Different Forms of Violence in Genocide:
The Case of Rwanda

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Dedication

For the victims, living and deceased, of the Rwandan genocide. For the victims who are known, and those who have been forgotten and ignored.

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There are so many people who have helped me through this process, who I would like to thank. Some came into my life long before I began writing, while others entered at the perfect moment to assist with my understanding of this thesis.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Though visual and media representations of genocide frequently focus on the dead or dying, they often times neglect to address the non-lethal violence that also accompanies genocidal acts. Using the United Nations definition of genocide as an act that is committed with the intent to destroy a group culturally or physically, we will consider the two different forms of violence: violence that is physical and violence that is emotional and cultural. By examining genocide through these forms of violence we will consider how the concentration on only those instances of physical violence and death fails to encompass the entirety of the violence committed, and further distances us from the United Nations encompassing definition of genocide.

To demonstrate the forms the above types of violence manifest in instances of genocide, this thesis examines the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The Rwandan genocide took place over the course of approximately 100 days beginning with the assassination of Juvénal Habyarimana on April 6th, 1994. During that time approximately 800,000 people were murdered (Barnett, 2008). The genocide was the result of long-standing tensions between the minority Tutsi and majority Hutu. The Rwandan genocide is representative of the two forms of violence that can take place both during genocide and in the time preceding genocide. *Visible* violence took the form of murders, eviscerations, machete lacerations, and rape. While *invisible* violence took the form of elicit radio programming and propagandic print media. By understanding the overarching themes that link violence, genocide, and culture we can come to a greater understanding and appreciation of the ways these relationships are shaped through dynamic intracultural and intercultural perceptions.

For the purposes of this study, violent acts are divided into two categories, those that are *physical* and those that are social, cultural and emotional, or as Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1996) describes *invisible*. Acts of *visible* violence include physical force or assault, murder, genital mutilation, rape and sexual assault, burning, cutting, forced abortion, and similar acts which can be readily and documented through physical markers, cues, and/or images. Acts of social, cultural, and emotional violence are programs or performances that induce social or mental suffering, the use of dehumanizing language (e.g. "vermin"), verbal aggression through propaganda or exploitative media, and limited or restricted access to resources (Scheper-Hughes 1996). *Social, cultural and emotional* violence may include those actions that have become normalized and seen as benign (Bourgois 2004). By studying the interplay between *these categories of* violence, we can gain a greater understanding of the ways in which genocidal violence is interpreted or perceived within the communities experiencing the event and by the world at large.

Outline of the Thesis

In chapter two we will examine key anthropological and social science theories in order to get a better understanding of how to interpret genocide. Additionally, chapter two examines the anthropological literature, and explores the role of anthropology in discussing genocide. In chapter three we examine violence and genocide theories to demonstrate the various ways genocide can give us a better understanding of the ways different forms of violence inform the interpretation of genocide. Specific theories include, the *poetics of violence* (Whitehead, 2004a; Hinton, 2004)*, visible* and *invisible* violence (Scheper-Hughes, 1996), and what Gorer (1955) refers to as the proliferation in visual representations of violent death. In chapter 4, the Rwandan genocide is used as a

case study to explore the different forms of violence that can take place in instances of genocide. The final chapter of this thesis reflects on the case of the Rwandan genocide, and summarizes the findings of this thesis.

Methods

In order to examine acts of genocide, I have utilized various anthropological and social science theories on violence[1]. The following theorists were used. For the purposes of examining the ways in which violence emerges and is perpetuated across time and culture, I turned to the work of anthropologist Philippe Bourgois (2004) and his theory of a *continuum of violence*. Building upon that foundation, the work of anthropologists Whitehead (2004a) and Hinton (2004) addressed the shared idiom of violence, what they termed the *poetics of violence*, which dictates the way violence and culture inform each other and reflects the extent and force of violent acts within a community. Similarly, anthropologist Scheper-Hughes' (1996) discussion of *visible* and *invisible* violence, as it relates to genocide, expands upon the way violence is perceived. Finally, the theories of anthropologists Linke (2009) and Gorer (1955) reflect on the visual representations of violence, and the ways in which violence is either normalized (Linke, 2009) or proliferated (Gorer, 1955) through the use of images and language. The above theories helped to develop a framework through which to consider the material pertaining to the Rwandan genocide.

Data for the Rwanda case study were obtained through academic literature originating from both inside and outside the field of anthropology. Though I draw from

[1] The body of work titled *Violence Theory* is concerned with exploring the individual and collective pathways to violence, and incorporates a theoretical framework that reflects on the interplay and integration of interpersonal, institutional, and structural violence.

researchers situated outside of the field of anthropology, my work is inherently anthropological in nature and interpretation.

Chapter 2: Defining Genocide

It became apparent in the process of this literature review that several concerns must first be addressed before the reflection on the *poetics of violence*, as they relate to genocide, may be undertaken. The first of these is whether or not the discipline of political science has a common theme or definition of genocide. Secondly, how does psychological scholarship addresses the mechanisms through which violence is undertaken, observed, and perceived by those communities engulfed by genocide? Thirdly, how does a reflection on the role of the bystander, and the emotional distancing that takes place in the presence of genocide, inform our understanding of the act? Fourthly, a reflection on the connection between anthropology and the study of genocide is in order.

Defining Genocide: Politically and Contextually

Though genocides have occurred throughout history, over a variety of different cultural contexts, it was not until the Holocaust that the word was finally created. As a word, genocide -from the Greek *genos* (race or tribe) and the Latin *cide* (kill)- was coined in 1944 by Raphael Lemkin, in order to describe acts that are executed with the intent to destroy, in part or whole, a national, ethnic, or religious group through means of serious physical or mental harm (Power, 2002a). Lemkin said:

> Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national

> feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group. [Lemkin, 2002, p.27]

As a Jew, Lemkin, a self-taught linguist and lawyer, had witnessed first-hand the devastation and destruction he would term genocide during the Second World War. During that period, Lemkin fled Poland for the United States, while a majority of his family and relatives were sent to concentrations camps and became the victims of a then-unnamed crime. Lemkin lost 49 family members during the Holocaust (Power, 2002b, p. 23-26), a reality he shared with countless others. By the end of the war, as many as 6 million Jewish people, along with members of other stigmatized groups, had been brutally murdered, and those who survived found themselves displaced, destitute, and psychologically damaged (Dawidowicz, 2010). Images of the camps and corpses circulated the globe and were answered in many Western cultures with a resounding promise of "Never Again" by those who came to recognize it as genocide. The initial proclamation of "Never Again" actually came from prisoners of the liberated Buchenwald concentration camp in 1945, later immortalized by a stone monument with the words engraved on it (Rieff, 2011). In 1984, President Reagan, speaking of the United State's support of the ratification of the Genocide Convention, said:

> With a cautious view, in part due to the human rights abuses performed by some nations that have already ratified the documents, our administration has conducted a long and exhaustive study of the convention. And yesterday, as a result of this review, we announced that we will vigorously support, consistent with the United States Constitution, the ratification of the Genocide Convention. And I want you to know that we intend to use the convention in our efforts to expand human freedom and fight human rights abuses around the world. Like you, I say in a forthright voice, "Never again!" [Ronayne, 2001, p. 37]

Similar monuments and memorials have been constructed in Chile and Rwanda (Rieff,

2011). Yet, as the decades progressed after the initial proclamation at Buchenwald, genocides have continued to erupt around the world--in Rwanda, Guatemala (Grandin, 2000), Argentina (Minow, 1999), China (Rummel, 2007), India (Roy 2008), Cambodia (Etcheson, 2008), Bosnia (Miller, 2006), Iraq (Kelly, 2008), and Sudan (Kessler, 2004), to name but a few. Despite the countless images and reports of bloodshed and trauma, the international community has debated the numbers of victims killed and whether an adequate body count had been amassed to declare that genocide had definitively been committed (LeBlanc, 1984).

In defining genocide, political science literature pertaining to the study of genocide frequently refer back to the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Article 2 of the convention defines genocide as:

> ...any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life, calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

However, researchers who study genocide from a political science perspective propose numerous reasons why the above definition has made understanding of genocide more complex. Most cited is the vagueness of the above definition, compounded by a desire to commoditize the number of victims that needed to be murdered, and systematize the definition in order to quantify and empirically measure genocide. (Power, 2002a; Shah, 2002; Card, 2003; Kelly, 2007). Some political scientists suggest that quantifying the definition of genocide by counting the number of deaths would potentially eliminate human-error when attempting to interpret acts of violence against a group. Another definition focuses on the theme of *intent* to commit genocide, and whether or not this

can accurately and consistently be identified (Power, 2002a; Kennan, 1985; Harff, 2003).

