Book Discussion

Adeeb Khalid, Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015)

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"Students of Soviet history will see how the Soviet Union appeared from Tashkent and Bukhara, and if they might find it a little unfamiliar, I will consider my job well done," writes Adeeb Khalid, signaling that his goal is to reverse the more conventional way of viewing the Soviet Union from the center by moving the gaze to the periphery (21).

Khalid argues that policies emanating from the center often looked quite different than intended once Soviet officials in Tashkent, Bukhara, or any of the other republics in the outer regions implemented them. His study centers on the premise that Uzbekistan's emergence as a national republic in the 1920s began at the initiation of Central Asian Muslim intellectuals long be- fore the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. These intellectuals conceived a national project that sought to deliver the Uzbek nation from backward traditions into modernity by way of a revolution. Two agents of modernity, the Bolsheviks and Jadids, competed for primacy. The Jadids, indigenous intellectuals who believed in a modernist reordering of their society and its children's education, did not share the Bolsheviks' vision of modernity. Khalid's book provides a history of this very struggle between the Bolsheviks and the Jadids over the nature of desired change in Uzbekistan. Most important, it scrutinizes the purposes, methods, and consequences of the transformations these reformers proposed. His book demonstrates the differing starting points, trajectories, and results of seemingly similar projects by these two groups of cultural revolutionaries. Finally, the book contends that although the Jadids acquired a more extensive and radical worldview because of the Bolshevik Revolution, they were not the product of it.

Making Uzbekistan fills important gaps in the English-language scholarship that has yet to pay attention to the era between the Bolshevik Revolution and

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the national delimitation, when Turkestan and Bukhara turned into Soviet Socialist Republics. Khalid gives Uzbekistan pride of place, claiming, "the history of Uzbekistan is in a sense the history of all of Central Asia," and proposing that other Central Asian republics owe their Soviet identities to Uzbekistan (5). By privileging national over class struggle, the Jadids initiated a process that helped fashion Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Tajik, and other identities. The Jadids supported the development of their ethnic identities by taking advantage of the Soviet cultural revolution that promised public education, healthcare, women's rights, and land reform as well as other progressive policies. As Khalid argues, these policies were far from an improvement on any colonial policy that preceded the Soviets. He does, however, also show that because of the presence of colonial settler populations, Central Asians took almost a century to shed their imperial bonds to become fully fledged modern republics.

Khalid's first book on the Jadids, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*,[1] provided an original and comprehensive study of these modernist Muslim intellectuals who were often dismissed as either too few to be significant or mere products of late colonial ideologies who could not be viewed as noteworthy figures of reform. His new book staunchly reiterates that Jadids should not be studied or judged according to whether or not their movement was authentic, rather with the acknowledgment that they belong to a culture that constantly varied. He reminds us once again that the age- old tropes that pit so-called traditional against modern or progressive fail to explain the persistent contestations and continuous alterations of revolutionaries such as the Jadids. Furthermore, he connects the Jadidist debates over modern identity formation to other revolutionaries in the Ottoman Empire and Tatar lands in Russia in order to demonstrate the fluid yet contentious internal dynamics and external exchanges.

As Khalid attests, archival research proves that Central Asian cadres played a central role in drawing the boundaries of the Soviet Central Asian republics along ethnic lines (13). He argues against the hackneyed "divide-and-conquer" narrative that took away any agency the Central Asians possessed in forming the post-revolutionary republics. Khalid maintains that Turkestani unity did not threaten the Soviets as much as a possible disintegration of Central Asian political structures and society. His study proposes that Uzbekistan owes its modern identity to the Muslim intelligentsia, not to the Soviet ethnographers

1 Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

and Bolshevik administrators of the 1920s. Thus, he ensures that the reader not mistake "a Turkestan-centered Turkism" with pan-Turkism. Turkestan- centered Turkism considered the sedentary Central Asians as Uzbeks who were the inheritors of a high culture of the Islamicate Timurid golden age and whose language would be Uzbek or modernized Chaghatay. This book takes the reader from these imagined and recognizable origins to unexpected out- comes. One surprising argument shows that even the Persianate Tajik intellectuals supported this Chaghatayist project. This suggestion is in keeping with one of the inventive aims of the book, that is, to redefine nationhood and nationalism. According to Khalid, the indigenous makers of the republic of Uzbekistan that emerged as a "putative nation" had a greater concern with the consciousness of identity, and its formation through education, health and family, than Uzbek nationalism (16).

