National Security Intelligence Professional Education:
A Map of U.S. Civilian University Programs and Competencies


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Dedication

I am deeply honored to dedicate this study to my brilliant academic colleague and dearly departed friend, Ismael Idrobo, Captain (Retired), Armada (Navy) of the Republic of Colombia.  Ismael and I drove to classes together for two years, sharing stories about our mutual workplace, the National Defense University's Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and exchanging ideas about how to survive the Higher Education Administration program at George Washington University.  Ismael was my self-appointed tutor in the Spanish language, always keeping my mind sharp and my sense of humor intact.  He was truly loved and admired by everyone in Cohort Three at the Virginia Campus, our home away from home for two years of intense coursework and comprehensive examinations. Regrettably, Ismael never finished his dissertation because the Divine Creator called him home far ahead of his time, obviously having other missions in mind for this happy-go-lucky sailor, astute scholar, devoted husband, and beloved father.  Nevertheless, Ismael's international educational perspective, his endless warmth, and his contagious good cheer continued to inform the efforts and spark the motivation of all his comrades who were able to finish.  This dissertation is therefore dedicated to the memory of Captain Idrobo, a highly distinguished military officer who had served as a naval attaché and understood intelligence well, an academician who loved to teach about defense management and display his tremendous capacity with computers, and a wonderful human being who was fiercely loyal to both his native and adopted countries.  Ismael and his ever-present, almost impish, smile will be sorely missed and never forgotten.

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Abstract of Dissertation

National Security Intelligence Professional Education:
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This study explores national security intelligence education within U.S. civilian universities. Intelligence education is of interest to higher education institutions, as signaled by the rapid increase of "intelligence studies" programs across the U.S. since September 11, 2001. That presumably well-educated analysts could fail to anticipate and avert the attacks, and fail again in confirming weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, awakened concern in the intelligence and higher education communities that somehow America's educational process had failed to prepare intelligence officers to address such issues effectively. The research addressed whether the burgeoning numbers of intelligence education programs are appropriately augmenting the existing variety of liberal arts programs in U.S. civilian colleges and universities in educating potential future national-level government intelligence professionals.

In qualitative research relying on a grounded theory approach, the researcher examined the educational experience of recent hires in the Intelligence Community (IC), gathered original views and recommendations of senior government intelligence practitioners and observers, and developed a database of course and program offerings in prominent civilian institutions of higher education in the U.S. Data from these sources were assessed in light of core competencies for intelligence analysts developed by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).

The researcher found that new hires had typically not pursued an intelligence studies path but rather a liberal arts program. Most applauded the idea of university intelligence courses but see such a specialized curriculum as more appropriate for

graduate-level education once intelligence professionals are more settled in their careers.

Subject matter experts generally concurred and expressed concern about program quality.

The implication is that intelligence education programs are useful in times of crisis when

many bright analysts are needed quickly, but the great expansion of such programs is not

merited and raises questions of deficiencies in self-assessment.  A detailed written survey

of universities across the nation is recommended, and a prototype of the survey is offered

to ODNI for follow-up.  ODNI can thus help shape the preparation of individuals who are

sufficiently prepared for the myriad challenges they will face as key players in the IC of

the 21st century.

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**Chapter 1**

**AN INTRODUCTION TO NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION:  A COMPETENCY-BASED APPROACH**

> Educating our young leaders for the world they face today and what they're
> going to be facing in the future is critically important to our nation, critically
> important to cause them to think in different ways about the strategic
> environment, and it is a changed strategic environment that we're facing.
>
> -- Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, former
> Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, in
> welcome remarks to participants of NDIC-ODNI
> Conference 2007, "Intelligence Strategy:  New
> Challenges and Opportunities," September 26,
> 2007

## Introduction

The efficacy of higher education in national security intelligence has heretofore

received scant attention from the greater academic community.  Additionally, most

intelligence agencies have focused rather narrowly on the training of new analysts,

collection managers, and other budding professionals on the job *after* their assignment

and arrival.  Thus, little thought has gone into the sort of educational preparation they

should receive *beforehand* on the campuses of U.S. colleges and universities which

would predispose them to excel as government intelligence professionals.

The series of tragedies on September 11, 2001, awakened in national-level

decision-makers a sense of urgency to do whatever is necessary to prevent any more

disastrous intelligence failures due to misreading the capabilities and intentions of a

markedly more agile, pernicious, and asymmetric threat than ever before encountered

during the relatively static Cold War.  In the past, the U.S. had experienced intelligence

failures, or in some observers' minds *policy* failures, with such tragedies as the Japanese

surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba in 1961, and

isolated terrorist attacks on U.S. targets throughout the Middle East and elsewhere beginning in the 1970s. After "9/11," two highly visible commissions were convened to investigate what went wrong given the inability to detect and deter terrorist attacks by al Qaeda and, a short time later, the miscalculation regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction leading up to the U.S. invasion of that beleaguered country and the downfall of Saddam Hussein in 2003.

For at least three decades, and in particular after a series of intense Congressional investigations and reforms in the 1970s, a handful of typically small institutions of higher learning gradually began to develop intelligence education programs, often with former government officials and other practitioners as instructors. Several attempts have been made over the years to capture what is being taught and how, though most of these endeavors have fallen short or are woefully outdated. In this latest, most comprehensive effort, the author explores the field of intelligence education, a major subset of which is called "intelligence studies."

The research question undergirding this study is, "Are the burgeoning numbers of intelligence education programs appropriately augmenting the existing variety of liberal arts programs in U.S. civilian colleges and universities in educating potential national-level government intelligence professionals?" Several key questions associated with this principal question are enumerated at the end of Chapter 2, where this research question is placed in the context of a review of the pertinent literature.

## **Problem Statement**

On September 11, 2001, or "9/11", when the U.S. was assaulted in three locations almost simultaneously by al Qaeda terrorists (*The 9/11 Commission report*, 2004), the

federal government had a large number of well-trained, attentive, intelligent personnel on duty protecting the homeland.  Yet, the nation's overall national intelligence system failed it miserably.  How could that have happened?  The present study proceeds on the assumption that the manner in which these individuals were educated, the way in which they were prepared in their formative years for such difficult duties, could have affected their mindset, that is, the way they approached a problem during a time of crisis, in which there is a premium on thinking quickly, accurately, objectively, and with full appreciation for the value of unimpeded communication across government agencies.

As documented in the next chapter, the higher education literature sheds little light on how intelligence education should be carried out.  Because "intelligence studies" is a new or emerging discipline, most of the discussions about it have been reflected in the literature of the Intelligence Community (IC), not that of the higher education community.  This study is intended to fill that gap, at least partially.

Since 9/11, probably no aspect of the U.S. federal government has been under closer scrutiny than the function of intelligence.  Its leaders have been continually in the eye of the storm.  Whether it be policy regarding homeland security in the aftermath of the horrific terrorist attacks of 9/11 or the existence of so-called "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD) in the Middle East and North Korea, or a preemptive war in Iraq to remove a ruthless dictator, the role and efficacy of intelligence have been questioned to a degree rarely, if ever, seen before in American history.  Richard Betts, a renowned foreign policy scholar at Columbia University, lays out the conundrum with a chapter titled "Two Faces of Failure:  September 11 and Iraq's Missing WMD" in his latest book

*Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security.* (2007, pp. 104-123).

The researcher examined the two commission reports mentioned above to ascertain what they had to say about intelligence education. For example, in the WMD Report's summary and recommendations for Chapter Six, titled "Leadership and Management: Forging an Integrated Intelligence Community," the Commission recommends that the DNI: "Make several changes to the Intelligence Community's personnel policies, including creating a central Intelligence Community human resources authority; developing more comprehensive and creative sets of performance incentives; directing a 'joint' personnel rotation system; and establishing a National Intelligence University." (The Commission on the intelligence capabilities of the United States regarding weapons of mass destruction, March 31, 2005, p. 311)

Numerous calls for reform and transformation of the IC in the wake of 9/11 resulted in the landmark Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), which called for the appointment of a Director of National Intelligence to oversee a large, fractious community. Earlier, a host of intelligence and security procedural changes were enacted with the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act (which is actually an acronym standing for "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism), quickly pushed through Congress in the weeks after 9/11, and in March 2003 the huge and immensely complex Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established. Part of the IRTPA addressed the need for greater education of Intelligence Community employees. As the second DNI, Navy Vice Admiral (Retired) J.M. "Mike" McConnell, observed in his keynote address during an

intelligence strategy conference hosted by the National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC) at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center in September 2007, "We've got a lot of transformation to accomplish, and you do that most readily through the education and training process." (NDIC-ODNI strategy conference, 2007, proceedings, p. 21)

One prominent observer of the U.S. Intelligence Community, UCLA professor Amy Zegart, who has chronicled some of its most glaring deficiencies, views educational priorities as one of the major problems. She notes that "at a time when intelligence agencies have never been more important, universities are teaching and studying just about everything else. In 2006 only four of the top 25 universities ranked by *U.S. News & World Report* offered undergraduate courses on intelligence agencies or issues. . . Scholarly inattention is even more glaring in academic publishing. . . At precisely the time that intelligence issues have dominated headlines and policy-maker attention, the nation's best political scientists have been studying other subjects. . . At the same time, the costs of studying intelligence are extraordinarily high. Data are the lifeblood of academic research and, in the case of intelligence, are in very short supply." (Zegart, Universities must not ignore intelligence research, p. 9) She may be overstating the problem a bit, and may not be aware of many of the smaller programs for intelligence education that already exist at schools not prominent on the listing of *U.S. News*.

The intelligence failures of the last few years suggest that part of the problem context is a changed environment, as LTG Maples alludes to in the quote at the beginning of this chapter. We can assume that the formulas for navigating the international environment that were useful in the 1950s and 1960s at the height of the Cold War are no longer applicable. The fact that the U.S. is the sole superpower in the world does not

guarantee success in its struggle against new adversaries, and sweeping globalization complicates matters even more.

Therefore, the problem we are facing is essentially one of an altered intelligence environment while the intelligence functions and processes of the past have not adapted to accommodate that change, and the education of intelligence professionals may not be preparing them adequately for the new challenges. Many of the "classics" of the intelligence literature that address the education environment and are highlighted in Chapter 2 were written during the Cold War. Clearly, the dramatically changed security environment now demands a reassessment of the nexus between higher education and national security needs, particularly in the demanding intelligence field. A more explicit approach to dissecting and addressing the problem presented here can be envisioned through an appropriate conceptual framework.

### Conceptual Framework

The Integrated Competency Directory that ODNI officials are developing is a solid first step toward offering a conceptual framework for those concerned about or involved in higher education for national security, and in particular for future intelligence professionals. The core competencies, which amount to distillation by ODNI officials of cognitive requirements for effective performance, provide standards that professionals from all member agencies should meet in order to be hired and promoted. The civilian higher education community has a key role to play in taking these required competencies into account in the design of curriculum or programs because newly hired officers are expected to possess a modicum of these competencies as a result of their educational

experience.  Among other things, education officials can establish criteria based on these competencies to measure success, reward good work, and penalize failure.

Particular colleges and universities that have been in the national security education business a long time tend to be breeding grounds for accomplished intelligence professionals.  Ostensibly, they could play an even greater role if they only knew what qualities the IC agencies are looking for, designing courses keyed to the competency framework and modifying those courses once external factors change (e.g., the nature of the threat, trends in collection/analysis technologies, pedagogical advances, etc.).  This is where the link between governmental and non-governmental entities is critical.

### Significance of the Study

Since 9/11, almost a totally new generation of young intelligence professionals has been brought into the government.  According to LTG Maples, DIA Director from 2005 to 2009, two-thirds of his agency's workforce has come on board since 9/11. (NDIC-ODNI strategy conference 2007, Intelligence strategy:  New challenges and opportunities, proceedings, September 2007)  Moreover, according to David Shedd, Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Policy, Plans, and Requirements, 45 percent of the personnel now working in the entire national Intelligence Community (IC) have arrived since 9/11. (Strategy conference, 2007, proceedings)  Yet, we have no idea how many of them were educated specifically for this sort of work that is so vital to the nation.

A significant difference from other professions is that analysts and other intelligence officers are not licensed to practice their craft in the same way physicians are certified to practice medicine or attorneys to practice law.  Hence, we do not know how many of them were ever enrolled in an intelligence studies program or even took a single

intelligence-related course. We have no idea whether their educational background was geared to help them prepare for this kind of work requiring mental agility, critical thinking and, sometimes, intestinal fortitude to go against the prevailing views of the day. To learn whether the formal, higher educational experience of these individuals is related to their preparation for professional employment in the IC is a principal objective of this study.

The often close relationship between universities in the U.S. and the federal government's security-related policies and programs also contributes to the argument that those involved in Higher Education Administration would be well advised to consider seriously the place of intelligence education in the variety of higher education institutions across the country. A major example of such policies and programs are those stemming from the National Security Education Act of 1991 (NSEA), which authorized a new aid program for foreign language and area studies and examined its relationship to federal intelligence agencies.

<u>**Assumptions**</u>

In this study, in addition to the incidental assumptions already mentioned, the researcher is assuming he can perform an objective assessment despite being what some observers would call an "insider." The factors leading to possible bias are discussed in Chapter 3, as are actions taken to reduce this bias. Nevertheless, his experience working in the IC, both as a military intelligence officer assigned to the Army and more recently as a civilian contractor working for the Defense Intelligence Agency, is critical to the high level of understanding through participation that permits use of the grounded theory approach. In fact, the researcher has been straddling the intelligence and higher

education communities during a significant portion of his career, in that several of his assignments have been in teaching or academic administration while others have been in the mainstream of tactical and strategic intelligence.  He also served as a military attaché, which means he has practical experience in applying the theories of international relations learned in graduate school and knows the importance of foreign languages, area studies, and cultural/psychological approaches to gathering and processing information for use by policymakers, both at the national level in Washington and at remote U.S. diplomatic posts around the globe.

Another assumption is that the data collected by a number of different methods are accurate.  Much of what the researcher accumulated is of the informal variety, and not from formally published books or other peer-reviewed sources.  It is a fact of life that a significant portion of the current information about intelligence education is available only through brochures, Websites, conference materials, and conversations with the academicians who are teaching the intelligence courses.  Some of them are scholars in the traditional sense, i.e., tenured professors who have been teaching and conducting research at accredited institutions for many years, while others could more accurately be described as practitioners in training to be scholars, without necessarily possessing the high-level academic credentials preferred by the higher education community nor extensive experience teaching at such institutions.

## Delimitations-Limitations

In the "Espionage" section of *The Art of War*, attributed to Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, we read that "prescience cannot be gained from ghosts or gods, cannot be augured through signs, and cannot be proved through conjectures.  It must be gained from what is

learned by men." (Bay, February 20, 2004)  In a luncheon address honoring his long-time

colleague, legendary intelligence figure, and master linguist, U.S. Army LTG Vernon

Walters, retired Army GEN (and former Secretary of State) Alexander Haig concurred

when he noted that "high-tech intelligence systems are no substitute for brain power."

(Author's notes, 2004 annual Joint Military Intelligence College Conference, "Vernon

Walters:  Pathfinder of the Intelligence Profession," June 3, 2004)

Normally, national security is what most people are referring to when they discuss

intelligence at the national or strategic level.  Two other categories, which are related to

national security intelligence and to each other, have been identified by a relatively new

organization designed specifically to study intelligence and education, the International

Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE).  According to IAFIE's by-laws, the three

categories of intelligence under its purview are national security intelligence, law

enforcement intelligence, and competitive intelligence (sometimes referred to as business

intelligence). (IAFIE website, 2008).  The first two are closely linked, and especially

since 9/11 as many of the traditional walls against crossover between the two have been

torn down by such federal legislation as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism

Prevention Act of 2004.

This study focuses mainly on national security intelligence, which is the most

indispensable core element in the overall security panorama.  However, some mention is

made of law enforcement and competitive intelligence, but only when they are relevant to

the overall discussion.  The lines between these categories have blurred significantly

since 9/11, and the resultant missions of such national security organizations as the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have been broadened and integrated considerably.

Further, the approach to this study can be narrowed in terms of the type of education or training conferred, and at what level, and whether conducted inside the government or outside it. This study emphasizes the latter, the *non*-governmental or *civilian* piece, and explores education rather than training. Research data regarding intelligence education in colleges and universities remain primarily anecdotal. That is, information about intelligence studies and overall intelligence education in the U.S. has not been systematically collected and analyzed rigorously. The author has experience with some intelligence study courses and acquaintance with some programs and their instructors, both in military and civilian settings, government-sponsored and non-government-sponsored. The latter environment in particular invites study, for it is the civilian contingent of analysts which operates closest to the locus of national power and authority. Some uniformed military analysts work at the national-level intelligence agencies, but most are civilian. The balance shifts to predominantly military personnel in operational- and tactical-level field elements, the arena classically considered "military intelligence," which is outside the scope of this study.

Military analysts usually get considerable intelligence *training* before they receive high-level *education* that would support their capabilities, while civilian analysts tend to get their *education* first and follow up later with on-the-job *training* offered by whatever agency they work for. There does exist a "revolving door" between the military and civilian communities and, at the highest levels in Washington, intelligence agencies reflect a diverse mix of civilian and military professionals. Most of them have benefited

from some degree of education tied to intelligence and/or national security. There is also a revolving door between employment in the government and non-government sectors.

This study does not explore in detail the many sources of intelligence *training*. Instead, it focuses on intelligence *education* in the higher education arena, specifically in the civilian colleges and universities of this country, and at both the undergraduate and graduate levels because some institutions offer a mix. To distinguish between training and education, at least in the intelligence field, the perspective of a former DIA Director, Navy Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, is instructive: "Training is about skills; education is about expertise development." (Jacoby, 2004) The former can usually be accomplished more quickly, through short courses offered frequently because skills are perishable and need to be kept up to date. The latter, on the other hand, takes years, and some would argue it is never completed. Intelligence is certainly one of the endeavors that benefits from "lifelong learning" and years, even decades, of intense cognitive development.

## Operational Definitions

In its most elemental form, *intelligence* is nothing more than raw information that has been collected and processed into a format where it can be analyzed and disseminated to key decision-makers. (Spracher, 2004) Put another way, "Intelligence is more than information. It is knowledge that has been specially prepared for a customer's unique circumstances. . . The word *knowledge* highlights the need for human involvement." (Brei, 1996, p. 4) Too often in the past, U.S. decision-makers had relied primarily on technical intelligence, e.g., that provided by machines such as satellites and computers looking at images and listening to signals. The human element was downplayed. Now, since 9/11, there is growing realization that more and better *human* intelligence is needed,

and the only way it can happen is through use of knowledgeable humans. Those precious assets must be educated about national security intelligence during their formative years to produce the mindset necessary for the conduct of reliable human intelligence.

The understanding of and capability to produce this "finished intelligence" from raw, unprocessed data depends heavily on the tacit knowledge accumulated through long experience, and thus may or may not be transmitted through formal education. Yet, as the 18th century British philosopher Edmund Burke observed, "Education is the cheapest defense of a nation." (as quoted in Krizan, June 1999, p.1) In the traditional "guns vs. butter" debate on how to spend a nation's resources, what often get overlooked are the wisdom and knowledge of the high-level policymakers and those who feed them the critical information required to make a rational decision between those two commodities. Since the policymakers are almost never intelligence professionals themselves, but instead tend to be lawyers and professional politicians, they must be informed and persuaded by non-partisan, objective, highly educated intelligence types. And the latter must not allow themselves to become politicized, intimidated, or swayed by "what the boss wants to hear."

The distinction between *intelligence education* and *intelligence studies* must be clarified before proceeding further, because these two terms seem to be used almost interchangeably in much of the literature. This author, and probably most other observers of the intelligence scene, views intelligence studies as a *subset* of intelligence education. University professors have been teaching de facto intelligence for decades, but usually that has occurred more as an ancillary mission subsumed in programs belonging to the more traditional departments such as political science, the professional schools such as

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law, or popular interdisciplinary offerings such as international relations. The phenomenon of intelligence studies per se, taught by specialized departments or institutes and often leading to degrees with the word "intelligence" in their titles, is relatively new.

Intelligence studies is a significant component of intelligence education, and several civilian institutions of higher education in the U.S. have developed intelligence studies programs. Nevertheless, how these programs interact with other disciplines in producing a well-rounded graduate properly prepared for employment in the national security intelligence field is the province of intelligence education. There is more to educating an intelligence professional than merely subjecting him or her to an intense intelligence studies program (many of which focus almost exclusively on analysis). Developing an overall curriculum that gives the student all the tools he or she needs to become an intelligence "generalist" should be of concern to higher education administrators.

Without due attention to national security, a nation cannot defend itself and protect its people. In examining the study of intelligence as a commodity, or instrument, that all nations need in order to survive, we can refer to the phenomenon as "national security intelligence." Another area of intelligence inquiry is "law enforcement intelligence," which could also be referred to as "homeland security intelligence." However, the latter—focusing on the domestic arena *inside* the sovereign borders of the United States, and the former—which covers the foreign arena *outside* the nation's borders, are now considered inseparable. (Spracher, 2002) Protecting the "homeland" is now equated to protecting "national security," and the two are essentially fused together.

A third category, "competitive intelligence," sometimes referred to as "business intelligence," is not quite as closely integrated, though the intense involvement of federal contractor companies in the national security effort is greater now than ever before. Many routine duties formerly performed by uniformed soldiers or civilian government employees are now handled by contractors hired by the government for reasons of expertise, economics, or effectiveness. Moreover, several contractor companies are now becoming more intricately involved in intelligence education, as many of the recipients end up getting hired by these same companies. (Fuchs, 2005, p. 3) Some observers have dubbed the increasingly cozy relationship between private industry and the IC as the "intelligence-industrial complex," playing off the older expression reportedly voiced first by President Eisenhower in the 1950s, the "military-industrial complex."

Incidentally, for reasons of simplicity, the author does not distinguish between *colleges* and *universities* throughout the remainder of this study. Whenever the generic term *university* is used, it should be taken to mean any four-year institution, whether its designation is a college, a university, a federal service academy, or any other such rubric. Distinctions by Carnegie classification are discussed in Chapter 3.

Finally, the term *civilian* in the study's title merits some additional clarification. It essentially means anything *non-governmental* in nature. Although no academic institution in the U.S. is purely *civilian*, in that it likely receives some funding from the federal government even if it is private, the researcher deemed that term more accurate than *non-governmental*, as civilians make up a rather large contingent of the students in *governmental* educational programs, even those considered to be *military* institutions. For the purposes of this study, *civilian* academic institutions will be considered those

colleges and universities not directly under the controlling authority of the federal government.  The institutions under study include both public and private entities.

### Role of Researcher

The present study will lay essential groundwork by compiling and assessing the "roadmap" of existing intelligence study programs and courses, while leaving the question about assessment of their relative value or specific contributions of their graduates to the nation's security to subsequent research.  As discussed earlier, the ODNI is currently in the process of producing discrete lists of core competencies for various types of professionals working in the Intelligence Community.  For example, the first list completed and coordinated among the sixteen IC agencies dealt with intelligence analysts, probably the largest population and the one that contributes the most individuals who climb the ladder to key management and leadership positions.  Nevertheless, because these competency listings are so new, and to date not in a purely unclassified, non-caveated form that can be released to the public, they have not yet been captured in the syllabi of existing intelligence studies courses.  The researcher has verified that fact with a large number of professors teaching intelligence.

Consequently, a necessary first step is to map the educational environment where the competencies can be operationalized through decisions in the higher education community regarding how the various cognitive capacities supporting the competencies can best be instilled in students.  This mapping, together with an exploration of the educational experience of intelligence professionals who were recently university students and the perspective of senior intelligence professionals, is within the capability of the researcher.  His own educational and work experience allows him to assess the

relationship among these threads of information through the process of grounded theory

research.

## Outline of the Study

Chapter 2 reviews the substantive literature and is divided into several sub-

sections.  A hefty portion of Chapter 2 is taken up with a discussion of the "classics" of

intelligence literature that directly or indirectly address the educational environment.

Another section addresses the rather sparse literature on employment of intelligence

professionals in the IC, in terms of their educational background, and a final section deals

with literature about, and by, senior matter experts in the IC.

Chapter 3 discusses the research methods used in the study.  The grounded theory

approach will be highlighted, as the researcher capitalized on his experience in both the

higher education and intelligence communities to obtain information about intelligence

education.  The three modes of data collection are a written questionnaire, informal

subject matter expert interviews, and compilation of a database of courses cross-walked

with core competencies.  These data sources establish the basis for a triangulation on the

research question.  The researcher controlled for biases by pre-testing the questionnaire

with young IC employees, and he pre-tested a longer written survey with a handful of

subject matter experts, some with intelligence experience and some without.  Again, as a

reminder, the research question asks, "Are the burgeoning numbers of intelligence

education programs appropriately augmenting the existing variety of liberal arts programs

in U.S. civilian colleges and universities in educating potential national-level government

intelligence professionals?"

Chapter 4 presents and analyzes the data collected by the author and provides a compilation of the findings. In part, the findings consist of information gathered about universities already offering intelligence studies programs or other educational programs related closely to intelligence and national security. In part, they include opinions expressed by young intelligence professionals who were administered the questionnaire discussed in Chapter 3 regarding the educational experience they underwent to prepare for their work. Finally, the findings present some ideas offered by key experts involved in intelligence education gleaned through informal interviews.

Chapter 5 sets forth the conclusions of the study and implications for theory, practice, research, and educational process. This research effort focuses on the growth and direction of intelligence education in civilian universities in the United States and whether this phenomenon can be expected to contribute to the development of professionals ready to serve their country in the national Intelligence Community. This study can make concrete contributions to theory, practice, research, and educational process.

**Chapter 2**

**BASELINE REVIEW OF THE INTELLIGENCE EDUCATION LITERATURE**

> Intelligence, as I am writing of it, is the knowledge which our highly placed
> civilians and military men must have to safeguard the national welfare. . . But
> no matter whether done instinctively or with skillful conscious mental effort
> intelligence work is in essence nothing more than the search for the single
> best answer.
>
>             -- Sherman Kent, former Yale University history
>               professor and author of *Strategic Intelligence*
>               *for American World Policy*, 1949

### Overview

The literature of *intelligence* is rich and voluminous.  The literature of *intelligence*

*education*, on the other hand, is much more sparse.  The subject of intelligence has long

captured the imagination of readers, in part because it has been sensationalized and made

to sound more intriguing than it probably is in real life.  It is viewed by many as

"forbidden fruit" because much of it has crept out of the shadows through unauthorized

government leaks and media fascination with political scandals.  The highly charged

atmosphere surrounding national intelligence in the United States since 9/11 is the

epitome of this swirling trend in which anything related to intelligence is magnified

through the ever watchful lens of the media and, according to some observers, politicized

for partisan purposes. (Vest, J., The recent past and future of intelligence politicization,

February 13, 2009)

"Knowledge is power," as the age-old aphorism goes, and if a person believes he

is reading something to which no one else has access, or to which widespread public

exposure is prohibited, then he feels a sense of euphoric exclusivity.  That is why spy

novels, counterespionage thrillers, and James Bond films have mass appeal.  That is why

exposés penned by disenchanted former employees of secretive intelligence agencies attract a good deal of attention. For example, in the mid-1970s, Philip Agee's *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* (1975) and Victor Marchetti and John Marks' *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (1974) were best-sellers, even if they did not enhance the image of that agency. And that is why adventure novelists and biographers, some authorized and some unauthorized, some serious and some merely looking for salacious material about which to write, breathlessly await the declassification of government documents 25-30 years after a particularly nasty chapter of American history or, if they cannot wait, seek to obtain documents expeditiously through the Freedom of Information Act process. This is not the sort of literature in which this researcher is interested, though the best pieces of it are certainly utilized in college-level courses on intelligence.

This chapter reviews the substantive literature on intelligence education, examining those few works from higher education research that have focused on the topic of intelligence and also the more voluminous material from scholar-practitioners within the Intelligence Community itself. We start with the well-known "classics," typically written during the post-World War II years up to about the early 1970s when relations between the two communities were still relatively warm. A few pieces were written in the last quarter of the 20th century, mainly as counterpoints to the dismal times when intelligence, particularly at the national level, had fallen out of favor with the academic community and, to a degree, with the American public at large. As mentioned in Chapter 1, with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new kind of enemy in the terrorism-plagued 21st century, perhaps the old paradigms no longer apply and some new

"classics" need to be generated.  An incisive article just published in the summer of 2009

which addresses that theme will be examined here in that light.

Because intelligence education is slowly emerging as an academic discipline, the

*formal* literature regarding it is also slowly building in volume.  Although literature on

intelligence education does exist in the form of journal articles and case studies, much of

the current literature on intelligence education falls under the category of *informal*

literature.  As institutions and teachers expand their programs, they publish brochures,

point papers, Websites, and even "blogs" about the substance of what they are teaching,

much of it coming from formerly classified government documents, government

textbooks, a growing number of non-governmental texts (many focusing on analysis),

and monographs.  For-profit businesses and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

have added some documentation on intelligence education, but not to the extent they have

on the related topic of intelligence training.  Consequently, the researcher will highlight

some of this informal literature, which no doubt will soon spawn more formal references

in the form of scholarly textbooks, treatises on the relationship between intelligence and

the higher education community, and hopefully comprehensive studies produced by the

civilian universities themselves which are benefiting from the growth of these programs.

### Classical Literature Linking Intelligence Academics and Practitioners

Classic works on intelligence education address the authors' experiences and

theories that can be accommodated in a higher education curriculum.  Any intelligence

curriculum purporting to teach critical thinking, for example, should take into account the

views of certain illustrious critical thinkers and doers.  For instance, Sherman Kent's

*Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, first published in 1949 (hereafter

referred to as *Strategic Intelligence*), has been described as "probably the most influential book ever written on US intelligence analysis." (Davis, J., "The Kent-Kendall debate of 1949," *Studies in Intelligence*, vol. 35, no. 2, summer 1991, p. 37)  Kent himself has been revered by many as the "father of strategic intelligence."  Kent's message to academics as well as to intelligence practitioners centers on the development of an intelligence literature.

Having experienced wholesale intelligence demobilizations after two world wars, Kent sees the benefit in writing things down, even if highly classified.  He observes, "The plain fact is that 'security' and the advance of knowledge are in fundamental conflict." (1955, p. 9)  Education is all about the advancement of knowledge, and intelligence education is no different than the other categories on that score.  In an article he wrote for the inaugural issue of the IC journal *Studies in Intelligence* in 1955, titled "The Need for an Intelligence Literature," he argued for the regular production of a scholarly journal to build a body of professional intelligence literature to "keep it a robust and growing discipline." (Salvetti, L., fall 2000, foreword to *Studies in Intelligence*, 45th anniversary special edition, p. vii)  In his article, Kent insists, "Intelligence today is not merely a profession, but like most professions it has taken on the aspects of a discipline:  it has developed a body of theory and doctrine; it has elaborate and refined techniques.  It now has a large professional following.  What it lacks is a literature." (Kent, 1955, p. 3)  He goes on to clarify that what is not lacking is a literature on the substantive findings of intelligence, the end product of the IC's labors, of which there is a great deal and possibly too much to digest.  What he is talking about is "a literature dedicated to the analysis of

our many-sided calling, and produced by its most knowledgeable devotees. . .You might call it the institutional mind and memory of our discipline." (p. 3)

Despite his apparent common-sense approach to an intelligence literature that promotes education, some of Kent's views were not accepted without controversy. Willmoore Kendall, one of Kent's teaching colleagues at Yale's Institute of International Studies, critiqued *Strategic Intelligence* in a review which appeared that same year in *World Politics*, a new journal at the time published by the same Yale entity. Kendall's "The Function of Intelligence" rejected what he depicted as Kent's ideal of bureaucratic scholars processing information to understand the outside world for the benefit of bureaucratic policy planners. Indeed, Kendall felt Kent's approach was unsatisfactory in that it tried to do too much, reflecting "a failure to define his task with precision." (Kendall, p. 542) "Mr. Kent," Kendall lamented, "may, to be sure, awaken in the beginner some expectations that are doomed to disappointment." (p. 543) Further, Kendall believed the function of intelligence is to help "politically responsible" leaders achieve their foreign policy goals, not only by fathoming "what goes on abroad," but also by taking into account "our domestic scene" that generates the policies for which, in Kendall's view, intelligence needs to examine alternatives. (p. 549)

The implications of Kendall's critique is that we may be expecting too much of an intelligence professional if we assume he is equally well-educated on foreign affairs, domestic issues, and everything else going on in the world. In the post-9/11 world, where foreign intelligence and homeland security are now inseparable, we rely on specialists likely educated a bit differently than those generalists dealing with a clear-cut threat during World War II and the Cold War. As we shall see later, Kendall suggests the

teachers prepare the intelligence professionals, and not become the intelligence

professionals themselves. If the theorists all become practitioners, who will be left in

academe to teach the other practitioners and the future theorists?

Kendall saw "certain differences between government research and academic

research that make the ethics of the latter not strictly applicable to the former." (p. 543)

He examines some of the characteristics of the "state of mind" of Kent, which brought

him to record, but not identify as such, "recognizably pathological aspects of existing

intelligence arrangements." (p. 547) Kendall goes on to describe these characteristics:

(1) A state of mind which is dangerously "dominated by an essentially wartime

conception of the intelligence function" (p. 548), (2) a state of mind "dominated by an

essentially bureaucratic conception of United States government, and of the intelligence

problem" (p. 549), (3) a state of mind "characterized by a crassly empirical conception of

the research process in the social sciences" (p. 550), and, finally, (4) a state of mind

"characterized by an uncritical optimism regarding the supply of skills upon which the

effective performance of the intelligence function depends." (p. 551)

Kent, justifiably according to Kendall, looks primarily to the social sciences for

these skills; however, he tends to see the solution of the intelligence personnel problem in

terms of "attracting back to Washington the social science scholars," assuming that "in

the universities, in the research institutes, or, one supposes temporarily unemployed"

exist the individuals needed who are just waiting for the call to return. (p. 551) Kendall,

on the other hand, believes such a supply of skills is "hopelessly inadequate" and is likely

to remain so, "unable to release any significant number of men to government

intelligence without wrecking the teaching programs upon which the future supply of

such men must depend." (p. 552)  Although he does not continue on to suggest exactly

where this "significant number of men" (and today, women also, presumably) should

come from, Kendall would likely suggest that the scholars should educate and produce

the bureaucrats rather than becoming the bureaucrats themselves.

The relative merits of Kent's views versus those of Kendall may depend in part on

what decision-making era one is studying.  According to one observer, the case can be

made that Kent's doctrine as projected in *Strategic Intelligence* had considerable

currency in practice during the 1950s, when "President Eisenhower's administrative style

for national security issues—regularly planned NSC meetings to discuss if not to decide

policy—provided an orderly place for the scholarship of intelligence." (Davis, p. 44)  As

National Intelligence Estimates were regularly included in briefing books for Presidential

meetings, policymaking officials had a stake in being informed on, and in trying to

inform, intelligence judgments.  This changed in the 1960s with President Kennedy's

more *ad hoc* operating style.

Ray Cline was a recognized authority on intelligence organization, control, and

oversight.  He wrote an illuminating book in 1976 titled *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars:*

*Blueprint of the Essential CIA*, which goes into depth regarding the critical relationship

between academics and intelligence operatives.  The book was written at a tumultuous

time when intelligence agencies, and the CIA in particular, were being investigated by

Congress (the Church and Pike Committees) for abuse of authority and improper

exploitation of non-governmental human assets such as clerics and academics.  Cline

concludes, "We should keep the specifics of our intelligence operations closely guarded,

but much of the knowledge that emerges from our analytical research can be made

available more widely . . . findings should be distributed wherever they are useful to enrich the public dialogue and provide a sound factual footing for political debate on defense and international affairs." (p. 271)

Calling for a separate research institution under CIA, Cline urges that, where secret sources and methods are not involved, "analytical reports could be released publicly for the benefit of university scholars, journalists, and citizens who need objective facts to guide them in thinking about pressing policy issues involving international developments." (p. 271)  Congressional legislation would be required to create such an entity, but "passage would provide additional opportunity for educating the country on what intelligence is and what it is not . . . the peculiarly American combination of spies and scholars, working in tandem, can be mobilized . . . to do the job of central intelligence better than it has ever been done anywhere in the world." (p. 272) Establishment of an open research institution with these goals would go a long way toward creating a mutual appreciation for national security and intelligence that would be shared by both the higher education and intelligence communities.  It would also help educate students as well as the general public on the genuine benefits of intelligence; too often they hear only about the risks to their individual rights and liberties.

Another book of this genre, *Military Intelligence and the Universities:  A Study of an Ambivalent Relationship*, an edited anthology by several authors, was published in 1984. (Watson & Dunn, eds.)  It discussed ways of building bridges between the two communities, which had become considerably estranged as a result of intelligence monitoring of campus protest activities during the 1960s and the plethora of investigative commissions that followed in the mid-1970s, some of which looked into the alleged use

of professors traveling overseas for academic purposes as intelligence gatherers. The

days of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) recruiting from the cream of the crop at the

most elite universities of America were long gone. Ever since the Vietnam War, the

relationship between the bulk of academia, considered generally leftist, and federal

government intelligence agencies, usually tending toward the other end of the political

spectrum, has been cool at best.

An early, yet insightful, assessment of the relationship between the IC and

academia was presented by then-CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Gates

during a speech delivered at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government in

February 1986. The future Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of Defense

started out by refuting a 1985 *Boston Globe* comment: "The scholar who works for a

government intelligence agency ceases to be an independent spirit, a true scholar." The

present researcher, from his own experiences in the civilian academic environment,

would interpret Gates' view as suggesting that scholars should not work *for* a

government intelligence agency but rather *with* it, on a voluntary and witting basis only,

of course. Gates, as the head analyst at the CIA, went on to center his remarks on what

he called "two simple propositions":

- First, preserving the liberty of this nation is fundamental to and prerequisite for the preservation of academic freedom; the university community cannot prosper and protect freedom of inquiry oblivious to the fortunes of the nation.

- Second, in defending the nation and our liberties, the federal government needs to have recourse to the best minds in the country, including those in the academic community. Tensions inevitably accompany the relationship between defense, intelligence, and academe, but mutual need and benefit require reconciliation or elimination of such tensions. (Gates, CIA and the university, 1986, p. 27)

In responding to controversy that arose at Harvard regarding appropriate CIA/university relationships, Gates carefully explains why CIA needs academe and vice versa. While the Agency possesses experts in virtually all subjects of concern, he notes, "There is a vast reservoir of expertise, experience, and insight in the community of university scholars that can help us, and through us, the American government, better understand these problems and their implications for us and for international stability. (p. 30)

After listing the various forms of involvement with the academic community that exist—consulting, sponsorship of conferences, research, scholar-in-residence program (academics spending a year or two at CIA, the converse of the Officer-in-Residence program, which involves CIA officers teaching at select universities), and information sharing (p. 31)—Gates tries to allay fears of academics being tainted by their association with the Agency: "We do not believe that working with your government to help bring about better informed policy is shameful; indeed, it should be a source of pride and satisfaction. Contributing to a better understanding of some of the most difficult and occasionally dangerous problems of the world, in my view, is responsive to the scholar's highest calling." (p. 33)

As Gates aptly concludes in his remarks to the Harvard audience, "Consultation and cooperation with CIA on the problems this nation faces abroad do not threaten academic freedom. . . The government cannot coerce any scholar to cooperate or work with the Department of Defense, Department of State, or CIA. By the same token, no scholar should be prevented by academic institutions or colleagues from doing so. And none should have to worry that his or her reputation will suffer because of a public-spirited, patriotic willingness to help us better understand and forecast developments

abroad affecting our national well-being and the forces that threaten our freedom." (pp. 35-36)

A popular historical treatment on the use of academics in intelligence operations is *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961*, by the late Yale University historian Robin Winks. He investigates fully how the OSS was established and what it achieved, basing his findings on previously unpublished private papers, recently declassified documents, and interviews with former OSS and CIA agents. More specifically, Winks looks at men who moved easily, at least in the early days, from this one Ivy League campus to the world of intelligence. He assesses their preparation for this profession from different perspectives, depending on their roles in the university and the ways they became educated and socialized to the intelligence business.

A more recent examination of the relationship between academia and intelligence was conducted by Pauletta Otis, a former NDIC faculty member and Pew Research Center scholar now at the Marine Corps University's Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, in "The Intelligence Pro and the Professor: Toward an Alchemy of Applied Arts and Sciences." Otis observes that, even though the U.S. academic community and the national foreign intelligence community are institutional managers of "information as power," their "potential for useful cooperation and collaboration is unrealized and the relationship between the communities continues to be somewhat strained." (Otis, May 2003, p. 7) This was not always the case, and Otis cites Winks' discussion of how, during World War II and the early Cold War years, Yale was openly supportive of the Intelligence Community. Students and faculty were participants in intelligence collaboration and analysis, and study centers were financially supported and

professional journals published. (Otis, p. 9)  The "blacklisting" of the McCarthy era of

the 1950s and college protests against involvement in Vietnam changed all that.

