Hispanics: The Typical American Voter? Comparing the Voting Behavior of Hispanics, Whites and African-Americans

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Dedication

The author wishes to dedicate this dissertation to Ludvik Cyril Halla for passing his love

of history and politics to his sons and through them to his grandson. The author also

wishes to dedicate this to Deborah Albert Halla for helping me through "the PhD years."

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Dissertation Abstract

Hispanics: The Typical American Voter?
Comparing the Voting Behavior of Hispanics, Whites and African-Americans

Hispanics vote at a much lower rate than do whites and African-Americans. But given that the Hispanic community in the United States is both the fastest growing demographic in the nation and the largest minority, their sheer numbers demand that we study their voting behavior more closely. My study focuses on three aspects of Hispanic electoral behavior. First, what factors shape Hispanic voter turnout and do they differ from the forces that shape voter turnout for other voter groups? Second, are the voting rules different for the Latino electorate than for others? For both of these chapters, it is necessary to model voter turnout separately for whites and African-Americans and for Hispanics. Furthermore it is vital to run interactions for each of the independent variables and Hispanics compared to the other demographic groups. I argue that there are significant differences in shaping Hispanic voting behavior compared to other groups. Some of the areas that I examine are religion, the impact of age, and the impact of one's native language since so many Latinos speak Spanish at home, compared to whites and African-Americans. Additionally I examine the strategies of several recent state and federal political campaigns to assess how campaigns in states with large Latino populations craft their voter turnout strategies. I conclude that while some campaigns' strategies mirror some of my findings there are other factors at work that limit the connections between my research and the actual actions taken by campaigns.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Chapter One

Introduction

The statistics are staggering. According to the PEW Research Center by 2050 the United States population will increase from 296 million in 2005 to 438 million people in 2050 of which 29% will be Latino.[1] Eighty-two percent of this increase will come from immigrants (117 million) and their children (67 million). By 2050 immigrants will make up 19% of the entire US population. Furthermore while only 20% of Americans that are now under 18 are Hispanic, the number will rise to 35% while the working age Hispanic will make up 31% of population (Passel and Cohn 2008).[2] Since Hispanics will make up over one-third of the voting age population it is important that political scientists understand what impacts this group electorally. Are they the same or different from whites and African-Americans when it comes to voting? Likewise are their voting habits governed by the same theories that the other two demographic groups follow? Finally, will these potential changes have any noticeable impact on political campaigns as they struggle to reach the growing Latino population?

[Insert Table 1.1 Here]

With a rapidly growing population, it is important to study what is motivating the Hispanic voter to get to the polls as they are not going to the polls for a variety of

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[1] The US Census has determined that the word "Hispanic" is interchangeable with "Latino," so I will use both terms to mean the same thing.
[2] Defined as 18-64.

reasons. For example between 2002 and 2006 the Latino population saw a 50% increase in the US population, but only 20% of the newly eligible voters during this time period were Hispanic. Thus in 2006, eligible Hispanic voters made up 32% of that ethnicity was able to vote and just 13% (5.6 million people) of Hispanic actually made it to the polls.[3] This is only a slight increase from 2002 when only 30% of the Hispanic electorate was eligible and 12% actually got out and voted (Pew Hispanic Center 2007). Part of the reason this ethnicity does not get out to vote is because they have a high percentage of immigrants and thus many learn English or fully assimilate into the American populace.

Furthermore, it is vital to know which party the Latino population is siding with and whether the normal rules of vote choice apply to this ethnic group. For example there was some consensus that after George W. Bush won 40% of the Hispanic vote in 2004 that there had been a sea change and that Latinos, perhaps led by the Protestant minority, was changing its ideology and becoming more conservative. With the election of Barack Obama, the pendulum has swung the other way with 67% of the Hispanic electorate choosing the Democratic candidate. This is fully 10% more than any federal election since 1999. Equally important is that so many Democrats said that Obama could not get elected because so the overwhelming majority of them were supporting Hillary Clinton in the primaries.

[Insert Figure 1.1 Here]

Even though the Hispanic population votes at a much lower rate than whites and African-Americans, given that the Hispanic community in the United States is expanding so rapidly their shear numbers demand that they be studied more closely. There are three

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[3] This is compared to 52 and 39% for whites and 41 and 27% respectively for blacks. In 2002, these numbers were 49 and 37% for whites and 43 and 27% for blacks.

areas of study that need to be examined. Not surprisingly, the first is what, if any, factors are different for Hispanics in terms of why or why not they get out and vote. Secondly, are the voting rules different for the Latino electorate than others or not? For both of these chapters I feel it is necessary to look at separate models for whites, African-American and Hispanics. Furthermore it is vital to run interactions for each of the independent variables and Hispanics compared to other races. While a few authors have done this for one or two independent variables, no one has done it for all of them. This will be the best way to see if there are indeed differences between the different ethnic groups as I feel there will be. For both getting out and voting as well as vote choice, I am also going to argue that religion plays more of a role for Hispanics than other groups, in part because of their split between Catholics and Protestants. Age will also be a factor to consider since such a large portion of the Hispanic population is under thirty years old. One's native language will be a variable to consider since so many speak Spanish at home as opposed to blacks and white.

As a final thought this dissertation will take a very practical look at a number of political campaigns to see if some of the factors played out in getting out the vote and vote choice are a concern or not. Without seeing my results in chapters two and three are campaigns already concerned about the differences between the Hispanic voter and other races or are they treating them exactly the same.

To begin to answer these questions, the introduction will look at the key pieces of literature in the field. I will show both the strengths and the holes in the literature and what I intend to do in each of the three subsequent chapters of this dissertation. The

chapters then will look more closely at each independent variable as I more fully build my models.

Chapter two will consider why people go out and vote. When one considers why a person decides to vote, the journey must begin with Downs (1957) who looked at voting as an economic decision. With a culture that is decidedly poorer than both African-Americans and whites, whether or not a person goes to the polls could be a real financial burden. For example the Hispanic population, among registered voters, is evenly split with those making over $50,000 a year and those under. These facts are closely tied into educational attainment as exemplified by the fact that 54% of Hispanics have a high school degree or less, only 17% have a college degree (Passel and Cohn 2008).

Beyond these SES variables there is a growing body of literature that looks at some of the other reasons why Hispanic voters may be coming out to vote. None, though, combines enough elements into one study which is why I believe this dissertation is necessary.

A good study to begin was done by Tam Cho who does a commendable job of comparing Asians, African-Americans and Latinos (1999). There are several problems with her study, though. First she has very few independent variables beyond the expected SES ones. Her additional variables are whether the person speaks Spanish, is foreign born and whether a person is native born. In her first model she has all of her ethnicities in one model and adds in different variables[4] over each new model, but incorrectly assumes that the effect can be teased out to show the affect of each race. Since she includes a variable for blacks and Hispanics, her results merely reflect whether or not

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[4] Such as the ones just mentioned above.

4

those two races are more or less likely to get out and vote than whites given that education, income and age are the same. Finally the database is small as it only has 1300 surveyed for all races[5]. Almost as if she knows this fact, separate models for just Asians and Hispanics are run where she uses interactions between the group's ethnicity and age, income, education, foreign born status and whether or not the person speaks English. This is a great improvement, but still needs to be built on as a comparison to all others to see if Hispanics differ from the general public.

A second contribution to the Hispanic literature looks at other aspects of getting out the Hispanic vote, all of which add to the models I will be using in my research. For example, Arvizu and Garcia (1996) look at whether the number of years in the United States and age have an impact on turnout. But as with the Tam Cho article, Arvizu and Garcia limit themselves to just SES variables. Again, as with Cho's article, ethnicity is used as an independent variable to see the impact of the other variables on it. While there are several models[6], there is not one that looks individually at Hispanics, nor as a comparison to all other people going to vote.

A third model comes from Pei-te Lien who breaks her independent variables into four categories: acculturation (importance of voting, information level support, employer sanction, against bilingual ballot), alienation (experience of discrimination, perception of prejudice), group ID (non-ethnic social group, own ethnic group), deprivation (own ethnic group has fewer opportunities) (1994) . Certainly these categories are more comprehensive than Cho (1999) and Lien goes further by having a separate model for Asians and Mexicans, but does not go far enough.

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[5] 574 Latinos, 335 blacks, 308 Asians and 317 non-Hispanic whites
[6] Whether the person registered to vote in 1984, voted in 1984, contributed money to a campaign, worked on one, used the media or contacted officials.

Carol Cassel goes even further than Lien (1994) in terms of her use of independent variables and beyond the standard SES ones to include the number of years a person has lived in the same residence, whether a political party or a candidate for office had contacted the potential voter, one's party strength and efficacy. But as with Cho (1999), there is only one model with each individual race being treated as an independent variable in the model. So while Cassel is controlling for race, she is not looking at either a separate model for race or a true comparison of the minorities (or even one at a time) compared to others getting out to vote. Finally the results are also dated as the most recent election data used is 1990. As I will show in chapter two, the growth of the Latino community has been so rapid and so tremendous in population that more recent data is needed.

Another older study comes from Shaw, de la Garza and Lee (1996) and while they have become one of the most prolific groups writing in the literature, they too only look at the Hispanic voter in a vacuum, preferring not to compare them to other groups who are also coming to the polls. Even more so, Mexican-Americans and Cuban-Americans are also variables within the model rather than having two models, one of each of their subsets. Admittedly this would be hard for Cubans since they are always such a small group on any survey, but with Mexicans being by far the largest Latino group in the US, they could have been taken out of the sample to get a more definitive result.

A study by Verba, Schlozman, Brady and Nie ads a necessary item to the discussion, namely looking at African-Americans and Latinos and their involvement in the church and how that affects their turnout. Their independent variables include

whether one's church skills are related to attendance and whether attendance has an impact. But, as with several other studies mentioned, they include the two ethnicities as variables in the model, rather than having an interaction model allowing for comparison to non ethnicities. Finally they do not run separate models for each of the ethnicities (1993).

To help with my model I also will look at several studies that look at African-Americans and the impact of religion on voting (Bobo and Gillian 1990; Wilcox 1989; Wilcox and Sigelman 2001). Their findings conclude that blacks are significantly more likely to vote if they go to a Protestant church. Knowing that the Latino community now has a significant minority of their population shunning the Catholic Church for Protestant institutions, it is important to take a closer look at whether one does acquire skills at religious institutions that are transferable to getting out to vote.

It may also be important to look at younger voters and their impact on the Latino people. Hispanics under eighteen make up 17 million of the total 44 million population while another 27 million are between 25 and 44. Another way of looking at this is that the median Hispanic age is 26 whereas the entire US is 35.4 (Census 2004). Coupled with this there is some evidence that younger voters tend to more evangelical and based on previous research we know these people are more likely to vote (Lee and Pachon 2005). Will it be the case here or not?

Finally, of all the literature articles mentioned here only Lien looks at the impact of strength of party identification on getting out to vote (1991). My models will have both whether a person has a strong party affiliation as well as the strength of their ideology.

Thus, chapter two of this dissertation will seek to extend beyond some of the studies mentioned above. It is imperative to know whether Latinos are motivated to vote in the same ways as African-Americans and whites. To do this, I will run separate models, one for each ethnicity, as well as one for Mexican-Americans since my "n" is so large. None of the aforementioned articles have done this. Furthermore I include not just the standard SES variables, but also ones for religion, religious attendance, strength of party affiliation and the age of the voter. Additionally I plan to run an interaction model for each of the independent variables interacted with Hispanics so a comparison can accurately be made to the rest of the population. Only then will we be able to accurately see a comprehensive breakdown on how, if at all, the Hispanic voter is different from others going to the polls. Another advantage of running a series of interactions is that it will be more likely to create a statistically significant model than the standard stand alone models. This is because it allows one to see the affect of an independent variable on the dependent "according to the level of the other independent variable" (Frederick 1982, 804). This means that the models in the literature mentioned above only look, for example, at the effect of education on Hispanics or the effect of income on whites. The interaction variable will allow me to look at the effect of income on voting as it relates to Hispanics compared to the rest of voters. In sum, using interactions will give me more detail than a single independent variable will be able to do.

Chapter three of my dissertation will focus on the whether Hispanic vote choice is different than African-Americans and whites. While there are far fewer articles on Hispanic voting preferences, they have been generally more thoughtful than the ones on turnout. But most of the studies look at Hispanics, or at best Mexican-Americans as a

8

single entity on databases that do not have other groups. When non-Latino groups are used in the statistical models, there is no interaction model such as was the problem in most of the turnout models.

One of the better done pieces on Hispanic voting is *Immigrant and Native: Mexican American Partisanship and Candidate Preference in the 2004 Elections Across Immigrant Generations.* The dataset is large enough that the authors were able to have separate models for foreign born, first, second and third generation Latinos. While there were virtually no differences amongst the independent variables, breaking out the models in this fashion did allow the authors to find that there is a significant influence of the issues on vote choice in the third generation, but none before (DeSipio and Uhlaner 2005). In of itself these are useful models, but there is no way to compare those surveyed to African-Americans or whites for some of the other variables such as religious attendance and to see if there is a difference on the issues across races.

Another useful piece by Alvarez and Bedolla (2003) also looks only at only Hispanics so it suffers from the same shortcomings that DeSipio and Uhlaner (2005) have. The authors also use virtually every independent variable one can think of using. For example there are six different issues[7]even though several of them are probably highly correlated with ideology which is another variable. Furthermore there are four variables for education, three for age and two for ideology when the model would function better with continuous variables rather than the dichotomous ones used by the authors. Nicholson et al. also use the "kitchen sink" approach for their models by adding in such correlated variables as partisanship and whether or not the person liked Al Gore

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[7] Abortion, , illegal immigration, affirmative action, vouchers, government health insurance, gun control

9

and another variable for whether or not the surveyed individual liked George W. Bush (2006).

Running models of multiple races and producing ones that show interactions that compare Hispanics to other groups is not enough. I will show in chapter three that religion will also most likely have an impact on vote selection amongst Hispanics. With the growing number of Protestant Hispanics[8], it is vital to see if this is true and whether or not there are differences with the other races. Several studies have convinced me that religion has a notable impact on Hispanics and therefore should be studied in the electoral realm. Espinosa, Gaston; Elizonda, Virgilio and Jesse Miranda looked at the length of time that each of the surveyed Latinos had been in the United States and concluded that the longer they were here, the more likely they would be Protestant and therefore evangelical[9](2003). This connects to the several studies that show that people are likely to vote Republican if they are evangelical (Kellstedt 1989, Burns et al. 2001, Ellison et al. 2005). Part of the reason I believe Hispanics will vote Republican if they are Protestant or evangelical is that Hunt found that Protestants are more involved in their churches and more likely to pick up skills which translate into voting and if they follow their church doctrine, vote conservatively (2000). There are two studies that look more at depth at this element, notably Lee and Pachon who find that there is statistical significance, albeit barely, between being evangelical and vote choice (2005). Of course virtually all the models discussed above that do not discuss religion use abortion as one of their independent variables. It is certainly reasonable to assume that evangelicals are much

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[8] 67.6% Catholic and 19.6% Protestant (Suro et al. 2007).
[9] Often identified by frequency in church attendance.

more likely to be pro-life than not, so in a sense this might serve as a defacto variable for religious influence – even if it is not a perfect substitute.

So my models in chapter three will develop a comparison to look at Hispanic voting. As with the models examined above, I will look at Hispanics as a group as well as Mexican-Americans as well.[10] In a sense these models will serve as baseline ones since they do not differ much from the other existing models. But I will also have models run for whites as well as African-Americans to draw comparisons. But since that is not a true comparison, I will also run interactions between Hispanics and all the independent variables so they can be compared in the same model to all others. This will allow me to see if there is truly a difference between Latinos and others and if so what factors are causing the differences in voting.

Unfortunately there is not enough cross over between political science and the political world so I have decided to devote chapter four to just this task. Certainly some political scientists serve as paid consultants and help with statistical models for polling, but it is much less often that their theory and hypotheses are used by campaigns to better explain voting habits and therefore how to reach the voter. Knowing this dichotomy between the two professions, I will devote the third chapter of this dissertation to exploring the differences and similarities between my findings in chapters two and three and actual campaigns.

For this study, I will look at four recent campaign areas. All of the campaigns were chosen because of the fact that a large number of Hispanics are voters in the states, and in one case, city being investigated. The best models to study are the ideal ones that have

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[10] Even though the Annenberg survey I will use in this dissertation has 80,000 respondents, when one gets down to Puerto Rican-Americans and even more so, Cuban-Americans, there are too few to be studied with a high degree of certainty.

the most Latinos to contact and the most money to spend. For this reason I will look at the 2008 presidential campaign. First Hillary Clinton (D) and then Barack Obama (D) did an amazing job of galvanizing Latinos and served as a model for future campaigns. Clinton won the Latino vote by a 2:1 margin over Obama winning Super Tuesday by 63 to 35%, the Texas primary 66 to 32% and garnering 73% of the New York primary. Likewise by July Obama was leading McCain 66 to 23% (Lopez and Minushkin 2008) among Hispanics and ultimately won the demographic 66 to 32% on election day (Zogby International 2008).

Likewise one of the most Hispanic states in the US is Colorado which has the 7th largest Hispanic population in the US with 927,000 individuals ("Demographic Profile of Hispanics in Colorado" 2006). With several recent statewide campaigns to choose from, it seems an ideal state to study. Therefore I will look at the 2006 race for governor between Bill Ritter (D) and Bob Beuprez (R). That campaign had the luxury of using what was learned in the 2004 victory of Ken Salazar (D) over Peter Coors (R). Both of these campaigns, on both sides, made notable efforts to get Latinos to vote for them. In a state that has recently been swinging to the more liberal side, looking at the reasons for the successes of the Democrats could prove a useful case study.

Another state that has long been a conservative stronghold has been Virginia. But in recent years Tim Kaine (D) in 2005 for governor, Mark Warner (D) in 2008 and Obama (D) have all been successful in winning the state. In fact, Obama was the first Democratic presidential candidate to win since Lyndon Johnson in 1964. Are the reasons for the Democrats success hinting at similar reasons to what I will find in my vote choice chapter? Are the campaigns using knowledge similar to what I will find in my get-out-

the-vote chapter or are there other conventions in use? With the sixteenth largest

Hispanic population in the United States the US is a useful choice to study (Pew Hispanic

Center 2008).

Finally I will look at New York City as 25% of its population is Hispanic and has

elected a Republican in the past two elections. In the latter, Bloomberg (R) defeated an

Hispanic, Freddy Ferrer (D). This may also prove to be a good comparison to the 2004

senate race in Colorado since Salazar (D) is Hispanic as well.

In the end, I hope this dissertation will provide a more complete comparison of

the Hispanic voter with their African-American and white brethren. In this case, a useful

conclusion can even be the null set since it will tell us that the same rules apply.

Table 1.1: Ethnic Changes			
Ethnicity	Percentage of the Population	Working Age (18 – 64)	Percent of Child Population
Hispanics	29% (14)	31% (14)	35% (20)
Non-Hispanic White	67% (47)	45% (68)	59% (40)
African-American	13% (13)	12% (14)	16% (14)
Asian	9% (5)	5% (10)	10% (5)
Taken from "US Population Projections: 2005-2050. Passel and Cohn 2008.			

Figure 1.1 Hispanics and Their Vote

Souces: Pew Hispanic Center: National Survey of Latinos 2002-7/WashPost?Kaiser Foundation/Harvard Univ. 1999 Survey on Latinos in America, "Hispanics and the 2008 Election: A Swing Vote?

Chapter Two

Does Hispanic Turnout Differ From African-Americans and White Voters in the 2004 Presidential Elections?