As the Jadids pursued a modern Uzbekistan with a distinctly national consciousness, they failed to marry some of their most significant modernist aims, such as new roles for women and Islam, with those of official Soviet policies. Khalid demonstrates that when the Soviets purged the first group of revolutionary intellectuals in 1929 and 1930, they destroyed any possibility of constructing Uzbekistan along national lines as neighboring Turkish and Iranian elites managed to do. The carefully and nuanced construction of the narrative in this book shows, however, that without the dedicated advocacy of national leaders, the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and other republics would not have materialized as autonomous entities. By cautioning his readers against the exaggeration of the influence of Soviet nationalities' and cultural policies, Khalid notes that the Uzbek nation would not have emerged without the complex relationship be- tween the indigenous elites and the state—a relationship that produced a new society and culture while destroying many of the original ideas and people who came up with them.

The most innovative and exciting feature of Khalid's book is his attention and appreciation of revolutionary-era Central Asian literature, cleverly pointing out that Western scholars "have been so busy reading between the lines for coded political messages that they have often missed what the lines in fact say" (19). The flourishing of revolutionary poetry, prose, and theater in the 1920s established the literature and dramatic arts of modern Uzbekistan. "The cast of characters," namely writers and other thinkers of Uzbekistan, did not create works just to critique or protest Russian and Soviet influences or oppression, but also turned their criticism inward to their own Muslim society. Although they were critical of religiously centered schools and the lack of women's rights, they saw Islam as compatible with modernity (28). Khalid's study offers

a comprehensive and readable account of influential ideas produced by thinkers such as Behbudiy, Munavvar qori, Niyoziy, Avloniy, Azizzoda, Mahmudov, and Xo'jayev, in addition to more well-known figures such as Qodiriy, Aini, Fayzulla Xo'jayev, and Fitrat. The reforms these intellectuals proposed in regard to Muslim and other local customs went hand-in-hand with the revolutionary aims. Therefore, the book reiterates that although the Bolsheviks and the Jadids did not agree on how to reform Uzbekistan, they understood that there needed to be a cultural revolution from below.

Another strength of the book is its comparative perspective, which helps place the Central Asian cultural revolution in a global context and contrasts it with others in the Muslim world, for example, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. It examines the underexplored connection between the Soviet drive for Muslim intellectuals to be included in the administration and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman revolutionaries such as the Young Turks served as role models or, more realistically, ideological comrades to the Central Asian intellectuals. They often intermingled in Tashkent with other revolutionaries arriving from a vast region stretching from Turkey to India. Nevertheless, some of the more ambitious among these revolutionaries did not see eye-to-eye with the Bolsheviks. A case in point is the Ottoman Enver Pasha, whose ambitions centered on building his own power rather than advancing Central Asian revolutionary goals. Khalid explores these Young Turk connections well, while somehow avoiding the devastating crimes of the three notorious Pashas against the Ottoman Armenians in 1915.

In a way, this separation of tangentially connected yet atrocious realities shows that the intellectual understanding and the high-minded path to reform and revolution among these leaders of diverse origins did not always result in benign consequences for everyone in the Ottoman Turkey or Russian Central Asia. Khalid refers to the words of Mustafa Cho'qoy to demonstrate this reality: "Enver, like all Turks in general, knew nothing of Turkestan and Bukhara, he had no understanding of the character of their internal events" (150). To that end, the story of Tajik populations and their aspirations exposes the complexities of assigning modern national identities in the Central Asia of the 1920s.