Other reasons for gradual estrangement of the two communities are too numerous

to list here.  Otis does mention the problem of "group-think" on both sides, as many

others have also noted:  "Each assumes not infrequently that they have a lock on reality

and often simply refuse to be open-minded.  This occurred during the Vietnam era when

the IC felt itself misunderstood and abused, and the academic community believed that its

information and personnel were being used by intelligence agencies in ways of which

academe did not approve. . . The academic community believes that it is not afflicted

with the IC's tunnel vision and can contribute to lateral thinking that supports enhanced

problem-solving capabilities." (p. 12)

Many educators and trainers endorse the use of simulations, war games, and case

studies as a way of introducing students to how intelligence analysts should interact with

their customers and consumers—the policymakers.  Not only does such training benefit

the current practitioners, but the inclusion of historical materials about the ways various

U.S. Presidents used intelligence and case studies of actual crisis situations taught in

civilian educational institutions' intelligence and national security curricula can go a long

way toward preparing future analysts for their sometimes politically and bureaucratically

uncomfortable roles in the decision-making process.

One example of such current application is by Thomas Shreeve, the creator and

first director of the Intelligence Community's Case Method Program.  This retired U.S.

Marine Corps Reserve colonel learned the craft of case method teaching as an MBA

student at the Harvard Business School and has applied it throughout the IC. (Shreeve,

"Experiences to go: Teaching with intelligence case studies," JMIC *Discussion Paper Number Twelve*, September 2004, p. 47)

This educational method has proven useful not only in teaching intelligence but in teaching many other subjects. It is widely recognized in the higher education community as an appropriate pedagogical technique, and was mentioned by Kent in his article about the need for an intelligence literature. To illustrate that the IC does in fact write down some of the things it does, he notes, "We have done a good bit of chronicling of interesting case studies with an educational end in view. (Kent, 1955, p. 5)

Kendall might disagree about the value of intelligence education, including Shreeve's use of case studies. In concluding his critique of Kent's views, Kendall notes:

> . . . he tends to assume that "out there"—in the universities, in the research institutes, or, one supposes, temporarily unemployed—the men you need exist and await your call. One finds in him, and in the intelligence fraternity in Washington, none of the anxieties that would cause most responsible scholars in the fields other than History (for which we leave Mr. Kent, as a professional historian, entirely free to speak) to say to him: There could be no more dangerous error. The supply of skills you have in mind is hopelessly inadequate and, failing drastic national action—for example, a new Manhattan Project, but this time in the social sciences—to increase it, will remain hopelessly inadequate throughout the predictable future. It is inadequate in two senses: We are, and are likely to remain, unable to release any significant number of men to government intelligence without wrecking the teaching programs upon which the future supply of such men must depend; and we have grave misgivings. . . about the ability of our sciences to supply the sort of knowledge which, in Mr. Kent's phrase, "our highly placed civilians and military men must have." (Kendall, pp. 551-552)

Roger Hilsman was another early participant in, and observer of, the U.S. national security and intelligence community. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, Hilsman's most notable contribution came after his military service when he was with the Center for International Studies at Princeton University. In 1956 he published *Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions*. As he notes in the Preface, "When OSS, America's

wartime secret intelligence service, was set up in 1941, one of the basic ideas behind it was the novel and almost impish thought that scholars could in some respects take the place of spies. The idea seemed to work and since the war more and more people have come to believe that it is in the strategic intelligence agencies that research—and even the social sciences—will find their real home within the formal structure of government." (1956, p. 7)

Understanding bureaucratic politics before other writers began to characterize it as such, Hilsman notes that "the division of labor between the different offices and agencies of a bureaucracy is very rarely precise or even formal. But within each organization and among the community of organizations dealing with each other, a body of rules and principles—here called doctrine in the sense that a recruit is indoctrinated with them—grows up to define the organization's role, its functions and responsibilities, and the line of demarcation in different situations between its functions and those of nearby organizations engaged in work on similar or adjacent matters. . . even though one should be wary of accepting the doctrines as an entirely accurate description of practice, they do, of course, influence practice very greatly indeed." (pp. 7-8).

Among the noted scholars acknowledged by Hilsman for helping him structure his thoughts were political science/international relations giants Gabriel Almond and Klaus Knorr, Willmoore Kendall, and Sherman Kent. (pp. 10-11) Hilsman conducted interviews with government officials in the intelligence agencies, the State Department, and the Executive Office of the President. Hilsman insists that "the operators tend to believe that practical experience, rather than scholarly academic training, is the true and perhaps the only path to the kind of knowledge and judgment needed in dealing with

problems that arise in the real world, in the rough and tumble of the "marketplace." They

apparently believe that out of practical experience a man develops a 'feel' for a problem,

a talent for accurate hunches, and that only this sort of sixth sense can sweep away the

tangle of doubt and complexity surrounding problems in foreign affairs and seize the one

effective course of action." (p. 53)

According to one high-level government official whom Hilsman interviewed and

cited, ". . . On the policy side, experience was most important. Any good student or

scholar [would have] been trained in analysis, but there was a great difference between

analyzing the Versailles Treaty and evaluating events today as they were actually

happening. In analyzing diplomatic facts that called for action, there was no training

except experience." (p. 54) Using as an example George Kennan, first director of the

State Department's Policy Planning Staff, and the author of the seminal *Foreign Affairs*

article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" on containment theory after World War II,

Hilsman says Kennan "was better at seeing implications than the research people. What

was the difference? The difference was between a lifetime habit of dealing with realities

and a lifetime habit of dealing with libraries. . . More professionals were needed and

fewer experts and students." (p. 54) Yet, Hilsman concedes later in a section titled

"Know-How" that it seems obvious that "what is most desirable is a combination of the

two kinds of knowledge, the knowledge that comes from books and the knowledge that

comes from experience." (p. 74)

The themes of theory versus practice and education versus experience continue in

such agencies as the CIA, which has always manifested a severe dichotomy between the

bright analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) and the street-smart operators in the

Directorate of Operations (DO). This has implications for the types of educational background that the Agency seeks in its new employees and its readiness to permit them to pursue further education once on the job. It also affects the nature of the Agency's own internal education and training establishment, the so-called CIA University, the most visible component of which is the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis. This school maintains a DI-specific curriculum, while DO officers go elsewhere. The Kent School does maintain linkages with the civilian higher education community. Its public Website mentions that "analysts can take advantage of part-time or evening course work at the multitude of excellent universities in the Washington, D.C. area. Full-time study options are available on a select basis through individual offices." (CIA website, www.cia.gov, accessed August 3, 2009)

To bring some of this classical thinking into the modern era, with the previously mentioned changing intelligence environment as a backdrop, Anthony Olcott, an analyst in the DNI's Open Source Center, offers an enlightening article in *Studies in Intelligence* titled "Revisiting the Legacy: Sherman Kent, Willmoore Kendall, and George Pettee—Strategic Intelligence in the Digital Age." The author observes, "The Kent legacy has survived because his approach to intelligence analysis served the United States extremely well for a long time. However, as happens when environments undergo dramatic change, successful adaptations for one environment can prove to be much less efficacious—perhaps even fatal—in a new environment. . . [P]rofound changes of environment also can reveal the adaptive virtues in structures and approaches that did not thrive in the past. Kent had at least two contemporaries, Willmoore Kendall and George Pettee, who outlined quite different approaches to strategic analysis. Their views found little traction

in their day but now seem to anticipate in striking ways the vision of the future of the intelligence community published by the director of national intelligence (DNI) in 2008." (June 2009, p. 21)

Olcott describes Kent's best-known public work, his 1949 book *Strategic Intelligence*, as prescriptive, not descriptive. Kent devotes considerable attention to the nature of the intelligence analyst and the relationship the analyst (the "professional man") should have with the policymaker, whom he dubbed the "consumer" or the "client" of intelligence. The author criticizes Kent's view of reality as "profoundly and unshakably Platonic" or assuming the existence of a single truth or solution path to world issues of concern to the IC and its clients. (pp. 22-24) The author considers Kent a "puzzle-solver," while Kendall is more a "mystery-solver." (p. 27) The former uses reason and the scientific method to find the single correct solution, while the latter understands that belief systems are arbitrary constructions that can never be proven true or false, a point of view that coincides with the perspective of contemporary social scientists. (See, for example, Patrick A. Kelley's *Imperial Secrets: Remapping the Mind of Empire*, October 2008, p. 4)

Olcott's contribution to the literature thereby opens a new pathway of understanding and interaction between intelligence practitioners and university academicians. He observes that one of the criticisms of Kent is he assumed there would always be adequate numbers of capable officers to perform the requisite intelligence tasks, whereas observers like Kendall recognized instead there would likely be a critical shortage of specialists when most needed in the future to evaluate the human condition in certain key areas.

Olcott notes that, like Kendall, George S. Pettee was certain that peacetime would create for the U.S. even greater challenges than those faced in World War II (Pettee had written *The Future of American Secret Intelligence* in 1946, a book which received little attention at the time).  Unlike Kent, Pettee came out of the war experience unconvinced of the value "objective facts" might offer to strategic analysis.  He was deeply skeptical of such data and put more stock in beliefs than data, as did Kendall (pp. 28-29)  Like Kent, Pettee saw the solution to intelligence problems in research, but unlike Kent, Pettee argued that research, the gathering of facts, is useless if conducted separately from the functions of policy. (p. 29)  A diagram Pettee often used to illustrate his lectures bears a remarkable resemblance to the depiction of the intelligence process offered at the end of the DNI's *Vision 2015:  A Globally Networked and Integrated Intelligence Enterprise*. Both diagrams share the hierarchical, though integrated, relationship between analyst and policymaker advocated by both Kendall and Pettee, but which Kent warned against. The DNI's model blurs the distinction between producer and consumer, which Kent always strictly upheld.

These debates regarding intelligence relationships are highly useful as a component of today's intelligence education, as the proper mindset required to inform the policymaker—the consumer—objectively and competently is formed during an intelligence analyst's educational experience.  Consequently, one can see how the "classics" of the past can be applied to the problems of the future, assuming the new strategic environment and its challenges are taken into consideration.

A veritable growth industry has sprung up over the years regarding the impact of the phenomenon of "groupthink" on policymaking and the use of intelligence in

informing those policymakers.  The pioneering study on which this trend is based is

Irving Janis' *Victims of Groupthink:  A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions*

*and Fiascos* (1972), worthy of including in any course dealing with intelligence theory,

with the problems of conducting objective intelligence analysis, or with critical thinking.

Other views on the problems of groupthink and how they have been addressed by recent

intelligence reform efforts include John Kringen's "How We've Improved Intelligence:

Minimizing the Risk of Groupthink" (2006) and Mark Amidon's "Groupthink, Politics,

and the Decision to Attempt the Son Tay Rescue" (2005).  The latest incisive treatment of

how to combat groupthink with careful analysis can be found in David Moore's "Critical

Thinking and Intelligence Analysis" (2006), an NDIC *Occasional Paper*.  Moore's

findings on critical thinking are based on his educational efforts at the National

Cryptologic School, which is the schoolhouse of the National Security Agency (NSA)

that parallels the CIA's Kent School.

Because policymakers sometimes are led astray by the intelligence input they

receive, or choose to ignore what they hear because of a predetermined policy direction

they have already decided to pursue, the function of intelligence control and oversight,

which is a subset of overall accountability, deserves to be addressed in intelligence

education programs.  Given the series of intelligence failures highlighted in Chapter 1,

articles addressing these subjects are on the rise, as are civilian university courses under

development.  A fairly large segment of the extant intelligence literature focuses on

correcting the failures of the past through either a "lessons learned" process or better

mechanisms for accountability through control and oversight.  This trend is relevant to

the present research because of the great concern of policymakers and civilian educators alike over the changed operational environment.

A precise definition is called for when dealing with such complex issues as control, oversight, and accountability, all of which are related to assessment of an entity's performance. One offered by Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane in an *American Political Science Review* article seems appropriate:

> *Accountability*, as we use the term, implies that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met. Accountability presupposes a relationship between power-wielders and those holding them accountable where there is a general recognition of the legitimacy of (1) the operative standards for accountability and (2) the authority of the parties to the relationship (one to exercise particular powers and the other to hold them to account). The concept of accountability implies that the actors being held accountable have obligations to act in ways that are consistent with accepted standards of behavior and that they will be sanctioned for failures to do so. (2005)

Real or perceived intelligence failures usually spawn calls for greater accountability and oversight of the agencies involved, if not outright demands for doing away with them and creating something new as a way of fixing the problem. Much of the literature in professional journal articles, especially in the aftermath of 9/11, has fit that genre and crept into intelligence course syllabi. Whatever one chooses to call the process—lessons learned, best practices, outcomes assessment, performance metrics—it is a central focus of the IC of today under ODNI guidance and oversight. Intelligence studies programs known to the author are increasingly focusing on such material, which is related closely to critical thinking. Students must not only master the skills of critical thinking in order to perform analysis *within* an agency, once they join it; they must also think critically *about* the agency's mission and the way it discharges it in the public interest.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has developed a "Lessons Learned ODNI Presentation Series," in which all IC agencies are invited to participate. The proponent for this program is the IC Lessons Learned Center, under ODNI. (Hardy, J., e-mail to IC agency representatives, August 22, 2006)  Oversight often serves as the impetus for identifying intelligence failures and prompting corrective action.  Critics of the IC like to claim various agencies are not accountable to the people at large, which is problematic in the sometimes deep, dark shadows of the classified world of intelligence. Yet agencies such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and a group of entities set up as the result of a series of Congressional investigations and commissions in the 1970s conduct such oversight daily and classification is not an obstacle (though leaks sometimes are).  Examples include the President's Intelligence Advisory Board, the Intelligence Oversight Board, the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight, and a series of hearings by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) hearings following 9/11.  The SSCI and its counterpart, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), were just two of the control and oversight mechanisms set up as a result of the 1970s investigations.  Higher education programs have ready access to all such materials.

Intelligence deals with uncertainty, but appropriate intelligence education can reduce uncertainty through more confident analysis based on learned cognitive processes. Just as case studies have a solid role in intelligence education, so do procedures for capturing lessons learned from past failures and mistakes so as to avoid them in the future.

The public policy scholar introduced in Chapter 1, Amy Zegart, is currently a highly visible name in terms of studying control, oversight, and intelligence reforms in general. Her popular 2007 book, *Spying Blind:  The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11*, critiques the performance of the IC since 9/11 and finds it sorely wanting. The book's entire third chapter, "Crossing an Academic No-Man's Land:  Explaining Failed Adaptation," is devoted to sound professional intelligence education, or the lack thereof, from an organizational theory perspective. Zegart laments the fact that:

> Existing research does not offer a ready-made explanation for intelligence agency adaptation failure.  This is because the CIA, FBI, and other national security agencies live in an academic no-man's land, overlooked both by scholars who study organizations as well as those who examine national security affairs.  On the one hand, organization theorists (who usually come from sociology, economics, and business schools) investigate organizational problems but focus almost exclusively on understanding private sector firms.  On the other hand, political scientists examine national security affairs but treat intelligence agencies as inputs to policy decisions, not as phenomena to be studied in their own right. The burning theoretical questions of both fields have directed scholarly attention elsewhere, leaving U.S. intelligence agencies and their organizational deficiencies on the sidelines. (p. 43)

In discussing the current operational environment for intelligence, Zegart cites some earlier international relations scholars' notable work, namely Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision:  Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (1971; 2nd edition with Philip Zelikow, 1999); Morton Halperin's *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (1974); Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (1996); and Joseph Nye's *Soft Power:  The Means to Success in World Politics* (2004). (Zegart, p. 220)  These works can form part of the essential reading for any course or program dedicated in whole or in part to intelligence education.

Many observers view political science as the discipline most closely related to intelligence studies, and in fact a number of these programs are embedded within university political science departments.  Zegart has strong opinions about that field too:

> The most serious limitation of political science is that it rarely peers inside the black box of government agencies to examine internal forces like norms, routines, and cultures that make the bureaucracy resistant to change.  Indeed, most political science research assumes that government agencies can and do adapt; major work over the past twenty years argues that Congress controls the bureaucracy, and in surprisingly efficient ways. . . Much of the literature examines how lawmakers craftily ensure their preferences are heeded by building control mechanisms into the very design of government agencies, or by using (or threatening to use) existing controls such as withholding appropriations, or both. (p. 48)

The rest of Chapter 3 is replete with perceptive observations about control and oversight of the IC and how the higher education community as it is currently configured is not well equipped to deal with educating intelligence professionals in this serious subject. Zegart is a severe critic of the IC, and of education related to its functioning, but her work helps set the stage for improved intelligence education in the universities.

As urged earlier, any respectable intelligence studies program must be grounded in the so-called "classics," i.e., those seminal works that have stood the test of time and seem to be represented in all the well-resourced bibliographies.  These works often investigate the relationship between the intelligence professional and the decision-maker, or between the intelligence practitioner and the academician.  The classics truly bridge the gap between theory and practice and transcend generations, assuming their conclusions are updated for changes in the intelligence environment.  Without them, academic intelligence courses are intellectually shallow and bereft of the sort of lessons learned that contribute definitively to the development of professionals responsible for

the success of the Intelligence Community.  In the event that Zegart's insights contribute

to the development of more serious academic attention to government intelligence

organizations and processes, her work will also attain the exalted status of "classic"

literature.

Another noted author mentioned earlier who commands considerable respect in

the higher education community is Richard Betts.  He wrote an intriguing article in the

U.S. Army War College's respected journal *Parameters* titled "Intelligence Warning:

Old Problems, New Agendas."  Betts, a renowned intelligence studies scholar and

political science professor at Columbia University and former Director of National

Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in New York, served on the

staff of the original Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and continues to

consult for the IC.  He adroitly sums up the "intelligence dilemma" faced by all analysts

trying to think critically and disseminate objectively:

> All in all, US intelligence has performed well over the half century
> since the National Security Act.  This assertion is hard to prove, because it
> depends on what we make of the dogs that did not bark and what we assume
> might have happened if we had not had the huge intelligence establishment
> that evolved during the Cold War.  Most of all it is hard to prove because
> evidence of success is less obvious than evidence of failure.  Good news is
> no news.  Many of the cases where the warning system worked well are not
> noticed, simply because policymakers take such performance for granted.  Or
> such cases are not publicized, because there is no political impetus to reveal
> classified information as there is when things go badly wrong. (1998, p. 26)

Betts comments about the journal *Intelligence and National Security* in its most recent,

but undated, promotional brochure:  "Intelligence studies have mushroomed into a

serious field of research, and this journal has led the way as the main outlet for the best

articles on the subject."

Betts is just one of several current national security scholars who have woven intelligence themes into their writings in addressing the new operational environment. The works of these scholars and others dealing with the role of intelligence in foreign policymaking are appropriately used not only in purely intelligence education courses, but are often found in the syllabi of broader political science and international relations programs.

The scholarly literature on intelligence specifically, and on national security and foreign policy more generally, contributes greatly to the resources available to intelligence education instructors and administrators in designing courses and programs. It also offers a solid baseline to this researcher in examining programs to determine whether they are meeting rigorous academic standards. That is why eventually obtaining course syllabi is critical to follow-on research. In addition to addressing the core competencies disseminated by ODNI, the courses also must be academically robust in order for the intelligence education discipline to gain standing within the higher education community.

### Epistemic Groups Build Resources for Intelligence Studies Courses

The term "epistemic" deals with knowledge based on experience. In this study the researcher uses his considerable experience within the Intelligence Community as it has adapted over the years to meet new challenges in an ever-changing operational environment. A number of academic initiatives have emerged from time to time over the last two decades with the intention of bringing the classic literature on intelligence up to date. Some have been fleeting and in response only to a particular event that thrusts intelligence into the public limelight for only a short period. They purport to address the

altered collection or analysis environment, but usually do not have any significant effect on decision-making. Others have been a bit more permanent in that they are cited for a while in journal articles and course syllabi, but typically have not had real, lasting impact. More work is needed to create a permanent bridge among academics, junior practitioners, and senior intelligence experts to foster better understanding and tighten collaboration. The latter group in effect comprises the intelligence enterprise policymakers who are usually referred to in the present work simply as senior "subject matter experts."

A few attempts to capture what is going on in the college classroom with respect to intelligence education have been made over the years, but none is current. Two volumes list some institutions that taught intelligence studies late in the 20th century, *Teaching Intelligence in the Mid-1980s: A Survey of College and University Courses on the Subject of Intelligence*, edited by Marjorie Cline (1985), and *Teaching Intelligence in the Mid-1990s*, with the same sub-title, edited by J.M. Fontaine (1992), both published by the National Intelligence Study Center (NISC). They were heavily focused on schools in the Washington area; provided course names, instructors, and syllabi summaries; but refrained from evaluating the courses' effectiveness.

Also active in the latter part of the 20th century was a grouping of scholars known as the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, loosely headed by political science professor Roy Godson of Georgetown University. Publications fostered by this now-defunct group, such as *Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s: Collection, Analysis, Counterintelligence and Covert Action* (1989) and *Strategic Denial and Deception: The 21st Century Challenge* (1997), provided background information for academics wishing to receive guidance in establishing courses.

In 2000 the influential British journal *Intelligence and National* Security offered an interesting article by Meredith Hindley of American University on her "Teaching Intelligence Project." The author describes this contribution as the first installment in what the publisher intended to be a regular feature of the journal. "The impetus for the project came from two desires: first, to provide an international overview of the classes taught on the history of intelligence; and second, to provide an opportunity for those teaching about intelligence to exchange ideas with each other. Forty-six instructors from nine countries submitted their class syllabi for inclusion in the project. The list is not complete by any means," she concedes, "but rather represents a collection of scholars willing to share information about their classes and teaching philosophy." (Hindley, 2000, p. 191) Countries represented in Hindley's finding include the United Kingdom, Canada, Austria, Australia, Brazil, Israel, and the U.S. Unfortunately, the promise of further installments has not been realized.

Although not a journal per se, a series of government documents not otherwise easily obtainable can be accessed through the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). Steven Aftergood is a prolific researcher heading FAS's Project on Government Secrecy, which disseminates documents under the rubric *Secrecy News*. The fruits of his efforts are often reflected in journals and other periodicals available to intelligence educators, such as the National Military Intelligence Association's (NMIA) *ZGram* and the Defense Department's *Early Bird*, which highlight media accounts dealing with intelligence and national security. Aftergood seeks and then posts, sometimes through formal Freedom of Information Act requests and sometimes just through intense open-source searching, Congressional Research Service reports, Government Accountability Office reports, and

other key documents not classified but nonetheless often buried beneath layers of government bureaucracy and thus difficult for the interested reader to access.

Other highly reliable sources for intelligence educators in the higher education community include publications by the National Defense Intelligence College Press (www.ndic.edu/press/press.htm) and the Center for the Study of Intelligence (www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/index.html), which offer a variety of detailed, first-hand accounts and interpretations of government intelligence processes.  The International Association for Intelligence Education (www.iafie.org), and a near-daily "blog" by an active member of IAFIE and professor of intelligence studies at Mercyhurst College, Kris Wheaton (http://sourcesandmethods.blogspot.com), promote informal dialogue among members who routinely teach about intelligence and share pedagogical ideas and lessons learned with each other.  Most recently, Wheaton has endeavored to offer detailed advice to students and other IAFIE members on how to find a job within the IC.  These easily accessible electronic resources are used widely in intelligence education programs in universities across the land and are of particular interest to the younger, more computer-savvy, generation of analysts and other types of officers coming into the intelligence profession whose views are highlighted in the next section of this chapter.

**Literature Documenting the Circumstances of Intelligence Community Players**
*New, Young Intelligence Community Professionals*

The second of three data sources supporting the present work, the first being the population of professors and administrators who shared information on intelligence studies courses and programs in the U.S. university community, is a sample of young

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intelligence professionals who have recently experienced a university educational process.  The researcher was faced with choosing a representative group of young employees from as many of the IC's 16 member agencies as possible.  The starting point was a core group of so-called Defense Intelligence Scholars (or "DI Scholars," formerly known as Intelligence Community Scholars, or "IC Scholars") who attend the National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC) as a prelude to their working in the IC.

The literature on this program is scant.  Even though the degree-granting institution, the NDIC, educates these individuals, policy regarding their hiring and placement is handled by DIA's Human Capital Directorate.  Some informal literature, however, has emerged regarding this program.  DIA's in-house electronic newsletter described the 2005 group of IC Scholars as consisting of "10 of the nation's best and brightest college graduates" whose "learning curve as intelligence analysts is expected to be several years shorter than has been traditionally the case due to the combination of their exceptional academic skills, their youthful energy and the jump start provided by the MSSI degree program." (Sutherland, "DIA adds new weapon to intelligence arsenal: Fresh, young minds," *InterCOMM*, February 23, 2005, p. 6)

The NDIC Office of Enrollment and Student Services has produced an undated fact sheet, "Defense Intelligence Scholars Program," that briefly describes the program, sets forth eligibility criteria, and explains application procedures.  Another undated fact sheet produced by the DIA Human Capital office is titled "Education as a Hiring Incentive:  A Comparison of Two Recent Initiatives."  It compares and contrasts the then-IC Scholars Program with the Congressionally authorized Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program (PRISP).  Whereas the former was a DIA-specific hiring incentive

established in 2000, the latter was an IC-wide incentive promulgated in 2004. Both

programs claim to "attract high-caliber employees who have critical skills" and both seek

applicants proficient in a critically needed language (e.g., Chinese, Arabic, Persian, Urdu,

Pashtun, Dari, Korean, etc.). The DIA program entices young scholars with the

opportunity for full-time MSSI study and both programs lead to a competitive salary.

Such programs attract the sort of young intelligence professional the IC sorely

needs and provide sound education to the selectees as part of the hiring process. Because

they come from disparate backgrounds, but then come together for a shared educational

experience tailored by the agencies seeking their knowledge and skills, these individuals

provide a representative glimpse into the larger population of new IC professionals. They

are truly products of a "natural experiment" which links formal education, and the

adequacy of that experience, to readiness to serve in the community and be positive

contributors to the intelligence workforce for the foreseeable future.

### *Senior Intelligence Community Experts*

So-called "subject matter experts" (or SMEs), are "the people who have

experience with and knowledge of a particular system, application, product, process, or

task that you need to learn about." (Lambe, J., 2005) In the Intelligence Community

itself, one becomes a senior SME through years of work experience, peer recognition,

promotion up the ladder to positions of leadership, and acclaimed scholarship reflected in

written and oral communications (e.g., books, journal articles, presentations at

professional meetings). Another view comes from an official of the U.S. Government

Accountability Office (GAO): "Subject matter experts who have broad, unique insight

on target populations . . . might be incorporated into questionnaire development and

testing in a variety of ways. . . such experts might come from professional or trade associations, news media, consulting or research firms, and academia." (Ramirez, p. 1)

In fact, the SMEs selected by the researcher, to be identified later, come from precisely those sources—a professional association (IAFIE), a consulting firm (Intelligence & Security Academy, LLC), and academia (four colleges and universities). The only group not represented is the news media. All have long-standing experience and credibility both in the intelligence process itself and in education about intelligence.

**Applying Baseline Literature to the Research Question**

The substantive literature review covers all three modes of data collection performed in this study—educational experience of young intelligence professionals, expertise of senior intelligence scholars and practitioners, and intelligence curriculum development represented in courses developed by universities placed in the context of core competencies. The researcher thus has established a baseline upon which he can thoroughly address the problem outline in Chapter 1.

As will be shown in this study, many young professionals entering the IC come from liberal arts programs in some of the nation's best colleges and universities. Others hail from programs in engineering and the sciences. The IC has a need for a certain number of officers from virtually all educational backgrounds, depending on the specific agency in question and its mission. For example, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) needs a large number of geographers, while the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) seeks out aerospace engineers. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) needs analysts schooled in political science, international affairs, and economics, while the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has a continuing requirement for linguists and

those educated in regional studies, psychology, and sociology.  This is just a sampling of some of the disciplines critical to the IC, and the long list will become more apparent in Chapters 4 and 5.  Liberal arts programs, rather than explicit intelligence studies programs, tend to lead in producing employees for the IC overall, as will be shown later.

In light of this fact, the research question examined in this study in effect asks whether the growing number of intelligence education programs, and intelligence studies curricula, are really necessary.  Do they adequately augment the pool of employees coming out of the many liberal arts programs?  Do they provide any added value?  If so, are they most appropriate at the undergraduate level or later in the educational process?

We in the higher education community do not know what kinds of graduates are needed by the national security/intelligence community.  In turn, those of us also in the IC do not know how to ask the higher education community for the kinds of graduates we need.  National security is widely taught in higher education, but it usually is placed within the more traditional programs like political science or international relations.  There is little systematic decision-making about how this is done from institution to institution.  Hopefully, the "map" provided by this study will facilitate that process.

## Chapter 3

### RESEARCH METHODS

In the work of intelligence, heroes are undecorated and unsung . . . their
inspiration is patriotism; their reward can be little except the conviction
that they are performing a unique and indispensable service for their country
and the knowledge that America needs and appreciates their efforts.

--President Dwight D. Eisenhower, November 3, 1959,
as quoted by MG (Ret) Charles F. Scanlon, author of
*In Defense of the Nation:  DIA at Forty Years (2001)*

### <u>Paradigm of Inquiry</u>

Beginning in the late 1970s, primarily as a result of increased public awareness of

intelligence issues and a number of abuses that had been investigated by Congressional

panels, civilian academic institutions gradually began introducing this subject to their

students, usually within existing social science curricula.  At the same time, some

institutions began to develop programs in intelligence studies, and some even began to

offer undergraduate and, less frequently, graduate programs in this new field.  We do not

know just how widespread and comprehensive these intelligence courses are in the

civilian sector, what model if any has served as an impetus for their development, what

sorts of students are taking them and why, nor, most importantly, whether intelligence

courses or programs in civilian colleges and universities are producing graduates who are

well suited to and capable of readily becoming intelligence professionals.

The goal of the study can best be achieved through a qualitative approach, and the

most useful perspective is that of the higher education community.  The focus of this

study is on the relative value of two different approaches to intelligence education

administered by civilian institutions of higher learning in the United States – the

traditional social science approach or the more specialized intelligence studies

curriculum. The study applies the most essential strategy of qualitative studies in the social sciences, that of triangulation, which refers to the practice of approaching the problem and the central research question through an analysis and synthesis of data from multiple, complementary sources. Subsequent sections of this chapter will explain how qualitative variables were developed from three chief sources of relevant data.

## **Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical framework for this work rests on two salient phenomena that characterize the information environment of intelligence education in institutions of higher education and of its practice in government agencies. These phenomena are associated with all three data sources: new, young employees of the IC; senior IC experts; and the extant university courses and programs in intelligence studies.

### *Natural Experiment*

A "natural experiment" involves taking advantage of sources of data that have undergone an "experimental treatment" germane to the research problem and question, and that are at the same time readily available to the researcher. In this case the statements of individuals who have undergone the "experimental treatment" of having been educated in institutions of higher learning, and who are now serving as intelligence professionals, provide data as a product of such a natural experiment. (Rog, D.J., 1994) Considering data from such young professionals as a natural experiment allows the researcher to meet a key criterion of theoretically sound work: applying measures to reduce data distortion, thereby ensuring both its validity and reliability. This end is achieved because data from the young professionals provide a check against biases that might appear in the assessment practices of higher education programs in intelligence as

well as those biases that might occur as intelligence agencies engage in their own

assessment of the competencies of professional intelligence officers.

## *Grounded Theory*

This study was designed to use a grounded theory approach. A sizable proportion

of qualitative research rests on grounded theory, whereby the large accumulation of data

leads to formation of theory. It is called "grounded theory" because the theory is

grounded in the data that the researcher collects rather than on the research literature.

(Brownfeld, S.E., informal series of discussions with researcher, July 2009) This is how

William Trochim, a professor of policy analysis and management at Cornell University,

describes grounded theory in his *Research Methods Knowledge Base*:

> Grounded theory is a complex *iterative* process. The research begins with
> the raising of *generative* questions which help to guide the research but are
> not intended to be either static or confining. As the researcher begins to
> gather data, *core theoretical concept(s)* are identified. Tentative *linkages*
> are developed between the theoretical core concepts and the data. This early
> phase of the research tends to be very open and can take months. Later on,
> the researcher is more engaged in verification and summary. The effort
> tends to evolve toward one *core category* that is central. (2004, p. 160)

Paul Leedy and Jeanne Ormrod take a similar view in their classic textbook (now in its

8th edition), *Practical Research and Design*, in which they bounce their ideas off those of

John Creswell and his *Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*:

> Of all the research designs we describe in this book, a grounded theory study
> is the one *least* likely to begin from a particular theoretical framework. On
> the contrary, the major purpose of a grounded theory approach is to *begin*
> *with the data and use them to develop a theory*. . .The term *grounded* refers
> to the idea that the theory that emerges from the study is derived from and
> "grounded" in data that have been collected in the field rather than taken from
> the research literature. (2005, p. 140)

This is precisely what the researcher intends to accomplish in this study. He

explores certain processes of educating individuals in the subject of intelligence and then

forms conclusions about them based on data and insights from three independent but overlapping sources that essentially are tapped simultaneously: the educational experience of young intelligence professionals as it relates to their jobs, subject matter experts in the field of intelligence education, and course data from the institutions that offer courses and programs in intelligence studies. This approach exemplifies what Paul Oliver observes in *Teach Yourself Research for Business Marketing and Education*: "Finally, in the grounded theory approach, research design, data collection and theorising [English spelling] are seen as simultaneous activities. They are not viewed as a temporal sequence, but rather as activities which inform and relate to each other, and which are equally and mutually important to each other." (1997, p. 133)

Oliver adds some additional motivation to the researcher's decision to pursue this approach when he asserts, "It can be argued that theory which is grounded in the data presents a better model of the world, and enables people to relate to it much better than is the case with a more abstract theory. **Grounded theory** [emphasis the author's] may present a picture of data which is more immediate and 'real,' and which is of greater relevance to the researcher." (p. 132) This researcher concurs, and finds no other viable option for pursuing this study because no previous educational theories cleanly apply to the new discipline of intelligence education. The potential for developing a conceptual, if not completely theoretical, framework using as a baseline the Integrated Competency Directory developed by ODNI seems the most promising way to proceed in this instance.

In sum, the grounded theory approach makes eminent sense for this study. It uses a simultaneous approach to data collection, analysis, and synthesis rather than a traditional sequential one, and data analysis can begin as soon as its collection is

accomplished.  Grounded theory bypasses the abstract thinking that characterizes the beginning of "social science" research. (Brownfeld, 2009)  It begins with observation and analysis.  Typical sources of data for grounded theory include interviews, observations, documents, historical records, videotapes, etc.  This study relies primarily on the first two sources (Trochim categorizes them as "participant observation," "direct observation," and "unstructured interviewing," p. 161)

## Research Questions

The primary question behind this research is:  Are the burgeoning numbers of intelligence education programs appropriately augmenting the existing variety of liberal arts programs in U.S. civilian colleges and universities in educating potential future national-level government intelligence professionals?  That question was approached through an examination of some related key questions:  If undergraduates were the product of identifiable "intelligence studies" or other pre-professional intelligence-related programs, could the education these individuals receive prepare them for government service and help them perform well?  That question was answered in part by informal interviews of subject matter experts and in part by former students now working in the IC, especially whenever the latter had been on the job long enough to generate some performance appraisals and some self-evaluation of whether and how their educational background had benefited them.

What is the nature of some of the existing intelligence studies programs and are they finding success in placing their graduates in solid jobs within the national security and intelligence communities?  That is a question best directed at the providers of the education, such as the faculty members with whom the author is in touch through his

professional network.  The researcher is acquainted with the programs and teaching methods of some of these instructors through conversing with them at conferences and symposia, reviewing the syllabi they provide, and studying brochures and Websites disseminated by their universities.  This information is reflected in part in the course database at Appendix C.  Placement of graduates is a subject which the researcher has discussed with a handful of university administrators during professional gatherings and in one case during a subject matter expert interview.

Are some categories of intelligence studies offerings in higher education more suited than others for enhancing the preparation of new Intelligence Community professionals?  That question might best be answered by the recent graduates themselves, whose views are tapped and assessed through their responses to a questionnaire in this study.

What skills or knowledge can be isolated as being especially needed by intelligence professionals, and do intelligence studies curricula provide those essential skills and knowledge?  That is a question to which all the data sources accessed in this study, including ODNI's core competency standards (Appendices B and F), can help contribute a comprehensive answer.

Another ancillary, but salient, question is:  What or who has served as a model or mentor in the development of intelligence studies, and do these mentors tend to be practitioners or academicians?  This question is salient because we can expect that the process of professionalization thrives when there are strong role models for students to emulate and mentors for counseling.  What we do not know is whether it is practitioners or academicians who serve as more influential role models.   Here, the questionnaire

instrument designed for new, young professionals will contribute information toward the resolution of this question.

Is the U.S. Intelligence Community already obtaining the quality analysts it needs through the employment of graduates of liberal arts and sciences programs, such as political science, international relations, regional studies, and linguistics, or of professional curricula, such as law and business? That question can be answered by the researcher based on his questioning of the new hires and other young intelligence professionals, supplemented by interviewing senior subject matter experts who underwent similar educational experiences. The answer reached can be verified and fleshed out further by interviewing the consumers/users themselves, such as the new hires' supervisors and human capital officials at the various agencies. Can or do the best intelligence studies programs in higher education institutions provide additional or missing skills or knowledge to this pipeline? That question also can be answered best by those who employ and supervise human capital in the IC. Those sources of data were beyond the scope of the present study. Hence, final resolution of that issue is best saved for a future researcher, such as from ODNI. Nevertheless, the present researcher presents his tentative findings on this question in Chapter 5, along with suggestions in Chapter 5 on how the answer can be further developed.

The data collection practices employed for this study have provided answers to all or most of these questions from two basic sources: (1) interviews of new IC employees using the written questionnaire, and (2) informal oral interviews of seasoned and knowledgeable IC and academic experts. The data gathered from these sources were evaluated against the data on intelligence courses at U.S. universities, which in turn were

evaluated in light of ODNI core competency standards.  This approach allowed the researcher to answer the principal research question by application of the following criteria to judge whether the growing number of intelligence studies programs are appropriately augmenting the existing variety of liberal arts programs in U.S. civilian colleges and universities in educating potential future national-level government intelligence professionals:  (1) a plurality of young employee respondents find it advisable for future students to take intelligence-related courses, if available, to better prepare themselves for IC employment; (2) a majority of senior experts find that intelligence studies programs do provide additional value for entering professionals; and (3) a majority of existing intelligence studies courses and programs provide suitable coverage of a majority of the ODNI competency standards at the sub-major category level.

In sum, the practices employed in this study allowed the researcher to answer the principal research question, though follow-on research is recommended to answer it even more completely.  The data gathered from the above two sources were supplemented by those the researcher gathered separately regarding intelligence courses and compiled into a database.

### Population of the Study

The overall population for this study includes young intelligence professionals working for the U.S. government within the national-level Intelligence Community, subject matter experts in intelligence education, and the universities which administer intelligence education programs.  There exists a clear basis for linkage among these groups, which is identifiable as the university educational process.

The population of young intelligence professionals sampled includes all those currently working in the IC as analysts, collectors, team leaders, or virtually any other position directly related to the substantive intelligence business. Administrative or logistical personnel are not included. The professional intelligence officers are employed either by ODNI itself, which oversees the IC, or by one of its 16 member agencies. All possess at least a baccalaureate degree from an accredited academic institution, and some have earned master's degrees. The vast majority are permanent U.S. government employees, though one is a contracted employee and three were interns while attending a civilian university at the time they were questioned. Specific selection criteria for the survey respondents as representatives of this population are listed later.

The population of senior subject matter experts includes those individuals who are recognized experts on intelligence education, and have achieved this status by serving as long-time scholars, practitioners, or both. Specific selection criteria for the sample of experts from this population are listed later.

The population of universities includes all those in the U.S. which could feasibly teach intelligence or intelligence-related courses, whether or not they have a full-fledged intelligence studies program. Some simply offer such courses as part of a social sciences or other liberal arts curriculum. To obtain data regarding the universities in general, the researcher examined several compendia of civilian institutions within the U.S. available in any library and found one particularly useful. The ultimate reference source which lists all U.S. universities and gives some clues as to what is taught there is the *2008 Higher Education Directory*, edited by J.M. Burke and published by Higher Education Publications, Inc., in Falls Church, VA, every two years. This reference cued the

researcher to the sort of institutions available to be mapped, and perhaps subsequently surveyed, and provides many useful details about the schools, to include their Carnegie classification, which is of special interest to the higher education community.

