

# The Abu Sayyaf Group

## A Terrorist Criminal Enterprise<sup>i</sup>

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### ABSTRACT

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This paper explores a new model—the terrorist criminal enterprise—for assessing the convergence of terrorism and organized crime in illicit networks, and examines some of the policy implications of utilizing that model to address this phenomenon. Since 2001, several other models have promulgated theories on this observed trend. Some of the prevailing theories are discussed alongside the terrorist criminal enterprise model. The paper analyzes the case of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines, a resilient security threat in Southeast Asia, in terms of this new model. Security professionals familiar with the group have long-debated whether the ASG is a terrorist organization or an organized group of bandits. To be sure, its history of interwoven political and profit-motivated exploits makes this a difficult question. However, as the terrorist criminal enterprise model illuminates, this is a false dichotomy and leads to a debilitating bifurcation in security efforts. The ASG is an exemplar of this new model, it is unique in its own right, but it is hardly alone. Indeed, terrorist criminal enterprises like the ASG should be considered part of the new normal. Therefore, the implications of dealing with the ASG as such have broader applicability to security policy.

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<sup>i</sup> The term “terrorist criminal enterprise” is not the author’s. See Thachuk and Lal, *Terrorist Criminal Enterprises*.

## **INTRODUCTION**

The intent of this paper is to propose a new approach in analyzing the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Republic of the Philippines. The Philippines, even with U.S. assistance, has been unable to eradicate this threat group. The ASG exhibits features of both a traditional terrorist group and an organized crime syndicate. The ASG is a threat to the safety of innocent citizens and visitors to the Philippines, a destabilizing force for development and social progress of the Philippine government, and a potential threat to U.S. national interests in the region.

How a threat organization is conceptualized by a government and its security forces is critical in the design of the efforts to counter it. Traditional either-or conceptualizations of terrorist criminal enterprises such as the ASG lead to inefficiencies in security force organization, information sharing, and resource allocation. However, proper conceptualization will produce gains in these areas, provide better insight to addressing the root causes of lawlessness and subversion, and potentially lead legislators to consider how they might better write laws to deal with threats like the ASG. By approaching the ASG threat from a terrorist criminal enterprise perspective, the reader will gain a better appreciation of the steps necessary to degrade and defeat it and other terrorist criminal enterprises

This paper is divided into three major subject sections. The first section provides a select review of the prevailing literature on the terrorist criminal crossover, concluding with the terrorist criminal enterprise model. The second section is a general overview of the historical, cultural, and geographical factors pertinent to understanding the ASG. The third section demonstrates the terrorist criminal enterprise approach to analyzing the ASG. It will show that the ASG's criminal and terrorist activities are inexorably linked throughout its history, growing ever tighter despite internal leadership changes and external pressures. Therefore, other models to analyze and combat this threat begin at a significant disadvantage due to their underlying dichotomization. By the conclusion, policymakers will understand why the terrorist criminal enterprise approach offers a higher potential for effectively defeating the ASG.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

Since the end of the Cold War, scholars are increasingly analyzing the nexus of terrorism and organized crime. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the following examination of terrorist financing further spurred this inquiry. The United States' defunct Global War on Terror (GWOT), the franchise of a'-Qa'ida (AQ), and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have all provided ample opportunity for study of the Islamic extremist variant of

terrorist criminal overlap.<sup>ii</sup> Combined with prior analyses of more traditional non-Islamic movements, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), there is a growing body of literature on the evolution and convergence of terrorists and organized criminal organizations.

Four significant models attempting to characterize this phenomenon have emerged: Dishman's transformation model, Makarenko's continuum model, Mullins and Wither's nexus model, and Thachuk and Lal's terrorist criminal enterprises model. The first three models focus differently on various components of terrorist and criminal organizations and their behavior. Each provides valuable insight into this changing aspect of the security landscape, and may offer some utility for assessing an organization at a given moment in time. However, each preserves the traditional dichotomy between terrorism and organized crime, which the fourth model discards. To better understand the ASG as a terrorist criminal enterprise and why the latter model facilitates better holistic analysis, this paper will examine these four major conceptualizations in more detail.