Finally, the analysis on "Tajik as a Residual Category" attempts the ambitious task of providing answers to the question of why Persian-speaking Tajiks failed to parallel the ambitions of their Turkic-speaking Uzbek counterparts. Khalid connects this failure to the Persian-speaking intellectuals of the 1920s who were an essential part of the Chaghatayist vision, based on Turkism until it was too late for them to assert their Tajikness. He lays out the gradual transformation of the linguistic realities among those who communicated with the Russian administrators and later with the revolutionaries between the 1860s

and 1920s. He points out that most intellectuals in Bukhara who were bilingual favored Uzbek as the language of their revolution. This reality was coupled with influential arguments like that of Abdurauf Fitrat, who suggested that the Bukharans were Persianized Turkic people (293).

No matter the ethnic or linguistic origins of the early twentieth-century intellectuals of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, *Making Uzbekistan* ends with the Stalin-era arrests and massacres of intellectuals of all ethnicities during 1937 and 1938, the notorious era known as the Great Purge. Yet, it shows the revolution the Jadids initiated with (and despite) the Bolsheviks, the Uzbek–Tajik dual society became Soviet. Due to the successful educational and cultural policies, and Central Asian participation in defeating the enemy in World War ii (the Great Patriotic War) Uzbeks became Soviet. These men who served in the Red Army and in Soviet civilian institutions, the descendants of the Jadids, made Uzbekistan what it is today.

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Adeeb Khalid's impressive new book is a continuation of themes that have pre-occupied him throughout his career. It centers on the Jadids, a small group of intellectuals who developed a vision of an independent Central Asia based on modern educational methods, the Turkic language, and reformed Islamic culture. He follows the trajectory of the Jadids and their ideas through the 1920s, as they tried to use the Bolshevik Revolution as an opportunity to impose their vision on a reluctant society. The book is partly an intellectual biography of Abdurauf Fitrat, a prolific writer in multiple genres. Ten years after the Revolution, the Jadids' hopes were destroyed by Stalin's assaults on pre-revolutionary intellectuals and Islamic social structures. Most Jadids were dead by 1938, their works forgotten until after the fall of the USSR in 1991.

This overview is familiar from Khalid's earlier work. Now he uses the lives and ideas of the Jadids as the basis for a comprehensive re-thinking of how Uzbekistan was created. He relies heavily on Turkic- and Persian-language primary sources, not only Jadid writings but also serials of the period, mining them more deeply than anyone has done before. He uses archival documents—including my notes from the Uzbek Communist Party archive, to which I was granted brief access in 1992—and secondary sources in a daunting array of languages. With this deep evidentiary base, Khalid is able to widen

our view of Uzbekistan's history to include Bukhara (both the emirate and the Bukharan People's Socialist Republic of 1920–1924) and how and why Tajikistan was split off in 1929. The book is quite detailed, but clear and well-constructed throughout.

Khalid challenges the standard Communist Party-centered narrative and raises fundamental historiographical questions. A favorite topic of debate among historians has long been "take the state out of the narrative—or put it back in?" Khalid shifts our attention decisively away from the state, in part because he wants to privilege the perspective of the colonized rather than the colonizer. In doing so, he says that it is not accurate to call the USSR a colonial empire, because it re-shaped and modernized societies in the republics on a much more ambitious scale than the European colonial powers ever did, even as it failed to entirely shed imperial habits (9–10). At the same time, Soviet policies and behaviors were so contradictory that there is no avoiding logical tangles. Khalid argues that historians have exaggerated the role of the Communist Party at the expense of understanding the influence of indigenous actors (18). While the party may have been unsure of its control over its Uzbek members, it was strong enough to inspire those Uzbek members to do much of the dirty work in attacking Islam and imposing the cotton monoculture (362). In truth, the party was both astonishingly weak in some sectors and able to im- pose its will in others, and we are far from having a complete understanding of how these contradictions shaped Soviet Central Asia. This is one area for new research that Khalid points us toward.