Journalist and head of Harvard's Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Samantha Power (2002a), calls attention to the capacity of political figures and decision-makers for ignorance and self-interested behavior as comprising two of the leading reasons for the two aforementioned issues facing the definition of genocide. Gellert (1995) and Kennan (1985) both address the issue of recognition and identification of mass violence by noting that often the preceding intervention expected after a declaration of genocide is intertwined with State interests and potential gains. The role which external governments assume is that of the bystander, a concept explored by Vetlesen (2000), who wrote generally on the responsibility of bystanders. Vetlesen (2000) suggests that in instances of genocide, the disregarding of invisible and visible violence demonstrates to the perpetrators and victims that the action, genocidal violence, may continue without external intervention or repercussion. It was also noted, for example, that it is the bystander "who decides whether the harm wrought by the aggressor is permitted to stand unrectified or not. The bystander who reacts with non-reaction, with silence in the face of killing, helps "legitimize that very killing" (Vetlesen, 2000 Because of this phenomenon, even nominally passive bystanders are indirectly participants in (and to some degree culpable for) witnessed acts of genocide. This concept is given further consideration below in the section on the psychological perspective of genocidal research. Regardless of the limitations of this approach to the definition and recognition of the term genocide, it is important to recognize that without an internationally recognized legal definition and the political will of countries to enforce such a definition, genocide will persist under the assumption that any repercussions will be "minimal" to "non-existent," according to Staub (2000), Power (2002a), Gellert (1995), DeRouen and Goldfinch (2005), Jafari (2004), Kabatsi (2005), and Chalk (1989).

Psychology of Genocide

Some researchers have demonstrated that a connection between cultural groups and genocide may be attributed to global market and economic trends that fuel ethnic violence and hatred (Chua, 2003), ecological distribution of lands and goods (Niazi, 2005), and issues of colonization and westernization (Mohan, 2005; Niazi, 2005; Brehl, 2005; Uvin, 1999). These above trends do not exist within a vacuum that are exclusionary to each other; indeed, a single act of genocide may be reflective of all of these connections. Though these mechanisms can be beneficial for a review of the ways that conflict escalates into genocidal violence, they do not serve as an adequate source through which to explore cultural process that may create the myriad forms of visible and invisible violence and their relationship to denial of genocide.

Some scholars have approached genocide from a post-conflict, reconciliatory perspective, citing Ervin Staub to create different methods of deconstructing ethnic conflict. In his 2000 paper, "Genocide and Mass Killings," Staub posited that the onset of genocide and collective violence can largely be traced back to the influences of perpetrator-instigators, difficult life conditions, the evolution of increasing inter-group violence over time, and a deep-seated respect for authority. Staub (2000) identified three independent factors that can be used to identify areas where there is a potential for genocide: (1) cultural characteristics, (2) the strain or threat to the group's quality of life, and (3) bystanders and bystander response. These factors represent the cultural and psychological processes that can be observed in most instances of genocide, and they are the systemic processes, which enable one group to harbor hostility toward and another that potentially erupts into full-fledged killing sprees (Staub, 2000). Once one or more of these potentials becomes operationalized through rhetoric or actions, they begin to take on the role of systemic processes, further heightening the likelihood

of genocidal conflict (Staub, 2000). The first, cultural characteristics, concerns itself with the issue of the dehumanization of a group which is reinforced by authoritarian propagation of such discrimination (e.g. Nazi propaganda that aimed to establish Jews as subhuman and an economic drain). This operates by stripping the marginalized portions of the population their humanity while those in positions of power cultivate any such lingering sentiments (Staub, 2000). This process justifies the slaughter of other persons by severing the potential victims' connection to humanity: instead of being viewed as human beings, they become sub-human pests, which can be justifiably exterminated (Staub, 2000). The second process is the strain, or perceived threat of strain, on a group's quality of life. This may result from an actual situation of economic strain (e.g. hyperinflation in the Weimar Republic) or a group's fear that the marginalized group's presence or economic interaction will detract from potential financial gain or living space (Staub, 2000). It arises out of a fear over group survival, when the perpetrators feel that their livelihood and/or culture is being placed at unnecessary risk by the mere presence and existence of the group(s) they are targeting (Staub, 2000). The third and final process through which genocide is enacted is through the presence of a bystander (Staub, 2000). The bystander can be viewed as any individual or group of individuals who have the ability to intervene or mitigate the effects of group hatred and mass violence, but nonetheless stand aside and witness these acts come to fruition (Staub, 2000). Such individuals can be categorized as those in the position of an emotionally disconnected third party, where they can see the entirety of the conflict and have the potential to call the crimes to the attention of a wider audience. These three categories are manifested in various ways, but they exist in all instances of genocide, according to Staub (2000). Staub (2000) asserts that the above characteristics are purposefully broad enough to be utilized to identify areas of potential or pending group violence, but may also be used in a post-genocide analysis. One concern with

Staub's (2000) theory is that it does not give us the means to explore the particular nuances that may characterize each influencing factor. For example, how should researchers go about delving into what constitutes difficult life conditions for a particular region or group or, for that matter, evaluate the extent to which a group displays a deep-seated respect for authority? These categories are difficult to define and quantify, due to the different cultural constructions of respect and authority. The same variables hold true within and between groups regarding the recognition of visible and invisible violence. Yet, some researchers continue to homogenize the complex cultural variables that lead to genocide by trying to create precise formulaic predictors for this phenomenon.

One such example was a briefing paper presented to the US State Department in 1996 by legal advisor and anthropologist Gregory Stanton of genocidewatch.org. During this briefing, Stanton (1996) identified eight stages of genocide formation (See Table 1, next page). The table below demonstrates both the advantages and downfalls to viewing genocide within a rigid framework. The primary strength of Stanton's eight stages of genocide is that the systemic denial that is utilized by perpetrators of genocide is explained in a logical and categorical manner. There are, however, disadvantages with Stanton's taxonomy. While historically, many examples of genocide have revolved around mass killings, as observed in the UN definition the scope of genocide is not limited to instances where large numbers of people have been murdered. In limiting the scope of the eight stages to instances of genocide that result in mass killings, Stanton (1996) ignores the import of Raphael Lemkin's (2002) legal definition, which aimed to illustrate that genocide represents "a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves." While there is great value to Stanton's (1996) eight

stages, a more encompassing evaluation of the ways in which each stage may manifest itself needs to be considered.

Classification	All cultures have categories to distinguish people into "us and them" by ethnicity, race, religion, or nationality: German and Jew, Hutu and Tutsi. Bipolar societies that lack mixed categories, such as Rwanda and Burundi, are the most likely to have genocide.
Symbolization	We give names or other symbols to the classifications. We name people "Jews" or "Gypsies", or distinguish them by colors or dress; and apply the symbols to members of groups. Classification and symbolization are universally human and do not necessarily result in genocide unless they lead to the next stage, dehumanization. When combined with hatred, symbols may be forced upon unwilling members of pariah groups: the yellow star for Jews under Nazi rule, the blue scarf for people from the Eastern Zone in Khmer Rouge Cambodia.
Dehumanization	One group denies the humanity of the other group. Members of it are equated with animals, vermin, insects or diseases. Dehumanization overcomes the normal human revulsion against murder. At this stage, hate propaganda in print and on hate radios is used to vilify the victim group.
Organization	Genocide is always organized, usually by the state, often using militias to provide deniability of state responsibility (the Janjaweed in Darfur.) Sometimes organization is informal (Hindu mobs led by local RSS militants) or decentralized (terrorist groups.) Special army units or militias are often trained and armed. Plans are made for genocidal killings.
Polarization	Extremists drive the groups apart. Hate groups broadcast polarizing propaganda. Laws may forbid intermarriage or social interaction. Extremist terrorism targets moderates, intimidating and silencing the center. Moderates from the perpetrators' own group are most able to stop genocide, so are the first to be arrested and killed.
Preparation	Victims are identified and separated out because of their ethnic or religious identity. Death lists are drawn up. Members of victim groups are forced to wear identifying symbols. Their property is expropriated. They are often segregated into ghettoes, deported into concentration camps, or confined to a famine-struck region and starved..
Extermination	Extermination begins, and quickly becomes the mass killing legally called "genocide." It is "extermination" to the killers because they do not believe their victims to be fully human. When it is sponsored by the state, the armed forces often work with militias to do the killing. Sometimes the genocide results in revenge killings by groups against each other, creating the downward whirlpool-like cycle of bilateral genocide (as in Burundi).
Denial	Denial is the eighth stage that always follows a genocide. It is among the surest indicators of further genocidal massacres. The perpetrators of genocide dig up the mass graves, burn the bodies, try to cover up the evidence and intimidate the witnesses. They deny that they committed any crimes, and often blame what happened on the victims. They block investigations of the crimes, and continue to govern until driven from power by force, when they flee into exile.

Table 1: The Eight Stages of Genocide. [Stanton, 1996]

Bystanders in Genocide

A significant criticism of many theories and approaches to the study of genocide is that the role of the bystander is largely treated as a secondary consideration. While acknowledged by several researchers as a contributor to the processes of genocide, very few studies have delved into the ways in which societies are enculturated to become bystanders in instances of genocide (Staub, 2000; Power, 2002; Gellert, 1995; DeRouen and Goldfinch, 2005; Jafari, 2004; Kabatsi, 2005; Chalk, 1989). For the purposes of this review, bystanders can be defined as that segment of society who, to some degree, perceive and publically acknowledge genocidal violence, such as people in positions of power or in positions of action (Monroe 2008). According to Monroe (2008), the bystander is an individual who feels a sense of powerlessness in their ability to intervene in instances of genocide. The bystander embraces an alternate form of denial, not as a means of dehumanization but as a means of self-protection from physical and emotional trauma. Baum (2008) suggests that in every bystander there is also the potential to become a perpetrator of genocide. In this way Baum's (2008) work aligns with the work of Zimbardo (2007) and Baron-Cohen (2011), who both reflected on the factors that can lead good people to engage in atrocities and the traits within all human beings that demonstrate our ability to commit such crimes.