### *TRANSFORMATION AND THE LEADERLESS NEXUS*

In the first conceptualization model, Chris Dishman rebutted "alarmist" assertions that a new norm was emerging in which terrorists and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) were cooperating. Dishman posited that instead of wholesale cooperation, organizations were mutating along a linear spectrum. At one end of the spectrum sits both terrorist and criminal organizations "... who have not transformed any of their organization and remain politically or criminally 'authentic;'...these groups might at times involve themselves in a nontraditional activity...to further their 'end game.'"<sup>1</sup> At the other end of the spectrum are organizations which completely changed their "ultimate aims and motivations," and "no longer retain the defining points that had hitherto made them a political or criminal group," even if they still "maintain a public façade."<sup>2</sup> The range between the end points consists of organizations that participate or collaborate to varying degrees in either terrorist or criminal activities.

In 2004, Dishman amended his theory. The four years after his earlier

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<sup>ii</sup> A variety of spellings of al-Qa'ida (AQ) exist, e.g. Al Qaeda, al-Qaeda, etc. This is due to the fact it is a transliteration of the Arabic phrase meaning "the base." Additionally, there are several sub-groups or affiliates such as al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Unless otherwise noted, AQ is intended to mean the overarching AQ organization or AQ core formed by the late Osama bin Laden. Similarly, several variants referring to the organization the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Examples include: the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State (IS), and Da'esh. Both organizations will be referred to, throughout this paper, as they appear on the U.S. Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. (<https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>).

work saw an increase in both practice and academic research on the evolution from hierarchical to more network-like structures of these illicit organizations. Following the work of Arquilla and Ronfeldt, he supposed that this changed the cooperative dynamic between terrorist organizations and TCOs.<sup>iii</sup> The resulting decentralization removed traditional ideological barriers imposed by previous hierarchies, enabling a “leadership nexus,” and allowing lower-level leaders of terrorist and criminal cells to cooperate and form varying degrees of alliances.<sup>3</sup> Dishman suggested that this ‘nexus’ would yield two important outcomes: “...these leaders will increasingly seek to work with criminal or terrorist counterparts outside of the organization for extended periods of time,” and the “...organization will internally transform so that both criminals and terrorists are critical ingredients in the organization’s structure.”<sup>4</sup>

### *THE CRIME-TERROR CONTINUUM*

In the second conceptualization model, Tamara Makarenko conceptualized the nature of organized crime and terrorism differently. The Crime-Terror Continuum places pure terrorist (politically motivated) and pure criminal (profit-driven) organizations at opposite ends with a “convergence” in the center, as opposed to Dishman’s linear spectrum model.<sup>5</sup> The crux of Makarenko’s conceptualization is that illicit actors of each type may move back and forth across the continuum based on operational motivations and organizational needs. Like Dishman, she also suggests that organizations can fundamentally change their end game. However, Makarenko’s model indicates a deliberate transition through one of seven distinct phases, whereas Dishman’s model is a tool for identifying where a group might naturally fall along the spectrum.<sup>6</sup>

### *THE CRIME-TERROR NEXUS AND CONVERGENCE*

In the third conceptualization model, Sam Mullins and James K. Wither approach the issue from a social-psychological perspective. They compare similarities and differences among organized crime and terrorist organizations by the key dimensions of membership demographic profiles (the individual terrorist or criminal), methods (tactics and operations), organizational structure (hierarchical to cellular), and motives (political or ideological goals versus profit).<sup>7</sup> In doing so, Mullins and Wither arrive at what they term the “crime-terror nexus”<sup>8</sup> and categorize it with “four overlapping types of relationships:”

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<sup>iii</sup> Among other works, Dishman cites “Networks and Netwars” edited by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, RAND Report (2001).

1. Interaction, where terrorists and criminals either work together somehow, or else compete or come into conflict with one another;<sup>iv</sup>
2. Appropriation, where one incorporates the methods of the other (i.e. where terrorists rely on their own “in-house” criminal capabilities, or where criminals use the tactics of terrorism);
3. Assimilation, where “hybrid” organizations emerge, which regularly engage in both terrorism and crime to the extent that it is difficult to say which is predominant; and,
4. Transformation, where a change in identity occurs, so that one becomes the other.<sup>9</sup>

Although Mullins and Wither have a different conceptualization than either Dishman or Makarenko, they all agree that terrorist criminal mergers are not the new global norm.<sup>10</sup> Of note, they are the only selected authors in the literature review to reference the ASG. True to their model, especially the “Assimilation” and “Transformation” relationships, they have difficulty placing the ASG firmly into either category – although they lean toward “Assimilation,” due in part to the loss of the group’s more ideologically-based leadership.<sup>v11</sup>