However, the book is not broad social history either, since the Jadids were themselves not only an educated elite, but an embattled minority in a conservative society. The most frequent criticism of Khalid's work is that the Jadids just weren't that important over the long run. He tackles this criticism directly, emphasizing that they were an influential voice in a cacophonous debate among young and old, modernizing and conservative, and those of varying political persuasions (11–12). Khalid wants to bury the older model of a homogenous Uzbek society crushed by Russian Bolsheviks in favor of a complex model, wherein Uzbeks struggled with each other to advance their competing visions of what their society should be, while maneuvering within the new political structure.

Taking the state out changes how historians understand power in a society. We are accustomed to focusing on the brutality of Stalinism, for good reason, but Khalid is emphasizing the subtler but still real power of ideas and culture, which can survive the deaths of their originators. Before 1927 the Jadids and Bolsheviks had interests in common, particularly cultivating modern education and national identities. Both topics have attracted historians' attention

before, but Khalid again focuses on the local, indigenous contribution to the creation of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic in 1924. The Chaghatay Gurungi circle (Chaghatayi Conversation), formed in 1918 by Fitrat, promoted an Uzbek national identity based on a modernized version of the written Turkic court language known as Chaghatay, paired with the claim that the borders and culture of Timurid Transoxiana were the basis for the true Uzbek nation. While the state suppressed the circle itself, their model of the Uzbek nation fit closely with what the Soviet border-drawing commissions and language reformers— who were mostly Turkestani—created in the 1920s. This, Khalid argues, shows the power of Jadid conceptions of Uzbekistan, even if the Jadids themselves had little to do with the political process (388–389).

Since this is a roundtable discussion, I'd like to pose a few questions and challenges to Adeeb directly. Yes, the Uzbek SSR resembled Fitrat's ideal, but does that really prove a connection? Tracing intellectual influences is notoriously difficult, and in this case one can argue that the Soviet model for nations matched that of the Jadids because both models were ultimately rooted in European ideas of the nation. The development of "ethnogenesis" as a governing concept in the 1940s might have been welcomed by Fitrat, but it came out of Stalinist ideological needs (to counter Otto Bauer's autonomy thesis and to preserve the Mongols' role as evil foreign invader), not Chaghatayist ideals.

Shifting attention away from the party and state provides a refreshing new angle on Soviet Uzbekistan's history. It also highlights a gap in the standard approach that demands further exploration, namely, who were these hothead young Uzbek communists who, Khalid argues, did much to destroy the Jadids and traditional Turkestani culture? None of the Jadids became members of the Communist Party, and the book gives a reader the curious sensation that there is considerable activity going on somewhere over *there*, behind a curtain, that is really important but we can't quite see. The curtain is, of course, the current difficulties in archival access that prevent us from fully answering this question. Nonetheless, Khalid could have enlarged our view of intra-Uzbek conflicts by spending more time on the work of Uzbek Communist Party First Secretary Akmal Ikromov, about whom there is extensive published information, and the head of the Uzbek state government, Fayzulla Xo'jayev. Ikromov was the frontline enforcer of central policy; Khalid suggests that Xo'jayev tried to protect the Jadids, at least early on. Both were sons of the clerical and mercantile elite, both radically turned against their origins, and both were prosecuted in the 1938 show trial. Knowing more about the motivations of them and other non-Jadid modernizers would have aided Khalid's goal of complicating our understanding of Uzbek agency under the Soviets.

This book makes a tremendous contribution to Central Asia scholarship and is an essential reference on topics as diverse as the twentieth-century history of Bukhara, the creation of Tajikistan, and the literary imagination of Fitrat and other Jadid writers. It is then especially unforgivable that Cornell University Press refused to allow a complete bibliography, even if they gave readers the rare luxury of footnotes. Aside from that annoyance, it is a deeply impressive historical study.