Of particular importance to this thesis is the exploration of denial and emotional distancing that bystanders use in order to cope with genocide. Using Staub (2001), Baum (2008) argues that, due to being less emotionally involved, a passive bystander may avoid recognition of a violent event in order to avoid emotional turmoil. Staub (2001) states: "It is difficult to see others suffer and do nothing. To justify their passivity, reduce their guilt, and reduce empathy with the victims that would make them suffer, passive bystanders tend to distance themselves from the victims, in part by devaluing

them." In his utilization of the terms *distancing* and *devaluing,* Staub (2001) is referring to the act of *distancing* themselves as being facilitated by the mechanism of *devaluing* the victims. An alternate interpretation of Staub (2001) could be understood this way: the act of remaining separate from genocidal violence is facilitated by the connected mechanisms of *distancing* and *devaluation*. Baum (2008) suggests that the above process forges a psychic numbing so that the bystander may continue as a functional individual, a "second self." To further build on the concept of psychic numbing, Lifton (1982) adds:

> Numbness is not only a psychological form of self-protective dissociation; it is arguably a new, highly self-conscious narrative about the collective construction of moral availability, if not empathy, and may thus constrain humanist aspirations in ways we do not yet recognize. Because numbness may also be a necessary dimension to our ability to absorb a mass atrocity, it paradoxically confirms ideas about our common humanity- we can only respond numbly to what we feel in excess- while also rendering humanitarian practice increasingly vexed. It may be that numbness merely exposes in new and dramatic terms the limits of the ideally expansive liberal 'we.' [Lifton, 1982, p. 5]

The complexities of understanding the human pyche are immense and are complicated enough in times of peace. Attempting to explain group or individual behaviors in the chaos of mass violence requires a mutifactorial approach that not all researchers can agree on. However, there does appear to be some consensus in the psychological literature that responses to instances of mass violence such as genocide are affected directly by the number of victims. Additionally, psychic numbing appears to function both as a way of enabling the bystander to be a functional individual, as well as a method of justifying inaction (Slovic, 2007; Lifton, 1982; Staub, 2001; Baum, 2008). While the above literature in the field of genocide studies has focused on the relationship between denial and emotional distancing, the field of anthropology has largely avoided the issue of genocide.

Anthropology and Genocide

The anthropological literature addressing or acknowledging the occurrence of genocide prior to the 1990s is limited and the number of anthropologists who regularly concentrate on the phenomenon of genocide remains few, in comparison with other disciplines. A brief survey of articles published before 1990 has anthropological authors falling into one of three categories: those whose entire article focuses on genocide (Gonzalez, 1973; Gomez, 1974; Berdichewsky, 1979; Frankel, 1981; Do Nacimento, 1989; Barsh, 1987); authors who discuss it briefly in their published works (Scholte, 1985; Diop, 1986); those who discuss it under the term "Holocaust" (Shiloh, 1975; Rogers, 1976); or authors who call for other anthropologists to undertake the study of genocide and its aplicability to the profession (Berreman, 1968; Casteel, 1970; Magubane and Faris, 1985). Here, I am making a distinction between the mere mentioning of genocide and an actual critical engagement with the topic. When this criterion is employed, the number of papers and texts published on genocide is comparatively under-represented in the anthropological literature. Most genocide literature is situated outside of the field of anthropology and provides expansive historical information situating individual genocide case studies within a particular cultural and historical context. Furthermore, although this review addresses the works of most of the seminal anthropological scholars in the study of genocide, scope constraints meant that the writings of some major figures, such as Hannah Arendt, have not been extensively explored or included[2]. This is in part due to my framing of understanding genocide through the question of *visible* and *invisible* violence, a subject not necessarily adressed by these eminent scholars. Finally, although philosophical literature on the subject of genocide and the topic of the

[2] This was, in part, due to the relevance on her work to the aims of this thesis.

obscuring of invisible violence exists, evaluative studies using qualitative or quantitative methods demonstrating the connection of the two individual subjects are scarce.

In her book, *From Racism to Genocide: Anthropology in the Third Reich,* Schafft (2004) explores the connection between anthropologists, Hitler, and the Holocaust. Schafft (2007) explains that, while the theories and methods of anthropologists during the 1930s and 1940s were reinventions of earlier studies of humankind, in the Nazi era many became forerunners for the racist philosophies leading to the Holocaust. Schafft (2007) says:

> Their theoretical positions make it clear that there was nothing new under the sun in Nazi orders for the geographic and social segregation, and even in some cases the elimination, of various population groups. That some ethnic groups should flourish and others disappear forever was not merely an outcome of Hilterism but also an outcome of philosophies that had found an accepted place in the literature and in the hearts of men and women for more than a hundred years. [Schafft, 2007, p. 37-38]

Hinton (2002) anticipates Schafft's (2007) observation by noting that anthropologists, as researchers, had long been concerned with understanding and noting human difference biologically, culturally, and geographically. However, according to Scheper-Hughes (2002), despite the profession's interest in studying humankind, issues of racism and intergroup relationships, the material on genocide is lacking. Why is this the case in a field of study that takes pride in an extensive history of field-work spanning countless regions, cultures and periods of modern history? The answer, odd though it may seem, is a general tendency for previous generations of anthropologists to avoid issues of violence, according to Hinton (2002) and Scheper-Hughes (2002).

It is important to frame this avoidance of violence within the larger context of anthropological work and the literature we have covered so far. According to Scheper-Hughes (2002), such avoidance may reflect a general attitude in traditional perspectives of the profession to avoid discussing or acknowledging conflict, saying:

> A basic premise guiding twentieth-century ethnographic research was, quite simply, to see, hear, and report no evil (and very little violence) in reporting back from the field. Classical cultural anthropology and its particular moral sensibility orients us like so many inverse bloodhounds on the trail and on the scent of the good and the righteous in the societies that we study. [Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 348-349]

It has not been an issue of blatantly ignoring the subject of violence for the sole purpose of ignoring it; instead, it may have been a reflection of a general attitude in the profession towards cultural relativism and avoiding the stigmatization of cultures experiencing violence as barbaric or uncivilized (Scheper-Hughes, 2002; Hinton, 2002; Geertz, 1995). Another possible explanation as to why anthropologists have generally skirted the issue could be found by examining the 1960s fieldwork of Clifford Geertz. As Scheper-Hughes (2002) reflects, there is no mention of the notorious "Killing Fields" that started to take place shortly after Geertz's time in Indonesia, and Geertz (1995) himself acknowledged that he consciously avoided periods of conflict when he entered into the field. Geertz's avoidance of writing on indigenous conflict is an instance through which violence was obscured for the purpose of accomodating Western (specifically American) goals. His training, and subsequent theoretical perspective, was situated within a modernization theory that called for indigenous cultures to appear to be rational and positive in behavior and outlook (Ross, 1998). As the profession has continued to evolve, an increasing number of anthropologists are beginning to address the topics of violence, genocide, and denial. The seminal works of those will be discussed in the next chapter of this thesis[3].

[3] Literature on Warfare will not be included in this thesis, though it may be said that additional comparisons can be made between the literatures.

Summary

To conclude, it is important to frame the literature reviewed here with the understanding that these authors maintain a particular viewpoint and set of cultural conditionings that affect the universality of their arguments. It is in this way that the analysis of genocide does not only reflect the act itself or the victims, but becomes a process that reflects the cultural ideals of the individual conducting the review.

Chapter 3: Theory

This chapter represents a compilation of different anthropologists who speak on issues of violence and representations of death in different cultural scenarios. Neil Whitehead (2004a, b) and Alexander Hinton's (2004) discussion of the *poetics of violence* considers the relationship between individual agency and historical and cultural rules. Their works further the discussion of genocide by making the case for a thorough examination of the ways that culture and violence inform and shape and give meaning to each other. Philippe Bourgois and Nancy Scheper-Hughes (2004) present us with a discussion of the diagnostic limitations of perceiving violence as only those acts that result in physical hurt, and offer an alternate categorization of violence into those acts that are physical and those acts that are culturally, socially, and mentally harmful. This adds to our examination of genocide through providing a categorical system through which to examine violence, and aids in understanding the limits of concentrating on only physical aspects. The work of Uli Linke (2009) on the *Body Worlds* exhibit demonstrates the ways in which language and presentation can serve to normalize and trivialize physical violence, and aids in considering the formative use of language to either raise or downplay genocidal violence. Additionally, the writings of Geoffery Gorer (1955) and Jacque Lynn Foltyn (2008) explore the ways that images of violent death are proliferated, while images of normal, ordinary death are obscured. In relation to genocide this assists in understanding the purpose images of violent death play in obscuring the reporting of everyday, ordinary death. Finally, the theory of Steven Bauman's (2000) reflects on the ways that the removal of violence, specifically in instances of genocide, from the immediate physical presence of ordinary members of society allows for the illusion of a civilized culture.

The poetics of violence in Visible and Invisible genocides

While the topic of violence is one that is embedded within this work, our particular focus has been on the *poetics of violence* as they serve to move along what Philippe Bourgois (2004) described as the *continuum of violence*: where violence perpetuates itself across generations and individuals. We will return to the work of Bourgois (2004) shortly in the defining of *invisible* and *visible* violence,; however, for the moment, we will examine and define what is meant by the *poetics of violence*.

