it. And they were not well trained combat prepared or mentally prepared for the ordeal they were being sent to. They'd been scooped suddenly out of very soft berths in Japan and they'd signed up to be occupation troops, not to be [ER: combat troops.] a hard--right.

[ER:] Well uh have you found a change in the um feeling among the boys um now uh when they're fighting under the flag of the United Nations. Do you find--what do they say to you?

[Marguerite Higgins:] A G.I. is not a very articulate person in-a--but the best way to know how he feels, is overhearing him talking to his buddies because he feels self-conscious in talking to a correspondent. I think there's been a tremendous an-and really heartening change. I couldn't ascribe it to any one thing, I think it's partly that somebody who gets pushed around wants to get even with the person who pushed him around; I think it's partly that they have much better equipment and better leadership and that they understand a little bit better what they are fighting for.

[ER:] Well that's very interesting. And now we have to let our announcer have a few words and then we'll come right back to this interview.

(Break 25:20-25:23)

[ER:] Now we're coming back to the talk with Miss Marguerite Higgins of the *New York Herald Tribune* staff. And I want to know a perfectly um a simple question at home but I should think a very difficult one when you're off in Korea. How did you file your stories?

[Marguerite Higgins:] That was one of the most difficult operations. Being at the front was comparatively simple. There were--the army never made any uh communications available to us on a steady basis. It was quite different from the Second World War where Eisenhower, who has a different attitude towards the press than the army in Korea had towards the press, provided each army with a PreWi, that's a press wireless, or an RCA set. We got from time to time a telephone use by the army, naturally only when it wasn't busy and the rest of the time we tried to fly or give a pilot our stories and--or we would jeep back

to a place like Busan [Pusan] which was a non-combat base and from there we could send our stories by tele-type. It was just luck and God and-and maybe it got through and if it did it was a miracle. (26:39)

[ER:] Well now, how-you've talked of various methods of transportation, how did you usually get around?

[Marguerite Higgins:] I had a-a jeep which was really not my jeep but um the reward of Keyes Beech and Frank Gibney [1924-2006], Keyes Beech [1913-1990] of the *Chicago Daily News* and Frank Gibney brought that jeep out of Seoul and they have a lot of credit due them because our sixty Americans abandoned all our vehicles but Keyes and-and Frank got their jeep out. They carried it, pushed it, got it out and we kept it for most of the war, and in that jeep that was-those were-that was our Seeing Eye dog.

[ER:] That was-- That was the way you got about. Now you've mentioned General [Douglas] MacArthur, but I'd like to know if you've ever met General MacArthur.

[Marguerite Higgins:] Yes, I've met him many times um, Mrs. Roosevelt.

[ER:] Well um, what um-what do you think is um his feeling um at the beginning? Um was he a little surprised at the reverses or did he expect them?

[Marguerite Higgins:] I think General MacArthur, as did every other American, underestimated the fighting power of the Soviet directed Oriental. I also think he underestimated the extent to which Soviet Russia had supplied, and was continuing to supply, the North Koreans.

[ER:] Uh would that be really a criticism of intelligence or would it be that he perhaps hadn't uh thought it worthwhile to find out?

[Marguerite Higgins:] General MacArthur was not responsible for intelligence in Korea and that's a point that's rarely understood and I'm afraid he's become a whipping boy in many cases. I'd like to take this chance to clear it up: the facts are that Korea was not under General MacArthur's command in any way, shape, or form, in fact he was scrupulously bypassed-- if-if I could put it that way. The State Department people in Korea reported directly to Washington; the same is true of the Korean Military Advisory Group [KMAG]. The people who were responsible for gathering information about the enemy were the Korean Defense Unit and the KMAG. Their reports went back to Washington. That doesn't mean that MacArthur's intelligence didn't keep an eye on it. (29:07)

[ER:] Well did um-did they have intelligence under-under them which could have found out do you think or not?

[Marguerite Higgins:] The-the Korean--? [ER: Yes.] Yes, they did and they frequently reported it, and in Washington it was discounted.

[ER:] Well did they report to uh War Department heads in Washington? Or just to um the State Department heads?

[Marguerite Higgins:] The Korean Military Intelligence went back to our Military Intelligence, is in turn funneled through and according to our-our own system, as you know each unit has its separate intelligence. [ER: Yes.] And the State Department re-reported back to State, but if you remember back in March and April, the Korean Defense Minister flatly predicted an invasion of South Korea and it was laughed off. We don't like to believe that the dictators when they say they're going to invade us really mean it.

[ER:] Yes well we've learned that haven't we? Um I'd-I'd like to ask you a personal question because you seem to have seen a great deal um of adventures of various kinds and I think many people would be interested to know whether you were ever frightened under fire?

[Marguerite Higgins:] Of course, it's-you're always frightened under fire. Um in a time, what I now call my first encirclement I was of course very-very much afraid. And in war, almost like speaking on the radio or-or making a speech, it's a matter of learning to control fear. You--the first time it's worse, the second time it's not quite so bad, but you never stop being afraid.

[ER:] No, and uh it's really-it's really a matter of discipline isn't it? The discipline you learn that's uh—

[Marguerite Higgins:] Learning to control your own fear, something you have to fight out in yourself.