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Making Uzbekistan, by Adeeb Khalid, constitutes the most important revisionist account of the history of modern Uzbekistan to emerge in the past 20 years. Khalid argues that the republic's birth resulted less from Soviet policies of nation-building (let alone "divide and rule") than from fierce competition within Central Asia's intellectual and political elite. His seminal contribution is to demonstrate that the Uzbek republic's creation was an indigenous, rather than colonial, project, one with intellectual roots far predating Bolshevik rule.

Khalid challenges the longstanding assumption that the nation-state was introduced and created by the Communist Party. He demonstrates that Jadid circles authored the idea of Uzbekistan long before the republic's borders took shape in Stalin's planning: "Muslim intellectuals, not Soviet ethnographers or party functionaries, were the true authors of Uzbekistan and the Uzbek nation" (15). *Making Uzbekistan* traces Tsarist-era debates in the Jadid sphere about Turkism and the necessity for a Turkic political entity in Turkestan. These debates, Khalid argues, underwent significant radicalization in the cli- mate of turmoil following the empire's collapse. The 1924 delimitation present- ed an historic opportunity for the realization of this Turkic, or "Chaghatayist,"project. However, Uzbekistan's Jadid progenitors quickly found themselves superseded, and ultimately annihilated, by indigenous cadres of the republic's Communist Party.

The idea of Uzbekistan was thus not an arbitrary state-building measure imposed by Russian communists upon Central Asia's Muslim population. One of Khalid's groundbreaking, and provocative, steps forward in this book is to make a similar argument about the struggle with Islam that would reach a

climax during the Terror of 1937–1938. Chapter 7 starts out by illustrating the dramatic scope of Jadid anticlericalism in early Soviet Central Asia and ends with an eloquent analysis of several works by Abdurauf Fitrat (1886–1938) written in 1923–1924. Fitrat, a founder of Bukhara's Jadid movement, minister of education in the short-lived Bukharan People's Soviet Republic (1920–1924), and who would meet his end in an NKVD torture chamber, is rightly hailed as one of the greatest figures of contemporary Central Asian poetry, drama, fiction, and literary academic writing. He is one of the heroes—and martyrs—of *Making Uzbekistan*. Khalid highlights the critique of Islam contained in Fitrat's output at the time of the national delimitation as a critical turning point in his career. The author's discussion of the one-act play, *Satan's Revolt Against God*, is particularly insightful (245–247). Instead of reading Fitrat's apparent sympathy for Satan as a hidden critique of Soviet policies, Khalid argues that the author effectively embraces irreligion through an "Islamicate," rather than Bolshevik, critique of Islam (250). The implication of Khalid's discussion is that the repressive secularization implemented by Bolshevik leaders in Central Asia from 1927 onward cannot be interpreted exclusively as a colonial imposition; it derived intellectual sustenance from an existing indigenous discourse about Islam. Although this discourse certainly took inspiration from a new vocabulary for discussing Islam made possible by the *ancien regime*'s collapse, its origins rest squarely in the Muslim intellectual circles of the late Tsarist and early Soviet state.

One argument made in the book that will certainly provoke no less consternation in certain corners of the region concerns the origins of the Tajik nation. As Khalid notes: "The most striking thing about the identity discourses of Central Asia in the early twentieth century is the almost complete absence of any mobilization or agitation on behalf of the Persian-speaking population of Transoxiana" (292). *Making Uzbekistan* argues that the Tajik category was created by Uzbek Communists as a means of geographically imagining Central Asia's "residual" Persian-speaking population, i.e., those Central Asians who could not conceivably fit within the Turkic, "Chaghatayist" core imagined by the Jadids. Tajikistan's relegation to the mountainous, agriculturally impoverished regions that once constituted the eastern provinces of the Bukharan Emirate was a reflection not of Soviet nation-building, but of the Turkic nationalism spearheaded by the Jadids. Put succinctly, Tajikistan was an Uzbek creation.