Schools in the highest tier of research institutions, and hence those likely to have the closest link with programs of national security and activities of other national-level interest, would more likely have intelligence-related programs or individual courses than those less closely tied to high-level research efforts. Community colleges, which tend to be technical/occupational in focus, not to mention regionally/locally oriented, are left completely out of the mix, despite the realization that community colleges are becoming increasingly involved in courses related to homeland security and law enforcement intelligence. (Straziuso, 2004; Class notes, *National Defense Intelligence College Foundation newsletter*, April 2007) Specialized schools, such as medical, veterinary, law, divinity, music, business, and those preparing students for specific occupations, such as the priesthood/ministry, fine arts careers, or the health profession, are generally excluded too. Tribal colleges similarly are excluded, but no distinction is made for Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) as the *Directory* does not clearly delineate that category.

### **Selection of the Participants**

The general approach to sampling taken in this study can be described as "purposive" or "stratified" (both terms commonly used in the higher education community), in that the researcher knew beforehand from his intelligence education experience where to look for knowledgeable respondents. He thus conducted direct sampling from those smaller populations. Although random sampling is generally an

appropriate approach to the selection of information sources, in this case the author's familiarity with the makeup of the population argued for a subjectively based selection methodology.

To sample the pool of young intelligence professionals working in the IC, the researcher took advantage of his workplace, the Defense Intelligence Agency, where DI or IC Scholars are employed. These are entry-level DIA employees recruited in most cases straight from undergraduate campuses. They are enticed to join the Agency with the opportunity for a year of full-time study at the National Defense Intelligence College leading to a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI) degree, a competitive salary while undergoing their NDIC education, and facilitation by DIA human capital officials in finding a suitable position at DIA or elsewhere in the IC upon graduation.

DIA is an agency with a broad mission extending beyond a single intelligence discipline, or "INT," and therefore its new, young analysts represent the diversity of expertise found throughout many of the other more specialized intelligence agencies. Unlike the National Security Agency (NSA), which deals only with signals intelligence (SIGINT), or the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), focused only on geospatial intelligence, DIA delves into human intelligence (HUMINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), counterterrorism, counternarcotics, general order of battle of conventional adversaries, indications and warning, and a host of other subjects related to military intelligence. Its employees come from a broad range of academic backgrounds. Still, to ensure that IC specialists were also represented in the sample, young professionals from 13 other IC agencies were contacted through intermediaries and included in the exercise. A total of 77 valid responses were obtained,

well beyond the minimum number of 30 cases generally considered necessary to represent the variation in a population such as that delimited by the exacting requirements attached to being an intelligence professional.

To interview DIA employees required gaining the approval of pertinent Agency human capital and research officials, a process started as soon as permission was granted to collect data based on an acceptable proposal. Young analysts who were not DI/IC Scholars were also interviewed, since they went through a similar undergraduate or graduate experience at the same types of civilian academic institutions as the DI/IC Scholars. A list of Scholars back to 2004 was obtained from the NDIC Enrollments Office. The researcher ascertained if they were still working at DIA by use of the IC global address directory. Some were located through contacting their NDIC classmates and fellow Scholars. All Scholars in the 2004-09 year groups were not located, but a sample of approximately 40 percent of the individuals in these year groups was found and administered the questionnaire.

Other IC employees were accessed via a variety of means. Some of the respondents from agencies outside DIA had been NDIC students in the past and thus their locations were known; in turn, they referred the researcher to some of their colleagues who had no connection to NDIC or DIA whatsoever. A convenient "gate" at which to capture more of the young DIA employees is when, as new hires, they are put through a short DIA indoctrination course called TIP ("Tomorrow's Intelligence Professionals"). TIP instructors from the Joint Military Intelligence Training Center (JMITC) are able to provide leads on how to find these individuals.

The population of subject matter experts could be a very large number of individuals, depending on how one might define "expert." Nevertheless, the researcher was able to narrow the field by setting some specific criteria for selection. Those criteria included: (1) having a well-known name in the field of intelligence education, intelligence itself, and usually both; (2) being recognized by the higher education community as having legitimate academic credentials, even if not earned doctorates (one-third of those selected possess PhD degrees; all have at least one master's); (3) having spent at least 25 years in the IC and/or in the intelligence education field; (4) possessing expertise in a broad range of the various intelligence disciplines; (5) preferably having both governmental and nongovernmental experience; and (6) having published extensively on intelligence themes, with the result that their name appears frequently in course syllabi throughout the higher education community.

To populate the matrix of universities that offer intelligence studies courses, this study applied directed sampling. The researcher did not select universities at random to determine what intelligence education curriculum they might sponsor. Because relatively few of the thousands of candidate schools actually offer intelligence studies courses, or intelligence-related courses of any description, the purpose of random sampling would not be well served. Instead, he explored those for which he had a credible lead through personal contacts or through revelations from comprehensive open-source research.

For example, the program sponsored by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence known as the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence (CAE) specifically seeks out HBCUs and other minority institutions for selection and receipt of CAE funds to support the creation of intelligence studies programs. If these

schools had developed intelligence studies curricula, the researcher became aware of that fact through professional contacts, and included those institutions in his study. (Gant, L.P., 2005, Communities of academic excellence proposal model: A force multiplier approach, presented to a sampling of representatives from such schools at the ODNI workshop on teaching intelligence held in Adelphi, MD, in July 2005)

Given the involvement of numerous experts as intermediaries in the researcher's efforts to identify intelligence studies programs, the resulting matrix is more comprehensive than any earlier attempt to delineate this population. It is somewhat perishable, however, in that the course data must continually be kept updated with the frequent changes that routinely occur in university course offerings.

<u>**Research Design**</u>

Because a study using the grounded theory approach can involve disparate research activities carried out simultaneously, the researcher proceeded to collect data from new young analysts as well as from senior experts in the same time frame. The principle of simultaneity brought benefits to the process even as he worked with the different sub-groups among the new, young professionals. For example, although he administered the questionnaire first to DI/IC Scholars as the core group of respondents and then branched out from there seeking other young DIA employees, then NDIC students assigned to NSA and NGA through the College's two Graduate Centers, and finally a representative sampling from as many other IC agencies as possible, as this process continued iteratively he gained more leads to other respondents to seek out and even some volunteers who, after hearing about the study, expressed interest and wished to contribute their views.

At the same time, the researcher began contacting potential senior subject matter experts for intensive interviews. By the time he conducted the first interview with a senior expert in early September 2008, about two-thirds of the questionnaires from new, young professionals had been completed and analyzed in a preliminary fashion. Enough data were available by the time of the interviews to permit the researcher to report some of the tentative results from the sample of young professionals and gauge the reaction of the senior experts. Throughout this period, he was also in the process of compiling the database of universities and courses from the sources mentioned earlier, and he was able to supplement the information with additional leads developed in talking with the young intelligence professionals he questioned and the subject matter experts he interviewed.

All of the above strategies were part of the research design and demonstrate how the researcher was able to operationalize the grounded theory approach. His experiences in both the intelligence and higher education communities over more than four decades, added to the experiences and educational backgrounds of those sample populations he contacted, allowed him to reach the conclusions and form the hypotheses that will be set forth in Chapter 5.

<div align="center">**Instrumentation**</div>

The only formal instrument employed in this study is a short questionnaire used to gather data about the educational experiences of young intelligence professionals (see Appendix A). The questionnaire was validated using peer review procedures among fellow graduate students and critiqued by one of the committee members in 2006. It was pre-tested on three analysts working for DIA during the 2006-07 time frame. Their consolidated reactions and suggestions for improvement were incorporated as revisions to

the questionnaire in order to improve reliability. The written questionnaire was administered in a setting where the respondent enjoyed privacy.

Interviews of the subject matter experts were conducted in open-ended fashion, with some common questions asked of all subjects but others tailored to the subjects' specific position, organizational affiliations, and academic/research interests. For example, some of the commonly asked questions included: (1) Are you optimistic about the direction civilian (non-governmental) colleges are headed regarding intelligence studies? (2) Who should be teaching intelligence studies—scholars, practitioners, or both (i.e., scholar-practitioners)? (3) What are the primary topics intelligence education should focus on? (4) How important are foreign languages? (5) At what level are intelligence studies most appropriately taught? At the undergraduate level, the graduate level, or both? Is a PhD program viable? (6) Is intelligence a full-fledged profession? Why or why not? Do you consider intelligence studies a legitimate academic discipline? Why or why not? (7) What advice would you offer young people today seeking a career working in intelligence? How best can they prepare themselves for this line of work? The subjects did not request, nor did the researcher offer, the opportunity to review the questions in advance, wishing the interchange to be as spontaneous as possible.

The data on intelligence studies courses and programs were gathered by the researcher as he explored a host of sources—program brochures, institutional Websites, selected course syllabi, conversations with professors and administrators, conference proceedings, school catalogs, press releases, journal articles, etc. Informal interviews of key individuals across the IC and in academia known in advance to be deeply involved in intelligence education were conducted for the purpose of obtaining amplifying comments

and not as a substitute for systematic data collection from the university intelligence education enterprise. This collection consisted of informal queries of faculty members involved in teaching intelligence and national security subjects, Web searches, and accumulation of course syllabi. The unit of analysis was the *course*.

Although limiting the research to use of only one instrument or mode (questionnaire *or* interviews) would have been simpler, the use of both allowed for input by more respondents who have knowledge and experience in the field. In congruence with the rationale behind grounded theory, insights can thus be expected to be more valid.

The data were processed by grouping and categorizing the questionnaire results and by doing the same with the comments from the interviews of senior experts. For the former, tables were created presenting the statistics, with a textual explanation following each one. For the latter, merely a textual explanation is used. For the compilation of course data, a spreadsheet was created showing how the courses compare in terms of the core competencies addressed. The researcher also compiled a summary table of representative universities and their involvement in intelligence education programs, with textual elaborations of some sample institutions' programs as they relate to the research question. The resultant groupings of data facilitated the researcher's assessment of the results in Chapter 4.

### Procedures for Collecting Data

New employees of the IC were contacted by a variety of methods. If they were former IC/DI Scholars, they were usually reached initially by e-mail, which was sometimes followed up by telephone calls and/or visits to their work sites within the DIA facility (known as the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, or DIAC). In some cases,

the contacts were merely the result of chance encounters in the hallways of the DIAC. Current DI Scholars and interns were approached directly by the researcher in a face-to-face mode since they were present for duty on a daily basis. NSA and NGA employees were contacted using the NDIC Graduate Center program managers at those locations. Employees of the other IC agencies who study at NDIC were approached directly or by e-mail/telephone.

The subject matter experts were selected according to the criteria previously outlined in the section on participant selection. They were interviewed at a site of their choosing where they felt most comfortable. Three of the six subjects live and work outside the Washington, DC, region. One of those, the most elderly of the group who no longer travels often due to health reasons, was visited by the researcher in his office on the campus in southern Virginia where he still works part-time in emeritus status. Another was interviewed on the margins of a professional conference attended by the researcher in the New England region where the professor teaches, and a third was interviewed at his hotel while attending a conference in Washington. The other three subject matter experts are all based in the Washington metropolitan area and requested the researcher conduct the interviews in their respective offices.

For collecting data about university programs and courses, a wide variety of sources and intermediaries was used, as previously specified. The researcher verified the data whenever possible by consulting with independent, trusted individuals having knowledge about the programs/courses.

## Data Analysis

Analysis of the data was performed in an iterative fashion as they were being developed.  The researcher categorized the data to make them more meaningful, as reflected in the tables presenting the data in Chapter 4.  What was really important in this study was to evaluate the pattern of the responses (or the significant non-responses) among both the new professionals and the senior experts.  Questions were analyzed not in isolation, but with reference to other questions.  The questionnaire and interview schedule were constructed with a natural flow, where one question logically led to the next.  The responses were viewed in their totality, and patterns of answers sometimes revealed more new knowledge than individual answers.

A database of university courses in intelligence was gradually developed.  The preferred method for presenting the findings was an Excel spreadsheet showing the schools and the intelligence courses they teach on the *y*-axis and the ODNI competencies addressed by the courses on the *x*-axis.  Naturally, this required the author to use his subject-matter expertise to make some subjective judgments about which competencies are covered and which are not, because it was a matter of degree and not an absolute "yes-no" decision.

Because the ODNI Integrated Competency Directory was originally "for official use only" within the federal government and was delayed from being released to the public at large, it became necessary for the researcher to gain permission from ODNI officials to provide a preliminary listing that was totally unclassified and releasable to the public.  Otherwise, the institutions within the higher education community would never know exactly what competencies and skills the intelligence agency recruiters are seeking.

Although the releasable list probably was not as detailed and comprehensive as the official one making up ODNI's formal directory, it was still useful and a step in the right direction for linking the two communities together in the endeavor to find and develop the best possible young professionals for employment in the Intelligence Community.

<div align="center">**Design Issues**</div>

*Concerns about Bias*

One issue that always arises in a qualitative study, and particularly one with a grounded theory approach in which the researcher's own experiences are crucial, is the possibility of bias. Because the researcher has been working in the Intelligence Community for many years, he no doubt has developed certain relationships and been involved in isolated situations that could affect his objectivity and ability to view issues dispassionately.

To correct for this tendency, the researcher attempted to view the subject matter at hand from the perspective of the higher education community, in which he has also participated for a number of years. For example, he put himself in the shoes of the "scholar" instead of thinking in the "practitioner" mode, relying on his graduate course work instead of the preconceived notions he may have developed while working in the field. Despite being a retired military officer, part of his graduate education was obtained through what is known as "advanced civil schooling," in which the Department of Defense outsources the graduate education of many of its members while supporting them financially with paid tuition. Spending that time on a civilian college campus exposed the researcher to many diverse social, political, and cultural views that have modulated his mindset ever since. For example, his first master's degree, in the field of

international relations, was earned at an Ivy League campus in the immediate post-Vietnam War, post-Watergate era. The civilian students and faculty with whom he interacted daily voiced a wide range of opinions which were somewhat new and provocative to the researcher, whose entire undergraduate experience had been spent within the cocoon of a federal service academy. He came out of his graduate experience with a much broader view of both domestic affairs and the proper place of the United States in the international order.

In designing this study, the researcher capitalized on his prior knowledge about intelligence education, his current participation in it via his contractor employment with the National Defense Intelligence College, and his professional connections through belonging to a number of private organizations dealing with intelligence education. In preparing his questionnaire instrument, he first did a lot of background work to determine what sorts of questions to ask and how to ask them so as not to lead the respondents toward any predisposed conclusions. He pre-interviewed five of the 2005-06 contingent of then-IC Scholars (now DI Scholars) to validate the survey instrument. The researcher also pre-interviewed a number of experts during the literature review phase of his study. The exercise of interviewing a broad segment of more senior personnel with far more educational experience than himself helped neutralize any particular individual biases about the value and quality of current intelligence education he might have had based on his earlier life experiences.

Another part of the study which could be affected by bias is the selection of which core competencies are addressed by the intelligence education programs and courses as reflected in the database produced as a result of this study. The researcher held a

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preconceived notion about what ODNI is looking for in promulgating these competencies both through conversing with involved ODNI officials and through talking about the process with other educators he met via professional organizations, some of whom actually teach the courses in intelligence studies being evaluated here.  He also has a deep familiarity with most of the various categories of courses, some of which he has taken himself over the years, or very similar courses, and can therefore reach an educated judgment as to whether a course covers that particular competency.  Naturally, if actual course syllabi and/or program brochures are available for perusal, or even better the chance to interview the instructor personally, there is a much better chance that the researcher's "educated guess" is much more precise and well-informed.

*Copyrighted Materials*

None was used in the preparation and dissemination of the written questionnaire. The content was developed completely by the author, based strictly upon his own views and opinions.

## Consideration of Human Subjects

This issue was of minimal concern, although there is no doubt that U.S. intelligence-related activities at home (e.g., psychological experimentation on human subjects during the Cold War or recent domestic eavesdropping by NSA on U.S. citizen telephone conversations with likely terrorists overseas) and operations abroad (e.g., covert operations to topple unfriendly regimes in the 1950s-60s or intelligence personnel involvement with Abu Ghraib prison excesses in Iraq in 2004-05) have overstepped ethical boundaries.  On the other hand, the teaching of intelligence courses in the modern era is relatively non-controversial.  The items in the questionnaire were in no way

personally threatening.  They deal solely with academic issues and what motivated the students to get involved in intelligence education in the first place.  The questions asked of the intelligence personnel in the questionnaire are not intimidating.  It is true that some courses are likely taught by former intelligence professionals who worked for the federal government, and perhaps taught similar courses in government schools, but the nature of what they are teaching now is not classified or even particularly sensitive.  The reading materials used are unclassified or declassified government documents.  Everything is in the public domain.

If the questionnaire itself or its results were to be publicly revealed inadvertently, there would be little damage expected.  As anticipated, most respondents waived anonymity, if for no other reason than the fact they took such courses in an open setting indicated the accompanying lack of sensitivity.  In those few cases where former students did not want their names associated with questionnaire responses, for whatever reason (one was under official cover), that was easily accommodated.

## <u>Summary</u>

Higher education in the U.S. has always been associated with intelligence organs to some degree, and occasionally deeply enmeshed in classified intelligence research, but more can be done to bring the topic of intelligence education to a wider audience.  It is expected that the questionnaire instrument and the informal interviews of senior experts introduced in this chapter will be a first step in obtaining information from individuals educated for the intelligence profession that can be fed back into both the higher education and intelligence communities to enhance how the subject of intelligence is

taught.  Ultimately, the goal is to identify best practices for developing future intelligence professionals who come to work in the U.S. Intelligence Community.

In sum, the methodological approaches employed in this study were a mix of well-established qualitative techniques suitable for the application of a grounded theory approach to the problem and the research question.  Three data streams from related and overlapping, but nonetheless independent, sources produced a wealth of data on intelligence education.  The findings will be analyzed and synthesized in Chapter 4.

**Chapter 4**

**PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA**

Today, we face some of the greatest threats that any generation will ever know, and we must not be slow in confronting them. We must . . . provide frank, unencumbered analysis. . . Lives are saved, and America's cause is advanced, when the right intelligence is in the right hands at the right time. That is the enduring mission of our Intelligence Community, and the animating force of our professionals.

> -- Vice Admiral (Retired) J.M. McConnell,
> second Director of National Intelligence,
> in a letter to all employees of the Intelligence
> Community on his first official day in office,
> February 13, 2007

If you are in charge, then take charge. I would rather have you commit the sin of commission than omission. In this business, we can deal with soundly-reasoned mistakes more than we can withstand the cost of missed opportunities and failures.

> -- Lieutenant General Ronald L. Burgess, Jr.,
> Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, in
> guidance to DIA employees at U.S.
> European and Africa Commands in
> Stuttgart, Germany, May 11, 2009

## Overview

This chapter will present the data collected by the researcher in summary fashion, analysis of the results, and some preliminary findings that will inform the more strategic-level conclusions and recommendations offered in Chapter 5. The chapter is organized around the three principal sources of data that were explained in Chapter 3. First, the results from the written questionnaire administered to young intelligence professionals will be presented and analyzed, followed by the results from the interviews of senior subject matter experts. Finally, a sampling of representative colleges and universities which offer intelligence education programs will be discussed, with a brief assessment of

their more relevant courses. Following a synthesis of the results from these three sources, the researcher will set forth his general findings, answers to key questions, and to the principal research question. Throughout the chapter, references are made to a series of appendices at the end of the study which present more detailed information that will be of particular interest to those teaching intelligence.

## Questionnaire for Young Intelligence Professionals

The first of three data collection modes to be assessed is the questionnaire administered to young intelligence professionals from throughout the Intelligence Community. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the core around which the body of respondents was built was a group of Intelligence Community (IC)/ Defense Intelligence (DI) Scholars who have attended the National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC) over the last five years. Other respondents were procured from most of the 16 IC agencies' employee ranks, some of whom were former NDIC students. Yet others are analysts who have never attended NDIC but earned their bachelor's and master's degrees from civilian colleges and universities. A detailed breakdown of the respondents will be provided later.

As part of the questionnaire (Appendix A), the respondents were given a summarized list of core competencies released and provided by ODNI to the researcher in the late summer of 2008 (Appendix B). They were asked to compare the intelligence courses they had taken with the list of competencies needed within the IC, as developed and coordinated by ODNI's Office of Competencies and Standards under its Director, Jane Homeyer. The competencies were announced by ODNI in a directive published September 17, 2008. (Ballenstedt, *Government Executive.com*, October 3, 2008)

The summary of respondent information is as follows:  81 total questionnaires were received; 4 were unusable, resulting in a subject group of 77.  The questionnaires were completed between July 10 and November 23, 2008, with the exception of one which was not turned in until April 16, 2009.  Of the 16 members of the Intelligence Community (IC), all but the Departments of Energy and Treasury were represented.  One individual assigned to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (which provides oversight of the IC), specifically the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and one contractor to the IC, a recently retired Coast Guard officer still working under contract for that service, were included.  For DIA, three interns and 22 IC/DI Scholars were included.  The seventy-seven participants represented the following organizations:

| Table 1:  RESPONDENTS | |
| --- | --- |
| IC MEMBERS | RESPONDENTS |
| Air Force | 3 |
| Army | 2 |
| CIA | 1 |
| DEA/DOJ | 9 |
| DHS | 3 |
| DIA | 32 |
| FBI | 3 |
| Navy | 1 |
| NGA | 7 |
| NRO | 1 |
| NSA | 6 |
| State | 3 |
| USCG | 2 |
| USMC | 2 |
| OTHER | |
| Civilian Contractor | 1 |
| ODNI/NCTC | 1 |
| | |
| TOTAL SUBJECT GROUP | 77 |

Four questionnaires were rejected as unusable because the respondents neglected to sign the necessary release.  One of those also did not provide his/her name.

*Questions and Summary of Responses*

**1. I have been an intelligence analyst (or BLANK, if your job title is something other than analyst) since BLANK (year).**

Of the 77 questionnaires accepted, 26 of the respondents indicated they were

intelligence analysts. The length of time served as an analyst spanned from 1978 to 2008

(a couple of early outliers were due to military service in the intelligence field), with the

average start date of 1999 and a mode of 2002. Other positions held included action or

staff officer, attorney, cartographer, instructor, collector, cryptologist, intelligence

operations or research specialist, foreign affairs officer, investigator or special agent,

language or regional analyst, program manager, and systems engineer.

**2. This is my first such intelligence job or, if not, I previously worked at BLANK (name of government agency or private company).**

Thirty-one respondents indicated they were in their first intelligence position.

Twelve did not note previous work experience, while four others said the question did not

apply to them. Of the 27 who did list previous work, military experience or work in the

Department of Defense and Service intelligence offices was common. Other government

experience included Department of Commerce, Department of Justice, U.S. Coast Guard,

and the State Department. Previous IC experience included CIA, FBI, NGA (and its

predecessors NIMA and DMA), NRO, and NSA.

**3. Do you work in, or desire to work in, a single discipline or "INT," or is a more broad-based professional outlook preferable? BLANK. If a single "INT" is your focus, which is it? BLANK.**

Of the 77 responses, 18 were unusable or incomplete. With 47 respondents

choosing a broad-based or multi-INT approach, it was the preferable method of work. Of

the 13 who specified a single intelligence discipline, HUMINT and SIGINT (to include

the sub-disciplines COMINT and FISINT) were noted most often. Other INTs such as IMINT were mentioned, as were other focus areas such as intelligence analysis, law enforcement, security, counterintelligence, and social analysis.

**4(a). My undergraduate degree was in the field of BLANK and was awarded by this college or university BLANK (name).**

Table 2 reflects the undergraduate fields of study reported by the respondents. By far the largest group majored in one or more of the social sciences, with 39 respondents. Even though regional studies are considered a social science, they are split out separately due to the great concern currently within the IC over an inadequate number of regional experts. The same is true for foreign languages, which are split out from the humanities, even though language study is normally considered to be in that category. Humanities represent the second largest group with 17 respondents, and foreign languages third with 10. It is clear that liberal arts are where the overwhelming number of young intelligence professionals devote their undergraduate effort. One respondent merits special mention, because he majored in just "liberal arts," not further specified. The school he attended, St. John's College in Annapolis, MD, is considered one of the few remaining "pure" liberal arts institutions in the U.S., where virtually all students take an identical core liberal arts curriculum.

Of special note given the topic of this study is that only one respondent reported having pursued an intelligence studies path, a DIA analyst who attended Mercyhurst College in Erie, PA. The reason there are 99 students reporting majors but only 77 respondents is that a sizable number of graduates were double majors. Below Table 2 is a listing of the undergraduate institutions attended by the respondents.

| Table 2: *UNDERGRADUATE FIELDS OF STUDY* | |
|---|---|
| DEGREE/MAJOR | STUDENTS |
| Social Sciences (e.g., Pol Sci, Govt, Econ, Intl Rlns) | 39 |
| Humanities (e.g., Engl, Hist, Philosophy, Religion, Theology) | 17 |
| Foreign Languages | 10 |
| Business | 7 |
| Criminal Justice/Criminology | 5 |
| Engineering | 3 |
| Geography | 3 |
| Journalism/Communications | 2 |
| Mathematics | 2 |
| Psychology | 2 |
| Regional Studies | 2 |
| Anthropology | 1 |
| Biochemistry | 1 |
| Computer Science | 1 |
| Finance | 1 |
| Liberal Arts | 1 |
| Pre-Law | 1 |
| Intelligence Studies | 1 |

American Military University
American University
Amherst College
Boston University
Carleton College
Cedarville University
Dickinson College
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Excelsior College
George Mason University
George Washington University
Georgetown University (2)
Graceland University
Hawaii Pacific University
Holy Cross College
Hood College
Idaho State University
Indiana University
Indiana University (PA)
Inter-American University of Puerto
  Rico
John Jay College
LaSalle University
Mercyhurst College
Michigan State University

New Mexico State University
Northwestern University
Northwood University
Notre Dame College
Ohio State University
Ohio University
Pennsylvania State University
Point Park University
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Rice University
Rutgers University
Salve Regina University
Shippensburg University
Southeast Missouri State University
Southern Illinois University
St. John's College
St. Mary's University
St. Vincent College
State University of New York (SUNY)
Strayer University
Sweet Briar College
Syracuse University
Texas State University
U.S. Air Force Academy
University of Alabama

University of California, Berkeley          University of Puget Sound
University of California, Riverside          University of San Diego
University of Chicago                              University of South Florida
University of Delaware                           University of Southern California
University of Florida                               University of Washington
University of Illinois (2)                         University of Wisconsin
University of Maryland (5)                      Valparaiso University
University of Massachusetts                    Wellesley College
University of Michigan                           Wesleyan University
University of North Carolina                   Wheaton College
University of Pennsylvania                      Yale University
University of Pittsburgh (2)

**4(b). My graduate degree, if I have one, was in the field of BLANK and was awarded by this college or university BLANK (name). Additional degrees were earned in the field(s) of BLANK from this college or university BLANK (name).**

Table 3 reflects the graduate fields of study reported by the respondents, obviously a shorter list than the undergraduate one because many of them have not yet earned civilian master's degrees (though 23 have earned the Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence degree from the National Defense Intelligence College). Again, by far the largest group (16 respondents) studied in one of the social sciences. Law and business were a distant second (five) and third (four), respectively. The individual who earned a master's in "war studies," which perhaps could be considered one of the social sciences, or even one of the humanities if it is history-related, did so under a program in the United Kingdom. Only one individual reported having taken an intelligence studies path through a civilian institution, and in his case it was a concentration within a more general "security studies" program.

As in the case of the undergraduate fields of study, there were more degrees reported than there were individuals earning them, because a fairly significant number (16) of the respondents have earned multiple graduate degrees. Below Table 3 is a listing of the graduate institutions attended by the respondents.

| Table 3:  GRADUATE FIELDS OF STUDY | |
|---|---|
| DEGREE/MAJOR | STUDENTS |
| Social Sciences (e.g., Pol Sci, Govt, Econ, Intl Rlns) | 16 |
| Law | 5 |
| Business | 4 |
| Humanities (e.g., Engl, Hist, Religion) | 3 |
| Public Administration/Public Policy | 3 |
| Education | 2 |
| Foreign Languages | 2 |
| Geography/Cartographic Sciences | 2 |
| Operational Research | 2 |
| Regional Studies | 2 |
| Criminal Justice | 1 |
| Forensic Psychology | 1 |
| Journalism/Publications Design | 1 |
| Sports Science | 1 |
| War Studies | 1 |
| Security/Intelligence Studies | 1 |

Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT, 2)
American University (3, 1 of them law school, 1 with 2 degrees)
Catholic University
Duke University
Florida Institute of Technology
George Mason University (2)
Georgetown University (4, 2 of them law school)
George Washington University (3)
Harvard University (2)
Indiana University
Indiana University (PA)
Johns Hopkins University (School of Advanced International Studies)
Johnson and Wales University
King's College London
Marquette University
Marymount University
Northeastern Illinois University
Oxford University
Shoreline College
Tulane University
University of Arizona
University of Baltimore
University of Chicago (2)
University of Kentucky
University of Maryland
University of Pittsburgh
University of Texas

University of Wyoming

**5. While in college, were you aware of any intelligence studies courses taught by your school? BLANK. If so, what were they? BLANK. Did you take them? BLANK. Would you recommend offering some other type of intelligence or intelligence-related course than those offered? BLANK. If so, what? BLANK.**

The overwhelming majority of respondents (57) indicated they were not aware of any intelligence studies courses taught by their school. Those who did signal awareness (20) more often than not attended the schools with large, well-known intelligence studies programs, such as American Military University or Mercyhurst College. Interestingly, however, most of the respondents did not study under any of those programs. It was not that they did not value such programs. It was more a case of their attending the school with a different program and/or career goal in mind and then after graduation finding their way into a job with the IC. This was true in particular for the DI/IC Scholars; few of them had taken an intelligence studies path as an undergraduate.

Still, a considerable number of respondents (18) emphatically stated that they wished they had taken more intelligence courses to fill in some of the gaps in knowledge they experienced after joining the IC. Commonly cited areas of study desired were analysis, analytical research methodology, foreign languages, area/regional studies, foreign cultures, intelligence processes, and production. It was only after being recruited by the IC and starting work in a particular agency that they realized where their educational shortfalls lay.

**6. Did you consider yourself educationally well prepared when you began your intelligence job? BLANK. Why or why not? BLANK. What sort of courses might you have taken that would have prepared you better? BLANK.**

Over two-thirds (54) of the respondents considered themselves well prepared when they began intelligence work. A fairly large number mentioned they had a

background in intelligence or military experience before joining the IC, or at least a good understanding of how it worked. Many mentioned aspects of their education, such as the need for analysis, research, and writing required, subject areas studied, and critical thinking skills acquired. Developing the scientific method of thinking and experience gained through internship was noted by one individual. Another respondent believed that outside reading in history and social studies helped prepare him/her.

These individuals still noted courses or study areas which they felt would have helped them be better prepared, such as (representative responses):

- Advanced statistics
- Analytical methods, refresher on English grammar and composition rules
- Analytical thinking and writing
- Applied economic theory
- Briefing and writing skills
- Business management, finance
- Collection
- Counterterrorism, basic intelligence writing
- Critical analysis of current affairs, world religion, heavier government studies
- Critical reading, writing, thinking skills
- Cultural studies
- Culture and language
- Foreign cultures
- History of intelligence, intelligence law
- Intelligence analysis (5), tools for intelligence analysis, counterintelligence
- Intelligence overview, area studies, language
- Intelligence product processes, writing short products
- Iraq conflict
- Language
- Language and culture, foreign policy
- Logistics, rhetoric
- Middle East issues, Iraq familiarization, operations training, advanced political analysis, collection management
- Overt intelligence
- Political science, regional studies
- Protective intelligence
- Regional geopolitics, culture, traditions
- Regional studies
- Regional studies, history, analytic research methods

- Scientific method of thinking, other internships
- Writing style

Note the emphasis on intelligence analysis and regional studies.  There is also a marked interest in writing for intelligence work.

Of the ten people who said their education did not prepare them, some of the following reasons were given:  they lacked training or had no prior military or technical background, or came from another background altogether.  One respondent mentioned that the learning curve was steep.  What type of courses would have helped them be better prepared?  About half mentioned introductory or overview intelligence courses, looking at the structure, processes, methodology, and services offered by particular IC agencies.  Others mentioned having background in national security policy or an overview of military structure and organization.  Hard science courses such as engineering, physics, and electronics were mentioned by one individual, while another felt that writing, research, history of intelligence, foreign relations, and creative problem solving were needed.  Statistics and social network analysis or social complexity theory were desired by one individual.  Regional and cultural studies were mentioned by several respondents.

An equal number of respondents felt partially prepared.  These individuals cited the same reasons mentioned above.

**7.  Do you feel education for intelligence professionals should be centered on a rigorous intelligence studies curriculum, or is a more traditional path preferable, such as one with a liberal arts or an engineering focus?  Why or why not?**

Approximately half (40) of the respondents believed that the traditional path was preferable.  Half of those specified liberal arts.  One commented that "the IC is a very dynamic environment that is better suited to learn on the job after IC fundamentals have

been learned." Another said that a "more focused undergraduate program would fail to expose students to the foundations of world thought."

Only eight felt a rigorous intelligence studies curriculum was the best approach. One of these individuals noted that having had that background would have better prepared them for their career.

Over a quarter (21) preferred a combined approach. One person commented that "the technical INTs need the engineering background, while fusion, geopolitical and military need the liberal arts background." Another individual commented that "Having a non-intelligence degree is important for being a specialist in a field and gaining a perspective, to which you can then relate to any intelligence work."

Three responded they were not sure, one said it depended on the intelligence discipline, and four did not answer.

## 8. Do you speak a foreign language at least at a conversational level? If so, which language(s)?

The foreign languages spoken by the respondents are shown in Table 4. It should be noted that, when there was a language skill, there were one to four languages spoken per person. Fourteen respondents indicated they did not know a foreign language, and nine others left the question blank, which means that 55 (71.4%) spoke at least one foreign language. Ten respondents knew two foreign languages, six knew three, and two had mastered four languages. One remarkable individual spoke Ukrainian, French, Spanish, and Ancient Greek. It is also interesting to note that there were nine undergraduate language majors or minors in the group and three who went on to gain a master's degree in a language or regional study.

| Table 4:  FOREIGN LANGUAGE COMPETENCY LIST (ALPHABETICAL) ||
|---|---|
| LANGUAGE | SPEAKERS |
| Ancient Greek | 1 |
| Arabic | 7 |
| Cebuano | 1 |
| Chinese (Mandarin and/or Cantonese) | 6 |
| Croatian | 1 |
| Estonian | 1 |
| French | 14 |
| German | 7 |
| Hebrew | 1 |
| Hindi | 2 |
| Irish Gaelic | 1 |
| Italian | 2 |
| Japanese | 1 |
| Kannada | 1 |
| Korean (Hangul) | 2 |
| Persian (Farsi) | 2 |
| Portuguese | 2 |
| Russian | 4 |
| Spanish | 13 |
| Telugu | 1 |
| Turkish | 1 |
| Ukrainian | 2 |
| Urdu | 1 |

As shown in Table 5, the predominant languages spoken were French and Spanish.

Arabic, German, Chinese, and Russian were also well represented.  The remaining

languages, although only one or two respondents noted competency in them, amounted to

eighteen different, and in some cases very difficult, languages.

| Table 5:  FOREIGN LANGUAGE COMPETENCY CONCENTRATION LIST (FREQUENCY) | |
| --- | --- |
| LANGUAGE | SPEAKERS |
| French | 14 |
| Spanish | 13 |
| Arabic and German | 7 |
| Chinese (Mandarin and/or Cantonese) | 6 |
| Russian | 4 |
| Hindi, Italian, Korean (Hangul), Persian (Farsi), Portuguese, and Ukrainian | 2 |
| Ancient Greek, Cebuano, Croatian, Estonian, Hebrew, Irish Gaelic, Japanese, Kannada, Telugu, Turkish, and Urdu | 1 |

**9.  The single most significant person or thing that motivated me to want to become an intelligence analyst/officer was BLANK.**

There was a wide range of answers to this question, ranging from the altruistic to plain curiosity.  Fifteen respondents attributed their motivation to become an intelligence officer or analyst to specific people who influenced them.  Six others mentioned family connections or members, such as a father or grandfather.  About the same number mentioned personal interest or a lifelong dream.  Others listed a particular interest such as foreign affairs, international relations, geography, language, a region, or culture. Particularly interesting responses included:

- Historical studies on George Washington's intelligence work

- Ideals of pursuing justice

- The politicization of the IC that encouraged the U.S. to invade Iraq

- Useless wars worldwide

- An interest in the "meta-text" of human liturgy

Eight respondents mentioned the September 11 attacks as the motivation for joining the IC and one listed the Iranian hostage crisis.  Seven said it was patriotism or the desire to

serve their country (although one specified "from a desk").  Three mentioned courses

they took, experiences while in school (e.g., participating in a mock UN panel), or the

desire to study abroad.  Others mentioned literature, the movies, and even "the hype and

mystery surrounding the CIA."  A few noted that they just needed a job or wanted to

work close to where they lived.  Two claimed self-motivation.  Eleven did not answer

and one said it was not applicable to him/her.

**10.  I consider BLANK to be my most important role model or mentor as an intelligence professional.  If you have never had a role model related to intelligence or national security, check this block BOX.**

More than half (48) did not respond to this question or indicated they had never had a

role model.  However, the rest mentioned at least one person, many times by name and

with full title or where they knew them from.  Some were family members, previous

supervisors, or professors; even historical figures such as Thomas Paine and George

Washington were mentioned.

**11.  Please peruse the ODNI core competencies list (attached to questionnaire) and indicate those areas in which you feel you were well prepared by your formal education and those in which you were not (focus just on your formal education, not on any agency-specific or job-related training courses you might have taken since then).  Note that the competency list was excerpted from Intelligence Community Directive 610, Appendix B.**

Of the 77 respondents, four indicated their education prepared them for ALL the

competencies.  Six either did not complete this section or their answers were unusable.

Thirty-eight responded by marking the major areas only and noting minor deviations.

Twenty-nine indicated they were prepared (or not) by sub-categories.  The results of

these two groups are reported in Tables 6 and 7 respectively.

| Table 6: IC CORE COMPETENCIES FOR NON-SUPERVISORY IC EMPLOYEES AT GS-15 AND BELOW MAJOR CATEGORIES (38 RESPONDENTS) | | |
|---|---|---|
| MAJOR CATEGORY | PREPARED | NOT |
| Engagement and Collaboration | 15 | 21 |
| Critical Thinking | 36 | 2 |
| Personal Leadership and Integrity | 25 | 7 |
| Accountability for Results | 30 | 3 |
| Technical Expertise | 11 | 22 |
| Communication | 33 | 3 |

Looking at the major categories of core competencies, the three for which the respondents who addressed only these categories overwhelmingly felt prepared were critical thinking, accountability, and communication. A fourth—personal leadership and integrity—showed many more prepared than not, though the proportion was not as stark.

The two categories reflecting significant non-preparation were engagement and collaboration and technical expertise. This is not surprising, in that working with peers in other agencies is not something easily taught; it has to be experienced. Serving as an intern is one way to be exposed to this milieu. Another is a rotational assignment, which is normally done at the midpoint of a career or later. In the IC, under ODNI guidelines, such assignments are mandated as a prerequisite for selection into the Senior Executive Service (SES)/Senior Intelligence Service (SIS). However, this phase is far down the road for most young respondents, who have not begun to think about such possibilities.

The biggest shortfall was in the category of technical expertise. This also is not surprising in that intelligence professionals largely glean such expertise through in-house training programs, on-the-job training (OJT), or both. They do not normally gain, or even expect to gain, detailed subject matter expertise through college academic offerings, especially if they fall under the rubric of a liberal arts program, which the majority of respondents took in college.

| MAJOR CATEGORY/SUB-CATEGORIES | PREPARED | NOT |
|---|---|---|
| Engagement and Collaboration | | |
|    Building Professional/Technical Networks | 11 | 10 |
|    Influencing/Negotiating | 8 | 17 |
|    Interpersonal Skills | 21 | 5 |
|    Information Sharing | 12 | 9 |
| | | |
| Critical Thinking | | |
|    Creative Thinking | 27 | 1 |
|    Exploring Alternatives | 24 | 2 |
|    Enterprise Perspective | 8 | 14 |
|    Situational Awareness | 15 | 9 |
|    Synthesis | 25 | 3 |
| | | |
| Personal Leadership and Integrity | | |
|    Courage and Conviction | 11 | 8 |
|    Dedicated Service | 12 | 6 |
|    Innovation | 14 | 5 |
|    Integrity/Honesty | 15 | 4 |
|    Resilience | 11 | 6 |
|    Respect for Diversity | 17 | 1 |
| | | |
| Accountability for Results | | |
|    Adaptability | 19 | 2 |
|    Continual Learning | 19 | 3 |
|    Initiative | 14 | 3 |
|    Resource Management | 13 | 13 |
|    Rigor | 15 | 3 |
| | | |
| Technical Expertise | | |
|    Professional Tradecraft | 1 | 21 |
|    Subject Matter Expertise | 9 | 13 |
| | | |
| Communication | | |
|    Multimedia Communication | 15 | 5 |
|    Oral Communication | 20 | 3 |
|    Written Communication | 32 | 0 |

*Table 7: IC CORE COMPETENCIES FOR NON-SUPERVISORY IC EMPLOYEES AT GS-15 AND BELOW SUB-CATEGORIES (29 RESPONDENTS)*

The same patterns bore out for those respondents who answered by sub-categories rather than by major categories. The areas reflecting overwhelming preparation in college were interpersonal skills, creative thinking, exploring alternatives, synthesis, innovation, integrity/honesty, respect for diversity, adaptability, continual learning, initiative, rigor, and oral and written communication.

