VREME JE! IT'S TIME! MOBILIZATION AND VOTING FOR REGIME CHANGE: THE SERBIAN ELECTIONS OF 2000

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A Dissertation submitted to

The Faculty of
Columbian College Of Arts and Sciences
of The George Washington University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

August 31, 2009

Dissertation directed by

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Dedication

To My Parents, for making all things possible

Acknowledgments

Every project is a journey. Journeys frequently start out in one place and often end most unexpectedly in another. This project is no exception to that rule. It started out more years ago than I should say and took more time than ever anticipated. It began as a three country comparative examination of electoral revolutions and ended up being a one country case study—yet one that is informed by field research done in two other countries. As with all journeys that change unexpectedly when the sojourner is someone who does not like change, it required the steadying influence of those who could see further and had more faith in the sojourner than she had in herself. For this and so much more I am immensely grateful to certain people, as this journey—which took place over a long number of years, when I was already past my youth, was professionally employed full time and had other responsibilities to attend to—was harder and more demanding than I had anticipated. Thus this journey would not have been possible without the love, faith, support and good counsel of a number of important people who in so many ways made this possible.

I would also like to thank several organizations for their institutional support with special thanks to those at those institutions who decided to place their faith—and grants—with me. First I would like to thank the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and specifically the East European program for making me their Short-Term Scholar, giving me both financial support and an emotional home when I needed one. My thanks to Martin Sletzinger, Director, East European Studies, Nida Gelazis, Program Associate, East European Studies and Elizabeth Zolotukhina, Program Assistant, East European Studies at the Woodrow Wilson Center. I would also like to thank the

Woodrow Wilson Center more generally and specifically Christian Ostermann and Mircea Munteanu of the Cold War International History project where I was employed when I first started on this journey. Their support, flexibility and humor as colleagues were invaluable, as was their recognition of someone attempting scholarship in a field other than history! My thanks also to many others at the Center for making my job there such a pleasure and my attempt to be a scholar part time so much easier. I would also like to thank Professor Hope Harrison and the committee of the Hoffman Dissertation Award at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at the George Washington University, who were very generous in granting me financial support to pursue my field research. Field research is a vital aspect of a project such as this.

Field research is valuable not only for the facts it provides but also because it affords an opportunity to meet some truly incredible people. I sincerely thank those who allowed me to interview them as part of this project, who gave me so much of their time to tell me their stories and to share with me their own journeys, which changed their countries. I admire them for their courage, their stamina, their foresight and their persistence in what must have seemed to be horrible odds. Each of these individuals has an important position now in their countries, yet each was kind enough to find time for a graduate student and forgive me my occasional ignorance about some aspect of their efforts—when I most likely should have known better. They were honorable, kind, funny, smart and determined. I thank each of them for their insights.

Special acknowledgement and thanks have to go to my parents for their support, love, guidance, scoldings and affection of the type that can only be given by your parents and that is all so necessary to sustain one through such a process. Special thanks too to

Sharon Wolchik who, in addition to being my dissertation chair, has been my friend, mentor, supporter and cheerleader, and has been kind enough to always be there for more years than she would like to count. She too has provided guidance, scolding and affection as well as sound critiques and judgment on which I knew I could rely.

Finally, credit must be given to a small furry one who curled up on my desk, absorbing the heat from the computer, but most importantly who chose to keep me company at all times, good and bad. He earned his reputation as the "dissertation kitty" quite honestly.

Abstract of Dissertation

Vreme Je! It's Time! Mobilization and Voting for Regime Change: The Serbian Elections of 2000

In Milosevic's Serbia, after going to the polls more than seven times in seven years, citizens had no success in achieving regime change through the ballot box despite the fact that surveys repeatedly showed that those favoring the opposition were increasingly in the majority. Over this span of time, citizens became disillusioned, coming to believe first that their vote did not make a difference due to government fraud and gerrymandering and second, there were no real alternatives to vote for. This disillusionment, along with the regime's conscious policies to demobilize voters led to an ever increasing number of voters who abstained from voting.

Placed within the context of the wave of democratizing elections in Central and Eastern Europe, this dissertation examines why it was that individual voters decided to vote in record numbers in the elections in September of 2000 when they previously had not done so. In contrast to many accounts of the fall of the semi-authoritarian regimes that either emphasize the political opportunity structure and focus on the vulnerabilities of the regime, or other accounts of the Serbian case that only view the week of post-election protests as crucial to regime change, I argue that it was choices made and strategies used by the opposition prior to the election that were crucial to the election's outcome, an outcome that was in no way assured either for Milosevic or for the opposition. Without a victory in the elections, the rest could not have happened. Thus the process that came before the protests, and before the elections, was crucial. Examining both the "demand," or potential in society for protest, and drawing on literatures that

examine grievance formation, attribution of blame and collective identity, and the "supply" side of participation, including framing and action repertoires, the dissertation analyzes the combination of conditions and actions, especially by the opponents of the regime, that are needed to successfully bring about change in a semi-authoritarian regime. Based largely on elite interviews of both Serbian and foreign actors in conjunction with documentary evidence, reported interviews and Serbian academic analyses and contemporary news accounts, my dissertation contributes to an often overlooked aspect of these so-called electoral revolutions, which is why this effort to bring about change via elections would succeed when previous efforts had failed.

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List of Abbreviations

ANEM	Association of Independent Electronic Media
CeSid	Center for Free Elections and Democracy
DEPOS	Democratic Movement of Serbia
DOS	Democratic Opposition of Serbia
DS	Democratic Party
DSS	Democratic Party of Serbia
EU	European Union
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GSS	Civic Alliance of Serbia
JUL	Yugoslav United Left
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
RTS	Radio and Television of Serbia
SANU	Serbian Academy of Sciences
SPO	Serbian Renewal Movement
SPS	Socialist Party of Serbia
SRS	Serbian Radical Party
Zajedno	"Unity" Coalition

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The images that flashed across TV screens on Thursday, October 5, 2000, from Belgrade clearly showed a revolution: hundreds of thousands of people in the streets, the parliament building on fire, protestors putting up barricades, and taking over buildings including the Radio and Television Station (RTS) of Serbia. It was a solid mass of humanity in protest. Aerial shots of Belgrade would have showed long columns of buses all headed for the capital, police barricades being tossed aside while policemen sometimes just stood and watched, clearly disobeying orders as the buses lumbered through. Flags waving, triumphal honking, drummers with their drumbeats sure and clear resonating throughout the crowds heading up huge masses of people, many with scarves at the ready should tear gas be used. A bulldozer being used to gain entrance to buildings as the last line of resistance seemed to crumble. Men from some of the provinces, especially in Central Serbia and from a town called Cacak, ready to act as commanded by opposition forces; they had left wives and children behind and vowed not to go home until it was all over. Yet people of all ages were out on the streets, walking, singing, whistling, and charging. A military helicopter hovering over the crowds near the Parliament building would report back to base that it was too cloudy and windy to drop its load of tear-gas on the crowds gathered below—it was a clear day. Police would rush into the Democratic Party building seeking to surrender to anyone and asking for protection. Skirmishes broke out all over town as some police decided—for a short

while—to try to obey orders, before taking off gear that marked them and disappearing into the crowds.

While these events were taking place—when citizens of Belgrade were unsure of exactly what would happen or how things would turn out—until RTS was taken over by demonstrators, the state-run TV station broadcast a program on how to distinguish real honey from fake honey at the markets. Radio Belgrade, even as the protests had begun, also seemed to notice nothing unusual. As people below in the streets were whistling, cheering and singing one of the unofficial anthems of protest, "Slobodan kill yourself, Save Serbia" Radio Belgrade gave no coverage of the events outside its door to the hundreds of thousands of people across the country. Instead its news bulletin headlined the fact that Milosevic's government was considering a trade agreement with Russia. It followed that with a comedy and cheerful folk songs. As one Serbian commentator noted, "Everything is so unreal, as if Radio Belgrade was broadcasting from some far-away planet: thousands of demonstrators are passing under their windows but the Radio does not see them."[1]

How had Serbia reached this moment of revolution? On the surface it was simple: there had been an election. In September of 2000, people went to the polls and voted for Vojislav Kostunica to become the new president of the country. In any "normal" democratic country that would have been the end of the matter. After the appropriate interval fixed by the law, the new president would have been sworn in, people would have gone about their business, and the new government would have gotten

[1] Petar Lukovic, "New Serbian Dawn," Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report, No. 183, October 6, 2000, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.

down to the task of appointing new ministers, getting its people settled in and carrying on.

But Serbia in 2000, as its own citizens frequently remarked, was not a "normal" country. It was a semi-authoritarian regime run primarily by Slobodan Milosevic on the "family and friends" cronyism plan while outwardly adopting—as these regimes typically do—the trappings of a "normal" state and a "normal" democracy, complete with a parliament, rules and elections.

Most discussions of the Serbian revolution of 2000 focus on the importance of the boycotts, protests and uprisings that happened in the last week after the elections: Mark Thompson and Philipp Kuntz for example argue that the protests were a spontaneous reaction to vote fraud and identify this fraud as the turning point.[2] But such accounts tend to ignore the fact that these protests were well prepared and well coordinated. They also ignore the motivations of people to vote and, more importantly the creative work that was done to mobilize people to go to the polls, stirring them from their apathy and making them sufficiently vested in the process that they cared enough not only to vote but to protest. Most importantly though, the protests that led to Milosevic's removal could not have happened had the opposition not won the most votes in the elections by actually getting out the vote and finding a way to show how much vote fraud existed. As

[2] See Mark R. Thompson and Philipp Kuntz, "Stolen Elections, the Case of the Serbian October, "*Journal of Democracy* 15: 4 (2004) for an example of such an argument. A different but related argument is made by Joshua Tucker, who argues that recognition of vote fraud is essential to overcoming the collective action problem of getting enough people out in the streets to a protest which overturns the government. Again, Tucker's argument does not seem to recognize either the preparatory work that helped to make individual inchoate senses of grievance recognizable, and stoked and channeled sense of grievance into protests that could be both large and sustainable or the fact that large protests occurred before the one on October 6th even if they did not overturn the government. If Tucker is making a general argument about when people protest, he has not accounted for why people would protest repeatedly in cases of danger to themselves when few others will come. While Thompson and Kuntz argue from the perspective of emotional indignation, Tucker argues from a traditional rational choice perspective noting that people protest when they perceive a change in the likelihood of success. Tucker however seems forced to turn to an emotional reason for why the first protestor protests—noting that such a person or people have a grievance.

Marko Blagojevic of the Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSid) adamantly stressed, "Milosevic was toppled in an election—he was not toppled in the street. The 5th of October would not have been possible if September 24th had not happened."[3]

It is the process that led to the change of the regime in Serbia via elections in September 2000 that is the central focus of my discussion. In contrast to many accounts of the fall of the semi-authoritarian regimes that either emphasize the political opportunity structure and focus on the vulnerabilities of the regime, or other accounts that only view the week of protests as crucial to regime change, I argue that it was choices made and strategies used by the opposition that were crucial to the outcome of the election, an election whose outcome was in no way assured either for Milosevic or for the opposition. Without a victory in the elections, the rest could not have happened. Thus the process which came *before* the protests, and *before* the elections, was crucial.

This dissertation is the story of that process and the opposition's efforts. It is an attempt to understand what combination of conditions and actions, especially by the opponents of the regime, is needed to successfully bring about change in a semi-authoritarian regime. It is also an attempt to better understand why it was that, after ten years, this effort to bring about change via elections in Serbia would succeed when previous efforts had failed.

Theoretical Issues and Literature

My study seeks to explain what factors and processes were necessary to mobilize a sufficient number of people in September 2000 so as to bring about a change of regime at the polls, something that prior to this point had not occurred. My study draws on

[3]Marko Blagojevic, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 3, 2007.

academic literature in political science and sociology that specifically examines the situation in Serbia from 1990 through 2000 as well as literatures frequently used in the study of contentious politics and social movements, i.e. literature on framing, collective identity and a relatively recent body of work that considers the importance of culture and emotions to political protest. My study is also informed by broader studies of democratizing elections in postcommunist states.

Literature on Serbia: Mobilization and Demobilization

As the former Yugoslavia experienced four wars, the dissolution of the federated state into disparate parts, extreme hyperinflation, poverty and eventual involvement of NATO in the affairs of the country from 1989 to 2000, there is no paucity of literature on questions of war, foreign relations, democratic transitions and nationalism which use the former Yugoslavia, Serbia and Milosevic as part of their case studies. Excluding literature that deals primarily with questions of international relations and foreign policy, much of this literature asks one of several, often interrelated questions: how did Milosevic come to power, how was Milosevic able to maintain power and finally what roles did personalities, structural factors and culture play in the eventual dissolution and collapse of the regime in 2000? Analyses such as those by Louis Sell, Leonard Cohen and Robert Thomas give a comprehensive chronological overview of the Milosevic regime, examining both its domestic and foreign policy.[4] While each has a slightly different emphasis, these books primarily examine elite level politics throughout the entire

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[4] Louis Sell, *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002); Lenard J. Cohen, *Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002); and Robert Thomas, *The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s,* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

Milosevic period, although Thomas, who focuses most directly on domestic politics, ends his account prior to the events in 2000.

A central focus of much of the literature on Serbia concerns how Milosevic maintained power and why it is that change took so long. Within this literature there is a split among those who focus primarily on Milosevic's ability to mobilize the political and business elite, creating a form of state capture or sultanism as a means of control and those who primarily focus on Milosevic's ability to mobilize a broader segment of the population, specifically through the use of populist promises of economic security for the least well off, combined with nationalism.[5] There is broad consensus that Milosevic was able to latch on to nationalism and ride it to power as Vuk Draskovic would later say, using it as part of his fight within the Communist party to capture power vis-à-vis communist party elite backing and resources.[6] Much of the literature also supports the idea that nationalist and populist positions were also popular more broadly among the Serbian public.[7] Where debate about Milosevic and specifically his use of nationalism for

[5] For a discussion of Milosevic's use of nationalism and populist economic promises to be able to maintain his popularity and mobilize people especially in the early years of 1990-1993 see the collected essays in Vladimir Goati, *Challenges of Parliamentarism: The Case of Serbia in the Early Nineties*, trans. Philip Hepburn, (Belgrade: Institute of Social Sciences, 1995). See also Srecko Mihailovic, "Political Formulae for the Perseverance and Change of the Regime in Serbia," in Ivana Spasic and Milan Subotic, eds., *Revolution and Order: Serbia after October 2000*, trans. Vera Gliborijevic, Duska Vujic, Linda Louise Krstajic, and Ivana Spasic, (Belgrade: Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, 2001), 59-71. For discussions that center on Milosevic's ability to maintain control over the political and business elites that he mobilized, see Goati and Pavlovic for what they term as Milosevic's increasing sultanistic tendencies.

[6] Vuk Draskovic was founder and head of the political party Serbian Renewal Movement from 1990 on. Previously an author of literature, including the books *Judge*, *Knife* and *Prayer*, Draskovic's actual words were that, "With his speech on Kosovo Polje Milosevic mounted the horse that the Serbian intelligentsia had saddled long ago," as cited in Marko Zivkovic, "Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny in the 1980s and 1990s," PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2001, 167.

[7] Most authors agree that nationalism was a popular position from 1990 to at least 1993. See, for example, Eric D. Gordy, "Serbia's Bulldozer Revolution: Conditions and Prospects," *Southeast European Politics* 1/2 (December 2000): 78; and Mihailovic,"Political Formulae for the Perseverance and Change of the Regime in Serbia," 64-65. Goati goes so far as to assert that the SPS was a truly popular party through 1998: see Vladimir Goati, "The Nature of the Order and the October Overthrow in Serbia," in Ivana Spascic and Milan Subotic, eds., *Revolution and Order: Serbia after October 2000*, trans. Vera

purposes of mobilization begins however, is the larger question of whether or not Milosevic was subsequently able to use nationalism instrumentally to mobilize the general public behind him for the wars, whether or not the wars were truly rooted in any sort of nationalist feeling among the populace and if so the depth of such feeling. [8] Of interest to me for this dissertation was the degree to which Milosevic had been able to mobilize people with his nationalist rhetoric and the degree to which nationalist rhetoric and concepts of nationalism more generally could mobilize people. Interestingly, analyses of both types noted above assume that nationalism, or myths about nationalist aspirations, do have some power to shape the political landscape.[9] Yet by the period of interest for this dissertation, 1998-2000, Milosevic had lost a significant amount of popularity. The question thus arises as to how Milosevic was able to maintain his power.[10]

For a significant body of authors, Milosevic's hold over the polity was due not to his popularity or his ability to mobilize people through his espousal of nationalism or communist ideologies. Nor was his ability to maintain power due primarily to his skillful

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Gliborijevic, Duska Vujic, Linda Louise Krstajic, and Ivana Spasic, (Belgrade: Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, 2001), 47.

[8] See for example, Vesna Pesic, "The War for Ethnic States," in *The Road to War in Serbia, Trauma and Catharsis*, ed. Nebojsa Popov and Drinka Gojkovic, (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 9-49; and Valere Paul Gagnon, Jr., *Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s,* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). On the longer-term roots of Milosevic's authoritarianism, see Veljko Vujacic, "Reexamining the 'Serbian Exceptionalism' Thesis," *BPS Papers*, 2004, No. 3, Institute of Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies (University of California, Berkeley), http://repositories.cdlib.org/iseees/bps/2004_03-vuja.

[9] Ivan Colovic, *Politics of Identity in Serbia: Essays in Political Anthropology,* trans. Celia Hawkesworth, (New York: New York University Press, 2002); Florian Bieber, "Nationalist Mobilization and Stories of Serb Suffering: The Kosovo Myth from 600th Anniversary to the Present," *Rethinking History* 6/1 (2002): 95–110; and Olga Zirojevic, "Kosovo in the Collective Memory," in *The Road to War in Serbia, Trauma and Catharsis,* 189-211.

[10] Through the mid-1990s Milosevic received the trust of roughly one-third of respondents to public opinion polls while another one-third trusted no-one, but by 1998, those who considered him the "most trusted" politician had declined to 14.4%, while 33.3% trusted no-one and another 19.4% were indecisive. See Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, "Yugoslav Public Opinion in Serbia 1998," ZA4277, http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp.

political maneuvering. Rather, the primary means by which he maintained his power was his ability to use his authority so as to deprive people of viable alternatives to the regime itself. Pesic and Spasic, for example, argue that Milosevic maintained his dominance over society and politics by destroying the structural aspects of domestic society to prevent interest differentiation and articulation, and hence any concerted collective identity formation and subsequent action.[11] His success made it impossible for society either to find its voice or to find efficient ways to give democratic voice efficacy.[12] Other discussions of society's inability to mobilize for democratic changes also focus on structural aspects of Serbian society, as well as on society's confusion. They also try to ascertain the extent of damage to people's sense of identity and thus their ability to construct a normal society.[13]

Eric Gordy on the other hand focuses specifically on Milosevic's ability to destroy cultural alternatives to the regime, thus depriving people of alternatives to the

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[11] Ivana Spasic, "Identity Void: Structural Confusion and Everyday Life in Present-day Serbia," in Zagorka Golubovic and George F. McLean, eds., *Models of Identities in Postcommunist Societies,* Volume 10 of Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change, Series IVA, Eastern and Central EuropeWashington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1999, 109-124; and Vesna Pesic, "Prospects for Democracy in Serbia: An Analysis of the Collective Identities of State, Society and Nation,"in *Models of Identities in Postcommunist Societies,* 55-68.

[12] Discussion of the failure of the opposition to provide a viable alternative to the electorate at a national level prior to the 2000 elections for either structural reasons or personal vanity is a theme that runs through almost all work on Serbia. For a sampling of this in the academic literature see Goati, *The Challenges of Parliamentarism,* Mihailovic, "Political Formulae for the Perseverance and Change of the Regime in Serbia," and for a more popular discussion, Dejan Anastasijevic and Anothony Borden, *Out of Time: Draskovic, Djindjic and Serbian Opposition against Milosevic*, (Belgrade: Beta News Agency, a publication of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 2000).

[13]Among these articles there are differences as to who sees the structural problems and confusion as a result of Milosevic's purposeful actions to demobilize society (Pesic and Spasic) and those who tend to see both structural and value orientations that resulted in societal inaction as a result of incomplete structural and value differentiation as a leftover from communism. In addition to the works already cited by Pesic and Spasic, see Srbobran Brankovic, "Social Class and Political Affiliation," in Goati, *Challenges of Parliamentarism*, 69-91, Dragomir Pantic, "Voters Value Orientations," in Goati *Challenges of Parliamentarism,* 93-104. Bojan Todosijevic, "Serbia," in Sten Berglund, Joakim Ekman and Frank H. Aarebrot, eds., *The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe*, (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2004), 493-548. See also Marko Zivkovic, "Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny," especially "Chapter 6, Everyday Life, Conspiracy Theories and the Opacity of the Social World," 232-278.

regime in their everyday lives.[14] V. P. Gagnon focuses on Milosevic's strategic creation of wars using nationalism—so as to "demobilize those who were pushing for changes in the structures of economic and political power that would negatively affect the values and interests of those [conservative] elites."[15]

Some analyses have assumed that the problem had less to do with Milosevic's ability to demobilize people than it did with the inability of the political opposition itself to unify. Finally, some analysts have traced society's demobilization to the problem of media access, which was improved though not completely ameliorated in 1997, when the opposition gained control of several towns and their local media outlets.[16] Much of the literature that focuses on demobilization as a strategy ends before 2000. For those authors whose work does extend into 2000, their discussions as to how and why Milosevic was able to demobilize the political elite are convincing and their explanations frequently describe the political opposition as the fifth column.

Although the works noted above provide plausible accounts of why Milosevic was able to demobilize both the political elite and the populace, they do not provide a good explanation for the phenomenon that is central to my study, namely why people would suddenly be mobilized to vote or protest. According to these analyses the

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[14] Eric D. Gordy, *The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives*, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).
[15] Gagnon, *The Myth of Ethnic War*, xv.
[16] Zarko Paunovic discusses the importance of the opposition gaining control of some towns to NGOs obtaining resources and "free spaces" within which to work. See Zarko Paunovic, "NGOs in the FR Yugoslavia in the Aftermath of the War. New Answers to Some Old and New Problems." Centar za Razvoj Neprofitnog Sektora, Analize, September 1999. http://www.crnps.org.rs/projekti/analize/seal_en.html, and Zarko Paunovic, "Non-Profit Sector in Serbia: A Brief Review of the Current Situation." Centar za Razvoj Neprofitnog Sektora, Analize, August 2000. http://www.crnps.org.rs/projekti/analize/ngo_current_en.html. While Eric Gordy mentions control of the media as a likely source of change, Serbs themselves, especially those in politics and the media believed that this was of the utmost importance. See Uros Komlenovic, Zorica Miladinovic and Zoran Radovanovic, "Air Over Serbia: What Audiences in Belgrade, Nis, Kragujevac, Pancevo, Cacak…See and Hear,"*Vreme*, Belgrade, February 27, 1999, http://www.ex-yupress.com/vreme/vreme45.html.

opposition political elite should have remained divided and unable to unify and the populace too demoralized due to Milosevic's strategies and ability to infiltrate peoples everyday lives to allow anyone to unite or mobilize. Gagnon's primary answer as to why this change occurred is that Milosevic simply ran out of necessary allies and resources to be able to effectively pursue a successful demobilization strategy.[17] However he does not explain fully either why Milosevic did not continue to pursue what had otherwise been a seemingly successful strategy by other means nor how, if people were so thoroughly demobilized, they suddenly found their voice not only in 1996/97 but again in parts of 1999 and 2000. The demobilization/lack of alternatives literature indeed excels in explaining why people in Serbia were fearful, depressed and unable to take action. It offers excellent insights to explain why, despite Milosevic's decreasing popularity, he managed to stay in power. Such literature also often speaks to the importance of culture and symbols in demobilizing as well as mobilizing people.[18] Yet it does little to explain significant examples of mobilization against the regime. Thus these studies fail to explain why it was that there were sparkling moments when people did mobilize.

Such moments, when parts of society could and did find their voice, are examined in a variety of ways in the literature. Sociologists Marija Babovic, Slobodan Cvejic, Vladimir Ilic and Bora Kuzmanovic have examined the demographics of protest participants in 1996/97 as well as their motivations to protest, their goals and hopes.[19] Others such as Mirjana Prosic-Dvornic have discussed the development, the types and

[17] Gagnon, *The Myth of Ethnic War*, 89,130, and 184.
[18] Eric Gordy, *The Culture of Power in Serbia* is a particularly excellent example of this.
[19] See the following essays by sociologists in Mladen Lazic, ed., *Protest in Belgrade: Winter of Discontent*, trans. Liljana Nikolic, (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 1999): Marija Babovic, "Potential for an Active Society;" Slobodan Cvejic, "General Characteristics of the Protests and Prospects for Democratization in Serbia," pp. 60-78; Vladimir Vuletic, "Citizens in Protest;" Vladimir Ilic, "Social and Political Consciousness of Protest Participants;" and Bora Kuzmanovic, "Value Orientations and Politial Attitides of Participants in the 1996/97 Student Protest.

significance of different cultural repertoires in protest in the Serbian case, exploring the power of culture to mobilize or demobilize people through music, literature, and myth.[20] Yet, despite the fact that mobilization or demobilization of political opposition and society is a focus in one way or another of much of this literature, almost all of these works discuss time periods prior to 1998. Moreover, none provides a detailed analysis of what specifically led to the mobilization of people in September 2000.

Several authors do, however, pose the question why Yugoslavia had what they term a delayed transition, and focus not only on the period prior to 1998 but specifically on the later period through 2000. Florian Bieber, Eric Gordy, Svetozar Stojanovic and Srecko Mihailovic, for example, concisely identify a combination of factors that are both structural and agential as responsible for the delay.[21] These discussions not only skillfully analyze elite political strategies and concerns, but also address questions of perception, vision, culture and emotions. Their treatment of these subjects had an important influence

[20] On music, see Brana Mijatovic, "Music and Politics in Serbia (1998-2000)," PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 2003; Brana Mijatovic, "'Throwing Stones at the System:' Rock Music in Serbia during the 1990s," *Music & Politics* 2/2 (2008): 1-20; Marc W. Steinberg, "When Politics Goes Pop: On the Intersections of Popular and Political Culture and the Case of Serbian Student Protests," *Social Movement Studies*, 3/1 (April 2004): 4-29; Gordy, *The Culture of Power in Serbia,* 103-164; Zivkovic, "Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny." For the most complete discussions on the development of the student cultural repertoire from 1991 through 1997 see Mirjana Prosic-Dvornic, "Enough! Student Protest '92: The Youth of Belgrade in Search of 'Another Serbia'," *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 10/1-2 (1993), http://condor.depaul.edu/~rrotenbe/aeer/aeer11_1/prosic-dvornic.html (accessed May 6, 2009), and the same author's "The Topsy-Turvy Days Were There Again: Student and Civil Protest in Belgrade and Serbia, 1996/1997," *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 16/1 (1998), http://condor.depaul.edu/~rrotenbe/aeer/aeer16_1.html#Prosic_Dvornic (accessed May 8, 2009); Lazic, *Protest in Belgrade*; Stef Jansen, "Victims, Underdogs and Rebels: Discursive Practices of Resistance in Serbian Protest," *Critique of Anthropology* 20 (2000): 393–419; and his "The Streets of Beograd: Urban Space and Protest Identities in Serbia," *Political Geography* 20 (2001): 35-55. The intersection of culture and politics is also a key theme of the contentious politics literature, as discussed in the next section of this review.

[21] Florian Bieber, "The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society: Roots of the Delayed Transition in Serbia," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 17/1 (2003): 73-90; Eric Gordy, "Serbia's Bulldozer Revolution: Conditions and Prospects," *Southeast European Politics* 1/2 (December 2000): 78-89; Mihailovic, "Political Formulae for the Perseverance and Change of the Regime in Serbia;" Stojanovic, "Democratic Revolution in Serbia," in Spasic and Subotic, eds., *Revolution and Order*, 25-33.

on my thinking about the factors that might be most important in understanding the end of the Milosevic regime.

Highly detailed examinations of the end of the Milosevic regime occur largely in more popular literature, much of it written by Serbs either directly before or in the direct aftermath of the events in 2000, focusing on the collapse of the regime. Many of these works offer interesting insights written largely by professional observers of events.[22] However, while many provide important first person accounts which I have used as sources in my analysis, these discussion do not provide a detailed, integrated account of why it was that people who had been demobilized could become mobilized and what factors and processes would be necessary for such mobilization to lead to regime change.

Scholars have also examined the change of regime in Serbia in 2000 within the framework of studies of electoral revolutions, also termed democratizing elections. Seeing Serbia as one case among several that happened in a discrete span of time and whose means and methods of ending semi-authoritarian regimes possessed distinct similarities, debates in this literature focus on whether or not these democratizing elections occurred primarily due to structural similarities among the cases and similar structural collapses, or largely, though not exclusively, as the result of agency through a process of diffusion.[23] Analysts such as Paul D'Anieri have also discussed the role and

[22] For three such examples see Dragolub Djukic, *Milosevic and Markovic: A Lust for Power*, trans. Alex Dubinsky, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001); Dragan Bujosevic and Ivan Radovanovic, *The Fall of Milosevic: The October 5th Revolution*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); and Anastasijevic and Borden, *Out of Time*.

[23] Lucan Way, "The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions," *Journal of Democracy,* 19/3 (2008): 55-69; Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, "Debating the Color Revolutions: Getting Real about 'Real' Causes," *Journal of Democracy* 20/1 (January 2009): 69-73; and Lucan Way, "Debating the Color Revolutions: A Reply to My Critics," *Journal of Democracy* 20/1 (January 2009): 90-97. See also Mark R. Beissinger, "Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions," *Perspectives on Politics* 5/2 (June 2007): 259-276; and also his

importance of specific elites such as the security forces in allowing for mobilization;[24] others such as Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik have argued that purposeful action by elites was key to mobilization.[25] Still others argue, on the other hand, that the elites were less important to the outcome of events; rather that spontaneous protests by the general populace solely in reaction to election fraud, were responsible for the outcome.[26] Related discussions in this literature focus on the role of the security forces and youth. Additional discussions also weight the importance of a variety of external factors in regime change including a changed international environment, external funding and international and transnational NGO networks.

As many of these studies have compared three or more revolutions within any given article (to date most of the discussion has occurred in journal articles and not full length monographs) fewer have examined any one case in depth,[27] and as this comparative literature focuses primarily on a macro level of analysis and does not examine the impetuses, processes and mechanisms at either the meso or individual level of analysis, it does not fully explain why it was that people in Serbia would or could be

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"Debating the Color Revolutions: An Interrelated Wave," *Journal of Democracy* 20/1 (January 2009): 74-77.

[24]Paul D'Anieri, "Explaining the success and failure of post-communist revolutions," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39 (2006): 331-350.

[25] See for example Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, "International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions" *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 39, no. 3 (September 2006): 283-304; Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, "Debating the Color Revolutions: Getting Real about 'Real' Causes," *Journal of Democracy* 20/1 (January 2009): 69-73; Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, "Democratising Elections in the Post-Communist World: Definitions, Dynamics and Diffusion," *St. Anthony's International Review (STAIR*) Volume 2, Number 2, (February 2007): 64-89.

[26] Joshua Tucker, "Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions," 2007 *Perspectives on Politics*, 5(3): 537-553; Mark R. Thompson and Phillip Kuntz, "Stolen Elections: The Case of the Serbian October," *Journal of Democracy,* 15: 4 (2004): 159-172.

[27] Exceptions to this include Cory Welt. "Georgia's Rose Revolution: From Regime Weakness to Regime Collapse," *Waves and Troughs of Post-Communist Transition*, (Stanford, CA: Center of Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, 2006), Taras Kuzio's various articles on Ukraine, including "Ukraine's Orange Revolution. The Opposition's Road to Success," *Journal of Democracy* 16/2 (April 2005): 117-130; and Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul, eds., *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).

mobilized. Bunce and Wolchik, for example, focus on the importance of the electoral model, and argue that this model includes the following elements that are critical to bring about the ouster of semi-authoritarian leaders through elections:

> 1.) formation of a unified opposition; 2.) efforts to increase voter registration and turnout and to improve the quality of voter lists; 3.) efforts to focus campaign debate on the costs of the incumbent regime and the benefits of participation to opposition members and citizens at large; 4.) utilization of international and domestic election monitoring as well as the media and public opinion polls, where possible; 5.) preparations for protests if incumbents or their anointed successors try to steal the elections.[28]

While clearly at the macro level these factors were crucial to the outcome of the Serbian case, what is less clear is *why* individual Serbian voters would choose to go to vote; what processes and mechanisms, what emotions and grievances, convincing arguments and frames would give rise to Serbian voter mobilization. At such a level of analysis, factors such as grievance, moral shock, framing and meso-level coordination and cooperation receive significantly less attention. Similarly, the literature that focuses on the role of NGOs and Otpor in the change in Serbia does not provide a complete or integrated picture as to the roles of all the opposition actors in concert. While such literature does provide a more detailed understanding of the groups and their actions, in many instances it provides less analysis as to why such appeals should mobilize people than a description of the steps taken. More importantly, these detailed analyses of NGOs and of Otpor do not explain important synergies between groups across the spectrum nor provide a complete picture of why the actions they took actually were effective in mobilizing people to vote. Thus, while these studies provide a great deal of useful information and insights they do not provide an in-depth explanation of why, even with a

[28] Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, "Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions," *Journal of Democracy* 17/4 (October 2006): 6.

large number of resources, that mobilization of citizens to vote and even to protest would occur. Nor, aside from indicating that blame was an important element, do they examine how emotions affected and were used to help mobilize the populace or the importance of the development of acceptable cultural alternatives and the use of culture and identity more generally to mobilize an otherwise passive electorate.

Social Movements/Contentious Politics Literature and Mobilization

Current work in the social movements/contentious politics literature, especially that which explains mobilization through the lens of culture with an emphasis on grievances, collective identity formation and framing can help to fill these gaps. Although scholars working in this area have always been interested in explaining mobilization, as with any literature, the social movements/contentious politics literature has grown and changed over time in terms of what scholars consider to be the most important level of analysis, what types of movements it considers the appropriate subjects for study, how it defines those subjects and the degree of emphasis placed on structure versus agency. With its origins in the collective behavior literature in the 1950's, the original literature explained protest and movements in emotional terms, but considered protests irrational and those who participated in such protests as people who were suffering from social anomie, disconnected from normal society. While the early literature did focus on grievance as an explanation for protest, again it castigated those it examined as being somehow irrational and abnormal and outside of regular society. The literature also only saw contention as something that occurred outside of institutions and was pitted against

them.[29] With the wave of protest movements in the 1960s, as Mancur Olson was explaining why no one would want to participate in such protests (without being offered important selective incentives), large numbers of people in the United States and Europe were taking part in such protests, creating an awkward gap between reality and the literature's ability to explain it. Such dissonance between the explanatory value of the literature and reality gave rise (along with the protests of the 1960's) to a new generation of scholars many of whom had participated in protests themselves. For this generation of scholars it was of paramount importance to examine protest in such a way as to be able to show, contrary to the claims in the literature of the 1950s and 1960s, that protest was actually rational and that protesters were normal people seeking reasonable outcomes. This desire, along with an increase in the 1970s in organized social movement interests, gave rise to resource mobilization literature which explained social movements as a practical outcome of resource availability. The theory was built on a rational choice perspective of decision-making. Unlike crowd behavior literature which examined people's reasons for protesting and located protest largely at the individual level, resource

[29] For extended discussions of the historiography of this early literature including detailed discussions of crowd theory, mass behavior theory strain and breakdown and relative deprivation theories see Steven M. Buechler, "The Strange Career of Strain and Breakdown Theories of Collective Action," in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 47-66. ; J. Craig Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements,"*Annual Review of Sociology* 9/5 (1983): 27-53; John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial theory," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 82/6 (May, 1977): 1212-1241; Mayer N. Zald, "Looking Backwards to Look Forwards: Reflections on the Past and the Future of the Resource Mobilization Paradigm," in Aldon Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller, eds., *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory,* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) 326-348, James M. Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography and Creativity in Social Movements,* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1997),19-23; James M. Jasper, "Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements," in Bert Klandermans and Conny Roggeband, eds. *Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines* (New York: Springer 2007), 59-110; Jeff Goodwin, James Jasper and Francesca Polletta, "The Return of the Repressed: the Fall and Rise of Emotions in Social Movement Theory," *Mobilization*, 5/1 (Spring, 2000): 65-84; Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of the Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*, 2nd ed., (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982, 1999), 5-19; Alberto Melucci, "The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements," *Social Research*, 52:4 (Winter 1985): 789-816.

mobilization literature (and political process literature which followed it) assumed that there were a large number of grievances available at any one time for people to act on and why people mobilized was not a question worthy of consideration. When grievances were considered in resource mobilization theory they were considered constant, "deriving from structural conflicts of interest built into social institutions;"[30] it was also thought that "that movements form because of long-term changes in group resources, organization, and opportunities for collective action"[31] or in the formulation of McCarthy and Zald were "manufactured by the mobilizing efforts of movement entrepreneurs." As McCarthy and Zald state, "the definition of grievances will expand to meet the funds and support personnel available."[32] In contrast to collective behavior theory of the 1950's, resource mobilization theory located the nexus of protest not at the individual level, but rather at the level of the group, seeking to normalize protest as part of a more routinized form of politics. Resource mobilization theory, therefore, was initially centered on the idea that in order to successfully mobilize people for collective action it was necessary to build formal organizations such as unions, parties and grass-roots organizations, i.e. to accumulate and organize resources. Focusing almost exclusively on formal protest organizations, resource mobilization literature was especially useful in uncovering answer to issues such as how resource scarcity, including not only money but time, could constrain action, the importance and outcomes of competition for resources among similar protest organizations, and the nature and importance of various organizational structures to protest success. It also usefully examined strategies for resource

[30] Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," 530.
[31] Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," 530.
[32] John D. McCarthy and Mayer Zald. *The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization*. (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1973), 13.

accumulation.[33] However, as resource mobilization theory grew, it confronted several problems: first, there were successful protest actions that were not based in formal organizations, second, over time the concept of resources had grown from money and time to encompass what they called moral and cultural resources, and in doing so it threatened to become meaningless through concept stretching, [34] third, with its focus exclusively on groups and centered in a rational choice framework, RM did not analyze many things that critics of the approach found important, namely "grievances, ideologies, manipulation of symbols through oratory, and the written word, media portrayals, consciousness-raising and identities."[35] Critics of resource mobilization argued that RM "was without a social psychology that could explain what real human beings do either inside movements or in reaction to them." Many were quickly coming to believe that there were not only problems but significant lacunae in the theory.[36] By 1980, although

[33] Original RM theory was first set out in monographs and then articles by McCarthy and Zald, starting with *The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization* (1973), and including John D. McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (1977): 1212-1241. For excellent overviews of the strengths and weaknesses of RM theory see Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," 527-53; Carol McClurg Mueller, "Building Social Movement Theory," in Morris and Mueller, eds., *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, 3-52; Mayer N. Zald, "Looking Backwards to Look Forwards: Reflections on the Past and the Future of the Resource Mobilization Paradigm," in Morris and Mueller, eds., *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory,* 326-348; and Doug McAdam, "Introduction," to *Political Process and the Development of the Black Insurgency 1930-1970,* 2nd ed., (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1999), 20-35.

[34] Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization," in Snow, Soule, and Kriesi, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, 116-152.

[35] Morris and Mueller, "Preface" to Morris and Mueller, eds., *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, ix.

[36] Aldon Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller's *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* was an edited volume with 15 essays by many prominent members of the field devoted to criticizing Resource Mobilization theory, setting forth the areas that it did not adequately address or could not explain, while seeking to suggest new paths for investigation. Other critiques of resource mobilization theory in addition to these 15 essays can be found in Jack A. Goldstone, "Towards a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 139-87, see especially page 153 for the critiques of RM theory; Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, "Collective Protest: A Critique of Resource Mobilization Theory," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society,* 4/4 (1991): 435-458. Some critiques point out the positive as well as negative aspects of this theory: see Jasper, *The Moral Art of Protest*, 45-48, 69; Sidney Tarrow, "Paradigm Warriors," in Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, eds., *Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning and Emotion* (New York and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 39-46. For an excellent early critique of resource mobilization theory that details the

it was the dominant paradigm, Mayer Zald pointed out that resource mobilization theory ignored other significant problem areas, including "the relations of class and identity formation to mobilization, the political opportunity and state structure as determinants and constraints on social movement mobilization and outcomes, the microfoundations of risk and rationality, the role of demonstration effects, and the intersection of cultural crises and social movement activity."[37] Attempts to find a new model that could better explain their concerns split the field, largely by continent; the Americans eventually developed the political process model while the Europeans focused on what they termed new social movements (NSM). The interests and emphasis of each model differed. Whereas the political process model would go on to focus largely on what Zald termed "the political opportunity and state structure as determinants and constraints on social movement mobilization," as noted above, new social movements literature examined, as Zald noted "the intersection of cultural crises and social movement activity." So, on the whole while the political process model would focus largely, though not entirely on structure, in which one of the actors was always the state, new social movements approach would focus largely but not entirely on the individual level as its practitioners were interested in micromobilization and pursued questions dealing with identity, culture and its relationship to social movements and contentious politics. For NSM, claims could be made on the state but the movements were about identity, not about economics.

Before either model was fully developed, interesting work was done on both sides of the Atlantic, although the work largely hewed to the structural/cultural divide. Thus

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questions it tackled, who investigated the empirically using the model and the positive and negative aspects of the model see Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," 527-53.
[37] Zald, "Looking Backward to look Forward, Reflections on the Past and Future of the Resource Mobilization Research Program," 327.

Charles Tilly did significant work on mobilization, repertoires, and examples that linked challengers to the "members of the polity."[38] Sidney Tarrow worked on how different structural conditions affected political organization and behavior, strategies for resource accumulation and political opportunities.[39] His subsequent work on political opportunities coincided with the development of the political process model, first developed by Doug McAdams in his study, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency.*[40] David Snow and Robert Benford also began trying to incorporate culture into the understanding of social movements through their work on framing. But much of the work done on the American side was structural.[41]

On the European side, culture and especially identity received far more attention than it did in the U.S. as European authors retained an interest in explaining grievance. Authors such as Alberto Melucci developed a strong interest in explaining the importance of collective identity, exploring how collective identity "replaced class consciousness as the factor that accounts for mobilization and individual attachments to new social movements."[42] Thus for NSMs "the grievances and mobilizing factors tend to focus on cultural and symbolic issues rather than on economic grievances that characterized working class movements."[43] While many debated whether the New Social Movement

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[38] Tilly is prolific but the work frequently cited as his most significant during that time period is *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978).
[39] Sidney Tarrow, *Peasant Communisn in Southern Italy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), and his *Between Center and Periphery*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).
[40] McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*.
[41] Important exceptions to this tendency included once more the *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, which not only was a critique of resource mobilization but explored cultural aspects of social movements. as well as books published in the mid to late 1990s such as Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans, eds. *Social Movements and Culture*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1995.
[42] Scott A. Hunt and Robert D. Benford, "Collective Identity, Solidarity and Commitment," in Snow, Soule and Kriesi, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, 433-457.
[43] Hank Johnston, Enrique Larana, and Joseph R. Gusfield, "Identities, Grievances and New Social Movements,"in Enrique Larana, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield, eds., *New Social Movements,* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 7.

literature, which posited a different type of post-industrial movement based on identity claims, was truly a new kind of movement and whether such movements could be seen and should be studied in ways different from more traditional movements, the scholars working in this tradition did much to advance theoretical and empirical work on issues such as the relationship of personal identity to collective identity and the importance of collective identity to mobilization. They also explored and favored more cultural explanations that often emphasized "symbols, values and meanings related to sentiments of belonging to a differentiated social groups; members images of themselves; and with new, socially constructed attributions about the meaning of everyday life."[44]

Each approach, political opportunity structure and the political process model and the more cultural NSM studies developed somewhat independently for almost twenty years. While there certainly were efforts to add some culture to the structural political process model, and acknowledgment by the culturalists of the importance of political context, each approach tended to maintain its own emphases. Below I consider the most recent critiques of the political process model, a model which was dominant in American study of social movements for almost twenty years as well as examining the development of newer cultural models by American sociologists. The challenges to the political process model by the culturalists would lead to important new avenues of study that would further our understanding of not only *how* mobilization happened (a question previously addressed largely by resource mobilization theory) but would challenge the political opportunity structure/ political process model's understanding of *when* mobilization would occur. Finally the culturalists would return to a question long

[44] Johnson, Larana and Gusfield, "Identities, Grievance and New Social Movements," 7.

considered superfluous by resource mobilization theorists and political opportunity theorists—*why* mobilization happened.

Political Process

The political process model as developed by Doug McAdam was an attempt to understand movement emergence as more than a matter of resources. Incorporating political opportunities, mobilizing structures and cognitive liberation, the model was an attempt to place social movements within a political context, acknowledging the importance of the political environment in shaping group emergence and mobilization. The model also attempted to incorporate a cultural element, cognitive liberation, a subjective process through which people evaluated their situation and the likelihood of their success.[45] Cognitive liberation as described, however, was directly related to people reading "political opportunities" and was, as one critic noted, "a relatively instrumental reading of available information abut the likelihood of repression."[46] McAdam, while disputing this interpretation of cognitive liberation, did note that the "distinction between objective conditions and their subjective interpretation that informed earlier versions of the model have generally been absent from later political process formulation."[47] Even the later change from cognitive liberation to Robert Benford and David Snow's clearly more cultural and agential concepts about framing did not save the political process model from extensive criticism by the mid to late 1990's. Although the political process

[45] Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of the Black Insurgency*, 48-51 for his description of cognitive liberation.
[46] Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, "The Return of the Repressed: The Fall and Rise of Emotions in Social Movement Theory," 65-84.
[47] McAdam, "Revisiting the U.S. Civil Rights Movement," in Goodwin and Jasper, eds., *Rethinking Social Movements,*205.

model and empirical work based on political opportunity structure had been fruitful and produced an impressively large and important body of literature, the biggest impetus to changing the paradigm had come from a younger cadre of scholars led by Jeff Goodwin, James Jasper and Francesca Polletta whose constructivist work on culture and emotions had been crucial to pushing the dialogue.[48] Tarrow noted that much research that had been done with a heavy emphasis on political opportunity had failed to understand other important aspects of movements and protest through the neglect of non-structural factors. In his book with Amiinzade, Goldstone, McAdam, Perry, Sewell and Tilly, Tarrow sought along with these scholars to point out the "silences" in the previous work done based largely on the model they had helped to develop. Tarrow noted, for example, that emotions, which had never been given any weight in political process or political opportunity structure models were now something that, "no sensible social movement scholar would exclude …from the repertoire of factors that induce ordinary people to pour out onto the streets…"[49] McAdam himself also acknowledged in light of the new scholarship by culturalists such as Jasper, Goodwin and Polletta, that the political process

[48] The following works were especially important to moving the discussion forward: Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest* (1997), Francesca Polletta, "Culture and Its Discontents: Recent Theorizing on the Cultural Dimensitons of Protest," *Sociological Inquiry* 67/4 (November 1997): 431-450, Francesca Polletta, "'It Was Like a Fever...': Spontaneity and Identity in Collective Action," *Social Problems* 45 (1998): 137-159, James M. Jasper, "The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and around Social Movements," *Sociological Forum* 13/3 (September 1998): 397-424, Jeff Goodwin, James Jasper and Francesca Polletta, "The Return of the Repressed: The Fall and Rise of Emotions in Social Movement Theory,"*Mobilization* 5/1 (Spring 2000): 65-84, Jeff Goodwin, James Jasper and Francesca Polletta, eds., *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001, and Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 27 (2001): 283-305. The interaction between the two schools of thought is well reflected in the edited volume *Rethinking Social Movements, Structure, Meaning and Emotion* (2004) which not only contains critiques of the structuralist approach by the newer school of thought, but also interactive essays that explore the relationship between their work, leaving the authors at odds as to whether the political process model could be emended to suitably address the concerns of the culturalists or whether the approaches were incompatible.

[49] Tarrow, "Introduction," in Ronald R. Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William H. Sewell, Jr., Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, eds., *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 8.

model was far too structural and had, in many cases become structurally deterministic. He stated that what had been "perceived as socially constructed opportunities have given way to 'political opportunity structures' (POS) and with this change what was once conceived of as a structural/constructivist account of movement emergence has become a structurally determinist one."[50] That POS seemingly compels mobilization denies "collective meaning-making its central role in social life."[51]

Another aspect of this problem was that socially constructed senses of "we-ness" which were responsible for setting people in motion had also disappeared from the model; mobilizing structures were now seen as being effective merely due to people's proximity to each other and the model "failed to sketch even a rudimentary model of individual motivation and action to explain the observed network effects." Again McAdam noted that networks had come to be seen as structures rather than being understood as "culturally conceived and constructed by a significant subset of the group's members."[52] McAdam also criticized what had come to be a fairly static perspective which despite its use of framing did not give sufficient weight to "contingent interpretive processes"[53] and tended to use methods that would aggregate events counting each protest event as equal to all others as opposed to evaluating whether specific events had special qualities that could transform situations. While McAdam still finds much that is positive in the political process model and believes that it can be improved and does not need to be discarded, he avers that,

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[50] McAdam, "Revisiting the U.S. Civil Rights Movement," 205-296.
[51] McAdam, "Revisiting the U.S. Civil Rights Movement," 206.
[52] McAdam, "Revisiting the U.S. Civil Rights Movement," 207. Jasper also strongly makes the point that networks are grounded in culture and are consciously created groups of people who share common values, especially common images of social justice and social change. See Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest*, 61-63, 173, 326-327.
[53] McAdam, "Revisiting the U.S. Civil Rights Movement," 216

> for all the attention devoted to cultural processes in social movements, the dominant analytic framework in the field has remained resolutely structuralist. Even the attempt to 'soften' the perspective by adding 'framing' to the mix, has only succeeded in structuralizing the concept, by rendering meaning-making little more than a strategic challenge facing mature movements previously 'birthed' through the fortuitous confluence of favorable political opportunities and available mobilizing structures.[54]

Questions about various aspects of the paradigm had also been raised by those who were not known as culturalists. One of the best known and still cited studies that went to the heart of the political opportunity/political process model questioned whether or not political opportunity structure was a good predictor of protest. Charles Kurzman's study examining the 1979 Iranian revolution showed first, that the assumption by the political opportunity/ political process model of alignment between objective and perceived political opportunities was an incorrect assumption and second, that political opportunity which had been defined largely in terms of changes in state power, (an opening or closing of the system, i.e. changes in repression, and splits in the elite of the state) was not the criteria that protestors themselves used to subjectively define if they thought it was a good time to protest. Rather protestors used their own personal evaluations of the strength of the opposition to decide whether or not they should protest. Importantly Iranians perceived the repressive and other powers of the state to be as strong as they had ever been. These results suggested that protest was not dependent on a change in political opportunities as defined by Tarrow or McAdam, but rather that "perceived opportunities may affect the outcome of revolutionary protest independent of structural opportunities."[55] Political opportunity and the political process model had, importantly,

[54] McAdam, "Revisiting the U.S. Civil Rights Movement," 225.
[55] Charles Kurzman, "Structural Opportunities and Perceived Opportunity in Social-Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979," *American Sociological Review* 61 (1996): 165. See also Padraic Kenney, "Framing, Political Opportunities and Eastern European Mobilization," in Hank Johnston and John A.

brought political context back into the picture, and had attempted to integrate political context, structure and culture. It had been a very productive research model but its approach had not fully succeeded and its problem areas were increasingly apparent. Ultimately McAdam, as well as Tarrow and others who had been instrumental in the development of political opportunity structure and the political process model, came to believe that their concepts and implementation in recent years had become too structural and paid insufficient attention to agency—and hence to culture.

Cultural analyses received increasing attention in social movement literature beginning in the late 1980's with Benford and Snow's work on framing and then more concerted attention with more complete exploratory works in the 1990s such as *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory* (1992), an edited volume containing 15 analyses which not only critiqued resource mobilization theory but also sought to explore an explicitly more culturalist approach to social movements.[56] Such attention to culture took two different directions: first approaches like those by Benford and Snow which sought to "bring culture back in." On the positive side Snow and Benford's work (discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two under framing) made significant theoretical contributions, focusing on not only how elites could deploy culture but how and when such deployments were likely to result in mobilization and what factors could be used as likely indices of success. Snow and Benford focused on the interactive construction of meaning. In addition to putting new emphasis on the role of agency, the focus on framing brought back into the

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Noakes, eds., *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 143-161, for another study that argues that the framing chosen and enacted by an opposition group (WiP in Poland) actually weakened the state, thereby changing the political opportunity structure. Framing changed the structure; structure was not open before the frame. There are parallels between WiP in Poland in the 1980s and Otpor in Serbia in 1999 and 2000.

[56] Volumes on cultural approaches in the early to mid 1990s included two other significant collected volumes, Johnston and Klandermans, *Social Movements and Culture* (1995) and Larana, Johnston, and Gusfield, eds., *New Social Movements* (1994).

study of contentious politics ideational, cultural and emotive aspects of social movements, elements that had largely been ignored or underemphasized in previous works. While credit is given to Erving Goffman for introducing the basic concept of framing,[57] it received almost no attention as social movement scholars were eager to move away from the "mass behavior literature" which had argued that protesters were people who were alienated from society and who supposedly used protest as an emotional release from their deprivation, dissatisfaction and greater unhappiness. Keen to show that protest was actually a rational act, especially for those to whom access to the conventional political sector was cut off or severely circumscribed, and that protesters were not mentally unstable people disconnected from the rest of society, the field moved as far as it could from emotion, culture and ideational constructs to rational choice and resource mobilization theories where "mobilizing beliefs and ideas were seen as ubiquitous and therefore unimportant."[58]

Many of the critiques of Benford and Snow's work were not of the actual work itself but of the fact the framing concept was employed in the triadic political process model in which two-thirds of the model was weighted in favor of structure, and in which culture was said to mediate between the two other components, mobilizing structures and political opportunity structures. The framing concept as employed by McAdam implied that structural political opportunities were objective/rational and juxtaposed them against culture which he described as subjective. Viewed as such, Polletta argued that "Culture mediates between objective political opportunities and objective mobilization, in this

[57] Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).
[58] David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," *International Social Movement Research* 1 (1988): 197-217.

view; it does not create those opportunities."[59] Jasper agreed with Polletta, averring that such an argument implied that there were "objectively given opportunities which potential protestors either see or do not see correctly. There is no role for culture to shape those opportunities or to spur to protest in the absence of 'objective' opportunities."[60] More generally scholars such as Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta argue that culture should not have to be "brought back in" and is clearly more than a residual category.[61] These scholars argue for a stronger, "thicker" understanding of culture and its importance as an explanatory variable. As such they argue that culture has power to shape events and create change in more than just "unsettled" times. In contrast to the arguments made by scholars such as Ann Swidler and Hank Johnson and Bert Klandermans, that culture's primary effectiveness in mobilizing people comes during periods of social or economic turmoil,[62] scholars in favor of a thicker understanding of culture argue for the power of culture to shape protest movements and polities even in more stable settled times. If culture shapes the world only during unsettled times when political or economic structures are weak, then, argue scholars like Polletta, "shouldn't we be studying the structural factors generating disequilibrium rather than the cultural challenge that only

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[59] Francesca Polletta, "Snarles, Quacks and Quarrels: Culture and Structure in Political Process Theory" *Sociological Forum* 14/1 (March 1999): 65. She also cites Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings,* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1996); and Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, "Toward an Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolutions," in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman, eds., *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 142-173 as making the same objective subjective distinction with regard to political opportunities and culture.

[60] Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest*, 37.

[61] See also Rhys H. Williams, "The Cultural Contexts of Collective Action: Constraints, Opportunities, and the Symbolic Life of Social Movements," in Snow, Soule, and Kriesi, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, 91-115.

[62] Ann Swidler, "Cultural Power and Social Movements, in Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans, eds., *Social Movements and Culture*, 25-41; Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans, "The Cultural Analysis of Social Movements," in Johnston and Klandermans, eds., *Social Movements and Culture*, 8.

then comes into play?"[63] On the other hands she goes on to wonder, "is there a time when societies are thoroughly stable? And can't social movements themselves contribute to destabilizing the institutional logics that inform everyday life?"[64] Scholars such as Polletta and Jasper also argue that culture is both powerful enough to effect change but can also be both structuring and constraining.[65] In opposition to some earlier cultural theories in which culture was strategically deployed into a structural world, scholars such as Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta argue the world is cultural almost all the way through. Jasper argues that a cultural approach,

> in which human action is thoroughly permeated by meaning, emotion and morality requires more than the addition of culture to other models. It demands that we rethink apparently noncultural concepts from a cultural point of view, demonstrating their meaningful character… A fully cultural approach recognizes no factors that do not at least interact with our understandings.[66]

In their view, even concepts that on their face seem diametrically opposed to culture, such as rationality and strategy are, indeed, shaped by culture; they are not concepts in opposition to each other. As Jasper points out there are only three categories of strategic action: coercion, payment and persuasion. Of the three, persuasion is the most obviously cultural as attempts at strategic persuasion usually involve" appeals to collective identities, emotional solidarities to prevent defections and the elaboration of moral exemplars."[67] Similarly, decision-making is a complex process which relies on traditions, norms and cognitive heuristics to help people quickly define and categorize a situation. Moreover, strategic engagements usually involve players making calculations

[63] Polletta, "Culture and its Discontents," 443.
[64] Polletta, "Culture and its Discontents," 443.
[65] Polletta, "Culture and its Discontents," 431-450, Francesca Polletta, "Culture and Movements," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 619 (September 2008): 78-96.
[66] Jasper, "Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements," 89.
[67] Jasper, "Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements," 94.

about the other players as well: their intentions, depth of commitments, estimating resources and advantages. Such calculations are based on their interpretations of others. Culture can also affect political opportunity structures through people's "conceptions of the proper scope and role of the state."[68] Goodwin has pointed out that "state officials ideological commitments, moral assumptions, policy styles and collective identities help to shape particular state policies and institutions."[69] Even structures and networks are strongly influenced and shaped by culture: norms, common practices and bureaucratic cultures strongly shape organizations as the new institutionalists point out; networks are not structures absent the people with common values who compose them. Scholars who study social movement and contentious politics through culture have developed nuanced frameworks and ideas that better explain social movements and contentious politics, examining culture both as constraining and enabling, looking for movement and change through culture.

The study of contentious politics has seen a return of emotions which were also discarded after the 1960s in favor of the more "rational" resource mobilization theory. Whereas emotions in the older models were portrayed as irrational, actors in the grip of uncontrollable passions, scholars who integrate emotions into their work today see emotions as perfectly compatible with rationality and as having important explanatory value, central to movement emergence, growth and decline. Jasper notes that the emotions most closely related to cognitive concepts are of most interest to those who study social movement and contentious politics but works such as *Passionate Politics* edited by Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta (2001) which focuses on the intersection of

[68] Polletta, "Cultural and its Discontents," 433.
[69] Jeff Goodwin, "Towards a New Sociology of Revolutions," *Theory and Society* 23 (1994): 731-766.

emotions and contentious politics, clearly shows that a wide range of emotions can impact various elements and stages of social movements and contentious politics. Comments by scholars such as Ron Aminadze and Doug McAdam in their chapter "Emotion and Contentious Politics," that the "mobilization of emotion [is] a necessary and exceedingly important component of any significant instance of collective action,"[70] clearly indicate that the study of emotion and its role to understanding contentious politics and social movements has reached the broader field.[71]

In my dissertation I draw strongly on the most recent work done on culture and on emotions, as well as on work done on culture by Gamson and Benford and Snow whose writings are still important to understanding social movements and contentious politics. Where applicable, I also incorporate understandings from some of the older theories such as resource mobilization and political process, as most scholars agree that these models and the empirical work done under their frameworks developed important insights about the importance and use of resources to contentious politics (RM) and on the importance of strategies and political context (political process) .

Case Selection

Slobodan Milosevic's regime, one of the most repressive of the semi-authoritarian regimes that had a "colored revolution," offers a useful opportunity to use insights generated by the literature above to test the importance of strategic decision-making and especially of framing to mobilization as opposed to the importance of structure in influencing outcomes. Since I hypothesized that these factors, not just structure, played a

[70] Aminzade and McAdam, "Emotions and Contentious Politics," 14.
[71] Aminzade and McAdam fully credit William Gamson, James Jasper and Verta Taylor as being the leading scholars in the area of emotions and social movements.

critical role in outcomes in semi-authoritarian regimes, Serbia offered the best case. Structural theories, especially political opportunity structure theory, argues that the success of an opposition should decrease with increases of repression as well as if there are few or no significant breaks in the elite. Among the cases I considered, Slovakia, Georgia and Serbia, no other case had as repressive a regime as did Serbia. In Slovakia, Meciar played loose and fast with the democratic rules and favored his friends, but he never brought out tanks against his own people. The same was true in Croatia. In Georgia, Shevardnadze was clearly corrupt and also played fast and loose with the "rules" of democracy—but he had allowed a free media, helped the development of NGOs and had never used force against his own people. Although he was forced out of office by protests, in many senses he had given up long before that occurred.

Milosevic, however, had used force against his own people engaged in a peaceful protest in March of 1991. He not only had brought out the security forces to monitor and control all forms of subsequent major protest but he had regularly and increasingly taken control of public "space," specifically of the media as a way to inform and influence attitudes and suppress alternative points of view. He had, however, allowed NGOs and political parties to function. In the period under consideration Milosevic himself had chosen to "purge" certain people from their positions—but there were no truly open signs of such elite factionalism that it would break Milosevic and his regime's hold on the party and the government from within. While some people had left his party to form opposition parties—there was no evidence that they themselves commanded the loyalty of a large number of their former colleagues. Moreover, Milosevic also steadily increased repression during the period under consideration beginning in 1998 with new laws

restricting the media and the university designed to strangle independent thought and action, imposing further war restrictions during the NATO bombing that included tightening restrictions on association and, beginning in May 2000 increasing arrests of NGO activists, Otpor students and regular citizens. In addition to the arrests of ordinary citizens, political murder of prominent politicians continued, culminating in the disappearance of Ivan Stambolic, a man who had once been Milosevic's mentor but had begun to publicly raise questions about Milosevic less than a month before the elections. Thus, if opportunities for successful actions by an opposition are dependent on periods in which repression decreases, this would not have been the period in which to make such efforts. Part of the problem for the opposition lay within their own ranks—that is with people who sympathized with them but who either were apathetic or afraid to vote with the opposition for fear of losing their job. If one of the major problems was to get a large enough turn-out to the polls so as to prevent massive fraud by the regime and also ensure a victory, the opposition would have to find a way to sufficiently mobilize people to take action.

Materials Used

This dissertation relies primarily on interviews conducted with actors in the events in Serbia in 1999 and 2000. Between September 2007 and July 2008 I conducted in-depth interviews with representatives of almost all of the significant actors in the case including those from Otpor, the NGOs (CeSid and Civic Initiatives), Serbian intellectuals representing the "other" Serbia, and Mrs. Djindjic about her late husband. I also conducted interviews in Washington DC including one with Sonja Licht who was

instrumental in the Bratislava process and had been President of the Open Society Foundation Serbia, the organization that until almost 1996 was the sole funder of NGOs and who had personal relationships with the important actors including foreign actors. I also interviewed a representative of a US NGO who worked personally with Djindjic on a regular basis in Serbia and Hungary and had been on the ground in Serbia or Hungary for several years. (See bibliography for a full list of interviews.) My interviewees were selected for the depth of their level of involvement, as well as for their personal knowledge of other key players who they dealt with on other aspects of the process informally. Thus, for example Miljenko Dereta, with whom I spoke in his capacity as the head of Civic Initiative, the NGO largely responsible for the coordination of the NGO's campaign, had also been on the Executive Board of the political party GSS and was a founding member of the Executive board for the Social Democratic party. As such he had informal ties with members of the political parties such as Vesna Pesic and Zoran Djindjic and was up to date on many of the inner workings of the political parties. Marco Blagojevic, who was one of the founders of CeSid, was personal friends with Slobodan Homen and Srdja Popovic and could also speak about Otpor whose founding meeting had taken place in his office. Each of my interviewees was asked to discuss events that they had played a key role in, but each was also uniquely placed to know and reflect on another organization's or player's actions. Such knowledge allowed me to draw several perspectives on one event. I also utilized knowledge gained in extensive interviews in Slovakia and Georgia in September 2007, many which indirectly shed light on aspects of my case and some which directly impinged on such ties. For example my interview with Pavol Demes, a Slovak NGO leader who was key in conceptualizing the OK98 campaign

in Slovakia (and who was European Director of the German Marshall Fund of the US in 1999 and 2000), was important as he was one of the major architects of the model of integrated NGO/ civil society/political party campaigning first implemented in Slovakia and later in Serbia. He was also personally involved in the Bratislava process (discussed in Chapter Three). Similarly, my interviews in Georgia with Nini Gogiberdze, one of the original Kmara activists, and similarly my separate interview with Giorgi Meladze, also a founding member of Kmara, shed some interesting light on techniques that Otpor employed, as they taught some of the same techniques to Kmara. All of my interviews ran a minimum of two to four hours and in some cases I interviewed people two to three times personally. In addition to these accounts by participants in various aspects of the developments I analyze, I also draw heavily on Serbian news and journal articles as well as the academic literature on the case.

Chapters

The dissertation is organized into three parts following Bert Klandermans's argument that both supply and demand are necessary for mobilization. His concepts are discussed in greater depth in the next chapter. Thus, patterned loosely on Klandermans's organizational schema, this dissertation is broken into the following parts: Part I, Supply; Part II, Demand and Part III, Mobilization. Part I also contains the introduction and Chapter Two which briefly examines some of the central analytical concepts that run throughout the dissertation. In Chapters Three and Four, I turn to the supply side of the equation. I argue that oppositions first have to perceive their environment and then decide on the basis not only of their assessments but of their ambitions, what sort of "political

opportunity structure" they want to create. While it is true that they can be constrained in their actions by the nature of the regime which may restrict or alter their choices, it does not completely control their ability, especially in semi-authoritarian regimes, to build their own structures, resource-base and identity, all of which will be crucial to future mobilization. In order to make such an argument I first briefly examine the traditional political opportunity structure approach. Traditional political opportunity structure arguments focus almost exclusively on the power of the regime as the factor that provides opportunities or constrains the opposition. Traditional POS arguments also frequently assume that there is full knowledge on the part of all participants as to what that structure is. In contrast to those arguments I argue that such an approach neglects first agency and second what I call the "political opportunity structure" of the opposition. In Chapter Four, I focus on how the various Serbian political opposition forces perceived their environment beginning in 1997 and assessed what their needs were if they were going to be an effective force in politics in the future. In all cases the various actors perceived the need to build organizations and drew on their sense of identity to create a variety of different structures that they not only believed would be effective in their fight, but also fit their own conception of themselves. In Chapter Four I also argue that as political actors "oppositions" make strategic choices which can alter the landscape of contention. In the case of the Serbian opposition, I examine how the opposition forces came to the conclusion that the most important strategy that they needed to pursue was one of cooperation, coordination and unity. I argue that coalition-building is work; it does not occur naturally or without difficulties. Such work is agential—and it is these actors, not

structures that are decisive in changing the eventual outcome. These tactical decisions are important in that they add a new synergy to the equation.

In Part II, I focus on the demand side of the equation (Chapters Five and Six). In Chapter Five, I examine the situation on the ground in Serbia leading up to the events in 1999 and 2000 with a special focus on the economy. I discuss not only the situation but also how such conditions were perceived by people at the time, asking whether such an environment was likely to be conducive to protest. In part, this chapter is the basis of asking whether certain types of social and economic strains produce protest and if so—what type they are likely to be.

Chapter Six is an empirical examination of the protests that broke out in the summer of 1999 in Serbia. Largely spontaneous and unorganized, these protests clearly illustrated the amount of raw grievance in the country—and where that grievance was concentrated. I suggest that such protests on their own would not have been long-lasting, sustainable or effective had they not become organized, but they indicated the availability of various demographic groups for subsequent organization and mobilization. Despite the fact that these protests were in response to very immediate grievances and ceased when those grievances were suitably addressed, I also argue that these protests were not "pre-modern" or parochial and should not be ignored. Moreover, I note that these protests were significant because a sense of injustice and a violation of cultural norms played a significant role in their grievances. Understanding and focusing on these grievances and their emotional and cultural sources would be crucial if the opposition political figures were to have an impact. I show that at least initially, the political coalition, Alliance for Change, understood the significance of the underlying emotional and cultural issues and

was able to use these in its rallies. Moreover, these protests, especially the spontaneous ones, allowed people to see how many other "ordinary people," who were "just like them," felt as they did. This realization, that there was a hidden community of similar "selves," was significant to increasing a collective identity among people which would help lower barriers to future mobilization. Finally, I show how in certain instances organizations resulted from this spontaneous protest.

Chapter Seven through Chapter Twelve comprise Part III of the study, examining mobilization through framing as well as through the use of cultural materials and repertoires. Chapter Seven, following the schema provided by the framing literature as explained in Chapter Two, discusses the degree of credibility that the various actors had not only with each other but just as importantly with bystander audiences. As credibility is a crucial factor that helps determine frame resonance, I consider how various actors were perceived throughout the period under consideration so as to help understand how the frames promulgated by the opposition political parties and the regime (discussed in the subsequent chapters) might be received by their intended audiences. Since credibility is not a static property that a group can earn and retain without effort but is constantly in flux, groups must regularly work to maintain or increase their credibility. They do this sometimes on the backs of their allies, frequently at the expense of their opponents. In this chapter I examine the interplay between the various actors as they attempted to increase their credibility thereby increasing the likelihood that their frame would be considered if not accepted.

Chapter Eight examines how one of the two main issues that divided Serbian society, nationalism, was framed by the government and served both as its legitimating

ideology that expressed its worldview and also as a means to try to maintain control over society and politics by eliminating alternatives. I also explore attempts by the opposition to reframe nationalism, investigating how the political opposition drew on an alternative conception of nationalism that existed in society to reframe the debate—to change people's mental constructs about how the world around them functioned, and how it could be were they open to alternatives.

Chapter Nine examines the framing of the second main issue that divided Serbian society, the desire to live what Serbs termed a "normal" life. If, as I maintain, nationalism continued to have the degree of salience it did in politics and society because it was the regime's legitimating ideology, it had to compete with a strong sense that was percolating from the bottom of Serbian society up—a desire to live a normal life. I explore how Serbs perceived their lives in this period and what they themselves spoke of as their primary desire. I also investigate how both the political opposition parties and the regime attempted to deal with that desire which vied with the regime's attempt to impose its views and by extension its policies that extended from such views. I examine how the Alliance for Change (and later DOS), was able to take this organic and rather inchoate desire that originated from below, give it public voice and shape it into a series of frames that would give meaning to people's desire in a series of value and policy orientations that openly competed with the regimes nationalism legitimating frame. I also explore why the Alliance for Change's framing could be considered credible by those it addressed. The chapter analyzes the regime's attempt to re-frame people's desire for a normal life by attempting to shift the meaning in normal life from one that dealt with

dignity and justice to one that dealt with material consumption and prosperity. I also examine the regime's reconstruction frame.

Chapter Ten explores more definitively why the frames discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine varied in success or failed. Based on the literature on framing first discussed in Chapter Two, I discuss the concept of resonance in greater detail. I then flesh out how specific aspects of resonance operated when paired with specific observations drawn in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine.

While Chapters Eight through Ten deal with content frames that carry legitimating worldviews, Chapter Eleven and Twelve examine mobilization frames, the type of framing that is done to immediately mobilize people from the sofa to the streets—or in this case the voting booth. Mobilization framing is largely based on certain types of efficacy or propriety frames In this case, various NGOs, Otpor, and the political parties urged people to go and vote because, for example, their voting would mean that there were fewer votes for Milosevic to steal (a form of efficacy framing), because they should vote so that their children have a chance at a better life (moral/propriety framing) or because, as Gamson argues, they could become agents of history. In addition to looking at the types of frames used to mobilize people, I examine the material aspects of culture, symbols and tactics that have power to move people to act. Finally, I also examine several techniques that were used, focusing especially on the importance of humor and briefly exploring why such techniques were effective. I also briefly consider the techniques that are usually used to de-mobilize people, i.e. repression, and consider its effects in this case.

Chapter Thirteen is the conclusion. It draws the lessons that can be learned from this case about why, when and how people protest and what ingredients are needed for attempts to mobilize people for the stated goals. I evaluate the importance of agency versus that of structure and discuss the contribution of culture and emotions to mobilization in the Serbian case.

CHAPTER TWO

Central Concepts

In this chapter I briefly review the specific analytic concepts that I employ in this dissertation, giving extended treatment to the concept of framing as the concept is applied throughout six chapters, Chapters Seven through Twelve. Since the literature on each of the concepts is quite extensive, I have focused my discussion on those aspects of each concept that are most frequently employed in this dissertation, leaving aside interesting but tangential issues.

Levels of Analysis

Anyone seeking to understand the events in Serbia in 1999 and 2000 may seek their explanation at a variety of levels of analysis. My specific interest lay in trying to understand why individual human beings would choose to mobilize at this point in time and go to the polls and vote when they had not done so previously. Such an interest dictated a focus therefore primarily on the individual or micro level of analysis combined with the meso, or group level of analysis.[1] Although I fully acknowledge the importance of macro level analysis, and in the case of Serbia in 2000 specifically the importance of the diffusion process of the electoral model across countries as well as the importance of changes in the international arena, the macro level of analysis does not explain nor elaborate on the specific mechanisms and processes that compel individuals to mobilize to vote or protest. If, as previously noted, more than a new supply of resources and more

[1] I include here the sociocultural understanding of sociology, which is at a level higher that that of the individual but below that of society as a whole.

than just better organization was necessary for people to turn out when they were otherwise apathetic, and if the country's government was increasingly repressive, then a search for an explanation needs to be found elsewhere. For such an explanation I turn to the literature on grievances and more specifically on moral shock and injustice, collective identity and boundary maintenance, and framing. I use Bert Klandermans's framework for mobilization as my organizing principle.

Bert Klandermans's Mobilization Framework

Klandermans argues that mobilization is the process by which demand and supply are brought together. Demand, according to Klandermans, is "the potential in society for protest."[2] The study of demand entails studying phenomena such as "grievance formation, causal attribution and the formation of collective identity." Supply, according to Klandermans, is "the opportunities staged by protest organizers." The study of supply entails studying phenomena such as "action repertoires, the effectiveness of social movements, the frames and ideologies movements stand for, and the constituents of identification they offer." Mobilization is the process through which these two sides, demand and supply, become linked.[3] Klandermans argues that the study of mobilization, "concerns such matters as the effectiveness of (persuasive) communication, the influence of social networks, and the perceived costs and benefits of participation."

[2] The following three definitional quotes all come from Bert Klandermans, "The Demand and Supply of Participation: Social-Psychological Correlates of Participation in Social Movements," in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, (Cornwall UK Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 361.

[3] Rhys Williams also speaks of the importance of discussing both supply and demand noting that focus just on supply is little different from resource mobilization's focus just on resources. See Rhys Williams, "The Cultural Contexts of Collective Action," in Snow, Soule and Kriesi, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements,* 94.

The discussion of key concepts used in this dissertation is also set up to follow the demand and supply framework. I first examine the importance of the potential in society for protest though an examination of grievance and emotions, and the formation of collective identity. I then examine one important theoretical aspect of the supply side, frames and framing.

Emotions and Grievance

"A demand for change begins with dissatisfaction, be it the experience of illegitimate inequality, feelings of relative deprivation, feelings of injustice, moral indignation about some state of affairs or a suddenly imposed grievance."[4] Although this seems to be a simple statement, it was published in an article in 2004 and is one that focuses directly on *why* it is that people might want to protest, a matter than has been almost completely disassociated from the study of actual mobilization for protest for almost the last 20 years. Strain and breakdown theories and relative deprivation theories which connected people's sense of grievance and associated emotions to collective protest disappeared in a hail of rationality in the 1970's through the 1990s, with the decision that grievances were ubiquitous and were incidental to protest. Indeed counter to the assumption by Olson that no one should want to protest, resource mobilization and political process implicitly assumed that anyone with a grievance *would* protest if they had either the appropriate resources or the correct structural opportunity to do so. This unstated assumption allowed both theories to ignore why anyone would either want to protest or, if given the resources or the opportunity, what would drive individuals to

[4] Klandermans, "The Demand and Supply Side of Protest," in Snow, Soule and Kriesi, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements,* 362.

protest. However, variants of breakdown and strain and relative deprivation theories, along with theories on emotions are reappearing again in modified form in the literature.[5] This is in part because political opportunity theories and political process theory were overly structural, largely denying agency and the importance of the human actor and human emotions in the emergence, mobilization and effectiveness of social movements and contentious politics. As Benford noted, even many theorists who worked with culture through framing had been unable to incorporate emotion in their models. Later acknowledging its importance he said,

> "those operating within the framing/constructionist perspective have not fared much better than their structuralist predecessors in elaborating the role of emotions in collective actions. Instead we continue to write as though our movement actors (when we actually acknowledge humans in our texts) are Spock-like beings devoid of passion and other emotions."[6]

Thus all three structural theories denied what came to be recognized as important elements of the strain and breakdown and relative deprivation theories: the importance of people's emotions to protest and the centrality of grievance—especially in the form of a sense of injustice—to explaining why people mobilized.

Although there was much wrong with the older theories as they were promulgated, especially their tendency to assume that macro-level strains automatically gave rise to micro-level phenomena, ignoring how "individual mental states are translated into genuinely collective phenomena,"[7] both grievance and emotions had been central to their explanations. My interest here is not in the larger revival of strain and breakdown

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[5] See Steven M. Buechler, "The Strange Career of Strain and Breakdown Theories of Collective Action," in Snow, Soule and Kriesi, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, 47-66, for an excellent overview of Strain and Breakdown theories and newer variants.
[6] Robert D. Benford, "An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective,"*Sociological Inquiry* 67 (1997): 419.
[7] Buehler, "Strange Career of Strain and Breakdown," 51.

theories, but in the two elements that many agree are important to protest and have been previously neglected: first, the role of emotions more generally to mobilization in social movements and contentious politics and second, and more specifically, the role of injustice and moral shock in grievance formation and mobilization.

Emotions

By 2001 a consensus seemed to have been reached that, "the mobilization of emotions [was] a necessary and exceedingly important component of any significant instance of collective action."[8] The ever-growing literature on emotions contains, as does any newer literature, numerous debates about the strength of the explanatory power of emotions as a variable, when they matter, how much they matter, what kind of emotions matter and how best to measure their impact. For the purposes of this dissertation I shall provide below only a brief overview of the salient concepts with a slightly more detailed examination of three emotions and their impact on mobilization.[9]

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[8] Aminzade and McAdam, "Emotions and Contentious Politics," 14.

[9] James Jasper, one of the most prominent scholars in this field, has published numerous articles discussing various aspects of emotion and their intersection in contentious politics: see James M. Jasper "Emotions and Social Movements," in Jan E. Stets and Jonathan H. Turner, eds.,*Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions*, (New York: Springer, 2006): 611-635; "Motivation and Emotion," in Robert Goodin and Charles Tilly, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Studies,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2006): 151-171; with Jeff Goodwin and Francesca Polletta, "Emotional Dimensions of Social Movements," in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. (Oxford: Blackwell 2004): 413-432; "Cultural Approaches to the Study of Social Movements," in Bert Klandermans and Conny Roggeband, eds., *Handbook on Social Movements*, (New York: Springer, 2007), 59-110; "Introduction: Why Emotions Matter," in *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*. 2001. Pages 1-24; With Jeff Goodwin and Francesca Polletta, "The Return of the Repressed: The Fall and Rise of Emotions in Social Movement Theory," *Mobilization* 5/1 (Spring 2000):65-84; With Jeff Goodwin and Francesca Polletta, "The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions in and around Social Movements," *Sociological Forum* 13/3 (September, 1998): 397-424; "Recruiting Strangers and Friends: Moral Shocks and Social Networks in Animal Rights and Antinuclear Protest," *Social Problems* 42/4 (November, 1995): 401-420. With Jane D. Poulsen, "Recruiting Intimates, Recruiting Strangers: Building the Contemporary Animal Rights Movement," in Jo Freeman and Victoria Johnson, eds., *Waves of Protest: Social Movements Since the Sixties*, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield,1999), 65-82; James M. Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest, Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1997). For additional work on

Jasper distinguishes five categories of emotions ranging from urges, such as hunger and thirst, to complex moral emotions that require cognitive interpretation.[10] These emotions, which include compassion, shame, pride, and certain types of fear and anger, are aspects of social action that are "shaped by social expectations as much as they are emanations from individual personalities."[11] Thus in this sense emotions "mediate between the individual and the social world without being reducible to either."[12] Complex emotions especially are culturally shaped as people are socialized into appropriate emotional reactions and behaviors. Similarly, we learn what we should be proud or ashamed of—emotions are tied to societal moral values. In between complex emotions and urges fall emotions called affects and those called moods. Affects tend to be longer-lasting such as love for one's parent. Moods, such as depression, can also be longer-lasting, acting as a "filter for perception, decision and action—especially by giving us more confidence or less."[13]

Why is this categorization important and how do such emotions affect the likelihood of mobilization? Simply put emotions can help to explain why people choose to act or not to act. Both Elisabeth Jean Wood and Derrick Bell have explored instances where there was no perceived hope for change and yet, in Wood's study, Salvadorian

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emotions see the 16 chapters in Passionate Politics, Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper and Francesca Polletta, eds., *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).

[10] James M. Jasper, "Motivation and Emotion," in Robert Goodwin and Charles Tilly, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 151-171.

[11] Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, "The Return of the Repressed," 78.

[12] Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, "The Return of the Repressed," 78. Jasper distinguishes between the fear we feel when we see that we are going to be immediately hit by a truck versus the fear we may feel at a nuclear facility being built in our neighborhood. See Jasper, "Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements," 59-110.

[13] Jasper, "Cultural Approaches in the Study of Social Movements," 82.

peasants protested in an attempt to regain their dignity. [14] Similarly Derrick Bells' exploration of civil right's protestors found that many protested to regain their dignity—not because they had honest expectations of change. Jasper notes that protestors can choose to act from a sense of deontological pride, a positive feeling that comes from doing the right thing, closely related to a sense of dignity.[15] Emotions such as affects can also be essential to holding movements together. Participants may not only have a strong belief in the righteousness of their cause, but may also feel strong positive affects towards other members in their group with whom they share what they perceive to be central values and ideas. It is loyalty to one's group and sometimes even the specific members of one's group that can keep a movement together.[16] In part, positive affects to one's group, which are central to the development of a collective identity, are also central to mobilization as is explored below. Managing emotions can also be central to effective action, such as fear management in adverse conditions, which is explored by Stephen Pfaff and Jeff Goodwin. Those emotions that are most central to mobilization are cognitive emotions. Such emotions are not automatic responses to urges but are "related to moral intuition, felt obligations and rights…all of which are culturally and historically variable."[17]

In short emotions are an integral part of contentious politics and social movements. Below I examine the role of a sense of injustice and moral shock to

[14] See Elisabeth Jean Wood, "The Emotional Benefits of Insurgency in El Salvador," Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, eds., *Passionate Politics*, 267-281; Derrick Bell, *Faces at the Bottom of the Well: the Permanence of Racism* (New York: Basic Books 1992).
[15] Jasper, "Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements," 88.
[16] See for example Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin, "Network Analysis, Culture and the Problem of Agency," *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (1993): 1411-55.
[17] Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, "Introduction: Why Emotions Matter," in *Passionate Politics*, p. 13.

movement emergence as well as the role of collective identity (and affects) to mobilization.

Injustice and Moral Shock

Many theorists agree that a sense of injustice is key to mobilizing people to protest, or at a bare minimum, preparing the ground for the organization of protest. While older deprivation theories had many flaws, one of the things that they did point out was that people's sense of injustice could arise from their perceptions of inequitable distribution.[18] *Perceived* injustice was thus seen as a source of grievance. Concepts related to morality and justice are often portrayed in older theories as purely cognitive concepts without important emotions that could also affect their impact. One exception to this was William Gamson's discussions of injustice. Gamson, in his book *Talking Politics* noted that moral indignation, especially when it was presented as part of an injustice frame was, "not merely a cognitive or intellectual judgment about what is equitable but [is] also what cognitive psychologists call a hot cognition—one that is laden with emotion."[19]

Grievance may also lead directly to protest. In contrast to most RM and political process models that focus on networks and organizations as the loci for protest, Edward Walsh and James Jasper agree that certain types of grievances can, without any sort of mediation by organizations, precipitate widespread protest and mass mobilization. Edward Walsh's theory of "suddenly imposed grievances" argues that rapid mass

[18] For more detailed examinations of relative deprivation theory both in its older form as well as in its newer incarnations see for example Buechler, "The Strange Career of Strain and Breakdown;" and Bert Klandermans, Marlene Roefs and Johan Olivier, "Grievance Formation in a Country in Transition: South Africa 1994-1998," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 64/1 (2001): 41-54.
[19] William A. Gamson, *Talking Politics* (New York: Cambridge University press, 1992), 7.

mobilization can occur unmediated through any form of organization as a result of the perceived imposition of a major grievance, especially one which is "attributable to human decisions or negligence."[20] Citing his empirical study of the mobilization surrounding events at Three Mile Island, as well as studies by Useem on court-ordered bussing and a study by Levine on Love Canal, Walsh argues that discontent is indeed a variable, not a constant that can be disregarded as is often done in RM studies and in some political process studies.[21] Moreover, as Jasper points out in references to Walsh's studies, accidents like the Three Mile Island accident and other suddenly imposed grievances are so effective at mobilizing people because they change not only how people cognitively view the likelihood of such accidents or incidents, "but also helped to articulate their emotions and moral objections."[22]

Jasper makes a very similar argument that a moral shock can act to recruit strangers to a cause, not only in the absence of a network but frequently in a way that networks cannot. Jasper maintains that a moral shock occurs when, "an event or situation raises such a sense of outrage in people that they become inclined toward political action even in the absence of a network of contacts. These are usually public events, unexpected and highly publicized."[23] Such moral shocks and the immediate resulting protest may also result however from the violation of basic moral principles; the more explicit such principles are the more likely an individual is to protest or to consider protesting alone.[24] In addition to the violation of moral principles, violations of moments of "life passage"

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[20] Edward T. Walsh, "Resource Mobilization and Citizen Protest in Communities around Three Mile Island," *Social Problems* 29/1 (October 1981): 18.
[21] Walsh cites Bert Useem, "Solidarity Model, Breakdown Model, and the Boston Anti-Busing Movement," *American Sociological Review* 45 (1980): 357-369; and Adeline Levine, "Love Canal," Paper presented at meetings of the Eastern Sociological Society, New York, March, 1981.
[22] Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest*, 91.
[23] Jasper and Poulsen, "Recruiting Strangers and Friends," 498.
[24] Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest*, 137.

and specifically the moral codes that surround birth, death and sexual relations are especially likely to set off moral shocks,

> Such life passages are a place to look for protest since they involve deeply held intuitions and assumptions about how the world works, our standards of how it should work and our emotions about fulfilled and unfulfilled visions—just the things to which protest organizers appeal. Threats to our understandings and life passages will lead to moral outrage…Not that moral visions, emotions and cultural meanings are not operating at other times, but they never operate so explicitly as during life passages.[25]

Jasper asserts that there is "no more powerful rhetoric than that of death."[26] Violation of concepts, customs and beliefs surrounding death, or instances in which death could be seen as unjust and attributable to a person would be especially powerful in creating moral shocks.

Jasper also goes a step further than Walsh, suggesting that such moral shocks may not only arise from "suddenly imposed grievances" but also may be purposefully generated by movement organizers who try to shock people into action through the nature of their appeals. He cites as an example the graphic, horrifying images used by the anti-abortion movement and the animal rights activists to push people into action. However, even such purposely generated moral shocks still begin at the "gut level," leading moral intuitions to trigger emotions.

Because suddenly imposed grievances and moral shocks are capable of recruiting individuals to a cause or mobilizing them directly to protest, both question the commonly-held assumption in RM and much political process theory that recruitment and mobilization occur only after the formation of networks and organizations. The shared argument of these two theories is that organizations and networks do not need to

[25] Jasper, *TheArt of Moral Protest*, 96.
[26] Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest*, 96.

come first. Conversely, neither Walsh nor Jasper assert that national networks have not yet formed, merely that they are not necessarily what open people to a cause, making them available for protest. One of the more interesting findings of Walsh's work is that suddenly imposed grievances may result in citizen aggregation as a result of their protest activities; that citizens who are individually mobilized may then find each other through their protest, sometimes resulting in the formation of grass roots organizations.[27] Neither organizations and networks nor grievance and protest must come first—both may occur independently and simultaneously.

Injustice frames, suddenly imposed grievances and moral shocks all depend on emotion to generate mobilization. Whereas injustice frames are mediated through networks or organizations, as framing is an active effort to shape otherwise inchoate emotions and perceptions into a frame, suddenly imposed grievances and moral shocks are frequently not interpreted through institutions and networks. Such grievances and shocks are capable of directly "recruiting" and mobilizing people. Such arguments once again confirm the importance of grievance to protest, and why grievance cannot be assumed away or neglected in attempts to understand mobilization.

Collective Identity

Collective identity is crucial to mobilization. Isolated individuals may feel helpless and unable to take action, but when they identify themselves as part of a

[27] Walsh, "Resource Mobilization and Citizen Protest in Communities around Three Mile Island;" Kim S. Law and Edward J. Walsh, "The Interaction of Grievances and Structures in Social Movement Analysis: The Case of JUST," *The Sociological Quarterly* 24 (Winter 1983): 13-136. Jasper notes that his own conception of "moral shock" has changed over the years from a relatively strongly cognitive concept to one that carries more emotion. See Jasper and Poulsen, "Recruiting Stranger and Friends;" Jasper, "The Emotions of Protest," 397-424; and Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest*. See also Nepstad and Smith, "The Social Structure of Moral Outrage in Recruitment to the U.S. Central American Peace Movement," in Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, eds., *Passionate Politics*, 158-174.

collective, they frequently feel a moral responsibility to act when they perceive an injustice has been done to the group. Numerous studies illustrate that "the more someone identifies with a group the more likely it is that he will participate in protest if he feels that his group is treated unjustly."[28]

Although most groups and collective identities are not politicized, those of interest here are indeed those whose collective identities have been politicized. Gamson, Bruce Fireman, Steven Rytina, Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier and others have noted that collective identities become politicized when

> collectively defined grievances produce a 'we' feeling; causal attribution points to a "they" which is held responsible for the grievances; if authorities are considered the culprit, interaction with these authorities will rapidly politicize collective identity. This is especially so when authorities are unresponsive to the demands or react in repressive ways."[29]

Collective identity exists at the socio-cultural level, i.e. between two or more people, although it is based on an individual's "cognitive, moral and emotional connection to a broader community, category, practice or institution," as Polletta and Jasper define it. [30] Similarly Klandermans notes that such identities have a cognitive, evaluative and affective component.[31] Important here is that collective identities demonstrate a consciousness of choice in identity and positive affects towards the

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[28] Bert Klandermans, "How Group Identification Helps to Overcome the Dilemma of Collective Action," *American Behavioral Scientist*; 45 (2002): 887-900, p. 889; Bernd Simon and Bert Klandermans, "Politicized Collective Identity: A Social Psychological Analysis," *American Psychologist* 56/4 (2001): 324-325.

[29] Klandermans, "How Group Identification Helps to Overcome the Dilemma of Collective Action," 891; Simon and Klandermans, "Politicized Collective Identity," 324-325. See also Gamson, *Talking Politics*; and William A. Gamson, Bruce Fireman, and. Steven Rytina, *Encounters with Unjust Authority*, (Homewood, IL: Dorsey, 1982).

[30] Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements," Annual *Review of Sociology* 27 (2001): 285. While analysts recognize that there are three types of identity: the personal, the collective and movement identities, almost all analysts choose to group collective identity and mobilization identity simply under the term "collective identity." I shall follow their lead in the following discussion.

[31] Bert Klandermans, "How Group Identification Helps to Overcome the Dilemma of Collective Action," 890.

group.[32] Moreover as Gamson argues, "when a collective identity becomes a central part of one's personal identity, group solidarity and personal honor become indistinguishable."[33]

Belonging to a demographic group (age, race, gender) does not by itself indicate a collective sense of identity either with or among other members of the group, as research by Klandermans and others has shown.[34] On the other hand, belonging to demographic or even a structural group (such as class) that shares grievances, especially in everyday life, may result in people discovering a shared sense of identity due to the discrimination or hardships faced by those in similar demographic or structural positions.[35] Nonetheless, for such identities to become politicized collective identities, they still have to recognized by the members of the affected group as such—neither structure nor demographic objectively provides a collective identity.[36] Collective identities may also be "discovered" when either suddenly imposed grievances or moral shocks make previously unseen community of people who share grievances apparent to one another.[37] Whether

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[32] This positive affect is also termed solidarity by some sociologists. See Jasper, "Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements," 81; William A. Gamson, "Commitment and Agency in Social Movements," *Sociological Forum* 6/1 (March 1991): 27-50.

[33] Gamson, "Commitment and Agency in Social Movements," 46.

[34] See Klandermans's empirical research on how the Dutch elderly chose to self-categorize themselves as not being elderly despite the government's official criteria in Bert Klandermans, "How Group Identification Helps to Overcome the Dilemma of Collective Action," 893.

[35] Collective Identity arising out grievance due to quotidian disruptions is discussed by David Snow, Daniel M. Cress, Liam Downey and Andrew W. Jones, "Disrupting the 'Quotidian': Reconceptualizing the Relationship Between Breakdown and the Emergence of Collective Action," *Mobilization* 3(1998): 1-22, as discussed in Buechler, "The Strange Career of Strain and Breakdown Theories," 59. See also Hank Johnston, "New Social Movement and Old Regional Nationalisms," in Larana, Johnston and Gusfield, eds., *New Social Movements*; Verta Taylor and Nancy E. Whittier, "Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities: Lesbian Feminist Mobilization," in Morris and Mueller, eds., *Frontiers in Social Movements*, 104-129.

[36] Johnson, Larena and Gusfield all comment on E.P. Thompson's 1963 study of the emergence of the English working class and point out that "there were many instances when the collective identity deriving from a shared sense of grievance was particularly strong." See Johnson, Larana and Gusfield, 22.

[37] Both suddenly imposed grievances and moral shocks have been discussed above. See Walsh, "Resource Mobilization and Citizen Protest in Communities around Three Mile Island," on suddenly imposed grievances. On moral shocks see the works by James Jasper cited in footnote 9 above.

groups already exist or are specifically created in order to mobilize people for specific political actions, whether groups are formally organized with membership rolls offices and dues or whether they are a loose association, no group has a collective politicized identity without constructive work. As Jasper notes, an "aggrieved community" is not a fixed entity—it is created through cultural work.[38] Such communities may be imagined, as in Benedict Anderson's imagined political community.[39] As Anderson argues, members of the nation will most likely never know each other personally. Many will never meet. Yet each member believes that he or she shares a very important kinship with the other members of the nation. Each member self-identifies as being part of a distinct and important collective entity with its own collective identity. These identities are just as real and powerful as any in which members of the group all know each other. Identities can also be created through re-imagining names or labels that have been previously given, or through the creation of new entities. Collective identities "exist only so far as real people agree upon then, enact, argue and internalize them…"[40]

Studies have also shown that participation in group activities can reinforce identity as much as identity can reinforce participation. Previous participation increases the likelihood of future participation.[41] In concrete terms, this means that in addition to shaping a collective identity that appeals to people enough to allow them to identify with it, activities by the group and opportunities for participation can strengthen group membership and reinforce identity. Moreover, participation in group activities or any type "of public demonstration of commitment under conditions of risk help create

[38] Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest*, 38.
[39] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,* (London and New York: Verso, 1983).
[40] Nancy Whittier quoted in Jasper *The Art of Moral Protest*, 85.
[41] Klandermans, "How Group Identification Helps to Overcome the Dilemma of Collective Action," 898.

solidarity and strengthen it."[42] Such activities tend to further increase the sense that one's "personal honor" is "indistinguishable" from that of the group, again reinforcing the personal with the collective.

Boundary Construction

Boundary construction and maintenance is also crucial so that group identity does not fade, membership does not lose strength and so that new adherents may be brought into the fold. A variety of means are used to reinforce boundaries, delegitimize opposing groups and reinforce collective identities. Cultural materials such as "names, narratives, symbols verbal styles, rituals, clothing," may be used by groups as condensing symbols of their identity.[43] But such markers of "we-ness" also automatically imply another, outside "they."[44] Boundaries can be reinforced through physical claims on territories, by shared cultural experiences or when a group is singled out for persecution by another either through rhetorical means or through practices such as arrests by the state. Attempts to delegitimize groups in power can also be made by attempting to undercut such group's authority through mockery and humor.[45] When successful, such actions illustrate that the opposing group cannot control its territory or people. Opposing groups can also be de-legitimized when, in a "zero-sum" game, respected members of society clearly claim

[42] William A. Gamson, "Commitment and Agency in Social Movements." *Sociological Forum* 6/1 (March 1991): 46.
[43] For an interesting review of both material and metaphoric carriers of meaning, see Jasper, "Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements, " in Klandermans and Roggeband, eds, *Handbook on Social Movements Across Disciplines* (New York, Springer 2007), 59-109. See especially pages 72-80.
[44] Polletta and Jasper, "Collective Identity and Social Movements, "283-305; Johnson, Larana and Gusfield, 20. See also Verta Taylor and Nancy E. Whittier, "Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities," in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, 112. While I do not agree with Taylor and Whittier's characterization of what constitutes a boundary, they do agree that boundaries are used to separate groups and increase and solidify one group's sense of itself in opposition to another. See also Gamson, "Commitment and Agency in Social Movements," 27-50 for one example of how the formation of a politicized collective identity almost automatically results in boundary delineation.
[45] See Chapter Eleven for a longer discussion of this use of mockery and humor.

their affinity for "your" group and their opposition to the other group. Finally, boundary reinforcement in these groups can come as much from its successful attempts to delegitimize the other as it can from positive actions it takes to reaffirm its own identity. Such actions provide clear separations between us and them, clearly affirming the collective identity of the group.

Framing

As the arguments in Chapters Seven through Twelve are not only based generally on the framing literature, but directly follow the progression of the discussion in this section, the examination of the framing literature in this chapter is somewhat more extensive. I shall concentrate my discussion on the framing concepts developed and employed by Robert Benford, David Snow and William Gamson, the three most preeminent scholars on framing, upon whose work almost all academic analyses in the literature are based. Framing, according to Benford and Snow, is the act of "assign[ing] meaning to and interpret[ing] relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents and to garner bystander support and to demobilize antagonists."[46] Key to this definition is the act of signifying meaning, mobilizing those who favor you and demobilizing those who do not. Framing itself is an interactive process of meaning and identity construction. As Noonan points out, human agency is very central to this process: a frame is not a static worldview but is "actively

[46] David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization," *International Social Movement Research* 1 (1988): 198.

created by participants in a movement as part of a struggle over symbols and meanings."[47]

Currently much of the debate on framing focuses on the degree of emphasis that should be given to culture, emotion and identity as negotiated meaning from the "bottom up" as opposed to how much emphasis should be put on more strategic, top-down concepts of framing. While the approaches jostle with each other for recognition and preeminence, neither argument invalidates the other. As Noakes and Johnson note, framing operates at different levels of analysis and these arguments can be complementary. Benford and Snow, pioneers of the original concept of framing in their 1986 and 1988 articles, largely focus on framing as the actions, decisions and strategies of social movement leaders, first in relation to the movement itself (finding and creating its own identity), second in relation to their opponents (framing and counter-framing), and third with their potential constituents. This perspective, in which culture is strategically developed at and deployed from an organizational level, does not invalidate the findings of scholars such as William Gamson who focus on the social-psychological processes at the micro level. Studies of framing and mobilization at this level examine how individuals come to decisions as to whether or not they should participate in politics as well as how their opinions about any given political issue are formed based on what they have seen in "public culture," be that the media, discussions among friends or the result of personal cultural understandings based on deeply held cultural beliefs and myths.

[47] Rita K. Noonan, "Women Against the State: Political Opportunities and Collective Action Frames in Chile's Transition to Democracy," *Sociological Forum* 10/1 (March 1995): 86.

Benford and Snow argue that three sets of interrelated factors affect the mobilizing potency and hence the likely success or failure of movements: first, the three core framing tasks—diagnosis, prognosis and mobilization; second the internal societal belief system constraints; third, the relevance of the frame to the life cycle of the target group. In order to "win the day" for their cause, movements must successfully perform the three core framing tasks: first identifying some aspect of social or political life as problematic and in need of change; second proposing a solution to the problem that specifies what is to be done and identifying "strategies, tactics and targets,"[48] and third mobilizing people to do something by effectively calling people to arms—by convincing people through rhetorical, visual, theatrical or verbal means not only that the movement's cause is right and just and worth doing something about, but actually getting them to do it—"moving people from the balcony to the barricade." [49]

The first two core tasks, deciding what the problem is and what is to be done are tasks done both among organizations and interested parties internal to the movement to build consensus and foster a joint identity, and also between the "movement" and those who are at least initially external to the movement—the people the movement wants to influence. As discussed in the following chapters, the use of the phrase, "the movement" or "the opposition," is merely shorthand for individual groups and organizations who come together and form an alliance and something of a joint identity in pursuit of a common goal. Such alliances have to perform consensus core framing tasks that are internal to the movement, but in this discussion I shall primarily concentrate on the consensus framing tasks done by the movement for the purpose of influencing people to

[48] Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Resonance, and Mobilization," 201.
[49] Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,"*Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 615.

share in the goals of the movement, how they affect and are affected by both by the culture in which they function and by the framing and counter-framing done by their opponents.

Gamson's conception of framing shares key concepts with that of Benford and Snow. Gamson also argues that framing has three functions: identity, injustice and agency. For Benford and Snow, the first two core framing tasks are consensus tasks—meant not only to identify the problem and the solution—but to build a sense of shared identity and fate. Similarly for Gamson the identity component is one in which the aggrieved group clearly specifies who they are—who is the "we" and who is the "them." Gamson's injustice component take this one step further by insuring that there is someone to blame for the problem—further delineating not only who is the we and who is the them but who is to blame for what is wrong.[50] For Gamson, framing injustice is crucial as it acts as a "hot cognition" to righteous anger that motivates and mobilizes people to participate—something that is not true in Benford and Snow's more strategic and less "emotional" conception of "diagnosis," although the latter do believe that clearly identifying and placing blame is very important to ensure mobilization. They note that "since social movements seek to remedy or alter some problematic situation or issue, it follows that directed action is contingent on identification of the sources of causality, blame or culpable agents."[51]

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[50] Gamson's stress on injustice as an emotion, i.e. something that causes people to go "red hot" as he terms it, is in accord with Jasper's stress on the importance of emotion to mobilization. For more on emotion and contentious politics, especially as related to framing and mobilization, see James M. Jasper, "Motivation and Emotion," in Robert Goodwin and Charles Tilly eds. *Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006), 157-171; Jeff Goodwin and James M. Jasper, "Emotions and Social Movements," in Jan E. Stets and Jonathan H. Turner eds., *Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions* (New York: Springer 2006), 611-635; and Jeff Goodwin, James Jasper and Francesca Polletta, eds., *Passionate Politics, Emotions and Social Movements.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2001).
[51] Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements," 616.