### *TERRORIST CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES*

In the final conceptualization model, Kimberly Thachuk and Rollie Lal make a radical departure from the previous authors’ characterizations. Dishman, Makarenko, and Mullins and Wither all suppose through their spectrum, nexus, continuum, and convergences that a fundamental dichotomy exists – no matter how small – between terrorists and organized crime. Thachuk and Lal argue that the evolution of 21st century terrorist groups makes this a “false dichotomy,” and that it is “...fruitless to continue to classify terrorists and organized crime separately.”<sup>12</sup> The main points of their “terrorist criminal enterprise” (TCE<sup>\*vi</sup>) model are:

- TCEs, “like traditional organized crime...engage in a variety of illicit operations including large-scale drug trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking, extortion, kidnapping for ransom...”
- “The factors that distinguish [TCEs] from traditional organized crime may only be their motivation for raising money and the manner in which the illicit funds are spent.”

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<sup>iv</sup> These categories are presented as a numbered list, as they appear in the source document.

<sup>v</sup> ASG leadership will be discussed in further detail in a later section.

<sup>vi</sup> Thachuk and Lal do not use the abbreviation TCE. The author is employing this definition for brevity. Neither do Thachuk and Lal provide a bullet list as used here. The author is synthesizing to create a framework for analyzing the ASG as a terrorist criminal enterprise.

- TCE’s “...ideological goals should not obscure the fact they act as organized criminal enterprises.”<sup>13</sup>

Dishman, Makarenko, et al., discuss the policy implications of their theories, that is, how crime and terror fighting agencies could better address the problems. The TCE approach, by contrast, is the only framework that shifts the paradigm by removing the bifurcated counterterrorism versus law enforcement approach. Thachuk and Lal provide three case studies – the FARC, AQIM, and ISIL (referred to in their work by one of the alternate names, Da’esh) – to illustrate how the TCE conceptualization would lead to a better approach. This paper will evaluate the ASG as another case that would benefit from using this methodology and explore specific policy implications of that case.

## **ABU SAYYAF GROUP IN THE PHILIPPINES: AN HISTORICAL, GEOGRAPHIC, AND CULTURAL OVERVIEW**

### *THE BANGSAMORO – A PEOPLE AND A PLACE*

The Southern Philippines is a Muslim majority area consisting of Mindanao, Basilan, the Sulu Archipelago, and Tawi Tawi. This area is both the historical homeland of the Moros – the original indigenous Muslim people of the Philippines – and the now decades-long base of operations for the ASG. A thriving Muslim resistance has endured for over 400 years, surviving multiple foreign colonization attempts and invasions, including those by Spain, Britain, America, and Japan.<sup>vi, 14</sup> Although the Spanish were ultimately successful spreading Catholicism throughout the Northern Islands (Luzon and the Visayas), the Moros resisted and repelled these attempts.<sup>15</sup> The next major, and somewhat successful, attempt at changing the balance of power in the area was by the Philippine state. Beginning in the early 1930s, the government of the Philippines engaged in a program called “minoritization,”<sup>16</sup> which facilitated mass migrations by Christians from Luzon and the Visayas to the south.<sup>17</sup>

This program, supported by government legislation, provided land grants and subsidies in an attempt to consolidate Manila’s influence in the South. It was successful in doing so, at least in Mindanao. It also successfully spurred the creation of several Muslim separatist groups, including the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). These organizations ultimately undertook peace negotiations with the government to create an autonomous Muslim region, but this historic division also contributed to the strife that gave rise to the ASG.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>vi</sup> Colonizing states listed in chronological order: Spain (1569-1898); Britain (1764-1773), as part of the Seven Year’s War; America (1898-1942), beginning with the Spanish-American War through the Philippine-American War, until World War II; Japan (1942-1945) until end of World War II.

## THE FOUNDING AND ROGUE SPONSORSHIP

The ASG's orthodox insurgent pedigree is undeniable. Its founder, Aduradjak Abubakar Janjalani, was born in Basilan to an ulama.<sup>viii</sup> He traveled extensively in the 1980s, including traveling to Saudi Arabia to study the Islamic faith and more specifically to Mecca to study Islamic law. Aduradjak Janjalani traveled throughout the Middle East, Libya, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, where he participated in the peak of Mujaheddin fighting against the Soviet Union.<sup>21</sup> During this time, he was befriended by Osama bin Laden, trained in militant tactics, and exposed to further radicalization through close ties with professors of the strict Wahabbi interpretation of Islam.<sup>ix, 19</sup>

Aduradjak Janjalani returned to the Philippines between 1988 and 1990, where he began laying the ground work for the ASG. He had been a member of the MNLF before leaving the Philippines to study and fight abroad. He easily capitalized on the widespread disenfranchisement among many MNLF members following the announcement of peace talks with the government in 1989.<sup>20</sup> Janjalani's ideals were well received by those who felt marginalized by the prospect of concessions, allowing him to rally those who preferred to fight instead of negotiating.<sup>21</sup> From this foundation, the ASG was formed. The initial stated goal was the establishment of an independent Muslim state in the southern islands. In theory, that goal has remained unchanged.