The areas suggesting a lack of preparation in part could be attributed to a lack of understanding of what they mean. For example, "enterprise perspective" elicited some consternation; only 8 respondents indicated they were prepared for it while 14 stated they were not. As the term "enterprise" is a fairly new buzzword in the IC, and five officials would probably define it five different ways, this is not surprising. The most negative response mirrors the result for the major category of technical expertise. As expected, the sub-category of professional tradecraft is the most lopsided in the direction of "not prepared." This is something most intelligence types expect to be prepared for once they arrive at their agency, and each agency's training establishment does it a little differently. Subject matter expertise, though leaning toward "not prepared," is considerably more balanced.

**12. I will probably continue to work in the intelligence field for the next BLANK years.**

There were a number of ways this question was answered. In total, there were 68 responses of either a specific number, a range (e.g., 3-5, 10-15, 14-25), or an "at least" caveat. One individual simply said "for the rest of my career." The specific numbers were likely computed to correspond with projected retirement dates. Three were unsure how many years they would continue to serve in the IC. Five did not answer. Taking the highest number provided in the range and the "at least" numbers and averaging across the

total of 68 responses, 13 was the average number of years.  The minimum stated was one

year and the maximum was 30 years.  Ten years was the mode.

**13.  If I leave intelligence to pursue another career, it is likely to be BLANK.**

Sixty-six respondents answered this question.  Of those, six were unsure what they

wanted to do after leaving intelligence work and one said the question did not apply to

his/her situation.  Of the 59 who listed possibilities, there was a wide variety mentioned.

Twenty individuals said they were interested in an academic career or education, to

include teaching, conducting research, or being part of a think tank.  Some chose multiple

options, such as teaching or business.  Approximately 12 mentioned a new career in

business, either opening their own or working in the corporate world.  Consulting,

investing, finance, sales and marketing, and management were mentioned, as was using

their intelligence skills in the corporate setting.  Others planned to go into law, law

enforcement, or public policy.  Continuing to serve in the government in a different

capacity or organization (e.g., FBI, State Department) was an option for some.  Serving

as a diplomat was a goal for two respondents.  A number of unique and different careers

were mentioned, such as aviation, culinary arts, politics, ministry, fiction writing,

inventing, and non-profit work.

## Analysis of Questionnaire Results

As mentioned previously, 77 questionnaires were accepted and processed.  Those

results represented the views of employees of 14 of the 16 agencies of the Intelligence

Community (IC), with only employees of the Departments of Energy and Treasury not

being included as a result of their not being accessible or known to the researcher.

Additionally, one of the respondents is employed by the Office of the Director of

National Intelligence (ODNI) and another is a defense contractor working for the intelligence component of one of the armed services (Coast Guard), from which he recently retired as a uniformed member.  Consequently, a broad base of responses from diverse sources was obtained.

*Questions Dealing with Job Experience and Preferences*

The first question dealt with the respondents' job titles and how long they had worked in that field.  What was striking to this researcher was the wide variety of duty descriptions, given that he had assumed the vast majority would be basic intelligence analysts.  This was not the case.  Only 26 indicated they were currently analysts.  Others were collectors, operators, investigators, program managers, instructors, action officers, etc.  There was even one attorney for the Drug Enforcement Administration.  Intelligence education is obviously much more than learning how to do analysis, and intelligence professionals have applied their learning to associated positions that will make them more rounded and help them get to the top of the intelligence career ladder.

The second question asked whether this was the respondents' first intelligence job or if they previously worked somewhere else.  Interestingly, 27 of 77 indicated they had previous work experience.  Several had served in the military, and not just as intelligence personnel, while a number had worked for other IC agencies or even federal agencies outside the IC.  They seem to be very mobile and not tied down to one particular agency, unlike earlier generations which tended to stay put longer in one place.

The third question addressed intelligence discipline-specific stovepipes, or "INT"s.  Overwhelmingly, the respondents preferred the multi-INT approach.  It is clear they have been indoctrinated into thinking that the way to get ahead is to diversify their

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intelligence work experience and broaden their horizons. Later in their careers, even if they tend to specialize in a single "INT," rotational assignments required for advancement to the senior levels promise to take them out of their comfort zones and loosen them from their traditional loyalties.

*Questions Dealing with Experiences in College*

The professionals' academic experience was the subject of the fourth question, to include schools attended and degrees earned. A very broad range of colleges was cited, geographically spread across North America and Western Europe. Undergraduate institutions ranged from elite bastions like Yale, Northwestern, Wellesley, Chicago, and Rice to the oft-purported "degree factories" like Strayer and online entities like American Military University. Graduate institutions followed the spectrum from Harvard, Duke, and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies to Johnson and Wales, Shoreline, and the Air Force Institute of Technology. Notable overseas universities attended at the undergraduate or graduate level included Oxford, King's College London, and the Inter-American University of Puerto Rico. Mildly surprising was the fact that the vast majority of degrees were not in the intelligence field, though liberal arts of some sort abounded.

The fifth question delved into knowledge about, and experience in taking, intelligence studies courses. The researcher was shocked to learn that 57 respondents were not aware of any such courses being taught by their school. The result would probably be different if new hires only were questioned. The burgeoning number of intelligence and intelligence-related courses listed in Appendix C suggests that their availability to student populations nowadays would be much higher than was the case just

a few years ago when most of the respondents were passing through their college years. Paradoxically, many of the respondents who did admit to awareness of intelligence courses did not take them. Many had other careers in mind at the time they went to college, reinforcing the earlier observation that young professionals nowadays are very mobile in their pursuit of a career, not to mention their educational preparation for one. Nevertheless, once they got settled into intelligence work at one of the IC agencies, a solid number said they wished they had taken advantage of the courses that would have helped prepare them for the intelligence business.

The sixth question explored how well prepared the respondents were for their jobs. Over two-thirds considered themselves well prepared. A bit surprisingly, many said they had a good understanding of how intelligence worked, and cited coursework requiring extensive research, writing, analysis, and critical thinking as instrumental. Still, a long list of study areas was gleaned by asking the respondents what courses or program areas would have helped them be better prepared. In this list, the oft-mentioned regional studies, cultural studies, and foreign language courses were expected by the researcher. This observation solidifies what has often been cited as a weakness in U.S. education since 9/11, i.e., the lack of international focus that would better prepare an American college graduate to confront the problems of a dangerous world.

*Questions Dealing with Academic Preferences and Foreign Language Expertise*

Whether education for intelligence professionals should be centered on an intelligence studies curriculum or better kept within the traditional paths such as liberal arts or engineering was the topic of the seventh question. A little over half of the respondents preferred the traditional path. Astonishingly, only eight deemed an

intelligence studies program was the way to go.  A significant number (21) desired a combined approach, with a broad curriculum early on and progressively more specialization in the later educational stages.

The eighth question asked about foreign language expertise.  As expected, the vast majority spoke at least one foreign language.  What was surprising, however, was that the most oft-cited language was not Spanish, but French (14 vice 13).  The results reinforce what has been discussed in the media repeatedly about a lack of intelligence professionals proficient in the really difficult, but critically needed, languages such as Arabic, Chinese, Farsi, Dari, Pashto, and Urdu.  Not only are those languages difficult to master, there is a shortage of personnel in the inventory qualified to be deployed who have these skills and can keep them current.  Without fail, however, the respondents recognized the importance of language study of some sort to their intelligence work.

### Questions Dealing with Motivation and Mentorship

The ninth question dealt with motivation for desiring to become an intelligence officer.  There were no surprises here.  The responses touched on all the anticipated motivational sources—family members, teachers, political ideals, previous coursework that struck a chord, the impact of 9/11, desire to serve the country, patriotism, and interest in traveling and seeing the world.

The tenth question—considered by the researcher as a natural follow-on to the ninth—did provide a remarkable result, however, in a somewhat negative way.  It was surprising that 48 of the 77 respondents either left it blank or confessed to never having had a role model or mentor.  Given the current emphasis placed by IC agencies on the importance of mentoring, the researcher expected a lot more positive responses.

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*Question Dealing with Core Competencies Addressed in Coursework*

The eleventh question required the respondents to rate their educational experience against the ODNI core competencies. Not surprisingly, a very small number (four) indicated having been prepared for all the competencies during their formative years. In hindsight, it would probably have been advisable to give clearer instructions to the respondents, so as to avoid the conundrum where about half responded just to the major categories of competencies while a little less than half responded just to the sub-categories. It was obvious that critical thinking is not only uppermost in young intelligence professionals' minds, but almost all felt this area was sufficiently covered in their college courses, which is a welcome revelation. Communication skills were emphasized too, which is positive. However, collaboration/engagement was not cited as decisively; yet that is the watchword of the IC reform effort. Technical expertise is something students obviously expect to get through on-the-job training.

The researcher was a bit surprised to see that personal leadership, integrity, and accountability are apparently dealt with in the universities to the extent they are. Although the respondents may have answered this part of the question in a way they felt they were expected to—that is, it could be one of those areas in which the tenets are "preached" but not "practiced"—the raw numbers are nevertheless encouraging. Of the sub-categories cited, there were no real surprises. Such attributes as creative thinking, interpersonal skills, respect for diversity, adaptability, and oral/written communication were heavily cited in the "prepared" column. Some attributes were not, such as professional tradecraft. Yet, this was expected, because "tradecraft" connotes agency-

specific training, not general education, and the respondents evidently felt they could get that training once on the job.

"Enterprise perspective" drew a considerable number of "not prepared" responses. Figuring this might be the case, the researcher offered the respondents the chance to read definitions of the categories and sub-categories in the Intelligence Community Directive (Appendix F), but almost all declined, saying they had a fairly good idea of what all the terms meant. Apparently, the concept of the "intelligence enterprise" is still catching on within the IC. In fact, the new DIA Director recently designated a special "Enterprise Day" (June 2, 2009) to help teach and instill his Agency's employees with the enterprise perspective. The event consisted of an informal group discussion on the theme, "What is the Enterprise to you?" A second discussion period focused on, "How can we create the Enterprise of tomorrow?" Finally, after lunch a "Crossing Boundaries" session (a series of special face-to-face engagements between employees and their leadership begun by the previous DIA Director at the behest of his Knowledge Lab chief) addressed, "How can I contribute to the Enterprise?" Throughout the day, employees were encouraged to network with peers and counterparts during display presentations in the lobby sponsored by DIA directorates, the combatant commands, and the military services. (Save the date for Enterprise Day – Tuesday, 2 June! *DIA Internal Communications*, May 19, 2009)

It is not just DIA that has embraced the term "enterprise"; it has entered the IC-wide lexicon. For example, in his June 24, 2009, memo to the Community, "From the DNI: 2009 Galileo Awards Program Announcement," Dennis Blair remarks: "The Intelligence Community (IC) faces a world in which the pace, scale and complexity of change is unprecedented. Our security depends on understanding and anticipating both

the threats and opportunities emerging from this dynamic environment.  To meet these new challenges, we must transform the IC into a globally networked intelligence enterprise, one that constantly adapts and embraces innovation and reinvention."

### *Questions Dealing with Long-Range Employment Plans*

The twelfth question queried the respondents as to how long they intended to continue working in the intelligence field.  When the average number of years came out as 13, it was considered very positive by the researcher, given how professionally mobile the younger generation has proven itself to be.  Of course, if all the respondents had been entry-level employees, just starting out in their careers, the number might have been a bit lower.  Considering some respondents already had a few years in the IC under their belts, and given the economic uncertainty generated by the current recession, the fact that many want to stay put for a while makes sense.

The thirteenth and final question asked about possible careers after leaving the intelligence field.  The only striking finding here is how diverse the anticipated fields are, how unrelated some of them are to the intelligence profession, and how broad the interests of intelligence personnel are.  The question dovetailed nicely with an earlier one on courses taken, reflecting that many intelligence professionals must see their current work as an occupation and not necessarily a lifelong calling.  Many would like ultimately to get back into fields they studied early on in their educational experience.

En route to a thorough evaluation of the meaning of these results in light of the principal research question of this study, the thrust of each of these generalized findings was combined with the wisdom of six senior experts in intelligence education.  The product of that combination of perspectives is presented in the following two sections.

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**Interviews of Senior Experts in Intelligence Education**

Six individual subject matter experts were interviewed by this researcher during a 10-week period between August 6 and October 21, 2008. The experts who agreed to assist with this study were, in chronological order, Professor Arthur Hulnick of Boston University, Professor Robert Heibel of Mercyhurst College, President Emeritus Samuel Wilson of Hampden-Sydney College, Mark Lowenthal of the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) and the Intelligence & Security Academy, LLC, Professor Jennifer Sims of Georgetown University, and Carmen Medina of the Center for the Study of Intelligence. Each will be addressed in turn, followed by a wrap-up of some common threads running through all the interviews.

These interviews complemented a number of earlier informal interviews and meetings with other experts during the preliminary phase of this study when the literature review was being conducted and the proposal formulated. Most of those occurred in the 2005-06 time frame and included William Nolte, first Chancellor of the National Intelligence University (NIU) System and now a professor at the University of Maryland; Ronald Garst, then-Provost of the Joint Military Intelligence College and first Chair of IAFIE; Army LTG William Boykin, then-Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Warfighting Support and now a professor at Hampden-Sydney College; and retired Army LTG William Odom, former professor at the U.S. Military Academy, Director of the National Security Agency, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, and adjunct professor at Yale University. In the 2007-08 time frame, additional meetings and briefings dealing with this study were held with Ronald Sanders, Chief Human Capital Officer, Office of the Director of National Intelligence; Professor Emeritus Martin

Rudner of Carleton University and Founding Director of the Canadian Centre of

Intelligence and Security Studies; retired Army National Guard MG William Navas,

Executive Director of the National Security Professional Development Integration Office;

and the Human Capital Working Group of the Project on National Security Reform under

the auspices of the Center for the Study of the Presidency. All of these informal

interviews and meetings with key, knowledgeable officials—theorists and practitioners

alike—contributed greatly to this researcher's understanding and appreciation of the

importance of national security intelligence education, both in the civilian and

government sectors.

### *Hulnick Interview (August 6, 2008, East Hartford, CT)*

Arthur S. Hulnick is Associate Professor of International Relations at Boston

University. Previously, he worked for many years at the Central Intelligence Agency in

both its analytical and operational arms and made the transition to academic life by way

of the Agency's Officer-in-Residence program. After three years in that role, he was

asked to stay on after retirement from government service to continue teaching and

mentoring students about intelligence and national security. He was appointed an

associate professor on the strength of his book, *Fixing the Spy Machine* (2000). He also

serves on the editorial committee of the *International Journal of Intelligence and

CounterIntelligence*. His undergraduate degree is from Princeton University and he did

his graduate work at American University. He was an Air Force intelligence officer prior

to joining the CIA in 1965. He recently wrote a second book on a currently controversial

topic, *Secret Intelligence and Homeland Security* (2004).

Asked how difficult it is to sell an intelligence studies curriculum in the somewhat liberal northeastern part of the country, Hulnick confided that at BU there has been "no faculty fuss." For years it was a "Silber dictatorship" (referring to the long-time and somewhat controversial President and Chancellor John Silber). The proposals for Hulnick's courses on intelligence history, foreign intelligence systems, and industrial security were brought before the Faculty Senate and easily got the nod. He said he was viewed as "not dangerous" to the other professors and his CIA experience probably helped rather than hampered him. He boasted that his courses have been fully subscribed since the beginning.

Hulnick revealed that BU currently offers ten intelligence courses, four of them taught by the current CIA Officer-in-Residence, who was on a 2-year tour that had been extended until 2009. The courses are part of the Foreign Policy and Security Studies track leading to a BA or MA in International Relations. Asked if intelligence studies should be a distinct program, Hulnick said he sees no sense in making it a separate track. Intelligence needs to be integrated with other liberal arts subjects. That way, the students will develop a broad background in international relations.

Hulnick insisted that the CIA does not really want to hire graduates who are intelligence specialists. Instead, it wants "transnational types with a foreign language and area background." The popularity of the BU intelligence courses has spread. For example, Hulnick was asked to present a summer lecture on intelligence at the University of Massachusetts-Boston. He asserted that Boston College had a course on intelligence too, but was not sure if it was still being taught.

*Heibel Interview (September 10, 2008, Washington, DC)*

Robert Heibel, Director of the Institute for Intelligence Studies at Mercyhurst College, is another noted professor of intelligence who does not possess a doctorate but has not let that stand in his way. While Hulnick moved into the academic world via the CIA, Heibel's path of entry was through the FBI. Heibel is considered the father of intelligence studies at Mercyhurst, which is usually the first school mentioned whenever anyone brings up intelligence education. Having been in the teaching business nearly 20 years, he has led the way in helping Mercyhurst find a niche where it can be a leader and innovator. This researcher first met Heibel in 2004 during a visit to DIA to give briefings on his program and explore placement/intern opportunities for his students. That meeting led to an invitation to participate in the annual Intelligence Colloquium at Mercyhurst, which became the spawning ground for IAFIE. The Association was formally founded that summer, centered on a nucleus of intelligence scholars who regularly attended the annual event at Mercyhurst. Heibel was elected Vice Chair of IAFIE the second year of its existence, and the third year he moved up to be Chair.

Asked if he was optimistic about the direction of intelligence studies, Heibel confided "not particularly." He sees progress driven by funding. "Small, hungry private schools are looking for ways to attract students." He noted that at West Virginia University it took ten years. Mercyhurst has helped other schools interested in developing an intelligence studies program get started. That is the only thing about which he is optimistic, he claimed, i.e., the fact that programs seem to be springing up in a lot of schools.

Queried as to the future of IAFIE, Heibel insisted it depends on how aggressive the organization becomes and the level of participation of its members. IAFIE definitely has a role to play, as a conduit for bringing people together who teach intelligence. However, it also has to establish "standards," and he is concerned whether there are enough people with sufficient energy to get that done. He admitted that he had played an instrumental role in kick-starting the Association, but that "it got lonely." Even though there are good people leading IAFIE now, it "takes the vision of someone with more experience" to push the organization forward to a more definitive mission, such as certification. Heibel stated that IAFIE needs more chapters and younger members, such as adding more students. He said he is also a member of the International Association for Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA) and the Association For Intelligence Officers (AFIO, formerly the Association of Former Intelligence Officers).

When the researcher shared with Heibel some of the preliminary results from administering the questionnaire to young intelligence professionals, and the breakdown of respondents opting for a liberal arts program vice a pure intelligence studies program, he insisted strongly that the Mercyhurst undergraduate program *is* liberal arts, and that it leads to a liberal arts degree. It has a foreign language requirement and mandates a wide range of core courses. He admitted he has had an ongoing debate with several others (one of them IAFIE Executive Director Mark Lowenthal) as to the value of Mercyhurst's intelligence program compared to a more traditional liberal arts path, but that "it is not worth it to argue with them." There is "reluctance on their part," he added, to admit that Mercyhurst has been highly successful in placing its graduates in the IC. Whereas many students in the DC area proceed to earn a master's degree in security studies, political

science, or international relations at a fairly large university like Georgetown (where Heibel got his), he explained that the Mercyhurst graduate program is "designed for outsiders."

Asked about intelligence studies programs in general, and their good points versus bad points, Heibel said the good is that these programs "take generalists to the next level" and give them "intellectual flexibility." The bright students tend to be conservative and patriotic. The bad is that often these programs "become possessions of departments that will take them." The departments have their own agendas, sometimes hampering the intelligence programs' chances to develop broadly. Mercyhurst is fortunate in being very interdisciplinary. At some schools, the administration/management does not understand the thrust of intelligence studies. Asked about the IC Centers of Academic Excellence program, he said it is a "wonderful opportunity," though he cautions that many schools do not take advantage of the CAE benefit due to a lack of managers who understand intelligence. He said he was very proud of what Mercyhurst had accomplished, but that it gets lonely out there. He stated that the College needs some friendly competition; the closest right now are Embry-Riddle and Patrick Henry.

Heibel conceded some schools are trying to move too fast. They want to start a master's program without first establishing a sound undergraduate program. A "solid foundation" is needed, and courses have to fit together well. He cited the ethics and intelligence courses developed by Johns Hopkins as an example of doing it the right way.

Asked if it made sense to develop a PhD program in intelligence, Heibel conceded that he would like to have some sort of "ultimate degree" in intelligence, which could very well be a "practitioner's degree." First, a school needs to have a solid master's

program.  There are a couple of U.S. models in existence, he observed—nursing practice and information technology—and there are lots of models in the United Kingdom. Developing a doctorate in intelligence is one of his goals, and he said he "personally will drive it."  He alluded to the students he has helped through bachelor's and master's programs at Mercyhurst:  "The quality of the kids is amazing and there is no limit to the work they can do if given the right tools."

Finally, queried as to the primary topics intelligence studies programs should cover, Heibel listed communication (written and oral), computer tools, critical thinking, how to approach decision-makers, and building a product from scratch (using a "tool chest").  He said most of the 500 or so Mercyhurst graduates he has shepherded through wanted to work for a specific agency, and through dutiful mentoring, careful placement, and available internships most have been able to do that.

*Wilson Interview (September 12, 2008, Hampden-Sydney College, VA)*

The researcher visited with President Emeritus Samuel Wilson in his office on campus at the Wilson Center for Leadership in the Public Interest, which was named for him when he retired.  He still holds the title of Wheat Visiting Professor of Leadership. On April 16, 2009, he returned to DIA, where he had served as Director in 1976-77, as part of its Distinguished Speaker Series to share some of his experiences that had led him to be inducted into the Military Intelligence Hall of Fame and the U.S. Army Ranger Hall of Fame.  The researcher wanted to include Wilson as a senior interviewee because he had been impressed with his wisdom when he keynoted the June 1999 JMIC conference that explored the theme, "Teaching Intelligence at Colleges and Universities," while still President of Hampden-Sydney College (H-SC).

The first question put to Wilson was, "Reflecting on what has transpired in the nine years since you spoke at the JMIC conference, do you feel any different now about the importance of intelligence education and training?" He responded emphatically that he felt even more strongly now. It is a "critical necessity, both for practitioners and informed citizens." He cited the impact of 9/11 and the changed lives of some of his students and their families as a result of this event. To the question, "Has serving as DIA Director and President of H-SC affected your thinking on this?" he replied that one must put this in the context of where he is coming from. As the first Wilson Center Fellow, he was sadly convinced that America's leadership is woefully lacking. He and his school are endeavoring to prepare students for public service, to include government, the military, the Foreign Service, and the public sector. One "does not get very far in leadership without learning the essentials" for people in leadership positions.

In terms of programmatic development, some of these individuals will go into intelligence, he said, where they will encounter challenges to their morality and ethics. H-SC has one of the strictest honor codes in the country, the general boasted, which is administered entirely by students. In HUMINT, you have to do all these things that bring ethics into question, and this produces a dilemma for which intelligence professionals must be prepared. We have to figure out "how to teach people of honor to pilfer and purloin." This is a real quandary with which we must deal. We need more practitioners in ethics associations and must grapple with a personal sense of values and how to seize the moral high ground. Wilson informed the researcher that Gerry Boykin (retired LTG William G. Boykin) is in the midst of his second book, which deals with a Special Forces officer being infiltrated into an al Qaeda cell, where he will no doubt get "blood on his

hands" and eventually have to be exculpated.  Hence, ethics has to be woven into courses in an absolute way.  The inability to deal with it results in a sizable proportion of the population finding intelligence to be distasteful.  Yet, intelligence is a "valuable national possession" and must be treated that way.

To the question of whether he is optimistic about the direction civilian colleges are headed regarding intelligence studies, Wilson said he is not too well informed on that subject, though he has been in touch with several former colleagues now in the teaching profession.  Couching his remarks by saying he was speaking based on assumptions, he asserted that "one of the problems in academe is the contest between academic freedom and accountability."  He confided that he knew a couple of people teaching intelligence who are not sufficiently qualified.  Intelligence education needs "accreditation and certification," he opined.  When the researcher informed the general about the mission of IAFIE, he said he was glad to know such an organization exists.

To the question of who should be teaching intelligence studies—scholars, practitioners, or both (i.e., scholar-practitioners)—Wilson stated that the ideal is a combination of both.  We need "people who know from experience, but are also grounded academically, know foreign cultures, and are personality-driven."  To a follow-up on how important foreign languages are, he insisted they are the *sine qua non* of education and that one could make a case that "an educated American without a second language is illiterate."  (Author's note:  Wilson is fluent in Russian, and served as Defense Attaché to Moscow during the height of the Cold War with the Soviet Union.)

To a query as to how intelligence is taught at H-SC, Wilson discussed some of the courses he had developed since first coming to the college and those now taught by

Boykin and a couple of other professors. They are laid out in the previous section on representative institutions. For years, he had taught a course he developed titled "An Overview of U.S. Intelligence." In it, he included discussion of the intelligence cycle, but the general said his cycle has more steps than the classic one. Boykin has taken that course over now, but Wilson still guest lectures on occasion. Another course with a heavy component of intelligence content is "U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security: Threats, Issues, and Responses."

To the question of whether being an all-male liberal arts college makes any difference, he insisted absolutely none. He mentioned several "fine women's colleges" in Virginia, and recounted the hassle in 1995 over whether H-SC should go coed. As President, he said he did not take a stand, but that in a country as rich and freedom-loving as the U.S. one should be afforded a choice in whether to attend a single-gender college. Having different types of student bodies "represents diversity." H-SC invites students from counterpart colleges, such as Randolph-Macon Women's College, to participate in some of its programs; he had even helped one visiting female student find a teaching job. The general proudly asserted that 47% of H-SC's assistant professors are women and that 24-30% of the entire staff and faculty are women. He felt the subject of coeducation will come up again someday, however.

Asked if intelligence is also an area of interest for the Wilson Center and whether he could comment on how leaders for the IC might best be developed, Wilson said that they do not develop leaders for a specific occupation. Instead, they are more broadly focused and develop leaders for all types of circumstances. He had helped the Center set up an advanced seminar in 2000 in leadership and ethics, and one unit of that seminar

concentrated on intelligence.  To the question of whether he considered intelligence a full-fledged profession and intelligence studies a legitimate academic discipline, Wilson responded confidently, "Teaching is a calling; intelligence is a profession."  That said, he concluded that intelligence studies is a legitimate academic discipline.

The researcher broached the ODNI program known as the IC Centers of Academic Excellence.  Wilson confessed he had not heard of it, but stated he would like to see a packet with more information, and upon return to DIA the researcher put him in contact with the head of the CAE program office.

The researcher put a final overarching question to Wilson:  "What advice would you offer young people today seeking a career working in intelligence?  How best can they prepare themselves for this line of work?"  He responded that they must learn at least one additional language, hopefully from a country of interest to them and the nation.  They must be able to answer for themselves the ethical dilemmas mentioned earlier.  They would fare best in a classic liberal arts curriculum, such as that offered by H-SC, followed up by a master's program more narrowly focused, with some degree of specialization in an area of interest to the United States.

*Lowenthal Interview (September 19, 2008, Reston, VA)*

Mark Lowenthal is a well-known figure in the intelligence education enterprise, having been the classic scholar-practitioner.  He was an Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production and Vice Chairman for Evaluation on the National Intelligence Council.  He was staff director of the HPSCI in the 104th Congress, where he directed the committee's study on the future of the Intelligence Community, *IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century*.  He also served in the State

Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) as an office director and was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. Earlier he had been the Senior Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress.

Lowenthal is currently the first Executive Director of IAFIE and runs his own consulting firm in national security education and training, the Intelligence & Security Academy, LLC. He holds a PhD in history from Harvard University and has been an adjunct professor at Columbia and Johns Hopkins. His book, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, now in its fourth edition, has become a standard college and graduate school textbook on the subject.

Lowenthal was the genesis of the final two senior interviews to be discussed later, that of Jennifer Sims and Carmen Medina. They were interviewed based upon his strong recommendation. The list of questions asked of each of these three individuals is essentially the same, whereas the first three senior interviews were more free-flowing and questions asked were tailored to the specific individuals. Therefore, in the interest of brevity and clarity, the researcher will use a "Q & A" format, with paraphrased direct responses, for the final three interviews.

Q: What do you see as the future of IAFIE?

A: It is uncertain because of the constituent audiences involved. Academics are not very smart bureaucratically; they do not know how to manipulate their own bureaucracies. Government employees do not understand universities, where cross-fertilization is important. The overall idea of IAFIE is valid, but it may never get there. The three audiences (national security intelligence, law enforcement intelligence, and competitive intelligence) are not the issue. These differences are easily bridged.

Q:  Are you optimistic about the direction civilian (non-governmental) colleges are headed regarding intelligence studies?

A:  I'm guardedly optimistic, because schools are economic beasts.  The goal is to put "butts in the seats."  Schools were stunned that the response to intelligence studies was so great.

Q:  Why are you optimistic (the good points)?

A:  More people want this type of education.  The general view of intelligence has improved.  Application rates to get into the IC are high.  Schools follow these trends, so the rate will not drop for a while.

Q:  Why the "guarded" caveat (the bad points)?

A:  College funding just took a hit from an economics standpoint.  College studies are "trendy."  Things can change.  I do not believe in linearity.  Schools can be very resistant academically.  Intelligence studies are finding their biggest success in small schools which are not necessarily trendsetters but have less bureaucracy to deal with.

Q:  Who should be teaching intelligence studies—scholars, practitioners, or both (i.e., scholar-practitioners)?

A:  Definitely both.  The problem is that it is hard to teach a job or skill-related subject.  I am not a "techie"; how-to courses are not my thing.  The skilled practitioners might not be scholars and be able to teach.

Q:  What are the primary topics intelligence education should focus on?

A:  It depends on the type of program.  Mercyhurst offers an analysis practicum.  Johns Hopkins and Columbia provide an introduction into the world of intelligence.  The Georgetown curriculum hires former NIOs (National Intelligence Officers) and offers

courses with titles like "Intelligence and _____" (fill in a specific region of the world). You should talk to Jennifer Sims. She is grappling with the program at Georgetown. Some topics that should definitely be covered are the intelligence cycle and its associated processes, the intelligence demands of the decision-maker, and certain currently relevant issues (e.g., particular areas of the world, arms proliferation, etc.).

Q: Are there any topics that should be avoided or that are overdone?

A: Intelligence fiction is overdone, though intelligence history is an open book. Analytical writing is overdone. Most academics would be hard-put to teach collection, so I would by and large avoid that. The risk with teaching too broad a range of subjects is polemics, and with so many instructors out there with little or no experience there is a risk of amateurism.

Q: How important are foreign languages?

A: They should be part of any undergraduate program, and not just intelligence. Studying languages makes you think. Language is not a prerequisite for intelligence; it is a prerequisite for education. I would tell students desiring admission to an intelligence studies program, if you do not already have a language, get one.

Q: At what level are intelligence studies most appropriately taught? At the undergraduate level, the graduate level, or both? Is a PhD program viable?

A: At all levels. We have pre-med and pre-law programs; why not pre-intel? They do not have to have any specific courses per se, but can be preparatory programs that have a variety of courses from different sources. For example, the national security policy program at Columbia has only one intelligence course at the graduate level. There are no undergraduate courses in intelligence yet, but they are in the process of recruiting

someone.  Regarding the PhD, why not?  Intelligence is a field of study; a PhD program in that field is where the future professors would come from.  A PhD program suggests full-blown research.  Any school could develop one, and bachelor's and master's programs are not required.  For a doctorate, though, the school probably needs to have the master's to feed into that.  (As an aside, the researcher shared some preliminary results from the questionnaire administered to young intelligence professionals and mentioned Robert Heibel's comment about his ongoing debate with Lowenthal, to which the latter replied, "I disagree with Heibel" (on the value of a purely intelligence studies program vice a more general liberal arts program).  However, the "Mercyhurst people did great in open source competition."  Their focus on principally analysis prepares them well for that sort of intelligence endeavor.)

Q:  Is intelligence a full-fledged profession?  Why or why not? Do you consider intelligence studies a legitimate academic discipline?  Why or why not?

A:  Yes, intelligence has all the attributes of a profession.  It is unique unto itself and not generic.  And yes, intelligence studies is a legitimate discipline.

Q:  What advice would you offer young people today seeking a career working in intelligence?  How best can they prepare themselves for this line of work?

A:  Take something that interests you.  You will never outguess or outgame the system.  Do something you have a passion for.

Q:  What do you think of the ODNI program Centers of Academic Excellence?

A:  It is very successful and creates a more heterogeneous community.  I recently visited the one at UTEP and was impressed.

*Sims Interview (October 8, 2009, Georgetown University, Washington, DC)*

Jennifer Sims is Director of Intelligence Studies and Professor-in-Residence at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. She also is a frequent consultant on intelligence and homeland security for various federal agencies and the private sector. Earlier in her professional career, she served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Coordination and was a staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). Prior to coming to Georgetown as a visiting professor, she was a research professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Research interests include intelligence theory; intelligence support to counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and homeland security; and the application of advanced technologies to intelligence missions. (Georgetown SFS biography, 2009) Dr. Sims appeared as a panelist at the 2006 annual conference of IAFIE, attended by this researcher, who decided to include her as a senior interviewee based on the recommendation of Mark Lowenthal. The Intelligence Studies Program at Georgetown falls under the Center for Peace and Security Studies. Dr. Sims invited the researcher to her office, where the following dialogue ensued:

Q: Are you optimistic about the direction civilian colleges and universities are headed regarding intelligence studies?

A: Yes, I see positive changes under way. However, I am concerned that universities develop their curricula along proper lines. Regular universities (as opposed to trade schools) should not be teaching just to produce intelligence professionals. I am not saying there is not a role for professional schools, but for students interested in advanced graduate work in international affairs there needs to be an understanding of the

broader concepts. They need to study the causes of war and conflict, and not just how the U.S. does it. How other countries have approached their intelligence challenges should be included to leaven the discussion.

I currently teach a survey class on intelligence. I talk about HUMINT and what case officers need to know. I focus on what distinguishes HUMINT from technical intelligence. I discuss how people in history used intelligence, such as the intelligence failures of Stalin during World War II. I relate actual practice to the theories of collection and discuss how to improve intelligence. There are many weaknesses in collection management. I try to make it understandable and relevant not just to the people who are going into intelligence. It is important to determine how intelligence affects state power and is a key component of that. I make intelligence studies relevant to students who will pursue PhD programs in national security. Intelligence managers and users need to know this kind of information, but not all intelligence professionals at all levels need it. In my courses we attempt to bust open traditional paradigms and approaches to the practice of intelligence.

Q: Who should be teaching intelligence studies—scholars, practitioners, or both (i.e., scholar-practitioners)?

A: All three, but there is a real role for scholars here. They can challenge theoretical assumptions. Most practitioners are very defensive. They tend to be focused on one case or one point in time. Scholars are better at generalizing. In intelligence studies programs there is a lot of overlap, which must be eliminated. Everyone seems to be focused on the intelligence cycle, but that is just one model.

Q: What are the primary topics intelligence education should be focused on?

A: Within the scholarly paradigm, the relationship of intelligence to the causes of war should be taught. There must be a theoretical understanding of what intelligence is. That is why in the past we have offered such courses as "Theories of Intelligence and Their Relationship to State Power" and "The Role of Secret Policy in Intelligence Operations." Other topics that should be covered include counterintelligence and clandestine operations in strategy, both military and diplomatic; the ethics of intelligence; intelligence in democratic systems, to include the role of the media and oversight (which is a must-have; it fails in dictatorships); domestic intelligence and law enforcement in a modern society; problems in intelligence policy and how it can break down; and comparative intelligence practices. We do not do business intelligence here, but I can understand why it is taught in many schools. I did not include analysis, because it should be treated more as a process—the analytical method. We definitely should not be teaching tradecraft and professional practices.

Q: How important are foreign languages?

A: They are very important for intelligence professionals. If one is going just into the policymaking arena, he or she does not need a language, but national security studies in general and advanced scholarship usually require it. There are many other reasons to justify the need for a foreign language. Basically, any scholar doing research needs that capability.

Q: At what level are intelligence studies most appropriately taught? At the undergraduate level, the graduate level, or both? Is a PhD program in intelligence viable?

A: Intelligence studies should be part of any political science or government curriculum at the undergraduate level, because intelligence is a form of national power.

A student is never too young for us to start teaching it. It is one of the ways we lubricate national choice. However, we are way behind in developing intelligence theory. Regarding the doctorate, absolutely. An ideal dissertation would be one that talks about intelligence as a part of national power. In fact, there are several such studies under way here at Georgetown.

Q: Is intelligence a full-fledged profession?

A: Yes.

Q: Do you consider intelligence studies a legitimate academic discipline? Why or why not?

A: As I have defined it, it is. And that means defining it as the gathering of information in competing situations to help one understand an adversary. It must be an area of scholarly interest, related to power. As I have said, tradecraft is not part of it; that is mainly training.

Q: What advice would you offer young people today seeking a career working in intelligence? How best can they prepare themselves for this line of work?

A: Take the basics—lots of writing; become a prolific and critical reader. Have a good background on the enduring themes of history. Have an appreciation for the political art, to include the causes and conduct of war. Gain a background in strategy and strategic thought. One theme of history that needs to be teased out is an appreciation for the role of technology in society. The intelligence agencies should be looking for people trained in the arts—choreography, music—because proficiency in the arts regulates the ability to orchestrate and keep the moving pieces together. Timing is critical. There is a strategic purpose that must be understood, a natural capacity to orchestrate information

for decision-making.  There is a tendency to believe we need experts, but they often do not collaborate.  Many people hide their talents in that area.  They should be rewarded for their collaboration.  Look at the great deceptions in history.  Most were designed by very artsy people.

Q:  What can you give me regarding Georgetown's intelligence studies program?  What is your vision for the program?  What obstacles are you facing?

A:  [Sims provided a listing of current intelligence courses, but no syllabi were offered.]  My vision is to bridge the scholarly world with policy-relevant studies and to create a cadre of graduates who are interested in, and knowledgeable about, the role of intelligence in international power and politics.  I hope to inspire more dissertations on intelligence.  I would like to see intelligence employed by more thoughtful users in business or government.  I would like to see a more balanced literature created, and a more scholarly approach so that students can better take on their roles as citizens.

Q:  What do you think of the ODNI program Centers of Academic Excellence?

A:  I cannot answer this question.  I have a conflict of interest.  Georgetown has a sub-contract with one of the CAE programs in California.

Q:  I heard you present as a panelist at one of the IAFIE annual conferences.  What do you see as the future of IAFIE?

A:  There are limits in how much the organization can do.  I am skeptical about too much outreach from government institutions to non-governmental ones.  We must avoid groupthink.  We have to explore how to encourage innovation and new approaches.  Right now, there is a tendency toward a congealing of views.  That said, I must confess I have kind of lost the bubble on IAFIE and do not really know enough about it.

*Medina Interview (October 21, 2009, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Sterling, VA)*

Carmen Medina is the Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI), which is subordinate to the Central Intelligence Agency. The Center maintains the Agency's historical materials and promotes the study of intelligence as a legitimate and serious discipline. Prior to this assignment, Medina was the CIA's Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence, which means she was on the analytical side of the Agency (DI) and not the operational side (DO). Earlier she served as Chief, Strategic Assessments Group, Office of Transnational Issues.

At CSI, Medina leads a team of historians and other intelligence professionals tasked by the CIA Director to develop and manage an Agency-wide Lessons Learned Program, administers the CIA Museum, maintains the Agency's Historical Intelligence Collection, and publishes the widely respected journal *Studies in Intelligence*. In addition, CSI fosters productive relationships with colleges and universities through its academic outreach activities, including the Officer-in-Residence (OIR) program. She is a graduate of Catholic University in Washington and pursued graduate studies at Georgetown's School of Foreign Service. (Medina bio, 2009)

Q: Please tell me a little bit about CSI's academic outreach to civilian colleges and universities, such as through the Officer-in-Residence program.