In the introduction to his edited volume, *Violence* (2004a), *Neil* L. Whitehead discusses the *poetics* of violent practices, and the ways in which those poetics clarify and complicate the study of violence. Whitehead (2004a) describes the poetics of violence as the ways that "cultural conceptions of violence are used discursively to amplify and extend the cultural force of violent acts or how those violent acts themselves can generate a shared idiom of meaning for violent death." The connection between the dynamic manifestation of violence and the cultural understanding of violence, which Whitehead described, can alternately be understood as the ways in which social categorizations of violence can serve to determine the type of violence in practice and intensify its effect. One such example of the poetics of violence is Alex Hinton's essay *The Poetics of Genocidal Practice* (2004), where he describes the practice of the Khmer Rouge perpetraitors eviscerating their victims and consuming portions of their victim's liver in a symbolic act that moves the practice beyond the violence to the body. Hinton writes:

> By cutting out and consuming the liver of a victim, then, Khmer Rouge cadre likely believed they were increasing their daring to the point that they would be able to cut off their sentiment and kill without hesitation or remorse, even if, as Khmer Rouge ideology exhorted, the "enemy" was a former friend, relative, or family member. There are many stories of Khmer Rouge cadre who did just this to prove their loyalty to the regime. Finally, the liver is also associated with anger and emotional equilibrium. On the one hand, liver eating is done to someone against whom one is enraged, especially sociopolitical enemies. If two people

> argue and one becomes furious, he or she may express extreme rage by telling the other, "I'm so angry I could eat your liver." [Hinton, 2004, p. 180-181]

In this example, the liver was already culturally constructured as a site through which anger is symbolically expressed but not physically enacted. It was in the transition to a physical act during the genocide that the symbolic act gave way to the physical, and enabled the Khmer Rouge cadre to literally manifest anger and oposition through the consumption of the "enemies" liver. An underlying point to be observed in Whitehead's (2004) exploration of the poetics of violence is the formative and regulatory role of individual agency in shaping the conversation of violence. The majority of violence, according to Whitehead (2004a) and Bourgois (2004), is rule-governed and meaningful, however may represents what may be described as a descent into a lack of social order. Whitehead explains:

> Violent actions, no less than any other kind of behavioral expression, are deeply infused with cultural meaning and are the moment for individual agency within historically embedded patterns of behavior. Individual agency, utilizing extant cultural forms, symbols and icons, may thus be considered "poetic" for the rule-governed substrate that underlies it, and for how this substrate is deployed, through which new meanings and forms of cultural expression emerge. At the same time, the poesis of violence can also lead to its broader legitimization, by linking violent acts to prevelant cultural values.. [Whitehead, 2004a, 9-10]

Therefore, according to Whitehead (2004a) the poetics of violence represent the ways that cultural meanings inform violent behavior, which, in turn, result in violent behavior forming new cultural meanings.

Bourgois and Scheper-Hughes (2004) added another important dimension to understanding the relationship of violence to genocide in their description of the concept of violence as being "slippery", nonlinear, productive, destructive, and reproductive. As was described in the above section on the *poetics of violence*, the actualization of violence is dynamic and incorporates cultural constructions of, and responses to,

violence. Given its nature and subjectivity, defining violence cannot be approached in what Bourgois and Scheper-Hughes (2004) call a "check-list" manner. Rather, Bourgois and Scheper-Hughes (2004, p.2) argue that the pursuit of determining what violence is defies easy categorization since it cannot be quantified, or, in their words, violence "can be everything and nothing; legitimate or illegitimate; *visible* or *invisible*; necessary or useless; senseless and gratuitous or utterly rational and strategic." Although Bourgois and Scheper-Hughes (2004, p. 1-2) and Whitehead (2004a) would each argue against defining violence, Whitehead (2004a) goes on to propose that an attempt to adequately conceptualize what acts may be considered violent may be productive to the researcher. Whitehead (2004a) states that though it may seem that defining violence would lead to a better understanding of it, the task should instead focus on the individual narratives of violence in order to create an accurate representation of what is violent within a culture. This is a particularly important issue to be raised given that often times violence has sought to be defined through those actions that can be empirically measured.. In *The Anthropology of Violence,* David Riches attempts to define violence as "an act of physical hurt deemed legitimate by the performer and illegitimate by some witnesses" (1986, p. 8). Additionally, Riches' (1986, p. 8) definition of violence would suggest that in instances of genocide violence would only constitute those acts that are physically measurable, making it insufficient to address the other forms of violence which take place in genocide that result in no physical harm at all.[4] Bourgois and Scheper-Hughes (2004, p. 1-2) speak to the above by that "focusing exclusively on the physical aspects of torture/terror/violence misses the point and transforms the project into a clinical, literary, or artistic exercise, which runs the risk of degenerating into a theater or pornography of violence…" Bearing this in mind, it has been the aim of this researcher to

[4]There are forms of violence that don't result in physical hurt (i.e. emotional violence and verbal abuse).

expand upon the definition of violence provided by Riches (1986), with special attention to the concerns raised by Bourgois and Scheper-Hughes (2004), in order to adequately evaluate acts of violence in genocide. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, acts of genocidal violence are divided into two categories, those that are *visible* and those that are *invisible*, as Nancy Schepper-Hughes (1996) describes in her paper *Invisible Genocides*. As discussed in the introduction, those acts that constitute *visible* violence include the use of physical force or assault; murder; genital mutilation; rape and sexual assault; burning; cutting; impalement; starvation; forced abortion and infanticide; and similar acts which involve the body, and can be readily and documented through physical markers, cues, and/or images .. Conversely, acts that are considered *invisible* violence include those programs or performances that induce social or mental suffering, such as the categorization of a victim group by perpetrators as being "dangerous," "vermin," "inhuman," or otherwise a threat, perceived or actual, to the perpetraitor groups' way of life (Schepper-Hughes, 1996); verbal aggression (Whitehead, 2004b); propagandic or exploitative media; limited or restricted access to resources for livelihood and general wellbeing; or those scenarios that have become normalized, in what Schepper-Hughes' (1996) refers to as the "violence of everday life." ,,It is critical to understand though, that, while these descriptive terms appear to suggest, superficially, that those forms of violence that are "*invisible*" are deemed so because they lack physical expressions of violence that may not be recognized culturally or are sequestered to secrecy, the opposite is in fact true. Scheper-Hughes explains:

> "the paradox is that they are not *invisible* because they are secreted away and hidden from view, but quite the reverse. As Wittgenstein noted, the things that are the hardest to perceive are often those which are right before our eyes and therefore simply taken for granted."
> [Scheper-Hughes, 2004]

It isn't merely that *visible* or *invisible* violence is perceivable by the average person's gaze; but instead, that an individual may recognize and situate an act of violence based on whether the violence being perpetrated is a benign symptom of everyday life. This recognition of what is *visible* and *invisible* violence lends itself well to an understanding of the way that particular types or visual representations of violence tend to receive more attention than others. Addressing this, Whitehead (2004a) draws attention to the roles of media *representations* and observer *interpretations* in engaging or normalizing instances of violence:

> The media does not cause people to kill, but it certainly suggests the poetics by which killing can be made meaningful to an audience... Firstly, that such aesthetics feed the poesis of individual actors, the construction of victimhood, and the interpretations of observers. ...depictions of violence create a space for the contemplation of violence but also show us the centrality of such images to notions of violence... In this way, the interpretation of violence - as monstrous, mad, barbaric, and so forth - is too facile. Although such interpretations satisfy our moral outrage and despair and enables acts of vengence and justice in response, they also occlude violence's disruptive force and subjective meanings.
> [Whitehead, 2004a, p. 19, sic]

Through his assertion that there are a set of *poetics* that facilitate the intepretation and contemplation of violence, Whitehead argues that visual representations of violence silmultaneously affirm a culture's construction of violence as well as obscure meanings of violence. However, while visual representations of violence inform violence, there are instances where the bombardment of images of visible death weakens the cultural understandings of violence, and results in the normalization of extraordinary violence (Bourgois and Scheper-Hughes, 2004). Whitehead's model of a *continuum of violence* suggests the idea that violence continually gives way to new meanings and expressions of violence. In considering the *continuum*, the above quote could be interpreted to mean that frequent images of violence may desensitize a society's response to violence, so that, in turn, those images of violence will become normalized as a facet of day-to-day life

experience. In instances where violence has become *invisible* through frequent images or representations in the media, an added degree of frequency or brutality of violence needs to be present for it to resume visibility. The degrees to which cultures and individuals interact with *invisible* and *visible* violence has been observed by both Uli Linke (2009) and Jacque Lynn Foltyn (2008)..

Invisible Violence and the Vernacular of the "Corpse Museum"

In her paper, *The Limits of Empathy (2009),* Uli Linke examines the phenomenon of "corpse museums" in modern day Germany, and what this may represent about the commodification of death and the cultural desensitization of the corpse. The "corpse museums" Linke refers to are more widely recognized as the "Body Worlds" exhibit of plastinated corpses, designed by German anatomist Gunther von Hagens. At this exhibit, corpses of varying ages and sexes are defleshed and plastinated in various everyday and sexual poses to highlight the positions of internal organs and muscles. Linke (2009, p. 140) says:

> The bodies have been skinned, cut open, dismembered, and sectioned to expose the interior world of human physiology: muscles, bones, nerve strands, blood vessels, organs, and reproductive regions including fetuses, wombs, and penises. In short, the installation "consists of hardened plastic corpses that, while standing upright ... render specific aspects of their anatomy graphically visible."