ASG expert Zachary Abuza aptly refers to the inaugural years of 1991-1995 as the "Anti-Christian/Islamic State Terrorism" period.<sup>22</sup> During this time, the ASG conducted 67 attacks including: attacks against two American evangelists and an Italian priest; the bombing of a Christian missionary ship, housing complex, and cathedral; the kidnapping of two Spanish nuns and a priest; and the assassination of a Catholic bishop. The group set off a series of bombs in the populous city of Zamboanga and continued with a killing and looting spree in the town of Ipil. The total carnage of these years amounted to 136 dead civilians and hundreds more wounded.<sup>23</sup>

The continued training and financial assistance of al-Qa'ida during this period undoubtedly aided the ASG's unmitigated violence. Though the training was significant in the tactical development of the ASG, it is overshadowed by the critical strategic impact of the financing. Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law, Jamal Khalifa, was deployed to the Philippines to establish a network of charities – a branch of the Islamic International Relief Organization

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<sup>viii</sup> According to the Oxford English Dictionary, an ulama (also spelled ulema) is a body of Muslim scholars who are recognized as having specialist knowledge of Islamic sacred law and theology; or a member of said body. (<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ulema>)

<sup>ix</sup> Wahhabism, in short, "is an austere form of Islam that insists on a literal interpretation of the Koran. Strict Wahhabis believe that all those who don't practice their form of Islam are heathens and enemies." (<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/analyses/wahhabism.html>)

(IIRO).<sup>24</sup> The IIRO provided money for the ASGs terrorist operations and funded projects in Muslim communities such as mosques and schools.<sup>25</sup> Both the operations and the projects had the effect of increasing popular support amongst the community and boosting recruitment.

### *THE TURNING POINT*

Several crucial events unfolded over the next five to six years that led to the ASG's evolution into a TCE. The significant uptick in violence and the appearance of the IIRO drew the attention of the Philippine authorities. Ultimately, a foiled bomb plot to destroy several transpacific passenger planes led to the end of IIRO (and AQ) financing operations.<sup>26</sup> Lacking a major source of funding, the ASG's operations declined significantly. According to Abuza, by the time the United States had designated the ASG a foreign terrorist organization, "the group had all but abandoned terrorism."<sup>27</sup>

Aduradjak Janjalani was killed during a shootout with the Philippine authorities in 1998. His death, combined with the loss of external sponsorship, crippled the ASG operationally. Despite a crisis of leadership and some organizational fracturing, it maintained a generally cohesive structure. The ASG evolved into an even more cellular organization with geographic centers of gravity on the Islands of Mindanao, Jolo, and Basilan. Aduradjak's younger brother, Khadaffy Janjalani, assumed a leadership role. He was more ideologically-focused than some of the others that assumed leadership in the organization, but he was less radicalized and authoritative than his older brother.<sup>28</sup>

The ASG was forced to engage in a wide range of illicit operations, such as drug trafficking and ransom kidnappings, for the bulk of its financial support from 2000 onward. In the following years, further changes in leadership due to combat deaths and law enforcement actions ensued. These events also coincided with the post-9/11 deployment of the U.S. counterterrorism mission under Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines and included the death of Khadaffy Janjalani and other operational setbacks.<sup>29</sup> Prior to his death, the younger Janjalani established a new and enduring connection to the Indonesia-based Jemmah Islamiyah, which increased the ASG's technical expertise in bombing and likely expanded the reach of both groups' other illicit criminal networks.<sup>30</sup> While contextually important, none of these events are as significant as the overall evolution of the group from a sponsored terrorist group to a terrorist criminal enterprise.