Making the Case: A Brief Argument

The Hispanic voter was shown to be important in the presidential election of 2008 by the fact that many of the swing states in the 2008 presidential election had large Hispanic voting blocks including New Mexico, Colorado, Florida, Virginia and Arizona.[11] Despite this while studying why people vote has long been researched for whites and African-Americans, little literature has been produced for Hispanics. We have long known that employment, higher income and better education lead to higher turnout amongst voters (Verba and Nie 1972; Barreto 2002; Brady et al. 2002). But mobilizing Hispanic turnout faces a unique constraint compared to whites and African-Americans since so many Hispanics are not registered to vote (Bass and Casper 2001). An additional impediment to Hispanic mobilization lies in the fact that Hispanics have low levels of involvement in community affairs, (Lien 1994) a factor that has been shown to lead to higher voting rates (Putnam 1995). On the other hand Hispanics are involved in

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[11] Anita Dunn, who was a senior advisor and chief communication advisor for Obama's presidential campaign, argued, in an interview with me, that if John McCain was not from Arizona that it too would have swung towards Obama. As it was, the Obama campaign ran television advertisements in the state late in the race.

their churches and because of their membership in both the Protestant and Catholic churches, they have different factors affecting their turnout than do African-Americans (Strate et al. 1990; Strate, Parrish, Elder & Ford 1989 452).   This might be so since blacks are more likely to be members of a Protestant church and Hispanics members of a Catholic one. Finally there is the question of the impact of turnout of the younger voter on the Hispanic electorate. Are younger Hispanics mobilizing at lower rates than their elder brethren as is expected or are other forces at work? There is a great deal of literature that states just the opposite which would make this a surprising finding since younger people are less likely to have children, own homes, etc. which are often motivators to buy into the system by voting (Converse and Niemi 1971; Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 1998; Strate et al. 1989; Highton and Wolfsinger 2001).

More to the point, are factors beyond the SES variables making it so that Hispanic turnout is more likely to have different rules than other groups – or are do they vote for the same reasons as whites and blacks?   Do Hispanics act like non-Hispanic whites who are also split into two predominantly Christian religions – that of Protestants and Roman Catholics? Or do Hispanics act more like African-Americans in their reasons for getting out to vote? Trying to discover what are the differences, if any, between Hispanic turnout and the norms seen among whites and blacks will be the central aim of this chapter. [12]

Background

Spanish descendents have a long history in the United States. The earliest permanent town in the U.S. is St. Augustine, FL founded in 1565 long before Jamestown. The descendents of the Spanish settlers have continued to have an influence on

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[12] While it may be correct to say "non-Hispanic whites" for whites who are not Hispanic, it is a bit cumbersome. For that reason if I use the word "white," it will be referring to non-Hispanic whites.

demographics in the US today. Latinos are mostly found in California, New Mexico, Arizona and Texas. The largest group is Mexican-Americans consisting of 60% of Latinos, followed by Puerto Ricans who make up the second largest group. Seventy percent of Puerto Ricans currently live in New York City. [13] Cuban-Americans, found mostly in southern Florida, make up the next largest group with others coming from Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador and Costa Rica (Garcia 2003). For research large surveys usually break the Latino participants into Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans and other such as non-Mexican South or Central American.

Not only is there a long Hispanic history in the US, but the Hispanic electorate has been growing at such an astonishing rate. As of July 2006, there were 44.3 million Hispanics amongst the 299.4 million population. With blacks at 38.3 million and only 2.9 million Asians, Hispanics now make up the largest minority in the US.[14] While 25.6% of all Hispanics came to the US during the 1980s, 52.1% came between 1990 and 2002 (Soro et al. 2005). More importantly between 2003 and 2004, they accounted for 50% of the national growth in the United States which was a 3.6% increase over the previous year. Incredibly, it is estimated that the Latino population will be twenty-five percent of the total US population by 2060 (Coffin 2003: 214). With its youth, Hispanics will have an opportunity to have a great impact on American voting (Sora et al. 2005).

[Insert Figure 2.1]

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[13] According to the US Census Bureau's "US Hispanic Population 2006" which can be found at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hispanic/cps2006/CPS_Powerpoint_2006.pdf and was accessed on October 8, 2007, the Hispanic population is derived from the following areas of origin: 65.5% Mexicans, 8.6% Puerto-Ricans, 3.7% Cubans, 8.2% Central American, 6% South American and 8% other Hispanics

[14] According to the US Census Bureau (www.census.gov), these statistics were accessed on December 21, 2007.

Finding answers to why Hispanic turnout may have differences with other groups will not be easy. Part of the problem stems from the different groupings within the Hispanic population. Long term comparisons are very difficult to make because prior to 1972 all surveys listed Hispanics as "Mexican-Americans" regardless of a person's country of origin. Another factor may be the dramatic increase in population that the Hispanic people have seen in the United States in the last two decades, leaving those who prepare national surveys to scramble to the adjustments in size and differences in country of origin. The lack of literature may also be due to the dismal voting turnout that Hispanics have had to date. While the Hispanic immigrant population will continue to increase in real population terms, the percentage of Hispanic who are US born will increase from 60 to 67% over the period between 2005 and 2050 (Passell and Cohen 2008). This is important since Hispanics born in the US are more likely to learn English and more likely to vote in elections. Thus when coupled with the youthfulness of the Hispanic population their impact of this partition of the population will continue to increase for decades to come.

The Theory of Voting

Research shows that Hispanics are 16% less likely to vote in presidential elections than whites because they are less educated, younger, poorer and contacted less frequently by campaigns (Cassel 2002).[15] With that in mind, I have broken up the theory into three major categories which are social mobility, community networks and age. Within social mobility there are such factors as education, knowledge of a campaign, income and

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[15] This number grows to 25% in mid-term elections.

whether a person is married and of which make a person much more likely to vote. My community networks variables include where a person lives, the length of time one has lived in their most recent location, whether a person is civically active, a person's awareness of the issues, whether the person goes to church and for how long and if the person considers him or herself born again. Finally I have added age last since there may be some unusual oddities amongst Hispanic voters that are not seen with other demographics and will take some more theoretical explaining.

Social Mobility

The first factor to consider within the social mobility category is and has long been the level of education attained by an individual person turning out to vote. Those with the most education are expected to vote at a higher rate. This is because those who have college education are more likely to follow campaigns in the newspaper or online and have a better idea of who to vote for on Election Day. These people also have better paying jobs that will allow for the flexibility of getting to the polls and more importantly provide the skills that make one more likely to gain the civic skills that would make one more likely to vote. Thus knowledge of the issues and the desire to make sure a preferred candidate leading to the voter's potentially improved status in society leads to a higher rate of turnout (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001).

A second variable within the social mobility grouping for whether or not someone is going to vote is income which in turn is closely aligned with education. To a point, the better one is educated, the more one is going to make in terms of income. As one ages, one's income will also generally increase until retirement. The more a person makes, the more likely he/she is to buy a house and feel financially and emotionally stable (or at

least as much as buying a house can do this). When one acquires a home, he/she is likely to start participating in civic behaviors such as joining local community groups which (as we will see later) lead to higher turnout in elections (Strate, Parrish, Elder and Ford 1989). [16]

Hypothesis 1 a. Hispanics, like other races, who are better educated, are more

likely to vote.

Hypothesis 1b. Hispanics, like other races, who are richer, are more likely to

vote.

Part of one's education is the knowledge of the issues in a campaign. Today one gets political news from television, newspapers, radio as well as the Internet. Candidates who receive the most press attention are the ones most likely to be best known by the populace and this ultimately reinforces people's desire to vote on election day (Weaver 1981; Shields et al. 1995). While it is a bit antiquated, Chaffee and Frank found that newspapers are a primary source of information for people to find out about their presidential candidates (1992). More recently[17] there have been studies that access to the Internet has also increased one's participation in elections (Tolbert and McNeal 2003).

Hypothesis 1c. Hispanics, like other races, who are regular consumers of the

Internet, newspapers, television and radio will be more likely to vote.

Another variable included in the social mobility category is whether a person is married. Being married translates into better voting since married couples are more

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[16] It may appear to be an obvious oversight that home ownership is not listed as part of the theoretical section, but there is no variable for this in the Annenberg data.

[17] The authors actually found in 1996 that the Internet did not have a statistically significant impact on voting whereas in 1998 and 2000 it did.

likely to discuss issues with each other and remind each other that the election is coming

– even, at times, pressuring one another to vote (Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1980;

Jackson 2003).   Obviously living with someone who may educate the other person on

elections or attending community events may serve as a catalyst for voting.

Hypothesis 1d: Hispanics, like all races, are more likely to vote if they are

married.

Community Networks

Community interaction can also be tied into ethnicity (Verba and Nie 1972;

Uhlaner 1989; Bass and Casper 2001)**.**   This is in part because whites overall have more

education than blacks and Latinos (Schlozman et al. 2001). Verba and Nie (1972)

contend that when SES variables are controlled, there is no difference between blacks and

whites, but Bobo and Gillian (1990) contend otherwise finding at times that blacks are

even more likely to vote than whites when the former is politically engaged. This echoes

Wolfinger who found that ethnic voting "depends on the intensity of ethnic

identification" as it increases impact during the first two generations residing in the US,

but loses its impact thereafter (1965, 905). The ethnic voting theory finds that the sense

of ethnicity falls the longer a person is in the United States (Wolfsinger 1965) with the

chance of voting conversely will go up over time (Arvizu and Garcia 1996; Bass and

Casper 2001). For those who are born abroad and may not be proficient in English, there

is a negative impact on voting (Tam Cho 1999). Indeed "older, wealthier and better

educated immigrants naturalize more quickly" and are also more likely to vote. Mexican-

Americans have the lowest turnout rate among minority subgroups (Citrin and Highton

2002. 57) in part, at least, because they are the most poorly educated Latino group (Bass and Casper 2001). This is shown by two studies foreign citizens are often fearful of discrimination from Immigration and Naturalization Service employees and in many cases do not have enough English comprehension to be able to take the citizenship exam (Fuchs 1990; Pachon 1991). Thus many immigrants never even get to the voting stage because they do not obtain citizenship. However the longer one is in the US, the better chance there is of getting to the voting booth (Uhlaner 1989; Arvizu and Garcia 1996) in part because of the increasing ability to speak English (Uhaner et al. 1989).

Hypothesis 2a. Hispanics who are native born are more likely to vote.

Hypothesis 2b. Hispanics who have been in the US longer are more likely to vote.

Verba and Schlozman (1993) conducted a detailed study of civic engagement among different ethnicities and discovered a number of differences in public involvement. Since civic action is highly correlated to voting rates knowing whether a group is active in their community is important to the understanding of voting (Putnam 1995; Lien 1994). This is true because the most active people in a community develop skills germane to participation such as public speaking, organization, awareness of public issues, etc. Since voting is a subset of involvement, community activists are thus more likely to participate. Verba and Schlozman found that white men are the most active in civic affairs, while Hispanic women are least involved, falling behind all other groups in their level of contacting government officials, getting involved in groups, contacting public officials and attending a demonstration. Furthermore whites are more active than blacks and blacks are across genders generally more active than Hispanics although Latino men are almost as active as African-American males. This is further clarified by Bobo and Gillian

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who found that if blacks feel empowered if they have a black mayor in their city and thus will be significantly more likely to vote (1990).

Finally, since people are generally more likely to get more involved in their community the longer one lives in an area; one could measure involvement by years of residence. Not surprisingly as one meets more people in the neighborhood and makes new connection, it is anticipated that each person will join more activities and those who do this are more likely to vote (Brady, Henry, Sidney Verba et al. 2002. "Who Bowls? The (Un) Changing Stratification of Participation). Thus:

Hypothesis 3: Those who have been at their address the longest are more likely to vote.

The Influence of Religion on Getting Out the Vote

One form of community networks is involvement in religion which has been shown to improve civic skills in its members (Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001). I hope to show that religious activity contributes to whether a Latino person makes it to the polls as it gives people civic skills that are transferable into voting and that there is a difference between Hispanics and African-American and white voters. Religion is the single biggest voluntary collective activity in American life (Wald 1988; Harris 1994) and develops attitudes (Secret et al. 1990; Wald, Owen & Hill 1990: 201) through its various activities such as group meetings, public speaking, and other actions promote civic behavior and thus lead to voting (Wald et al. 1993; Harris 1994). These activities have been shown to lead to "greater civic competence" (Strate et al. 1990; Strate, Parrish,

Elder &Ford 1989 452). Since minorities are more likely to be in lower classes and thus less likely to get these skills, church attendance is more important than the workplace in terms of getting to the voting booth. Burns et al. go further in stating that "religious institutions operate both to incubate civic skills and to recruit congregants to politics through explicit requests for political action" (2001, 232).

There is some evidence that the development of civic skills in a religious institution applies more to Protestants than Catholics since the latter religion is less likely to provide opportunities within their churches due to the "hierarchical structure of its church, the larger size of the Catholic parishes and the more limited role for the laity in the liturgy and in church governance." (Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001, 237-8). Other evidence includes the fact that the "theological climate (is) … found to contribute strongly to the members' political conservatism over and above …traditional values" (Wald et al. 1988, 533). Obviously one would expect that the impact on civic participation increases the more one goes to a religious institution. One problem, though, with this predisposition is that it assumes that everyone gains from going to church/synagogue/mosque even if the person is somewhat passive. Church attendance alone may exert a greater influence on civic behavior like turnout more than socioeconomic factors. Indeed, Harris claims that church attendance as an indicator of voting was even more significant that education (1994: 63).

As a group, African-Americans are significantly more likely than others to be recruited for civic activities, including voting, than those who are mainline Protestant and like their Hispanic evangelical brethren are very likely to be mobilized by their church pastor (Bobo and Gillian 1990; Wilcox 1990; Wilcox and Sigelman 2001). This

recruitment makes church going blacks "more likely to vote even when taking into account their socioeconomic status" (Leighley and Veditz 1999; Alex-Assensoh and Assensoh 2001; Wald and Brown 2006). Tate goes even further arguing that black primary voters in the 1988 presidential election were more affected by organizational membership, of which churches are included, than racial identification (1991). This then may become one of the central findings here. With one once considers that many Hispanics are first or second generation Americans and often are native Spanish speakers, I am left wondering if the connection between blacks and Hispanics to church activity and voting will be different from each other and whether because they are more likely to be in lower socio economic classes, also show different impact levels (Verba et al. 2001).

> *Hypothesis 5a: As with other races, Hispanics who attend religious services on a regular basis are more likely to vote.*
>
> *Hypothesis 5b: As with other races, Hispanics who label themselves as born again Christians are more likely to vote.*
>
> *Hypothesis 5c: Hispanics who are Protestant are more likely to vote than those who are Roman Catholic.*

The Youth Vote

Still yet another group to consider in studying motivations of the Hispanic voter is the under-thirty category. The "youth" subdivision makes up the largest demographic. Seventeen million of the nation's 44 million Hispanics are under 18 while another thirteen million over 18 are between the ages of 25 and 44. With another 5 million between 18 and 24, fully 37 million of this demographic is under the age of 44. Among

the 18 to 24 group, 27.6% report being registered to vote, 44% for the 45 to 64 (US

Census 2004). The question here is how active is the under 30 crowd. After all this

demographic led the conversion[18] of the "solid South" from a Democratic stronghold to

its current status as a Republican bastion over a period from the late 1940s to 1988 when

Republican voters finally became more numerous than Democrats (Campbell 1977;

Wattenberg 1991). The 2004 Edison/Mitovsky exit polls show that among Hispanics the

under-thirty set voting at a higher rate than their elder brethren and more conservatively.

One of the reasons for this was because, as with the Southern conversion, young people

were much more likely to be Republican in part because the younger group was more

educated than their parents' generation (Converse 1966; Smidt 1989; Wattenberg 1991).

This may be a possible connection to Hispanics as their median age is 26 compared to the

US population of 35.4. Since 60 percent of Hispanic citizens were born in the US,

younger Hispanic voters have been educated in the US and are more attuned to the

culture and the language. This may cause the differences between younger and elderly

Hispanic voters and the difference they may have with the rest of the American

population (US Census 2004).

[Insert Figure 2.2 Here]

An initial survey seems to bolster the claim that younger voters are changing the

Hispanic electorate. The 2004 Edison/Mitofsky survey found that Hispanics vote at a

10% higher margin for the 18-29 set than do their non-Hispanic white counterparts. The

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[18] By "conversion," I mean the change of the entire South in the aggregate, not the change of individual
voters.

Hispanic population in the 18 to 29 age bracket was only 16% of all Hispanics in 2002,[19] but in 2004 they made up 27% of Hispanic electorate. This is compared to the 14.9% for whites from the same demographic group in 2000 and 9.2% in 2004. The National Election Survey had similar results finding in 2000 that the 18 to 29 Hispanic sub-group made up 21.88% of the voting population while their Anglo counterpart constituted only 15.9% (National Election Surveys).

These statistics seem to go against the adult role theory which postulates that younger people do not vote as well as people in their thirties and older because they are finishing school, marrying, starting a family, do not have high home ownership and are trying to establish a career (Converse and Niemi 1971; Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 1998; Strate et al. 1989; Highton and Wolfsinger 2001). People also are creatures of habit and voting in previous elections greatly increases the chances that a voter will go to the polls in the future (Gerber, Green and Shachar 2003). These findings are also in stark contrast to Cassell (2002) who looked at returns for 1964, 1972-1988 and found that Hispanics had 16% less turnout than whites. White drew this conclusion because of the relative youth of the group and their inferior educational levels. This phenomenon in 2004 is very curious, but it mirrors the changes that occurred in the South where the youth vote was the driving force behind the change from a Democratic to a Republican South. Significantly the Hispanic population increased by 14% from 2000 to 2004 with the addition of 1.7 million people. Since the majority of these people were US born, the majority of this number will be eligible to vote when they turn eighteen so understanding this category now will help us to better understand future elections.

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[19] "The Hispanic Population in the United States: March 2002: Detailed Tables." US Census Bureau. http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hispanic/ppl-165.html . Accessed on November 19, 2005.

Hypothesis 6: Unlike other races, younger Hispanics are more likely to vote than Anglo or African-American voters.

Data

The data source for this chapter is the 2004 Annenberg Election Surveys which took place over a year's time ending just after the presidential election. It is useful because it places Hispanic voters into three subsets: Cuban-Americans, Puerto Ricans and Mexican-Americans. Cuban-Americans have tended to be much more conservative than their Latino brethren. Also since a large majority of Puerto Ricans live in a small demographic area – New York City – it might be useful to break up the three groups. There were 280 Cuban-Americans, 699 Puerto Ricans, 3349 Mexican-Americans, 4807 African-Americans and 67,851 white survey takers. For this chapter, I broke Hispanics into three categories: Mexican-American, Cuban-Americans and Puerto-Rican-Americans. I further broke up religion into Catholicism and Protestantism since, as already mentioned, there is some evidence that Protestants have more chances for engagement and thus a better chance to get out and vote. Finally I also compared these results to ones from African-American and white voters.

The dependent variable for this chapter is whether the survey respondent said he/she was going to vote. The main problem with this is that 93% of respondents said they were going to vote in the election when the actual rate among registered voters was

only 64% in 2004.[20] This is because the survey was a rolling one and if I had limited it to those who answered the survey after the day of the election, the number of respondents would be too small to make any reasonable conclusions. This is not an insurmountable hurdle, though and while "non-voting voters" tend to be "less interested and less emotionally in politics, less inclined to think it is their duty as citizens to participate and younger than voters" the "factors that influence voting or non-voting are largely unaffected by the use of validated as opposed to reported voting data" in part because all of the survey groups have reporting error (Sigelman 1982, 47, 54). In short, the 93% number for those who said they would vote will not distort my results. In fact, it is known that the more educated and more partisan you are the more likely you are to lie and say you voted when you didn't, so even if the survey had been done entirely after the election, this might not have changed the results.   Blacks who are frequent church goers and anyone who has been contacted and encouraged to vote also tend to mislead survey takers (Bernstein et al. 2001).

A more minor problem is that since the date is collected over a year's time ending just after the respective elections so some respondents are more tuned into the elections than others. That is they be reading the newspaper more, talking about it at a religious institution, etc.