The exhibit was marked with such a high degree of success, that, as Linke (2009) notes, a proliferation of off-shooting "Body Worlds" exhibits began to tour around the world. The corpses on display were said to provide medical insight and have been approached as a site of *infotainment* for the general public. Linke (2009), however, suggests that there are deeper cultural implications that are not as openly dissected as these corpses are. The central concern in Linke's (2009) essay revolves around the issue that the normal

emotion of grief and human rights concerns surrounding death are obscured by the use of language that tells the public that the deaths of the numerous individuals on display were not in vain or unabashedly used for monetary gain, but that they have instead been reborn/repurposed purportedly as a tool for education and the further attainment of knowledge for both the public and medical community (Linke, 2009). Linke refers to the above paradox at the end of her essay as being a form of "selective vision", a way of minimizing or altogether excluding the facts that would lead the general public to see or connect to the apparent issues of exploitation that mimic the Nazi agenda leading up to and during the Holocaust. What Linke (2009) refers to as the "Nazi agenda" was the expropriation of a vast number of Holocaust victims to power their medical experimentation industry and act as unwilling human test subjects. These projects included high altitude decompression tests, amputation and replantation experiments, hypothermia and exposure simulations, and the collection of body parts from the victims of these exams for record keeping and analysis (Aly et. al, 1994). This heralds back to the point Bourgois (2004) raised on the frequency and amount with which images of violence, or in this instance the representation of the dead, lead to a process of redefining and raising the proverbial "bar" of what sorts of violence or death can be construed as socially acceptable or even entertaining. Such an assertion, however, is only a portion of a larger phenomena that Linke (2009) identifies as "emotional anesthesia." As she writes:

> Inhumanity, techno-rational regimes of death, and the "banality of evil," as Hannah Arendt (1963) termed it, succinctly capture the governing principles of the modus operandi of modernity in the twentieth century, and moreover, recall the formation of a new kind of subjectivity: the increasing atrophy of empathy. Emotional anesthesia or the devolution of feelings, as I suggest, is integral to a cultural apparatus that feeds on the labor of the negative: the abrogation of hummanity. While societal practices of affect negation may indeed be symptomatic of a capitalist modernity, they are simultaneously embedded in specific histories, discourses, and meanings (Linke, 2009, p. 147-148).

Connecting the action of anesthesizing emotion to a culture that feeds on negative human experiences, such as violent death or human rights violations, Linke (2009) asserts that the obscuring of death is is deeply reflective of a set of cultural conventions within a society that will inhibit individuals from connecting emotion to violence, death, or a corpse. It is within the environment of the museum or the news that the gruesome reality of violence and death is digested by the general public, and through the moderators of such exhibits that observers can be reassured that death, depicted as foreign and a tool for knowledge-seeking or entertainment, can be observed without emotional connection. Linke (2009) states:

> ..it is the virtuality and optical distance of such image-marketing techniques that produce a sense of the surreal and, in turn, enable affective detachment among consumers... They [corpses] are supposed to be self-referential or auto-iconic: emptied of meaning, emptied of symbolic content, and devoid of emotions. [Linke, 2009, p. 149]

It is not simply the sheer volume of corpses present in these "museums" that creates a shift in the ways that visitors respond to death or violence, but it is the accompanying dialogue that assists in guiding the ways that the paying public perceives the corpses. Terms like "Anatomical Teaching Collection," "The Cycle of Life," "Vital," and similar subtitles create a sense of what Linke (2009) referred to above as "emptying the meaning" of these individual deaths. The language used for these exhibits creates an environment wherein the processes of death (such as dying, decomposition, and skeletonization) are halted indefinitely for a process of artistic medical consumption that aims to answer questions about the body that are unseen and often unquantifiable by the general public. [elaborate—it's not entirely clear what you mean here]. It is not that the processes of death are ceased for the sake of just being able to do so, but that through their hindering the public can engage in a conversation with the human body that was once limited to only those in the medical field. This suggests that there are different ways that representations of death and the corpse can be culturally constructed as

acceptable for the public to view or engage with. The concept of the different ways in which violence and death are represented or treated is not a theory solely explored by Linke (2009) and Bourgois (2004); anthropologists Jacque Lynn Foltyn (2008) and Geoffery Gorer (1955) also explored the ways in which representations of violent death, demonstrate that not all death is treated or represented equally.

The Proliferation of Violent Death and the Obscurring of Natural Death

In her article *Dead Famous and Dead Sexy: Popular Culture, Forensics, and the Rise of the Corpse* (2008), Foltyn's central theory builds upon the idea that not all deaths are created or treated equally. As a result, certain forms of death, particularly those that are violent and "extraordinary", have become more prevalent in their public display. Foltyn (2008) is concerned with the two different treatments and public representations of death, in what she describes as the difference between the obscuring of normal death in modern culture (such as dying at old age or heart disease), and the proliferation of violent death (such as a raped, eviscerated, or skinned corpse). Foltyn (2008) builds on theory originally developed by anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer (1955) called the "pornography of death." In it Gorer (1955, p. 50) describes the transition of natural death into a hidden process and violent death into a more public display. Gorer (1955) says:

> During the last half-century public health measures and improved preventive medicine have made natural death among the younger members of the population much more uncommon than it had been in earlier periods, so that a death in the family, save the fullness of time, became a relatively uncommon incident in home life; and simultaneously, violent death increased in a manner unparalleled in human history. *Wars* and *revolutions, concentration camps*, and gang feuds were the most publicised of the causes for these violent deaths... While natural death became more and more smothered in prudery, violent death has played an ever-growing part in the fantasies offered to mass audiences- detective

> stories, thrillers, Western, *war stories*, spy stories, science fiction, and eventually horror comics. [Gorer, 1955, p. 51 *emphasis added*]

Conversely, violent death he suggested were those deaths, described as rare, extraordinary or unusual. The result today, as Gorer (1955) initially stated and Foltyn (2008) added to, is that the proliferation of graphic, violent deaths in the mainstream media and on television allows a death-denying culture to maintain distance from the personal emotions of grief, loss, and emotional recognition and recovery. This allows individuals to engage with an image of violent death while emotionally and physically distancing themselves from physical decline and illness more typical of old age, (Foltyn, 2008). Foltyn (2008, p. 164-165) states that today Western societies are bombarded with images of death unrelated to how most people actually experience it (e.g. being skinned alive or horrifically burned). He writes, "...if the viewer learns something about death, dying, decay, and dissection, this is death at its most ghastly..." The result is the creation of a category of violent death that allows for the consumption and dissemination of un-mourned, unnatural, violent death (Foltyn, 2008).

If we consider the works of Gorer (1955) and Foltyn (2008) in terms of genocide and violent death, this suggests that some of the reactions and responses to genocide are based in a cultural model that proliferates such imagery through cultural curiosity and its entertainment and infotainment values. As Gorer (1955, p. 51) says in the above quote, violent death has played an expanding role in the stories offered to the public, especially in the form of war stories, revolutions, and concentration camps. What this represents, for the purposes of genocide, is a concentration and proliferation of those stories that appeal to the genre of war stories. An example of this would be the 2004 movie *Hotel Rwanda,* which told the true story of hotelier Paul Rusesabagina saving 1000 Rwandans from being murdered during the genocide. There is a high degree of entertainment value in these depictions of violent death, as it feeds into a war narrative

of "good" conquering "evil," but these types of narratives serve to distance the viewer from the actual violence itself. Such images represent what Foltyn (2008) states is the absence of emotional connection. Foltyn (2008) would assert that there is a difference between the ways that violent and normal death are culturally portrayed and understood are based upon social categorization. It can also be observed that certain kinds of violence, lethal or otherwise, are sequestered to those cultural spheres that are deemed appropriate or comparable. Foltyn takes this premise one step further by asserting that it is within visual and verbal depictions that visible violent death represents cultural ideals, and serves to simultaneously elicit and exploit violence and cultural response through obscuring visible violence.

> Cross-culturally, dead bodies are transformed into the cultural body, aesthetically displaying a group's common values, customs, social roles and social relations. There is a mass market for morbid images of the real and simulated dead and this tells us much about who we are as a people. In this vein, the de facto argument that we live in a death denying culture is more mantra than fact; rather, death has been more hidden than denied. (Foltyn, 2008, p.169)

The obscuring of violent death is reflective of cultural values and practices; however, this leads to questions about the short- and long -term consequences of representations, or absence thereof, for visible and invisible violence. To deal with this issue, I turn to the theoretical work of Zygmunt Bauman (2000).