Mobilization, Benford and Snow's third core task, is what needs to be done to get people actively involved and to move them off the sidelines, to mobilize potential adherents, persuade "bystanders" to join and to demobilize opponents. Mobilization is essential to movements because neither grievances nor resources either alone or jointly create change. Mobilizing people requires a "call to arms or rationale for action."[52] Even if a movement has agreed on a problem and a potential solution, until it can implement that solution through the mobilization of people, it is all alone with its ideas. "Participation is thus contingent upon the development of motivational frames that function as prods to action."[53] Gamson's third task of framing, agency, is similar in that he argues that people must recognize that unjust conditions can be changed. Specifically is people refuse to accept the "immutability" of their current situation and choose to participate in collective action, people can be "empowered" and recognize their ability to be "agents of their own history."[54] Mobilization has a vocabulary of its own. Benford has identified four generic vocabularies of motive: severity, urgency, efficacy and propriety. Severity framing, as the name suggests, describes the problem as one which is severe, dire and in need of action. Yet knowledge of and even agreement with the fact that a problem is severe may not move people to action. Sometimes it is the vocabulary of urgency that moves people: "For even if people believe that a problem is the most troublesome, unless the expected undesirable consequences are believed to be immediately forthcoming, rationales for postponing action can be easily reconciled."[55] As

[52] Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Resonance and Mobilization," 203.
[53] Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Resonance and Mobilization," 203.
[54] Gamson, "Constructing Social Protest," 90.
[55] Robert D. Benford, "'You Could Be the Hundredth Monkey': Collective Action Frames and Vocabularies of Motive within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement," *The Sociological Quarterly* 34/2 (1993): 201.

important, if not more important than the severity and urgency of the problem, is the question of efficacy—"if only you believe!" Efficacy framing is framing which convinces people that they *can* make a difference, but it is up to them to do something. Such frames create a sense of optimism about a likely positive outcome. This increases the likelihood that people will participate and thereby aids in increasing the size of the movement. By making the movement seem stronger and more likely to succeed, efficacy framing increases the likelihood that others will consider action. Benford notes that scholarship is finally coming to address a matter that activists in movements have known to be important for some time, the fact that "successful motivation hinges on the shared beliefs that collective action will produce the changes desired."[56] He believes that research has not paid attention to "the process by which optimism or a sense of efficacy is developed and sustained."[57] Finally, propriety framing puts participation in the movement in moral terms—it is one's duty to participate to alleviate the problem. Lack of participation is dereliction of duty to oneself and future generations. Such framing often argues that if someone chooses not to participate, they are part of the problem.[58] The effectiveness of frames based on these vocabularies also depends on the frame's resonance. Resonance is the degree to which the frame is credible and salient and the relevance of the frame to the lifecycle of the target group. Resonance is discussed below.

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[56] Benford, "'You Could Be the Hundredth Monkey,'" 205. Bert Klandermans, "Mobilization and Participation: Social-Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory,"*American Sociological Review* 49 (1984): 583-600.

[57] Benford, "'You Could Be the Hundredth Monkey,'" 205, citing Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes," 470-471.

[58] Jasper also argues that morality is very important to mobilization. See Jasper, "Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Movements," in Klandermans and Roggeband eds, *Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines*, 59-111. See especially 86-89 for an important discussion on moral motivations, cultural variety of morality and morality and emotion. See also Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest*.

Culture and Internal Societal Belief Systems

Culture, which is central to framing both enables and constrains movement formation and mobilization. As no man is an island, no frame exists without cultural references and reference points to make the frame meaningful to a group of people. Culture can constrain how people see things or possible strategies or tactics in framing. However, culture can also empower movements if those creating frames know and understand which beliefs deeply resonate so as to amplify or refocus attention to those beliefs, thereby strategically using them as weapons. Benford and Snow restrict their very brief discussion of the internal cultural belief system to two factors in which culture acts only as a constraint on framing. However there is a much larger and pertinent debate on culture as it relates to framing.

Benford and Snow argue first, that the centrality of the concept to the belief system is an important constraint on framing. According to their argument, belief systems may have a few or numerous core concepts. Centrality refers to how high in a culture's hierarchical ordering of beliefs the belief promoted or valued by the social movement stands: "It is axiomatic that the greater the correspondence between values promoted by a movement and those held by potential constituents, the greater the success of the mobilization effort, as measured by the number of contributors to or participants in the movement. Things are seldom that simple."[59] They go on to note that not only is a high correspondence necessary—but the value promoted by the movement has to be one that is more intensely felt than other core values. To be effective, the value the movement is promoting has to be a priority for individuals—that is it has to be more important, or at least have a higher ranking than other core concerns which compete for individual's

[59] Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Resonance and Mobilization," 205.

attention. The second constraint that Benford and Snow site is that of range and interrelatedness. "If the framing effort is linked to only one core belief or value that is of limited range, then the movement is vulnerable to being discounted if that value or belief is called into question or if its hierarchical salience diminishes within the entire belief system.[60] The main "framing" hazard is overextension, i.e. incorporating values and beliefs that are peripheral to the movement in order to try to extend the appeal of the movement to a larger group of people.

Despite the fact that Benford and Snow argue that culture is constraining, their conception of framing is one in which culture is used instrumentally. They tend to ignore a very large debate about the role of culture and how changes in culture occur. Older definitions of culture saw it as a deeply held static, unified set of values that acted as a barrier to innovation and change. Current debate about culture's role in various forms of protest and how it both constrains and empowers change, the levels at which it operates, its public and private faces, as well as its relation to structure, resources and agency is extensive and quite lively. For our purpose what is useful here are the ideas not only of Ann Swidler's cultural toolkit, in which certain pieces of culture can be picked up and recombined, but more importantly the ideas of James Jasper, who argues that culture and emotions are central not only in framing and mobilization, but to all aspects of contentious politics.[61] Unlike Benson and Snow, who see culture as a discrete unit expressed through frames which can be put "on top" of structure in an "additive" argument, Jasper argues that culture is responsible for how we understand our universe,

[60] Snow and Benford, "Ideology, Resonance and Mobilization," 206.
[61] Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action," *American Sociological Review* 51/2 (April 1986): 273-286.

how we name things, how we understand and envision things. It provides the background for decision-making and shapes which actions we take:

> No individual or group has goals or interests that are objectively given without cultural interpretation. In interaction with others we perceive what our interest are (economic, moral, emotional…) and build political goals in accordance with them. We also decide what tactics are appropriate, even what organizational forms fits our moral vision."[62]

He is however very clear that culture is not a sponge, soaking up all other dimensions of theory such as structure, clearly stating that structure and cultural are not in opposition to each other but can be complimentary. In contrast to older cultural arguments, he also argues that there is no monolithic culture. Rather contestation among various cultural meanings is frequently at the heart of contentious politics. Thus culture is not a static entity but something that is reshaped through interactions and contestation with some ideas finding greater acceptance and others falling out of favor.[63] This view of culture is shared by others such as Katherine Verdery who also argues that culture is constructed and reconstructed through interactions, many of them contentious.[64]

Such contentious interactions that both deploy culture and reshape culture are frequently purposeful. Like Benson and Snow, Jasper argues strongly that culture can be deployed strategically with the goal of obtaining specific ends:

> Cultural meanings and feelings do not exist in a vacuum. We always need to appreciate their strategic contexts: who hopes to have rhetorical effects on others, in what arenas, with what goals in mind and how are audiences affected by the messages they receive, the beliefs and morals they hold,

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[62] Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest*, 10.
[63] Jasper and others make the point that competing cultures—or cultures that are in fundamental disagreement over certain points can exist in one place and time. See also Marko Zivkovic, "Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny in the 1980s and 1990s," PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2001, which also strongly makes this point throughout.
[64] Katherine Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies, Reburial and Postsocialist Change*, (New York: Columbia University Press 1999). See especially 34-36.

> the emotions they feel…combined, culture and strategy offer us a powerful toolkit for explaining political action.[65]

Thus, while cultural understandings can constrain political actors by limiting their understanding of the world and the options available to them, culture can also be at the heart of opportunities for political change.

It is also essential to many contemporary understandings of culture's role in framing and mobilization to understand not only how cognitive "ideas," but also emotions, play an essential role in political change. As previously noted, authors like Jasper, Verdery, and Goodwin are at one with Gamson on this issue. While not all authors cite injustice per se as the "red hot" button that can bring about action, they all do agree that, as Goodwin and Jasper put it, "some emotions form the raw materials for movement sympathy and recruitment," and that "emotion norms also affect whether people think that they can engage in politics and in which ways." [66] They note some emotions such as depression, fear and shame are debilitating, depressing the likelihood of mobilization while others such as confidence, anger, outrage and pride increase the likelihood of action.[67] While emotions can spark spontaneous actions, nonetheless it is political activists who "do extensive rhetorical work to transform emotional raw materials into specific beliefs and suggestions for action."[68] This type of rhetorical work, which is purposeful and strategic, is framing.

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[65] Jasper, "Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements," in Klandermans and Roggeband, eds., *Handbook of Social Movements*, 61.
[66] Goodwin and Jasper, "Emotions and Social Movements," in Stets and Turner eds. *Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions*, 618.
[67] These emotions are not the same as what is meant often meant in the literature when analysts discuss "efficacy," i.e. a rational calculation of the chances of success.
[68] Goodwin and Jasper, "Emotions and Social Movements," in Stets and Turner eds. *Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions*, 620.

Relevance of the Frame to the Lifecycle of the Target Group

Why is it that some frames strike a "responsive chord in individuals" so as to motivate them to action and some do not? What makes people move from the armchair to the ballot box when in the past they believed that their vote had not made a difference? As a Slovak piece of campaign literature noted, on election day people have options—they could "go to the mountains, clean out the cellar, go on vacation, visit relatives at the other end of Slovakia, make sauerkraut, vote, or forget about the elections and then go complaining to the gods."[69] And, what mobilizes people if need be from the warmth and security of their homes to potentially violent street rallies to protest electoral fraud?

Credibility and salience are the two major factors that make frames effective, increasing the likelihood of mobilization. Frame credibility is a "function of three factors: frame consistency, empirical credibility and the credibility of the frame articulators or claimmakers."[70] In short is the frame believable? Consistency is a matter of whether or not a social movement's actions are consistent with its professed beliefs. Do what they say and what they do, and the way that they do things, match? If, for example a movement claims to be a non-violent movement, throwing stones will be seen as inconsistent and will detract from the strength of its frame and is resonance. Empirical credibility, the second factor of frame credibility, is "the apparent fit between the framings and events in the world. The issue here is not whether diagnostic and prognostic claims are actually factual or valid, but whether their empirical referents lend themselves to being read as "real" indicators of the diagnostic claims."[71] The perceived credibility of

[69] GEMMA 93, *Volby 98: Cesta pre Slovensko* (Elections 98: The Road for Slovakia), (Rimavska Sobota: Institut pre verejne otazky and GEMMA 93, 1998).
[70] Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements," 619.
[71] Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements," 620.

the frame articulators is whether or not the speakers seem to be experts on a topic so that their professional credentials give their testimony or arguments additional weight and whether or not the speakers are to be trusted.

Salience is composed of two factors: experiential commensurability and narrative fidelity. Experiential commensurability is the degree to which "movement framings [are perceived to be] congruent or resonant with the personal, everyday experiences of the targets of mobilization"[72] Framings that are too abstract or distant will not resonate in the same way. Thus framing of distant ideals or principles are harder to grasp than things that can act as the embodiment of that principle or are factors that are part of people's everyday lives. Narrative fidelity speaks to the degree that the framing is congruent with cultural myths, folk wisdom and national or cultural narratives.

Thus credibility and salience of frames as planned and devised by elites are what move people, in this case, from home to the ballot box. While at the beginning of campaigns people may be unconvinced that their vote will make a difference, especially if they have been cheated repeatedly in the past, once convinced through efficacy frames that they can make a difference and that their vote does matter, through propriety frames that it is their duty to themselves and to their fellow citizens to vote, and through injustice and agency frames that at this critical historical moment it is their opportunity to become agents of their own history—many may move from the armchair to the ballot box. Certainly in the Serbian case as I demonstrate in Chapters Three, Four and Seven through Twelve, what moved people first from their homes to the ballot box and later to the streets was the fact that having become convinced over the course of the campaign that change was possible if they voted, having invested time, effort, energy, their hopes and

[72] Benford and Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements," 621.

beliefs into the campaigning—injustice, righteous anger moved them first to the ballot box and then later to the streets when electoral fraud was perpetrated under these conditions.

PART I: SUPPLY

CHAPTER THREE

Political Opportunity Structures: Government and Opposition

Political opportunity structure has long been a variable used to explain outcomes in contentious politics by making claimants highly dependent on the political contexts in which they operate. In most variants, political opportunity structure arguments focus on the structure of the government in power—whether or not there are fissures among the elite, whether the armed forces are under control of the government, whether or not the government seems to be opening or closing space for claimants. Such political contexts are usually examined to see how they constrain challengers from achieving their goals.

There is no denying the importance of context and the ability of government in power to alter the playing field. However, such arguments seem to argue for a rather static playing field and they almost always assume the existence of previously organized challengers. The problems with such assumptions are clearly twofold: First, while isolated individuals may have grievances and may share grievances, collective entities that will make claims on a government need to be built—their existence cannot be taken as a given. Such entities will also not always be social movement organizations per se—it may be an alliance or coalition of groups or groups and individuals. How people understand their purpose, their needs and their capacities and the degree of cooperation that is needed to achieve a joint goal, will affect their ability to reach a desirable end. Second, such entities, once formed, have the ability to change the playing field through their choices and actions. They must not only *perceive* opportunities but they can choose to take strategic actions to alter both their own supporters and their opponents'

perceptions and calculations. Thus, in most political opportunity structure arguments a full fifty percent of the equation is missing in action—the opposition.

I argue that oppositions have political opportunity structures that they create and that these structures, while shaped to some extent by the context in which they are operating are not solely defined nor determined by the context. Clearly the nature and strength of the regime in power can shape perceived opportunities and make some choices seem easier or harder than others. But I will also argue that oppositions are less constrained by these factors than traditional arguments see them as being. Oppositions—a term I use loosely to denote a whole constellation of different types of organizations that are joined by opposition to someone or something and choose to work together[1]—can reshape the actual landscape of contention and tip the balance in their favor. First however, they have to come into being.

This chapter will examine the political opportunity structure in Serbia in the late 1990's. Without delving too deeply into the past, since many others have done extensive work on Serbia, the dissolution, the wars of the 1990's its foreign relations and their affects on opposition protests, I will give an extremely brief history of events—the interaction between the government and contenders in prior years—and briefly consider the government's subsequent strategy. I will then briefly consider the constellation of forces that would eventually come together to work against the government. I will examine their origins, the lessons they chose to take from past encounters with the

[1] My conception here of "oppositions" as multi-organizational and faceted follows that of Dieter Rucht, Juergen Gerhards and Friedhelm Neidhardt, who point out that an "opposition" is rarely a single unified entity. Rather it is usually composed of "complex webs of individuals and organizations—'mobilized networks of networks.'" Dieter Rucht, "Movement Allies, Adversaries and Third Parties," in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 202.

government and how these previous experiences shaped their thinking about what was necessary if they were to succeed in the future.

Shaping the Political Opportunity Structure

By the year 2000, political opposition, students and NGOs had been engaged in an almost decade-long struggle to change the political course in Serbia. With the exception of the 1996 municipal elections in which the Zajedno coalition had won 41 municipalities,[2] none of those who opposed the government's policies—and the nature of the regime itself—had had very much success in either electoral politics or changing the nature of the government's policies. The following section briefly considers the question of why there had been little success against the regime in the past.

Political opportunity structure arguments would lead us to believe that previous efforts failed because the regime had been very repressive, or that the regime elite had been very unified and that therefore there was no possibility of either opposition civil or political figures capitalizing on these fissures among the regime elite to gain a "foothold." Neither argument is a particularly accurate picture of Serbia in the early 1990s. The Serbian government throughout the 1990's was a reflection of what is commonly called a "hybrid" regime—a government in which there are authoritarian components or tendencies—but also one in which such tendencies had not gained a solid foothold and the regime, either out of choice or necessity, cannot completely exert its will. In fact, like

[2] The total number of municipalities that Zajedno won differs in various accounts although it is significant that Zajedno took most of the largest cities in Serbia. While Sreten Vujovic reports that Zajedno won elections in 41 out of a total of 189 municipalities, Milica Bogdanovic, Ljiljana Milanovic and Miodrag Shrestha in the chronology of the same book reported that Zajedno claimed to have won in 45 municipalities. See Sreten Vujovic, "Protest as an Urban Phenomenon," in Mladen Lazic, ed., *Protest in Belgrade: Winter of Discontent*, trans. Liljana Nikolic, (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 1999), 206. The *New York Times* reported that Zajedno won 32 municipalities including the capital Belgrade.

many such regimes, in order to maintain its legitimacy, it had regularly held elections which could not be termed completely free and fair due to the government's ever-increasing hold on the media and a certain amount of electoral fraud—but neither could they be called completely falsified elections in which the government was assured of a win.[3]

As many have pointed out, part of the responsibility for past electoral failures of the Serbian opposition lay with the political opposition itself, not only disunited about programs and tactics (especially whether to participate or boycott) but frequently rife with vitriolic personal in-fighting. The political opposition had been able to bring people to the streets for protests but not been able to change the government. Moreover, parties and their program were not the axis on which politics turned in Serbia—rather, personalities were key. Thus, in-fighting, continual splits in parties and realignments, and a lack of solid party programs led to confusion, vote-splitting and eventually disgust among many of the voters who might have voted for the opposition. Many voters retreated almost completely from "politics," seeing opposition politicians as being as "dirty" as regime figures. Moreover, the opposition had never been able to present a

[3] See Larry Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes," *Journal of Democracy* 13/2 (April 2002): 21-35. Diamond notes that such regimes are "pseudodemocratic" in that the arena for contestation is not free and fair but that an opposition victory is not impossible (24). Diamond's article is the cornerstone for debate on the topic of hybrid regimes. See the April 2002 issue of *Journal of Democracy* for an exchange among several scholars on how to define hybrid regimes. This topic continues to spark extensive debate, for example the discussion between Lucan Way and Sharon Wolchik with Valerie Bunce in *Journal of Democracy* 20/1 (January 2009). See also Graeme P. Herd, "Colorful Revolutions and the CIS: 'Manufactured' Versus 'Managed' Democracy?", *Problems of Post-Communism* 52/2 (March-April 2005): 3-18; Ivan Krastev, "Democracy's 'Doubles'," *Journal of Democracy* 17/2 (April 2006): 52-62; Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., "Revolution Reconsidered," *Journal of Democracy* 18/1 (January 2007): 42-57; Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell, "Pathways from Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy* 18/1 (January 2007): 144-156; Henry E. Hale, "Democracy or Autocracy on the March? The Colored Revolutions as Normal Dynamics of Patronal Presidentialism," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39 (2006): 305-329; and Kimitaka Matsuzato, "Differing Dynamics of Semipresidentialism across Euro/Eurasian Borders: Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland, Moldova, and Armenia," *Demokratizatsiya: Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 14/3 (Summer 2006): 317-345.

credible unified vision of a different future. Even those voters sympathetic to the overall orientation of the opposition—generally against wars, in favor of positive relations with the West—had no concrete idea of what they would get were they to vote for the opposition. Some authors, both Serbian and foreign, termed the opposition the fifth column of Serbian politics.[4]

Moreover, Milosevic had proved to be an adept politician, first ensuring that in the first "multi-party" elections he had maintained power and the assets of the former regime and then later frequently splitting the opposition and co-opting some part of it to his side. He had been able to control the political and discursive agenda. Prior to 1999 he had successfully argued for the need for unity in the face of wars, and had convinced a large number of people that Serbia was an innocent pawn or victim of other countries desires, playing to some extent on national myths about the victimhood of the Serbian people. The armed forces, while not always happy, had remained largely loyal. Nonetheless, Milosevic purged top officials in 1998, most notably General Momcilo Persic, who he believed to be less loyal. Milosevic had also excelled at playing "Calvin-ball," as the cartoonist Bill Watterson of "Calvin and Hobbes" imagined it: continually making "new rules" of the game that adjusted structural conditions so as to ensure that they were favorable to him. These rules, such as the adjustment of the number of electoral districts in July 1997 from 9 to 29, which essentially gerrymandered the entire country for him, were argued to be legitimate changes that could be made by

[4] Florian Bieber, "The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society: Roots of the Delayed Transition in Serbia," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 17/1 (2003): 73-90; and Vesna Pesic, "Prospects for Democracy in Serbia: An Analysis of the Collective Identities of State, Society and Nation," in Zagorka Golubovic and George F. McLean, ed. *Models of Identities in Postcommunist Societies,* Volume 10 of Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change, Series IVA, Eastern and Central Europe, (Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy), 1999, 55-68.

parliamentary rules and were ratified as needed by the appropriate official bodies. The fact that Milosevic was making choices, i.e. *choosing* to constantly change the rules shows that Milosevic had not created a structure that, by itself, constricted options; rather Milosevic and his regime were working regularly to create and enforce inequalities. This was the act of doing something—agency—not structure at work. Thus, the idea that political opportunity for the opposition was a matter of waiting for a window to open or to shut in the structure that Milosevic had created is a false notion. As the opposition would have to do work to change the context, so too was Milosevic constantly working to create and reinforce the inequalities he had managed thus far to impose.

Although it occasionally used coercion, the regime had not been particularly physically repressive towards Serbians prior to 1999. Students had protested and with the exception of the particularly brutal use of force to put down student demonstrations in March of 1991, the regime had not put tanks on the street against Serbs.[5] NGOs had also been allowed to form and freely function with only minimal disruptions.[6] They had distributed aid to various sectors of the population, dispensed legal advice, recorded human rights abuses and held academic debates. Several NGOs had held protest actions against the wars, in some cases cooperating with other groups such as students. Students too had been allowed to protest. While frequently harassed and sometimes arrested, they had not been slaughtered, gassed or tortured. Oppositional films and theater pieces were shown. The media was strongly repressed, but it was not controlled entirely.

[5] Although the 1996/97 student and political protest had been non-violent and peaceful on the part of the protestors, there had been several days when the police violently beat protestors and political figures including Vesna Pesic. See the Chronology in Lazic for an overview of these occasions.
[6] Sonja Licht, interview by author, Washington DC, November 8, 2007.

In short, Milosevic did not have complete control over the political environment and neither could, nor did, use totalitarian means to completely control Serbs in Serbia proper.[7] Nor were political fissures among the elite, to the extent that there were any, particularly useful to the opposition. But this was not due to the political opportunity structure, i.e. the political context of the state in which they operated, as much as it was due to what I term the political opportunity structure of the opposition. The political opposition was unable to complete successfully in a biased environment because they themselves did not, and seemingly could not, manage to create the structure that would be necessary to win. In the past not only had Milosevic been in control of the "agenda" but he had managed to split the votes among opposition candidates, siphoned off candidates thereby discrediting them, and had stolen votes. To win, the opposition would have to build a working framework in which they would appear to be unified, back a single list of candidates, have a candidate for president (if presidential elections were to be called) who was electable and who would be credible to voters. In order to win in such an environment the opposition would have to devise and agree to a *strategy* that would allow them to build a single unified vision of the future on issues that mattered to people—to make its issues top the agenda and manage to get along with each other long enough to build credibility and get people to the polls. Vote total would have to be verified in such a

[7] It is unclear that Milosevic ever garnered sufficient loyalty from the armed forces after 1991, other than his "special forces," so that any of them would have directly mowed down unarmed, peaceful Serbian civilians. There are definite indications that the Army especially would have been extremely reluctant to use force against unarmed civilians. Professional training and sense of institutional professionalism reinforced their sense that they were to fight only outsiders. Milosevic's cavalier treatment of the Army, unpaid wages, assigning them to duties they felt were not their place (e.g. assigning officers to guard Mira on her shopping trips) and sending them to into harm's way to fight against NATO had not gone over well, especially among the lower echelons of the officer corps, though the most senior commanders expressed loyalty to Milosevic. The Army also felt ill-treated in comparison to other types of armed forces who Milosevic paid on time. See Daniel Sunter, "Army Disaffection Grows," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report, No. 137, May 5, 2000, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.

way so as to prevent large vote theft, or make it possible for Milosevic to win through only such large vote theft that he lost all legitimacy, including in the eyes of many in the armed forces.

NGOs and students had had success in the past—but in limited ways. To the extent that they had to rely on politicians to bring about change in the system they were clearly hampered by the lack of a unified political opposition. Even in cases where such unity had existed (DEPOS, Zajedno), it had been short lived. NGO and student protest success, or lack of success, was also a result of each group's size, their reach and depth. Both NGOs and students had primarily though not exclusively appealed to, and had been found appealing by, a largely middle class well-educated urban audience. Although all movements and protests prior to 2000 had had some appeal in urban centers outside of Belgrade, the NGO movement especially through 1996 was largely Belgrade-centered. Both the students who were to form Otpor, as well as NGOs such as Civic Initiatives and CeSid realized that to run an open-ended campaign with no known "endgame" they would have to both broaden and deepen their appeal, building a broader more durable institutional base of support as well.

Such a campaign for the long haul would be different from previous efforts, including those of 1996/97. In the past, NGO and student "actions" had been of shorter duration and had been in ***reaction*** to events. In contrast to anything they had done in the past, to help bring about a change in the regime when no elections had been called NGOs and students would have to commit to proactive measures, not against a specific event or policy, but rather against the entire regime. As they would have to commit to a struggle of uncertain duration—there was no guarantee that the opposition politicians would be

able to convince or force the government to hold elections in the "next" year, or the year after that—they would have to procure monetary resources, and enlist the enlistment many people, building ever wider and deeper networks that would include a larger demographic than they had previously reached. NGOs and students would have to devise strategies that were not vague but concrete, based on the resources they had—not what they wished they had. They would have to find a way to reach and convince a larger number of people than ever before to somehow be directly involved: to go to rallies and join organizations. Eventually, should the opposition convince the government to hold elections, NGOs and students would have to get people to join in door-to-door campaigning, to monitor polls for parallel vote counts, to help run debates, organize transportation, but at a minimum convince people to go and vote.

Thus NGOs and students both learned invaluable lessons from the 1996/97 experience: in order to "win" they would have to take charge of and change their own "political opportunity structure"—they would have to create deep, strong and wide networks, with varied demographics nationwide if they wanted to succeed. This would include building a membership that had a strong collective identity dedicated to the same goals and willing to take action. They would have to procure resources and find ways to cooperate so that a "multiplier" effect would work to their advantage. They would not only have to obtain resources but deploy them in such a way so as to increase the number of people who participated and were vested in the process. Finally, they would have to devise and effectively deploy strategies to keep their membership intact, find ways to continue to work cooperatively and ultimately demonstrate their effectiveness.

Both students and NGOs recognized the importance of building organizations to their future success.[8] Organizations recruit members; dedicated members who share the group's goals and visions are essential to goal attainment. Membership is not only important to convince the ruling regime of one's legitimacy through "vastness in numbers," but more importantly, is crucial to carrying out sometimes risky but necessary tasks. People who choose to become members of a group become vested not only in the goals of the organization, but through participation develop increased emotional as well a rational attachment to members of the group as well as the group's goal. Studies have repeatedly shown that development of a collective identity is key to mobilization and overcoming the "collective action" dilemma. Without having been "taught" these things in a classroom, both students and NGOs knew the importance of dedicated members and of building membership from their previous experiences at collective protest.

Organizations may be structured to reflect the identity of the group, or to project a certain type of identity.[9] Thus, the degree of internal democracy, the way information flows and the type of internal hierarchy that exist are all reflective of the group's sense of its own identity (both real and aspirational) and are meant to project an image of the group. Tactics groups choose may also reflect their sense of identity. These types of

[8] It should be remembered that unlike groups who gather to protest or overturn something, these groups had hoped not only of getting rid of the old regime in a peaceful manner, but also of building organizations and institutions that would help in the aftermath to bring about a functioning solid democratic system in Serbia. Thus organization-building served both an immediate function, i.e. to help get rid of the Milosevic regime and were envisioned to have a more long-term function. This is not an argument that organization-building is necessary to successful protest activities, but that under certain conditions, it may be helpful. In the case of Serbia, opposition actors based on their prior experiences *did* decide that building organizations would better help them to reach their goals. In the case of NGOs they also could look to the experiences of Slovakia and Croatia in which such building and coordination had been helpful to successful outcomes.

[9] Organizational structures are as much about "identity" and the creation of meaning as they are about "rational" assessments of efficacy. Even "rational assessments" are culturally based since the understanding of what is "rational" in any given culture is based on shared mental worlds. See James M. Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography and Creativity in Social Movements*, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 20.

organizational identity decisions not only affect a group's ability to gather new members and retain older ones, but may also seriously affect a group's effectiveness. Again, as we shall see later in this chapter, different types of groups chose different types of structures, based not only on "rational" considerations of effectiveness, but on their identity and sense of who they were and how they wanted to be perceived. Otpor, for example, chose a less openly hierarchical structure appealing to those of their generation who wanted to "throw stones at the system." They therefore advertised extensively their lack of hierarchy and the large amount of creativity and decision-making leeway that students had. NGOs each internally structured their organizations differently but coordinated their efforts through a smaller core group—albeit working in a fairly decentralized manner. Political parties were far more centralized, and directly reflected the party leader's goals and personality. These different organization structures actually were all effective in getting jobs done, in part because the organization's choice of structure resonated with each group's membership.

Organizations also help to coordinate what might otherwise be vast but dispersed resources and human capacity. Such capacity left uncoordinated can dissipate instead of concentrating and multiplying the effect of both human and material resources at one's disposal. One of the lessons learned from their efforts prior to 1996/97, but emphasized by their efforts to be involved in 1996/97, especially in the case of NGOs, was how shallow and disconnected their reach was outside of major cities. Students too realized that their efforts had largely been concentrated in Belgrade. Students had walked to Belgrade from other cities during the 1996/97 protests to show their dedication and unity to the cause. But what key student organizers of 1996/97 realized was that had they been

able to mine more deeply the available student population and those of their age throughout the country, their efforts could have been that much stronger.

Finally, both students and NGOs came to recognize that their ability to reach shared goals would be multiplied if they found ways to work together. Organizational coordination can be difficult as some groups may try to control tactics and agendas leaving other groups to feel as though they have been taken over. This can lead to a diminution in membership of the group which feels overtaken due to a sense of disappointment and loss in the organization. The students had discovered this in both the 1992 and 1996/97 protests when they felt that the political parties had tried to take them over. In 1992 they had agreed to join their protests to those of the political organizations. By 1996/97 they had reached the conclusion that such combined action had not been fruitful and that students had been marginalized from goal-setting and decision-making, causing their particular interests to be under-represented. Students, therefore, had vowed that they would work with groups but would not be controlled by any other groups in the future. Splits in unity may also be caused by disagreement over tactics as well as the sense by one group that another group that is crucial to the coalition's success is disloyal. Otpor, for example, believed it was its duty and place to help keep the political opposition unified and on track and took extensive measures, including public shaming and rewards to ensure that the opposition acted properly so all parties could achieve their shared goal.

Building Organizations

By the time the NATO bombing had ended in mid-June 1999, both students and NGOs had put new and serious effort into building collective identities and organizations, the students since the fall of 1998 and the NGOs since 1996. Students, who had run their own protests against regime actions in 1991, 1992 and 1996/97, and NGOs, some of whom had been working for human rights or environmental protection since the communist era, had both learned important lessons from their prior experiences. Even political parties began once again to rebuild.

Non-Governmental Organizations

NGOs, in the aftermath of the 1996/97 protests, immediately recognized their lack of coordination, and in many cases capacity, in the regions.[10] While some significant civic associations, anti-war groups, some human rights groups and legal associations had sprung up from 1992 to 1996, most NGOs were smaller and were concentrated in major cities (Belgrade, Novi Sad, Subotica and Nis). They frequently had to compete for a very small amount of available financial resources,[11] and suffered from "splitting" (when members of one group split off to start another NGO with a very similar purpose).[12] While some of them, such as the women's rights organizations and anti-war groups in which women were heavily involved, had managed to coordinate informally amongst

[10]Miljenko Dereta, interview with the author, Belgrade Serbia, Ocotber 3, 2007.
[11] Until 1996/97 the only serious funder of Serbian NGOs and their activities was the Open Society foundation. Sonja Licht, interview with the author, Washington DC, November 8, 2007.
[12] See Zarko Paunovic, "Non-Profit Sector in Serbia: A Brief Review of the Current Situation." Centar za Razvoj Neprofitnog Sektora, Analize, August 2000. http://www.crnps.org.rs/projekti/analize/ngo_current_en.html; Zarko Paunovic, "NGOs and Peace Organizations – Serbia," *Republika* (Belgrade), September 1-15, 1995, summarized and translated in *Balkan Media and Policy Monitor* 2/18-19 (September 30, 1995), http://mediafilter.org/Monitor/Mon.18-19.html#Republika.

themselves for years based on personal ties and shared histories,[13] efforts of NGOs to be more politically involved in 1996/97 had clearly demonstrated the need for more formal, wider-reaching and deeper cooperation and coordination among NGOs. In 1996 both the Center for the Development of the Non-Profit Sector and Civic Initiative were founded specifically to bring about better coordination of NGOs.[14] While the Center for the Development of Non-Profit Sector described itself as a, "a non-governmental, independent, non-profit institution intended as a center for information and documentation, communication, counseling and research," Civic Initiatives described its founding in May 1996 as intended meant to remedy, "the relative failure of democratic movements against Milosevic regime. A great need was recognized to create social, civil base that could sustain democratic changes by educating citizens about their rights, democracy, civil society and how to be active citizens in order to decide about own lives."[15] This need was recognized by, "a group of prominent NGO activists that were involved in the anti-war movement and non-nationalist democratic opposition since 1990."[16]

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[13] See the discussion in Bojana Susak, "An Alternative to War," in Nebojsa Popov and Drinka Gojkovic, eds., *The Road to War in Serbia, Trauma and Catharsis*, (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 479-508.

[14] Theory refers to these as "mesomobilization actors" which Jurgen Gerhards and Dieter Rucht define as, "those groups and organizations that coordinate and integrate micromobilization groups. … Mesomobilization actors play a role similar to that of micromobilization actors; in contrast to them however they mobilize not individuals but groups, organizations and networks." According to Gerhards and Rucht, mesomobilization actors perform two vital functions: they provide structural integration by "connecting groups with each other, collecting resources, preparing protest activities and doing public relations. Second they aim at a cultural integration of the various groups and networks in developing a common frame of meaning. This serves to interpret the issue at stake and to link the specific concerns to this issue." See Jurgen Gerhards and Dieter Rucht, "Mesomobilization: Organizing and Framing in Two Protest Campaigns in West Germany," *The American Journal of Sociology* 98/3 (1992): 559.

[15] CRNPS – Center for the Development of the Non-Profit Sector, "About Us: Mission and Goals," http://www.crnps.org.rs/english/mission-goals.aspx ; Civic Initiatives, Citizens' Association for Democracy and Civic Education, "About," http://www.gradjanske.org/page/about/en.html.

[16] Both Dereta and his wife, Dubravka Velat, were crucial to Civic Initiative's founding. Velat, active in the Center for Anti-War Action had been invited by Centers for Pluralism to a training session in 1993. Both Dereta and Velat attended the March 1994 Third meeting of Centers for Pluralism, a trans-regional network

Both Civic Initiatives and the Center for the Development of the Non-Profit Sector worked hard from 1996 on to assist the development of viable NGOs, to increase their geographic reach and build and coordinate trust networks. The victory of the political opposition in the municipal elections in 1996/97 was important to this endeavor as opposition towns provided more "open space" for new NGOs to form. In fact, led by Vladimir Ilic, the new mayor of Cacak, mayors and political representatives of the new opposition towns started their own NGO, the Association of Free Towns and Municipalities.[17] Moreover, citizen experiences in 1996/97 led some of them to be more interested than previously in being involved with NGOs.[18] NGOs jumped in number from 196 in 1994 to 695 in 1997. Paunovic notes that after 1997 an increasing number of NGOs were funded in smaller towns and cities, especially those held by the opposition. These "strongholds" for opposition activity were important as the 33 opposition towns contained, according to his calculations, one half of the entire constituency of Serbia. New NGOs did, however, also form in SPS-JUL controlled towns such as Leskovac.[19]

In June 1998 the First Forum of the Yugoslav Non-Governmental Organizations was held, organized by the Center for the Development of the Non-Profit Sector, the Center for Democracy Foundation, and Belgrade and Open University Subotica. Their

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of NGOs that included people with experience in other formerly communist countries such as Poland and Hungary. From this came international funding from IDEE for certain programs such as training and outreach, as well as regional and international NGO contacts in a period of international isolation. See Miljenko Dereta, "The Serbian Experience: Revolution? No, Networking." *Centers for Pluralism Newsletter*, 24 (2000), Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe, Washington, DC. http://www.idee.org/CfP24.html.

[17] This organization also networked local opposition leaders in significant ways, as discussed below.

[18] Miljenko Dereta, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 5, 2007. Several NGO websites in their "About Us" sections mention their involvement in the 1996/97 protests as the impetus to found new organizations. See for example the website of Protecta which states that Protecta was established by participants in the Student Protest of 1996/97. http://www.protecta.org.yu/en_o_nama.php

[19] See Paunovic, "NGOs in the FR Yugoslavia in the Aftermath of the War. New Answers to Some Old and New Problems,"Centar za Razvoj Neprofitnog Sektora, Analize, September 1999, http://www.crnps.org.rs/projekti/analize/seal_en.html.

goal was "establishing a flexible coordination of NGOs and prompting the awareness of common interests and actions directed towards the change of the current status and position of NGOs in Society."[20] One hundred fifty NGOs attended this conference to discuss how they could improve their situation and to network. The Second Forum of NGOs was held in October 1999 to consider the role NGOs could play in the reconstruction of the country and society.

Civic Initiatives was also central to efforts to assist the building of NGOs. But Miljenko Dereta, the founder and director of Civic Initiatives, directly tied the poor situation of NGOs to the lack of democracy in the country. He therefore linked some of Civic Initiatives' actions to changing the regime. In December 1998 Dereta invited Pavol Demes, a leader in the NGO community in Slovakia to Belgrade. Demes, who had been instrumental in the Slovak OK98 campaign which had, through elections, ousted the Meciar government, did not accept the invitation, but sent Andrej Bartosiewicz who had been part of the same campaign to explain their strategy to Dereta.[21] The meeting was the first of what would be many further contacts between the Serbian and Slovak NGO communities, many in part between Dereta and later Demes.

Civic Initiatives had also been working on a campaign since 1997 to assist the development of the NGOs network called "Breaking Barriers, Building Bridges." [22] While the campaign had regularly held meetings between various NGOs as well as providing training for local and regional NGOs, its first major conference was held in

[20] Paunovic, "New Answers."
[21] Miljenko Dereta, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 3, 2007. Demes was to come later to examine the situation. See Pavol Demes "Civil Society Development in Post-War Kosovo and in Post-War Serbia," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Occasional Papers of East European Studies, Number 57, August-September 1999, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ACF45D.pdf.
[22] This campaign was part of a larger project conducted with the support of the American NGO, Institute for Democracy Eastern Europe.

September 1999. At the conference held September 5-6, over 206 participants from 144 non-governmental organizations from 38 towns of the FRY came together.[23] Joining them were also international participants. It was also the first time that many who had spontaneously initiated the Citizens' Parliaments in the summer of 1999, joined together with the rest of the NGO community. Dereta also made sure that members of the Slovak OK98 campaign were on hand to share their strategies and experiences as well as the lessons learned from that campaign—many of which Dereta was convinced could be transferred to the Serbian situation and conditions and could lead to the peaceful ousting of Milosevic.[24]

In the aftermath of 1996/97, two "niche" NGOs, [25] the Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSid) and G17 Plus, which would become key to the events in 1999 and 2000, were founded. CeSid, founded in 1997, was a direct outgrowth of the 1996/1997 student protests. Law students who had been involved in those protests and had created a student legal board, decided that change would most likely come only when the opposition had a way to count votes and hold the regime accountable. Fraud by the regime had taken many forms, but stealing votes, the very act which had triggered the 1996/97 protests, was one the students realized might be diminished if they had a way to hold the regime accountable. The law students who formed the backbone of CeSid, along

[23] This did not fully represent the spectrum of NGOs that Civic Initiatives had helped to network between 1997 and 2000. Dereta estimates that between 1997 and 2000 Civic Initiatives helped to network 300 NGOs all outside of the capital and had trained 1,000 NGO activists in NGO management. See Dereta, "Revolution? No, Networking." Also, Miljenko Dereta, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 5, 2007.

[24] Miljenko Dereta, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 3, 2007. Other goals of the conference included trying to find a way to obtain and distribute humanitarian aid, furthering ethnic tolerance and intensifying local and regional networks including the establishment of a Forum of women's organizations. See Miljenko Dereta, "Press Release, Civic Initiatives, FRY NGO Conference, September 6, 1999," http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/English/pressrelease/ci-6-9-99.html.

[25] Niche is used here to denote their specialization. Unlike Civic Initiatives, neither organization was a coordinator of a multitude of smaller organizations though both did coordinate their activities with others and ran outreach activities.

with several academics with unique and needed skill sets (especially mathematicians, staticians, and political scientists), set to work almost immediately to monitor the September-October 1997 parliamentary and presidential elections.[26] Given the nature of CeSid's work, as an organization it did not need a regular increase of members or adherents as much as it needed "occasional" but dedicated people who would help monitor elections. Due to the short period of time between its founding and the first set of elections it was to monitor, the independent trade union, Nezavistnost, whose president was also on CeSid's Council, asked members of its local branches to help with the nation-wide effort. Members of the independent Union of Retired People and several student groups also volunteered. In less than a month CeSid gathered and trained 712 people to monitor elections.[27] While insufficient for the immediate task, CeSid realized that to be successful in the future it would have to build regional offices that could train election monitors, distribute materials about free and fair elections, and help with tabulation and counting tasks. Between its founding in 1997 and the end of July 1999, CeSid managed to establish 9 regional and 16 local offices sufficiently staffed to train people across the country to monitor elections. CeSid also gained important experience in monitoring the elections in the fall of 1997 and again in December of 1997. It went public with its report of fraud in the December 1997 elections, gaining the attention of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. CeSid saw its mission not only as bringing democracy to the people through free and fair elections but also as bringing people to democracy.[28] It would need to be able to convince a large number of people of the importance of its mission—namely that the process of free and fair elections

[26] Marko Blagojevic, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 3, 2007.
[27] Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSid), *First Five Years* (Belgrade: Tipografic), 4.
[28] Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSid), *First Five Years* (Belgrade: Tipografic), 4.

mattered. Recruiting monitors would be an important task in the future when and if elections were called, as would be a public education campaign about elections. Its experience both in 1997/98 and its networking with other groups such as Nezavisnost put it in a relatively good position for when elections might once again be called.

G17 was also a direct outgrowth of the 1996/97 elections. Mladjan Dinkic, an economist, realized that the opposition was devoid of a program of economic reform,

> At that time flocks of foreign correspondents and journalists were inquiring about the program of the opposition, and I did not know what to tell them….At that time the idea was born for a group of economists to come together to prepare a program for the people that would outline exactly what democratic changes would bring to Serbia…With our collaborative efforts, we gathered a group of 17 economists to work out a program. The press named us Group G17.[29]

As an expert group, G17 continued to build its membership primarily among economists,[30] and initially limited its outreach activities to those in its field, including organizing a summer school for "young researchers." Within less than a year however, its activities that were meant to build awareness of its views as well as to build capacity for change, were aimed at a much broader audience. Its membership too would broaden in the lead-up to the September 2000 elections.[31] In September of 1999, G17 set up a network of local experts in towns across Serbia. Named G17 Plus, these experts, many but not all economists, were to help small cities and towns become better at problem-

[29] "Man of the Year 2002 – Mladjan Dinkic: Even I Entrust My Money to Our Banks," *Vreme*, G17Plus Press Clippings, http://www.g17plus.org.yu/english/files/press_clip/vreme1.html.
[30] Miroljub Labus, another important economist, joined G17 after leaving his position of Vice President of DS, a position that he held as Djindjic was president of DS.
[31] Prior to the September 2000 campaign other well known cultural figures, such a drummer Dragoljub Djuricic, became members of G17Plus, to help spread awareness of G17Plus's programs and aims. "Dragoljub Djuricic, Member of the Group 17 Plus: What Kind of President is Afraid of a Mere Drummer?" *Free Serbia Interviews*, January 14, 2000, http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/interviews/2000/e-djuricic14012000.html, accessed on February 16, 2009.

solving and local administration. [32] While G17 and G17 Plus did not actively seek "members" per se, they too actively ran public education campaigns (meant to counter Milosevic's claims about reconstruction and the economy), workshops and seminars in towns to help build local capacity, and organized a campaign for free and fair elections as well as one to get out the vote.

Several other pre-existing organizations that would be crucial to changing people's attitudes as well as eventually getting out the vote also sought to increase their memberships and solidify their networks in the period from 1996-1999. ANEM, the Association of Independent Electronic Media both benefited from the 1996/97 municipal electoral victories and was able to assist new stations now in opposition-run towns. Nezavisnost, the Independent labor union also worked hard to increase its membership and its geographic reach in the aftermath of the 1996/1997 municipal elections.[33]

The efforts of activists in the more established NGOs to aid the founding and development of the NGO sector and to strengthen and organize it were crucial to the establishment of a viable civil society in Serbia. The establishment, or at least the strengthening, of such a civil society would prove to be important to the strategy of coordinated action across NGO sectors for a single goal that first began to be devised among activists like Dereta in the early 1990's but was only actualized in the post 1996 period.

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[32] "Dinkic Announces Establishment of New 'Group G 17 Plus'," *BETA*, Belgrade, September 6, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0906, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

[33] Nezavistnost notes that its membership began to grow significantly beginning in 1995 in certain major industrial regions such as Sumadija and Pomoravlje although it provide no figures. See Dragan Ranic, "Regional ID: Introducing the Region of Sumadija and Pomoravlje," Nezavisnost Trade Union Council, Belgrade, http://www.nezavisnost.org.yu/unions/regions.htm. Martin Upchurch, "Strategic Dilemmas for Trade Union Transformation: The Experience of Serbia," *South East Europe Review for Labor and Social Affairs* 4 (2006): 51, also cites 1996/97 as a crucial year.

Civic Initiatives and Center for the Development of the Non-Profit Sector's decision to offer assistance to organizations without tying them tightly into a hierarchical structure was both an identity issue and an organizational choice that helped forge a network across interest sectors (humanitarian aid, IDP, anti-war, ecological, civil rights, women's issues) as well as across geographical regions. Because both Civic Initiatives and Center for the Development of the Non-Profit Sector sought to be a center for, but not to centralize, these relationships, the network that was built was like a spider's web, strong but flexible. It was in many ways highly decentralized, with the "center" providing "skills and supplies" to feed demand for varied projects. Since neither Civic Initiatives nor Center for the Development of the Non-Profit Sector sought to control the individual NGOs, the bond of trust between them was also high. Moreover it allowed for the development of NGOs that were "local," i.e. developed by local community NGO activists to serve the specific needs of local communities. These types of NGOs usually had both a good understanding of the communities they were functioning in and the trust of the communities they served. This "local" knowledge and trust would be key to the effectiveness of the later coordinated NGO campaign to get out the vote. This choice of decentralized highly flexible bonds based on mutual trust and volunteerism also allowed for great amounts of creativity that would be utilized later as part of the coordinated efforts and campaign, Exit 2000.

Coordination across NGOs and with other sectors of society such as labor unions, students and political parties would be more fully developed and pursued beginning at the Bratislava conference in July of 1999. Membership efforts within the NGO community and efforts to build and strengthen networks would not cease once a strategy was devised

for cross-sector cooperation—in fact, devising a strategy was part of the consensus-building that would have to be done to build and retain membership. Throughout 1999 and 2000, efforts would have to be made continuously to recruit members to help with the campaign, to retain members and keep the various NGOs working harmoniously.

Students

After the student protests had formally ended in March of 1997, many students, still dissatisfied with the regime and feeling that more needed to be done, found new ways to organize. One group of students who had worked closely together during the 1996/97 protests remained personally close, but chose to take alternative routes to the same goal. Some of these students formed the Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSid). Other very close friends formed Otpor. Otpor first came to the public's attention in the fall of 1998 with an intentionally provocative advertisement in a newspaper announcing their presence and their goals. This rather shocking but traditional way of announcing their arrival on the scene was followed by less regular means—graffiti fists sprayed on buildings and the arrest of some of their members. Membership in Otpor, especially initially, was not for the faint of heart. Little was known of them and what was, was clearly "untraditional." Otpor's main campaign at first was aimed at making themselves a household name—even if not everyone would approve of them. As a close-knit group of twenty or so people who had known and trusted each other for years, their primary goal was not increasing membership, but rather spreading "resistance."[34]

[34] All 20 founding members of Otpor had been active in the various student organizations, Student Union, Student Federation and the Serbian Student Movement, and had worked closely together in 1996/97. Their initial meetings were coordinated by Srdja Popovic. Their goal was to ensure that resistance "not be confined to the University but to expand it to all segments of society." Dusan Kosanovic, "The End of

However, the initial members quickly came to realize that membership would eventually become key to Otpor's success.[35] The more people who were official members of Otpor, the more people there would be who would participate in their actions. The more people who would participate in their actions the more they would identify with Otpor and the more likely they were to be mobilized for future actions.[36] Also, the more members Otpor had, the more overwhelming they would seem to the regime. As Otpor continuously reminded people, the regime could arrest individuals, but they could not arrest a whole movement—safety lay in numbers. However, the philosophy of Otpor also included the concept of individuals, each actively withdrawing legitimacy from the regime. Thus each person who was living in resistance was someone who could not and would not support the regime.[37]

Otpor first targeted people their own age to recruit for membership. This was an obvious choice for several reasons. First, there was a rather large pool of available and

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Otpor?" *Free Serbia Comments*, January 23, 2001, http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/comments/2001/e-a23012001.html.

[35] The concept of "membership" was tricky for Otpor as they constantly claimed that they were not hierarchical and had no members—only people living the idea of resistance. The constant disclaimers about membership—especially initially, was meant to convince the authorities that Otpor was like a multi-headed hydra and could not be stopped by arresting some of its number. The denial of "membership" also was an identity issue, it was part of its "appeal" to youth who were disillusioned with traditional forms of organization and authority. However, denial of membership proved problematic for Otpor, as, once it had grown stronger there were strategic advantages to announcing its strength in terms of members as well as how many people it could mobilize. By March of 2000, it occasionally announced how many members it had. As we shall see in a later section, Otpor also was less than straightforward, or at least never openly clear about its membership procedures. People who wished to be affiliated with Otpor filled out an application form in which they recorded their names as well their skill sets and how many hours per day they could devote to Otpor. Sinisa Sikman, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 5, 2007.

[36] If arrest records are any indicator, a large number of Otpor activists were repeatedly arrested. This could be just because they had become "known" to police and therefore arbitrarily arrested or more easily picked up after any action. However, the numbers of "repeat" offenders across a wider geographic area does seem to indicate that there were indeed people who, despite their arrest and the threats of future sanctions against them, chose to repeatedly participate. The Humanitarian Law Center's arrest reports from 2 May to 24 September 2000 give a fairly clear picture of this. See Spotlight on Police Crackdown on Otpor Serbia 2 May to 24 September 2000 accessed at http://www.hlc-rdc.org/Izvestaji/574.en.html.

[37] Otpor's concepts of the relationship of the individual and the collective in protest are further examined in Chapter Eleven.

skilled "talent" from the 1996/97 campaign lying fallow. Many students, due to the increasing restrictions on the university and due to their participation in the demonstrations of the previous year, had not yet finished their studies. Additionally, many students who were near to completion of their studies delayed finishing—aware that there were few jobs to be had.

Second, Otpor knew from polling data that of the 40% of the population that said they did not want to vote, about 65% of those were between 18 and 25. Otpor clearly saw youth between 18 to 25 as its "target audience."[38] For Otpor, initially targeting people in its own age cohort made sense. One demographic factor that can aid collective identity is age. In Serbia public opinion studies had shown that after nationality, generation was the primary factor used by people to identify themselves.[39] Moreover, as the founders of Otpor themselves knew, age was not in itself key—rather it was the experiences of a generation under Milosevic. They had largely spent the bulk of their "aware" years under Milosevic, unable to travel, unable to buy many goods, living with parents who, in many cases, were out of work. Awareness of themselves as a special and different group had also been enhanced by their sense that they simply were not living "normal lives."[40] This sense of "otherness" had been part of the reason for protest and had been reinforced by the protests in 1991, 1992 and 1996/97. It had also been

[38] Vuk Jeremic, an Otpor "international representative," quoted in Helena Smith, "A Study in Victory," *The Guardian* (London), October 31, 2000, reprinted by The Centre for Peace in the Balkans, http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=article&articleid=13909.

[39] In a poll conducted in February, 2000, 33.5% of respondents gave "generation" as the most significant "belonging" to them, just trailing "national belonging." (34.4%). See Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, "Pre-Election Study – Presidential Elections, Serbia, February, 2000," Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universität zu Köln (ZACAT), http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp.

[40] More is said about Serbs wanting "normal lives" in Chapter Nine. Two early Otpor members also discuss wanting a normal life as their reason for joining in an article published in December 1998. Both were also active in the 1996/97 protests . See Gordana Jocic, "Students against Dictatorship: Our Language is Resistance." *Nezavisna Svetlost*, Kragujevac, December 13 – December 20, 1998. http://www.ex-yupress.com/nezsvet/nezsvet9.html.

expressed in the music and lyrics of many popular rock groups. The "Milosevic Youth" generation saw these rock groups, in contrast to the regime's turbo-folk, as their authentic voice. Rock groups were also seen as cosmopolitan and expressive of a counter-culture, and many dared to have politically expressive lyrics that students knew and with which they identified. "One of the Otpor activists said, 'I grew up with these bands. They helped me become aware and take the stand that I have today.'"[41]

This was the generation of youth who had, in many ways, grown up trying to change the system; they had, in the lyrics of Darkwood Dub, grown up "throwing stones at the system."[42] Many of student age, especially those who could be drafted, had left the country. But many of the students who formed or later joined Otpor expressed the sentiment that Serbia was their country and they just couldn't "desert." One student, Ivan Marovic, expressed what many felt when he said, "I considered living abroad, but I would feel defeated if I left. This country is worth fighting for. If you had a parent in a mental hospital, you would still visit him, you would not leave home."[43] Another student, Jovan Ratkovic expressed similar sentiments even after being beaten by police when he said, "They can arrest us, maltreat us, even kill us, but we won't give up. We are staying here, we don't have a spare country."[44] In fact, not only did many argue they had did not have an alternative place to go, some saw joining Otpor as a moral obligation. Teodora Tabacki, a third year student at the Belgrade department of philosophy and a Social

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[41] Brana Mijatovic, "Music and Politics in Serbia (1998-2000)," PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 2003, 145.
[42] Brana Mijatovic, "'Throwing Stones at the System:' Rock Music in Serbia during the 1990s," *Music & Politics* 2/2 (2008): 1-20.
[43] Ivan Marovic, Otpor member quoted in "Yugoslavia's Youth Unite," *The Times* (London), September 19, 2000, reprinted in United Nations Mission in Kosovo, Department of Public Information, DPI News, International Media Monitoring Report, http://www.unmikonline.org/press/wire/im1909pm.html .
[44] Zorana Smiljanic, *Plan B: Using Secondary Protests to Undermine Repression*, ed. Liam Mahoney, trans. Dragana Gavrilovic (Minneapolis, MN: Center for Victims of Torture, 2003).

Democratic Youth member who was arrested for spraying "fist" graffiti stated, "I am convinced that the resistance to this fascist regime is my moral, political and patriotic obligation and I will continue my activities, but more carefully." [45]

In short, many young people did want to continue living as they had been living. They were "available" to be recruited. Many were experienced organizers; the protests in 1992 as well as 1996/97 had been highly organized affairs with coordinating committees that had successfully overseen and coordinated large numbers of people to get media attention, to divide protest tasks, had overseen "facilities" and "resources," had assigned duties, coordinated demands, set goals and ensured that the protests remained peaceful. Finally, university age people were good recruitment targets for Otpor because they did not have as much to lose. As an Otpor spokeman Vukasin Petrovic noted, people of university age could not be threatened with job loss, they largely did not have wives and children who could be threatened, they saw no future in Serbia as it was under Milosevic.[46] They understood better than any other group in Serbia that their future depended on change.

Otpor's framing of itself, key to its identity, which was part of its appeal, remained constant even as it later needed to appeal to a different demographic. Such consistency over time, especially as the regime became more repressive towards Otpor, added to its credibility and people's sense of its "authenticity." There were three major aspects of its identity that it framed to mobilize supporters. First, Otpor marketed itself as

[45] Veljko Popovic, "Graffiti is the Only Means of Protest Left: Interview with Teodora Tabacki, Social Democratic Youth Activist, after her Release from Prison," *Danas*, November 14, 1998, http://www.ex-yupress.com/danas/danas4.html.
[46] Vukasin Petrovic cited in Vladimir Milovanovic, "What Is Otpor?" *AIM* Podgorica, May 21, 2000, published May 24, 2000, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200005/00524-001-trae-pod.htm.

a *movement*, making clear that it was not a political party. This framing of itself was strategic in two ways: first—youth were largely disillusioned by political parties and uninterested in politics. Otpor founders knew that Otpor would most interest the younger generation if it was "of politics" but not "political." Second, such a framing of itself as a movement for change—one specifically interested in getting rid of the regime without tightly defining any other specific political goals, allowed it to attract youth with a fairly wide range of political orientations. This seeming certainty of direction while remaining vague in its specification, would later prove important as it also tried to appeal to a greater age range who were more set in their political and value orientations but could agree more generally on the need for change. This conscious choice of Otpor activists allowed it to expand its base as it allowed youth who were already active in the different political party youth groups to join forces and work together. Framing itself as a movement, that was not running candidates allowed it to argue, successfully, that it was not interested itself in obtaining power. Such a framing allowed its actions and sentiments to be more credible as much of the public did not trust politicians.

Second, key to its framing of itself, to its very identity and to its strategy was its clear and unshakeable commitment to non-violence. This very self-conscious decision, which the founders of Otpor both discussed at the time and subsequently in newspaper articles, interview and on their website was key to recruitment, retaining members and was a fundamental source of their power as they understood it. The decision to be and remain a non-violent movement, based initially on their prior experiences from 1992, 1996 and 1997, as well as adapted from Gene Sharp's theory of non-violent struggle,[47] was a core value of Otpor as well as a strategic decision, knowing, as they did that only

[47] Otpor founding members initially obtained Gene Sharp's work in translation from Civic Initiatives.

non-violence would help them retain their appeal. Through such non-violence, according to Sharp's theories, they could win.

The third crucial aspect of Otpor's identity and its appeal, both for recruitment purposes as well as for its reception among the general public was its sense of—and use of humor. While Otpor took its goals and actions quite seriously—it realized that to retain members for longer periods of time, and be appealing to the public in what were otherwise sometimes grim circumstances—part of its actions would have to be fun and funny. As one activist noted, in 1996/97 he had looked forward to being involved in the actions each day because he had fun—they were creative. Similarly Otpor founders and leaders realized that students who became involved with Otpor appreciated the chance to be creative, observers of the action could feel more kindly towards the movement if it made them laugh and, as is further explored in Chapter Eleven, humor was a means to reduce the regime's legitimacy. Thus key to building itself as an organization and to recruiting and retaining members were these three touchstones that were both an outgrowth of Otpor's own identity but were also consciously made choices by Otpor's founders and leaders.

Otpor's decisions on how best to recruit their target groups were well organized, highly directed efforts based on polling data. Their actions and efforts were not all "spontaneous actions" of "kids" poking at the system but were based on the accumulation of extensive data that was regularly consulted. Ivan Andric noted that Strategic Marketing regularly did polling for Otpor, running 16 different focus groups in 8 towns

"with city populations and village populations of different ages and different interests."[48] By the end of the Otpor's actions after the election in 2000, Andric had more than nine thousand pages of focus group and survey data.

Otpor's techniques for recruiting members also changed over time as both their target for recruitment, from youth to a broader demographic and political circumstances changed. In October 1998, when it was first founded, the group of 20 original members simply called all their friends who they knew "shared our values and shared the goal of removing Milosevic, and those who we knew had the will, the time and the energy to fight."[49] By this means they increased their membership to 100 people by the end of the year. Similarly, the appearance of two Otpor members on an ANEM TV show about the group netted approximately 500 calls of people who were interested in joining.[50] Both techniques, talking to people they knew, and getting publicity to make the general public more aware of Otpor's existence were further developed throughout Otpor's existence and played a key role in Otpor's subsequent recruiting efforts. However, initially Otpor realized that these clearly could not be the sole means of recruiting.[51]

Like the NGOs, Otpor realized that to succeed they would have to have a strong network outside the capital.[52] Initially when they were less well known and had fewer

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[48] Ivan Andric "On Marketing and Deciding to Target Specific Groups," in "How Did We Succeed: Superior Propaganda for Advertising Freedom," Centre for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies, http://www.canvasopedia.org/content/serbian_case/otpor_propaganda.htm#02.

[49] Milja Jovanovic, "Rage Against the Regime: The Otpor Movement in Serbia," in *People Building Peace: Successful Stories of Civil Society*, online publication of the European Center for Conflict Prevention, July 2005, http://www.peoplebuildingpeace.org/thestories/article.php?id=136&typ=theme&pid=31.

[50] "Our Language is Resistance."

[51] Publicity of their actions was indeed crucial not only to make people think about the regime and supporting it, and about getting out to vote, publicity of its actions was a key to recruiting. Coverage of Otpor's actions often resulted in more people being interested in joining Otpor.

[52] This realization was a "lesson learned" from 1996/1997. Just as importantly—they knew that they would have to have appeal not only among "university" students, but among people their age more generally if they were going to succeed. In this they appear to have been successful. According to Ilic, "Otpor has an incomparably greater proportion of youth of working class origins who are distributed as far as could be

members, they would pick a regional town or city that they believed had an audience "receptive" to their message and at night would spray-paint fists on walls or put up posters. Otpor specifically chose to target the regions and try to recruit outside of Belgrade. Ivan Marovic described their recruitment strategy as follows: "activists show up in a provincial town and put up posters, distribute flier or write graffiti of Otpor, the Police arrests then and a few days later the buzz about this movement spreads so much that a local outpost of Otpor is founded in the small town."[53] Activists from Kragujevac, Nis and Novi Sad also all got in touch with Otpor activists so they could start Otpor branches in their own towns. Meetings were then held to develop an action plan for the founding of new branches.[54]

Otpor took recruiting outside of Belgrade seriously. For this too they used the focus groups and polling data that they had regularly gathered. In fact, Dusan Kovanovic noted that Otpor took off much more quickly in the regions than it did in among "Belgrade" students.[55] Milja Jovanovic, one of the early Otpor activists, called the decision and successful efforts to build Otpor outside the capital a "turning point in Otpor's history." [56]

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gathered far more evenly in the suburbs of Serbian towns." Vladimir Ilic, *Helsinki Files No. 5. Otpor: In or Beyond Politics.* Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2001. http://www.helsinki.org.yu/doc/files05.zip.

[53] Nenad Lj. Stefanovic, "What is Otpor? Fist in the Eye of the Regime: Interview with Ivan Marovic," *Vreme* (Belgrade), May 13, 2000, http://www.ex-yupress.com/vreme/vreme72.html. Accessed December 3, 2007.

[54] Milja Jovanovic, "Rage Against the Regime," http://www.peoplebuildingpeace.org/thestories/print.php?id=136&typ+theme.

[55] See Dusan Kosanovic, "The End of Otpor?" *Free Serbia Comments*, January 23, 2001, http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/comments/2001/e-a23012001.html. This matched the more general pattern in 1999 of the regions reacting when Belgrade did not.

[56] Jovanovic, "Rage Against the Regime."

Later, especially as it recognized the need not only to attract a greater number of members with a wider demographic,[57] but also to ensure that "regular people" remained on its side,[58] Otpor utilized several other techniques. One of these was "soft actions" during which Otpor would try to aid the local community. The attempt to hold a rock concert fundraiser for a young boy with leukemia in Indija was one example of such an action. Otpor also had activists in rural communities help farmers on their farms in an effort to let people get to know them and to show that they were "good kids." In this way they also sought to influence rural opinion about them if not recruit farmers.[59] In some instances in addition to helping the community, Otpor could not resist providing their actions with a humorous name mocking the regime even as they helped the community. In July, Nis activists decided to help beautify the city by pulling up weeds. The action, named "Pulling up Weeds in July" was a pun on the hated JUL party's acronym JUL—which is the same as the name of the month. The meaning was obvious to all. Activists at the action were arrested for wearing Otpor t-shirts. Similarly in Gornije Milanovic, Otpor activists together with G17 Plus activists planned to clear garbage out of a passageway in the center of town in an action called "Refuse Collection." Although activists wanted to beautify the town, they were arrested by police for holding an illegal assembly. Such actions—both by Otpor and by the police only served to reinforce a positive image of Otpor for actually working to help their local towns and villages while making authorities

[57] This is clear from Otpor's attempts to broaden its base by declaring itself a People's movement at its convention in February 2000, it efforts to register as a people's movement in May, as well as in the efforts that it undertook described briefly below.
[58] Ivan Marovic also "warned that Otpor as an authentic youth movement must have the support of other occupational and age groups if this initiative was to succeed." Ivan Marovic , *Blic*, April 11, 2000, cited in Ilic, *Otpor: In or Beyond Politics*.
[59] Srdja Popovic, "On Reaching beyond Young People," in "How Did We Succeed: Superior Propaganda for Advertising Freedom," Centre for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies, http://www.canvasopedia.org/content/serbian_cose/otpor_propaganda.htm#04.

look silly or mean-spirited when they arrested them. This was especially true in the case of the attempts to raise money for a young boy, Damir Jovanovic in Indija, who was suffering from leukemia. In that instance not only did the police not allow the rock concert fund-raiser for the boy to take place, although it had been fully registered in time with the authorities, they also arrested Otpor activists, their mothers and some minors who were simply trying to run the concert as well as anyone who had already gathered there wearing an Otpor t-shirt. In this instance there had been no attempt to mock authorities—only an honest attempt to provide money for needed medical care.[60] Such actions were both helpful to recruiting, to re-enforcing a positive image of Otpor and to diminishing the authorities' credibility and legitimacy.

The second type of action to enlist a broader demographic was based on one of Otpor's initial techniques: simply talking to people that you know to try to persuade them to join.[61] In a campaign called "Otpor in the Neighborhood," begun after the Otpor "Congress" in February 2000, Otpor sought to enlist larger numbers of people of various ages and professions to Otpor and to strengthen Otpor in each town and village, thereby building an increasingly strong network. The sophisticated guidance material provided to activists on how to run such a campaign provided highly detailed information with strategies for approaching one's neighbors, friends and acquaintances to persuade them either to join, or at least support, Otpor. It detailed not only techniques but the underlying theories of "conversion," i.e. what would help change people's minds about Otpor and remove legitimacy from the regime. It also reminded activists themselves of the

[60] For information on the Pulling Weeds, Refuse Collection and Leukemia Fund-Raising attempts see "Spotlight on Police Crackdown on Otpor, Serbia, 2 May to 24 September 2000," *Humanitarian Law Center Reports,* Humanitarian Law Center, Belgrade, http://www.hlc-rdc.org/Izvestaji/574.en.html.
[61] Face to face communication as a means of persuasion was also to figure prominently in the NGO's get out the vote campaign as well as the political opposition's campaign once elections were announced.

importance of the individual to change, citing Otpor's small beginning from fewer than 20 people to a movement of more than 20,000. In an argument that resembled an "efficacy" argument it reasoned that if we can do it—so can you. Finally, the material reminded activists that for all their neighbors, they were the face of Otpor, so their individual choice of actions and the way they comported themselves mattered to the effectiveness of the movement. This was clearly a moral imperative argument—activists had a moral obligation, a duty to themselves and a personal obligation to all other members of Otpor not to do anything that in any way could diminish Otpor or imperil their fellow activists as they strove for a common goal. The campaign required activists to be organized and detail-oriented as they made charts of who they had talked to, those people's initial responses to Otpor, kept track of those who might by sympathetic to Otpor and followed up appropriately, sharing the charts with other Otpor members in the regions to brainstorm about approaches to people. It also reminded activists that they should be meeting at least once a week to exchange information and plan activities.[62]

The campaign to enlist a broader demographic was aided by the regime's own actions when it took increasingly repressive measures against the students beginning in March 2000[63] with a sharp upswing in repression against Otpor beginning in May of 2000.[64] The beating of several Otpor activists by the president's son's bodyguards

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[62] OTPOR People Movement OTPOR HR centre, *Resistance - In The Neighborhood: Resistance in the neighborhood - How to resolve the Serbian crisis peacefully*, *http:*//www.canvasopedia.org/files/w.../Resistance_in_Neighbourhood.doc

[63] According to one report, 2,000 activists from 20 towns in Serbia were arrested in March of 2000. Subsequently, 41 activists were arrested after Otpor put up around 60,000 anti-regime posters in 67 towns to commemorate the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia. See Srdjan Staletovic, "Students Protesters Side with Opposition," *Hope on the Balkans News Archive*, May 5, 2000, http://www.ddh.nl/fy/kosova/news/2000/students0505.html.

[64] After the SPS congress at the end of February the government began almost immediately to act in a more repressive matter. In March it stepped up actions against independent radio and television stations and also started arresting an increasing number of Otpor activists. While it is unclear why the regime selected May

outside his discotheque, "Madonna," and the activists' subsequent arrest by police kicked off a month of brutality against Otpor activists at a level which had not previously been seen. The Pozarevac case itself received a fair amount of attention and generated sympathy for Otpor. That Milosevic's son Marco was largely seen by the public as a privileged spoiled thug was also helpful in garnering more sympathy for Otpor and general outrage towards the regime.[65] On May 13, after Milosevic's ally and Vojvodina Executive Council Chairman Bosko Perosevic was murdered at a county fair in Vojvodina, the regime, finally awakened to the danger that was Otpor, used it as a pretext for cracking down on Otpor, arguing that the murderer was a member of both SPO and Otpor who had American government contacts in his personal address book. The fact that this was patently untrue—given subsequent reports which quickly emerged and were publicized by Otpor and through the independent press, showing that the accused held a personal grudge against the Perosevic and had never been a member of Otpor—made the regime's claim untenable.[66] This however did not stop the regime from publishing a piece

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as a month for a marked increase in repression, perhaps it found the opposition rally in April unnerving; it began what was clearly a coordinated campaign not only against the political opposition, but especially against Otpor.

[65] The case in Pozarevac was an important case and marked an escalation in violence against Otpor. The case also garnered national attention due in part to the involvement of Marko Milosevic and the thuggish brutality used. The political opposition then planned to stage a rally in Pozarevac in protest of the treatment of the Otpor activists and received needed permissions but on the day of the rally found their busses turned back, the town barricaded and a hasty counter-demonstration called by SPS involving school-children ostensibly to celebrate fifty years since the Serbian victory over Fascism. In order to avoid a confrontation, the political opposition called off the rally and rescheduled it for Belgrade at a later date—but not before pointing out that Pozarevac was a "forbidden" city on Serbian territory. Reporters were also arrested as they attempted to cover the story including a few foreign reporters. Defections of some establishment figures, triggered by the resignation of a Pozarevac judge, followed. This kept the case in the news for another few weeks. In sort, Pozarevac became a cause célèbre and was a microcosmic picture of all that was wrong on a larger national level. The situation played out for well over a month. For a flavor of the moment, consult "'Defence' of Pozarevac on Victory Day: From Belgrade to Bubanj Potok and Back," *Free Serbia Specials*, May 9, 2000, a running account with video and photos of the day's events. http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/specials/report/09052000/e-index.html.

[66] "Milosevic Ally Is Shot Dead," *The Independent*, May 14, 2000; Alexandar Ciric, "Political Violence in Serbia: Anxiety, Fear and Some Hope," *AIM*, Podgorica, May 15, 2000, published on May 19, 2000, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200005/00519-001-trae-pod.htm; Philip Schwarm, "Murder

in *Politika* denouncing Otpor as a foreign traitorous organization as well as Minister of Police Vlajko Stoiljkovic calling Otpor members traitors.[67] The increase in arrests, "informal conversations" (a form of lengthy illegal interrogations), and then additional beating of Otpor members, especially towards the end of May at a rally Otpor had called, actually led to an increase in the number of people who wanted to join. Moreover, it led to a change in the demographic joining as more "Mothers for Otpor" groups were formed.[68] The sentiment that their children should not be beaten, that they were not terrorists and that their children were doing something that they believed in—and that the Mothers sometimes wished that they had done earlier themselves—were three of the reasons frequently given for the increase in this demographic after May 2000. Moreover, in the wake of the repression in May of 2000, increasingly younger people joined Otpor.[69]

Not only did Otpor want to enlist a broader age and regional spectrum of people, it was particularly interested in "enlisting" to its side—informally at least, members of the police and military. To this end, Otpor leaders such as Srdja Popoivc and others had devised an overall strategy that was taught to all activist focused on making police understand through each contact with an Otpor activist that Otpor meant them no harm and demonstrating through each and every contact that Otpor was sympathetic to the police who they framed as victims of the Milosevic regime. To reinforce this message not only through each individual activist's interaction and contact with police, but also

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of Bosko Perosevic: Ominous Marketing of Death," *AIM*, Podgorica, May 15, 2000, published May 16, 2000, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200005/00516-001-trae-pod.htm

[67] Like the murder of publisher and journalist Slavko Curuvija in 1998 which followed a piece in *Politika* Express, such pieces when they appeared in *Politika* using certain types of wording were certainly signals from the regime to the person or persons they was slandering as well as more generally. These warnings, as people had learned, were to be taken seriously.

[68] For additional details on this see Chapter Twelve.

[69] Ilic, *Otpor: In or Beyond Politics.*

symbolically, Otpor devised several specific "actions," to send the message they were not "at war" with the police. Once again this was in some ways a carry-over from the 1996/97 tactics when protesting female students had, for example, presented the police with flowers, but this time the strategy was highly detailed. Especially in the case of arrests and during actions, full discipline was demanded from each and every Otpor member.[70] Otpor's "human resources" department ensured that all activists were aware of the rules of engagement, the difficulties that they could encounter and were well-rehearsed in what were and were not appropriate actions towards the police.

Otpor's efforts to recruit ever more people to its organization was in fact aided by the way it framed its organization, portraying itself as loosely organized groups with no hierarchy or leader. This portrayal of itself was, in some sense truly representative of how Otpor was structured, but in some senses it was also a strategically chosen illusion carefully selected to help recruit and retain members, to align with its philosophical credo and to reinforce to outsiders, especially to members of the regime, the idea that Otpor was a multi-headed hydra who could not be stopped by arresting its "leaders." [71]

Otpor chose to be less open about its hierarchical structure and in fact extensively "advertised' its lack of hierarchy and the large amount of creativity and decision-making leeway that students had. Such an image was crucial to recruit students who wanted to "throw stones at the system."[72] In certain ways there was a large amount of internal democracy—students in chapters could take decisions by consensus and the "national"

[70] In addition to "preparing" activists for beatings and coaching them on how to be rid of fear, it is clear that one significant "imperative" that kept Otpor activists disciplined was the sense that they would "betray" the group if they failed. The identity of Otpor activists with the group, and their sense that they had dedicated their lives to Otpor and its cause, led to an amazing amount of internal discipline.
[71] The idea that Otpor had no hierarchy is an oft repeated "fact" in both the popular and academic literature on this subject which I believe is wrong and reflects the success of Otpor in propagating this notion.
[72] This phrase is meant figuratively as Otpor was insistent on non-violence.

branch often challenged other branches to contests of who could be most creative in coming up with and implementing certain types of "actions."[73] While there certainly was a large amount of daring, and freedom in devising certain activities, Otpor was, nonetheless, a highly disciplined organization in which certain key decisions were taken at the top and the discipline instilled was crucial to the group's success. Despite its argument that it had no hierarchy, the leadership of Otpor remained part of the original founding group. While the group may have governed more or less by consensus and solicited opinions from a variety of Otpor "branches," Otpor still had a group of people who still seemed to have final say on issues of national strategy and directed other "chapter" organizations on key decisions. The decision for example to stop all activities during the NATO bombing to preserve the organization's reputation was one such decision. Similarly, certain campaigns, such as the "Its Time" or "He's Finished" campaigns, that were run during different phases of Otpor's existence, were also finalized on at a national level by a select group of people. Posters, stickers and other materials were also devised and approved at the national level and sent out to all the branches for use. Similarly Otpor segmented its functions at the national level so as to be more efficient in its running and organization. It had, for example, a "marketing" division, responsible for, among other things, devising national campaigns utilizing professional polling data, and a "human resources" (HR) division which helped not only with recruiting and membership but was also responsible for seeing that all activists were adequately trained so they knew how to act and how to handle certain situations, such as arrest, beatings etc. Nor was Otpor a "spontaneous" and "loose" organization when it came to running its campaigns. For its "in the neighborhood" campaign Otpor trained

[73]Sinisa Sikman, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 5, 2007.

"trainers" for all the major locations and provided not only highly detailed and specific guidance for how the campaign was to be implemented, but also how, organizationally it was to be structured. In a memo Otpor HR set forth how any branch or chapter was to be organized for this campaign. There was to be an "officer," who was the "first person recruited in neighborhood [and] who at the beginning does everything," there was also to be a "council." The memo went on to detail the rest of the structure as follows:

> "The Council" which is formed after discussing things with activists from [the] area. And which is permanent body at meetings in homes of activists, until activities start to require separate offices, even if it's not possible to have an office. And in that council, the work is roughly divided among organizers, one or more; who coordinate work of the council:
>
> "Coordinator for work" (not more than three) The future trainer who takes care of human resources and their fitting into new activities of the local Otpor.
>
> "Coordinator of activities" for group when the neighborhood increases– who thinks and plans and is responsible for performing some of the previously mentioned activities;
>
> "Coordinator in charge of material"–takes care that there is always enough material supplies.
>
> If needed, those mentioned coordinators are formed into a group at the municipality level for activities that overlap. In case your Otpor is capable of local fund-raising, you will need a cashier but that can be discussed later.[74]

Otpor also clearly had branches and new branches frequently looked to older branches for help and ideas with structure and organization. But it is clear that these branches were not individual "cells" free to operate as they pleased with discretion in all matters. Like any hierarchical organization the ties between and among groups was clear and there clearly was a top-down direction. That the organization chart might have been a bit flatter than the "typical" organizational pyramid with one block at the top did not

[74] OTPOR People Movement OTPOR HR centre, *Resistance - In The Neighborhood: Resistance in the neighborhood - How to resolve the Serbian crisis peacefully*, 11, *http://*www.canvasopedia.org/files/w.../Resistance_in_Neighbourhood.doc

change the fact that Otpor was an organization and *did* have leaders and hierarchy.[75] Moreover Otpor had *memberships* and although Otpor had decided for strategic reasons that it would never turn down anyone who wanted to be a member.[76] Indeed, to be a member one had to fill out a membership card including hours of availability, special skills and what type of activities one might be interested in.[77] Branches would also try to make sure that what they were asking of various members suited their age, interest, courage and skills.

Otpor also insisted on a high degree of discipline and planning both to ensure the success of its actions and that its "brand" and strategies were protected. All actions, from small ones where one or two activists took part in a small town square to larger "theatrical" actions involving 20 or more activists, were planned and organized: "detailed calendars and time charts were mounted on flip charts and task lists were posted for every activist…a Plan B was laid out for each primary action, in case the activists involved got arrested."[78] Plan B itself spoke to the high degree of organization at Otpor as well as the sense of collective identity that held activists together. At each action performed by Otpor activists were others, not participating who were somewhere in the crowd who would activate "Plan B" were the activists to find themselves arrested. Plan B involved 1.) calling lawyers who had already agreed to help Otpor, 2.) calling all Otpor activists on

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[75] Srdja Popovic in reference to what he learned in 1996/97 and applied to Otpor commented, "I also learned that, what I learned I my party work[is] that there is a golden rule of campaigning—that you have democracy in coming to a decision, but there is no democracy in executing the decision. Democracy in executing the decision is like anarchy—and it will cost you. So once the plan is settled on, everyone has to stick to the plan." "In His Own Words: Srdja Popovic," *A Force More Powerful,* http://www.aforcemorepowerful.org/films/bdd/story/otpor/srdja-popovic.php, excerpts from an interview with Srdja Popovic conducted in Belgrade, November 20, 2000, by Steven York.

[76] Membership was open to anyone. Some of the top activists realized that they might be infiltrated but they also strongly felt that such infiltration would be unable to shut them down. See for example discussion with Marco Djuric in Laura Secor, "Rage Against the Regime: Serbian Students Fight Milosevic," *LinguaFranca* 10/6 (September 2000), http://linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/print/0009/otpor.html.

[77] Sinisa Sikman, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 5, 2007

[78] Smiljanic, *Plan B*, 7.

your "phone tree" to gather at the police station and participate in a second non-violent demonstration outside the police station, 3.) informing the independent media of the arrest, 4.) calling all opposition political parties asking them to condemn the arrest and asking them to get in touch with party activists to come and join the demonstration outside the police station and finally 5.) calling the local NGOs, asking them to inform international organizations and to send letters of protest. Smiljanic herself makes the point that Plan B was planned well in advance and "could not be organized on the spur of the moment." After detailing the type and amount of work involve in each Plan B for each action she notes that "this level of extensive and rapid mobilization was possible only due to the meticulous work Otpor had done over two years in building accurate and up-to-date databases." These databases themselves were extensive, including lists what types of Otpor activists could be used for which types of actions, a database of friendly lawyers, friendly NGO activists and friendly journalists. The databases were "built up through the constant gathering and systematization of personal contacts."[79]

Action at Plan B events, the amount of discipline maintained[80] and the very purpose of organizing a Plan B event, to rescue activists while bringing further attention to their cause, also speaks to the strength of solidarity and identity built up within Otpor as an organization. Attention to individuals to make them feel needed, valuable and part of the collective was a key to Otpor's success. Both Srdja Popovic and Zorana Smiljanic frequently speak to the importance Otpor as an organization accorded to people in order

[79] Smiljanic, *Plan B*.
[80] Smiljanic notes that every activist that went to a Plan B action outside a police station was well aware that they had to be non-violent at all times, no matter the provocation and had to remember that there was no excuse ever for anger or violence. This was key to Plan B being successful. Activists also had to appear to be having a good time (singing and volleyball were employed for example) while waiting for their friend's release to engage the sympathy of the passersby—while aggravating—but not annoying the police. Finally there had to be a commitment on the part of those outside the police station to stay until the activists were released. Groups pressing for release could not be seen to be getting smaller. Smiljanic, *Plan B*, 17.

to make them feel necessary, wanted and one with the organization. Popovic speaks in several instance of the importance of the "Human Resources" department, specifying for example that people were asked to do jobs that they were best suited for so that they could feel that they had succeeded at whatever task they were asked to perform. He also has emphasized that activists were asked to take responsibility for actions so that they could feel that positive outcomes were the efforts of their labors. Smiljanic points out that Plan B was not only successful in getting activists released, but that activists, when they were released from arrest, were frequently "exhausted, tired, frightened and angry." However when they were "greeted by crowds of friends and well-wishers" they felt needed, appreciated and taken care of by their organization. They knew—and other activists saw too that they would not be deserted by the organization when they needed help. Additionally released activists would be asked to share their experiences with other activists in their branch. This both prepared activists for future arrests and created a sense of solidarity. Such care to tending human needs within the organization certainly built up not only a sense of efficacy within units, but a strong collective identity throughout Otpor, one that only increased the sense of shared identity due to generational factors and in many cases common past experiences in protest.

What is remarkable for all this is the vociferous degree to which Otpor regularly announced that it did not have a leader, that Otpor was an "idea" that no one can be in charge of and that every individual that resisted was living resistance. As previously mentioned, some of this "advertising" was due to the fact that young people perceived the Milosevic regime as being hierarchical and they simply did not want to be like "them." The generation that Otpor most often sought to attract and influence simply would not

identify with an organization if it could be called "hierarchical" and identity would be important to recruitment, commitment and retaining members and their loyalty. It was not a cynical design per se by a leadership to pull the wool over members' eyes and call themselves something that they were not—it was how the original members perceived themselves and was part of their identity. But underlying the disclaimer of hierarchy and organization was indeed a hierarchical organization that had a top and a middle—perhaps flatter than some—but one that indeed was organized and found that it had organized itself in such a manner because it was most efficient to its own running. That its identity did not exactly jive with its needs allowed perhaps a certain amount of "schizophrenia" in what it called itself and what it was. Otpor wanted to be a "movement" not a "political party" and movements were freer and less hierarchical than parties in their eyes.

The philosophy underlying Otpor, that every individual could contribute if they chose to live in resistance, was key to its appeal—not only for obtaining members but also for increasing bystander sympathy. However the philosophy did not allow for an "openly" hierarchical organization. Such a philosophy belied the need for organization at all. Thus having local branches and chapters that seemed to be groups of spontaneous kids doing things fit much more closely with the professed belief system than did an organized hierarchy—which was indeed exactly what Otpor professed to fight. Not only in its beliefs, but in its means of organization, it wanted to show that it was different than the regime—it sought to change not just the people—but the system. Having this as a professed goal, it clearly could not appear to resemble the system. To be clear, I am not arguing that Otpor was organized in the same manner as the regime—but I am arguing that its organization chart did not fully match the image it sought to portray.

Finally, the argument that Otpor had no leader but could mobilize hundred and thousands of people was one that Otpor needed to be able to make to the regime for the "intimidation" factor if nothing else. It knew that eventually its ability to turn out numbers would be required. Moreover, it could not afford to allow the regime to believe that if they rounded up and arrested 20 specific people they would have killed off Otpor. Ironically, initially in the first few months of Otpor's existence this would have been true. By the time the regime realized and started to act against Otpor, with massive arrests, it was in a sense too late. Each Otpor branch was set up and its members carefully trained so that one person could replace another if need be. Activists were trained in techniques to deal with arrest and systems had been set in place (Plan B specifically is one example) to free activists as quickly as possible. Otpor had built strong relationships with attorneys who willingly worked to get Otpor's activists freed and had, perhaps very importantly learned how, through framing to keep the sympathy of the general public on its side. Its repeated claims however that it had no leader and that it was just a movement were essential to keeping the regime "off balance" as the regime sought a way to damage or cripple Otpor permanently.[81] That the regime believed that Otpor had leaders and was structured as it was, became clear in the questions repeatedly asked during each interrogation and "informal talk" of arrested Otpor activists. That the regime never got

[81] An example that encapsulates this is an interview that B2-92 did with Srbijanka Turajlic, (described as 'chairwoman" of the Otpor "presidency,") in which Turajlic was reported as saying: "The regime is fighting an already lost battle, since it cannot detain all eight millions people who support this movement…Turajlic said that the secret of the success of this movement was the fact that activists did not need leaders. You cannot get rid of the Popular Resistance Movement because you do not know who is the one that should be eliminated Turajlic said." Radio B2-92, "Serbian Resistance movement consists of people, not leaders—activist," June 24, 2000 in Serbo-Croat, BBC Monitoring Europe – Political, June 24, 2000, available on Lexis-Nexis/Academic.

names was a credit both to the discipline of activists and to the way the Otpor had chosen to organize itself.

Despite its claims about being a spontaneous movement, Otpor was indeed a very well-structured organization with lines of command, divisions of labor and "national" leadership. It was both efficient and effective at "growing its' membership. Otpor managed to "grow" itself from it original 20 members to approximately 80,000 people by September 2000[82] with branches throughout Serbia. It was highly disciplined even in the face of police brutality and it trained its members in such a way to keep them both on message and on task. Although Otpor was initially created in response to two laws which students felt were egregious, a new university law and a new media law, Otpor quickly broadened its mission to one not only of regime change but of systemic change. Specific research on the subject done for Otpor demonstrated to Otpor's founders that its target audience was those of its own generation who had become so disillusioned that they were no longer willing to work against the system or even to vote. Awakening people from apathy and getting them to "resist" was its goal. In order to recruit and retain enough members to do this, Otpor internally framed itself as a "movement," so as not to be seen as a political party, which carried with it negative connotations. This framing of itself also was strategically useful for recruiting, allowing it to capture anyone in the "opposition" spectrum—no matter what party they normally might be affiliated with, if any. It also allowed them to maintain credibility with a wider external audience and be seen as something fresh and new. Their internal framing of their organizational structure also increased their appeal to their own generation. This not only made them interesting to potential recruits but increased loyalty and collective identity among members that

[82] Jovanovic, "Rage Against the Regime." Jovanovic was an Otpor activist.

would later be instrumental to increased mobilization. Similarly their insistence that they were only funded locally and from the Serbian diaspora was a framing done to ensure that they maintained their credibility both with their own membership as well as with the external public.[83] Like certain NGOs, Otpor was an organization that was built for a specific purpose and although it occupied a very specific niche in the oppositional spectrum, it had widespread appeal. The purposeful and successful building of Otpor was crucial in bringing about changes in the "political opportunity" structure, changing the power equation on the ground.

Political parties

Whereas NGOs had had a limited history before 1996, and students had a long but positive history of protest, opposition political parties and figures had a long and checkered history as far as the public was concerned. The leadership of the opposition had, since the inception of the various parties beginning first in 1990, never managed to overcome infighting among leaders of various parties—often personal and vituperative factionalism and splits in parties. Most opposition parties were also largely the product of leaders, not the products of nor representative of certain regular sets of political values. While such problems might be expected in a country that prior to 1990 had been

[83] Otpor was almost completely financed by the US government. This financing paid not only for stickers, buttons, posters, the desirable t-shirts and other Otpor paraphernalia—but was also crucial in providing "infrastructure" support in the form of computers, servers, cell phones and other means of communications. The money also paid for regular trainings that activists received as well as travel and other assorted expenses. It is clear that Otpor's ability to extend its reach and more importantly maintain its level of activity was dependent on such funding. Daniel Calingaert, interview by author, Washington DC, January 3, 2008. That Otpor's reach was significantly increased is an opinion shared by Ilic, *Otpor: In or Beyond Politics*, 55. For additional mentions of Otpor funding see Roger Cohen "Who Really Brought Down Milosevic?"*The New York Times Magazine*, November 26, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/26/magazine/who-really-brought-down-milosevic.html. The funding of Otpor was a constant topic of discussion as the government in particular sought to tie Otpor to outside funding in an effort to brand them as traitors. It is likely that had the broader public know the degree to which they were funded by the outside it would have discredited them.

officially "socialist," the problems in Serbia—especially among leaders did not seem to diminish over time. Some Serbians called them the fifth column, arguing that Milosevic couldn't stay in power without their help. Thus the many attempts at building coalitions which could have challenged Milosevic resulted in failure as the coalitions fell apart. Even the Zajedno coalition, which the public had spent 88 days out in the streets in the middle of the winter protecting, quickly fell part once it got into office in 1997, a victim of fighting between Draskovic and Djindjic.[84] The immediate fallout from this was the complete disillusionment of the public with the national opposition politicians. Amongst the politicians themselves who had formed the coalition. Vesna Pesic (GSS) sided with Djindjic, blaming Draskovic for the break-up.

The only real victory of the 1996/97 elections was at the local level outside of Belgrade where the opposition coalitions refused to disintegrate just because their national coalition had done so. Newly elected opposition mayors, many still fighting for their seats and powers well into February 1997, took their hard-fought-for offices and proceeded to go about the business of trying to govern towns and municipalities. They also decided that banding together to learn from each other and form their own "bloc" to better pressure the federal level was a good idea. By March 15, 1997, the Alliance of Free

[84] Djindjic's refusal to promise that he would back Draskovic for post of president in the *next* set of elections as he had indicated that he would when they first formed Zajedno led to Draskovic also personally ensuring that Djindjic was removed from his post as mayor of Belgrade. Djindjic's term was thus quite short running from February 21, 1997 to September 30, 1997. Draskovic's personal ambition and desire to make sure that he exacted revenge for what he perceived as personal slights or acts of disloyalty were to plague his relations not only with the rest of the opposition figures through the end of 2000, but just as importantly with his own party at the local level. See Chapter Seven for his treatment of Velimir Ilic, the SPO's Vice President and opposition mayor of Cacak until his ouster by Draskovic. This changed the dynamic of relations between local opposition mayors and their support for Draskovic versus their eventual decision in many cases to join with the Alliance for Change led by Djindjic.

Towns and Municipalities of Serbia had held its ninth session.[85] Representatives of 33 towns and municipalities took part in the meeting in which they agreed to a method of self-financing. They agreed that the opposition towns as a group would demand that the Serbian Supreme Court re-examine the way in which a new law allowed town and municipal properties to pass into federal hands and to ask citizens, if necessary, to protest the sale of national assets, especially the postal, telephone and telegraph service to pay salaries of the police and army. Over the next few years opposition mayors and town councilors actively built connections and new bonds using the Alliance of Free Towns and Municipalities as a vehicle to learn from each other, exchange information and establish better trust and working relationships at the local level.

The Alliance of Free Towns and Municipalities also supported its citizens who cared to be involved in politics, and protest, as well. In September 1999, after the "long hot summer" of spontaneous protest (see Chapter Six), The Alliance for Free Towns assisted with the creation of a national Civic Parliament of Serbia.[86] Civic parliaments, which had sprung up that summer as a result of citizen initiatives, would now be networked together to create "an association of all the civic parliaments so as to facilitate cooperation between towns." Verica Barac, the spokeswoman for the Civic Parliament of Cacak noted that, "At the constituent meeting we will agree on mutual links and cooperation to help one another in case of the regime's repression of our attempts to join together citizens who wish to state their dissatisfaction publicly, as happened in Leskovac

[85] The Alliance of Free Towns and Municipalities held its first "congress" on December 22, 1996. Miodrag Shrestha. Milica Bogdanovic and Ljiljana Milovanovic., "Chronology of the Protest," in Mladen Lazic, ed., *Protest in Belgrade: Winter of Discontent*, trans. Liljana Nikolic, (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 1999), 211-230.

[86] Civic Parliaments and the National Civic Parliament were again "cross-tied" into a network through their invitation to the NGO conference held by Civic initiatives as discussed above.

and Valjevo."[87] Barac also stated the Civic Parliament was not to be thought of as a replacement for the republican parliament or a parallel government structure, but rather as an NGO that would be more political and partisan than most NGOs as it fought for "the democratization and decentralization of Serbia."[88] The Alliance of Free Towns agreed to participate at the national Civic Parliament's first meeting to be held in Cacak,[89] presenting information on investment aid that might be coming to towns and humanitarian projects. Thus the Alliance of Free Towns which itself actively worked to network opposition mayors and local-level politicians across the country and also sought to support the creation of a "vertical and horizontal" network of like-minded citizens. Such a network now tied local opposition governments more tightly to like-minded citizens—and did so not only in one locality—but across the country.

The Alliance of Free Towns and Municipalities also worked actively to elicit international support, both monetary and otherwise, for local needs, working with G17Plus and the European Union (EU) in the Energy for Democracy program in the winter of 1999 and later for example the Schools and Asphalt for Democracy programs in the summer of 2000. In short, from 1997 on, newly elected opposition leaders at a municipal level sought to create and then actively worked to strengthen a network that had not previously existed.[90] The building of such "structures" however took the active initiative of people to not only create a structure, but to give it meaning. Moreover, it was the strategic thinking and actions of those involved in the project that gave it life and

[87] "Cacak Dissident previews 'Civic Parliament' Activity," *BETA*, Belgrade, September 2, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0902, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[88] "Cacak Dissident previews 'Civic Parliament' Activity."
[89] Cacak's mayor, Velimir Ilic was a leading member of the Alliance of Free Towns.
[90] Many, but not all of these politicians of course knew each other informally from their political parties but a more formal expression into a network was new.

direction. The opposition mayors who created the Alliance of Free Towns and Municipalities reached out to a variety of other actors and created a greater density of ties both vertically and horizontally.

National Politics

Djindjic and Draskovic's visceral dislike for each other was a key factor that influenced the construction and arrangement of future political alliances and would shape those arrangements going into the elections in the fall of 2000. Moreover, Draskovic's decision in the fall of 1997 not to join the opposition's unified boycott of the parliamentary and presidential elections and then joining Milosevic's government, strongly influenced both popular perceptions of Draskovic and regional and local level political configurations.

Although Draskovic's party, the SPO, would remain the singular most popular opposition party for some time, his credibility as a "man of the people" and the "king of the streets" never fully recovered from his decision to join Milosevic—even as he argued he was trying to change the government from within. Despite his open break with Milosevic over the war with NATO (see Chapter Five), his subsequent occasional forays to "opposition rallies" led by the Alliance for Change sometimes resulted in negative reactions.

At the local opposition level, many of the regional SPO branches were unhappy at Draskovic's cooperation with the Radicals (SRS) and the Socialists (SPS) to oust Djindjic from his position as mayor. They also disliked his decision-making procedures. It was in fact at a meeting of the Alliance of Free Towns on October 27 that the Vice-President of

the Arlje town government, himself a DS member, not an SPO member, suggested that perhaps it would be best if the Alliance for Free Towns were to suggest its own candidate for the next round of presidential elections, indicating the Ilic would be a good candidate. Draskovic, perceiving this as an act of disloyalty and a "gross violation" of his position, removed Ilic from his position as Vice President of SPO.[91] Left without a party Ilic went on to found his own rather successful political party, SPO-Zajedno, which was later to be an important member in the Alliance for Change coalition.

The configuration of the opposition "political universe" was thus to be shaped from 1998 through the elections in 2000 largely by the relationship between Draskovic and Djindjic.[92] Draskovic made personal choices that decreased his popularity and led to changes in political configurations in the regions. However the shape of the opposition political universe was not based on his actions alone. Djindjic's personality and choices, especially his decision to try to bring together a political coalition of opposition parties that could bring about change, aptly named the Alliance for Change, were equally important to the future of political events.

[91] Robert Thomas, *The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 354-355.

[92] Both the history and personalities of both men have been commented on at great length by others as has the impact of those personalities and previous choices on their politics. On the whole Draskovic is largely discussed as a charismatic and fiery orator who was a "romantic" looking to the past to reestablish the monarchy and playing on Cetnik traditions. He is also described as impetuous, and moody with an insatiable desire to be the leader of all the opposition. Djindjic for his part is described as a brilliant mind who could be quite ruthless. He saw himself, as goal-oriented and willing to sacrifice some things along the way to reach his desired end. He saw himself as a realist who suffered no delusions about the somewhat amoral character of politics in Serbia and did not suffer fools gladly. He was a "modernizer," rationalist and constantly claimed to desire "modern" and "efficient" techniques and bureaucracy. He too wished to head the opposition and had been somewhat ruthless in his ascent to the top of DS.

Alliance for Change

Djindjic recognized as early as 1993 that if he wanted his party (DS) in the ascendancy, it was going to require a solid well-built party network on the ground. This network was to be efficient and "modern" in that branches and offices should run as organizations. In an interview with *Vreme* in 1996 he noted that DS had about 600 local branches, "We entered the 1993 elections with only 84. Some are better, some worse, some probably exist just on paper. In 1994 we realized that tough times were ahead of us. We started gathering people and forming branches in villages and small towns. It was a good investment."[93] Indeed by 1998 and through the elections in 2000, DS had the largest, strongest and most professionally operating party network on the ground. This organization and its members, who would provide manpower, ended up being the spine of Alliance for Change and crucial to effecting change due to their distribution and strength.[94]

If Djindjic's organization was a strength—so too was his recognition that DS could not do it alone—that it would require a coalition of opposition parties and that the larger the number of parties, the broader the coalition, the more likely they would be to succeed. Again, he had foreshadowed this strategy in 1996 in his interview with *Vreme* when he argued that the opposition parties should all have to run as one list:

> With a number of lists in the elections, the opposition might get the majority on the whole, but each list would then be under the direct pressure of the Socialist party of Serbia (SPS) which will then try to attract it. The risk of loosing[sic] the majority this way is enormous. The only way to defend ourselves from the pressure of SPS and possible blackmails is to make flirting with the socialist more expensive for each of us. This can be done with a united opposition list. In my

[93] Nenad Lj. Stefanovic, "Serbia is a Great Mistery [sic]: Interview: Zoran Djindjic, Democratic Party Leader." *Vreme News Digest Agency*, No. 223, January 15, 1996, http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/serbian_digest/, accessed May 6, 2009.
[94] Kent Patton, interview by author, Washington DC, June 13, 2008.

opinion, whoever decides to leave such a list will be politically dead in Serbia forever.[95]

Djindjic was prescient in this matter. The decision to run one and only one list at all levels was an important decision that the Alliance for Change/DOS would make after the elections were announced that would prove to be important to their victory.

To get to one list however, Alliance for Change had to gather together as many parties as it could and seek to unify them through one vision. Beginning in the summer of 1998 Djindjic and Pesic sought to gather these parties together. By October of 1998 the Alliance for Change was composed of 12 political parties and had secured the cooperation of the Trade Union Nezavisnost as well as known and liked Serbian politicians such as Dragan Avramovic and Milan Panic. Obrad Kesic, a former advisor to former Prime Minister Milan Panic, in an interview with Voice of America also noted that unlike Zajedno, the Alliance for Change had a positive program that could be enacted—a vision for the country.[96] While the Alliance for Change's obvious public activities were put on hold during the NATO bombing from March 24 until June 10, 1999, Djindjic, who had gone to Montenegro, actively "worked" the international scene in an effort to gain support for his party from the United States, Germany and other European countries as well as strengthen ties between his party and Montengrin leader Milo Djukanovic. Almost as soon as the bombing stopped, the Alliance for Change once again took up very visible public activities to make itself better known and to enlist the support of the public. It concentrated its public activities in Central and Southern Serbia

[95] Zoran Djindjic in "Serbia is a Great Mistery [sic]."
[96] Obrad Kesic, interviewed for Judith Latham, "Serbia's Democratic Opposition," Voice of America, October 21, 1998.

where spontaneous protests had broken out, capitalizing on people's anger and helping to organize, channel and direct their indignation.[97]

After the major rally sponsored by G17 in August 1999 and then its own rally in September, Alliance for Change, unable to win a promise of resignation or elections from Milosevic, called off its daily protest activities in December. While Alliance for Change had been successful in many ways at building itself into a viable alliance of parties with ties to outside groups such as G17 Plus, Djindjic and others realized that in such a fractured political spectrum, they would have to bring more political parties "under the tent." A major concern was also whether the opposition could succeed without Draskovic and the SPO, especially as Draskovic seemed largely unwilling to cooperate with Djindjic.

The Serbian political opposition would spend the next seven months trying to bind itself together to create the unity that the public demanded if they were to favor it. The process, which had begun with the gathering of some parties into Alliance for Change, would begin again in earnest in September 1999 leading to the October 1999 and January 2000 roundtables and proceed through the next spring and summer. Interestingly, while an unusual number of parties would find a way to work together, and in some cases suppress their own discrete interests (for example the issues of Voijvodina autonomy would be set aside), both the public and Serbian journalists and commentators perceived the unity as shaky at best. As late as May 2000, especially when the opposition parties did not immediately condemn the government's take-over of Studio B and propose a

[97] See Chapter Six for an in-depth discussion of both the spontaneous protests and Alliance for Change's activities. An Alliance for Change strategist also noted that Alliance for Change concentrated on Central and Southern Serbia because they did not have as much strength in some areas, especially Belgrade, as did the SPO. By showing Draskovic that they could bring people out in significant numbers, they were hoping to persuade him to consider working together with them and recognizing them as an equal "force."

rally, the commitment of the various parties to unity and to a common purpose was widely and strongly questioned.