There are several ethnicities that are going to be studied here: whites, blacks and Hispanics. There will be dichotomous variables for each of these groups as well as for Puerto Ricans and Mexican-Americans. I used the latter two groups since they have been for a long time Democratic strongholds. But, since Hispanics, have voted Republican

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[20] The concern here is that this is such a high number that it will distort my findings that use logit. However based on King and Zeng 2001, they found you do not need "relogit" to make up for this high number. Their findings indicated that it is only necessary if the event occurs 5% or less of the time.

with increasing regularity, comparing the two groups should prove helpful. A second reason to use the two in comparison to each other is that the youth vote led the movement in the South towards the Republican Party and an initial data search by me seems to indicate a similar trend amongst the under 35 set for Hispanic voters (Wattenberg 1991.

The hypotheses generated out of the theory above can be broken into four subsections: socio-economic variables, political interest of the respondents, religion and residency. It is my contention that there will be some effects seen from the religious side as well as the youth vote.

Thus: y(whether voted or not) = b + b1(SES variables) + b2(Political Interest) + b3(Religion) + b4(Residency).

Methodology

For my models, I use a logit regression with a dichotomous dependent variable where the 1 = INTEND TO VOTE[21] and a 0 = no plan of voting. There are several models that will individually look at Hispanics, Mexican-Americans, whites and blacks. I looked at all Hispanics collectively as a way to bolster the number of observations, but could not individually look at Cubans or Puerto Ricans because their numbers were two low. Thus I only looked at Mexican-Americans individually as a subset of Hispanics. There will also be two comparison models: all groups compared to Hispanics and Mexican and Puerto Ricans compared to Cuban-Americans. The first model is an interaction and the second is limited to Hispanics where Cubans are the group left out. Cubans are the comparison group because they are far more likely to vote than the other Hispanic groups.

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[21] Each variable will be referred to by all capital letters.

There are a number of independent variables. Whenever possible[22] the highest numbers of the coded variables are set for the most conservative person. Liberal voters would be coded for the smaller numbers. For example, if one was very conservative the coded number might be a six and those who said they were very liberal would be coded as a zero.

I have broken the independent variables into several groupings: informed voting variables; socio-economic factors; residency factors, political variables and religion. For the informed voting variables there are five variables. The first is a simple statistic for the number of years of EDUCATION attained by the voter. Secondly INFOSCALE is coded as a 3 if the person has read the paper, listened to the news and gone online seeking news in the last week otherwise. It is coded 2, for two of these, 1 = once and 0 = not at all. Next is the independent variable for being MARRIED which is designated with a 1 if the person is married; otherwise, it is coded as 0. INCOME is broken into nine parts starting with those making less than $10,000 to those who are making $150,000 in the top slot.[23] Finally there is a variable for one's native language called LANGUAGE. Although there is not a question asked in the survey about one's primary language, I made the inference that the native language was Spanish if that was how the survey was conducted. There could be people who did not fall into this category who are native Spanish speakers, but are fluent in two or more languages or people who are better at a language other than Spanish or English. For this variable, one is used if the person was interviewed in English and zero if in was conducted in Spanish.

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[22] Obviously this cannot work for all variables since those with a PhD tend to be more liberal than not.
[23] See Table 1 for a complete discussion of the variables.

Next are is captured by two variables, AGE and AGE^2. Age is measured by one's self reported real age. I used AGE^2 to see if there is a downtown among the elderly for turnout.

Next there are a number of religious indicators. To begin with there are two similar ones: a statistic for those people who describe themselves as BORN AGAIN and one for RELIGION. The former is broken into a 1 for people who profess to be born again and 0 for all others.[24] RELIGION equals 0 if a respondent never attends church, followed by go a few times a year (1), once or twice a month (2), to once a week (3) and finally more than once a week (4).

The next two variables are STRENGTH PARTY and STRENGTH IDEOLOGY which are both coded for strength of attachment.[25] STRENGTH PARTY is coded three for a strong Democrat or a strong Republican, two for weak Republican/Democrat and a one for independents who lean Democrat/Republican. Finally zero was given to those who identified themselves as independents. For STRENGTH IDEOLOGY I combined "Very conservative" and "Very liberal" into the coded number of two. "Conservative" and "Liberal" were coded as one and moderates were coded as zero.

Finally I am including CURRENT ECONOMY and CURRENTPOCKETBOOK. The former refers to whether the respondent believes the economy is doing well. It is coded 2 for believing the economy is excellent and 1 for it being poor. The same codings are used for CURRENTPOCKETBOOK which is whether the interviewee believes his/her personal financial situation is doing well or not.

Results

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[24] The wording is "Do you consider yourself an evangelical or born again Christian?"
[25] For STRENGTH PARTY I combined three original variables. The first was "Party ID," the second "Strength of Party ID" and the last "Lean Republican or Democrat."

There were many results that one would expect. To begin, as one can see in table 3, the fit of the model was moderately good with R^2 results all between .22 and .35. Furthermore the chi^2 numbers were all highly significant therefore I was able to reject the null hypothesis that my variables jointly are equal to zero.[26] There are also many statistically significant independent variables thus supporting many of my hypotheses.

[Insert Table 1.3]

The results for EDUCATION were statistically significant at the .001 level for blacks and whites. If one changes the amount of education for whites and blacks from eight to twelve years of education, one sees a jump in chances of voting from 3% for whites and 4% for blacks. [27] It was not at all significant for Hispanics. This is a very surprising result as blacks and whites in numerous studies have been shown to have a higher turnout depending on their education (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001).

[Insert Table 1.4]

A form of education is whether or not a person is informed. To this end EDUCATION AND INFOSCALE are related.[28] For blacks, whites, Hispanics and all Hispanics compared to Cubans, the results are highly significant indicating that if one is following the news, be it on television, the newspaper or on the Internet, one will vote. Only for Mexicans, was the result significant at the .05 level and for Puerto Ricans, it was

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[26] For a look at the number of variables for each statistic as well as the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum see table 2.

[27] This is done in Stata with a command called "Prvalue." The dependent variable is taken out and all the independent variables are set to one possible level. This is run twice with just one variable being changed the second run and the difference being reported. For example, you might want to look at a white, male, regular churchgoer, etc. On the second run you would change one item of statistical significance such as the number of times attending church. Therefore you could see the exact impact of this one independent variable.

[28] They are, though, not collinear as they only have a .53 relationship.

not significant at all. If one went from not getting any news to getting it from at least three sources, the chances of voting increased 10% for Mexican-Americans, 11% for whites and Hispanics and an amazing 14% increase for African-Americans.

INCOME was significant, but only for all Hispanics and whites and not for African-Americans.[29] If one goes from less than $10,000 in annual salary to $75,000 there is a 3% jump in likeliness to vote for both whites and Hispanics. Interestingly enough it was significant for Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans compared to Cubans. This means that all non Cuban Hispanics are more likely to vote than are Cubans, the higher their income goes.   For Mexicans-Americans alone, this indicator is not statistically significant. This may be in part because of the smaller sample size which was only 715, but certainly the number is large enough for a fair result. More importantly, this factor just missed being significant at the .05 level with a .08 level. None of these results are surprising and are supported by prevailing literature difference (Verba and Nie 1972; Uhlaner 1989; Bass and Casper 2001). The more educated one is, the more likely one will vote; likewise the more partisan one is, the more likely one will get out and vote.

There were other results that were consistent with previous research (Converse and Niemi 1971; Abramson, Aldrich and Rohde 1998; Strate et al. 1989; Highton and Wolfsinger 2001). Thinking that the younger Hispanic voter might come out at a higher rate than whites and African-Americans, I squared the AGE variable, but did not find it as being more significant for the younger voter for any of the models. For AGE, the

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[29] Concerned that INCOME and EDUCATION would be collinear; I ran a regression for the two variables and found them to only have only a .44 correlation.

direction was correct for all groups,[30] but none of the variables were statistically

significant.   Thus there seems to be no difference between Hispanic groups and what is

know about black and white voters, despite the fact that so many Hispanics are not native

born or are second generation Americans.   But, this is all the more curious since so many

second generation Hispanics grow up as a part of American culture and one might be

better voters.   The only group that showed any impact with age among Latinos were

Puerto Rican voters for which turnout for age was significant only at the .05 level.   It is

more surprising that it is not significant for all ages, but for Hispanic voters only, there is

a definite drop in voters as one gets to the oldest voters as shown by the age squared

statistic which was significant.   As with the age statistic, it is surprising that this is not so

for all voters, but once again there is a difference for older voters.

For partisan politics, there were mixed returns. For the collapsed variable for

STRENGTH PARTY, there were highly significant results (.001) for all the groups

except for black voters. So the Hispanic voter performed as one would expect or that is

just like whites. If one goes from the weakest partisan identification to the strongest,

there is a 5% better chance that African-American and Hispanics as well as a 6% for

whites and 9% for Mexican-Americans. This was not the case for the STRENGTH

IDEOLOGY variable which had the most ideological conservative and liberal lumped

into one category and the least into another.   Here no group, including white voters

showed any significant correlation.

The religious variables were mostly what I had been suspecting based on the

literature. That is to say I thought I would see differences between Protestants and

Catholics as well as significance for the more one attends religious services. RELIGION

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[30] Meaning as one gets older, one is expected to vote at a higher rate

was highly significant for both Mexican-American as well as whites, but not for Hispanics as a whole.[31] As with partisanship driving out more people to vote, Mexican-Americans prove again to be different from African-Americans, but not from whites. The results indicate that as one attends more church, one is more likely to get out to vote which is in line with the literature (Harris 1994; Wald 1990; Bob and Gillian 1990; Wilcox 1990; Wilcox and Sigelman 2001; Wald 2001). [32]

The literature does bolster the claim that being Protestant should be statistically significant and the results for Hispanics indicate the opposite out, but just barely (Bobo and Gillian 1990; Wilcox 1990; Wilcox and Sigelman 2001). Being Protestant is statistically significant for Hispanics as well as Puerto Rican Americans at the .05 level to make them less likely to vote. Compared to everyone else, Hispanic Protestants are 17% more likely to vote. Catholics are nearly, but not quite statistically significant with a .054 variable to also cause voters to stay home. Hispanic Catholics, compared to non-Catholics are 15% more likely to vote. Just as importantly neither whites nor African-Americans are statistically significant for this motivating voting.[33]

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[31] Perhaps the other Hispanic groups would have the same result if they had a larger sample as Mexican-Americans had a "n" of 16,442, but when the Puerto-Rican Americans and Cuban-Americans were run separately their combined sample sizes were just 153 and 53 and a number of variables were dropped making for a poor model.

[32] There was some concern that the term RELIGION overlapped other variables such as INFOSCALE, EDUCATION and other variables. So I did an "oprobit" with religion as the dependent variable. The independent variables that were included were EDUCATION, INCOME, INFOSCALE as well as two others that were not in my main model for whether the person received campaign brochures, if he/she follows politics and if he/she intends to participate in the campaign. If the entire database was used, then there was a .000 correlation between religion and both INCOME AND INFSCALE and .05 for EDUCATION. None of the others were statistically significant. However, when it was limited to just Hispanics then only EDUCATION (.004) and INTENDTOVOTE (.01) showed a strong correlation. For whites and blacks, education was the only significant one (.001).

[33] It should be noted that the variable PROTESTANT has 1=Protestant and 0 for all others. There are others some of which include "no denomination." The same is true for CATHOLIC. I ran a separate model where I made an independent variable where Protestant=1 and all others=0. I also had a separate variable, OTHERREL where 1=any religion other than Protestant and Catholic where Protestants were coded = 0. Therefore Catholics were the variable left out. This model did not show that any significance for the

There were several other key findings related to residence. Whether or not a person was born in the US was for all groups at the .001 level indicating that those who are born abroad are significantly less likely to vote in the 2004 campaign. This statistics will become even more important as more and more second generation Hispanics are born in the United States. Those Hispanics are 17% more likely to vote than those born abroad. For whites it is an amazing 27%, blacks are 28% and Mexican-Americans just 6% more likely. When one considers that there were only seven percent who indicated that they were not likely to vote, this is even more important.

How long a person in their current residence was also a motivator for white voters (.001) as well as Puerto Ricans (at the .001 level), Hispanics and Mexican-Americans. This is decidedly different for African-American voters who are not significant. If one looks at residence changing from one to ten years then Hispanics and Mexican-Americans are 8 and 9% more likely to vote when they have shown some residential stability. Whites improve their voting behavior just 3% over the same period.

In the last model, I compared Hispanics to all others. There were three significant differences that turned up. The first notable one is for LANGUAGE. For those Hispanics who took the Annenberg survey in English, there was a significantly higher chance that they would vote than non-Hispanic voters. Likewise those Hispanic voters who are more informed news readers/listeners, there is a significantly better chance than other voters that they will get out to vote. [34]   The same is true the longer a Hispanic voter lives at the same address. What this all means is that with such a young population of Latinos in this

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Protestant variable thus, I could not show that being a Hispanic Protestant made one more or less likely to get out to vote.
[34] It should be noted that my variable for INFOSCALE includes television news in both English and Spanish.

country, we should expect to see a significant increase in the number of them voting as they assimilate into American culture, be it by being fluent in English, following the news or showing stability with their residence.

The method above can be further improved by running interactions between Hispanics and each independent variable.[35] This method found some similar findings to what has been presented above, but it is interesting to note the variables where Hispanics were more likely to get out to vote. The first of these interactions was for the age variable. The coefficient was both positive and in the positive direction meaning that as Hispanics age, they are more likely than non-Hispanics to get out to vote. This is a very interesting finding since one would assume this would be true for whites.

[Insert Table 1.5]

Interestingly enough Hispanics are also significantly more likely to vote if they believe their economic situation is doing well. Related to this is the INCOME variable which also showed that the Latino voter was more likely to vote than the general population the more his/her income increased. The above findings are also true for the Latino voter who perceives that the nation's economic situation is also doing well.

Finally Hispanics were also more likely to get out and vote the stronger their party identification than the rest of the voting population. All of these above findings are important as it indicates that non-Hispanics are not always more likely to vote than Hispanics. As the number of Hispanics grows in this nation and becomes more of a

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[35] To do this I hand calculated using the formulas found in Frederick (1982). The formula is the square root of Variance of X + variance of HispanicX +2(Covariance of X, HispanicX) = SE for X for Hispanics. Then the Z score was calculated by the coefficient for X and the coefficient for Hispanic X. This number was then divided by the SE to get the Z score. I then used the Z score tables to see if the number was significant.

voting force, this could mean that those who are economically advantaged will be more and more of a target for campaigns.

Conclusion

The compelling question of this chapter is whether or not Hispanics are notably different than African-American and white voters in terms of getting out to vote. The answer is a resounding yes. Within the Hispanic group, Mexican-Americans are the most likely to show the differences. This, of course, has to be partly attributed to their size and the fact that there is a better chance of reaching significance the bigger a group is observed.

First off, though, in most categories there was no real difference between the Hispanic, African-American and white voters for turnout. Being born in the United States and living in one place for a long time, for example, is a significant factor for all groups. This, of course, tells us that second generation Hispanic voters will be more likely to vote especially when they become settled in one neighborhood. Likewise those who know English well also indicates there is no difference in turnout between the three groups. Finally being informed via news sources also is a significant contributor to whether a person votes, be they Hispanic, white or African-American.

There are many differences, though. Most notably is that whites and African-Americans are statistically more likely to vote when their educational levels increase while this is not the case for Hispanics. Likewise all three are very likely to vote when they are informed of daily events, and Hispanics are not.

One of the central premises of this research was that I would find that younger Hispanic voters and those who attend church more regularly would be more likely to get out and vote. This was not the case. In fact AGE and AGE^2 were not significant factors for Hispanics, but then again they were not for any of the groupings. Just the opposite was actually shown as my interaction between AGE and Hispanics showed that as Hispanics age they are statistically more likely to vote than whites and African-Americans. Likewise being BORNAGAIN was only significant for whites. This may be partly because the Catholic religion holds far more Hispanics than the Protestants and would bear further research in the future since the latter group has been growing very quickly. Only whites show a positive and statistically significant relationship with getting out to vote. There is some evidence that religion plays a role for Hispanics, though. For those who claim to be CATHOLIC or PROTESTANT, there is significance for only the Hispanic voter and not for any whites or African-Americans.

The real surprises are evident in Table 3 which shows that the better off Hispanics are financially or the better they perceive themselves to be, the more likely they will vote compared to other demographic groups. One would assume that party identification increase the more one is assimilated into a society which is born out by the fact that the Hispanic voter is much more likely to vote the stronger their party identification. As with the stability results of being born in the US and staying at one's address a long time, it is evident that the longer Hispanics stay in the US and the better they do in the workplace, the more of a force they will be on election day.

Figure 2.1
Growth of the Latino Electorate

This table comes from "The Latino Electorate: An Analysis of the 2006 Election."
http://www.pewhispanic.org. Accessed on October 20, 2007.

- - - Total Hispanic Population ——— Total Hispanic Voters

Figure 2.2
Turnout By Age

Source: US Census

41

Table 2.1 – Explanation of Variables

Table 2.1 – Explanation of Variables

Age: Age range is from 18 to 97 (no explanation given for why it was 97)

BornAgain: 1 = yes, 0 = no

Born US: 1 = yes, 0 = no

Current Economy 3 = economy is in excellent shape, 2 = good, 1 = fair, 0 = economy is in poor shape

Education

1 Grade 8 or lower, **2** Some high school, no diploma **3** High school diploma or equivalent **4** Technical or vocational school after high school , **5** Some college, no degree, **6** Associate's or two-year college degree, **7** Four-year college degree, **8** Graduate or professional school, no degree, **9** Graduate or professional degree

Income

1 Less than $10,000, **2** $10,000−$15,000, **3** $15,000−$25,000, **4** $25,000-$35,000, **5** $35,000−$50,000, **6** $50,000−$75,000

7 $75,000−$100,000, **8** $100,000−$150,000, **9** More than $150,000

Informed News: 1 = yes, 0 = not informed

Language: 1 = English, 0 = Spanish

Pocketbook economy. 1= personal financial situation is poor. 3= personal economic situation is excellent

Protestant 1 = yes

Religious: 1=never attend religious institution; 2=few times a year; 3=once a month; 4=once a week; 5=more than once a week

Strength of ideology: 2=very conservative/liberal, 1=conservative/liberal, 0=moderates

Strength of party identification: 3 = strong Republican/Democrat, 2=weak Republican/Democrat, 1 = independent who leans Republican/Democrat, 0=independent

YearsinUS: # of years, 0 to 97

YearsPresentAddress: # of years, 0 to 97

Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables					
Variable	Observations	Mean	St Dev	Min	Max
Age	18587	48.16	16.25	18	97
Age^2	18587	2583.63	1657.1	324	9409
Religion	18587	3.14	1.23	1	5
Born US	18587	.93	.26	0	1
Strength Ideology	18587	.89	.93	0	3
Born Again	18587	.45	.5	0	1
Current Economy	18587	1.04	.81	0	3
Current Pocketbook	18587	1.44	.84	0	3
Married	18587	.62	.49	0	1
Income	18587	5.2	2.03	1	9
Protestant	18587	.64	.48	0	1
Catholic	18587	.28	.45	0	1
Education	18587	4.86	1.86	1	8
Infoscale	18587	1.85	.65	0	3
Language Type	18587	.97	1.75	0	1
Years At Present Address	18587	11.84	12.85	0	87
Strength Party Identification	18587	2.14	.94	0	3