The Illusion of the Absence of Violence

Speaking to the above, Bauman (2000) offers another theory, which adds to the discussion of this chapter, in his examination of the consequences in the aftermath of the representation of violence, emotional anesthesia, and the proliferation of visual representations of violent death. In *Modernity and the Holocaust*, Bauman (2000)

states that the supression of emotion creates the illusion that modern civilization is non-violent.; where genocidal violence and the images of violence are sequestered into remote areas of the average human experience, both physically and psychologically. This is similar to the work of Nancy Schepper-Hughes (1996) on *invisible* genocides and everyday violence. In contrast to Linke (2009) and Foltyn (2008), who suggest that the suppression of emotion serves to facilitate the denial of natural death,, Bauman (2000) asserts that this is a circumstance which distances the modern observer from the violent act itself, and, in turn, allows for a concentration of violence in those cultural areas where violence is permissible or a part of everyday life. :

> All in all, the overall non-violent character of modern civilization is an illusion. More exactly, it is an integral part of its self-apology and self-apotheosis; in short, of its legitimizing myth... what in fact has happened in the course of the civilizing process, is the redeployment of violence, and the redistribution of access to violence. Like so many other things which we have been trained to abhor and detest, violence has been taken out of sight, rather than forced out of existence. It has become invisible, that is, from the vantage point of narrowly circumscribed and privatized personal experience. It has been enclosed instead in segregated and isolated territories, on the whole inaccessible to ordinary members of society. The ultimate consequence of all of this is the concentration of violence. (Bauman, 2000, p. 97)

The concentration of violence, of which Bauman (2000) refers, is the intensification and limitation of violence to specific areas that would not be readily encountered by members of civilized society. Instead of forcing violence out of existence, it has been physically removed from sight. An example of this type of redistribution and concentration of violence can be observed in the sequestration of the Jews, alongside other targeted groups, into ghettos, concentration and death camps during the Holocaust. Within the confines of these areas the victims could be openly slaughtered, worked to death, and gassed, while ordinary German citizens could deny the existence of such violence since it was not a part of their daily lives. To this point, Bauman (2000) argues that it is the physical distancing from violence and violent death that allows

individuals to ignore or deny the existence of violence within their civilized culture. Contrary to what Gorer (1955) and Foltyn (2008) would say about the proliferation of extraordinary death, Bauman (2000) asserts that modern, civilized cultures detest violence and aim to sequester its existence and only put it on display when it impacts those facets of life where it is deemed appropriate (such as the ghettos) or informative (such as news reports and the media). This means that the violence that is experienced by members of civilized society is a mediated violence, and serves to foster an illusion. Simply put, in order to maintain a perception of civility within the modern image, violence has been limited to specific regions and specific contexts.

Summary

The theorists and examples presented in this chapter highlight the poetics of violence and the dynamic roles of both *visible* and *invisible* violence as they reflect individual cultural attitudes and practices. Whitehead (2004) considered it through a theoretical perspective, reflecting on the various facets of cultural norms that play a part in the categorization of *visible* versus *invisible* violence. Linke (2008) approached it by studying the obscuring and normalizing dialogue in a corpse museum in Germany and concentrated on the ways that cultural reflexivity in regard to national history and genocide are ignored in the pursuit of entertainment. Gorer (1955) and Foltyn's (2008) approaches were concerned with the concept of violent death, both real and fictionalized, and the proliferation of violent death in entertainment, infotainment, and the news. Bauman (2000) examined the illusion of the absence of violence. This represented the physical distancing of violence from everyday life, which, in turn, fed into the illusion of a civilized society that is free of violence.

These writers illustrate a variety of theoretical considerations that can be applied

towards the study and understanding of the various forms that violence may assume in instances of genocide. Further, they demonstrate that violence does not exist within a static, categorical vacuum, but instead that categories of violence exist within complex cultural understandings that shape how, when, and why violence can or cannot be recognized. Oftentimes, as has been demonstrated in this chapter, it is only those instances in which *visible* violence (Scheper-Hughes, 1996) is present that cultures are able to recognize a violent act. Put simply, the cultural significance of the act is measured by its ability to be socially understood, constructed, or even seen (Linke, 2002; Foltyn, 2008; Scheper-Hughes, 2002; Hinton, 2002).

Chapter 4: The Rwandan Genocide

The Rwandan genocide is an example of modern-day genocide that demonstrates the importance of distinguishing between both genocide in terms of physical violence and death and genocide in terms of violence that induces social attacks or mental suffering.

Anarchy Rules Rwanda's Capital And Drunken Soldiers Roam City, an April 14th, 1994 news article in the *New York Times*, hardly seems easy to reconcile with the atrocities of the Rwandan genocide. The genocide began on April 6th with the bombing of President Juvénal Habyarimana's jet, and lasted for 100 days. The targets were Tutsis, Tutsi sympathizers, and some moderate Hutus. Men, women, children, and infants were systematically sought and murdered by Hutu gangs armed with machetes. Women became targets for rape and forced abortion, in an effort to eliminate the next generation of Tutsis (Thomas and Fleischman, 1996). As the days passed and the number of corpses mounted, corpse-made barricades began to be erected around the country. Victims who fled to churches for asylum found no safe haven, as armed men would enter and lay waste to those seeking refuge inside, symbolically demonstrating that God himself could not protect them (Taylor, 2004). By the end of that period, between 500,000 to 800,000 Rwandans had been murdered (Barnett, 2008). To say that the genocide was short-lived would be a gross understatement, however, because while the rivers are no longer flooded with blood, the violence suffered through and witnessed can never be cleared from the memory of those who personally experienced and survived the genocide. Binafer Nowrojee, Dorothy Q. Thomas, and Janet Fleischman (1996) examined the widespread sexual violence that occurred during the genocide and the emotional and physical repercussions that abused women experienced in the aftermath.

Richard Neugebauer et. al (2009) reflect on the prevalence of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in Rwandan children and adolescents who were witness to or victims of the genocide. Susanne Buckley-Zistel (2006) discusses instances of selective amnesia in response to the genocide, and those who choose to not speak about or remember the events.

Most observers agree that the Rwandan genocide began on April 6th, 1994, when Rwandan-Hutu president Juvénal Habyarimana's jet was shot down with him and the Burundian president aboard, but tensions between the Hutus and Tutsis had been growing for a long time prior to this event. As far back as the 15th century, Hutu-Tutsi relations had been strained and renegotiated by the processes of colonization (Hintjens, 2001; Taylor, 2004). Initially, moreover, Hutu and Tutsi were not racial identifiers, but instead identified ecological, subsistence-based occupational categories: the Hutu farmed land and the Tutsi raised cattle (Keane, 1995). In fact, these were so removed from the concept of "race" that an individual could change their occupation and move into a different subsistence category (Keane, 1995). It was with the arrival of German colonialists in 1895 (Louise, 1963), and, subsequently, with formal Belgian colonial occupation following 1921 (Hatzfeld, 2005) to the beginning of Rwandan independence in 1963 (Linden, 1977; Taylor, 2004), that these categories became racialized, most explicitly during Belgian colonial rule between the 1930's and 1962 (Kinloch, 2005: 166). The categories that were once considered fluid and dynamic became artificially constructed markers of race. During the period of Belgian colonization, Belgians appeared to favor the Tutsi minority over the Hutu majority in the distribution of material and non-material goods, land, and resources (Kinloch, 2005).

In 1933, the Belgians introduced identity cards that bore the racial "identity" of the person, as traced through the line of the fathers (Hintjens, 2001). These cards, which served as a means through which to systematize ethnic identities so that the

colonialists could distinguish between the Hutus and Tutsis, would remain in place until 1994 (Hatzfeld, 2005; Hintjens, 2001; Watson, 1991; Kinloch, 2005). It was through this system that the economic interests of the ruling colonial power could be regulated and safeguarded, and it further ensured that the Rwandan people remained a divided and economically unbalanced group (Hintjens, 2001). However, it must be noted that, while this system superficially appeared to benefit the Tutsi minority over the Hutu majority, in reality the Tutsi fared no better than their Hutu neighbors (Hintjens, 2001). Nevertheless, this process served to increase animosity and thus laid the foundation for the Hutu Revolution of 1959, when 10,000 Tutsis were killed and 120,000 fled into surrounding countries (Watson, 1991; Kinloch, 2005). In an attempt to negate their past suffering, during the post-colonial era beginning in 1963 (Hintjens, 2001), the new Hutu government favored their fellow Hutus, initiated a biased land-redistribution project, and later reintroduced the system of "ethnic identity cards" to distinguish between the two groups (Keane, 1995). As noted by Gourevitch (1998), years of Belgian colonial indoctrination, based on the ideology of racial superiority/inferiority, had become internalized in the minds of the Rwandans and laid the groundwork for the Hutu transference of racial stigmatization from the Hutu to the Tutsi. This example of invisible violence demonstrates the ways in which violence informs culture and vice-versa, in the manner of Whitehead (2004) *Poetics of Violence*. If we return momentarily to the point raised by Whitehead (2004) about the poetics of violence representing the way in which historically embedded patterns of violent behavior is utilized by individual agency, then we can better understand the internalization and transference between the Tutsi and Hutu. The deep-seated belief of racial superiority as a mechanism for power and control over another group was historically established and enforced by the Belgians (Hintjens, 2001). When the tables shifted, and an opportunity arose for the once-oppressed Hutu to govern over the once-oppressor Tutsi, the utilization of the extant

cultural practices alongside pre-existing rules allowed for a smooth transference of systematic violence from the Hutu to the Tutsi. Indeed one prime example of this was the continued use of the same racial "identity" cards (Hintjens, 2001).