While it is true that the various opposition parties did have issues that they had to work through, they did try to resolve these issues by meeting regularly. Such regular meetings, including those that were part of the Bratislava process (discussed below and in the next chapter), at low-level meetings amongst themselves and at roundtables, gave a forum for the numerous parties to slowly work their way through an assortment of issues, coming to agreement. That such meetings did not break down in acrimony or result in everyone walking away was due to several factors: first, opposition politicians themselves had come to recognize that this was their last chance.[98] The public was growing weary of the same faces that never cooperated and usually broke out into public squabbling.[99] It was, as many recognized, the last chance for them as politicians to be in a position to create change and become leaders.[100] Second the politicians recognized that there was a certain restiveness in Serbia that had not been seen previously. In the summer

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[98] Sonja Licht, interview by author, Washington DC, November 8, 2007.

[99] Public opinion surveys regularly showed rates of trust for opposition politicians that were dramatically low. For example, in 1993 a survey showed that while Milosevic was trusted by 32.9% of respondents, only Vuk Draskovic among other political figures was trusted by more than 5% (5.6%). A similar question in 1998 showed that Milosevic's trust level had declined to 14.4% (33.3% trusted no one), and only the Montenegrin president, Milo Djukanovic, came close with 12.3%. See Hans-Dieter Klingemann, and Liljana Bacevic, "Public Opinion in Serbia 1993," Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universität zu Köln (ZACAT), ZA2907, http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp, and and Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, "Yugoslav Public Opinion in Serbia 1998," Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universität zu Köln (ZACAT), ZA4277, http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp. More anecdotally however Slobodan Homen of Otpor noted that, "You're looking at the same faces in the opposition for the last ten years… All these politicians are politicians of the Milosevic era. And our main strategy is that to get rid of Milosevic, they have to become part of the past. Of course not in the same moment, but two or three years after Milosevic, they have to be history for this country." Slobodan Homen quoted in Secor, "Rage Against the Regime."

[100] Sonja Licht, interview by author, Washington DC, November 8, 2007. See also Zoran Djindjic in, Mirjana Vujovic, "All Those with Influence in the West Support Kostunica: Interview: Zoran Djindjic, president of the Democratic Party and chief of the electoral staff of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) talks about the chances of the united opposition." *Danas*, August 26 – 27, 2000. http://www.ex-yupress.com/danas/danas39.html.

of 1999, Central and Southern Serbia spontaneously erupted in protest. While capitalizing on it themselves by organizing demonstrations, petition drives and other protests, the politicians realized that were the feelings of anger, and to some degree empowerment, to give way to despair, they might not be able to re-create such a good opportunity for change. [101] Unity would be crucial if they wanted to use the raw demand evidenced in the summer of 1999 for change. Along with the raw demand, Otpor was also constantly working to create or maintain a demand for change—and Otpor had little patience for opposition squabbling. Third, certain tactical issues that had always split the parties, in particular whether or not to boycott elections, were now effectively off the table. The international community, who was now willing to help the political opposition to become unified and to move forward, would not brook discussions of boycotts. As early as the end of November 1999 an Alliance for Change officer ruefully remarked: "Whenever, speaking in English, I even mention the word boycott to a foreign diplomat, he looks at me as if I am speaking in Swahili."[102] Fourth, the international community constantly exerted pressure for the political opposition to stay together. Using both carrots and sticks which were frequently considered rude and crass by many in the opposition, the international community made it clear that only through cooperating and making steady progress towards unity would the international community continue to give the political opposition the backing that it needed to succeed.[103] Thus, while negotiations and

[101] In this case "themselves" was not only Alliance for Change but was an example of an early coordinated effort in which Alliance for Change parties clearly worked together with Nezavistnost and in some cases coordinated with Otpor. See Chapter Four for details.
[102] Alliance for Change official (nameless) quoted in "BETA: Milosevic Still in 'Full Control'," *BETA* Belgrade in English, November 24, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-1126, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[103] The international community's relationship with the political opposition is a complex one that I do not have space to cover here. There is clear evidence that the international community's actions were sometimes, unintentionally, harmful to the popularity of the political opposition and gave what appeared to

discussions among opposition parties were often quiet, they were nonetheless on-going amongst almost all the parties, except in the case of Alliance for Change and the SPO. Draskovic's mercurial temperament, visions of greatness and inability to conceive of anyone but himself leading the opposition, led to very public declarations by Draskovic first of unity and then very public pronouncements by Draskovic of his refusal to cooperate. His constant maneuvering led to a decrease in his popularity—which was already tarnished by his decision to go into government with Milosevic.

The process that took place over seven months that created an increasingly unified opposition was overshadowed by people's frameworks for thinking about what Serbian opposition unity should look like. Despite the actual increases in coordination and cooperate, albeit imperfect, Serbians were so accustomed to thinking of Draskovic and his SPO as an essential component of the opposition that they could hardly conceive of it without him. Thus the very open, public and frequently acrimonious divisions between Draskovic and Djindjic mentioned above, only served to confirm preconceived notions and verify pre-existing fears that unity amongst the opposition was fragile or non-existent. The idea that the opposition could not be successful without Draskovic was due largely to Draskovic's own self-promotion. Draskovic's previous self-styling of himself as *the* opposition leader and his ability to bring large crowds on the streets had led many to *perceive* Draskovic and the SPO as essential to any opposition coalition and opposition

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be credence to Milosevic's charge that the political opposition was the lackeys of Western foreigners. The demand prior to the Luxembourg meeting in October 1999 was one such example of unintentional harmful actions. On the other hand, it is also clear that the international community made a significant funding commitment to the political opposition and assisted with training and strategy. As importantly in my view was the serious expectation imposed by the international community that the opposition would make progress in its negotiations and regular meetings. Having regular meetings and deadlines in my view helped to "focus the mind" on the task at hand.

unity.[104] In contrast, Djindjic, who was not particularly trusted or popular amongst the public and whose party had suffered some very public internal splintering in the early 1990s, was viewed as important, but not as a potential leader of a unified opposition. The perception thus persisted that significant opposition unity would only occur when Djindjic and Draskovic's parties, The Alliance for Change and the SPO were merged—that without Draskovic, success was an unlikely business. But such a perception, while understandable, tended to overshadow the real acts and commitment to unity that developed among many of the other parties who had significance, and ignored Draskovic's actual loss of popularity.[105]

Conclusion

From 1996 on various pro-democracy forces in Serbia worked to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the regime by strengthening their own internal structures, finding resources and strengthening their collective identities. If a paucity of resources, lack of control of the environment and an inability to equally access the sources and structures of

[104] That SPO was the single largest opposition party was a reason for honest concern but Draskovic never failed to point to this as to why he should be in charge. While it was essential to try to unite as many opposition votes as possible behind one coalition so that Milosevic could not split off a party or dilute votes, concerns about this to some degree overshadowed ongoing changes to Draskovic's popularity and tended to lead people to dismiss almost out of hand that there could be a successful opposition without Draskovic. Once again pundits failed to give any weight to the idea that people, offered a unified opposition without Draskovic, might actually vote for it.

[105] Poll results by July 2000 showed Draskovic as the most unpopular politician. Nonetheless the perception continued to exist, and Draskovic worked to perpetuate it—that the opposition could only be him plus others. Poll results commissioned and published by BETA in July 2000 done by the Belgrade Institute of social Sciences showed.: " Avramovic obtained more positive than negative points, the second was Vojislav Kostunica (39 percent negative, 34 percent positive), and Milosevic came out third (50 percent negative, 34 percent positive). Two politicians who scored the most negative points were Seselj (60 percent negative and 14 percent positive) and Vuk Draskovic (67 percent negative and 14 percent positive). See "BETA's Poll Suggests Kostunica 'Could Convincingly Defeat Milosevic'" BETA in English 26 July 2000 FBIS-EEU-2000-0727.

power is in part what defines the need for contentious politics and movements,[106] the pro-democracy forces recognized their structural inequality and were determined, by building more internally unified and stronger organizations, movements and identities to overcome these deficiencies. Driven by a different vision of what Serbia should be, as I discuss extensively in Chapters Six through Eleven, key individuals and groups who were at the center of building such forces recognized the need to try to create their own opportunities by changing the nature of the playing field—and that included attending to their own organizational structural and cultural weaknesses. Conceptions of their group's identity, (Otpor as a movement not a party or NGOs seeing other NGOs as equal partners) and how each group wanted to be seen strongly influenced the choices that they made in building their organizations. These organizational choices in turn shaped their appeal to potential members, influencing its ability to recruit thereby also delineating their niche in the spectrum of forces that could be arrayed against the regime. Such forces, however, no matter how well organized, internally unified and resourced as individual organizations, would need to find ways to work together. This was also a key lesson learned from prior experiences from 1991 through 1997. Strong organizations on their own could not exert the same force as strong organizations that could work together in common purpose using a joint strategy. How organizations come together, develop through interaction and dialogue a shared understanding of their situation, goals and strategies is the story of the next chapter.

[106] Contentious politics is also built around non-structural issues based in culture. As we will see in my subsequent chapters, especially Chapters Four through Eleven, I do not argue that structure trumps culture, rather that culture is an equal player in the determination of when contentious politics and movements develop and how they are shaped.

CHAPTER FOUR

Calling on All Democratic Forces to Unify: Cooperate and Coordinate

This chapter will examine the efforts of the various pro-democratic forces in Serbia to come together not only in a common purpose, but to devise and execute strategic plans to meet those goals so as to influence the landscape of contention. As we saw in the last chapter, the various democratic opposition players knew in the aftermath of 1996 that the structures and resources that they had at their disposal were insufficient to create regime change through elections. Thus they spent several years attempting to build the structures that they thought would be needed to effect such changes. But even structures built for such a specific purpose may be insufficient if the actors who profess to share a common goal work at cross-purposes, at worst seeing each other as competitors for resources or at best benignly lacking coordination to maximize not only their resources but creative potential. As Rucht observes, "most social movements would not come into existence let alone survive if there was there no cooperation between the groups and organizations that consider themselves part of a broader entity."[1] Rucht goes on to note that such alliances between groups do not occur "naturally" as a product of their common interests. Rather the building and maintenance of such alliances are the product of active engagement of participants in what has been termed "'coalition work.'" In seeking to build successful alliances groups have to regularly overcome internal conflicts over strategy, find ways to allocate resources for effective action fairly, agree on common purposes, develop a sense of shared identity and avoid the loss of either

[1] Dieter Rucht, "Movement Allies, Adversaries and Third Parties," in David Snow, Sarah Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, (Cornwall: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 203.

members or "audience" due to frame "overextension." Thus the work that was done from 1996 to 1998 by NGOs, students, the independent trade union Nezavistnost and others to build stronger organizations that had larger and wider memberships, better skills for organization and mobilization and a positive organizational identity and culture for internal work were all important to developing a stronger independent civil society. But past experience had shown that without a common goal, shared strategies, and a high level of coordination, energy and opportunities had dissipated. This chapter examines the active engagement of the pro-democracy forces, namely the opposition political parties, the NGOs, the independent trade union Nezavistnost and Otpor to be proactive and do the type of alliance-building and coalition work that would allow them to succeed where they had failed in the past.

Bratislava Process

The Bratislava process, initiated by Sonja Licht, Executive Director of the Fund for an Open Society Yugoslavia (Soros Foundation) in Serbia in concert with the East West Institute, the Slovak Foreign Ministry and important Slovak NGO figures, served three important functions. First, the process, which went on for over a year, was instrumental to bringing about coordination, strong cooperation and efficacy among the various Serbian political and NGO opposition players. Second, the process also allowed a broader swatch of players in the international community to recognize that there were Serbs who were democrats and who were organized and professional. Third, the process allowed the international community not only to be in more direct touch with the Serbian

NGO community, but such contacts also brought resources, especially funds for various opposition efforts, especially activities and projects of the NGOs.

The role of the Bratislava process in coordinating international players with the Serbian NGO and political opposition community was very important, as was its role in bringing a regular stream of resources especially to the NGOs, through the Donors Forum. There is no doubt that the regular press of scheduled meetings with members of the international community and expectations of positive results helped to keep the process of setting goals, increasing unity and meeting benchmarks on track in a way that had been previously lacking.[2] The meeting also helped to overcome a sense of isolation that was frequently felt by those in the NGO community.[3] Similarly Western diplomats, governments and international organizations such as the EU, and donor organizations and foundations' increased contact with Serbian democratic forces in a variety of fora over a period of months, allowed foreign parties to better understand how democratic Serbs in the NGOs, independent labor union and political parties understood their own needs and priorities. This understanding allowed foreign donors not only to increase their funding to the democratic Serbian opposition groups but also to better organize how they provided support so as to bypass Milosevic and regime authorities.[4] The Bratislava process was also what Bunce and Wolchik have called an East to East[5] exchange of information whereby a previously successful model of coordination that directly contributed to the successful defeat of a semi-authoritarian regime (the defeat of Meciar in 1998) was

[2] As noted earlier pressure from the international community also was effective in removing certain "options" from consideration such as boycotting the elections thereby helping to prevent the process from stalling or going off course.
[3] Sonja Licht, interview by author, Washington DC, November 8, 2007; Miljenko Dereta, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 5, 2007.
[4] Sonja Licht, interview by author, Washington DC, November 8, 2007; Miljenko Dereta, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 5, 2007.
[5] Personal discussion with Sharon Wolchik.

diffused to a group of democrats further east with similar problems and who were in search of a model to emulate, transforming it to meet the conditions in their own country. This is not to say that the Serbs were merely instructed in a successful model and instructed to take it home and try it out. Rather the process was one in which on ongoing constructive dialogue developed between Slovak NGOs and government officials who had been involved in the OK98 campaign that had led to Meciar's defeat in the Slovak 1998 elections with their Serbian counterparts, passing on information, ideas and contacts and discussing how the model could best be adapted to Serbia. While the aspects of international coordination and structure building through the Bratislava process are complex and interesting, as well as having been a critical component for a positive outcome, I am going to focus on the role of the Bratislava process in clarifying goals and overcoming coordination hurdles among various Serbian oppositional players.

The Bratislava process, and especially its first meeting, held on July 21-22 1999 in Bratislava, less than two months after the NATO bombing, provided the first real opportunity for different sets of Serbian opposition "players," including pro-democracy political parties, NGOs, independent media, trade unions and student organizations to gather together in a neutral space to discuss their own visions for what would be necessary to achieve their end goal—the replacement of Milosevic. Although they officially claimed that their goal was building a better, more democratic Serbia and their goal was not the replacement of Milosevic per se,[6] it was also clear to most, if not all of the players who were there that that was the first objective. The meeting, entitled "The

[6] "Communique, Extended Meeting No. 3: Task Force on the Future of the FR of Yugoslavia," EastWest Institute, January 30, 2000, www.bbnet.org.yu/bdnet/task/eng/belgrade/communique.htm, accessed June 7, 2008. http://www.seerecon.org/Calendar/1999/events/bratislava_conclusions.pdf, 5: "Develop a comprehensive program for the transformation of Yugoslav society. Getting rid of Milosevic is necessary, but this is not a program."

Future of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Context of Postwar Reconstruction," was the first time that such a large and varied set of opposition players had come together in one place to hash out differences, look for commonalities and try to set a course for future cooperation. Pavol Lukac, noted that the discussions were among what was, initially, a "politically divided and diverse anti-Milosevic opposition, non-governmental organizations and think tanks so they could, in a mutually difficult dialogue, consider not only how to defeat the Milosevic regime but also the way of renovation of the democratic life in the country."[7] As Rucht points out, sometime actors that share similar goals do not immediately see themselves as allies but rather see each other as adversaries. Although groups understand that cooperation might bring benefits, they may fail to overcome disagreements on issues such as tactics and leadership.[8] On such occasions, a neutral mediator is useful to lower the levels of conflict or disagreement and to provide leadership. The Slovak government and NGO community present at the Bratislava meeting acted as mediators, providing neutral territory to help the various groups find agreement. As Dushan Mihajlovic, president of the New Democratic party said, "'the conference was the first step in the right direction. People were talking to each other.'"[9]

One result of the meeting was the development of permanent structures to facilitate coordination and cooperation both amongst themselves and with the international community. Both the "Community of Change within the FRY" and a "Task Force" to develop a "comprehensive action plan for the future of the FRY" were

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[7] Pavol Lukac, "Slovak Foreign Policy towards the Western Balkans—a need for Continuity, Differentiated View and Flexibility," in Alena Kotanova and Katarina Zakova, eds., *Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2002*, trans. Danica Brendzova, Peter Brenzani, Kristina Krajcirova and Katarina Zakova, (Bratislava: Slovak Institute for International Studies/Slovensky institute medzinarodnych studii, 2003), 48.
[8] Rucht, "Movement Allies, Adversaries, and Third Parties," 211-212.
[9] Dusan Mihailovic president of opposition New Democratic Party quoted in "The Serb Opposition: A Shadow Serbia," *Central European Review* 1/6 (August 2, 1999), http://www.ce-review.org/99/6/bauerova6.html.

established for these purposes at this meeting.[10] A schedule of meetings was set up for each group, with the Task Force[11] scheduled, for example, to have four international meetings between the July 1999 meeting and February 2000, as well as four internal meetings to take place in Belgrade. A six month report assessing progress noted that the Belgrade meetings had become a "unique place where high ranking officials of opposition parties meet regularly with important NGO, trade union and media activists."[12]

Another important outcome of the meeting was a stronger sense that the opposition could not just be against someone, specifically Milosevic, but also had to present themselves as *for* something. Branislav Canak, president of the independent trade union, Nezavisnost, called not only for unity amongst the various democratic opposition members, but also argued strongly for a positive, comprehensive program. "'Down with Milosevic is not a sufficient program,'" he said.[13] Similarly the agenda for the first meeting in July assembled by the EastWest institute also made this point; it stated, "Develop a comprehensive program for the transformation of Yugoslav society. Getting rid of Milosevic is necessary, but this is not a program."[14] The realization that having a

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[10] Aleksandar Lojpur, "A New International Partnership: Task Force on the Future of the FR of Yugoslavia: The Bratislava Process: Summary of the First Six Months and Plan for 2000." EastWest Institute, February 25, 2000. http://www.bbnet.org.yu/bdnet/task/eng/plan2k.htm, accessed June 7, 2008.
[11] The Task Force was to have a total of 15 members, 10 from within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Sonja Licht was to head the Force. "The Future of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Context of the Post-War Reconstruction: A Conference Organised by the EastWest Institute & Co-sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia, Bratislava – July 21-22, 1999." EastWest Institute, July 1999. http://www.seerecon.org/calendar/1999/events/bratislava_conclusions.pdf.
[12] For details on meetings times and places see Lojpur, Aleksandar. "A New International Partnership: Task Force on the Future of the FR of Yugoslavia: The Bratislava Process: Summary of the First Six Months and Plan for 2000."
[13] Branislav Canak, president of Nezavisnost quoted in Ladka Bauerova, "The Serb Opposition: A Shadow Serbia." *Central European Review* 1/6 (August 2, 1999). http://www.ce-review.org/99/6/bauerova6.html.
[14] "The Future of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Context of the Post-War Reconstruction: A Conference Organised by the EastWest Institute & Co-sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

positive program was a necessary component of the campaign became an important part of both the NGO and political parties shared strategy to defeat Milosevic.[15]

Finally, the initial as well as subsequent meetings stressed the importance of not waiting for something to happen, i.e. just waiting for a political opportunity—but instead stressed the importance of taking charge and making something happen. The meetings stressed that it was essential that the political parties and NGOs develop strategies, laying out possible scenarios of what might happen, and preparing for any of them. Plans were to be definite but flexible. This too was a theme that took root, especially among the NGOS.[16] Ultimately however the plans laid out were not to be dependent on changes in the Milosevic regime; rather, plans had to be made to make something happen. The initial agenda was quite blunt about this in addressing its FRY/Serb partners: "Act now. Do not wait for the international community to bring change. The future of the FRY and Serbia is in the hand of the Yugoslav citizens."[17]

Political Parties, Coordination, Cooperation and Unity in the Aftermath of the Bratislava Conference

The final imperative, to "act now" was taken to heart by both the political parties and the NGOs. After the flurry of protests in the summer of 1999, the large

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Slovakia, Bratislava – July 21-22, 1999." EastWest Institute, July 1999. http://www.seerecon.org/calendar/1999/events/bratislava_conclusions.pdf.

[15] See Chapter Seven for a discussion of this at greater length. It is also touched on in Chapters Eight and Nine.

[16] Miljenko Dereta, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, Ocotber 3, 2007; Marko Blagojevic, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 3, 2007.

[17] The talking points urged the need for a comprehensive program, and cautioned against rigidity on the part of the member parties: "Assistance must be immediate, flexible, and decentralized." "The Future of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Context of the Post-War Reconstruction: A Conference Organised by the EastWest Institute & Co-sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia, Bratislava – July 21-22, 1999." EastWest Institute, July 1999. http://www.seerecon.org/calendar/1999/events/bratislava_conclusions.pdf.

demonstration by G17 in August and the opposition political rally in September, the opposition political parties gathered in September and October 1999 trying to come to an agreement. After meetings on September 2, September 30 and October 7 attended by representatives of 21 political parties and organizations, an expert group was formed to work out the details of acceptable conditions under which elections could take place and of common legislative agenda. Although the original negotiations had included Draskovic's SPO, the SPO was not a signatory to the agreement on October 14 by eight parties and groups to form an electoral coalition, specifying the minimum acceptable conditions for elections.[18]

By December however it was clear that the protests that Alliance for Change had been carrying on daily to try to force Milosevic's resignation before elections could be held, had been unsuccessful. Moreover, the protests that had taken place all fall into December in cities throughout Serbia had not even been successful in forcing Milosevic to call early elections. While the October meetings and agreement had laid the groundwork for further cooperation, events by December led to discussions as to whether or not Alliance for Change was going to stand by its original pre-conditions that Milosevic resign before elections be held or whether it was time for a new tactic. Moreover, whether or not Milosevic had to resign prior to elections so that conditions for free and fair elections could be created was a major point of difference that had separated Alliance for Change from Draskovic's SPO, which did not call for Milosevic to step down prior to elections.

[18] "Constitutional Watch: A Country-by-Country Update on Constitutional Politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR: Yugoslavia." *East European Constitutional Law Review* 8/4 (Fall 1999). http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol8num4/constitutionwatch/yugoslavia.html.

Alliance for Change called off its protests in December and after a series of internal meetings acknowledged that its previous tactic had not been successful in achieving its stated goal. This recognition combined with the understanding that a new tactic would be necessary led it to accept Draskovic's call for an early January meeting that would attempt to unify the opposition. As BETA pointed out, it was yet another example of Draskovic acting on his belief that the opposition should be unified by him and under him. Nonetheless Alliance for Change agreed to participate.[19] The documents resulting from this meeting[20] and decisions also taken at a follow-up meeting call b y Kostunica for January 19 indicated that all players of the political democratic opposition were trying to demonstrate that "unity was a priority."[21] Aleksandar Lojpur, the Co-ordinator of the Task Force on the Future of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, reviewing the progress made from July 1999 through February 2000, stated that the January 10, 2000 meeting was the "culmination" of attempts to develop a joint strategy by the opposition.[22] His opinion was echoed by those in the international community who, after the January 19 meeting in Budva, noted that it was the first time that the opposition had had a united approach in international meetings, "as opposed to previous such encounters."[23] The accord in January led to additional meetings including one in February that laid out the "rules of cooperation." These included meetings by the

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[19] Djindjic however did not attend personally. See Milenko Vasovic, "Serbian Opposition Parties Unite," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report No. 106, January 11, 2000, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.

[20] For the text of the January 10, 2000 agreement see "Text of Serbian opposition accord—Beta News Agency," January 13, 2000. BBC Monitoring European – Political. http://global.factiva.com.

[21] "BETA Sees Opposition Get Closer Together." *BETA* Belgrade, in English, January 19, 2000. FBIS-EEU-2000-0120. *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

[22] Aleksandar Lojpur, "A New International Partnership: Task Force on the Future of the FR of Yugoslavia: The Bratislava Process: Summary of the First Six Months and Plan for 2000," EastWest Institute, February 25, 2000, http://www.bbnet.org.yu/bdnet/task/eng/plan2k.htm, accessed June 7, 2008.

[23] "BETA Sees Opposition Get Closer Together," *BETA* Belgrade, in English, January 19, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0120, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

opposition leaders themselves at least twice a month while working meetings were being held more frequently. It was further decided that all decisions would have to be made by consensus.[24] Despite the outward appearance of cooperation, rifts persisted between Draskovic and Djindjic, not only through the spring and the summer, but right through the time that elections were called with particularly vituperative discussions in August.[25] Despite this however, opposition unity and development continued within the Alliance for Change. Alliance for Change gained increasing name recognition and popularity throughout the spring and summer. Although the public continued to express its concerns about the solidity of the coalition, the parties met regularly to think through what strategies they needed, what resources they had and how best to meet contingencies. To aid with this they also set up an interior working group headed by Vesna Pesic called Political Team 2000 whose purpose was to, "help the political parties by providing them with the results of the opinion polls, by indicating which combinations, organising methods and techniques as well as which political views would prove to be the most efficient in the current situation."[26] As Zarko Korac, President of the Social Democratic Union, noted in January after the January 10 opposition agreement,

> The opposition is preparing all viable strategies for all possible moves on the part of the authorities. This is precisely what the regime finds to be quite discomforting. The process of the opposition's homogenization isn't

[24]Vana Susa, "News Review for Serbia: News from Serbia since 6 February 2000," *Central European Review* 2/6 (February 14, 2000). http://www.ce-review.org/00/6/serbianews6.html.
[25] "SPO Demands 60 Percent on Opposition's Joint Election Ticket,"*BETA*, Belgrade, August 6, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0806, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com; "SPO Accuses DS, Djindjic of Anti-SPO Campaign, Secret Deals with Milosevic," BETA, Belgrade, August 13, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0813; "BETA Analyzes Divisions among Opposition Prior to Elections," *BETA* Belgrade, in English, August 24, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0824, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com; and "Draskovic Accuses Democratic opposition of Attempts to 'Destroy' SPO," *BETA* Belgrade, August 28, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0828. *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[26] Vesna Pesic as quoted in Bojan Bozic, "Ph.D. Vesna Pesic, Director of the Centre for Antiwar Action: Parties' Political Programs are Irrelevant at the Moment," *Free Serbia Interviews*, April 9, 2000, http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/interviews/2000/e-pesic09042000.html, accessed May 18, 2009.

> only a hollow story for the media with pictures of the opposition leaders gathered together. At issue here are two things: working out a detailed strategy "what if" and, more importantly, establishing a media team which would determine which political leaders will take part in which discussions with the people throughout Serbia. So we'll put up strong resistance to the media lynch by talking to the common people and discussing every issue. In my view this strategy will yield satisfactory results. [27]

The 18 political parties that would unify to become known officially as the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) did speak to people not only at large protest rallies such as the opposition rally in April and the rallies held in May to protest the crackdowns by the regime on Otpor and the media, but also during its very extensive door-to-door campaigns which it ran during the campaign period. The door-to-door campaign and the DOS bus tour of the country, both which depended heavily on personal contacts with people for their success, were built on the backbone of organizing and preparation that had gone on for more than a year *before* the elections were ever called. Unlike any previous campaign or election, the opposition had created a positive platform and had worked extensively at building trust and solid networks amongst itself. Members had subordinated individual personal and even individual party interests for the good of the whole[28] and, with the exception of Draskovic and the SPO, had succeeded in building a large, solid, wide-spectrum coalition.

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[27] Zarko Korac, President of the Social Democratic Union, in Boris Milicevic, "Zarko Korac, President of the Social Democratic Union: No One Could Possibly Vote for Absolute Personal Disaster," *Free Serbia Interviews*, January 29, 1999, http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/interviews/2000/e-korac29012000.html.

[28] Djindjic's stepping aside for Kostunica to be the leading candidate for DOS is one example of the subordination of personal interests to the good of the whole. Djindjic's widow noted that he was very practical and upon seeing the numbers, knew what he had to do. Personal interview with Rucica Djindjic, Belgrade, Serbia, October 2007. This opinion about Djindjic was corroborated through an interview with Kent Patton, who noted that Djindjic was practical and hardheaded when it came to business—but that he still wished that he could have run for the position. He was consoled at the idea that he would get the Prime Minister slot if Kostunica won. Kent Patton, interview by author, Washington DC, July 23, 2008.

NGOs, Labor and Otpor and Political Parties: Coordination, Cooperation and Unity in the Aftermath of the Bratislava Conference

As the political parties had taken the "act now" imperative to heart, so too had the NGOs. Building on networks developed over the last several years, they now worked to coordinate *across* their own various networks to draw on established institutional strengths of various groups (such as membership lists), avoid duplication of efforts and reach various niche groups using local people who were already familiar to those they sought to reach. The NGOs also sought not only to reach existing networks but also to help new NGOs become involved. The NGOs also sought to reach beyond the traditional NGO networks and to work closely with outside groups such as the independent labor union Nezavistnost, with Otpor and to coordinate with the political parties. The NGOs sought to ensure that they enacted the lessons learned from the Slovak '98 and Croatian '99 NGO political experiences. Unlike the Slovaks, Serbian NGOs did not have internal concerns and conflicts as to whether or not NGOs should be taking partisan political action. The campaign of the Serbian NGOs was promoting change, and change in Serbia was clearly partisan.[29] Because of its partisan nature, and the need for G17Plus and CeSid to be seen as neutral and independent, neither G17Plus nor CeSid officially took part in the campaign that was to be Exit 2000, but they did maintain close contacts and coordinated closely with those NGOs that did participate in the campaign.

From September 1999 through July 2000 the NGOs prepared to run a campaign for elections that would be called at some indefinite date in the future. Whenever they were to be called however, the NGOs not only wanted to have a structure in place to run a campaign but also, as importantly, a strategy. From September 1999 through July 2000

[29] Miljenko Dereta, interview by author, Belgrade, Serbia, October 3, 2007.

the NGOs ran a series of meeting to solidify their working relationship with the political parties as well as to build better relationships among themselves and to devise a strategy. Meetings were held with members of the opposition political parties in October 1999 as well as with members of the independent media and independent trade unions, (October 26-27 "How to Achieve Changes" conference) and again in February 2000 when representatives of 30 NGOs met with 12 opposition political party representatives. At the October meeting an agreement was reached that the NGOs, opposition political parties and other pro-democracy forces in Serbia needed to run coordinated, unified actions if change was to be achieved. This sentiment was later solidified in a joint declaration at the February meeting with meetings in March arranged to discuss the "concrete proposals on the modalities of cooperation."[30] Informal exchanges of information between members of the NGO sector and the political opposition took place on a semi-regular basis due to the dual membership and ties that people had.

NGOs also met to improve their coordination, devise a long-term strategy and prepare to take concrete steps. At the March 16, 2000 meeting 35 NGOs sat together analyzing their prior discussions with the opposition political parties, dissecting their own shortcomings and focusing on targets for their improvement. They also set up a Campaign Preparation Board which included well known and fairly well-established NGOs such as ANEM, Forum of Yugoslav NGOs, Civic Initiatives, Center for Research of Alternatives, Women's Network, Timoc Club as well as CeSid and G17Plus, the two

[30] Statement of the political parties of the democratic opposition and non-governmental organization participating at the joint roundtable in Belgrade, 18 February 2000 in Zarko Paunovic, Natasa Vuckovic, Miljenko Dereta, Maja Djordevic, *Exit 2000: Non-Governmental Organizations for Democratic and Fair Elections: Pre-election campaigns of NGOs in Serbia*. (Belgrade: Center for Democracy Foundation, Center for the Development of Non-Profit Sector, Civil Initiatives, 2001). http://www.centaronline.org/Download/Publications/IzlazEng.pdf.

NGOs who would not directly be a part of the Get out the Vote Campaign (GOTV). The Campaign Board was tasked with setting up a strategic plan and design for a campaign. The board reached the following important conclusions: first, it would have to find a way to address and mobilize an older population including retirees. Second, it would have to ensure that it had control of the electoral lists and could recruit and train enough election monitors to handle elections (CeSid had already been working on the overall situation for several years but would begin to intensify its preparations beginning in January 2000).[31] Third, although they had been trying to increase contact between Belgrade NGOs and the regional NGOs for years, the Board noted that such cooperation would really have to be stepped up. Finally, the Board reported that better internal communication between NGOs needed to be established.

In order to ascertain the NGO community's strengths and weaknesses before running a widespread, intensive GOTV campaign, the Campaign Preparation Board decided in April to do a survey to ascertain what projects either were already ongoing or were planned for a future date that could be put to the service of a GOTV campaign. In June over 90 NGOs met along with Nezavisnost to discuss future strategies as well as lessons learned from efforts to date.[32] In July a questionnaire on capacity and willingness to participate was sent to 300 NGOS with 100 responding affirmatively indicating their willingness to participate. Additionally new NGOs and NGO networks such as the South-East network were created to act as regional coordination bodies. Between April and July when elections were announced, the NGOs hosted a series of meetings in different areas

[31] Marko Blagojevic, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 3, 2007.
[32] Nezavisnost Trade Union Confederation, *Summary of Nezavisnost Bulletins Nos. 11 and 12,* June 2000, http://www.nezavisnost.org.yu/archive/indexe.htm, accessed July 29, 2008; Paunovic et al., *Exit 2000: Non-Governmental Organizations for Democratic and Fair Elections,* 11.

of the country to educate their own members on how to run a GOTV campaign as well as solicit ideas, increase coordination and encourage all NGOs to devise campaign projects that would be ready to be run the moment the elections were called. Working off the Slovak model, and having discussed the issue of funding with the international community through the Bratislava process, they knew that as soon as elections were called (and in some cases sooner) money would flow to projects through the international Donors Forum. Thus it was essential to have projects not only conceptualized but lined up and ready to go. An Information Center was set up and staffed to help NGOs at all levels prepare grant proposals, mediate between the donor's forum and the NGO, work with the promotion team and the NGOs to make sure that all literature had appropriate branding and keep calendars of important dates. By the time that Milosevic announced at the end of July 2000 that elections would be held, the NGOs had been working not only several years in advance to build capacity more generally, but had been working together on a specific campaign strategy for the next election which would educate voters and turn out the vote. These types of highly professionalized, intense, routinized and coordinated preparations, especially done over a longer time frame was a new strategy for Serbs, but it was one that had worked in Slovakia in 1998 and in Croatia in 1999; it now was to be implemented in Serbia in 2000.

Coordination and shared strategies among the NGOs, political opposition parties, independent trade unions and Otpor as well as strengthening and building better networks, were key. Such cooperation began as early as July 1999 and continued through the end of July 2000 when the elections were called. Publicly demonstrating this cooperation among various segments of the pro-democracy opposition was important not

only to build trust and coordination across groups but also to show the public the unity and coordination of the democratic forces across different sectors of society. One thing that was clear to all the pro-democracy forces was that to triumph either in getting elections called, or in elections themselves when they were eventually held, they would need *all* available sympathetic sectors of society to participate—not just the students or the intellectual classes as had largely been the case in the 1996/97 protests. Thus groups that appealed to different demographic segments of society publicly worked together. Often working in pairs or trios, one group was usually charged with publicly heading an action, while the other groups involved were responsible for coordinating and working it. Such cooperation was evidenced in July 1999 when 40 different NGOs (many of them part of Yugoslav Action) worked side by side with Nezavisnost to raise awareness and to mobilize people to action. Their tactic was a referendum entitled "In what kind of Serbia do I want to live?" Nezavisnost members and NGO activists handed out a sheet with a tear-off coupon on the bottom that asked the reader to decide whether the Serbia described on the sheet was possible under Slobodan Milosevic. Statements included social and labor oriented statements such as: "I want not to be ashamed of being a labourer, and I want my field not to be overtaken with weeds," "the pensioners should be pensioners and not beggars who depend on the pity of those who robbed the pension fund," but also included political ones calling for the protection of journalists, respect for laws and human rights, and demanding that politicians be accountable to the citizens. The petition noted that "I want to live in a Serbia that will belong to me, too and not just to Slobodan Milosevic and his family."[33] Further evidence of such cross-group cooperation

[33] "Serbia: Trade Union Launches Petition for 'Radical' Reforms," *Beta News Agency* (Belgrade, Serbia), July 5, 1999, BBC Monitoring Europe - Political: *NewsBank Access World News*,

could be seen in August 1999 when Otpor joined with the Cacak Citizens Parliament, presenting a declaration at the 26th consecutive gathering against the authorities by the citizens in Valjevo and again in November when several political parties (the Nis branch of the Democratic Party (DS) the Civic Alliance of Serbia, Social Democracy, and the Independent Radical Party) joined with several independent trade union branches and NGOs in Nis to sign the Otpor petition for free and democratic elections. This type of cooperation and coordinated action across the country continued through July 2000. The Partnership for Democratic Changes gave talks across Serbia to groups of citizens. They coordinated their talks with the political parties. They also organized a festival in July in Novi Sad called "JUL is Cool"—Deja Vu" at which a multi-media arts center, Otpor, Art-Circus, Nezavisnost and members of the Democratic Partnership mocked the regime, replete with "fake openings of factories and bridges, sarcastic speeches, exhibits, debates and fashion shows." [34]

Of note in these actions was that such cooperation among groups was publicly on display throughout Serbia. Such actions did not take place just in Belgrade but rather, even as the few illustrations above show, in Central Serbia (Cacak and Nis) in Voijvodina (in Novi Sad) and in other regions of the country as groups traveled to different towns and villages coordinating talks for people at their local town halls. It was also important that groups that might draw different demographics by age and class worked together to bring people together at events (this would also be seen during the campaign period). Finally it was important that cooperation was occurring across a wide range of groups:

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http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org International Reports. NewsBank Access World News.
[34] Nezavisnost Independent Trade Union Council, *Summary of Nezavisnost Newsletter No. 14*, July 2000, http://www.nesavisnost.org.yu/archive/indexe.htm, accessed on July 29, 2008. JUL, the acronym for the hated Yugoslav United Left of Milosevic's wife, also means "July" in Serbian.

sometimes it was the political parties acting with the NGOs, or the NGOs working with the independent trade union Nezavisnost, Otpor working with a Civic Parliament thus increasing their knowledge and trust of each other and sharing of resources. Such cooperation and coordination did not happen naturally or without effort however. One organizer noted that it was essential to keep the lines of communication open and to continue to forge understandings.[35]

On some occasions, all groups: the opposition political parties, the NGOs, the independent trade union and Otpor, worked cooperatively for a major event.[36] Such public cooperation among all the groups was especially significant when it could be featured at high profile events such as national protest rallies. The opposition political rally on April 14, 2000, which drew a crowd of more than 100,000 people and was broadcast by Free Serbia on the internet, [37] was one at which not only representatives of political parties appeared on the stage (in alphabetical order) but were also joined by a representative from Otpor and one from the Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia.[38] That cooperation among all groups as well as unity among the political opposition was seen by the public served not only to strengthen ties among the groups but also to make it harder for any one to defect without consequences. It was in fact at this rally that Otpor handed its flag for the first time to the political parties to signify both its

[35] See Jelica Minic and Miljenko Dereta, Izlaz 2000: An Exit to Democracy in Serbia," in Joerg Forbrig and Pavol Demes, eds., *Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Changes in Central and Eastern Europe*, (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund, 2007), 79-99.
[36] Otpor was careful about with whom it worked publicly so as not to lose credibility with its own constituency. It also was careful not to dilute its more radical "brand." For more on this see Chapter Seven.
[37] As always crowd estimates varied. Central Europe Review noted this, "According to the French press, there were more than 70,000 people attending, and Reuters and Fonet estimated more than 100,000 people attended, while the Beta news agency claimed the number was even higher, at about 200,000 people." Vana Susa, "News from Serbia: All the important news since 10 April 2000." *Central Europe Review*, 2/15 (April 17, 2000). http://www.ce-review.org/00/15/serbianews15.html, accessed on May 20,
[38] The Free Serbia website still contains both audio and video clips from the actual rally that can be seen and heard using Real Audio. See *Free Serbia, FS specials*, "Rally of the United Opposition April 14, 2000" at http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/specials/broadcasts/14042000/e-index.html accessed on 19 May 2009.

endorsement of the united opposition as well as giving a veiled warning as to the consequences should the opposition begin to fracture.

Another public event that demonstrated cooperation between groups was the May Day protest staged on May 1, 2000 by Nezavisnost. Nezavisnost itself noted in the past the political parties had not bothered to attend but, "unlike the previous period and similar campaigns and initiatives in which the political parties often failed to show even minimum interest," for this event they, "demonstrated a positive attitude and readiness to cooperate." Nezavisnost reported noted that "there are grounds to believe that among other things this new attitude is the result of numerous ongoing campaigns and initiatives of a political nature undertaken by TUC Nezavisnost."[39] The event which garnered between 10,000-12,000 participants was an opportunity for independent labor and the opposition political parties to show their solidarity.

In addition to such formal meetings and ties, coordination and reaching agreement was assisted through informal personal relationships among the various democracy players. In a country such as Serbia, in which many of the democratic opposition players had known each other and in some cases worked together for ten years, especially due to their usual exclusions from the government, there was a fairly strong informal web of relations. Such relations usually helped players to better know the strength and weaknesses of those on their side. But it was the informal nature of such relationships that helped to facilitate certain types of action. These relationships occurred across organizational fields and also occurred at different hierarchical levels.

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[39] Report issued by Nezavisnost Independent Trade Union Council, "Information on the Preparations, Course and Assessed Effects of the May Day Protest 2000, Organized by TUC Nezavisnost." Belgrade, May 2000. http://www.nezavisnost.org.yu/archive/indexe.htm, accessed July 29, 2008. "Protest March Instead of May Day Parade." *Free Serbia Specials*, May 1, 2000. http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/report/01052000/e-index.html, accessed on January 10, 2009.

For example, although Otpor officially kept its distance from the political parties, which as we saw in the last chapter was part of its identity and appeal, it had ongoing informal relations with many of the political parties through its members. One of the founders of Otpor, Srdja Popovic, was actually an elected official (Belgrade City Assembly deputy) for the DS party. As such he had his own set of contacts within DS. Some Otpor members were also members of the youth branches of political parties. Such memberships, in addition to having provided them with prior organizational training and experience, also resulted in a net of personal relationships that could be unofficially tapped to assist Otpor.[40] In the months following May 2000 especially, it was dangerous to be found carrying Otpor posters or other materials since that was now grounds for arrest. Yet Otpor still needed to find ways to move such materials around the country. Some of the members of Otpor who were in youth branches of political parties were able to tap their contacts in the parties to ask if they would transport Otpor materials under stacks of legitimate, and legal, political party posters.[41] Information about party activities also flowed in the same way to Otpor while Otpor's feelings about party statements or actions flowed unofficially in the reverse direction.

Similarly unofficial relations existed in some cases between NGOs and political parties. In addition to the NGOs and the political parties having had some contacts in the 1996/97 campaign, there were also personal ties between the groups. Miljenko Dereta, head of Civic Initiatives who was coordinating the efforts to build denser and wider NGO networks within Serbia, had previously been both the president of the Executive Committee of the Civic Alliance (GSS) from 1992 to 1996 as well as a founding member

[40] Sinisa Sikman, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 5, 2007.
[41] Sinisa Sikman, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 5, 2007.

of the Executive Board of the Social Democratic Party. As such, he too had a residual network of informal ties and friends who he could call on. His days of party work had also allowed him to become reasonably well acquainted with some of the key political figures such as Djindjic.[42] Similarly Vesna Pesic, who was one of the founding members of Alliance for Change and who was President of GSS until 1998, was well acquainted with the NGO world as she had started the Centre for Antiwar Action and been deeply involved in the anti-war movement until heading GSS.[43]

Unofficial relations also existed between CeSid and the Nezavisnost labor union. As we saw earlier, this type of informal tie allowed for information flows as well as expedited cooperation when help was needed. Nezavisnost also had some ties with Otpor. Some of the Otpor member's parents were in Nezavisnost—the informal ties to local friendly labor leaders thus existed for cooperative informal actions.

While building formal ties across groups was necessary as was utilizing pre-existing informal ones, most important for effective action was coming to an agreement on a common strategy to try to change the regime (and some would have argued the very nature of the political system itself). The major point of agreement among all groups was that it was absolutely imperative to get as many people as possible to vote when elections were called. Two principle reasons dictated this: first there was a large new cadre of voters who had been too young to vote in the last election. These young voters, as well as

[42] Miljenko Dereta, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, Ocotber 3, 2007.
[43] Pesic epitomized this personal intersection of NGOs and politics as her biography shows. She was founder and director of the Centre for Antiwar Action, the first pacifist organization in Serbia, in 1991. She was a founding member of the Yugoslav Helsinki Committee (1985), the Association for the Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (1989) and the Yugoslav European Movement (1991). From 1992 till 1998 she was the president of the Civic Alliance of Serbia, and from 1993 until 1997 she was one of the leaders of the Coalition Zajedno.

those who had abstained were primarily oriented towards the opposition.[44] Second, the more people who voted, the fewer votes there were for Milosevic to steal and the more blatant his fraud would have to be if he was to win.[45] In the game of numbers, getting a large turnout was the single most important factor to winning the elections provided there was a unified opposition so that the vote would not be split. In order to get a large turn-out the opposition would have to find ways to appeal to people in different demographic groups, placing special emphasis on those groups identified through public polling and focus groups as most oriented towards the opposition who were also most likely to abstain. They agreed that one way to do this was to get as many people as possible personally involved in the campaign so that they would have a very personal vested interest in the outcome. Political parties also agreed that turn-out was key to the election and Kostunica himself strongly felt that it was the duty of not only the NGOs but the political parties to get people to the polls, "One should not forget that a massive turnout largely depends on two conditions. It is the job of political parties to motivate voters to turn out at the polls, and not vice versa. The people are an inspiration for political parties."[46] Finally in addition to getting as many people to the voting booth as possible, it was also imperative to try to ensure as few opportunities as possible for the regime to cheat and to have the method and means in place to expose vote fraud. To try to ensure

[44] A survey by G17Plus indicated that many of the abstainers were those who would be first time voters. Overall, "according to public surveys, every sixth young person would vote for the ruling parties, while the first five include at least three abstainers." "G17 Plus announces Campaign to Increase Voter Turnout." *BETA* Belgrade, August 14, 2000. FBIS-EEU-2000-0814 *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[45] Vladimir Goati, *Elections in FRY from 1990 to 1998: Will of the People or Electoral Manipulation*, 2nd extended edition, *Addendum to the First Edition: Meaning and Significance of the Elections of 2000*. Translated by Vladimir B. Zimonijic and Slobodan S. Stetic. (Belgrade: Center for Free Elections and Democracy, 2001), 232.
[46] "I Must Accept the Candidacy,"Vojislav Kostunica press conference, August 7, 2000, From the DSS website at www.dss.co.yu, translated and published by *BDnet News* at http://www.bbnet.org.yu/bdnet/news/eng/0807dss.htm.

that fraud would not go undetected, CeSid began its own education campaign in earnest in January 2000. Additionally it tried to ensure that it was fully staffed in regional offices and would have both enough people to train election monitors as well as the necessary equipment (such as computers) to handle the project.[47]

In addition to agreeing to general strategies oriented to their agreed-upon end goal, key was how they would coordinate their actions. While each of the groups had worked over the past year or more to reach its "own" demographic, from January 2000 onward a coordinated strategy was devised among the political parties, NGOs, Nezavistnost and Otpor. The strategy was one of integrated decentralization. While actions and schedules would be highly integrated, the work itself was divided with each group primarily responsible for its own demographic/core constituency. Thus women's networks would be primarily responsible for devising programs to mobilize women voters, lawyers groups would primarily be responsible for helping arrested NGO members, political party activists and Otpor members, while the labor union would be responsible for maintaining regular contact with and persuading labor members to mobilize etc. This type of decentralization in which each group was responsible for a part of the demographic "spectrum" was chosen because it represented a way to overcome several obstacles that occur when groups try to coordinate: first, while the various individual campaigns run by smaller NGOs pursued similar goals, each group had an expertise and a local clientele who knew and trusted it. This played to a group's strengths as well as preventing feelings of competition among groups. Second, this type of integrated decentralization was a form of insurance that were the regime to move against any group or sector of the campaign, it could not take down the whole pro-opposition

[47] Marko Blagojevic, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 3, 2007.

grouping at once.[48] In addition, groups understood that the public had certain expectations about the roles of different groups and sought to play to that as a strength: political parties were supposed to have candidate and ideas, NGOs were supposed to be expert and fair, groups such as G17Plus and CeSid were seen as impartial expert groups, while Otpor was perceived as a somewhat radical student/youth group that was not tainted by party affiliations. Being perceived by the public in a certain light and fulfilling that role was a way to positively meet expectations and maintain credibility.

The opposition groups also agreed that once elections were called several coordinated national campaigns would be run, as it was crucial that they demonstrate their unity. Although a certain amount of decentralization would remain, a more integrated set of national level campaigns would be run. These national campaigns, together with the smaller local campaigns, would also demonstrate opposition unity through their shared branding. While this was largely an uncontested idea among the NGOs, the political parties had more trouble coming to terms with the fact that their materials would have to have a more unified look, and some of the usual party branding would have to be sacrificed.[49]

In addition to shared branding, the groups agreed that sharing the labor and the burdens would be essential. Many campaigns, especially once the elections were called would be highly labor intensive especially as getting the word out would be dependent largely on personal contact—the national media was largely unavailable to the opposition. In some cases, especially where Otpor was concerned, it was clear that they would concurrently run their own campaigns that fit more directly with their image.

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[48] Miljenko Dereta, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 5, 2007.
[49] Kent Patton, interview by author, Washington DC, June 13, 2008; Miljenko Dereta, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 5, 2007.

When the NGO community ran its "Time to Clean Up" and "There is a Way Out! Get Out Choose Change!" campaigns with their logo and branding, Otpor ran its "He's Finished" campaign with its own very distinct logo and branding. While obviously not unified, they were quietly coordinated. This sort of coordination, in which one group acted as the more radical flank was also part of a strategy to appeal to as wide a cross section of the public as possible. Just as people had different "sizes of courage" and were willing to take on certain types of tasks, so too different groups and their images made for a better fit with various demographic groups. Otpor was seen—and used—as the "radical flank," making participation in NGO campaigns seem far more staid. Participation as part of an NGO campaign had wider acceptability for the middle-aged and older demographic, just as among many of the younger people belonging to Otpor and being arrested was a badge of honor. [50] Thus the strategy to "spread the field" in terms of image was effective in recruiting participants to both camps. As some middle-aged women who became Otpor Mothers were to discover, however, their activism and specifically their choice to identify with Otpor brought with it a certain amount of shunning not only in their place of employment but also within their communities. Many of their neighbors and work colleagues either disapproved of their activities outright or were afraid of being seen associating with them for fear of losing their jobs.[51]

From January onwards, NGOs, labor and the independent media sought to inform the public on voting procedures, vote fraud and inform them of the importance of their vote. They also informed them of what NGOs were and what they did, and tried to recruit people to act as vote monitors for eventual elections. They did this through a

[50] Miljenko Dereta, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 5, 2007.
[51] Marija Kleut,and Slobodanka Markov, "Women in the Popular Movement "Resistance" ('Otpor') in Novi Sad 2000," *Gender Studies* (Timişoara), 4 (2005): 168.

variety of local programs and activities that not only were in support of the communities they approached but also reinforced their coordination and commitment to coordinated action.[52] In addition to increasing the number of program about elections, voting and voter education an increased number of small local program were held to try to reach as many people as possible within their communities and to help solve local problems. "The NGO leaders took part in public debates and electronic media programs at the local level and a huge number of brochures, booklets and promotional materials were distributed."[53] Such outreach, especially programs which worked to solve local problems were meant to make more people favorably disposed to the NGOs and their campaigns later after elections were announced.[54]

The NGOs, Nezavisnost and Otpor's sense of solidarity increased in the face of increased attacks by the government that multiplied dramatically beginning in May of 2000. While the NGOs had always been outspoken about transgressions by the government against the civil and human rights of citizens, increased attacks on Otpor, especially those beginning in May 2000 brought about coordinated statements and actions by the NGOs, Nezavisnost and the political parties in Otpor's defense. These government attacks also prompted open, coordinated actions by these groups in defense of Otpor students who had been arrested. One example of this was a protest rally organized in Leskovac against the recent arrest of an Otpor activist. The demonstration

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[52] For a day by day calendar of events that were staged by various NGOs—often in concert with Nezavisnost or Otpor, beginning in April 2000 see the calendar at Free Serbia, "NGO News" http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/news/ngo/2000/e-04-2000.html

[53] Minic and Dereta p. 85.

[54] The energy for democracy program run in the winter of 1999 and later the asphalt for democracy and schools for democracy run by G17Plus in coordination with local opposition mayors and international players is one example of such programs that increased coordination, helped at the local level and allowed the local communities to see that the West, or at least Europe, was not against them Sonja Licht noted that these were significant programs for just such reasons. Interview with Sonja Licht, Washington, DC. See Chapter Ten for more.

was lawfully registered with the police and the appropriate permits obtained. Despite this, police illegally shut down preparations for the rally and arrested the Humanitarian Law Center's lawyer, the president of the Committee for Human Rights, the president of the Leskovac People's Parliament, a member of the Democratic Party and two activists from the movement for a Democratic Serbia. In this instance the protest action had been coordinated not only across the NGO spectrum but also with the political parties.

Moreover, at the end of June, the beginning of July, when *Politika*, the government's mouthpiece published an article accusing NGOs of being traitorous organizations sponsored by the West, the NGOs, labor and Otpor correctly interpreted this as a signal of a significant crackdown on the NGOs with an uptick of repression against their members. From this point in time through the end of the campaign, financial police regularly interrupted the operation of NGOs to supposedly check the books and frequently removed vital equipment. The police began regularly arresting NGO activists, sometimes beating them as well. Again, such actions by the police led to increased solidarity among the various groups that had been working together. As Nezavisnost together with the Foundation for Peace and crisis noted at a conference of the Participants of the Partnership for Democratic Changes conference in June, "only the solidarity of all social groups can lead to changes in Serbia."[55]

The Election Campaign—August through September 24, 2000

Once the election date was officially announced the coordinated NGO/Labor/Otpor campaign to get out the vote swung into high gear. The period from July 27 when elections were announced to the start of the official campaign period was

[55] Free Serbia NGO New calendar at http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/news/ngo/2000/e-06-2000.html.

short—approximately one month. The NGOs immediately gave a name to the umbrella campaign under which projects would work: IZLAZ 2000 (Exit 2000). In addition to a national coordinating body, regional coordinating bodies were set to work, a "Desk of Ideas" shared campaign ideas amongst NGOs, campaign proposals were reviewed and funded and an Information and Support center was funded. [56] The Information and Support Center, now "gathered and distributed information on different campaigns, established a calendar of events for coordination, and gave support to local NGOs in all phases of their projects."[57] Publicity was also necessary for the campaigns; ANEM regularly publicized the work of the various regional campaigns as well as the national level projects. Using various appeals that were emotional, cultural and efficacy-oriented, the NGOs sought to inform the public about voting and electoral procedures through booklets, pamphlets and community meetings. [58] They sought to convince the populace of the importance of their vote and how important it was to "Get Out and Vote!" as the campaign slogan said quite directly. The Vreme Je (Its Time) campaign held rock concerts featuring Serbian rock stars in public squares, fields and open venues throughout Serbia. NGOs ran public debates, seminars, high school essay competitions, sewing competitions for women in rural areas at which voting literature was distributed, and supported special theater performances such as the one in Pirot called "Dialogue in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu"—the allusions were quite clear to the audience. Special segments of the voting audience were especially targeted. Women were targeted with projects in 50 towns directed at getting them to vote. Such targeting was largely

[56] Donor forum funding began in July 2000. See Minic and Dereta p. 89.
[57] *Exit 2000: Non-Governmental Organizations for Democratic and Fair Elections.*
[58] See Chapter Eleven for a discussion of the content of the appeals and their effects on eventual mobilization.

(though not exclusively) done by female NGOs such as Women's Movement-Women's Network, The Group for the Promotion of Women and the Association of Women "Cilim."[59]

Youth were also targeted. Otpor specialized in mobilizing the youth to participate in actions prior to the announcement of elections as well as to vote. In addition to Otpor, 37 NGOs together with ANEM, the radio station B92, the Student's Union of Serbia and the European Movement of Serbia who were especially interested in targeting youth joined together in the Vreme Je campaign. In addition to the well known rock and roll tour that they sponsored at which famous rock and pop stars urged the youth to get out and vote after giving concerts, the groups also devised special promotional jingles for radio and television and passed out materials at events.

Rural communities and especially women in rural communities were targeted as they had been shown to be less likely to vote. One example of a group that sought to increase the female vote was the Vox Feminae group in Uzice that carried out its campaign in 51 villages in three municipalities. Visiting four to five villages a day the activists with Vox Feminae talked to a total 6120 women (an average of 512 women a day) in their door-to-door campaign, which represented coverage of 53% of all female registered voters in the Uzice municipalities. In addition to their door-to-door campaign they ran sewing competitions, giving prizes for the best handiwork. At such events that put these women at their ease, Vox Feminae noted that the women were more likely to "talk freely on topics such as social status of women and the importance of voting at

[59] Izlaz 2000 Info Center: Non-Governmental Organizations for Democratic and Fair Elections, *Calendar of Events, September 2000*, http://www.crnps.org.yu/infocentar/infocentaren/kalendar.htm, accessed on July 30, 2008.

elections."[60] The alternative Citizens Parliament of Paracin also ran a campaign targeting rural women, and rural citizens more widely. Such work however was not without its hazards—activists were sometimes not only insulted but were physically assaulted. In some cases they reported that stones were thrown at them, at times they were threatened with an ax, and in one village they were shot at.[61]

The combined NGO/labor campaign was intense during this period and their activities blanketed the entire country. More than 150 NGOs took part in the campaign carrying out more than 60 different projects under the Exit 2000 logo. Dereta notes that of the 164 municipalities in Serbia, almost every single one featured at a minimum one event sponsored by an NGO. It is also clear from a review of the calls for assistance on the IZLAZ center's main website from the period, and even a cursory assessment of the reports and grant project requests during the campaign that this was a campaign that was, as mentioned, labor intensive.[62] One project, "Your Vote—The Vote that will Make the Difference," run by the Group for Promotion of Women's Political Rights in cooperation with local women's "networks, initiatives and groups" was to be run in 30 cities throughout Serbia and 700 volunteers would be needed to conduct 50,000 interviews. Women were to be trained from August 26 to September 8, going door to door from September 11-23.[63] Another example that illustrates the amount of human capital that was needed to run such campaigns was that run by the People's Parliament in Leskovac.

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[60] *Exit 2000*, 42.
[61] *Exit 2000*, 43 and *Izlaz 2000*, 88. See both of these reports for additional examples of campaigns run to target this secotr of the population.
[62] See Izlaz 2000 Info Center campaign website at http://www.crnps.org.yu/infocentat/infocentaren/info.htm accessed on 30 July 2008, *Exit 2000* and *Izlaz 2000* for a description of some of the projects. Other projects from the period are listed on a variety of websites of organizations many that still exist, such as the Leskovac People's Parliament website at www.parlament.org.rs/protests.html, accessed on March 28, 2008.
[63] See Izlaz 2000 Info Center campaign website at http://www.crnps.org.yu/infocentat/infocentaren/info.htm accessed on July 30, 2008.

The People's Parliament, founded in August 1999, as an outgrowth of the significant spontaneous protest that had occurred that summer in an SPS-JUL controlled town, ran a five day door-to-door campaign to try to mobilize the electorate. In addition to a stand with promotional materials that the Parliament erected in the center of the city, within the first three days of a five day campaign activists visited more than 2,000 residences and distributed more than 10,000 pieces of propaganda material.[64]

In fact the full spectrum of activities run by the People's Parliament in Leskovac alone gives an idea of the density of the campaigns being run. Despite the fact that Leskovac was controlled by SPS-JUL, the People's Parliament of Leskovac managed to run three major projects in 2000 in addition to the one described above. The first project, run for nine months preceding the election, was designed to "make a break through the media blockade" in Leskovac. This was done by producing and regularly distributing free of charge a bulletin called "Changes Start with All of Us." The second project, also run during the nine months preceding the election, involved setting up the Parliament Club—a place that Leskovac People's Parliament members described in their report as "the only free place available for seminars, tribunes, foundation assemblies, round-tables etc." They go on to note that tremendous benefits were derived from this project for the pro-democratic forces as during the nine months of the Club's existence they ran more than 35 programs there which ranged from a presentation on "The Croatian Winning Formula—How HZD was Defeated" to "Aphorisms, Evening 'Bapsi and Friends.'"[65]

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[64] See Izlaz 2000 Info Center campaign website at http://www.crnps.org.yu/infocentat/infocentaren/info.htm accessed on 30 July 2008

[65] Since most aphorisms during this time were against Milosevic, while very humorous, aphorism writing was also dangerous to the extent that aphorism writers were being arrested. Bapsi, as Boban Militic was known, had been arrested by the regime and accused of "damaging the reputation of FR Yugoslavia by publishing his book 'Cry Mother Serbia' which allegedly contains aphorisms insulting and humiliating FRY President Slobodan Milosevic…" See the calendar at Free Serbia, "NGO News,"

They also had exhibitions of NGO and Otpor materials and discussions on the "Influence of Law on Information on free media and journalists of those media." While both these projects were held directly within the municipality of Leskovac, the Parliament ran a full-scale GOTV campaign in five of the municipalities of Jablanica County in August and September of 2000. Just as at the national level, when possible, local NGO campaigns also targeted certain voting groups. The Leskovac People's Parliament therefore targeted the more rural outskirts of Leskovac, running a 22-day telephone survey campaign that included more than 2,000 households, "located in town outskirts and villages, places that were less covered by other activities." Women were also targeted in Leskovac as part of the "your vote, the vote of difference" campaign discussed above. For young people the People's Parliament had a rock concert in the town center, as well as a party called "Don't Gamble—Vote!" They also ran more general activities, including a 22 day door-to-door campaign covering over 4,000 households. Humor and fun played an important role in activities in order to pique people's interest in voting including a display of caricatures by the most beloved Serbian cartoonist Corax's and a presentation by Corax himself with several others called "Save Serbia and Vote."[66] Overall, during the campaign the Leskovac People's Parliament estimated that it gave away over 400,000 pieces of materials including pencils, caps, T-shirts and even little sugar packets with the logo, "Make Your Life Sweeter on September 24—Vote!"[67]

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http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/news/ngo/2000/e-04-2000.html. Aphorisms were thus a form of subversive humor. For more on humor and subversion see Chapter Eleven.

[66] "Save Serbia and Vote" was a humorous take on the chant that had developed at football stadiums and then was used more generally at protests, "Slobo Save Serbia and kill yourself." For more detailed information on the activities run by the Leskovac People's Parliament see their website at http://www.parlament.org.rs/projects.html accessed on 28 March 2009.

[67] Leskovac People's Parliament, http://www.parlament.org.rs/projects.html accessed on 28 March 2009.

The political campaigns were also integrated with the NGO campaigns. NGO activists handed out materials at political rallies to get out the vote. Politicians took part at debates and forums designed to educate voters. Unfortunately the political campaign, specifically between the DOS coalition and its president, Kostunica did not achieve the same degree of coordination, integration and unity that the NGO/Labor/Otpor campaign did.[68] Despite the fact that Kostunica and the DOS leaders all appeared together before elections were announced at protest rallies and loudly and frequently professed unity, the actual election campaigns were run out of separate offices and the DOS caravan and the Kostunica caravan were rarely in the same cities at the same time. Fortunately both Kostunica and Djindjic recognized the value of each other to the campaign as well as the overriding and crucial need to appear unified. Their staff worked hard to ensure that such differences were minimized, or at the least not apparent to the public. A high level GSS envoy was employed for important discussions when such discussions were needed between Djindjic and Kostunica.[69] Their political campaign during the election period was also very much a door-to-door campaign crisscrossing Serbia with their caravans.[70] In the end the political campaigns acted in concert with the local political parties, youth activists from each party and NGOs activists. As with the NGO campaigns, the DOS and Kostunica political caravans had required advanced planning and organization to ensure that after Milosevic called elections, their campaigns were ready to go.

[68] The two campaigns could only talk to each other through an intermediary such was the feeling between Djindjic and Kostunica. Fortunately the top aides to each campaign worked well together with a member of GSS acting as a high level intermediary between the two campaigns. Kent Patton, interview by author, Washington DC, July 23, 2008.
[69] Kent Patton, interview by author, Washington DC, July 23, 2008.
[70] See Chapters Eight, Nine, and Ten for a detailed discussion of various aspects of the political campaigns.

Conclusions

Having made the effort from 1996/97 onward to build organizations and networks, in some cases with the specific aim of effecting leadership change, leaders of the pro-democracy forces realized that without coordinating their efforts, sharing their resources and building not only a common sense of purpose but also an integrated strategy, they still might not be able to overcome the deficits they faced due to inequalities that Milosevic constantly worked to reinforce. If, as Jasper argues, strategies are "moves that individual and groups make in integration with others, responding to them and anticipating future response," then the Serbian NGOs, political parties, labor and other pro-democracy forces worked to develop a strategy between 1997 and 2000 to counter Milosevic.

This strategy first entailed first building their own organizations and networks as I examined in the last chapter. Yet those in the NGO community, having following events closely in Slovakia in 1998 and then in Croatia in 1999, realized that coordination across the entire spectrum of opposition forces, including not only the NGOs but also labor, youth and the political parties would be necessary to bring about change in the country, especially the end of the Milosevic regime. The Bratislava conference and the ensuing process, initiated in large part by a Serbian NGO leader, Sonja Licht, helped the various factions first talk to each other and then continue to coordinate to build a joint strategy and to best utilize limited resources. The original meeting provided neutral territory and moderators, established external expectations of success and acted as an ongoing vehicle for building trust. The Bratislava process would not have been successful however, were it not for the constant efforts of those involved to coordinate their actions and develop

plans for the future, plans that they implemented despite steadily worsening conditions in Serbia.

In order to overcome frequent organization dilemmas that prevent the formation of successful alliances, such as the degree to which alliances or movements should be centralized, who shall be in change of leading the alliance, how resources are expended, whether one group perceives its identity being either taken over or diluted by another group and what tactics to employ externally to reach bystander audiences, through much "coalition work," the parties developed a useful mode of organization that I have termed integrated decentralization. This mode allowed the Serbian NGOs, independent labor, political parties and Otpor not only to overcome such problems but to use many such issues to their advantage. A key to success was the decision that this was to be a united front—but one that operated in a decentralized manner. Such decentralization allowed each group, whether large or small, to feel that its voice was being heard, its membership fully represented in decision-making and that it could have an impact. It allowed groups to be creative in their proposals and targeted in what they proposed since they knew their target audience best. Such people were also more trusted in their local areas, in many cases being familiar faces and thus their actions and words were more likely to be heeded. Integrated decentralization was also important because neither specific regions nor particular demographic sectors were deemed to be more important. Belgrade was not more important than the groups in the regions. Independent labor was not more important than women's groups or youth groups. Each group thus had an important role to play. Such integrated decentralization equalized the importance of groups to the cause, thereby increasing everyone's personal vesting in the process.

Because the process was not only decentralized but also highly coordinated, each group's access to a different demographic was used as an advantage. The "overextension dilemma," when a movement feels that it has lost its identity or purpose due to an over-dilution in an effort to build a broad-based coalition, was avoided. The challenge of coordinating the numerous groups that could appeal to various demographics was turned into an advantage. Each "niche" was assigned to those who already were active in that sphere. Thus, for example, Otpor handled much of the effort to mobilize youth. The various women's networks handled women and regional coalitions took responsibility for their regions. Decentralization did not mean that groups were left on their own without help however. The frequent meetings among the players assured that resources, labor and guidance were made available to those in need.

Finally, it is important to remember that none of the opposition forces had any idea of when Milosevic would call presidential elections. Milosevic was neither obligated to, nor expected to call them when he did. The opposition forces saw it as their obligation to try change the situation the ground. Political parties sought to force Milosevic to call elections, while NGOs, independent labor and Otpor saw it as their duty to prepare people to mobilize whenever elections might be called. Such long-term pro-active actions that had no known endgame required the alliance to work to change the status quo and force a change in the alignment of forces and power. This task, however, did not stop these groups from taking charge of their own destiny as much as they could in the hopes of changing the overall alignment of forces and power. Success in these efforts, the effective coordination and cooperation built up among all these opposition forces during the Bratislava Process, and especially the strategy developed out of that effort, meant that

when the election was finally announced, the Serbian opposition was better placed than at any previous time to realize its aim: the defeat and removal of Milosevic. The outcome of such preparations would be reflected in the massive turnout for the elections. Yet for all the political strategy-building these forces accomplished, without the existence of some sort of demand for change within the general population, the opposition would not have been able to achieve their aim. It is to an exploration of the demand side of the equation that we now turn.

PART II: DEMAND

CHAPTER FIVE

Demand: Perceiving Grievance

> "The merit and worth of Serbian institutions have been destroyed in a systematic manner…Pensioners are forced to dig through garbage looking for food because the state-run pension fund owes them six to seven months pension. With financial pyramid schemes, loans and confiscated foreign currency deposits, the state has stolen about $6.5 billion from its citizens. About 2 million people are currently out of work. Meanwhile more than 100,000 well-educated and able individuals have emigrated, fleeing the war, hoping to avoid the draft or simply because they didn't see a future for themselves in this country. Your country is in decline. Serbs are dying from diseases which are curable or do not exist elsewhere in the world. There are no medicines, the health care system is on the point of collapse, and the population turns to sedatives in the way vitamins are used in the developed countries…Your Excellency, your country, your people and your compatriots have been living for ten years in a state of fear, psychosis, with nothing but death, misery, terror and despair around them…hungry and humiliated, your citizens have exhausted their spirits and have no strength to make even verbal protests…" *Excerpts from "What's Next Mr. Milosevic?" by Aleksandar Tijanic and Slavko Curuvija, published in the Belgrade Weekly* Evropljanin *on October 19, 1998.*[1]

Mobilization of society for social contention requires not only a "supply" of social movements, resources and networks that can be activated for a cause but also a "demand" for change. For many years, reacting against previous research that had argued that social movements and protests were caused by maddened crowds, rootless individuals experiencing social anomie and those suffering relative deprivation, social movement research moved away from any study of grievance to emphasize the rationality of participants and the "how" of how social movements were organized. Resource

[1] Aleksandar Tijanic and Slavko Curuvija, "What's Next Mr. Milosevic?" *Evropljanin* [The European], October 19, 1998. Reprinted in English at "Hope on the Balkans Opinions Archive, 1999," http://www.ddh.nl/fy/kosova/opinions/1999/whats_next.html accessed June 7, 2008.

mobilization models and political process models argued that grievances were ubiquitous. It was unimportant to study whether or not people had grievances, how grievances developed and how they affected subsequent movements. Rather what was important was *how* any given grievance was transformed into a movement—what resources and strategies were necessary to organize and move people. The move away from the "why" of social movements to the "how" did help to develop what is clearly an important aspect of social movements, but also resulted in an overemphasis on the "how" to the neglect of why it was people would want to expend energy, take risks. It also resulted in an overemphasis on "rationality" and cognitive function and away from emotions and culture that were an essential part of *why* people protested or even thought about protesting in the first place.

As Jasper, Gamson and others have argued, to move people out of their normal routines, to make them willing to risk and possibly make significant sacrifices of their freedom, jobs and lives, people have to actually care deeply, desire, and want change. More importantly people have to feel a strong "red hot" sense of injustice.[2]

A sense of deep injustice cannot be created out of whole cloth by Social Movement Organizations (SMOs). While peoples' attitudes can be changed, new issues can be brought to the forefront of cultural awareness as something that people should care about or want to see changed, claims that are made have to resonate.[3] As Benford and Snow point out, in order to move people to protest, claims have to be made by those with credibility in society, they have to resonate with people's *own* knowledge and cognitive

[2] William Gamson, *Talking Politics* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 7.
[3] See Chapter Two for my discussion of the literature on resonance. See Chapter Ten for a discussion that is Serbia-specific.

and emotional understandings of the situation, and they have to be salient to people's lives—they have to be a priority.

But while framing literature such as that by Benford and Snow pointed to the concept of resonance as being a "key," little attention was actually given to *why* a specific frame should resonate, i.e. to the grievances that people had, why some claims might be more salient than others. As Klandermans points out, "to be sure, grievances abound in a society, but that does not mean there is no reason to explain how grievances develop, and how they are transformed into a demand for protest."[4] Why a particular grievance or set of grievances should become salient at a particular time, salient enough to move people to act, both as individuals and collectively, is worthy of consideration. Political process and resource mobilization models argue that it is indeed the "how" that makes the difference, i.e. resources, organization and opportunities but they neglect the possibility that what may make a grievance salient enough to act upon might also have to do with emotions engendered at a specific point in time—that a cultural tipping point is reached: "enough is enough"—that moral indignation over injustice may be sufficient to move people to demand change. Despite realizing they have little hope of changing things, people may protest to gain a sense of dignity in their lives, because they believe that they have a moral obligation to a broader community that they identify with, because they owe a debt to future generations—it is "for the children."[5]

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[4] Bert Klandermans, "The Demand and Supply of Participation: Social-Psychological Correlates of Participation in Social Movements," in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 361.

[5] Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper, "Emotions and Social Movements," in Jan E. Stets and Jonathan H. Turner, eds., *Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions*, (New York: Springer, 2007), 622. Jasper notes that Wood's work shows that Salvadorian peasants took part in rebellions not because they believed that they would succeed, but rather to reclaim their dignity through agency.

They also need to sense, or develop a sense that they are part of a group of like-minded and feeling people, that they have a collective identity—of being part of a "we" against a "them." Collective identity can be developed, shaped and molded through framing. This sense of being part of a collective may also be discovered as people expose and begin to express their grievances. However for mobilization to be effective this collective identity needs to be developed and established.

The following chapter examines the "raw materials," specifically the development and depth of grievances: people's perceptions of their lives, events that affected those perceptions and people's emotional preparedness and openness that affects the willingness and/ or availability of people to be mobilized.

Serbia—Raw Demand

"What's Next Mr. Milosevic?" published in 1998 pointed both to serious grievances in society and the fear that many Serbs had to act on them. As Aleksandar Tijanic and Slavko Curuvija pointed out, for ten years many Serbs had had serious grievances, and some had acted on them. Protesters had taken to the streets in March 1991 when Vuk Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement organized a rally to protest bias in state television programming that drew surprising large crowds, provoked a violent government response, and touched off three days of demonstrations.[6] In June 1992, a double rally, one part led by the students and the other, later part led by the political

[6] Stephen Engelberg, "Protests Widen in Belgrade," *The New York Times*, March 12, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/12/world/protests-by-the-serbs-widen-in-belgrade.html, accessed April 3, 2009.

opposition in the DEPOS coalition, demanded that Milosevic resign.[7] Further student demonstrations continued into July. From 1996 to 1997, in by far the biggest and longest protest demonstration in Serbia, thousands of people took to the streets over a period of eighty-eight days in Belgrade and other towns in which the opposition had been denied its victories, to protest Milosevic's refusal to recognize the opposition's victory in municipal elections in 22 important cities and towns throughout Serbia.[8] Milosevic's refusal to recognize important opposition victories sparked true anger among citizens. He was not only denying the importance of their votes, but just as much if not more importantly denying their grievances—the existence of reasons to have voted for the opposition in the first place. As early as 1992 a great majority of Serbs felt that their country was "going in the wrong direction." Over the years the percentage of citizens who felt that way fluctuated slightly but never fell below 70%.[9]

The following section looks at grievances, including the nature of the grievances, their history, levels and raw demand, especially from 1998 on, to ascertain the likelihood of successful mobilization. First it examines what empirically were the main problems in

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[7] Patriarch Pavle, head of the Serbian Orthodox Church also led a rally on June 15 after the Pentecost service. Michael T. Kaufman, "Thousands Protest against Serbian President," *The New York Times*, June 15, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/15/world/thousands-protest-against-serbian-president.html, accessed April 3, 2009. For more information on the political protest see Bojana Susak, "An Alternative to War," in *The Road to War in Serbia, Trauma and Catharsis*, Nebojsa Popov and Drinka Gojkovic, eds. (Budapest: CEU Press, 2000), 501-503, and Mirjana Prosic-Dvornic, "Enough! Student Protest '92, The Youth of Belgrade in Search of 'another' Serbia," *Anthropology of East Europe Review* Vol. 10:1-2 (1993), http://condor.depaul.edu/~rrotenbe/aeer/aeer11_1/prosic-dvornic.html, accessed April 3, 2009.

[8] Robert Thomas, *The Politics of Serbia in the 1990's* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 306-7. An OSCE fact-finding mission headed by Felipe Gonzalez ruled on December 27, 1996 that the opposition had won in eight districts of Belgrade and the Belgrade city council, plus Pirot, Kraljevo, Uzice, Smederevska Palanka, Vrsac, Nis, Soko Banja, Kragujevac, Pancevo, Jagodina, Lapovo, Sabac, and Zrenjanin.

[9] See Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Liljana Bacevic, "Yugoslav Public Opinion 1992," Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universität zu Köln (ZACAT), ZA2908, http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp, "Public Opinion in Serbia 1993," ZA2907, "Yugoslav Public Opinion 1996," ZA2911, Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, "Yugoslav Public Opinion in Serbia 1998," ZA4277, "Pre-Election Study - Presidential Elections Serbia February 2000," ZA4280 and the discussion below in this chapter.

society, i.e. based on objective measures did people have reasons to have a grievance. Second, it examines Serbs *perceptions* of their lives—whether or not Serbs perceived problems in their lives that were enough of a priority to be open to taking action. Grievances have to be perceived, acknowledged as such and be a priority if people are to demand change. How, if at all, had people's perceptions of their lives and political situation changed since 1997, the last time segments of society protested? What, if anything, had precipitated these changes, and among what segments of society?

This section also considers whether the nature of the grievances and the demographics of dissent were likely to result in a net change in the number, type and intensity of people desiring change—the raw materials that could be shaped into action and protest. Were perceived problems accepted as "fate and unchangeable" or were they seen as unjust, unmoral or unfair? Was blame for problems affixed—were people yet developing—or had they managed to maintain—the "righteous anger"?[10] Had they developed a sense of collective identity? Who was the "we" and who was the "them"?

Finally, even if change was desired and people affixed blame, did they believe rationally and/or feel emotionally that they *could* make a difference? Did they believe there was anything that they could *do* to change their lives? Both rational belief in efficacy and emotional conviction are essential to action. As Jasper and others have noted, emotions affect peoples' capacity to take action—despondency and resignation do not lead to action, organization or any form of mobilization. Judgments as to the potential for efficacy come from not only cognitive rational beliefs but also emotions. Without a belief in their own efficacy, without feeling emotionally that they could change the

[10] William A. Gamson, *Talking Politics,* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), 1992, 34.

situation, they were unlikely to mobilize or be available to be mobilized. What did people believe and feel about their ability to bring about changes?

Assessment of Main Problems in Society: Objective Measures

Empirically most Serbs indeed had cause to be aggrieved and had had such cause for some time. Since the end of the communist system their quality of life and living standards had decreased—in some cases dramatically. Living standards began a precipitous decline in 1990-91 with the fall of the dinar and hyperinflation, temporarily recovered under the stabilization program pushed through by Dragoslav Avramovic as governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia between 1994 and 1996, but began to plunge again after his dismissal in 1996. While some had benefited from Milosevic's corrupt "crony" system of government and profiteered on the grey market, the majority had become increasingly impoverished.[11]

Moreover the wars perpetuated in their name increasingly isolated the country and its citizens from the rest of the western world. This clearly affected not only how Serbians perceived the West and felt about their own lives but more concretely the ability of various professionals, many crucial to the health and welfare of the citizens, to keep up with developments in their fields. Educated professionals who were accustomed to traveling to conferences were usually banned from traveling, thereby adversely affecting their ability to keep up with their fields, to maintain their professional networks and their ability to help those most in need. As a UNICEF report noted, "restricted cultural and social contacts caused intellectual and scientific isolation that was felt strongly by people

[11] John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*, second ed., (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 381-382, 403-404.

in the FRY. Restricted from international travel, denied scientific information, cut-off from research funding and shunned by professional organizations, many of those most capable of responding to the country's humanitarian needs were discouraged from acting both by the Milosevic government and its international adversaries."[12]

Sanctions on fuel importation imposed on Serbia by the West in direct response to Milosevic's choices also limited the supply of heating oil and other fuel available to citizens although it was Milosevic and his government who were largely responsible for how the fuel that was available was distributed, causing great inequalities. Towns and small cities that had voted for the opposition in the 1996 elections were most often "punished" by receiving few to no allotments of fuel for winter heating, while those that were loyal SPS/JUL towns were "rewarded," receiving a far greater share. "Energy for Democracy," a democratic outreach program of the European commission along with similar programs by Canada and Norway certainly helped in the winter of 1999 to alleviate the shortage.[13] The European commission alone distributed 17,000 tonnes of heavy fuel and gas oil, distributing it to major opposition towns including Nis, Pirot, Kragujevac, Kraljevo, Novi Sad, Sombor and Subotica.[14] Other major opposition towns

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[12] Richard Garfield, *Economic Sanctions, Health and Welfare in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1990-2000*, (Belgrade: UNICEF United Nations Childrens' Fund and OCHA, 2001), 61. See Ljiljana Bacevic, "Empirical Social Research in Serbia and Montenegro," http://www.cee-socialscience.net/archive/serbia-montenegro/index.html (accessed May 5, 2009), for a similar assessment.

[13] The idea for Energy for Democracy actually was suggested by economists from G17Plus, a Serbian NGO, along with the mayors of Nis and Pirot. They proposed it to the European commission who, along with Norway and Canada, enacted the program.

[14] "Serbia 2000: Action Programme Part 3, EU180 million Emergency Assistance Programme," http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/ear/serbia/main/ser-annual_programme_2000_part3.htm, accessed May 8, 2009.

such as Cacak, Uzice, Trstenik, Bajina Basta, Pozega and Arilje also received fuel assistance.[15]

Milosevic did not take kindly to defeat. Following the opposition's success in the 1996 municipal elections, which he acknowledged only after intense citizen protest backed up by pressure from the international community, especially through an OSCE investigation commission headed by Felipe Gonzales, Milosevic and his government acted to narrow even further the space for speech about or against him as well as space for political actions through the imposition of three significant laws. This series of laws led many to believe that the situation was worsening and that the government was tending increasingly towards authoritarian rule. Foremost among these laws was the Law on Public Information, adopted in October 1998. Under this legislation, misdemeanor judges (appointed by the government) could try "libel" cases and impose high fines. Between October 1998 and January 2000, judges found independent media in Serbia and Montenegro guilty of libel thirty-one times, imposing an average fine of 420,000 dinars, while pro-government media had been punished only six times with an average fine of 143,000 dinars.[16] Combined with other forms of repression against opposition speech and other expressions, this law effectively undermined the availability of alternative information to the public. Even before this, in May 1998, a law on universities (shaped without any input from the universities themselves) was rushed through the parliament, giving the government the right to close universities, appoint and remove rectors, and force all employees, including tenured professors, to sign new contracts even if they

[15] G17Plus, "G17Plus Projects," http://www.g17plus.org.yu/english/files/active/projects/proj-list.html, accessed May 5, 2009.
[16] "Serbian Repression on the Rise: Testimony before the CSCE Commission," *Human Rights Watch*, June 30, 2000, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2000/06/30/serbian-repression-rise-testimony-csce-commission, accessed April 2, 2009.

already had valid contracts. Widespread protests against the law as a blatant attempt to muzzle the universities, which had been centers of opposition to the government since the early 1990s, expressed the outrage of students and portions of the public, but did not force its repeal.[17] A new law on local self-administration passed in November 1999 was directed at taking back the municipalities the ruling coalition had lost in the 1996 elections by increasing the competence of the central authorities in local matters and altering election procedures to favor the government.[18] This series of laws and other actions led many to believe that the situation was worsening.

Empirically however, it was the ever-worsening economy with its associated ills: the decrease in the availability and quality of health care, unemployment, increasing poverty and dangers of undernourishment, decreasing supplies, and the availability to afford them that severely impacted large numbers of people from all walks of life. As we shall see in the next section, Serbs themselves considered the economy and its associated ills their number one problem. After 1990, and especially after 1993 with hyperinflation and the fall of the dinar and again after 1998, greater numbers of Serbs were adversely affected.

One economist calculated that by 1999, 6,500 people had become "extremely wealthy," 6,186,000 were poor and 462,000 were extremely poor.[19] Inequalities in income distribution increased. While exact figures differ, one estimate stated that the former middle class, which at the end of the 1980's had comprised 70% of the

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[17] Olga Nikolic, "Rebellion against Government Draft Law on University: The Left and the Right Abolish Autonomy of University,"*AIM* Belgrade, May 26, 1998, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199805/80526-024-trae-beo.htm, accessed April 2, 2009, and Barbara Cochrane, "Academic Freedom in Serbia," *Human Rights Brief*, 6:3 (1999): 15-19, http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/06/3freedomserbia.cfm, accessed April 2, 2009.
[18] "BETA Sees New Law as 'Blow' to Opposition," *BETA* Belgrade, November 17, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-1118, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[19] Milan Milosevic, *Political Guide to Serbia 2000* (Belgrade: Media Center, 2000), 52-54.

population, had shrunk to a mere 20% of the population by 2000,[20] but there was an overall decline in income due in part to greater unemployment. Of a total labor force of 3.2 million people in the 1990s unemployment grew from an estimated 14% in 1991 to 27% in 2000 with "an additional 10% on leave." Another estimate of unemployment calculates that the registered unemployment rates was 19.7% in 1990, 28% in September 2000 while the hidden unemployment rate in "enterprises of the former socialized and state sectors" increased from 20.7% in 1990 to 60% in 1999.[21] Moreover, of those that were employed only 10% were estimated to have substantive jobs. Even 60% of employees in the state sector received their salaries late in 2000. One Serbian commentator summed up the situation as follows:

> The combined effect of low salaries, high unemployment and impediments to normal trade during the sanctions created both the need and opportunities for informal economic activity…However, the distribution of the supplement was highly unequal. While the majority subsisted with small-scale earnings and food production, others made fortunes through smuggling.[22]

What did this mean for people's daily lives and who were the most severely affected? In 1990, the proportion of citizens who were "poor" (i.e. living on 2$US per day or less) was 14% of the population whereas in 1999, 33% of the population, approximately 2.2 million people, were living on $2US per day with approximately half a

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[20] Ratomir Petkovic, "Misery: The Trump Card for the Elections: Poverty and Inequality Spreading over Serbia," *AIM* Podgorica, February 28, 2000, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200002/00228-001-trae-pod.htm, accessed May 8, 2009. See also Predrag Jovanovic and Danilo Sukovic, "A Decade under Sanctions," *Transparency Serbia Documents*, http://www.transparentnost.org.rs/english/DOCUMENTS/d012.html, accessed May 8, 2009.

[21] "Social Welfare Situation and Need for Donations," *YU Survey 4/2000*, http://www.pregled-rs.rs/article.php?pid=220&id=20573&lang=en, accessed May 8, 2009. For a detailed examination of the economic situation from 1990-2000 see also United Nations Development Program Serbia: European Movement in Serbia, 2001, "Vulnerability Trends and Perceptions: Suspended Transition," http://www.undp.org.rs/index.cfm?event=public.publications&pg=8, accessed May 5, 2009.

[22] Jovanovic and Sukovic, "A Decade under Sanctions," and Garfield, *Economic Sanctions, Health and Welfare*, 32.

million living on less than $1US per day.[23] The ability to purchase food, specifically the percentage of income needed to do so, is a recognized indicator of poverty and clearly a mark that easily signifies how people's everyday lives are affected. In 1980-91 the percentage of income needed to buy food varied from "between 30-40% …In 1991, the average salary bought one food basket for a family of four. In 1993, it bought only 1/5 of a food basket. In 2000, with an average salary a man could buy only 0.4 of a food basket."[24] The number of meals a day that people ate also steadily decreased as people sought ways to conserve steadily decreasing resources. "In 1988 20% of adults ate two or fewer meals per day; the proportion increased to 36% in 1995 and 40% in 2000. Bread, which had only been sold in complete loaves, started to be sold in halves."[25]

Poverty and hunger were not equally shared among the various sectors of society. Whereas in the 1980's those who had been less well off were rural, in the 1990s the demographic of those less well off were urban, pensioners and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).[26] Agricultural production for self use, urban dwellers with rural relatives who could provide their urban relations with food and networks of barter for foodstuffs became the normal, self-coping mechanisms to try to deal with the problem.[27] However these mechanisms did not cover all in need, especially as between 1991 and 2002, the rural population had shrunk by 37%.[28] By January of 2000, even *Vecernje novosti* reported that 100,000 people, mostly pensioners and people on welfare were dependent

[23] Jovanovic and Sukovic, "A Decade under Sanctions."
[24] Jovanovic and Sukovic, "A Decade under Sanctions."
[25] Garfield, *Economic Sanctions, Health and Welfare*, 34.
[26] Jovanovic and Sukovic, "A Decade under Sanctions." The IDPs were mainly Serbian refugees from Milosevic's wars in Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Kosovo.
[27] Vesna Bjekic, "Investigation: Strategy of Household Survival, How People Make Ends Meet in Serbia," *AIM*, September 27, 2000, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200009/00927-002-trae-pod.htm, accessed May 5, 2009.
[28] "Serbia on the Demographic Map of Europe," *YU Survey/1999*, http://www.pregled-rs.rs/article.php?pid=225&id=20863 accessed May 8, 2009.

on soup kitchens organized by the Yugoslav Red Cross. The reports acknowledged that despite the aid being given out, it was nowhere near enough to meet the need.[29]

Serbs, recognizing their decreasing standard of living, developed "coping" mechanisms. The key finding of the survey carried out by the Centre for the Investigation of Alternatives in July and August 2000 on a sample of 992 households in 28 municipalities, was that people were either sacrificing or greatly reducing all types of consumption. Those least affected were giving up their vacations while those most severely affected, nearly half of those surveyed, were buying food of "poor quality." About 61% were buying only the very bare essentials in toiletries, using only soap, detergent and toothpaste. Moreover, of that 61%, 13% further reduced their consumption of even these basics. "Households not only reduced or did not buy clothing or shoes but also were frequently forced to sell personal property; land, jewelry, vehicles and even in some cases their housing to try to manage."

> In developing the strategy of their survival, the citizens first reduce their needs, grow vegetables in their gardens, unite with relatives or friends or work illegally, just in order to slow down inevitable economic ruin and satisfy the fundamental needs of members of their household.[30]

In addition to greatly reduced consumption of even essential items, the primary coping mechanisms were the barter of goods and services and extensive use of the networks of social support—most highly developed in non-agricultural households—especially to try to obtain jobs or needed medical services. Even this mechanism however was in danger as an increasing number of household had less and less to barter, and fewer

[29] "Red Cross to Open Soup Kitchens throughout Country," *BETA* Belgrade, September 2, 1999. FBIS-EEU-1999-0902.
[30] All citations in this paragraph are to Bjekic, "Investigation: Strategy of Household Survival."

could ask friends for help.[31] The grey economy, for many years a "standby" alternative to supplement income became tighter, with only 26% of the households surveyed obtaining income from the grey sector as opposed to 34% previously.[32]

Assessment of Main Problems in Society: Subjective Understandings

As important as their empirical reality to the possibility of "demand" for protest was the way Serbs perceived and felt about their lives and who, if anyone, they held responsible. The most telling sign as to how some Serbs felt about their lives were the number who chose "exit." While those choosing "exit" were not, in theory, available to give voice, their very choice spoke loudly as to how younger Serbs especially perceived their lives and their future. Rough statistics put the number of Serbs who had emigrated from Serbia between 300,000 and 600,000 between 1990 and 2000. A UNICEF report notes, "These emigrants are mainly young adults, especially males."[33] As telling in many ways were the numbers who had considered or at least thought of leaving. In 1998 a representative sample of over two thousand respondents from Serbia (excluding Kosovo) and Montenegro found that, in response to the question "Have you thought about leaving Yugoslavia and going abroad for a longer time?" 14.7% reported that they thought about it "all the time" while 30% said that they thought about it "sometimes." In short, almost half the country had thought about leaving.[34] By 1999, one poll reported that "as many as

[31] Bekic, "Strategy," and Mark Lawrence and Alexandra King, *Serbia Food Economy Assessment, March 2000*, United Nations World Food Program, draft for comments, April 17, 2000.
[32] Lawrence and King, *Serbia Food Economy Assessment*, 18-19 and 23-24.
[33] Garfield, *Economic Sanctions, Health and Welfare*, 36.
[34] "Yugoslav Public Opinion in Serbia 1998," ZA-4277, accessed August 16, 2000. While marginally more Serbs than Montenegrins thought about leaving "all the time" (15% versus 14%), a smaller percentage had thought about it "sometimes" (28.5% to 34.2%).

68% of persons below 30 are ready to leave the country."[35] Truly reflective of how many Serbs felt about their situation was a bitterly self-deprecating joke about leaving: "Question: 'How does a clever Serb call a stupid Serb?' Answer: 'From abroad!'"[36]

Clearly, change was desired not only among those that had emigrated—they had spoken with their feet—but also to some degree among those left behind. How did citizens of Serbia perceive their lives?

Assessment of the Problems: Subjective Understandings as Reflected in the Public Opinion Polls

As in any country there was no "one Serbia." Serbian citizens were divided in their opinions about their political, economic, international and social situations. Yet survey data reflected several overall trends in the country. Beginning in 1992, repeated surveys of representative samples of the populations of both the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia demonstrated that the great majority of those surveyed consistently felt that the country was headed in the wrong direction. Negative responses, recorded in a survey in 1996 that included Montenegro as well as Serbia proper, peaked in 1993 in Serbia at 91.3%, but never fell below 71.1%. On the eve of the elections, in February 2000, 81.2% of those surveyed thought Serbia was headed in the wrong direction.[37] Moreover throughout the 1990s, they typically saw the number one problem in the country as the economy and its associated ills. This in fact had always

[35] Biserka Matic, "People in Serbia – Living in Fear," *AIM* Podgorica, October 27, 1999, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199910/91027-003-trae-pod.htm, accessed May 6, 2009.
[36] Stef Jansen "Victims, Underdogs and Rebels: Discursive Practices of Resistance in Serbian Protest" *Critique of Anthropology* 20:4 (2000): 413.
[37] See "Yugoslav Public Opinion 1992," ZA2908, "Public Opinion in Serbia 1993," ZA2907, "Yugoslav Public Opinion 1996," ZA2911, "Yugoslav Public Opinion in Serbia 1998," ZA4277, and "Pre-Election Study - Presidential Elections Serbia February 2000," ZA4280, at http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp.

been the number one concern of people since the late 1980's, and in repeated public opinion surveys over one-third of respondents listed the economy as the first most serious problem facing the country, with another third listing it as their second choice.

Trust in Institutions and People

Trust in institutions also steadily declined. In public opinion surveys conducted in 1993, 47% of people responding had "no trust" in the Federal Parliament, while an additional 31.2% had "little trust." The Federal Government "enjoyed" similar numbers, while those for the Parliament of Serbia were even worse. Only the Yugoslav Army seemed to have any significant level of trust among the population, with 26.8% expressing "much" trust in it, and another 32.6% having "some" trust. Those figures declined over time but not as precipitately as for other institutions: in 1997, 13.4% trusted it "completely" and 29.7% said they "mostly" trusted it. In an open-ended question posed in 1998 about what institutions people trusted the most, 24.4% chose the army, but fully 21.5% trusted "none" and 16.9% were indecisive. By February 2000 the same question showed that the army had actually lost its status as the single most trusted institution to the Serbian Orthodox Church, which was selected as "most trusted" by 23.2% (up from 12.5% in 1998), while the Army was selected by 20.6% of the respondents. Through the mid-1990s, Milosevic received the trust of roughly one-third of respondents to public opinion polls while another one-third trusted no-one; but by 1998, those who considered him the "most trusted" politician had declined to 14.4%, while 33.3% trusted no-one and another 19.4% were indecisive.[38]

[38] "Yugoslav Public Opinion 1993," ZA2909, "Yugoslav Public Opinion 1995," ZA2910, and "Yugoslav Public Opinion in Serbia 1998," ZA427, http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp, accessed May 8, 2009.

Assessment of Blame

Despite the regime's regular and ongoing attempts since the early 1990s to blame economic and political woes on outsiders, especially on the West, over time increasingly larger numbers of Serbs were not "biting." Milosevic's use of war to distract them from economic woes had limited success in 1992-1993, but became increasingly less effective over time as people not only "noticed" the linkage between the wars, the country's isolation and their economic situation, but also became less inclined to blame those pernicious "outsiders" on whom Milosevic kept trying to pin responsibility for the sanctions and subsequent economic woes. When asked in 1992 to what extent they blamed Milosevic for the imposition of sanctions, 41.5% exonerated him entirely, while 27.3% considered him only "partly responsible." Only 31.2% blamed Milosevic for the sanctions. By the late 1990s, however, those who blamed Milosevic and his regime for the country's economic woes ranged from two-thirds to nearly three-fourths.[39] As we shall see in the following chapters, the combination of Milosevic's attempts to put the blame elsewhere for economic difficulties at home *and* to convince people of the success of his new "reconstruction" campaigns fell on increasingly disbelieving ears as the credibility gap between the claims made and reality became ever starker. As one "worker in Belgrade put it, the best source of information is his wallet. 'When I work all day and

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See also United Nations Development Program Serbia: European Movement in Serbia, 2001. "Vulnerability Trends and Perceptions: Suspended Transition." http://www.undp.org.rs/index.cfm?event=public.publications&pg=8, (accessed May 5, 2009), and Vesna Bjekic, "What the Citizens of Serbia Fear: Public Opinion in Serbia: Scared, Indecisive And Down In The Dumps," *AIM* Podgorica, October 12, 1999. http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199910/91012-002-trae-pod.htm accessed May 10, 2009.

[39] "Public Opinion in Serbia 1992 (First Wave)," ZA2904, "Yugoslav Public Opinion in Serbia 1998," ZA4277, "Election Study Serbia September 1999," ZA 4278, http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp, accessed April 2, 2009, and National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, *Serbia Issues Poll,* October 24, 1999, http://www.ndi.org/files/410_yu_serbpoll99.pdf.

it is still empty, you tell me which newspaper or television station can convince me that the regime is all right.'"[40]

Nor did Serbs believe that the West or other outsiders were responsible for all the wars fought in their name. While in 1995 Serbs blamed the suffering of Serbs in Krajina and Republika Srpska on Western countries and organizations (35.2%) and only 16.2% blamed Milosevic,[41] in the fall of 1999 after the NATO bombing, blame was rather "evenly" apportioned: just under 30% of respondents blamed Milosevic for the conflict, while roughly one-third blamed President Clinton and just over one-third "both equally."[42] By February 2000, blame had shifted: 57.2% of Serbians rejected the often-repeated government claim that the international community was primarily to blame for Serbia's misfortune, while now only 42.8% agreed.[43] Moreover, despite the strong propaganda offensive claiming that conflict was inevitable and that the Serbian regime did not bear the main responsibility for it, independent surveys conducted between December 1999 and February 2000 found that an absolute majority of the population believed that a wiser foreign policy could have avoided the conflict (as high as 69.3% of respondents in one poll).[44]

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[40] Milenko Vasovic, "The Media War Continues," Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report No. 57 (July 16, 1999), http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.

[41] "Yugoslav Public Opinion 1995," ZA2910, data from Republic of Serbia only. Interestingly during the earlier conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1992, a little more than half of the respondents to one survey blamed Milosevic at least partly for that fighting (26.7% fully blamed him, 26.3% partially,) while 47% exonerated him of responsibility.

[42] "Election Study Serbia September 1999," ZA 4278, NDI, *Serbia Issues Poll,* October 24, 1999, 37.

[43] "Pre-Election Study - Presidential Elections Serbia February 2000," ZA4280, February 2000, http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp, accessed May 8, 2009.

[44] United Nations Development Program, Serbia, "Vulnerability Trends and Perceptions: Beyond the Democratic Breakthrough," http://www.undp.org.rs/index.cfm?event=public.publicationsDetails&revid=CE1BC0BC-3FF2-9C75-28E50EC1F0F76597, accessed May 8, 2009; Vesna Bjekic, "Public Opinion of Serbia: Hope for Change," *AIM* Podgorica, January 17, 2000. http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200001/00117-002-trae-pod.htm (accessed May 7, 2009); and "Pre-Election Study - Presidential Elections Serbia February 2000," ZA4280, http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp accessed May 8, 2009.

This is not to say that Serbs necessarily liked the West—in that same poll from February 2000, 40% of the respondents expressed a "strongly unfavorable" opinion about Americans, 37.6% about the British, 35.5% about the Germans, and 29.8% about the French—but it is clear that they were not taking the regime completely at its word as to the source of the troubles and had a far more nuanced understanding of their lives and troubles than either the regime or the West gave them credit for.[45]

Trust in Opposition

The opposition, especially at the national level, was not seen as the answer. It was not trusted, if not blamed in part for people's difficulties. If only "unity would save the Serbs," the constant personal infighting among opposition figures that repeatedly led to the dissolution of coalitions had created a high degree of distrust of opposition political leaders. In a public opinion poll in 1998 Draskovic obtained 1.5% favorable ratings, Djindjic 0.8% and Kostunica 1.3%. On individual numbers Milosevic still beat them all with 14.4%, claiming the spot as the most trusted politician. In subsequent surveys in 1999 and 2000, Milosevic's levels of trust remained comparatively high, but as the election neared trends showed a crystallization of support behind the candidate of the opposition, Kostunica. For example, although on the eve of the election in August 2000 Milosevic's level of personal trust among the electorate was still greater than Kostunica's (32.9% to 29.7%), not only did these figures represent a significant increase for Kostunica's trust level, but in the same survey, when asked who they would vote for in the presidential election, 34.7% chose Kostunica as opposed to 23.4% who would vote

[45] "Pre-Election Study - Presidential Elections Serbia February 2000,"ZA4280, February 2000, http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp, accessed May 8, 2009.

for Milosevic. Thus through their campaign activities, the Alliance for Change managed to address the problem of the public's perception of the opposition with some success.[46]

Was there past evidence that Serbs would do something about it? And if so—who was likely to act? (Glimpsing Future Protest Potential from Past History)

To the extent that past experience could serve both as an indicator of potential future demand as well as a "learning experience" for the future, there was reason to think that not only would there be a renewed demand for change, but that efforts would be made by certain segments of society to make something happen. In 1991, 1992, and 1996/97 some Serbs had protested in the streets. Serbs clearly had shown ability in the past not only to be aware of their grievances but to try to do something about them. Certain segments of Serb society had consistently been demanding changes from 1990 onwards. In 1991, 1992, and 1996/97 the calls for change had certainly come from the students. From the beginning students self-identified, had a collective identity as a distinct group, whose civil rights were being abridged, who saw politics as having gone badly wrong and who wanted a chance to lead a "normal life." On March 9, 1991, after the regime used tanks and killed a student while attempting to suppress a peaceful demonstration by the SPO and other opposition supporters calling for the "liberalization of government media," students gathered and occupied the center of the city at Terazije. For ten days, while occupying Terazije, the students conducted a "Parliament" which

[46] "Election Study Serbia November 1999,"ZA4279, "Pre-Election Study - Presidential Elections Serbia February 2000," ZA4280, "Pre-Election Study - Presidential Elections Serbia May 2000,"ZA4281, and "Pre-Election Study - Presidential Elections Serbia August 2000," ZA4282, and compare with "Election Orientation of Citizens of Serbia in 1999-2000: According to the Data of the Center for Political Research and Public Opinion of the Institute of Social Sciences," *BDnet Service,* http://www.bbnet.org.yu/bdnet/elections/eng/lutovac.htm, accessed December 29, 2007.

enunciated their demands not only for the resignation of key members of the media and the freeing of those arrested during the demonstrations, including Draskovic, but also very political demands such as the resignation of the Minister of the Interior. Although the "Parliament" formed a variety of committees to handle its operations, it ultimately ceased operations ten days later, its goals of being a "restraint, both on the regime and the opposition, poised to summon the 'extra-party' student parliament to defend fundamental principles of freedom and democracy,"[47] unmet. The "Parliament" did not succeed in any of its political demands, but the language of protest it developed was important for subsequent student demonstrations through 2000.[48]

As early as the 1992 protest, that lasted for 26 days, students were well-organized, protesting specifically against Milosevic and for a better future. Their demands were clearly and openly political, set forth in Student Proclamation # 8: first they wanted the "dissolution of the National government and Serbian Parliament," second "the resignation of President Milosevic," third, "the formation of a government of National Salvation," and finally "the organization of elections for a Constitutional Convention."[49] Slogans were posted by students on the glass wall of the Philosophical faculty, nicknamed the "wailing wall," and located in a central Belgrade passageway available to many passersby who copied down the sayings. The slogans clearly illustrated that the students were well aware not only of economic problems, but of political ones, and made clear where blame should be placed. Phrases such as: "we are not ashamed of our past but

[47] From the Proclamation of the Terazije Parliament Forum, signed by over 100,000 people, as cited in Susak, "An Alternative to War," 500. See also Thomas, *The Politics of Serbia in the 1990's*, 82. Thomas notes that student protests took place not just in Belgrade but also in "major cities and towns across Serbia including Nis, Novi Sad and Kragujevac." See also Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1992), 48-50.
[48] See Susak, "An Alternative to War," p. 500, and also Mirjana Prosic-Dvornic, "Enough! Student Protest '92."
[49] Susak, "An Alternative to War," 500.

of our future," "if you are SLOBODAN [the name means free], I don't feel that way," "this is chaos, in anarchy there is some order," "only in novels do people die of love, in reality they die of hatred," and "elevators for heavenly Serbia are out of order," identified not only the fact there were political problems, but who was to blame for them. Some slogans clearly protested the difference in understanding between the self-identified and unified younger generation and their parents—"Dad, do I have to get killed for you to come to your senses?" reflecting a particularly bitter realization by students that their parents' understandings of politics differed greatly from their own in some cases. There were also pointed messages posted to the greater population about the economy: "do you have food for your children?" or "how long can you support your family without a job?"[50] In short, the students "got it"—they had not only economic grievances but political ones. The students not only wanted change, but affixed blame, organized, framed their campaign and acted collectively.