[ER:] Well um, I wonder if um you had any-any feeling uh um how the organization of the American forces uh was done? Do you think it was finally done very efficiently or--?

[Marguerite Higgins:] Well Mrs. Roosevelt, I had-I have very strong feelings on that score, and they reflect the feelings of the regimental commanders and the men that I knew best. I think the American army is paper heavy, has much too-in the way of administrative officers, there are not enough people who know how to fight. Up in the Chosin Reservoir, I remember very well a Colonel pointing to a Marine Sergeant and saying: "That Marine Sergeant's been in the legal division for thir--twenty five years," I think it was. "And he's good at legal division." But in this case where we were trapped, we needed every man to know how to shoot, and that Colonel said "If I have my way, every man in this army is going to have to go out and train for six months if necessary so he can fight and fire every important type of weapon. We can't have just administrators. Everybody's got to know how to fight." (32:02)

[ER:] I think that's a very good decision. Perhaps we may be learning a good deal that's going to be valuable if uh ever we are under the horrible necessity of going to war.

[Marguerite Higgins:] There is no--there is no way of paying back the lives that have been lost in Korea, but I feel very strongly that perhaps if we do get in a big war the proportion of dead-dead Americans will be less because of what we've learned in Korea. It will be our own fault if it isn't.

[ER:] I hope we have the intelligence to really learn. We've done a good many things that we've had the chance to learn before, but we don't always learn. Um I wonder what your impression was of the South Korean people for instance, as regards uh communism? Did you think that they were influenced by the North Koreans and favored communism or not? (33:00)

[Marguerite Higgins:] In the early days, in May 30th, before the war, I talked to some South Koreans who thought that the land reform program held out bright promises and that the promises for the workers were at least uh interesting. And-and uh then I was in Seoul--I've been in two evacuations of Seoul--and they, I thought, afforded a very striking contrast: in the first evacuation of Seoul many, many millions stayed behind. The second time, really nobody stayed behind. Someone has called it a kind of a "silent plebiscite,"--the people had tasted communism and they knew this time they went South as fast and as far as they could.

[ER:] That's interesting that it came um so quickly. Well now did you ever meet any North Koreans?

[Marguerite Higgins:] Yes, I've met quite a few POWs, I talked to them in the hospitals mainly.

[ER:] Largely prisoners? [Marguerite Higgins: Yes.] Um, you did have a meeting, didn't you , with the Chief of the Korean Army?

[Marguerite Higgins:] Yes um Major General Kim Il-Kuan [Ching Il-Kwon, 1917-1994]. That was the- that was quite a-quite a day. We'd gotten down from Suwon to Daejeon and we'd just filed our stories after ten miserable hours, and by a fluke got our stories through and we emerged out into the rain--it was the rainy months and season and Tom Lambert of the *Associated Press* was still phoning. And I went out to-on the detail of finding a jeep to bum a ride with and I saw this jeep with an officer and a driver in it, and I hailed it and they stopped very politely and I asked not expecting them to understand English, if they would take us up to our headquarters and they said "yes" and Tom came out and he was so pleased at-at uh having filed his story, felt very chipper and he got in the back with this officer, a very neat looking man, and he clapped him very hard and jovially on the shoulder and said "Hey buster, are you fighting in this man's army?" and the officer said rather dignifiedly, "Yes." And he said, well he said "What are you going to do?" and he said "Well I shall reorganize this army, you see, my name is Major General Kim Il-Kuan. I'm the new Chief of Staff" [ER and Marguerite Higgins laugh].

[ER:] That must have terrified-- that must have been rather a shock, I think.

[Marguerite Higgins:] I think Tom was so tired that nothing shocked him, but it silenced him anyway [ER and Marguerite Higgins laugh].

[ER:] I think that's very funny. That leads me to ask you whether you ever found any difficulties with the other correspondents or felt that um your job was really too difficult because of friction or anything of that sort?

[Marguerite Higgins:] Well the-the--lot of the male correspondents thought--preferred not to have a woman at the front, especially if the woman at the front happened to scoop them a couple of times in a row. And uh their resentment or perhaps you could say--well anyway their feelings, were in Tokyo rather strong on at times, but at the fighting front to distinguish from what we call the headquarters correspondents, or the palace guard, at the fighting front, correspondents were-were wonderful because if you share a situation, a difficult one, together, there is a kind of camaraderie that develops very quickly. (36:29)

[ER:] And you never felt it was too much of a job?

[Marguerite Higgins:] No, I never felt that it was any more difficult for me than it was for anyone else.

[ER:] Oh I think that's a wonderful thing to hear a woman say, and I want to congratulate you on the way in which you've come through what too good many people would think was pretty dreadful job and on learning to control fear which is probably one of the biggest things anyone has to learn. Thank you for being with me today.

[Marguerite Higgins:] Thank you.

[ER, faintly:] That's the end.

[Unknown voice:] Cut!

(Break 37:06-37:21)

[Elliott Roosevelt:] And now it's time to close the program and to remind you that you've been listening to the Eleanor Roosevelt Program which comes to you each Monday through Friday at this same time and this is Elliott Roosevelt speaking, and wishing you all good day.

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