A: For the last ten years, CSI has been on a downward trajectory within the Agency in terms of budget and importance. It used to be much bigger, but self-inflicted wounds resulted in lost funding. General Hayden created a lessons learned program, which is why I am here now. We have more slots, to include a dedicated outreach slot designed to run with the outreach program to the universities. That individual has been

on board only a couple of months.  I would like to expand the number of OIRs, but last year we did not get enough applicants.

Q:  How many schools currently have an Officer-in-Residence?

A:  We have 10 ten right now but are shooting for 20.  Some schools do not want OIRs, for obvious reasons.  However, those that do indicate they get a lot of bang for the buck.  It depends on the size of the school.  The 7th Floor [CIA Director's office] must approve each position, and they seek a balanced mix of schools.  Traditionally, an OIR taught in the national security curriculum, but that needs to change.  There is a limited pool of qualified personnel.  Those selected must broaden the curriculum in which they are involved.

Q:  How are the schools selected?

A:  In the past, the OIR would pick the school, and often it was his final assignment before retirement.  It is better, however, to have mid-career types.  The schools should serve a more corporate purpose too.  The Agency should maintain contact with academia for a host of reasons.  It makes sense to seek out new schools and not go back to the same ones over and over.  That would increase the diversity of the hiring pool and spread out the geographic distribution.  It would also increase the awareness of CIA among more diverse schools.  There is a Recruitment Center that gives us leads and guidance.  The program is also mentioned in the DNI's 500-Day Plan.  Two years ago many people were averse to supporting the CAE schools, but now there is the realization that we must reach out to a broad segment of the population.  We can still provide OIRs to some of the elite schools but not all of them.

Q:  Is the unclassified issue of *Studies in Intelligence* distributed widely to colleges and universities?

A:  All unclassified articles are placed on the Internet, whether in the classified or unclassified issue.  I have personally visited 6-12 universities in the last 18 months.  Teachers of intelligence view *Studies of Intelligence* as their best source, which is great for ground truth.

Q:  Are you optimistic about the direction civilian colleges and universities are headed regarding intelligence studies?

A:  My goal is to visit all the CAEs; I have already visited more than half of them.  I will be going to Tennessee State University this fall.  I am generally encouraged by what the 10 CAEs are doing now.  Some of the students are great.  The schools are offering many courses on intelligence.  Some are embedded in humanities courses on critical thinking, some within computer science, etc.  The substance of intelligence cannot be dealt with in a broad, cookie-cutter approach.  Each CAE has its own strengths.  The specialization I have witnessed is great.  However, I tend to be on the side of a broad liberal education.  I am not a fan of schools that teach specifically on intelligence.  The topics needed are in flux.  I am also not a fan of the jigsaw puzzle metaphor of connecting the pieces.  Thinking is more important than simply technique.

Q:  Who should be teaching intelligence studies—scholars, practitioners, or both (i.e., scholar-practitioners)?

A:  A combination of both.

Q:  What are the primary topics intelligence education should focus on?

A:  Critical thinking most definitely.  There is a difference in becoming a subject matter expert and a good thinker.  These are not synonymous skills.  For example, take the field of probability and causality.  Sometimes this is part of critical thinking and sometimes not.  I recommend people read *The Black Swan:  The Impact of the Highly Improbable*, by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, and *The Tipping Point:  How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference*, by Malcolm Gladwell.  We must understand systems and how systems change; we must know what it means to talk about probability and risk.  There are too many high-end analysts who learn this only by OJT.  The type of probability taught in statistics courses is not done in the context of what the IC needs.  Things that are unlikely happen more often than we think.

Q:  Are there any topics to avoid or that are overdone?

A:  We should stop teaching the intelligence cycle.  It is out of date and much more appropriate for the mechanistic Industrial Age.  We also need to rethink stovepipes.

Q:  How important are foreign languages?

A:  Really important.  Some people are blessed in these, and some are not.  Being bilingual early in life is an advantage.  It gives one insight into culture.  Learning another language gives you a certain flexibility of the mind.  Different languages give you a different structure and order, which is a really important skill for an intelligence officer.  By studying foreign languages we get an appreciation for "otherness."

Q:  At what level are intelligence studies most appropriately taught?  At the undergraduate level, the graduate level, or both?  Is a PhD program viable?

A:  That's a really good question.  If we are teaching just the nuts and bolts, then we can do so in bulk at the undergraduate level.  At the graduate level, we get them

involved in the difficulties of operating in the gray area (the "hard stuff"). We could have an intelligence PhD program in business, since we really need those types, or in the discipline of intelligence, but I do not foresee one oriented to the practitioner. I sort of like the "doctor of practice" idea, but the IC agencies would not hire a PhD in intelligence per se.

Q: Is intelligence a full-fledged profession? Why or why not?

A: Yes, it is an emerging profession, but not yet full-fledged. Intelligence does not have a doctrine the way it should and the way most professions do. It has no standards, and there is too much making it up as we go along. There is a difference in knowing a lot of facts compared to the fallacies of intelligence, causality, etc. Subject matter experts know a lot in a descriptive sense. But we need analytic intellect; we need people able to put together the pieces that are needed similar to the pieces of any other profession.

Q: Do you consider intelligence studies a full-fledged academic discipline?

A: Yes, full-fledged.

Q: What advice would you offer young people today seeking a career working in intelligence? How best can they prepare themselves for this line of work?

A: Pick a subject that interests you and get to know it very well. Being a good critical thinker requires going through an intellectual process of introspection. Engage in some kind of activity that makes you use analytical skills; don't just learn about them but actually use them. Debating is a great process or activity. Design a process that forces you to make a prescriptive choice. Make an argument; do not just describe something. This makes you humble about your conclusions.

Q:  What do you think of the ODNI program Centers of Academic Excellence, to which you have already alluded?

A:  I fully support it, especially if allowance is made for maximum flexibility. There are budget issues to consider, of course.

Q:  I heard you present during the 2007 IAFIE annual conference.  What do you see as the future of IAFIE?

A:  I just recall having run a breakout group.  I am not a member, so I will pass on that question.

Q:  Thank you for candidly sharing your thoughts.  In closing, do you have any general comments you would like to make?

A:  A big issue in our profession is who exactly the people are that choose to be intelligence officers.  We attract a narrow segment of society.  Too many come in thinking in terms of good vs. bad, and that there can be no gray area.  They soon come to realize that there is no puzzle solution.  I worry about the feeder pool, and hope that we do not attract just certain types of people.  There is an organizational culture within the community against creativity, and that has to change.

## Analysis of Senior Expert Interviews

Six subject matter experts were interviewed informally between August and October 2008 simultaneously with the bulk of the questionnaire administration to the young intelligence professionals and the data collection regarding intelligence courses. To the extent possible, the researcher discussed his findings to date in the aggregate with the expert interviewees.  Without exception, the latter group seemed eager to hear what

the younger generation had to say, though some are still actively teaching at the college level and interact daily with the future intelligence professionals of this nation.

*Achieving the Proper Balance to Avoid Groupthink*

In selecting whom to interview, the researcher attempted to obtain a mix of experts whose broad experience would allow them to assess the subject of intelligence education openly from a learned and multifaceted perspective. Of the six, four still teach at the college level—Arthur Hulnick at Boston University, Robert Heibel at Mercyhurst College, Jennifer Sims at Georgetown University, and Mark Lowenthal as a part-time adjunct at Johns Hopkins University, Columbia University, and elsewhere. Another— Samuel Wilson—formerly taught at the college level and remains closely associated with Hampden-Sydney College. Carmen Medina did not teach at the college level but maintains close liaison with the various Intelligence Community (IC) Centers of Academic Excellence. Four currently are, or have been in the recent past, administrators of academic entities—Heibel as Director of the Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies and concurrently Chair of the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE), Wilson as President and now President Emeritus of Hampden-Sydney College and distinguished scholar in residence at the Wilson Center for Leadership in the Public Interest, Lowenthal as Executive Director of IAFIE and President/CEO of the Intelligence & Security Academy, LLC, and Medina as Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, which is essentially a government think tank and research center.

All six interviewees have been affiliated with a federal government agency, and more pointedly an agency belonging to the IC, at some point in their career—Hulnick

with CIA, Heibel with FBI, Wilson with DIA and CIA, Lowenthal with CIA and State

Department, Sims with State Department, and Medina with CIA. Two have been

Congressional staff members—Lowenthal with the House of Representatives (HPSCI)

and Sims with the Senate (SSCI). One is currently active in private industry in support of

the IC—Lowenthal with his training and consulting business. Four either produce or

serve on the editorial boards of renowned intelligence publications—Hulnick, Lowenthal,

and Sims with the *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* and

Medina with *Studies in Intelligence*. Another—Wilson—has been profiled on more than

one occasion in the *American Intelligence Journal* and the *Defense Intelligence Journal*.

As a result of such extensive bona fides, the views of these six eminent individuals

should carry considerable weight.

### *Interpreting Responses to Questions*

Some of the interview questions were asked of all six subjects, while others were

individually tailored to a particular subject based on his or her background, area of

expertise, or current interest. The following paragraphs focus on areas of agreement and

disagreement on the commonly asked questions. Particularly incisive quotes will be

highlighted and repeated from earlier.

**Should intelligence studies be a distinct academic program?**

Regarding whether intelligence studies warrants being treated as a distinct

academic program, the subjects were split. Hulnick emphatically said no; intelligence

needs to be integrated with other liberal arts subjects so that students can develop a broad

background in international relations, which is what his department primarily teaches.

The former CIA official and Officer-in-Residence at Boston University insisted that the

CIA does not really want to hire graduates who are intelligence specialists. Instead, it wants "transnational types with a foreign language and area background." LTG Wilson agreed, urging future intelligence professionals to pursue a broad liberal arts program like the one offered at Hampden-Sydney College. Lowenthal also jumped on the liberal arts bandwagon, reiterating that this is one point on which he and Heibel continue to battle. Heibel runs a large and robust intelligence studies program at Mercyhurst College, and asserts it does represent a genuine liberal arts curriculum. Sims has no qualms about a distinct intelligence studies program, probably in part because she orchestrates one at Georgetown University. Medina does not favor making intelligence studies a separate, distinct program. Despite having visited the majority of IC CAE institutions, she feels intelligence should not be dealt with "in a broad, cookie-cutter approach." She applauds the specialization of the CAE schools but insists she remains on the side of a broad liberal education. She is "not a fan of schools that teach specifically on intelligence."

**Are intelligence studies being developed appropriately**?

Asked if they were optimistic about the direction intelligence studies are heading, the researcher was surprised at the cautionary responses, even by those currently teaching intelligence studies. Heibel said he was "not particularly optimistic." Sims claimed she approved of the general direction and saw "positive changes under way," but couched her positive feelings in terms that universities must develop their curricula along proper lines. She is not in favor of intelligence "trade schools" that teach for the sole purpose of producing intelligence professionals. The causes of war and conflict must be integrated into the teaching of intelligence, she asserted strongly. Lowenthal confessed he was "guardedly optimistic" because of the economic vicissitudes of universities as businesses.

What is "trendy" today may not be tomorrow. Medina was optimistic about the direction of intelligence studies, but conceded she was most familiar with what the CAE schools are doing in terms of cultivating interest in intelligence among underserved minority populations. Wilson claimed he was not up to date on the subject and thus reluctant to render a judgment. However, both he and Lowenthal cautioned against "amateurism," as the growing impetus to get intelligence studies programs started could result in the quick hiring of some instructors not properly qualified for teaching at the university level.

### What are appropriate topics for an intelligence studies program?

An interesting mix of responses emerged when the researcher asked what topics should be covered by intelligence studies programs. Heibel pushed for oral and written communication, computer prowess, critical thinking, and proper support to decision-makers. Medina also raised critical thinking, and added that knowledge about systems and change in systems is important. Teaching how to deal with probability and risk is key too; unfortunately, she felt that most college statistics courses do not prepare future intelligence professionals for the types of quantitative analysis they will need to know how to conduct. Interestingly, Medina asserted that colleges need to get away from teaching the traditional intelligence cycle while Lowenthal, who insisted Medina be interviewed, pushed for teaching the intelligence cycle, along with regional subjects, intelligence support to decision-makers, and arms proliferation. Wilson, Heibel, and Sims all mentioned the importance of teaching ethics, while Sims gave a laundry list of other indispensable topics to cover—counterintelligence and clandestine operations (in terms of their linkage to the causes of war), law enforcement and domestic intelligence,

intelligence policy, the role of the media and oversight, and comparative intelligence practices (the international angle to counter a much too single-minded U.S. focus).

**Who should teach intelligence studies?**

Regarding who should teach intelligence studies courses—scholars, practitioners, or both—the researcher found unanimity among all the subjects asked that question. Without exception, the answer was a combination of the two, i.e., "scholar-practitioners." The problem is finding enough qualified instructors to avoid too many "amateurs" exploiting the currently high demand for intelligence educators, a challenge echoed by Canada's Martin Rudner in his most recent essay on intelligence education. (*International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Spring 2009, p. 123)

**Of what importance are foreign languages?**

Another question eliciting an overwhelmingly enthusiastic response concerned the importance of foreign languages. Without fail, all subjects who were asked this question felt that a foreign language is indispensable for an intelligence professional. Lowenthal went so far as to insist foreign languages should be part of any undergraduate program, because "studying languages makes you think. . . Language is not a prerequisite for intelligence; it is a prerequisite for education." Medina's perspective on foreign languages is equally insightful. "Learning another language gives you a certain flexibility of the mind. . . By studying foreign languages we get an appreciation for 'otherness.'" Wilson was the most emphatic of all, asserting that a case could be made that "an educated American without a second language is illiterate."

**Is intelligence truly a profession?**

Relative unanimity was also achieved on the question of whether intelligence is a full-fledged profession. All agreed, with the exception of Medina, who claimed it is not yet full-fledged, but "emerging." Furthermore, all essentially agreed that intelligence studies is a legitimate academic discipline, with the caveat, of course, as discussed earlier, as to whether it should be taught as a separate, distinct discipline or subsumed under a broader liberal arts curriculum.

The researcher was mildly surprised at the across-the-board support for some sort of doctoral program in intelligence. All subjects asked this question were generally in agreement, though there was some concern voiced as to whether the program should be a traditional PhD or some modified track leading to a "doctor of practice" or similar rubric. The latter is finding some adherence in other professions nowadays and warrants more exploration as to its benefits.

**What advice needs to be given students about an intelligence career**?

Without a doubt, the question that elicited the most intriguing responses was the one which asked what advice the interviewees would offer young people today seeking a career working in intelligence. Wilson stated he would insist they learn at least one additional language, "hopefully from a country of interest to them and the nation." They also must answer for themselves the ethical dilemmas they will surely face. Lowenthal would counsel them to "take something that interests you. You will never outguess or outgame the system. Do something you have a passion for." Sims takes a bit more systematic approach. "Take the basics—lots of writing; become a prolific and critical reader. Have a good background on the enduring themes of history. Have an appreciation for the political art, to include the causes and conduct of war." Finally,

Medina suggests young people interested in intelligence "pick a subject that interests you and get to know it very well. . . Engage in some kind of activity that makes you use analytical skills; don't just learn about them but actually use them. . . Design a process that forces you to make a prescriptive choice. Make an argument; do not just describe something. This makes you humble about your conclusions." All the interviewees offered superb advice. They would make excellent role models and/or mentors for those young professionals who confided in their responses to the questionnaire to never having one or needing one.

The general message to be drawn from these two data sources, the new, young intelligence hires and the senior subject matter experts, is that intelligence studies programs are appropriate for some but not for all. Many young people entering college have no clue what profession they would like to enter, or if they do have a goal in mind they often change directions as undergraduates when they discover through the courses they took that a certain profession or discipline is not what they expected. Their opinions and career goals are much more solid by the time they return to graduate school, and that is where the majority of the interviewees thought intelligence studies could have the most value added. Many of the new hires had some other career goal while in college than working in intelligence. It was not until after being hired and on the job for a while that they developed a passion for this profession and decided they would like to pursue higher education in its intricacies in a more thorough fashion. In hindsight, they realized there were programs and courses offered at their universities which would have been beneficial to their job performance, but they did not have the benefit of such a perspective at the time they were just trying to muddle through and become college graduates.

## Analysis of University Intelligence Course Offerings

*Database of Courses*

The listing of intelligence and intelligence-related courses being taught currently in U.S. universities is set forth in Appendix C. This researcher was astonished at how many courses are being taught and by how many different schools. Based on previous experience (e.g., attending professional gatherings, reading brochures handed out at such events, meeting professors, perusing messages disseminated through private association Web sites, talking to colleagues in the government education arena, etc.), he expected to find about 25-30 civilian academic institutions teaching intelligence and about four times that many courses. He was already aware of some of the well-known schools for intelligence studies, and knew which had master's programs in intelligence, bachelor's programs, certificate programs, majors/minors, concentrations, fields of study, electives, etc. Still, he had no idea just how widespread the phenomenon is. As of the arbitrary cutoff date for new data of June 1, 2009, the count stood at 100 schools and 845 courses.

To qualify this remarkable discovery, however, it is important to caution that whether a course is "intelligence-related" or not depends on who is defining it. One person's characterization of a course can be quite different from another's. The same can be said for the crosswalk performed between those courses listed and the ODNI core competencies desired for an intelligence professional. Even if the researcher had a complete syllabus for each course, which he does not have, or even if he had the chance to interview personally each instructor, which he did not, whether a course adequately addresses a particular competency would still be somewhat "in the eyes of the beholder." In preparing Appendix C, the researcher determined whether to mark a column with an

"X" based on the nature of the program to which the course belongs, the intent and capabilities of the instructor, discussions about a course on a college Web site/catalog, or merely by the title of the course.  The word "intelligence" cannot be found in a large number of course titles cited, but in many others it is unabashedly advertised as such.

It must be emphasized that the list of academic institutions and courses is not exhaustive.  It is somewhat of a "moving target," in that a course taught in the fall semester might not be taught in the spring, the professor may be away on sabbatical for a year or two with no substitute to teach the course for him/her, or the course may be taught only once due to the availability of a knowledgeable adjunct or a recently retired practitioner who is a "distinguished visiting professor" for only one year or one semester. An example could be found at Georgetown University when special electives were taught by the recently retired Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet and the retired Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith.  Both were sufficiently well-known and controversial that their courses attracted a large following of curious students. (Linzer, D., Teaching recent history from opposite perspectives: At Georgetown, it's Feith vs. Tenet and policy v. intelligence, 2007, p. A17)  Neither course is still being taught and is therefore not listed in Appendix C.  However, it is possible such courses could be revived at a later date if the right kind of instructor comes along and the demand is sufficiently great.

Colleges value "butts in the seats," to use an inelegant phrase borrowed from IAFIE Executive Director Mark Lowenthal during interview.  College presidents and their trustees tend to welcome courses which bring in a lot of tuition, and programs/courses on intelligence and homeland security are "hot" right now and likely to

be for some time to come. Course titles can be somewhat murky too. Some schools still shy away from use of the word "intelligence" due to its negative overtones and sometimes sordid past. Instead, terms like "security studies," "information analysis," "emergency preparedness," "threat awareness," and "strategic policy" are used as they are less likely to offend or arouse ire among certain political actors. The field of national security or international security has been around a long time. The amount of "intelligence" content in courses with such names is a function of the particular scholar teaching the course, his/her life experiences, and his/her ideological bent.

## Representative Intelligence Studies Programs Being Taught

Previous chapters mentioned that some colleges and universities have instituted national security and intelligence studies programs. The table below lists some of the best known programs, categorized in descending order in terms of the level of maturation/progress of integrating such programs into the overall curriculum of the institution, followed by a discussion about the programs of a few institutions from each category in the same descending order. The category at the bottom of the table includes four of the ten universities currently participating in the ODNI Centers of Academic Excellence (CAE) program, which does not suggest they are less involved in intelligence studies; quite to the contrary, they are heavily invested, with financial assistance from the federal government.

| | REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAMS | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **Program Type** | **Institution** | **Academic Offering** |
| **L e v e l   o f   M a t u r a t i o n / P r o g r e s s** | Graduate Studies Degree | | |
| | | Mercyhurst College | MS in Applied Intelligence |
| | | American Public/Military Univ. System (DL mode) | Master of Strategic Intelligence (MSI) |
| | | Johns Hopkins Univ. | MS in Intelligence Analysis |
| | | Penn State Univ. | Master of Geog Info Systems (MGIS) |
| | Undergraduate Studies Degree | | |
| | | Mercyhurst College | BA in Intelligence Studies |
| | | American Public/Military Univ. System | BA in Intelligence Studies |
| | | Point Park Univ. | Baccalaureate in Intelligence & National Security |
| | | Penn State Univ. | Baccalaureate in Security & Information Analysis |
| | Other Degree with Major in Intelligence | | |
| | | Patrick Henry College | Intelligence & Foreign Policy Program |
| | Other Degree with Minor in Intelligence | | |
| | | Neumann College | Intelligence Studies Program |
| | | Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ. | Global Security & Intelligence Studies (GSIS) Program |
| | Other Degree with Concentration in Intelligence or Integral Component of Program | | |
| | | Notre Dame College | Intelligence Analysis & Research Program |
| | | West Virginia Univ. | Intelligence Studies Program |
| | Other Degree with Electives in Intelligence | | |
| | | Univ. of Maryland | Center for International Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) |
| | | Univ. of New Haven | National Security & Public Safety Program |
| | | Yale Univ. | International Relations Program & Political Science Department |
| | | Hampden-Sydney College | Wilson Center for Leadership in the Public Interest |
| | | Georgetown Univ. | School of Foreign Service |
| | | American Univ. | School of International Service |
| | | New Mexico State Univ. | Physical Science Laboratory |
| | Developing Intelligence Studies under IC Centers of Academic Excellence Program | | |
| | | Trinity Univ. | Inaugural Testbed |
| | | Univ. of Texas at El Paso | Intelligence & National Security |
| | | Univ. of Washington | Institute for National Security Education & Research |
| | | California State Univ. (San Bernardino) | 7-Campus Consortium |

A much more detailed listing of 100 institutions, courses taught, and a crosswalk with ODNI core competencies can be found at Appendix C, Representative Academic Institutions, Their Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Courses, and Crosswalk with Core Competencies.

First, let us look at some of the larger and more well-known intelligence studies programs. As a precaution to the reader, this grouping is by no means exhaustive, and course offerings change frequently from semester to semester, depending upon such factors as availability of adjunct professors, scheduling of sabbaticals for tenured professors, financial resources, and number of students subscribing for the courses.

### *Mercyhurst College*

The current "gold standard" for intelligence education at both the graduate and undergraduate levels is Mercyhurst College in Erie, PA. The Intelligence Studies Program is now administered by the Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies (MCIIS). It is tailored to meet the entry-level needs of the students themselves and of the organizations hiring intelligence analysts. It is a multidisciplinary program that "couples specialized intelligence courses from a number of diverse departments including: History, World Language Cultures, Religion, Philosophy, Business and Computer Science. Upon completion of the program, the student will receive a BA in Intelligence Studies." (Brochure, "Mercyhurst College Department of Intelligence Studies," undated) The bachelor's program has been in existence since 1992, and initially was part of the History Department; a newer master's program has been on the books since 2004, and awards an MS in Applied Intelligence. (Meeting between JMIC/JMITC officials and Robert Heibel of Mercyhurst College at JMITC, March 10, 2004) This accredited

graduate degree program grew out of an intelligence concentration in an established master's program in Administration of Justice. (Brochure, "Master of science degree in applied intelligence," undated)

The undergraduate degree is designed to provide the necessary background for students to pursue careers as research/intelligence analysts in government agencies and private enterprise. "The work of these analysts, whether relating to national security or criminal investigative activities, involves the preparation of assessments based on the collection, correlation, and analysis of intelligence data. The goal of this program is to produce a graduate qualified for an entry-level position who has reading competency in a foreign language; a broad understanding of world and American history; a knowledge of comparative governments and political philosophies; the ability to produce written and oral reports and assessments based on research, correlation, and analysis; a familiarity with computer operations and database management; and a general understanding of statistical techniques. (Mercyhurst College Website, http://www.mercyhurst.edu/undergraduate/academic-programs/index.php?pt-riap, accessed April 21, 2005) In fact, the Intelligence Studies Program was formerly known as the Research/Intelligence Analyst Program (RIAP). The catalyst for Mercyhurst's rapid entry into the intelligence education business was, and is, the founding Director of MCIIS, Robert Heibel, a retired FBI deputy counterintelligence chief. Heibel was interviewed by CNN on September 12, 2001, and provided an assessment of what had transpired the day before based on his rich federal experience. ("R. Heibel: Intelligence and counterterrorism," CNN.com, accessed August 4, 2006)

The graduate program (33 credits) is designed to provide a theoretical and practical framework for the study of intelligence and its application in a wide variety of situations. This is accomplished through "a rigorous curriculum that includes a basic core, which exposes students to the fundamental and advanced concepts and analytic techniques related to intelligence, and a set of elective courses that allows the student to pursue study in areas of law enforcement, national security and competitive intelligence." (MCIIS Website, http://www.mciis.org/graduate/indes.php, accessed April 21, 2005)  A distance-learning version of the program was developed in 2005. (Brochure, "Master of science degree in applied intelligence," undated)

For several years the MCIIS hosted an International Colloquium on Intelligence (though in July 2007 it was hosted by Notre Dame College and sponsored by the new Great Lakes Chapter of IAFIE).  Presentations relating to the research question have covered such topics as whether intelligence studies is a legitimate academic discipline, teaching intelligence history, using the case study method, various delivery methods of intelligence education, intelligence for law enforcement, accelerated analysis, teaching interrogation, and incorporating counterintelligence into intelligence education. (*Proceedings*, The Eighth Annual International Colloquium on Intelligence, June 5-8, 2006)  Mercyhurst students and recent graduates help administer this event, which draws intelligence scholars and practitioners from a broad cross-section of federal and state agencies and public and private academic institutions.

In recent years, graduates of Mercyhurst's undergraduate and graduate programs have been placed in positions with such organizations as DHS, FBI, CIA, DIA, NSA,

GAO, DEA, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), the

Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),

non-governmental organizations (NGOs), crime task forces, multinational corporations,

private consulting firms, state and local police, and the armed forces. (Brochure, "Why

are the following interested in graduates of the Mercyhurst College Department of

Intelligence Studies?" undated)  Currently over 200 Mercyhurst Intelligence Studies

graduates are working in the various levels of the IC.  As a benchmark, approximately

98% of the 2005 graduates were hired within three months of graduation at an average

starting salary of $45,000. (Brochure, Mercyhurst Department of Intelligence Studies)

Many Mercyhurst students enjoy a robust intern experience while matriculating at

this small Roman Catholic college far from the intense national security milieu of the

Washington, DC, region.  In the past few years, internships or "cooperative experiences"

have included positions with NSA, DoD, CIA, DHS, DEA, National Drug Intelligence

Center (Department of Justice), Northrop Grumman, ConocoPhillips, Booz Allen

Hamilton (for which Mercyhurst has been teaching a certificate course in security

analysis in Tysons Corner, VA, since 2005), a number of other private firms, and state

and local agencies. (Brochure, Mercyhurst Department of Intelligence Studies)  One

former graduate student from Canada worked in Washington in 2005-06 and visited

NDIC on occasion.  While at Mercyhurst she co-authored a book on communications and

reporting with one of the intelligence studies professors, a former Army intelligence

officer mentioned in Chapter 2 as author of a popular blog regarding intelligence

education. (Wheaton & Wozny, *Communicating with decisionmakers:  Best practices for*

*intelligence professionals*, 2005)  The MCIIS is slowly getting into the publishing

business to highlight the work of its students and faculty and share knowledge with other academic institutions.

A final Mercyhurst organization worthy of mention is the Center for Information Research, Analysis, and Training (CIRAT), a non-profit entity of the College which develops "contracts, grants, and partnerships that enhance the intelligence-related skills of students, while utilizing the experience of its staff and the capability of its knowledge management laboratory." (Brochure, Mercyhurst College Department of Intelligence Studies)  CIRAT tailors timely open source products for such clients as the CIA, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS, now part of DHS), the Regional Information Sharing System, and major international corporations.  It can identify patterns and trends crucial to the analytical process and has become a clearinghouse for computer software related to that process.  The Center's current researchers have fluency in critical foreign languages like Arabic, Farsi, Hindi, Polish, Russian, Serbo-Croatian, Spanish, and Urdu.  In addition, CIRAT provides intelligence-related training to such public and private sector clients as DHS, and has developed domestic terrorism training case studies with CIA University and the University of Arkansas under a Department of Justice contract. (Brochure, Mercyhurst College Department of Intelligence Studies)

*American Public University System*

Charles Town, WV, is the headquarters of the American Public University System, a distance learning institution that includes American Military University (AMU) and American Public University (APU).  An administrative office is located in Manassas, VA.  Like Mercyhurst, AMU/APU also administers both graduate and undergraduate programs in intelligence.  The System is one of the few institutions that is

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both regionally accredited, through the Higher Learning Commission of the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools, and nationally accredited, through the Distance Education and Training Council.

According to AMU/APU administrator Gary Berry, the System "provides relevant and affordable distance learning to more than 15,000 students worldwide [now up to 30,000, based on brochures distributed in 2009]—taught by professors who are experienced in the real-world subjects they teach. AMU and APU prepare students for careers in homeland security, intelligence, national security, criminal justice, emergency management, business and more." (Berry, G., e-mail to IAFIE members, May 23, 2006) This individual's title at the time was Department Chair, National Security, Intelligence and Space, but he has since become Professor of Political Science and Intelligence Studies, with a second hat as Dean of New Program Development for both AMU and APU. In an earlier message Berry explained, "We are a for-profit, private higher education institution. . . 85% of our students are military. And, in the MSI program, all of the faculty have served as military or civilian agency intel analysts or operatives." (Berry, e-mail to researcher, February 8, 2005)

AMU/APU offers a bachelor of arts degree in Intelligence Studies, which is "designed for students who are currently employed or wish to pursue positions as military, civilian, or corporate intelligence specialists. Subjects covered in the curriculum are terrorism, espionage, national security, competitive intelligence, regional intelligence, the 'war on drugs,' and ethnic conflict." (APU Website, http://www.apus.edu, accessed March 2, 2006) Concentrations available include Criminal Intelligence, Intelligence Analysis, Intelligence Collection, Intelligence Operations, and Terrorism Studies.

Among the program objectives and learning outcomes listed on the AMU Website are the Intelligence Community, the Historical Perspective of Intelligence (describing "lessons learned" from intelligence successes and failures), the Intelligence Process, Threats and Analysis, and Intelligence and Ethics (discussing the ethical challenges in conducting intelligence operations and appraising the ethical environment in which intelligence activities may be viewed as inconsistent moral behavior).

AMU/APU also offers a Master of Strategic Intelligence degree (MSI), which is "designed for students who hold or intend to hold positions as military or civilian analysts." This 36-credit hour program has core courses in Strategic Intelligence and Analytical Methods and required courses in Research Methods in Intelligence Studies, plus the opportunity to take major courses from various concentrations and electives. Concentrations available include Competitive Intelligence, Intelligence Analysis, Intelligence Collection, Intelligence Operations, Middle East Studies, and Terrorism Studies. The University claims to offer "one of the nation's premier intelligence programs. Every professor in the program is currently working in the intelligence field," affiliated with such entities as DHS, DoD, CIA, DIA, the State Department, and NDIC. (APU Website, 2006) The school also offers master's degrees in Homeland Security and Military Studies. (Various brochures, AMU, July 2005) [According to the latest brochures disseminated at the IAFIE Annual Conference in Adelphi, MD, May 26-28, 2009, the programs are now titled Bachelor and Master of Arts in Intelligence Studies and Bachelor and Master of Arts in Homeland Security, respectively.]

A military student enrolled in the MSI program informed the researcher that "American Military University does a good job of providing a structured learning

environment which the student may access at any time. There are time requirements but extensions and accommodations are made for those who have issues. In the National Intelligence Community TDY [temporary duty] is common and can put constraints on a student's time, but the professors understand the problem. The courses are open to anyone and can be completed concurrently or one at a time. AMU does cost me 750.00 a course, but I can divide that out over four months and I get to work from home or the office." (Nowak, B., e-mail to researcher, March 7, 2005) In a follow-up message the student added, "They do have a library on-line from which you could easily get any book you wanted. I would argue that the on-line library is far friendly [sic] to the user since you do not have to search the shelves for titles which may or may not have been re-shelved in the correct place. . . So far, I love the experience at AMU, I am an active cheerleader for their program and am working to promote it to others in the military. I recently started a discussion group on AKO [Army Knowledge Online] dedicated to AMU, and so far I have had a good response." (Nowak, e-mail to researcher, March 16, 2005)

The system is reaching out to the Air Force too. In February 2007 AMU signed a cooperative degree program agreement with the 17th Training Group at Goodfellow Air Force Base in San Angelo, TX. That unit provides intelligence and cryptologic training for not only Air Force personnel but also selected Army, Navy, and Marine Corps service members. Students at Goodfellow who now complete intelligence and related courses on-base can transfer those credits toward online intelligence bachelor's or master's degrees at AMU. Students can transfer up to 15 semester hours toward a master's degree or up to 90 hours toward a bachelor's degree. (American Military University signs

cooperative degree agreement with Goodfellow Air Force Base, *PrimeNewswire*,

February 5, 2007)

The approach taken by AMU/APU in targeting military personnel seeking a

convenient way to pursue intelligence education while working full-time parallels what

such institutions as the University of Phoenix, DeVry University, and Walden University

are doing in the civilian world. An article in *The Chronicle of Higher Education* assesses

the successes and challenges of such efforts. In "Be All You Can Be – Online: Colleges

that market to military students discover they present new challenges," Dan Carnevale

observes that "registering for classes is often a hassle. But try doing it while fighting a

war." This author, like others, has noticed AMU and applauds its efforts: "Institutions

such as American Military University, a for-profit online institution based in West

Virginia, and University of Maryland University College, the continuing-education

branch of the state university, were among the early pursuers of military students. But in

the past few years, the field of providers has become far more crowded." (Carnevale,

2006)

### *Pennsylvania State University*

A final institution to be highlighted that offers both undergraduate and graduate

intelligence-related degrees is Pennsylvania State University, the inclusion of which

reinforces that not all intelligence education emanates from small private colleges.

Graham Spanier, President of Penn State, is a strong supporter of national security

initiatives. The PSU Website posted an article indicating a new intelligence program was

being developed at the school, the largest in Pennsylvania, titled "Government, Corporate

Leaders Help Shape New Program in Security and Information Analysis" (2005):

A proposed new program in security and information analysis (SIA) would integrate studies in the emerging realms of information security, intelligence analysis and cyber forensics. The program would strive to produce practical leadership skills essential in a variety of workplace settings that make up today's global digital economy. As a first step in forming this new major, 15 experts—including CEOs, CIOs and federal agency heads—joined University President Graham B. Spanier, Provost Rodney Erickson, Dean of Information Sciences and Technology James Thomas and faculty leaders for a daylong discussion on Nov. 9 about the proposed curriculum. The panelists discussed options that would best respond to society's needs in a variety of areas, among them information gathering and analysis, combating identity theft and corporate fraud, intrusion detection, risk management and national security. . . Said Spanier, "We're asking what we should be doing here in a four-year program—and later in a master's degree program—to give students the education, internships and exposure to meet the needs of the workforce." . . . Penn State has recognized a void in higher education, which has not adequately addressed the unique, interdisciplinary training and education needed to prepare graduates for careers and leadership in the analysis and assurance associated with these critical infrastructures. Currently, the University plans for the proposed interdisciplinary SIA baccalaureate program to be administered by the School of Information Sciences and Technology, in association with psychology, business, communications, law, agriculture, political science, criminal justice, geography and other units. . . The University also is considering a graduate degree program in SIA that would be tied closely to the proposed baccalaureate degree program.

The focus of Penn State's program appears to be more in the business or competitive intelligence arena, though it recently has increased its course offerings in the geospatial information systems (GIS) field.

The university recently advertised for an Instructor in Geospatial Intelligence, who would lead online classes and collaborate with faculty colleagues from home. Penn State offers a post-baccalaureate certificate program in Geospatial Intelligence through its online "World Campus." It is one of four certificate programs accredited by the U.S. Geospatial Intelligence Foundation. The program is also included as an option in the school's online Master of Geographic Information Systems (MGIS) degree. In addition to full-time faculty at Penn State's University Park campus, the MGIS program also

employs part-time faculty members located across the country and around the world. (Penn State Website, http://gis.e-education.psu,edu, accessed May 20, 2009)

President Spanier chairs the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board (NSHEAB), which strives to overcome the suspicion and distrust held by many academics toward the federal government and its perceived all-pervasive intelligence-gathering arms.  He discussed his challenges during a luncheon address at the IAFIE annual conference in May 2006.  Spanier identified three major areas of concern for the higher education community that the NSHEAB attempts to tackle—counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cybersecurity.  Specific concerns include university-produced intellectual property, classified research, international students, and foreign visitors to campuses.  The Board is made up of 17 university presidents, most from top-tier research universities like Penn State, and meets three times a year.

Spanier also heads a subordinate National Counterintelligence Working Group, which oversees 11 CIWG regions and involves all 16 IC agencies.  He stated that the mission of the NSHEAB is "to make higher education part of the national security solution," to promote understanding, to provide advice on the culture of higher education, and to build on the traditions of openness and academic freedom.  There are quite a few opportunities to improve relations with the IC, to include new academic programs such as intelligence studies, internships, faculty counseling, IC recruitment of employees directly from campus programs, university research in support of national needs, and a "better use of FBI time" than was the case in the past.  Challenges continue to be the difference in cultures, a residual history and lingering suspicions, the need to clarify the distinction between activities that are "voluntary" versus "required," the fact that academics question

everything, and divergent views on authority.  He closed his remarks by insisting, "We in academe never forget anything and tend to hold grudges; we need to close the gap." (Spanier, notes taken by researcher, 2006)

### *Point Park University*

Point Park University in Pittsburgh, PA, offers an undergraduate-only Intelligence and National Security Program, headed by a professor with over 30 years of experience as a special agent for the U.S. Treasury Department and Customs Service, continuing to reflect the pattern of academics starting intelligence education programs with expertise from prior careers in government intelligence or law enforcement.  The school offers an associate degree in Professional Studies with a Law Enforcement concentration; baccalaureate degrees in Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement, Intelligence and National Security, and Professional Studies; and a graduate degree in Criminal Justice Administration.  For individuals earning their bachelor's degrees in other fields, a post-baccalaureate degree requiring the completion of 57 credits in Intelligence and National Security is available.  For non-degree-seeking students, the school offers a 15-credit certificate in Intelligence and National Security.

The bachelor of science program in Intelligence and National Security "provides a solid foundation for the planning, implementation, and management of national security operations in government and private organizations."  It focuses on issues in national security, intelligence operations, emergency services, covert operations, criminal investigations, and crisis management.  Point Park advertises that "this new major is the first bachelor of science degree in intelligence and national security in the nation." (Brochure, "Intelligence and National Security," Point Park University, undated)

*Patrick Henry College*

For a representative institution that offers a major in intelligence, we look to a small private college located in Purcellville, VA.  Patrick Henry College consists mainly of students from families that practice home-schooling.  According to the principal adjunct instructor for its intelligence studies programs, the aim is to prepare students for public service in an environment emphasizing individual achievement and conservative family values. (Middleton, G., interview by researcher, July 10, 2007)  Patrick Henry's Intelligence and Foreign Policy Program (IFP) offers a minor to students who typically major in a traditional program such as political science.  In fact, the founding director of the IFP, Robert Stacey, was also head of the Department of Government.  Stacey left Patrick Henry in 2006 along with a handful of other professors concerned about a lack of academic freedom at the sometimes controversial conservative school and is considering setting up a similar program at Regent University in Virginia Beach, where he now teaches.  His assistant director at the time the IFP was established was Eliot Jardines, a JMIC graduate who later served as the first Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Open Source.  The new government department head at Patrick Henry is not directly involved in the IFP, as was his predecessor, in effect leaving most of the teaching on intelligence to experienced adjuncts. (Middleton, July 10, 2007)

The former IFP director provided a set of briefing slides to the researcher in 2004. He indicated the IFP mission is "to provide students with a rigorous, systematic study of the disciplines of intelligence and foreign policy so that they are fully equipped to positively influence this nation's intelligence and foreign policy endeavors."  A program goal is to have all IFP graduates employed within six months of graduation.  The staff

claims its students are of top quality, with an average SAT score of 1354 and an average

GPA of 3.4.  It touts the school's benefits of being located fairly close to Washington,

DC, and having a Program Board of Advisors with representatives from the federal

government.  Students cannot apply for the IFP Track until they have completed

freshman year with a cumulative GPA of at least 3.0.  They must then be interviewed by

the IFP Track selection committee, pass a security interview, and undergo a preliminary

background investigation. (Stacey, R.D., presentation slides, 2004)

The required core curriculum at Patrick Henry is 77 credit hours, with 6-8 hours

of electives; IFP Track students must earn an additional 47 hours within the IFP

curriculum.  Representative intelligence-related courses include "American Intelligence,"

"Intelligence Research and Analysis," "Criminal Investigation and Analysis," and

"Empirical Research Methods."  Internships are a critical part of the program and earn 12

credit hours; most are with government agencies and require security clearances.  The

IFP also requires 12 credit hours for a "Special Project."  Examples of recent student

projects include "IRA-FARC Relations" (IRA is the Irish Republican Army and FARC is

the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, both considered dangerous terrorist

groups) and "China C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers,

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance)."  Patrick Henry also boasts an

Intelligence Analysis Center, which is a secure computer lab where students learn the

latest in analytical data visualization and open source exploitation software tools and

techniques.  Within the Center, all computer terminals have high-speed Internet access,

which allows students to conduct such activities as producing a weekly product for the

U.S. government titled "Border Security Alert." (Stacey, presentation slides, 2004)

*Neumann College*

This small Catholic institution in Aston, PA, is an example of a school that offers a minor in intelligence studies, through its Division of Arts and Sciences. An information sheet distributed at the May 2006 IAFIE annual conference indicates this is a 24-credit undergraduate minor designed to provide a theoretical and practical framework for an introductory study of intelligence analysis and its application in a variety of contexts. The program exposes students to the fundamental concepts and analytic techniques related to national security, homeland security, and law enforcement. The basic core of courses can be incorporated into any major program but is "especially congenial with English, Liberal Arts, and Political Science." The program contains specific courses in intelligence studies and includes the "cutting-edge electronic intelligence studies course." (Chance, discussion with researcher, June 6, 2006)

The program also requires preparation for a broader knowledge of foreign languages, especially certain critical languages, and the interdisciplinary cultural studies required for national security analysts. (Fact sheet, "Intelligence Studies Minor," undated) The head of the program is a former New Jersey State Police official who teaches political science and criminal justice at Neumann and is a former IAFIE board member. One of his former adjunct instructors, a retired Army officer now working for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), shared her syllabus from a summer 2006 adult education course titled "U.S. National Security and Intelligence."

*Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University*

In response to this researcher's solicitation of information regarding college intelligence studies programs in the *NMIA Newsletter*, he received an e-mail from a

graduate of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU) who was pursuing a minor in intelligence studies at the Daytona Beach, FL, campus while working for a defense firm. He was impressed with the courses and the professor teaching them. He also provided an electronic link (http://www.erau.edu/pr/degrees/b-gsis.html) and a list of courses required for ERAU's minor program in Security and Intelligence.

As of the fall 2003 semester the seven courses required (for a total of 21 credits) were "American Foreign Policy," "Global Crime and Criminal Justice Systems," "Studies in Intelligence I," "Intelligence Analysis—Writing and Briefing," "Studies in Intelligence II," "Corporate Security," and "National Security Issues and Terrorism." For "Studies in Intelligence I," with prerequisites of psychology and government/history courses, "The student will be provided descriptions of the varied ways strategic intelligence is used by world leaders to shape policy and its effect on world events. Intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination and counterintelligence will be among the issues examined and discussed." "Studies in Intelligence II" is "a simulation of intelligence officers' activities. The student will function as an intelligence desk officer. . . Using the simulation, the student will study and practice many components of tactical and strategic intelligence. Some components included will be intelligence collection, evaluation, analysis, production, and dissemination; intelligence oversight; covert and clandestine operations; intelligence bureaucracies; espionage; ethical and moral issues in intelligence; and counterintelligence. The course emphasizes functional interactions."

The "Intelligence Analysis—Writing and Briefing" course offers "the opportunity to gain practical experience in the intelligence functions of analysis, writing, and briefing. The student will be expected to demonstrate an 'intelligence-oriented mind' and ability to

work under time pressure.  The student will become familiar with analytical

methodologies and writing styles that make complex world events explicable to military

decision makers and senior policy makers."

The Director of the Global Security and Intelligence Studies (GSIS) Program at

ERAU's Prescott, AZ, campus is Philip Jones, who requested an NDIC volume on

critical thinking for use in an intelligence analysis course. (Moore, D., 2005)  Based on

information provided by IAFIE in a faculty vacancy notice, the GSIS Program at ERAU

"has a successful record in preparing students for a range of careers in government at all

levels and the private sector, as well as further study in graduate programs or law school

. . . The GSIS Program at the university's Prescott campus has gained national

recognition as an innovative academic program in a topical area of increasingly vital

importance." (Heibel, R., e-mail to researcher, September 22, 2005, p. 1)

In addition to the BS in GSIS offered at the Prescott campus, the Daytona Beach

campus now offers a BS in Homeland Security, making Embry-Riddle truly a nationwide

program accessible to a broad geographic range of students interested in pursuing careers

in intelligence and intelligence-related fields, in addition to its more traditional programs

in aeronautics, air traffic control, meteorology, space studies, and aviation safety that

have been the "bread and butter" of this unique university from the start.

*Notre Dame College*

Another small Catholic college which has developed an intelligence studies

program, but only as a concentration, is Notre Dame College in Cleveland, OH (not to be

confused with the much larger University of Notre Dame).  An IAFIE board member

from this school has the title of Director, Intelligence Analysis and Research Program,

which is part of the Department of History and Political Science. According to a fact
sheet given the researcher, the concentration program in intelligence analysis and
research (IAR) is "a multidisciplinary emphasis . . . that has been designed to give
students the necessary background that will enable them to pursue careers as research or
intelligence analysts in government agencies or in private enterprise. Analysts who do
this kind of work, whether it is related to national security, the investigation of criminal
activities, or competitive business intelligence, prepare assessments based on the
collection, correlation, and analysis of intelligence data." The goal of the IAR program is
to prepare qualified graduates for entry-level positions and to bring with them the
following skills:

- A broad understanding of world and American history
- A knowledge of comparative governments and political philosophies
- The ability to produce written and oral reports and assessments based on research, correlation, and analysis
- A reading competency in a foreign language
- A familiarity with computer operations and database management
- A general understanding of statistical techniques (Fact sheet, Notre Dame College, undated)

Notre Dame also offers a certificate in Intelligence Analysis through its Center for
Professional Development; the program, begun in fall 2004, consists of five courses. The
researcher received a brochure, "Notre Dame College Certificate in Intelligence Analysis
2005-2006 Course Booklet" from one of the Center's adjunct professors who is also a
PhD-level analyst working for the FBI; another adjunct is a DEA analyst. (Name
withheld by request of IAR Director due to the FBI employee's active involvement in
current investigations, e-mail to author, July 5, 2005, with brochure and course syllabus
mailed separately) Again, the pattern of teachers of these kinds of courses coming from
the professional law enforcement and intelligence communities holds true. The Director

of IAR does not fit this mold, however. He is a career academic with a PhD in history. He informed the researcher that the baccalaureate program at Notre Dame started up in the fall of 2005, with an inaugural class of seven students. The goal for 2006 was 20-25 students. In January 2007 the IAR Director notified the researcher that, during the inaugural meeting of the IAFIE Great Lakes Chapter, encompassing colleges in northwestern PA and northeastern OH, he had been asked to chair the IAFIE Educational Practices Committee and had accepted. He in turn invited the researcher to join him on that committee. (Moore, G., letter to researcher, December 23, 2006)

The IAR Director has often stated that personal ties of some of his faculty with nearby Mercyhurst College were important in seeking ideas and applying lessons learned from that highly successful program. The Director added, "The program is designed to be the most rigorous one in the college—students have to maintain a cumulative 3.0 to stay in. The intel faculty are adjuncts—all active or retired analysts. Our competitive intel guy works for a Fortune 500 multinational corporation located in N.E. Ohio. . . We're going to apply for a CAE grant [Centers of Academic Excellence, an ODNI-funded program, discussed elsewhere in this study], hopefully by the end of the year, and we've been accepted into the Collegiate Partnership Program run by the i2 corporation (software for analysts—we'll train the kids on Analysts' Notebook). . . If we get to the point where we routinely recruit 20-30 students a year, we'll probably add a full time intelligence faculty member." (Moore, e-mail to researcher, November 8, 2005)

*West Virginia University*

West Virginia University (WVU) is another large institution that has entered the undergraduate intelligence studies arena, through introduction of a concentration.

According to an op-ed piece on the school's website, even before 9/11, "The Political Science Department not only saw a need for quality analysts, but laid the groundwork for a program devoted to intelligence and national security studies." The writer claims that WVU today is "the lone state-funded, large institution offering such studies at the undergraduate level." (Ulrich, L.J., February 8, 2007, pp. 1-2) The school's president embraced the idea, and enrollment in the intelligences studies program at WVU has tripled in the last two years. According to instructor Jason Thomas, the idea is "to identify and train good analytical candidates—people who can establish an impressive work ethic, and understanding of foreign affairs, upstanding moral character and sound foreign language ability." (Ulrich, p. 2) Students gain insight into the national-level IC, intelligence collection, analytical techniques, and foreign policymaking, as well as exposure to foreign languages and opportunities to serve as interns in both the public and private sectors.

The program at WVU reportedly has been so successful that a graduate-level complement is in the works, prompted by recognition of the need for a talent pool to assume analytical and managerial positions in the near future as "baby-boomers" begin to retire. Location and the fact that many federal agencies have moved some of their operations to the northern part of the state are key factors. "WVU's intelligence programs are a lucky beneficiary of a handful of political and geographic gifts: Sen. Jay Rockefeller, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee; Robert C. Byrd, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee; and, of course, the campus's vital proximity to federal resources in Fairmont, Pittsburgh, northern Virginia and Washington, D.C. The fit is natural." (Ulrich, p.2)

Despite the seemingly enthusiastic reception and recruitment record for the WVU program, detractors exist. The chair of the program at AMU claims he visited the WVU Website and could find nothing more than a BA in International Studies program with two intelligence courses added (i.e., what makes it a concentration). He thus concluded this could not be considered a serious program for intelligence studies. Whereupon the head of the IAFIE Educational Practices Committee (of which the researcher is a member), who received the critique of WVU by AMU, remarked that this observation raises an issue critical to IAFIE's mission—that of determining a professional standard for academic programs that aspire to educate and produce students well prepared to become capable analysts. (Moore, G., e-mail to researcher and others, February 13, 2007, p. 1) IAFIE intends to explore exactly what standards academic programs in intelligence studies should meet, realizing that many programs already exist or are being developed, from certificate to graduate-level programs. Teaching intelligence is a worthy enterprise; however, assessment of how well it is being taught and whether the outcomes are as desired is just as important or more so. The IAFIE Educational Practices Committee has as its short-term goal discussing what standards academic programs in intelligence studies should meet and a long-term goal of eventually accrediting academic programs in intelligence studies. (Moore, p. 1)

### Yale University

We now examine a few institutions that teach some intelligence electives. Yale University is the third oldest institution of higher learning in the U.S., founded in 1701 (preceded only by Harvard in 1636 and William and Mary in 1693). A traditionally liberal Ivy League college, Yale does not have an intelligence studies program per se, but

has shown a deep interest in the subject over the years through the courses it offers and the faculty it hires. It should be recalled this was the campus milieu that spawned the Kent-Kendall debates of the 1940s and produced many recruits for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in the pre-CIA days of World War II. It is also the alma mater of such intelligence figures as Walter Pforzheimer, a former CIA general counsel considered the unparalleled master of intelligence literature for decades prior to his death. An OSS veteran, Pforzheimer graduated from Yale College in 1935 and Yale Law School in 1938. The aforementioned Robin Winks was a renowned historian at Yale. In his seminal work, *Cloak and Gown*, he singles out a host of Yale scholars deeply involved with intelligence activities, to include Arnold Wolfers, James Angleton, Dean Acheson, and Richard Bissell. (Winks, 1996, pp. 14-19, 30-41, 219)

One of the researcher's professors and then-chairman of the Political Science Department in the late 1970s, H. Bradford Westerfield, was a long-time scholar of intelligence issues and incorporated intelligence-related themes into his courses on U.S. government and foreign policy. Two decades later, the researcher met Westerfield again, this time while the latter was serving on a panel at the 1999 JMIC annual conference, with the theme "Teaching Intelligence at Colleges and Universities." The professor had maintained long-standing ties with JMIC, serving on its Board of Visitors for several years prior to his retirement from active teaching at Yale. As noted in his obituary in 2008, Westerfield "was known for writing and teaching about foreign policy with a particular emphasis on espionage, offering one of the first courses at any American university on intelligence and covert operations, which students playfully christened

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'Spies and Lies.'" (Martin, *The New York Times*, January 27, 2008)  The actual course title was "Intelligence and Covert Operations," which is no longer taught.

While participating in a "summer institute" event in July 2003 at the Yale Center for International and Area Studies (YCIAS, renamed the MacMillan Center in 2006), during which the researcher presented to a group of high school and college instructors on the challenges of integrating intelligence and homeland security, two fellow presenters were Yale professors John Lewis Gaddis and Minh Luong.  The former teaches courses on the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy, and international relations, while the latter focuses on international security studies, economics, and ethics and is director of the Ivy Scholars Program.  Luong's presentation at this particular symposium dealt with an elective he was teaching at the time called "Economic Espionage," which he claimed attracted many students interested in the role of intelligence in a fast-moving, increasingly globalized world economy.  Luong is a member of IAFIE and headed its Educational Practices Committee upon the organization's founding in 2004.

Another who taught intelligence-related courses at Yale as an adjunct professor was retired (now deceased) Army LTG William Odom, a former Director of the National Security Agency and chief of Army Intelligence who in retirement was a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.  The researcher first met Odom in the 1960s when the latter taught in the USMA Social Sciences Department.  He was plucked from that relative anonymity by Zbigniew Brzezinski in the late 1970s to work as his military assistant on the National Security Council in the Carter administration.  Odom had been Brzezinski's doctoral student at Columbia focusing on Russian studies.  The Yale University Press persuaded the general to write a book on intelligence reform in the wake of 9/11, which Odom told

the researcher in April 2005 he did reluctantly because he really wanted to write another book on the Soviet Union, his principal passion for many years, and thus struck a deal with the University Press.  The result is *Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America* (2003).  Paradoxically, during that same conversation at a Social Sciences Department reunion, and after a little prodding, Odom firmly insisted he did not feel intelligence studies is a valid academic field, and that courses on intelligence merely support other, more pertinent, academic disciplines.  This was surprising coming from a career intelligence officer and scholar, one who had spent considerable time in both military and civilian academia and had taught many courses regarding intelligence and foreign policy.

To reiterate, Yale does not have an intelligence studies program.  Nevertheless, a check of academic offerings in 2006 revealed the terminal MA program in International Relations has a concentration in U.S. Diplomatic History and Foreign Relations.  Within that concentration are included a history course, "Cold War International History"; another history course, "Studies in Grand Strategy" (taught by the imminent Paul Kennedy); and a political science course, "Theories of War and Peace" (taught by Bruce Russett, long-time editor of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*).  These required courses are taken along with electives in economics and foreign languages, plus an international relations course, "International Affairs:  Core Issues and Approaches" (taught by Nancy Ruther, former YCIAS Executive Director).  Other intelligence-related electives offered are a law course, "Public Order of the World Community" (taught by Michael Reisman, and a political science course, "U.S. National Security" (previously taught by Odom).  All touch on the importance of intelligence to U.S. diplomacy and foreign relations.  Despite dabbling around the edges of intelligence, however, given Yale's liberal heritage,

it is doubtful the school will move any closer to developing a full-scale intelligence studies curriculum.  Odom would have concurred; he passed away in May 2008.

In 2003 Yale launched an electronic multimedia magazine on globalization, *YaleGlobal Online*, which has passed the 100-million mark in the number of hits received from readers around the world.  This represents a "phenomenal rise in readership," according to the institution's monthly online newsletter to alumni.  "*YaleGlobal*, the flagship publication of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, explores, analyzes and debates the implications of the growing interconnectedness of the world.  The online publication draws on the rich intellectual resources of the Yale community, and [sic] well as scholars and experts worldwide." ("ELine Newsletter," February 22, 2007)  Articles briefly touch on intelligence matters, but as is typical of entities for which the word "intelligence" can have negative connotations the word "information" is used more often.

Yale graduate students have also embarked on a publishing venture, producing since 2006 their own print periodical titled *Yale Journal of International Affairs*, the second-ever volume of which International Relations students distributed gratis to attendees at a MacMillan Center-sponsored reception held in Washington in March 2007, an annual event which allows alumni to meet current IR students visiting the Nation's Capital for orientation and job networking.  The *Journal*'s Board of Advisors includes such familiar names as Gaddis, Kennedy, Russett, William Foltz (a noted Africa scholar), and Paul Bracken (well-known in the economics and business arena).  In this volume is an article by Yale's Stefanie Pleschinger, "Allied Against Terror:  Transatlantic Intelligence Cooperation," and another by Middlebury College's Allison Stanger and Mark Eric Wiliams, "Private Military Corporations:  Benefits and Costs of Outsourcing

Security." These are just two examples of articles dealing with intelligence and related to the research question about the intelligence aspects of traditional liberal arts programs.

*Hampden-Sydney College*

One of the few remaining all-male liberal arts institutions in the U.S. is Hampden-Sydney College (H-SC), a small private school established along with U.S. independence in 1776 and located in rural south-central Virginia. The former head of that institution, who is still active as President Emeritus, is retired Army LTG Samuel Wilson, former Director of DIA. H-SC offers a number of intelligence and intelligence-related electives.

In addition to being President Emeritus, upon retirement in 2000 Wilson became the James C. Wheat Visiting Professor of Leadership. His military career in special operations and intelligence is legendary. He became Adjunct Professor of Political Science at H-SC in 1982, and was appointed President of the College in 1992. Since retirement, he has been affiliated with the Wilson Center for Leadership in the Public Interest and continues teaching national security and intelligence electives on occasion. That Center offers an array of public service and civic education programs for students, faculty, staff, and the community. Launched in 1997, it was renamed in 2000 to honor Wilson upon his retirement. (Hampden-Sydney College website, March 23, 2007)

A sampling of events on the Wilson Center calendar reflects its abiding interest in, and affiliation with, intelligence issues: In August-December of each year Wilson has taught two interdisciplinary studies courses, "An Overview of U.S. National Intelligence" and "Advanced Seminar on Leadership and Ethics." In August 2004 noted military affairs writer and retired Army intelligence officer Ralph Peters lectured on "The War on Terror: Where Do We Stand?" Every June the Center assists in the planning and funding

of an Alumni College event called "Intelligence, Espionage, and the Spy Who Loves Us."

In September 2005 a foreign affairs specialist from Johns Hopkins University gave a

presentation on "Fighting Terrorism Within the Law."  In October 2006 the Center held a

two-part program that looked back at the Cuban Missile Crisis, with General Wilson as

moderator.  In November 2006 the Public Service and Military Leadership students

hosted a presentation by Army LTG William Boykin, then-Deputy Under Secretary of

Defense for Intelligence and Warfighting Support.  Boykin now teaches at H-SC and has

taken over some of Wilson's classroom duties.  In December 2006 Wilson and another

professor held a forum titled "Special National Intelligence Estimate:  Putin and Russia's

Failed Experiment in Democracy."  In February 2007 the Military Leadership/National

Security Studies Program sponsored a presentation by a retired Air Force officer and

Hampden-Sydney alumnus on "Asymmetric Warfare and the Military Challenge of

Time-Sensitive Targets." (Hampden-Sydney College/Wilson Center website, accessed

March 23, 2007)

Wilson has long taught courses on intelligence at Hampden-Sydney.  A 1997

article in a Norfolk, VA, newspaper described how Wilson's course, formally titled

"Introduction to Intelligence" but informally "How to Be a Spy," was the most popular

one that year. ("Pssst! College Students Study Spying:  College President Tells of

Espionage Exploits in His Intelligence Class," *The Virginia-Pilot*, November 4, 1997, p.

B5)  He used role-playing, case studies, and personal experiences liberally in the

classroom.  Wilson said he "recounts his experiences primarily to give him legitimacy as

he teaches the nuts and bolts of foreign intelligence-gathering and analyzing information

used by military and political policy-makers."  He hopes his students can apply the skills

in civilian jobs. "Ninety percent of intelligence comes from open sources," Wilson tells

his students. "The other 10 percent, the clandestine work, is just the most dramatic. The

real intelligence hero is Sherlock Holmes, not James Bond." (p. B5)

President Emeritus Wilson's portrait in academic garb, with his Army green

uniform in the background, graced the cover of the National Military Intelligence

Association's *American Intelligence Journal* in summer 2006. That edition was

dedicated to promoting more extensive HUMINT and cultural intelligence efforts. The

lead-off article was written by Wilson and extols the value of cultural expertise in gaining

vital intelligence and building beneficial personal relationships; its intriguing title is

"Wanted: An 'Intelligent' Use of the Human Spirit." The epitome of the scholar-

practitioner recounts a number of individuals he had worked with and/or admired over

the years who had brilliantly used their language expertise and feel for local cultures to

accomplish their difficult missions. In observing that such experts are often not rewarded

by their agencies' personnel systems, he concludes:

> In the 21st century we find ourselves in a new war of ideas, our primary enemy
> the shadowy Islamist terrorist. To prevail will require a greater premium on
> sound intelligence than we have ever been willing to place. We will have to rely
> especially on HUMINT. Useful human intelligence requires a substantial
> investment of time and resources. We must nurture and reward those motivated
> professionals willing to devote years to refining the uncommon ability to cross
> the barriers that divide the world's cultures. With that, and a keen sense for
> connecting with the human spirit, they will be prepared to simultaneously harvest
> information and sow mutual respect around the globe whenever an opportunity
> presents itself. (Wilson, p. 7)

### Trinity University

The ODNI program promoting Centers of Academic Excellence (CAEs) was

mentioned previously. The first such Center, and the former home of the CAE

administrator, Lenora Peters Gant, is Trinity University in Washington, DC. A February

2007 position vacancy announcement for the director of the CAE effort at Trinity

provides a glimpse into the sort of person such a program needs: "Successful candidates

will demonstrate the potential for strong intellectual and academic leadership in working

with Trinity's faculty to develop the Intelligence Studies program. . . The successful

candidate will present strong experience in academic or professional positions in

Intelligence or related fields, as well as strong administrative, budget and grants

management skills. The ICCAE is a federally funded program, and the Director is

responsible for all phases of program and grant administration. The Director oversees all

related curriculum and program development, faculty training, student engagement

including study abroad opportunities, high school outreach, an annual colloquium, and all

relationships with members of the Intelligence Community and other federal agencies. . .

The Director will facilitate multiple internship, fellowship, cultural immersion, language

intensive and scholarly opportunities for students and faculty."

In line with the above requirement for an annual colloquium, an event was held at

Trinity on April 20, 2007, with the theme "Public Policy and National Intelligence in a

Changing Landscape: An Academic Colloquium." Speakers and panelists included

experts from the IC as well as student participants in Trinity's intelligence studies

program. For example, two of the presenters were the NDIC President and Provost.

NDIC's predecessor, JMIC, had co-sponsored with ODNI an intelligence conference at

the University of Maryland in July 2005 that targeted academics from institutions either

already applying for or considering CAE grants to establish intelligence studies

programs. The ten participating universities as of the end of 2006, some of them

historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs), included Trinity in Washington;

Tennessee State University in Nashville; Clark Atlanta University in Georgia; Florida

International University in Miami; California State University in Los Angeles (actually a

consortium of seven CSU campuses; for more information see Perry, D., CIA working

with CSUs to find new blood, July 5, 2007); the University of Washington in Seattle; the

University of Texas-Pan American in Edinburg; Wayne State University in Detroit; the

University of Texas at El Paso; and Norfolk State University in Virginia. (Willing,

Intelligence agencies invest in college education, *USA Today*, November 28, 2006)

The Trinity Website provides more detail about its intelligence studies program

and the general motive behind the CAE effort:

> The Intelligence Community Center of Academic Excellence was established at Trinity in Fall 2004 with a one-year, $250,000 renewable grant from the U.S. Intelligence Community. The pilot program is designed to increase the pool of eligible applicants for positions in the intelligence community with an emphasis on women, persons with disabilities and ethnic minorities, with diverse cultural backgrounds, language proficiency, geographical expertise and related competencies. The project goals include increasing awareness among college and high school students of career opportunities in the intelligence community and developing skill sets relevant to intelligence community careers. The project includes:
>
> • Designing and revising curricular components at Trinity to develop critical intelligence community skill sets, and providing Trinity faculty with professional development and course development opportunities in intelligence.
>
> • Creating an <u>Intelligence Community Center of Academic Excellence Scholars program</u>; Trinity students apply to this selective program, take courses in the IC curriculum, receive study abroad travel scholarships, and participate in internships at IC agencies.
>
> • Forming partnerships with Consortium members to host outreach activities, collaborative programs and an <u>Academic Colloquium</u>.
>
> • Developing a metropolitan Washington high school outreach program to promote awareness about the intelligence community. (Trinity website, March 12, 2007)

Up until 2008, the Program Chair at Trinity was Robert Maguire, an international relations professor and recent guest speaker at NDU's Institute for National Strategic Studies on the dire situation in Haiti. He insists intelligence agency recruiters like small Catholic schools such as Trinity, with more than 90% of its approximately 1,000 undergraduates being women and 70% minorities. Intelligence students study creative problem solving, contemporary diplomatic history, and social science research methods. The dozen or so who pursue an "intelligence certificate," essentially a minor in intelligence studies, serve as summer "spy camp" counselors, chaperoning high school students who visit the CIA and attend lectures by intelligence professionals. (Willing, November 27, 2006) The current Program Chair is James Robbins, who previously taught at NDU's School for National Security Executive Education (SNSEE), recently renamed the College of International Security Affairs (CISA).

### *University of Texas at El Paso*

As mentioned above, the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP) is another institution selected to receive a CAE grant. Texas' own native son Rep. Silvestre Reyes is now chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). In an interview with the *El Paso Times*, he claimed a lack of diversity hurts the quality of U.S. intelligence. Nevertheless, the program introduced at UTEP in early April 2007 is intended to change that by educating high school and college students for intelligence jobs—private, state, or federal. Because the UTEP student body is more than 72% Hispanic, and about 82% of the total enrollment comes from El Paso County, the program will take advantage of the biculturalism and bilingualism of the region. (Roberts, C., April 12, 2007, p. 1B)

UTEP has received an initial grant of $500,000, which can be renewed for up to a maximum of $2 million. It will include a 4-week summer seminar for high school students, focusing on culture and language exposure and contemporary issues. The program also began offering a certificate in Intelligence and National Security requiring 18 semester hours and a graduate certificate in Homeland Security for the first time in fall 2007. A graduate certificate and a master's program in intelligence and national security will be developed in the near future. The program provides up to $5,000 per semester for foreign travel. (Roberts, p. 5B)

*New Mexico State University*

Moving just next door, New Mexico appears to be another border state embracing intelligence education. This school is being discussed here as somewhat of a special case in that it is not a CAE institution, does not have an intelligence studies program per se (merely offering intelligence electives), and its intelligence focus is not under the auspices of a social sciences or other liberal arts program but rather under the "hard sciences." New Mexico State University's Physical Science Laboratory in Las Cruces hosted a symposium in February 2005 with the theme "Open Source Intelligence: Lessening Risk in Supply Chains." (E-mail from Holden-Rhodes, J.F., January 19, 2005) This event explored how intelligence reduces risk and uncertainty. The organizer indicated that NMSU offers a "suite of academic degrees" in Intelligence Studies, and that "real-world" OSINT (open source intelligence) work is critical to the success of the students. The requirements for users of OSINT include: smart people "who know something about something"; language capability; good data storage, retrieval, and analysis/synthesis tools; smart people "who are relational and transactional thinkers";

cultural knowledge; smart people "with broad knowledge on many places"; reliable Internet access; and awareness of limitations. (Holden-Rhodes, symposium briefing slides, February 8-9, 2005) Case studies used during this symposium included the December 2004 tsunami that devastated much of South Asia and a 1996 fruit-borne illness traced to Guatemala.

During the 2009 IAFIE annual conference held at University of Maryland University College (UMUC) in Adelphi, MD, James Holden-Rhodes, who is no longer at NMSU, was recognized as the winner of IAFIE's first-ever "Teacher of the Year" award. In his acceptance presentation, the honoree noted that many students at NMSU are Native Americans. In fact, one is the grandson of a Navajo "code talker" of World War II fame. (Researcher's notes, May 27, 2009) Consequently, it is clear NMSU, UTEP, and other universities within border regions are reaching out to the same sort of minority student populations that the CAE program is intended to serve. Diversity of the hiring pool for IC positions is an admirable goal for the higher education community at large.

In a related development, in the spring of 2009 NMSU was granted a U.S. Congressional earmark to develop a program for National Security Professionals in accordance with a Presidential Executive Order on "National Security Professional Development." The school is requesting $10 million toward "the design, engineering, and equipping of a facility, and for the development and delivery of programming of an Institute for National Security and Public Policy that will prepare national security professionals to serve as managers and policy leaders in an ever-changing global environment. . . The Institute will provide leading symposia, training opportunities, and core curricula to New Mexico-based national security personnel, regional and national

leaders, and NMSU undergraduate and graduate students preparing to work in this critical arena." (OSD description of New Mexico State University program, undated)

In sum, this examination of representative institutions sheds some light on heretofore unremarked university course and programs in intelligence studies. In some cases, there are full-fledged intelligence studies programs designed to produce graduates prepared to move directly into the Intelligence Community as analysts or some other category of specialized professional. In other cases, the institutions continue to rely on well-heeled and respected liberal arts programs, or even science programs, to provide intelligence instruction to individuals who may or may not seek employment in the IC. They are grounded in a solid, but more general, curriculum that appears to be the path most current intelligence professionals took, to include those senior experts interviewed. Whether that will be the case in the future remains to be seen; it may be too early to divine clearly that aspect of the intelligence profession of the 21$^{st}$ century. Still, it is not too early to ask the questions the researcher has posed.

## Findings

The foregoing analysis sets the stage for a synthesis, through triangulation, of the three modes of data collection to produce some solid, useful findings as answers to key questions and to the principal research question. It also has helped clarify in his mind the significance of the existing broad range of views about intelligence education and leads him to some rather pointed conclusions and recommendations to be laid out in the fifth and final chapter. This study has generated a number of implications for teaching, theory, and practice which will be discussed there.

*Answers to Key Questions*

It is now possible to link together the results of the three data collection streams. The analysis leads to synthesized findings associated with each of the key questions that in turn contribute to our understanding of how to address the overarching question that has guided this research, which asks if the burgeoning numbers of intelligence education programs in U.S. civilian colleges and universities are appropriately augmenting the existing variety of liberal arts programs in educating potential national-level government intelligence professionals.

*1. Is the U.S. Intelligence Community already obtaining the quality analysts it needs through the employment of graduates of liberal arts and sciences curricula, such as political science, international relations, regional studies, and linguistics; or of professional curricula, such as law and business?*

Based on the results of the questionnaire and the senior expert interviews, the IC appears to be obtaining the high-quality analysts and other types of intelligence professionals it needs through the traditional college studies route. Most of the questionnaire respondents went through that formative process themselves. Many who were aware of specialized intelligence studies programs chose not to enroll in them, not because they did not think they were any good but because at the time they had other careers in mind. In hindsight, once they were on the job in the IC, they stated they wished they had taken some of the intelligence courses offered to round out preparation for their jobs.

A preponderance of respondents concluded that a liberal arts program was the best approach at the baccalaureate level, especially when some students are not yet sure in what occupation they will end up working, and that an intelligence studies program would be a more logical course of action once they were already entrenched in their life's

work and returned to college for a master's degree to enhance their bona fides. Yet, they did not disparage their colleagues who, knowing all along they wanted to be intelligence analysts, chose to follow an intelligence-specific path through bachelor's programs, master's programs, or both by attending a school such as Mercyhurst College that goes to great lengths to prepare students for work in the IC and helps them get jobs through internships, cooperative relationships with private corporations, networking, etc. In other words, the majority seemed to be saying, "Intelligence studies are great for some people, but they were not what I needed at the time." The majority of senior interview subjects echoed this sentiment, asserting that liberal arts programs are the bedrock of higher education in support of the IC, but there is a place for intelligence studies programs too. It is not an "either…or" proposition, where one path obviates the other. Both paths have their role to play, and should be supported by the government and society.

If the question is refined to whether there are *enough* quality analysts coming out of the traditional college programs, the answer might be situation-dependent. That is to say, in normal non-crisis periods, the traditional liberal arts source may be adequate in terms of numbers. Nevertheless, in a crisis period such as immediately after 9/11, when the CIA, DIA, FBI, and other agencies found themselves bereft of enough assets with language, cultural, and/or HUMINT experience to saturate the new target, that might be the appropriate time for a "surge capability," to borrow a popular term from the Iraq War military setting, which could only be achieved through churning out a large number of regional-focused analysts in a relatively short period of time.

Intelligence is an uncertain art, which was designed to lessen uncertainty in the minds of decision-makers by providing them the best advice available. Developing

course curricula and getting specialized programs approved by an academic bureaucracy takes time, and to surge in response to an intelligence-driven human resource challenge requires fast action. Hence, keeping the intelligence studies pipeline open and going strong would seem prudent, as those schools can likely react more rapidly in producing the kind of analyst or operator needed in a crisis. For instance, if the CIA needs a Pashto-speaking analyst schooled in structured analytic techniques who has completed regional studies courses focusing on Afghanistan and already had some experience working for the IC as an intern—maybe even already possessing a TOP SECRET clearance—then Mercyhurst would likely be a better place to scour for candidates than Harvard or Yale.

*2. Can or do the best intelligence studies programs in higher education institutions provide additional or missing skills or knowledge to this pipeline? These two questions are seen from the point of view of the user.*

The best intelligence studies programs do indeed provide additional or missing skills and knowledge to the pipeline of accessions coming into the IC. There are certain courses that are mandatory in an intelligence studies program which might be only an elective, or not offered at all, by a liberal arts program. Of all the steps in the intelligence cycle, collection and analysis seem to be the two areas in which intelligence studies programs excel, in that these are the most oriented on subject matter expertise (or "tradecraft," to use a term reluctantly that means different things in different agencies and different organizational cultures). As specified in earlier chapters, much of this expertise will be gained ultimately through agency-particular training programs or on the job. Yet, getting a jump start on the theoretical underpinnings of such complex topics as denial and deception, counterespionage, geospatial mapping, and interrogation can be extremely useful for a young professional devoted to learning his or her occupational art as quickly

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and as thoroughly as possible.  These kinds of subjects would not be taught in a purely liberal arts program, though other, more general subjects equally applicable to the mastery of intelligence skills are available, such as logic, philosophy, psychology, probability and statistics, and foreign languages.

A quick perusal of the universities and intelligence courses listed in Appendix C will reveal a large number of highly technical and specialized courses offered by those entities with intelligence studies programs.  In comparison, the intelligence and intelligence-related courses offered by the schools with traditional programs tend to be more general and useful not only for intelligence professionals but for those going into almost any profession.  This observation lends greater credence to the approach mentioned before; i.e., that a student should take a more general path at the bachelor's level and then, after deciding what he or she really wants to do for a professional career, delve into the more technical and esoteric intelligence subjects later at the master's level.  Perhaps, as cited elsewhere, the intelligence studies discipline will eventually mature to the extent that a program leading to a doctorate in intelligence would be very appealing to lifelong intelligence professionals, especially those aspiring to high-level management and leadership positions within the IC.

3. *What is the nature of the existing intelligence studies programs and are they finding success in placing their graduates in solid jobs within the national security and intelligence communities?  This question is seen from the point of view of the provider.*

The nature of the existing intelligence studies programs was spelled out in this chapter, with a few representative programs discussed in some detail and virtually all of them at least included in the database at Appendix C.  Based on discussions with the program managers and instructors, they are finding considerable success in placing their

graduates in solid jobs within the IC. It is not clear how great a negative impact the current economic downturn is having on this rate, but from all media reports it seems the national security and intelligence "business" has not been hit that hard. After all, the threat does not diminish just because an individual is in dire economic straits, loses his or her job, or has trouble supporting a family financially. If anything, a poor economy exacerbates the threat, and especially if the effects are worldwide, which is the case today. It is no secret that terrorist recruitment goes up when disenchanted young men, and even some women who aspire to be martyrs, are unemployed, poverty-stricken, and looking for something meaningful to pull them out of their doldrums. Intelligence analysts and other officials will always be needed as long as there is an Intelligence Community monitoring a viable asymmetric threat. The greatest negative impact of a troubled economy might be on those who represent the contractor portion of the intelligence enterprise, as the Obama administration has made promises to cut back and streamline this expensive type of asset. However, that situation could redound to the benefit of those seeking permanent government employment in the IC if the contractor slots are converted to permanent government positions, which appears to be the plan.

Intelligence studies programs are currently a big business. They are filling classroom seats and earning lots of tuition dollars for their colleges and universities. The increased threat since 9/11 has served to stoke that windfall, and even if the military picture on the ground improves quickly and American citizens start to feel more secure, the trend of growing intelligence courses will not turn around immediately. There is a certain built-in momentum to university curriculum development, as alluded to by Mark Lowenthal. Sometimes it takes a while to cut through all the bureaucracy and get the ball

rolling initially, but once it starts gaining speed it is hard to stop it quickly. Enrollment in certain academic programs will always lag a bit behind the changing situations that prompted the programs to be established in the first place.

4. *Are some categories of intelligence studies offerings in higher education (e.g., master's program, bachelor's program, major, minor, concentration, electives) more suited than others for enhancing the preparation of new Intelligence Community professionals? This question is seen from the point of view of academic administrators.*

From the evidence presented in this study, some categories of intelligence studies offerings do seem to be more suited than others for enhancing the preparation of incoming IC professionals, at least in the eyes of those developing and maintaining the programs. The master's and bachelor's programs in intelligence, whether offered by the in-residence institutions or the online schools, appear to be very popular. In informal discussions with professors and administrators from various schools, and through noting on the Internet the number of new programs springing up overnight, it is clear that schools are pushing hard to establish full-fledged bachelor's and master's degrees in such fields as intelligence analysis, homeland security, information assurance, competitive intelligence, and security studies. That is not to say the minors, concentrations, and electives are not flourishing too, as are more narrowly focused certificate programs. They are growing in number, but the big push currently seems to be in developing full-blown, cradle-to-grave degree programs that mold the kind of graduates a university is looking for to enhance its reputation in a particular niche (its "branding," so to speak) or to increase its placement rates after graduation.

5. *What skills or knowledge can be isolated as being especially needed by intelligence professionals, and do intelligence studies curricula provide those skills and knowledge?*

From crosswalking the ODNI core competencies against the intelligence courses offered, despite this exercise being somewhat judgmental and inaccurate, as cautioned earlier, it appears more emphasis is needed on the first, third, and fourth competencies. In other words, lots of courses are focused on critical thinking and analysis, technical expertise, and oral and written communication. After all, these are the indispensable skills for successful analysts. However, the competencies related to engagement and collaboration, personal leadership and integrity, and accountability for results seem to be lacking. Granted, there are a few courses taught in law, public policy, and business schools that focus on these management-type skills almost exclusively, but the bulk of the courses in both the intelligence studies programs and even the traditional liberal arts programs seem to assume the students will be able to develop these traits elsewhere or at a later stage of their learning process.

### *General Observations*

First, there was tremendous support for relying on a liberal arts curriculum to prepare future intelligence professionals. The questionnaire respondents leaned heavily that way, as did the subject matter expert interviewees. No one denigrated intelligence studies programs per se, but most did not see them as the primary channel through which the majority of intelligence professionals should spend their formative years. These programs instead were seen more as a way of pursuing a specialty within intelligence rather than achieving a broad, basic educational grounding prior to entering the profession. The courses discovered also reflected a large number of niches within liberal arts programs, such as international relations, political science, geography, philosophy, public policy, and law that are filled with intelligence or clearly intelligence-related

courses in the higher education enterprise.  Criminal justice programs are also where

many intelligence-related courses reside, which makes sense now in the wake of 9/11 as

national security intelligence, law enforcement intelligence, and competitive intelligence

have witnessed the walls between them crumbling.

Interestingly, a cursory perusal of Appendix C would suggest that the ODNI

competency most frequently covered by the courses is technical expertise, while the

young intelligence professionals reflected in their questionnaire responses that they

expected to get most of this type of instruction through training once on the job.  Perhaps

more attention in the courses needs to be focused on those competencies less adequately

addressed, at least on the surface, such as engagement and collaboration, leadership and

integrity, or accountability for results, which the researcher will endeavor to promote in

Chapter 5 by suggesting a notional survey course on intelligence at the master's level.

The recommendations of the various intelligence reform commissions, such as the ones

studying failures related to 9/11 and WMD in Iraq, reinforce this direction.