## THE ASG AS A TERRORIST CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE

The activities and behavior of the ASG from 2000 to the present make it an exemplar of Thachuk and Lal's terrorist criminal enterprise model. Since its formation, O'Brien and Mullins and Wither suggest that the group continuously fluctuates between an organized criminal group and terrorist group. This also fits into Dishman's "leaderless nexus" explanation, and Makarenko's model might suggest that the group is moving across the continuum, perhaps on its way to eventual firm identification with one camp. However, the terrorist criminal enterprise is the only model that accounts for ASG's ineluctable duality.

### *TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES*

The ASG undertook some of its most violent terrorist attacks from 2001 through 2016. Though not an exhaustive list, there were at least nine significant reported incidences of terrorism:

1. Bombing Davao international airport, 22 killed, 170 wounded
2. Bombing SuperFerry 14 in Manila Bay, 116 killed
3. Near simultaneous bombings across three cities, eight casualties
4. Bombing Basilan National High School and ambushing responding security forces, 11 dead, 1 wounded
5. Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks outside schools and at wedding ceremonies, 8 killed
6. Attack on a Mindanao village at the end of Ramadan, 21 killed, including six children
7. IED attack on a police station, no casualties
8. Bombing a bus in Zamboanga, killing an 11-year old child, with 32 others wounded
9. IED attack on a Davao city market, killing 14 and injuring 71 others.<sup>31</sup>

Whether the ASG has remained true to its founding ideology and objective to establish an independent state is debatable. Scholars and security professionals argue whether the group's radical ideology is a primary or a secondary concern at any given time. It is also worth noting that in 2015, current (alleged) ASG leader Insilop Hapilon pledged the loyalty of the group to ISIL and its leader Abubakar al-Baghdadi.<sup>32</sup> This declaration is also the subject of discussion as to whether the pledge was ideologically motivated or for image, recruitment, or other potentially beneficial purposes. Nevertheless, it is unquestionable that terrorist operations continue to be a major activity of the ASG.

## *KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM (KFR)*

It is estimated that the ASG obtains over 90% of its funding by conducting KFRs.<sup>33</sup> Following the loss of external support, this became one of the lucrative main endeavors of the group, with conservative profit estimates ranging from approximately \$65 million to \$1.3 billion. The ASG's victims consist of both foreign nationals and Filipino citizens, although foreign nationals are generally considered high-value targets. According to one consolidated report, there were 45 confirmed high-profile kidnapping incidents from 2011-2016 alone. During this time, the ASG captured 75 foreign nationals or high-value locals.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, there has been an uptick in KFRs since the beginning of 2016.

Some ransoms are paid, some victims escape, and some low-value victims, likely taken erroneously, are released. Low-value victims whose executions will not double as an effective political statement are also released. However, if a high-profile target's ransom deadline is not met, they will likely be beheaded.<sup>35</sup> A low-profile victim is also likely to be executed if fear-mongering or political gain can be achieved. This was the case for a locally elected Filipino leader, a Malaysian, and two Canadians in a one-year period between 2015 and 2016.<sup>36</sup>

## *DRUG TRAFFICKING*

Although little detailed information is available in the public domain, the ASG is clearly involved in the transnational drug trade. The U.S. Department of State produces an annual report on international narcotics control. The ASG was first identified in the 2003 report and featured prominently in successive years, especially from 2004-2009. The ASG's involvement in the international drug trade started with the collection of money from smugglers as payment for protection and the control of a marijuana production site in Basilan.<sup>37</sup> Successive reports indicate its involvement grew to penetrate all aspects of the supply chain of the Philippines' two highest-demanded drugs: crystal methamphetamine and cannabis. Another U.S. government report confirms ties between the ASG and the Hong Kong-based 14K Triad drug syndicate. The ASG previously utilized the 14K Triad to launder proceeds from KFRs.<sup>38</sup> This provided a natural avenue into an additional lucrative illicit venture.

## **POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF A TERRORIST CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE APPROACH TO ABU SAYYAF**

The most significant advantage of the terrorist criminal enterprise approach is that it avoids the binary conceptualization of a threat organization. By avoiding a more traditional approach to the crime-terror crossover, the TCE sidesteps an either-or choice between law enforcement or counterterrorism. Although

the Philippine security forces are not perfect, the elite paramilitary police force and military counterterrorism forces are well trained and dedicated.<sup>x</sup> The United States also provided the most sophisticated technology and intelligence possible for the better part of 15 years. However, the Philippine government and Security Forces are hindered by the same ‘turf wars’ as the U.S. government departments and agencies. There are legal obstacles that both states face in combating the ASG and other terrorist criminal organizations. The military, law enforcement, and the intelligence community – all of whom have a role to play in effectively eradicating a terrorist criminal enterprise – have different authorities, requirements, regulations, and oversight. In some cases, cooperation can still occur but does not for fear of intruding upon another agency’s dominion. Together, legal restrictions and mandates can create an inflexible and ineffective response approach to the ASG.