As the years progressed, systematic waves of ethnic cleansing under the Hutu government led an exiled group of armed rebels, mainly Tutsi, to organize the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which, in 1990, invaded Rwanda from Uganda (Power, 2004a, p. 336). During the same year, the Hutu paper, *Kangura ("Wake Up!"),* published the *Ten Commandments of the Hutu*, which, in addition to laying forth Hutu guidelines for oppression of Tutsi, further solidified Hutu identity by endorsing violence within the state against the Tutsi and Tutsi sympathizers (Power, 2004a, p. 339):

1. *Every Hutu should know that a Tutsi woman, wherever she is, works for the interests of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor any Hutu who:*
    - *Marries a Tutsi woman;*
    - *Befriends a Tutsi woman;*
    - *Employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary or concubine.*

2. *Every Hutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and conscientious in their role as woman, wife, and mother of the family. Are they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honest?*

3. *Hutu women, be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to reason.*

4. *Every Hutu should know that every Tutsi is dishonest in business. His only aim is the supremacy of his ethnic group. As a result any Hutu who does the following is a traitor:*
    - *Makes a partnership with a Tutsi in business;*
    - *Invests his money or the government's money in a Tutsi enterprise;*
    - *Lends or borrows money from a Tutsi;*
    - *Gives favors to a Tutsi in business (obtaining import licenses, bank loans, construction sites, public markets…)*

5. *All Strategic positions, political, administrative, economic, military and security should be entrusted to Hutu.*

6. *The education sector (school pupils, students, teachers) must be majority Hutu.*

7. *The Rwandese Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. The experience of the October [1990] war has taught us a lesson. No member of the military shall marry a Tutsi.*

8. *The Hutu should stop having mercy on the Tutsi.*

9. *The Hutu, wherever they are, must have unity and solidarity, and be concerned with the fate of their Hutu brothers.*
    - *The Hutu inside and outside of Rwanda must constantly look for friends and allies for the Hutu cause, starting with their Bantu brothers;*
    - *They must constantly counteract the Tutsi propaganda;*
    - *The Hutu must be firm and vigilant against their common Tutsi enemy.*

10. *The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961, and the Hutu Ideology, must be taught to every Hutu at every level. Every Hutu must spread his ideology widely, Any Hutu who persecutes his brother Hutu for having read, spread and taught this ideology, is a traitor.*
    [Power, 2004a, p. 338-339]

Christopher Taylor (2004) further explored the use of such print media propaganda, as an example of the way in which people create an "imagined" – invisible – violence before actually committing the visible, violent act. In his essay, *Deadly Images: King Sacrifice, President Habyarimana, and the Iconography of Pregenocidal Rwandan Political Literature* (Taylor, 2004), Taylor explores the ways in which, following the French initiative to establish a free press in Rwanda in 1989, the Rwandan newspaper cartoons served as evidence that, in the years leading up to the genocide, an atmosphere of violent sentiment and conditioning was active and influential. In particular, these newsprint stories and cartoons often depicted or alluded to the death of President Habyarimana as being a *King Sacrifice*, a historically-based act through which the leader of Rwanda could ensure the livelihood and prosperity of his people (Taylor, 2004). These cartoons became increasingly violent in tone and were more frequently published leading up to the crash of his private plane on April 6th, 1994 (Taylor, 2004). The images and dialogue used in the news media published by Hutu extremist groups served the dual purpose of

recording the discord between the main political parties in Rwanda and vocalizing the perceived threat and retaliatory feelings that Hutu extremists held (Fenton, 1996; Hintjens, 2001; Malkki, 1995; Taylor, 2004). As Taylor states:

> This iconography, by the very nature of the violence depicted in it, which is often cruelly sadistic, shows that even when members of the UN Security Council were speaking in sanguine terms about the prospects for peace in Rwanda, Rwandans were speaking to each other in very different voices. Extremists promoted violence by imagining progressively worse forms of what "they" (Tutsi) were doing to "us" (Hutu)... These [invisible] forms of violence, depicted in images and narratives, were then given wide exposure in the available media. ...perpetrators of violence became desensitized to the pain they were about to inflict or had already inflicted upon others. [Taylor, 2004, p. 82]

In the above excerpt, Taylor (2004) draws a clear connection between the different ways in which the UN Security Council and the Rwandans responded to and interpreted the use of invisible violence in speech and media. This is a prime example of the different ways in which violence is perceived from within or outside the culture experiencing the violence or, more accurately, the way in which social constructions of violence will lead to the recognition of violent acts. This is better understood in terms of the differences and connections between *invisible* and *visible* violence (Scheper-Hughes, 1996). Though the recognition of violence within the print media may have been under-examined or considered less tangible, there were other actions taking place that pointed to and explicitly called for the initiation of large-scale violence. The first were two separate 1993 *Central Intelligence Agency* (CIA) reports documenting the importation of some 40 million tons of small arms from Poland into Rwanda, through Belgium, and specifically mentioning the likelihood of mass violence (Lemarchand, 2007). Second was the steep increase in Hutu propaganda on T.V. and radio programs, calling the Tutsi a future threat that should be preemptively exterminated (Power, 2004a). With the exception of the importation of 40 million tons of weapons into Rwanda, the above instances of invisible violence show the ways in which violence can be overlooked or

considered as part of what Scheper-Hughes (1996) called the violence of everyday life. While the signs pointed to the eventual emergence of visible violence, the lack of a *visibly* violent act ensured that the prevalence of invisible violence was not substantial enough to prompt intervention in the pending conflict (Power, 2004a). Coupled with the importation of small arms into the country, these were markers of pending genocidal violence, however these forms of emotional and cultural violence were insufficient to demonstrate just how viable the pending large-scale slaughter was.

It was President Habyarimana's plane crash that became a rallying point for Hutu extremists to point to the "real" threat of the Tutsi, whom they blamed for the crash. Very quickly after the plane crash on April 6th, 1994, it became apparent that violent retaliation would proceed (Taylor, 2004). By April 8th, 1994, reporters were already describing the numbers of bodies covering the roads, and the targeting of Rwandan Tutsis; on April 9th 1994, the *Washington Post* reported on the slaughter of Rwandan relief agency employees; on April 16th, 1994, the *New York Post* reported the machete-massacre of nearly 1,200 men, women and children seeking refuge within a church; and, by April 26th, 1994, the British aid agency Oxfam announced that 500,000 people had been reported missing (Power, 2002). Many reports described the Rwandan violence, which had yet to be classified as genocide, as "typical" for the region, the unavoidable result of ancient tribal hatred or an instance of civil conflict (Schimmel, 2011), though very few addressed the connection to colonialism and the Western presence within the country. As Schimmel (2011) observes:

> The Rwandan genocide did not appear out of nowhere, it had historical, political and cultural precursors that the media failed to examine and report. The media uncritically disseminated government claims that the genocide was a civil war, a paroxysm and spontaneous outburst of violence ('disintegration into chaos and anarchy' wrote Elaine Sciolino in the New York Times) rather than a meticulously planned and executed project of extermination of all Tutsis in Rwanda by the government, army, militias and Hutu civilians.
> [Schimmel, 2011, p. 1125-1126]

In another lapse of detailed reporting, the number of victims reported varied widely, between 500,000 and over 1,000,000, and directly reflected a general attitude of what Kinloch (2005) and Power (2002) describe as neglect and denial. According to the descriptions used in the reporting of the genocide, the violence was to be expected for Rwanda, the product of centuries' old tribal, ethnic animosity turned into civil war, which resulted in the death of some 500,000 to 1,000,000 individuals. The normalization of the Rwandan genocidal violence through the use of history and inaccurately presented information is an example of what Linke (2009) described as "selective vision." In the Rwandan instance, these are evident in the use of terms that trivialized the genocide as being the result, or an indirect consequence, of tribal civil war. These insinuations normalize violence in very much the same way that the terms used in the *Body Worlds* exhibit (such as "educational" and "cycle of life") normalize death. The use of these words undermines the extent and distribution of the violence, and serves as a way of obscuring, rather than clarifying, violence. This is a particularly salient point given that there were numerous photos, testimonies, and videos that were being widely disseminated. It has been noted that Western media outlets purposefully downplayed the violence through censorship:

> The media engaged in self-censorship, suppressing images and graphic details which were considered to be too shocking to readers. In this way the genocide was sanitized, made palatable, as media coverage was selected so as not to disturb the purportedly tender sensibilities of Western readership and viewers. This is not a problem unique to the reporting of the Rwandan genocide, it is a constant one that the media faces: having to make judgments about taste and minimizing shock to audiences and showing respect for victims of violence and for the dead, and balancing those concerns with the responsibility to report fully and honestly without withholding information and images that, however shocking, convey the unfiltered truth. Chouliaraki confirms this selective tendency in Western media reporting of disaster and violence taking place in the developing world: 'Distant misfortunes are subject to the strictest of restrictions…on what is reported and how, so as to minimize the disturbing impact of such misfortunes on spectators.' Tom Giles, a British

journalist, explains how this played out in the Rwandan genocide:

> The ones (photos) that showed the scale of the slaughter – had never been aired. They were sent to London in mid-April when the need to alert the world to what was happening was greatest. An entire news piece, gathered at great risk to the BBC team filming it, was dropped. It had been deemed too graphic for British viewers. The next day, I met the same BBC team in Nairobi. With polite exasperation, the cameraman explained how he had been told to make future pictures wider – less distinct, more impressionistic. Weeks of frustration followed. Pieces were often re-edited in London – shots of bodies removed.
>
> By the time strong footage showing evidence of the genocide was aired on 27 June, with video and photos from the journalist Fergal Keane, the genocide was almost over. [Schimmel, 2011, p. 1128-1129]

Madeleine Albright and Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire, who was the United Nations Force Commander in Rwanda at the time, have made statements that reflect a Western cultural understanding of violence. Dallaire, who had been in the process of organizing peaceful reconciliatory meetings between the Tutsis and Hutus prior to April 6th, was initially shocked at the violence, but initially believed that the violence was only targeted at the Tutsi-affiliated politicians, therefore unintentionally downplaying the extent and range of violence in Rwanda (Dallaire, 2004;Power, 2002, p. 348). This is not only another example of Linke's (2009) theory, where the ways in which violence in the Rwandan genocide was initially rationalized and normalized, but also an example of Staub's (2000) defining of the bystander. To explain further, by rationalizing the violence as being the result of tribal conflict or the idea that the killing was targeted moderated the perception and representation of the violence, they, as bystanders, justified their inaction and undervalued the extent to which lives were being threatened or systematically targeted.