If the 1992 protest evidenced political demand by the students, so did their 1996/97 campaign. As in 1992, the students had specific concerns about the autonomy of the university, specifically the removal of the unpopular rector, who had been nominated by the ruling party. As in 1992, however, the students supported wider demands, this time the Zajedno coalition's call for its victories in the local elections of 1996 to be recognized. The protesters, both students and others, used a whole range of tactics seen in earlier demonstrations and used with great effect later by the student movement Otpor in the run-up to the 2000 election, tactics in which biting humor against the regime

[50] An excellent, in-depth discussion and analysis of 1992 in Serbia is Prosic-Dvornic "Enough! Student Protest '92."

played a prominent role.[51] In one sense the immediate political aim of the protests, to force the recognition of opposition victory in the constituencies in which results had been "annulled," was finally reached when Milosevic passed a special law (February 11, 1997) seating the opposition in the contested municipalities. While the Zajedno coalition formally ended its protests on February 15, students continued to agitate until March 20, when the rector and student vice-rector of the university resigned.[52] Though the students were generally anxious to avoid being identified with particular political parties, the great majority considered their protest to be political, and thought that it ought to be understood as political but not identified with specific political parties.[53] As one Zajedno leader characterized the protests, they were not a "mass movement" or an expression of "people power," they were "a protest of citizen-voters against the falsification of their free elections," that is, a fundamentally civic, political protest.[54]

In all three major student protests in 1991, 1992 and 1996/97, students had worked hard to establish their collective identity and to enunciate their collective grievances and demands. All their campaigns clearly fought for change—change that would result in better futures, "normal lives," in rule of law, regularized political situation, and improved economics, including good relations with the West. While in

[51]Mirjana Prosic-Dvornic, "The Topsy Turvy Days Were There Again: Student and Civil Protest in Belgrade and Serbia, 1996/1997," *The Anthropology of East Europe Review* 16:1 (1998), http://condor.depaul.edu/~rrotenbe/aeer/aeer16_1.html#Prosic_Dvornic, accessed May 9, 2009. Otpor and the importance of humor is discussed more fully in Chapter Eleven.
[52] Milica Bogdanovic, Ljiljana Milovanovic and Miodrag Shrestha, "Chronology of the Protest," in Mladen Lazic, ed., *Protest in Belgrade: Winter of Discontent*, (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999), 211-230.
[53] Dragan Popadic, "Student Protests: Comparative Analysis of the 1992 and 1996-97 Protests," in *Protest in Belgrade: Winter of Discontent*, 151-167, see especially 159, where student participants reported that 77% of them considered that the protests *ought* to be "political but not party-related," and 82% considered that the protests actually *were* such.
[54] Thomas, *The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s*, 289.

1991 and 1992 the majority of student demands were political but vague, by 1996/97 students had very specific and achievable demands.

In November 1998, less than a month after Slavko Curuvija had published "What's next Mr. Milosevic?" the following paid advertisement appeared in the daily newspaper that he edited, *Dnevni Telegraf*,

> Resistance is the answer! There is no other way. It will be too late when someone close to you starves to death, when they start killing people on the streets, when they turn off all the lights, and poison the last spring. It will be too late. This is not a system. This is a disease. Bite the system! Get Hold Of Yourself, Live The Resistance.[55]

In raw, blunt language, meant to shock people out of their misery or complacency and acceptance of life as it was, the students gave expression to their thought and feelings. Resist! they said. As in the past, students were once again one of the first groups in society not only to demand change, but to mobilize for it. Their assessment of the situation was that life had not gotten better, if anything the promises of the 1996/97 election had been lost or broken and they wanted a different future—it was time to act. As discussed in Chapter Eleven—not only did the students have very direct political demands and goals, they acted on them using peaceful, frequently humorous means to get rid of Milosevic. Their grievances had not changed. In fact if anything they had intensified and their determination to see their actions and goals through became a point of pride for them and won them admiration from even their toughest opponents—the thugs who were sent by Milosevic's government to beat them up. "It is incredible how persistent these students are," one of these bullies said. "Unlike the majority of citizens, they have no fear, they are real fatalists. They are the only ones we've got any respect for.

[55] "Deepening Authoritarianism in Serbia," *Human Rights Watch Report*, 11:2 (1999), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/serbia/ accessed May 8, 2009. See especially the section "Faculty and Student Response."

Ordinary people are cowards and don't really cause us any problems."[56] Their courage in the face of adversity, demands for responsible leadership and actions on the streets had a direct impact on demand for change. First, accusations against the students and their humorous actions became increasingly unbelievable to a segment of society that had, up to that time resisted demanding change. Parents knew that their children were not foreign hirelings and they could not stand idly by as the regime beat them in some cases simply for wearing t-shirts. Second, residents in smaller villages and towns who had known many of the "activists" since they were in diapers (Grannies for Otpor) or who were among their peers could no longer believe the regime propaganda as they saw for themselves in their village squares that the students' actions—though humorous and sometimes poking fun at the regime—caused no one any real harm. This was especially true as the membership of Otpor grew and expanded to include middle school students, young people who were not at University but who lived in smaller villages throughout Serbia, and finally as it became a "people's movement." For a host of reasons that shall be explored both later in this and in the following chapters, students, and especially Otpor, were crucial to increasing the demand for change—demand that resulted in increased mobilization.

Students mobilized in other ways as well. As explored in the previous chapter, students who had been part of the 1996/97 campaign formed the backbone of the group CeSid, who knew that only through pressure for free and fair elections did hope for change exist. Other students, though fewer, joined the youth arm of political parties. Yet

[56] Daniel Sunter, "Belgrade Bully-boys Set Loose**:** A Sinister Group of Regime Henchmen Are Trying to Silence Government Critics," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report No.125 (March 17, 2000), http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.

others worked with NGOs to help get out the vote. In subsequent chapters I will explore how they too mobilized demand for change.

In both 1992 as well as in 1996/97 the largest support for the demonstrations organized by the students and the political opposition had come from those in "the other Serbia," largely middle class citizens, intellectuals and politicians. Some support for the students did come from elements outside the mostly urban, middle class milieu. One scholar who studied the 1992 events describes how students were brought milk, cheese, and fruit from peasants and how one even appeared in full folk costume with the complete makings for a lamb roast. She goes on to note that "their participation was extremely important because the regime's propaganda always boasted of having the support of villagers, 'simple people who can immediately tell right from wrong and cannot be deceived by fancy talk.'" [57] If her argument can be generalized to the larger rural/peasant population, it would be interesting to explore how this squares with the generally received wisdom that the peasants and rural dwellers were primary supporters of Milosevic, especially in Central and Southern Serbia, not only through 1992 but through 2000. Though these and other signs suggest that support for opposition was reaching other social levels, the fact remains that the protest movements were strongest in cities and towns, though not limited only to Belgrade.

The term the "other" Serbia originated in the Belgrade Circle, a group founded in 1992 by intellectuals from various disciplines whose strong self-defined collective identity centered on specific values: for democracy and individual human rights, and against xenophobia and populism. Among other activities they organized public gatherings they described as the

[57] Prosic-Dvornic, "Enough! Student Protest '92."

> vital core for the political and cultural life of the so-called 'Other (in sense different, non-nationalistic) Serbia', [which] were envisioned as opposition to the militaristic nationalism of Milosevic's regime, to its xenophobia and populism which had overtaken the Serbian society in the early 1990s. 'The Other Serbia' revisited legitimating to wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, thus sending a powerful message to Europe and the world that not all citizens of Serbia stand united in support of bloodshed and genocide.[58]

The Belgrade Circle provided its members a "support" group: first as a trusted group of peers with whom they could debate and talk about important political issues, second, as a self-created network to lean on for moral support and third, as a support system to find resources for the various activities in which its members were involved, [59] including the founding and running of NGOs such as the Humanitarian Law Center headed by Natasa Kandic.

The "other Serbia' was not a uniform group, nor did people from "the other" Serbia uniformly participate in activities that expressed demand for change. Some such as Kandic and the Humanitarian Law Center spoke out regularly and actively defended those persecuted by Milosevic's government. Such people attempted to demand and make change largely through formal organizations such as the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Yugoslav Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights, the Alternative Education Academic Network, or through grants and activities sponsored by the SOROS foundation to look for ways and to take initiatives to make it happen.

But the "other Serbia" extended far beyond just the Belgrade Circle. Over time, the term the "other Serbia" came to be used in regular parlance, including in Serbian

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[58] Belgrade Circle. "Belgrade Circle: A Brief History." http://www.belgradecircle.org/eng/aboutus/index.html, (accessed May 6, 2009). Mirjana Prosic-Dvornic, "The Topsy-Turvy Days Were There Again: Student and Civil Protest in Belgrade and Serbia, 1996/1997," *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 16:1 (1998), points out that the Belgrade Circle first coined the term the "other Serbia."

[59] Ivan Vejovoda, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 4, 2007.

newspaper articles to mean those citizens, whether by-standers or active participants whose values were similar to if not the same as those enunciated by the Belgrade Circle: for democracy, rule of law, against populism and xenophobia. It was a set of values that some had previously labeled 'cosmopolitanism" as opposed to "nationalism." The essence of the "other" Serbia was a *culture* that was far removed from the one promulgated by Milosevic. The "other Serbia" was composed of actual people but was also an imagined community that drew strength from knowing that others who shared their values existed in the society. As Anderson's imagined community came into existence with wider more broadly distributed press allowing people who never met personally to be drawn together on the basis of shared ideas and feelings, so too Serbia's "other" imagined community located itself in the independent media, in the lyrics of rock music such as those by Darkwood Dub and Dza ili Bu and through the lyrics and concerts of "pop" figures such as Djordje Balasevic, whose songs and performances clearly laid bare the problems of the Milosevic years and gave voice and distinct words to people's desires and demands for change.[60]

Moreover in the aftermath of 1996/97, the "other" Serbia was not located strictly in Belgrade, as discussed in the previous chapter. While primarily located in more urban areas the "other" Serbia also now existed in smaller towns in Central and Southern Serbia—especially where the opposition had won the municipal elections. In addition to "think tanks" and civic rights groups there were also humanitarian aid groups frequently trying to help the internally displaced Serbs from the previous wars. Nezavistnost, the independent trade union that opposed the regime, had also made inroads in the regions.

[60] For an excellent examination of the importance of music in protest in Serbia in the 1990's see Branislava Mijatovic, "Music and Politics in Serbia (1989-2000)" PhD dissertation, University of California Los Angeles, 2003.

Opposition towns also had radio and television stations that now openly discussed "other" points of view. Even in some of the towns strongly controlled by SPS-JUL, such as Leskovac, there were signs of the existence of the other Serbia, such as the Leskovac Human Rights Committee.

There were also the "bystanders" in the "other Serbia"—those who shared the values and sympathized with the causes and idea promulgated by the "other Serbia" but who were not always active participants. They were the people who had attended the rallies in 1997, had provided support to the protesting students in 1992 and 1996/7, who attended the lectures and events held by groups such as the Belgrade Circle. These were by and large middle class citizens. In the best survey that we have of the participants of the 1997 protests, the results show that the protestors were disproportionately well-educated, urban, and came from the professions or were students. The industrial and service sectors were underrepresented. Thus, one author cautiously concluded that the 1996-97 protest was "primarily a protest of the middle strata."[61] After 1998, however, these people began to show signs of fatigue, as the demonstrations failed to achieve lasting results. Despite the significant spontaneous protests that broke out throughout the summer of 1999 (examined in the next chapter), frustration and apathy began to set back in in the mid to late fall of 1999 as few concrete results could be seen as having derived from the protests. Moreover, increasing numbers of citizens were unwilling to protest anymore. Increasing numbers of citizens thought that meaningful change would have to come through the system itself. Although in September 1999, 64.9% of respondents to a survey said they supported the demonstrations, by November of that year 66% believed

[61] Marija Babovic, "Potential for an Active Society," in Mladen Lazic, ed., *Protest in Belgrade: Winter of Discontent* , trans. Liljana Nikolic (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999), 39-40.

there was "no point" in continuing them. In February 2000, while 24% of respondents in one poll claimed that they had participated in an opposition rally, and another 21.1% said they could take part in a demonstration, fully 54.2% replied that they would not participate. Overall, people were disappointed in the outcome of the protests.

In a survey conducted in 1998, 41.4% of the respondents felt that compromise and cooperation between the ruling coalition and the opposition would contribute the most to positive political change in Serbia, while 29.8% depended on an electoral defeat of the ruling regime. Only 10.6% felt that mass protests and citizens' demonstrations were the answer. By February 2000, the number expecting change via demonstrations had shrunk to 3.3%, while 39.4% were counting on an electoral defeat of the regime, and 37.5% were hoping for some kind of deal between opposition and regime.[62] People feared losing their jobs, provoking conflicts with family or neighbors, arguments with political opponents, confrontation with the police, or arrest.[63] A survey conducted by the Belgrade Center for Policy Studies in late August and early September 1999 confirms these tendencies: in the words of the summary, "It would appear that the most numerous participants in the 1996/97 protests now prefer to relinquish the leading role in direct involvement in favour of the less educated (and numerically stronger) categories."[64] Overall there was simply a greater reluctance to use any sort of mechanism or protest that was outside the system.

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[62] See "Yugoslav Public Opinion in Serbia 1998," ZA4277, "Election Study Serbia September 1999,"ZA4278, and "Pre-Election Study - Presidential Elections Serbia February 2000," ZA4280), as well as NDI, *Serbia Issues Poll, October 24, 1999*, http://www.ndi.org/files/410_yu_serbpoll99.pdf (accessed May 6, 2009), and Bjekic, "What the Citizens of Serbia Fear."

[63] Bjekic, "What the Citizens of Serbia Fear." In a representative sample of 1,588 citizens conducted by the Institute for Social Sciences in September 1999, 56% of respondents said they were not ready to risk any conflict with family or neighbors for politics, 55% did not want to quarrel political opponents, 63% were not willing to risk job loss, 68% would always avoid conflict with the police, and 70% did not want to risk being arrested.

[64] "Between Disappointment and Hope – Public Opinion in Serbia, September 1999," Center for Policy Studies/ Centar za proucavanje alternativa, Belgrade, 1999. http:// www.cpa-cps.org.yu/public.htm.

Whereas in 1996/97 66% had said that they would be happy to throw eggs even if they knew that police cameras were recording them, in polls taken in September and December 1999, half of those polled preferred gradual change to radical action.[65]

Thus from 1991 through 1997, students and the middle class had been in the forefront of demands for change. But the "other Serbia," at least those who were regular and active participants in it, represented a small percentage of the population. How did those not in "the other" Serbia perceive their situation? What, if anything had changed, especially in the years after 1997 that might indicate once again a desire for, or at least sympathy towards change and perhaps even a readiness to take action?

Media and Information—Shaping Demand for Change—Belgrade and the "Rest"

Demand for change is based on how people perceive "their reality." These perceptions are influenced in part by the media as media can help set agendas, distribute information as to how one party would like a situation to be understood (framing) and can impart factual information that people can use to compare and gauge their situation to that of others, as well as to convey information that they might otherwise not be aware of. Complete suppression of certain types of information also curtails people's understanding of the world. Just as Benedict Anderson argued the world changed dramatically with the printing of newspapers so too television and radio changed how people understood their

[65] Slobodan Cvejic, "Civic Movement, Social Capital and Institutional Transformation in Postsocialist Serbia," *Sociologija* 46 (2004): 275; Vesna Bjekic, "Serbs Opt for Rebellion," Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report No. 129, March 31, 2000. http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.

identities and which issues were priorities. Television helped to define who was part of which communities and helped shape these communities "imagined" and otherwise. A report from *Vreme* exposed this reality in Serbia in 1999:

> A telephone conversation between two friends, a Belgrader and his former neighbor who has been living in Cacak for the past few years, reveals an unusual turn of events: "of course you don't know that, you in Belgrade cannot watch TV Montenegro news," says the one in Cacak adding: "on second thought, you are the one who lives in the province."[66]

As at least half of the Serbian population professed to prefer TV as their primary medium for obtaining information,[67] one of the important achievements of the Zajedno opposition victories in the municipal elections was gaining control of radio and television stations at a local level. RTS had been called "TV Bastille" by many after the events of March 9, 1991. It had been whistled at, booed and had backs symbolically turned on it during the "media walk" protests of 1996/97. It had been the object of disdain and hatred for many, especially in Belgrade when pots and pans were used to drown out the noise of the "lies" during its prime news hour during the protests in 1996/97. Despite all this, RTS was the only channel with nationwide coverage, and prior to the opposition municipal victories 49.7% of TV viewers watched it, with two other pro-government stations accounting for an additional 24% of the audience. Thus RTS together with the two pro-government stations were in a position to influence nearly three quarters of the Serbian population. [68] As the official station of the country under the control of Milosevic

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[66] Uros Komlenovic, Zorica Miladinovic and Zoran Radovanovic, "Air over Serbia: What Audiences in Belgrade, Nis, Kragujevac, Pancevo, Cacak…See and Hear," *Vreme*, February 27, 1999, http://www.ex-yupress.com/vreme/vreme45.html (accessed May 6, 2009).

[67] Polls taken in 1995 showed that 64.2% of the population watched government TV programs 6-7 times per week, while 50.7% trusted domestic TV completely or somewhat. In 1998 a similar survey showed that 50.8% considered TV the information source they used most. See "Yugoslav Public Opinion 1995,"ZA2910, and "Yugoslav Public Opinion in Serbia 1998," ZA4277.

[68] Rich McClear, Suzi McClear and Peter Graves, PPC Evaluation Working Paper No. 10: U.S. Media Assistance in Serbia, July 1997-June 2002" (Washington DC: USAID Bureau for Policy and Program

and his government, RTS along with always promoting the government line, did a rather remarkable job of suppressing all information that ran contrary to its pre-determined interests. Djindjic had once remarked that, "if something is not on RTS—it doesn't exist.'"[69] For Belgraders, by the beginning of 1999, the Law on Public Information and the collapse of the Zajedno coalition meant they received very little independent news. Draskovic's control of Studio B meant that it presented a one-sided perspective—his own—much to the disgust of other opposition leaders, leaving B92 a lone voice in the wilderness. Independent newspapers such as *Vreme* and *Nasa Borba* had been sharply curtailed.

However, in Central and Southern Serbia, as well as in Voijvodina, the 1996/1997 municipal victories vastly changed the scope and quality of the media landscape changing the quality and nature of the information that a much broader segment of the population in more rural areas as well as towns in this region received. While it is difficult if not impossible to quantify the exact impact this had on shaping people's perceptions and demands, it is possible to assert that people in the region recognized the value of these new information sources. Low level skirmishes between citizens of the opposition–led towns and regime authorities broke out as early as January 1997 when these authorities began their efforts to restrict if not eliminate broadcasts by the newly independent radio

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Coordination November 2003), 4. See also Media Center Research Team Belgrade, "A Media Portrait of Serbia – Life in Repression," *Mediaonline.ba: Southeast European Media Journal*, http://www.mediaonline.ba/en/?ID=9.

[69] Djindjic made this comment in 1996. Nenad Lj. Stefanovic, "Serbia is a Great Mistery [sic]: Interview: Zoran Djindjic, Democratic Party Leader," Vreme News Digest Agency, No. 223 (January 15, 1996), http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/serbian_digest/, (accessed May 6, 2009). The entire interview, which covers a range of topics, is remarkably prescient. Djindjic pointed out that without regular public discussion of important political issues on TV, including on RTS, politics moves from a rational discussion of policy alternatives into one of "passions….People become silently dissatisfied and their political dissatisfaction gradually turns into rage." As of the beginning of 1996, only some were beginning to realize that they had been "anaesthetized" by RTS and that none of the problems that were first "conceived" in 1988 had been resolved—he specifically cited Kosovo, the national questions and the international position of the country.

and television stations. As early as January 1997 the citizens of Kragujevac clashed with police in an effort to physically defend their transmitter from take-over, resulting in several casualties.[70] Such efforts by citizens against the authorities only accelerated as the authorities increasingly tried to shut stations down, often by physically removing their transmitters. Citizens became increasingly enraged by such actions. During the NATO-led bombing, due to the successful hits by NATO on government transmitters, the government required all independent stations with functioning transmitters to play RTS news feed and programs. Despite this demand, some stations such as TV Cacak, defiantly stayed on air with their own programs 24 hours a day. Those stations that had yielded to the government's demand, expected and then demanded once the bombing had ended that they be allowed to go back to their own programming. When such demands were not met, several cities such as Sokobanja, Nis, Kraljevo and Bajina Basta simply bypassed authorities, removed the seals from their premising and resumed transmitting their own broadcasts.[71] Citizens detestation of regime stations and protective sentiment towards their own stations were expressed in a variety of ways and reached its most extreme form when reservists returning from the Kosovo front blew up the hated Galaksija 32 station in Cacak, which was seen as the "most war-mongering and patriotic television station."[72] A Serbian reporter of this event went on to note that "despite the brutal tactics used against Galaksija 32, few in Cacak appeared to regret the station's demise."[73] Throughout the fall

[70] Uros Komlenovic, Zorica Miladinovic and Zoran Radovanovic, "Air over Serbia: What Audiences in Belgrade, Nis, Kragujevac, Pancevo, Cacak…See and Hear," *Vreme*, February 27, 1999. http://www.ex-yupress.com/vreme/vreme45.html (accessed May 6, 2009).
[71] Teofil Pancic, "Freedom of the Media Unsealed: On the Air in Serbia," *AIM* Podgorica, June 22, 1999, published June 26, 1999, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199906/90626-002-trae-pod.html.
[72] Anonymous, "Explosive Reporting," Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report No. 55, July 11, 1999, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-. The author was an independent journalist from Belgrade whose identity was withheld.
[73] "Explosive Reporting."

and winter of 1999 and especially into the spring of 2000 the regime stepped up attacks on local media in concert with its more directed attacks on media in Belgrade. Citizens in opposition-led cities employed a variety of tactics to prevent any interruption of their independent radio and television service. While some tactics were mild, such as peaceful demonstrations, most efforts, initiated by the citizens themselves in self-organized groups, were more direct and physical in nature to match the regime's tactics of literally stealing transmitters. Citizens in a wide variety of towns, including Cacak, Pirot, Uzice, Kraljevo and Nis, formed citizen action committees that could be called upon to go and physically defend the station's transmitters. Some citizens erected barbed wire around their transmitters and towers while others, such as those in Cacak in March of 2000, mounted a 24 hour armed guard around the transmitter and placed bear traps around it as well for its protection. Vladimir Ilic, the mayor of Cacak, went so far as to say that he would mine the approaches to the buildings where the transmitter was housed to safeguard the station.[74] Such acts of defiance by self-organized citizen groups clearly illustrate the degree to which citizens in opposition–led cities had come to value their independent media, much of which was well-balanced, not tilting excessively towards the opposition. Maja Tasic, the media coordinator for GSS and the Alliance for Change agreed that those in the area outside of Belgrade were much better informed than those in

[74] See "Explosive Reporting," "Rally to Be Held in Valjevo Against State Media Reporting," *BETA* Belgrade, August 27, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0827, "SPS Says SZP People Among Arrested for Transmitter Blast," *BETA* Belgrade, October 13, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-1013, Vlado Mares, "Muzzling the Media," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkans Crisis Report No. 77, September 21, 1999, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-; "Serbia: Town Council sets up committee for defense of local radio-TV," BBC monitoring Europe - Political, Radio B2-92 Belgrade, March 13, 2000, available on Lexis-Nexis Academic; "Media protection committee formed in town in western Serbia" BBC Monitoring Europe – Political, *BETA* news agency, Belgrade, March 28, 2000, available on Lexis-Nexis Academic, Miroslav Filipovic, "Sumadija Takes on Belgrade," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report No. 128, March 28, 2000, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-, Vlado Mares, "Independent Media Writhe under Crackdowns," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report No. 130, April 4, 2000. http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.

Belgrade itself. In her interview with *Vreme* in 1999 she observed that while it was impossible for GSS and Alliance for Change to get any airtime in Belgrade, terming it "'completely off-limits for us," she noted that "outside Belgrade the situation is much better and the people in larger towns and cities are definitely better informed about the activities of the opposition parties than the Belgraders, since they have to rely on B92 only."[75] In her estimation, "the rest of Serbia has a far livelier political scene exactly because of the greater access to information."[76]

NATO Bombing

A final factor increasing demand for Milosevic's ouster was the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia between March 22 and June 11, 1999, in an attempt to end the crisis over Kosovo. Views on the impact of the bombing are controversial within Serbia.

> Following the first NATO bombs, my neighbor ran out on the balcony, looked up in the sky and unleashed a torrent of abuse. He cursed NATO for what he considered an unjust and illegal bombing. And he cursed his president, whom he had never voted for, asking rhetorically: "Where are you now, Slobo? I'll bet your somewhere safe unlike the rest of us."…The second night the bombing went by, the third and the fourth, by which time my neighbor could no longer be heard voicing his double-pronged anger. He continues to watch the skies from the balcony, but has decided it would be prudent to keep his opinions to himself.[77]

Less than two weeks before the beginning of the bombing, 78% of Serbian citizens surveyed in a poll that ran in *NIN* magazine said that they did not believe that they were going to be bombed.[78] When the bombs fell on Belgrade, as well as cities and

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[75] Maja Tasic quoted in Komlenovic, Miladinovic and Radovanovic, "Air over Serbia," February 27, 1999.
[76] Tasic quoted in Komlenovic, Miladinovic and Radovanovic, "Air over Serbia," February 27, 1999
[77] Anonymous, "Slobo's Biggest Ally—the Fear…" Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report No. 16, April 5, 1999, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-. The correspondent's name was suppressed to protect his family from reprisals.
[78] "Opinion Poll: 78.5% of Citizens Do Not Expect Air Strikes," *BETA,* Belgrade, March 18, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0318, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com, and Petar Lukovic, "The War Comes

villages throughout Central and Southern Serbia, it came as a great shock to the city's residents. Blame for the bombing was placed on ***both*** the West and Milosevic—though at the time most political watchers, NGO leaders and analysts in Serbia believed that only the West would be blamed and that the Serbs would unite strongly and firmly behind Milosevic.

"It set us back ten years!" was a commonly voiced sentiment from NGO activists in reference to the NATO bombings.[79] Not only did the NATO bombing make it harder for NGOs to carry on their work, and harder to convince people that they should like and want to be part of the "West," the NGO bombing was also a source of bitter disappointment if not sour disillusionment to those in the "other Serbia" who themselves had their faith in the "West" shaken. It was now hard to argue that the West represented rationality, humanity and that it was a source not only of funds but positive values when it was bombing the homes of your neighbors, friends and relatives. Thus NGO and other civil society activists who espoused positive relations with the West believed that NATO's actions not only would be a temporary set-back to their activities for the duration of the bombing, but would also permanently change peoples' perceptions of the West and who was to blame for Serbia's current troubles—undoing all their hard work and making their future efforts that much more difficult.[80]

Home," Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report No. 10 (March 27, 1999), http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-..

[79] Miljenko Dereta, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 5, 2007; Sonja Licht, interview by author, Washington DC, November 8, 2007.

[80] Miljenko Dereta, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 5, 2007; Sonja Licht, interview by author, Washington DC, November 8, 2007. See also Anonymous, "A Marshall Plan of the Mind," Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report No. 38 (May 27, 1999) http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.; again, the author's name was suppressed to protect him. See also Vojin Dimitrijevic, "The Collateral Damage Is Democracy," Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report No. 13 (March 31, 1999), http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.. Dimitrijevic was a professor of International

The NATO bombing also led to the suspension of public work by Otpor. On the advice of Slavko Curuvija, Otpor suspended all public operations for the duration of the bombing.[81] "How could we act against the regime at a time like this?" I was asked rhetorically when talking to a former Otpor member. "We were being called up—many of our friends were in uniform—we didn't like the regime—but how could we protest—we would have been seen as being unpatriotic. It would have perhaps justified Milosevic's criticism of us. And it was *Serbia* that was being bombed—not just Milosevic's regime—we all cared about Serbia which is why we were in Otpor in the first place."[82] Some students turned their ire and humor on NATO, using the same types of cultural cosmopolitan references that they had employed in the 1992 and 1996/7 campaigns against Milosevic.[83] While they might be against the Americans and the West, their point of reference was often western, if not American. This, as Stef Jansen points out, enabled them to be both "within and without" Western culture. An example of this was "developed during the air strikes, and … [was] a phenomenon which was visible all

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Public Law at the Belgrade university and former vice-chairman of the UN Human Rights Committee in Serbia. See also Belgrade Center for Human Rights, *Report*, Belgrade, April 2, 1999. http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/bchr2-4-1999.html; Concerned Serbian Citizens, *Let Civility Prevail: A Statement Of Concerned Serbian Citizens*, Belgrade, April 16, 1999. http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/bchr16-4-1999.html; European Movement of Serbia, *Open Letter to Mario Soares, President, International Organization of the European Movement*, Belgrade, March 31, 1999, http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/ems31-3-1999.html; Yugoslav NGOs, *Against The Logic of War: Letter to the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights*, Belgrade, May 21, 1999, http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/pressrelease/bngo21-5-1999.html; *Letter to Albanian Friends from Nongovernment Organizations*, Belgrade, April 30, 1999, http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/ems30-4-1999.html; *Report to the Governments of the FRY, Serbia and Montenegro to the Parliaments of the Fry, Serbia and Montenegro*, Belgrade, May 10, 1999, http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/bchr10-5-1999.html; and *Statement on the Possible Internet Ban*, Belgrade, April 26, 1999, http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/pressrelease/26-4-1999.html, all accessed June 7, 2008. These statements included open acknowledgement of the atrocities against Albanian citizens.

[81] Milenko Vasovic, "Belgrade Students Lead Resistance to Bad Government," Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report No. 79 (September 28, 1999).

[82] Sinisa Sikman, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 5, 2007. Note this is a paraphrase and not a direct quote.

[83] On this issue see Prosic-Dvornic, "Enough: Student Protest '92", the same author's "Topsy-Turvy Days," and Jansen, "Victims, Underdogs, and Rebels."

over Serbia: windows lined with brown tape as a protection against nearby explosions – they were called 'Windows 99."[84] Yet the students' humor and clear ire at the West did not mean that they wanted to keep Milosevic and rejected the West. Being of both Serbia and the world, wanting to go back out in the world, they bided their time—sincere in their anger against NATO, sincere in their dislike of Milosevic.

Milosevic's regime organized rock and folk/pop concert extravaganzas in the streets and squares and gathered people on the bridges to show the West that Serbs were not afraid and that they were all united with the Milosevic government. Such activities both provided an outlet for true outrage felt against NATO and was meant to take people's mind off the situation. Impressing popular stars to perform did not always work to the regime's favor. While all were patriotic and did not find NATO's bombing to be justified, some also did not approve of the regime.[85] Thus, forced into appearing at one of the regime's concerts in early to mid-April, pop star Djordje Balasevic, a widely respected and loved performer to more than one generation, became the first person in Serbia to publicly and "explicitly demand…that the international community's demands be accepted."[86] While these concerts in Belgrade and other major cities were well attended in the first few weeks of the war, numbers attending dwindled not only as anger turned to resignation but as the practical aspects of everyday survival, such as life

[84] Jansen, "Victims, Underdogs and Rebels," 408.
[85] Several popular bands such as Darkwood Dub took a risky decision and refused to give any performance at all. Others, such a Block Out "demanded that the posters of Slobodan Milosevic be removed from the scene." See Bojan Bozic, "We Didn't Want to Play in Honour of Total Destruction of Our Country: Kanda, Kodza i Nebojsa, a Rock Band," *Free Serbia Interviews*, February 11, 2000, http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/interviews/2000/e-kkn11022000.html accessed May 8, 2009.
[86] Ilic explicitly states that "it is worthy of note that the first clear and resolute demand to accept the conditions for ending the suicidal war came from a pop celebrity, not a politician or a non-governmental organization active in Belgrade." Vladimir Ilic, "The Serbian Opposition during and after the NATO Bombing," *Helsinki Files No. 2, Potential for Changes*, 75. http://www.helsinki.org.yu/doc/files02.zip (accessed May 6, 2009). Djordje Balasevic was more than "just" a pop star—he was understood by many to be an important voice of moral authority based on his many public positions strongly and clearly enunciated against the regime and its policies.

frequently without electricity and water in high-rise apartment buildings, as well as attempts to obtain necessities such as bread and other scare essentials, became the focus of daily living.[87]

Milosevic's regime also used the officially declared state of war as a convenient excuse to further tighten laws on media, association and travel. On March 24 when the bombs began falling, Milosevic imposed "emergency decrees" which forbade a variety of activities including demonstrations without prior permission of the police, and further increased government censorship of the media.[88] Men of "military age"— defined broadly as ages 18 to 60—were forbidden to travel abroad, and those who were potential draftees were refused visa renewals.[89] The police were also given broader powers to search and arrest people in the effort to apprehend spies and stop war profiteering. A clear signal was sent by the government to the "other Serbia" with the murder of Slavko Curuvija, who was gunned down while walking with his girlfriend in the mid-afternoon a "few hundred yards" from the Yugoslav Parliament building on April 11, 1999. His murder, following a veiled warning in *Politika Express* for his supposed support of NATO's bombing, was a clear signal that the regime would no longer tolerate open speech against the government and would further restrict (to the extent that one still existed) the independent media. The man who had given voice to citizens' grievances and fears in asking the president "What now Mr. Milosevic?", and who had published Otpor's manifesto was now dead. While his murderer was "being sought," his funeral attracted

[87] Anonymous, "National Unity: Utter Exhaustion," Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report, No. 36 (May 21, 1999), http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.
[88] Steven Erlanger, "Milosevic Takes Measures to Restrict Demonstrations," *The New York Times*, June 23, 1999.
[89] "Government Bans Travel Abroad for Military Draftees," *BETA*, Belgrade March 29, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0329, *World News Connection*, http://wnc.dialog.com.

several thousand ordinary citizens, as well as well known political, media and cultural figures who came to pay their final respects.[90] The NATO bombing did indeed represent the perfect moment for the government to insist on unity and country above all else.

Politicians also suspended criticism of Milosevic for fear of seeming unpatriotic. From the beginning of the NATO bombing until the end of April, opposition politicians stuck to patriotic platitudes and openly opposed NATO's conditions. Vuk Draskovic's statement on April 25 against the war, against the policies of the government, and in favor of settlement, was the first time a politician ventured to speak out against the actions of the Milosevic regime. That Draskovic was at the time part of the regime made his statement that much more sensational. Opposition politicians found themselves in the odd position of having to second the words of Draskovic, even as he still held a position with the government. Vuk Obradovic, leader of the Social Democratic party and Zoran Djindjic, president of the Democratic party both ended up saying that they "agreed" with the bulk of the views that Draskovic had put forward, though neither Obradovic nor Djindjic could resist the opportunity to snipe at Draskovic: Obradovic for not having access to Studio B to promote such views, and Djindjic pointing out that Draskovic was a member of the government and suffered from "proverbial fickleness."[91] By the middle of May, politicians such as Zoran Zivkovic, mayor of Nis, openly argued that the government needed to "urgently state our plan in connection with Kosovo and to draft a time and life cost estimate." He also flatly stated that "Empty stories of patriotism and

[90] "'Several Thousand' Attend Publisher Curuvija's Funeral" *BETA*, Belgrade, April 14, 1999. FBIS-EEU-1999-0414, *World News Connection*, http://wnc.dialog.com.
[91] "Draskovic Urges Leadership 'To Stop Lying' to Nation," *BETA*, Belgrade, April 25, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0425; "Social Democracy Leader Supports Draskovic's Remarks," *BETA*, Belgrade, April 26, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0426; "Djindjic Agrees with 'Most' of Draskovic's Views," *BETA*, Belgrade, April 26, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0426, all at *World News Connection*, http://wnc.dialog.com.

dramatic productions on squares and bridges are not serious politics,"—a bold statement directly accusing Milosevic's promotion of patriotic pomp and circus of having no real substance.[92]

Zivkovic's words also reflected a little noticed fact. According to a poll carried out by the Medium polling agency at the beginning of May, while the bombing campaign was in full swing, Slobodan Milosevic enjoyed no more support during the war than he had before it. Medium's poll registered 30 percent of the population supporting the president. Thus, contrary to frequently voiced views, the war had not unified the country behind the president personally.[93]

While other politicians began to speak out against the war and in favor of ending it, the strongest voices of protest came not from politicians, but from citizens themselves. These were not citizens in Belgrade who were traditionally the leaders of protest. The only signs of protest in Belgrade were those that appeared in the graffiti—something of an indicator of the mood of the city. In June, after NATO hit Milosevic's "residence," graffiti appeared throughout Belgrade complaining "'Slobo, when we needed you most, you were not home."[94] Otherwise Belgraders seemed shocked, quiescent, or were, at the very least, quiet. The loudest voices of protest against the war did not come from the NGOs who had long spoken out against the wars. The voices that would speak out most

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[92] "Nis Mayor Demands Leadership Present 'Plan' for Future," *BETA*, Belgrade, May 13, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0513, *World News Connection*, http://wnc.dialog.com.

[93] Spomenka Lazic, "Political Commotion in Serbia: Division into Patriots and Traitors,"*AIM* Podgorica, May 27, 1999, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199905/90527-001-trae-pod.htm (accessed May 6, 2009).

[94] Anonymous, "Harsh Reality under the Bombs: Belgrade's bravado in the wake of NATO's early air strikes disappeared as the reality of daily bombing set in," Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report No. 42 (June 3, 1999) http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.. Again, the correspondent's name was suppressed for his own protection. For an interesting study on the cultural and political function of graffiti in Serbia in this period se Aleksandar Zikic, "A Concrete Museum," in *The Last Decade, Serbian Citizens in the Struggle for Democracy and an Open Society 1991-2001*, eds. Group of Authors (Belgrade: Media Center 2001), 64-68.

loudly for change—and perhaps they seemed so loud because they were so unexpected—were the voices of citizens in towns across Central and Southern Serbia.

CHAPTER SIX

Demand: The Long Hot Summer of 1999

In this chapter I examine the unexpected outbreak of broad spontaneous protests in their various manifestations in Central and Southern Serbia in the summer of 1999. I focus on protestors own explanations of their motivations to protest, especially their claims related to morality and injustice and consider the importance of emotions and culture to protest. I examine the demographics of those who protested to ascertain if these protestors differed significantly from those who had protested in 1996/97 and whether they could constitute a new reservoir of people to be mobilized for future protest. I also address whether or not the grievances that were expressed were purely local and parochial or had a larger significance to the likelihood of future mobilization for protest; specifically did the protests in any way reflect a significant change in certain segment's of society's understanding and ordering of their world that could lead to further mobilization.

In the second major section of this chapter I examine the organized protests that also were held in the summer of 1999 by the political coalition Alliance for Change. I examine the synergies between the two types of protests. Finally I examine the government's response to these protests.

Central and Southern Serbia: May 1999

They had had enough and it had to end. The war had to end, the way they were living had to change and the government needed to treat people better. This was the

announcement of the citizens of Central and Southern Serbia to Milosevic and to their local SPS-JUL leaders. While the larger towns in Central and Southern Serbia had voted for the opposition in the municipal elections of 1996, much of the region was rural, and many towns in southern Serbia such as Leskovac were "owned" by SPS-JUL governments, i.e. were still Milosevic territory. Yet in cities, towns and villages across this region, before the bombing ended, people began to speak out. They not only voiced their sentiments—in spontaneous acts they *demonstrated* their feelings. While the citizens of Cacak, an opposition town led by a rabble-rousing mayor, held a citizen's parliament decrying not only the war but the violence perpetrated against Albanians, in towns across the regions parents of soldiers protested their sons' mobilization. Throughout the next few months, the Serbian analysts, intellectuals and commentators who believed that NATO actions would only unite the populace behind Milosevic and against the West were to be proven wrong. In cities and towns across Central and Southern Serbia, even as bombs were falling—the protesting had begun. Although the bombing stopped in the middle of June, the summer months of June, July and August would prove to be hot in ways that had not been anticipated by the government or by the experts. It was to be, as Djindjic said, "a hot summer, hotter than any summer that has come before."[1]

Protests Before and During the Bombing: Parents' Protests (March 21, May 17-26)

Before the bombing had even begun, a certain amount of restiveness was evident among the parents of Central and Southern Serbia, whose sons' military service was to be

[1] Blaine Harden, "In Provincial Serbian Town, 10,000 Say 'No' to Milosevic," *The New York Times*, July 7, 1999, citing Djindjic at an Alliance for Change rally in Uzice.

extended. On March 21, in Kragujevac, a group of approximately 30 parents stood in front of the Yugoslav Army Hall, hoping to speak with Army representatives to ask why their sons' tours of duty were being extended and to argue against it. One father argued that his son had already spent ten months in "war conditions." Many refused to show identification out of fear that their efforts would have a negative impact on their sons, but nonetheless they had come. Of the parents who did speak to Army representatives, one father reported that they were being told "fairy tales."[2] While 30 parents did not represent a significant number of the total number of parents whose sons were serving, nor even a majority whose sons were in the "March class" that was being extended, it certainly was unexpected that parents would directly request talks with the Army to protest such a thing.[3] It was a minor ripple—but a ripple nonetheless.

Almost two months to the day later, protests broke out again in Krusevac, but this time it would not be a mere thirty or so people: 3,000 to 4,000 citizens stood in the streets, mothers, wives and sisters demanding the return of their sons, husbands and brothers from Kosovo in the middle of the war. In a government stronghold, it was a remarkable event. It was sparked by a government lie. "They had been telling us that our lads were alright, that nobody was killed. Then the coffins with the bodies arrived. They had lied."[4] On Monday, May 17 and Tuesday, May 18 around 3,000 wives, mothers, and parents protested their loved ones' deployment in Kosovo. "The dead don't need

[2] "Parents Complain to Military over Army Service Extension," BETA, Belgrade, March 21, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0321, *World News Connection,* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[3] One parent averred that there would have been more parents there had they known about it, but the local media refused to announce the protest.
[4] Spomenka Lazic, "Anti-War Protests In Serbia," AIM Podgorica, June 2, 1999, www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199906/90602-001-trae-pod.htm, accessed May 14, 2009.

Kosovo," read one sign carried at the rally.[5] "We want our sons, not coffins," chanted other protestors.[6] Others held a banner with a similar sentiment: "Bring back our sons, we do not want them in coffins." Faced with an outright government lie about the safety of their sons, the parents of Krusevac experience what Jasper and others have identified as a "moral shock" which resulted in spontaneous protests.[7] The authorities' response to this on-going protest was apparently to use force on some of the parent protestors.[8] As reservists received news of the abuse of their parents and wives, they did an about-face and deserted.[9] One soldier, hearing of the force used on his mother, told a reporter later that same week about the reservists' "bitterness" and their attempt to get home:

> We managed to get home. There were many problems along the way. They used water hoses to prevent us from going home. They demanded that we lay down our arms. We refused to obey. It was not enough that we were killed by bombs, now they are beating our parents. I shall not go back there. This is not a war, this is a frenzy in which it is both difficult to survive and to remain sane. I don't want to

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[5] Anonymous, "The Dead Don't Care About Kosovo," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report No. 42 (June 2, 1999), http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-. Again, the author's name was concealed for his protection.

[6] Jeannette Pearson, "Southern Yugoslav Demonstrators Demand End to War," London Press Association May 19, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0519, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com, accessed May 14, 2009.

[7] See John P. C. Matthews, "Majales: The Abortive Student Revolt in Czechoslovakia in 1956," *Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 24,* http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ACFB31.pdf, for another example of how a lie by authorities acted as a moral shock and was crucial to ensuing events including student protests.

[8] It is not clear how much force was used if any—reports from the period out of Belgrade, Montenegro and from international news services do not agree on this point, although Serbian sources tend to report that force was used. It is clear however that some of the reservists had *heard* that force was being used and this along with reports of the demonstrations sparked their desertion from Kosovo and return home. See Lazic, "Anti-War Protests in Serbia," Margita Cvetkovic, "Krusevac Case: Retreat or Desertion," *Nezavisna Svetlost,* (Kragujevac), May 28 – June 5, 1999, http://www.ex-yupress.com/nezsvet/nezsvet10.html (accessed May 6, 2009), and Lara Santoro, "Reservists' Row May Test Mettle of Yugoslav Army: Army Cracks Down on Protests about Reservists' Involvement in Kosovo," *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 27, 1999, http://global.factiva.com, accessed October 31, 1008, for reports of rumors of the use of violence on the parents and its affect on the reservists.

[9] Serbian and Montenegrin reports are clearly based on interviews with the reservists, in which they themselves say that they deserted. Other reports such as Carlotta Gall, "Wives Protest and General Sends Troops Back Home," *The New York Times*, May 21, 1999, state that they returned home only with permission. Given that reporters from foreign papers such as Gall were forbidden from entering Krusevac and Alexandrovac, and the Serbian and Montengrin sources such as Cvetkovic, "Krusevac Case: Retreat or Desertion," and others actually report desertion, which was later "negotiated" into "leave," I have chosen to trust the reports from native sources.

> kill anyone, nor do I want to be killed. I have a wife and a small child. I can't understand how anyone can be pushing us into all this…[10]

In nearby Aleksandrovac protests also broke out when about 1,000 people gathered at a bus station to prevent the return to the front of their sons who had been on leave. When the SPS Mayor addressed the crowd he was apparently pelted with eggs and stones.[11] Protests demanding the immediate return home of the reservists from the front also broke out in several others towns across the region such as Raska, Vrajne, Vrnjacka Banja, Paljevic and Brus, all within the same week.[12] Protests that had begun on Monday continued on Tuesday and Wednesday. According to one report, reservists agreed mid-week to return to their original recruitment points for negotiations with military authorities, at which it was agreed that if they handed in their weapons they would be issued a demobilization certificate "noting that they had served in Kosovo and authorizing them to return to their homes."[13] However the authorities once again broke their good faith agreement with the parents and the reservists, issuing a remobilization call, demanding that the reservists appear for service again in Kosovo, with the warning that any who did not appear would be dealt with by a military court.[14] This prompted a renewed set of protests that had escalated by Sunday when the returned reservists joined their parents in protests in towns across the region.[15] Protests in Raska were apparently

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[10] Lazic, "Anti-War Protests in Serbia."
[11] Pearson, "Southern Yugoslav Demonstrators Demand End to War," and "AFP Report: Signs of Dissent as Soldiers Families Protest," Agence France Presse, May 19, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0519, *World News Connection,* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[12] Lazic, "Anti-War Protests in Serbia."
[13] Julian Manyon, "War in the Balkans: Police Rush to Tense Town of Deserters," *The Independent*, May 21, 1999.
[14] "Krusevac 'Tense' following 23-24 May Anti-War Protests," Agence France Presse, May 25, 1999, citing Montenegro Radio-TV Podgorica, FBIS-EEU-1999-0525, *World News Connection,* http://wnc.dialog.com. See also Santoro, "Reservists Row May Test Mettle of Yugoslav Army."
[15] "Serb Reserve Soldiers Protest Kosovo War, Reports Montenegro Paper," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, citing the independent Montenegrin daily *Vijesti*, May 24, 1999. See also Lazic, "Anti-War Protests in Serbia."

especially heated when General Nebojsa Pavkovic, commander of the Third Army stationed in Kosovo, was unable to convince reservists who had deserted to return to the front. [16]

In addition to the open breach of faith, parents and reservists felt that they were being unfairly and unjustly treated: that their region was being called upon to do more than its fair share for the war in Kosovo and that reservists from other regions, and even more importantly, the sons of the local political elite were not being called upon to sacrifice. The people felt, as one reservist complained, that only "poor people were sent to the warfield, that sons of officials and rich people are sitting at home or abroad."[17] At the Raska protest, demonstrators demanded that sons from Belgrade and Pozarevac (Milosevic's hometown) be called up in place of their sons and some demonstrators held up a sign saying, "While one part of Serbia is screaming, another is singing," pointedly referencing their suffering versus that of the people attending the rock concerts going on in Belgrade.[18] Similarly in a meeting that had occurred with General Pavkovic in Krusevac the previous week, women had complained that "rich men went around town talking on their cellular telephones"[19] and that these men with connections had been shown favoritism allowing them to avoid any service.

Not surprisingly, news of the Krusevac and Aleksandrovac events was not carried on RTS—Serbian official media studiously chose to ignore the protests. Independent media were gagged by the emergency decrees. In Belgrade news of the events was passed

[16] "Serb Reserve Soldiers Protest Kosovo War."
[17] Lazic, "Anti-War Protests in Serbia."
[18] "Serb Reserve Soldiers Protest Kosovo War," and Lindsey Hilsum, "Rebel Serbs Call for Human Rights," *The Guardian*, May 23, 1999, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/may/23/balkans3/print.
[19] Gall, "Wives Protest and General Sends Troops Back Home."

by word of mouth.[20] Confirmation that something was happening was indirectly given when SPS spokesman Ivica Dacic told a news conference that was carried by BETA that "Parents in Krusevac and Aleksandrovac are interested in the return schedule of some of the army and police units; they are not demonstrating against the war, which is what NATO claims." He went on to say that it was "normal that parents are interested in the whereabouts of their children, particularly in regions that have given the most people for the defense of the country."[21] In addition to SPS spokesman Dacic's statement on May 20th, Seselj could not resist commenting either, claiming that that the SPO was responsible for the protests and that the demonstrations "had been provoked by 'anti-Serbian and traitor elements, coordinated with NATO forces.'"[22] The commander of the Yugoslav Army Garrison in Krusevac accused the organizers of the protest of "undermining the defense of the country, treason, and direct collaboration with the enemy." Parents, in the scenario set forth by the Army command, had had their "feelings abused" by the organizers.[23]

The ongoing demonstrations by the parents, and the "unofficial" return of the reservists, presented the regime with serious dilemmas. The first was what to do with the approximately 2,000 reservists who had returned from Kosovo, but had not given up their arms and were protesting (peacefully) in town.[24] Bodies were needed at the front. But parents and reservists were protesting not only their return to the front, they were

[20] Lazic, "Anti-War Protests in Serbia."
[21] "SPS: NATO Misrepresents 'Interest' as Demonstrations'," BETA Belgrade, May 20, 1999, FBIS-EEU-19990520, *World News Connection*, http://wnc.dialog.com. See also Cvetkovic, "Krusevac Case: Retreat or Desertion."
[22] "Seselj: Vojvodina's Canak, Cacak Mayor To Be Arrested," BETA Belgrade, May 20, 1999, FBIS-EEU-19990520, *World News Connection*, http://wnc.dialog.com.
[23] "Minister Accuses NATO of Inventing Army Desertion Stories," BETA Belgrade, May 20, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0520, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[24] "Krusevac 'Tense' Following 23-24 May Anti-War Protests."

demanding that the other local units be allowed to return (and stay) home. Moreover NATO's open mention of "desertion" by the soldiers, which had prompted a regime response saying that no desertions had occurred, that such talk was just NATO propaganda, led to both a public relations nightmare and a practical problem of how to handle the desertions. The regime opted in favor of saying publicly that some of the troops were on leave while others had been demobilized, but away from the glare of the media and public statements, they attempted to make sure that those reservists returned to the front.

Of more significance was what those protests represented. Significant numbers of people in Central and Southern Serbia were saying–enough! They would not sacrifice their sons for Kosovo; Kosovo was not worth sacrificing for. After all, as one sign said, "the dead don't need Kosovo." Reservists were saying "enough!" They were not going to be targets for NATO bombs—especially as it appeared that Serbia would lose the war. And enough of unfair treatment whereby they made all the sacrifices and others who were politically well-positioned in their region profited by not having to send their sons off to war. Not only did these people *say* enough—they took to the streets about it. They confronted military authorities. Reservists had been heard to say that no one was going to make them go back to Kosovo.[25] For a regime that had built its power by depriving people of alternatives and had used war as a means to keep people's attention elsewhere—away from the economy, the lack of medical care, jobs and supplies—having people who lived in the heartland of "Milosevic country" stand up and say "enough"

[25] "Krusevac 'Tense' Following 23-24 May Anti-War Protests," Carlotta Gall, "Protests Are Resumed by Families of Yugoslav Reservists Ordered Back to Duty in Kosovo," *The New York Times*, May 25, 1999, and David Hearst and Lazar Dzamic, "Serbs Step up Protests against War," *The Guardian*, May 25, 1999.

must have given the regime pause.[26] As one Serbian commentator noted, "without presenting a single political demand, the protestors have effectively challenged the entire ideological construction on which the Milosevic regime is based simply by asserting that they care more about the lives of their nearest and dearest than they do about Kosovo."[27] As all who commented on the event at the time noted—the protestors' demands were not political demands. They just wanted their sons to come home; they just wanted more justice, more fairness in spreading the burdens of sacrifice. Even Djindjic noted that the protests were not political:

> These are the first signs of the disintegration of a regime that was already weak, corrupt and disorganized. They have not been organized by the opposition, and they have no political goal, and this makes it all the more difficult for Milosevic because, if it were a party, he could have tried to corrupt or decapitate it. He can only calm these people down for now by meeting their demands, and he cannot meet their demands unless he stops the war, gives them their sons back, and finds them work. Had he been able to do all that, he would have been a good president. Indeed it is the victims of his policies who have taken to the streets…[28]

The protests attested to the depth of dissatisfaction about certain "normal" things.[29] They spoke to the potential of demand, to the courage of the people but also, importantly, to how a sense of injustice and moral outrage could move them to act. Although they were not demanding overtly political things, in a country where almost everything was becoming politicized, demands for a "normal" life, justice, and fairness could certainly become political.

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[26] Manyon, "War in the Balkans: Police Rush to Tense Town of Deserters."
[27] "The Dead Don't Care about Kosovo."
[28] "Opposition Leader Djindjic Says Milosevic's Only Tactic Now is Repression," BBC Monitoring Service: Central Europe & Balkans, citing *Liberation*, Paris, May 28, 1999, http://global.factiva.com, accessed October 31, 2008.
[29] Normal in the sense I use it here is as it was used by Serbs, to express not only a disruption of everyday life but of a sense of normality and order. See Chapter Nine for a fuller discussion of this issue.

Cacak Parliament (May 17-May 24)

If the events in Krusevac and Alsandrovac were massive spontaneous protests in response to moral shock and raw feelings of injustice, especially in response to actions by local officials and the Army, the Civic Parliament that took place in Cacak on the same days represented a more measured protest with far fewer people involved but with a more far-reaching, broader objective that was not local in nature such as bringing local reservists back from the front.[30] Thus, while both the parents' protests and the Cacak Parliament were spontaneous acts of opposition, they differed in how they manifested themselves, their tactics, their targets and the degree to which they were openly political. They were different representations of demand.

Twenty citizens of Cacak from a variety of professions gathered for seven days, first openly with other citizens and then by themselves in venues such as churches and bomb shelters as they were pursued by police, to express in measured terms their disgust for the policies of the Milosevic regime that had resulted in the bombing of Serbia and to call for widespread political changes.[31] Specifically they called for an end to the bombing, for the "true democratization of Serbia and Yugoslavia" and for an end to Milosevic's adventurist policies. While the call for an end to the bombing could now be seen as both a sincere but pro-forma protest against NATO's heavy bombing of Serbia, one which would be approved by the regime, direct language regarding Milosevic's

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[30] Anonymous, "Cacak's Voice of Reason," Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report No. 51 (June 30, 1999), http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-. Again, the author's name was suppressed to protect him from reprisals. See also "Central Serbian town of Cacak Demands End to Milosevic's 'Adventurist' Policy," BBC Monitoring European-Political, May 18, 1999, TV Montenegro report, http://global.factiva.com (accessed November 2, 2008), and "Serbian Opposition Party Says Regime Cannot Break Serbs' Democratic Spirit," BBC Monitoring European-Political, May 28, 1999, http://global.factiva.com (accessed November 2, 2008).

[31] Margita Cvetkovic, "Civic Parliament in Cacak,"*Nazavisna Svetlost*, Kragujevac May 28-June 5, 1999, http://www.ex-yupress.com/nezsvet10.html, accessed May 15, 2009.

policies, i.e. calling actions in Kosovo "adventurist policies," clearly took a step beyond the usual boundaries. Furthermore, remarks by Verica Barac, one of the 20 citizens in the Cacak Parliament, carried on Montenegrin TV (on a tape obtained from Cacak TV) included some very straight political language:

> I believe that in this state, all who think differently than the dictatorship which has led us into this war are under threat. This is one party's war and its struggle for power. That struggle for power has finally threatened the survival of an entire nation…We can say that we are aware of this and that we are partly responsible for not opposing this. But we must oppose this. We must demand an end to this. However, we must demand that there be someone who will also reach an agreement with people outside this community. [32]

The actions of the Civic Parliament were also very different from the street protests by parents as the Civic Parliament formally protested primarily *national* policy and did so using the pen, not by taking to the streets. [33] They used television, especially Montenegrin TV[34], radio stations and BETA to inform others of the letters they had written to political figures and of their proposed solutions to national problems. On May 19 they held a news conference specifically noting that they wanted an end to ethnic divisions, specifying that Albanian Kosovar families should be protected and allowed to return to their homes. This demand was very controversial as it was rarely publicly acknowledged that Albanian families were suffering as a result of Serbian actions. When

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[32] "Cacak 'MP' slams Belgrade 'dictatorship'," BBC Monitoring Newsfile, May 19, 1999, TV Montenegro report, http://global.factiva.com, accessed November 2, 2008.

[33] The Cacak Parliament did make two important concrete "local" demands: first that the military move its assets to outside the town so that the town would no longer be a direct target and second, that TV Cacak be restored to them. See "Cacak Citizens Parliament Wants Army to Pull Out of Town," BETA Belgrade, May 19, 1999 FBIS-EEU-1999-0519, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

[34] TV Cacak, which remained on the air 24 hours a day even after NATO started bombing and was known for its independent reporting, was silenced on April 3 not by bombs but by federal inspectors who, with the help of police, removed TV Cacak's transmitters. The reason given was that TV Cacak was "undermining the defense of the country." The regime silenced Radio Cacak shortly thereafter. Anonymous, "Explosive Reporting," Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report no. 55 (July 11, 1999), http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-. Again, the author's name was withheld to protect him.

it was acknowledged it was frequently part of a "package" of images of joint suffering. The Civic Parliament also wrote letters to government officials: to Milosevic on May 20 appealing to Milosevic to "stop the war immediately and bring your decision into conformity with the terrible suffering of all the people of Yugoslavia which you lead." Moreover they told Milosevic that they wanted Yugoslavia returned to the *full* community of nations (indicating that this meant the West), its isolation ended and any policies that separated people along ethnic, religious or party lines to cease. To their representatives in the republican and federal assemblies they wrote open letters, pointedly reminding these men that they had the ability to change the course of Serbia's history, thus placing on them a moral and historical burden: "history has placed you where you are at present. Remember that you are writing history…and that people are awaiting your decisions." They also wrote to Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic, supporting his stands on events and once again openly stating that Milosevic's policies were adventurist, "based on collective suicide."[35]

One could argue that 20 people in Cacak had no impact and no notice was taken of them. In fact, while observers had been sent from other opposition cities in the hopes that they might learn and be able to repeat such a parliament in their own towns, the Civic Parliament, given the regular bombings, blackouts from lack of electricity and people's daily concerns, might have received very little attention outside of a small circle of people in Cacak.[36] However the regime's actions with regard to the Civic Parliament and

[35] "Serbian police detain members of anti-war organization," *Montena-Fax News Agency* (Podgorica, Montenegro), May 24, 1999, Europe - Political: NewsBank Access World News, http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org.

[36] It is unclear how many people attended the open sessions before the police drove the rest of the sessions them underground. Carlotta Gall, "Crisis in the Balkans: The Serbs: Grass-Roots Politics Looks for an Opening in Serbia," *The New York Times*, June 17, 1999, reports 500 Cacak citizens attended the open sessions, but there seems to be no other corroboration of this figure.

its political supporters in Cacak guaranteed that more attention was paid than might otherwise have been the case. On the evening of May 19 the military police questioned Vladimir Ilic, the mayor of Cacak, who had openly supported the Parliament's work. He then dropped out of sight.[37] Ilic's sudden disappearance, which was commented on openly by town officials and other members of his New Serbia party, as was his failure to appear at the City's celebration of Ascension Day, garnered more attention than if he had been left alone. The city's residents and the national political parties that were part of Alliance for Change openly asked where he was and demanded that the authorities account for his whereabouts. The arrest of several of the leading members of the Citizens Parliament also created opportunities for opposition politicians to again draw attention to the actions of the Parliament, their words and beliefs. Social Democratic leader Vuk Obradovic argued that people were "being persecuted only because they have raised their voices for an end to the war and for the salvation of the people and the state" and "accused 'self-proclaimed patriots and would-be fighters for the defense of the people and the state' of 'pursuing a campaign against the people who hold different political views.'"[38] The leadership of the Cacak SPS party heightened tensions by firing off a statement in which it accused the Cacak local opposition government of treasonous behavior, of not having "shown even the minimum of patriotism" and of following orders

[37] Ilic was apparently informed by amateur radio hams sympathetic to him that the military patrol was on its way to arrest him. He then went into hiding for 40 days, first appearing on June 29 as a speaker in Cacak at one of the first Alliance for Change rallies. For information on his disappearance see Dragan Todorovic, "Gde se krio Velja Ilic (Where was Velja Ilic Hding)" *Vreme* (Belgrade) July 10, 1999, 6, as reported in "Curtailing Political Dissent: Serbia's Campaign of Violence and Harassment against Government Critics," *Human Rights Watch Reports* 12/6 (2000), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2000/serbia/Yugsrb00-02index.htm#TopOfPage (accessed May 6, 2009).

[38] "SD Leader Protests 'Persecution' of Cacak Opposition," BETA Belgrade, May 24, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0524, *World News Connection*, http://wnc.dialog.com, accessed October 28, 2008. See also Cvetkovic, "Civic Parliament in Cacak."

from abroad to divide people and to "weaken defense forces."[39] Not surprisingly Ilic's party, New Serbia, issued a statement which said that "no-one has the right to declare other people traitors just because they think differently and just because they tell the truth."[40] Both opposition statements echoed the sentiments of Ilic in his interview with Montenegrin TV, who, in very blunt language noted that the frequent accusations of "treason" by the regime, which "has granted itself the role of untouchable ruler over war and peace, and which during the last elections did not receive more than 35 percent of the vote"[41] were quite arrogant if not hypocritical.

What is unknown is the exact degree of support the actions and words of the Civic Parliament garnered or the number of people who quietly agreed with them. While the Cacak Parliament had begun life mere weeks before as a small group of people who decided to hold weekly prayer meetings during the bombings to "counter the Government's organizing of daily pop concerts on the main square in Belgrade," within a short period of time it evolved into a body whose professed objective was to create "a forum…trying to enable citizens to gather on squares and speak freely, as in classical democracies…We think that the terrible things happened to us over the last 10 years were caused by our silence."[42] Although the members of this Parliament claimed that theirs was a non-political body merely trying to end the war, a goal that almost all citizens supported, their appeals and media presentations were clearly political. Thus the Civic

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[39] "Ruling Party Accuses Cacak's Leaders of 'Treason and Collaboration'" BBC Monitoring Service, Central Europe & Balkans, citing Tanjug News Agency, May 27, 1999. http://global.factiva.com.
[40] "Serbian opposition party says regime cannot break Serbs' democratic spirit," *Montena-Fax News Agency* (Podgorica, Montenegro), May 28, 1999, Europe - Political: *NewsBank Access World News,* http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org.
[41] "Serbian Mayor Says Yugoslav Leadership Knows 'End is Nigh'," BBC Monitoring Service: Central Europe & Balkans, TV Montenegro report, http://global.factiva.com (accessed November 2, 2008).
[42] Verica Barac, as quoted in Carlotta Gall, "Crisis in the Balkans: the Serbs; Grass-Roots Politics Looks for an Opening in Serbia." *The New York Times*, June 17, 1999.

Parliament was a collective body of courageous civic voices openly stating political opinions—not only their opposition to Milosevic himself but to his policies, attempting to make sure that he took ownership of both his actions and their results. The actions by the authorities against these citizens and their mayor brought more attention to the Parliament's deeds and words than they might have garnered on their own. It allowed opposition politicians to point out in the midst of the NATO action that in addition to bombs currently falling on citizens' heads, industry was almost fully destroyed, there were few jobs and little in the way of food, citizens now also did not have the right to speak their minds—even to ask the regime to stop the war. The regime they pointed out, dared to call those who were suffering the most, unpatriotic. The authorities' actions thus gave opposition politicians an excellent opportunity to begin re-framing what it meant to be patriotic and moreover who had the moral high ground so as to rightfully be able to declare who was a patriot and who was a traitor. The framing of nation, nationalism and patriotism will be examined more extensively in Chapter Eight. What is important to note here is that the Civic Parliament represented "demand" in so far as it was a group of citizens joined by a common set of ideas and ideals in a collective identity, who had a grievance, had strong feelings about that grievance and found a means to give expression to that grievance, as well as to see that its symbolic protests were heard. One Serbian commentator examining the situation averred that the persecution of both Ilic and the citizen leaders only "enhanced" their popularity and solidified demand for change.[43]

[43] "Cacak's Voice of Reason."

Protests after the End of the NATO Bombing

Reservists protests (May 24 – August 5)[44]

Less than two weeks after the last bomb had fallen, several hundred reservists in Kraljevo blocked the bridge over the Ibar demanding to be paid the per diem allowance they had earned by serving in Kosovo, not just their salaries: "They only want to pay us salaries, which is nothing. Since we regularly pay taxes and owe nothing to the state we want that the state and the Yugoslav Army in return owe us nothing."[45] For the rest of June, all of July and much of August reservists in towns and villages across Central and Southern Serbia blocked critical roads and bridges to protest their non-payment. With bills that had accumulated in their absence and families to feed, reservists needed the money that they had been promised—both their salaries and their daily allowances. Just as importantly, they believed that there was also an issue of fairness involved: they had been promised extra pay and, having performed their duty, felt that they deserved it. They also had noticed the extreme discrepancy between their pay and that of the special units that had been sent in: "We want nothing more or less than what the Interior Ministry troops received in Kosovo…They got all the money, while we bled for three months for nothing."[46] At a bare minimum, most reservists simply wanted what they had fairly earned. Noted one protesting reservist, "everyone wants me to pay for electricity and utilities, and no one wants to pay me what I have earned."[47] Another stated: "People do

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[44] There were a few additional, relatively isolated protests in Novi Sad in Vojvodina later than August 5, but most of the activity took place between these dates.

[45] "Reservists setup another road block near Kraljevo in southern Serbia," *Beta News Agency* (Belgrade, Serbia) June 24, 1999, Europe - Political: *NewsBank Access World News* http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org.

[46] Miodrag Stankovic , leader of the Nis Association of 1990 Veterans, quoted by Jovana Gec, "City Centres blocked by Serb protests," *The Independent* (London), July 17, 1999.

[47] "BETA Reports on Atmosphere at Reservists Rally in Nis," BETA Belgrade, July 16, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0716, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com

not have anything to eat, bills for electricity, telephone and communal services have arrived, and I would like to ask our officers how I can settle these when they owe me 4,000 dinars."[48]

Protests ranged in size from 50 to over 500 men. They ranged from several hours as a form of symbolic protest to several days in an all out blockade of major roadways and bridges causing backlogs of traffic. Moreover, although not all protests were of equal size or duration, they were scattered almost uniformly throughout all of Central and Southern Serbia, in many cases in villages and towns that had clearly voted for Milosevic as well as others, like Nis, that were clearly opposition towns. An informal survey of reservists' protests in July in Central and Southern Serbia reveals that during the month of July there were only five days on which protests did not occur.[49]

In contrast to certain opposition-led municipalities, such as Nis, that met with the reservists and agreed not to charge the reservists and their families' communal fees, the Army's handling of the reservists' protests only served to inflame tensions. Throughout the month of July the Army would alternately promise that the reservists would be paid what they were owed and then renege, saying payout would occur in another 10 to 15 days. Reservists who had been blocking roads would initially agree to end their protests, beginning them again when it was clear that the Army was not going to pay out as promised at the appointed time.[50] Many Army officials also snubbed the reservists by

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[48] "Reservists in southeastern Serbia hold protest, demand pay," *Beta News Agency* (Belgrade, Serbia), July 19, 1999, Europe - Political: *NewsBank Access World News*. http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org.

[49] A few reservists' protests occurred in Vojvodina as well but they were not as numerous nor did as many soldier participate.

[50] "Nis Reservists suspend Protests after Army Promises Pay," BETA Belgrade, Sunday July 18, 1999, FBIS-EU-19990719, *World News Connection*, http://wnc.dialog.com, and "Reservists Again Block Cacak Road," BETA Belgrade, July 28, 1999, *World News Connection*, http://wnc.dialog.com, and "Disgruntled

refusing to meet with them. On July 13 as protestors in Vranje were protesting for the fourth straight day, General Nebojsa Pavkovic, commander of the 3rd Army responsible for troops in Southern Serbia including those who had gone to Kosovo, refused to meet with them despite the fact he was actually in Vranje. One observant reservist wondered aloud why there was "no money for the per diem allowances if we have won."[51] Despite the snub, the Army's Lt. General Ljubisa Stomirovic stated in a conversation with Bor municipal authorities on July 22 that the Yugoslav Army was seriously concerned and working on how to pay the reservists. Stomirovic stated that they anticipated payments would commence on August 1. A few days later, on July 26, the Army once again changed its mind. It announced that actually it would make payments to reservists in installments over the next six months instead of in lump sums—once again injecting some protests with fresh fervor. Protesting reservists pointed out that the money they received several months from now would be devalued by the time that they had received it and that they could not neither pay their bills nor buy the firewood necessary to keep their families from freezing with money that they didn't have.

Promises of future payment were not enough for many. Desperation and anger motivated seven reservists on July 26 to begin a hunger strike in front of the entry to the Yugoslav Army Hall in Nis, headquarters of the 3rd Army. Less than two days later they were joined by an additional thirteen reservists—bringing the number of reservists on hunger strike to 20. They were also joined by four injured reservists and three women, two who had volunteered for duty and one whose husband had been killed in Kosovo. By

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Reservists Announce March to Belgrade," BETA Belgrade, July 21, 1999, FBIS-EU-1999-0721, *World News Connection*, http://wnc.dialog.com.

[51] "Yugoslav Army reservists in Vranje protest during army commander's visit," *Beta News Agency* (Belgrade, Serbia) July 13, 1999, Europe - Political: *NewsBank Access World News,* http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org.

the sixth day of the hunger strike, numbers had diminished to just 14 reservists—some due to health reasons. But those remaining, some in uniform, vowed to continue. The Army's reaction to the hunger-striking reservists was at worst negative and at best indifferent. On the first day of the hunger strike the reservists were asked to leave as they were on a "military installation" and General Pavkovic threatened to call the police to have them evicted. In the end however, other than accusing the hunger-striking reservists of lacking patriotism, the Army left them alone. Miodrag Stankovic, president of the Nis Association of 1990 Veterans and one of those on hunger strike, poignantly expressed how far reservists had been pushed and their dire need when he said, "All those who want to see a Serbian soldier turn to hunger strike to prevent his family from starving tomorrow should be ashamed."[52]

The reservists' protests on the whole were orderly and calm. They expressed a quiet determination to protest for their pay. Having found no other avenues to make the Army pay them, they literally took to the streets. The protests were also instrumental—reservists wanted something concrete, local and finite—their wages and bonuses. These were neither political protests nor were they protests for grandiose ideals—these were protests for money, and once they had obtained that end the protestors were willing to go home. One can see this in the instances when the Army promised to pay at a certain date, actually did, and the reservists peacefully disbanded. However, the Army's somewhat arrogant treatment of the men, refusing to meet with them and on some occasions calling them traitors despite their recent service in Kosovo sparked additional anger as the reservists believed that theirs was a fair and just cause. In their own eyes, they had

[52] BBC News, "World: Europe: Serb Protesters Defy Army," Tuesday July 27, 1999 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/europe/404017.stm.

served honorably and respectably, neither going into hiding nor fleeing the country. Having honored their obligations to the country, they believed it was only fair to expect that the Army would honor their obligation to those who had fought and pay the reservists the promised salary and bonus. Thus, the Army's actions and statements inflamed their feelings of moral indignation. Stankovic's direct reference to "shame"—indicating that the Army should be ashamed that it had forced honorable men to have to hunger strike to keep their families from starving—is a clear indicator that protest was no longer *just* about an instrumental end, but had in itself created a new reason to protest. The protests were now also ideological—they were a means to protest moral inequities as well as express emotions of anger and betrayal.

Leskovac (July 1 – August 6)

There was little sign in Leskovac, a town of 70,000 residents 40 km from Kosovo, that any sort of protest would occur. Leskovac was a stronghold of the SPS-JUL government;[53] it received few if any independent newspapers and people listened to RTS which was the "principle if not only medium."[54] Leskovac had voted solidly for the SPS since 1990. While it did have a small opposition, the opposition had never received massive popular support. Moreover, the town was active in clamping down on anything that it perceived to be dissent, jailing Dobrosav Nesic, Chairman for the Committee on Human Rights in Leskovac and editor of an independent magazine, for writing a piece

[53] The SPS and YUL held a two-thirds majority on the Leskovac City Council. See "Leskovac City Council Rejects Call for Milosevic Ouster," BETA, Belgrade, August 12, 1999, FBIS-EU-1999-0812, *World News Connection*, http://wnc.dialog.com.

[54] Anonymous, "Clamp-Down in Southern Serbia," Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report No. 46 (June 14, 1999), http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-. "The author is an independent journalist from southern Serbia whose identity has been withheld."

called "To Write like All Other Normal People," that criticized the operation of the media in Leskovac.[55] The town had sent a large number of reservists to the front and had, in the two weeks after the NATO bombing, not experienced any type of protest as had other nearby towns. On the night of Thursday July 1, much of the town was glued to their TV sets to watch Yugoslavia play Germany in a European Championship basketball match. While waiting for the second half of the game to start, viewers suddenly found themselves watching a 20 minute pre-recorded speech by Ivan Novkovic, an unknown tape editor at the TV station. Novkovic pointed out that the SPS district head, Zivojin Stefanovic, had sent reservists in record numbers to go fight a war they could not win and that it was Stefanovic's fault that the economy of the town was in shambles, that citizens were impoverished and that TV Leskovac was blockaded. He called on the district head to resign. He called on citizens to go to the town square on Monday, July 5, to force Stefanovic's resignation.

The SPS executive committee in Leskovac met Thursday night and angrily proclaimed Novkovic a traitor, a "collaborator with the enemy." It was clear and loud in its condemnation of him, presenting him as a person "linked with all enemies of Serbia and Yugoslavia from 1990 onward," while protecting Stefanovic, "pointing out that it is common knowledge that Stefanovic 'is not responsible for the war' but, instead is a man who 'with his daily activity made an immeasurable contribution to the defense of the country.'"[56]

On Monday July 5, 20,000 people materialized out of the side streets and lanes of Leskovac into the central square by the Beograd department store to protest, creating the

[55] "Clamp-Down in Southern Serbia."
[56] "BETA: Leskovac TV Producer Publically Calls for Ouster of SPS," BETA, Belgrade, July 2, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0702, *World News Connection*, http://wnc.dialog.com.

largest demonstration in Serbia since the end of the Kosovo war. Novkovic, who had spent the weekend in hiding since his tape had aired on TV, appeared at the rally, heavily guarded by reservists who had also decided to go to the rally in large numbers to protect the demonstrators from the police, should that prove to be necessary. Many reservists self-organized to wear black shirts to the rally as "a sign of mourning for the state of Serbia."[57] Novkovic's speech to the crowd was reportedly interrupted regularly by the crowd with chants of "We want changes," "Ziko quit," "Slobo get lost"[58] and, in a moment of self-recognition of the significance of their actions, "Leskovac is no longer Red!"[59] While many reservists were present, reservists alone could not account for the size of the crowd. On Tuesday July 6 Novkovic was arrested and tried. The trial lasted only 20 minutes and was attended only by the justice, an officer from the Internal Affairs Department and a stenographer. Novkovic was not allowed to have a lawyer or witnesses nor was he informed of his rights. He was sentenced to 30 days in jail.[60] Protests over Novkovic's imprisonment would continue in Leskovac for a full 32 days until he was released, but they were greatly reduced in size compared to the initial protest, with about 2000 regular attendees in the first week, a count which regularly decreased as police arrested people and as workers were threatened with job loss at their factories.[61] The protests also became officially and formally organized. First, an organizing committee

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[57] According to Zvonko Stojadinovic, secretary of the "unregistered" Association of Serbian Volunteers to BETA, "Signs of Tension in Leskovac Ahead of Rally," BETA, Belgrade, July 5, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0705, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

[58] "BETA Reports 20,000 Attend Leskovac Anti-Milosevic Rally," BETA Belgrade, July 5, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0705, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

[59] Steve Crawshaw, "Pressure on Milosevic to Go Intensifies," *The Independent* (London), July 7, 1999, reporting from Uzice in Serbia.

[60] Jelena Grujic, "Fear Spreads through the Town: Leskovac Counts Ivan Novkovic's Prison Days," *Vreme* (Belgrade), July 17, 1999, www.ex-yupress.com/vreme/vreme51.html. See also "Leskovac Demonstrators Tried without Defense, Witnesses," July 12, 1999, BETA Belgrade, FBIS-EEU-1999-0712, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

[61] "Fear Spreads Through the Town."

formed to plan speakers for each night. Shortly thereafter the SPO began obtaining official permits for the rallies and also for the marches to prison to take Ivan Novkovic presents from people in the town. But of special interest here is the initial spontaneous protest: why, in a "red" town, did 20,000 heed the call of an unknown tape editor to attend a rally?

Ardor, quick to rise, is also usually quick to cool if it is not actively stoked. Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta point out that reflex emotions, those that come upon us quickly and strongly and tend to dissipate just as quickly, are not the same as emotions such as permanent anger and outrage, which are complex moral and cognitive emotions. Between Thursday, July 1 and Monday, July 5 were four full days for people to reflect on the possible cost to themselves if they appeared at such a rally—jobs could be lost, one could be arrested, punished—and they easily could have decided to stay home. Yet on Monday July 5, 20,000 people appeared in solidarity at the town square. In a town of 70,000 citizens, for a rally that was not sponsored or organized by a political party, had not been planned in advance, and that was held to demand the resignation of the SPS district administrator who controlled not only the town but also many jobs, supplies and services, the turn-out was nothing short of remarkable. The protesters' decision to attend suggests that the complex emotions and thoughts that prompted them to go to the rally to protest were of the longer-lasting, more deep-seated and more deeply-rooted variety. This then speaks, even after the number of protesters diminished significantly, to a greater demand that would remain more viable and "available to be worked with over time."[62] Even with that greater demand, given that there was no political party umbrella to hide

[62] See Jeff Goodwin, James Jasper and Francesca Polletta, "Emotional Dimensions of Social Movements," in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 413-432.

behind should something go wrong, no one to protect them in a town where the police were known for doing their job, no one to work to ensure turn-out, why should so many people choose to take risks and decide to turn out to protest?

Injustice was a key reason that brought people out to protest. Novkovic's accusation that Stefanovic had exceeded the quota in pushing reservists to the front struck a nerve. Rumor in town was that Stefanovic had organized the call-up of 18,500 men from the Jablanica district alone out of a total of 40,000 reservists called up throughout Serbia in order to gain special favor in Belgrade, exempting of course his body guards and friends from service.[63] This resulted in black humor, often a true barometer of feelings, and specifically in a joke that claimed that due to Mr. Stefanovic "there were just two combatants in the Kosovo war: NATO versus Leskovac."[64] When the reservists returned to find that promises to care for their families during the war had been broken by the district administrator (as well as by the Army), and that there were no jobs to be had nor help upon their return, it caused ill-will, if not outright resentment. Discussions by reservists with their families of what they witnessed in Kosovo, along with reservists returning with cases of post traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD) and depression that in some cases led to drunken and disorderly behavior in the streets, led many people to find

[63] William Branigin, "Milosevic Base Is Moved by Maverick Serb; Lone Protester Foments a Loyal Town's Dissent," *The Washington Post*, August 10, 1999, mentions the 18,500 figure, while Blaine Harden, "Reservists a Crucial Factor in Effort against Milosevic," *The New York Times*, July 9, 1999, cites the 40,000 figure as representing the reservists called up by Stefanovic, not the total number of those mobilized across Serbia. Both Yugoslav Army spokesmen and others within and outside Serbia cite Central and Southern Serbia as having provided a disproportionate number of men for Kosovo. This perception, combined with Stefanovic's zealous efforts, appears to have resulted in the perception that Stefanovic cared for no one but himself and was willing to sacrifice others, even if it meant their death, for his personal betterment.

[64] Harden, "Reservists a Crucial Factor in Effort against Milosevic." See Jasper on jokes as a cultural way to convey meaning in James M. Jasper, "Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Movements."

Nokovic's statement credible and his reasoning correct.[65] One Serbian reservist said that he realized in Kosovo that they were being told lies after he and his comrades listened to both Serbian radio and foreign broadcasts. "'We were in the field and we could see that Serbian radio was telling us lies about the war. We believed BBC and now we are not afraid.'"[66] A Serbian reporter in Leskovac at the time reported that families were "bitter" at the government, felt cheated and tricked by authorities: "Having consistently voted for him [Milosevic] at every election over the past nine years, they now believe that Milosevic has cheated them.…People in Leskovac now say they took on NATO because of the stupidity of their authorities and that the price they have paid has been too high."[67] Thus an intense sense of injustice due to Stefanovic's actions, but also less directly to Milosevic's policies, motivated reservists and their families to protest. Survey results from 1999 and early 2000 confirm this reasoning. For example, when asked in October 1999 whether they agreed and with the statement that "there must have been a better way to defend Serbia's interests" than the policies Milosevic followed in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo, 72% of Serbian citizens agreed (42% agreed "strongly," and 24% agreed).[68] Lying to families on the front and to soldiers in the field was a serious breach of faith by the authorities of those who had trusted them. This breach also both directly lessened Milosevic's and Stefanovic's legitimacy and people's fear of the consequences of protesting. One reservist noted that, as they had spent 3

[65] Bojan Toncic, "The Basketball Revolution?" Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report, No. 53, July 6, 1999, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.
[66] Harden, "Reservists a Crucial Factor in Effort Against Milosevic."
[67] Toncic, "The Basketball Revolution."
[68] National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates. *Serbia Issues Poll,* October 24, 1999. http://www.ndi.org/files/410_yu_serbpoll99.pdf (accessed May 6, 2009). See also Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, "Election Study Serbia September 1999," Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung an der Universität zu Köln (ZACAT), ZA4278. http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp.

months in Kosovo having bombs dropped on them, they could certainly spend three days sitting in the town square to force Stefanovic's resignation.[69]

The end of the NATO bombing coupled with Novkovic's statement also acted as a release mechanism for the pain caused by having endured ten years of increasing impoverishment. In a town that was the second poorest in Serbia and where there were no jobs to be had, either legitimately or even on the grey market, people had reached a breaking point. In front of open mikes at the subsequent protests people spoke up—despite the risk to themselves. One 55-year-old man who had fought in Croatia with his son who had been killed, had fought again in Bosnia and then was drafted again, despite his plastic knee, to fight in Kosovo wondered how life could go on when they had nothing: "'We just have war, and I am getting poorer…We don't have bread, cigarettes, sugar or cooking oil…I am asking Mr. Milosevic, 'How long can you keep this up?'"[70] An older woman, reported as a JUL supporter, talked openly about the need for change at the microphone:

> We need a new president…We need to give it another try. I want to be able to buy an ice cream for my grandson and to buy fruit and food. Health suffers without fruit. Please forgive me for being so emotional, but we all know where our children went. They did not go to the mountains to pick mushrooms, they went to defend the country.[71]

The plight of people in the town was also illustrated by the case of Bratislav Stamenkovic, an economist and a Leskovac city council member, who was arrested for supposedly helping to organize the protests. His wife told BETA that both she and her husband had university degrees, had been out of work for 10 years and that they, along with their child, were hungry. She told BETA that "she was aware that many people in

[69] "BETA Reports 20,000 Attend Leskovac Anti-Milosevic Rally."
[70] Harden, "Reservists a Crucial Factor in Effort Against Milosevic."
[71] Grujic, "Fear Spreads Through the Town, Leskovac Counts Ivan Novkovic's Prison Days."

Serbia shared the fate of her family, and pointed out that that was the reason for her to take part in the rally."[72]

People also attended the rally because Ivan Novkovic, who was not a politician but rather someone just like them, had had the courage to stand up and say something—he had spoken truth to power about things that everyone lived and experienced; they found what he said to be true. First, Novkovic was someone just like them, they identified with him on a personal level and found him to be more credible than politicians who, in their view were almost all "tainted."[73] Second, his statements and call to rally touched a chord due to the way people perceived their lives and how they saw their condition. Thus his statements and his call had resonance.[74] One 24 year old resident of Leskovac best expressed it when he said, "What Ivan did was something that woke people up. What he said everybody had in mind, but they didn't know how to send the message."[75] Another reason that people decided to takes risks is that many had lost their sense of fear—at least for a night. This loss of fear seemed to be especially true of the reservists who, in multiple interviews, basically said having lived through events in Kosovo, and having come home to nothing, they had nothing to fear anymore.

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[72] "Wives Protest Arrest of Husbands at Leskovac Rally," BETA Belgrade, July 14, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0714, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

[73] "Political Crisis in Serbia," *BETAweek,* E1, July 8, 1999, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/62/098.html accessed May 16, 2009, also notes that the strength of Novkovic's call lay in the public's perception of him as "uncompromised." In the next chapter I deal more extensively with how the credibility of a group, can impact its ability to convincingly convey a message. Specifically I examine how the perception of politicians as tainted diminished their credibility and lessened their ability to convey certain messages, while others, such as the students in Otpor, were seen as "pure" and therefore more credible.

[74] The concepts of salience, credibility and resonance and their centrality to mobilizing efforts were discussed in Chapter Two. In this case Novkovic's call appealed to many because what he was saying was of central importance in their lives, he was credible as he was not a politician or a "name" but someone just like them who could be trusted, in part due to the obvious risks he took, and what he said rang true.

[75] Branigin, "Milosevic Base Is Moved by Maverick Serb," quotes Jovan Jovic. "Political Crisis in Serbia," also notes "the fact that a single call attracted such a huge number of people without any organization or media campaign, proves that a strong anti-regime mood prevails in the population and it only has to be properly articulated."

Novkovic's statements also had credibility because of their obvious sincerity. In a subsequent interview Novkovic stated that he wanted to be free; that he wanted to be able to openly say that they had "hit the bottom, in economic, political, mental and spiritual terms. It's nice that some pieces of paper say we've got rights and freedom, but it is all so deplorable until we are given a chance to experience that in practice."[76] As someone from the town who spoke openly of things that people had been thinking, Novkovic may have inspired people to follow through on his request because in addition to what their head told them, they liked him for his sincerity, trusted and respected him for his bravery in speaking out, and wanted to support him.[77]

Finally, Novkovic's concerns may have struck a chord with a generation of people, and that generational collective identity, solidified in collective concerns for a better future, may have motivated some to participate. Born in 1965, Novkovic was 34 years old in 1999 when he made his video and put it on TV. He was of the generation who had lived almost all of their adult lives under Milosevic but was still old enough to remember life under communism, when they had more money and freedom.[78] Novkovic

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[76] Bozic, "A Man Can't Change Anything on His Own (Interview with Ivan Novkovic)."

[77] This would be illustrative of a type of affective bond that people may have felt for him,. For more on affective bonds see James M. Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest*, 80, 190-192, 197; Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, *Passionate Politcs,* 8, 10, 17; Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper, "Emotions and Social Movements," in Jan E. Stets and Jonathan H. Turner, editors, *Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions*, (New York: Springer, 2006), 621-622.

[78] On this generation in Serbia, see Bjekic, "Serbs Opt for Rebellion," and Ilic, "Middle Generation Might Change the Predominant Anti-Western Sentiment." Finally numerous interviews of leading Otpor activists talk of the need to protest for the future. For examples see the comments of Ivan Marovic cited in "Yugoslavia's Youth Unite," *The Times* (London), September 19, 2000, reprinted in United Nations Mission in Kosovo, Department of Public Information, DPI News, International Media Monitoring Report, http://www.unmikonline.org/press/wire/im1909pm.html; and the interviews with several Otpor activists in Gordana Jocic, "Students against Dictatorship: Our Language is Resistance,"*Nezavisna Svetlost*, Kragujevac, December 13 – December 20, 1998, http://www.ex-yupress.com/nezsvet/nezsvet9.html. Novkovic clearly straddles two generations—the under twenty-five who are predominantly oriented to demonstration and regime overthrow, and those of the slightly older generation that Ilic discusses who are more reluctant to use street protest but are eager for change.

himself explained his actions in a way that resonates with many statements of his and even slightly younger generations about why they protest:

> Everyone has to think about his future. When we were little we had our dreams, but it seems we've forgotten how to dream about our future. Someone's stolen our dreams. We should have a sound plan abut our future, the future of our family, our friends. How on earth can we help others if we our unable to help ourselves?[79]

Thus Novkovic's personal motivation was to speak freely and to find a better future for himself and his family. While recognizing the possible personal risk in the short term, Novkovic felt a responsibility to speak the truth as he saw it—thus taking action against what was wrong where he lived. The regime, whether local or national, could no longer leave him without alternatives. He would create one and offer it to others as well. Twenty-thousand people found truth and motivation in what Novkovic said—they came to protest. By doing so they found their own individual and collective moment of liberation. Just as importantly, they discovered that there were a large number of like-minded individuals who shared their feelings and fate.

Impact of the NATO Bombing

The protests by the parents, the reservists, the Cacak Parliament and even in Leskovac, were a direct result of Milosevoic's choice to use war as a means to maintain his domestic power and his decision to ignore the predictable consequences of his actions, the NATO bombing. The NATO bombing itself directly led to an increase in protest and an increase in overall demand for larger change in Central and Southern Serbia. People in Central and Southern Serbia would not be quiescent in the name of "national unity" and patriotism —even during the bombing. Many chose to speak up and

[79] Bozic, "A Man Can't Change Anything on His Own (Interview with Ivan Novkovic)."

act out. The protests by ordinary citizens, reservists, mothers and parents increased the visibility of discontent in this region, making it clear to other local citizens as well as to the rest of the country that change was desired here, in what was formerly a "red region." Moreover, the protests gave the lie to the idea that the only valid type of patriotism was that which backed Milosevic and his policies.

The NATO bombing itself served as a critical event, giving new and intense urgency and immediacy to issues that were directly related to the war—and less clearly, though very directly, related to issues of domestic policy. The bombing increased the immediacy and heightened emotions surrounding issues of life and death. These emotions in turn increased the saliency to local citizens of certain issues, making them pay closer attention to the response of their local and national officials to their concerns. Importantly, the SPS and army leadership failed the test of seeming responsive to citizen concerns and thus lost a crucial degree of legitimacy for those who decided to protest. Awareness of the protests and of official responses through the local media, as well as via direct contacts between towns, also likely impacted citizens' thoughts on the legitimacy of both local and national officials. Also as Central and Southern Serbia sent a disproportionate share of reservists to the front, and thus held a disproportionate share of the burden, few people were left personally unaffected by the fate of those men and how they were treated by officials. Geography also played a role in events. The proximity of Central and especially Southern Serbia to Kosovo meant that as people fled Kosovo, the first areas that received the refugees were in towns in Central and Southern Serbia. Both their stories and their sheer numbers, which placed a burden on social services in the

area, gave the lie to Milosevic's propaganda as to how smoothly everything was going, about how the Serbs had been "victorious" in war.[80]

Finally, the very act of protesting during the war, against actions taken by the Army and by Milosevic, contradicted Milosevic's propaganda that true patriots followed Milosevic. His arguments about the importance of "national unity" in time of war, that those who disagreed with him and his policies were traitors, were battered especially by the protests of the very people who he wanted to do his fighting—and who had without a doubt fought loyally for his regime and for Serbia in the past. Although Milosevic's disapproval number had been high for some time, many people still had not completely managed to disconnect Milosevic and the good of Serbia from each other in their minds, especially in a time of crisis. Yet spontaneously, without the leadership of political figures, without the help of organizations who were accustomed to organizing gatherings and events, people in Central and Southern Serbia protested against the regime in the time of war and immediately thereafter. These protests clearly indicated that for some, a juncture had been reached in which the two, Milosevic and patriotism, Milosevic and Serbia, were not so firmly united. That ordinary people would protest during the war came as a surprise to other organizations that had purposely abstained from taking action during the war for fear of appearing "disloyal" and losing support from the population. Milosevic's wartime "honeymoon" due to the NATO bombing was quite short-lived. The intense solidarity that the population was supposed to have with him as a result of the bombing, which many intellectuals and NGOs indeed feared, barely materialized and

[80] "Political Crisis in Serbia."

manifested itself before it began to actively disintegrate in protests a scant month and a half later.

Moreover, the intensely negative effects that the NATO bombing was to have on the public's opinion of the West, so feared by the intellectuals and NGOs, also did not materialize. People in Serbia had a rather clear sense of who was to blame for the war—and who should have to take responsibility for it. Less than three months after being directly bombed, 60% of the respondents in a public opinion poll in Nis wanted to join the European Union and 49 % were even in favor of Serbia joining Partnership for Peace.[81] In the country, public opinion surveys indicated that even in August, less than two months after the end of the NATO bombing, 86.7% thought that they needed aid from the international community (in opposition to Milosevic's claim that they could do all economic reconstruction themselves) and 55.5% were in favor of establishing diplomatic relations with NATO member states.[82] As we saw in the earlier section on "subjective understandings," as time passed favorable numbers for close relations and reliance on the West increased as did blaming Milosevic, especially for economic woes.

Demand in Central and Southern Serbia and its Larger Contribution

What do these spontaneous protests by the parents, the Cacak Parliament, the reservists and the citizens in Leskovac say about demand in Central and Southern Serbia? What did their voices and actions say about the possibility for change in the future? One could easily dismiss them as unimportant for national affairs, pointing out that all of their

[81] Carlotta Gall, "A Young Man Stands Out among Serbia's Opposition," December 6, 1999, cites these poll figures.
[82] "FRY Poll Indicates Rise in Popularity for Opposition," BETA Belgrade, August 18, 1999, FBIS-EU-1999-0818, *World News Connection*, http://wnc.dialog.com. The survey was carried out by the Belgrade Partner Agency between August 10-16 on 1,000 adults in 32 municipalities in Serbia excluding Kosovo.

protests were indeed spontaneous, against local officials and problems and instrumental—which is to say that they could be easily satisfied with direct local actions. Such protests, some might argue, are very much like the type of protests that Tilly has discussed as non-modular and of the "pre-modern" type.[83] Like peasants that attacked the tax collector's house for taking their grain, people in Central and Southern Serbia were protesting against largely local authorities in a very direct way. It would be easy, but I believe foolish, to dismiss these protests as of little importance for the national scene, arguing that they would easily dissipate along with the anger that had created them when their demands were met.

These protests, although initially largely instrumental and somewhat parochial, were also based on strong sense of moral injustice sparked by specific incidents that had been accumulating over time. Although most of the protests claimed to be apolitical and were not about political power but for normalcy, in a country where nothing was apolitical anymore, protests against the local authorities, against moral injustice and against the authorities' inability to resolve problems were clearly also protests against the national authorities who similarly seemed unable to provide what was needed. Thus protests by reservists for pay at local garrisons were also a statement to the Yugoslav Army and the country about the protestors' resentment at having been used as cannon fodder for a war that could not be won. Protests by parents similarly against local authorities, both political and military, against the injustice of having given disproportionate numbers of their sons to the war, also spoke to national issues. They

[83] See Charles Tilly, *Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2005), Charles Tilly, "Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834," in Mark Traugott, ed., *Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action*, (Durham and London, Duke University Press 1995), 15-44, and Hanspeter Kriesi, "Political Context and Opportunity," in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 67.

spoke directly to people's lack of tolerance for further "adventurist" policies and directly against Milosevic's policy on Kosovo. Parents were not willing to have their sons harmed or beaten anymore and would no longer actively or even quietly support such policies.[84] Even in Leskovac, that the local SPS party could no longer have its way unfettered was a clear reflection on national policy, and the size of the crowd made this statement in shocking numbers. Protests such as that in Leskovac caught some political parties such as the Serbian Renewal Movement flat-footed, although they soon tried to remedy that situation by obtaining permits for the protests. Importantly, however, Milan Bozic, deputy leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement, stated that the significance of events in Leskovac was that "All of a sudden, it looks as though frustration over Milosevic is much more deeply embedded into the national consciousness than we expected."[85] As Aleska Djilas said at the time, "If Milosevic is in trouble in Leskovac, then he is really in trouble…It is like a Kennedy being in trouble in Boston. This is the beginning of the end. I don't know when the end will happen, but it will be months, not years."[86]

These protests, although spontaneous, had various forms of staying power that indicated not only an immediate visceral reaction to events, but also the depth of feeling that would sustain protests over time and indicated that people might be available in the future to protest. The protesting reservists, though not great in number, protested solidly for over a month over a rather wide geographic swatch of central and southern Serbia until there was movement on their demands. Their protests were not one-off events. In

[84] There was an irony noted by some Serbs that Milosevic's Kosovo policy, which had told Serbs that no one dared to beat them, had resulted in Serbian reservists being shot at and Serbian civilians being bombed.
[85] Harden, "Trouble in the Backyard," citing Bozic.
[86] Harden, "Trouble in the Backyard." See also Milenko Vasovic, "Can the Alliance Get It Together?" *Hope on the Balkans Archive*, http://www.ddh.nl/fy/kosova/opinions/1999/alliance0907.html (accessed May 7, 2009), where he cites Djilas noting that the events in Leskovac mean the "beginning of the end of Slobodan Milosevic," also arguing that "power cannot be defended with that percentage, and I believe that the months of his rule are now being counted down."

various towns, either in ways meant to completely disrupt, or in ways almost purely symbolic, protests were repeated, frequently in several day swaths, with some going on in periodic intervals for the entire period of such protests. Similarly the Cacak Parliament protest went on for well over a week despite the real harassment of the activists by the police, who chased them out of public fora into underground shelters. That the work of the Cacak Parliament was observed by people from other towns who later developed similar "parliaments" in a sense lengthened the effectiveness of the Cacak action.[87] The protest in Leskovac, though greatly diminished in numbers after the initial day and then after the initial week, also had staying power. It lasted more than 32 days, and during that time anywhere from several hundred to 2,000 protestors regularly showed up. After the initial protest, it first co-existed and then merged, as we shall see in the next section of this chapter, with organized demand, i.e. rallies organized by Alliance for Change, creating a situation in which protest was further extended.

In summary, these protests were spontaneous but had staying power. They were instrumental but also "identity-based" and concerned with moral justice. The protests were both symbolic, and very practically based. They were clearly based on grievances that had reached a "tipping point." Movement towards that tipping point was influenced first by a sense of injustice—that officials were not being fair and had exceeded community standards, crossing a culture line of what was acceptable and what was not. Authorities took unnecessary and stupid actions that actually increased resentment in each of these examples of protest. Some of the resentment had its origins in their

[87] The civic parliaments in Leskovac, Valjevo, Nis, Novi Pazar, Uzice, Paracin, Sombor, Subotica, Cacak "and other towns" eventually took part in a "Civic Parliament of Serbia" whose constituent assembly took place September 4, 1999. See "Dissidents to Found 'Civic Parliament' in Cacak 4 September," BETA Belgrade, September 1, 1999, FBIS-EU-1999-0901 *World News Connection*, http://wnc.dialog.com.

increasing greed, corruption and privilege, but their apparent disdain for people's real needs as expressed in the protests intensified and focused that resentment. In an SPS town where the local mayor agreed with the protesting reservists and wrote a letter for the protestors, they disbanded rather quickly, but in the face of actions by the authorities meant to impress protesters with the authorities' power, many protestors' resolve stiffened. Movement toward that tipping point was also influenced by an increasing credibility gap in which the government's words and promises no longer corresponded to the reality that people experienced on the ground—either in long term problems such as the economy or in immediate problems such being paid as promised for having served in Kosovo. The importance of the credibility gap and its impact for mobilization will be explored more fully in the next chapter. Local media along with other forms of communication allowed for more information flow in the region about grievance and protest. Although it was very restricted, information about protests allowed others in the region to see that there was certainly a "community," imagined or otherwise, that shared in certain types of grievances. An example of this was shown above when the wife of a Council member in Leskovac said that "she was aware that many people in Serbia shared the fate of her family, and pointed out that that was the reason for her to take part in the rally."[88] This statement embodies both a sense of collective identity and moral responsibility, both of which are vital to mobilization.