Making Uzbekistan will set the agenda for scholarly discussion of Soviet Central Asia for years to come. In significant part, this is due to its advocacy for "the impossibility of authenticity," which, Khalid, writes, has resulted in a "refusal to accord attention to modernist intellectuals" (12). Khalid suggests that

recent trends in the study of Islam in Central Asia and Russia have generated an untenable characterization of the Jadids as not really Muslim. As he notes: "specialists in Islamic studies also join in the suspicion of modernist intellectuals, although for them the 'real' insight into Muslim society is to be gained from documents produced by Muslim jurists and ulama" (11). The author states that this neglect of the Jadids results from an ahistorical dichotomy between rulers or ruled, or " 'Muslim society' and 'foreign Bolsheviks' " (12).

Khalid's call for scholars to move beyond the kinds of questions generated by simplistic nationalistic, or purely anti-Soviet, characterizations of early Bolshevik rule surely constitutes an advance for the field. Many questions remain, however, about just who the Jadids—and their opponents in the fields of Islamic education, law, and thought—were. Several contributions in a recent edition of the *Journal of the Social and Economic History of the Orient*, edited by Paolo Sartori, raise important methodological questions related to the study of Jadidism. One such concern is the fact that the catch-all category employed to refer to the Jadids' would-be detractors, the "traditionalists (*qadimchilar*)," does not appear be an empirically tenable one.2 Another, according to Devin DeWeese in the same issue, is a widespread teleological approach to the emergence of the Jadids that dispenses with any attention to their intellectual genealogy and their close links to trends in the Muslim world other than secular nationalism. "In accepting the Jadids' arguments," DeWeese writes, "whether by naively assuming that they presented accurate descriptions of the past, or by insisting that their arguments were historically 'necessary' as a response to a pressing 'modernity,' the admirers of the Jadids try to relieve themselves of the need to take seriously anything *but* the Jadids."3 DeWeese suggests that an abiding and even evangelical faith in the inevitable emergence of "modernity," as manifested in a secular Turkic nationalism, among many Western scholars of Central Asia has resulted in an historically unwarranted exaggeration of the influence exercised by the Jadids in the late Tsarist and early Bolshevik periods, one that has obscured their Islamic intellectual origins.

Khalid will have his hands full for years to come formulating responses to these and many other critiques of his provocative arguments that will surely emerge from a wide variety of scholarly and non-scholarly constituencies.

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2 Jeff Eden, Paolo Sartori, and Devin DeWeese, "Moving Beyond Modernism: Rethinking Cultural Change in Muslim Eurasia (19th–20th centuries)," *Journal of the Social and Economic His- tory of the Orient,* 59, no. 1–2 (2016): 16.

3 Devin DeWeese, "It was a Dark and Stagnant Night ('til the Jadids Brought the Light): Clichés, Biases, and False Dichotomies in the Intellectual History of Central Asia," *Journal of the Social and Economic History of the Orient,* 59, no. 1–2 (2016): 83.

Such is the price a scholar of his caliber must pay for making a monumental contribution to the study of modern Central Asia, one that rests on breathtaking erudition and a vibrant, palpable passion for the subject matter. *Making Uzbekistan* presents the kind of exciting, innovative, and bold history writing that alone can advance our field.

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I am grateful to my colleagues for their thoughtful comments on *Making Uzbekistan*. It is very gratifying to receive commentary on a book that was so long in the making. I first set foot in Central Asia 1985, and this book is an attempt to answer the myriad questions that first arose in my mind then. I seriously began work on this book in 1999 and, in the long years since then, the project has taken many twists and turns. The book sprawls in several directions, and I was curious to see what reviewers would pick up on.

I had a number of interests in writing this book. I hoped to explore the outer edges of Islamic reform, nationalism, and communism, to see what they have in common, where they intersect. They are all forces that have remade the world in the twentieth century, and they intersected all too robustly in Central Asia. I was also interested in how "cultures" and "religions" change through time. What is Central Asian or Uzbek or Muslim "culture"? How is it articulated and by whom and how? Further, I wanted to think about the making of the Soviet Union, of how the programs and policies dreamed up at the center were actually implemented, and what their putative subjects made of them. What did "revolution" and "Bolshevism" or "communism" mean to Central Asians? And finally, I was interested in untangling the early twentieth-century history of Central Asia, which still remains poorly understood. This in- volved doing such unfashionable things as uncovering "facts" and figuring outchronologies.