The most significant policy implication, therefore, is two-fold. Terrorist criminal enterprises are the new normal. First, this must be accepted as both an analytical and a practical matter. Second, legacy military, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies do not seem able to operate effectively against them in the current construct. The ASG and other terrorist criminal enterprises seem to have divined, through trial and error, the advantages that this gap affords. Legislation must be passed to address these legal problems that limit a truly integrated response. Perhaps a new Title for the United States Code (and its Philippine-equivalent), and a new unified agency with the requisite skills and authorities, is the best solution. This path is something that should be considered by both the United States and the Philippines.

## CONCLUSION

The security challenges presented by the ASG and other terrorist criminal enterprises are manageable. However, they will require a significant effort by the security community—scholars, policy makers, the military, law enforcement, and intelligence professionals—to change the way threat groups are approached. As malign actors evolve, so too must the protectors of society. The terrorist criminal enterprise is not only an approach to analysis – it offers a new and more effective framework for organizing an effective response.

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### ENDNOTES

- 1 Chris Dishman, “Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 24, (2001), 43 - 58.

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<sup>x</sup> The author’s own experience as a military advisor in the Philippines from 2012-2013. See also Oakley, 45-42.

- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Chris Dishman, "The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 28, (2005), 237-238.
- 4 Ibid, 246.
- 5 Tamara Makarenko, "The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism," *Global Crime*, vol. 6, no. 1, (February 2004), 129-145.
- 6 Ibid, 131.
- 7 Sam Mullins and James K. Wither, "Terrorism and Crime," *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, vol. 15, no. 3, (2016), 66-70.
- 8 Ibid, 70.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Ibid, 77.
- 11 Ibid, 74, 77.
- 12 Kimberly Thachuk and Rollie Lal, "Terrorist Criminal Enterprises in The Theory and Practice of Terrorism: Alternative Paths of Inquiry," eds. Elana Mastors and Rhea Siers, (Nova Science Publishers: 2017), chapter 2, 2.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Bob East, *The Neo Abu Sayyaf: Criminality in the Sulu Archipelago of the Republic of the Philippines*, (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), Kindle edition, loc. 42-60.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Ibid, loc. 177-241.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 McKenzie O'Brien, "Fluctuations Between Crime and Terror: The Case of Abu Sayyaf's Kidnapping Activities," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 24, no. 2, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2011.648679, 323.
- 19 Zachary Abuza, "Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf Group," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Department of Defense, (September 2005), Kindle edition, loc. 106.
- 20 Counter Extremism Project, Abu Sayyaf Group, 20 April 2017 , <https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/abu-sayyaf-group#keyleaders>
- 21 O'Brien, 323.
- 22 Abuza, 132.
- 23 Ibid., 145.
- 24 Ibid., 152-165.
- 25 Ibid., 172.
- 26 O'Brien, 324.

- 27 Abuza, loc. 186.
- 28 East, "The Neo Abu Sayyaf," 126.
- 29 Richard T. Oakley, "Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines: FID Success and the Way Forward," *Special Warfare*, vol. 27, no. 1, (January 2014), 46-51.
- 30 O'Brien, 325.
- 31 Counter Extremism Project, Abu Sayyaf Group Profile.
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 O'Brien, 325.
- 34 Red24, "Philippines: Overview of the Abu Sayyaf Kidnapping Threat," Security Briefing, 3 June 2016, <[https://www.red24.com/members/intelligence/newsletters\\_security\\_briefings/philippines\\_overview\\_abu\\_sayyaf\\_kidnapping\\_03062016.php](https://www.red24.com/members/intelligence/newsletters_security_briefings/philippines_overview_abu_sayyaf_kidnapping_03062016.php)> (23 April 2017).
- 35 Ibid.
- 36 Counter Extremism Project, Abu Sayyaf Group Profile.
- 37 United States Department of State, "International Narcotics Control and Strategy Report," Vol. 1; March 2003 – 2009, <<https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm>> (20 April 2017).
- 38 Library of Congress, "Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Narcotics-Funded Terrorist/Extremist Groups," Federal Research Division, (May 2002), 104.