Independent Variable	Base Model	Hispanics	Mexican	White	Black	Hispanics Compared to Cubans
AGE	.03 (.01)*	.01 (.03)	.05 (.05)	.02 (.01)	.02 (.05)	-.00 (.03)
AGE^2	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)
BORN_US	1.75 (.1)***	1.51 (.23)***	1.74 (.32)***	1.9 (.13)***	2.42 (.38)***	1.5 (.23)***
CURRENTECONOM	.06 (.04)	-.25 (.12)	-.23 (.16)	.01 (.06)	.-.24 (.21)	-.24 (.12)
CURRENTPOCKETBOOK	.14 (.05)	.32 (.12)*	.41 (.17)	.12 (.06)*	.04 (.2)	.31 (.13)*
MARRIED	.01 (.07)	-.29 (.17)	-.42 (.23)	.08 (.08)	.55 (.33)	-.26 (.18)
INCOME	.13 (.02)	.13 (.05)*	.04 (.04)	.13 (.02)***	.12 (.08)	.13 (.05)**
BORN AGAIN	-.13 (.02)	-.03 (.2)	-.01 (.25)	-.25 (.09)**	.37 (.31)	-.04 (.2)
PROTESTANT	-.06 *.12)	-1.16 (.54)*	-.05 (.82)	-.01 (.14)	-.37 (.253)	-1.05 (.54)
CATHOLIC	-09 (.12)	-1.03 (.52)*	.35(.82)	.16 (.16)	.26 (.65)	-.85 (.52)
EDUCATION.	.27 (.02)***	.00 (.05)	.14 (.08)	.28 (.02)***	.31 (.09)***	.09 (.05)
YEARS AT PRESENT ADDRESS	.02 (.00)***	.05 (.02)**	.05 (.02)*	.02 (.00)***	.01 (.01)	.05 (.02)***
INFOSCALE	.88 (.14)***	.066 (.39)***	.32 (.54)*	.65 (.17)***	1.9 (.45)***	.05 (.4)***
RELIGION	.24 (.03)***	.08 (.07)	.15 (.2)	.29 (.03)***	.14 (.13)	.08 (.07)
STRENGTH IDEOLOGY	.05 (.04)	.02 (.14)	.15 (.2)	.07 (.07)	-.08 (.22)	.01 (.14)
STRENGTH PARTY IDENTIFICATION	.45 (.03)***	.02 (.08)***	.47 (.12)***	.44 (.04)***	.32 (.14)*	.34 (.08)***
LANGUAGE PUERTORICAN MEXICAN	.71 (.14)***	1.04 (.23)***	.93 (.33)**	.71 (.17)***	1.2 (.55)*	.96 (.23)*** 1.14 (.4)** -.04 (.18)
Pseduo R^2	.22***	.32***	.35***	.22***	.23***	.33***
# Observations	18,587	1346	715	13917	1690	1366
Chi2	2107.52***	533.56***	336.84***	1711.6***	166.07***	551.11***

Table 2.3: Impact of Variables on Voting

*** = .001, **=.01, *=.05

Table 2.4: PR Values of Significant Variables from Low to High				
Variable	Hispanic	Mexican	White	Black
Born US	17%	6%	27	28
Current Pocketbook	6		4	
Income (from 1 to 7)*	3		3	
Born Again			4	
Protestant	17			
Catholic	15			
Education (1 to 8)*			44	36
Years Present Address (1 to 10)	8	9	3	
Religion			21	
Strength Party Identification (0 to 3)*	5	9	6	5
Language	20	18	14	21

* see Table 1 for explanation of numerical values

Table 2.5: Interaction of Hispanics and Independent Variables	
AGE	.03 (.06)*
AGE^2	.000 (-.24)
BORN_US	.23 (1.58)
CURRENTECONOM	.16 (.36)*
CURRENTPOCKETBOOK	.16 (.34)*
MARRIED	.21 (.33)
INCOME	.06 (.12)*
BORN_AGAIN	.23 (-.63)
PROTESTANT	.48 (-.6)
CATHOLIC	.47 (.09)
EDUCATION.	.06 (.05)
YEARS_PRESENT_ADDRESS	.39 (.04)
INFOSCALE	.43 (.3)
RELIGION	.09 (.74)
STRENGTH IDEOLOGY	.14 (.51)
STRENGTH PARTY IDENTIFICATION	.09 (.38)**
LANGUAGE	.86 (1.1)
Pseudo R^2	.23
# Observations	16442
*** = .001, **=.01, *=.05	

Chapter Three

Voting Alone? Hispanics and
Their Voting Decisions

Stating the Case

During the 2008 Democratic primary, Hillary Clinton defeated Barack Obama in

every primary and caucus among Latinos with the single exception of Obama's home

state of Illinois. Most of the contests were not even close which left Bill Clinton arguing

that only Hillary Clinton could win in November against John McCain since he had sided

with legislation favoring illegal aliens two years before and could therefore garner their

support.[36] In the end Latino support which had been as high as 40% for George Bush in

2004 swung the other way and supported Obama with 67% of the vote. Latinos were

also a very important element in a number of swing states that ultimately swung the

electoral college in Obama's favor. What factors caused Latinos to vote for Obama and

were they different than whites and African-Americans is the focus of this chapter.

Latin America is the home of more immigrants to the US than any other part of

the world. In 2006 the Hispanic population in the US was 44.5 million people. The

growth has been so rapid that between 2000 and 2006, it accounted for 33% of the

nation's growth. This movement is projected to continue with the Hispanic population

reaching 102.6 million people by 2050. Indeed as the Hispanic population grows, its vote

will become more of a factor in shaping electoral outcomes. The aim of this chapter is to

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[36] There is a thorough discussion of this in chapter four.

look at what motivates the Hispanic vote as compared to other groups; particularly African-Americans and whites. As with African-Americans, there is a high percentage of lower income Hispanics, so it is important that the standard socio-economic factors be considered such as income, education, and age as variables have been standard indicators of voting habits with different demographic groups. But Hispanics are also unique due to the high percentage of immigrants and people who speak little or no English. Will these differences mean the normal theories will not apply due to the linguistic differences and overseas births or will it not matter? Finally does the relative youth of this group also lead to differences between the other two groups? As we saw in chapter two, there is some evidence of a divergence for these groups when it comes to getting out the vote, so whether the same will be true for voting is an important question to consider.

Cursory evidence does not indicate that there is going to be much difference between the three groups. For example, arguably one of the biggest news stories of the 2004 election was that George W. Bush succeeded, based on exit polls, in capturing 44%[37] of the Hispanic vote. Although one might posit that Bush's historic Hispanic vote reflects the power of an incumbent president (Markus 1988; MacKuen et al. 1992; Gomez and Wilson 2001; de la Garza and Cortina Forthcoming), there have been other high water marks such as Reagan's 37% mark in 1984. Additionally Republicans garnered 39% of the vote in the 2002 midterm elections. Thus there is some evidence of Republican support from Hispanics for some time. Knowing that Hispanic Protestants have more education, come from higher income brackets and better jobs, could it be that the growing number of Protestant Hispanics are voting with their more conservative

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[37] While it's a statistically insignificant difference Leal et al. 2005 did a study and found it to be closer to 40%.

denominational brethren (Hunt 1999)? Or could it be something else such as the fact that fully one-third of the Hispanic voters were under the age of thirty, an extremely unusual statistic and one that may help unravel the secret of Bush's success (Edison/Mitofsky 2004)**.**[38] Of course Bill Clinton, in his re-election bid, won 72% of the Hispanic vote with Senator Bob Dole (R-KS) weighing in with just 20%.[39] Four years later, Vice President Gore, while losing the Electoral College, still won 62% of the Hispanic vote so it is not apparent that there is necessarily a trend that has been pushing Latinos to the conservative side (Leal, Barrett et al. 2005).

The Theory of Voting

One of the principal reasons that people vote for someone is captured by the rational choice model, that assumes that a person will weigh all his choices and make the one which will maximize his utility (Downs 1957). Downs' theory reasons that people seek out all possible alternatives and then rank order them in order to make the best possible decision (Abramowitz 1989; Abramson et al.1992). That is to say the voter will consider a host of options about candidates such as ideology, elect ability, media coverage (both good and bad), the number of previous primary and caucus wins and caucuses, and even personality traits. These will be rank ordered and weighted and finally a decision can be made. A person with very strong preferences might rank ideology highest amongst their schema while another activist might be more practical and want to select the person they not only can agree with on most issues, but who is the most electable – that is who has the most utility for the voter.

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[38] This is based on a preliminary data check from this survey conducted for the major television newscasts.
[39] Ross Perot received the other 8%.

There are a number of factors with which people can rank their candidates and chose their presidential candidates. What made so many Hispanic voters go with the Republican Party in 2004, especially after having been a reliable Democratic vote for so long? Was this a "conversion of the faithful," a sign of the strength of an incumbent president or some other factor. This was partially addressed by de la Garza and Cortina (forthcoming) where they concluded that Hispanic voters crossed the partisan divide because of their approval of Bush's job performance and not because of ideological similarities. Likewise they found that Hispanic voters in 2000 liked the man (Bush) and not his ideology. DeSipio does make the leap that conversion has occurred among Hispanics finding that

> "*twenty-five percent of US citizen (are) Latino Republicans and as many as 1/3rd of Mexican-American Republicans are former Democrats.*" (1996, 82).

But he does add later that "over 75% of these Mexican-Americans and over 50% of the Puerto-Ricans who were former Democrats" did not consider themselves strong Republicans. This is in stark contrast to African-Americans who have been consistent supporters of Democratic presidential candidates from 1964 through 2004 (Hajnal and Lee 2008). Does it follow that Hispanics will naturally vote for the Democratic candidate simply because of a party label? Thus the rational choice African-American rank ordered party label as being the most important factor in deciding who to vote for in an election whereas Latino voters have had a variety of different elements ranking highest in their schema. Or are the presidential actions enough to sway the Latino voter. The popularity of the president has been shown to have a .73 correlation between Gallup surveys and actual electoral outcomes so one would expect the same correlation to stand up across races (Sigelman 1979).

> *Hypothesis 1: Those Hispanics, African-Americans and whites who approve of the president's job performance will vote for the Republican candidate.*

The rational actor model of voting was attacked by the work of Campbell et al. who concluded that the average voter is irresponsible and did not know enough about issues to make a well thought out decision about future issue choices (1960). In the absence of issue knowledge, voters substitute party identification as a shortcut to election decision making. Party identification is something learned at an early age from parents who teach their offspring a set of issues that are important to them. These issues may be different for each person as only the perception of party position really matters to the individual voter. Bartels adds to this understanding with his *Partisanship and Voting Behavior* which posits that while partisan voting went up each election between 1952 and 1996, partisanship has gone down with younger voters, particularly the ones added to the polls with the advent of the 26th amendment (1987).

> *Hypothesis 2: Those Hispanics, African-Americans and whites who identify themselves as Republican will vote for the Republican candidate for president.*

In stark contrast to Campbell's work is Wattenberg who countered that the role of the party actually has declined. He showed this by looking at the proportion of voters in independents went up during the years he studied from 1952 to 1996[40]. Other variables he looked at included the number of ticket splitters in the House and Presidential

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[40] Unless one adds "leaners" into the equation and then there very little difference.

elections and even between those who voted for members of the House and the Senate. This is partly because voters are more educated and thus less likely to rely on party ideologues to determine their votes. But even more importantly with the rise of the media, candidates, can appeal directly to the electorate and thus can rely less on party tags to solicit votes (Wattenburg 1982; Wattenburg 1984).

A twist on the rational actor model voter comes from Gelman and King (1993, 431) who reason that if the voter had weighed everything about the candidates, there would be no change in the poll results during the course of the campaign. Or, they postulate, if the voters did not know everything and were merely gathering information during the course of the campaign, one would see gradual shifts and not the shocks that sometimes accompany the presidential conventions and other key events. Indeed, they conclude that, "presidential general election campaigns produce no unexpected advantage for their political party and are not necessary for forecasting" (Gelman and King 1993, 449).

Fiorina (1981) took these thoughts a step further in *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* where he agreed with V.O. Key's (1961) belief that citizens

> *should view the mass public as concerned with the ends of government policy more than the means. But like Downs, we should view the voter as looking ahead and choosing between alternative futures,*

based on knowledge of actions in the past (Fiornia 1981, 198). In other words if a person is a parent and is concerned about which party or candidate will provide better schools, their own knowledge of growing up in a community with fine schools may precipitate them to vote one way because of that issue. Key would differentiate slightly believing the voter is only concerned with past actions and less worried about future choices that

politicians may make (1961). To this Fiorina adds that "elections do not signal the direction in which a society should move so much as they convey an evaluation of where society has been (Fiorina 1981, 6).

One of the more respected econometric models about this comes from Abramowitz who contends that only three factors need be used to predict national voting patters: length of time the incumbent has been in office (even if he is not running), approval of the sitting president and the growth of the economy through June of the election year (1989, 2008). Economically voting theory can be broken up further by considering the economic situation both nationally and individually in what is known as "sociotropic" or "pocketbook" voting. While counterintuitive, the former refers to the fact that the voter will base his electoral decision on the nation's economy. If there is low unemployment and the stock market is doing well, the voter will be more inclined to vote for the party of the president. "Sociotropic" voting is echoed by the referendum model which believes that "presidential elections are ultimately decided on the state of the national economy and the proven ability of the incumbent administration to manage it successfully," rather than on party identification or other factors (Finkel 1993, 5).

On the other hand pocketbook voters are more concerned with their own personal welfare. If the voter is employed and not struggling to pay bills, then he will often want the current administration's ideas to continue (Markus 1988, MacKuen et al 1992). In contrast the pocketbook theory would argue that at the individual voter level, John Kerry, in 2004, did not need to discuss his ideas for the future, but merely point to an individual's economic problems that the voter believed had existed during the four years of Bush's presidency. If Kerry could strike a cord whereby the American voter would

say, "Yes, I have lost my job or have less earning power now than I did in 2000," then he might have been elected if that were sufficient cause for an individual. The classic example of this was Reagan's question, "Are you better off now than four years ago?" worked since the economy was so poor during the Carter administration. Thus it is not surprising that de la Garza and Cortina (forthcoming) found that the higher the income of a Hispanic voter the better chance of voting for George W. Bush in 2004. This is exactly what one would expect from a white voter or a black voter as George H.W. Bush won 24% of the African-American population that was making more than $75,000 and 50% of whites (Allen et al. 1989. Bolce et al.1993). More specifically, Wald and Calhoun-Brown found that higher income Hispanics are "often more conservative in their approach to political matters (2007, 189). This would be because they favored Bush as their perception was that his policies helped to make them financially secure.

> *Hypothesis 3a: The higher one's income and the more likely the Hispanic, African American and white voter will vote for a Republican.*
>
> *Hypothesis 3b: The better the perception of the economy the more likely the Hispanic, African-American and white voter will vote Republican.*
>
> *Hypothesis 3c: Hispanics, African-Americans and whites who perceive the US as doing well economically will vote for the incumbent.*
>
> *Hypothesis 3d: Hispanics, African-Americans and whites who perceive themselves (pocketbook voters) as doing well financially will vote for a Republican.*

Finally there is the "minimal effects" theory first postulated by Lazarsfeld et al. that postulates that because of things such as religion, union membership, party identification, etc. people have their minds made up before the major campaign events of the presidential campaign (Lazarsfeld et al 1944, Finkel 1993, Hillygus 2003). People can be overwhelmed with all the media attention on the presidential campaigns especially if they are living in a swing state that will have all the advertisements and even phone calls. To avoid this overstimulation, people use cues such as party identification. These voters assume that the person running from their chosen party will represent their views. Likewise, if the union endorses a candidate then the union member can rest assured that they will be voting "correctly" and not have to worry about understanding the issues at hand. As a result campaigns will produce only "minimal effects" on vote choice, which Lazarsfeld noted that a campaign was only worth between five to eight percentage points in his study (1944, 87) Markus, in his study of campaigns from 1958 to 1976 found the average campaign to be worth just three percentage points (1988, 150). It is to these effects that this paper turns. Is a "performance" at a debate and/or a political convention enough to push a candidate to victory? With Kerry apparently losing the pivotal state of Ohio by as little as 2% of the vote, these minimalist events, in a close election, may, though, mean the election (Faler 2004).

The problem with the minimal effects is the decline of the American party exemplified by Wattenberg's research (1984) who showed that fewer people are identifying with a political party thereby meaning they have to look elsewhere for their decision making needs. One potential source is Iyengar and Kinder's priming (1987) which postulates that there is too much "schema" in the world and the media allows the

voter to focus on a sample of the stories in the world (Krosnick and Brannon). Thus college students in Iyengar and Kinder's study were influenced by what they saw on television. For example, if the news on television, radio, internet, etc. focuses on Bush through the prism of the "War on Terrorism," then the voter will be "primed" to consider their views of Bush on this issue. Nelson et al. add that not only are one's issues primed by news stories on television, but it can even force people to see an issue in a different light. The authors studied people who saw the Ku Klux Klan in a more positive light when its views were framed as a 1st amendment right to free speech. This then was why in 2004 Kerry tried to focus the American public on the war with Iraq as he was hoping people would see more negative schema of the war would push people top vote Bush out of office. To put it in light of this dissertation, Nicholson et al. found that Hispanic voters have a lower level of political information, interest (in political campaigns) and strength of partisanship when they were compared to whites and African-Americans (2006). So the question becomes twofold. Do Hispanics have a lower level of political information and secondly are the most informed more likely to vote Republican?

Hypothesis 4: Hispanics, African-Americans and Whites who are more
tuned into the news will be more likely to vote Republican.

Tuning into the news, of course, leads to a better understanding of the issues at stake in an election. There is some contention here as to whether the issues matter enough, especially to Hispanic voters. Is the group, especially more recent immigrants part of the "post materialistic" world in which Americans are so affluent that they no longer need to focus on economic norms and instead can consider cultural values found in such issues as

abortion or family values (Layman and Carmines 1997). Nicholson et al. found that issue

voting only mattered to the highly educated (2006), but de la Garza (1992) and Verba et

al. (1995) both found that Hispanics are lower than blacks and whites for issue

knowledge. This is in part because native born voters are better tuned into the issues

(Nicholson et al. 2006). There is some contention on the abortion affect as Alvarez and

Bedolla found that it does not seem to persuade Hispanic voters, with the notable

exception of Cuban-Americans (2003). They found that the uninformed voter was more

swayed by symbolism of the campaigns. This is important for this dissertation because

de al Garza et al. found that Hispanics and African-Americans had low issue knowledge

(1992). Verba et al. go as far to say that Hispanics are even lower than blacks and whites

for issue knowledge (1995).

> Hypothesis 5: Hispanics, Whites and African-Americans will vote
>
> Republican if they are pro-life.

Unlike whites and African-Americans, Hispanics add another "minimal"

dimension to why people vote the way they do because there are so many who are not

born in the US. Will there be any differences between them and elder participants who

immigrated to the US? While it does not discuss vote choice, Cho looked at California

residents in the 1984 election and found that ethnicity had no impact on them if they were

born in the US in terms of getting to the polls (1999). Similar results were found by

LaFountain and Johnson (2008). In other words, being Hispanic was no different than

her other ethnicities which included African-Americans and Asians and also whites. Will

this still be the case for vote choice?

Hypothesis 6: Those who speak fluent English will be more likely to vote

Republican.

    Coupled with national origin is age since Hispanics are a much younger demographic than whites and African-Americans. For example Hispanics, 30 and under, make up 34.7 % of their population whereas among whites of the same demographic is only 15.1 % and African-Americans are 25.2 %. There is also some evidence that younger Hispanics are more likely to be evangelical (a group that is decidedly Republican) than their elder brethren and likewise that older voters are more likely to be Catholic – a group that is more likely to vote Democratic (Lee and Pachon 2005). Other research has found that at the very least younger Hispanics are more likely to be independent of party labels (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003). When this is added to the fact that evangelicals[41] are more likely to vote Republican, it is important to investigate this phenomena (Layman 1997; Lee and Pachon 2005).

Hypothesis 7a: Younger Hispanics will be more likely to vote Republican

as opposed to younger African-American and White voters.

Hypothesis 7b: Older Hispanic voters will be more likely to vote

Democratic as opposed to older African-American and White voters.

Hypothesis 7c: Native born candidates will be more likely to vote

Republican.

Hypothesis 7d: Younger Hispanic voters will be more likely to vote for

the Republican.