Gorer (1955) and Foltyn's (2008) theoretical frameworks are concerned with the proliferation of violent death serves as a means by which those acts of *natural death* are obscured or constructed as "everyday," the differential treatment towards those deaths

being reported during the genocide should be considered. From the perspective of reporting on the Rwandan genocide, the media focused on those victims, and images thereof, who had been murdered or brutally mutilated. Reporting of those natural deaths that occurred within Rwanda during the time of the genocide are all absent from a brief survey of the media records. The primary focus was those extraordinary, violent deaths and injuries that could fuel what Gorer (1955) referred to as the fantasies of war stories and infotainment (Foltyn 2008). Foltyn (2008, p. 164-165) states it is in the process of viewing images of violent death, when death is portrayed at its most "ghastly," its most *visibly* violent, that the viewer learns "something" about death and dying. Returning to the *poetics of violence,* the dynamics that regulate what images, or lack thereof, resonate within a particular group is innately informed through the cultural dialogue that give meaning and understanding to acts of violence (Whitehead, 2004a), specifically, examples of violence that are either physical or culturally and emotionally damaging.

In the aftermath of the end of the genocide many Rwandans were displaced, with some having fled to surrounding countries for refuge. In the months and years following the genocide, reconciliation programs and *gacaca*-translated as "grass"- courts were formed to aid in distributing punishment to those committing and participating in the killings (Sarkin, 2001). These served as a means of reforming the Rwandan communities that had been torn apart, while enabling families to participate in the process of sentencing and punishment (Zorbas, 2004). However, for what success and empowerment this process offers, it does not acknowledge the enduring social effects of the genocide (Brounéus, 2010). In her 2010 article *The Trauma of Truth Telling: Effects of Witnessing in the Rwandan Gacaca Courts on Psychological Health* Karen Brounéus presents the findings of a randomly administered, 1,200-person survey. The survey findings demonstrated that those Rwandans who are witness to the *gacaca* "truth-

telling" courts suffered from higher levels of depression and PTSD, and that longer exposure to these systems did not result in a decrease in this emotions: though many have argued these strategies help with rebuilding efforts (Carter, 2007; Sarkin, 2001; Zorbas, 2004). This sentiment is not isolated to Brounéus (2010), Rettig (2008) also deeply questioned the ability of these courts to facilitate emotional healing. The concern raised by Brounéus (2010) is that the *gacaca* courts fail to address the issue of sexual violence as it emotionally affects the surviving women and girls in these courts, since it is a type of trauma that is emotional and not always visibly identifiable in the aftermath of the genocide. This is especially troubling when we consider that between 250,000 to 500,000 rapes took place during the genocide (Nowrojee,et. all, 1996). Many times the voices of these women are not heard in the *gacaca* courts due to their post-genocidal roles as the sole head of house, local stigmatization, and also due to the re-victimization that takes place when they are asked to give testimony to the violence inflicted upon them (Wells, 2004). Though this falls out of the realm of this thesis, it is important to understand the enduring effect of physical and emotional violence on the surviving victims.

Summary

The ways that forms of violence manifest in instances of genocide is important to the Rwandan case because they can assist in understanding that often times substantially more attention is paid to physical instances of violence rather than their emotive precursors. This returns us to the point raised by Bourgois and Scheper-Hughes (2004), where they warned against the exclusive focus on physical violence because it transforms analysis into a clinical exercise that can degenerate into a proliferation of images of violent death. What we stand to learn from their point is that while genocide is often

times associated with physical death, there are a number of other historical, cultural, and emotional characteristics that should also be considered. The historical foundations in colonialism created a system that encouraged animosity between the to groups, in what Whitehead (2004a) described as culture and violence informing each other. While in post-hoc analysis writers and researchers have considered the historical and colonialist structures that initiated and fueled Tutsi and Hutu animosity, they often times neglect to examine the ways in which historical practices, such as *King Sacrifice* (Taylor, 2004) informed the assassination of President Juvénal Habyarimana, which was the catalyst to the genocide. As Taylor (2004) remarked, the ways in which the language and depictions of violence were portrayed served to rally Rwandans into action. The differential ways in which physical violence and social violence were addressed during the time surrounding the genocide adds to the work of Scheper-Hughes' (1996) *invisible* and *visible* genocidal violence. As a form of social and mental violence, Rwandan radio broadcasting and print media was enculturated to reflect a set of historical attitudes and meanings. Later, when physical violence became widespread, the roles that the above social, cultural, and mental forms of violence played were considered as a facilitating factor *ex post facto* (Kellow, 1998; Li, 2004; Schabas, 2000; Taylor, 2004).

Furthermore, Linke's (2009) theory of *selective vision* expanded on the use of language and representation to normalize the physical violence taking place, and the ways in which such terms and concepts trivialized and minimized the perceived impact of said physical violence. Finally, it is through Gorer (1955) and Foltyn (2008) that we can appreciate the media concentration on those instances of violent death at the expense of ignoring instances of normal death. Images from the Rwandan genocide concentrate on those instances of violent death (such as eviscerated victims lying dead on the road) and extreme physical violence (Images of survivors with open machete wounds on their heads, arms, and legs), and portray a limited scope of the different

forms of violence that ought to be considered genocidal as well.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

The creation of the term genocide took place in 1944 by Raphael Lemkin, with the legal definition becoming legally adopted during the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. However, while the definition was broad enough to include both acts of violence that are physical, cultural, and mental, over time genocides have come to be associated with violent physical harm and death, distorting the original definition. Genocide has become synonymous with violent death, and the ability to diagnose or evaluate those other instances of genocide has become dependent upon what the bystander perceives. In an attempt to systematize and universalize an agreement on what acts may or may not be considered genocide, the global community has created a diagnostic framework that ultimately fails to accomplish anything more than spark further debate. Further, such a framework assumes that genocidal violence is linear and static, and, as examined earlier in this thesis, violence represents an interwoven narrative between history, cultural meaning, and individual agency (Whitehead, 2004a). We can observe the exchange between these processes in the case of Rwanda. One example was the construction of "racial" identity, which emerged during the colonial period, was reconfigured and repurposed by the Hutu, and persisted through the genocide in 1994 (Hatzfeld, 2005; Hintjens, 2001). Another example was the use of propagandic media and radio transmissions that utilized preexisting cultural meanings in the guise of an everyday medium (Kellow 1998; Taylor 2004).

In is in the above ways that the Rwandan genocide offers an opportunity to distinguish between both physical and social instances of violence in genocide, and critically reflect on the ways in which the concentration on analysis of physical death

neglects to acknowledge the presence or extent of the social violence also taking place. The consequence of this narrowly focused analysis is that genocidal violence becomes synonymous with physical death, and is further driven away from the official United Nations definition, which includes cultural destruction and mental harm. This leads to the misrepresentation that genocide only occurs within those contexts where physical death has occurred, and as has been explored this is far from the case. The impact of such perceptions is that diagnosis of genocide is dependent on the presence of violent death, and this is inadequate to the recognition of those instances of genocide that have crossed over into physical violence and murder.

Towards a New Avenue of Genocide Studies

Violence in genocide can assume many forms, yet many still persist in describing genocide in terms of the number of people killed or the ways in which they were murdered. While it is true that many genocides result in physical harm it is a disservice to past, present, and future victims to state the genocide can *only* be said to have occurred where there is death and physical suffering. When genocidal violence is constructed in such limited and linear terms the ability to recognize genocide prior to bloodshed is overlooked and undermined.

It is within the overlooking of the numerous other types of violence enacted against another group, in which the most heinous crime takes place. By denying or ignoring the existence of violent acts aimed at destroying the social, cultural, and mental wellbeing of targeted groups, we are disregarding the legal definition of genocide and disrespecting the victim's humanity. We unwittingly allow them to become an inconsequential line in a history book, and even that recognition is seldom granted. Arbitrary constraints and definitions on genocide have been placed since a

disproportionate amount of research and reporting have focused on only instances of physical violent and death, especially those large-scale genocides that are akin to the Holocaust. By so doing, we inadvertently place a higher value on the death of many; when in fact we should value each individual life, regardless of the volume of those individuals or the type of violence they are exposed to.

This thesis was written with the intent to serve as a springboard for new avenues of discussion on the subjects of genocide and violence. In those goals, this project has succeeded yet, in so many ways, for all the answers new questions may be posed. So this thesis will end with the hope that, in the near future, scholars can begin to engage with victim communities and to usher in a new era of genocide awareness that accounts for the considerations of different forms of violence. In the past, the world said "Never Again," but that phrase has been problematic and did not address the overabundance of violence factors that have briefly been covered in this thesis. There is no single solution, but there are alternatives to the ways that we, as social scientists, engage with the topic.

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