In conclusion, the local grievances were indeed local, but they were merely a microcosmic representation of large national problems, and these were becoming increasingly apparent. Local authorities did very little to pacify or meet people's needs and their inability to do so reflected back almost directly on Milosevic. In some cases it

[88] "Wives Protest Arrest of Husbands at Leskovac Rally."

was harder for people to make that leap. In Leskovac, for example, one older man told his friend that he would not join the protests because he was for Milosevic, even though he was against local SPS leader. In other cases, such as the Cacak parliament and even in the case of the reservists, however, it was increasingly clear that what happened locally could not and would not be solved locally, but was part of a larger national problem that once again could not be merely contained. Did the local protests in Central and Southern Serbia guarantee a demand for change at the national level? Certainly not—but the grievances and dissatisfaction made people more open to think about taking action for change —and their protests were emblematic of how things had changed. Perhaps if something were to happen, Belgrade would not be going it alone with just the major opposition cities' elite to help them. Perhaps this time the push for change would come from an increasingly wide demographic across a larger geographic area.[89]

Organized Protest and Demand

Alliance for Change Rallies

While spontaneous protests began during the bombing and continued throughout the summer, organized protests by Alliance for Change began shortly after the bombing

[89] A public opinion survey conducted by the Partner Agency in Belgrade if 1,000 citizens in 32 Serbian municipalities excluding Kosovo reportedly showed that "the ruling coalition was losing support." See "Poll Shows Ruling Coalition Is Losing Support," *BETA*, Belgrade, reprinted at *Hope on the Balkans News Archive 1999*, August 19, 1999, http://www.ddh.nl/fy/kosova/news/1999/poll1908.html (accessed May 7, 2009). In fact there was a shift away from SPS and JUL throughout the country that had been going on since the end of 1997. A survey carried out in December 1999 showed that 42% of SPS voters in 1997 elections would not vote for SPS again, while 69% of SRS voters in 1997 would not vote for them. See the public opinion poll carried out Dec. 12-19, 1999 on sample of 2,039 citizens in Serbia excluding Kosovo by Institute for Social Sciences Belgrade as cited in AIM "Public opinion in Serbia: Hope for Change December 31 1999 by Vesna Bjekic and the poll from December 1999 by Institute of Social Sciences survey as cited in "Election Orientation of citizens in Serbia 1999-2000," from www.bbnet.org.yu/bdnet/elections/eng/lutovac.htm. This move away from SPS and SRS did not result in a directly equal increase in those favoring the opposition. There was however an increase in the number of undecided voters.

ended. The large and regular turnout at these protests organized by the Alliance for Change in Central and Southern Serbia as well as in Vojvodina also support the conclusion that people were dissatisfied with their national leaders and looking for outlets to express their dissatisfaction and their desire for change. Running often concurrently with spontaneous protests, Alliance for Change organized its first protest less than three weeks after the bombs stopped falling. On June 29 in Cacak more than 10,000 people gathered to protest Milosevic, his government and its policies. Vladimir Ilic, the popular mayor of Cacak who had been in hiding, reemerged for the first time to take center stage and speak. Similarly, Zoran Djindjic, who had gone into "exile" in Montenegro, first appeared at the Alliance for Change Rally in Uzice on July 6 at which 5,000-10,000 people were in attendance.[90]

Throughout the summer Alliance for Change organized numerous rallies throughout Central and Southern Serbia, as well as in Vojvodina, at which both local opposition politicians and national political figures such as Djindjic, Pesic, and Avramovic spoke.[91] Overall these rallies were relatively well-attended, though they varied wildly in size from 3,000 in attendance in Prokuplje on July 8 to 25,000 at the rallies in Nis and Zacar on July 24 and August 14, respectively. In some cities a tradition arose of rallying daily, not just when a special protest event was organized. These daily rallies continued on into December (when they were officially called off by Alliance for Change), and though some dwindled in size over time, for those who participated in them

[90] Attendance numbers at most protests and rallies vary. Where reported numbers vary greatly I have given the range as is given above. The *New York Times* reported 10,000, whereas a report by RFA/RL reports only 5,000.

[91] While Alliance for Change was not the only group that organized rallies, it was the predominant group to do so. SPO organized some of its own protests as did independent groups such as farmers, students and pensioners who were part of the Nezavisnost independent pensioners union.

they were a matter of both pride and protest. These ongoing protests spoke to the depth of feelings of some, and were a constant reminder of the calls for change. These small rallies were of special importance over the summer, as they drove towards large cumulative rallies to take place in Belgrade in August and September.[92]

The organized rallies were also a chance for Alliance for Change and local opposition party politicians to both point out and reinforce people's own knowledge of the faults of the ruling party (corruption, greed and incompetence), those of Milosevic in particular (failed leadership) and the state of the country, especially the poor economic circumstances and the recent losses in Kosovo. Speaking to the topic of corruption for example, the deputy mayor of Uzice spoke about Milosevic's son, Marco building "Bambiland" in the middle of the war amidst other people's poverty, despair and ruin: "He is spending $380,000 on Bambiland while we have columns of Serbian refugees coming back from Kosovo."[93] Such themes had resonance and crowds did not always need to be told about such things. At a rally in Vrbas in August, one placard bitterly noted "One Child has Bambiland, while Millions Don't have Enough to Buy a Bambi Cookie."[94] Statements such as these emphasized the regime's amorality and injustice.

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[92] The August rally was actually called by the G17 Plus group in support of its Pact for Stability in Serbia. Alliance for Change leaders were apparently somewhat upset as it pre-empted the rally they had been planning for September and they feared that turnout in August when people might be away would still not be good. Nonetheless they agreed to participate and to have their leaders speak. See "BETA on Political Scene Ahead of 19 August," *BETA*, Belgrade, August 18, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0818, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com. Draskovic refused to participate but apparently upon seeing the size of the crowd could not resist the opportunity to address them. He was whistled and boo'ed—something which Studio B, Draskovic's station, removed in showing him at the rally speaking. In this Draskovic was not better than the regime in re-making reality. See "BETA Views Draskovic's Political 'Debacle'," *BETA*, Belgrade, August 26, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0826. *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com. More importantly, these rallies also were a means for Djindjic to show Draskovic that he was wrong about not wanting to "take it to the street" and gave Djindjic a political "edge" in the "leadership" of the opposition battle that was being waged between the two men.

[93] Harden, "In Provincial Serbian Town 10,000 Say 'No' to Milosevic."

[94] "'Around 2000' Rally in Vrbas to Demand Milosevic Ouster," *BETA*, Belgrade, August 7, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0807, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

These topics, part of larger "ideational packages' which will be examined more fully in the next chapters on framing, were also part of the larger coordinated campaign that the Alliance for Change had put together and would run in conjunction with others, such as NGOs and G17 for a year until the elections in 2000.

As with any set of organized demonstrations, these rallies allowed the Alliance for Change to reinforce the collective identity of those who were already participants in political parties, to draw in bystanders who had previously stood on the sidelines and also provided an organized outlet for those individuals who had grievances/demand but no organized means to express them. One theme that was regularly put forward by the Alliance for Change to create (and in some cases reinforce) a sense of collective identity was that there was only one unified Serbia. Goran Svilanovic, chairman of the Civic Alliance of Serbia (GSS) told an assembled crowd of over 4,000 in Gornji Milanovac that "There will be no civil war in Serbia, because two Serbia's do not exist, just one, and it is against the current authorities."[95] Similar but less well stated versions emphasized that there were only two Serbia's—those for and those against Milosevic.

The rallies also provided opportunities for Alliance for Change to signal other groups. Not willing however to lose possible support, Djindjic for example made sure to emphasize that the movement for change was open to any and all who wanted change, "Even SPS members are welcome to attend our rally. There are right-minded persons in this party as well, but they are not at the top."[96] Signals were also sent to the citizens and SPO leaders in Belgrade by the AFC chairman of the Belgrade district of Cukarica that

[95] "'Over 4,000' Gather at the Protest Rally in Gornji Milanovac," *BETA*, Belgrade, August 2, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0802, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[96] "Opposition Warns SPS to 'Not Play with Fire' in Prokuplje," *BETA*, Belgrade, July 7, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0707, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

they needed to think about protesting. Symbolically going to Leskovac, Zoran Alimpijevic told the demonstrators there "You have taken the lead in Serbia, and the whole of Serbia and the world know what you said here. Please endure, because Belgrade will be burning with demonstrations soon."[97] This signal was largely sent to counter Vuk Draskovic's refusal to cooperate with the Alliance for Change, symbolized for example by the SPO controlled Belgrade city assembly not passing a resolution for Milosevic's ouster in a rather "stormy" session.[98] Other types of signaling that spoke not to demand but to brinksmanship and strategy occurred as well, such as in Prokuplje, when the SPS called on its sympathizers to rally at the same time and place as the previously announced AFC rally. Recalling the attempts that had ended so tragically in 1996/97, when the regime had bused poorly-informed supporters to Belgrade from Central and Southern Serbia to "counter-demonstrate" against overwhelming numbers, causing a few deaths and some injuries, the AFC clearly and openly called the local SPS authorities to account. Vuk Obradovic, chairman of the Social Democratic party warned the SPS "not to play with fire" mentioning the events of December 1996. Thus, the organized rallies spoke to pent up demand, focused existing demand into particular channels, and helped to organize demand into visible but peaceful manifestations which in turn could also help to create new, additional demand for change.

[97] "DS Official Announces Wave of Protest in Belgrade Soon," *BETA,* Belgrade, July 16, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0716, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[98] "BETA Views Attempt at Milosevic Ouster," *BETA*, Belgrade, July 15, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0715, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

Opposition Petitions and Municipal Declarations

In addition to the organized rallies, demand for change was organized at two other levels as well during the summer of 1999. The first was at the municipal level via municipal declarations passed by the local assemblies declaring a town's desire for Milosevic to resign. Although there were small variations among them, some being straight-forward statements demanding Milosevic's resignation and some detailing his "disastrous policies," the underlying purpose was to make clear that these municipalities wanted Milosevic to leave immediately. These were, not surprisingly, largely passed in opposition-controlled towns. The second level of demand for change was organized by opposition political parties and the Alliance for Change but was carried out through individual acts of courage, specifically signatures by individual citizens on petitions demanding Milosevic's resignation. In small towns such as Smederevo and 18 nearby villages 3,500 signatures were collected.[99] In the Branicevo district that included the home town of Milosevic, Pozarevac, 10,328 signatures were collected by mid-July, including signatures by the radicals and other "non-party" citizens,[100] while in large cities such as Belgrade 70,000 had signed by the middle of July. Overall, by only mid July over 550,000 people had signed such petitions. Once again there was clearly a demand for change.

[99] "3,500 Sign Anti-Milosevic Petition in Smederevo Region," *BETA,* Belgrade, July 28, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0728, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[100] "Anti-Milosevic Petition Signed by 10,328 in Branicevo," *BETA*, Belgrade, July 26, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0726, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

Farmers, Students, and Pensioners

In addition to the large organized groups such as Alliance for Change, farmers, small student groups that were not part of Otpor and other smaller groups protested wages and lack of payment. Of course what would have been a normal labor negotiation in any other political climate often became highly politicized and specifically critical of the regime. All over Serbia different groups, some quite small like the pensioners and some larger like the farmers, entered their frustration and grievances with the government. For example, while reservists were blocking the roads in the middle and south of the country, farmers took to blocking the roads in the north of the country with tractors. Organized originally by the Banat Forum,[101] the farmers were protesting the government buy-up price of wheat. Although on the face of it this once again appeared to be a purely local protest for an instrumental reason, specifically more money, it had political overtones as farmers announced that they did not want furniture or even electricity in a swap for their grain as they felt the government kept offering—they wanted money. By the next day, July 21, Djordje Garabandic, president of the Independent Serbian Farmers Trade Union, announced that a protest meeting was being organized in Pancevo for farmers from all over Serbia and that another road blockade was sure to follow. In a statement that turned what could have been termed a mere labor negotiation into a political protest Garabandic said, "There will be no more games with the people of this country and we wish to make it clear what we can and what we cannot do and, if we are unable to chase out the current authorities, then we deserve nothing

[101] The Banat Forum was a regional NGO in the eastern region of Voijvodina that attempted to preserve regional Banat identity and served to protect and preserve the interests of the farmers of the region.

better than to live under their rule, we and our grandchildren."[102] The government took harsh action. On the night before the new blockade of the roads was to take place and farmers were to drive their tractors to protest, police visited villages and farmers, threatening "revenge." It also physically blocked farmers from getting to Pancevo to join the convoy. The Coalition Vojvodina stated that "the Belgrade regime has shown with its violent and unlawful dispersing of the road blockade in Vojvodina that it fears the Vojvodina protest because it has been robbing agriculture."[103]

Other groups were also coalescing and protesting. In Valjevo, the artist Bogoljub Arsenijevic-Maki founded the Valjevo Civic Movement. Working at times alone and at times with Otpor, the group held regular protests against Milosevic and local SPS leaders. The arrest of Maki infused new life into the protests which had been going on for 42 days. Once again the authorities, through their own actions managed to inflame a situation.

Students who were not officially part of Otpor also protested—as did Otpor itself throughout the summer. In Nis, medical school students held a protest in the middle of town, "Serbia or Slobo" and then blocked traffic on the town's main square for a half hour. Otpor was a guest of the protest organizers.[104] Earlier in the summer the Nis student rights organization had also issued a demand for Milosevic's resignation. Its content however went far beyond the usual type of "he has ruined our country and so must go"

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[102] "Farmers Say 'No More Games,' Vow To Remove Government," *BETA*, Belgrade, July 21, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0721, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[103] "Police Reportedly Threaten Participants in Road Blockade," *BETA*, Belgrade, August 3, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0803, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[104] "Nis Students to Block Traffic Following Protest," *BETA*, Belgrade, July 21, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0721, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

demand. Rather the students used Serbian history to question Milosevic's honor if he did not choose to resign, and to place a moral obligation on Milosevic to leave:

> We would like to remind the Serbian people that after losing the Serbian-Bulgarian war of 1885-1886, King Milan Obrenovic abdicated for the sake of moral salvation of the Serbian army and state. The current Milosevic "dynasty" has been seriously threatening the biological survival of the Serbian people for 10 years.[105]

Moreover, the students went on to state who should take responsibility for this state of affairs. The onus, they concluded, was not just on the regime. Rather in a way that was far less common in discussions of blame and responsibility they went on to say, "by keeping silent and suffering, we continue to be accessories to our own destruction, and not theirs."[106] The student's statement was an announcement of a demand for change couched in moral terms as well as a call to action. And they hoped that people would respond as the students believed times had changed. People were no longer blind; the students hoped that the regime could not and would not terrorize the people "whose consciousness has been awakened."[107]

In short, throughout Serbia different groups were finally tired of accepting the government's claim that there was a need for unity. They were tired of taking a back seat to other "pressing national needs" such as wars. They had had enough. In fact "Enough" was occasionally the title of rallies held by the Alliance for Change. The sentiment expressed precisely how many people felt. They had had enough and they were no longer going to take it.

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[105] Statement by Nis Students Human Rights Group published in "Students Call on Army, Church to Oust Milosevic Dynasty," *BETA*, Belgrade, July 9, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0709, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[106] "Students Call on Army, Church to Oust Milosevic Dynasty."
[107] "Students Call on Army, Church to Oust Milosevic Dynasty."

Government "Pushback" on Demand

Throughout the summer of 1999, the government was not completely idle, ignoring the signs of protest going on around it. There was a certain amount of "pushback" both by the security forces (mainly the police) and by local SPS-JUL parties. While the government could do little to stop the municipal declarations, it did use police in many locations to try to intimidate citizens from signing the petitions and banned, harassed and intimidated activists who had set up petition stalls in public places to collect citizen signatures. Police frequently began by telling activists they their activities were banned, or that they were "handing out leaflets with inappropriate content." When asked to see a written statement to this effect the police would not provide one. Depending on the location the police would frequently tell activists that they could collect signatures inside party or union headquarters but not in public places such as the park, on the street, in the city square—i.e. in any public location where they might be easily seen by passers-by.[108] In some cases rougher measures were used such as happened in Novi Beograd when unidentified "jump-out" teams of roughs jumped out of cars and inflicted severe head injuries to those collecting signatures.[109] Less frequently, police attempted to suppress rallies by banning them. This was not particularly effective as mass numbers of people usually quietly but steadily overwhelmed such attempts. In the cases where police removed generators for power people frequently brought in new, borrowed ones or supplied megaphones to speakers.

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[108] The independent trade union Nezavisnost (Independence) also organized a petition drive during the summer and set up booths in public places, including Terazije Square in the middle of downtown Belgrade, to collect signatures. See "Curtailing Political Dissent: Serbia's Campaign of Violence and Harassment against Government Critics," *Human Rights Watch Reports* 12:6 (2000), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2000/serbia/index.htm#TopOfPage, accessed May 6, 2009.
[109] "Curtailing Political Dissent."

Suppression of expression of demand was also attempted by the government against individual citizens by threatening job loss of those attending opposition or Otpor rallies. In Vranje the management of the Simpo Company told the workers not to attend the rally so as to preserve the "reputation" of the Simpo president. One worker who wished to remain anonymous nonetheless had the courage to tell BETA: "They were quite explicit. Whoever appears in the center of Vranje tonight may as well collect his labor booklet himself. They did not animate us in the same way for the meetings of the Socialist Party of Serbia but instead packed us into factory buses and drove us to the rallies."[110] In the case of the farmers as seen above, the government physically threatened farmers and their families. Finally the government used one of its regular techniques to suppress demand—it pretended the opposition rallies and activities did not exist and so did not report on them. In the case of certain rallies which absolutely could not be ignored, such as the rally in Belgrade on August 19 which was attended by 150,000-200,000 people, the regime attempted to minimize the importance of the rally, calling it a failure, and downplaying attendance. The government owned daily, *Borba*, claimed that some 15,000 "'passersby and those walking their pets' gathered at the rally."[111] In the "wishing will make it so" school of thought, the government seemed to believe that there would be no news outlets of importance other than its own and that by not reporting on events they would disappear. It did however immediately and intensely increase its own propaganda against the opposition parties and leaders, speaking not about rallies and protests, but about how the leaders of such parties were puppets of

[110] "Simpo Orders Workers to Avoid Protest Rally in Vranje," *BETA*, Belgrade, August 13, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0813, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[111] "BETA Sees Opposition Protests Dwindling," *BETA*, Belgrade, August 26, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0826, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

foreign governments and were trying to take over the country via politicians since they had failed to do so with NATO bombs. What the government did not seem to accurately think through was first, that its own propaganda barrage would be properly interpreted by many as meaning something actually *was* going on that RTS was not talking about and second, and more importantly, that even if the government did not allow problems to appear on the news, wishing them away would indeed not make it so—the grievances would still exist. RTS did not, in fact, make reality.

Conclusion

As Djindjic had noted, the summer of 1999 was indeed a hot one for the government. On any given day there was a tremendous amount of activity, often throughout the country. Protests overlapped. Spontaneous protests often occurred on the same day and sometimes in the same place as organized ones. Unorganized citizens heeded calls to appear, organized rallies took place. Roads were blocked by reservists and farmers. Protestors went to protests in the hundreds and in the thousands. No one could say that this was a normal summer—although the definition of "normality" had long since been stretched so far as to perhaps lose meaning. Protests that appeared local, parochial and against local government, or for specific instrumental causes had a way of becoming political and about injustice—often due to inept governmental responses. If nothing else the sheer amount of demand, of grievance seemed to spill out in ways and in places that it had not before. For the first time since the 1996/97 protests people once again saw themselves as part of a collective because through protests they saw that there were others who shared their grievances and they saw that they were numerous.

Still, despite all the activity, despite the demand shown, public opinion surveys showed that people were afraid, depressed and did not want to participate in anything that would result in risk to themselves or their families.[112] Moreover, even though Alliance for Change rallies brought in large crowds in certain cities like Nis, the surveys showed that the public by and large did not trust politicians, did not believe that change would come through the ballot box and many, despite the evidence at rallies were disheartened and afraid of civil war. What then would keep these citizens mobilized? What or who would organize their grievances and not allow that sense of injustice and anger to just dissipate but would find a way to channel it for change, eventually moving people from the sidelines to participating. How would those who refused to share an identity with politicians who they saw as "tainted" come to identify with them and their cause enough to work for them and vote for them? The next chapter on framing examines what ideas and frames helped organize discontent, give it an identity and a channel for action.

[112] In a survey conducted in September 1999, 56% of respondents were not ready to risk any conflict with family or neighbors for politics, 55% did not want to quarrel with political opponents, 63% were not willing to risk job loss, 68% would always avoid conflict with the police and 70% did not want to risk being arrested. This was the first major poll taken after the conclusion of the NATO bombing, by Srecko Mihajlovic, Institute for Social Sciences, on a sample 1,588 citizens in Serbia without Kosovo. Vesna Bjekic, "What the Citizens of Serbia Fear: Public Opinion in Serbia: Scared, Indecisive and Down in the Dumps," *AIM* Podgorica, October 12, 1999, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199910/91012-002-trae-pod.htm, accessed May 10, 2009.

PART III: MOBILIZATION

CHAPTER SEVEN

Movement Framing: Credibility

> "The front can not be formed against a single man or against a single party, but against a certain order, the situation in society, against a certain way of life. The opposition should be gathered over a principle of positive formulations of everything that we would like to have as opposed to everything that we do have and not only on the basis of 'we don't want this'. I fear that by sticking solely to the 'we are against' motto we will stay on the sidelines again. The gravest mistake we made in the pre-election campaign was to torture ourselves with what we do not want. Most people do not want 'this'." (Dragoljub Micunovic, the president of the Democratic Party, Serbia in an interview with *Vreme* December 16, 1991)

Micunovic, though he did not put it in these terms, was arguing for better framing by the opposition; that is using frames that more clearly stated what the opposition believed the problem was, what they thought the answer should be, strategically deploying their resources to make those arguments clearly so as to motivate people to go out and vote for them. Micunovic clearly states that the "we do not want this" frame was, indeed, not what people wanted, indicating that this would be insufficient to mobilize people to vote for them. Ironically, nine years before the opposition could truly beat Milosovic at the ballot box, Micunovic saw part of what needed to be done. The strategy he outlined above in 1991 was, in part, what made DOS successful at the ballot box in 2000.

Framing occurs in all elections. People want to define the problems and put forward their solutions: they want to put specific issues on the agenda and deemphasize or ignore others. They appeal to people's intellects, values, emotions and experiences in an effort to mobilize people to vote for them and not their opponents. All of these things were true in the Serbian elections of 2000. What made these elections different, however,

was that the fact that they were being held not in a democracy but rather in a semi-authoritarian regime: a regime type in which the government actively cheated and tried to deprive the opposition of resources (e.g. media attention, funding). In this a regime type, the regime also structurally changed the playing field in order to disadvantage the opposition by changing the "rules" of the game such as the composition of electoral commissions, the regulations governing parties and blocs and the thresholds needed to enter parliament. Moreover, the election, due in part to the framing by the opposition, came to be understood by both the government and opposition as well as by ordinary citizens to be 'critical elections"—judgements on the regimes themselves—thus raising the stakes and necessity for each side to be effective in mobilizing its supporters. The critical nature of the elections also raised the likelihood that the government would cheat and that the opposition, working on an uneven playing field with limited access to the normal system, would have to use extraordinary frames and strategies to win.

The Serbian Case, Movement Framing: Overview

In Serbia, the various actors were not strangers to each other. Milosovic and the democratic opposition leaders and parties had a more than a 10 year passing acquaintance—likewise the public with both of them. The government and various NGOs also had longstanding relationships—in some case neutral and in some cases adversarial—but they all had taken each other's measure. Framing was thus not going to be a brand new "getting to know you" exercise—they all already knew each other. Rather framing was an exercise in which elites sought to strategically reshape the public's understanding of what was important, which candidates could make that difference,

which road was the road to change. It was to play on cultural rifts and attemptedto take advantage of knowledge of people's values, aspirations and hopes—information that NGOs, outside foreign democracy promoters and opposition elites knew in advance they would need and therefore obtained through regular public opinion polling data.

Elections were also not a new phenomenon. Serbia could actually be said to be experiencing election fatigue having had 13 elections in 7 years.[1] There was nothing new about elections—they occurred, the same opposition candidates opposed the government and Milosovic always won. In the public's view, the oppositions were not to be trusted. They argued incessantly, never seemed to agree on candidates or policy. People did not initially believe that his time would be different. True, in 1996 in Serbia the Zajedno coalition had won local elections, elections which had had to be defended in the streets by the politicians associated with the Zajedno coalition as well as by the students and the public. Thus they had effected some change locally—but Milosevic still ruled in Belgrade and gave no indication that he would let mere elections change this. Thus framing with regard to elections was such that the public had to be convinced by the

[1] Nedovic, Slobodanka, gen. ed. *Guide through Electoral Controversies in Serbia*. Translated by Vladimir B. Zimonjic and Slobodan S. Stetic. Belgrade: Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju, 2000, prints a complete chronology of multiparty elections in Serbia, 77. The elections were as follows: December 9, 1990, Elections for the President of the Republic of Serbia; December 9, 1990, Elections for Deputies in the National Assembly of Serbia, (second round on December 23, 1990); May 31, 1992, Elections for the Chamber of Citizens of the Assembly of FRY; May 31, 1992, Municipal elections (second round on June 14); December 20, 1992, Elections for President of Republic of Serbia; December 20, 1992, Elections for Deputies in National Assembly of Serbia; December 20, 1992, Elections for the Chamber of Citizens of the Assembly of FRY; December 19, 1993, Elections for Deputies in National Assembly of Serbia; November 11, 1996, Elections for the Chamber of Citizens of the Assembly of FRY; November 11, 1996, Municipal elections (second round on Nov. 17); September 21, 1997, elections for Deputies in National Assembly of Serbia, September 21, 1997, Elections for the President of Republic of Serbia (second round on Oct. 5th), Dec. 7th, 1997 Elections for the President of Republic of Serbia, (second round on December 21). For a more detailed look at some of the elections see Vladimir Goati, *Elections in FRY from 1990 to 1998: Will of the People or Electoral Manipulation*, 2nd extended ed., *Addendum to the First Edition: Meaning and Significance of the Elections of 2000*, trans. Vladimir B. Zimonijic and Slobodan S. Stetic, (Belgrade: Center for Free Elections and Democracy, 2001).

NGO and opposition elite that this was a real opportunity for change—that change would come and that elections were the right vehicle for that change if only the public would believe—and act. The public could no longer be allowed to be bystanders; elites had to frame elections in such a way so as to mobilize citizens, and convince them that they made a difference that they could be agents of their own history and that the outcome would be different, if only they would be active—if only they would vote.

Although NGOs in Serbia diagnosed the problem as the "lack of democracy," and political oppositions frequently saw things similarly, the public had seen a deterioration in their social and economic conditions and in their personal safety. People were tired of not being allowed to travel when they had been allowed to travel under Tito in the former Yugoslavia. They were tired of not having enough to eat or living close to the poverty line. As one Serb in an interview was quick to point out, Serbia was a European country; even under communism they had not had gulags as many other eastern European countries had had. Serbs had been free to live as they wished and had had a moderately good life that had allowed for travel to Paris had the pocketbook allowed.[2] In short, the public was tired—framing by opposition politicians would give their feelings a name, empathize with the public and let them know their lives could be different that if they went to vote and voted for the opposition. Politicians then could help them to live "a normal life." Framing by political oppositions had to make sure people were convinced (if there were any doubts) that there was someone to blame for their misfortune and in some cases misery—that it was not just bad luck that things had gone wrong. That person

[2]Miljenko Dereta, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 3, 2007. This sense of Serbia place as a civilized nation and their sense of having been different than the other "East European" countries came up not only in interviews that I did, but appears regularly in newspaper articles, as discussed in Chapter Nine as the desire for a "normal life."

to blame had a name—Milosevic. And the NGO's and opposition political elites knew that they had to convince their publics through their use of frames that if the democratic opposition candidate could be elected, they could help them to lead "normal" lives—they could raise the standard of living, they could turn the country around and head in the right direction towards Europe.

In the next five chapters I examine the framing done by both the government and opposition actors in an attempt to mobilize the Serbian people. Even before elections were announced, Otpor and the political parties attempted to awaken the people and provide a convincing alternative world view. Following the outline of framing set out in Chapter Two, I first examine the credibility of the various parties. The effectiveness of frames can be seriously affected by the credibility of those promulgating the frame. In the next two chapters I examine the interactive framing processes and the development and deployment of alternative world views on two issues that were considered crucial to the Serbian people. In Chapter Ten, following Benford and Snow's framework, I examine whether or not the frames were likely to be effective, specifically whether or not these alternative worldviews set forth by the opposition had any resonance, and how much resonance the rival government framing had. Finally, in Chapters Eleven and Twelve, I examine "action" or mobilization framing, attempts by the NGOs, Otpor and the political parties to literally move people (as Doug McAdam puts it) from the balcony to the barricade, or in this case from the sofa to the voting booth. Taken together, these chapters examine the key concepts in framing: prognostic and diagnostic framing (Chapters Eight and Nine), the resonance of such frames (Chapter Ten) as well as

mobilization framing (Chapters Eleven and Twelve). I begin, however, by examining the credibility of all those involved.

As shown in the theoretical literature on framing, discussed in Chapter Two, the credibility of the messenger is crucial for a message to have an impact and for frames to be accepted. Yet credibility is not a static property of any person, organization or group. Credibility can be earned or lost by people and groups based on their actions. In any given contested situation, groups will try to frame their own honesty and trustworthiness while framing the dishonesty and duplicity of their opponent. They may be more or less successful at this process. People make judgments about these frames based on their personal knowledge. How much credibility any one person or group has at any given time is, in itself, a measure of people's trust and their assessment of the person or group's honesty.

This chapter will examine the centrality of credibility to effective persuasion, i.e. to having one's message heard. It will look at how much credibility various actors in the Serbian case had at various points of time and the strategies that they employed to either improve or maintain their credibility while decreasing that of their opponents. Finally this chapter will examine how effective various players were in positioning themselves to win people to their cause, or at least to win sufficient trust that their message would receive a hearing and would be able to subsequently mobilize people to take action.

The Political Opposition

The biggest problem for the national opposition figures in Serbia from the mid-1990s through 2000 was their lack of credibility. As political parties did not have strong

profiles, and were often seen by the public as something that could not be differentiated from their leaders, in fact were often perceived as almost the possession of these leaders, the credibility of opposition leaders was crucial to their ability to getting their message heard. For the opposition to win, it was not going to be sufficient for Milosevic to be unpopular. Nor could a campaign that was run simply as a referendum on Milosevic win. Milosevic had been disliked for years. The opposition had run against him (and each other in many cases) for years and not been successful. Moreover, as public opinion polls conducted in September and November 1999 and March 2000 by the Strategic Marketing Agency showed, a drop in voter support for Milosevic did not automatically signal an increase in voters for the opposition. Instead, such voters frequently moved into the "undecided" or worse—the "will not vote" category. In one survey, for example, support for the regime declined from 24.3% to 21.8%, but support for the opposition went up only from 27.9% to 28.2%, while the indecisive group increased from 34.1% to 41%.[3] As one observer of the scene noted in October of 1999, "In an isolated, fearful universe where nearly 52 percent of the people are unable to articulate an alternative leader for Serbia, the man who commands a solid 20 percent of the vote can remain king."[4]

Thus, if the opposition wanted to get its message out in a way that would be heard, they had to find a way to gain credibility in the eyes of the voters. In many ways this was the toughest task the opposition faced. They first had to become truly united. As we saw in a previous chapter, the public had come to the conclusion, far earlier than any individual figure in the opposition was willing to admit, that they could only be trusted if

[3] Aleksandar Ciric, "What is Milosevic Up to?" *AIM* Podgorica, April 22, 2000, published on May 2, 2000, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/achive/data/200005/00502-001-trae-pod.htm.
[4] Steven Erlanger, "Still Standing—A Special Report: Ignoring Scars Milosevic Is Stubbornly Pressing On," *The New York Times*, October 31, 1999.

they were to "hang" together.[5] Previous opposition coalitions had all come unglued due to infighting, usually of a personal, not substantive nature. National opposition politicians did not have a good *reputation* for being able to subordinate their personal ambition to the good of the whole—past shared history between the public and opposition coalitions had been disappointing to say the least. The opposition had sometimes been called the fifth pillar of Milosevic's government. Unity had to be "for real"—fig leaves papering over discord and called "unity" would not increase the public's trust: false steps or notes would only heighten their disgust and distrust of the opposition. This was especially true, as the public perceived almost all opposition figures as interested in gaining power for power's sake or for personal gain just as they perceived government figures. Media reports (even in the independent media) of sniping and maneuvering among national opposition figures, especially between Djindjic and Draskovic, as well as news of backstabbing by national figures such as Draskovic aimed at local opposition leaders, did nothing to quiet the public's fears as to how much they could trust the opposition. Even as late as April of 2000, in the midst of a "unity" campaign that had kicked off in January of that year, and despite the earlier July 1999 signing of a pledge by all the opposition parties not to speak ill of each other, an example of such an incident took place.[6] Just prior to the first major opposition rally of 2000, scheduled for April Draskovic

[5] In addition to the public's practical experiences from 1990-1999—victory or something near to it when the opposition remained unified and failure when it did not.—there is also a mythical dimension to unity for Serbia. Serbia's coat of arms contains the motto "Only Unity Saves the Serb," disunity among Serbian feudal lords was seen as one reason for the defeat to the Ottoman Empire. See Marko Zivkovic, "Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny in the 1980s and 1990s," PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2001, 210.

[6] For a copy of the documents adopted by the Round Table of the Democratic Opposition on January 10, 2000, see Slobodanka Nedovic, gen. ed., *Guide through Electoral Controversies in Serbia*, trans. Vladimir B. Zimonjic and Slobodan S. Stetic, (Belgrade: Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju, 2000), Addendum IV, 84-86. For information on the pledge not to speak ill of each other, see "SZP Proposes Non-Aggression Pact to Opposition," *BETA*, Belgrade, July 28, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0729, *World News Connection,* http://wnc.dialog.com.

categorically stated that the mayor of Cacak, Vladimir Ilic, could not be allowed to speak at the rally. Ilic, a member of Alliance for Change, had appeared at their rallies and had been a strong supporter of the Alliance, facilitating things in his own region as well as with other opposition mayors across the country with whom he was in regular contact due to his position in the Alliance for Free Towns and Municipalities. Draskovic, however, believing that Ilic had personally wronged him by stepping out of SPO to form his own party, chose to veto Ilic's appearance. The debate and wrangling became quite public, causing Goran Svilanovic of GSS, a prominent Alliance for Change figure, to claim that he was "ashamed" of the opposition for such an incident. Ilic stepped aside, choosing not to speak at the rally for the sake of unity. Although the incident passed and the rally went forward, the opposition could ill afford such public blunders as it tried to frame its unity. Not one to let such a public spat between opposition members pass, Milosevic chose to capitalize on these public divisions among the opposition to counter-frame the opposition's claim that they represented "change" and, more importantly, that they were unified and could be trusted. Milosevic strongly argued that the opposition indeed could not be trusted: "Those who quarrel over who is to speak at a rally are not the people to carry out change."[7] This type of framing by the government was not entirely new—the Milosevic government regularly took advantage not only of strategic opportunities to try to keep the opposition divided, but also of opportunities to frame the divisions and infighting of the opposition. In 1997 Dusan Matkovic, Vice President of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), had argued that the opposition was not to be trusted and should be seen as immature and irresponsible, declaring in the wake of the break-up of Zajedno: "I

[7] Milenko Vasovic, "Rally Underwhelms Belgraders," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report No. 132, April 11, 2000, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.

think that our coalition is the most trusted political force, particularly in the light of recent developments, notably the Zajedno coalition breakup, which signaled its political immaturity to handle Serbia's pressing problems."[8] This counter-framing, far more subtle than the Milosevic government's usual framings of the opposition, contained a clearly visible, recognizable grain of truth. This made it more dangerous to the opposition than the usual statements by Milosevic's government in which he declared the opposition to be foreign mercenaries. Decisions taken independently in 1999 and 2000 by opposition figures also reduced their credibility. Djindjic's departure for exile in Montenegro during the bombing had not won him plaudits from the public who had had to sit in Serbia and take what came. Draskovic's decision to become part of the Milosevic government, his holding out for as many powerful ministerial spots as possible, as well as his partisan use of Studio B for the good of his own party and the detriment of the rest of the opposition, his refusal to let the Belgrade City council declare that they were against Milosevic during the summer 1999 petition drive and his ongoing petty refusals to cooperate with Alliance for Change, lost him considerable public trust.

Moreover national opposition politicians' public conduct left a legacy of distrust. It was this legacy that they would have to overcome if they wanted their message to have credibility. Past cooptation and flirting with the government as well as the "revolving door" from positions in government to positions in the opposition increased the public's distrust of politicians. As a Serbian commentator pointed out in March 2000 as the anniversary of the March 9, 1991 protest neared, Vuk Draskovic, former "king of the streets" had subsequently gone to bed with the government,

[8] Dusan Matkovic quoted from *Borba* (date not given), Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, *Radicalisation of the Serbian Society.* (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 1997), http://www.helsinki.org.yu/doc/Radicalisation-EN.zip.

> the student's leader, Zarko Jokanovic, became the head of New Democracy party, the regime's coalition partner for years. General Momcilo Persic, today an opposition politician was shelling Zadar in 1991, and somewhat later 'liberated' Mostar by leveling it to the ground. The current leader of the opposition Democratic Alternative Nebojsa Covic, was a faithful member of the Milosevic Socialist Party of Serbia at the time. With us also is retired general Vuk Obradovic, head of the opposition Social Democracy, who, in '91 was in uniform defending Milosevic's vision of Yugoslavia with fiery words. With such people still around memories of March 9 leave a bitter taste. [9]

His views were not isolated. Public opinion polls repeatedly showed that no opposition figure was very popular or trusted.

In short, since all politicians were dirty[10] and in it for personal gain,[11] only if the opposition could unify, submerge individual willfulness to the good of the whole, truly fight for the public, show by deeds and not just words that they meant it and advocate a

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[9] Petar Lukovic, "The March 9 Legacy," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report No. 122, March 7, 2000, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-. See also Florian Bieber, "Delayed Transition and the Multiple Legitimacy Crisis of Post-1992 Yugoslavia," in Dimitris Keridis, Ellen Elias-Bursać, and Nicholas Yatromanolakis, eds., *New Approaches to Balkan Studies*, (Herndon, Virginia: Brassey's, 2003) , 129-148.

[10] Even some Serbian politicians and political activists employ the language of "clean and "dirty" in referencing political activity. A Democratic Party activist when discussing why Otpor was successful said, "Otpor is an organization that enjoys the greatest confidence of the citizens, It is a group of young people who are certainly not trusted for their experience. They cannot be experienced. Rather they are trusted because they are clean." Quote from opposition Democratic Party activist Slobodan Vuksanovic in Jolyon Naegele "Yugoslavia: Otpor Launches Get Out the Vote Campaign," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, July 7, 2000, http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1094380.html. A similar sentiment was voiced by Otpor activist Ivan Andric, "On the Opposition and Political Parties," in "Otpor and the Opposition: From Competition and Misunderstanding to Functional Coalition of Efforts and Actions," Center for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies. http://www.canvasopedia.org/content/serbian_case/otpor_opposition.htm#03. When discussing whether or not Otpor would work with political parties Andric noted, "So Otpor needed to stay clean."

[11] Djindjic himself, in the Slovenian newspaper *Delo*,stated that the opposition had not managed to defeat Milosevic because they were seen as being in politics for personal power, "People who follow events say 'They are all the same. All they want is power.' And they are right." Djindjic quoted in Dejan Anastasijevic and Anothony Borden, *Out of Time: Draskovic, Djindjic and Serbian Opposition against Milosevic*, (Belgrade: Beta News Agency, a publication of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 2000), 90. He also noted that Draskovic became a victim of his actions, especially in the summer and fall of 2000 when instead of joining together and sticking with the opposition as part of a unity program, he took actions that were judged by the public to be for personal political positioning and gain. Milan Nikolic, head of the Centre for Policy Alternatives in Belgrade also noted this in the public opinion polling that showed that people wanted change but were afraid to trust opposition politicians, "They see them as squabbling power-seekers who are vain and immature." Nikolic then went on to contrast this with the public's positive view of Otpor. See Milan Nikolic's remarks in Helena Smith, "Rage of innocents: Helena Smith on the dramatic rise of Serbia's anti-government student movement," *The Guardian* (London) May 30, 2000, http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2000/may/30/highereducation.

policy that was "for" something as well as against something could they win the public's trust.[12] It was a tall order to regain trust. Milosevic and SPS's most recent victories had largely been the result of "new rules" concerning voting districts and outright vote fraud. In tandem with opposition boycotts of elections resulting in public confusion and apathy, these tactics had handily kept Milosevic and his governments in power. The closest the public had come to identifying with politicians was in the municipal elections in 1996.[13] Yet their decision to come out on the streets for months in the face of Milosevic's refusal to recognize opposition victories in 14 towns had been less about the politicians who had won or the politicians who had called them out and more about the injustice done to them, the voting public, in the form of vote fraud and theft. Moreover, many had placed their trust in the students and responded more to the students' calls for action than to those of opposition politicians. The students, unlike the politicians, were seen as being pure and untainted, removed from politics and thus had the public's trust.[14]

As the discussion above illustrates, the public had never felt any true, long-lasting sense of shared fate or community (*collective identity)* with national opposition politicians after the mid to late 1990s. Past experience with opposition politicians and opposition coalitions had not led to either positive feelings and emotions (affects) or a sense of trust for opposition politicians. As Jasper has pointed out, affects act as a filter to

[12] Even Draskovic, whose moniker was "king of the streets" for his ability to draw people to the streets based on his charisma and his fiery oratory, seemed to have lost his charm especially after 1996. His "downfall" was complete, as evidenced in part by the boos and jeers that greeted him at the August 19, 1999 rally in Belgrade.

[13] There was one exception to this—Dragoslav Avramovic. Due to his role in rescuing the Serbian economy from hyperinflation, and his departure from the Milosevic government when Milosevic would no longer take his recommendations, Avramovic was relatively popular. Avramovic would lend his credibility to both G17 and Alliance for Change.

[14] See "Gaudeamus" in Ivan Colovic, *Politics of Identity in Serbia: Essays in Political Anthropology*, Celia Hawkesworth, trans., (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 231-239, for a strong argument on this issue.

information. This is especially true of how people view politicians [15] Whereas positive affects would have inclined the public to process incoming information about opposition leaders more positively, conflicted to negative affects inclined people to be neutral at best and at worst to see new revelations about such figures in a more negative light. The public chose to remove itself from politics, to be observers who had a role but not a collectivity that identified strongly with any group of politicians. It chose to be to be a third party to any elections or negotiations—there were government politicians, opposition politicians and them.[16] But for national opposition politicians to win, they needed to be able to move people from the "undecided" or "not willing to vote" categories to the voting categories. They needed to move even their own supporters to the polls. Only a large turnout would reduce the margins for fraud and be more likely to assure them victory when elections were eventually called. The opposition both had to find real unity and some form of personal credibility if they were to win. They had to find ways to make people feel that their fate was tied to that of the opposition, that the opposition represented what people wanted—that *collectively* they shared important goals if not an identity. To do this, the opposition had to obtain greater credibility—and the clear route to this was through unity in their tactics and talk.

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[15] See James M. Jasper, "Motivation and Emotion," in Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Studies*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) , 157-171, especially 163. Jasper points to Victor C. Ottati and Robert S. Wyer, Jr., "Affect and Political Judgment," in Shanto Ivengar and William J. McGuire, eds., *Explorations in Political Psychology*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), 296-315.

[16] While moving from the position of bystander with positive feelings towards a political group to becoming a member of a party is indeed a step, if it was any indication of how people felt about politicians and politics, people were not, on the whole interested in making such a leap. Polls showed that few people were interested in being affiliated with or becoming a member of a political party, nor were they interested in political work per se. See, for example, "Between Disappointment and Hope – Public Opinion in Serbia, September 1999," Center for Policy Studies/ Centar za proucavanje alternativa, Belgrade, 1999, http://www.cpa-cps.org.yu/public.htm, 7, where "almost nine out of 10 uneducated respondents, almost three-quarters with completed elementary school, two-thirds with vocational training and secondary education and three-fifths with the highest education said they were not willing to undertake any party activities."

As Micunovic had pointed out in 1991 and as Branislav Canak, president of Nezavisnost, Serbia's only independent trade union, echoed in 1999—the opposition needed to be *for* something. It was not sufficient to be against something.[17] The public might want to get rid of Milosevic—but they might be very reluctant to go to the polls if they did not see anything better replacing him, just men in search of glory without policies or plans.[18] A firm policy orientation and consistency in argument and action would be essential to move the public. Obrad Kesic, formerly an advisor to Prime Minister Milan Panic, also made this point as early as October 1998 in an interview with Voice of America. Discussing the differences between Zajedno and the Alliance for Change, Kesic noted that he thought that the Alliance for Change was in a better position to succeed because "Zajedno did not have a program. The Alliance for Change has a program. The members have agreed to implement the program."[19] He pointed out that the 21 point program included a new constitution, economic stabilization and reform and the reintegration of Serbia back into the international community. Mladjan Dinkic, one of the leaders of G17 Plus also argued that it was crucial not only to be against Milosevic but that the opposition parties needed to have a plan if they wanted to have any credibility with the public. This, he argued, had already been shown after the opposition had taken control of towns in 1997 without a plan,

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[17] Canak addressing his remarks to the political opposition forces said, "Down with Milosevic is not a sufficient program," and called on the democratic opposition to put forward a "comprehensive program." Branislav Canak as quoted in Ladka Bauerova "The Serb Opposition: A Shadow Serbia," *Central European Review* 1/6 (August 2, 1999), http://www.ce-review.org/99/6/bauerova6.html.

[18] As Hunt, Benford and Snow point out, framing is a three pronged process which not only entails diagnosis of the problem, but "prognosis," what is to be done. Prognostic framing, the second prong, "outlines a plan for redress, specifying what should be done by whom." See Scott A. Hunt, Robert D. Benford, and David A. Snow, "Identity Fields: Framing Processes and the Social Construction of Movement Identities," in Enrique Larana, Hank Johnston and Joseph R. Gusfield, eds., *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 191. While one might argue that the plan for redress was simply to get rid of Milosevic, I argue this was insufficient.

[19] Judith Latham "Serbia's Democratic Opposition," Voice of America, October 21, 1998, available at http://www.hri.org/news/usa/voa/1998/98-10-21.voa.html#03.

> Opposition parties had no programme of work for the local level when they assumed power in towns and that is why some of them disintegrated. Now the opposition knows that is not enough to criticize the ruling regime for them to win the elections. It knows full well that the majority of citizens are against the regime, but it would like to know what the parties stand for.[20]

Ironically, much of the public did not stand initially so far from the policy positions that the opposition would formulate and came to stand for—the public just did not identify them as those of the opposition per se. Moreover the public identified opposition parties with the men who led them first and foremost—not with policies and positions. The opposition clearly had work to do.

As we have seen in Chapters Three and Four, many opposition parties had already realized that were any elections to be held in the near future, in order to win, they would have to unite and they would have to improve their reputation. Milan Nikolic, head of the Center for Policy Studies, had privately shared with opposition politicians data from public opinion polls that indicated that the public had had enough of them—that any actions they would take would be their last great shot.[21] Alliance for Change's development was the first important step towards credibility for the opposition. Moreover, in order to win, the opposition would have to convince the public of the urgency of the problem, the critical nature taking action now and that the opposition was a viable, credible source for real change. Framing the situation in the language of urgency, Djindjic himself voiced his recognition of this fact in August of 1999, "'I

[20] Misa Brkic, "Some Other Serbia: Group G17 Plus, the Opposition Cannot Do Without Us,"*AIM* Podgorica, June 7, 2000, published June 28, 2000, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200006/00628-003-trae-pod.htm , citing Mladjan Dinkic.
[21] Sonja Licht, interview by author, Washington DC, November 8, 2007.

believe that this is the last opportunity to get rid of Milosevic…it's not just the last chance for me, but for us as a country.'"[22]

In addition to appearing together at rallies and making declarations of unity after roundtables, such as those in October 1999 and January of 2000, another means to obtain credibility was leaning on the credibility of others. Beginning with the rallies in the summer of 1999 on through the elections themselves, the opposition politicians "borrowed" credibility by being seen together and cooperating with others who already had the trust of the public. To some extent some national politicians leaned on the credibility of local opposition politicians—especially when they held rallies in opposition-controlled municipalities. Despite the national demise of Zajedno, local opposition politicians had largely proven that they were willing to continue to work together and had earned the trust of their voters. Local opposition politicians had also fought regular battles on behalf of their towns and in some cases, had managed to bring positive benefits—such as the local radio and TV stations whose reporting was more fair and informed. Some local opposition politicians such as Zoran Zivkovic, mayor of Nis, and Vladimir Ilic, mayor of Cacak, were very popular and respected in their towns and in many of the surrounding communities.[23] That local opposition politicians were willing to back and "vouch" for the unity of the national politicians had immense value, as one of the criticisms of the national opposition politicians was that they all wanted to be "king"

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[22] Steven Erlanger "An Anti-Milosevic Leader Tries for a Comeback," *The New York Times*, August 28, 1999.

[23] Ivan Novkovic's respect for the Mayor of Nis, Zoran Zivkovic, is what led Novkovic to try to make an appointment with the mayor of Nis shortly before his act of protest in Leskovac. In an interview Novkovic said, "Zoran, when I thought of him, inspired confidence. Even though I hadn't met him before I felt a certain closeness to him…" See Bojan Bozic, "A Man Can't Change Anything on His Own (Interview with Ivan Novkovic)," *Free Serbia Interviews*, March 24, 2000, http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/interviews/2000/e-novkovic24032000.html, (accessed May 6, 2009).

and that none of the them was willing to sacrifice for the good of the whole, let alone the good of the public.

However, the most crucial groups from whom national opposition politicians could borrow credibility were G17 Plus and Otpor. G17Plus was known as an "expert" group that worked independently of politicians. Their work was known to the public due to their plans for a transitional government which they had advocated through the summer and into the early fall of 1999. Furthermore, their development of the successful "Energy for Democracy" plan for the winter of 1999 and open support first for Alliance for Change and then for DOS, lent not only an air of respectability to their campaign but legitimacy. In addition to the fact that G17 Plus' work on plans such as "Energy for Democracy" had aided citizens directly, it was the fact that the members of G17 Plus were "experts" i.e. those in specialized technical fields requiring high levels of training, and certification, that increased the public's level of trust.[24] They specifically were ***not*** politicians. Again Mladjan Dinkic of G17 Plus recognized the importance of his group and its credentials for the opposition's credibility: "after ten years on the political scene the opposition has lost some of its credibility. Now it needs the support of independent expert teams."[25] The public began to trust that were DOS members to be elected, they had a credible plan that would get people out of the current financial mess because these

[24] Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 620-21. In the Center for Policy Studies' September 1999 poll, when asked what form of government they preferred most, the most preferable was "government by experts," with 83% for, 6% against, and 7% who did not know. See "Between Disappointment and Hope – Public Opinion in Serbia, 1999," 6. In a poll carried out in Belgrade by the Beografiti organization 11-15 September 2000, 64.63% believed "entirely or to some extent" in the expert group G17. CeSid received the trust of 58.64% of Belgraders. This can be contrasted to the numbers for example received by the government in the same poll in which 27.05% trusted the federal government while 72.95% said that they did not believe the government. Overall in the poll "expert NGO organizations enjoyed significantly more trust than the federal government." See "Belgraders Believe Pre-Election Opinion Polls and NGOs," *AIM Evening News*, September 20, 2000, citing FoNet agency, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/decani/message/35249.

[25] Brkic, "Some Other Serbia," citing Mladjan Dinkic.

politicians, who had never run anything, actually had people at their side who were experts who could help them govern.[26] Moreover, G17 Plus' act of campaigning with Alliance for Change and with DOS opened people up to listen to their actual messages.

Otpor too was crucial to Alliance for Change and DOS and other opposition politicians gaining credibility. As one of the two most trusted groups in the country,[27] Otpor was careful as to how it lent its support and was very careful about not allowing itself to be—or be seen to be—co-opted by the political parties. General Momcilo Persic, for example, sought credibility from Otpor when he decided to found a movement. In its first week he stated, "I have no desire to fight for power, but to ensure improvements in Serbia together with young people." Days later he publicly announced that he had set up a meeting with Slobodan Homen, one of the key Otpor activists. Otpor, as usual, was wary but provided limited credibility and cooperation. Homen noted that General Persic was apparently ready to sign Otpor's declaration but he went on to add that while Otpor was willing to cooperate, they were "not ready to become one with General Persic's organization."[28] Persic was not the only opposition figure to openly woo Otpor. Vuk Obradovic, president of the Social Democratic party, was reported in *Blic* as saying that "Otpor was always right and that his party should support all their actions. 'Our positions

[26] See comment by Predrag Markovic of G17Plus on the importance of the plan and the public's belief in it: "G17 Plus announces Campaign to Increase Voter Turnout," *BETA* Belgrade, August 14, 2000. FBIS-EEU-2000-0814 *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com. See also "Between Disappointment and Hope – Public Opinion in Serbia, September 1999," 6.
[27] See United Nations Development Program, Serbia, "Vulnerability Trends and Perceptions: Beyond the Democratic Breakthrough," http://www.undp.org.rs/index.cfm?event=public.publicationsDetails&revid=CE1BC0BC-3FF2-9C75-28E50EC1F0F76597, 6.
[28] Zoran B. Nikolic, "Enthusiasm the Biggest Advantage," *Vreme*, September 14, 2000, http://www.ex-yupress.com/vreme/vreme82.html.

are identical, so those clever people can always count on all our support.'"[29] While Otpor was willing to loan limited support to the cause, it was very careful to maintain not only physical autonomy from any of the parties but a definite ideological space and separateness.[30] Clear that it wanted Milosevic out, but also clear that its support was not necessarily for the opposition politicians per se,[31] Otpor leveraged its credibility both to help the opposition with the public but also to ensure that the opposition lived up to its word thus increasing Otpor's credibility with the public. When the Otpor representative at the April 14, 2000 rally in Belgrade called the opposition leaders to not only stand side by side with him, all with fists raised in the clenched Otpor salute, but also handed opposition leaders the Otpor flag—the action did not come without a serious threat: "From one hundred towns, ten thousand of us will march and come under the window of

[29] Vladimir Illic, *Helsinki Files No. 5. Otpor: In or Beyond Politics*, (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2001), http://www.helsinki.org.yu/doc/files05.zip. Politicians also regularly invoked Otpor's name and slogans at rallies they held, not only gaining credibility from invoking Otpor's name and endorsing its program but also tying together Otpor, the future of the country and the platform of the opposition. Democratic Alternative President Nebojsa Covic at the May 15, 2000 rally was reported to say that "the regime claimed the opposition were traitors, while looking to destroy our children and our future at the same time. He said Resistance, (Otpor) is all we have left to give out children a normal life in Serbia." See "Stop the Terror! For Free Elections," Report with video and photos of opposition rally in Belgrade on May 15, 2000, *Free Serbia Specials, Broadcasts*, May 15, 2000, http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/specials/broadcasts/15052000/e-index.html.

[30] Although Otpor was open to anyone who wanted to join, it frequently engaged in boundary framing, i.e. clearly delineating who and what the group was—and who and what it was not. Boundary framing thus helped to increase collective identity within the group as well as maintain separation from other groups such as civil NGOs and opposition politicians. This was necessary for Otpor to maintain its credibility and to keep its "brand" clean. See Scott A. Hunt and Robert D. Benford, "Collective Identity, Solidarity and Commitment," in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds., *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 442-444, and Ira Silver, "Constructing 'Social Change' through Philanthropy: Boundary Framing and the Articulation of Vocabularies of Motive for Social Movement Participation," *Sociological Inquiry* 67/4 (November 1997): 488-503. See also my discussion of boundary framing in Chapter Two.

[31] Otpor's careful statements that it did not support any political party were a very well thought out and measured tactic. Clearly all Otpor members realized that if they wanted Milosevic to go, the only available option to take his place was DOS. However, for both internal unity and external reputation it was to Otpor's advantage to retain its "apolitical" label. Internally some of its members were part of SPO and were Draskovic supporters, externally the students wanted to maintain credibility with the public, hence retaining the "clean" student reputation and not taking on any of the "dirt" of politics was a necessary and important strategy.

any one of you who betrays this oath."[32] Otpor also spoke out openly against the opposition's inaction and decreased its support, as it did when the opposition could not muster either a unified or a forceful response in May of 2000 to the closing of Studio B, the closing of the universities and the increased beating of Otpor and NGO activists, "'We have a great problem with those opposition guys. They are retreating yet one more step and leaving us exposed,' said Otpor representative, Srdja Popovic. 'People are supporting us, and we have given the opposition part of our legitimacy.'"[33] Nonetheless, opposition politicians, aware that Otpor had more credibility than any other organization, leaned as much as they could on Otpor's reputation—they very publicly allied with Otpor, were seen with Otpor and wore Otpor t-shirts, as did their bodyguards.

While the stratagems to demonstrate unity changed and developed over time—as Alliance for Change slowly evolved (with conscious effort and work on the part of participants) into DOS, credibility was slowly developed in the year, months and weeks leading up to the actual elections. Hard work, creative framing and constant efforts were needed to help create not only a more positive view of the opposition political parties by the public but also to create a sense of collective identity—of shared fate, ambition and purpose between the organized opposition and the voters. They hoped to mobilize the voters not only for rallies, but to go to the polls—and to take to the streets in the face of

[32] Vladimir Pavlov, Novi Sad Otpor activist, at the April 14, 2000 rally, cited in Alexander Ciric, "Opposition Protest in Serbia," *AIM*, Podgorica, April 15, 2000, published April 25, 2000, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200004/00425-004-trae-pod.htm , and Srdjan Staletovic, "Students Side with Opposition," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report No. 137, May 5, 2000, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-, who notes, noted, "The gesture was significant. It was the first time Otpor had publicly demonstrated its support for the anti-government alliance, representing a victory of the pro-opposition faction of the movement over advocates of a more independent stance."

[33] Laura Rozen, "Opposition Campaign Fizzles Out," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report No. 144, May 31, 2000. http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=- in Belgrade (BCR No. 144, 31-May-00).

the regime and its power should it prove to be necessary. Although progress towards this goal was not always steadily headed in an upward direction, especially when open splits between Draskovic and Djindjic were highlighted and reported on, the overall direction was positive.[34] Moreover, with the help of "borrowed" credibility from local opposition politicians, G17 Plus and Otpor, people listened to the messages not only against Milosevic but the concrete promises of what the opposition would do were they to be elected. DOS's 16 page booklet, issued in August, containing their economic plan and vision for the country was actually a "hot" item and one that was apparently well-thumbed through by many voters.[35] Moreover, what the Milosevic government tried to trumpet as a negative of the opposition—namely its closeness to foreign powers, the public seemed to see begrudgingly as a positive. Repeated public opinion surveys showed that the public believed that foreign capital would be necessary for Serbia to recover and that they recognized that the opposition politicians were the only group in a position to deliver.[36]

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[34] From February to August 2000 there was a strengthening of support for DOS and DOS parties from 21% to 38 %. See analysis of data from the Center for Political Research and Public Opinion of the Institute of Social Science, "Election orientation of citizens of Serbia in 1999-2000," *BDnet service Elections 2000*, http://www.bbnet.org.ye/bbnet/elections/eng/lutovac.htm. The last minute maneuvering by Draskovic in August of 2000 to try to increase his power and to try to co-opt the work of DOS—as well as gain a lead position in the coalition which he had largely shunned did not work to his favor. His numbers decreased. See "Draskovic Accuses Democratic Opposition of Attempts to 'Destroy' SPO," *BETA* Belgrade, August 28, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0828, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com for an example of Draskovic's attitudes. In February 2000, 8.0% of voters considered Draskovic the most trusted politician, in May 10.2% considered him the best leader, but by August 2000 only 3.9% still considered him the best president. Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, "Pre-Election Study - Presidential Elections Serbia February 2000," (ZA4280), "Pre-Election Study - Presidential Elections Serbia May 2000," (ZA4381) and "Pre-Election Study - Presidential Elections Serbia August 2000," (ZA4280).

[35] G17 Plus had been assisting DOS (and previously Alliance for Change) with its economic data, suggestions for the future and public statements about the economy well before August of 2000.

[36] In October 1999, for instance, 66% of respondents agreed that opposition leaders had to deal with the West to lift sanctions, open borders and reintegrate Serbia into Europe—a goal that was considered "extremely important" by 73% of all voters, including 56% of SPS and 57% of SRP voters. See National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, *Serbia Issues Poll,* October 24, 1999, 25-27, 38.

If any single action could be said to have given a true boost to the credibility of the opposition when they needed it, it was their choice of a presidential candidate. Vojislav Kostunica embodied much of what the public was looking for in an opposition candidate, even if the public itself did not realize it immediately. His biggest strategic advantage was that he came with less baggage than anyone else, fewer negatives and more overall positives.[37] He was a man, who, although firm in his convictions, could be framed as (and in many ways was) the antithesis of all current Serbian politicians. Although he had often previously been referred to as Seselj in a tuxedo, in the weeks leading up to the election, through the careful constructive and creative work of many, he would come to be seen as the embodiment of what the public was looking for—someone who was honest, not flashy, who was uncorrupted, who had not cozied up to the government or pandered to the West, as someone who was solid, true to his convictions, a man of the common people, a moderate nationalist who was a patriot but would take them back to Europe. In an analysis of his selection, BETA averred that "In the eyes of the electorate, the general consensus over Kostunica's nomination will look as a clear sign that the opposition's priority is a struggle for political change instead of for power, a stark message the opposition is trying to convey in its campaign."[38] The opposition strategically chose to announce Kostunica's selection at a crucial time close to the kick off of the official campaign—thus focusing attention on Kostunica himself. In the three

[37] See a summary of "Positive Opinion on S. Milosevic and V. Kostunica from 1992 through 2000," as well as the sheets "Vojislav Kostunica" and "Slobodan Milosevic," that examine each candidate's positive and negative attributes, in the Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, "From the Previous Surveys," August 2000. http://cpijm.org.yu/previous/aug2000.htm.

[38] "Serbian agency analyses election campaign, divisions within opposition," *Beta News Agency* (Belgrade, Serbia), August 17, 2000, Europe - Political: *NewsBank Access World News,* http://infoweb.newsbank.com.

weeks following his selection, with careful crafting, Kostunica's selection would prove to be a boost for the opposition's credibility in the final push towards election day.[39]

The Government

If the opposition had a credibility problem because in part it had collaborated with the government, that certainly reflected on the size and scale of the government's credibility problems. While it could certainly derive a certain amount of credibility from being the authority in power, this was very limited. In the discussion of demand in Chapter Five, we saw that that people had little trust in either governmental institutions or leaders. Moreover, regime "trust" numbers over all continued to sink. While Milosevic had been the "most trusted leader" by 42% of the people in 1990 he reached his nadir of 13% trust in 1999 before managing to climb back to between 20% to 21% in 2000.[40]

A rather large problem for the government was that the government was responsible for the problems that voters cared about most and the voters recognized this fact, not blaming others despite the government's strong framing efforts to the contrary. While the opposition might discuss issues—the government had to find a way to deal with its very low negative numbers with regard to the policies for which it was responsible, especially when it came to its handling of the economy. In a September 1999 public opinion poll, 71.6% of the respondents blamed Milosevic and the government for

[39] Kostunica's selection had a strong effect on DOS's popularity according to United Nations Development Program, Serbia, "Vulnerability Trends and Perceptions: Beyond the Democratic Breakthrough," http://www.undp.org.rs/index.cfm?event=public.publicationsDetails&revid=CE1BC0BC-3FF2-9C75-28E50EC1F0F76597, 19. In December 1999 15% claimed that they would vote for DOS, in February that number rose to 17%, and after Kostunica was announced as DOS's candidate the number rose to 38%.
[40] Center for Political Studies, "From the Previous Surveys," August 2000, and Bekic, "What the Citizens of Serbia Fear."

the state of the economy.[41] While sanctions were seen as a contributing factor to the state of the economy, the public held Milosevic—not foreign governments—responsible for their impoverishment. The verdict of the public was that Milosevic had to go. In an October 1999 poll, the public believed that "removing him from office is the best way to improve the situation. Two-thirds want him to resign before the end of his term."[42]

In short, Milosevic, the government ministers and the institutions of government had very little credibility. Not only were Serbian voters "extremely angry with Milosevic," but they strongly disliked him, his government ministers and especially his wife, Mira Markovic, and her JUL party.[43] In a survey taken from August 3-11, 2000, when asked to list the virtues and weaknesses of the presidential candidates, respondents characterized Milosevic as "autocratic" (32%), "dishonest" (26%), "disrespected abroad" (18%), "careless" (17%), and "incompetent" (17%), though they conceded that he was "capable" (34%), a "good speaker" (24%) and "patriotic" (15%).[44] Milosevic and his government would have to find a way to increase their credibility with the vast majority of Serbian voters—which would mean finding a way to give the public what it wanted in

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[41] Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, "Election Study Serbia September 1999," (ZA4278).

[42] *Serbia Issues Poll,* October 24, 1999, 5.

[43] *Serbia Issues Poll*, October 24, 1999, 5. Milosevic's wife Mira Markovic was particularly disliked by the public (including many SPS members) and was more than "fair game" for ridicule. While even some who disliked and distrusted Milosevic himself were slow to blame him for everything, due to his successful framing of himself as a statesman above the fray of politics, these same people were quick to blame Mira for troubles. Kent Patton, interview by author, Washington DC, July 23, 2008. The dislike of Mira ran deep and her trademark of wearing a flower above her ear or on her hats in almost all public appearances was used in bitter caricatures of her by the cartoonist Corax and by Otpor.

[44] Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, "From the Previous Surveys. Yugoslav and Serbian Public Opinion on Virtues and Weaknesses of Presidential Candidates: Slobodan Milosevic," http://www.cpijm.org.yu/previous/aug2000.htm, accessed December 2, 2007. While the public largely did not harbor positive affects for the opposition, it harbored decidedly negative affects for Milosevic and his government, as discussed in Chapter Five. Oddly, however, Milosevic continued to retain the number one slot as the politician the public "trusted" the most.

terms of policy—or find a way to successfully cheat—again.[45] It was going to be the rule of results ("rationality") that the public was going to use when measuring Milosevic and his government.[46] If he could produce a better economy, real jobs and reconstruct the country, many might have been willing to increase the amount of legitimacy accorded to him. Some measure of this was seen when his reconstruction campaign seemed to have some success and the polls saw that he was "cut some slack" by the voters.[47] As we shall see in Chapter Eight, Milosevic too recognized this as he framed the Herculean efforts and achievements of the Serbian people under the direction of his government in reconstruction and at a more concrete level, demanded 'sacrifices" from some of the men who had become "captains of industry" under his cronyist personal policies. But as Djindjic had already noted, had Milosevic been able to revive the economy, to provide people with jobs, to have good relations with neighbors in the first place he would have been a good president.[48]

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[45] Importantly it was when the public became conscious of and demanded positive domestic policy outcomes that Milosevic seemed to have the most trouble. Djindjic also pointed out, as have others such as Gordy and Pesic that Milosevic needed to create or aggravate crises with the outside to distract from domestic disasters and to issue calls for unity.

[46] As noted in the previous chapter the elderly as a demographic group overwhelmingly supported Milosevic, more than any other age-based demographic. This despite the fact that they suffered horribly under his rule as a result of the government not paying pensions to people who had the lowest standard of living of any group in Serbia. See "Serbia on the Demographic Map of Europe," *YU Survey/1999,* http://www.pregled-rs.rs/article.php?pid=225&id=20863, accessed May 8, 2009, and "Social Welfare Situation and Need for Donations," *YU Survey 4/2000*, http://www.pregled-rs.rs/article.php?pid=220&id=20573&lang=en, accessed May 8, 2009. Zivkovic argues that this type of support for Milosevic by those who were most disadvantaged by his regime was due to what he calls "poor cognitive mapping"—see especially Chapter Six in his dissertation. Although I do not agree with Mihailovic's normative judgments about "rationality," for the meaning of "rational" voting in the Serbian context see Srecko Mihailovic, "Political Formulae for the Perseverance and Change of the Regime in Serbia," in Ivana Spasic and Milan Subotic, eds., *Revolution and Order: Serbia after October 2000*, trans. Vera Gliborijevic, Duska Vujic, Linda Louise Krstajic, and Ivana Spasic, (Belgrade: Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, 2000), 59-71.

[47] Vesna Bjekic, "Public Opinion of Serbia: Hope for Change," *AIM* Podgorica, January 17, 2000, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200001/00117-002-trae-pod.htm, accessed May 7, 2009.

[48] "Opposition leader Djindjic says Milosevic's only tactic now is repression," BBC Monitoring Service, Central Europe & Balkans, citing *Liberation* (Paris), May 24, 1999, published May 28, 1999, http://global.factiva.com.

Ironically having legitimacy and giving at least the appearance of legality seems to have been very important to Milosevic and his government. As we shall see in his framings, he went to great lengths to speak about how things were done by the book, how the law was followed. It was also important to Milosevic that the elections appear to be legal, with proper procedures followed, so that he appeared to win fair and square. As one Serbian commentator noted, one of the plausible reasons Milosevic may have called the elections early was to gain new legitimacy so as to be able to use this as clout to regain a place in the international community to regain foreign aid among other things. [49]

Otpor and Credibility

From the start Otpor had an advantage over all other groups who sought legitimacy from the public. Otpor followed in the footsteps of other recent Serbian student movements that had stood up in humorous and unselfish ways in defense of *all* people's rights and dignity. The fact that over the years students had stood up and endured in everyone's name for *everyone's* gain, was not lost on people.[50] Moreover, the

[49] No one actually knows why Milosevic called the elections when he did. Radoman Bozovic, then head of one of the then-largest companies in Serbia maintains that Milosevic has no idea of the true state of affairs in the country as he was being told by his trusted advisors citizens were enjoying greater prosperity, reconstruction was going well and there were plenty of essential goods. See Radoman Bozovic quoted in Jeffrey Smith and Peter Funn, "How Milosevic Lost His Grip; Leader was isolated in final Days," Washington Post October 15, 2000 Section A, A01; other s argue that his poll numbers taken the previous spring coupled with his belief that the opposition couldn't unify led him to think that he could easily win. For an example of this logic see "Elections in Serbia, "Is Vote Fraud Possible?" *AIM Press* September 21, 2000 accessed at http://www.aimpress.c/dyn/trae/archives/data/200009/00921-008-trae-po....Accessed on June 2, 2008; A third view argues that Milosevic called elections because he knew that his government was dangerously low in funds, unlikely to survive another winter. Hoping to get funds from a new American administration he intended to secure his legitimacy before it was too late. For a sample of this reasoning see, Ratomir Petkovic, "Serbia After Elections, who has Fooled Milosevic?" *AIM Press*, October 5, 2000 accessed at http://www.impress.ch/dyn/archive/data/200010/01008-006-trae-po...Accesed on June 5, 2008.

[50] That repeated positive interactions over time develop trust is a concept frequently examined in international relations literature and game theory. The concept is just as applicable here between two groups who do not personally know each other but are forced to develop an assessment which results in the one having a reputation, in this case positive. For an example of a similar situation in a different setting see

fact that student protest was always perceived by people to be "apolitical," "motivated by a genuine desire for a better country rather than for political power or personal gain,"[51] added to students, and hence Otpor's, credibility. In 1996/97 the student protests were hailed by one Serbian writer in *NIN* as "elementary, civil, ethical and therefore pre-political"[52] and these qualities initially devolved onto Otpor almost effortlessly. It was only a year after the end of the 1996/97 protests that Otpor was founded and announced its presence on the scene. In one short year the student movement's non-violent, humorous, determined and uncompromised protests during the long winter of 1996 and 1997 were still fresh in people's minds. Thus, not only had the student movements of 1991, 1992 and 1996/97 served as a basis for personnel and a reservoir of experience and operational memory for Otpor—the public's experiences with those student movements served as a pre-established basis of positive historical legitimacy for the nascent movement.

Youth was also a plus for Otpor's credibility. The fact that the activists were primarily (although not exclusively) young added to their credibility as students were seen as innocent and virtuous with pure motives. Once again this was an inherited virtue. In the 1996 protest student efforts were regularly hailed by various national cultural figures for their pure non-political character. One composer argued that the students were

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Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North, Barry R. Weingast, "The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs" in *Economics & Politics* 2/1 (March 1990): 1-23.

[51] Milan Nikolic, director of the Centre for Policy Studies Belgrade, noted: "the students don't have any skeletons to hide, they have never done deals with Milosevic and their demands for change sound very legitimate in the ears of people." Quoted in Smith, "Rage of innocents." See also Jessica Greenberg, "Noc Reklamozdera: Democracy, Consumption and the Contradictions of Representation in Post-Socialist Serbia," *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 29/2 (November 2006): 181-207. Importantly see also "Gaudeamus" in Colovic, *Politics of Identity in Serbia*, 231-239, for a strong argument on this issue.

[52] Colovic, *Politics of Identity in Serbia*, citing the writer M. Pantic in *NIN*, December 31, 1996, 234.

supported due to the fact that their motives and demands were "…the clearest, purist, uncalculating and non-party-political [demands]."[53] Otpor itself recognized the virtue of this framing and indeed tried to preserve the credibility it derived from being "youth." Ivan Marovic, one of the main spokesmen for Otpor ironically pointed to a "blunder" by the government in its attempts to re-define Otpor and reduce its credibility on this basis: "'If they continued with their old line that we are actually lazy students who do not want to study but are active in politics, the general populace might have believed them. And in that case we could have discussed why we are active in politics rather than dedicating ourselves to our studies." He went on to note that the government's attempt to frame Otpor as terrorists however was "a call for a lynching.'" The government's efforts to frame Otpor as a terrorist group were to fail with all but the most hard-core supporters of the regime.[54] The fact that almost all Otpor activists were someone's child or grandchild made the government's rhetoric look patently ridiculous. This was especially the case as those joining Otpor became increasingly younger. Calling 12 to 14 year olds foreign agents did not pass the "sniff" or credibility test. Personal experience and personal relationships to the Otpor activists belied the government's attempts to frame Otpor as dangerous. Moreover, especially as repression against Otpor was stepped up and ever younger activists were arrested and sometimes abused by police, parents moved from aggravated to incensed at the regime. One parent, whose underage child who had threatened, questioned and arrested by police in while on a school outing in Krusevac

[53] Colovic, *Politics of Identity in Serbia*, citing V. Kostic, a composer, from *Demokratija*, December 24, 1996, 233.

[54] While it is clear that some police did not believe these accusations, details from police interrogations and abuse of Otpor detainees seem to indicate that some either did believe, or were simply sadistic. For details of police interrogations and abuse of Otpor detainees, including the questions asked and the accusations made of Otpor detainees, see "Spotlight on Police Crackdown on Otpor, Serbia, 2 May to 24 September 2000," *Humanitarian Law Center Reports,* Humanitarian Law Center, Belgrade. http://www.hlc-rdc.org/Izvestaji/574.en.html.

warned, "The right to defend and protect a child is a holy right."[55] For some parents who had been undecided, the treatment meted out to their children by the regime moved them from apathetic or "on the fence" to against the regime. The regime's abuse of the "youth" increased the credibility of Otpor and decreased the credibility of the regime, adding to a sense of moral outrage, that the regime would arrest and otherwise abuse children.[56]

If Otpor began life with an advantage in credibility it was up to Otpor to maintain that credibility and not allow either its own actions or the actions and statements of others to tarnish it. Otpor recognized how crucial its credibility was to its ability to perform effectively and took specific, strategically chosen steps to protect its credibility. From the start it recognized that the public perceived politics as "dirty" and tainted and Otpor as being "clean." In order to maintain that image, and preserve if not enhance its credibility, it insisted on being seen as a movement, not as a political party. It clearly stated that it had no candidates and would not run any candidates—its only goal was to see Milosevic leave power. It publicly distanced itself clearly from all political parties and only loaned its credibility to the political coalition of DOS as long as they moved forward in a unified direction. The fact that there were indeed ties between the political parties and Otpor was to remain a fact that simply was not discussed.[57]

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[55] Dragoljub Pavic, the boy's father, quoted in "Father of the underaged boy, detained in Varvarin, warned the police," *Free Serbia News*, June 2, 2000, http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/news/2000/06/e-02-06-2000.html.

[56] For further examples of this see my discussion in Chapter Twelve. See also Roger Cohen, "Who Really Brought Down Milosevic?"*The New York Times Magazine*, November 26, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/26/magazine/who-really-brought-down-milosevic.html, and "A wake-up call to Serbia," *Free Serbia News*, May 24, 2000, http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/news/2000/06/e-05-24-2000.html.

[57]Ivan Andric, one of the key members of Otpor stated, "So Otpor needed to stay clean, but only in the eyes of the public. We were very connected to the opposition. But to stay clean and to cooperate in public only with the united opposition. You know, not with the parties themselves, but only with the united opposition. And that was the big message. When you are sitting in a meeting with the united opposition, it's like you are supporting them. And it's a message to the people that you're saying you can vote for them. But you can't vote for the different parties. The only way to beat Milosevic is to vote for all of them. That was the

Otpor's legitimacy in part resulted from its ability to express things people themselves thought but were afraid to say. Moreover Otpor did this in a way that the public found culturally appropriate (i.e. within the bounds of what was acceptable)[58] and with which they already had some familiarity and felt comfortable such as skits, street theater and posters. Otpor sought to legitimate itself not only through its message, but just as significantly, through the means by which that message was expressed. Non-violence was chosen as a tactic not only as a statement of Otpor's values, but also because its use would point up any harsh measures that the government might use, thereby giving Otpor the moral high ground and greater credibility. Its activists would be seen as brave and valiant—the government as dirty, underlining the message that Otpor would regularly be putting out about the nature of the regime. This strategy was successful. Srda Popovic later noted, "And that's how we collected the third party in the whole story which is very important - the publicity. The people on the ground with sympathy for our activists who are brave and were victims of the violence." [59]

Otpor's credibility also sprang in part from the inclusivity of the movement. At its February 2000 congress, Otpor members consciously chose to be inclusive, allowing anyone who wanted to join Otpor to join. This had the practical effect of increasing the "work force" available to it. This strategic choice also created more people emotionally

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message to the people." Ivan Andric, "On the Opposition and Political Parties," in "Otpor and the Opposition: From Competition and Misunderstanding to Functional Coalition of Efforts and Actions," Center for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies. http://www.canvasopedia.org/content/serbian_case/otpor_opposition.htm#03.

[58] This differed from the case of the Georgian group Kmara. Not only did Kmara not have the same historical basis of sympathy, but also it did not manage to gain support from the larger public, who perceived Kmara's "hard" actions as inappropriate, almost disrespectful generally and destructive in a negative sense. A founding member of Kmara believes that if Kmara had done more "soft" actions to obtain wider public approbation, they would have been more widely supported and more successful with a broader audience. Nini Gogiberdze, interview by author, Tbilsi Georgia, September 28, 2007.

[59] Srdja Popovic, "On Otpor's Strategy," in "Non-Violent Struggle in Serbia and Otpor Strategy," Center for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies, http://www.canvasopedia.org/content/serbian_case/otpor_strategy.htm#04.

vested in Otpor and its success. This decision was successful. During the spring and summer of 2000 in any given town, it seemed that someone knew a friend or a relative that was involved in Otpor. Chapters were developed in towns and cities of "Grannies for Otpor" and "Mothers for Otpor." The personal familiarity and involvement in the organization not only was tactically intelligent in promoting collective identity and cohesion, but also provided an increasing number of people with a stake in the network, a vested interest in Otpor and its success. Those who were sympathetic to Otpor, though not necessarily members, would also come out when notified to stand front of police stations and courts after an Otpor member had been arrested, to try to ensure "fair treatment" and demand the Otpor member's release. These people too were vested in Otpor's success.[60] Thus credibility accrued to Otpor based on personal familiarity with its personnel. Counter-framing by the regime, trying to brand Otpor activists as spies and traitors for example, was significantly less successful than it might have been had fewer people had real contact with Otpor. Otpor, in fact, strategically employed the "familiarity breeds love" strategy too when it came to trying to move police and other figures of authority to its side. Both Popovic and Smiljanic noted that Otpor's strategy with regards to arrests was to never be violent or offensive to the arresting policemen. Otpor activists were trained to show little fear but also to refrain from offense against the individuals that arrested them. This was smart, as it gave the police no additional reasons to hold or otherwise abuse them, but the Otpor activist noted that it was hoped, especially in smaller

[60] See Zorana Smiljanic, *Plan B: Using Secondary Protests to Undermine Repression*, ed. Liam Mahoney, trans. Dragana Gavrilovic, (Minneapolis, MN: Center for Victims of Torture, 2003). To the best of my knowledge there are no numbers of how many people who gathered when called on such occasions were actually Otpor members and how many were non-members but were sympathizers. Smijlanovic's study indicates that the core that gathered was contacted via phone trees and consisted typically of "known" sympathizers, but not all Otpor members.

towns, that once the police had continuously rearrested the activists—who were either young adults, or in some cases as young as 14, they would realize that Otpor was just a "bunch of kids" and not, as the regime was telling them, dangerous foreign agents.

NGOs

If Otpor benefited from its past history, so too in a far more limited way did the NGOs. As noted above, G17, later G17 Plus, had established a reputation and obtained credibility not only as economists, hence experts, but as economists who had tried repeatedly through concrete projects to improve the living situation of people in the country. It was G17's rally in August 1999 that drew a significant number of people—more than would end up participating in the opposition rally in September.[61] Their plan for a transitional government of experts that would be headed by the most popular political figure, Dragoslav Avramovic, was one that most people approved. In a public opinion poll carried out in August through September 1999, fully 83% of respondents were "for" a government by experts.[62] Although this plan did not come to fruition, G17 was once again publicly seen to be working for the public good. In early September, at its meeting in Belgrade to discuss "further options," 2,000 people outside the hall watched developments through a video link. More concretely and importantly, G17 was seen to be responsible for the plan to bring heating fuel to opposition towns otherwise likely to be

[61] While crowd estimates can vary from source to source The G17 Rally in August was estimated to have drawn approximately 170,000 to 200,000 people in Belgrade, while the September 21, 1999 rally in Belgrade was estimated to have drawn 80,000. See "Rally of G17 Organization: Belgrade – In Front of Federal Assembly – August 19, 1999," *Free Serbia Specials: Broadcasts*, August 19, 1999, http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/specials/broadcasts/19081999/e-index.html; and "Rally of the Alliance for Change: Belgrade – The Liberty Square – September 21, 1999," *Free Serbia Specials: Broadcasts*, September 21, 1999, http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/specials/broadcasts/21091999/e-index.html, for these crowd estimates.

[62] "Between Disappointment and Hope – Public Opinion in Serbia, September 1999."

starved of heat for the winter.[63] Working publicly and closely with opposition town mayors and the EU, G17 was given credit by those in opposition towns for helping to keep them warm through that winter.

In addition to its major program "Energy for Democracy," which raised the profile and credibility of G17, it also established a network of experts who worked across the country to develop solutions to local problems, especially in opposition-led towns. Once again, working at the local level, where its name and work was visible, helped it gain credibility from a broader spectrum of people than it might have had, had it remained merely a few economists in Belgrade. The purpose of such work was not only to help opposition municipalities but to prepare for when change should come. "'Our …aim was, once the economic reforms start, to have experts capable of implementing them in each town. In other words, it is not enough to have only the reform government, but also reform-oriented citizens.'"[64] This sort of optimism and practical forward thinking established direct contact between G17 Plus and citizens, increasing their credibility. While more openly supportive and allied with Alliance for Change and DOS than Otpor, G17Plus also emphasized its independence from individual opposition political parties and the apolitical nature of their campaign in order to boost its credibility with citizens. G17 Plus clearly stated that they were neither politicians nor beholden to politicians. Dinkic noted publicly as late as August of 2000 that "the G17 has the task to help citizens and not parties."[65]

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[63] Sonja Licht, an NGO activist, noted that the Energy for Democracy program was one of the most important, if not the most important program not only for G17 Plus, but also to influence Serbian public opinion favorably towards Europe. Sonja Licht, interview by author, Washington DC, November 8, 2007.
[64] Mladjan Dinkic cited in Brkic, "Some Other Serbia."
[65] "G17 Plus announces Campaign to Increase Voter Turnout," *BETA* Belgrade, August 14, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0814, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

Unlike G17 Plus, many other NGOs that would eventually take part both nationally and at a local level in the campaigning against Milosevic did not have such a high national profile. While some such as CeSid and Women in Black were known especially in Belgrade and other urban centers, others such as Civic Initiatives, who were central to the coordination of the entire NGO campaign, were not well-know to the public. Even at the local level, many small NGOs that would take part were only known among those they directly served. That members of the NGO network had credibility with each other but were not widely known to the public did not hurt their efforts or lesson their credibility. Unlike in certain other countries where NGOs had developed a negative reputation among the public as "grant-eaters,"[66] NGOs in Serbia, due to sanctions and other dire conditions, had not had the opportunity to develop such negative press. Thus they neither lacked in credibility nor did they have stocks of credibility to call on. To some extent their "credibility" with the national public would be developed through the actions they took in this campaign—they had no negative history to hold them back.

[66] Ghia Nodia, *Civil Society Development in Georgia: Achievement and Challenges: Policy Paper*, Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, Citizens Advocate Program, (Tblisi, 2005), 14, and personal communication from Mario Skunca concerning NGOs in Croatia, January, 2007.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Framing Worldview: Nationalism or Patriotism?

Having briefly discussed "who" was doing the framing and why anyone might listen to their arguments, i.e. whether or not those doing the framing were "credible," the next step is to think about the nature and the content of the frames that were to play such an important role in the outcome of the election. Frames, as previously discussed, have several important functions, they attempt to convince people to believe or do something based on packages of meaning that the frames put forward. These packages of meaning originate from the culture and can also be transformative of those same cultures.[1] These packages express world views and try to create collective identities so that people feel they share each other's fate as members of a certain group.

In this chapter I will first examine the general nature of content frames and their role in politics. I then examine how the Serbian government tried to maintain control over Serbian society and politics through its definition and construction of the concept of nationalism. I also examine how the political opposition attempted to forge an alternate set of meanings around the concept that would resonate within society, and serve to wrest control of (or at least loosen the government's grip on) this dominant mental construct that had shaped Serbian politics for almost ten years.

Content frames are worldviews put forward by participants, in this case the government and opposition political parties, in an effort to create legitimacy for

[1] James M. Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest Culture, Biography and Creativity in Social Movements.* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 48-54; and Katherine Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change,* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 34.

themselves, their cause and their eventual election. After a brief discussion more generally of content frames and how they operate I examine how the government attempted to maintain its dominance over society and politics in Serbia through its framing of nationalism (in its specific Serbian variant), while the opposition attempted, through its counter-framing, to change the agenda and offer a new vision of what nationalism in Serbia could mean. Through such a shift in meaning it hoped to open up the possibility for political change.

Framing Content, Framing Culture—Political Parties

If, as Gamson maintains, "every regime has a legitimating frame that provides the citizenry with a reason to be quiescent,"[2] elections are a time during which a regime's legitimating frame can be openly questioned and other worldviews and cultural concepts of legitimacy can be set forward. Frequently, these contesting concepts originate in deeper cultural cleavages within society. As there is no one monolithic culture that pervades any nation, different ideas jostle with each other for currency.[3] At no time is that more easily visible in politics than during the election cycle. Moreover, in countries in which the very nature of the regime is contested, elections are a fight not only over matters of policy—but over matters of legitimating worldviews. An election is a contest between two or more parties to construct an interpretation of the world in a way that is not only true to a group's beliefs but is also meaningful to the audience they are trying to

[2] William A. Gamson, "Political Discourse and Collective Action." *International Social Movement Research* 1 (1988): 219.
[3] This idea is well-illustrated and substantiated in Marko Zivkovic's dissertation, "Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny in the 1980s and 1990s." PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2001.

convince to share their understandings, thereby building a sense of collective fate and identity.

The enunciation of such worldviews, done through framing, relies on the power of cultural symbols and touchstones. In the context of politics, especially during elections, worldviews are greatly reduced in their complexity from the "constellation of narratives" which is a "latent matrix"[4] that has developed over time through myths, the work of poets, musicians, artists and other creators of meanings, to sound bites that rely on slogans and allusions to conjure up emotions and the larger stories in which they are embedded.[5] For such condensed versions of worldviews to be effective however, they must have resonance with their intended audience. Resonance is not just a cognitive act. It is one in which emotions as well as a whole web of cultural meanings play an important role in peoples' responses to these abbreviated political framings. Thus condensed worldviews rely on previously created webs of symbols and meanings for their effectiveness.

Worldviews are even further simplified during campaigns as they are rarely offered to people as complete packages in which the speaker expresses all the ideas that create the package at one time. Rather, worldviews are expressed through ideas on discrete topics that, when aggregated, afford a window into the worldview of a political figure or party and refer to an even larger set of complex cultural meanings. What constitutes the package is important to understanding what is contested in a polity—in

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[4] Ivan Colovic, *Politics of Identity in Serbia: Essays in Political Anthropology*. Translated by Celia Hawkesworth, (New York: New York University Press, 2002) . See also Marko Zivkovic, "Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny in the 1980s and 1990s." PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2001, 173.

[5] As Colovic, Zivkovic and Verdery argue, symbols, stories and myths are relevant, in fact crucial in politics. See Colovic, *Politics of Identity in Serbia: Essays in Political Anthropology*; Zivkovic, "Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny in the 1980s and 1990s," PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2001; and Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.

terms of disputed values, issues and hence in politics. Finally, what frequently allows a worldview, like a narrative, to be effective is not its clarity but its ambiguity. No effective narrative or worldview is ever cut and dried; there are contradictions and certainly vagueness into which people mentally insert their own interpretation. These allow people to feel kinship where it otherwise might not occur and allow politicians to gather together people who might otherwise not hew to one outlook were they to be forced to hammer out specific details. Such ambiguity of narratives also allows people who live in situations of ideological "dissonance" to try to come to terms with their reality, reconciling what logically should be competing ideologies.[6]

In the case of Serbia in 2000, the issues of concern were direct questions about Serbian identity and Serbs' understandings of themselves and their place in the world. The campaigning during the 2000 elections focused discussion on how people imagined their lives—what they should hope for, and what kind of people they were and should become. Much of this was to be shaped by the way they perceived their lives and what they constructed and identified with as their worldview.[7] The election, once it was declared, was seen and actively characterized by both sides as a "referendum," a defining moment that had the potential to reorient not only policies, but politics.

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[6] This is true in many important ways in the case of Serbia—it allowed quasi-communist and nationalist mythologies to live side by side and it allowed people to cope with what they were seeing and what they were being told. It is also related to Havel's concept of how people live in a lie, as is explored more fully in the next chapter on "everyday" life. In this way these narratives share the ambiguity and multivocality that David Kertzer discusses regarding other political rituals, David I. Kertzer, *Ritual, Politics and Power* (New York and London: Yale University Press, 1988, 11 and 67-69. See also Francesca Polletta, *It Was Like a Fever: Storytelling in Protest and Politics*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); and Zivkovic, "Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny in the 1980s and 1990s," especially the postman story, 240.

[7] Gamson notes that "the definition of actors and events is a matter of constant contestation. A central part of the symbolic struggle then is about the process of constructing specific meanings." Gamson, "Political Discourse and Collective Action," 219.

The Last Ten Years—Brief Overview

The election, when it was finally announced in July, was almost the end of a long road in which each side attempted to frame itself, the "other" and their respective worldviews, a process that had been ongoing since the first "multi-party" elections in 1990. Since that time, the opposition and the government had regularly fought, at least in theory, for the "hearts and minds" of the citizens, a struggle which neither side had won. Although the government had regularly won the elections, it was not—as Gordy, Pesic and others point out—always because people favored or even approved of the government's policies or worldviews. Rather, the government won through the "destruction of alternatives," whereby it made "alternatives unavailable—attempting to close off avenues of information, expression and sociability."[8] Academician Ljubomir Simovic noted that the regime did not have political vision; it had a strategy to preserve itself in power:

> All regimes attempt to stay in power by improving the situation of their countries. Our country's regime is staying in power in a much more original way: by constantly worsening the country's situation. In order to maintain the necessary tension in the country, the regime has been working hard on not solving the problem of Kosovo for at least ten years. Now that Kosovo, with its fires, has floated away from Serbia, the regime in order to preserve the tension that preserves it, is trying to start a backup blaze in Montenegro.[9]

Yet even as it was destroying alternatives or trying to preserve the "necessary tension," these efforts had to be framed in a light that was favorable to the government, "plausible" to citizens and in line with the government's legitimizing frame. One means of destroying alternatives was to make people's daily lives so chaotic and their need to

[8] Gordy, "Investigating the Destruction of Alternatives," *Problems of Post-Communism* 44:4 (1997): 12.
[9] "Academician Ljubomir Simovic, speech at the G17 Plus gathering, September 9, 1999 in the Great Hall of Dom Sindikata," reprinted in *Vreme*, September 18, 1999, translated by *Free B92 Press review*, and accessed at http://www.ex-yupress.com/vreme/vreme57.html.

attend to daily survival so pressing that they had neither time nor will to seek alternatives to the government and its policies, as was especially true from 1992 through the beginning of 1994 in the period of hyperinflation. This crisis was framed not as the result of the government's bad economic and "crony-capitalist" policy,[10] but as the result of unfair sanctions from the West which sought to victimize the Serbs. The government monopolized flows of information in its quest to destroy alternatives. Independent information, though available, had to be actively sought out and was not available uniformly throughout the country. From 1998 through the election in 2000, the restrictions on the media became ever more stringent. By means of the media laws enacted in October 1998, the emergency decrees issued during the Kosovo war in 1999, and the takeover of Studio B in May 2000, the government actively sought to subdue alternative sources of information. By forcing independent media out of business or into acts of serious self-censorship, the government tried to control the way in which the world could be framed by controlling the *means* by which information was disseminated. Such censorship was framed, however, as the government's need to protect the nation during wartime by preventing the enemy from being able to broadcast scurrilous and false information and moreover as enforcing the law against illegal and renegade actions by the media such as illegal use of radio and television frequencies, tax evasion and the like. The government also regularly changed the rules of the game so that even with decreasing numbers of people voting in its favor, the new rules, combined with voting

[10] Mladjan Dinkic who later became the Executive Director of G17 Plus, published a book in 1995, *The Economy of Destruction*, which explained in "non-technical language" the ways in which the government had produced hyperinflation, illustrating how it was not a normal economic phenomena but one that had been created by the authorities in power though choices they made. See Zivkovic, "Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny," 256-261 for a detailed summary of the finding of Dinkic's book in English as well as Zivkovic's observations.

fraud, allowed it to win.[11] Instead of using framing to mobilize people, the government strategically chose to use framing—and much of its tactics—to *demobilize* people. Not unlike attempts to atomize society, as in communist/totalitarian regimes, the Milosevic government systematically attempted to sow discord among groups within society, to leave people with no time to attend to matters of "sociability," and feeling a collective spirit only in the sense of feeling collectively hopeless and bewildered. These attempts to demobilize society, however, were framed as the inevitable result of the work of nasty outside forces—it was the West that had imposed sanctions on the Serbian people—the Milosevic government was doing its heroic best to help the Serbian people in their time of need resulting from unfair victimization by others. The Milosevic regime's framing thus served two purposes: to legitimize its actions during crises that were almost wholly of its own making, and to find a way to blame others for the results through conspiracy theories. That the Serbian government actively shaped its claims and legitimized itself and its actions utilizing historic myths to "substantiate" its claims was clearly a benefit, as these myths did have some resonance with people—though they were not, as Robert Kaplan claims, what singularly motivated people to action.[12]

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[11] Gordy cites the following statistics: "In 1992 the SPS took 40.4 percent of the parliamentary seats with only 28.8 percent of the popular vote. Together with the regime-sponsored Radical Party, which received 29.2 percent of the parliamentary seats and 22.6 percent of the ruling vote, the ruling party gained an overwhelming parliamentary majority." In 1993 he notes that SPS, without a partner received "only 36.7 percent" of the popular vote but still managed to obtain 49.2 percent of the parliamentary seats. Rule changes made in 1997 from 9 electoral districts to 29 were also rule changes made specifically to garner SPS a disproportionate share of votes. Their rule changes went beyond the type of gerrymandering that is known in western democracies. See "Constitution Watch: A country-by-country update on constitutional politics in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR," *East European Constitutional Review*, 6/4 (Fall 1997), http://www3.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol6num4/constitutionwatch/yugoslavia.html.

[12] Zivkovic argues, and I agree, that at a minimum the regime was partially successful at transferring blame for its trouble onto outside others.See his discussions on p. 238, 198 as well as in his chapter on conspiracy theories pp. 232-278. see also Vladimir Ilic, "Middle Generation Might Change the Predominant Anti-Western Sentiment." *Helsinki Files No. 2, Potential for Changes*. http://www.helsinki.org.yu/doc/files02.zip (accessed May 6, 2009), 31-33.

Milosevic and Nationalism–Sacrifice for Salvation

The government's position during these years relied heavily on a romantic vision of the past and historicized the present. Nationalism and the nationalist cause had dominated the political landscape in Serbia since at least the 1986 SANU memo "legitimizing" Serbian national aggrandizement and emphasizing Serb victimhood. If at the Kosovo Polje in 1989, Milosevic merely "mounted the horse that the Serbian intelligentsia had saddled up long ago"[13] he purposefully rode that horse to power and regularly remounted it to maintain himself in power. There is no doubt that nationalism and particularly its language of victimhood were important to Milosevic's political rhetoric and initial success, even though Milosevic himself frequently proclaimed himself to be a moderate, "proving" that claim by pointing to the rhetoric of SRS.[14] His speeches and causes initially resonated with Serbs because of their own familiarity with the stories and the tropes that they were based on.[15] As Zivkovic noted, sacrifice on earth for a more "heavenly" order for Serbia was a key element of the Kosovo mythology, and Milosevic regularly played on the need of the Serbs to sacrifice for Greater Serbia. Milosevic's speech at Kosovo Polje in some ways remarkably portended key themes that Milosevic would strike in his rhetoric for many years to come. In addition to referencing the Kosovo myth, either himself or through his surrogates[16] Milosevic also consistently reiterated something he stated in his speech in 1989:

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[13] Vuk Draskovic, cited in Zivkovic, "Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny," 167-197.
[14] See Stef Jansen "Victims, Underdogs and Rebels: Discursive Practices of Resistance in Serbian Protest." *Critique of Anthropology* 20 (2000): 393–419, on modern day victimhood, and also Zivkovic's discussion in "Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny" of historic victimhood and how it played into politics under Milosevic in the late 1980's, especially Chapters Six and Seven.
[15] See Colovic, *Politics of Identity in Serbia*.
[16] Gordy points out that Milosevic frequently used surrogates, Eric Gordy *The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives*, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 17.

> Serbs in their history have never conquered or exploited others. Through two world wars, they have liberated themselves…The Kosovo heroism does not allow us to forget that, at one time, we were brave and dignified and one of the few who went into battle undefeated…[17]

Remarkably, through four wars he was certainly partially responsible for initiating and losing, Milosevic always claimed that Serbs were the victims and moreover that they were always the defenders, never the aggressors. Even after his defeat at Kosovo in 1999 he claimed victory: "Dear citizens, the aggression is over. Peace has prevailed over violence. Dear citizens, I wish you a happy peace! … Early this year, numerous rallies were held throughout the country. Their united message was We Shall Not Give Up Kosovo. We have not given up Kosovo."[18] What was common to Milosevic's rhetoric on nationalism was his claim of Serbian victimhood at the hands of outside forces. By 1999 with the loss at Kosovo, the rhetoric had lost much of its seductive power. Despite Milosevic's efforts to portray Serbia's defeat in Kosovo at the hands of NATO as a victory, as one commentator noted, the circle for Milosevic began and ended at Kosovo. What was largely left by 1999 was the argument of "victimhood" and the need to sacrifice for Serbian unity. The ten years in which nationalism had dominated political and cultural discourse seemed to have reached an endpoint. More than one commentator noted that in the face of the Kosovo defeat, the regime's rhetoric also seemed to lose its cohesiveness. Cerovic, for example, argued that "all remnants of sense have vanished from the regime's discourse, there is no hope for a miracle."[19] The government was left

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[17] Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997) 164.
[18] "Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's Address to the Nation," *Tanjug*, posted at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/speech/milospch.htm. See also Michael Dobbs, "Milosevic Claims Victory, Lauds 'Best Army in the World'," *The Washington Post*, June 11, 1999; and "Yugoslavia 'Never Gave up Kosovo'," *The Washington Post*, June 11, 1999.
[19] Stojan Cerovic, "Comment: Serbia Seeks an Exit from History," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report No 72, September 6, 1999, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-

with a core argument of victimization without the other legitimizing aspects of the national discourse.

Beginning in 1999, the government focused almost exclusively on how it was being victimized by NATO (a codeword primarily used to designate the United States, with European members included only to a lesser degree) and the New World Order. That NATO bombed Serbia proper certainly made it easier to make this claim. The regime depicted itself as the sole defender of the Serbian people, a government that was constantly besieged by evil outside domineering and colonizing forces (the New World Order) while trying to preserve the life and honor of its heroic, victimized people. The primary sources of evil were those who had prevented Serbia from achieving its destined historical ends in Kosovo by expelling most of its ethnic Albanian population—NATO. Jasper notes that the construction of victimhood in which the victim can become a hero, especially against a far off or foreign enemy is particularly effective because it plays on classic narrative form in which there is a hero and a villain. This immediately provides cues to people, "this mini-narrative encourages audiences to take sides emotionally expressing sympathy for the victim, admiration for the hero and hatred for the villain and his sidekicks." More importantly as Jasper points out, such narratives also allow the so-called victim to initiate political action. [20]

Such claims and framing of outside forces that were intent on destroying Serbia were meant to further demobilize people—make them acquiesce in the need for a "unity" government and acknowledge the government's right to continue wartime restrictions on the media, mass gatherings and political actions. These were instrumental frames meant

[20] James M. Jasper, "Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements," in *Handbook of Social Movements*, ed. Bert Klandermans and Conny Roggeband, (New York: Springer, 2007), 77.

not so much to positively motivate people to identify with the government as to scare them into acquiescence. Milosevic's government so much as acknowledged this during the 2000 campaign, when a spokesman for the campaign confirmed that the regime was running both a "negative" and a "positive" campaign. The negative campaign, which focused on outside spies, enemies and infiltrators, was to be continued and receive more money were it to prove to be more successful. The "positive campaign" on reconstruction was to receive more money were *it* to be the better campaign.[21]

Who Shall Betray Me? Internal Enemies

Evil came not only from the outside in the government's worldview, but also from the enemies "lurking" within, an enemies list that could be made longer as strategic needs to keep the regime in power arose. With the defeat in Kosovo in 1999, Milosevic's rhetoric instead took on shades of another Serbian myth from the Kosovo cycle of stories—that of Serbia's betrayal by Vuk Brankovic, a story which strongly echoes the betrayal of Christ at the Last Supper.[22] The question of "who among you will betray me" was regularly portrayed on television and in government news releases in thin guises. To this question there were usually two answers: first, selected "enemies" of the regime such as Slavko Curuvija, whose political murder was clearly foreshadowed in a commentary by Miroslav Markovic and published by the government mouthpiece *Politika ekspress*. That the regime marked this as a particularly perfidious betrayal or case of treason was

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[21] Zeljko Cvijanovic, "Milosevic's Winning Campaign." *Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report* No. 165, August 18, 2000. http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-

[22] For an excellent explanation of the myth as well as notes on its political instrumentalization see Zivkovic, "Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny," 208-211. See also Aleksandar Ciric,"Postwar Serbia, Hunting Traitors,"*AIM*, Podgorica, June 22, 1999, published on June 24, 1999, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199906/90624-006-trae-pod.htm.

emphasized when the commentary was read on RTS.[23] Clearly such murders went beyond political rhetoric and framing, although they were symbolic in that they were meant to send a message to those who were prominent enough and troublesome enough to the regime that they should keep in line. The second group that "betrayed" the regime was the political opposition. Milosevic and his surrogates constantly accused them of being "traitors" and "janissaries,"[24] arguing that the opposition could not be considered legitimate opponents as could SRS for example—because the opposition and their leaders were all traitors. The fact that Milosevic now positioned them outside the sphere of what was internal to Serbia, beyond redemption, was an attempt to "cast them out" and make consideration of them as a political option unacceptable to those who might be unsure on these issues.