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[41] Defined by the amount of time one attends church – usually more than once a week (Layman 2007)

While there is some research on the impact of religion's impact on Hispanic vote choice, there is very little on immigrants and how they vote. My research only found one article which claimed that the longer someone is in the US, the more likely they will vote Democratic (Gimpel and Kaufman 2001). This may be, in part, because of the connection to older voters voting Catholic whose Hispanic voters lean Democratic.

Religion can be seen as another "minimal effects." Lazarsfeld et al. postulated that because of religion people have their minds made up before the presidential campaign begins (Lazarsfeld et al 1944, Finkel 1993, Hillygus 2003). Layman (1997) showed that between 1980 and 1994, there was a movement by conservative Protestants to join the Republican Party. It will be important to see if there is a difference especially between whites and Hispanics since each has a membership in the Protestant and Catholic churches. This is an important question because of the evidence that religion does have an impact on political connectedness. Using a 1990 national survey, Kosmin and Keysan found that Hispanic Protestants are 7% more likely to be Republican. The distribution of religious groups is shown in Figure 1.

[Insert Figure 3.1 here]

There are a variety of reasons why a person would be more likely to vote Republican if they are Protestant rather than Catholic. The main reason is the expected impact control over the church and services seen in the Catholic religion. This is different from many Protestant denominations in which lay person can conduct the sacrament and read the weekly Bible lessons. Protestant churches are governed by a group of parishioners who hire the minister and make decisions such as expansion of the physical structures and what kind of programs are going to be run such as children's classes, summer

retreats, etc. (Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001). Secret hypothesized that building civic skills in a religious institution will carries over to being politically active and therefore voting (1990). Indeed this view was tested by Hunt who found that conservative Protestants have higher attendance and are more likely to be in church-related groups (1998, 355). Furthermore among Latinos who are Protestant, most are evangelical and are more pro-life than any other Hispanic group (Burns et al. 2001, Ellison et al. 2005) and tend to be.[42] Kellstedt found that white "denominational evangelicals who attended church regularly" were more likely to vote for Republican candidates than those who did not attend church frequently adding that it was impossible to "mobilize in a religious context" those who were not regular church goers (1989, 109) since members of a particular church expect their members to act in a similar fashion to themselves (Johnson and White 1967, Wald 1990). Furthermore one study found that women are more likely to carry out church related layman tasks and possibly may be more impacted in their vote decision because of this (Burns et al. 2001). This is echoed by the fact that "high attenders" amongst the African-American community are also more likely to be Republican (Calhoun-Brown 2001). In the past, another reason for the phenomena has been that evangelicals are more likely to have been contacted in a presidential election by a political group and this is in part because of the access gained by the Christian Right to churches through their voter guides and thus encouragement of their religious dogma (Wilcox and Sigelman 2001). Kelly and Kelly did find during the 1990s that Latinos followed these norms (2005). This was found to be even true of the younger parishioners. Ellison et al. also found, using the 1990 survey, that these pro-life

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[42] This is sometimes defined by self identification or by the frequency of attendance of church attendance. Wald (2003) defined evangelicals who see Jesus as their savior, read the Bible literally and who try to spread their faith to others.

groups tend to be lower income and foreign born. The pro-life stance is critical as Wald

found that African-Americans who believe in this stand are also Protestant (2003). "Born

again" Latinos (Lee and Pachon 2005 and Protestant Hispanics in general (DeSipio 2005)

were significantly more likely to vote for Bush in 2004 and "cultural orientations" do

have a significant impact on Americans' religiosity (Layman and Carmines 1997), but

since they are such a small subset of the Hispanic population, it may not make much of a

difference (2005, 3).

> *Hypothesis 8a: Hispanics, whites and blacks who attend church on a*
>
> *regular basis are more likely to vote Republican.*
>
> *Hypothesis 8b: Hispanic Catholics who see themselves as "born again"*
>
> *will be more likely to vote Democratic than those who do not.*

METHODS AND DATA

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for this paper will be the intended vote choice on election

day.[43] There are several ethnicities that are going to be studied here: whites, blacks and

Hispanics. There will be dichotomous variables for each of these groups. Whites are the

comparison group for African-Americans and Hispanics. I used the latter two groups

since they have been for a long time Democratic strongholds. Since Hispanics, have

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[43] The number of people polled on or after Election Day was so small as to drive the "n" of any of my models of whites or any minority group to a meaningless number. But there were 23,996 who said they were voting for Kerry (51.45%) and 22,640 (48.55%) of the population who were going to select Bush. For Hispanics the numbers were considerably smaller with 2,404 (66.63%) supporting Kerry and 1,204 (33.37%) supporting Bush. For blacks, there were 3,666 (91.28%) supporting Kerry with just 350 (8.72%) supporting Bush. Finally 20,896 (53.29%) supported Bush while 18,314 (46.71%) supported Kerry.

voted Republican with some regularity[44]comparing the two groups should prove helpful. A second reason to use the two in comparison to each other is that the youth vote led the South towards the Republican Party and it is important to see if a similar move has occurred among the under 35 set for Hispanic voters (Wattenberg 1991. Additionally Asians do not provide a useful comparison since they seem to vote more predominantly Republican, but will be left in the model since whites will be the group that each minority is compared to in the models.

Estimation

The hypotheses generated out of the theory above can be broken into five subsections: socio-economic variables, political interest of the respondents, religion, residency and issues. It is my contention that there will be some effects seen from the religious side as well as the youth vote.

Thus: y(vote choice) = b + b1(SES variables) + b2(Political Interest) + b3(Religion) + b4(Residency) + b5(Issues)

For my models, I use a logit regression with a dichotomous dependent variable where 1 means the intended vote choice is Bush and 0 means that the respondent is going to vote for Kerry.[45] This means that a negative coefficient on the independent variables indicates that the variable is motivating the voter to select Kerry and a positive sign leans towards Bush.

My choice of surveys is the 2004 Annenberg survey because of its richness of data. The original survey had over 54,000 respondents. After I whittled down my variables, I still had a pool of 45,806 intended voters with which to work. Of these,

---

[44] albeit a minority
[45] Other choices were thrown out of the model.

22,856 claimed they were going to vote for Kerry and 18,897 for Bush. The breakdown of the ethnic groups appears in table 2. While the "n" goes down precipitously for the ethnicities, the "n" is large enough that I can do a regression for both Hispanics and Mexicans, but none for Puerto Ricans and Cubans as the number of respondents would be less than one hundred. Thus the models will look at African-Americans, Hispanics and whites as well as Mexican and Puerto Rican Americans. There will also be a comparison model of Hispanics to all others.

[Insert Table 3.1 here]

Independent Variables

There are a number of independent variables that have been broken into several categories. For each variable the larger the value, as with the vote intention, indicates a more conservative voter. For example the religion variable starts with 1 for people who rarely go to a religious institution ranging to a 5 if they go more than once a week which would be a person who most likely adheres to the conservative agenda. The categories that are used are informed voting variables, age, residency factors, political variables and religion.

For the informed voting variables there are six measures. The first EDUCATION which is broken into nine segments starting with those who do only complete eighth grade or less =0 and going up to those who earn a graduate degree =9.[46]

Next are demographic variables. The first is for being MARRIED which is designated with a 1, otherwise it is 0. Then INCOME is broken into nine parts starting with those making less than $10,000 to those who are making $150,000+.[47] Finally there

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[46] All variables appear in capital letters. See the appendix for a breakdown of the EDUCATION levels.
[47] See the appendix for a complete list of the variables and their breakdowns.

is a variable for one's native LANGUAGE. Since not enough people answered this question, it would decrease my sample size too much. So in its place, I use language of the respondent in the interview. Since the interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish, I made the inference that the native language was Spanish if that was how the survey was conducted. Obviously there would be more people who did not fall into this category who are native Spanish speakers, but are fluent in two or more languages or people who are better at a language other than Spanish or English. Nevertheless there is some merit to gain from seeing if people who are more comfortable in a secondary language in the US are more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate. For this variable persons interviewed in English are coded 1, 0 otherwise. So, one would expect that English speakers are more likely to select Bush as a candidate as would the most educated voters, those who are the most informed, and so on.

Next I measure the AGE of the respondent and the YEARS AT SAME ADDRESS. Because Annenberg does not record how long an immigrant has been in the US, I use a measure instead tells if the respondent was BORN IN US, measured by 1, otherwise 0.

Thirdly, I created a variable to capture the INFOSCALE. This variable is a combination of multiple sources of information for the voter: television, newspaper and Internet. The person was coded 1 if he used one of these sources, 2 for two sources and 3 for all of them. Within each there were different places a person could go. For example for the television the surveyed person could have used both English and Spanish television and the same was true for the Internet and newspapers.[48]

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[48] The wording of the questions is as follows: "How many days in the past week did you watch a twenty-four hour cable news channel such as CNN, Fox News or CSNBC," "How many days in the last week did

The fourth set of variables capture religious observation. The first is a self described measure of those professing to be BORN AGAIN. I expect that these people will be more likely to vote for Republican. The second variable, RELGION, is the number of times that a person attends a religious service. Those that go more often than once a week are the most likely to vote conservatively which in keeping with the format I have laid out as a 5 going all the way down to a 1 for those who seldom go to a religious institution.[49].

The next group is made up of ideology and party identification. For IDEOLOGY those who are most conservative are coded as a 4, 3 = conservative, 2 = moderate, 1 = liberal and 0 = most liberal. The same is true for party labels. So for PARTYID this would mean that liberal Democrats and liberal Republicans are coded 0 and 6 respectively, moderates are given a 3. To these I added BUSHJOBAPPROVAL. Since it was for an incumbent president, I felt this variable would go beyond partisan identification and since my beliefs proved to be so, I keep added it to the model. [50]

Finally I control for respondents' views on several issues. Two of the most controversial are ABORTION and GAY MARRIAGE[51]. For reasons explained in the theoretical section I also added variables to capture each respondent's perception of the economy and his or her personal economic situation. For both of these measures,

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you watch the local news such as "Eyewitness News" or "Action News," "How many days in the past week did you watch news on a Spanish channels such as Telemundo or Univision, "How many days in the past week did you read a daily newspaper." If the respondent answered one or more for any of these, it was coded 1.

[49] See Table 1 for more details.

[50] The correlation between BUSHJOBAPPROVAL and IDEOLOGY was-.22 and with PARTY_ID_7PT was -.6.

[51] The question for GAY MARRIAGE is "Would you favor or oppose a Constitutional amendment saying that no state can allow two men to marry each other or two women to marry each other." The abortion question is actually made up of two questions which are as follows: "The federal government banning all abortions – do you favor or opposed the federal government doing this" and "Laws making it more difficult to get for a woman to get an abortion – do you favor or oppose this."

perceptions of "excellent" are coded 1, 2 = good, 3 = fair and 4= poor. I also included

two highly variables measures: views about abortion and gay marriage.[52]

<center>[Insert Table 3.2 here]</center>

<center>**Results**</center>

The results that appear in Table 3 both confirm findings in the literature, as well

as suggest new angles for understanding Hispanic vote choice. All of the models had a

very good pseudo R^2 ranging from .57 to .84.[53] Secondly the Chi^2 are all highly

significant indicating that I am able to reject the null hypothesis since my variables are

jointly equal to zero.

Not surprisingly voter identification is highly significant indicating that the more

partisan one is, the more likely one will vote for the party of the person you agree with

ideologically (Campbell et al. 1960; Bartels 1987). Thus, I find that a highly partisan

Democrat was more likely than a highly partisan Republican to have voted for John

Kerry.

<center>[Insert Table 3.3 here]</center>

Each of these findings apply equally to whites, African-Americans and Hispanics as well

as the subgroups of Puerto Ricans and Mexicans. Changing one's party from the most

conservative to most liberal makes a black person 33% more likely to vote for Kerry; a

white person, just 5%; Hispanics 4% and Puerto Ricans an amazing 41% more likely.

<center>[Insert Table 3.5 here]</center>

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[52] For a more descriptive statistical explanation on the variables look at Table 3.4 where you will see total number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum.

[53] See Table four for the statistics on each variable which include the total variables, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum points.

<center>65</center>

Similarly those who approve of Bush's job performance were very likely to vote for him on Election Day. As with PARTY IDENTIFICATION, there are some large changes when one moves from not approving of Bush to just the opposite Whites see a 64% increase in voting for Bush, Hispanics a 74% greater chance, blacks increase 39% and Mexicans go up 40%. Only Puerto Ricans see a modest 6% increase.

There are a number of differences from the literature, however, in my results. The most noticeable is the impact of the economy on one's vote choice. Respondents were asked their perception of the economy. Verifying other research, white voters who believed the economy was going in the positive direction indicating they were very likely to support Bush (Markus 1988; MacKuen et al. 1992). But what is surprising is that Hispanics were only statistically significant at the .05 level while blacks were at the .01 level. While surprising that they were not more statistically relevant, it was in the expected direction of supporting Bush. Those who believed the country was doing fine economically had a 21% greater chance of voting for Bush while African-Americans had a 35% better chance. Also surprising is that there is not statistically significant evidence for whites or Hispanics for those who believe that their personal economic situations are fine.[54] Only African-Americans who believe they are doing well have a statistically significant relationship to their vote with those who feel their personal situation is going well are more likely to vote for Bush. This echoes Hajnal and Lee (2008) It is also surprising, based on the literature, that only African-Americans, at a statistically significant level, voted for Bush if they thought they were doing well economically as one would expect at least whites to believe the same (Markus 1988, MacKuen et al 1992).

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[54] The result is not because they are too highly correlated as there is a .2 correlation.

Another expected result for AGE and AGE^2. AGE is both positive, significant and in the direction of voting for Bush with white voters. Thus, generally, as one got older, one was more likely to vote for the Republican choice. To look closer at this variable, I squared AGE and found the result both negative and highly significant. This means that as voters get both older and younger, they are more likely to vote for Kerry. The point at which this is occurs is age 58 for the base model and 56 for the one for whites only. Younger voters are more likely to vote for more liberal candidates so this is no surprise.

Next I had hypothesized that the more one follows the campaign news, the more likely one would vote Republican. What I found is that this was not the case and only the baseline model and Mexicans and Puerto Rican Americans compared to Cubans were significant. In both cases they had a negative coefficient indicating they would be less likely to vote for Bush. This certainly makes sense for Hispanics since they are decidedly more liberal than their Cuban brethren.

Given the literature on Hispanics and religion, it is important to look at religion and issues related to it (Johnson and White 1967, Kellstedt 1989; Wald 1990; Kosmin and Keysan 1995; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001; Hunt Calhoun-Brown 2001). Considering the literature, it is surprising that it has such a small impact on Hispanics and their votes. As one attends more religious services, Hispanics are not more likely to vote Republican. For those who are born again, both whites and blacks shows a statistical relationship to voting. There are some differences when it comes to issues that are important to those who attend religious services on a regular basis. For whites who are

against abortion[55], there is a highly significant relationship with those who voted for Bush. There was no statistically significant relationship for Hispanics or African-Americans. These results then square with Alvarez and Bedolla who found that abortion only impacted Latino voters if they were Cuban-American (2003).[56] The same finding was true for gay marriage. For whites who opposed it there was a highly significant relationship where those who were against it, were very likely to support Bush. As with abortion, there was no significant relationship for either Hispanics or African-Americans

As a final test to see if there was more of a difference in voting between Hispanics than the rest of the population, I ran an interaction model.[57] Each independent variable was interacted with Hispanics so as to allow a comparison of Latinos to all other voters. This model mostly echoed many of the individual models in that not one variable for Hispanics proved to be significantly different from the non Hispanic voters. Thus the main finding among the results is that there are very few differences in voting behavior between Hispanics in the United States and other groups, notably African-Americans and Anglo voters.

[Insert Table 3.6]

Not surprisingly considering the national origin of many Hispanic voters, there were some differences for the language used by the respondents. No question was asked for one's primary language in the Annenberg survey, but I substituted this for the

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[55] Actually the question was whether the person was in favor or against federal government spending for abortions.

[56] I ran a logit model for only Cubans-Americans and while many of the variables were dropped, religion was not and it was not significant. However, I do not believe anything can be read into this as there were only 71 people left in the survey results.

[57] To do this I hand calculated using the formulas found in Frederick (1982). The formula is the square root of Variance of X + variance of HispanicX +2(Covariance of X, HispanicX) = SE for X for Hispanics. Then the Z score was calculated by the coefficient for X and the coefficient of Hispanic X. This number was then divided by the SE to get the Z score. I then used the Z score tables to see if the number was significant.

language chosen when answering the questions. White voters who answered in English were highly likely to vote for Bush. Hispanic voters who answered in Spanish were likely, at the .05 level, to vote for Kerry. This statistical significance did not follow when Hispanics were broken into Puerto Ricans and Mexicans individually.

Conclusion

One of the major arguments in the literature (Secret et al. 1990, Hunt 1998, Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001, Ellison et al. 2005) reviewed in this chapter was that religion does have an impact on voting especially on Hispanics. Layman (1997) was wrong in predicting a difference between Catholic and Protestant voters. Kosmon and Keysan found that Protestant Hispanics are more likely to vote Republican (1990), but this was not shown to be the case in 2004. But there also were no differences found between the two denominations for white or black voters. Furthermore attendance or religious services, contrary to the findings of Kellstedt (1989) also did not have an impact on vote choice. The only perceived differences that might be attached to religion came with one's view of abortion and gay marriage where only whites who opposed each were significantly more likely to vote Republican whereas Latinos and African-Americans were not statistically moved by either of them. The only evidence that religion was connected to vote choice came from Mexican-Americans Protestants who were found to have a significant connection between their vote choices, but unlike the previous research (Burns et al. 2001, Ellison et al. 2005), it was found that these voters sided with Kerry – not Bush. The only other connection between voting and religion was found among African-Americans who considered themselves born again. These voters were, as expected, supporters of Bush.

69

There were a few other important economic differences between whites and Hispanics. First off income was not a significant indicator of voting for Hispanics or blacks, but it was for whites. Also the perception of the economy was a highly significant indicator of vote choice for whites, but less so for Hispanic and African-American voters.

The last difference was for language type. White voters who answered their survey in English were significantly likely to vote for Bush at the .001 level whereas Hispanics were only likely to at the .05 level. Language choice did not matter at all for African-Americans. Thus the differences for Hispanic voters are much smaller than were noted for getting out the vote. In some cases they act like white voters and sometimes like black ones.

Figure 3.1 Breakdown of Religious Groupings

Source: Author generated from the 2004 Annenberg Presidential Survey

Table 3.1		
Breakdown of Ethnicities for Intend to Vote		
Percent in Parentheses		
Ethnicity	Bush	Kerry
Black	368 (10)	3,350 (90)
Hispanic	1,268 (38.4)	2,032 (61.5)
White	21,101 (55)	17,389 (45)
Cuban-American	94 (57)	72 (43)
Mexican-American	689 (38)	1,105 (62)
Puerto-Rican American	124 (33)	251 (67)

Source: 2004 Annenberg Presidential Survey

Table 3.2 – Explanation of Variables

Abortion: The federal government banning all abortions—do you favor or oppose the federal government doing this? 5=Strongly favor, 4 Somewhat favor, 3 Somewhat oppose, 2 Strongly oppose, 1 Neither favor nor oppose

Age: one variable for voters going from 18 to 97 (no explanation given why 97 was the top age)

Age^2 : age squared

BornAgain: 1 = yes, 0 = no

Born US: 1 = yes, 0 = no

Bush Job Approval: 4=strongly approve, 3=somewhat approve, 2=somewhat disapprove, 1=strongly disapprove

Catholic: 1 = Yes

Collection of news (Infoscale): scaled index that looks at multiple sources of news (television, internet and newspaper) where a 3 is from all of them, 2 from just two, etc.