A second observation is the incredible mobility of today's young intelligence

professionals.  Not only do they tend to move from agency to agency and from one

intelligence discipline to another, but they have sampled a wide variety of educational

channels to get to their destination.  The destination is less fixed than in the past, and

organizational loyalties are deemed less solid.  This physical and psychological mobility

is probably a contributing factor also to the mobility of seeking disparate educational

opportunities, which likely explains why some of the largest programs reflected in

Appendix C are those accessible online.  The online institutions such as AMU, Capella,

Henley-Putnam, and UMUC are able to attract students who cannot afford the time or

money to study full-time in residence, and their instructors likewise can teach from afar while engaged in other professional pursuits. Part-time intelligence education seems to be the wave of the future, even if a review of the course offerings would suggest that some of them look more like technical training than they do broad-based education.

Third, despite the commonly held view that analysis is, or should be, the core of an intelligence studies curriculum, it is clear that a large number of young intelligence professionals see the path to the top as not being restricted to that channel. A surprising number of them are presently involved in activities other than analysis. They evidently need, and want, courses other than those that teach critical thinking, which most already claim they have mastered, and prepare them only to be competent analysts. They desire to branch out and diversify, and the most germane programs under development now and in the future will endeavor to keep up with that type of demand.

*Answering the Principal Research Question Based on Established Criteria*

The foregoing analysis permits answering the principal research question in the affirmative, with some conditionality. The intelligence studies programs are indeed augmenting the liberal arts programs in producing young intelligence professionals. To measure to what extent this is true, the criteria set forth in Chapter 3 must be revisited.

The first criterion required a plurality of the young questionnaire respondents to agree that future students should take intelligence-related courses. This requirement was satisfied in that over eighty percent of the respondents applauded the idea of taking intelligence courses, and most stated that, given the chance to do so again and knowing now what they did not know then about job requirements, they would have taken more intelligence courses if offered by their schools. There was a decided preference, though,

to take the more specialized and sophisticated courses at the graduate level rather than the undergraduate, as they would be more useful to them at that point in their careers.

The second criterion required a majority of senior experts to find that intelligence studies programs do provide additional value for personnel entering the profession. This too was satisfied in that four of the six interviewees were optimistic about the future of such programs, though for different reasons and with different levels of optimism about the direction the programs are headed. The seniors, like the juniors, tended to value the programs most at the graduate level, though most of them felt an institution offering a graduate program in intelligence studies needs to have some sort of undergraduate pipeline feeding into it. That channel could easily be through a more general liberal arts curriculum.

The third criterion required a majority of existing intelligence and intelligence-related courses to provide suitable coverage of a majority of the ODNI competency standards at the sub-major category level. This criterion is a bit more difficult to evaluate. At Appendix C one can peruse whether each course listed addresses the ODNI core competencies at the major category level. As mentioned by the researcher, the placing of the "X" on the line for a particular course addressing a particular competency is an exercise involving a great deal of discretion and judgment. Not enough details about most of the courses are known to be able to do this at the major category level, much less the sub-major level. Still, if one grants that the researcher's experiential level is sufficient for his "educated" guesses to be accepted, then a bare majority of the courses do qualify, and it can be concluded that the courses do provide suitable coverage. Of

course, how one defines "suitable" is a judgment call in itself, just as how one ascertains the quality of the courses will vary greatly.

Regrettably, only a very small number of graduates of full-fledged intelligence studies programs could be interviewed, and until the growing population of individuals with those qualifications is available to researchers, the outcome of the natural experiment they are engaged in, with respect to the research question, cannot be judged with unequivocal conviction. The need also exists to find and gather data from young intelligence professionals who have actually taken some of the courses listed here, and that exercise will require a great deal of digging and "crosswalking" by some future researcher. However, the analysis to date has aided in filling in the holes of the "map" and setting the stage for the next step in research concerning intelligence education.

## Summary

This chapter presented, analyzed, and synthesized the data to be converted into conclusions and recommendations in Chapter 5. The principal sources of information on intelligence education were the informal questionnaire administered to young intelligence professionals; a listing of representative colleges and universities and their intelligence and intelligence-related courses, compared against the core competencies required for intelligence professionals as compiled by ODNI; and interviews with a half dozen subject matter experts having vast experience in educating present and future members of the IC.

The study at hand will be of greatest use in providing the requisite background information on how intelligence education arrived at the point of maturation it holds today and in mapping the academic terrain as it currently exists. Introducing core competencies desired of new employees of the IC's member agencies, most of which

were represented among the questionnaire respondents, sets the stage for more detailed and comprehensive assessment to come regarding just how well U.S. colleges and universities are preparing the nation's intelligence leaders of tomorrow.

**Chapter 5**

**CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY,
PRACTICE, RESEARCH, AND EDUCATIONAL PROCESS**

I look to the diffusion of light and education as the resource most to be relied
on for ameliorating the condition, promoting the virtue and advancing the
happiness of man.

> -- Thomas Jefferson, third President
> of the United States, second Vice
> President, and first Secretary of
> State, 1822

The field of knowledge is the common property of all mankind.

> --Thomas Jefferson, 1807

## Purpose and Significance of the Study

Intelligence analysis requires critical thinkers—intelligent, perceptive, well-

educated men and women—who can dissect an issue and bring information to bear from

a variety of points of view to inform the decision-maker and assist him or her come to a

workable solution to the problem. As IAFIE's Teacher of the Year for 2009, James

Holden-Rhodes of the U.S. Air Force Research Lab, and formerly of New Mexico State

University, observed during a presentation at the organization's annual conference in

Adelphi, MD, "Intelligence studies is the art of critical thinking," and "the nucleus of

intelligence studies is critical and analytical thinking." (Holden-Rhodes, J., researcher's

notes, May 27, 2009) In addition to competent, objective analysts, the Intelligence

Community (IC) requires other bright professionals who can adroitly execute the

associated processes of the intelligence cycle—the establishment of requirements and

provision of guidance (i.e., management), collection of information, processing of data,

production of finished intelligence, and feedback so that the functioning of the cycle can be continually fine-tuned and refreshed.  A representative grouping of just that sort of individual was tapped for input to this study.

The overall purpose of the study was to map the terrain of intelligence education being carried out in civilian colleges and universities of the United States to determine whether the rapidly increasing number of specialized intelligence studies programs is appropriately augmenting the existing variety of liberal arts programs in educating young intelligence professionals for service in national-level government.  Based on the results, the researcher's intention was to transmit the study to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), or some other relevant entity, to act upon this research and to take it to the next level in producing the type of data that will assist Intelligence Community (IC) agencies in hiring the best personnel adequately prepared to serve in a difficult profession, and at the same time assist the higher education community in developing appropriate intelligence education programs to achieve that goal.

## Summary of Findings

A total of 77 young intelligence professionals from 14 of the 16 government agencies making up the IC were administered a brief questionnaire about their educational experiences.  The questionnaire is found at Appendix A.  The core competencies that would ideally be addressed by their studies are outlined in Appendix B.  Six considerably more mature and seasoned subject matter experts, who are at the same time quite familiar with the field of intelligence education, were interviewed, and assessments of those interview results are provided in Chapter 4.  A notional written survey instrument that goes into more detail than the questionnaire—and is

institutionally-focused rather than individually-focused—can be found at Appendix D, and a list of the largest public and private universities by state and territory, to which the survey might initially be sent, is at Appendix E. A detailed listing of the core competencies for intelligence professionals developed by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), as set forth in Intelligence Community Directive 610 and which are addressed both in the survey and the questionnaire, is at Appendix F. Finally, a comprehensive database of representative academic institutions, their currently offered intelligence and intelligence-related courses, and a preliminary crosswalk with the ODNI core competencies can be found at Appendix C. In that database are 100 colleges and universities, broken down regionally across the United States, and 845 courses. This astonishing number of schools and courses, in light of the commentary obtained through the questionnaires, and even more so through the senior interviews, suggests that intelligence education is a rapidly growing phenomenon in this country.

Whether this burgeoning growth is merely a passing fancy, a "flash in the pan" prompted by the tragedy of 9/11, and what its ramifications are for higher education in general will be discussed in this final chapter. The principal research question and key questions were addressed at the end of Chapter 4. They will be reexamined in Chapter 5 in light of the implications of those answers for theory, practice, research, and the educational process, as introduced in Chapter 1. Recommendations for further research will be offered because intelligence education is a broad subject with many dimensions, and all of them could not be covered in this single study. Other enticing lines of inquiry were detected, but they had to be set aside for now as being outside the scope of the study.

## Interpretation of Findings

This study set forth as the overarching research question the following:  *Are the burgeoning numbers of intelligence education programs appropriately augmenting the existing variety of liberal arts programs in U.S. civilian colleges and universities in educating potential national-level government intelligence professionals?*  In light of how the key subsidiary questions were answered at the end of Chapter 4, and based on the criteria established for evaluating the principal research question, it is clear that the intelligence education programs are appropriately augmenting the liberal arts programs.

Nevertheless, more research is needed, especially through closer collaboration with those institutions teaching intelligence studies.  This researcher would strongly suggest early administration of the written survey instrument found at Appendix D, supplemented with the accumulation of as many course syllabi and direct interviews with course instructors as possible.  He has found that intelligence studies programs are in fact producing professionals who do make a difference in providing essential skills or knowledge to the IC, though perhaps not to the degree claimed by some of their promoters.

## Critique of the Study

The research done so far on this topic and embodied in this study has brought us to an actionable level of understanding the intelligence education environment, its limitations, and possibilities.  We now have an understanding of what is being taught, by whom, where, and for what reasons.  We have a sense of the magnitude of the phenomenon of intelligence studies and what the student/user audience is demanding.

Most of the information previously available on this subject was purely anecdotal in nature, and had not been collected in a systematic manner. This study uses a systematic, grounded theory approach in the best tradition of qualitative research.

The title of this study refers to national security intelligence education, and the majority of findings and conclusions have not made a distinction between that subset of education and, on the other hand, law enforcement intelligence education and competitive intelligence education. Although the bulk of the researcher's practical experience falls within the national security arena, it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate these closely related fields of intelligence, just as increasingly the various intelligence disciplines ("INT"s) have fused together. Sometimes the topics get artificially separated by the placement of courses in various curricula. For example, a course on intelligence analysis embedded in a criminal justice program would likely be different from one which is part of an international relations program or an informatics track. Basic analytical skills are transferable, but sometimes the techniques and specific processes are not. In short, this and any future research in the efficacy of intelligence education needs to declare the limitations of transferring findings from one sector to another in this broad field of inquiry.

We have now heard from the practitioners themselves, both the young ones just starting out in the business and the seasoned veterans who have the benefit of a longer perspective over time and over various periods of our nation's history when intelligence was greatly appreciated, severely castigated or, probably the worst of all attitudes, simply ignored. To project what more is needed to complete the overall picture, several recommendations for further research will be offered later in this chapter.

## Implications of the Study

Some of the catalysts for the ongoing intelligence reform process were mentioned briefly in Chapter 1. To reiterate, the high-level commissions convened to investigate the role of intelligence in the 9/11 tragedy and in the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction debacle prompted such legislation as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which mandated the creation of the ODNI and its oversight of the entire national Intelligence Community. The Act also had a provision calling for establishment of a National Intelligence University System, where a conceptual frame could be taught to both analysts (the "thinkers") and operators (the "doers"), both of whom can take what they learn and move to the top rungs of the leadership and management ladder within the Community.

### *Implications for Civilian Higher Education*

From the point of view of the educational administrator, and as detailed in Chapter 2 of the present study, many relevant educational issues already have been mulled over by a variety of officials trying to ascertain how new educational approaches might produce a greater number of the sorts of critical thinkers needed to avoid massive intelligence failures in the future. The ODNI's Integrated Competency Directory (a portion of which was released and is found at Appendix F) is just one tool developed to specify what the IC is looking for in its future employees, who hopefully will not fall into the same analytical traps and groupthink that plagued their predecessor generation.

The ODNI integrated competency standards, as a distillation of the ODNI's thinking about the cognitive skills needed by the IC workforce, comprise a model for higher education administrators to operationalize the design and evaluation of

intelligence education curricula which purport to develop these competencies. Such a model not only expresses the abstract ideas found in the standards; it also represents what we know about the relationship among variables in the learning process. Considering the complex relationships inherent in intelligence education, the model would assist higher education administrators in determining if the most effective approaches were being utilized.

Notwithstanding the importance of theoretical model building, as virtually all the senior interviewees insisted, what intelligence studies programs need is a combination of scholars and practitioners, or scholar-practitioners. Therefore, care should be given to factor in professional or "real world" experience in order to develop the individual fully. It is difficult to split out theory from practice in intelligence. As Edwin Meese, former Attorney General during the Reagan administration (and an Army Reserve intelligence officer in his early years), observed during a luncheon address at the recent IAFIE annual conference, "What is needed is a professional approach that is grounded in theory and common-sense procedures to put it into effective practice." (Meese, E., author's notes, May 27, 2009).

Most of Meese's talk focused on the law enforcement realm as might be expected of a lifelong lawyer, White House Counsel, and the nation's top law enforcement officer, and provided excellent examples of so-called "intelligence-led policing." Nevertheless, he assured the attendees, a blend of scholars and practitioners which the IAFIE membership roster reflects, that his guidance was just as applicable to the intelligence profession in general.

***Implications for Improving the Relationship between Civilian Universities and the Intelligence Community***

There has long existed suspicion and distrust between academics and government practitioners and this fact has tended to inhibit close collaboration between the intelligence and higher education communities, at least over the last three decades since the tumultuous Vietnam and Watergate episodes. Bruce Watson and Peter Dunn have described this situation as an "ambivalent relationship." In the fast-paced, politically charged, high-tech world of the 21$^{st}$ century, there is no room for ambivalence or fogginess when it comes to analysis and production of intelligence to support high-level decision-making.

As intelligence courses continue to blossom in U.S. colleges and universities, they should gradually gain more recognition, legitimacy, and credibility within academia, and especially among those professors and administrators who might feel threatened by this emerging discipline encroaching on their turf. An implication of the greater respect for intelligence studies is that both faculty and students will have an extended opportunity to elevate their interaction with potential employers, including the federal government. In turn, there is an opportunity to restore the kind of close and productive relationship between academia and the IC that existed in the period just after World War II.

***Implications for Applied Academic Research and Teaching***

It is clear from the results of this study that there is a lot of intelligence-related research going on in the civilian higher education community. It is no secret that a number of top-tier research universities are heavily involved in national security research under contract with the federal government. In the past, these activities have not been very open and transparent, just as research being done by one government agency was

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usually not known by another with similar interests.  There was too much "stovepiping"

and protection of one's own turf.  Since 2005, ODNI has worked hard to open up the IC

to collaboration and cooperation, both in conducting research and practical application of

that research to intelligence operations.  ODNI has tried to facilitate closer links among

its member intelligence agencies and has pushed the idea that the old mindset or

watchword of "need to know" must be changed to "need to share" or "responsibility to

provide."  Similarly, this trend toward greater collaboration, as opposed to competition,

can be translated to the non-governmental arena through education and outreach.

The National Defense Intelligence College is just one institution that has this sort

of outreach as part of its mission statement.  Its Center for Strategic Intelligence Research

and the NDIC Press openly publish much of the College's research online at

http://www.ndic.edu/press/press.htm, which is just one aspect of its attempt to network

more broadly not only with the governmental research community but also with the non-

governmental one.  Through such venues as being an institutional member of the

International Association for Intelligence Education, and encouraging its individual

faculty members to participate actively in such organizations as the International

Intelligence Ethics Association, the National Military Intelligence Association, the

Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association, and the Intelligence Studies

Section of the International Studies Association, NDIC is sending the signal that it wants

to work closely with counterpart research organs and not hide behind a wall of secrecy,

proprietary information, and classified course curricula.  It already is reaching out within

the interagency arena for students, research fellows, and faculty; it is now poised to do

the same within society at large, especially through the medium of civilian institutions of

higher education.  Many NDIC Press publications in paper form are now sitting on the

shelves of civilian professors at colleges and universities around the country, and at no

cost to them.  Some are being used in teaching intelligence courses.

The ODNI core competencies explored in the present study will be key in

aligning what is taught in university intelligence studies curricula with the needs of the

agencies hiring the graduates who become the intelligence professionals of tomorrow.

Human capital evaluation tools, such as individual performance appraisals, are being

redesigned by ODNI for the entire IC to make them competency-based and geared to

performance, not just to job title, rank, or tenure.  The implication for civilian university

educators is that the ODNI competency standards can be translated into educational goals

in a variety of curricular areas associated with the liberal arts and sciences.

## Recommendations for Further Research

As explained earlier, the present study is a "mapping" exercise; it assesses the

intelligence education terrain and fills in gaps about current programs and knowledge in

the field.  It goes further than any previous effort to explain what is transpiring in this

immensely popular field and why.  More research needs to be done, however, before one

can assert with confidence that graduates of intelligence education programs in civilian

colleges and universities of the United States provide a variety of essential skills or

knowledge when employed by the national-level Intelligence Community.  Evidence

presented here suggests that they do make a difference in one area:  those who take

intelligence studies courses or an entire curriculum bring unique skills to the business of

intelligence that most of their colleagues do not possess, especially in the sub-field of

analysis.  Yet, at this stage of curricular development, not a significant enough number of

IC professionals has graduated from an intelligence studies program, or even been exposed to one, to reach a definitive conclusion. Many very successful IC professionals obtained their formative education through more traditional liberal arts, humanities, or engineering/science programs. Many of these individuals are aware of the intelligence-specific programs and value them. Nevertheless, they tend to be most comfortable with what they are most familiar with, and that is the traditional path(s) to government service.

This researcher recommends that ongoing research begin with the proposed survey (Appendix D), which should be administered promptly to at least 100 of the largest public and private institutions in the United States, in an effort to ascertain what intelligence educational efforts are ongoing or in the planning stages that are unknown to the researcher. A well-resourced and well-known entity such as ODNI would be ideal to promote the survey. Not only could the instrument be transmitted with the authoritative voice of the federal government, thus likely triggering a much more solid return rate than if sent out by a single private citizen, but it would also be in the purview of the same high-level organization that oversees the hiring of employees for all 16 IC agencies through its network of Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCOs). ODNI also controls the purse strings for the growing IC Centers of Academic Excellence program.

The distinct benefit to administering the survey this way, of course, would be that the researcher would be speaking on behalf of the U.S. government and not as a private citizen and would have access to the resources that would ensure robust and repeated follow-up to the initial solicitation for information. In fact, the entire study could be replicated every few years when the receptor audience is deemed to have changed sufficiently to warrant sending out the survey to another set of schools, administering the

brief questionnaire to another set of young intelligence professionals from agencies that were perhaps missed in the past, and/or interviewing another set of senior subject matter experts who have risen to the top of the intelligence teaching profession.

If, on the other hand, ODNI is unable or unwilling to continue this line of research, another competent entity that could fill its shoes is the National Defense Intelligence College. NDIC is considered the hallmark institution of the National Intelligence University System, and it has been educating national security intelligence professionals for nearly a half century. Yet another alternative for consideration in continuing this study's research might be one of the IC Centers of Academic Excellence. As these ten institutions continue to mature their intelligence studies programs, and as the number of schools in the program likely grows, perhaps ODNI could tap one of these centers, with assistance from the IC CAE program office that oversees them, to become essentially a laboratory/pilot program for such intelligence education research.

Appendix C reveals a large number of courses that apparently do not address very many of the ODNI core competencies discussed previously in this study. One reason may be that the curriculum developers had no idea what sorts of competencies the IC is looking for. Another may be that courses with intriguing-sounding names draw a large number of subscribers, which in turn is lucrative for the university offering the courses. To assist those who may need some guidance in designing a course that meets the ODNI competency criteria, the researcher has outlined a notional graduate-level introductory course on intelligence that is reflected in Table 9 below, followed by a legend specifying the core competencies (major categories only) addressed by each of the lessons over a typical 14-week academic term.

| | Table 9: NOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE STUDIES INTRODUCTORY COURSE (Graduate-Level) | |
|---|---|---|
| WEEK | LESSON TITLE | COMPETENCY(IES) ADDRESSED |
| 1 | Overview of National Security Intelligence: The Key Players and Agencies of the IC | 1 2 3 |
| 2 | Law Enforcement and Homeland Security: The Post-9/11 Panorama in a Globalized World | 1 2 4 |
| 3 | Information Sharing and Collaboration in the Interagency Environment (with field trip to one of the IC agencies) | 1 4 5 |
| 4 | A Primer on the Collection Disciplines and the Intelligence Cycle | 2 4 5 |
| 5 | Structured Analytical Techniques and How They Fit into Overall Intelligence Research Methods | 2 5 |
| 6 | Intelligence Estimates and Assessments (with practical exercise requiring working group oral presentations and individual written product) | 2 4 5 6 |
| 7 | Intelligence for Decision-Makers and the Policymaking Process (with short briefings to role-playing decision-makers) | 1 3 4 6 |
| 8 | Control and Oversight of Intelligence: Effectiveness through Accountability | 3 4 |
| 9 | International Engagement: Intelligence Sharing and Operational Cooperation in a World of Diverse National Cultures | 1 5 6 |
| 10 | Use of Case Studies and Simulations in Intelligence Studies (with practical exercise requiring group oral presentations) | 2 5 6 |
| 11 | Ethics of Intelligence | 3 4 |
| 12 | Management of the Intelligence Enterprise: The Role of Competitive Intelligence and the "Intelligence-Industrial Complex" | 1 3 5 |
| 13 | Capstone Exercise: Intelligence for Crisis Resolution (either notional international incident or domestic disaster; use of role-playing) | 1 2 3 4 5 6 |
| 14 | Leadership in the IC and the Psychology of Organizational Cultures | 1 3 4 5 |

*Legend (ODNI Core Competencies)*:  1 – Engagement and Collaboration

2 – Critical Thinking

3 – Personal Leadership and Integrity

4 – Accountability for Results

5 – Technical Expertise

6 – Communication

Recent developments point to the fact that ODNI under its new leadership is exploring creative avenues of educating intelligence officers.  In a front-page story in *The Washington Post*, there was an eye-catching article with the dubious title, "Obama Administration Looks to Colleges for Future Spies."  Reportedly, the administration is proposing the creation of an intelligence officer training program in colleges and universities that could function much like the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) program run by the military services.  The idea is to create a stream "of first- and second-generation Americans, who already have critical language and cultural knowledge, and prepare them for careers in the intelligence agencies," according to a description sent to Congress by DNI Blair.  "The proposed program is an effort to cultivate and educate a new generation of career intelligence officers from ethnically and culturally diverse backgrounds." (Pincus, W., June 20, 2009, p. A1)  If this initiative makes it through Congress unscathed, it would be a positive outgrowth of the concerns loudly voiced since 9/11 about the lack of cultural and linguistic awareness within the IC, in spite of the media's unfortunate fascination with using the word "spies" to label any individuals involved in intelligence.

To continue with the theme just discussed, this study has pointedly concentrated on intelligence education programs in the United States. Another lucrative avenue for further research would be to expand the net to include international programs administered overseas. The author is aware of growing efforts in intelligence education by such partner nations as Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Australia, South Africa, Israel, Brazil, Chile, and Sweden. The list grows daily, as does the interaction/exchange of information among intelligence educators through such channels as the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE, whose annual conference in 2010 will be held in Ottawa, Canada, stressing the "International" part of its name) and the International Intelligence Ethics Association (IIEA), not to mention publications such as *Intelligence and National Security* and the *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*. It is obvious that "international" is the way to go, as no one nation fights its wars alone anymore or relies on information from only one national source. Sharing of best practices would be facilitated through the creation of a database that includes not just U.S. programs but also those overseas.

The present study also restricted its canvassing to civilian programs within the U.S. only. However, the researcher caveated this approach by explaining that many of the civilian programs were jump-started by governmental institutions or former practitioners who worked for years in the government sector. It would be enlightening for some enterprising researcher to do an assessment of the many extant governmental programs, probably in close coordination with the office of the Chancellor of the National Intelligence University System, which holds that charter. As the flagship academic institution of the NIU, and charged with expanded outreach to civilian academic

institutions, the National Defense Intelligence College definitely could play a critical role too. The NIU oversees both IC education and training, while NDIC is essentially in the education business only, but there appears to be no reason why NDIC research could not be extended also to the intelligence training milieu. For the current study, however, training was beyond the manageable scope of the researcher's focus. Related to an extended net cast far and wide, yet another way to expand the breadth of the research would be to explore the possibilities of outsourcing some aspects of intelligence education and training to an element of the so-called "intelligence-industrial complex."

Another fertile path which has been addressed in part is the phenomenal growth of education and training programs related to the field of homeland security. As mentioned previously, it is impossible to separate intelligence and homeland security completely, and no prudent policymaker or college administrator would want to do so. Notwithstanding the synergy between the two fields, there has been somewhat of a bifurcation in developing programs to prepare professionals in these closely related occupational areas. Top-tier research universities have tended to focus on students wanting to work in intelligence at the federal level, while smaller, more regionally-focused colleges have filled the void in preparing students for homeland security work at the state, local, and tribal levels. In particular, community colleges have moved into the homeland security and emergency management realm in a huge way. (Straziuso, 2004) According to one recent appraisal, since the 9/11 attacks, "about 320 colleges and universities have begun awarding graduate or postgraduate certificates or degrees in emergency management, bio-defense and other security-related fields. Federal grants and

a steady growth in jobs have driven the surge." (Drogin, B., *The Los Angeles Times*, June 10, 2009, p. 1)

In addition, the proliferation of state-level fusion centers has been aided by the education of homeland security personnel and first responders in community and junior colleges throughout the land.  The trend has spread even to the high school level, as some secondary schools located near federal agencies, such as Meade High School at Fort Meade, MD, are successfully introducing homeland security programs and using them as a way to stimulate interest in learning and to prepare students for lucrative jobs in their own local neighborhoods. (Drogin, p. 1)  It should be reiterated that the aforementioned IC CAE program under ODNI also has a mandatory outreach to high schools component, utilizing such attractions as the summer "spy camps" organized by Trinity University in Washington, DC.  There is plenty of room for further research into what is transpiring at the community college level and below in the U.S., perhaps by some researcher who has studied at that level or has real-world experience working with homeland security entities at the sub-federal level.

Growing just as fast, or perhaps faster, are online programs in intelligence education targeting primarily adult learners who are already employed in the IC, many of them at remote locations where they cannot take advantage of residence-only programs. The present study has included some of the more well-known of these online institutions and course offerings in Appendix C, such as American Military University, University of Maryland University College, Henley-Putnam University, and Capella University. However, that world is much larger than what the present researcher can embrace in a single study, and it is growing at a phenomenal pace.  One needs only to peruse the

course listings at Appendix C to determine how many of these courses are being offered online. It is highly recommended that a future research study approach intelligence education in the U.S., or overseas, from a distance learning perspective.

Much more depth can also be achieved in the effort to explore how well core competencies are being addressed in intelligence education programs. Once ODNI's Integrated Competency Directory has a chance to mature and be promulgated widely to colleges and universities hosting intelligence education programs, it would be very useful for some researcher to explore the competencies more deeply and discover exactly how they are accommodated in the modern classroom. As asserted previously, this will require obtaining detailed course syllabi and interviewing a larger number of instructors on how they are reaching their students.

The intelligence education field is ripe for the application of professional educational assessment or series of assessments. The written survey recommended here could be a useful aid for getting started, with the future researcher taking into consideration the need for accreditation of intelligence studies programs or at least certification of them. Perhaps an enterprising researcher with expertise in doing such comprehensive assessments (e.g., someone with experience as a director of institutional research) can start from where the present researcher has left off.

## Conclusion

This study has addressed only one facet of a serious problem in the United States: how to engage the civilian higher education community in a common effort with government agencies to ensure greater success in carrying out the national security intelligence function. Grounded theory method allowed the researcher to take advantage

of his own institutional knowledge of higher education and of the national intelligence community, as well as of the experiences of recent university graduates and senior experts who reflected on their own educational preparation for an intelligence career.

Data from individuals who belong to three source groups, all of which bear a strong association with civilian courses and programs in intelligence studies, contributed to answering the primary research question affirmatively. In addition to being a snapshot of the current efficacy of intelligence education in the universities, the work bears theoretical importance in illustrating and calibrating the qualitative relationships among these three groups, which can also be viewed as interest groups or "variables" with respect to the problem of educating personnel for worthy intelligence careers.

This study, which merely provides a "roadmap" for the more efficacious integration of students, educators, and national security needs, can be used for more official and fruitful future assessments and enhancements of intelligence education that can lead us more directly, quickly, and safely to a resolution of a continuing problem.

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## QUESTIONNAIRE FOR YOUNG INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS

Name: _____
(will not be mentioned in study; data used will be discussed in the aggregate only)

Agency: _____
(will be mentioned in terms of number of respondents only)

Date: _____

1.  I have been an intelligence analyst (or _____,
if your job title is something other than analyst) since _____ (year).

2.  This is my first such intelligence job or, if not, I previously worked at _____
_____
_____(name of government agency or private company).

3.  Do you work in, or desire to work in, a single discipline or "INT," or is a more broad-based professional outlook preferable? _____ If a single "INT" is your focus,
which is it? _____

4.  My undergraduate degree was in the field of _____
and was awarded by this college or university _____ (name).

My graduate degree, if I have one, was in the field of _____
and was awarded by this college or university _____ (name).

Additional degrees were earned in the field(s) of _____
from this college or university _____ (name).

5.  While in college, were you aware of any intelligence studies courses taught by your
school? _____ If so, what were they? _____
_____
Did you take them? _____
Would you recommend offering some other type of intelligence or intelligence-related
course than those offered? _____ If so, what? _____
_____

6. Did you consider yourself educationally well prepared when you began your
intelligence job? _____
Why or why not? _____
What sort of courses might you have taken that would have prepared you better? _____
_____

7.  Do you feel education for intelligence professionals should be centered on a rigorous intelligence studies curriculum, or is a more traditional path preferable, such as one with a liberal arts or an engineering focus?  Why or why not? _____
_____
_____
_____

8.  Do you speak a foreign language at least at a conversational level?  If so, which language(s)? _____

9.  The single most significant person or thing that motivated me to want to become an intelligence analyst/officer was _____.

10.  I consider _____ to be my most important role model or mentor as an intelligence professional.  If you have never had a role model related to intelligence or national security, check this block _____.

11.  Please peruse the ODNI core competencies list attached and indicate those areas in which you feel you were well prepared by your formal education and those in which you were not (focus just on your formal education, not on any agency-specific or job-related training courses you might have taken since then):

Prepared:  _____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

Not prepared: _____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

12.  I will probably continue to work in the intelligence field for the next _____ years.

13.  If I leave intelligence to pursue another career, it is likely to be _____.

**Thank you for your time and interest!  You are welcome to write in any additional comments you might have in the remaining space below.**

APPENDIX B

## **CORE COMPETENCIES FOR NON-SUPERVISORY IC EMPLOYEES AT GS-15 AND BELOW**

(excerpted from Intelligence Community Directive 610, Appendix B;
for full-blown definitions by ODNI of all the terms below,
if needed, see Mr. Spracher)


[1] Engagement and Collaboration (major category)
       Building Professional/Technical Networks (sub-category)
       Influencing/Negotiating
       Interpersonal Skills
       Information Sharing

[2] Critical Thinking
       Creative Thinking
       Exploring Alternatives
       Enterprise Perspective
       Situational Awareness
       Synthesis

[3] Personal Leadership and Integrity
       Courage and Conviction
       Dedicated Service
       Innovation
       Integrity/Honesty
       Resilience
       Respect for Diversity

[4] Accountability for Results
       Adaptability
       Continual Learning
       Initiative
       Resource Management
       Rigor

[5] Technical Expertise
       Professional Tradecraft
       Subject Matter Expertise

[6] Communication
       Multimedia Communication
       Oral Communication
       Written Communication

## APPENDIX C

## REPRESENTATIVE ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS, THEIR INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE-RELATED COURSES, AND CROSSWALK WITH CORE COMPETENCIES

**NOTE:** Columns 1-6 reflect the core competencies (major categories) listed in Appendix B.

| INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE-RELATED COURSES | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area* | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| American University (DC) | | | | | | |
| U.S. Intelligence Community | X | | | | X | |
| Terrorism and the Media | | | | | X | X |
| Strategic Communications, Intelligence, and National Security | X | | | | X | X |
| Intelligence and National Security | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| George Washington University (DC & VA) | | | | | | |
| Fundamentals of Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Counterintelligence | X | | | | X | |
| History of Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Covert Action | | | | | X | |
| Democracy and Intelligence | | | X | X | | |
| International Law and Transnational Threats | | | | | X | X |
| Transnational Security Issues | | | | | X | |
| Intelligence and National Security | | | | | X | |
| Intelligence and Strategic Analysis | X | X | | | | X |
| Evolution of Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Counterintelligence and Security:  Theory and Practice | | X | | | X | |
| Homeland Security:  The National Challenge | X | | | | X | |
| Crisis and Emergency Management | X | | | | X | |
| Information Technology in Crisis and Emergency Management | X | | | | X | X |
| Mgmt of Risk & Vulnerability for Natural/Technological Hazards & Terrorist Threats | X | X | | | X | |
| Health and Medical Issues in Emergency Management | X | | | | X | |
| Terrorism Preparedness | X | | | | X | |
| Disaster Recovery and Organizational Continuity | X | | X | X | X | |
| Hazard Mitigation in Disaster Management | X | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Georgetown University (DC) | | | | | | |
| Theory and Practice of Intelligence | | | | | X | X |
| Intelligence and the Policymaker | X | | X | X | | |
| Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Comparative Intelligence Policies | | | | X | X | |
| Technology and Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Covert/Clandestine Intelligence Operations | | | | X | X | |
| Intelligence and the Military | X | | | | X | |
| Human Intelligence Operations | | | | | X | |
| Key Problems in Intelligence Policy | X | | X | X | | X |
| Intelligence in Democracy | | | X | X | | |
| How Washington Works | X | | | X | X | X |

| Course | C1 | C2 | C3 | C4 | C5 | C6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Covert Action and Counterintelligence:  Instruments of Statecraft | | | X | X | X | X |
| **George Mason University (VA)** | | | | | | |
| National Security Law Seminar | | | | | X | X |
| Technology, Terrorism, and National Security Law | | | | | X | X |
| Human Terrain Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Introduction to Spatial Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Defense and Intelligence Applications of GIS | | | | | X | |
| Integration of Remote Sensing and GIS | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| **University of Maryland, College Park (MD)** | | | | | | |
| Intelligence and Policy:  Executive, Congressional, and Public Dimensions | X | | X | X | | X |
| Intelligence, Politics, and Policy | X | | X | X | | |
| Intelligence Policy and Organization | X | | X | X | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| **University of Maryland University College (MD)** | | | | | | |
| History of Intelligence and the U.S. National Intelligence Community | X | | | | X | |
| The Intelligence Cycle | | X | | | X | |
| Criminal Investigations | | X | | | X | |
| Legal and Ethical Issues in Intelligence | | | X | X | | X |
| Computer-Based Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Advanced Computer-Based Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| **Johns Hopkins University (MD & DC)** | | | | | | |
| Analytical Writing | | X | | | X | X |
| Special Issues in Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Case Studies in Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | X | X |
| Information and Telecommunication Systems | | | | | X | X |
| Terrorism:  Concepts, Threats, and Delivery | | | | | X | |
| Art, Creativity, and the Practice of Intelligence | | X | | | X | |
| Analysis, Data Mining, and Discovery Informatics | | X | | | X | |
| Strategic Thinking:  Concept, Policy, Plan, and Practice | | X | | | X | |
| Art and Practice of Intelligence (SAIS) | X | | | | X | |
| Current Asian Security Studies (SAIS) | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| **Trinity University (DC)** | | | | | | |
| Global Competitive Intelligence | | | | X | X | |
| Security in Global Context | | | | | X | |
| "Soft Power" and International Security | X | | | | X | |
| Jihadist Global Strategies | | X | | | X | |
| Democratization and U.S. National Security | | | X | X | | |
| Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare | | | | | X | |
| Contemporary Counter Terrorism | X | | | | X | |
| The Global War on Terrorism | X | | | | X | |
| Strategic Intelligence and U.S. Security:  Policy, Capabilities, Ethics, and the Law | | | X | X | X | X |
| Intelligence Assessment in Historical Perspective | | X | | | X | |
| Intelligence and International Terrorism | | | | | X | |
| Written and Oral Briefings | | | | | | X |
| | | | | | | |
| **Patrick Henry College (VA)** | | | | | | |
| Intelligence Research and Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| History of American Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and Civil Liberties | | | X | X | | |
| Counterintelligence | X | | | | X | |