Milosevic's rhetoric in 1999 and 2000 took on more absolutist and strident tones. Two positions became increasingly starkly delineated over time—you were either a patriot (i.e., for Milosevic) or you were a traitor.[25] The concept of being for Milosevic and hence a patriot also created a matrix in which being for Milosevic meant that you were "for" Serbia—since Milosevic over the years had come to frame Serbian statehood as equivalent with his person. In his framing therefore the inverse was also true, you could not possibly be against Milosevic without being an enemy of Serbia as a nation-state.[26] Using this logic Milosevic could say, as he did, that the opposition parties were

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[23] Ciric, "Postwar Serbia, Hunting Traitors."

[24] The specific use of the word janissary is especially demeaning in the Serbian context as janissaries were the regular infantry soldiers of the Ottoman Sultan, once recruited as tribute from among the children of the non-Muslim subjects of the Sultan.

[25] Spomenka Lazic, "Political Commotion in Serbia: Division into Patriots and Traitors,"*AIM* Podgorica, May 27, 1999, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199905/90527-001-trae-pod.htm, accessed May 6, 2009.

[26]This idea became apparent through the framings in the "traitors and enemies", especially through efforts to embody him as the greatest national hero. Laslo Sekelj also says, "As Milosevic held the state firmly in

traitors to Serbia, whereas SRS politicians were merely his political opponents. These distinctions of patriots and traitors were not only applied to members of the opposition,[27] but were expanded over time to include Otpor and NGOs such as Helsinki Watch and Civic Initiatives. [28] Having initially decided to make its internal enemies "disappear" by ignoring them and not acknowledging their presence, the government's strategy slowly changed in the case of each group—not only to acknowledge them but to frame each group in its turn as an enemy of the state, not merely an opponent.

Somewhat bizarrely this categorization of patriots and traitors was also expanded by the government to include citizens themselves. In a paranoia-like phase, the government invited citizens to hunt for traitors and spies in their midst. It urged them to turn in citizens who were different or perhaps not openly "patriotic."[29] Generally such efforts attempted to induce a sort of conspiracy paranoia not seen in many years and once

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his own hands and was the personification of statehood…" clearly indicating the framing that was being done by Milosevic throughout the 1990's. See Laslo Sekelj, "Forced Democratization of a Criminalized State," in Ivana Spasic and Milan Subotic, eds., *Revolution and Order: Serbia after October 2000*, trans. by Vera Gligorijevic, Duska Vujic, Linda Louise Krstajic, Ivana Spasic, (Belgrade: Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, 2001) 95-108.

[27] "FRY Minister Sees Elections as Clash between 'Patriots and Traitors'," *BETA,* Belgrade,September 5, 2000. FBIS-EEU-2000-0906. *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

[28] One of the most blatant framings of Otpor as traitors to the state occurred in May of 2000 when the government printed up and distributed thousands of fliers to homes throughout Belgrade and posted posters around Belgrade depicting Otpor as "Madeleine Youth" equating Madeleine Albright to Hitler and Otpor to Hitler. Using the style and iconography of the Hitler youth posters, the Madeleine Youth posters used a soldier in a straight arm salute/flag-holding pose against a flag background. The poster, done primarily in red and black as were many of the original Hitler youth posters, changed out only the swastika where it would have originally appeared on the flag, the soldier's helmet and armband, replacing it with the Otpor fist. Another Madeleine Youth poster depicted the Otpor fist crammed with dollar bills. This framing was meant not only to show Otpor as traitors and allied with the U.S but to inject specific doubts about their incorruptibility and their "cleanliness." See Ksenija Bilbija and Tomislav Longinovic, "After the Fall," Photographs by Mileta Prodonovic, in Ksenija Bilbija, Jo Ellen Fair, Cynthia E. Milton and Leigh A. Payne, eds., *The Art of Truth-telling about Authoritarian Rule*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 94-95. See also Laura Secor, "Rage Against the Regime: Serbian Students Fight Milosevic," *LinguaFranca* 10/6 (September 2000), http://linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/print/0009/otpor.html. See also Brian Pozun, "Planning for an Uncertain Future," *Central Europe Review*, 3/8 (February 2001), http://www.ce-review.org/01/8/pozun8.html; and Laura Rozen, "Milosevic's Media Blackout," Salon News, May 18, 2000 http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2000/05/18/milosevic/index1.htm

[29] "Milosevic's People - Off On A Paranoid Hunt For Enemies Of Serbia." Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Reports No. 79, September 28, 1999. http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=.

again typical of the type of paranoia that communist governments, especially during Stalin's time, used to try to atomize society, making all reliant on the government.

The regime's rhetoric also clearly reflected communist inflections in both style and in substance. Milosevic's increasing emphasis on the absolutist conception that all who were not with him were against him, his discussion of the heroic (Stakhanovite-sounding) workers throughout the reconstruction campaign and the ever greater numbers of (unreal) positive achievements, frequently sounded like an "over-fulfillment" of the plan. Whether or not communism was "returning to Serbia riding on the corpse of tarnished nationalism"[30] was questionable, but the mindset that had underlain much of communism and its framings, as well as the rhetorical aspects of communist jargon were clearly present in the regime's pronouncements.

Using communist language and ideas tied into nationalist rhetoric garnered a larger base of support for Milosevic than he would have had otherwise. Frequently what appeals to people is not the content of what we say, but the language or forms of language in which that appeal is couched. Milosevic's use of communist-speak was a blatant means to reach out to another audience.

The defeat at Kosovo in 1999 pauperized Milosevic's legitimizing mythology, creating a situation in which he was reliant on the outlines but not the substance of the myths. This forced him to hang concepts such as encirclement and victimization on a somewhat threadbare outline of an original myth that had been far more complex.

[30] Nenad Stefanovic Duga, cited in Zivkovic, "Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny, 247.

The Opposition, 1989-1996—Playing a Losing Game, Agenda Setting

From 1989 to 1996 the government had triumphed in the ideological struggle with the opposition in that it was able to set the agenda and establish the playing field on its terms—nationalism. The "opposition" was not unified on this issue, and different opposition politicians played and "gave up" the nationalist card as their primary focus at slightly different times. This is not to say that it was ever completely abandoned, as we will see in the detailed discussion of Kostunica later in this section.[31] Agenda-setting is a crucial means of deciding the terms of the debate and framing which issues are most relevant. In this area, the government won. The opposition regularly debated the government on its chosen issue and was unable or unwilling to move the conversation elsewhere. Opposition politicians in fact vied to outdo each other with the "national" credentials such was the field of play.[32] This choice, if nothing else, reflected a conception among politicians that this was a fertile field for framing their claims to power. Additionally, few opposition figures attempted to change how "national" was defined and what it meant to be a good Serb. Vesna Pesic was one who tried to change the terms. Her anti-war stance and actions were in clear contrast to the more nationalist actions of those like Draskovic with his regular nationalist rhetoric in the early 1990s and his continued celebrations in subsequent years at Ravna Gora, and with the stance of Kostunica, who was photographed wearing an assault rifle while visiting with Kosovar

[31] For additional details see Florian Bieber , ""The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society: Roots of the Delayed Transition in Serbia." *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 17/1 (2003): 73-90.
[32] Florian Bieber, ""The Serbian Opposition and Civil Society: Roots of the Delayed Transition in Serbia." *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 17/1 (2003): 73-90 and Sekelj, "Forced Democratization of a Criminalized State," 95-108.

Serbs in 1998, and even that of Djindjic, who ate roasted ox with Radovan Karadic in the Bosnian Serb capital Pale. Pesic's stand was a lonely one indeed.[33]

Opposition Framing 1998—Time for a Change

From its inception in 1998, the Alliance for Change under Djindjic, took a "rational," technocratic approach to the problems of Serbia. This approach was not completely new. In 1996 in an interview with *Vreme*, Djindjic articulated a position similar to the one that he put forth again in 1999 and throughout the campaign in 2000.[34] However, in the period from the end of the NATO bombing through the election in September, this worldview was to be developed and expressed more fully than at any time in the past. In this case the Alliance for Change and later DOS noted that there were tremendous problems in Serbia, namely the economy, the lack of civic freedoms and the lack of stability in the society. It assigned a large portion of blame to Milosevic's policies

[33] See Sekelj, "Forced Democratization of a Crimialized State," 96, where he also makes this argument about the opposition's acceptance of Milosevic's terminology and "dominant matrix" see esp. p. 96.
[34] See Djindjic's interview with Vreme correspondent Nenad Lj. Stefanovic, "Serbia is a Great Mistery [sic]: Interview: Zoran Djindjic, Democratic Party Leader," *Vreme News Digest Agency*, No. 223, January 15, 1996. http://www.scc.rutgers.edu/serbian_digest/, accessed May 6, 2009. Djindjic argues that there are three political positions in Serbia: socialist which "governs people's lives with small doses of corruption…national-populism which is "traditionally attached to the radicals in Serbia. It is anti-European, anti-developmental and provincial…no one knows the aims but here we are we don't need much, we have bread, butter and potatoes…The third is the developmental modernizing one…" Steven Erlanger in his interview with Djindjic also notes that Djindjic saw his perspective and worldview as "modern" as opposed to that of Milosevic's government which was "anti-modern" with its concentration on primitive Communism, traditionalism and nationalism." See Erlanger, "An Anti-Milosevic Leader Tries for a Comeback." Finally Srecko Mihailovic, "Political Formulae for the Perseverance and Change of the Regime in Serbia," in Ivana Spasic and Milan Subotic, eds., *Revolution and Order: Serbia after October 2000*, trans. by Vera Gliborijevic, Duska Vujic, Linda Louise Krstajic, and Ivana Spasic, (Belgrade: Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, 2001) 59-71, argues that voters who voted based on economic issues were "rational" voters while those that voted based on nationalism were not. Although I do not agree that values voters, i.e. those who vote based on criteria that are not "rational choice" based criteria in the economic sense of the world are irrational—there is a sense in some parts of the Serbian academic establishment that decisions or worldviews that are not based on economic criteria are backwards or primitive. Although the worldview had been expressed previously it did not find as full expression as it did in the period that it was under development from 1999 through the elections in 2000. Moreover, why it had greater resonance now, as opposed to previously will be addressed later on in this chapter.

(though frequently mentioning the West as well), but argued that these problems could be solved through practical step-by-step measures. Ironically its worldview, which was "rational," "modern" and "practical," purposefully did not include a "grand vision" that was romantic or ideological in nature. The opposition sought to portray itself as a practical, problem-solving coalition with an integrated, enlightened vision whose goal would be attained through modest yet effective steps, e.g. observance of the law, fairness and justice and the "can-do" spirit of the public. Though not above borrowing terms from the discourse of nationalism such as "national salvation," the opposition was quick to point out that such things were to be achieved in legal, discrete and small ways—such as using the ballot.[35]

If the two ideological worldviews, that of the regime and that of Alliance for Change were juxtaposed to each other in their most simplified forms, stripped of nuances, it is evident that while Milosevic's view had previously been based on the myth of Serbia's historic uniqueness, the worldview of the Alliance for Change and DOS was what more than one Serbian observer or philosopher called an "exit from history," a chance to attend to everyday matters. While not offering up greatness or the ability to achieve messianic ambitions, it did offer smaller benefits—jobs, food on the table, integration with the world, stability, morality, rule of law. Stojan Cerovic, writing in *Vreme* in 1999, commented that:

> When Serbia no longer has anything big to tell the world, there will be no reason for big sacrifices to match and Serbs may turn their attention to matters of lesser import, like their tax returns. The Serbs may suffer withdrawal symptoms as they give up history to others. Everything will look trivial and senseless at first, but in

[35] Terms that were especially laden with meaning from nationalist discourse were primarily introduced into discussion by Kostunica. As shall be discussed in depth later, his ability to do so while still speaking of integration with the West allowed him to "bridge" two audiences and through such framings bring more people "under the tent"

> time they will get used to it. Soon the making of history will appear boring in comparison with the making of children. And the delights of *cvarci* [crispy pork crackling] and wine, of fishing and traveling, meeting, greeting and grumbling will remain.[36]

There had been clear indications before that such an exit from history was possible and even desired by certain segments of the population. Serbian student rallies from 1992 on had argued for the necessity of leaving behind hopes for a "celestial Serbia" if they were ever to have a "normal life" in the here and now.[37] The students wanted a "normal" future, and "normality" was defined not by the search for greatness but in the ordinariness of everyday life. While Milosevic had argued that "Serbia has risen" as part of his nationalist campaign of greatness, a poster during the 1997 student protests argued for a new and normal day, using an ironic twist on Milosevic's slogan: "Serbia has arisen—make her some coffee!"[38]

Nationalism and Patriotism, 1999-2000—How to be a Good Serb and Live a Normal Life

In the case of Serbia two inter-related topics were contested and had been contested for some time: first, what it meant to be a "good Serb," specifically nationalism and patriotism along with outward orientation—i.e. to the West or to the East; second, how people imagined their everyday lives and what they valued when they dared to dream about what constituted a "normal life." These two concepts had been at odds with

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[36] Cerovic, "Serbia Seeks an Exit from History." For a slightly different translation see Zivkovic, "Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny," 321-322.
[37] Prosic-Dvornic, "Enough! Student Protest '92: The Youth of Belgrade in Search of 'Another Serbia';" and the discussion in Chapter Five above.
[38] Zivkovic, "Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny," 324. See also Ivan Colovic, *Politics of Identity in Serbia: Essays in Political Anthropology,* 298.

each other largely because Milosevic's conceptualization and framing of nationalism, which he had pushed to dominance for almost ten years, precluded normal life in the sense that many Serbs wanted. The discussion of a normal life focused on practical matters such as the economy but it also dealt with underlying issues of psychological importance such as stability, order, and freedom, and the structures which usually ordered people's lives, thus allowing them to place themselves and understand their own identities. However Serbs had a difficult time finding another construct of patriotism that would allow them to be good patriots and live a normal life. Discussions over nationalism and living a normal life were long-standing in the Serbian context and represented cultural fissures within Serbian society.[39]

Although nationalism seemed to have dimmed in salience after Kosovo in 1999 it certainly was not off the table. To the degree that nationalism was still on the agenda, after nearly ten years of playing the nationalism game on Milosevic's terms, using his definitions had been a losing proposition for the opposition—they had to find a new way to compete. Milosevic's loss in Kosovo, but also the NATO air strikes themselves made clear and intensely relevant the question—how great the sacrifice? The opposition now had a viable opportunity to ask," What level of sacrifice was necessary to be a "good Serb?" Interestingly, given his past history as a romantic nationalist, Vuk Draskovic was one of the first to suggest in his April speech (which resulted in him leaving the

[39]Reviews of the literature clearly indicate, as did public opinion polls, that questions of everyday life and nationalism were key fissures. For examples of literature on this subject see Gordy, *The Culture of Power in Serbia*; Zivkovic, "Stories of Identity and Destiny in the 1980s and 1990s"; Nejbojsa Popov and Drinka Gojkovic, eds., *The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2000); Gagnon, The *Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s,* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). Such fissures often overlapped or intersected with urban-rural and nationalist-cosmopolitan fissures. See for example Stef Jansen, "Who's Afraid of White Socks? Towards a Critical Understanding of Post-Yugoslav Urban Self-Perceptions" *Ethnologia Balkanica* 9 (2005): 151-167.

government) that it might be wiser to accept the deployment of an international force under UN control in Kosovo, and that Serbs should not fear the return of Albanian refugees. So-called "patriots" (fellow ministers in the government) were lying to the people, he said.[40] The repudiation of sacrifice of men's lives for the nation as the ultimate good was a repudiation of Milosevic's version of the Kosovo myth—the very version that had helped propel his rise to power. Central Serbian parents, quite apart from the political opposition, also questioned and made clear as we have seen in the last chapter—that the sacrifice of their sons in war was one they were not willing to make. The idea that men needed to die in order for Serbia to live eternally was not favored, especially by those parents who had carried signs that said "the Dead Don't Need Kosovo"—thereby indicating their preference for life now, not eternal life in the hereafter. Despite Gordy's argument that Milosevic's nationalism was "ideologically inconsistent" and used only instrumentally to destroy alternatives, it was still a political language that did have larger meanings that were understood by the general public. It therefore also functioned as a language of communication that both sides could utilize to make clear their positions on more practical but also symbolic issues.[41] The mayor of Nis, Zoran Zivkovic not only questioned the content of the regime's patriotism, but also questioned one version of the Kosovo myth when he said "Patriotism does not mean dying for any idea or part of territory. Patriotism means securing a future for your fellow citizens."[42] This direct and clear questioning of the Kosovo myth—from one of corporeal sacrifice and

[40] Ilic, "The Serbian Opposition during and after the NATO Bombing." *Helsinki Files No. 2, Potential for Changes*, 72.
[41] See Eric D. Gordy, "Investigating the Destruction of Alternatives," *Problems of Post-Communism* 44:4 (1997): 12-22, as well as his *The Culture of Power in Serbia*.
[42] "Nis Mayor Demands Leadership Present 'Plan' for Future." *BETA*, Belgrade, May 13, 1999. FBIS-EEU-1999-0513. *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

victimization, and the reframing of nationalism and patriotism to a version that was practical and future-oriented was a clear signal of the opposition's overall break with the "nationalist" agenda as well as part of an important struggle for the "hearts and minds" of Serbs. Such a competing vision of the Kosovo myth repudiated the notion that where Serb bones were buried there were Serb lands that men must die for. Yet why should such a repudiation of myths that had previously dominated the landscape of Serbia, be successful? The answer to some extent lies in the cultural content that informed the Alliance for Change's version and Zivkovic's specifically.[43] Scholar Marco Zivkovic argues that Cosic's book *A Time of Death* and Popovic's *Book of Milutian* challenge final sacrifice as the highest good of the nation:

> In opposition to the hot-headed, Highlander exultation of total sacrifice, the two novels seem to embrace its opposite—the pragmatic, down to earth judgment of a Serbian peasant (the Lowlander from the heartland of Serbia in my definition) such that epic suicidal choices should have been avoided and lives, that is the living substance of the nation, preserved rather than sacrificed. If the Kosovo myth seemed to reign supreme in the Serbian imaginary, perhaps this is the alternative telling that challenges the dominant narrative, in a word, what Bruner and Gorfain would call the inherent dialogism of great national narratives.[44]

The reframing of nationalism, as a narrative in which life and the future were valued more than death and sacrifice, gained the most traction in Central Serbia—the place that Zivkovic argues is the "home" of the more practical, lowlander peasant, and where a disproportionate number of young men were being asked to serve. The reframing

[43] A mentioned previously, there is not just one monolithic culture. Ideas compete with some gaining more traction at certain times than others. The "new" version of what it meant to be a "good Serb" had resonance in part because an alternate version of the dominant myth existed and was known even if it was not I ascendance.

[44] Zivkovic, "Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny, 215. Zivkovic also tells the story of having been on a train with a "middle-aged Serbian Bank clerk" who for seven hours insisted on explaining Serbian politics through historical myths but who argued that the highest value was not the sacrifice of the nation—but the more "pragmatic view that stresses survival and denounced needless loss of life," 220. In short, "average" citizens, not just elite and intellectuals used these various tales in their alternative versions as signposts as to how to reshape their politics and their future.

of nationalism could gain traction in part because people saw the request for their boys to be sacrificed in the face of unlikely odds of survival as just too great, as morally unjust and beyond what should be asked of them. It could sit "more comfortably" and not feel as though it were a "betrayal" of Serbian history in part because the idea that had been the "idea in good currency" i.e. Milosevic's version of the need for personal sacrifice for the nation, had begun to pale in the face of people's experiential reality—what will later be examined as part of resonance. But it could also feel as though it were not a betrayal because an alterative version of what it meant to be a good Serb existed in the culture, was known, resonated in myth and narratives, and so was not completely alien. There was an opening created by the mistakes made by the Milosevic regime and the framing done by Alliance for Change that allowed people to consider something new. And in the "stockpile" of cultural ideas and myths, an acceptable myth existed that could help to replace the idea that was losing favor.

How were these worldviews expressed in the framings of the political oppositions in 1999 and in 2000 through the actual election campaign? Alliance for Change's and DOS's version of the Kosovo myth promoting the necessity of improving life in Serbia now if there was to be a "future Serbia' manifested itself in a variety of framings and themes. It was predicated on the *severity* of the crisis at hand and the *urgency* of the move for change—and it framed it as such—change had to be made now if Serbia was to survive in the future. The opposition also argued that changes had to be made now "for our children." This framing skillfully combined patriotism and moral imperative for the future generation—what Benson and Snow call moral propriety framing—with severity and urgency framings that mobilize people to action. A perfect example of such a

framing took place in October 1999, shortly after protestors had been brutally beaten by police at an Alliance for Change rally at the end of September. Djindjic urged protestors to stand peacefully but firmly should the police advance again: "We must make this sacrifice so our country may live…We as a generation must do it now. We shouldn't allow our children to be beaten in the future. It's better if we take the blows on our own backs now. Somebody must."[45] Opposition speeches and rallies about the necessity of change always emphasized the urgency of such changes: we have to do it *now* if we want to save Serbia. They linked Serbia's salvation, a word Kostunica was to use regularly in his campaign, to going to vote. It was that simple. Such a focus also allowed Alliance for Change and DOS to focus on the "present" aspect of everyday life, discussing who was to blame for the situation before moving on to the prognosis of what needed to be done for the future of the people and Serbia. Changes needed to save Serbia, they argued, would not come about without a major infusion of capital to the economy. Such capital was not available in Serbia. Change to save Serbia thus would of necessity involve positive relations with the West. The West had the power to lift sanctions and to infuse capital. Change to the economy would mean a job, goods to buy in shops, fruit for the children. Change would mean the ability to live a normal life. But for this change to happen, Serbia would have to have good relations with the West. And only an opposition victory could bring about such relations. In such a manner Alliance for Change and DOS tied together what people wanted most, a normal way of life, with external relations and the necessity of dealing with the West. Thus, dealing with the West was not unpatriotic—it was the patriotic thing to do to save Serbia. These framings both coincided with and reinforced

[45] Djindjic quoted by Milenko Vasovic, "Opposition Leaders Beaten by Riot Police, Media Targeted," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report No. 80, October 1, 1999, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=- .

people's beliefs. In regular surveys nearly three-fourths of respondents disagreed to some degree with the statement that the opposition leaders were traitors for talking to the West.[46]

Both in their rhetoric and in their actions, Alliance for Change and DOS were very careful not to be seen as obsequious or as "servants" of the West, as Milosevic consistently framed them. Thus, they framed themselves as equal partners with the West, and needed to be seen to be in command of their own policies. The West's efforts in October 1999, prior to the Luxembourg meeting, to impose the particularly egregious precondition that Milosevic and four of his aides be extradited to the Hague immediately if the Alliance for Change came to power resulted in a cancellation of the meeting by the Alliance for Change leaders. Djindjic explicitly stated, "We want to participate as equal partners in such a meeting, and not to be simply presented with something we have to sign."[47] As the regime constantly framed Alliance for Change and opposition politicians as "NATO lackeys," Alliance for Change politicians could hardly fulfill the conditions required by the West for the meeting—even if they had agreed with them. Framing their policy of what it meant to be a good, nationalist Serb was as much about framing dignity in relations with other countries as it was the actual policies themselves. For over a year, it was necessary to maintain in fact, not only in theory, relations with the West in which Serbs could feel they were being treated with dignity, not giving way to any action that would make them appear as if they were being colonized by the West—as Mira Markovic

[46] See ZACAT Survey ZA4378 (September 1999), where 48.3% "strongly disagreed" and another 23.1% "somewhat" disagreed, and National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, *Serbia Issues Poll,* October 24, 1999, http://www.ndi.org/files/410_yu_serbpoll99.pdf (accessed May 6, 2009), which cites similar figures.
[47] Djindjic quoted in "Alliance for Change Leaders Did Not Go to Luxembourg," *Hope on the Balkans News Archive,* October 11, 1999, http://www.ddh.nl/fy/kosova/news/1999/luxembourg1110.html.

was so fond of claiming. Nonetheless, DOS politicians persisted in reminding people that Serbia's past and future lay with the West, and not with the East, as Milosevic had been arguing, re-orienting Serbia's policy towards Russia, Belarus and China. Moreover many in DOS stressed that Serbia had had positive ties to the West in the past and should have them again in the future. "Our road has always led to the West, not toward the East. Only lately have we given up that road and paid a high price for it. The road to the West does not mean humiliation, on the contrary. Our road to Europe is dignified…the greatest names from our history were educated in the West."[48]

Opposition—Otpor, Framing Patriotism

To resist the current government was patriotic, according to Otpor, the most popular group in the country. While their activities were not directly coordinated with the opposition's campaign, the consistency of message between the two through their framings was subtle but clear. Otpor posters urged people to "Resist! Because I love Serbia." Though all of Otpor's messages emphasized that they were patriotic to Serbia—and fought to separate Milosevic and his regime from being synonymous with patriotism, the frame that Milosevic regularly employed—the "Because I love Serbia" campaign also clearly tied the future of youth—which Otpor symbolized—to that of Serbia. This reinforced the opposition's message that it was patriotic and right to do what was needed for the future—and especially the future of their children. Though the opposition's campaign "for the future of our children" was primarily a campaign of "moral imperative" to motivate people to vote, its underlying theme was that what was good for

[48] "DOS Leaders Present Platform, Candidates on Radio Television of Serbia," *BETA* Belgrade, September 17, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0918, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

your children was what was good for Serbia—and what was good for Serbia was a change of regime.

Kostunica and Patriotism—A Slightly Different Lens

If the Alliance for Change under Djindjic sought to reframe nationalism and change the agenda from previous definitions, Kostunica, the DOS presidential candidate, in almost direct opposition to the movement he was representing, tackled nationalism within the "old" framework and claimed it as one of his issues. His argument was not that nationalism was about new and different things, rather his nationalism focused on Serbs living in one land and on a greater Serbia. The problem, in Kostunica's view and framing, was not nationalist concepts but Milosevic's execution of them. In this sense Kostunica too leaned on the Kosovo myth cycle and the betrayal of Serbia by Vuk Brancovic and the "who shall betray Serbia" theme. But contrary to Milosevic's framing of DOS as traitors, Kostunica framed Milosevic as the traitor to the state—not for wanting a greater Serbia or Serbs in one state—but for losing territory, displacing Serbs and otherwise abrogating what should have been Serbian rights. In a speech at the April 14 opposition rally in Belgrade, Kostunica declared, "the present day rulers of Serbia, who have decreed themselves patriots, have demonstrated their patriotism to all but the Serbs. They have built other people's countries and demolished their own…Slobodan Milosevic has committed a mortal sin against his own people and his own state. Accordingly he has to leave."[49] At a news conference in August, Kostunica spoke in a similar vein, responding to questions about the state media's depiction of DOS as traitors and NATO lackeys: "I

[49] "Speech by President of the Democratic Party of Serbia Vojislav Kostunica at Democratic Opposition Rally, Belgrade, April 14, 2000." Reprinted at *BDnet News: Elections in Serbia 2000*. http://www.bbnet.org.yu/bdnet/elections/eng/0414kostunica.htm.

did not sign the Kumanovo capitulation in Kosovo; neither I nor DOS parties brought SFOR [Stabilization Force], IFOR [Implementation Force], UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], UNMIK [UN interim Administration in Kosovo], or KFOR [Kosovo Force] onto our territories. The Socialists and the Radicals will have to explain the presence of such forces, because these are the result of their policies."[50] Nor did Kostunica reserve this interpretation of nationalism for news conferences. Speaking in Kosovo while on the campaign trail, Kostunica flatly declared that, "Slobodan Milosevic is the biggest traitor of the Serbian people…he betrayed you…"[51] While campaigning in Gornji Milanovic he once again emphasized that it was Milosevic who was responsible for "bringing foreign armies onto Serb territory."[52]

Kostunica also attacked the United States—following Milosevic's lead in that respect—but he tempered his rhetoric with slight bow in the direction of Europe. On the anniversary of the NATO attacks Kostunica gave a speech in which he stated, "Numerous powers have ruled the Balkans, but not one of them have done as much spiritual and material damage as Washington's lords of war and death."[53] A month later he argued,

> it is hard to believe that people are killed, exhausted and starved by sanctions, and that their environment is poisoned for their own benefit...In order to survive as a people, we have to normalize our relations with the world but we must neither disregard nor forget the foreign violence conceived by the United States and NATO.[54]

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[50] "Serbian opposition candidate condemns Milosevic for Kosovo 'capitulation'," *Beta News Agency* (Belgrade, Serbia) August 21, 2000, Europe - Political: *NewsBank Access World News*, http://infoweb.newsbank.com.
[51] "Yugoslav presidential candidate injured by rocks in divided Kosovo town," *FoNet News Agency* (Belgrade, Serbia) September 14, 2000. Europe - Political: *NewsBank Access World News*, http://infoweb.newsbank.com.
[52] "Kostunica: Elections the New Serb Uprising,"*Hope on the Balkans News Archive*, September 8, 2000, citing B92, http://www.ddh.nl.fy/kosova/news/uprising0809.html.
[53] Vojislav Kostunica, "Hopes of Coexistence Dashed," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report No. 127, March 24, 2000, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henibcr&s=i&o=-.
[54] "Speech by President of the Democratic Party of Serbia Vojislav Kostunica."

It is interesting to note in both statements Kostunica blames only Washington for the bombing. As Milosevic did, Kostunica made NATO and its activities equivalent to "Washington, DC" and the United States, refusing to acknowledge anywhere that for such activities to have taken place under NATO auspices, European countries had to give their assent. Given that Kostunica's first statement above was written on the anniversary of the bombing one might assume that the rhetoric might be stronger than otherwise but indeed this was not the case. Kostunica regularly framed the United States in terms similar to those used by Milosevic, and was scathing in his critique of U.S. foreign policy, which he depicted not only as dangerous and hegemonic, but as oafish and clumsy. He regularly pilloried American attempts at democracy assistance as harmful and counterproductive. For example, in Kostunica's interview with *Vreme* on August 12, 2000, he said: "I also believe that we have to distance ourselves from declarative, counterproductive support coming from the present, departing American administration which has proved to be absolutely useless for the opposition and democratic forces in Serbia. And that support can cause a lot of harm in the coming election campaign."[55] As such, and as a point of "honor" once he had accepted the offer to be the DOS presidential candidate, he insisted on setting up a separate campaign office, and running a campaign that would accept no foreign funds.[56]

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[55] Nenad Lj. Stefanovic, "Empty Pocket and State: Interview: Dr. Vojislav Kostunica, Presidential Candidate," *Vreme*, (Belgrade), August 12, 2000. http://www.ex-yupress.com/vreme/vreme79.html, accessed May 8, 2009. See also "I Must Accept the Candidacy," Vojislav Kostunica press conference, August 7, 2000, from the DSS website at www.dss.co.yu, translated and published by *BDnet News* at http://www.bbnet.org.yu/bdnet/news/eng/0807dss.htm, in which Kostunica denounces American support as "Greek gifts."

[56] Two people whom I interviewed for this project, one who worked directly on the DOS campaign and one who helped to direct the NGO campaign pointed out that Kostunica's "pledge" was one that he kept in name only. While he did not accept foreign funds, he did accept "in-kind" support from DOS—much of which was paid for with foreign funds. The fact that Kostunica also benefited from DOS's campaign efforts some of which were supported out of foreign funds also is worth noting.

Kostunica also made it a point to separate the Europeans from the Americans in his framings. On the whole the Europeans were framed as civilized and understanding of the Serbian situation, while the Americans were framed as uncaring. In fact, Kostunica went out of his way to point out that his criticisms of the United States did not represent a critique of "Western values" or civilization, it was simply that the United States no longer, in his view, represented democratic and liberal values as the Europeans did.

> As far as [my] fierce criticism of the current American administration is concerned, it does not at all imply an anti-western attitude. On the contrary. That criticism is in a way balanced with a different attitude with respect to Europe. That criticism is pro-western rather than anti-western. Inasmuch as it advocates the return of the West to its original democratic and liberal values.[57]

Kostunica publicly pointed to European efforts to help Serbia, especially pointing to the Energy and Asphalt for Democracy programs that he juxtaposed against American support for continuing sanctions. "It is Europe that is pushing for programs like Energy or Asphalt for Democracy…It is America that is keeping us back, America has locked us up in a prison, since its officials have personalized to the extreme their relations with our country and reduced them only to Milosevic." He also noted that the French, who at that time tended to see Washington as a "hyperpower" were "open to understanding Serbian patriotism."[58] Yet Kostunica saw himself, his brand of nationalism and Serbia as "European" at heart. In his press conference accepting the nomination of the presidency he averred, "I neither can nor want to renounce my national convictions. I am a European and a democrat as a Serb, as someone with Serbian roots…Why would I love my country and spiritual space, my culture, tradition and history less than some Frenchman would love his history and his culture?" He regularly argued at campaign stops that "we draw

[57] "Empty Pocket and State: Interview: Dr. Vojislav Kostunica."
[58] Steven Erlanger, "The Yugoslav Who Could Be Leader Sketches the Nation He Envisions," *The New York Times*, September 29, 2000.

strength from our roots and my roots are here. This nation will exist as long as it has a conscience about its roots, whatever happens to it in the meantime."[59] Such framings returned dignity to the Serbian people and nation. People should not be made to feel ashamed of being Serbian, he asserted, and argued that Serbs were indeed European at heart and their values were European ones. In locating where Serbia "belonged" and what the Serbian identity was, he always looked to Serbian "roots" and westward. In his statement on the anniversary of the NATO bombing he not only pilloried the United States, he also stated, "…both the US and unfortunate [sic] Europe have overlooked one important point—Serbia has long had a pro-western orientation."[60] He went on to say that Milosevic's attempts to create allies among "undeveloped countries in the Far East" did not point in the direction Serbia should be heading. Similarly he argued that a "real Serbian house" had to be built on "Serbian roots," not on the "borrowed architecture of Russia, China and Belarus."[61] By the time he was on the campaign trail, Kostunica had honed his argument. While campaigning in Kikinda in September, Kostunica synthesized his views to argue that Serbia had always been European, even if the Europeans were slow to realize this, that Milosevic was not a patriot but a traitor, and, encompassing the DOS argument that the salvation of Serbia lay in saving Serbia from Milosevic, he concluded: "Europe is where Serbia naturally belongs, and Europe is slowly beginning to realize this. Serbia has to join the world regardless of the many injustices there. The

[59] Kostunica in the Church of Saint Paraskeva in Kostunici, reported by M. Glisic, "Time of Miracles: Scenes from Sumadija," *NIN*, Belgrade, September 14, 2000, http://www.ex-yupress.com/nin/nin61.html.
[60] Kostunica, "Hopes of Coexistence Dashed."
[61] Erlanger, "The Yugoslav Who Could Be Leader."

authorities keep talking about patriotism, but the highest level of patriotism is to help this nation survive."[62]

Kostunica's attitudes to the world beyond Serbia, his distrust of NATO, the United States and Europe, yet his acknowledgement that integration with Europe would be necessary, expressed and reflected the opinions of a large part of the public. Poll results as early as 1998 showed this clearly. In one poll from 1998, 54% of respondents agreed that Yugoslavia should rely more on Western countries, while in October 1999, 73% of respondents rated reintegrating Serbia into Europe and the world as "extremely important" (a five on a five-point scale), while another 15% gave it four points on the scale. Another survey from February 2000 showed that 52% of the public supported a pro-Western orientation relying on the EU and the United States, and in a similar poll in November 2000, the number supporting relying on the EU had grown to 80%.[63] Additionally, Kostunica's reassurances that one could still could attend to "traditional" Serbian interests while also becoming integrated with the West and not have any further wars was very appealing to some who were "more traditional." Kostunica's framing also appealed to those with more traditional values by garbing his frames in traditional language and music. He used the nineteenth century song (and national anthem of the Kingdom of Serbia) "Boze Pravde" as his preferred piece of music at rallies and during campaign stops when bands would play.[64] While eschewing the language of self-sacrifice, he regularly referred to the Church and God's help. He also sought to use

[62] "DOS's Kostunica Says Serbia Has To Join World Despite 'Many Injustices'," *BETA*, Belgrade, September 6, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0906, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[63] See "Yugoslav Public Opinion in Serbia 1998," ZA4277, NDI, *Serbia Issues Poll*, October 24, 1999, and "Vulnerability Trends and Perceptions: Beyond the Democratic Breakthrough."
[64] For a typical account of such a rally, see "Kostunica ovacijama docekan u Zajecaru," B-92 news report archived at http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2000&mm=09&dd=03&nav_id=11217 accessed May 12, 2009.

traditional narrative elements that would resonate deeply in his campaign. During the campaign he stopped in the village of Kreman in western Serbia and sought out the Tarabic prophets, who were renowned for their prophesies throughout Serbia. Stories about these prophets always emphasized their mystical qualities as well as the natural, pure and spiritual setting in which they lived. During the visit the head prophet welcomed Kostunica with the greeting of "welcome President" and went on to say that all who visited Tarabici ruled well while currently "infidels rule." He also went on to tell his prophecy that "'it has been told that a man from the people would come and would bring prosperity and freedom from scourge,' …to the question of [the] reporter who that man was the elder quipped 'Mr. Kostunica.'"[65] In this case, the visit by Kostunica to the prophets was clearly planned and meant to be widely reported in independent newspapers. The account in *Danas* was written to ensure that the reader understood the significance of the Tarabic prophets (Tarabic is referred to as the "Serbian Delphi") and to emphasize not only the prophecy that Kostunica would be president because he was a man of the people who was trusted by the people,[66] but also to give Kostunica a chance to frame the upcoming election as an opportunity to "liberate our country, from our new Turks, so that it can become better and show its true face."[67] In such a framing Kostunica is endorsed by a higher power, yet is portrayed as a common man with whom other "common" men can identify, while Kostunica himself frames Milosevic as a traitor—no

[65] Nenad Kovacevic, "Thus Has Been Told," *Danas*, (Belgrade), September 14-15, 2000, http://www.ex-yupress.com/danas/danas43.html accessed May 8, 2009.
[66] See the next section on "everyday life" which further expands on the importance of the prophecy as a method of framing Kostunica as a "common man" of the people. See also Srdja Pavlovic, "'Mirror, Mirror on the Wall…': Prophecies, Horoscopes, and the Politics of the Paranormal in Serbia (1992–2000)," *SOI—Spaces of Identity: Tradition, Cultural Boundaries, and Identity Formation in Central Europe and Beyond* 1/1 (2001), https://pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/soi/article/view/8055/7235.
[67] Kostunica's phrase reported in "Thus Has Been Told."

better than the Turks—who were clearly infidels.[68] Had this been a one-off report on the prophesy it might have merited only a footnote. However, the incident has greater significance because for the duration of the campaign, when the famous actor Branislav Lecic was on the road with Kostunica or the DOS campaign, he would recount the visit and the Tarabic prophesy, thereby repeating and more deeply rooting the frames of Kostunica as a common man, and as one who, in keeping with deep ethnic/national Serbian traditions and narratives, was destined to be president.[69] Lecic's retelling of the story was part of Kostunica's purposeful and strategic action to frame himself cloaked in Serbian national traditions and prophesies.

Despite these frames that emphasized very traditionalist aspects of Serbian identity and Serbia's place in the world Kostunica, in fact, sought middle ground between an ultra-conservative nationalist rhetoric of victimization and self-sacrifice and the more modern, pragmatic very Western European oriented leanings of Alliance for Change and DOS. He fiercely argued that Kosovo had to remain Serbian, yet did not use the language of self-sacrifice. Rather he spoke of rational acts of international law. He used traditionalist pieces of culture and folk beliefs to appeal a more traditional audience—which was in fact in keeping with his actual beliefs, thus reinforcing his credibility and that of his frames—but never advocated the type of pure nationalist agenda that many nationalists had sought to put forward since the late 1980s.. By doing so he blunted the somewhat more "cosmopolitan" sounding rhetoric of DOS, broadening its appeal to the as-yet undecided electorate.

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[68] In this way Kostunica calls Milosevic a "janissary" as Milosevic has been calling the opposition politicians. For an interesting discussion on how Turks are conceptualized and discussed in Serbian society at various times see Zivkovic, "Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny."

[69] Zoran B. Nikolic, "Enthusiasm the Biggest Advantage" *Vreme*, September 14, 2000, http://www.ex-yupress.com/vreme/vreme82.html.

Moreover, although clearly there was some "daylight" between Kostunica's framing of Serbian nationalism and the understanding of that subject by DOS, the latter's firm, unswerving embrace of Kostunica and Kostunica's framing of nationalism served to "broaden the tent," expanding the potential number of voters for DOS. Both Kostunica and Djindjic recognized the positive aspects of this synergy. Kostunica himself stressed the moderate nature of his nationalism and its ability to draw people together,

> Simply the public assessed that there must be some median between the attitude with respect to modernity and tradition, between tendencies to regulate the relations in the world in the way that they have to be regulated and the attitude that that must not be done at the expense of national dignity and endangerment of national interests. Some balance was found there.[70]

Djindjic also directly addressed this aspect, calling Kostunica a "'necessary bridge' between the politics of the past and a more modern European future."[71] Djindjic also addressed how Kostunica's nationalism and his framing of nationalism affected relations with others outside of the country. The framing literature reminds us that attempts to broaden a group's appeal can also alienate important audiences who previously had felt they shared the collective values and identity of the group. New, expansive definitions of those values, or framings which appear to be a reshaping of those values, can lead to a loss of audience—not just an increase. Djindjic firmly notes that because Alliance for Change enjoyed "credibility" in the West, including in the United States, Kostunica's attitude towards the United States would not cost the Alliance for Change American support. Moreover Djindjic argued that Kostunica and his values—and the framing of those values—would indeed bring others, who might not have been inclined to support Alliance for Change, into the fold:

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[70] "Empty Pocket and State: Interview: Dr. Vojislav Kostunica."
[71] Erlanger, "The Yugoslav Who Could Be Leader."

> Kostunica as a candidate brings other elements, it is enough that he is a democrat, dedicated to the rule of law, without inclination to voluntarism and political adventurism. *For the first time we have created a symbiosis of different political options covering the spectrum ranging from democratic nationalism to cosmopolitanism*.[72]

Kostunica's nationalism also contained elements that were more in line with DOS's type of framing of nationalism, emphasizing that the salvation of Serbia was dependent on changes being made in Serbia—and the change that needed to be made most was getting rid of Milosevic through elections. In these mobilization framings Kostunica, like Alliance for Change and DOS, emphasized the severity and urgency of the problem. Kostunica also emphasized the moral necessity of taking action—of people becoming agents of their own history, as Gamson put it—to save Serbia. At one rally he proclaimed: "With your attendance you are demonstrating that there is a desire to take matters into our own hands, because it is up to us to save Serbia."[73] As shall be further discussed in Chapter Twelve, Kostunica was sharply aware of the need not just to convince people that he was right and had something positive to offer them, but that *they* needed to actually get up and go out to vote.

Kostunica also linked his version of nationalism to the importance of having a "normal life." He recognized that many wanted an exit from history, and so sought to focus on the more legal aspects of the nature of the state but carefully distinguishing his ideas about state and statehood from the bigger ideas about "Serbdom:"

> In fact, the FRY does not exist as a state. Its status is undefined both internal and with respect to its surroundings…This is not a big story about state, national

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[72] Djindjic interview by Mirjana Vujovic, "All Those with Influence in the West Support Kostunica: Interview: Zoran Djindjic, president of the Democratic Party and chief of the electoral staff of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) talks about the chances of the united opposition," *Danas*, August 26 – 27, 2000. http://www.ex-yupress.com/danas/danas39.html.

[73] "Kostunica Greeted by 1,000 Kovin Residents as Next President," *BETA*, Belgrade, September 5, 2000. FBIS-EEU-2000-0905, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com

interests, Serbdom and so forth. Simply this is an issue of whether we shall live in a normal state like the rest of the world or whether that state is no more. …Others will, of course head to the polling booths thinking about their empty pockets. Both concerns are legitimate and intertwined and cannot be resolved independently.[74]

[74] "Empty Pocket and State, Interview with Dr. Vojislav Kostunica."

CHAPTER NINE

Framing Worldviews: "I Just Want to Live a Normal Life"

In the last chapter we focused on how the government attempted to control society and politics through its framing of nationalism, and how the democratic opposition through counter-framing attempted to redefine the meaning of the term so as to change the terms of the "game." If nationalism as a frame to impose meaning and order on society and politics started as a top down phenomena, the frame that I examine in this chapter, the desire for a "normal" life, clearly was a cry from within society and worked its way up. In this chapter I examine this desire for a "normal" life, what it meant to people and why it became such an important focal point not only for society but also for politics.

If Serbian citizens wanted anything in 1999 and 2000, what they wanted most of all was a "normal life." The concept was one that was known to all yet differed to some degree in specific meaning to each individual. It was a phase and a concept that owed its origins to no one man, except perhaps to Slobodan Milosevic as a result of the chaos and dislocations that he had created in politics, people's everyday life and in society. Wanting a "normal life" was a concept that had grown organically as people found themselves and their lives increasingly disorganized and their understanding of their world displaced. It was something that almost all citizens wanted yet was ambiguous—its complete definition left up to the person who was speaking.

By the fall of 1999 people in Serbia were living with increasingly large contradictions in the logic of the life around them. One author called these contradictions moral "warps" which were "responsible for creating social opacity and a sense of

bewilderment among those who lived with them," especially "the effect of their compounding over time."[1] Nothing was as it seemed, everything seemed to be a façade for something else. On a higher political level the system called itself a "democracy" and Milosevic regularly emphasized how the rules of the game would be followed—but they were not, and the system was not a democracy. The economy had official parameters, with banks, laws and exchange rates but almost all useful transactions took place outside of these in the grey zone. People officially had jobs but many were put on "forced vacations"—a term which in and of itself was an example of the contradictions that people faced. In the legal system laws were selectively enforced and in times of need "invented" to suit the political needs of the ruling party, while the judiciary was increasingly politicized. A Serbian commentator wrote,

> At first sight Serbia still resembles a normal country. It has a government, police and laws, and claims to guarantee its citizens a wide range of freedoms and rights. In practice, however, nothing works properly. If you retire, there is no pension. If you win the lottery, there is no prize. If you fall ill and go to hospital, there is no medicine. "Nema" - that is "There is none," is the only explanation.[2]

It was not only that things did not work properly—it was that things were not at all what they seemed or pretended to be.[3]

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[1] Zivkovic, "Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny," 245.

[2] Milenko Vasovic, "Serbia's State Swindle," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report No. 65, August 11, 1999, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=- .

[3] This sense of displacement also was expressed in cultural media such as movies and plays. See comments by the Serbian film director Srdjan Dragojevic in Nancy Ramsey, "Growing Up in Belgrade with Suitably Black Humor," *The New York Times*, August 22, 1999. For more on cinema and directors who directly addressed the "absurdist" nature of the times people lived in see, "The Break-Up of Yugoslavia:Cinematic Reflections 1991-2001," in *Liberated Cinema: The Yugoslav Experience*, 2nd ed., revised and expanded. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002.
See also the story and interview with playwright Biljana Srbljanovic, whose plays "Belgrade Trilogy," "Family Stories: Belgrade" and "The Fall" also directly addressed such issues, in Joan McQueeney, "A Voice for Outsiders." *The New York Times*, July 2, 2000. That such displacement had occurred and was occurring was also recognized regularly by "common" people attending rallies and football matches, who chanted "Save Serbia from this madhouse"—a variant on the chant "Slobo, kill yourself and Save Serbia." Once Kostunica became the DOS candidate the chant specifically said "Kostunica, Save Serbia from this madhouse."

In people's personal lives markers that had been standard to help people forge their identities were also at odds—"the usual attributes of wealth-power-prestige almost nowhere any longer coincide," one sociologist wrote. "People's education, training, degrees and calling have become largely meaningless, in the situation where many of them are objectively prevented from practicing their profession, and therefore identifying themselves with it and through it."[4] The loss of a firm basis for personal identity also helped to demobilize people, as having a strong sense of personal identity is important to a person's sense of agency.[5]

Had there been an internal consistency that people could count on, as had occurred in some counties under communism—even if things were not called by their proper names—people would have had an easier time mapping their lives and making sense of their social landscape. What was particularly invidious in the world under Slobodan Milosevic et al. was the degree to which things not only were incongruent with each other, but the speed with ideas or items which had been used as markers to chart life changed, slipping dangerously away underfoot. It was because even everyday life was so slippery that people reacted with greater emphasis than they might have otherwise to those things termed "moral shocks" discussed in the previous chapters. It was because certain things like death or one's children were so personal and definite that offenses against such basic touchstones of life were particularly apt to act as a "hot button" as Gamson called it.[6] Those things that were not "hot buttons," however, seemed merely to

[4] Ivana Spasic, "Identity Void: Structural Confusion and Everyday Life in Present-day Serbia," in Zagorka Golubovic and George F. McLean, eds., *Models of Identities in Postcommunist Societies,* Volume 10 of Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change, Series IVA, Eastern and Central Europe, (Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1999), 109-124.
[5] Jessica Greenberg,"Citizen Youth: Student Organizations and the Making of Democracy in Post-Socialist Serbia," PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2007, 26.
[6] See also for example Katherine Verdery for the importance of death and life to culture and identity.

depress people, leaving many bewildered and confused. Public opinion polls showed that people were depressed and fearful.[7] Conspiracy theories and fortune-tellers (some state-sponsored and given their own TV programs for propaganda purposes) gained in popularity.[8] People alternated between being activated for rallies—such as those in the summer of 1999—and being seemingly too depressed and pessimistic to want to participate in activities, political or otherwise. All that seemed certain was that it was all getting worse. One joke that circulated in Belgrade said, "We have a tragic past and our present is even more tragic. Luckily we have no future."[9]

No matter how they joked, people wanted a future—and they wanted it to be "normal" for themselves and for their children. In Chapter Six we saw the JUL grandmother in a southern Serbian town of Leskovac, speaking out against the ruling party because she wanted to be able to buy fruit and an ice cream for her grandson. Clearly this could be considered merely a desire for a better economy, and would be satisfied if the economic situation was corrected. But she connected her desire to be able to do these things not just to an improvement in the economy and different economic *policies*, but to the need for a *complete* change of leadership. Buying an ice cream might

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[7] See Vesna Bjekic, "What the Citizens of Serbia Fear: Public Opinion in Serbia: Scared, Indecisive And Down in the Dumps,"*AIM* Podgorica, October 12, 1999, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199910/91012-002-trae-pod.htm, and Vesna Bjekic, "Public Opinion of Serbia: Hope for Change," *AIM* Podgorica, January 17, 2000, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200001/00117-002-trae-pod.htm, accessed May 7, 2009.

[8] Jelena Grujic, "Milosevic Wields Psychic Weapon: Serbia's Popular Clairvoyants Have Become Part of the Belgrade Propaganda Machine" *Hope on the Balkans, Kosova Crisis 2000, News*, June 6, 2000, http://www.ddh.nl/hy/kosova/news/2000/psychic0606.html; and Srdja Pavlovic, "'Mirror, Mirror on the Wall…': Prophecies, Horoscopes, and the Politics of the Paranormal in Serbia (1992–2000)," *SOI—Spaces of Identity: Tradition, Cultural Boundaries, and Identity Formation in Central Europe and Beyond* 1/1 (2001), https://pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/soi/article/view/8055/7235.

[9] Joke recounted in Catharine Samary, "Milosevic Still in the Saddle, West Thwarts Serbian Opposition," *Le Monde diplomatique* (English Edition), February 2000, http://mondediplo.com/2000/02/05samary, accessed May 6, 2009. Kostunica expressed a variant of this thought when he said at a news conference in August 2000, "'in the past the years the Socialists have managed to prove that the worst situation can get even worse.'" "Kostunica Condemns Milosevic Administration for 'Capitulation in Kosovo'."

be all about having the ability to purchase something, but this particular example of buying a sweet for your grandchild speaks to every day activities—normal things—that grandparents do with grandchildren, a marker of "normality."

Travel was also an activity that was frequently mentioned in discussions of normal lives—primarily by those in the middle classes, especially for those from larger cities and towns. Being able to go abroad on vacation, and to international conferences as an indicator of your place in a profession and hence your identity, were seen as markers of a normal life. Economics, of course, played a role in the ability to do such a thing, but the ability to travel was about more than just economics. Being able to travel freely was a marker of normality because it would mean that Serbia and Serbian citizens were no longer seen as a pariah state and people, isolated from the rest of the world. Goran Svilanovic, president of the Civic Alliance party, encapsulated this feeling in an interview. He said that if the opposition were in charge, Serbia "would definitely move to an open country which will look at its neighbors—by traveling to these cities, talking to these people, going freely to Europe—without any burden. We want Serbia without any burden. That way any citizen who leaves this country, *could be proud because he is from Serbia and because it would be normal*."[10] For professionals, intellectuals and the urban middle class who had regarded themselves as part of an international cosmopolitan culture, traveling would mark their return to being an integrated part of a western urban intellectual culture.[11] Moreover, traveling was something that people had been able to do

[10] Emphasis mine. Goran Svilanovic in "Rally of the Alliance for Change: Statements of Alliance for Change Leaders: Goran Svilanovic," *Free Serbia Specials: Broadcasts*, September 9, 1999, http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/specials/broadcasts/21091999/e-izjave.html#svilanovic. Important in this quote is also the notion of pride, and inversely shame—a lack of dignity. Svilanovic is arguing that a normal life is about dignity.

[11] Richard Garfield, *Economic Sanctions, Health and Welfare in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1990-2000*, (Belgrade: UNICEF United Nations Childrens' Fund and OCHA, 2001), 61. See also Ljiljana

under Tito, before Slobodan Milosevic. It had been a point of pride differentiating Yugoslavia from other communist countries, as citizens of Yugoslavia had been able to travel freely in the West without special visas. One Serb reminded me that Serbia had not been like those other East European countries that had gulags; citizens of Yugoslavia had been able to travel to Paris if they wanted. [12] This ability not only set them apart from the countries of the Soviet bloc, but solidified their identity as "cosmopolitan and European."[13] The standard of measure for Yugoslav and then many Serbian intellectuals was not how they were doing compared to those former East European countries, but how they were doing compared to the West. Thus for Serbs, the loss of the right to travel was the loss of a particular kind of dignity, not only self-respect, but respect from others against whom they measured themselves.

A story by an astute Serbian commentator encapsulates what travel meant to Serbs, how it related to their past and what they desired for their future. Petar Lukovic, a journalist and commentator, was once asked in a blog how he envisioned Serbia, if he could envision a new future. He responded as follows:

> One June morning in 1977—I remember for a reason—I was drinking my first morning coffee, espresso with cold milk, in the garden of the Sumatovac restaurant, I looked into the blue, sunny sky and found myself deciding that I would go to London that afternoon. The Sex Pistols had released the single "God Save the Queen," the Stranglers had just celebrated their debut album, the Clash had a concert then … a perfectly good reason for me to organise a nice weekend on the Island. I got travellers checks and some pounds at Ljubljanska banka, bought a plane ticket at the main office of JAT, and I brought my red passport in which there was no visa (I remind the younger residents of Serbia that we never

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Bacevic, "Empirical Social Research in Serbia and Montenegro," http://www.cee-socialscience.net/archive/serbia-montenegro/index.html (accessed May 5, 2009), for a similar assessment.

[12] Miljenko Dereta, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 3, 2007

[13] Jessica Greenberg, "Citizen Youth: Student Organizations and the Making of Democracy in Post-Socialist Serbia." PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 2007, discusses the role of travel and "normal life" in Serbia for identity, especially in Chapter One: "On the Road to Normal: Travel, Democracy and the Moral Serbian Subject."

> needed visas then, the majority of owners of SFRJ passports had no idea what they were for). I told my parents that I was going to England and the only thing they asked me—I remember—was when I was coming back. I pulled this episode out of my memory as the only possible answer to today's science-fictitious question of how I imagine Serbia, if I am able to imagine anything at all. I imagine being free to, if it crosses your mind, go to London or Paris or Amsterdam, being able to afford that from your pay, not having to fuck around standing in line 96 hours in front of every embassy, where you will have to patiently explain to the officials the reason you want to go to London, to prove that you will not liquidate Bosniaks on Trafalgar Square like the Serbian national heroes of the Mladic or Karadzic or colonel Beara type, to promise that you will behave respectably because, you know, England is not Republika Srpska or Kosovo and that on the Island they use freezer trucks to transport ice cream and not corpses.[14]

Ice cream and not corpses—indeed "normal" life was *supposed* to mean ice cream and not corpses. It meant being able to travel—it also meant, as this story indicates, having one's values recognized as being shared European values and not being regarded as a barbarian or savage.[15]

Having a "normal" life as people envisioned it also had a distinct moral dimension involving fairness. It meant not having to take to the streets to get promised pay from the government when you had risked your life, not having them lie to you about

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[14] Petar Lukovic as translated and posted by Eric Gordy, "Imagine all the People," on his blog *East Ethnia*, http://eastethnia.blogspot.com/2005/04/imagine-all-people.html, April 22, 2005. Although Lukovic's essay is in resonse to a question in 2005, the anecdote clearly is one that could have been given in 2000, had Lukovic dared to dream that far in 1999 and 2000. Lukovic's commentaries at the time on the state of Serbia and his hopes for the future were all very bleak. The response does however encapsulate so much of what Serbs dreamed of or remembered as "normal." Lukovic's frequent reports can be reviewed in English in the Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report archive at http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henibcr2000&s=i&o=- accessed May 17, 2009. Travel as a marker of normality is frequently cited in both academic literature and journalism. See for example newspaper articles such as "The Independent: War-weary Serbs struggle in the grip of Milosevic tightens: BALKAN AFTERMATH Critical media shut down, opposition impotent and living standards at new lows - a nation despairs of changing the regime." *Independent, The* (London, England)/*Financial Times* March 17, 2000, *NewsBank Access World News*, http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxygw.wrlc.org. See especially the comment by Ljiljana Nonin, a retired secretary living in Belgrade: "Ten years ago, before everything happened here, we had a life…We planned our holidays, went to the Croatian seaside every year, to Spain, bought furniture. We could plan and manage."

[15] Greenfeld, "Citizien Youth," Chapter One, also examines in depth the relationship Serbs felt between Western perceptions of them and their feelings of "abnormality." Serbian students' inability to travel led them to question their normality, having no known outside indicators to measure themselves against, and they uncomfortably joked about being "abnormal" and being unable to live a normal life.

your dead sons, not having some men go to war while others drove around in big cars talking on expensive cell phones when they too should have been in Kosovo. It meant not having exemptions for political friends and families that were so flagrant in their inequity that they were impossible to overlook. Having a normal life meant having moral markers that were shared and regularly observed both in everyday life between citizens in their private transactions and more importantly in the implicit social contracts between the state and its citizens. Serbians sought normal life in laws that were just and applied equally to all citizens—no matter who they were. No one in a "normal life" should be bigger or grander than others so that the rules would not apply to him.

Having a normal life also meant being able to live in dignity, with one's head up and not in fear. Otpor activists expressed this sentiment most clearly, calling it central to their movement. As one of them said, "We students live resistance because "Otpor" is an idea and it can only be lived. What does that mean? That means to live normally, to fight for a normal life. The only demand, really is normal living. By that I mean a life without fear. The fear of the future, the fear of facing the past."[16] Another Otpor activist elaborates: "My strongest feeling is the inability to live the life the ways I should, as everyone should and the ways we would have lived if all this had not happened during the last ten years. I want to live a life that is worthy of a man."[17] In a completely different context another Otpor activist noted: "to me, dignity is very similar to resistance."[18] The concept of dignity as central to one's humanity and worth fighting for was not expressed

[16] Gordana Jocic, "Students Against Dictatorship: Our Language is Resistance," *Nezavisna Svetlost*, Kragujevac, December 13-December 20, 1998, http://www.ex-yupress.com/nezsvet/nezsvet9.html, interviewing Ratsko Sajic, a student of philology and a participant in the 1996/97 demonstrations.
[17] Jocic, "Our Language is Resistance," interviews Marko Mandic, a law student, Otpor activist, also a participant in earlier demonstrations.
[18] Steven Erlanger, "Student Group Emerges as Major Milosevic Foe," *The New York Times*, May 22, 2000.

by Otpor members alone. Others in society also saw their dignity as worth fighting for. Branka Prpa, Slavko Curuvija's partner, connected morality, fear, courage and dignity in the following way: "Essentially courage is a moral issue; it begins the moment that someone denies your humanity. When your moral convictions, reasons for being are brought into question, you realize that if you trade for your dignity, that is not what you want."[19]

Finally having an everyday life was about having a "normal" future. It meant a future without wars, being able to do all the little everyday things that one should have spent one's life doing. Fear of civil war was a regular concern of the citizens. Acknowledging at some level Milosevic's responsibility for their involvement in the previous wars, Serbs worried about civil war with Montenegro or within Serbia itself. Public opinion polls reflected this concern. In September 1999, four-fifths of the respondents to one poll were afraid of a civil war, NATO intervention, or ethnic conflict, with 35% of them ranking civil war as their major concern.[20] Opposition political parties as well as intellectuals also openly warned of authorities in Serbia wanting conflict—so as to be able to distract people from the business of normal life. In August of 1999, GSS drew this connection directly in a public statement warning that the authorities in Serbia were trying to "incite some new hostility and a new war." It went on to say, "it is obvious

[19] Ljubisa Stavric, "Personal Story: Branka Prpa, A Witness: 'They'll Stop Me Only When They Kill Me,'" *NIN*, Begrade, April 6, 2000, http://www.ex-yupress.com/nin/nin37.html. See also interview with Branka Prpa in the Los Angeles Times, "A Survivor anticipates Milosevic's Day in Court," October 12, 2000, http://articles.latimes.com/2000/oct/12/news/mn-35458, in which she commented: "I want it to be possible for us to be normal people in the future…it's a duty we have to fulfill for future generations." Such sentiments, that people wanted a normal life and it was a duty, a moral imperative to do something, is a comment found in many published interviews.

[20] "Between Disappointment and Hope – Public Opinion in Serbia, September 1999," Center for Policy Studies/ Centar za proucavanje alternativa, Belgrade, 1999, http://www.cpa-cps.org.yu/public.htm. See also Vesna Bjekic, "What the Citizens of Serbia Fear: Public Opinion in Serbia: Scared, Indecisive And Down in the Dumps," *AIM* Podgorica, October 12, 1999, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199910/91012-002-trae-pod.htm, accessed May 10, 2009.

that the authorities are most concerned by those who want the war cycle, which started at the beginning of the 1990's, finally to end and those who have directed all their energy into making it possible *to live normally* in Serbia again" (emphasis mine). The statement also addresses the role of the "audience" of the statement, the public, and says that it places its faith in the public to resist such an action: "The people of Serbia will not permit a handful of people gathered around a tyrant to lead them into a new war." Finally, in an effort to separate those SPS, SRS and JUL officials who might be wavering in support of such a potential policy, the statement says that GSS is "convinced 'that rationality will prevail in the minds of those in power who are not prepared to go down with their corrupt and failed leaders.'"[21] Through such a framing GSS directs people's attention to the fact that the wars have a person responsible for them, that that person or those people want such a conflict again, and they want it so as to prevent people from having a normal life.

Otpor frequently reminded citizens that Milosevic had deprived their generation of a normal past, especially with his wars, and that they wanted a "normal" future. In a framing action that encapsulates all the actions to make a strong frame (diagnosis of the problem, prognosis of what should happen and a reason for making it happen), the students acted in unity throughout Serbia in August of 2000 for Milosevic's 59th birthday, setting up a "birthday card" in many town squares. It read:

> Thank you for the childhood you have taken from us, for the unforgettable war scenes you have given us, for all the crimes you have committed in the names of Serbs, for all the lost battles…thank you for the unforgettable convoys of our brothers, for the sound of air raid sirens, for all the lives

[21] All quotes from GSS statement are taken from "GSS Says People Oppose 'Tyrant Milosevic's War Plans'," *BETA*, Belgrade, August 16, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0816, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

> lost in vain…Happy Birthday, Mr. President, may you celebrate the next one with your nearest and dearest on a deserved holiday in the Hague.[22]

Milosevic's birthday was also an occasion to indirectly remind people, in addition to the wars, what else Milosevic was responsible for, turning attention to what they should have had—what should have been their "normal future"—by pointing out what they did not have. Otpor did this by sending an empty telegram to Milosevic with a statement to the media about it that read:

> The person who is responsible for worker's empty paychecks, people eating from empty plates, the emptiness of Srpska Krajina, part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Metohija without Serbs, Serb passport without western seals, students empty looks towards the West, does not deserve anything better than an empty telegram for the empty politics he has been leading for the past ten empty years.[23]

As Zarko Korac, a psychologist, university professor and then leader of the Social Democratic Union noted, "these students feel they have no future, no employment…They can't travel and work. So they are fighting for their own future which is the future of the country."[24] Here again is the connection between children, normality and future. If generational factors were largely responsible for giving Otpor its sense of collective identity,[25] the framings of a shared past of a generation who only remembered life under Milosevic and who, more than anything desired a different, "normal" future acted as an

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[22] Card quoted in Joe Rubin, "The Kids Who Confronted Milosevic," *Mother Jones*, September 22, 2000, http://com Joe Rubin 22 September 2000 at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2000/09/kids-who-confronted-milosevic. Otpor framed war and its dangers in June of 2000. Vladimir Stojkovic, a 25 year old man from Leskovac who had fought in the war put up posters stating, "I will not have war, I will not have repression, I will not have fear." For his actions he was not only arrested but severely beaten and not provided adequate medical treatment. Otpor then put up posters with photographs of his disfigured face reading "This is Serbia."

[23] "Otpor sent Milosevic an empty telegram," *Free Serbia*, August 19, 2000, http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/news/2000/08/e-19-08-2000.html.

[24] Erlanger, "Student Group Emerges as Major Milosevic Foe," quoting Zarko Korac, Social Democratic Union leader.

[25] In a poll conducted in February, 2000, one third of respondents gave "generation" (33.5%) as the most significant "belonging" to them, just trailing "national belonging." (34.4%). See "Pre-Election Study – Presidential Elections, Serbia," February, 2000 (ZA4280).

important glue to hold the group together. The fact that the past that Otpor pointed to was shared by more than one generation—and that most people spoke of wanting a "normal life"—allowed Otpor's framings to resonate more widely across generations as they pointed to a desire for a normal future.

While many aspects of "normal life" were about the economy: buying ice cream, having money to travel, having a job, pensions being paid on time, being able to buy things in shops and exchange money at banks, having a "normal life" was also inseparable from much larger concepts of justice, fairness and dignity. An American political operative who worked closely with Djindjic and the DOS campaign noted that one did not have to develop a "concept" of normal life to use as a slogan to mobilize people—it was organic.[26] It was simply a matter of DOS and Kostunica framing it and showing that they understood and indeed could offer people a "normal" life. By grasping the complex matter, the desire for a "normal life," that ran deeply both intellectually and emotionally in Serbia, those who could best frame their ability to provide a normal life for people, and who could do so credibly, had a good chance to win the elections.

The Milosevic regime, however, neither understood nor could it provide these things. As a substitute for a normal life it offered the "reconstruction of the country." As a substitute for a leader who understood the woes of the common man and who would restore their dignity to them, Milosevic offered himself as hero of the nation, bigger and grander than the rest.

The reconstruction campaign kicked off to much fanfare almost as soon as the war with NATO ended. It offered the regime the perfect opportunity to both show the level of destruction perpetrated on Serbia by outside forces (as if people had not already

[26] Kent Patton, interview by author, Washington DC, July 23, 2008.

noticed this themselves) and also an opportunity to frame itself, and especially Milosevic as the savior of the nation who would reconstruct all that was destroyed and fix Serbia's ills.

Milosevic and Reconstruction

Milosevic's reconstruction campaign began within a week of the end of the bombing. In an effort to roll out the campaign and draw people's attention away from troop withdrawals from Kosovo, he announced the beginning of the reconstruction of a bridge near Novi Sad on June 14 and attended a ceremony to mark the start of apartment reconstruction in Aleksinac, a town in central Serbia. *BETA* immediately pointed out in a commentary that the days that Milosevic chose to attend such events or announce such events were the very days that troop withdraws were at their peak, and that the state media saturated the airwaves with Milosevic's appearances at reconstruction events, not with pictures of troop withdrawals.[27] Given that the country had just been bombed, it would not be unusual to find a president out among the people making appearances and promising reconstruction for a better future. The reconstruction campaign should have been a positive campaign for Milosevic—one in which he could convince the people that he could bring them a better future, one in which he could emphasize his solidarity with them and his empathy for their plight. His framing of the campaign however was marked by a somewhat bizarre combination of Stalinist style Stakhanovite figures concerning the advanced and unrealistic rate of reconstruction, and admonitions that the reconstruction campaign would really show the outside world that Serbia could make it alone and did

[27] "BETA Views Milosevic's 'Peace Offensive," *BETA*, Belgrade, in English, July 17, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0617, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

not require outside assistance or aid. The New World Order, he argued. was trying to infiltrate and take over Serbia. Any aid from these countries would lead with surety to the destruction of Serbia's independence. In short, Milosevic chose not to frame reconstruction in a positive upbeat light with a focus on the future. Rather he stuck to his previous choices when it came to framing; he chose to frame reconstruction through his form of nationalism, emphasizing the need for national unity in the face of ongoing conspiracies and outside threats of take-over, preaching self-sufficiency from the rest of the Western world.

Internal Enemies

One major focus of the government's rhetoric for the reconstruction campaign therefore focused on "enemies" of Serbia, primarily the opposition who advocated the need for outside aid from Western countries. The purpose of such rhetoric was to help clearly define boundaries of who was with the government (patriots) and who was against the government (traitors) and also give teeth to the government's framing of the need for unity with Milosevic at the helm. In an August 1999 speech specifically on reconstruction, Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic, instead of pointing to the government's achievements, spent time disparaging the political opposition, casting them in the role of traitors: "The people simply cannot consider those that are in the way, those that are wandering like Bedouins, mercenaries, quislings and others, as credible."[28] He also made sure to frame the opposition as enemies of the state, as forces "paid to bring

[28] The "wandering like Bedouin" reference was a derogatory slam at Djindjic, who had gone to Montenegro during the bombing.

down this country and put it into slavery, like we were for 500 years under the Turks."[29] No matter the topic, the government seemed to be obsessed by framing the opposition as traitors. The new year brought no let up in the reconstruction campaign's rhetoric against the opposition. Tanjug, the government's wire service, ran a virulent commentary in January which, in somewhat convoluted logic, argued that the opposition, in service of foreign powers (specifically the "bloodthirsty Albright"), [30] was trying to prevent the reconstruction of the country, but that the heroic people, unified behind the great leader Milosevic would not let this happen.[31] Both the reconstruction campaign and the nationalism campaign sought to strongly and tightly tie the opposition to Western European countries, and especially to the United States, since in people's minds these were unpopular countries.[32] Even the title of the reconstruction campaign, "The Reconstruction of the Country from the Consequences of the NATO Aggression," was meant to remind people of the country's victimization, clearly delineating who were patriots and who were enemies. As in its statements about nationalism, in the reconstruction campaign the government sought to define the opposition not as a political opposition, but as an enemy of the state. Despite its apparent disdain and disregard for the opposition, the government nonetheless spent much time shadow-boxing the opposition's claims, attempting to counter-frame the opposition's claims that the country could not

[29] "Serb PM Tells Jagodina to Show 'What Serb People Think'," BETA, Belgrade, August 3, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0803, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[30] Madelaine Albright was particularly hated by the regime, and they regularly invoked her as the symbol of all that was evil. Interestingly, if not symbolically, the two pythons in the zoo in Belgrade were named Madelaine and Christopher, after Madelaine Albright and Warren Christopher.
[31] "Tanjug: Opposition 'Darlings' of 'Bloodthirsty' Albright," *Tanjug* Domestic Service, January 16, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0116, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com. Of note was the particularly "communist rhetoric" type ring the language of the Tanjug article had. See also "Marjanovic Says Reconstruction Proceeding in Record Time," *Tanjug*, Belgrade, January 12, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0112, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[32] See, "Pre-Election Study - Presidential Elections Serbia February 2000" ZA4280.

recover on its own but needed outside funds, as we examine below. The government also repeatedly denied the opposition's claims that it was printing money to fund reconstruction projects, a claim which if true would strongly cut into the credibility of the government's framing of the importance and ability of the government's ability to "go it alone and succeed."

The other major foci, therefore, of the government's reconstruction rhetoric were self-sufficiency and freedom. One self-sufficiency campaign which it ran almost immediately after the NATO bombing ended was called "Let's Buy Ours."[33] Reconstruction reports continuously discussed the importance of the "freedom and independence" of Serbia from the imperialist powers through self-sufficiency in reconstruction, i.e. without Western aid. In July 1999, the Minister of Science, Branislav Ivkovic, urged members of the Academy of Science to "give their contribution to the reconstruction of the country stressing that the main orientation is preservation of independence, not only in the political but also in the technical sense."[34] In January 2000 Tanjug reported, "recalling the heroic defense against the NATO aggression, Marjanovic described today's opening of the rebuilt bridge over the Lim river in Priboj as proof more that only within a free Serbia can we build and further develop, 'There can be no development without freedom and independence. Thus the firm and unmovable policy of our leadership, headed by Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, that our country must

[33] A campaign which, as one Serbian commentator noted, "assumes that we won't be able to do without our famous Serbian computers and our even more famous Serbian cars.'' Petar Lukovic, "Comment: the Great Leap Forward," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report No. 64, August 5, 1999. http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.

[34] Ratomir Petkovic, "Two Approaches to the Future of Serbia: Reconstruction – The Main Trump Card." *AIM* Podgorica, July 9, 1999, published July 13, 1999. http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199907/90713-002-trae-pod.htm.

be successfully defended through all these years.'"[35] If that wasn't clear enough, a few weeks later SPS Main Board member Zoran Vujovic, at an SPS convention in western Serbia argued, "We have set out to rebuild the country with our own forces, because we do not need the help of those who bombed us and sowed death."[36] Central once again to the government's depiction of itself throughout its reconstruction campaign was both its victimization at the hands of greater powers and its "little engine that could" attitude: "A small European country, located in the heart of the Balkans became an obstacle on the power-wielders road to global imperialism…" Serbia was "a small but free and proud nation [that] had ensured a military, political and moral victory in this war that had been unfair in every way."[37] Unlike Hoxha's Albania however, self-sufficiency did not mean complete autarky—as Serbia sought and was granted aid and loans from Russia and China.[38] Moreover, as the Director of the Serbian Directorate for National Reconstruction, Milutin Mrkonjic was quick to point out, Serbia had good relations "with over two-thirds of the world's population—China, Russia and India—and that these countries are daily present and interested in joint investments in development projects."[39] Even western countries were urged to invest in Serbia as soon as they dropped their incorrect attitudes, i.e. their demands for democratic reforms.[40]

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[35] "Marjanovic Says Reconstruction Proceeding in Record Time."
[36] "SPS Official Rejects Aid from States that 'Sowed Death'," *Tanjug*, Belgrade, January 25, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0125., *orld News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[37] "PM Marjanovic Addresses Rally in Raska on Reconstruction," *Tanjug*, Belgrade, April 14, 2000. FBIS-EEU-2000-0414. *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[38] The Chinese government agreed to give Serbia $300 million solely for reconstruction in December 1999. Djindjic of G17 noted that this aid would double the country's foreign currency reserves allowing the government to buy foreign electricity, prop up the dinar. See "China Signs Pact to give Serbia $300 Million for Reconstruction," *The New York Times*, December 11, 1999.
[39] "Tanjug Cites CNN's Interview with Director of Serbian Reconstruction Agency." *Tanjug*, Belgrade, June 21, 2000. FBIS-EEU-2000-0621. *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com. See also the list of attendees at the SPS's Fourth Party congress in February 2000 for a good idea of which countries the government had positive relations with.
[40] "Tanjug Cites CNN's Interview with Director of Serbian Reconstruction Agency."

Nonetheless, central to the government's framing of itself even as part of its reconstruction campaign was its victimization at the hands of outsiders, specifically the west, even as it attempted to present itself as a leader (still) of the non-aligned nations. The "defense of freedom" was a key framing in the reconstruction campaign and "In Defense of Freedom" became the theme of the SPS election campaign in August.

Sacrifice for the country and unity behind Milosevic were also regularly called for as part of the reconstruction campaign. Workers were regularly portrayed on TV as happily toiling at all hours of the day and night on behalf of the regime for the good of the country. "The unity achieved through the resistance to the most powerful enemy during the aggression has been preserved in the period of reconstruction as well," the public was informed.[41] The Minister of Reconstruction was also shown regularly on RTS at constructions sites in the role of the guardian of the people's interests, "such as when he pays a surprise midnight visit to construction sites to encourage workers or publicly criticizes heads of construction companies for failing to meet deadlines."[42] The importance of unity was also regularly emphasized, as was the importance of Milosevic himself as a great leader. Showing how the country was pulling together, making individual sacrifices for the good of the whole and was unified behind the great leader was meant to create a sense of collective identity as well as reminding people that protest, of any kind, was a betrayal of the community, the collectivity, the nation.

The most complete and comprehensive statement of the government's framing on reconstruction, and the importance of reconstruction to the government's attempts to

[41] "Opposition 'Darlings' of 'Bloodthirsty Albright."
[42] Zeljko Cvijanovic, "Milosevic's Winning Campaign," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report No. 165, August 18, 2000., http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.

regain legitimacy, was the framing put forth by Gorica Gajevic, the general secretary of the Socialist Party of Serbia, in February 2000 at the fourth party congress of the SPS, in a speech entitled "Reconstruction, Development Reform." Gajevic's framing clearly connected patriotism, reconstruction and self-reliance,

> Reconstruction is another word for patriotism; Reconstruction is the same as unity. Reconstruction is as important as knighthood and heroism in the battlefield. It is the self-confidence of the people that fills us with pride…. The reconstruction process is a process that deals with the construction and engineering inside our consciences and souls.[43] If someone wants to do something—that is both spirit and defiance. To us it is the spirit from the bridges and the square on which citizens were singing and sending the message that we will not be frightened and banished into underground shelters.[44]

Most interesting in this framing is not only that reconstruction is for the good of the country—but that the good of the country involves the "engineering" of people's consciousness and their souls. Additionally reconstruction was not only a practical matter of giving people a place to live, but one that showed "spirit and defiance" to the outside world. Once again the government's framing was an attempt to forge a collective identity behind the government, to remind people of who the enemy was and who would protect them. Calls for such unity and portrayals of those who in any way dissented as enemies were meant not only to forge a sense of collectivity, but also to signal in a practical way what would and would not be tolerated.[45] The government's reconstruction campaign

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[43] This rings very clearly of Stalin's phrase about the engineers of human souls. In Stalin's case he was referring to writers yet the communist/socialist "ring" to the phrase, and the concept of changing people to suit the needs or act on behalf of the party, would have been familiar to the audience—especially to the foreign audience which was composed primarily of members of completely "unreformed" foreign communist parties.

[44] Excerpt from speech by Gorica Gajevic, general secretary of the Socialist Party of Serbia at 4th SPS congress February 17, 2000, in "Gajevic Delivers Speech at SPS Congress," *Tanjug* Domestic Service, February 17, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0217, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

[45] That the government framing and rhetoric had practical significance can be seen in the discussion among the opposition and in the opposition press as to what was meant by certain phrases by Milosevic and his allies. One example was Milosevic's statement at the Fourth party Congress in February 2000 that there

was well integrated with its "nationalism" campaign—both relied on framing Serbia as victimized and threatened, the only difference was that the reconstruction campaign spent more time on commending the heroic and patriotic spirit of the people and the victorious achievements of the government and the nationalism campaign spent more time emphasizing the outside threats.

Only the Greatest Socialist Successes

If an upbeat note was needed to assert the positive side of reconstruction, this came in the regular proclamations by the government of its successes. Despite the nature of the arguments put forth in framing reconstruction, the language used was nothing if not socialist in tone. Serbia was constructing everything bigger, better and faster than ever before. Statements such as "'Our construction workers build and reconstruct bridges roads and factories, schools and hospitals in record time ensuring top quality and relying on their own knowledge, resources, outstanding devotion and the entire people's patriotism,"[46] were the meat and potatoes of the positive spin campaign for reconstruction. Party officials showed up at openings of bridges, roads and oil refineries to praise the re-builders of Serbia, the quality and quickness of construction and to bestow honors such as those awarded to the employees at the Zavstava factory which had

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was no opposition. This set off indignant statements by the opposition, as well as statements for political gain pointing out the increasingly authoritarian tendencies by the government. However, it also set off concerns among the opposition that increasingly repressive measures were to be taken against them. Millosevic's previous speeches concerning traitors had in the past had such effects. Debates about the practical significance of the rhetoric and concerns increased especially as Milosevic steadily ramped up his "traitors campaign,",i.e. who he called a traitor and what the practical consequences of this were for the people and groups involved. Signaling by using such rhetoric in the press had been done by Milosevic, as in the case of Slavko Curuvija before his murder, and escalation of such rhetoric through media outlets was also used again before increased repression against Otpor. Although in the case of Otpor, other means were use as well, Milosevic's rhetoric and naming of "traitors" Another example of rhetoric having practical implications was the statement by Seselj in February 2000 on the "liquidation" of the press.

[46] "Marjanovic Opens Rebuilt Bridge Near Krusevac," *Tanjug*, Belgrade, January 15, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0115, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

been heavily bombed during the war. Even Milosevic, who did not normally make public appearances, made a point of attending several such openings. As BETA noted, some of his first appearances came immediately after the end of the war during the largest troop withdraws from Kosovo so as to pre-empt the news cycle and have it focus on the reconstruction campaign. On October 11, 1999 Milosevic appeared in Leskovac, the city that until the protests that July had always been an SPS stronghold, to open a railroad station. In addition to the derogatory language used to describe the opposition, Milosevic sounded a more upbeat note in which he declared that "'Serbia is being reconstructed at the speed of the missiles that destroyed her."[47] Construction was to proceed in record time, and by January of 2000, just in time for the fourth SPS congress in February, the government declared the first phase of construction completed. The completion of the first phase of reconstruction however was not the end of the reconstruction process or of the reconstruction campaign, both of which received renewed affirmation and gained speed at the SPS Congress (21 Projects for the 21st Century) and continued apace in the spring.[48] The reconstruction campaign heavily saturated the airwaves throughout the official election campaign period as well at the end of August and especially in September. From the fall of 1999 onward Serbian Prime Minister Marjanovic, who was sent out to openings regularly, frequently used the key words "unity" and "speed" in his speeches. Such statements, coupled with the government's regular bulletins issued via Tanjug, which gave incredible statistics, were meant to impress on people the full-out level of mobilization and the incredible rate at which achievements were being made.

[47] Milenko Vasovic, "The Serbian Opposition finds a Platform," *Hope on the Balkans News Archive*, October 21, 1999, http://www.ddh.nl/fy/kosova/news/1999/opposition2010.html (accessed May 7, 2009).
[48] "SPS Adopts 'Reconstruction, Development, Reforms' Document." *Tanjug*, February 17, 2000. FBIS-EEU-2000-0217. *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com,.

Such notices were meant to impress people with the concern the government felt for them and unify them behind Milosevic and his government. Of particular interest however was Milosevic's opening of the temporary bridge for railway and road transport in Novi Sad in May of 2000.[49] In his speech, Milosevic spoke of the significance of the bridge, "this bridge is sophisticated, visually modern and morally superior…it represents shining construction and a moral victory. We have defeated our enemies because we are better, not because we are stronger."[50] If bridges were representations of all that was morally superior, Serbian President Milutinovic opened a "modern highway" constructed to the world's "highest standards." Its construction also demonstrated that "we have shown that we can stand on our own feet whenever we wish and when we are in harmony, and restore the economic reputation that our country had before the external pressures and misfortune of the past years." Moreover, not only did the highway represent a victory over the oppression of the past, but Serbia was "…building not only for ourselves but also for posterity. We are laying the foundations of our future to be determined by our own results…therefore we are creating conditions for a better tomorrow and peaceful existence for our people through reconstruction and development and reforms in all spheres including the political system."[51] While it is clear that any government that had suffered significant losses, especially in infrastructure in a recent war might want to

[49] Milosevic chose to arrive by train, one that arrived at a slow rate of speed, the engine bedecked with flowers and draped with the Yugoslav flag. Directly imitating Tito, who often used such a train for his arrival in places, Milosevic clearly sought to link himself and Tito in people's minds—reminding people that he was the legitimate heir to Tito—hoping perhaps to have some of Tito's popularity rub off on him.
[50] Slobodan Milosevic quoted in Vana Susa, "New from Serbia, All the important News Since 29 May," *Central Europe Review* 2/22, (June 5, 2000) accessed at http://www.pecina.cz/files/www.ce-review.org/00/22/serbianews22.html accessed on July 18, 2008.
[51] "Milutinovic Speaks at Highway Opening Ceremony," *Tanjug* Domestic Service, July 11, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0711, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com. The reference to the political system was telling, as this speech was made directly after the changes were made to the constitution in July, clearly without any opposition support.

remind people that they could still provide for the people, Milosevic's government was intent on framing people in a constant state of mobilization, working for the good of the state—unified in work and spirit behind the socialist party and Milosevic. By showing workers and the Minister of Reconstruction working 24/7, speaking of the happy sacrifices of the workers, extolling the constant speed and progress of the reconstruction effort and printing numerous Bulletins full of huge figures representing their accomplishments, the entire reconstruction campaign took on a "socialist worker" flavor. If the rest of the framing of the reconstruction campaign was to keep people unified behind Milosevic because he was the only one who could protect them from dangers, the "socialist' aspect of the reconstruction campaign was the only one which offered an upbeat assessment of what Serbia could do and what the future might bring. The question was, would it be credible to those on the receiving end? Would they believe the government when it said that "reconstruction and reforms are priorities of the SPS economic strategy…For us economic progress is the basis for creating jobs, a safer future for young people, the development of those activities in which progress depend.'[52] Would they believe the government and put their faith in these promises of a better future?

The Opposition

From the start the opposition was only in a position to "counter-frame" the government's reconstruction campaign, denying the veracity of the government's claims

[52] "SPS Adopts 'Reconstruction, Development, Reforms Document."

and pointing out the flaws since they themselves could not do any reconstruction per se.[53] Certainly the government's "self-sufficiency" campaign gave the opposition fodder. Basing their arguments on data provided by the expert group G17, the opposition argued that going it alone was not a choice if the country was to be rebuilt and that outside funds, the type that only the West could offer, would be needed. The fact that Alliance for Change could claim to have impartial data from a group that was respected by the public boosted the credibility of their counter-responses to the government on this issue as did the statements made by Avramovic, also perceived as a well-respected expert by many people. These reinforced Alliance for Change's claims about the inaccurate nature of the government's framing of the economy, reinforcing AFC's claims that Milosevic was responsible for people's misfortune and that change was needed.

While this was an argument about economics—it was also clearly an argument about the direction of the country. The government's argument about the need for self-sufficiency did not meet with universal approval at home. Only a little more than a month after the bombing campaign finished, some spoke up against the government's reconstruction campaign.[54] As early as July 9, 1999, the Independent Union chairman of the Pcinj district publicly stated: "We do not want a reconstruction of the television or the building of bridges, we do not want the television image of prosperity, non-existent

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[53] The opposition's efforts to get Western sanctions lifted thus showing that they could win tangible results that they could bring back to Serbia from the West was the closest that they could get to "bringing home the bacon." The West was not always "cooperative" in the opposition's efforts to prove that it could do something for the people and bring them something.

[54] United Nations Development Program Serbia: European Movement in Serbia, 2001, "Vulnerability Trends and Perceptions: Suspended Transition." http://www.undp.org.rs/index.cfm?event=public.publications&pg=8, (accessed May 5, 2009), notes that in December 1999 69% of Serbs thought that international assistance would be needed for reconstruction and only 19% thought Serbia could go it alone; in February 2000 those numbers were 68% and 21%. According to the NDI *Serbia Issues Poll*, October 24, 1999, http://www.ndi.org/files/410_yu_serbpoll99.pdf (accessed May 6, 2009), 64% of Serbs disagreed that the opposition leaders were "traitors" for talking with the West (43% strongly disagreed and 21% disagreed).

employment and a life based on a non-existent income…We want fundamental changes, political, economic and all other changes." He went on to say that really the only demand of the Union was "a *normal* life for workers."[55] Moreover a discussion of reconstruction of the country allowed the political opposition parties and independent media to try to widen the argument to discuss the state of the overall economy. The opposition parties regularly released statements pointing to flaws in the government's projections for the economy as well as their budget figures. The opposition was also quick to point out the government's inflationary actions, namely the printing of currency without anything to back it up. The severe hyperinflation of 1993/94, a time of horror for most Serbs was not forgotten. Opposition statements that indicated that the government might be headed down a path that could lead to such chaos were clearly meant to remind people not only of the government's past actions—but what the future could hold were the current government to be allowed to continue. It certainly acted as a serious challenge to the government's framing of its reconstruction successes. Finally such framing by the opposition served to remind people that it had the economic experts—including Avramovic who had "saved" the country from the earlier hyperinflation, on its side. The framing was effective at putting the government on the defensive—feeling the need to respond to the accusations on more than one occasion in very public ways. Overall, the topic of the economy and discussions of the economy worked to the opposition's advantage. While the government would claim how quickly reconstruction was occurring and attempt to illustrate that using its monopoly on state TV and many other media outlets, the opposition could easily remind people which government had brought them

[55] "Trade Union Asks Authority to 'Look Reality in the Eye'," *BETA*, Belgrade, July 9, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0709, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

hyperinflation in the past, and, more to the point, was bringing them queues for basic supplies in the present.

The Campaign for a "Normal Life"

While the political opposition parties regularly attacked and responded to Milosevic's rhetoric during the reconstruction campaign from the end of the bombing in June of 1999 through the end of the election period, their real trump card when it came to discussion of the economy was their understanding of people's need for more than reconstructed brick and mortar buildings and factories. The Independent Trade Union leader cited above expressed this very clearly when he noted that people wanted fundamental change, not the "television image of prosperity."[56] The Alliance for Change campaign had summed this all up throughout its unofficial campaign starting after the NATO bombing, framing the need for "changes." Even its name, Alliance for *Change* made explicit its argument, which it framed with a diagnosis and a prognosis: people wanted changes made in their lives, Milosevic was to blame for the current state of affairs, and therefore the best way to achieve change was to get rid of Milosevic and to elect the Alliance, which could bring a better future. The Alliance for Change could thus both make the campaign a referendum on Milosevic and his government and implicitly promise a better future. Choosing "change" as a theme also allowed the Alliance for Change flexibility in the specific issues it could discuss and claim as its own. Importantly, while making a seemingly strong, explicit argument, as a frame, "change" was somewhat ambiguous, allowing people to fill in their own meanings and priorities.[57]

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[56] "Trade Union Asks Authorities to 'Look Reality in the Eye."

[57] See Francesca Polletta, "'It Was Like a Fever...': Spontaneity and Identity in Collective Action," *Social Problems* 45 (1998): 137-159, as well as a more detailed version in her book, *It Was Like a Fever: Storytelling in Protest and Politics*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006) on how ambiguity in

This was particularly useful in framing a "normal life" because as I have shown, a normal life meant different things to different people. While some middle class Serbs thought of normal life as being able to travel and attend conferences, others thought of a normal life as just being able to buy ice cream, and had no desire or expectations to travel.

People's desires for a normal life were regularly acknowledged by the Alliance for Change in its rallies throughout the summer and fall of 1999. In the spring of 2000 such acknowledgements of people's desire for a normal life were made clear not so much in independent statements by the opposition, but in a reaction to and in contrast with the government's own actions, especially those beginning in May 2000. The actions taken by the government in May of 2000 exemplified arbitrariness and disregard for basic rights, repression of a broader sector of the populace to induce fear, mobilization against traitors: in short, the government's actions exemplified everything that people did not want. The month of May was a critical juncture: the regime decided to increase repression and attempt to wrest more control over the populace for themselves and the people decided to rally in the face of what was now more clearly an open assault on their opportunity to live a "normal life" free from fear. The regime's actions had two distinct foci: first, Otpor, and second, the media. Both had previously been subject to harassment to varying degrees. However, the arrest and subsequent torture of three Otpor activists by police in Milosevic's home town, Pozarevac (due to an incident at the nightclub owned by Milosevic's son), and the physical assault on and take-over of Studio B and other media outlets in which the government did not try to seize their operations on legal pretexts, as had previously been the case, followed closely on each other's heels. These two

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narratives can provide for greater effectiveness. See also Katherine Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), especially the discussion on pp. 28-29 for the importance of ambiguity, multivocality and polysemy.

significant incidents, in combination with a host of other smaller attacks, such as those on an ever larger number of Otpor participants over a wider geographical range for relatively insignificant things such as wearing a "Changes," or an Otpor fist t-shirt, and the closing or jamming of radio and television stations, brought home in a more pointed way than previously what seemed to be the increasingly repressive nature of the regime. Moreover neither the attack on the activists in Pozarevac nor the closing of Studio B was a one day event. Rather each played out over the course of the month thus constantly keeping each event in the public eye. Other events too added to the sense that the government was taking increasingly serious measures, signaling the closing of public space and the taking of a more authoritarian turn. All of these events reminded people daily that they were not living a normal life in a normal state. Rather they were living in a state in which they were subjected to increasingly brutal and repressive events.[58] They were reminded of this not only by the independent media and at opposition rallies, but they saw it in their own communities with their own eyes. The regime framed its actions in terms of an increasing need for national security, against internal traitors. But as it increased the numbers, and types of groups and individuals that it called traitors, it signaled both through its actions and its words an across the board crackdown on a larger group of people than heretofore.[59] Whereas previously such actions had been largely perpetrated against elite

[58] For a sense of the sudden upturn in arrests and abusive police tactics against youth see Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies, "Otpor Campaign, 1999-2000," http://www.canvasopedia.org/content/serbian_case/otpor_campaign.htm. Between May and August 2000 more than 1,000 Otpor activists were arrested. The monthly record for arrests was in May 2000, when 221 members were arrested in 1 month—June was even higher. See Vesna Jelicic, "How to Resist Repression: Who Gets Arrested in Serbia," *AIM* Podgorica, July 14, 2000, published July 25, 2000, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200007/00725-003-trae-pod.htm.

[59] A brief chronology here may be useful: May 2: Otpor Pozaravac incident, May 8: Miroslav Filipov, a journalist who had written about Serbian brutality in Kosovo (a taboo that had not previously been broken), is detained by police, May 9: rally in Pozarevac called off in face of arrests, rescheduled for Belgrade: May 9-15, Studio B fined huge sums for mentioning incident in Pozarevac, May 13: murder of senior member of

politicians or journalists, now it seemed an increasing number of "regular" people, especially youth, were to be harassed, arrested and possibly brutalized.[60]

Within this context Alliance for Change ran three major rallies in Belgrade in less than three weeks. Given the regime's actions, calling one of the AFC rallies "Stop the Terror" did not seem in the least sensational. Rather it seemed a measured response to the regime's actions. Alliance for Change had little framing work to do in light of these events to show how it differed from the Milosevic regime. The differences were crystal clear due to the regime's own actions and the efforts by independent press and media outlets to make them known. Nonetheless, Alliance for Change did frame these differences between the regime's treatment of people and its own treatment of people and beliefs quite clearly. Such expressions by Alliance for Change were as much a way to make clear its outrage, and give voice to people's own feelings of anger, as they were to make clear their points. At the May 15 "Stop the Terror" rally held to protest both the actions taken against the Otpor activists and the arrests of journalists and activists who originally were going to protest in Pozarevac,[61] DOS politicians had three specific

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Milosevic government Bosko Perosevic in Novi Sad falsely blamed on Otpor as pretext for additional crackdown, May 15: Opposition Rally in Belgrade for Otpor, "Stop the Terror," May 17: government jams radio stations that can reach Belgrade and seizes Studio B, May 17: Red Star football fans beaten by police in a pitched battle, May17-18: Opposition rallies held for Studio B and free press and media, May 18: police beat peaceful demonstrators, May 23: students beaten in front of University Agricultural Faculty while protesting earlier beating of students by police, May 25: Milosevic shuts down the university early before the school year is complete, May 25-26: students protest university shut-down, May 27: Opposition Rally in Belgrade, May 29: Milosevic opens "morally superior bridge."

[60] For a more detailed examination of the events of May 2000 and their effects on mobilization see Chapter Twelve, especially the section on repression effects.

[61] The Alliance for Change rally was originally scheduled to be held in Pozarevac. AFC had applied for all the appropriate permits. The law in Serbia was one that allowed the rally to take place unless it was explicitly banned. In this case the activists were not informed that the rally had been banned until they were already underway in busses from all over the country. Journalists from Beta. Blic and Danas were arrested, two Dutch journalists were brought in for questioning and League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina president Nenad Canak and his bodyguard were also arrested. The fact that the ban was not announced till some time after 3am would seem to indicate that the regime was looking for a conflict as other bans on rallies had been given well in advance. Within 24 hours of the ban fifty activists and journalists were arrested and the town was completely closed off by police to anyone from the outside. "Who Stands Behind

messages all in keeping with their previous framings. The first message was that Pozarevac should not be "forbidden territory." All of Serbia should belong to all Serbians—there should not be privileged elite territory only for a select few who could break the law with impunity.[62] Vladan Batic told the assembled crowd that it was clear that the few civil rights that remained were being abrogated, and after calling Mira Markovic a red witch, he, "accused her of building a red wall around Pozarevac on her attempt to turn the town into a Serbian Tienanmen."[63] This framing encapsulated both moral aspects of right and injustice as well as having a democratic focus, making clear that the people should be in charge of their government. Democracy and freedom of movement, especially within one's own country was normal—"forbidden territories" within one's country were not part of a normal life.

Second, the speakers spoke out explicitly against fear, acknowledging that the audience and others might be afraid of what their government was doing, that the government appeared to be trying to incite civil war and was clearly trying to sow fear, but that the citizens had a right and in fact a duty to not allow the government to triumph. Speaking of the recent murder of Bosko Perosevic, Kostunica told the audience that "the regime always uses verbal and physical violence to realize its goals."[64] New Democracy President Dusan Mihailovic followed Kostunica at the podium, adding that the murders

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the Crisis in Pozarevac?" *Free Serbia News: Beyond the News*, May 9, 2000. http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/news/btn/2000/e-05-2000.html#9. Accessed May 29, 2009.

[62] The theme of forbidden territory is also discussed in Chapter Eleven on mobilization. Suffice it to say that the theme of "forbidden territory" was one that was well known to Serbs and had been discussed as part of the public discourse on the regime since at least 1996/97 if not before.

[63] Vladan Batic, remarks at "Stop the Terror! For Free Elections." Report with video and photos of opposition rally in Belgrade on May 15, 2000. *Free Serbia Specials, Broadcasts*, May 15, 2000. http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/specials/broadcasts/15052000/e-index.html (accessed May 7, 2009).

[64] Vojislav Kostunica, remarks at "Stop the Terror! For Free Elections." Report with video and photos of opposition rally in Belgrade on May 15, 2000. *Free Serbia Specials, Broadcasts*, May 15, 2000. http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/specials/broadcasts/15052000/e-index.html (accessed May 7, 2009).

were organized by the regime because the regime was "scared and because you know your end is near. So you are trying to scare us. Well have no fear. The future is ours,"[65] he told the audience. Batic too spoke of the fact that the regime appeared to be trying to provoke a civil war, arguing that only through such a war would they be able to maintain their power. Finally Momcilo Trajkovic, President of the Serbian Resistance Movement in Kosovo, told the demonstrators that the government was "exploiting the nation's misery to prolong its stay in power. They are looking for enemies where there are none—among the youth and future of Serbia. The united opposition has a great responsibility to save Kosovo and Serbia together with the people."[66] This framing explicitly tied together several key points of the opposition: first that the regime was immoral and would try to incite civil war, the kind most feared by people, to achieve its ends; second, the framing exhorted the people to resist and not to be afraid—that such bellicose behavior by the regime meant that the end could be near—implying that people should recognize the urgency and severity of the situation and indicating how the opposition clearly differed from the regime; and finally it tied the events to the future of Serbia. Such events it argued could not be allowed to continue if Serbia was to be saved. The future of Serbia, our children, was being harmed. A normal life was one in which citizens were not being incited to civil war and one's children were not being attacked. The regime was actively promoting war and distrust to prevent people from achieving a normal life.

[65] Dusan Mihailovic remarks at "Stop the Terror! For Free Elections." Report with video and photos of opposition rally in Belgrade on May 15, 2000. *Free Serbia Specials, Broadcasts*, May 15, 2000. http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/specials/broadcasts/15052000/e-index.html (accessed May 7, 2009).
[66] Momcilo Trajkovic, remarks at "Stop the Terror! For Free Elections." Report with video and photos of opposition rally in Belgrade on May 15, 2000. *Free Serbia Specials, Broadcasts*, May 15, 2000. http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/specials/broadcasts/15052000/e-index.html (accessed May 7, 2009).

Finally the AFC gave voice to what many parents throughout Serbia had expressed—"you will not beat out children!" Such a sentiment was sure to find resonance among people given the ways in which Serbs, especially in Central Serbia, had reacted to their children, reservists, being sent off to war the previous summer.[67] This sentiment, voiced on May 15 in response to the events in Pozarevac, was only to get stronger as the month went on and more "children" were arrested, inappropriately held for questioning and beaten by the police. The framing of this issue at the rally was explicit—clearly tying people's emotions, anger and outrage, into what actions they should take and why; differentiating what the regime did and offered to people and what the Alliance for Change stood for. Djindjic himself made this explicit, "if you attack our children you attack the future of Serbia. This is the position where mere gathering stops and something else has to be done."[68] Djindjic then went on to say that "the difference between the regime and the opposition has never been more clear-cut. The opposition offers a country

[67] The regime sent out recruitment notices to reservists in Central Serbia again in the spring of 2000. Army officers who were attempting to serve notices were met in some cases by villagers and city dwellers with pitchforks, staves and other agricultural tools who forced them off and out of town. This also led to renewed citizen protest both in towns and outside buildings housing the Army. See "Serbia: Kraljevo reservists protest against frequent call-ups," Beta News Agency, March 13, 2000, available on Lexis-Nexis Academic; "Serbia: Two thousand members of public join reservist protest against call-up," Beta News Agency, March 14, 2000, Available on Lexis-Nexis Academic; "Yugoslav reservists protest against call-ups in central Serbian town," March 15, 2000, Available in Lexis-Nexis Academic; "Town urges army to suspect call-up of town's reservists," BBC summary of World Broadcasts, Radio B2-92, March 20, 2000, available at Lexis-Nexis Academic; "Protesting Yugoslav Army reservists refuse to fight against Montenegro," BBC summary of World Broadcasts, Radio B2-92, March 22, 2000, available at Lexis-Nexis Academic; Gillian Sandford, "Weary from three wars, some Serbians defy the draft," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 28, 2000, 7; Miroslav Filipovic, "Serbs Defy Draft," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, BCR. No. 124, 14 March 2000; Laura Rozen, "Belgrade Braced for War," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, BCR. No. 121, March 3, 2000. Such actions on the part of the regime can only be seen as a "blunder" as they clearly reignited sentiment from the previous summer.