Current Economy: How would you rate economic conditions in this country today—would you say they are excellent, good, fair, or poor? 4 Excellent 3 Good 2. Fair 1. Poor

Current Pocketbook: How would you rate your personal economic condition in this country today—would you say they are excellent, good, fair, or poor? 4 Excellent 3 Good 2. Fair 1. Poor

Education: 1 Grade 8 or lower, 2 Some high school, no diploma 3 High school diploma or equivalent 4 Technical or vocational school after high school , 5 Some college, no degree, 6 Associate's or two-year college degree, 7 Four-year college degree, 8 Graduate or professional school, no degree, 9 Graduate or professional degree

Gay Marriage: 1 support…5= oppose

Ideology

4 Very conservative, **3**Conservative, **2** Moderate, **1** Liberal, **0** Very liberal

Income

1 Less than $10,000, **2** $10,000−$15,000, **3** $15,000−$25,000, **4** $25,000−$35,000, **5** $35,000−$50,000, **6** $50,000−$75,000

7 $75,000−$100,000, **8** $100,000−$150,000, **9** More than $150,000

Infoscale (Collection of news services): scaled index that looks at multiple sources of news (television, internet and newspaper) where a 3 is from all of them, 2 from just two, etc.

Language: 1 = English, 0 = Spanish

Married: 1=Yes, 0 = no

Party Identification (PARTYID) : 6=Strong Republican; 0=Strong Democrat

Protestant 1 = yes, 0 = no

Religion: 1=never go to a religious institution, 2 = occasionally go, 3 = once a month, 4 = go once a week, 5=go more than once a week

Years living in the US (YearsinUS): # of years, 0 to 97

Source: 2004 Annenberg Presidential Survey

Table 3.3: Impact of Variables on Vote Choice						
Independent Variable	Baseline	White	Hispanic	Black	PuertoRican	Mexican
Age	.04 (.01)***	.04 (.01)**	.43 (.36)	..00 (.05)	.2 (.17)	.08 (.06)
Age2	-.00 (.00)**	-.00 (.00)**	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)
Religion	02 (.03)	.06 (.03)	.00 (.08)	-.09 (.12)	.51 (.38)	.02 (.12)
BornUS	.71 (.15)***	.61 (.2)**	.54 (.27)	.01 (.5)	.44 (1.04)	.53 (.38)
Ideology	.27 (.04)***	.31 (.05)***	.-08 (.1)	.09 (.13)	-.00 (.44)	.17(.14)
BushApp	2.01 (.04)***	2.13 (05)***	1.7 (.11)***	1.77 (14)***	2.48 (.61)***	-1.9 (.16)***
Gay Marriage	.09 (.02)***	.1 (.02)***	-.02 (.06)	.12 (.07)	.5 (.26)	-.05 (.08)
Abortion	.12 (.022)***	.11 (.03)***	.09 (.06)	.2 (.08)	.07 (.21)	.12 (.08)
Current Economy	.44 (.05)***	.43 (.06)***	.28 (.14)*	.55 (.2)**	-.23 (.63)	.14 (.18)
Current Pocket	.03 (.05)	.02 (.05)	.18 (.14)	.09 (.3)**	-.54 (.57)	.34 (.18)
Married	.1 (.07)	.08 *.08)	-.07 (.2)	.09 (.29)	-1.31 (87)	-.02 (.28)
Income	.05 (.02)*	.05 (.02)*	-.03 (.06)	.01 (.08)	.20 (.22)	-.07 (.08)
Born Again	.19 (.08)	.19 (.09)*	.37 (.22)	.8 (.32)*	-2.09 (1.3)	.52 (.28)
Protestant	-.1 (.14)	-.18 (.16)	-.44 (.48)	-.52 (.41)	-1.92 (2.06)	-1.7 (.82)*
Catholic	-.06 (.14)	-.2.03 (.17)	-.56 (.46)	-.37 (.58)	-2.21 (1.98)	-1.4 (.8)
Education	-.02 (.02)	-.04 (.02)	-.01 (.06)	.06 (.08)	-.55 (.29)	.08 (.08)
Infoscale	-.12 (.06)*	-.12 (.06)	-.09 (.15)	-.21 (.21)	-1.32 (.7)	-.02 (.21)*
PartyID	.67 (.02)***	.67 (.02)***	.63 (.05)***	.48 (.07)***	1.48 (.44)***	.62 (.07)***
LanguageType	-.83 (.4)***	1.31 (.25)***	.71 (.31)*	-.27 (.82)	1.94 (1.73)	.54 (.41)
N	18,897	16,007	1434	1795	160	811
R^2	.76***	.83***	.61***	.57***	.84***	.59***
Chi2	19884.01***	16449.66***	1173.53***	602.72***	151.49***	642.17***

*** = .001, ** = .01, * = .05

Source: 2004 Annenberg Presidential Survey

Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables					
Variable	Observations	Mean	St Dev	Min	Max
Age	18897	47.9	16.38	18	97
Age2	18897	2564.93	1661	324	9409
Religion	18897	3.14	1.32	1	5
BornUS	18897	.93	.26	0	1
Ideology	18897	2.31	.98	0	4
BushJobApp	18897	2.37	1.26	1	4
GayMarriage	18897	2.03	1.8	0	4
Abortion	18897	1.57	1.7	0	4
CurrentEcon	18897	1.06	.81	0	3
CurrentPock	18897	1.42	.84	0	3
Married	18897	.62	.49	0	1
Born Again	18897	.45	.5	0	1
Income	18897	5.22	2.02	1	9
Protestant	18897	.65	.48	0	1
Catholic	18897	.28	.45	0	1
Education	18897	4.88	1.86	1	8
Infoscale	18897	1.82	.6	0	3
PartyID	18897	3.13	.24	0	6
LanguageType	18897	.97	.17	0	1

Table 3.5 : PR Value for the Independent Variables					
Variable	White	Hispanic	Black	PuertoRican	Mexican
Age (18 to 30)*	12%				
Age2 (324 to 900)*	5				
BornUS	13				
Ideology (0 to 4)*	30				
BushApp	64	74	39	6	40
GayMarriage	6				
Abortion	8				
CurrentEconomy	13	21	35		
CurrentPocket			4		
Income (1 to 7)*	2				
BornAgain	1		7		
Infoscale	3	4	10		1
PartyId	5	0	33	5	41
LanguageType	12	17			

Table 3.6	
Variables Interacted with Hispanic	
Independent Variable	Interaction
Age	.02 (.04)
Age2	-.00 (.00)
Religion	.01 (.11)
Born_US	.34 (.31)
Ideology	-.02 (.11)
BushApp	-1.04 (?)
Gay_Marriage	-.07(?)
Abortion	.07 (.07)
CurrentEconomy	.16 (.16)
CurrentPocket	.14 (.19)
Married	.00 (.27)
Income	-.03 (.07)
Born_again	.29 (.25)
Protestant	-.49 (.53)
Catholic	-.66 (.47)
Education	.00 (.07)
Infoscale	-.15 (.17)
PartyId	.58 (.060
LanguageTyoe	.54 (1.1)
Bushfav	.41 (.06)
Kerryfav	-.28 (.04)
N	18,880=n
R^2	.83***
*** = .001, ** = .01, * = .05	

Chapter Four

The Reality of the Hispanic Voter
Beyond Statistics; How Campaigns
Handle the Hispanic Voter

Introduction

If candidates were to listen to political scientists they might not campaign at all. Consider that many political scientists believe that a presidential election comes down to the sitting president's approval ratings and the state of the economy (Abramowitz 2004; Campbell 2004; Holbrook 2004; Wlezien and Erikson 2004). Never mind the issues of the day. If you follow the econometric models, the outcome of the election will rarely be in doubt. Some political scientists even go as far as to say that at best a presidential campaign could swing the popular vote just 3% (Marcus 1988). Following this hypothesis with George W. Bush at less than 30% approval and the overwhelming majority of Americans believing the US was going in the wrong direction, there was little need for Barack Obama or John McCain to campaign once they secured their party's nominations. To some degree, Obama mirrored this belief by keeping his focus on the economy and moving his speeches away from Iraq and health care, two of the issues he focused on during the primary campaign. Likewise McCain moved all over the ideological map from supporting government bailouts to trying to connect with the

average Joe (the Plumber) while also promoting traditional family values such as traditional marriage, and protection of unborn children.

But the reality is that candidates cannot simply give a few speeches as they did in the pre-Lincoln days and hope for the best. Few perceived in June 2008 that the economy would turn so sour after Labor Day and any candidate who chose not to campaign at that point would be perceived as weak, lazy or worse. So money is raised, groups are pursued, mistakes are made and in the end elections are perceived by the media to have been won or lost because of a few moves this way or that.[58]

After reading chapters two and three of this dissertation, it is intriguing to wonder if campaigns follow the same conclusions reached by me. For getting out the voters, do campaigns care about the relative youth of the Hispanic population or the religious split between Catholics and Hispanics? All of these are questions that I raised in the earlier chapters. Have they found Latinos are significantly less likely to vote if the advertisements are in English or that education is not significant when compared to other races, that age and income are more significant indicators of getting out to vote? When pursuing a person's vote choice have campaigns concluded that gay marriage and abortion are not significant indicators of vote choice for Hispanics or that approval of Bush's policies, partisan ideology and whether or not person speaks English are significant indicators? Or, are there other variables that come into play that are not measured by the Annenberg database?

The aim of this chapter will be to first look at the impact of Hispanics in the presidential election of 2008 as seen by the mainstream media and other mediums that

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[58] Sarah Palin, Joe the Plumber, taking the federal funds in the fall are a few of the mistakes mentioned about McCain.

make quick studies of elections. Then I will look at several campaigns in Virginia and Colorado[59] and New York City and consider the contrast between "the ivory tower" and the realities of running for office.

This chapter, then, is a reversal of the previous two as it looks at Hispanic voters from the elite level down as opposed to considering the just the voter. Will the same rules apply when one looks at voting from the top down as opposed to the other way around? To do this I interviewed a number of campaign directors from mostly federal or state wide campaigns. What I found is that many of the same conclusions that had been reached in chapter two and three for the Hispanic voter are being addressed by campaigns.

First, I will look at the 2008 presidential campaign. Hillary Clinton won the Hispanic vote in almost every primary. She beat Obama by a 2:1 margin and she easily defeated Bill Richardson (D-NM) even though he is Hispanic himself. There is much else to consider such why the Latino voter made such a quick switch from the Hillary Clinton campaign to join Barack Obama's 21st century historic journey to the White House. Furthermore, Hispanics make a very interesting study since the now famous 2004 Obama Democratic National Convention speech was not shown on either Univision or Telemundo.

Next, I will look at the New York City campaigns for Michael Bloomberg who is one of three Republicans studied in this chapter and the most successful in obtaining the Latino vote. New York City is 27% Hispanic and thus seems to be a good laboratory to see how a Republican tried, rather successfully, in 2001 to win a traditionally Democratic

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[59] As a native Virginian, my home state was an obvious choice, especially with its growing population. I chose Colorado because it also has a growing and sizable Hispanic minority and I have several connections that allowed me to contact the campaigns mentioned in this chapter.

group in a normally Democratic city. Likewise, I look at what were the elements that saw Bloomberg fair much more poorly in 2005 even though he had the advantage of being the incumbent.

From Bloomberg, I go to Virginia. While the Hispanic population is just the 16th largest in the US, it is comparatively affluent with their annual income ranking 4th in the US among Latino states. Furthermore, fully 62% have completed some or all college (Pew Hispanic Center c. 2008). All of this, of course, leads to a better than average turnout rate. Virginia is also a purple state and was so high on the target list for the Obama campaign that he finished his successful run for president in Manassas, VA. Indeed part of my discussion will focus on the plethora of spending done by Obama to woo the Hispanic population in Virginia. From a local perspective, one of the more successful Virginia Democrats has been Mark Warner (D) who ran against Jim Gilmore (R) in 2008 and will be the focus of part of this chapter. Another fascinating race was Jim Webb's (D) came from behind US Senate victory over, at the time, presidential contender, George Allen (R). These two races present contrasting efforts because Warner was always flush in cash while Webb's campaign worked not knowing where the money would come from day to day. Finally, I consider the Hispanic outreach effort for Jerry Kilgore (R) in his unsuccessful gubernatorial run against current Virginia governor, Tim Kaine (D). This also brings me back to the Obama campaign as Virginia was a "targeted" state in the 2008 presidential campaign and benefitted from a great influx of money from the Democratic National Committee.

Finally, I turn to Colorado and consider two campaigns there. Fully 20% of the state is Latino making it the 7th largest Hispanic state population in the nation.

Amazingly, it has gone from 735,601 in 2000 to 927,000 today. Thus it is not surprising that like Virginia, Colorado has been become a purple state that was targeted by Obama. The first race I study was Ken Salazar's 2004 US Senate race against Peter Coors (R), Salazar adds an additional element to this chapter because he is Hispanic. Finally, this chapter will look at Bill Ritter's (D) campaign for governor against Bob Beaupreux (R).

The 2008 Presidential Campaign

With its historic overtones, a good place to begin is the 2008 presidential campaign. While Barack Obama won the overwhelming majority of Hispanic voters, it was not an easy road to victory as Hillary Clinton won Latinos by a 2:1 margin during their heated primary contest. Indeed some of her margins were enormous such as a 63 to 35% win on Super Tuesday[60], 66 to 32% in the Texas primary, 68 to 32% in Puerto Rico and winning 73% of the Latino vote in the New York primary. This might have been because 28% of Hispanics[61] said the race of the candidate was an important factor in their (primary) vote and of those, 64% voted for Clinton. Clinton's big state strategy where she thought she could win the Democratic nomination was won in part by the Hispanic vote. For example in California and Texas, she could not have won at all without their overwhelming support. In these states the Latino vote was 30% and 32% of the Democratic turnout respectively (Minushkin and Lopez 2008).

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[60] In 2008 this included Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Missouri, New Mexico Democrats, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah and West Virginia Republicans (all others were both parties)
[61] and 13% of whites

The Primaries

Barreto et al. argue that it was less that African-Americans have had a difficult time winning the support of Latinos and more that Hillary Clinton had many factors working in her favor (2008). The authors point out that several large city mayors had won their positions with between 70 to 80% of the Latino population, notably Harold Washington (Chicago) in 1984, Wellington Webb (Denver) 1984, David Dinkins (New York City) in 1990 and Ron Kirk (Dallas) in 1996. They further claim that Clinton had her husband's advantages working for her, namely with endorsements and name recognition. In fact, by the time Obama announced his run for the presidency in early 2007, "almost all the consequential endorsements were locked up by Clinton" (Barreto et al. 2008 755). Furthermore in 2007 Hillary Clinton had a 68% approval rating among Latinos while only 7% had no opinion. Obama had 48 and 35% for the same survey responses. These numbers may be due in part to the fact that Bill Clinton left office with 80% approval among Latino voters.[62] A third reason Clinton did so well is that she outspent her rivals among Latinos and spent more time in Latino states while Obama and Latino candidate Bill Richardson were concentrating on winning Iowa and New Hampshire (Barreto et al. 2008). These reasons agree with what advertising executive Jim Learned said were the reasons why he left the Obama campaign at the end of the primary season despite believing that Obama would easily win the general election. Learned felt that the Clinton team did a much better job of identifying Hispanic voters than did Obama during the primaries (Learned 2008). Perhaps this is best shown by the fact that of the Latinos contacted by the Obama campaign, fully 58% were addressed in

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[62] This same point was made by Jim Learned in my interview with him.

English (Lopez 2009).[63] This was so partly because the Obama team incorrectly believed that everyone with a Latino surname felt an affinity with the Hispanic community. As Learned pointed out, many people with Hispanic last names have been in the United States for generations and do not feel part of the Hispanic community (Learned 2008). In fact, while 24% of the Hispanic populace obtains all of their news in Spanish, 44% get it from both English and Spanish media. Furthermore, over a period of years Hispanic immigrants slowly go from Spanish to completely using English language media (Suro 2004). The Obama pollsters also did not ask questions such as where do you get your news which was an important oversight as much of the Hispanic population gets their news from Univision. Interestingly enough, this channel did not show Obama's 2004 Democratic National Convention prime time speech that first brought him to the national stage and was another reason why he started so far behind Hillary Clinton. This is not to say the Obama team did not do anything, having spent $2 million on Hispanic outreach during the primary season, but not nearly as much as Hillary Clinton (Learned 2008).

[Insert Table 4.1 here]

The General Election

What is remarkable, though, is how quickly Obama secured the support of the Hispanic voter after winning the Democratic nomination. While the national media spent the summer of 2008 talking about how hard it would be for Obama to gain votes from women and Hispanics, Pew did a poll between June 6th and July 13th and found that Obama was already ahead of McCain 66 to 23%.[64] Of these 77% of those who voted for Hillary Clinton said they would select Obama in the general election and only 18% of her

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[63] 67% were contacted in English by the McCain campaign.
[64] 2015 Latinos were surveyed and of those 892 said they were registered.

supporters would select McCain. In fact three times as many people (32%) said that being black was a factor that would help Obama secure Latino votes as opposed to hurt him (11%). In fact 76% of Latinos in the survey saw him in a favorable light while only 44% saw McCain in this vein[65] (Lopez and Minushkin 2008).

During the summer of 2008 Latino voters went against much of the media's ideas for their top issues. For example according to the Pew survey, the top issue was education (93%), cost of living (92%), jobs (91%), and health care (90%). Well behind was crime prevention (82%), the war in Iraq (75%) and immigration issues (75%) the latter of which just two years ago was the number one issue within the Hispanic community. Even in July when the aforementioned survey was taken, the Latino community had much more faith in Obama than McCain with such wide margins as 66 to 18% for education, 65 to 19% for crime and 64 to 19% for helping with the cost of living (Lopez and Minushkin 2008).[66] To bolster these numbers the Obama campaign trained 500 Latinos over the summer of 2008 to work with securing Latino votes (Jaffe 2008). The campaign also changed their advertisements for Hispanics from immigration ones to health care and taxes on October 9th (O'Keefe 2008). The Obama campaign secured the assistance of Governor Bill Richardson (D-NM) and many other notable surrogates who had previously been locked up by Hillary Clinton. Additionally Obama started doing two weekly interviews with Latino media outlets (Dunn 2009).[67]

[Insert Table 4.2 here]

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[65] Interesting, 73% also said they viewed Hillary Clinton favorably.
[66] But, interesting enough, according to the 2004 Annenberg survey there was little difference between African-Americans and whites for their responses (Annenberg 2004).
[67] Anita Dunn was a senior advisor and chief communication advisor for Obama's presidential campaign.

Those of faith also had a quick conversion to Obama. Since much political science literature talks about the importance of religion to the Hispanic community both in getting out the vote and voting, it is important to look at the results generated by the Pew survey in the summer of 2008 (Burns et al.2001; Ellison et al. 2005; DeSipio 2005; Lee and Pachon 2005).[68] As the literature suggests and the survey backed up, Catholics were more likely to support the Democratic candidate and thus Obama secured 71% of this demographic (Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001). This is important since Latino Catholics make up 56% of the total Latino electorate.[69]

As it is well known now, when the general election results were tabulated Obama was the overwhelming victor over John McCain for Hispanic voters. Among Latinos Obama secured 66% of their vote to McCain's 32%. This support was evident in the most populace Hispanic states with it ranging from a low of 56 to a high of 76% (Minushkin and Lopez 2008) Even broken down by gender Obama did very well having secured 68% of Hispanic males and 71% of the females by late October (Zogby International 2008). In fact, Anita Dunn argued that if John McCain was not from a southwestern state, that the Obama campaign would have won Arizona in addition to New Mexico, California, Colorado, New York and Florida, all with significant Latino populations (Dunn 2009). Thus even though Obama had to fight a significant opponent in the primaries and one who had overwhelming support of the Hispanic community, he did significantly better than Senator John Kerry in the 2004 campaign

Part of Obama's victory and remarkable turn around among Hispanics might have been due to some major changes the campaign made after his nomination. To begin with,

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[68] Remembering that I did not find any notable differences between Hispanics and others from the impact of religion on voting (found in chapter two of this dissertation).