Many of the themes in this book emerge from my earlier work, but ultimately my focus in *Making Uzbekistan* on the prerevolutionary modernist intelligentsia was as much an organizational device as anything else, for this group was at the center of the many different themes I was interested in. I also took care to place the Jadids in their society. They were a small, embattled group that encountered a great deal of opposition from their society. In fact, as I show,

that sense of marginality and being embattled was what drove them to ever more radical positions after 1917. They were deeply embedded in their society and specific to their time and place. I would therefore hesitate to subscribe to Ali İğmen's statement that "the Jadids initiated a process that helped fashion Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Tajik, and other identities." I do not see the Jadids as an abstract, universal phenomenon in the history of each post-Soviet nation. Unless one uses the term "Jadid" simply to mean anyone with a modern education, it is hard to think of the modern intelligentsias that identified as Kazakh, Kyrgyz, or Turkmen as Jadids. Apart from that, however, I am highly appreciative of the overview İğmen provides of the book.

Shoshana Keller commends me for moving the focus away from the state. I would not say that I ever wanted to "take the state out," but only to decenter it in the narrative. The Soviet state is ever-present in my book—it brings the Bukharan republic to heel, it establishes new institutions, it launches the purge of Uzbekistan's Narkompros in 1929–1930, and it executes most of the protagonists of this book in 1938. What I have tried to do is to tell a story that is not driven by the state, its concerns, and its policies. Shoshana's point that the party "was both astonishingly weak in some sectors and able to impose its will in others" is, however, very well taken. Shoshana also asks a couple of direct questions that I am happy to answer. What is the connection between the Uzbek SSR and Fitrat's ideal? Of course, as she says, both the Jadid and the Bolshevik ideas of the nation were rooted in the Romantic tradition. But whether Uzbekistan was to be imagined as the heir to the Timurid state and the inheritor of Chaghatay high culture was still an open question. Moreover, Fitrat never used the term "Uzbekistan" before 1924, and he never produced a map. I never meant to imply that a certain blueprint went from Fitrat's desk to the territorial commission that delimited the boundaries of the new republics. Rather, the point is that the Uzbekistan that emerged in 1924 was home to the entire sedentary Muslim population of Transoxiana, which is how Fitrat (and others) had imagined the nation to be. Fitrat also had no use for the concept of ethnogenesis (in any case, he was murdered before the concept gained currency), but would certainly have approved of the way the Uzbek national heritage was canonized in 1941 by Iakubovskii. The Uzbek SSR represented the triumph of the Chaghatayist project not by being the true replica of a model dreamed up beforehand, but because it corresponded in fundamental ways with the desiderata of that project.

Shoshana also wishes that I had spent more time on Akmal Ikromov, Fayzulla Xo'jayev, and Uzbek communists in general. While they are not entirely absent from the book, I agree that their presence could have been more robust. I ended up cutting most of the material on Uzbek communists (non-Jadid

modernizers, as Shoshana calls them) for the sake of organization and so as not to make an already long book even longer. The point is well taken, however, and it will shape some of my work in the near future.