[68] Zoran Djindjic, remarks at "Stop the Terror! For Free Elections." Report with video and photos of opposition rally in Belgrade on May 15, 2000. *Free Serbia Specials, Broadcasts*, May 15, 2000. http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/specials/broadcasts/15052000/e-index.html (accessed May 7, 2009.)

wide open to the world market, to paychecks that will provide a decent life. The regime is not a political adversary anymore. They are a disease that must be cured."[69]

Such framings illustrate the Alliance for Change's grasp of both people's emotional needs—the need to express anger and moral outrage at events perpetrated by the regime—and AFC's realization that it needed to harness such emotions for action. The framings indeed spoke to what a "normal" life would be, by clearly pointing out what was not a normal life. Civil war was not normal. Being terrorized by your government so that they could stay in power was not normal, declaring war on much of the youth of the country was not normal, mobilizing people against traitors and spies was not normal, and closing off parts of the country for the exclusive use of the few was not what a normal life was about. By contrast, the Alliance for Change implied that it stood for something very different. It could provide Serbia and Serbia's youth with a future, could provide Serbs with a path to the West (and all that was European and "normal"), with paychecks, with peace, and calm—and an exit from history.

A mere two days later with the closing of Studio B such framings once again were the themes at the rally. The United Opposition issued a declaration after its meeting which urged citizens to be aware of their "historic responsibility" and be "agents of their own history" by raising their voices against what had happened. It urged citizens to perform acts of civil disobedience such as "blocking traffic, protest walks and abandoning positions." The Declaration pointed to the moral injustice perpetrated on the people of Serbia as "the regime has decided to turn this country into the private property of a handful of people who are totally indifferent to the fate of Serbia, its citizens and

[69] Zoran Djindjic, remarks at "Stop the Terror! For Free Elections." Report with video and photos of opposition rally in Belgrade on May 15, 2000. *Free Serbia Specials, Broadcasts*, May 15, 2000. http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/specials/broadcasts/15052000/e-index.html (accessed May 7, 2009.)

democratic institutions."[70] Moreover, following the theme of a few days earlier the "forbidden" aspect of territory was brought up by the Student Union of Serbia which argued in its statement that "by closing the only existing independent media in Belgrade the territory of the 'Forbidden City' has expanded from the Dejine neighborhood to the entire city of Belgrade." Furthermore the students declared, "It seems that the arrests and beatings of Otpor activists, journalists and political party leaders are not enough to keep the regime in power, and that it is necessary for night to fall on Serbia."[71] While other speakers at the rally on May 17 and later at the opposition rally for unity on May 27 spoke of the need to struggle for a better life, warned that the struggle would be long and people would have to endure, Nebojsa Kojadinovic, the manager and editor in chief of Studio B summed it up very nicely. He clearly delineated the difference between the opposition and what it offered and the regime and what it offered: "Serbia will enter the 21st century without Slobodan Milosevic, or the 19th century with Slobodan Milosevic."[72] Like the students he too perceived "night" falling over Serbia—people could choose their history—it would be history of their making. They would have to take action. "We must retrieve not only the radio and television station, but also our dignity." And that indeed summed up so well what "normal life" was about and what the opposition was trying to convey—it was moving forward, to the future—with dignity.

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[70] United Opposition Declaration and remarks excerpted in "Rally of Serbian opposition for freeing Studio B." Report with video and photos of opposition rally in Belgrade on May 18, 2000. *Free Serbia Specials, Broadcasts*, May 18, 2000. http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/specials/broadcasts/17052000/e-index.html (accessed May 7, 2009.)

[71] Student Union remarks excerpted in "Rally of Serbian opposition for freeing Studio B." Report with video and photos of opposition rally in Belgrade on May 18, 2000. *Free Serbia Specials, Broadcasts*, May 18, 2000. http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/specials/broadcasts/17052000/e-index.html (accessed May 7, 2009.)

[72] Nebojsa Kojadinovic, manager and editor-in-chief of Studio B quoted in "Protest of the United Opposition," *Free Serbia Specials,* Belgrade, May 27, 2000, http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/specials/broadcasts/27052000/e-index.html, accessed May 7, 2009.

However, the clearest framing of a normal life, one that showed not only an intellectual understanding of people's desires but also one that showed emotional empathy for their needs, was the campaign run by Kostunica after he was announced as the DOS candidate for president. A key component of this campaign was the framing of Kostunica himself—portraying him as someone who understood what it was to want an "normal life," who himself lived as one of the people, not above the people and who was empathetic to people's needs, sympathetic to their plights, uncorrupted, who was a man who could bring such changes. Messages only resonate with people if, in part, the person delivering them seem credible. As I illustrate in section that follows, the framing of Kostunica was both deliberate and, as polls were to show as the election neared, effective. Kostunica's framings for a normal life were also laced with terms to express the urgency and the severity of the situation, to impress upon people the need to go and vote. He recognized both implicitly in his framings and explicitly the importance of moving people to the polls. These mobilization efforts are examined in detail in the next chapter. However in addition to his "mobilization framings" and framing himself as someone who was the answer to Serbia's current problems, Kostunica also illustrated that he understood Serbian citizens desire to live a normal life and that he was someone that they could trust to deliver on such a promise.

"The question that arises is who can free Serbia of the poverty, fear and humiliation. The answer of course is Kostunica."[73] The quote from Kostunica's aide illustrates that the campaign itself had a clear grasp of what people wanted—an end to poverty and fear, and a return to dignity—an end to humiliation. This understanding was

[73] Nenad Milic, quoted in "Kostunica's Aides Vow to Conduct 'Modest but Clear' Campaign for FRY President," *BETA*, Belgrade, August 25, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0825, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com The slogan "Kostunica, of course!" became one of the key campaign slogans.

in part due to the fact that together with the DOS campaign, Kostunica's campaign was also utilizing information obtained from focus groups and public opinion polling. In addition to his patriotic message, which has already been discussed, Kostunica's main message was that he understood people's every day trials and could bring them a normal life—one in which rule of law was key, in which they could travel, in which they would have jobs, would have stability and most importantly—dignity. On the campaign trail in Loznica he baldly stated that the elections in September would decide whether, "we will live in dignity or whether the disintegration of the country will continue," noting that, "the people in Serbia had been brought together by 'misery and a wish to live normal lives.'" [74] He argued for a normal life which would return dignity to people through normal work. "People are leaving the country because they cannot live in it normally. I saw professors selling goods at the market in order to survive."[75] More than once in interviews Kostunica commented on how people would approach him, telling him that they were hungry and asking him to save them. He went on to say that "people are desperate, they are on some sort of edge…Quite simply, desperation is erupting from a lot of people who have been stripped of their rights and humiliated for decades."[76] Returning dignity to people was certainly one of the themes of Kostunica's campaign. He discussed the importance of the need for a "moral renewal" for the country along with a change in how institutions worked. His discussion of the need for moral renewal was usually coupled with discussions of the regime's hate speech and how he would not

[74] "Loznica, Sabac Citizens Greet 'Serb' Kostunica 'Enthusiastically'" BETA, Belgrade, September 4, 2000. FBIS-EEU-2000-0904. *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[75] "DOS Presidential Candidate Kostunica Starts Preelection Campaign," *BETA*, Belgrade, August 30, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0905, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[76] Batic Bacevic, "Serbia among Plum Trees,"*NIN*, September 7, 2000, http://www.ex-yupress.com/nin/nin59.html, accessed May 7, 2009. See also Steven Erlanger, "Milosevic Foe Leading Field in Yugoslavia," *The New York Times*, September 4, 2000.

respond in kind—citing hate speech as a type of violence against people that should not be tolerated and would not be a part of the way he conducted himself or his campaign.[77] By ruling out responses in kind he once again was differentiating himself from the regime, indirectly indicating that the regime not only used dirty tricks and hate speech, but was immoral. He would remain unsullied. More importantly, such framing of the regime, and conversely of his refusal to respond in kind indicated the type of regime that he wanted—where he and a new DOS-run government would respect civil rights and freedoms—as well as normal civility. Such framing indicated that all people would be treated with dignity and neither demeaned nor mobilized by being categorized into patriots or traitors. Such indicators spoke directly to people's wants when they thought of everyday, "normal" life. Vesna Pesic recognized this when she noted that Kotunica was appealing to people because, "he will simply allow them to without too much excitement find the lost path and sense. He will simply leave them alone and allow them to realize the scale of their calvary and turn their faces with more hope to the future."[78] He would provide dignity and stability. In short, Pesic argued that Kostunica would allow people an exit from history.

Indeed, on September 20, 2000, Kostunica gave his final pre-election day speech in front of 150,000 to 200,000 people. The speech's coherence, eloquence and sharpness brought into focus the framing efforts of DOS and Kostunica himself. He began by

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[77] See Kostunica's remarks in "Without Opposition Unity, There Will Not Be Us Either," English version of DSS press conference, July 28, 2000. http://www.bbnet.org.yu/bdnet/news/eng/0728dss.htm (accessed October 28, 2008). See also Kostunica's interview with *Vreme*, "Empty Pocket and State," where Kostunica states that he, "advocates normal dialogue, tolerance, exclusion of vengefulness, verbal violence and hate speech. All these values are sorely lacking in our public life." He goes on to note that without civil conversation, tolerance and mutual respect, democracy cannot come about since it requires these qualities to exist.

[78] Vesna Pesic, "Flood is Coming," *Danas*, Belgrade, September 14, 2000, http://www.ex-yupress.com/danas/danas44.html, accessed May 7, 2009.

noting that the elections were a chance to begin anew—to change lives. He examined the state that they were currently living in pointing out that it was the dictatorship of one man who cared not for the citizens. He then profiled himself in contrast to Milosevic, noting that he was "an ordinary average man. It has never occurred to me to see myself as some historic greatness." His next words spoke to the depth of his understanding of people's desire and yearning for a "normal life"—one that was an exit from history:

> I only know what you want, and what I want, of course is to live in an ordinary, average European country. A state free from within, democratic, that is. A state free towards the outside, that is to say independent. A state of average standard of living. Average relations with other states. Average membership of international organizations. Average economy. An average industrial growth. An average stable national currency. Average banks. Averagely supplied shops. Average salaries and pensions, which are averagely regular. An average social care system. Average health care. Average media in which field of cultural events would hit the headlines, in a word, a state of averagely European everything.[79]

If that was not a clear enough statement of what people wanted he then played devil's advocate, noting that what he was recommending might be seen as boring—and noting that indeed in the end that was what people wanted:

> Some would say: averages are boring, there is nothing exciting about them, nothing vivid. Something is always going on here. Yes indeed! Something has been going on for more than a half century more intensively so over the last decade. These dramatic events of ours have made us all but unique in the world. What have we been through? The wars in which we did not take part, but coffins reached us nevertheless. The waves of refugees—our kinsmen exiled from their hearths over the river Drina. Inflation that took our breath away. Queues for all kinds of everything, Sanctions. Isolation. The media demonization of our country…[80]

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[79]Speech by Vojislav Kostunica at the DOS Last Pre-election Convention, Belgrade, September 20, 2000, BD NetNews, Elections in Serbia 2000 accessed at http://www.bbnet.org.yu/bdnet/elections/eng/0920kostunica.htm. Accessed December 29, 2007.

[80] Speech by Vojislav Kostunica at the DOS Last Pre-election Convention, Belgrade, September 20, 2000, BD NetNews, Elections in Serbia 2000 accessed at http://www.bbnet.org.yu/bdnet/elections/eng/0920kostunica.htm. Accessed December 29, 2007

Kostunica went on to summarize the excitement of the past—and to question whether or not Milosevic's claims that he will "chase them all away" are at all credible given the past Kostunica has just summarized.

> I am absolutely sure that we have tired of all those stormy and tempestuous events. What we need is the New Testament—peace amongst ourselves. We need calm. We need a kind of life in which excitements would be confined primarily to the personal plane—let the public, political life be monotonous, even boring if you like. In a nutshell what we need is a normal and civilized state. A mundane and replaceable authority whose term in office would be limited time-wise. An ordinary democratic state where law rules. And order. A state in which the authorities fear the people, not visa-versa. A state whose citizen would not live in the permanent fear of destitution and poverty. This is the only state the Democratic Opposition of Serbia and I can offer to you…You have heard the offer. It is up to you to verify it on September 24. May god give us the wisdom and courage to win freedom. For Serbia, of course.[81]

Indeed, in every word he spoke, Kostunica was offering people an end to mobilization, an end to historical greatness, and end to messianic ambitions, an opportunity to realize personal dignity in the small things of life. He was asking them to vote for DOS and himself if they wanted a simple, stable, average, normal everyday life. He was offering, as Stojan Cerovic had written in 1999, an exit from history.

Looking for a Hero—The Hero and the Anti-Hero, Milosevic and Kostunica

Milosevic—The Hero

Nothing could better encapsulate the differences between SPS-JUL and Alliance for Change—and their respective worldviews—than their framing of their presidential candidates. The framing of these candidates was of special significance since Serbs largely saw leaders as controlling politics. Parties did not put forward candidates in

[81] Speech by Vojislav Kostunica at the DOS Last Pre-election Convention, Belgrade, September 20, 2000, BD NetNews, Elections in Serbia 2000 accessed at http://www.bbnet.org.yu/bdnet/elections/eng/0920kostunica.htm. Accessed December 29, 2007.

Serbia, despite reports that said so. Rather, leaders were in charge of parties. The individual characteristics and traits of those leaders were seen as markers to the types of policies that would be enacted and the type of government: democratic, semi-democratic, authoritarian, that would ensue. Leaders' personal characters were therefore carefully scrutinized by the public as these could be used as cognitive shortcuts to understanding what might follow. Thus how leaders chose to portray themselves was significant to how people perceived and understood them, whether or not they would sympathize and support them—and their causes—and ultimately whether or not they would actively mobilize for them. Milosevic and Kostunica chose to frame themselves in ways so different that no Serb could fail to notice what they were being told. But neither image was an unvarnished look at the "real" man—both images were carefully crafted so as to emphasize those traits that the politicians themselves thought would serve them best. This is not to say that these were false images—but they certainly were not left to chance.

Milosevic had previously worked to ensure that he was seen as a statesman, not as a mere politician. He used RTS and other media outlets to emphasize his meetings with world leaders, leaving it largely to surrogates to engage in the nasty business that was politics, while he issued, when needed, more measured statements. As the time grew nearer to when he would call elections however, it became apparent that he too decided to re-tool his image. While it is not known with whom the impetus to re-shape Milosevic from a statesman to national hero began, that such a campaign to reframe him was initiated is clear. Certainly it was not the first time such a campaign had been started or paeans of gratitude sung in his name. In 1996, powerful SPS leader Mile Ilic, who ran Nis, called for Milosevic to receive the Nobel Peace prize and led a movement to try to

get him nominated.[82] But the movement to elevate Milosevic's image, from statesman to "National Hero" was a far more concerted effort this time that spanned a larger period of time. Starting in the fall of 1999 Mirjana Markovic, Milosevic's wife and head of JUL, proposed that Milosevic should be named the "national hero."[83] This call was quickly and publicly endorsed first by Sinisa Vucinic, the leader of an almost non-existent party whose sole reason for existence seemed to be to act as a supposedly unbiased observer of events, but which was actually a mouthpiece for the regime. He argued that Milosevic had to be awarded the order of National Hero for "his hitherto patriotic stands and action, who, in the mannerism of a great political visionary, has placed himself among the greatest statesman of the epoch." Additionally, Vucinic argued that Milosevic was "the savior of Serbian statehood and an undaunted fighter for peace, justice, equality, humanism and solidarity," having made Yugoslavia into "a bastion of true democracy in Europe and at the same time the Piedmont of progressive, democratic forces of the entire world."[84] The quest to have Milosevic awarded National Hero status was also taken up by several World War II veteran's groups who argued that "the Order of National Hero [should be given to] Slobodan Milosevic, supreme commander of the Army of Yugoslavia… for his heroism in waging the defense war imposed by the NATO aggressor, led by the United States, and the heroic results in the reconstruction of the

[82] This effort was briefly "replayed" in December 1999 when the Loznica Veterans Association tried to have Milosevic nominated. Ivica Dacic, the SPS spokesman, noted however that it appeared that the effort would fail because, "So long as the Nobel prize is being given to shameful organizations, such as the Doctors Without Borders, and the Pulitzer award goes to the worst liars, I do not think these will be awarded to people who defend their country and nation." SPS Spokeman Dacic at a news conference December 23,1999 quoted in "SPS Sees Nobel Prize Nomination as 'Insult' to Milosevic." *BETA*, Belgrade, December 23, 1999. FBIS-EEU-1999-1223. *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[83] "The Cult of Milosevic," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report No. 95, November 22, 1999. http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.
[84] "BETA Profiles Leader of 'Non-Existent' Radical Party of the Left-Nikola Pasic." BETA, Belgrade, July 26, 2000. FBIS-EEU-2000-0726. *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

country which the Yugoslav president organized.'[85] In June 2000 the campaign redoubled its efforts and its visibility, with the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army proposing that Milosevic be decorated with the People's Hero Medal. Needless to say such a high profile request was featured prominently in regime-sponsored publications such as *Politika*. This was coupled with a request by another WWII veterans' association (Belgrade's Cukarica district) and the SPS of Kosovo-Metohija proposing that Milosevic be awarded the Order of National Hero.

Such redoubled efforts did not fail to catch people's attention, including that of the opposition political parties and Otpor, leading to a certain amount of counter-framing and push-back. In June, the Pirot Municipal Assembly passed two declarations countering the apparent clamor to have Milosevic made national hero: "We believe that the man who, along with NATO, is chiefly responsible for the bombing of our homeland and town, a man who never [visited] the military on the front, the parents of youths killed in combat, refugees and the wounded, cannot be mentioned in a positive context when it comes to the disaster of the war, and that is our obligation to all true heroes," the first declaration said. [86] The declaration thus squarely laid blame for the war on Milosevic, making a point to separate him from "true heroes" while still blaming NATO. NATO might still be to blame—but so was Milosevic. The second declaration was to name the true heroes, Otpor. "Serbia should be proud, because it is working in line with the best

[85] "Serbia: Local Community Says Milosevic Should Receive National Hero Status," *Tanjug*, Belgrade, November 30, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-1130, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com , and "Bela Crkva Council Wants Milosevic Declared National Hero," *Tanjug*, January 4, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0104, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com

[86] "Town in eastern Serbia says Milosevic does not deserve 'national hero' award," *Beta News Agency* (Belgrade, Serbia), June 9, 2000, Europe - Political: *NewsBank Access World News*, http://infoweb.newsbank.com.

Serbian traditions of honor and honesty."[87] The Veliko Gradiste municipal assembly, in which SPS-JUL had a majority, found itself in a slightly awkward position when it had to refuse to take up the proposal made by a GSS (Civic Alliance) assembly member who proposed that Milosevic *should* be awarded the title National Hero because, "he had won five wars that he had not taken part in, took care of 1 million unemployed people and just as many refugees in Serbia, negotiated that we have salaries averaging 80 German marks and led to the collapse of the assembly." The president's party, interestingly, refused to discuss this proposal! The GSS deputy, undeterred, noted that Milosevic should receive the award of National Hero in Kosovo Polje, "which is where Milosevic's enchanted circle should end."[88] General Persic also went on record in an interview with *NIN* opposing the campaign to have Milosevic decorated a national hero:

> The campaign to decorate him as a national hero would be humorous if it were not tragic. Milosevic is one of the co-perpetrators of the destruction of Yugoslavia, the loss of human lives, material goods, the loss of Kosovo and Metohija. A hero must be among the soldiers in the front lines of battle, with the citizens, must receive the families of those killed, visit the wounded. He has done none of this and does not deserve to be decorated as a national hero.[89]

Otpor too could not resist commenting on the attempts to decorate Milosevic as a national hero. Nis activists were arrested by police on June 28 when they tried to stage their performance "entitled the Supposed Hero within which they intended to symbolically present 'The Order of the Supposed Hero' to FRY President Slobodan

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[87] "Town in eastern Serbia says Milosevic does not deserve 'national hero' award."
[88] "Veliko Gradiste SPS, JUL Reject GSS proposal to declare Milosevic Hero, *BETA*, Belgrade, July 28, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0728, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[89] Svetlana Djurdjevic Lukic, "People from the File Drawer: Interview with General Momcilo Persic," *NIN*, June 22, 2000, http://www.ex-yupress.com/nin/nin49.html (accessed May 7, 2009). General Persic saw the "national hero" campaign as a background campaign to a more serious issue, a constitutional re-ordering of the Army command structure making Milosevic the "supreme commander" a position that under the constitution did not exist at that point.

Milosevic."[90] The arrests only created a greater furor, as Nis mayor Zoran Zivkovic and municipal government president Branislav Jovanovic stood watch outside the Secretariat of Internal Affairs (SUP) building where the activists were detained—with Zivkovic threatening to bring the whole town to stand there if the police tried to remove him as they originally threatened to do. Instead, the action was performed two nights later in an underground passageway (due to inclement weather) with 200 people in attendance. Zivkovic, unable to contain himself, noted that he thought that the rain signified that the heavens were crying if Milosevic was receiving a medal, clearly "the time has come for him [Milosevic] to go on holiday and the world is full of holiday resorts."[91]

Milosevic's SPS party did not react to the counter-framing, other than to try to prove how "beloved" and worshipped he was by the people, by asserting that they had gotten over 1.5 million signatures on his petition for his candidacy for the presidency (DOS snidely responded in a statement that many of the names had been taken directly from the telephone directory)[92] and continued to call him a national hero, the only man who could ensure Serbia's freedom from enslavement. One of his posters, SloboDa,[93]

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[90] "Nis Police Halt Demonstrators Protesting Arrest of 6 Resistance Activists," *BETA*, Belgrade, June 28, 2000., FBIS-EEU-2000-0628, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com. This was not only a social commentary as to whether or not Milosevic should be named a national hero but commentary on the language itself that Milosevic used to brand his enemies. Once someone was perceived as a traitor or an enemy they became the "supposed" or "so-called" in the government's propaganda, as in the "so-called British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the so-called US president" etc. For an excellent biting social commentary on the use of "so-called", or "supposed" as part of the Milosevic propaganda arsenal see Lukovic, "Comment: The Great Leap Forward."

[91] "Serbia: Resistance activists stage performance in underground passage," *FoNet News Agency* (Belgrade, Serbia) June 30, 2000, Europe - Political: *NewsBank Access World News,* http://infoweb.newsbank.com.

[92] "DOS Accuses SPS, JUL of Forging Signature of Support for Milosevic Candidacy," *BETA*, Belgrade, September 3, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0904, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

[93] In Serbian the word "sloboda" means freedom. The word "da" means yes. His posters were therefore a play on the world and his name, "Slobodan", his nickname, "Slobo" "da" meaning yes—to Slobo and yes to freedom. This was not a new poster, since 1992 students had been ridiculing the word play. See Mirjana Prosic-Dvornic, "'Enough! Student Protest '92: The Youth of Belgrade in Search of 'Another Serbia'," *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 10/1-2 (1993). http://condor.depaul.edu/~rrotenbe/aeer/aeer11_1/prosic-dvornic.html (accessed May 6, 2009).

emphasized the freedom theme. True to form of someone who was a "statesman" and "hero," news and television reports featured him in talks with foreign dignitaries and opening new buildings and plants completed as part of the reconstruction campaign. Aside from such limited and controlled circumstances he appeared at only a handful of rallies, for which the audience was bussed in.[94] At such events he was accompanied by dignitaries, rode in cars that were escorted by police to the venues, in short used all the political trappings that symbolically pointed to his elevation above the people—his hero and statesman-like status. Thus, from the end of the NATO bombing through the end of the campaign period, Milosevic chose to frame himself as bigger, above the people, as indispensable, as the only one who could possibly protect and save Serbia. His constant harping on outside enemies and self-elevation of his own status to protector and savior—to a "National Hero"—was meant to lend to his air of invincibility. To some degree this was successful in demobilizing people. Even those who found the strength and courage to work against him had trouble imagining that he would ever peacefully leave if he lost the election. It made their work, convincing others that Milosevic was not invincible, that much harder. After all, as Petar Lukovic pointed out, a "National Hero" does not lose.[95]

Kostunica—the Anti-Hero

[94] See for example his visit to the Zastava car plant for details on how tight security was, on how restricted and hand-picked the audience was. "Serbian nonstate media banned from Zastava factory during Milosevic's visit," *Beta News Agency* (Belgrade, Serbia), September 15, 2000, Europe - Political: *NewsBank Access World News,* http://infoweb.newsbank.com.

[95] Lukovic's statement is worth repeating: "The whole psychological make-up of the Milosevic regime precludes defeat. How can a "National Hero" lose? How can the symbol of the "World's resistance to the New World Order" possibly get fewer votes than Kostunica?" See Petar Lukovic, "The Milosevic Show," Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report No. 170, September 8, 2000, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.

If Milosevic chose to position himself above the people, Kostunica—who had frequently been called Seselj in a tuxedo, i.e. a nationalist who was stuffy, stiff and somewhat uncomfortable with people—had to be somehow remade into a "man of the people." Even those who knew him thought that Kostunica did not have the personality that would draw voters. Vesna Pesic said, "Who would have guessed that Vojislav Kostunica would become a 'candidate of the people' and even enter street poetry. The man who appeared glum and grumpy, too serious and monotonous. What drew the average voter to this man?"[96] Indeed, of interest is *how* average voters came to see in Kostunica someone who was "one of them," when he was known previously as a taciturn intellectual, a constitutional lawyer. That Kostunica be seen as trustworthy, reliable and empathetic was essential to their hearing his message of change and to mobilizing the undecided and apathetic voters to the polling places. Thus Kostunica had to be framed in such a way so as to turn his traits to best advantage.[97]

Part of Kostunica's "charm" was his lack of wealth. He did not have a big apartment, fancy clothes or flashy cars. These facts were regularly emphasized in reports about him in the independent media. Reports emphasized that he drove a battered ten

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[96] Pesic, "The Flood is Coming."

[97] It was helpful that from the autumn of 1999 onwards, Kostunica had the fewest "negatives" of the possible opposition candidates, in contrast to Djindjic. In public opinion poll conducted by the Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, between December 12 and 19, 1999, Kostunica was the only one among active opposition politicians about whom respondents had an equal percentage of favorable as unfavorable opinions (only former National Bank Governor Abramovic had a higher favorable rating, and he was not a serious potential candidate). See the summary of the poll results in Bekic, "Public Opinion of Serbia: Hope for Change." For a comparative chart of public opinion about politicians giving percentages of favorable, unfavorable opinions along with the percentage that was unaware of the particular politician, see Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, "Yugoslav and Serbian Public Opinion on Rating of Politicians According to Citizen's Positive and Negative Opinion," which gives results from surveys in February and August, 2000, http:// http://www.cpijm.org.yu/previous/aug2000.htm. Kostunica's relatively low "negative" rating contributed strongly to his selection as DOS candidate in the first place. But fewest negatives did not mean that he would receive the most votes or motivate people to turn out to the polls—for that to happen, positive framing of the candidate was necessary.

year old Yugo and wore older shoes. In fact his "famously scruffy shoes were the despair of his political allies—until they saw the tireless way he campaigned."[98] He lived a modest life in an apartment in Dorcol—not the most rich or fashionable section of Belgrade. All of these facts were widely publicized although much of this was already know. It was important that Kostunica not be seen as one of the flashy ones with money. Rather he should be understood to be a man, just like them, who lived in somewhat straitened circumstances and did so honorably. Kostunica himself acknowledged the importance of his own lifestyle for both his credibility with the voters and their acceptance of his statements, "'In a poor country where people live in difficult conditions, it is very important [for politicians] to show by personal examples that they share the people's destiny,'"[99] What the information about his shoes, car and apartment location signaled to people was that Kostunica might be able to understand their plight and have some empathy for their current impoverishment. In him, they might find a man, just like them.

Kostunica's lack of wealth, flash and cash also signaled to people that he did not have corrupt "fixer" friends and by extension was unlikely himself to be corrupt. Unlike Djindjic, who was seen as tainted, or Draskovic, who had chosen to be in government with Milosevic, Kostunica had never cooperated with the authorities and was believed to be "clean." The campaign purposefully played on this strength. "Who can look you Straight in the Eye" read Kostunica's campaign posters. From the posters Kostunica's

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[98] Martin Walker, "Yugoslavia's Revolutionary Election: Milosevic Era Ends, Kostunica Era Begins," *Europe*, Issue 401 (November 2000): 22.

[99] Kostunica quoted in Milorad Ivanovic and Tamara Jorgovanovic, "The Man above the Fray," from *Transitions Online*, republished in Hope on the Balkans 2000 at http://www.ddh.nl/fy/opinions/2000/fray1909.html, accessed May 7, 2009.

eyes stare directly into the eyes of the voters, unlike Milosevic's posters where he is always staring into the distance. While the poster spoke only in positive tones about Kostunica—they were an implicit reminder to others that Milosevic, Draskovic and others were not honest. Interestingly the posters hit a nerve with the Milosevic campaign, which ran multiple attacks on them. By so doing, the Milosevic regime indirectly acknowledged the importance of the posters and the effectiveness of their message. On September 17-18, a week before the polling, *Politika* ran an incredibly long and extremely vituperative (even for *Politka*) diatribe against Kostunica based on the poster. *Politika* begins the article with Kostunica's slogan "who can look you directly in the eyes" as its first line and answered the question directly saying that "honest people can" but "everything about him is a lie, starting with the surname he uses."[100] The article then goes on to accuse Kostunica of cheating on his wife, being supported by gays and Masons, splitting the country, faking devotion to orthodoxy and a host of other evils. The poster also received the direct attention of Information Minister Goran Matic at a press conference at which he claimed that the poster showing Kostunica's eyes was "not Kostunica but Al Pacino," and that, to paraphrase, this type of trickery had been done elsewhere in the world.[101] Apparently SPS-JUL found the poster and its message a particularly effective framing for Kostunica.

Ironically Kostunica's lack of charisma, his reputation as solemn and even dour, were made to work in his favor. He was portrayed as taking people and their problems

[100] U. R. "Consistent Liar: Pre-electoral Reminders," *Politika* (Belgrade), September 17-18, 2000, http://www.ex-yupress.com/politika/politika41.html, accessed May 7, 2009.
[101] "Minister says SPS-YUL 'Objective' Polls Show Kostunica With 4 Percent Support," *BETA*, Belgrade, September 9, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0909, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

seriously, as listening to them and working for their vote.[102] This was indeed a necessity as DOS was unlikely to be able to get airtime for TV commercials in cities like Belgrade where the government controlled most of the electronic media. In fact the Kostunica campaign played this up, with a staff member mentioning in an interview with the BETA News Agency that "the campaign would not be extravagant, since there were no funds for that," and with Djindjic mentioning in an interview with *Danas* that the campaign would be discrete and unassuming.[103] People were thus purposely reminded that DOS was not rich like other groups and could not afford airtime. Kostunica's campaign staff too made sure that they said publicly that they were going to conduct a "modest" campaign, in keeping with the candidate himself.[104] Kostunica also regularly reminded people that he would not accept American campaign funding so as to emphasize that he was not beholden to either side—and thus again emphasized that his campaign was modest and untainted, having not accepted funding either from corrupt businessmen nor from the foreigners. Thus he emphasized that he operated in straightened circumstances. But not appearing in glitzy commercials on TV was also a choice. This was highlighted in a story run by *NIN*, 'Serbia Among the Plum Trees" in which a worker on a forced vacation is

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[102] Ljiljana Nedeljkovic, who organized Kostunica's election campaign, sought to have him understood as a 'serious, nationally responsible democrat and stateman." See Ljiljana Smajlovic, "Women from the Shadows," *NIN*, February 1, 2001, translated by S. Lazovic, http://www.ex-yupress.com/nin/nin81.html. She coordinated her efforts with Maja Tasic, who held a similar position in the DOS campaign. Nedeljkovic later became Kostunica's chief of Staff and Tasic did the same for Goran Svilanovic, until she was killed in a car accident in March of 2001. Both Nedejkovic and Tasic played key roles in framing the respective campaigns. The decisions made were reached with the aid of focus groups and public opinion surveys. Kent Patton, interview by author, Washington DC, July 23, 2008.

[103] "Kostunica's Aides Vow to Conduct 'Modest but Clear' Campaign for FRY President," *BETA*, Belgrade, August 25, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0825, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com; Mirjana Vujovic, "All Those with Influence in the West Support Kostunica: Interview: Zoran Djindjic, president of the Democratic Party and chief of the electoral staff of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) talks about the chances of the united opposition," *Danas*, August 26 – 27, 2000, http://www.ex-yupress.com/danas/danas39.html.

[104] See comments by Nenad Milic, member of Kostunica's election staff quoted in "Kostunica's Aides Vow to Conduct 'Modest but Clear' Campaign for FRY President."

quoted as saying he use to vote for the Serbian Radical party but wouldn't anymore, "'How come Seselj has enough money to pay for all those TV advertisements and posters, when not even a single honest person in Serbia has enough money to buy a new car?"[105] Such a comment was meant to point out the corruptness and disdain the other regime parties had for the people, in contrast to Kostunica who would not be running glitzy TV spots. In the same article, the reporter noted that people acted as "impromptu advisers and political strategists, telling Kostunica 'Do not go to the TV Serbia. The less you can be seen there the more respect people will have for you.'"[106] Thus independent media in their stories emphasized the "choice" that was made by Kostunica not to appear or to run advertisements on state TV, and implied that having such commercials or being on TV would have made Kostunica a less honest man.

Kostunica needed to be seen as a man of the people and therefore needed to be seen campaigning among them and, just as importantly, listening to the people. He needed to make them believe that he cared about them and their concerns, winning their trust. The decision to run a door-to-door campaign dovetailed nicely with the fact that Kostunica, due to of his "lack of charisma," was also not seen as a good rally speaker, much better at conveying messages in smaller groups. The decision to run such a campaign was clearly a strategic decision. Kostunica's campaign staff announced that they would not hold rallies and that their candidate would run a small local meet the people campaign because holding large rallies was, "neither in Kostunica's spirit nor in the spirit of his party."[107] As his staff had previously noted, his campaign would be like

[105] Bacevic, "Serbia Among the Plum Trees."
[106] Bacevic, "Serbia Among the Plum Trees."
[107] Nenad Milic quoted in "Tanjug Reports on Launch of Opposition's Presidential campaign," *Tanjug*, August 25, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0825, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

the man himself, "honest, quiet, and modest."[108] Kostunica himself, before the beginning of the official campaign recognized the value of running a village to village campaign, "It is obvious we will have trouble with the electronic media in large cities, especially Belgrade. But even if the situation were different, after ten years there must be politicians who can listen to ordinary people, the unfortunate ones, who dare to come among them.'"[109] The decision to run a "village to village" campaign with stops all along the way was indeed a reality. In less than 30 days Kostunica traveled over 3000 miles in Serbia making campaign stops. He stopped both in villages and in cities. He drew large crowds. He was seen listening to people's concerns. A story in *NIN* during the campaign noted that "the decision to talk less at people and listen more to their problems, as well as a whole series of newly composed folk tales, have awoken in the people something that would be found in the most recent dictionaries of foreign words under faith, hope or other still undiscovered entries."[110] While *NIN*, as an independent paper, would clearly report stories more favorable to the opposition and might even be reporting in such a way as to bolster the opposition, the numbers attending Kostunica rallies, even waiting in the rain to hear him when his caravan was late, spoke to the importance people placed on seeing and hearing him personally.

Another interesting aspect of being a "common man" was to not have things that "common men" did not have—Kostunica did not use bodyguards on his campaign trips. This was noticed and commented on both by foreign and domestic news sources during

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[108] See comments by Vesna Djukic Dojcinovic, member of Kostunica's election staff quoted in "Kostunica's Aides Vow to Conduct 'Modest but Clear' Campaign for FRY President."
[109] "Interview: Dr. Vojislav Kostunica, Presidential Candidate: Empty Pocket and State." See also "Women from the Shadows," where it is also pointed out that Kostunica's campaign strategist also argued in favor of a door-to-door campaign to enhance Kostunica's reputation and to frame him as a serious politician.
[110] Bacevic, "Serbia Among the Plum Trees."

the campaign as well as by people who saw him at campaign stops. All politicians and especially government politicians took bodyguards everywhere.[111] It spoke to their importance, their special status and their special needs. Kostunica's decision not to have bodyguards signaled several messages: first, that he was a common person like them, second that he was not afraid—despite the rash of killing and abductions of high profile politicians, he was going to be unafraid. This spoke to his courage and moral integrity, reminding people that he was not a dirty politician and had nothing to hide. Interestingly his decision not to have bodyguards seems to have encouraged a somewhat protective attitude towards him by people at campaign stops. Batic Bacevic, a *NIN* reporter who traveled with Kostunica for part of the campaign reported,

> In this *NIN*'s journalist, who traveled in the same car with the president and was not built like a typical piano player, the people recognized in him an atypical and badly trained bodyguard, 'Take care of him son. Make sure they don't harm him,' said an energetic vital elderly lady…In Loznica a friendly brawny giant in a conspiratorial manner stated that he was taking over security from there. "We know that Vojislav does not have money to pay for professional bodyguards, but here the whole town will protect him."[112]

Kostunica's choice not to have bodyguards was also used by DOS and by Kostunica in particular, not only to frame himself in a positive way, but to frame Milosevic and the government negatively. At the beginning of the campaign period, Kostunica called on Milosevic to "start campaigning among the people if you dare, instead of hiding in various bunkers."[113] Later in the campaign at a rally he said, "They

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[111] Djindjic used bodyguards. He had also been threatened with a not too veiled warning in *Politika*. In the wake of the two assassination attempts on Vuk Draskovic and the series of high profile political murders, as well as the abduction of Ivan Stambolic, former President of Serbia and Milosevic's former mentor, Kostunica's decision to choose not to use bodyguards also spoke to a sense of courage and was a personal statement about not allowing the regime to make you fearful.

[112] Bacevic, "Serbia Among the Plum Trees."

[113] Kostunica at a rally in Plandiste on September 5 as reported in "Serbian presidential runner Kostunica challenges Milosevic to start campaign," *Beta News Agency* (Belgrade, Serbia) September 6, 2000, Europe

do not dare mingle with their people and because of that on September 24 we must separate them from power, because they have soiled Serbia and ruled it by force"[114] and at another he pointed out, "a brave man would mingle with his people. But how does Slobodan Milosevic mingle with his people? Accompanied by the police, helicopters and snipers on building roofs. This is the result of his rule…"[115] Thus Kostunica was able to make two important points: first, by walking among the people without bodyguards he was clearly a "man of the people" and second, Milosevic not only was not like the people and not of the people—he was afraid of the people![116]

Finally Kostunica's personal history, the fact that he had never been a Communist, that he was personally known to be a moderate nationalist, and that he was moderately religious all were elements that were perceived to be "Serbian." These were emphasized as part of the campaign. The song he selected to have played when he was around was "Boze pravde," the nineteenth century tune that was the Serbian Kingdom's national anthem. He chose to be seen going to Orthodox churches and publicly spoke of God. Kostunica himself especially emphasized the fact that he had never been a communist, that communism had never been a positive good, that communism had not allowed for individual thought and that communism's time was past. He clearly sought to

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- Political: *NewsBank Access World News*, http://infoweb.newsbank.com. Kostunica made the same point in his interview with Vreme, in which he said, "Many members of the ruling elite in Serbia do not dare to go out among the people…of course there is no need to mention that some of the top officials do not even dare visit some parts of the state." See interview with Kostunica, "Empty Pocket and State."

[114] Kostunica at a campaign stop as reported in Kovacevic, "Thus has been told."

[115] Kostunica at a rally in Leskovac September 18, 2000, in "DOS Candidate Kostunica Attacked with 'Red Paint' in Leskovac," *BETA*, Belgrade, September 18, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0919 , *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

[116] This point was reinforced in a news release from BETA during Milosevic's visit to the Zavstava factory, at which Milosevic appeared only surrounded in a "security perimeter" with a large contingent of police to which only people with passes were admitted and pensioners were bussed in. Kragujevac inhabitants, greatly inconvenienced by the visit, were reported to comment, "Why are you protecting him so much if the people like him that much?" See "Serbian non-state media banned from Zastava factory during Milosevic visit."

separate himself from the concept of being a "politician," from other politicians, and especially those politicians in the government, giving voters a clear choice. Given that Milosevic and his SPS-JUL members were using extremely socialist sounding language, especially when making grandiose promises, made the contrast between Kostunica and the government, especially Milosevic, crystal clear. Kostunica emphasized this regularly with statements on the campaign trail such as "the regime cannot understand that there are people who think differently. The world has changed, the Berlin wall has been destroyed, there is no five-pointed star on the Kremlin, there is no communism but there are still people who have communism in their hearts and souls although some of then do not believe in communism, but it serves to keep them in power."[117] Clearly Milosevic was a power-hungry man of the past. Kostunica was the man for the future.

All of the personal traits that were emphasized about Kostunica and by Kostunica throughout the campaign were indeed his. But these specific traits were chosen and deliberately highlighted for political purposes. Kostunica, like most people had different traits and characteristics that could have been made relevant and emphasized had the situation been otherwise. His status as an intellectual, a resident of Belgrade, and his translation of the Federalist papers could just as easily been the point of emphasis, thus portraying him as an effete, urban intellectual who was bookish and quiet. Equally, any of his characteristics could have been used against him as much as for him. Kostunica for example was known as an extremely stubborn, in some cases dogmatic person. This trait could have been portrayed as a vice—which would lead to a politician who would never listen to the people or heed their needs if it ran counter to his beliefs. Rather, his

[117] Kostunica at a rally in Smederevo August 30, 2000, "Thousands greet Serbian opposition candidate Kostunica on first campaign day," *Beta News Agency* (Belgrade, Serbia) August 30, 2000, Europe - Political: *NewsBank Access World News,* http:// infoweb.newsbank.com.

stubbornness was portrayed as a virtue—as the trait of someone who would stick to his word, fight for virtues, not succumbing to wealth or prestige and fight for the people. The framing of Kostunica was deliberate and selective for the purposes of the campaign. He needed to be seen as a man of the people, as someone who listened, was empathetic to people's plight, who understood their pain and was someone honest enough to be entrusted with not only people's votes, but also with their hopes. Belief that their hopes would be honored and not despoiled could be enough to move people to the voting booth.

As the preceding chapter has illustrated, Kostunica and Milosevic chose different strategies to frame themselves. Milosevic chose to portray himself not only as a statesman, but as a national hero. He positioned himself above the people as a protector and savior. Kostunica chose to frame himself as a man of the people, a solid earnest honest and incorruptible man, a "true Serb" who could empathize with their problems, feel their pain yet was someone who could bring them a better future. Both Kostunica and Milosevic made choices as to how they wanted to be seen. Both chose strategies that they thought would lend credibility to their statements, thus helping to collectively unite people behind them.

CHAPTER TEN

Framing and Resonance

How Did it Play in Peoria? How Did it Sound in Serbia?—Resonance of Rhetoric

Why does it matter what Milosevic and SPS politicians, or Kostunica and DOS politicians, chose to say and how they chose to frame their words and actions? Frames matter both as frameworks for legitimacy and as groups face off against each other, to mobilize their supporters and win over bystanders. But frames are only effective to the degree that they have resonance with their intended audiences. As discussed earlier, whether or not a frame has resonance is largely dependent on whether or not the frame is credible and salient. In this chapter, we examine the factors affecting the resonance of the key frames used in the contest between Milosevic and the opposition, specifically those of the DOS candidate for the presidency, Kostunica, in the months leading up to and during the electoral campaign of 2000. Analyzing the extent to which the various frames used were credible and salient among members of their target audience will illuminate the factors affecting the efficacy of the framing used by both sides.

Credibility

There are a number of factors that affect credibility, including how well the frames correspond with the beliefs, claims and actions of a group or person, whether the frames and real world events appear to fit together, and how credible the person or people

promulgating the frame appear to be.[1] One of the most important of these factors is whether or not the frame is consistent with what is known about those who promulgate it. In the case of Milosevic and nationalism, the nationalist/conspiracy frames he put forth in the lead-up to the 2000 elections and throughout the campaign were certainly consistent with the things that he had said and stood for in the past. Although one could argue that there were logical contradictions among his various frames, the arguments he put forward in his nationalism framing did not represent a huge break with what he had already said, nor did they contradict what else people knew about Milosevic. In that sense his nationalism frame was credible. To some extent the same could be said of his reconstruction framing. Based in large part on his nationalism/conspiracy logic, the parts of the reconstruction frame that were socialist in nature also were consistent with the rhetoric of the SPS in the past. This was, after all, the party that had promised Serbs a "Swedish standard" of living in 1990, vowed to build the "high-speed railroad" for Serbia in 1991, declared Belgrade to be a "Beopolis, City for the 21st Century in 1995," used "Serbia in 2000—A step in to the New Century'" as its slogan in 1996, and announced "bridges for a new century in 1999."[2] Whether or not its frames were believable in light of events is another question, one that we examine a bit further along, but certainly SPS's claims and slogans about reconstruction, especially its declaration of "Reconstruction, Development, Reforms—21 projects for the 21st Century," were entirely consistent with its past efforts.

[1] See Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 611-639, for a thorough discussion of these issues.
[2] See Milan Milosevic, *Political Guide to Serbia*, trans. Spomenka Grujicic (Belgrade: Media Center, 2000), 27.

Similarly the question that was asked about the regime's frames to ascertain its credibility, namely whether or not the frame it puts forth is consistent with what is known about those who promulgate it, can also be asked about the credibility of the frames promulgated by Alliance for Change, DOS and Kostunica before and during the election campaign. On the issue of nationalism, consistency and credibility for the opposition side were in some ways more problematic. Alliance for Change had not existed before 1998; its founding had come only one short year before the NATO bombings. Until 1999, Alliance for Change had little name recognition. Also, Alliance for Change and later DOS were coalitions composed of a variety of politicians who, as individuals, had held differing positions on nationalism over time. On top of that, Draskovic proved unable to decide whether he was "in" or "out" of either coalition, which also complicated matters, since he had held varied but strong positions on the nationalism question. Despite these issues, however, what ultimately gave Alliance for Change and DOS nationalism frames consistency was the strong influence of Djindjic, especially Djindjic's well-known and strongly held pro-European position. Moreover, his constant and clearly open dealings with the West throughout 1999 and 2000 gave his claims about the West European orientation of Alliance for Change and DOS added credibility. Thus Alliance for Change's and later DOS's claim that nationalism had a new meaning, that it meant a new future for Serbia with help from the West, did ring true with what was known of Alliance for Change's claims. Interestingly, Milosevic's own propaganda could have played a role in strengthening the public's perception of consistency within and throughout the Alliance for Change and DOS. Constantly decrying opposition figures for being NATO

lackeys may have perversely helped to solidify the idea among the public that Alliance for Change and DOS had strong ties to the West.

Kostunica's framing of nationalism differed somewhat from DOS's, both in tone and substance. His framings of nationalism throughout 1999 and in 2000 through the end of the campaign period were entirely consistent with what was known of him, even if his emphasis shifted slightly to be somewhat more open and accommodating to the West. The difference between DOS and Kostunica was more than just one of tone. However, DOS's firm embrace of Kostunica and Kostunica's equally firm statements confirming himself as DOS's candidate, regularly repudiating any charges of "space" between himself and DOS, acted to broaden what was perceived as the DOS/Kostunica stand on nationalism. The fact that Kostunica's position was consistent with his past claims, and that the regime could not claim that he was a "lackey" of the West in fact strengthened his position, making him, as the regime and western sources both pointed out, the perfect candidate. There was no chink in the consistency of his "nationalist" past. There were no photos of him kissing Albright's hand, nor could he be accused of being a phony when he argued "neither White House nor White Palace." His frame was consistent with what he had claimed in the past and with what was known of him, and thus was credible.

Empirical Credibility

Another aspect of credibility is whether the types of empirical indicators chosen are understood as being real indicators of the diagnostic claims, in other words, whether there is a good fit between the frame's claims and events in the real world. The empirical referents do not, however, have to be factual and valid, they only have to be convincing.

In this sense, both the government and the opposition played the "numbers game"—especially when it came to reconstruction. The government called on its various ministries to provide facts and figures, while the opposition called on various independent expert groups such as G17 Plus to provide competing statistics. In these instances what mattered the most was the degree of credibility that accrued to the individuals making the claims. In this sense, the opposition had the government beat hands down as the public's trust in government institutions and officials was quite low. Moreover, as we saw at the beginning of this section, groups such as Otpor and G17 Plus lent credibility to the opposition.

Salience

One of the important aspects of whether or not a frame will resonate with an audience is the degree to which the frame is consistent with the audience's everyday life experiences.[3] In Serbia this factor, in combination with the credibility of the individuals promulgating the frames, was one of the more important determinant's of the resonance of various frames. A slogan seen at a rally encapsulates much of how Milosevic's framings resonated in Serbia: "I want to Emigrate to the Serbia Shown on RTS." As the Serbian journalist Vlado Mares noted,

> Two worlds exist in Serbia. First the Serbia of state-run RTS TV where all is well with the country and people eat and live well under the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. Then there is the real world, where a Belgrade textile worker earned just 1.4 dinars a day in July—at the official rate,

[3] Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 611-639.

> barely 12 U.S. cents—less than half the cost of a single loaf of state-subsidized bread.[4]

Vesna Pesic made a similar argument:

> We share the same destiny and that is the big secret. With them, we cannot take even a single step forward. That is why JUL propaganda sounds so empty. That is why they managed to drag to Novi Belgrade, next to the "eternal flame" hardly 2-3 thousands. As if the worst "NATO traitor," just like a "patriot" has not suffered like a worm in their paradise. It does not matter any more in which God one believes, it does not matter anymore whether you are from Vojvodina or Sumadija, no one wants to know who your parents are anymore…. Everyone has paid the price…that is the truth that travels through Serbia, without any, let alone free media. [5]

Throughout 1999 and 2000, Milosevic framed Serbia's past, present and future in terms of nationalism as he conceived it. Even his reconstruction efforts were framed largely in terms of Serbia's relationship to the outside world, specifically against the West, in favor of "self-reliance." Milosevic barely addressed economic problems, except to blame others, and offered few positive solutions. He offered his reconstruction campaign as a positive sign of what his government could do for people and consistently used the reconstruction campaign to demonstrate that Serbia could go it alone.[6] He did little to acknowledge people's individual suffering or propose credible policies as to how his government was actually going to improve people's lives. In the cases where he did put forward budget plans, or addressed the economy, economists who had credibility with the wider public, such as those from G17 Plus, and well known individuals such as Avramovic, openly denounced his numbers as fantasy. They provided their own sets of figures and decried the government's printing of additional currency which could lead to

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[4] Vlado Mares, "Plenty of Bread for the Happy Folk in the Wonderful World of RTS TV Serbia," *Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report* No. 82, October 8, 1999, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.

[5] Vesna Pesic, "Flood is Coming," *Danas*, September 14, 2000, http://www.ex-yupress.com/danas/danas.44.html.

[6] These efforts were regularly scoffed at in the independent press, which reported on the illusion that was being created that did not match the rhetoric.

hyper-inflation. The government and Milosevic nonetheless chose to continue to frame almost all issues through the lens of nationalism and provided economic numbers that were considered unreal by trusted experts, who made their views known. As they had done since the late 1980s (see Chapter Five above), Serbs considered the economy and related social issues the number one problem facing their country. Nationalism as a concern ranked far below the economy.[7] Milosevic's framing, however, had changed little and no longer meshed with people's concerns. Nor was Milosevic able to rally a significant number of people to his side through his framing. Even on the first anniversary of the NATO bombing—a date which the government chose to highlight in its framings as of great symbolic importance—it seemed unable to rally significant support. For the commemoration of the anniversary, the official government trade union organized a rally in Belgrade. Government officials closed all the schools and government run factories so that people could attend, and officials announced that at least 100,000 people, for whom free buses were provided, would come to Belgrade to participate in the commemorations. While around 100,000 did take the buses to Belgrade, BETA reported that only 5-10 thousand seemed interested in the patriotic speeches, while

[7] In an October 1999 survey done for NDI, even SPS and SRS voters when asked, 'Who would you be more likely to vote for, a candidate emphasizing economic prosperity or a candidate who is strong on the Serbian national question," preferred a candidate strong on prosperity. 79% of SPS voter and 65% of SRS voters favored a candidate emphasizing economic prosperity as opposed to 10% and 28% respectively who preferred a candidate strong on the national questions. Among undecided voters 81% preferred a candidate emphasizing economic prosperity over 9% who favored a candidate emphasizing the national questions. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, *Serbia Issues Poll, October 24, 1999*, http://www.ndi.org/files/410_yu_serbpoll99.pdf (accessed May 6, 2009), 22. On the eve of the elections in August 2000, 84.9% of all respondents to the question of how much they would take into account the ability of a party to ensure economic development in choosing for whom to vote said they would consider the economy either "very much" (49.7%) or "much" (35.2%). Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, "Pre-Election Study: Presidential Elections Serbia August 2000" ZA4282, http://zacat.gesis.org.

the vast majority went to cafes and window-shopping.[8] In short, Milosevic's framing did not focus on the issue of primary importance to the people. Nor was he able, through his framing, to make this issue the issue that was most urgent for people. Moreover his framing of the issues of concern to people, especially those related to economic reconstruction and desires for a normal life, bore little resemblance to what they themselves were experiencing. As increasing numbers of people recognized this lack of congruence, they were forced to come to terms with how they understood their world and to confront the question of what should be done.

When is it that ideas lose their popularity, that ways of viewing the world shift and new alternatives open? How does it occur that sets of meanings lose their viability, their credibility and new ways of viewing the world open up? Several theorists have suggested that at some point the number of anomalies to a theory becomes so numerous that the theory is discredited. However, people cannot get rid of the theory that they operate under until there is an alternative to take its place.[9] Similarly in Serbia people operated under the framings of Milosevic despite the increasingly glaring number of anomalies, until a critical mass could no longer make the anomalies fit *and* until there was an acceptable alternative.[10]

That there were anomalies that could no longer be ignored had been apparent to many for some time. Different groups within society came to these conclusions at different times. Students and intellectuals had been one of the first groups to arrive at that

[8] "Milosevic's populism no longer popular, says Serbian news Agency," *BETA*, Belgrade, BBC Monitoring Europe – Political, March 30, 2000, http://global.factiva.com.

[9] Thomas Kuhn in his book on scientific revolutions suggested that paradigms break down as a greater number of anomalies become clear and can no longer be comfortably fitted into the paradigm. However he also notes that until there is an alternative paradigm that fits the theory and also can comfortably explain the anomalies, people are still stuck under the old paradigm.

[10] This is not to suggest that these shifts happen automatically. To the contrary—noticing anomalies and the resultant shifts happen because of the hard work of people who frame alternatives.

point. The student slogans, even in the 1992 protests, clearly reflected that they did not think that Milosevic's framings in any way represented the reality that they and others were experiencing. Similarly, many intellectuals had been at the forefront of offering an alternative view of how the world should be seen. Many of the home-grown NGOs were those that had been at the forefront of the anti-war movement. Similarly, the vote in the 1996 municipal elections had been in part a response against Milosevic's framing even then of the evils of the outside, especially Western world—"we are the world" many signs, banners and flags had said. Yet aspects of Milosevic's framings had also resonated with a significant number of people. Vladimir Ilic, a Serbian sociologist, reported in his study on the middle generation (ages 25-35), done in October of 1999, that the answers he received in response to his questions concerning who were the country's enemies and who were its friends "hint at a very large extent of media and political manipulation."[11] In a survey done in February 2000 as many as 52.2% of respondents said they did not think that the new world order was a propaganda fabrication.[12] Thus the landscape was not one that was completely clear-cut, in which people's views were all neatly and logically aligned and easily added up to either being all for or all against Milosevic and his framings.[13] Over time, however, some anomalies between life and rhetoric became more and more glaring for an increasing number of people—making the dissonance that they had lived with and regularly reconciled, increasingly difficult to accept.

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[11] Vladimir Ilic, "Middle Generation Might Change the Predominant Anti-Western Sentiment," *Helsinki Files No. 2, Potential for Changes*, http://www.helsinki.org.yu/doc/files02.zip (accessed May 6, 2009), 23.
[12] "Pre-Election Study - Presidential Elections Serbia February 2000" ZA4280.
[13] Ilic's Middle Generation study is particularly informative in this regard. Although it only looks at one generation it breaks down in great detail the differences by profession, level of education, regions, pointing out in several different sections that people often held seemingly incompatible values. See Ilic, "Middle Generation Might Change the Predominant Anti-Western Sentiment," especially the discussion of "value confusion" on p. 32.

The land being shown on RTS was full of happy people and sufficient amounts of food. On RTS no one waited in queues for cooking oil and sugar. On RTS reconstruction was taking place at a fevered pitch, creating surreal situations like one described in the daily *Blic*. Under the headline "Movie Extras on the Land of the Late Mr. Hinic," it detailed "how a film crew turned up to record the supposed start of the reconstruction of a bombed out home, watched by local factory workers bussed in for the occasion. Filming over, the workers and the TV crew were shipped out again. Days later the site remains exactly as they left it with no sign of more work to be done."[14] The world shown on RTS was in fact so far removed from people's everyday lives as to be a fantasy world, one that, as the slogan said, people would actually *want* to live in. But the world shown on RTS was not the one that people were experiencing.[15] Where real people lived their real lives, queues for cooking oil, sugar and other subsidized staples were widespread and this was widely recognized as a problem. Both the opposition politicians and Otpor reminded people that these staples were all the regime could offer. It was indeed what the regime *did* offer when it was election time.[16] Kostunica also took this up on the campaign trail, arguing that at the end of September the regime was first paying off July pensions and "offer[ing] cooking oil and sugar to those standing in queues because this is all their

[14] As recounted in Mares, "Plenty of Bread for the Happy Folk in the Wonderful World of RTS TV Serbia."
[15] See Chapter Five for the statistics on the economy—and just as importantly how people perceived their everyday lives.
[16] See "Serbia on verge of humanitarian disaster due to drought—opposition," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts citing B2-92 Belgrade, June 12, 2000, available on Lexis-Nexis Academic; "Novi Sad residents attack Montenegrin TV crew filming queues for oil, sugar," Beta News Agency, September 7, 2000, BBC Monitoring International Reports: NewsBank Access World news, http://infoweb.newsbank.com; Olivera S. Tomic, "Kragujevac: Election Campaign at its height," *AIM Press* September 20, 2000, http//www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200009/00920-001-trae-pod.htm., accessed on June 5, 2008; "Serbia: Opposition presidential runner says Milosevic bribing possible voters," BBC Monitoring Europe—Political, citing Radio B2-92, Belgrade, August 21, 2000, for reports on queues for sugar and oil; see Laura Secor, "Rage Against the Regime: Serbian Students Fight Milosevic," *LinguaFranca* 10/6 (September 2000), http://linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/print/0009/otpor.html, about Otpor's campaign about standing in line for such basic necessities.

electoral promises amount to."[17] That RTS's world differed from the real one was not entirely new—RTS had long since been discredited. It was clearly biased and was the government's main instrument for putting forth its framings of the world. Similarly, people had long since been experiencing life in a different world than the one shown on RTS, one in which basic supplies were hard to come by, people were out of work, were living at or below the poverty line and did not have jobs. However, that the framing on RTS of people's lives was so far removed from people's actual experience, and became more so as the elections drew nearer, increased people's basic frustration with the regime and decreased the amount of credibility that could accrue to the regime's framings. As one Serbian commentator noted, especially as the elections drew nearer,

> After being in power over the state newspapers and television for 14 years, [Milosevic] thought in one moment—it was very recently, in the last—a few months—that he was in charge of just saying spectacular, improbably fantastic things. Really. He was going over the top if you know what I mean. His people, in fact, were telling people on television such an incredible story that even the people who really loved Milosevic couldn't believe that it's going on.[18]

Had it just been a case of exaggeration by RTS, people might have found the regime's claims more credible. But the regime made promises both in the public media and in person at rallies that were regularly broken. People noticed.

Not only did RTS frame a different reality than the one people lived in, but RTS began to show that it had lost touch itself with reality in a way that was hard for people to

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[17] Vojislav Kostunica as quoted in, "Serbia: Kostunica Urges Vranje Residents to Vote for Change, " BETA September 18, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0918. World News Connection http://infoweb.newsbank.com.

[18] "In His Own Words: Petar Lukovic," *A Force More Powerful*, http://www.aforcemorepowerful.org/films/bdd/story/sum/petar.php, excerpts from an interview with Petar Lukovic conducted in Belgrade, November 20, 2000, by Steven York. See also Milenko Vasovic, "The Media War Continues," Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report No. 57, July 16, 1999, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-: "The distance between Serbia presented in the media and the everyday reality as experienced is so glaring that this time even Belgrade's best efforts to control people's minds may not succeed." Vasovic was a journalist for the independent daily *Blic*.

ignore. During a live broadcast of a soccer match in September 2000 between Red Star and Georgia's Torpedo Kutsi, the Red Star fans started up with the usual chant of "Slobo, Save Serbia and kill yourself," at which point RTS shut down the sound feed, as it usually did. The police intervened in unusually high numbers to silence the protesters, attacking Red Star fans with batons, brutally beating them on live TV. While this all played out before the viewers' eyes, the RTS commentator ignored the chaos unfolding behind him and commented on the "wonderful ambience on this magical night of football."[19]

This complete denial of reality was not an entirely new tactic either for RTS or for the government. The government had, with increasing frequency, begun denying any aspect of reality that it found too unpleasant. In February, at the congress of the SPS, the governing party denied the country had an opposition.[20] The government also regularly denied the reality of the number of people who were attending opposition protests. Such was the case in August 1999, when in writing about an opposition rally at which approximately 150,000 people attended, the government daily *Borba* reported that only 25,000 people were present at the opposition rally; anyone else who was seen in the vicinity around was there by chance, just "passersby and those out walking their pets."[21] Similarly, at the first major opposition rally, held on April 14 2000, attended by

[19] Istvan Molnar, "Red Star Fans Muzzled." Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report, No. 168, September 1, 2000. http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.
[20] As discussed previously, this was read as a threat by opposition politicians—a purposeful act and signal by the government that it was about to start the elimination of political figures. It was not understood as the government's inability to see an opposition. Yet, even as a chosen tactic, it was a form of denial of unpleasant reality.
[21] "BETA Sees Opposition Protests Dwindling," *BETA*, Belgrade, August 26, 1999. FBIS-EEU-1999-0826, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

anywhere from 70,000 to 200,000[22] people, state run media reported that only approximately 2000 "NATO Supporters" had gathered.[23] Perhaps such occurrences can be seen as a metaphor for the regime's larger problem and disconnect with reality. Such actions surely did not increase the credibility and efficacy of its frames.

The second part of the operative theory posits the need for a viable alternative to the theory that seem to account for all that exists *and* can handle the increasing number of anomalies to the theory or paradigm that one is currently operating under. In Serbia, for the first time there *was* ***a single*** viable alternative—one that not only explained the anomalies but also provided a single vision for the future. Alliance for Change and its successor DOS *did* present a single unified alternative to the regime. Despite Draskovic's ongoing plays for personal power and the consternation this caused among the public, much of his basic orientation to the West, views concerning nationalism, and positions regarding what people wanted in an everyday life were similar to those of Djindjic. When Draskovic did take part in "unified opposition" events, the substance of his remarks as well as his tone on these topics matched positions held by Alliance for Change. Thus while strategies sometimes seemed to vary among the DOS players, and between Draskovic and Alliance for Change, leaving the public concerned that the opposition was insufficiently unified, the framing by AFC/DOS on questions relating both to nationalism and to everyday life were remarkably consistent from the end of the

[22] Attendance figures at rallies are never scientific. According to Vana Susa "News from Serbia: All the important news since 10 April 2000," *Central European Review*, 2:15, April 17, 2000, http:// www.pecina.cz/files/www.ce-review.org/00/15/serbianews15.html , the French press reported 70,000 participants, Reuters and FoNet reported around 100,000 and BETA apparently reported around 200,000 people.

[23] Similarly, the government regularly inflated, drastically, the number of people attending its events, reporting for example that 100,000 people had attended Milosevic's speech at the opening of the hydroelectric plant in Kusjuk when only approximately 10,000 people attended. See Vesna Peric Zimonjic, "Milosevic Tells Serbs to Vote against the Traitors," *The Independent*, September 13, 2000, 13.

NATO bombing on through the end of the election campaign. Although elections were not called until July 27, 2000, DOS had indeed been running an "unofficial" campaign since the end of the NATO bombing. This was a result of carefully planned and executed strategy—not mere happenstance.[24] Thus the opposition offered people a true choice—one that could be effective. Like cultural framings that rely on an alternative being present and available for use,[25] the same could be said for what DOS had provided—they had provided an alternative, coherent vision that explained the past people had experienced, the present as they were experiencing it, and pointed towards the future. How, then, did this alternative framing of DOS resonate with people's everyday experiences?

DOS's alternative vision of nationalism emphasized taking action for the future of Serbia, and not on the need for endless self-sacrifice in the name of a greater, "celestial" good—which clearly resonated with voters in Central Serbia. As we have seen throughout the spontaneous demonstrations in Central Serbia in the summer of 1999 as well as those planned and held by DOS, many Serbs clearly were exhausted and tired of going to war—especially "nationalist" wars in which they won no territory and always seemed to lose. "The Dead Don't Need Kosovo," said the sign carried by one mother in a spontaneous rally. Four times they went forward in tanks—four times they had come home on tractors—this had become obvious to almost all Serbs.[26] Milosevic's definition of nationalism and patriotism was losing, if it had not already lost, credibility. It was no

[24]Kent Patton, interview by author, Washington DC, July 23, 2008.
[25] I have discussed this in Chapter Eight. See also Marko Zivkovic, "Serbian Stories of Identity and Destiny in the Late 1980s and 1990s," PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2001.
[26] See the discussion of this issue in Chapter Six. By February 2000, 57.2% of Serbians rejected the claim that the international community was primarily to blame for Serbia's misfortune, while 42.8% agreed. "Pre-Election Study - Presidential Elections Serbia February 2000," (ZA4280).

longer an idea "in good currency." This in part was evidenced by the increasing number of parents who said that they would not allow their sons to fight in Kosovo. In 1998, when asked, "If some of your close relatives or friends should fight so that Kosovo and Metohija remain a part of Yugoslavia, what would your reaction be—would you be against it or would you think of it as a patriotic duty?" 46% replied that they would oppose it, while 31.5% would consider it a patriotic duty.[27] Similar opposition to military adventures was also evidenced in part by the protests in March 2000 in the Central Serbian town of Kraljevo, during the Army's attempted mobilization of reservists. Officials attempting to serve call-up papers were driven off by townspeople and villagers with staves and pitchforks. Subsequent rallies of both reservists and townspeople protesting reservist mobilization in large numbers were very reminiscent of events in the summer of 1999.[28] Yet Serbs also believed in the importance of being a good patriot. In a survey from February, 2000, 71.9% of respondents agreed that "the first and most important task of a good citizen is to be a patriot," while only 28.1% disagreed.[29] DOS's alternative—that allowed Serbs to be "good Serbs," good patriots and look to the future of Serbia and her children—reconciled these two seemingly conflicting positions and clearly resonated with large segments of the population. Such sentiment resonated especially strongly among the youth. Otpor's framing of the Milosevic regime and its actions regularly reflected that it strongly believed, as DOS advocated, that patriotism meant fighting for a decent future, not fighting false "patriotic wars." Reacting to a claim in January 2000 by the JUL student group, who accused Otpor students of being in the

[27] "Yugoslav Public Opinion in Serbia, 1998," (ZA4277), http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp
[28] Miroslav Filipovic, "Serbs Defy Draft: Hundreds of Army Reservists Have Taken to the Streets of Kraljevo to Protest against the Yugoslav Government's Latest Draft," March 15, 2000, *Hope on the Balkans News Archive*, January-March 2000, http://www.ddh.nl/fy/kosova/news/2000/draft1503.html
[29] "Pre-Election Study – Presidential Elections, Serbia February 2000," (ZA4280).

pay of the West, Otpor said: "People who call themselves patriots have sent our peers to senseless and doomed wars, from which many never returned. We are those young people who, in spite of wars, misery, propaganda, lousy music and Latin American soap operas, have managed to retain their sanity and are capable of offering resistance."[30] Otpor then went on to note that it was fighting for a "better nicer and more just Serbia." This framing of nationalism was clearly consistent with the framings that had been done by Alliance for Change and by DOS. DOS's framing on this subject clearly resonated with the Otpor generation, something that was particularly significant given the numbers of young people who had previously abstained from voting but were eligible to vote.[31] As mentioned above, DOS's framing also clearly resonated with many who were the parents of the Otpor generation. This was especially true of those in Central Serbia who had sent the greatest number of reservists to Kosovo and who had had the largest number of refugees to remind them daily of the "success" of Milosevic's nationalist policies. These realities of everyday life accorded both with DOS's claims about Milosevic and as we saw in Chapter Eight, with many parents' views of what Serbian patriotism should be. The only generation with whom AFC/DOS framing of nationalism had little resonance was the generation of those over 60 years of age.[32] That AFC/ DOS's framing on

[30] SRNA news agency, Bijeljina, "Serbian student movement blasts 'shameful' statement by left wing colleagues," BBC Monitoring Europe – Political, January 13, 2000, http://global.factiva.com.
[31] One survey reported that 40% of Serbia's population did not want to vote. Of that 40%, 65% was between the ages of 18 and 25. See statement by Vuk Jeremic, one of Otpor's "international representatives" in an interview with *The Guardian* (UK) "A Study in victory," October 31, 2000. Jeremic went on to note that "the hope was to get at least 70% of the population to vote 'because you can steal 150,000 votes but it is practically impossible to steal a million.'"
[32] Milosevic's framing of nationalism resonated most strongly with SRS and SPS voters. One indicator of this was the number who thought that Kosovo should be forcibly brought back into Serbia. In December 1999, in a survey by the Center for Political Research and Public Opinion, Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade, of the 16% who indicated that as far as Kosovo was concerned they "favor the return to the state of affairs prior to the war, "most ... [were] older than 60 years (21 percent) and younger than 29 years (19 percent), including those who are not of military age or do not have much life experience." See "Poll: 34%

nationalism had resonance should not be completely surprising, in view of the fact that not only did it draw on an alternative Serbian cultural tradition, and offered an alternative—the only alternative to possibly more wars—but that it also was based in part on the results that had come from public opinion polling and focus groups. Moreover, as was discussed above, Kostunica extended the reach of AFC/DOS's framing on nationalism. Kostunica's somewhat more traditional "nationalist" stance—while still oriented to the West—extended DOS's reach among potential voters who agreed with his argument that Milosevic had betrayed Serbdom, and yet who did not feel entirely comfortable with the West either.

Similarly DOS's framing of people's desire for a normal life resonated as well because the entire framing campaign was actually a *reflection* of long-felt desires by people—taking sentiments and thoughts that people held and channeling them into a coherent campaign. As previously shown, DOS clearly captured in its framings people's needs and desires that extended beyond "brick and mortar." Moreover AFC/DOS's framing of the present circumstances, namely that people were impoverished and the government could not adequately provide if it were not to get help from the outside, certainly seemed to ring true to people as they viewed the lines for state subsidized staples and the path of reconstruction. Despite the government's optimistic promises in November of 1999 that there would be a steady supply of staple foods and hence there would be no need to queue, this did not accord with the reality experienced by people in

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Favor Kosovo Autonomy, 16% Return 'by Force'," *BETA* Belgrade, December 28, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-1228, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

the spring and summer of 2000.[33] Throughout the spring of 2000, people were still regularly lining up for hours when there were rumors that such goods might be available. Even at the height of the campaign in September, when shops would usually have been packed with such goods for the election, supplies were low. People noticed.[34] This discrepancy between the regime's claims and the reality people experienced over such basic commodities was a major focus of reports by the independent media during the campaign.[35]

Otpor, never one to let an opportunity pass especially to point out discrepancies between the government's framings and reality, carried out several actions where activists visiting people in lines for staples such as cooking oil and sugar handed out leaflets with the phrase "are you OK?" which in Serbian is a play on words, since the phrase "are you OK?" is the same as the one meaning "are you in line?" In another similar action they stood in line holding a banner that said, "Nothing out of line in Serbia." Police, who moved in accusing them of holding an unregistered demonstration, were told by the students that they were not aware of any law that required them to stand in line for necessities and that "like the rest of the Serbian populace they had to wait in line for basic food products."[36]

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[33] "Yugoslav minister promises steady supply of staple foods," Radio Belgrade web site, November 14, 1999, translated and reproduced in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, November 16, 1999, Part 2: Central Europe, the Balkans, Federal Republic of Serbia, http://global.factiva.com.

[34] For example, see "Montenegrin TV crew attacked by angry Serb pensioners," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Belgrade, September 7, 2000, available on Lexis-Nexis Academic.

[35] See Media Center's Report, "Media Monitoring September 2-8, 2000," *BD Net News Elections in Serbia 2000*, http://www.bbnet.org.yu/bdnet/electios/eng/0911media.htm, accessed on December 29, 2007, which noted: "In response to the government's campaign based on the reconstruction of the country, the media which are not under the control of the state are focusing on stories about food shortages (accompanied with photographs of people standing in long lines), the problems of medical patients, low standards of living, increase in prices and the exchange rate of the German Mark and looming high inflation."

[36] Laura Secor, "Rage Against the Regime, Serbian Students Fight Milosevic," *Linguafranca*, 10:6, September 2000, Volume 10, http://linguaframca.mirror.theinfo.org/print/0009/otpor.html, accessed January 31, 2009.

Even during the campaign period, when stores would normally have been stocked as full as possible in the last week or so leading up to the election, queues remained, reminding people—even some of the most ardent Milosevic supporters—of the state's inability to provide even the basics. Similarly, the much vaunted reconstruction did not fully live up to its hype, and many people recognized that. While much was indeed constructed, independent press regularly reported on the shoddy construction even in the case of several major infrastructure projects. Similarly, people noticed that many of the regime's reconstruction promises went unfulfilled—or at best were selectively filled. In June of 1999, Milosevic visited Novi Sad to officially declare the beginning of the reconstruction campaign, highlighting the bridges that had been destroyed by NATO, and promised that the bridge between Belgrade and Subotica would be reconstructed in 40 days and the railroad bridge would be reconstructed in three months. Yet months later residents of Novi Sad were still dependent on ferries to safely cross the river—something which Novi Sad residents had certainly noticed and commented on.[37] These two examples were but a few of the many instances when the distance between the regime's promises and reality were not only difficult but impossible to negotiate. Similarly the reconstruction of housing seemed to be targeted specifically for those groups that might support the regime.

Conclusion

By 1999, the concepts and ideas set forth by the regime's frames had very little to no resonance because they were so removed from people's experiential reality. Except

[37] Milena Putnik, "Everyday Life in Novi Sad: Life in the Conditional," *AIM,* Podgorica, September 29, 1999, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199909/90929-008-trae-pod.htm.

for the very privileged, no one was living in the world shown on RTS. This gap, between people's perceived reality and the image of life promulgated by the regime, increased people's sense of discomfort and dissonance, allowing them to be more open then they might have been to new ideas. By 1999, although the opposition was not fully unified, they were, by and large, speaking the same language and promulgating the same types of frames. The package of ideas that the opposition was putting forward was based in a culturally known and acceptable alternative, and resonated in a way that opposition ideas had not before. If resonance is based on credibility, empirical credibility and the salience of the ideas to everyday life, Alliance for Change and then DOS's framings rang true on a number of bases: first, in terms of empirical credibility, their use of experts and ability to quantify peoples economic unhappiness in terms that matched what people knew in the their everyday lives contributed positively to their resonance. Second, the overall credibility of the frames also matched what people knew of the opposition; their claim for example that were they to be elected the West would help to provide funds was consistent with what people knew of the opposition's relations with the West. Finally, Alliance for Change's and then DOS's frames were salient, i.e. accorded with people's everyday experiences because the frame that DOS chose to employ, wanting to live a normal life, had sprung organically from the people themselves in the first place. In sum, Milosevic's frames lacked resonance, citizens were now open to something new if it appeared to be a viable, and believable alternative. In 1999 through 2000, as the previous chapters have illustrated, DOS developed two alternative frames on critical issues that not only grew out of Serbian culture but which came to be seen as a viable alternative and resonated with people because their hopes and desires had found voice.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Mobilizing for Action: Boundaries and Identities

In this chapter and the next, I shall examine "action" mobilization, specifically what it is that immediately moves individuals from the sidelines to active participation. In Serbia people suffered both from apathy and depression. Unable to imagine a different outcome than Milosevic either winning through fraud or taking power even if he lost, many people simply did not want to vote, let alone participate in other ways. In this chapter I examine the means and methods used by groups to delineate clear boundaries. Boundary delineation is important both to group solidarity and participation. In addition to rhetorical means (examined in the next chapter), physical items can also be made to symbolically represent groups and their collective identity. I examine how items such as posters, T-shirts and stickers can be used to help clearly define boundaries between "us and "them," and help solidify people's allegiance. Such physical cultural manifestations were also strategically endowed with power and deployed to undermine opposing groups. I also examine the influence of music and street theater and humor on creating collective identity, delineating boundaries and moving people to mobilize.

Creating Boundaries and Collective Identity

A T-Shirt by Any Other Name

If rhetoric was one way to allocate blame and clearly create a sense of "us" and "them," another means of entrenching boundaries between groups was through physical manifestations and actions that acted to "mark" to whom various sorts of territory belonged. Clifford Geertz noted that, "When kings journey around the countryside,

making appearances, attending fêtes, conferring honors, exchanging gifts, or defying rivals, they mark it, like some wolf or tiger spreading his scent through his territory, as almost physically part of them." [1] The idea of marking territory so as to proclaim one's right to rule over it is a powerful impulse that occurs in a variety of societies in different ways. As kings and other rulers travel around "their lands" bestowing honors, implying with each step their right to rule and "marking" territories, so too in many societies street gangs "tag" their territory with spray paint, proclaiming their primacy over a piece of land, an area, its people and resources. In Serbia until the mid-1990's, territory had been claimed by marking it with graves that had been used to justify wars.[2] In each instance such "tagging" is done in opposition to another group, creating an "us" and a "them." In Serbia in 1999 and 2000, both the government and the opposition strategically deployed symbolic resources to delineate boundaries between themselves and the other, claim territory as theirs and delegitimize the other's right to rule over certain type of property.

Otpor used a variety of mechanisms to mark its territory including spray paint, stickers and T-shirts. Like street gangs, Otpor began life with cans of spray paint, tagging territory. Initially meant just to garner attention, the spray can, along with posters and stickers came to be items which Otpor used to mark where it had been, and, when such markings were removed by authorities, Otpor marked where it was going to stay—by remarking territory all over again. Otpor also used stickers to mark territory and create

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[1] Clifford Geertz, "Centers, Kings and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power," in Sean Wilentz, ed., *Rites of Power: Symbolism, Ritual and Politics since the Middle Ages*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985, 13-38.

[2] See Dubravka Stojanovic, "The Traumatic Circle of the Serbian Opposition," in Nebojsa Popov and Drinka Gojkovic, eds., *The Road to War in Serbia, Trauma and Catharsis* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 449-478, especially 458-459. For an excellent essay on mythical space and time constructions, including making claims and demarcating boundaries see Ivan Colovic, "The Renewal of the Past: Time and Space in Contemporary Political Mythology," trans. Nenad Stefanov and John Abromeit, *Other Voices: The (e)Journal of Cultural Criticism* 2/1 (February 2000), http://www.othervoices.org/2.1/colovic/past.html.

boundaries. The sticker offered little room to convey a large message—its "face" message had to be succinct ("He's finished," or "I am a sticker that resists"), but its true value lay in how many could be repeatedly plastered everywhere to proclaim Otpor's presence. Stickers were one of the more popular ways to mark territory. Small, easily pocketed, they could be utilized by people of all ages and found their way onto stop signs, walls, bus stops—and in some cases—even police cars.[3] As previously mentioned, they were a popular vehicle for protest for those who were elderly and wanted to participate but could not handle the poster-glue brigade, or for those who wanted to protest but had "smaller amounts" of courage. By using stickers many felt that they were joining Otpor, helping the cause, and doing their part. Stickers also showed that Otpor had a presence and was preparing to stay.

Similarly, posters had a "face" value but also were a means to delineate and mark off territory. While the poster was initially used most heavily by Otpor, after the election was announced Otpor, the opposition political parties and the government political parties all used posters—frequently plastering over their opponent's poster until posters were three or four thick in many places. Competing claims for people's attention and mastery over space were proclaimed in such a manner.

Unlike spray paint, posters and stickers, T-shirts were not stuck on anonymous walls by unseen people. Choosing to wear a T-shirt with "Promene" or an Otpor fist on it was a personal act of defiance of the government, was an act of bravery and represented a particular depth of commitment—a self-proclaimed identity of living in opposition to the

[3] Ivan Andric, head of Otpor's "marketing" department noted, "I saw some very interesting photographs of police cars with our stickers on then. And it was very nice and brave to do that." Ivan Andric "Developing Otpor's Slogans and Stickers," in "How Did We Succeed: Superior Propaganda for Advertising Freedom," Center for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies, http://www.canvasopedia.org/content/serbian_case/otpor_propaganda.htm#03.

authorities.[4] Especially after May 2000, when wearing such T-shirts became a reason for arrest and sometimes harsh interrogation, wearing the T-shirt not only spoke to a distinct depth of commitment to the collective but it also marked boundaries between oneself and non-T-shirt wearers.[5] Doing so proclaimed that one's body and soul were the territory of the opposition—or specifically of Otpor. Moreover, people wearing T-shirts were mobile. They were not only walking billboards, but could also physically cover distances and territory that fixed objects could not.

Such efforts by the opposition and Otpor to mark territory and thus deprive the government of legitimacy and space could be dismissed as amusing efforts at collective identity construction at best and posturing at worst, were it not for the fact that posters and stickers marking territory were systematically removed, and the people that put them up "hunted" by police. People were arrested for the possession of not only Otpor, but also opposition political party posters—even during the campaign itself. In some cases, teenage poster-pasters were forced to physically chew and swallow the entire poster by the police. Such actions were clearly perceived by many citizens as abuse of a minor and understood as representative of the power struggle between the regime and the

[4] Wearing T-shirts to proclaim political identity was not new in Serbia. It had been done in the 1996/97 protests as some wore T-shirts with slogans such as "I am a walker," "There are plenty of eggs in Belgrade," or "Together" but the wearing of such T-shirts had not been as dangerous to the wearer as it was by May 2000. See Mirjana Prosic-Dvornic, "The Topsy-Turvy Days Were There Again: Student and Civil Protest in Belgrade and Serbia, 1996/1997," *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 16/1 (1998), http://condor.depaul.edu/~rrotenbe/aeer/aeer16_1.html#Prosic_Dvornic (accessed May 8, 2009).

[5] There were several T-shirts worn by supporters of Otpor and the opposition—usually those with the word "Promene" changes or a fist logo. In some cases, collective identities compatibly coincided and this was also expressed on a T-shirt such as in the case of Miodrag Dencic, acting Chairman of GSS in Pirot who was arrested wearing a T-shirt that said 'Pirot—Free town" with the Otpor fist on it as well. See "Serbia: Pirot Police Arrest 'about Ten' Resistance Activists, GSS Official," *BETA*, Belgrade, July 31, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0731, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com. I have only found one instance in which regime parties openly wore and used T-shirts in the same way. In Pozarevac, men in T-shirts with the SPS logo prevented an opposition-sponsored roundtable debate from taking place. See "SPS Blocks SPO Roundtable in Dubrovica Near Pozarevac," *BETA*, Belgrade, September 13, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0914, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

opposition. Similarly T-shirts—mere pieces of material—particularly incensed the regime. Otpor activists were arrested and sometimes beaten to make them hand over any "stash" of T-shirts that they might have.[6] Beginning in May 2000, T-shirt wearers, often teenagers, were frequently ordered to remove the shirts and turn them inside out so that the message could not be read or were ordered to wear something over them. In some instances police forcibly removed T-shirts from their bodies, sometimes in public, including incidents in which male police made females strip off the offending article of clothing. Several cases were also reported in which police literally ripped the shirt off both male and female "offenders."[7]

These acts of violence—in some cases brutality—provoked by pieces of paper or fabric speak both to the power of symbols and their successful deployment to create concrete boundaries. Ironically, the more the regime acted forcibly against the symbols and those using them, the more people identified with the symbols and what they stood for, as well as with each other. Such forcible actions against material representations of groups threw a clean, clear light on the boundaries between "us" and "them." Such actions also triggered a backlash against the regime; they increased the number of people who were recruited to Otpor, CeSid and other groups and thus strengthened their commitment and collective identity with the opposition.

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[6] "Serbia: Valjevo Police 'Beat-Up" Resistance Movement Activist," *BETA*, Belgrade, August 3, 2000., FBIS-EEU-2000-0803, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

[7] "Sombor Police Strip Resistance T-Shirt off Female DS Activist 'By Force'," *BETA*, Belgrade, August 22, 2000. FBIS-EEU-2000-0822, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com. See also "Serbia: Violence Against Students Escalates," *Human Rights Watch News*, July 19, 2000, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2000/07/19/serbia-violence-against-students-escalates.
For an extremely detailed look at the violence used against students affiliated with Otpor see "Spotlight on Police Crackdown on Otpor, Serbia, 2 May to 24 September 2000," *Humanitarian Law Center Reports,* Humanitarian Law Center, Belgrade, http://www.hlc-rdc.org/Izvestaji/574.en.html.

Let's go For a Walk!

Other techniques, such as walks and music were also used to clearly delineate boundaries and increase collective identity. Some of these techniques had particularly strong resonance for people due to their successful use in 1996/97.[8] In 1996/97, a regular feature of the protests had been walks around town, during which participants had visited places of significance and en route made their feelings known.[9] Walks were revived again, though to a more limited extent, in 1999 and 2000. In the media walk, participants took a route that routinely passed by RTS and other hated regime-sponsored media outlets, where participants booed, chanted or blew their whistles.[10] Such walks around town served a variety of purposes. First—they were an effort to reclaim space from the regime and reappropriate it to the citizens, i.e. it was a way to mark territory. Second, taking the walks were a way in which citizens could feel as though they were physically doing something to change their circumstances—walks thus increased people's sense of efficacy. Third, walks were also useful in that those who were walking felt a collective sense of unity and spirit—almost an effervescence—and it was clear that those who were

[8] For an excellent discussion on the walks as protest and to mark territory see Stef Jansen, "The Streets of Beograd. Urban space and Protest Identities in Serbia," *Political Geography* 20 (2001): 35-55. See also Sreten Vujovic, "Protest as an Urban Phenomenon," in Mladen Lazic, ed., *Protest in Belgrade: Winter of Discontent*, trans. Liljana Nikolic (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 1999), 193-210. Walks were also part of the 1992 student protest, used especially to point out "forbidden territory." See Mirjana Prosic-Dvornic, "Enough! Student Protest '92: The Youth of Belgrade in Search of 'Another Serbia'," *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 10/1-2 (1993), http://condor.depaul.edu/~rrotenbe/aeer/aeer11_1/prosic-dvornic.html (accessed May 6, 2009).

[9] Stef Jansen notes that in 1996/97, "walking became a political act, and badges could be seen proclaiming the person who wore them a *setac* or *setacica* ('walker', m/f). The Serbian national motto 'Only Unity can Save the Serbs', represented by four Cyrillic letters S, which gained an infamous reputation during the post-Yugoslav wars, was modified and parodied into *Samo Setnja Srbina Spasava* ('Only Walking can Save the Serbs'). Amongst the numerous postcards for sale on the streets, there were a number which typically carried a picture of the common trajectory of the walks. From these examples it is clear that, in the specific context I have described, the very act of walking took on a political meaning." See Jansen, "The streets of Beograd," 39.

[10] While "walks" are most frequently associated with rallies and protests in Belgrade, they took place in other cities as well both in 1996/97 and again in 1999 and 2000.

preventing people from taking certain roads were on the "other" side. Walks thus served to clearly delineate who was "us" and who was "them."

During the fall of 1999 and into early 2000, opposition rallies did not initially feature walks. Yet over time, the crowds demanded them. The calls of "Lets go for a walk!" or "Protest Walk!" were frequently heard, prompting politicians to take their place at the head of the line and lead the way on a walk. It was clear that the crowds wanted not to be just passive recipients of information, but to feel joined in common purpose, spirit and identity for a cause. Finally, as in 1996/97, walks forced the regime to show citizens that there was forbidden territory. Any walks towards Dejinje—the area in which Milosevic lived, resulted in not only a strong police presence but threats, and sometimes violence. Similarly, Pozarevac, the hometown of Milosevic, his wife Mira Markovic and their son Marko and daughter Marija, was also clearly forbidden territory. It was in Pozarevac that several Otpor activists had been beaten with impunity at the beginning of May in part at the behest of Marko Milosevic, where opposition attempts to hold a protest against the beatings of the youths had had to be canceled due to the prospects of street clashes instigated by the regime and the Pozarevac police, and where opposition politicians had literally been run out of town when they even attempted to campaign there. The regime regularly drew clear boundaries of the territory people were not allowed to cross; this forbidden territory was marked not with mere signs, but began at the end of a gun. Arrests were swift when forbidden territory was breached.

The second type of walk was one in which people from towns and cities outside of Belgrade walked to Belgrade—sometimes distances of 70 or 80 kilometers. Such walks, as the one in April of 2000 by Otpor from Novi Sad to Belgrade, served several

purposes.[11] First, they clearly tied the regions to Belgrade—illustrating that the whole country was of one mind and everyone was in it together. The boundary was not between Vojvodina and Belgrade, or Central Serbia and Belgrade—the boundary was between all Serbs who opposed the regime and those who did not. Second, similar to a crusade or a pilgrimage, the walks were a significant undertaking—a sign of commitment to an idea. Third, the walks frequently were commemorative of a previous significant event. On December 18, 1999, Otpor students walked from Belgrade to Novi Sad to commemorate the second anniversary of the 1996 walk by 150 Novi Sad students who had walked from Novi Sad to Belgrade to join the winter protests against the government.[12] Such walks, like the walks round town, helped to both create a sense of collective identity as well as draw clear boundaries between the opposition and the regime and increased people's sense of commitment.

Sound as a Boundary Marker and Creator of Collective Identity

If, as Djordje Balasevic's lyrics said, "My heart beats to the rhythm of resistance [otpor],"[13] rhythm, music and sound were important means to delineate groups, create a sense of collective identity and thus clearly define who belonged to which groups in 1999 and 2000. Dragoljub Djuicic, a famous Serbian drummer who had participated in the protests of 1996/97 as had so many Serbian rock stars, also defined the importance of

[11] Vana Susa, "News from Serbia: All the important news since 10 April 2000," *Central Europe Review*, 2/15 (April 17, 2000), http://www.ce-review.org/00/15/serbianews15.html, accessed on May 20, 2008. See also "Rally of the United Opposition, Rally, the Broadcast and State Security," *Free Serbia Specials: Broadcasts*, April 14, 2000. http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/specials/broadcasts/14042000/e-index.html.
[12] "Deepening Authoritarianism in Serbia: The Purge of the Universities," *Human Rights Watch Reports,* 11/2 (January 1999), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/serbia/index.htm#TopOfPage.
[13] The song that the line comes from became Otpor's unofficial anthem and the CDs sold "like hotcakes." See Catherine Samary, "Double Challenge Confronts Belgrade." *Le Monde diplomatique* (English Edition), November 15, 2000. http://mondediplo.com/2000/11/15serbia.

sound to both life and protest when he said, "'The music is based on rhythm, so is the life. If the heart does not beat three times in rate, the fourth time it won't beat at all." Following the rhythm of two previous protests years, 1992 and 1996/97, sound was again instrumental as a means to try to beat the regime by creating unity, defying fear, expressing displeasure, and rallying people to the cause.

Using noise to create boundaries had a history in Serbian protest dating back to at least 1992 when bells were rung by people in a demonstration to try to awaken the rest of the populace from its slumber. In the 1996/97 protests, noise took on several special roles. First whistles were used to jeer at the regime. The act of blowing whistles in unison gave protestors a sense of community, again making it clear that those who were whistling were part of one group, and that they were against the regime. Some citizens wore the whistle on a cord around their neck even when they were not attending a demonstration. Like the T-shirt in 1999 and 2000, it was used by many protestors as a marker of their identity although it was a lot easier to hide or take off at a moment's notice than T-shirts. Sound was also used at 7:30 pm each night when RTS news came on to try to down out the regimes lies. This protest was particularly effective as anyone who had a pot or pan could anonymously join in if they did not want to be identified or, if they did not mind being seen, they could come out on their balcony or join those in the street. The "Noise is all the Rage" protest was so successful because it was participatory, offered various degrees of risk and through the successful act of creating so much noise, created a sense of fulfillment for those who participated.[14]

[14] So central was the act of banging saucepans to people's understanding of their protest and eventual victory that at the February 22, 1997 celebration of the Zajedno coalition's final victory, held in the central Square of the Republic in Belgrade, well-known Serbian composer Zoran Hristic created a piece entitled, "Celebratory Cantata for 1,000 Saucepans, Whistles, Trumpets and Drums" that was played not only by

Sound was sometimes used in conjunction with walks. Drummers frequently headed protest walks in 1999 and 2000 as they had in 1996/97. In 1996/97,

> every day, drummers from various rock-n-roll bands were at the head of the citizens' procession, making deafening noise by devotedly pounding their instruments and setting the pace for the march with Latin American and African rhythms. They heralded the approach of the procession to a neighborhood so that occupants of apartments and offices along the way had time to come to their windows and balconies and prepare to greet the protesters. They were not merely spectators, but equally important participants in the Protest. Often, rock bands and dancers performed while walking with the protesters.[15]

While sound itself was not as central to the protests in 1999 and 2000 as it had been in 1996/97, as Marc Steinberg notes, "mobilizing and reformulating cultural tradition as a form of collective memory provides a usable past and rituals through which groups can construct collective identities…"[16] In 1999 and 2000, the symbolic aspects of sound, the collective memories of 1996/97, were as crucial to boundary delineation and identity construction as the actual noise created. Two elements of sound protest that formed strong collective memories from 1996/97 were used again in 1999 and 2000 to help create a sense of collective identity: drummers and drumming, and music.

Drummers still sometimes led protest processions in 1999 and 2000 but as there were fewer walks in the 1999/2000 period than there had been in 1996/97, more often than not they were part of protest rallies. Drummers themselves had become important symbols of protest against the regime, first because almost all were well known rock and roll artists whose work had been banned by state media, and second, because of their very

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renowned Serbian musicians, but also by the general audience, who were urged to participate using their "own instruments." See "Zajedno Alliance forms joint 'leadership council'," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 22, 1997, Available on Lexis-Nexis Academic.

[15] See the description in Prosic-Dvornic, "The Topsy-Turvy Days Were There Again: Student and Civil Protest in Belgrade and Serbia, 1996/1997."

[16] Marc W. Steinberg, "When Politics Goes Pop: On the Intersections of Popular and Political Culture and the Case of Serbian Student Protests," *Social Movement Studies*, 3/1 (April 2004): 4-29, quoted passage on page 5.

prominent role in the daily processions in 1996/97. Some, such as Dragoljub Djuric, also became members of groups such as G17Plus where he participated in talks across the country. Drummers played at all the key opposition protests such as the New Year's Eve party (2000) sponsored by Otpor that Otpor abruptly terminated to remind people how other people's lives had been terminated by the regime. Drummers led the Nezavisnost May Day celebration's protest walk and were also prominent participants in the "It's Time" (Vreme Je) rock and roll tour in support of getting out the vote. They also appeared together with Otpor at many Otpor protests, traveled on the campaign trail with the DOS caravan and played at the final DOS rally on September 20, just before the elections were held. Drummers would also eventually lead all the key protests on October 5, heading up columns of masses of humanity, their drums sounding a warning to the government that they were on the way, giving courage to the people behind them.[17]

Drummers participated in such protests because they believed that their drums could help awaken people to the cause. Duricic's remark below illustrates both his political consciousness as well as the belief that his drumming could help awaken people:

> I would compare my engagement with that of someone seeing a man drowning in the sea. While he knows how to swim he nevertheless waits for the lifeguard. I decided not to wait for the lifeguard since someone pushed us 50 years in the past. The drumming was the only way to sound the alarm, to bring people together and let them know what they were being offered for their future. The people perhaps did not know who to vote for, but they did know who not to vote for.[18]

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[17]Dragoljub Duricic, "We Cut Just Like Through Swiss Cheese," *Blic*, Belgrade, October 7, 2000, http://www.ex-yupress.com/blic/blic20.html. See also video footage, 'Bringing Down a Dictator," a production of York, Zimmerman Inc. 2001; authors Dragan Bujosevic and Ivan Radovanovic note that trumpeters also headed up columns, "playing Chetnik evergreens like 'From Topola to Ravna Gora'." See Dragan Bujosevic and Ivan Radovanovic, *The Fall of Milosevic: The October 5th Revolution*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 76.

[18] Duricic, "We Cut Just like Through Swiss Cheese."

The sounds of the drums themselves can generate a variety of emotions in those who hear them. It is not an accident that almost all military bands, even fife and drum corps, include drums not only to help establish a rhythm for marching but also to call people to arms. Thus, in addition to the actual noise that can awaken people, the sounds emitted by drums can create an emotional sense of anger, of fearlessness.[19] Such sound can also be used instrumentally as noted by Col. Robert Helvey who taught Otpor its non-violence tactic "Sometimes the sounds of the enemy - the clicking of bayonets, the beating of the batons - can instill this fright. So you have your own people to chant and make a lot of noise so it drowns out some of the sounds which are coming."[20] Drums were used in just this way in opposition protests—they were often put at the head of the line to drown out the noise of police troops or tanks that might be headed towards the protestors. That the drummers and drums indeed played an important role in protest was noted by Djuricic when he rhetorically asked in January 2000, "What kind of President is afraid of a mere drummer?"[21]

Not only sound, but specifically music, played a crucial role in defining identities and creating boundaries. Such boundaries were complex as different types of music had come to symbolize complex identity packages from the mid-1990s on. To say that rock

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[19] On the intersection of music and affects see Steinberg, "When Politics goes Pop," 8. See also Mathew Collin, *Guerilla Radio: Rock and Roll Radio and Serbia's Underground Resistance*. (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press/Nation Books, 2001), 108, for a description of the emotional effect of the drums and whistles on protestors in 1996/97.

[20] Col. Robert Helvey, "On Overcoming Fear." in "Fear and Overcoming the Effect of Fear," Centre for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies, http://www.canvasopedia.org/content/serbian_case/otpor_fear.htm#01, accessed May 31, 2009..

[21] "Dragoljub Djuricic, Member of the Group 17 Plus: What Kind of President is Afraid of a Mere Drummer?" *Free Serbia Interviews*, January 14, 2000, http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/interviews/2000/e-djuricic14012000.html, accessed on February 16, 2009. The importance of drummers to protest had also been signified by the regime's attempt to arrest them in 1996/97 while people formed a protective circle around them. See Brana Mijatovic, "Music and Politics in Serbia (1998-2000)," PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 2003, 138. Drummers were instrumental in the final protests that took place after the elections, especially on October 5th, heading up the protest lines and marches. Duricic, "We Cut Just like Through Swiss Cheese."

and roll was the music of youth and was oppositional to the regime is true—but such a statement, which could also have been said about American youth and rock and roll in the 1960's, misses several crucial and specific political dimensions that Serbian music had taken on since the early 1990s. As Gordy, Steinberg, Mijatovic and others point out, although rock and roll had been identified even under Tito as western and urban, its identity was not one that had been oppositional to the regime per se.[22] It had, in fact, served to confirm Serbia (and Yugoslavia more generally) as western and cosmopolitan with rock bands from Yugoslavia receiving Western recognition. Many Yugoslav cities developed thriving rock and roll/punk scenes rivaling those in western capitals, something that urban Serbs themselves noted as a marker of who they were and their place in the world. Within Yugoslavia and in Serbia more specifically, rock had served as a signifier between those that were urban and rural. It was generally understood that rural immigrants to the city (of which there were still a large number in the 1990s)[23] preferred neo-folk, a form of music that "evolved as a link between the city and the countryside and a bridge between rural traditions and an evolving adaptation to 'modern life.'"[24] The urban/rural divide took on new political significance when Milosevic came to power as many of his closest allies were seen as rural hicks who were crude and lacked manners. Milosevic also actively promoted a new genre of music called turbo-folk which

[22] There were some exceptions, as Gordy points out, such as the band the Partibrejkers [a phonetic spelling of Party breakers], whose name was clearly a play on words. See Eric D. Gordy, *The Culture of Power in Serbia, Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives*, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 111.

[23] Gordy cites the following statistics to indicate the degree to which Serbia was still a country in transition from urban to rural in the 20th century: Belgrade had a population of 385,000 in 1948 which increased to 1,209,361 by 1971. Even between 1971 and 1981 there was an increase from 1,209, 361 to 1, 470,073. To indicate that this was not just a matter of urban birthrate but rather in-migration from the provinces he notes that in 1971 only 38.84 percent had actually been born in Belgrade. See Gordy, *The Culture of Power in Serbia*, 106.

[24] Steinberg, "When Politics Goes Pop," 15.

Alexi Monroe describes as, "an aggressive nationalist adaptation of pop culture used as a generator of a national-consumerist mode of Serbness."[25] Turbofolk was also seen as promoting "anti-modernism, anti-individualism, anti-intellectualism."[26] Gordy notes that turbo-folk was used by the regime not only to nationalize its rural and semi-rural base but also to actively marginalize that which it could not control, rock and roll and the types of people who were attracted to it—those who were urban, valued contact with the West and who considered themselves cosmopolitan, enlightened and European. Thus, the regime itself fused culture with politics in an active attempt to marginalize its cultural and now political opponents. This history, which had played out over ten years, had also led to the marginalization of rock and roll as the wars separated urban centers across the former Yugoslavia, eliminating the ability to travel and isolating Serbian rockers. This attempt by the regime to marginalize a political opponent also had unintended consequences. Whereas in 1992 many Serbian rock bands had opposed the war, even staging a large open-air rock concert against the war and for peace, rock musicians became more politicized, writing an increasing number of lyrics openly critical of the regime.

By 1999 and 2000 rock had been forced to the official margins of the music world in Serbia and was largely forbidden. Youth saw in rockers a reflection of their own youth and lived experiences. Rock lyrics also influenced how youth perceived themselves collectively as a generation, increasing and shaping their sense of collective identity. Rock lyrics not only protested against the regime, mocked Milosevic and denigrated the nationalist-populist project but as time went on some groups increasingly urged resistance. As DeNora has argued, "music can serve as a way of constructing a sense of

[25] Steinberg, "When Politics Goes Pop," 17.
[26] Stevan Vukovic, cited in Collin, *Guerilla Radio*, 119.

agency when socially recognized meanings are mapped or projected onto other patterned activities.'"[27] Steinberg also argues that rock music became "an aesthetic technology for constructing collective identity, providing mattering maps, and accentuated the framing of oppositional politics. In effect, rock was a soundtrack for the story that students told of their collective resistance."[28] By 1999 and 2000 a generation had grown up with rock music. This music, created during the 1990s, that had protested the wars, belittled the system created by Milosevic and had mocked Milosevic himself and his supporters, had helped them not only to define this generation as one that was distinct from its peers, but gave them a roadmap as to how to make sense of their experiences and what they could or should do about things. More importantly, the music helped solidify a sense of collective identity that was not only generational but also one that had specific content.[29]

It was not surprising then that in mobilizing youth to go out and vote in 1999 and 2000, rock played an important role. Rock concert tours were one important means that bands could use to express their protest against the regime and urge the young to protest against the system by voting. Tours in which young people were gathered together in concerts expressing unified feelings and thoughts also helped to solidify collective identity and will through a sense of effervescence. In 1999 ANEM put together a rock tour, "It's Not Human to Remain Silent," to protest the lack of media freedom. Panel discussions were planned as part of the bands' tour through 12 Serbian cities, to discuss how media repression had an adverse impact on hopes for developing a normal life in

[27] Steinberg, "When Politics Goes Pop," 7.
[28] Steinberg, "When Politics Goes Pop," 19,
[29] For an excellent analysis of the content of different rock bands lyrics and their increasingly political nature see Mijatovic, "Music and Politics in Serbia (1998-2000)." The dissertation gives full lyrics to a variety of songs illustrating how both through lyrics and instrumentally, emotions would be built up or direct people to certain aspects of politics.