[69] There were no results for Protestants.

it was not a forgone conclusion that McCain would badly lose the Latino vote. He had fought against James Sensenbrenner's (R-WI) HR 4437 that would have made it against the law to be an illegal alien or even to give one some assistance. Furthermore McCain was a key co-sponsor of S 2611 which was seen by the Latino community as a much more reasonable reform of our immigrant legislation (Barreto et al. 2008). But, Obama's campaign team must have realized the error of their ways as noted by Learned (2008) as they poured $20 million into Hispanic outreach from early October through election day. The effort included "recruitment, registration, staffing, advertisements … (hiring) activists" who worked in New Mexico, Nevada, Colorado and Florida (the "big four" Hispanic states). As noted above Obama's efforts included a shift from immigration issues to tax and health care advertisements both on the television as well as on the radio. In fact, the Obama campaign added radio spots in North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin on October 9th. This was in addition to television and radio spots that were run in the "big four" (O'Keefe 2008).

There were also tremendous technological advancements made by the Obama team. For example the campaign raised $500 million online of which the average donation was $80. Furthermore, Obama collected 13 million e-mail addresses for which the campaign sent out 7000 messages to targeted audiences. One million people received text messages on average getting 20 per month. Two million profiles were set up on the campaign's webpage helping to set up 200,000 events, 400,000 blog post and 35,000 volunteer groups. Additionally Obama had a webpage in 15 online communities such as Facebook, MySpace and BlackPlanet (Vargas 2008). A great deal of the information was collected via these techniques which were then used for micro targeting. This technique

was first utilized by the George W. Bush campaign in 2000 and perfected in 2004 when the campaign paid Target Point $3.5 million to survey voters and match their views with their consumer spending habits (Cillizza 2007, Wayne 2008).[70] The technique takes information known about a person such as if they have a new car, credit card, what magazines they buy, etc. and using statistics forecasts how a person will vote. It can find interesting angles to win voter approval. For example, it has shown Democrats that evangelical Christians are willing to listen to pro-environment arguments that liberals might make to sway their vote (Madden 2008, Wayne 2008).

The overwhelming victory by Obama in Hispanic states, seen in Table 3, shows the great success made by the Obama team. By taking a page from the Bush 2004 campaign in targeting Hispanics and realizing that they care about the same issues as whites and African-Americans, the Obama team was able to propel him to the presidency. These conclusions are not unlike my own in chapter two where I found few differences between the different demographic voters relative to their voting patterns.

[Insert Figure 4.1 Here]

Part of Obama's turnaround success with Hispanics can be seen in one of the targeted states – Virginia. Virginia had not voted for a Democrat for president since she selected Lyndon Johnson in 1964. In fact, it has not even been close in recent years with George W. Bush garnering 54% of the vote in 2004 and 53% in 2000. But, with the $750 million that Obama raised as well as the money that flowed into the Democratic National Committee (DNC), the campaign was able to target Virginia as one of the key states from

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[70] While there are many bloggers in the "blogosphere" that have no concrete evidence, a large number also are viewed as an additional source of important news. In some cases, as with Chris Cillizza, he has been hired by the *Washington Post* to try to increase readership online. Many of his stories are featured as prominent links on http://www.washingtonpost.com.

the onset of the campaign. That meant that roughly $7 million was transferred from the DNC to the Virginia Democratic Party (VDP) that in turn was used mostly for staff salaries and offices with the Obama campaign having set up 70 across the state (Storey 2009)[71].

Identifying and connecting with Hispanic voters was one of the targets of the coordinated campaign between the state of Virginia's Democrats and Obama. To identify Hispanics, the campaign continued their method of using surnames to cast someone as Latino as well as cultivating lists the Virginia party had identified from previous campaigns. They also utilized a number of Latino leaders who volunteered as soon as Obama had won the nomination. Leaders such as Walter Tejada (D), a supervisor from Arlington County, were utilized to get the campaign's workers into cultural events and introduce them to others who might help or at least spread information on Obama. One of the people who was also used as a surrogate for Obama was Tim Kaine (D), the current governor of Virginia, who while not Hispanic did live in Honduras for a year and speaks fluent Spanish. Also, while the coordinated campaigns did not do any advertisements on religion, they had Kaine speak about his devotion to religion, although he never mentioned that he is Catholic. Also helping to increase Latino interest in the campaign were appearances by Bill Richardson (D-NM), the first serious Hispanic candidate to ever run for president as well as both Hillary and Bill Clinton once their primary challenges were concluded (Storey 2009).

The message to Hispanic voters was no different than the ones transmitted to African-American and white voters. Change was the top campaign theme followed by the economy and ending the eight years of George Bush. The message was not targeted

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[71] Levar Storey is the current executive director of the VA Democratic Party.

for a specific age or gender. No advertisements were run on Spanish on television, although Spanish language radio spots were run as well as a mail piece describing Kaine's devotion to his religion (Storey 2009).

Virginia – US Senate Campaigns of 2006 and 2008
and the Gubernatorial Race of 2005

The Obama campaign was an outlier in modern elections. The $750 he raised was more than three times the amount that Bush and Kerry raised in 2004 and even adding in the $75 million the US government gave them for the general election, there was no comparison. Not every campaign can thus spend millions on Hispanic outreach. Indeed not every federal campaign even raises millions of dollars. A case in point is the 2006 senate campaign of Jim Webb (D) who started as a dark horse among Democrats and ended up toppling the Republican front runner for president, George Allen (R).

While Hispanic voters make up 6% of all Virginia voters, ranking the state 16th in the nation for Hispanics as a percentage of the population, it is still a good state to consider when looking at efforts to target Latinos. The younger voters[72] make up 31% of the population as opposed to the national norm of 21%. In comparison African-Americans are 25% and whites just 19% for the same category. The demographic is also fairly well educated with 62% having gone to or finished college as opposed to the national mark of 58%. Salary wise they are also fairly affluent as 48% make $75,000 or more a year compared to 43% which is the average for all eligible Virginia voters (Pew Hispanic Center c. 2008).

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[72] Termed as 18 to 29.

Jim Gilmore (R) vs. Mark Warner (D) - 2008

Looking at the data above, there is clearly some reason to believe that campaigning with an emphasis on Hispanics in Virginia might make some sense, but there are other reasons why this might not always come to fruition. One example of this occurred in the 2008 US Senate race between former governors Jim Gilmore (R) and Mark Warner (D). The victor, Mark Warner, was never behind in the race, ultimately winning 63 to 37%. Almost as importantly, Warner raised $13.6 million compared to Gilmore's paltry $2.7 ("Total Raised: Virginia Senate opensecrets.org 2008). According to Warner campaign director, Mike Henry, the disparity was so great that no advertisements were run on television until the final two weeks of the campaign and the campaign even cut back on the advertisements they originally planned. Thus, it is not too surprising to know that the only Hispanic advertising that was used was on the radio as opposed to television and mail pieces (Henry 2008). Having already explored a run once for president, Warner not surprisingly wanted to spend his money helping other candidates to raise his image nationwide and curry the support of potential future supporters. Thus even though Virginia has a number of Hispanic voters the dynamics of Warner's overwhelming victory made it so that he did not have to concentrate on the Latino population..

George Allen (R) vs. Jim Webb (D) - 2006

An entirely different dynamic was at hand with the 2006 US Senate campaign between Jim Webb (D) and the incumbent George Allen (R). Webb was such a dark

horse that he had served as Ronald Reagan's Assistant Secretary of the Navy and as a Republican had publicly supported Allen in his 2000 race. So in the 2006 primary, Webb was clearly the more conservative of the two Democrats running and was a surprise primary pick considering that the liberal candidate usually wins. In fact Webb's Democratic opponent, Harris Miller was not only more liberal, but by far the better financed candidate outspending Webb by 3:1 with Harris raising $1.7 million (Shear 2006; "Total Raised and Spent" Opensecrets.org 2006). Nevertheless, Webb still won with 53.5% of the vote. After the primary, and nearly out of money, running against what most news services termed was the front runner for the Republican nomination for president, very few gave Webb a chance to win his race. Yet win Webb did with 49.6% of the vote in part because of Allen's "macaca" comment that was seen by most to be a racial slur against an Indian-American University of Virginia student who filmed the comment and put it on http://www.youtube.com. With such low expectations, there was little money for the Webb campaign[73] until an infusion by the Democratic Campaign Senatorial Committee very late in the race. This money came very late as Webb did not surpass Allen in the polls until October 27th ("2006 Virginia Senate General Election: Allen (R) vs Webb (D) Pollster.com).

With so many Hispanics living in Northern Virginia, Webb would ideally have liked to have had a vigorous outreach during his campaign. Because of the lack of funds, Webb campaign director Jessica VanDen Berg said that not only was the campaign on a shoestring budget, but there was initially no money for advertisements on television and few mail pieces were sent to anyone, much less a targeted campaign for Hispanics. Only

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[73] Of the $8.5 million for Webb, 87% of which came from individuals and only 7% from PAC contributions. Allen raised $16.9 million of which 70% came from individuals and 19% from PAC contributions ("Total Raised and Spent" Virginia Senate 2006 opensecrets.org).

with six weeks left in the campaign was Larry Bryne[74] hired to reach out to the Latino

community (VanDen Berg 2008). Because Webb had written some controversial

opinions on immigration, Byrne's first task was to meet with Walter Tejada (D), the

chairman of the Arlington Board of Supervisors and the only elected Hispanic official in

Northern Virginia and a dozen other Hispanic leaders. The leaders decided to target

Northern Virginia, Harrisonburg and Virginia Beach with the emphasis being on Fairfax,

Arlington and Prince William Counties, all of which have high Hispanic populations.[75]

Much of the effort was limited to low budget items such as several public events that

gave Webb a chance to clear the air and get his views correctly into the Hispanic

community. Some of the issues he discussed were economic fairness and education,

especially since the community was upset that many of them were not considered

Virginia residents even though they had lived there all of their lives. The Webb

campaign did not identify any Hispanic only issue and indeed even found support for

both sides of the immigrant debate. The campaign also translated literature into Spanish

and distributed them in Hispanic communities. As with the Obama campaign's

identification of Hispanic voter, the campaign used a computer that looked at voter files

to identify members of the Latino community using more common surnames. Part of this

outreach included "robocalls" with messages from Tejada. No mail pieces were ever sent

out in a targeted way to Hispanics. Of the $8.9 million raised by Webb only $10,000 was

used for Hispanic outreach (Byrne 2008). So in the end, it was not that Hispanic outreach

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[74] Bryne is the husband of Leslie Byrne who is a former state delegate, state senator and was Virginia's first female member of the US House of Representatives.
[75] Fairfax has a Hispanic population of 11.03% (American Fact Finder), Prince William's is 9.74% (American Fact Finder), Arlington has 18.62% (Arlington County Planning Divisionhttp://www.arlingtonva.us/Departments/CPHD/planning/data_maps/pdf/Profile2006PreviousYear.pdf ("Profile 2006").

was not needed, but rather that most of the money raised did not come until the end of the campaign and then was used for paid television advertisements in English.

Jerry Kilgore (R) vs. Tim Kaine (D) - 2005

In January of 2009, President-elect Obama selected Governor Tim Kaine (D) to be the head of the Democratic National Committee. It capped a remarkable rise for the one time mayor of Richmond. Tim Kaine did not jump into the Lieutenant Governor's race until just eleven months to go in the 2001 election and only because the Democratic favorite, state senator Emily Couric (D-Charlottesville), had died a few months earlier of cancer. His win, along with Mark Warner's election as governor, marked the first two statewide victories by Democrats since 1993. In 2005 Kaine followed his first statewide campaign up with an election to the governor's mansion winning by a margin of 52 to 46% which was an even more stunning defeat knowing that Jerry Kilgore (R) had won more votes as the victorious Attorney General candidate in 2001 than Mark Warner did on top of the ticket.

In a race where the margin of victory was not close and in a state where Hispanics are 6% of the electorate, no one would say the Latino vote was the decisive difference in the gubernatorial election, but Kaine did win the group in overwhelming fashion. There were several reasons that the Kaine campaign was able to capitalize in such a large fashion on the Latino vote, though. To begin with Kaine had lived as a Peace Corps worker in Honduras for a year and consequently speaks fluent Spanish. He also talked about his religion faith in a move calculated to win more conservatives. He straddled the

fence by saying he was personally against abortion, but if elected would support the laws of the US and allow abortions to be performed in VA.

Initially, though, the Kilgore campaign did make some minimal efforts at winning Hispanic support by forming a working group that made a campaign appearance with the candidate and issued a number of press releases touting the Latino support for Kilgore. . Campaign director Ken Hutcheson felt that doing much more to woo Latinos was not worth the time or money and thus no advertisements were shown on Spanish television channels, nor mail sent out to Latino voters. While Hutcheson did briefly toy with the idea of having Kilgore learn Spanish, he ultimately abandoned the idea fearing it would come across as less than genuine (Hutcheson 2009). In fact, the Kilgore campaign ultimately decided to go entirely the other direction running advertisements on television touting Kaine's support of public monies for the building of a day labor center in Herndon and giving in-state tuition to illegal aliens wanting to go to Virginia's universities (Kessler 2006). Just as it did nationally, those who were perceived to be on the side of illegal aliens being treated more fairly were rewarded with the Latino vote with an overwhelming 84% going to Kaine (Center for Politcs 2005).

New York City Mayoral Race of 2001 and 2005

Michael Bloomberg (R-New York City) ran a much different Republican candidacy for mayor of New York City than did Jerry Kilgore in Virginia. His Democratic candidate in 2001, by a narrow margin, was Mark Green who had defeated Freddy Ferrer. The general election was an incredibly expensive race with the billionaire Bloomberg self financing his campaign with $74 million (Hicks 2005) while Green spent

$12 million (Reaves 2001). Even then, Bloomberg barely won the race, spending an average of $92.60 for each of the 744,757 votes he received. As of October 23, 2001, he had spent staggering sums in all areas of the campaign, with $8.4 million on television, $6.4 million on polls and $9.6 million on mail pieces (Cooper 2001).

Part of the reason for Bloomberg's 2001 success was his ability to capture the Hispanic vote where he received 100,000 votes (Latino Vote 2001) which represented 47% of the Hispanic electorate. In comparison, his Republican predecessor Rudy Giuliani tallied just 43% of the Latino vote whereas Democrats David Dinkins, in 1997 and Ruth Messinger, in 1997, received 64 and 57% of the Hispanic vote (Ojito 2001). Admittedly part of the Hispanic support for Bloomberg may have been because of "a racially divisive primary between Mr. Ferrer and Mr. (Mark) Green that left many Hispanic voters alienated" from their primary (Rutenberg 2005). Indeed there was a drop off of Hispanic voters coming out for the general campaign.

For the campaign team working with Bloomberg in 2001, it was no surprise that they would do as well as they did among Hispanic voters. He had to do well among Hispanics since 27% of the city was Hispanic in 2000 ("Latinos by Geography" 2009). To begin with Bloomberg speaks fluent Spanish, albeit with a poor accent, and even today has a tutor come to his home every weekday morning to work on his language skills. In fact, in his very first campaign advertisement Bloomberg talked entirely in Spanish. At no point in the commercial was there any mention of campaign issues. While he is far from Hispanic, this is a fact not lost on the community which appreciated his efforts to bond with the Latino community. But, even then Bloomberg did not spend extravagantly on the Hispanic votes with just $1.3 million spent on outreach and

advertising combined. Only a few focus groups were conducted and no money was spent on Hispanic polling (Learned 2008).

The 2005 election was a different one for Bloomberg in terms of the Hispanic community. Once again he spent an extraordinary amount of his own money, tallying $77.8 million to Freddy Ferrer's (D) $9.5 million (Hicks 2005). Despite being the incumbent, the election was no runaway with one Quinnipiac poll showing Bloomberg behind 39 to 47% in March (Temple Raston b. 2005). The big difference was that since Ferrer is a Puerto Rican American and in a city where twenty-seven percent of the population is Hispanic, the race dynamics were different. Ferrer played to this element repeating to voters that if elected he would be the first Hispanic mayor of New York City while pounding a "two New Yorks" theme pitting the wealthy against the working and middle classes (Moore 2005). Not surprisingly one of Bloomberg's consultants admitted, the campaign did not expect to do as well with the Hispanic community, but as early as mid May[76] put up $1 million of Spanish speaking advertisements again featuring the mayor speaking his Boston twanged Spanish (Temple-Raston a. 2005).

Encouraged by their 51% tally of Hispanic voters in 2001, the campaign team ran a series of unique advertisements to try to stem the loss of votes to Ferrer. To begin with Bloomberg campaigned to unite all Latinos, knowing that there are many subgroups living in New York City. To this end, the campaign ran many "feel good" advertisements with local Hispanics talking about their experiences all in Spanish. For example, two brothers from Peru were featured in one spot talking about the construction company they started. Another commercial featured two people discussing the improvements in their neighborhood under Bloomberg. Interestingly enough none of the

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[76] The election was in November.

advertisements were scripted and none had any appearance from Bloomberg. This was a calculated move since Hispanics have few elected officials to look up to and instead look to leadership from people such as doctors, teachers and other local community leaders. A third advertisement was simply video shots of people with a popular song, "Puerto Rican Power" playing in the background.[77] No advertisements mentioned religion, nor were the advertisements tailored to any age group. In the end Bloomberg's Hispanic outreach was greatly hurt by Ferrer as the mayor lost the Latino vote by 59 to 41%, a significant drop from 2005 (Learned 2008). So did the advertisements matter? Considering the previous Democratic majorities among Hispanic voters mentioned above, there was little change from previous non Bloomberg elections. What was different was the fact that Ferrer was Hispanic. Perhaps, though, the emphasis on Latino advertisements helped stave off a worse result.

Colorado – US Senate and Gubernatorial Campaigns, 2004 and 2006

An even better state to study for its Latino population is Colorado. The Hispanic population is 927,000 strong and makes up 20% of the state's population making it the 7th largest Latino percentage in the US. Of these 30% are foreign born and as with the most densely populated Hispanic states the median age is young with an average of just 27. Fully fifty-eight percent of Latinos speak a language other than English at home ("Demographic Profile of Hispanics in Colorado" 2006). The group is also increasing at an amazing rate having had just 735,601 in the 2000 US Census survey (US Census 2000).

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[77] The advertisements can be seen at http://elevation-us.com/ by clicking on "Videos" and then "Mayor Bloomberg." The ads ranged from 15 to 60 seconds.

Ken Salazar (D) vs. Pete Coors (R) 2004 US Senate Race

In 2004 Colorado Attorney General Ken Salazar (D) defeated beer producer Peter Coors (R) to win the Colorado US Senate seat vacated by former Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R). Salazar raised and spent $9.9 million with 79% coming from individuals and 10% coming from Political Action Committees PAC). Coors raised $7.6 million with 66% coming from individual contributors and 17% from PAC donations. Combined, the money they raised made the race the most expensive US Senate race in Colorado history. In the end, it was a fairly close election with the Democrat replacing the outgoing Republican Campbell with 50 to 47% of the vote ("Total Raised and Spent" opensecrets.org 2004). In winning his race, Salazar became the first Hispanic member of the senate since 1977.

Ken Salazar's family goes back twelve generations from when the Spanish came to North America and have been in Colorado for the last five generations. Therefore, he is a rare Hispanic politician to win a statewide race making the Hispanic outreach different from all others studies here except Ferrer. Ferrer suffered, though, from not only running against an incumbent, but also one who spent more than any mayoral candidate in New York City history   Salazar, furthermore, had a very compelling story that connected well to the Latino community as he grew up very poor and lived with his eight other siblings in the very small town of Manassa, CO.