Eren Tasar notes the chapter in *Making Uzbekistan* on the debates on Islam and especially my discussion of Fitrat's turn to irreligion in the early 1920s, al- though I am not sure why he finds it "provocative." My hope was to focus attention on the cultural radicalism of the era, something that can also be found outside the Soviet Union, in Kemalist Turkey, for example. Taking note of the religious ferment in Central Asia also helps us put the Soviet antireligious campaigns in their proper context and modulate the picture of a uniformly pious society that comes through in documents produced by Islamic elites. This is all the more significant since Tasar brings in his critique by proxy, by quoting at length the recent writings of Paolo Sartori and Devin DeWeese in the *Journal for the Economic and Social History of the Orient* (*jesho*). Although that issue of *jesho* appeared *after* my book was out, Tasar appropriates those views as his own and thus puts me in the uncomfortable position of having to respond not to him but to those writers here, in what is not the most appropriate venue for a response. I will just say that I wish that Tasar had shown how that "critique" applies to *Making Uzbekistan*. How, for instance, is my argument teleological, when the contingency of the revolution plays such a large part in? How have I relieved myself "of the need to take seriously anything [*sic!*] but the Jadids" when I focus on their contention with their opponents and see their being embattled as a key source of their radicalization? Where in my book does Tasar espy an "evangelical faith in the inevitable emergence of 'modernity'," when I chronicle the Jadids' hankering for it and note that most members of their society were indifferent to it? How do I "obscure their Islamic intellectual origins" when I show them starting off as fully committed to a reform of Islam? And I thought the book itself would answer the question of whether attention to the Jadids is an example of "historically unwarranted exaggeration of the influence exercised by the Jadids in the late Tsarist and the early Bolshevik periods," for it was the Jadids who created the modern Uzbek language we read today, the notions of national identity that are held as self-evident truths by most Uzbeks today, etc. I indeed have little use for the term *qadimchilar*, because I find it to be entirely residual. The careful reader will note that I do not once use it in my book, but prefer the term *traditionalist* to define those who sought their authority in the sanctity of tradition rather than in a devastating critique of it and who saw no use for reform. It is one thing to argue that the lines between the Jadids and their opponents could sometimes be difficult to draw (Behbudiy and Munavvar qori both had spotless Islamic credentials); it is quite different and quite preposterous to say that there was

no difference between them. That there was a difference of opinion between the Jadids and their opponents is clear from the evidence that I present (it was not limited to verbal jousting either, but caused blood to be shed). The task of the historian is to explain that debate and its consequences, rather than to deny that it ever took place.

DeWeese's essay is a flabby, self-indulgent screed against a generic target that includes everyone from occasional commentators, through scholars who specialize in other fields, to serious scholars of Central Asia; their only sin in common being an interest in the Jadids and modernist trends in Muslim societies. True enough, there are many problematic works around on the Jadids, and I share quite a lot of Sartori's and DeWeese's dismay at what passes for scholarship on modern Central Asia. But to anathematize the study of anything and anyone not connected to the Islamic elites of Central Asia is ridiculous. The insistence of Sartori and DeWeese that Central Asian societies can only be understood through the writings of traditionalist Islamic elites is deeply ahistorical. They hanker for a world in which the authority of the Islamic documents (and of the authors) that they study was uncontested. That world, if it ever existed, passed with the coming of colonialism. After that, Islamic authority was contested, challenged, and sometimes dismissed, from within and without Muslim societies. In any case, what Sartori and DeWeese complain about is a problem with our understanding of the *religious* history of Central Asia. I present the seemingly novel idea that—gasp!—there is much more to the history of Central Asia than its religious history. Our research has to be consonant with the questions we ask. I submit that no amount of research in *qazi* documents or hagiographies or sacred histories will provide us with an answer to the question of how Uzbekistan came into being. If we dismiss the Jadids from consideration, then we are left with only one explanation: that it was the work of outsiders (evil Russian atheists?) who transformed the region against its will. The good Muslims of Central Asia will then appear as victims, noble perhaps, and pious, but singularly unidimensional. That understanding of history will be entirely flawed.

It is my earnest hope that *Making Uzbekistan* will provoke new questions. I do hope, though, that they will be more productive than the complaints of philologists reproduced by Tasar here. There is a great deal more to be done, of course, and the three reviewers here point to some of those directions. My own sense is that we need a much greater sense of the economic history of Central Asia in this period, but one written from the vantage point of Central Asians and not that of the state agencies charged with productivizing this Soviet periphery. Let the work begin!