Serbia.[30] The tour was part of a plan for the "next time." Dragan Ambrozic, an organizer for the project, said that the 1999 tour was "an investment in the small-town audiences, building infrastructure for the future."[31] Mijatovic notes that the tour was "organized and managed on a level of professionalism unusual in Serbia and included the highest quality sound-systems, vendors, T-shirts of the bands…and promotional compact dics."[32] Especially significant was the fact that the songs the bands sang all had lyrics urging listeners not to passively accept the situation that existed, and not to allow themselves to be oppressed. Some lyrics went so far as to say blatantly "they will take your life and if you stay—your honor…Get out and Fight!"[33] Mijatovic states that "another important idea that this music got across was that people themselves were responsible for the change and they did not need to rely exclusively on political activists in the opposition,"[34] a message that paralleled Otpor's message that every individual had to live in resistance. The Vreme Je tour in August and September 2000 once again brought together musicians who urged the young to go out and vote.[35] This message to youth was given to them by a messenger that they trusted and found credible and contributed to mobilizing voters. As Dragan Ambrozic noted about the Vreme Je tour:

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[30] "ANEM Launches It is Not Human to Keep Silent Campaign." *BETA*, Belgrade, November 25, 1999. FBIS-EEU-1999-1125. *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com. The tour featured many of the same bands that would later participate in the "Vreme Je" tour including Sunshine, Kanda, Kodza,and Nebojsa, and Darkwook Dub.

[31] Dragan Ambrozic a personal conversation with Brana Mijatovic, cited in "Music and Politics in Serbia," 147.

[32] Mijatovic, "Music and Politics in Serbia," 147.

[33] Lyrics from Eyesburn, as quoted in Mijatovic, "Music and Politics in Serbia," 150.

[34] Mijatovic, "Music and Poltics in Serbia," 151. She also argues that Djordje Balasevic's songs, especially "Sloboda-ne" (Freedom-no), Krivi smo mi (It's Our Fault), reminded people of their responsibility to take action.

[35] While some might argue that the Vreme Je tour was a case of diffusion of the model used in Slovakia in which they had a Rock the Vote concert, I would argue that the Serbs had previously held rock concerts and by extension, tours for political purposes, such as that on April 22, 1992 in Belgrade against the war called "Don't Count on Us" and again in 1999. This was something that was homegrown.

> Bands like Kanda Kodza I Nejbojsa and Darkwood Dub were already transmitting the messages we wanted. Those bands grew up with this generation and had its experiences in their lyrics. All we had to do was put them together and the message was already there. They didn't even have to say "go and vote."[36]

The Vreme Je tour was a serious attempt to mobilize disenfranchised, disenchanted and sometimes despairing youth and to marshal them to the voting booth through a collective sense of anger with the regime as well as the concept that their vote would matter if they simply would go out and vote. In practical terms, the Vreme Je tour covered a lot of ground, playing in over 25 cities across the country in one month, covering over 2,000 miles and attracting over 150,000 people to the concerts.[37]

As with the physical objects such as T-shirts, stickers and posters, both sounds and walks were used to create collective identities, first by clearly delineating who was with you and who was against you, showing where those boundaries lay and actively solidifying them and then finally by reinforcing the sense of collective identity through shared activities. The reinforcement of boundaries through the marking of territory and the investment of meaning into symbols so that they would have constant emotional appeal required constant effort by opposition actors in DOS, the NGO community and Otpor. Such actions did make it clear that one needed to be for or against. Such activities also solidified communities of like-minded people who were ready to take action.

Humor—Undermining Authority, Creating Collective Identity

Humor, sometimes described as a weapon of the weak, has a history as a vital means to express frustration with governments and to help subvert regimes by

[36] Mathew Collin, *This is Serbia Calling: Rock 'n Roll and Belgrade's Underground Resistance*, (London: Serpents Tale, 2001), 208-9.
[37] Statistics for the Vreme Je tour are given in Collin, *Guerilla Radio,* 208; and Mijatovic, "Music and Politics in Serbia," 147.

undermining their authority.[38] Regimes that are successfully mocked, in public no less, hardly seem as monolithic. Under communist systems for example jokes were frequently a means to mock the mighty. Political cartoons also have frequently been a form of subversive humor. In Serbia, the work of cartoonist Corax (Predag Koraksic) had long helped to unite people against the regime. In 1997, signs were seen among the crowd, "Corax for President." His work, well known, almost always depicted the regime and especially its leaders as bungling and incompetent:

> What made Corax's cartoons so appealing to the Serbian public was his emphasis on the grotesqueness and personal vulnerabilities of…Slobodan Milosevic and his wife and the couple's closest entourage. By persistently portraying them as power-hungry, security-obsessed, irrational, cowardly and paranoid, Corax's images refused to reify the oppressive regime and surrender in apathy and disillusionment. They provided an immediate, visual avenue for the mobilization of popular dissent, protest and challenges to authoritarianism.[39]

But while jokes such as the kind that were told under communism and political cartoons certainly helped to relieve societal stress and pressure, and do mock—they are not a public performance shared among many. Frequently jokes were only told among confidants who trusted each other and shared similar opinions. In this sense the jokes served to solidify pre-existing bonds. Similarly political cartoons, while subversive in the sense that they mocked the regime—remained largely between the artist and the reader—a shared but silent protest between the two. This is not to deny the power of jokes or cartoon—but neither requires a public audience, i.e. people who have to "participate" by

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[38] See James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant* Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). Mockery of power in order to subvert it has a long history. Lent carnival traditions dating to the Middle Ages used such techniques—and still do today. See Peter Burke, *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe*, rev. reprint edition, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), especially Chapter Seven, "The World of Carnival," 178-204.

[39] Jelena Subotic, "Laughing at Power: The Works of Corax (Predrag Koraksic)," in *The Art of Truth-telling about Authoritarian Rule*, edited by Ksenija Bilbija, Jo Ellen Fair, Cynthia E. Milton and Leigh A. Payne, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2005), 80. See also Corax's own website, on which many of his cartoons are available, including a special section of his "Otpor" cartoons at http://web.archive.org/web/20061012121756/www.corax.co.yu/menu/index.htm.

choosing to watch and are seen, by others, to be watching. This sort of activity not only helps to subvert the authority of the regime, but helps to create boundaries. Those who laugh—who get the joke and find it funny come to realize that their sentiments are shared by others. The "public" aspect of this declaration also helps to draw boundaries—part of the "us" and "them" of collective identity and action.

Otpor's sense of humor was very publicly on display in village and city squares. It was both a means to frame government policies as well as a weapon to create a stronger sense of solidarity with the public. Humor was a weapon that Otpor could use since enacting such skits was low-cost, required little in the way of materials, took little time to "set-up" or dismantle, requiring only a few brave students with a sense of humor and willingness to be arrested. Humor was a particularly effective tool when framing the regimes actions because the regimes pomposity, righteousness and constant use of agitprop vocabulary made it a target that could not reply in kind. The regime simply had had no sense of humor. As one Otpor activist noted, "'Milosevic is many things, but he is definitely not a funny guy. He's stuck in 1386 [sic], in a field of black birds with Czar Lazur losing gloriously to the Turks."[40]

Otpor employed several different types of humor. One was to poke fun directly at people in the regime to diminish their authority.[41] One example of this is when Otpor activists, deciding to mock Milosevic's wife Mira—who was truly despised by most—put a small hat with a flower on a turkey and let it run around the village. Even those who were ready to excuse Milosevic himself frequently disliked Mira. Known for her hats and

[40] Sveta Matic, an Otpor member quoted in Joe Rubin, "The Kids Who Confronted Milosevic" *Mother Jones*, September 22, 2000. http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2000/09/kids-who-confronted-milosevic.
[41] See the discussion of Carnival in Burke, *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe*, reference in footnote 38 above.

the trademark flower that she always wore behind her ear, she was not a figure that one mocked lightly given her power. In Serbian, to call a woman a turkey is a form of grave insult. The hat with the flower made it clear to those in the town exactly who was being mocked and what she was being called, and apparently those who witnessed the action could not help themselves—they laughed. When the chief of police told his younger officer to go out and arrest the turkey, the audience's mirth was increased, as the young officer chased the turkey, otherwise known as Mira, in order to arrest her. The "skit," related to me by an Otpor activist, had all the elements of humor necessary to "subvert" the regime. The president's wife, who was despised, had been called a whore; an officer of the government was being forced to arrest the "president's wife;" and of course, being in a smaller town, the officer was personally known to many, as was the police chief. Another example of open and blatant ridicule of the regime was the "Dinar to Bop the Milosevic Puppet" campaign. The Otpor "dinar to do something" campaigns were a direct mockery of the regime's "Dinar for Sowing" campaign. For that campaign the regime had put out collection buckets in the shape of piggy banks so that the impoverished populace could donate money that in turn the regime would give to farmers to help in purchasing seed for sowing—as if the populace, weary, war-torn and impoverished, would have extra money to donate for something for which the state should have been paying. Thus the "Dinar for Resignation," "Dinar to Bop Milosevic" and other such campaigns were a direct ridicule of Milosevic and of the regime more generally.[42]

[42] See Milenko Vasovic, "Belgrade Students Lead Resistance to Bad Government," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report No. 79, September 28, 1999, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.

Humor also reminded people of the non-violent nature of the student movement. The arrests of the student activists reinforced the violent and authoritarian nature of the regime. That students continued to take part in skits that were funny—even in the face of arrests—undermined the authority of the regime. Srdja Popovic, one of the founders of Otpor again noted that this was a conscious strategy:

> Everything we did must have a dosage of humor. So we had only a few really serious actions. But generally each of our actions was full of humor. So what humor produces in the people is superiority of nonviolent movement. Because I'm joking, you're becoming angry. I'm full of humor and irony and you are beating me, arresting me, and in that story you are the dummy. So that's a story, that's a game you always lose because you are showing only one face and I'm always again with another joke, with another action, with another positive message to the wider audience.[43]

This strategy was employed even when Otpor had to utilize what it called its "Plan B," an attempt to save any Otpor member who had been arrested. In addition to getting a lawyer to the jail as quickly as possible, Plan B also called for activists and those who had agreed to participate to come to the jail as soon as possible to "bear witness," trying to exert public pressure for the release of the activist. These protesters, however, knew that in addition to following a very strict set of rules so as to provide no additional "provocations," they also had to "have fun" while waiting. This second group of protestors consciously employed

> non-violent humorous activities to maintain a positive atmosphere such as listening to music, singing songs and playing volleyball. Passersby found this funny and the police found this irritating—but what could they do? They could hardly arrest people for standing on the sidewalk and listening to music. [44]

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[43] "In His Own Words: Srdja Popovic," *A Force More Powerful.* http://www.aforcemorepowerful.org/films/bdd/story/otpor/srdja-popovic.php, excerpts from an interview with Srdja Popovic conducted in Belgrade, November 20, 2000, by Steven York.

[44] Zora Smijanovic, *Plan B: Using Secondary Protests to Undermine Repression*, edited by Liam Mahoney, translated by Dragana Gavrilovic, (Minneapolis, MN: Center for Victims of Torture, 2003).

These secondary non-violent protests drew the public's attention to the fact that another member of Otpor had been arrested and that in contrast to the regime, Otpor was non-violent. Such continued ridicule of the regime, even in the face of arrests, both undermined the authority of the regime and helped others find courage. Like the Cowardly Lion wishing for courage, people who wished for courage gained from Otpor's actions the chance to see themselves as braver, more purposeful and able to create change—the regime might melt.[45]

Thus humor was an important tool to undermine the authority of the regime. Using humor, it was possible to criticize and mock the regime and its policies while clearly pointing up what was salient—in short, framing what people should be paying attention to. Strategic use of humor allowed activists to draw attention to things in a way that people might otherwise have ignored, had the same point simply been made in a speech, a press release or a declaration. Humorous actions, in addition to making fun of specific policies of the regime also made obvious the tenor of the regime—the drabness of life in which everything was black or white, good or evil, and most of all not funny—because the regime had no sense of humor. People were forced to face the question of whether this was how they wanted to continue to live their lives—it was a question that was not only implicit, but explicit in many of the skits, clearly delineating the "us" and the "them" and how blame should be apportioned. Humor was subversive, it called people to action. Some skits allowed people to take direct and personal action against the regime in a way that was still "harmless" but allowed then to actively announce their feelings and get rid of their frustrations. The "Dinar to Bop Milosevic" was one such

[45] Like Dorothy and the other characters in the story of the Wizard of Oz, the public had to undertake an arduous journey to become convinced that they could change their destiny.

example. Yet whether or not they actively asked people to participate, such skits, and humor more generally, helped to draw dividing lines and undermine the regime's seeming invincibility

Medals and Monuments—Regime Efforts to Mark Territory

Opposition actors were not the only ones who tried to create and solidify boundaries through the use of material objects. If Otpor had posters, stickers and T-shirts, the regime had medals and monuments. In the aftermath of the NATO bombing the regime also, as Geertz noted about kings, journeyed through the country, "attending fêtes, conferring honors, exchanging gifts, [and] defying rivals."[46] Its reconstruction campaign, with its steady press coverage of politicians attending openings of new bridges, oil refineries and housing developments, was intended not only to show how much progress the country was making but to remind everyone exactly who was responsible for such largess. Monuments were also built to commemorate the losses and courage of the Serbian people. Monuments not only try to shape memory of how events are remembered and commemorated, but their very permanence is a reminder to all of the permanence of their builders. As such, a monument definitely marks territory, claiming the territory it sits on and the event it seeks to remember as the possession of the builders of such monuments. Beginning in the spring of 2000 the government began unveiling these monuments around the country. Of special note was the monument built in Belgrade

[46] See footnote 1 above.

called the eternal flame, with an inscription, in everlasting marble, penned by the president's wife, the despised Mira Markovic.[47]

Conferring honors in the aftermath of the NATO bombing was also something that the regime increased dramatically to mark its territory and to try to assure the loyalty of various sectors of regime elements such as the army and, more generally, the populace at large. Medals were given out to a variety of workers including workers at the Zastava plant, and electrical workers for quickly repairing the electrical grid. General Pavkovic at the ceremony for the electrical workers noted that the work done, "had demonstrated superiority over the enemy with their knowledge, courage, moral and patriotism and that their feats were equal to those of heroes in armed combat."[48] Vlado Mares, a Serbian commentator, noted: "hardly a day goes by without state media, particularly Radio-Television Serbia, reporting that Milosevic has awarded medals and decorations to a group of soldiers, or officers, or policemen or workers reconstructing buildings damaged by NATO bombs."[49] In addition to civilians who had done a heroic job, Milosevic made sure that medals were awarded not only to his special interior Ministry Forces to ensure their continued loyalty, but also to members of the Army to try to ensure their somewhat uncertain support. Reservists were another category of people whose support, in light of the events in the summer of 1999, was tenuous at best. In an effort to show his

[47] "Milosevic's Wife Writes Text on Monument to Victims of NATO Strikes," *Tanjug* in English, June 13, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0613, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com. For a biting commentary on the monument see Petar Lukovic, "Milosevic's Virtual Demise," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report No. 156, July 14, 2000, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.
[48] "CGS Gen. Pavkovic Presents Award to EPS Workers," *Tanjug* in English March 27, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0327, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com. For several other examples of such ceremonies see "Gen Ojdanic Presents Awards for 'Exceptional' Defense," *Tanjug* in English, March 27, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0327, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com; and "Milosevic's Envoy Decorates Tanjug, RTS, Politika, Others," *Tanjug* in English, April 26, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0426, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[49] Vlado Mares "Milosevic's Medals Spurned," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Reports No. 109, January 21, 2000, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=. Mares notes that during the fall and winter of 1999 around 4,500 medals or commendations were given out.

appreciation for their contribution in Kosovo, he presented awards to reservists as well. This strategy of awarding medals, especially to those whose loyalties were uncertain, to ensure that the face of unity was preserved, was not without certain difficulties. As Jasper notes, symbols are less easily controlled than a physical resource like money.[50] Despite the fact that a medal is indeed a physical thing, the meanings and significance attributed to it were more open to interpretation. In an effort to deny Milosevic legitimacy, to deny his claims about the unity of the people, to denigrate his attempts to control meanings of what a good Serb was, and certainly to deny him any claim over their dead sons, several parents of reservists individually refused the medals and made public statements as to why such medals were unacceptable.[51] One police officer also refused the medal that was awarded to him, resulting in his firing. He too gave an open interview describing why he could not accept such an award.[52] Such personal acts of courage contradicted the picture that Milosevic sought to portray of a united populace as well as the boundaries he tried to set over territory. His attempts to create a sense of collective identity and to mark boundaries were contested even by individuals with few resources, making the validity of his claims that much more tenuous. It made clear that all territory was not his and he could not mark it at will.

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[50] Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest*, 32.

[51] Dusan Vukovic refused the medal presented to his son. Several months later when the regime successfully managed to award it to the reservist's grandfather, Dusan Vukovic spoke out again against both the regime and his father. This story was in the news for several months, as was the case brought by 20 reservists' families against the government. Other personal acts of courage such as that of the policeman, or that of the mother of an RTS worker who refused, even under pressure to join the government's suit against Italy and instead sued RTS, were constant reminders that Milosevic's attempts to mark boundaries were regularly contested.

[52] Police Captain Slobodan Pajic, who refused to receive the Knight's Sword Medal for service in Kosovo and Metohija, refused on ground of his conscience. See Bojan Bozic, "No Responsibility in the Police: Interview with Slobodan Pajic, Captain in the Belgrade Police Department," *Free Serbia Interviews*, March 3, 2000, http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/interviews/2000/e-pajic03032000.html, accessed June 17, 2008.

Conclusion

As we have seen in this chapter physical manifestations of culture play an important role in delineating boundaries between groups and solidifying collective identities. As Steinberg notes," the recognition of a shared aesthetic is also an enactment of collective values, commitments and shared conditions."[53] Such visible manifestations of identity also help people with shared values and ideas to find each other, to create and consolidate new meanings and a shared understanding of their "we"-ness.

Symbols however can also be strategically deployed not only to consolidate inner group identity but to physically mark off and take over territory. [54] Symbols are powerful because of the meanings and emotions that people vest in them. In this case, material objects which, on their own are ephemeral, become imbued with power to concretely take over territory. Strategic deployment of such cultural phenomena may result in not only cultural skirmishes over meaning, but may have an important impact on politics by reshaping the field of contention upon which political acts and efforts are played out and the nature of the actors involved. Such shifts in one's perceived strength and efficacy have concrete effects on decisions to take action. The power of such symbols and techniques to change people's underlying mood, from despair to hope and to help mitigate cognitive emotions such as fear, is central to their importance and effectiveness in mobilizing people to protest.

[53] Steinberg, "When Politics Goes Pop," 8.
[54] My discussion of symbols includes all cultural carriers of meanings including plays, music and street theater and isn't meant to be only physical markers such as medals, monuments, stickers and poster.

CHAPTER 12

Mobilizing for Action: Imagining a Change

> "The fact that today many people cannot imagine Milosevic walking his grandchildren in a park is a consequence of the image he projects," Goran Svilanovic, President of the Civic Association of Serbia (GSS).[1]

> "You know, from January of 2000, our inside story was that a dictator is finished when everyone in Serbia thinks that he is finished. When they think that and have it clear in their minds that he must go, then in real life, he's really finished. He can't do anything to stay in power. So that was our story.'" Ivan Andric, Otpor activist.[2]

If there was ever a case to be made for the power of constructivism—and of constructing or deconstructing beliefs to challenge "reality"—it exists in the two statements above—both by activists working against he Milosevic regime. One of the greatest hindrances to achieving success against the Milosevic regime was emotional—the "bewilderment and opacity," the depression and doubt, and the fear and frustration of the citizens of Serbia. [3] Surveys regularly showed that citizens were afraid or despondent.[4] Surveys also showed that large numbers of people had abstained from voting in the last election in December 1997,[5] and planned to do so again should

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[1] Goran Svilanovic in Ana Matic, "Large Turnout Prevents Electoral Fraud: Interview: Goran Svilanovic, president of the Civic Association of Serbia, about the chances of the opposition in the forthcoming elections," *Danas*, September 2 – 3, 2000. http://www.ex-yupress.com/danas/danas40.html.

[2] Ivan Andric, "Developing Otpor's Slogans and Stickers," in "How Did We Succeed: Superior Propaganda for Advertising Freedom," Center for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies. http://www.canvasopedia.org/content/serbian_case/otpor_propaganda.htm#03.

[3] See Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper, "Emotions and Social Movements," in Jan E. Stets and Jonathan H. Turner, eds., *Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions*, edited by Jan E. Stets and Jonathan H. Turner, (New York: Springer, 2007), 611-635.

[4] See Biserka Matic, "People in Serbia – Living in Fear," *AIM* Podgorica, October 27, 1999, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199910/91027-003-trae-pod.htm, (accessed May 6, 2009) for public opinion polling data as well as academic analysis of poll numbers.

[5] As the opposition partially "boycotted" the December 1997 elections, with only Draskovic and his party deciding to participate at the last minute—it is impossible to tell from those figures how many people abstained from voting because of the boycott and how many would have abstained anyway. Subsequent surveys of voters however beginning in February 2000 showed that a significant percentage of the population was planning to abstain at the next elections and that of the population that would abstain, x

elections be held. In some cases citizens explained in interviews that there was no point in going to vote since it would not make a difference.[6] It appeared that the regime's efforts to demobilize people had worked and that its framing of Milosevic as "almighty," immovable—an immutable truth of Serbian politics and reality—had been effective. Serbian citizens might dislike him, privately scorn him, find his claims implausible and improbable, even despise what he had done, but few believed that anything that they could do would make a difference. Many were simply fed up and disgusted with the system. Even many who attended rallies believed that no matter what they did—whether they went to vote or not—that Milosevic would ever leave.

This inability to imagine Milosevic walking peacefully in the park with his grandchild after losing an election was in part brought on by the harsh reality of an outstanding international court warrant for his arrest leading everyone to assume that he would do anything to stay in power as a result. But it was also brought on by the fact that Milosevic had been successful in his attempts to frame himself as "gnome-like" and "sultantic," a "statesman above the fray" of everyday politics.[7] His ability to cling to

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percent were in favor of the opposition. Vuk Jeremic of Otpor told a British correspondent that 40% of the population was so "disillusioned after 13 years of war, poverty and the NATO bombing, it did not even want to vote. When we found out that at least 65% of that number was between 18-25 we realized we had found our target audience." Helena Smith, "A Study in Victory," *The Guardian* (London), October 31, 2000. Reprinted by The Centre for Peace in the Balkans, http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=article&articleid=13909.

[6]Public opinion polling also showed that voters thought Milosevic was invincible and, that even if he lost, he would not go. "The poll results pointed to a paradox that went to the heart of Milosevic's grip on power. On one hand, the Yugoslav president was detested by 70 percent of the electorate. On the other, a majority of Serbs believed he would continue to remain in power, even after an election. To topple Milosevic, opposition leaders first had to convince their fellow Serbs that he could be overthrown." See Michael, Dobbs, "U.S. Advice Guided Milosevic Opposition: Political Consultants Helped Yugoslav Opposition Topple Authoritarian," *The Washington Post*, December 11, 2000.

[7] Ironically Milosevic himself conceived of politics as "dirty," as he always tried to position and frame himself clearly as a "statesman," who was not a "politician." See Laslo Sekelj, "Forced Democratization of a Criminalized State," in *Revolution and Order: Serbia after October 2000*, edited by Ivana Spasic and Milan Subotic, trans. Vera Gligorijevic, Duska Vujic, Linda Louise Krstajic, Ivana Spasic, (Belgrade: Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, 2001), 96.

power despite the protests in 1996/97 and despite losing four wars also attested to the public, in a very real way, how past events that should have led to his departure had instead had no visible impact on his authority or where he sat. However, the inability to imagine Milosevic gone was also a failure of imagination that actively weakened the opposition in its attempts to unseat Milosevic. People who do not believe and who therefore fail to act, in this case by voting, are not part of the team—of the collective—who move semi-authoritarian figures out of office. There had to be a vision, a willingness to invest time and effort—and faith—to take a chance that one's hopes would not be dashed. It would require hard work by Otpor and NGOs such as CeSid, Civic Initiatives and a host of others—but people had to be made to believe through framings that it was possible that Milosevic could be defeated *and* that he would leave office.[8] They had to be sufficiently convinced so that many of them would be mobilized at a minimum to go to the voting booth on election day, if not join actions. People had to be stirred from their apathy and taught to "resist"—even if it was just one sticker that they placed, one time that they showed up outside a police station to protest the arrest of an Otpor activist, one small action that led them to feel that they had a vested interest, were part of a collective. People had to be brought to believe first in their collective identity and that together, as an entity, they were a sufficient force to create change. Even if they were not fully convinced of their efficacy, they at least had to be made to feel that at the very minimum they had a moral duty and responsibility to try.[9] People had to accept moral responsibility

[8] In a survey conducted in October, 1999, respondents claimed they would be more likely to vote if they were convinced that Milosevic could actually lose. 58% were "much more likely" to vote if they believed he would lose, while another 17% were "somewhat more likely" to vote. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, *Serbia Issues Poll,* October 24, 1999, http://www.ndi.org/files/410_yu_serbpoll99.pdf, accessed May 6, 2009, 18.

[9] As noted earlier, Benson and Snow refer to "morality" frames as propriety frames. Gamson refers to them within his two other definitions, as injustice frames and as "agents of history" frames. Jasper too refers to

for their actions—or inaction. Finally, the borders of the fight had to be clearly drawn, leaving no doubt as to who "us" and "them" were. The election had to be a referendum so as to leave no one with a shred of decency with a reasonable excuse to stand on the sidelines—absent from the voting booth.[10] People would have to be urged to participate by being convinced that they were "agents of their own history," that they could be efficacious (efficacy framing), or they had a duty and a moral responsibility to do something (propriety framing)—for themselves, the country and for their children

In this chapter, I examine action mobilization, i.e. the efficacy, agent of history and propriety framing done by Otpor, opposition political parties, NGOs and the regime in order to mobilize (or demobilize in the case of the regime) people for the elections. I examine what actions were taken first to awaken people to the need to take action. Clearly the actions take by groups such as Otpor were intended to shock people out of their apathetic or indifferent state. The government also took actions, as we shall see, whose consequences were unintended. These were also intended to shock people—but instead of being shocked into inaction, people were motivated by triggers the government clearly could not have intended to pull. In a state more amenable to action, I examine the actual action mobilization campaigns of the regime and the government and the specific NGO framings to move people to vote.

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the importance of morality in moving people to action. See James M. Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest Culture, Biography and Creativity in Social Movement*, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

[10] Ironically both sides would frame this election as a referendum. The government would frame it as a referendum for freedom against slavery and the opposition would frame it as one for change versus more of the same. Amusingly, the government's framing would have been acknowledged by the opposition as correct—the references as to what slavery and freedom meant simply would have been different!

Awakening

Otpor's Use of Shock

Otpor, as one of the earliest groups to appear after the 1996/97 demonstrations, realized that it would have very little chance of achieving its objectives if it could not change the basic framework of authority relationships between the regime and the people and shift the balance of power from the regime to the people. People would be unable to find their voices or courage to take action if they could not be made to believe that they had the power to do so. They would not go to vote—and cease from abstaining unless they could be convinced there was a reason to participate. Otpor activists believed that a necessary part of this process was undermining Milosevic's authority, not just mobilizing popular support against him.[11] A first step toward this goal was for Otpor to "announce" its presence" and shock people from their apathy. Ivan Marovic directly argued for the importance of "awakening people." In his interview with *Vreme* he cited Otpor's original manifesto, which says: "Therefore the key to replacing the regime in Serbia is primarily tied to awakening and reviving of the people, because their passive participation in politics is no longer sufficient. In the torpid quagmire of the Serbian political system, Otpor! falls like a massive rock, causing waves that spread in concentric circles."[12] "Awakening" the people of Serbia seemed to be a regular part of what Serbian protestors felt they had to do to get the attention of their fellow citizens; for example, there are

[11] Srdja Popovic makes an interesting and important distinction between simply "mobilizing popular support against Milosevic" and undermining Milosevic's authority. For more on this see Srdja Popovic, "Serbian Arena for Nonviolent Conflict: An Analytical Overview of the Application of Gene Sharp's theory of Non-Violent Action in Milosevic's Serbia," Center for Applied Non-Violent Actions and Strategies, Canvas Total Index, January 31, 2001, http://www.canvasopedia.org/files/serbian/CTI_Serbian_Political_Substance.doc, accessed on May 30, 2009.

[12] Ivan Marovic, "Spread the 'Epidemic': How to Win the Elections," *Vreme*, Belgrade, June 3, 2000., http://www.ex-yupress.com/vreme/vreme74.html.

discussions of Serbian protestors in a 1992 anti-war protest using alarm clocks, bells, key and banging on pots and pans to "signal their fellow citizens of Serbia that this is the 'final wake-up' call."[13] Otpor's first manifesto, a mere few sentences long, was (as we saw in Chapter Five) one which used shocking language and visions to try to "awaken" people from their apathy. Similarly its chosen logo, was one that was purposively designed to be upsetting and strong. Done in stark graphics, in black and white—no greys or soft color palate, it was meant to be visually simple, stark, raw and memorable.[14] Ivan Andric, another early member of Otpor, also notes that all of Otpor's messages were in black and white also to symbolically point out that, "everything is black and white. That may be our main message. You are for them or you are against them. And at this point, you must be against them. Don't be on the black side, be on the white side."[15] Otpor's symbol thus represented its view of the importance of individual action adding up to collective resistance. One of their slogans simply said, "Pull Yourselves Together—Resistance Alive," Shown together with the fist it illustrated the importance of the individual fingers clenching together into one, united fist.[16]

Otpor's initial actions to grab people's attention consisted primarily of spraying the "fist" logo throughout Belgrade—an act which apparently many found offensive—until they discovered that those doing the spraying were the students. In November 1998 police arrested four of the activists who were sentenced to ten days each in prison. As

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[13] Bojana Susak, "An Alternative to War" in Nebojsa Popov and Drinka Gojkovic, eds., *The Road to War in Serbia, Trauma and Catharsis*, (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000), 479-508.
[14] Ivan Andric, "On Organizing the Smaller Actions Instead of Larger Protests?" in "How Did We Succeed: Superior Propaganda for Advertising Freedom," Center for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies. http://www.canvasopedia.org/content/serbian_case/otpor_propaganda.htm#06.
[15] Andric, "On organizing the smaller actions instead of larger protests?"
[16] Otpor activist Zorana Smiljanic makes this point in *Plan B: Using Secondary Protests to Undermine Repression*. It was, as Popovic later noted, "the most recognizable artifact produced by Otpor." Popovic, "Serbian arena for Nonviolent conflict: An Analytical Overview of the Application of Gene Sharp's theory of Non-Violent Action in Milosevic's Serbia."

Milja Jovanovic, an Otpor activist stated, "The trials backfired, because soon the whole nation knew that Otpor was a movement of young people who were prepared to fight Milosevic's regime to the bitter end."[17] This activity apparently "awakened" students in other cities as, according to Jovanovic, students from Kragujevac, Nis and Novi Sad contacted them because they also wanted to start Otpor branches.

With the exception of the months of the bombing, Otpor took actions throughout 1999, but its major campaign undertaken in 2000 to "awaken" the country was initiated, symbolically, on New Year's Eve. Again the tactic was meant to shock people and move them from apathy to anger. Sinsia Sikman, an Otpor activist, stated that people thought that they were going to a huge outdoor party, a good time with music and dancing on Belgrade's main square for Orthodox New Year's Eve.[18] He added that just before it was time for the Happy New Year greetings, "we turned off the electric and showed people's pictures on the video wall—with one person reading the names—asking, 'do you know who these people are? They are the people who were victims of Milosevic'. Next the voice said, 'Do you have a reason to celebrate? Go home and think about that. This is the year'."[19] Leaving them on the brink of the new year without a celebration—Otpor literally "pulled the plug" on their party to make people think about what the past was

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[17] Milja Jovanovic (otpor activist), "Rage Against the Regime: The Otpor Movement in Serbia." In *People Building Peace: Successful Stories of Civil Society*, online publication of the European Center for Conflict Prevention, July 2005.
http://www.peoplebuildingpeace.org/thestories/article.php?id=136&typ=theme&pid=31. Georgian students who founded Kmara, based on advice from Otpor students also initially introduced their movement to the public by spray-painting signs on buildings. Despite later "soft" actions designed to be more appealing to a general sector of the public, Kmara's actions were not approved of by the general public. Even after finding out that it was students, unlike in Serbia, Georgians on the whole did not approve, as one of Kmara's founders told me in an interview. This speaks in part to the "cultural" reservoir of good will that the Serbian students had with the general public.

[18] According to a published account more than 10,000 people attended this celebration. The victims of Milosevic' regime shown on the video wall were young people who had been killed at previous anti-government protests. See "'Resistance' Honors 'All' Casualties of Decade of Wars." *BETA*, Belgrade, January 14, 2000. FBIS-EEU-2000-0114. *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

[19] Sinisa Sikman, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 5, 2007.

and what the future should be. People were left with the slogan "This Is the Year." No one needed to ask what this was the year for—it was clear.

Otpor was one of the few groups able to use shock tactics effectively. While opposition politicians regularly countered government claims of its massive achievements—be they reconstruction or employment figures—with alternative information in an attempt to shock the public into reason, such efforts did not have the effects that Otpor's did. In the first place, as one Otpor activist pointed out, Otpor claims were almost always made through actions—they did not want to just give speeches. Actions were visually more interesting than speeches and hence garnered more attention from friendly, independent media journalists. Even attention from RTS and *Politika* gave them media time which was "face time," as RTS's efforts to make its point always involved showing what had happened. Through such visual images—no matter what the commentators on RTS were saying—people saw for themselves parts of the Otpor action.[20]

Repression Effects—Regime Use of Shock, Undermining its Own Authority

The government itself unintentionally played a crucial role in awakening people, moving them from apathy to activity and creating a stronger collective identity and sense of efficacy amongst the public. Although the government intended increased repression and arrest to frighten the public into silence and inactivity, some of its actions had the opposite effect. Although the government had begun escalating its actions against ordinary citizens as early as March, the dramatic increase of arrests and in some cases

[20]Sinisa Sikman, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 5, 2007.

beatings, especially of Otpor youth, sparked a slow burn that by the end of May resulted in a definite counter-reaction.

As discussed in Chapter Nine, the month of May was a critical juncture. Although it is not exactly clear why, the regime chose to step up physical repression and arrests against ordinary citizens in May. The Pozarevac case at the beginning of May, whose impact was heightened by the regime's attempt to spark a counter-demonstration with the clear potential for bloodshed; the use of force by the police at the rally in Belgrade on May 18 against the closing of Studio B; its refusal to register Otpor as an organization, insisting instead that it was illegal; and the beating on May 23 of students who were protesting an earlier beating of a student, all began to have a cumulative effect. These actions both increased citizens' awareness that they were not living a normal life, and led to the mobilization of larger and increasingly wider segments of the populace.

This mobilization was triggered most immediately by an incident at the end of May, when the police beat a young boy who was clearly running away from them at a demonstration. His beating, shown on TV, sparked revulsion and moral outrage. [21] The significance of this incident crystallized for some[22] when Djordje Balasevic, a figure of some moral authority as well as a beloved singer, not only cancelled his concert, but also published an open letter announcing his reasons:

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[21]The beating was shown on a station that was broadcasting from Montenegro during the half time of a soccer match. It is unclear how many stations managed to carry coverage, or how far that coverage reached. It is clear however that it was a potent scene—one that also was in part responsible for the creation of the Otpor mothers group in Novi Sad. See Djordje Balasevic, "Cancelled Due to a Lowly Force," *Free Serbia Comments*, May 23, 2000, http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/comments/2000/e-p23052000.html, for the note that Balasevic saw it on the Montenegrin station.

[22] Dragana Manojlovic, whose own daughter was severely beaten in the May 18 Studio B protest, wrote an open letter in *Danas* urging parents to "wake up" and to not let their children be beaten. In addition to noting that parents had to find courage to take action if they wanted the respect of their own children and to be able to respect themselves, she noted that she found courage to write her letter because of the open letter written by Djordje Balasevic. See "Arrest Parents Instead of Children," *Danas*, May 25, 2000, http://www.ex-yupress.com/danas/danas29.html#marta, accessed on March 15, 2009.

> This is the first time I will not stage a concert because of a Lowly Force. Because of crazed thugs hunting down our youth across this sorrowful country…I saw some news on Sunday…Whether the scene was too strong or my stomach has become too weak is not important at this point. All this just has to stop…A boy ran across the street as if he was trying to escape punishment for some benign mischief. If it was any street of the world, some wet boulevard in Phnom Pen or a shady avenue in Venezuela, regardless of who was after him, my sympathies would definitely side with the boy…Especially in Belgrade…The figure with the club suddenly appeared on the street like some mutant from an SF movie and hit the boy forcing him onto a parked car. The passion with which the rest of the thugs swarmed all over him horrified me and made me feel broken and defeated for the first time since the wars started. The kid who knocked over the garbage can onto its side? Who are you protecting guys? Who and from whom? Ten years against your people? ... Kids all the way from Montenegro and Bosnia are preparing to come to the concert in Nis. Does my song need to be a drunken beater scaring a young flock of birds into the view of trigger happy guns? ... I wrote down somewhere that everything has to stop so that Some New kids could make a fresh start… I cannot and will not sing when they beat the daylights out of our kids in the streets…[23]

Balasevic's letter notes that he has performed in former Yugoslav cities that were scorched and war-torn, that he has seen some truly horrible things in his life—but what is of particular interest here is his specifying that his *stomach* was too weak—despite all that he has seen in the past. This visceral reaction, in this case his stomach being "too weak," is an emotional reaction that is one key to moral shock. Such shocks can either completely immobilize people or they can move them to such anger and outrage that they act. Jasper notes:

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[23] Balasevic derived his moral authority largely from his unswerving allegiance to certain moral principles such as his anti-war stance and his ethnic inclusivity, which were clear in the lyrics of his songs. Additionally he was a United Nations Goodwill Ambassador appointed by the UN High commissioner for Refugees in 1998. His canceling of his concert and his statement therefore carried both internal and external moral validation. See his full open letter, "Cancelled Due to a Lowly Force." Balasevic in his statement also suggested that his new concert date in Nis be "the day when Nis will celebrate freedom." He indeed played on that day. The pop singer Momcilo Bajagic Bajaga also cancelled his concerts as long as "children were being beaten in the streets of Serbia." See his comments at the May 27, 2000 demonstration in Belgrade, reported at "Protest of the United Opposition," *Free Serbia Specials,* Belgrade, May 27, 2000, http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/specials/broadcasts/27052000/e-index.html, accessed May 7, 2009. Balesevic's reference to the "New Kids" is a reference to Otpor and the song he wrote, "To Live in Freedom" (Ziveti Slobodno) about making a fresh start became their unofficial "anthem." See Brana Mijatovic, "Music and Politics in Serbia (1998-2000)." PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 2003, 156

> Whether the underlying image is a state of shock or an electric shock, it implies a visceral, bodily feeling, on a par with vertigo or nausea. The prospect of unexpected and sudden changes in one's surroundings can arouse feelings of dread and anger. The former can paralyze, but the latter can become the basis of mobilization. Activists work hard to create moral outrage and anger and to suggest targets against which these can be vented.[24]

In this case opposition activists did not have to work to create such feelings, as the government did it for them. As in the case of the government's blunder the previous summer, when its lies to parents about their sons being safe and alive in Kosovo also created a moral shock, the reaction on the part of Serbs to such shocks in this period increased.

That scene of the young boy being beaten also moved mothers in Novi Sad to action. In a journal article, Dr. Marija Kleut, herself an Otpor Mother, detailed:

> A TV scene of a fragile, boyish looking student surrounded and beaten by policemen went around the world…Resisting Mothers was one small group which could not accept repression aimed at young people and was courageous enough to oppose it in public, to get organized and begin with public political activities against the regime.[25]

Kleut and Markov specifically note that the scene of this boy being beaten was a trigger for action and that such scenes of children being beaten moved many to "anger and fury" as well as "new energy to and readiness to take part in bringing about changes."[26] While women had been involved in political action previously, especially with anti-war NGOs such as the Women in Black, such actions awoke the interest of women in specific demographic groups (age and class) that would not otherwise have been likely to take part in political action. Unlike many of the women who had previously been involved

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[24] Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper, "Emotions and Social Movements," in Jan E. Stets and Jonathan Turner eds, *Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions*, (New York: Springer, 2007), 611-635.
[25] Marija Kleut and Slobodanka Markov, "Women in the Popular Movement "Resistance" (Otpor) in Novi Sad 2000," 162-170.
[26] Kleut and Markov, "Women in the Popular Movement "Resistance" (Otpor) in Novi Sad 2000," 166.

who were primarily professionals or the women involved in Otpor who were younger, the mothers who created the Otpor Mothers group in Novi Sad were middle aged, (45-60 years old); Two-thirds of the were employed in state factories and institutions; Only one third were professionals such as judges and professors. As G17Plus' survey results used by the NGOs had shown, older women, especially those in the lower to middle classes with less education were less likely to take part in political action including voting.[27] Ironically, the government's own actions awakened some members of a demographic group that might otherwise not have become involved in political action, to become mobilized—and in the most radical way possible—with Otpor.

Otpor itself also noted a marked increase in its membership both during and after May 2000.[28] Regular Otpor groups (university age) grew and new branches were founded after May. Increased numbers of groups of high school age children now also founded their own Otpor branches (known informally as *Baby Otpor*).[29] The regime's attempts to silence the population by beating Serbia's children created a backlash.[30] For Otpor

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[27]See Zarko Paunovic, Natasa Vuckovic, Miljenko Dereta, Maja Djordevic, *Exit 2000: Non-Governmental Organizations for Democratic and Fair Elections: Pre-election campaigns of NGOs in Serbia.* (Belgrade: Center for Democracy Foundation, Center for the Development of Non-Profit Sector, Civil Initiatives, 2001), http://www.centaronline.org/Download/Publications/IzlazEng.pdf, 7. Minic, Jelica and Miljenko Dereta. "Izlaz 2000: An Exit to Democracy in Serbia," in Joerg Forbrig and Pavol Demes, eds., *Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Changes in Central and Eastern Europe*, (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund, 2007), 83.

[28] In the last week of May 2000, Otpor was reported to have gained between 400 and 1,000 new members daily. See M. Bjelovuk, "If Necessary We Shall Join the Socialist Party of Serbia: Ivan Marovic, a distinguished Otpor Activist for *Glas*," *Glas Javnosti* (Belgrade), May 31, 2000. http://www.ex-yupress.com/glas/glas18.html, accessed on March 15, 2009. CeSid also noted a marked increase in people volunteering to be election monitors after the government condemned it on state tv. See Aleksandar Ciric, "Authorities in Panic: How to Prevent Vote-Rigging: Interview of Zoran Lucic, a professor of the Belgrade University Mathematics Department and member of the administrative board of CeSid," *Vreme*, September 14, 2000. http://www.ex-yupress.com/vreme/vreme81.html.

[29] See Kleut and Markov, "Women in the Popular Movement 'Resistance'," 163. See also Svetozar Stojanovic, "Democratic Revolution in Serbia," Rev and Order p. 28

[30] In addition to the backlash by ordinary citizens cited in the text , the regime's treatment of Otpor apparently led to some within the regime to turn. Srdja Popovic notes, "Quickly after the repression began Otpor had at its disposal a network of supporters within various layers of the regime and access to strategic

members, arrest was seen as a badge of honor and served to consolidate emotional bonds as well as feelings of identity among activists.[31] Although many Otpor members were afraid of arrest, their shared experiences increased their sense of commitment. Similarly the dramatic increase in arrests of Otpor members had a ripple effect with parents—especially although not exclusively with those who had Otpor children.[32] The wave of arrests and beatings propelled mothers to declare that the regime would not beat their children—they too mobilized.

The Fokus column in the independent trade union Nezavisnost's July Bulletin noted that in spite of the government's increasing repression, "more and more people openly express dissatisfaction and demand change." It goes on to note that, "the desire to lead a normal and dignified life is suppressing fear that prevents many people from openly fighting for change.'"[33] As Slavko Curuvija's widow noted from her personal experience as well as her observation of others, "'Repression does not inspire fear, but anger. You calculate only while petty modes of persecution are applied: this is not very smart, you think, I might loose [sic] my job…But serious persecution does not inspire fear, on the contrary.'" [34]

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information like Milosevic's next moves." See Popovic, "An Analytic overview of the Application of Gene sharp's theory of Non-Violent Actioin in Milosevic's Serbia."

[31] Smiljanovic, *Plan B*, 14-15. See also Vesna Jelicic, "How to Resist Repression: Who Gets Arrested in Serbia,"*AIM* Podgorica, July 14, 2000, published July 25, 2000, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200007/00725-003-trae-pod.htm. Accessed on June 2, 2008; Ivan Marovic, "Concrete Tactics for Nonviolent Change in Serbia," *Gozaar: A Forum on Human Rights and Democracy in Iran*, July 1, 2007, http://www.gozaar.org/template1.php?id=654&language=english. Accessed January 6, 2009.

[32] Kleut and Markov note that fully half the "Otpor Mothers" did not have children in Otpor. See "Women in the Popular Movement 'Resistance'," 165.

[33] Fokus column in Nezavisnost Trade Union Council, *Summary of Nezavisnost Bulletin No. 13*, July 2000, http://www.nezavisnost.org.yu/archive/indexe.htm, accessed on July 29, 2008.

[34] Interview with Branka Prpa, Ljubisa Stavric, "Personal Story: Branka Prpa, A Witness: 'They'll Stop Me Only When They Kill Me,' *NIN*, (Belgrade) April 6, 2000, http://www.ex-yupress.com/nin/nin37.html.

Demobilizing—May the Force Be with You

If the purpose of much framing is to mobilize people by helping to construct a collective identity, framing who is to blame and what is to be done and giving them a motive to act, some framing was done to *demobilize* people. Such framing was done not only by the Milosevic regime, but also by Alliance for Change and then DOS while addressing members of a pre-existing collectivity, the security forces. Such framing had been done previously by students, especially in their 1996 and 1997 protests. During the time of daily protest marches the students had regularly approached the police in an effort to humanize them. Girls would regularly approach policeman with flowers, offer them food as they stood outside in the cold of winter, and try to do cute or fumy things to make them laugh. During the "traffic games," if they managed to make a policeman smile, they would chant "Blue is not Red" implying that the police were not on the side of the regime, intimating that they were the students' friends.[35] Prosic-Dvornic claims that, "the students never ceased trying to communicate with the police officers"[36] in the hopes that such actions would demobilize the police if they were given orders to attack the protestors.[37]

In 1996/97, however, not all attempts or interactions between the students and the police were positive. Students would also confront police and howl at them (Serbian

[35] Mirjana Prosic-Dvornic, "The Topsy-Turvy Days Were There Again: Student and Civil Protest in Belgrade and Serbia, 1996/1997." *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 16/1 (1998). http://condor.depaul.edu/~rrotenbe/aeer/aeer16_1.html#Prosic_Dvornic (accessed May 8, 2009). For additional games students played with police to try to make them laugh see Sreten Vujovic, "Protest as an Urban Phenomenon," in Mladen Lazic, ed., *Protest in Belgrade: Winter of Discontent*, trans. Liljana Nikolic, (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 1999), 193-210.
[36] Prosic-Dvornic, "The Topsy-Turvy Days Were There Again," 77 .
[37]See Srdja Popovic, "On Strict Policy with the Police and with the Wider Audience Considering the Problem of the Police (Political Jiu Jitsu)," in "Fear and Overcoming the Effect of Fear," Centre for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies.
http://www.canvasopedia.org/content/serbian_case/otpor_fear.htm#11.

slang for a policeman is dog). In 1999-2000, Otpor used only positive interactions, something which Popovic maintains was a major difference between their approach in 1996/97 and that of 1999/2000. In 1999 through 2000, Otpor regularly focused on two things in its interactions with the police: first, that the youth in Otpor were not foreign mercenaries, traitors or in any way dangerous, and second, that Otpor and the police were on the same side. To convey these messages Otpor took two different approaches. The first involved actions to illustrate that the police and students were all victims of the regime. Using skits such as the one they enacted on April 4, a historic anniversary of the date in the 1930s when students and police had clashed and two students had died, Otpor enacted a skit, which Srdja Popovic described as follows:

> 10 guys, tied their hands, blindfolded their eyes, and they were acting as students. They were facing the wall and there is a small girl with a can of red paint which symbolizes blood in front of them - and in front of the audience as well as journalists. On another wall on the same square, there was a group of our activists putting white sheets of paper, gluing them on the wall with markers and putting the names on that. And names on that papers were the names of the policemen who were killed in vain in Milosevic's war in Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo. And our message was that we, together, are the victims of the system. And there is no reason to be, to have war between victims and victims.[38]

The second approach to persuade the police that Otpor activists were non-violent and not dangerous was part of a set strategy that was utilized in every personal interaction with security forces, especially following arrests. As previously discussed in greater length, activists were fully trained in how they should handle all interactions with police. At no time were they ever to be violent. The key was to maintain self-discipline. They were reminded in training of how to handle the fear of arrest and potential beatings, that each activist, through their contacts with police, had the opportunity to show the true

[38] Popovic, "On Strict Policy with the Police and with the Wider Audience," Popovic gives several other significant examples of this technique on the website.

nature of Otpor and disprove the propaganda the police had been told about Otpor by their superiors. Otpor activists firmly believed that through such contact, policemen would realize that the information they were being given by the government was lies, and would quietly defect, or at least remain neutral in any conflict.[39] Marovic maintains that the plan worked and that through the increased number of arrests and Otpor's discipline when they were arrested, "the police got to know the enemy and found out the enemy was a bunch of kids that wanted peaceful change and to rid their country of a non-democratic regime."[40]

But perhaps most unusual and interesting was the framing done by Alliance for Change and then DOS to convince the members of the security forces, both the army and police, that they could honorably change sides—and be with the people. It was clear to people in both parties that members of the army especially might be receptive to their message. In the first place, low level contacts between members of the Army and police with certain NGO members from 1996/97 on had indicated a level of dissatisfaction within their respective forces.[41] NGOs shared some of this information with members of Alliance for Change and DOS. It was also well-known that the Army was rarely paid on time and that Army members earned less than police.[42] In July 1999, the deputy chairman of the Reform Democratic Party of Vojvodina reported that "both soldiers and policemen had been signing the petition for the removal of FRY President Slobodan

[39] Smiljanovic, *Plan B*, see also Marovic, "Concrete Tactics for Nonviolent Change in Serbia."
[40] Marovic, "Concrete Tactics for Nonviolent Change in Serbia."
[41] The contacts had existed since 1996/97. Miljenko Dereta, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 3, 2007.
[42] BETA"DS Says Middle, Lower Ranks of Army, Police oppose Regime," *BETA*, Belgrade, August 9, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0809, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

Milosevic."[43] Second, over a period of months, from the end of July 1999 through early summer of 2000, important members of the armed forces openly published articles stating that many in the army felt that their professionalism was abused and that the army as an institution was openly disrespected, especially in the aftermath of Kosovo. The published statement by Colonel Dragan Vuksic in his request for early retirement laid this out clearly: "'The current authorities evidently wish to use the Yugoslav Army as the last tool and support to remain in power and are boldly and ruthlessly pushing the army along the wrong track in order to abuse it at a time when inevitable changes are looming over us.'"[44] Serbian analysts reviewing his statement at the time believed that he spoke not just for himself but for a significant number of other officers as well.[45] Two days later, another statement was re-published in *Blic* by Ljubodrag Stojadinovic, the former military spokesman who had been dismissed in the mid-1990s. He had written in *Reporter* that, "neither the army nor the police are 'willing' to give their lives for Milosevic's personal power, and that they would never do it if a 'conflict with the people' was a price to be paid."[46] DS itself claimed to have low to middle-ranking sources in the Army and noted that,

> Last week's statements of General Momcilo Persic are just the tip of the iceberg, because we have learned from many contacts with low- and middle-ranking VJ

[43] "RDSV Says Army, Police Signing Anti-Milosevic Petition," *BETA*, Belgrade, July 27, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0727, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[44] Yugoslav Army Colonel Dragan Vuksic, quoted in "Colonel Warns Authorities Against 'Misusing'Army," *BETA* Belgrade, July 27, 1999, FBIS-EEU-1999-0727, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[45] "Serbian news agency analyses extent of army support for Milosevic," *Beta News Agency* (Belgrade, Serbia) 29 Jul. 1999, Europe - Political: *NewsBank Access World News,* http://infoweb.newsbank.com. Colonel Luksic was actually a very prominent member of the Army, having been a member of the delegation to the Dayton agreements, Yugoslav representative to the OSCE, to Germany and a participant in talks in Vienna on Sub-regional disarmament. BETA noted that he was not due to take retirement for another six years.
[46] "Serbian News Agency Analyses extent of army support for Milosevic," July 29, 1999.

> officers that they agree with these statements and a majority of them are professionals, whom we have never equated with the regime.[47]

While open statements by Army members against the regime slowed in the following months, the regime itself conducted a survey of officers through its Army Intelligence unit in January and February 2000 to determine the morale of the troops. The results of this survey were leaked to a reporter, Miroslav Filipov, who published excerpts from the study in the spring of 2000. The published excerpts included quotations from officers who flatly stated that they could not image themselves taking part in a civil war against Montenegro, which they feared was next. The published report also contained direct quotations that indicated that many officers were appalled by many of the acts that they had been asked to commit and that had been committed in their name by MUP (Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs troops) and paramilitary units in Kosovo. The release of the information, which for the first time gave graphic accounts of Serbian atrocities in Kosovo, clearly presented a picture of an Army demoralized by what it had been tasked with, with what it perceived as the denigration of itself as an institution and as a group of men unwilling to move against those it considered its own people.[48] Filipovic's publication of the information in April 2000 was only one of several reports published in the spring that again pointed to the likelihood that members of the Army at a variety of ranks who felt dishonored and disrespected, would be open to messages by Alliance for Change if they could be couched in the right language.[49]

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[47] "DS Says Low-, Middle-Ranking Army Officers Oppose Regime."
[48] Miroslav Filipovic was jailed for his reports, see for example Miroslav Filipovic, "Serb Officers Relive Killings," *Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report* No. 130, April 4, 1999. http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-.
[49] See Daniel Sunter, "Army Disaffection Grows," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkan Crisis Report, No. 137, May 5, 2000, http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_state=henfbcr157618&s=i&o=-, which lists several examples of open dissatisfaction during the spring of 2000.

The framing Alliance for Change and later DOS and Kostunica did to demobilize the various security forces from taking action against them should Milosevic call for it, was couched primarily in moral terms (propriety framing). It emphasized three main points: first, the men in uniform were honorable and as such had a duty to remain on the side of the people; second, DOS recognized and honored the institution of the Army and as such no one should dishonor it by doing the bidding of one man, rather soldiers had a moral duty (a sworn oath) to honor their constitutional obligations; and third, the Army and the police were not the enemies of Alliance for Change and DOS, but were also people who wanted change. As early as July 25, 1999, Vuk Obradovic, a former Yugoslav Army general urged the armed forces to, "'stop being the personal guard to anyone. He sought to reassure the Army that the opposition forces were not seeking to destabilize the country and informed them that the opposition believed that "The Yugoslav Army must be preserved as a stable institution at any cost."[50] The deputy chairman of the Reform Democratic Party of Vojvodina also issued two appeals typical of the type that were made to the forces in the summer of 1999. The first appeal was directed towards the men in uniform: "The policy conducted by the army leadership does not reflect the views held by Yugoslav Army officers and men." Although clearly made as a statement, it was also an appeal to men in uniform to sympathize with DOS, stating in effect that DOS recognized that first, these men were honorable and second, such honorable men would not hold ideas that were the same as those of the regime. It was also one of many attempts through framing to create a degree of separation between the men in uniform and the highest levels of the Armed Forces led by Milosevic's hand-

[50] Vuk Obradovic (himself once a promising young military commander) quoted in "Opposition Leader Asks Army to Remain Politically Neutral," *BETA*, Belgrade, July 25, 1999., FBIS-EEU-1999-0725, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

picked choices. Such separation, or the perception of separation, might allow the middle and lower ranking soldiers to honorably defect from the military leadership when the time came. The second appeal was issued to Army leaders to "give serious consideration to their constitutional role and the attitude they have towards the people."[51] Similarly, at a much more prominent venue in September, Djindjic made it very clear that the opposition did not consider the police their enemy: "We do not want to fight Milosevic's servants…We want him, not the police. He can keep on sending them here, but they are not our enemies."[52] Intermittent messages of this type continued to be sent to the armed forces through the open press and their number increased considerably as the elections neared.[53] Kostunica at several of his campaign stops on September 5 combined various elements of this framing, telling his audience in Plandiste that he was convinced, due to his visits with people throughout Serbia, that people in the various security forces would support him and vote for DOS. He urged his audience to welcome anyone from any of the services that wanted to join them. If anyone in the forces felt unsure of the sincerity of Kostunica's message, former chief General of Staff of the Yugoslav Army Persic also reiterated the same message in a rare opportunity to address the entire nation on RTS,

[51] Ratimir Svircevic quoted in "RDSV Says Army, Police signing Anti-Milosevic Petition," 27 July 1999 FBIS-EE- 1999-0727.
[52] Djindjic quoted in Gabriel Partos, "World: Europe Analysis: Can Serbia's opposition unite?" *BBC News, Europe,* September 30, 1999. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/461783.stm.
[53] It is also clear that a variety of backdoor channels had been developed between various political parties at both the local and regional level and police at various times. See Zoran Zivkovic, mayor of Nis's assertion that "We had secret talks with the army and police, the units we knew would be drafted to intervene,…and the deal was they would neither disobey, but neither would they execute." See Zoran Zivkovic quoted in Roger Cohen, "Who Really Brought Down Milosevic?" *The New York Times Magazine*, November 26, 2000. http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/26/magazine/who-really-brought-down-milosevic.html.. See also Dragan Bujosevic and Ivan Radovanovic, *The Fall of Milosevic, the October 5th Revolution*, (New York: Palgrave, 2003).

assuring the forces that DOS was not interested in any type of "revanchism," urging the Yugoslav Army to "do its job and not interfere in politics."[54]

In addition to assuring the armed and security forces they were not seen as the enemy and there that would be no revenge, DOS and Kostunica also sought to be openly sympathetic to the members of the forces and to appeal to their better, honorable nature, urging them to help the people. GSS issued a statement in May urging the forces not to be a tool of the regime. The statement went on to say,

> We are turning to our army and the police which have endured all fallen ideologies, ambitions and wars of these authorities, and whose mates were left lying on the battlefields in Slavonia, Bosnia and Kosovo. We are turning to them for the sake of our children and theirs to say a resolute 'no' to this regime, to side with their nation and become its integral rather than alienated part.[55]

Kostunica too regularly made statements that indicated that the Army was honorable, arguing that "During the NATO aggression the VJ fought honorably and bravely to defend the people, not the regime."[56] He went on to praise their professionalism: "it is a serious institution which has resisted attempts at politicization and which deserves respect."[57] He also sought to create a degree of separation between the regime and the soldiers, allowing the soldiers to see defection from the Milosevic regime as honorable, almost a duty: "How long should the army fight honorably when

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[54] Persic, quoted in "DOS Leaders Present Platform, Candidates on Radio Television of Serbia," *BETA* Belgrade, September 17, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0918, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com. Persic also accused the regime of turning off the RTS transmitters in western, southern and parts of central Serbia so that DOS's speeches could not be seen. See "Former Army Chief of Staff Criticizes Gen Pavkovic for Threatening To Use Army," BETA, Belgrade, September 18, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0918, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

[55] GSS Appeal to members of the Yugoslav Army and police excerpted in "Serbian opposition party urges army, police to side with opposition," BETA news Agency, Belgrade, May 18, 2000, BBC Monitoring International Reports NewsBank Access World News http://infoweb.newsbank.com.

[56] Kostunica quoted in "Kostunica Slams Gen Pavkovic's 'Irresponsible' Statements on VJ Return to Kosovo," *BETA*, Belgrade, September 3, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0903, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

[57] "Kostunica Slams Gen Pavkovic's 'Irresponsible' Statements on VJ Return to Kosovo."

Milosevic capitulates dishonorably?" he asked at one campaign stop. [58] At another he said, "this time the army and the police, which honorably fought and got killed in Kosovo on the war he could have prevented many years ago, will not vote for him [Milosevic] this time."[59] Such framing was even more intense during the period after the election and before October 5th.[60]

While it is impossible at this point to ascertain how effective the framing was to the eventual defections of police and soldiers from the regime, such framing certainly provided a positive framework that gave substantive reasons why the security forces should not use force against DOS, allowing them to see DOS and all those eventually in the streets as "their own people." Such framings also provided important information to the security forces that opened the door to defection, namely the new party, were it to come to power would not be "revanchist." Finally, by framing the police and army as ordinary honorable people who loved their country and its people, the framings provided plausible reasons why, if Milosevic were to request they move against the people, inaction would be the most honorable course.

In sum, Otpor and the political parties created several alternative frames that would allow men in the armed and security forces to defect honorably. Like any good frame many of these propriety framings both diagnosed the problem and had a prognosis of what should be done. The diagnosis was that Milosevic was to blame for putting the

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[58] DOS Presidential Candidate Kostunica Expects Votes from Army, Police," *BETA*, Belgrade, September 16, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0917, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com

[59] Kostunica quoted in "DOS Presidential Candidate Kostunica Holds Rallies in Mladenovac, Arandjelvac," BETA, Belgrade, September 17, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0917, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

[60] For one example of such framing from the September 26- October 5th period see one of Kostunica's speeches excerpted in Aleksandar Ciric, "Serbia After Election: 'Disagreement' Only About the President," *AIM*, Podgorica, September 30, 2000. http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/20000900930-005-trae-pod.htm, accessed on June 5, 2008.

soldiers and police in such a predicament that they felt they might have to fire on their own people. In both Otpor's framings and DOS's framings, especially through Kostunica's words, the frames clearly denote it is Milosevic and the regime who are to blame for the dishonor the men felt, especially for the slights to their professionalism and for the deaths of their colleagues in recent wars. The prognosis, reduced to its simplest in these frames, was that we know that you are with us in spirit, but please at least don't act against us in body.

Mobilization: Forward—Attack, Yes, Vote!

In addition to the framing awakening the people and the framing done to demobilize or at least neutralize the security forces, people also had to be actively mobilized to do things. They could not be allowed to remain interested but passive bystanders. Alliance for Change, DOS, Otpor and the NGOs all knew that to defeat the Milosevic regime more active participation would be required from various segments of the public. Repeated public opinion surveys had shown that important parts of the bystander public were sympathetic to the cause—but reluctant to participate for a variety of reasons. Key to their participation would be finding a way to make people believe in something bigger than themselves, to allow them to feel that they were part of a group, had a collective identity, and rationally agreed with the goals and empathized with the other members of the group.

It All Relies On You: Framing the Individual and the Collective for Mobilization

Two strains of argumentation were put forth in both efficacious and moral frames to motivate and mobilize people to take action; one focused on the individual and the other on the collective. Both emphasized how people constructed their own realities. The individualistic stream of thought was similar in some ways to Havel's concept of individuals living in a lie,[61] emphasizing people's individual responsibility for their present condition and their ability to change their own future if they could imagine and stand firmly, taking actions to free themselves and enhance their own dignity. However as Otpor activist Ivan Marovic explained individual actions were also tied to collective resistance: "Every single example of personal resistance blends into universal resistance, which again gives power to each individual act."[62] Like other forms of efficacy framing used to mobilize people that argue "you can make a difference," this framing showed individuals how even the smallest action that they took could be used to strengthen the group. Such reasoning, which was part of the underlying philosophy of Otpor, was presented to help mobilize individuals to take part in small acts of courage. For example, elderly people who wanted to find a way to express their individual outrage at the regime were given small stickers that they could surreptitiously move from inside their gloves or pockets onto a lamp post or a wall at a bus stop as they leaned on the wall or post for support while waiting for the bus to arrive.[63] Such reasoning also allowed those who performed small acts of individual resistance to feel that they were part of a larger collective—of the imagined community that was going to create change. This allowed

[61] Vaclav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," in Vaclav Havel et al., *The Power of the Powerless, Citizens Against the State in Central-Eastern Europe*, John Keane ,ed. (Armonk, NY: Palach Press, 1985), 23-96.
[62] Marovic, "Spread the 'Epidemic'."
[63]Miljenko Dereta, interview by author, Belgrade Serbia, October 3, 2007.

more people to be vested in the group, in the idea of change and collectively imagine efficacious resistance.

CeSid used similar framing during the run up to the election campaign. Its slogan, 1+1=2, was an effective reminder that one person's vote counted and that individual votes added up in the end to a more important collective result. The slogan also clearly pointed out that there should be fairness and transparency in vote-counting. Even the simplest of people can add one plus one and know that it equals two—not four or more. Even the government should be able to get that straight was the underlying message. Thus a fairness or justice message was also implicit in the slogan—asking people to help hold the government accountable. But just as important was the reminder that each citizen mattered and was part of a collective identity of concerned citizens.

The other type of argument focused directly on the collective and the importance of the formation of a collective identity, in which people understood themselves as empowered to create change. Pointing out that the present situation in the country was the result of the lack of a collective imagination, Simovic, at the G17Plus conference in September, argued that people who agree to "live without power, oil and medicines are able to survive without political vision as well, that is to say without any idea of a political future. And to people who have no awareness of their political future, anyone, local authorities and foreigners can do as they please."[64] He then went on to make a plea for people to collectively imagine a different future and discussed the actions that his group was taking with others to realize that end. Otpor also occasionally reminded the citizenry collectively that they had a moral obligation to act and were not doing so. In one

[64] "Academician Ljubomir Simovic, speech at the G17 Plus gathering, September 9, 1999 in the Great Hall of Dom Sindikata," reprinted in *Vreme*, September 18, 1999, translated by *Free B92 Press review*, and accessed at http://www.ex-yupress.com/vreme/vreme57.html.

such action in downtown Belgrade, Otpor members dressed as researchers "took to their hands and knees with oversized magnifying glasses in search of microscopic signs of civic engagement among the population."[65] Such actions indeed publicly pointed to a collective moral responsibility of citizens and, gently shaming them, reminded them of their power as a collective were they to choose to act.

The positive side of collective imaginings came through slogans such as that of Otpor, "The People Are Otpor." The East German people's spontaneous use of the slogan, "*Wir* sind das Volk," (*We* are the People) in 1989 was a purposeful perversion of the East German Communist party's slogan. Through self-appropriation of the phrase the East German public indeed made the point that they and not the communist party was in charge. Otpor's slogan of "The People Are Otpor" played on the word "otpor"—which was both the name of the group but which also means "resistance"—argued that each individual had to live in resistance—and that the people as a whole united in their resistance to the system were greater than the system. Similarly Zoran Djindjic, at the April 14, 2000 opposition rally, told the gathered assembly of several hundred thousand people: "This system relies on you and everything depends on you, ordinary people. You can change it, so do change it in elections…Let us decide this year that Serbia of the 21st century shall be a state we will be proud of."[66] Djindjic's point that the system "relies on you" was a clear reference to the people choosing to give authority to the system—and by extension—having the power to retract that authority.

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[65] Joe Rubin, "The Kids Who Confronted Milosevic" *Mother Jones*, September 22, 2000, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2000/09/kids-who-confronted-milosevic.
[66] Zoran Djindjic, quoted in Aleksandar Ciric "Opposition Protest in Serbia," *AIM*, Podgorica, April 15, 2000, published April 25, 2000, http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/200004/00425-004-trae-pod.htm.

The Campaign Itself

Both the regime and the opposition employed propriety and efficacy framings during the campaign to try to mobilize voters, in part by making the public itself an object of its framing, subject to approbation or condemnation depending on whether or not the public were to act in the interests of the party doing the framing. Throughout the campaign Milosevic and the regime parties' rhetoric was particularly strident—and unforgiving.[67] His "patriot or traitor" language, not only in his nationalism campaign but also in his reconstruction campaign, constructed a clear dynamic—you were either with us or against us. After he called the elections he set them up as a "defense of freedom" and presented people's options as siding with him—or living enslaved. There were clearly "propriety" framings in Milosevic's and the regime's framings. How could a good citizen ever vote for a traitor? The moral urging to do what was right—to be a patriot—was laced throughout his rhetoric. There was also no doubt that Milosevic's language had long since framed a adversarial dynamic in which there was no room for those who might have sympathies with the opposition.

After the Party congress at the end of February, Milosevic's actions drew clear boundaries between which citizens qualified as "us" and which citizens were "them." He named an increasing number of citizen groups—and by extension their sympathizers—as traitors. First the accusation was leveled at Otpor, and was followed by increased repression in May and June. Next, the NGOs that he had not publicly indicted previously now came under fire. They were increasingly harassed, their equipment was taken away

[67] JUL's rhetoric was always more extreme than SPS's. In the past SRS's rhetoric had also been more extreme—and it was again on certain issues. This had allowed Milosevic in the past to position himself as the moderate. In the year between the end of the NATO bombings and the announcement of elections, SPS's rhetoric seemed to pick up more of an edge. It still maintained a certain schizophrenic duality between upbeat socialist words and warnings of conspiracy but its tone became more strident.

and the financial police combed their books for weeks on end disrupting operations. Milosevic had long since harassed any independent media, and his operations against them—including regional media—picked up again in March, increasing the number of "named" enemies of the regime. On the other side, like Geertz's king, he and his subordinates crossed the land handing out medals for bravery in the face of NATO actions. He also erected monuments to victims of the NATO bombing. Milosevic's actions also clearly defined boundaries, although his actions only strengthened his popularity and collective identity with ardent SPS members, while diminishing any shared identity felt by by-standers. The sum of his words and his actions clearly made the elections a referendum.

It was also in the interests of the opposition to clearly mark the election as a referendum, ostensibly on Milosevic.[68] Such diagnostic framing, in which blame is squarely placed on a person, as opposed to outside uncontrollable conditions (such as fate, bad luck or NATO) clearly gave people someone to oppose. Thus, the election was about Milosevic and what his past ten years of rule had wrought. The opposition also presented an alternative framing on core issues that were of primary importance to people—they presented a prognosis of what was to be done and what changes would come about if they were elected. The opposition's own message however was sometimes overshadowed when it did not seem unified. As the elections grew near and Draskovic made a show of standing apart, it was even more important to the opposition to make sure

[68] In strategic terms the opposition had long since understood the importance of making the election about Milosevic. In October 1999, prior to the Roundtable meeting, Dr. Dragor Hiber of the civic alliance made the case that "the opposition parties had to understand that they have only one aim in the next election—change of government. Parties can march in several rows, but voting must be a referendum—in favor of or against the present government." See Vesna Vujcic, "A Fair Offer for Overcoming the Crisis: Opposition Agreement on pre-time elections," *AIM* Podgorica, October 20, 1999, published October 28, 1999. www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199910/91028-003-trae-pod.htm.

that indeed all possible voters were mobilized and went to vote. Turning out large numbers was essential for two reasons: first, the higher the actual vote count, the fewer votes Milosevic could steal without vote fraud being so apparent as to trigger outrage and delegitimize the entire process. Second, polls had shown that many who had abstained in the past had opposition sympathies—it was essential to get people to turn out so that there would not be a run-off election. Kostunica recognized clearly that it was the responsibility of the parties to give those voters a decent reason to turn out at the polls. In his press conference on August 7, 2000 in which he accepted the DOS presidential nomination he stated, "One should not forget that a massive turnout largely depends on two conditions. It is the job of political parties to motivate voters to turn must at the polls, and not visa versa. The people are an inspiration for political parties."

Kostunica and DOS also clearly recognized that making the election a referendum on the voters themselves would play a major role in getting people to the polls. Whereas in the past it had been acceptable to "sit out" the elections, such behavior had to be made to be seen as unseemly—nothing a good or moral person would do. To change what was acceptable to unacceptable, the opposition also employed the languages of severity, urgency and moral propriety. At a rally September 4 in Loznica, Kostunica noted that he was not calling them "to an uprising but to elections that should bring salvation and stabilization of Serbia."[69] Kostunica added that the result of the September elections would be decisive as to whether "we will live in dignity or whether the disintegration of the country will continue."'[70] Vojvodina Coalition President Dragan Veselinov, called on people to vote noting that by their actions on September 24, "they will decide whether

[69] Kostunica quoted in "Loznica, Sabac Citizens Greet 'Serb' Kostunica 'Enthusiastically'" BETA, Belgrade, September 4, 2000. FBIS-EEU-2000-0904. *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[70] Kostunica quoted "Loznica, Sabac Citizens Greet 'Serb' Kostunica."

they will live free or like slaves, as their parents have lived."[71] Clearly such statements put the onus on the voters, making them responsible for the outcome. This was therefore not only a referendum on Milosevic, but just as importantly on the voters themselves and whether or not they would honorably perform their duty. Moreover, couched in such emotional language such as "to live free or as slaves," "dignity or disintegration," the opposition politicians had made voting a moral imperative.

In addition to the moral appeal, DOS also used the language of efficacy both to try to show people that this time their vote would count and also to impress on them the urgency of voting because their vote could be stolen. It was a somewhat contradictory set of messages. Kostunica noted, "'Our biggest challenge is to convince people that their vote, which does not require too much investment from them, can change Serbia.'"[72] Reports in independent newspapers, radio and TV, pamphlets published by CeSid, and lectures and panel discussions throughout the country constantly informed Serbian voters how the vote tabulation process worked, how Milosevic had stolen votes in the past and why that would not happen again. Discussing in great detail how casting a vote would reduce the number of votes available to Milosevic to steal and how activities by vote monitors from the various opposition parties and CeSid would prevent large scale vote fraud from going undetected, these discussions constantly reinforced the message that this time people's votes could not be easily stolen. They also reinforced the message that people had a moral obligation to vote so as to reduce the pool of votes available for Milosevic to steal. The parties gave additional weight to their message by allowing

[71] Dragan Veselinov quoted in "BETA: Around 30,000 People gather at DOS closing Rally in Novi Sad," September 21, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0921, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
[72] Kostunica quoted in Steven Erlanger, "Milosevic Foe Leading Field in Yugoslavia," *The New York Times*, September 4, 2000.

experts, mathematicians with CeSid, and others to give these explanations. At the same time other DOS candidates on the campaign trail regularly warned of the possibility of "unprecedented electoral fraud" and urged people to take part in the elections "in the greatest number possible in order "not to aid these manipulations."[73] Again such arguments pointed to people's responsibility for the eventual outcome. The referendum was as much on the people's willingness to do their job and vote as it was on Milosevic.

Gamson argues that framings in which people are made to see that they are "agents of their own history" are crucial to mobilizing people. Interestingly, Crown Prince Aleksandar II of Yugoslavia, (Crown Prince in exile), sent a message to the Serbian people calling on them to go to the polls and vote for DOS to save Serbia. He urged: "Citizens, save Serbia, go to the polls and vote for change. Only with change will Serbia be able to rebuild, retain territory and get back its dignity." In an extremely strongly worded missive, Aleksandar called on all citizens "regardless of who you are" to vote for DOS,

> The regime cares only about itself, lives in imperialistic dictatorship luxury whilst you the people rot in poverty and wants you the citizens to be its perpetual slaves. No more slavery. Serbia deserves better, must survive and grow as a democracy. Vote for Change! Vote for the Democratic Opposition! [74]

Here and throughout the statement the Crown Prince clearly lays at the feet of the people the responsibility to be agents for change. Kostunica too regularly invoked such a framing when he told people that they could both exact their revenge on the regime and change history. In Cacak he said, "They insulted you and you need to exact your revenge.

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[73] "Serbian opposition presidential candidate fears 'unprecedented' electoral fraud." *Beta News Agency* (Belgrade, Serbia) September 12, 2000, Europe - Political: *NewsBank Access World News.* http://infoweb.newsbank.com.. See also Ljiljana Nestorovic, spokeswoman of DS's comments in "Serbian opposition party sees panic in ruling parties over drop in poll rating." *Beta News Agency* (Belgrade, Serbia) 25 Aug. 2000, Europe - Political: *NewsBank Access World News.* http://infoweb.newsbank.com.

[74] Aleksandar II, Crown Prince of Yugoslavia, "You the People Save Serbia: Vote for the Democratic Opposition," http://www.royalfamily.org/statements/state-det/state-69.html, accessed March 14, 2009.

The 24th is a day for revenge, not their kind of revenge but our kind with your pencil and your vote for the truth and not his lies."[75] He also acknowledged people's fears but urged them to overcome such things so that they could change Serbia: "Determination for change must be stronger than our fears. It doesn't take much to go out and cast your ballot on Sept. 24, and we have a lot to gain from such a small act."[76] By having its people turn out in the "greatest possible numbers" on September 24, "Serbia will turn a new page in its history."[77]

The parties also attempted to frame a sort of bandwagoning effect: they constantly asserted that they were going to win. This sort of efficacy frame, one that implied your vote would count because you would be voting with the wining side, held certain dangers. The opposition had to maintain a constant tension between making the voters responsible for the outcome of the vote to ensure that they did vote and convince the public that the opposition could not win if they did not vote. On August 31, on his first day of campaigning, Kostunica boldly asserted that "We are winners, already, we only have to verify our victory at the elections."[78] The second method of showing that voting for the opposition would not be a wasted vote was the publication of public opinion polls that showed Kostunica ahead and the self-referencing of such polls in news conferences

[75] Kostunica quoted in Vana Susa, "News from Serbia: All the important news since 10 April 2000," *Central Europe Review*, 2/15 (April 17, 2000). http://www.ce-review.org/00/15/serbianews15.html, accessed on May 20, 2008.
[76] Kostunica quoted in Alex Todorovic, "Hidden victories in Yugoslav vote," *The Christian Science Monitor*, World Section, September 13, 2000. For a similar comment by Kostunica on September 19th see "Opposition candidate urges Yugoslavs to vote without fear." *FoNet News Agency* (Belgrade, Serbia) September 19, 2000. Newsfile: *NewsBank Access World News.* http://infoweb.newsbank.com.
[77] "Serbian opposition presidential candidate fears 'unprecedented' electoral fraud."
[78] Kostunica quoted in We are winners already, verification at the elections: Vojislav Kostunica, DOS candidate, started election campaign." *Blic online*, August 31, 2000. http://www.bbnet.org.yu/bdnet/elections/eng/0831kostunica.htm, accessed on December 29, 2007.

and on the campaign trail. As with the interviews with mathematicians, such public opinion polls by well known "expert" firms, leaned on their seeming impartiality.

Ironically, it was this framing above all others that seemed to bother the regime the most. They began a counter-framing campaign in which they argued that the CIA was responsible for the polls and such things happened in all countries in transition. At a news conference in early September, Serbian Science and Technology Minister Branislav Ivkovic asserted that

> the aim of these polls was to "persuade" the undecided voters who, according to him, "always go along with the strongest." If they are wrong in their assessments, and the opposite proves to be the case, then they will talk about election rigging and call for an uprising. The newspapers that cite such opinion polls fail to say that the other candidate is (Yugoslav President) Slobodan Milosevic, who is in favor of cooperation with the world to our mutual benefit, and advocates our right to decide on our country ourselves.[79]

His assertion that overwhelming positive polls were published to persuade uncertain voters to go with the winners was in part true—but unfortunately for the regime, such numbers reflected the mood at the time fairly accurately.

In sum, by using these types of framings throughout the campaign period the democratic political opposition tried to mobilize voters not only through the content of the frames which I discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine, but also by using mobilization language. That language emphasized: first, people's moral responsibility to vote; second, how by voting people could become agents of their own history, thereby changing Serbia's history; third, it emphasized both the severity and urgency of the problem of potential vote fraud which was likely to occur if people did not vote; and finally, the fact that voting was efficacious, that voting was rational and their votes would not be wasted.

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[79] "Serbian Minister Says CIA Behind Opinion Polls Showing Kostunica in Lead," *BETA*, Belgrade, September 6, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0906. *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.

Between the end of July when elections were announced and the middle of September the number of self-reported abstainers and undecided dropped markedly from 30 percent of the electorate at the end of July to 9.7 percent two weeks before the September 24 polls. The numbers who supported first Kostunica and then DOS rose.[80]

NGO Campaign

The NGOs ran the largest Get out the Vote Campaign (GOTV) dedicated only to mobilizing voters to go vote. As discussed in Chapters Three and Four, it was a highly coordinated and targeted campaign that relied on techniques such as intensive local personal contact as part of a door-to-door campaign as well as a civic education campaign to help people understand the process and why they should vote. Much of the actual material used to convince voters was straight-forward with slogans that simply ordered people to "Go Out and Vote!" However, much of the material relied on the language and types of framings used for mobilization, efficacy, urgency, and severity and moral propriety.

Much of the material NGOs used attempted to convince voters of the efficacy of voting—that their vote would matter and therefore it was rational to go and vote. Women's groups in particular emphasized this fact. Vox Feminae ran a campaign with the slogan, "Its Ladies Choice This Time," and the Group for the Promotion of Women's rights, which ran campaigns addressed to both urban and rural women in Vojvodina,

[80] Innumerable polls were done on Kostunica versus Milosevic as well as the numbers of abstainers and undecided over a period of time. All of them trended in the same direction even if the numbers are not exactly the same. For a sampling of such results see the summary of Strategic Marketing's poll reported in "Milosevic Will Have to firmly Rely on Election Manipulations," *BETA* Belgrade, September 13, 2000, FBIS-EEU-2000-0914, *World News Connection* http://wnc.dialog.com.
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proclaimed, "Your Vote, Vote of Difference." Such framings emphasizing the worth of each individual and their vote were not confined to women's groups alone. The Association for the Creative Development of Children, Youth and Young Adults ran a campaign called "Unleash the Power of Your Voice." One of the Exit 2000 campaigns pointed out to new voters that, "You Are Turning 18, You Get Your Right to Vote! Get Out and Choose to Change Things!" Another one of the national Exit 2000 campaign posters also pointed out, in a bandwagoning argument, that people should vote because, "There Are More of Us. Get Out and Choose Change! Exit 2000." The main Exit 2000 material simplified arguments of urgency and severity to one phrase: all reminded voters that "Its Time."

However, like the political campaign, NGOs also used messages that made the 2000 election a referendum on the voters themselves: if voters did not take charge of their own destiny they would be responsible for what happened in the future, and they would have no one to blame but themselves. Among the slogans that focused on how this vote was a vote for people's future were: "A Vote for the Third Millennium" (NGO Forum Kraljevo) , "For A Better Life" (Rhoma Music) and "Your Future, Your Vote" (Alternative Civic Parliament Paracin).[81] These slogans only intimate that the voter is responsible for the future. But a slogan of the South-East Network that best expressed how voters would have no one to blame but themselves if they didn't vote and the opposition did not win was expressed clearly on stickers, T-shirts and pens that said, "It's Useless To Repent After Voting."[82] Finally, the NGO Exit 2000 campaign tried to offer hope to voters. If through this period many citizens felt that there was no hope for them

[81] For additional campaigns run along these lines see *Exit 2000,* 27-29.
[82] *Exit 2000*, 41.

and nothing would ever change, that Serbia was in the darkness,[83] Exit 2000 posters reminded voters, "The Sun Rises So That There Won't Be Eternal Darkness."

Conclusion—Gotov Je! He's Finished!

On September 24, 2000, 4,911,918 people throughout Serbia went to vote. From December 1999 through August 2000, the number of people who said they were going to either abstain or were undecided decreased dramatically.[84] Within the space of a year the figures had dropped, within the space of a month they declined sharply. Why indeed was it that anyone should come out to vote if no one thought that Kostunica could win? Why was it that they turned up at the polls anyway? And why had the numbers changed so that not only was there was a rise in the popularity of the opposition, but more importantly a decrease in the number of abstainers and an increase in the youth vote?

This chapter illustrates that the answer lies in part in the effectiveness of mobilization tactics and efficacy, agent of history and propriety framings utilized by the political opposition parties, Otpor and the NGOs. All the opposition forces made it clear that there was no dignity in "sitting it out." The concept of boycott was taken off the table leaving those who might have used this as a reason to abstain without such an excuse.

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[83] Like the concept of "awakening," the linguistic emphasis on darkness and light was a reoccurring theme in Serbian protests and discussions of how Serbs felt about the period that they lived in. Such phrases were regularly invoked and had additional resonance as a result. See for example such an invocation at the September 21, 1999 Alliance for Change Protest Rally by Kristina Peric from Valjevo Civic Movement, "Rally of the Alliance for Change: Belgrade – The Liberty Square – September 21, 1999." *Free Serbia Specials: Broadcasts*, September 21, 1999. http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeserb/specials/broadcasts/21091999/e-index.html.

[84] The figures for indecisive voters went from 41% in December 1999 to 30% in February to 29% in July to 17% in August; the figures for abstaining voters went from 20% in December 1999 to 19% in February, to 16% in July to 8% in August. The figures for both those abstaining and indecisive dropped by more than 50% . This also represented a dramatic change from December 1997 when 45% of the voters abstained (or boycotted). See Center for Political Research and Public Opinion of the Institute of Social Sciences "Election Orientation of Citizens of Serbia in 1999-2000, BD News Elections in Serbia 2000 accessed at http://www.bbnet.org.yu/bdnet/elections/eng/lutovac.htm accessed on August 18, 2008.

The opposition campaign was everywhere. It could not be ignored as women's groups, NGO youth groups and political youth campaigners were everywhere, going from door to door and leaving door tags when there was no one home. Stickers were plastered in every space, lectures and Otpor actions took place in the streets and rock concerts in practically ever city. People of all ages were personally involved. The election campaign took up physical and mental space like no campaign in Serbia before drawing clear boundaries between a single us and a single them. Unlike previous years of smiling, vacillating and untrustworthy politicians, people were being told that they had to vote by groups that they trusted. Otpor, Kostunica and the DOS campaign were able to effectively use propriety framings to convince voters that not to vote would have been to let down the youth, to let down one's neighbors who had participated in NGO campaigns. Most importantly not voting would be a moral failure of duty, to oneself, the country and their children's future. Despite the fact that people were not sure their victory would be recognized, people believed that they had a moral obligation to go vote—for the sake of their children, for their future.

As I illustrate, the regime's attempts to demobilize their own citizens through increased repression not only failed, but primed many to take action if someone would point them in the right direction and show them what to do. DOS's final rally, its open-air convention on September 20, attended by thousands of citizens, was intended to point the way to citizens in the final push to move them to vote. In and of itself the convention could not have been better scripted, better visually presented or emotionally charged, drawing together the opposition's mobilization frames. In and of itself it was a potent symbol. At 19:48 CET Dragoljub Djuricic and his drummers took to the stage, the

"powerful sound of the drums reverberates throughout the city," the reports said. As he stood in front of more than 100,000 people and yelled Changes! Who? at the audience an Otpor flag with a clenched fist could be seen fluttering at the back of the stage. Serbian actors and actresses (all well-known) sang "Its' time," a new anthem to creating change—and the act of voting. A Serbian pop star sang his well know song, "My friends are scattered throughout the world…," reminding people of why they needed to vote. A recently imprisoned journalist and an actor asked the citizens to go and vote "for a better life, for a better Serbia." Kostunica, the candidate of the opposition, appeared on the stage to begin his speech: "Dear Friends, Belgraders, Serbia, We are given a great opportunity to begin a different life in a different state after September 24th…I am an ordinary man…I only know what you want, and of course what I want is to live in an ordinary average European country…." And so the night went on. On September 24 people from all over the country went to the polls, some for the first time in their lives.

It seems appropriate to end this chapter where I started, thus bringing it full circle:

> You know, from January of 2000, our inside story was that a dictator is finished when everyone in Serbia thinks that he is finished. When they think that and have it clear in their minds that he must go, then in real life, he's really finished. He can't do anything to stay in power. So that was our story.[85]

It would take another week of protests, a coal miners strike, a general strike, strategic planning, and what would seem like organized chaos on the streets before Vojislav Kostunica could stand before the TV cameras and greet a liberated Serbia. But, as this dissertation illustrates, none of this would have been possible if people had not been convinced and mobilized to go to the polls on September 24 to vote for change.

[85] See footnote 2 in this chapter.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has shown that Serbia's electoral revolution in September 2000 occurred only because people actually mobilized—they went and voted in overwhelming numbers, unlike in many earlier elections, despite the fact that the government had become far more restrictive and repressive than it ever had been previously. It would not have mattered how many networks opposition forces had built or resources they had deployed if they could not convince people to go to the polls. Thus, I examined the question, why did Serbs in September of 2000 go to vote? What convinced those who had previously chosen to abstain from voting to now do so, both narrowing the potential number of votes available for vote fraud as well as well as making the decision to vote for the opposition? In the preceding pages, I have argued that the answer lies broadly in three important factors. These include the development of networks of movements and organizations, grievance and demand arising from moral shock, and successful framing by the opposition to build a coherent and resonant alternative worldview to that propagated by Milosevic.

Movement Emergence

One factor leading to the mobilization of citizens in 2000 was the decision and then honest commitment by opposition elites in political parties, from the NGOs and among students, to the realization that change would not come if they always were reacting to the regime—they would have to be proactive. To this end they had to struggle and work to build shared understandings of what the struggle would involve, what their

roles would be, how they would divide the labor and the shared content of their vision. They also had to work to build trust amongst themselves as well as with the public. In the beginning, they had to build networks and organizations, find resources and reflect on what lessons they had learned from their previous experiences, especially the protests in 1996/97, in order to better build organizations and execute plans that would work.

Traditionally movements are thought to emerge from pre-existing networks. The value of networks to movement emergence is usually seen in their ability to recruit people and to gather and organize resources. In the case of Serbia this was indeed true. The networks that developed did emerge out of contacts and associations that people had had with each other before, in many cases since the first set of protests in 1991. In fact many of the main players had remained the same throughout the years, although the new NGO networks that were developed represented a new and important component of the story. As in the more traditional view of networks as structures or loci for resource accumulation, I have argued that the networks were indeed important in movement emergence in Serbia because they helped to gather resources, organize further networks and recruit people.

However, the networks were not merely structural sites of resources. They were composed of and important to sustaining and nurturing both groups of people and their ideas about how the polity should be run. These networks were important because they were not just structures per se but also sites of meaning that were composed of people whose political values, belief in democracy, rule of law and construction of meaning ran counter to those of the state. In that sense they were the alternative conscience of the people and also a voice for those who felt they otherwise had no voice. It should be noted

that there were a variety of networks—not just one—that led to movement emergence, and in some cases they appealed to different constituencies.

In addition to being able to recruit people based on the bonds of personal trust, the networks were also effective in recruiting because their message was voiced in a variety of ways and had had a sustained presence on the opposition front. Thus while NGOs were less well known among certain segments of the public, they were at least seen as credible. Rock and roll stars would not have counted themselves as part of a network per se, especially before 1999 (although many did see themselves as part of an oppositional community or at the very least oppositional and had participated in activities early on such as the 1992 concert, "Don't Count on Us"), but they had regularly expressed an oppositional message that had its own appeal and definitely appealed to a different segment of the audience than did the NGOs often Belgrade-centered happenings.

Such networks were very clearly conscious communities of people with shared values, and it is their values that brought them together and kept them together. If culture is shared mental worlds and their physical embodiment, these networks were definitely cultural. Prior to their decision to organize specifically for concerted political action they did not have a large base outside of Belgrade. Even as they grew their base regionally, cutting across the socio-economic lines that also had previously divided people in Serbia proved to be difficult. However, if the emergence of organizations and networks was the entire story in Serbia, it would be no different than many other accounts of the emergence of social movements and contentious politics. The important difference that my dissertation has demonstrated was that in Serbia, movement emergence had two sources: first the more traditional source of networks as one might expect, and second, both the

organizations and the availability of a wider spectrum of the populace that developed as a result of moral shock.

Moral Shock

The second important source of movement emergence and subsequent mobilization was moral shock among sectors of the population, including the working class and more rural dwellers who, had until that point, been less likely to mobilize. Their reluctance to do so had been shown during the 1996/97 protests, when these groups had tended not to participate and had in some cases supported Milosevic. Yet this demographic was mobilized in the summer of 1999, due less to a concrete, positive vision of what should be and the opposition's and public's sense of their efficacy, than from strategic choices made by the regime that, in retrospect, can only be termed blunders (although neither the regime nor the opposition perceived them as such at the time). Both the opposition and the regime believed that Milosevic's decisions, for example the decisions that led to the NATO bombing, strengthened Milosevic and the regime. Clearly, this proved not to be the case. Instead, such blunders resulted in the recruitment of elements of the population that had previously been either neutral or favored Milosevic. This recruitment of new sectors of the population for movement emergence and their mobilization on behalf of the opposition resulted directly from the government's decisions and its violation of societal moral principles and codes. In contrast to the prevailing argument, that movement recruitment and growth results directly and almost solely from the work of some pre-existing network that seeks to mobilize people for a given cause, this case clearly illustrates that significant, meaningful recruitment can and

did result from the government's violation of basic moral codes. The spontaneous protests that occurred were a result of moral shocks. Such moral shocks had the unintentional, yet important effect of allowing people to see how many other people felt as strongly as they did.

Such moral shocks changed the terms of identity from structural bases of identification, such as class or region, to a shared identity of loss and moral outrage at being lied to on such an essential matter. This response cut across political lines. In some cases moral shock resulted in what might be termed a series of mini-transformational events. The protest in Leskovac marked a turning point for a significant regime-controlled town in deciding where its allegiance lay. It also resulted in the founding of citizen-led organizations such as the Citizens' Parliaments in various cities across the country and the Valjevo Civic Association that promoted opposition activities. These new organizations were able to provide an important nexus between the national level organizations that had been organizing since 1997 and local communities. Moreover the protests in the summer of 1999 became a rallying point to sustain various oppositional activists groups. An illicit recording of the events by a well-known Serbian filmmaker was surreptitiously passed around and informed people what had happened since the official media said very little; it served as a rallying point when it appeared that fewer people would be willing to protest.

The government's repressive actions, especially in May of 2000, and the beating of a young boy on national television, also created moral shock, or at the very least a violation of a sense of moral propriety among sectors of the population. These sectors, that until this point had been perhaps sympathetic to the cause but not radicalized enough

to actively participate, included a significant new group, Otpor Mothers. Otpor Mothers was organized directly as a result of the moral shock and repugnance of mothers at the beating of a child—this group cut across socio-economic lines. Moreover, the actions by the government radicalized members of the populace creating a significant upsurge in membership in various groups such as Otpor and CeSid. The timing of the shock also affected the impact as by this point, organized groups had been out in front effectively framing blame and prognoses for change. By this point in time organizations were visible for people to join. Thus, in this instance the case of moral outrage created fewer new organizations but increased membership in pre-existing ones.

Framing

In addition to movements, organizations, grievance and demand to mobilize people, the third key reason for mobilization was the strategic decision by the political parties to develop and deploy a credible and resonant alternative vision of what it meant to be Serbian and what was the Serbs' place in the world. To the extent that framing is addressed in the literature on the Serbian case to determine who mobilized people to vote in September 2000, the discussion has centered on the "blame frame," that is, the argument that people were convinced to blame Milosevic for their troubles. However, as I have demonstrated, the creation of new, alterative views of the world that people found credible was important to the opposition's success. It was insufficient simply to set up a diagnostic frame in which Milosevic was blamed. Public opinion polls had long shown that, in fact people *had* blamed Milosevic himself for many of their woes—they were not, especially in the case of the economy which they cited as the most important thing,

blaming the United States or other outside forces. Even in the case of the bombing, many blamed Milosevic almost from the start. Thus, a diagnostic framing of blame, replete with a sense of injustice, already existed to some degree. What was absent, however, was a vision of a viable alternative. By this I mean not only a unified opposition in which the candidates' various votes would be counted as one, but unified in the more important sense of having a unified vision for the future that the public would believe in and felt they could count on. Such an alternative vision had to present a credible vision of how politicians themselves had changed and why they should now be trusted. This work was the task and accomplishment not of the NGOs, but of the political parties. While other studies have examined what is indeed the important mobilization work of the NGOs, the NGOs were only one part, albeit an important part, of the story.

I argue that the blame frame was insufficient to mobilize people. Instead I have shown that it was important that people be offered a credible alternative vision of themselves and their country. This alternative vision (worldview) was necessary so that people believed there was a real reason to vote and not abstain as many had in the past. This type of prognosis framing would be important, along with the diagnostic framing of blame, to allow action mobilization framing to be more effective. Such framing effectively utilized frames of efficacy (i.e. they could make changes occur if they went to vote) and moral propriety frames to make each person believe that they had a moral responsibility to the greater community, to the future, i.e. to their children, to vote. Such framing, done by Otpor, the NGOs and the political parties together, was important in moving people to the polls.

The opposition strategy of framing a worldview that was not structurally based but was rather based in identity was essential to their success. Because economic issues were often rated in public opinion polls as the most critical issue or the issue of greatest concern to the public, the opposition could have attempted to frame the economic argument along class lines. However the choice to frame economic issues in terms of identity, in the form of wanting to live a normal life, united people in a way that the promotions of rights, democracy and other values could not do across a variety of class lines. Identity was also a unifier because although structural inequality could be argued to be responsible for the economic deprivations (structured by Milosevic's new class-based system), the decision not to appeal by class but on the basis of identity created a larger base for mobilization. Class-based appeals could have activated divisions such as those that were more prominent in the 1996/97 protests, that would then have been necessary to overcome. By creating a collective identity that transcended traditional class lines, demographics that might have produced division (educated, less educated, middle class, marked by profession, etc.) were more easily smoothed over.

The political opposition's ability to appropriate the term nationalism and redefine it in a way that had meaning but also created a new direction was also central to the opposition's success in mobilizing people to vote. The reconceptualization of nationalism to the concept of patriotism also made central use of identity to reorient people towards the opposition and their larger program. As the government's framing of nationalism had relied in the past on a set of well-known stories and myths that were used to define Serbian identity, so too the opposition made use of another set of narratives from the same cycle of myths to reshape what being Serbian meant. Their use of well-known

Serbian identity myths allowed them to draw on a pre-existing sense of collective identity, albeit one that had received less prominence under the Milosevic regime. The use of these particular narratives allowed them to connect their present day values to past founding myths, thus making their program and values seem less new and less foreign, now more solidly connected to all that was Serbian. Using a story out of the storehouse of founding myths also allowed the opposition to compete on the regime's territory, but to preempt the discussion, offering an acceptable, indeed, resonant cultural alternative. Thus as I have shown in the preceding pages, the opposition's strategic choices as to how to frame their vision for the future were crucial to making them an acceptable alternative to the public. Whereas previously the public had believed they had no real alternatives, through alternative identity framing the political opposition did offer an alternative worldview that could be seen to emanate from Serbian, not foreign sources.

Centrality of Emotions

Another central argument of this dissertation that has been overlooked in other treatments of this case was the centrality of emotions. Understanding how emotions such as depression, apathy and fear constrained people from taking action and how through constructive meaning work by Otpor, the political parties and the NGOs these emotions were turned first into anger through injustice and moral propriety frames and then into more positive outlooks such as the positive emotions of hope and efficacy is central to understanding why people went to vote. Emotions and being able to shift people's emotions was key to events in Serbia. Even prior to 1999 public opinion data showed that most Serbs already blamed Milosevic for their ills, and Serbs did not want to take to the

streets, they wanted change to come through the ballot box. Yet despite this, especially in the aftermath of 1996/97 with the new restrictive laws that Milosevic enacted in 1998 on the media and the university, they seemed unable to take action, having sunk into despair, fear and apathy. The Serbs themselves recognized how important their emotions were, monitoring their mood, publishing public opinion polls and academic articles on their sense of fear and listlessness. Journalists and commentators discussed how many people turned to clairvoyants, and societal commentators remarked frequently on Serbs' sense of displacement, the feeling that they had lost their sense of meaning and place in the world. As crucial as a vision was to any cognitive shift, moving people from apathy and fear and to optimism and a sense of efficacy was key to successful mobilization.

Both political parties and Otpor recognized that changing people's moods was key to their taking action and thus both made active efforts to change people's emotions. Otpor, in particular, excelled at this. Many have noted that without Otpor it is less likely that people would have mobilized, citing Otpor's ability to successfully mock the regime, noting that by so doing Otpor lowered people's fear of the regime and thus their fear of mobilizing. But in the existing literature the reduction of fear is discussed as if it was a conscious decision or cognitive act—that by mocking the regime successfully Otpor made the regime look less powerful. This is indeed true—but it is not, as I have shown, the entire story. I agree that Otpor activists were central to changing the balance of power on the ground but believe that their strength and effectiveness lay as much in their ability to change and shape people's emotions as it did their rational thinking about the regime. This study shows that the answer lies in their ability to help move people beyond three controlling emotions: fear and despair, and apathy. They did this in a very

systematic and strategic way, regularly attempting to remove the regime's basis of power. To do this they employed a full repertoire of cultural tools that were effective because of their familiarity and the emotions they were able to invoke. Street theater and other actions drew the audience actively in to their world and invited them to laugh. The humor not only mocked the regime, it provided a release through laughter and humor. Otpor also drew on cultural allusions and accurately gauged what the public would find funny, what would go literally to the heart of the matter—how people *felt* about the regime, about how they lived and about themselves. Otpor members offered people a sense of efficacy and thus greater optimism and hope by providing them the opportunity to participate along with them in a variety of ways at a variety of levels. Their inclusiveness made people feel empowered for having played a small role and having been able to act out their feeling, stimulating more positive emotions. Otpor was also successful because of its ability to engage people's sense of sympathy; thus when the arrests started and the beatings began, people's sense of outrage was that much greater—not only because the government had begun to exceed accepted moral boundaries, but also because the "kids" of Otpor themselves had made them feel that maybe something was possible and that feeling, too, was being attacked by the government.

Framing done by the political parties prior to the announcement of the elections was meant not only to provide an alternative vision but also sought to engage people's emotions to move them beyond their apathy and despair. Political parties and Otpor were both actively engaged in stirring people's sense of anger through injustice and blame frames. They cultivated that sense of injustice, seeking to guide people through their emotions into action. The regime too also goaded people into action, their worst blunders

resulting in moral shocks that moved people to action. Their lies about reservists' deaths and their actions against a young boy—and more generally against young Otpor activists—created a sense not of bewilderment but of anger. Such feelings often moved people to action and helped strengthen their resolve. Such emotions also gave rise to concrete organizations that would further organize and then strategize, working cooperatively with other opposition actors to form a broadening coalition of opposition actors with one goal, able to operate in a variety of regions, using strategies designed to suit their location and target audience. Emotions, too, played a central role in mobilizing people to vote even without framing work done by political parties. Even in the final weeks before the elections, there were many who, despite the public opinion polls, were afraid to believe that change could ever come. Yet, despite not having a strong sense of their own efficacy, they went to the polls for reasons that were based in emotions such as pride, shame and dignity. In interviews they noted that they were going to vote so they could face their children in the future, tell them they had done the right thing, to maintain their sense of dignity. As my discussion of mobilization in the Serbian elections of 2000 shows, emotions, which have not been discussed to any great degree in the scholarly literature on the change of regime in Serbia in that year, and are only beginning to become part of studies of social movements and protests elsewhere, are central to understanding why people mobilize. Thus, my dissertation, in addition to adding another dimension to what we know about events in Serbia and the so-called electoral revolutions in postcommunist countries, also contributes more broadly to the literature on social movements and contentious politics, particularly concerning factors that affect mass mobilization.

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