The Salazar campaign used a two-tiered approach to connect to the Hispanic community. First his story was told on television and radio advertisements. The Denver

affiliate of Univision was used as was radio in Pueblo, Denver and Ft. Collins.[78] The

campaign also made itself available to those mediums for interviews as they did to the

Spanish newspapers of LaVoz and El Senanario. The aim of this outreach was to tell his

life story that included the up from his bootstraps story as well as to describe his religious

devotion. Since the majority of Hispanics are Catholic[79] the campaign used his faith to

sell his candidacy by describing the importance of his faith growing up in Manassa as

well as his continuing commitment to his current parish. The advertisements also

described the fact that while he is pro-life, he believed it was up to "a woman and her

God." [80] However, the advertisements when dealing with issues were decidedly ones that

were not limited to the Hispanic community – as was seen in the Bloomberg, Kaine and

Obama campaigns. To this end the media campaign centered on education, jobs and

giving everyone the chance to make it in America (Carpenter 2009).[81]

Salazar's heritage and his timing gave him some other advantages. He grew up in

a multi-lingual family and with his Latino heritage was easily able to reach out to

Hispanic leaders. For example, Rueben Valdez, a former Speaker of the Colorado House

of Representatives, was recruited to work full time for the campaign for six months.

Valdez coordinated the outreach to the Latino community that included a large get out the

vote effort (GOTV) calling potential voters, knocking on doors and attending community

events not unlike how the Webb campaign utilized Arlington, VA Supervisor Walter

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[78] According to the New Democratic Network, Univision (and its affiliates) is watched more in prime time than ABC, NBC, CBS or FOX among 18-34 year olds for 31 nights during the year. They also estimate that 80% of Hispanics watch at least some television in Spanish (NDN Hispanics Rising 2007).
[79] See chapter two of this dissertation.
[80] In a state that has only recently swung to the left, this is an important distinction and an attempt to get it both ways a distinction which would have been important for some Democrats since Peter Coors was pro-Life both in his beliefs and his legislative outlook. Salazar's views are the exact same as was used by Kaine in his gubernatorial campaign.
[81] Carpenter was the campaign director for Salazar.

Tejada (D) (Carpenter 2009). Additionally, political consultant Jon Hutchings estimates that about $1.2 million was spent between the Democratic National Committee and the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee[82] for the GOTV effort. This money could not be used to directly help Salazar, but the simple act of recruiting new Democrats to vote would help Salazar on election day (Hutchins 2009).

The work of the Coors' campaign was not unlike the efforts of the Salazar campaign even though it knew Salazar had many advantages in the Hispanic community. As the first Coloradan Hispanic elected statewide, it would have been easy to choose not to target the Latino community as was done by the Kilgore campaign in Virginia. This was especially true since fellow Coloradan Tom Tancredo (R) had recently made himself a national reputation for speaking out against illegal aliens as a member of the US House of Representatives. Even though the Coors campaign did not associate itself with him, many Latinos assumed that since they were both Republicans, their views must be the same (Tonner 2009).[83]

Building on the 2002 re-election effort of Bill Owens (R) who garnered 48% of the Hispanic vote, the Coors campaign, despite their noted disadvantages were convinced this important demographic would continue to bring in voters. To this end, the campaign targeted the top 2000 Hispanic surnames and then cut down this list by looking for those who voted in gubernatorial elections[84] and further winnowed the list down by seeing if the people had voted in Republican primaries or given donations to the Republican Party. Furthermore in an early example of the micro targeting used so successfully by George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004 and Obama in 2008, the campaign identified areas slightly

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[82] This is in addition to the $9 million raised by the campaign.
[83] Tonner was the campaign director for Coors.
[84] As opposed to just federal ones.

larger than precincts that had concentrations of Hispanic voters and sent mailers to these areas. Finally, as I found in chapter three, the campaign targeted Hispanics who were regular church goers believing they were more likely to vote Republican (Tonner 2009).

Once identified as Hispanic voters likely to support Coors, a variety of techniques were used to reach these voters. About $500,000 was used for Spanish and bilingual advertisements on television, radio, and ones sent through the mail. Several prominent Hispanic leaders including former state representatives Juan Trujillo and Larry Trejillo were used to deliver the messages. As every other campaigns mentioned in this chapter, the issues used for the Latino voter were the same as for other groups: smaller government, family values, national security and abortion (Tonner 2009).

Bill Ritter (D) vs. Bob Beauprez (R) – Gubernatorial Race – 2006

In 2006 Democrat Bill Ritter (D) defeated Congressman Bob Beauprez (R) for the right to be Colorado's governor. His race was very different than Salazar's though for several reasons. To begin with, Ritter is white and has no ethnic connection to the Hispanic community. Furthermore, as noted above, the Latino community in Colorado is growing exponentially having added over 200,000 between 2000 and 2006. But, as Jim Learned noted with the Hispanic population during the Obama primaries, just because one is Hispanic does not mean there is going to be a natural tie between all people of that shared ethnicity (Learned 2008). While predominately Mexican, there are many other central and South American people who have immigrated to both the United States and Colorado, so connecting the groups with one another cannot easily be done. This fact is very different from older Hispanic states such as California, New Mexico and Texas

where the Hispanic culture has assimilated and has a distinct cultural identity (Hutchins 2009).[85]

Ritter also had some other disadvantages that Salazar did not have to face. For example, Ritter had a much smaller budget with which to work having only raised $4 million. His Hispanic outreach was only 10% of Salazar's and his Spanish language television and radio advertisements were slightly less than $100,000. Part of this reason was because the immigration issue was peaking in both Colorado and the nation. The Hispanic voters perceived Beauprez as being on the wrong side of the issue for choosing not to forgive illegal aliens for coming to the US. All of this led to a 57 to 40% victory for Ritter.

Conclusion

It is not easy for a political scientist used to quantitative data to garner conclusions from interviews. Even with the numerous interviews presented in this chapter the "n" is still too small to make definitive empirical conclusions about Hispanics in campaign races. Nonetheless there is still some substantial learning to be done. With the millions of dollars spent on statewide and national campaigns, political scientists cannot ignore the nature of campaigns and in particular the role of outreach made by candidates to the growing Latino electorate, especially since so many of the actions taken by the campaigns mentioned here match the findings found in chapters two and three of this dissertation.

A commonality between the campaigns mentioned here and the findings in chapters two and three is that the economy holds a vital role in campaigns and literature, whether it is for the state of the US's economy or each person's personal financial

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[85] Hutchins was a campaign consultant for Salazar and Ritter.

situation (Markus 1988, MacKuen et al 1992). Likewise, in a recent study by the Pew Hispanic Center, it was found in early 2009 that the top issue was the economy among Latinos followed by education, health care and only then in fourth, national security (Lopez 2009).[86] Thus, it is not surprising that Obama, Bloomberg and others used the economy as their top issue to the voters be they Hispanic or not. If anything this reinforces the belief of political scientists that campaigns do not have a significant advantage except in a close race.

Another commonality was that the issues were the same for Hispanics as they were for all groups. This was the case for the Democrats: Webb, Warner, Kaine, Salazar, Obama, Ritter and the Republicans: Coors and Bloomberg. This was especially shown in the 2008 campaigns when immigration had fallen out of the top five issues that Latino voters cared about on Election Day.

Third, a significant finding in chapter two was that if a Latino speaks English there was a much better chance that the person was going to get out and vote. Recognizing this limitation, Kaine, Salazar, Bloomberg, Obama and Clinton used Spanish language advertisements to try to better motivate the Hispanic voter. Each of these campaigns as well as Webb furthered this effort by using Spanish speaking surrogates to go to local political events in an effort to increase this group's willingness to show up on Election Day.

Next was the finding from chapter three that religion does matter. As with the survey results I found, Kaine and Salazar were very personal in their religious outreach to both Hispanics and the population at large. Literature suggests that evangelicals, who are more often conservatives, vote Republican (Layman 1997). So in a sense they played

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[86] Immigration ranked 7th.

both sides by stating their personal pro-life support, but also stating that it was an individual woman's right to choose an abortion or not, thus hoping to woo political conservatives to their side using the abortion issue. Using the 2004 Annenberg data as a guide, this was probably a wise move since 42% of Hispanics favored making abortion harder to obtain while 49% were opposed to it, thus showing a fairly even split amongst Latinos.

The reality, though, is despite the similarity of my findings and the actions of campaigns mentioned above, Latinos cannot always be successfully targeted. Bloomberg (R), despite his millions only spent a fraction on Latino outreach in his first election, though did much better than when he spent millions more during his second election. In that case, the presence of a Hispanic opponent seemed to minimize the effects of the outreach. Likewise, Webb (D) would have liked to have spent more money on Latinos, but the week to week nature of his dark horse candidacy meant he had little money for any group much less Hispanics until late October when the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee sensed a pick-up victory and started funneling money towards Webb. Likewise, fellow Democrat, Bill Ritter, spent far less on Hispanic outreach than did fellow Coloradan Ken Salazar (D) because in a non-presidential year there was less interest in the campaign and therefore less money which could be raised.

The message here is that since political scientists study in depth surveys just as campaigns study polls there are some similarities in the findings. Whether or not a campaign can capitalize on these, though, depends on many items such as the ethnicity of the candidate, the money raised by the campaign and national issues of the day.

Figure 4.1 Hispanic Democratic Support in the 2004 and 2008 Presidential Elections

Source: Lopez, Mark Hugo. 2008. "The Hispanic Vote in the 2008 Election. "PEW Hispanic Center. http://pew hispanicreports.98.pdf (Nov 5) Accessed in December 2008.

☐ 2004 ■ 2008

Table 4.1: Hispanic Primary Results in Key States						
Date	State	Winner	Victory Margin (all voters)	%o of Latino Vote	Clinton Latino Vote	Obama Latino Vote
Jan 19	NV	Clinton	6	15	64	23
Feb 5	AZ	Clinton	9	18	55	41
Feb 5	CA	Clinton	9	30	66	32
Feb 5	IL	Obama	32	17	49	50
Feb 5	NJ	Clinton	10	12	68	30
Feb 5	NM	Clinton	36	35	62	36
March 4	TX	Clinton	4	32	66	32
June 1	PR	Clinton	36	100	68	32

Sources: Barreto et al. 2008, "Clinton Captures Nevada," "Clinton Rolls to an Easy Win in Puerto Rico." "Hispanics Give Clinton Crucial Wins," 2008 National Election Pool state exit polls. *CO not included since Obama did not contest the state.

Table 4.2: The Most Important Issues: 2004						
Ethnicity	Economy	Education	Iraq War	National Security	Personal Economics	Immigration
Hispanics	17	5	19	9	13	3
Whites	17	4	15	3	8	1
Blacks	17	5	20	13	9	.3
2004 National Annenberg Election Survey						

Chapter Five

Concluding Thoughts

This dissertation began by discussing the fact that the Hispanic population in the United States is growing faster than any other demographic group. Not only that, but as the youngest ethnicity in the nation, it promises to be an electoral force throughout the 21st century. Studying Latinos has thus become a necessary exercise and knowing whether they follow the same theories as do other ethnicities, notably African-Americans and whites is imperative. Just because a group is a different ethnicity does not mean that it will follow different theories for getting to the polls and likewise for vote choice. But Hispanics offer several notable exceptions to the two other aforementioned groups. What led me to initially believe that there would be differences is because they have a very high percentage of young voters; a large percentage of immigrants and many do not speak English or speak it as a secondary language. This last issue is especially important since most white and African-Americans speak English as their primary language and thus may encounter fewer of the educational obstacles to voting faced by Hispanics. Thus I began this dissertation to try and see whether new theories would apply. In the end, I found that while many of the same ones do work with the Latino electorate this is not true across the board.

GETTING OUT TO VOTE

The literature for Hispanic turnout has been growing in recent years, but is still not nearly as extensive as ones for whites or even African-Americans. One of the problems is that Hispanics until 1972 were labeled as Mexican-Americans, even if they were not from that country. They were also too small a group to be included in most surveys. While surveys today typically label them more correctly as Hispanics or Latinos, it was not until the 1990s that political scientists were able to find data sets that were large enough to find statistically reliable results. Consequently Hispanic literature has been recently producing a number of articles looking more closely at Latino voters, although many have had shortcomings. Some such as Tam Cho (1999) included one's native language and whether the person was native born, while Arvizu and Garcia (1996) added in a variable for the number of years one has been in the United States. Verba, Schlozman, Brady and Nie added in the mostly overlooked element of church attendance and turnout (1993). But none of the studies put all these elements together and all of them either looked at Hispanics as an independent variable or ran separate models for each of the races being studied.

Thus I developed models to combine many of these elements into separate models looking at individual races. But I also included a model that interacted Hispanics and the independent variables when compared to other races. Some of my results were not surprising as I found that socioeconomic variables such as education was significant for Hispanics and the two comparative groups and likewise that income proved to be statistically significant, albeit only for Hispanics and whites. Another result that was not surprising was that the longer one stayed at the same address, the more likely the person

108

was to vote. This showed that residential stability in one's community shows that one will become more involved, even if just at the level of voting. Likewise, having English as one's primary language, served more as a motivator to voting no matter one's race. Obviously this is a factor that works against the Hispanic community since so many speak English as a second language.

An unexpected result based on my hypotheses was that the younger voters were not more of a force in getting and voting. Certainly the literature would have predicted this, but with a much higher percentage of younger voters who speak English, I had expected a different result assuming incorrectly that they would be more aware of elections as a result of going to American schools and generally be more immersed in our culture than their parents.

The most interesting results, though, came when I ran the Latino variable as an interaction with the independent variables. When compared to all other voters, as party strength increased Latinos were found to be more likely than other races to get out and vote. Likewise as one's income and age increase they are also more likely to get to the polls on Election Day. Having a positive view of the nation's economics and one's personal economic situation also makes Hispanics more likely than other groups to get out on Election Day. This is extremely important as it signals that as Latinos take on more leadership roles in the United States and achieve more economic success they will be more of a force to be reckoned with by candidates. If Hispanics answered the Annenberg survey in English, they were also more likely to get out and vote as were those who were more informed of the campaigns. Campaigns have tuned into this fact as shown in Chapter Four by advertising in Spanish. With the increasing viewership of

Telemundo, Univision and Hispanic radio channels more and more Latinos will be reached in the future. Based on my findings one assumes that coupled with increasing interest by campaigns in the Latino voter, that their attendance will show a marked improvement in the future.

VOTE SELECTION

In my third chapter, as with the second, I found some results that bolstered the existing literature for all groups. To this end those who were extremely partisan were more likely to vote with the corresponding candidate of their ideology. Those who were older were more likely to vote for Bush and younger for Kerry. This was found to be true whether the voter was Hispanic, white or African-American.

There were several surprising results. First off, one's perception of the economy was highly significant for whites, but not as much for blacks and barely significant for Hispanic voters[87] (Markus 1988; MacKuen et al. 1992). Another surprising result given my hypotheses was that religion was not more of a force in vote selection for Latinos. Indeed only the independent variable for "born again" had a significant impact – and that was only for black and white voters. None of the voters saw a significant impact from going to a religious institution, nor if they were Protestant. Even issues such as gay marriage or abortion that might be contrived as being close to religion did not have an impact on the Latino voter. Those white voters who were pro-life as well as those against gay marriage were very likely to have voted for Bush. What is surprising is that this had no impact on Latinos. Clearly some future analysis still needs to be done to pursue

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[87] .001 for whites and 05 for the others

religion and voting as too much of the literature, as I presented in Chapter Three, indicates that there should be a positive correlation.

CAMPAIGNS AND THE LATINO VOTER

How all of my results above impacts campaigns is an important question to consider. While political scientists wait for new data such as the next Annenberg survey to be published, political campaign teams are already readying for the 2010 federal elections. The Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee has already run advertisements against Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) in his home state and former vice-presidential candidate Sarah Palin (R-AK) has established a new "SarahPAC" to finance her travels across the country and support of candidate, a necessary first step as she moves towards her goal of securing the Republican presidential nomination in 2012. But even though campaigns are not waiting for political scientists, my research shows that my findings are echoed in campaigns. For example after looking at the 2008 presidential race and primaries as well as three races in Virginia and Colorado and the 2001 and 2005 mayoral races in New York City, I found a number of commonalities between campaigns and political science. To begin with the top issue of the 2008 campaigns was the economy as the literature predicts election after election (Markus 1988, MacKuen et al 1992). While no campaign team is going to not campaign, challengers are wise to talk about the economy in poor times as did Barack Obama (D), the de facto challenger did in 2008. In fact, taking this further, Al Gore (D), the de facto incumbent in 2000, would have been wise to talk about the strength of the economy rather than trying to run away from that issue and his association with President Bill Clinton (D).

Another significant finding of mine that tied to political campaigns was that using English as one's first language made the person more likely to vote. Knowing this campaigns are trying to solve this problem, as I found with my interviews by running advertisements in both English and Spanish. My research showed that when compared to all other voters, Hispanics are more likely to vote when they are aware of a campaign. Thus advertising as the Democratic and Republican campaigns in Colorado did on television and radio probably played a significant role in getting predominantly Spanish speaking voters to the polls. Of course, my research has shown that other than the economy which had a significant impact on the vote in 2004, there was no other issue that resonated with all Hispanics in a significant way as did abortion and gay marriage with white voters. There were a number of other issues that I did not pursue beyond those mentioned in Chapter Three as they pushed my sample of Latino voters to too small a number to be studied. But future research with more combined data might find it useful to look further at issues and their motivations of the Hispanic voter to see if they are motivated differently than white and African-Americans.

FUTURE RESEARCH

So what more can be done with future analysis? To begin with it would be interesting to look at individual states that have high percentages of Hispanic voters, perhaps the top ten most populated ones in the country would be a start. With the release of the 2008 Annenberg data later this year, it would be possible to combine the 2000, 2004 and 2008 to get enough data to make further conclusions at such a micro level of analysis. The idea would be to see if Latinos in states that have much higher populations

are indeed different than states where Hispanic populations are much lower. This might test the theory that Cubans in Florida are different, in part, because they are in such a contained environment. Since 75% of Puerto Ricans are in New York, the same conclusions could be applied for a group on the opposite end of the political spectrum.

A second element of future research would be to isolate different groups such as Puerto Ricans, Mexicans and depending on the "n" even Cuban-Americans. As has been noted in chapter one, Latino voters are much more diverse than the name "Latino" or "Hispanic" implies and have different experiences that are not easily lumped into a single demographic. Each subgroup might be interacted with each independent variable and then compared to whites or African-Americans as I did with the Hispanic grouping. Perhaps we would find differences with one group and not another. A hint of this is the fact, for example, that education has a positive impact on voting for Mexicans, but not the entire Latino population. This begs the question as to why one group would be positively impacted. In other words, which Hispanic demographic, if any, is not positively impacted by education and getting out to vote.

Related to education is the use of English. Chapter Three found that those who answered the survey in English were more likely to vote for Bush. Since the survey had hundreds of questions, one could easily conclude that these respondents are quite competent in English. While I did not investigate it, one might take the leap that that they are better educated than those who are not and thus it is not surprising that they voted for Bush. But as the younger and very large Hispanic population ages and is more likely to vote will this element change. Indeed one of the most interesting things about the Latino population is that they are growing at such a rapid rate and are the youngest

demographic group in America and so will bear watching more closely than the long established African-American and white population.

Another question that perplexes me still is why the more one goes to a religious institution does not impact Hispanic voters but it does has a positive impact on whites. The same question arises for those who consider themselves "born again." What does race have to do with either of this? Perhaps with more data, one could look at just those who are Protestant Latinos, since that is the group that I believe would be more likely to get out to vote the more they go to a church. The Protestant element might be doubly helped by the 2008 data since it has been the minority of Latino voters, but has been growing at a faster rate than the Catholic group. Increased data might also shed more light on voting practices as it is still surprising to me that Latino born again Christians and those who attend church at least once a week were not more likely to vote for Bush as were their white brethren. What is it about Latinos that would negate this similar finding for whites? Again with another election year's data, perhaps looking at just Mexican-Americans more light will be shed on this topic.

Clearly the study of the Latino has shown that many of the same theories for voting and vote choice apply from the models for white and African-American voters. But with some noted differences and the growth of Hispanics in the United States, this group should prove to an important group to study for years to come.

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