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Counterterrorism | X | | | | X | |
| Internship in Strategic Intelligence | X | | X | | X | |
| Special Projects in Strategic Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Intelligence Community Seminars | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| <u>Institute of World Politics</u> (DC) | | | | | | |
| Introduction to Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Intelligence and Policy | X | | X | X | | |
| International Relations, Statecraft, and Integrated Strategy | X | X | | | X | |
| Economic Statecraft and Conflict | X | X | | | X | |
| Foreign Propaganda, Perceptions, and Policy | | | | | X | X |
| Integrated Security Strategy:  Principles and Process | X | X | | | X | |
| Peace, Strategy, and Conflict Resolution | X | | | | X | |
| Public Diplomacy and Political Warfare | | | | | X | X |
| Immigration and National Security | | | | | X | |
| Terrorism and Counterterrorism | X | | | | X | |
| Counterintelligence in a Democratic Society | X | | | X | | |
| American Counterintelligence and Security for the 21st Century:  An Advanced Seminar | X | | | X | | X |
| Case Studies in Counterintelligence Operations | | | | | X | X |
| History of FBI Counterintelligence | | | | | X | |
| Spies, Subversion, Terrorism, and Influence Operations | | | | | X | X |
| Information Operations and Information Warfare | | | | | X | X |
| Problems of Promoting Regime Change and Democracy | | | | X | X | |
| Military Intelligence and Modern Warfare | | | | | X | |
| Political Warfare:  Past, Present, and Future | | | | | X | |
| Technology, Intelligence, Security, and Statecraft | X | | | | X | |
| U.S. Intelligence Since 1945 | | | | | X | |
| Genocide and Genocide Prevention | | | X | X | X | |
| Nationalism and Islamism | | | | | X | |
| Cultural Implications for Strategy and Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Ideas and Values in International Politics | | | X | X | | |
| Nation-Building Lessons Learned:  Stable Civil Society or Corruption and Extremism | | | X | X | X | |
| History of Political Warfare | | | | | X | |
| Comparative Intelligence Systems:  Foreign Intelligence and Security Cultures | | | | | X | |
| Homeland Security and Intelligence | X | | | | X | |
| Advanced Seminar in American Intelligence and Protective Security | X | | | | X | |
| Intelligence Warning and Forecasting | | X | | | X | |
| Politics, Culture, and Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Strategic Weapons Proliferation:  History, Technology, and Policy | | | | | X | |
| Chinese Grand Strategy:  Foreign and Military Policy | | | | | X | |
| Russian Politics and Diplomacy | | | | | X | |
| Western Moral Tradition and Foreign Policy | | | X | X | X | |
| Intelligence Collection | | | | | X | |
| Estimative Intelligence Analysis and Epistemology | | X | | | X | |
| Geography and Strategy | | | | | X | |
| Advanced Writing and Research Seminar | | | | | | X |
| | | | | | | |
| ***Mid-Atlantic Region*** | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| <u>James Madison University</u> (VA) | | | | | | |
| Introduction to National Security Intelligence | X | | | | X | |
| Data Mining, Modeling, and Knowledge Discovery | | X | | | X | |

| Course | | | | | |
|---|:-:|:-:|:-:|:-:|:-:|
| Cognitive Science and Information Analysis | X | | | X | |
| Ethics, Law, and Information Analysis | X | X | X | X | |
| Seminar in Information Analysis | X | | | X | |
| Business Intelligence | | | X | X | |
| Introduction to Global Competitive Intelligence | | | X | X | |
| Critical Thinking | X | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| Virginia Military Institute (VA) | | | | | |
| Espionage in the Ancient World | | | | X | |
| | | | | | |
| Hampden-Sydney College (VA) | | | | | |
| An Overview of U.S. National Intelligence | | | | X | |
| U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security:  Threats, Issues, and Responses | X | | | X | |
| | | | | | |
| University of Virginia (VA) | | | | | |
| Intelligence Law Reform | | | X | X | X |
| Intelligence Theory and Application for Law Enforcement Managers | X | | | X | X |
| | | | | | |
| Virginia Commonwealth University (VA) | | | | | |
| The Intelligence Community and the Intelligence Process | X | | | X | |
| Introduction to GIS | | | | X | |
| Terrorism | | | | X | |
| Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness | X | | | X | |
| Emergency Planning and Incident Management | X | | | X | |
| Risk and Vulnerability Assessment | | X | | | |
| Strategic Planning for Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness | X | X | | | |
| Legal and Constitutional Issues in Homeland Security | | | X | X | |
| Principles of Criminal and Criminal Investigation | | X | | X | |
| Criminalistics and Crime Analysis | | X | | X | |
| Incident Investigation and Analysis | | X | | X | |
| | | | | | |
| Norfolk State University (VA) | | | | | |
| Fundamentals of Intelligence | | | | X | |
| Applied Intelligence Research Methods | | X | | X | |
| Theory of International Relations | X | | | X | |
| Approaches to Critical Analysis | | X | | | |
| Language and Society | | | | X | X |
| Ideas and Their Influences | | | | X | |
| Contemporary Globalization | X | | | X | |
| Ethics in Media | | | X | | X |
| Major World Religions | | | | X | |
| | | | | | |
| Radford University (VA) | | | | | |
| Spatial Aspects of Criminal Intelligence Analysis | | X | | X | |
| Seminar:  Practical Issues in GIS | | | | X | |
| Advanced Topics in Geospatial Analysis:  Spatial Analysis with GIS | | X | | X | |
| Selected Topics in Information Technology:  Information Sources and Management I | | | | X | |
| Selected Topics in Information Technology:  Information Sources and Management II | | | | X | X |
| Data Mining | | X | | X | |
| Investigative Data Mining | | X | | X | |
| | | | | | |

| Course | C1 | C2 | C3 | C4 | C5 | C6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Regent University (VA) | | | | | | |
| Logic and Critical Thinking | | X | | | X | |
| Argumentation and Critical Thinking | | X | | | X | |
| Data Analysis | | X | | | | |
| Liberty University (VA) | | | | | | |
| Introduction to Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | | |
| History of Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Terrorism | | | | | X | |
| Counter Terrorism | X | | | | X | |
| Counter Intelligence | X | | | | X | |
| Military Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Strategic Intelligence | | X | | | X | |
| Strategic Intelligence (Capstone) | | X | | | X | |
| Interrogations and Investigations | | X | | X | X | |
| Open Source Intelligence | | X | | | X | X |
| Ethics in Intelligence | | | | X | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| West Virginia University (WV) | | | | | | |
| Introduction to Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | X | X |
| Intelligence Analysis Methods | | X | | | X | X |
| National Security Analysis | | X | | | X | X |
| National Security Community | X | | | | X | X |
| Intelligence and National Security Decision Making | X | | | | X | X |
| National Security Policy | X | | X | X | | X |
| | | | | | | |
| Fairmont State University (WV) | | | | | | |
| History of Intelligence and National Security | | | | | X | |
| Terrorism | | | | | X | |
| Introduction to Intelligence Research (with Lab) | | X | | | X | |
| Intelligence Research Analysis Senior Seminar Project | | X | | | X | X |
| Diplomatic History | X | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| American Military University (WV & VA) | | | | | | |
| Research Methods in Intelligence Studies | | X | | | X | |
| The U.S. Intelligence Community | | | | | X | |
| History of U.S. Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Introduction to Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Intelligence Collection | | | | | X | |
| Law and Ethics in Intelligence | | | X | X | | |
| Critical Analysis | | X | | | | |
| Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | | |
| Intelligence and Homeland Security | X | | | | X | |
| Counterintelligence | X | | | | X | |
| International Criminal Organizations | | | | | X | |
| Espionage/Counterespionage | | | | | X | |
| Denial and Deception | | | | | X | |
| Intelligence and Assassination | | | X | X | | |
| Covert Action and National Security | X | | | | X | |
| Spycraft | | | | | X | |
| Geographic Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Signals Intelligence and Security | | | | | X | |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Open Source Collection | | X | | | X | |
| Human Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Interrogation | | | | | X | X |
| Imagery Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Intelligence Data Analysis | | X | | | | |
| Criminal Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Geographic Information Systems I | | | | | X | |
| Geographic Information Systems II | | | | | X | |
| Threat Analysis | | X | | | | |
| Cyber Warfare | | | | | X | |
| Joint Forces Intelligence Planning | X | | | | X | |
| Tactical Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Foreign Intelligence Organizations | | | | | X | |
| Contemporary Intelligence Issues | | | | | X | X |
| Introduction to the War on Drugs | X | | | | X | |
| Terrorism and Counterterrorism | X | | | | X | |
| Terrorism and U.S. National Security | X | | | | X | |
| Illicit Finance | | X | | | X | |
| Forecasting Terrorism | | X | | | X | |
| China Country Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Iraq Country Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Iran Country Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Korea Country Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Psychology of Terrorism | | | | | X | |
| Law Enforcement Intelligence Applications | X | | | | X | |
| Criminal Profiling | | X | | | | |
| Crime Analysis | | X | | | | |
| Senior Seminar in Intelligence Studies | | | | | X | X |
| Research Methods in Security and Intelligence Studies (Intelligence Studies Focus) | | X | | | | X |
| Strategic Intelligence | X | | | | X | |
| Collection | | | | | X | |
| Analytics I | | X | | | | |
| Analytics II | | X | | | | |
| Writing Skills for Analysis and Reporting | | | | | | X |
| Interagency Operations | X | | | | X | |
| Assassination:  History, Theory, and Practice | | | | | X | |
| History of the Central Intelligence Agency | | | | | X | |
| Ethical Challenges in the Intelligence Community | | | X | X | | |
| Competitive Intelligence | | X | | X | X | |
| Intelligence Leadership, Management, and Coordination | X | | X | | | |
| Terrain and Weather Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Geographic Information Systems and Spatial Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Scientific and Technical Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Indications and Warnings | | X | | | X | |
| Regional Threat Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Intelligence Profiling | | X | | | X | X |
| Intelligence and National Security | | | | | X | |
| Intelligence in Low Intensity Operations | X | | | | X | |
| Information Warfare | | | | | X | |
| Electronic Warfare I | | | | | X | |
| Electronic Warfare II | | | | | X | |
| Counterterrorism | X | | | | X | |
| Terrorism:  Assessing the Past to Forecast the Future | | X | | | X | |

| Course | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intelligence and Weapons of Mass Destruction | | | | | X | |
| Computer Crime | | | | | X | |
| Industrial Espionage | | | | | X | |
| International Crime | | | | | X | |
| Forensics | | X | | | X | |
| Organized Crime | | | | | X | |
| Homeland Defense | X | | | | X | |
| Homeland Security Policy | X | | | X | X | |
| Deception, Propaganda, and Disinformation | | | | | X | X |
| Concepts of National Security | | | | | X | |
| U.S. National Security | | | | | X | |
| International Security | | | | | X | |
| Weapons of Mass Destruction and the New Terrorism | | | | | X | |
| Domestic Terrorism and Extremist Groups | | X | | | X | |
| Capstone Seminar in Strategic Intelligence | | | | | | X |
| Middle Eastern Studies | | | | | X | |
| Political-Military Intelligence | X | | | X | X | |
| Border and Coastal Security | X | | | | X | |
| Risk Communications | X | | | | | X |
| Crisis Action Planning | X | X | | | X | |
| Port Security | X | | | | X | |
| Cargo Security Management | X | | | | X | |
| Airport Security Design | X | X | | | X | |
| Chemistry of Hazardous Materials | | | | | X | |
| Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Hazard | | | | | X | |
| Emergency Planning | X | X | | | X | |
| Emergency Response to Terrorism | X | | | | X | |
| Economics of Disaster | X | X | | | X | |
| Research Methods in Social Science | | X | | | X | |
| Senior Seminar in Homeland Security | | | | | | X |
| Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident Command | X | | X | X | X | |
| Consequence Management | X | | X | X | X | |
| Homeland Security Organization | X | | | | X | |
| Public Policy | | X | | X | X | X |
| Research, Analysis, and Writing | | X | | | | X |
| Capstone Seminar in Homeland Security | | | | | | X |
| Drug Cartels and the Narcotics Threat | | | | | X | |
| Conflict Analysis and Resolution | X | X | | | | |
| Security and Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | | |
| Roots of Terrorism | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Campbell University (NC) | | | | | | |
| History of American Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| North Carolina Wesleyan College (NC) | | | | | | |
| Homeland Security | X | | | | X | |
| Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| Fayetteville State University (NC) | | | | | | |
| Intelligence and National Security | | | | | X | |
| Intelligence Analysis (Introduction) | | X | | | | |
| Intelligence Analysis (Advanced) | | X | | | | X |
| Intelligence Operations | | | | | X | |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Law Enforcement Intelligence | | | | X | |
| Corporate Intelligence | | | | X | X | |
| Ethics and Intelligence | | | | X | X | |
| Terrorism | | | | | X | |
| Emerging Intelligence and Security Threats | | | | | X | |
| National Security Policy | X | | | | X | |
| Internship in Intelligence | X | | X | | X | |
| Senior Seminar in Intelligence | | | | | | X |
| | | | | | |
| ***Northeast Region*** | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| <u>Pennsylvania State University</u> (PA) | | | | | |
| Introduction to Security and Risk Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Seminar in Security and Risk Analysis | | X | | | X | X |
| Threat of Terrorism and Crime | | | | | X | |
| Overview of Information Security | | | | | X | |
| Decision Theory and Analysis | | X | | | | |
| Risk Management:  Assessment and Mitigation | | X | | | | |
| Intelligence Analysis and Modeling | | X | | | X | |
| Information and Cyber-Security | | | | | X | |
| Social Factors and Risk | X | | | | X | |
| Deception and Counterdeception | X | | | | X | |
| The Nature of Geographic Information | | | | | X | |
| Geospatial Systems Analysis and Design | | X | | | X | |
| Geographical Information Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Geographic Foundations of Geospatial Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Analysis and Geospatial Technology Project Management | X | X | | X | X | |
| GIS Database Development | | | | | X | |
| Problem Solving with GIS | X | | | | | |
| Geospatial Technology Project | | | | | X | X |
| Remote Sensing for the Geospatial Intelligence Professional | | | | | X | |
| Geographic Information Systems for the Geospatial Intelligence Professional | | | | | X | |
| Virtual Field Exercise for the Geospatial Intelligence Professional | | | | | X | X |
| GIS Application Development | | | | | X | |
| GIS Programming and Customization | | | | | X | |
| Cartography and Visualization | | | | | X | |
| Environmental Applications of GIS | | | X | X | X | |
| Acquiring and Integrating Geospatial Data | | | | | X | |
| GIS for Analysis of Health | | | X | X | X | |
| | | | | | |
| <u>University of Pittsburgh</u> (PA) | | | | | |
| Security and Intelligence Studies:  Theories and Public Policy | X | | X | X | | |
| Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | | |
| Current Issues in U.S. Security Policy | X | | | | X | |
| Terrorism | | | | | X | |
| The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction | | | | | X | |
| Criminal Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | | |
| Computer Crime, Information Warfare, and International Security | | | | | X | |
| Transnational Organized Crime and International Security | | | | | X | |
| National and International Security Policy | X | | | | X | |
| Foreign Study | | | | | X | |
| Non-Military Approaches to International Security | X | | | | X | |
| Peacemaking and Peacekeeping | X | | | | | |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Competitive Intelligence | | X | | X | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Point Park University (PA) | | | | | | |
| Intelligence and Security Principles | | | | | X | |
| Intelligence Tradecraft Techniques | | | | | X | |
| International Terrorism | | | | | X | |
| Recruitment, Preparation, and Training of Terrorists | | | | | X | |
| Domestic Terrorism | | | | | X | |
| Special Topics in Intelligence (Intelligence Failures) | | | X | X | X | |
| Current Issues in U.S. Security Policy | X | | X | X | | X |
| Intelligence Analyst/Critical Thinking | | X | | | | |
| National Intelligence Authorities | X | | | | X | |
| Critical Issues in Risk Communications | | | | | X | X |
| Emergency Planning and Security Measures | X | | | | X | |
| Intelligence Internship I & II | X | | X | | X | |
| Issues in U.S. Security Policy | X | | X | X | | |
| Weapons of Mass Destruction | | | | | X | |
| Emergency Medical Services and Fire Operations | X | | | | X | |
| Mass Casualty Management Planning | X | | X | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Franklin and Marshall College (PA) | | | | | | |
| Terrorism | | | | | X | |
| Secrets, Spies, and Satellites | | | | | X | |
| War, Strategy, and Politics | X | | | | X | |
| Foreign Policy Analysis | | X | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| Neumann College (PA) | | | | | | |
| Basic Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | | |
| Strategic/National Security Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Intelligence Analysis of Organized Crime | | X | X | | X | |
| Intelligence Analysis of Terrorism | | X | | | X | |
| Electronic Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| St. Joseph's University (PA) | | | | | | |
| Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysis | | X | | X | X | |
| Law Enforcement Intelligence:  Policy and Process | | X | X | X | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Villanova University (PA) | | | | | | |
| U.S. Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| CIA:  The Early Years | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Temple University (PA) | | | | | | |
| Intelligence Theory and Practice | | X | | | X | |
| Intelligence Research and Analysis | | X | | | | |
| National Strategic Intelligence | X | | | | X | |
| Police Intelligence Practice | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Drexel University (PA) | | | | | | |
| Introduction to Information Systems Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Managing Information Organizations | | | X | | X | |
| Knowledge Assets Management in Organizations | | | X | | X | |
| Competitive Intelligence | | | | X | X | |
| Knowledge Base Systems | | | | | X | |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mercyhurst College (PA) | | | | | | |
| Introduction to Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | | |
| Advanced Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Terrorism | | | | | X | |
| History of U.S. Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Writing for Intelligence | | | | | | X |
| Law Enforcement Intelligence | X | | | | X | |
| Competitive Intelligence | | | | X | X | |
| Intelligence and National Security | | | | | X | |
| Strategic Intelligence | X | | | | X | |
| Internship/Co-Op in Intelligence | X | | X | | X | |
| Drugs, Crime, and Criminal Justice | | | | X | X | |
| Advanced Law Enforcement Intelligence | X | | | | X | |
| Advanced Competitive Intelligence | | | | X | X | |
| Research Methods in Intelligence | | X | | | X | |
| Leadership and Organizational Behavior | X | | X | X | X | |
| Intelligence Theories and Applications | | X | | | X | |
| Intelligence Communications | | | | | | X |
| Managing Strategic Intelligence | | | | X | X | |
| Advanced Analytical Techniques | | X | | | X | |
| Comparative History of Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Evolution of Counterintelligence | X | | | | X | |
| Theory and Process in Law Enforcement Intelligence | | X | | | X | |
| Strategic Business Intelligence | | | | X | X | |
| Intelligence and the Constitution | | | X | X | X | |
| Analyzing Financial Crimes | | X | | X | X | |
| Studies in Terrorism | | | | | X | |
| Counterintelligence Events and Concepts | X | X | | | X | |
| Analytical Methodologies for Law Enforcement and Homeland Security | X | X | | | X | |
| Intelligence, the Military, and Warfare | | | | | X | |
| Counterespionage and Decision-Making | X | X | | X | X | |
| Topics in Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Intelligence Thesis Seminar | | | | | X | X |
| Thesis in Applied Intelligence | | | | | X | X |
| | | | | | | |
| DeSales University (PA) | | | | | | |
| Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | | |
| Terrorism | | | | | X | |
| Forensics and Criminal Investigation | | X | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Clarion University (PA) | | | | | | |
| Information and Society | | | | X | X | |
| Information Operations and Management | X | | | X | X | |
| Systems Analysis | | X | | | | |
| Seminar in Contemporary Issues | X | | | X | X | X |
| Information Systems Auditing and Security | | X | | X | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Kutztown University (PA) | | | | | | |
| Investigation/Intelligence | | X | | | X | |
| Homeland Security | X | | | | X | |
| Comparative Police Systems | | X | | X | X | |
| Ethics in Criminal Justice | | | X | X | X | |

| Course | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Topographic Analysis and Land Navigation | | X | | | X | X |
| | | | | | | |
| Notre Dame College (OH) | | | | | | |
| Terrorism | X | | | | X | X |
| Introduction to U.S. Intelligence | X | | | | X | X |
| Competitive Intelligence in the Global Economy | X | X | | X | X | X |
| Writing for Intelligence | | | | | | X |
| Intelligence and National Security | X | | | | X | X |
| Strategic Intelligence | | | | | X | X |
| Advanced Research and Analysis | | X | | | | |
| Conflict Management and Resolution | X | | X | | X | |
| Writing for Business Intelligence | | | | | | X |
| Research and Business Decision Making | | | X | | X | |
| Analysis Techniques for Competitive Intelligence | | X | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Case Western Reserve University (OH) | | | | | | |
| United States Intelligence and National Security | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Ohio State University (OH) | | | | | | |
| Introduction to Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Modern Intelligence History from John Buchan to James Bond | | | | | X | |
| Bioterrorism:  An Overview | | | | | X | |
| Terror and Terrorism | | | | | X | |
| Media and Terrorism | | | | | X | X |
| International Security and the Causes of War | | | | | X | |
| Psychology of Personal Security | | X | | | X | |
| Water Security in the 21st Century | | | | | X | |
| The Geography of Transportation Security | | | | | X | |
| Development and Control of WMD | X | | | | X | |
| Rebuilding Failed and Weak States | X | | | | X | |
| Code Making and Code Breaking | | | | | X | X |
| Sociology of Terrorism | | X | | | X | |
| Introduction to Homeland Security | X | | | | X | |
| Security Policy During and After the Cold War | | | | | X | |
| Organized Crime and Corruption in Europe | | | | X | X | |
| Information Security | | | | | X | |
| Data Analysis and Display | | X | | | | X |
| Map Reading and Interpretation | | | | | X | |
| Peacekeeping and Collective Security | X | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Rutgers University (NJ) | | | | | | |
| The CIA and American Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Problems in International Relations:  Diplomacy and Intelligence | X | | X | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Fairleigh-Dickinson University (NJ) | | | | | | |
| Homeland Security and Constitutional Issues | X | | X | X | X | |
| Weapons of Mass Destruction/Terrorism Awareness | | X | | | X | |
| Strategic Planning, Implementation, and Evaluation | X | X | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| John Jay College of Criminal Justice (NY) | | | | | | |
| Intelligence and Law Enforcement | | | | | X | X |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| New York University (NY) | | | | | X | |
| U.S. Intelligence and Global Security | | | | | X | |
| Competitive Intelligence | | | | X | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| State University of New York (SUNY) Albany (NY) | | | | | | |
| Intelligence Analysis, Intelligence, and National Security Policy | X | X | X | X | X | |
| Long Island University (NY) | | | | | | |
| The Intelligence Function in Homeland Security | X | | | | X | |
| Domestic and International Terrorism | | | | | X | |
| Constitutional Issues in Homeland Security Management | X | | X | X | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Utica College (NY) | | | | | | |
| Critical Thinking | | X | | | | |
| Information Security | | | | | X | |
| Security Administration | X | | | | X | |
| Cyber Crime Law and Investigations | X | X | | X | X | X |
| Cyber Crime Investigations and Forensics | X | X | | | X | |
| Information System Threats, Attacks, and Defenses | | X | | | X | |
| System Vulnerability Assessments | | X | | | X | |
| Computer and Network Security | | | | | X | |
| Professional Ethics | | | X | X | | |
| Senior Seminar in Cybersecurity | X | | | | X | X |
| | | | | | | |
| Syracuse University (NY) | | | | | | |
| Prosecuting Terrorists in Article III Courts | | | X | X | X | X |
| Counterterrorism and the Law | | | | X | X | X |
| | | | | | | |
| Columbia University (NY) | | | | | | |
| Intelligence and Foreign Policy | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| | | | | | | |
| Yale University (CT) | | | | | | |
| National Security in Today's World | X | | | | X | |
| Espionage and Economic Intelligence | | | | X | X | |
| Privacy in the Information Economy | | | X | X | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| University of New Haven (CT) | | | | | | |
| National Security Programs, Architecture, and Mission | | | | | X | |
| Securing National Security Information Systems | | | | X | X | |
| NSP Personnel Security Programs | | | X | X | X | |
| National Security Charter, Legal Issues, and Executive Orders | | | X | X | X | |
| Architecture of Protected Information | | | | | X | |
| Integrated Studies in Safeguards and Countermeasure Designs | | | | | X | |
| Risk Assessment and Management in National Security | | X | X | | X | |
| National Security World and National Threat Modeling | | X | | | X | |
| Integrated Studies of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Communities | X | | | | X | |
| Weapons of Mass Destruction:  Chemical and Biological Agents | | | | | X | |
| Weapons of Mass Destruction:  Radiological Agents | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| University of Connecticut (CT) | | | | | | |
| Intelligence for Homeland Security:  Organizational and Policy Challenges | X | | | X | X | |
| Terrorism and Homeland Security | X | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Norwich University (VT) | | | | | | |
| Management Information Systems | | | X | | X | |
| Ethics in Computing and Technology | | | X | X | X | |
| Information Systems Security Assurance | | | | X | X | |
| Artificial Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MA) | | | | | | |
| Reading Seminar in Social Science:  Intelligence and National Security | | | | | X | X |
| Intelligence:  Practices, Problems, and Prospects | | | | | X | |
| Territorial Conflict | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Harvard University (MA) | | | | | | |
| Terrorism, Security, and Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Introduction to Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | | |
| American National Security Policy | X | | | | X | |
| National Security Organization and Management | X | | | X | X | |
| Economics and Security | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Tufts University (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy) (MA) | | | | | | |
| Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism:  Strategic Considerations for the 21st Century | | | | | X | |
| Political Violence:  Theories and Approaches | | X | | | X | |
| Foreign Relations and National Security Law | X | | | | X | |
| Law and Politics of International Conflict Management | X | | X | | X | |
| Counterproliferation and Homeland Security | X | | | | X | X |
| Corruption, Conflict, and Peacebuilding | X | | X | | X | |
| The Role of Force in International Politics | | X | | | X | |
| Seminar on Internal Conflicts of War | | | | | X | X |
| Seminar on Crisis Management and Complex Emergencies | | | X | X | X | X |
| The Politics of the Korean Peninsula:  Foreign and Inter-Korean Relations | X | | | | X | |
| Charismatic Leadership and Foreign Policy | | | X | | | X |
| Protracted Social Conflict | X | | | | X | |
| Marketing Research and Global Intelligence | | X | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Boston University (MA) | | | | | | |
| Intelligence in a Democratic Society | | | | X | X | |
| Intelligence and Homeland Security | X | | | | X | |
| Foreign Intelligence and Security Systems | | | | | X | |
| The Evolution of Strategic Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| International Business Intelligence and Security Practices | | | | X | X | |
| Problems in Strategic Intelligence | | X | X | X | X | X |
| Data Mining and Business Intelligence | | X | | X | X | |
| Database Security | | | | | X | |
| Signals and Systems in Telecommunications | | | | | X | X |
| Network and Software Security | | | | | X | |
| Network Security | | | | | X | |
| Cryptography | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Williams College (MA) | | | | | | |
| Intelligence and National Security | | | | | X | |
| Business Intelligence | | | | X | X | |
| Operational Analysis | | X | | | | |
| Global Strategic Thinking | | X | | | X | |

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***Southeast Region*** | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| University of Kentucky (KY) | | | | | | |
| International Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Intelligence and National Security | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Eastern Kentucky University (KY) | | | | | | |
| Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | | |
| Introduction to Homeland Security | X | | | | X | |
| Intelligence for Homeland Security | X | | | | X | |
| Legal and Ethical Issues in Homeland Security | X | | X | X | X | |
| Hazards and Threats to Homeland Security | X | | | | X | |
| Critical Infrastructure Protection | X | | | | X | |
| Cyber Security | | | | | X | |
| Vulnerability and Risk Assessment | | X | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Tennessee State University (TN) | | | | | | |
| Data Mining | | X | | | X | |
| Database Systems | | | | | X | |
| PC Networks and Computer Security | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Auburn University (AL) | | | | | | |
| Basic Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Advanced Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| Science and Technology-Related Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| University of Mississippi (MS) | | | | | | |
| Introduction to Intelligence Studies | | | | | X | |
| Fundamentals of Analysis | | X | | | | |
| Intelligence Communications | | | | | | X |
| National Security Issues in the 21$^{st}$ Century | | | | | X | |
| Internship in Intelligence and Security Studies | X | | | | X | |
| Senior Project in Intelligence and Security Studies | | | | | X | X |
| Analytics | | X | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| University of Georgia (GA) | | | | | | |
| Business Intelligence/Decision Support Systems | X | X | | X | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| North Georgia College and State University (GA) | | | | | | |
| Spies and Statecraft: The Role of Intelligence in Policy-Making | X | | X | X | X | |
| Terrorism and Political Violence: A Strategic Perspective | | | | | X | |
| International Political Violence | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Clark Atlanta University (GA) | | | | | | |
| Styles of Research | | X | | | X | |
| Preparing Effective Oral Presentations | | | | | | X |
| Critical Thinking | | X | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (FL & AZ) | | | | | | |
| Intelligence Analysis, Writing, and Briefing | | X | | | X | X |
| Introduction to Global Security and Intelligence Studies | | | | | X | |
| Studies in Global Intelligence I | | | | | X | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| History of Terrorism | | | | X | |
| Personality and Profiling | | X | | | |
| Global Crime and Criminal Justice Systems | | X | | X | |
| Global Crime and International Justice Systems | | X | | X | |
| Political Change, Revolution, and War | | | | X | |
| Intelligence and Technology | | | | X | |
| Counter-Intelligence | X | | | X | |
| International Security and Globalization | | | | X | |
| Environment and Security | | | | X | |
| Islam:  Origins, History, and Role in the Modern World | | | | X | |
| Homeland Security and Technology | X | | | X | |
| Information Protection and Computer Security | X | | | X | |
| Emergency Management and Contingency Planning | X | X | | X | |
| Comparative Religions | | X | | X | |
| Applied Cross-Cultural Communication | | X | | | X |
| Topics in Global History:  Politics and Culture | | | | X | |
| Intelligence Writing | | | | X | X |
| Forensic Science Applications in Security and Intelligence | | X | | X | |
| Observing Asian Cultures | | X | | X | |
| Network Security | | | | X | |
| Database Systems and Data Mining | | X | | X | |
| Information and Computer Security | X | | | X | |
| Introduction to Homeland Security | X | | | X | |
| Fundamentals of Transportation Security | X | | | X | |
| Introduction to Industrial Security | | | | X | |
| Terrorism:  Origins, Ideologies, and Goals | | | | X | |
| Business Skills for the Homeland Security Professional | X | | | X | X |
| Fundamentals of Emergency Management | X | | | X | |
| Critical Infrastructure and Risk Analysis | X | | | X | |
| Homeland Security Law and Policy | X | | X | X | X |
| Homeland Security Technology and Systems | X | X | | X | |
| Emerging Topics in Homeland Security | X | | | X | |
| Environmental Security | | | | X | |
| Senior Project in Homeland Security | X | | | X | X |
| Emergency Management Strategy and Policy | X | | X | X | |
| Terrorism and Emergency Management | X | | | X | |
| Exercise Design and Evaluation in Homeland Security | X | X | | X | |
| Asymmetric Terrorism:  Cyberspace, Technology, and Innovation | | X | | X | |
| Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Policy | X | | | X | |
| Emerging Issues in Homeland Security | X | | | X | |
| Introduction to Geographic Information Systems | | | | X | |
| Advanced Geographic Information Systems | | | | X | |
| | | | | | |
| International College (FL) | | | | | |
| Intelligence Community | X | | | X | |
| Law Enforcement Intelligence | | | | X | |
| Intelligence and the Law | | | X | X | X |
| | | | | | |
| University of South Florida (FL) | | | | | |
| International Terrorism | | | | X | |
| Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy | X | | X | X | |
| | | | | | |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| <u>University of Central Florida</u> (FL) | | | | | | |
| Marketing Intelligence | | | | X | X | X |
| | | | | | | |
| <u>Florida International University</u> (FL) | | | | | | |
| Surveillance, Intelligence, and International Relations | X | | | X | | |
| Geographic Information Systems | | | | X | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| ***Midwest Region*** | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| <u>University of Michigan</u> (MI) | | | | | | |
| The Global System | X | | | X | | |
| War in World Politics | | | X | X | | |
| | | | | | | |
| <u>Michigan State University</u> (MI) | | | | | | |
| Private Security | | | X | X | | |
| Law Enforcement Intelligence Operations | X | | | X | | |
| Homeland Security | X | | | X | | |
| Cyber-Crime and Cyber-Security | | | X | X | | |
| Counterterrorism and Intelligence | X | | | X | | |
| Analytic Thinking and Intelligence | | X | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| <u>Wayne State University</u> (MI) | | | | | | |
| Competitive Intelligence and Data Mining | | X | | X | X | |
| Communications:  Written and Oral | | | | | | X |
| Analytical Reasoning | | X | | | | |
| Critical Thinking | | X | | | | |
| Creative Problem Solving | | X | | | | |
| Forecasting | | X | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| <u>University of Minnesota</u> (MN) | | | | | | |
| U.S. Intelligence Organization, Policy, and Practice | X | | | X | X | X |
| | | | | | | |
| <u>Capella University</u> (MN) | | | | | | |
| Introduction to Homeland Security | X | | | X | | |
| Homeland Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century | X | | | X | | |
| Homeland Security and Multijurisdictional Coordination | X | X | | X | | |
| Homeland Security and Emergency Management | X | | | X | | |
| Leadership in Homeland Security | X | X | | X | | |
| Technology and Homeland Security | X | | | X | | |
| Domestic and International Terrorism | | | | X | | |
| World Conflict | | | | X | | |
| Intelligence Role in Homeland Security | X | | | X | | |
| History of Violence in the U.S. Society | | | | X | | |
| Principles of Public Safety Investigation | | X | | X | | |
| Communication Strategies for the Public Safety Professional | | | | X | X | |
| Introduction to Security Management | | | X | X | | |
| Principles of Security Management | | | X | X | | |
| Ethics in Security Management | | | X | X | X | |
| Leadership and Security Management | | | X | X | | |
| Information Security in Security Management | | | | X | | |
| Operational Security | | | | X | | |

| Course | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Security Management in a Global Business Environment | | | X | X | X | |
| System Assurance Security | | | | | X | |
| Cyber Defense and Countermeasures | | | | | X | |
| Organizational Security | X | | | | X | |
| Security Management and Policies | X | | X | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Bradley University (IL) | | | | | | |
| Intelligence in International Affairs | X | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Indiana University (IN) | | | | | | |
| Strategic Intelligence | X | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Missouri State University (MO) | | | | | | |
| The Foundations of Homeland Defense and Security | X | | | | X | |
| Topics in Homeland Defense and Security | X | | | | X | |
| Multi-Disciplinary Approaches to Homeland Security | X | | | | X | |
| Strategic Planning and Organizational Imperatives in Homeland Security | X | X | X | | X | |
| Remote Sensing | | | | | X | |
| Thematic Cartography | | | | | X | |
| Interpretation of Aerial Photography | | | | | X | |
| Introduction to Geographic Information Science | | | | | X | |
| Intermediate Geographic Information Science | | | | | X | |
| Advanced Geographic Information Science | | | | | X | X |
| Internet Geospatial Science | | | | | X | |
| Satellite Surveying and Navigation | | | | | X | |
| Remote Sensing Digital Image Processing | | | | | X | |
| Geographic Information Science Programming | | | | | X | |
| Introduction to Photogrammetry and Spatial Statistics | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| University of Oklahoma (OK) | | | | | | |
| Espionage, Diplomacy, and Covert Action | | | X | X | X | |
| Intelligence Process, Policy and Management | X | | X | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Oklahoma State University (OK) | | | | | | |
| Business Intelligence, Tools, and Management | X | X | | X | X | |
| Decision Support and Expert Systems | X | X | | X | X | |
| Data Mining and Customer Relationship Management Applications | X | X | | | X | X |
| Applied Information Systems Security | | | | | X | |
| Information Assurance  Management | X | | | | X | |
| IT Forensics | | X | | | X | |
| IT Risk Management | X | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| St. Edward's University (TX) | | | | | | |
| Business Intelligence and Knowledge Management | | X | | X | X | |
| Database Systems | | | | | X | |
| Analysis, Modeling, and Design | | X | | | X | |
| Data Security Management | | | X | X | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP) (TX) | | | | | | |
| Intelligence Applications in Law Enforcement | | X | | | X | |
| U.S. Intelligence and National Security Policy, Structure, and Process | X | | X | X | X | |
| Seminar in Intelligence | | | | | X | X |
| Contemporary Security Studies | | | | | X | |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Introduction to Intelligence Analysis | | X | | | |
| Historical Development of the Intelligence Community | | | | | X |
| Legal Issues in Intelligence and National Security | | | | X | X |
| Intelligence and Counterterrorism | X | | | | X |
| Intelligence and Counterproliferation | X | | | | X |
| Counterintelligence and Security | | | | | X |
| Political Economy of Terrorism | | | | | X |
| Conflict Analysis | | X | | | |
| Transnational Criminal Organizations | | | | | X |
| Professional Skills | | X | | | X | X |
| Selected Problems in Intelligence and National Security | | | | | X |
| Security Studies Internship | X | | X | | X |
| Intercultural/International Communication | | | | | | X |
| Organizational Theory and Behavior | X | | X | X | X |
| Intergovernmental Relations | X | | | | X |
| Seminar in Homeland Security | X | | | | X |
| Homeland Security Capstone | X | | | | X |
| Crime and Border Security | | | | | X |
| Critical Infrastructure Protection | X | | | | X |
| Legal Issues in Homeland Security | X | | | X | X |
| Public Health Issues and Homeland Security | X | | | X | X |
| Risk Analysis | | X | | | |
| Introduction to Geographic Information Systems | | | | | X |
| Introduction to Remote Sensing | | | | | X |
| Spatial Analysis and Modeling | | X | | | X |
| Digital Image Processing | | | | | X |
| GIS and Technology and Society | | | | | X |
| Selected Problems Capstone | | | | | X | X |
| | | | | | |
| Austin Peay University (TX) | | | | | |
| International Terrorism | | | | | X |
| | | | | | |
| University of Texas-Pan American (TX) | | | | | |
| Introduction to Global Security Studies | X | | | | X |
| Culture and Communication | | | | | X | X |
| Cross Cultural Psychology | | | | | X |
| Cyber Security | | | | | X |
| Information Security | | | | | X |
| | | | | | |
| *Far West Region* | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| University of New Mexico (NM) | | | | | |
| Survey of Geographic Information Science | | | | | X |
| Human Geography | | | | | X |
| World Regional Geography | | | | | X |
| Digital Image Processing | | | | | X |
| Applied Remote Sensing | | X | | | X |
| International Conflict, Arms Control, and Disarmament | X | | | | X |
| Civil Wars | | | | | X |
| | | | | | |
| New Mexico State University (NM) | | | | | |
| Intelligence Fundamentals | | | | | X |
| SIGINT Systems Seminar | | | | | X |

| | C1 | C2 | C3 | C4 | C5 | C6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arizona State University (AZ) | | | | | | |
| National Security Analysis | X | X | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| University of Utah (UT) | | | | | | |
| Business Intelligence Systems I | | | | X | X | |
| Building Business Intelligence Systems | | | | X | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| Utah State University (UT) | | | | | | |
| National Security Policy and the Intelligence Community | X | | X | X | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Stanford University (CA) | | | | | | |
| International Security in a Changing World | X | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| University of San Diego (CA) | | | | | | |
| Politics of U.S. Intelligence | X | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| California State University San Bernardino (CA) | | | | | | |
| Political Intelligence | X | | X | | X | |
| Strategic Intelligence | X | | | | X | |
| Organization of U.S. Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| University of California, Davis (CA) | | | | | | |
| Business Intelligence Technologies—Data Mining | | X | | X | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) (CA) | | | | | | |
| Crisis Decision Making in U.S. Foreign Policy | X | | | | X | |
| Methods of Policy Analysis | | X | | | | |
| Applied Policy Analysis I & II | | X | | | | X |
| Introduction to Geographic Information Systems | | | | | X | |
| Advanced Geographic Information Systems | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| San Francisco State University (CA) | | | | | | |
| Intelligence and Intelligence Agencies | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| University of the Redlands (CA) | | | | | | |
| Fundamentals of Geographic Information | | | | | X | |
| Information Systems Foundations for GIS | | | | | X | |
| Communicating Geographic Information | | | | | X | X |
| Programming for GIS | | | | | X | |
| Introduction to GIS Technology | | | | | X | |
| Creating and Managing Geodatabases | | | | | X | |
| Working with GIS | X | | | | X | |
| Introduction to Image Data | | | | | X | |
| MS GIS Colloquium | X | | | | X | X |
| Fundamentals of Remote Sensing | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| Henley-Putnam University (CA) | | | | | | |
| Writing for the Intelligence Professional | | | | | | X |
| Effective Report Writing | | | | | | X |
| Introduction to Critical Thinking and Logic | | X | | | | |
| History of Intelligence, Parts 1&2 | | | | | X | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Introduction to Intelligence | | | | X | |
| Introduction to Terrorism | | | | X | |
| Religious Extremism | | | | X | |
| Media and Terrorism | | | | X | X |
| Introduction to Analysis | | X | | | |
| Open Source Research | | X | | | |
| Propaganda and Disinformation | | | | X | X |
| World Intelligence Agencies | | | | X | |
| Cover Action | | | | X | |
| Terrorist Techniques | | | | X | |
| Introduction to Threat Assessment | | X | | X | |
| Counterintelligence | X | | | X | |
| Elicitation and Briefing/Debriefing | | | | X | X |
| Weapons Systems | | | | X | |
| Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons | | | | X | |
| Counterterrorism | X | | | X | |
| Technical Surveillance | | | | X | |
| Operational Security | | | | X | |
| Clandestine Communications | | | | X | X |
| Intelligence Collection | | | | X | |
| Collection Management | X | | | X | |
| Vetting | | | | X | |
| Advanced Strategies/Crisis Preparedness | X | | | X | |
| Advanced Analytical Methods | | X | | X | |
| WMD Terrorism | | | | X | |
| Advanced Intelligence Collection | | | | X | |
| Advanced Surveillance and Countersurveillance | | | | X | |
| Advanced Counterterrorism Analysis | X | X | | X | |
| Cover | | | | X | |
| Advanced Open Source Analysis | | X | | | |
| Double Agents, Denial, and Deception | | | | X | |
| Counterespionage | X | | | X | |
| Recruitment Cycle | | | | X | |
| Strategic Intelligence | X | | | X | |
| All Source Intelligence | | | | X | |
| Intelligence Policy and Reform | | | X | X | X |
| Analyzing the Terrorist Mind | | X | | X | |
| Leadership Analysis | | X | X | | |
| Political Analysis | | X | | | |
| Area Studies Analysis | | X | | X | |
| Propaganda Techniques | | | | X | X |
| Advanced Intelligence Operations | | | | X | |
| Advanced Intelligence Practicum | | | | X | X |
| Seminar:  Case Studies in Covert Action | | | | X | X |
| Cyberterrorism, Cyberwarfare, Cybercrime | | | | X | |
| Advanced Domestic Terrorism | | | | X | |
| Background Investigations | | | X | X | |
| Computer Intrusion Defense | | | | X | |
| Operational Concepts and Planning | | | X | X | |
| Intelligence Team Management | | | X | X | X |
| Conflict Resolution | X | | X | X | |
| Consequence Management | | | X | X | |
| Advanced Consequence Management and Incident Command System | | | X | X | |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Information Security | | | | | X | |
| Protective Security Law | | | | X | X | |
| Introduction to Data Analysis | | X | | | | |
| Advanced Protective Intelligence | | | | | X | |
| Advanced Counterterrorism | X | | | | X | |
| Advanced Threat Assessment | | X | | | X | |
| Right-Wing Terrorism | | | | | X | |
| Islamism and Terrorism | | | | | X | |
| Terrorist Group Dynamics | | | | | X | |
| Terrorism and Society | | | | | X | |
| | | | | | | |
| University of Washington (WA) | | | | | | |
| Competitive Intelligence | | | | X | X | |
| Business Intelligence:  Concepts and Principles | | X | | X | X | |
| Data Warehouse:  Concepts and Principles | | X | | X | X | |

**ID # _____**
*(Sample: #INTEL-001)*

## <u>SURVEY</u>

## *Intelligence Studies in U.S. Civilian Colleges and Universities*

**<u>Instructions</u>**:  Please complete the following questions in as complete a manner as possible.  It would be helpful for you to provide responses to all the questions, but if you desire to omit any for whatever reason that is permissible.  Most of the questions are multiple choice, intermixed with some short-answer, open-ended questions.  Please <u>circle the appropriate letter</u> for the multiple choice questions, and complete the other questions by <u>printing</u> clearly.  Request you refrain from using acronyms that might not be easily understood by non-professionals in this field.  If more space is needed, please attach a separate sheet of paper and indicate which question you are continuing.  The code number space in the upper right hand corner will be filled in only after receipt of your completed survey; therefore, it will not affect anonymity.  If you would prefer to discuss this survey and/or provide your response by telephone, you may call (703) 646-5931 and leave your number.  I will get back to you promptly.  If you prefer to fax your responses, the number is (202) 231-2171.

1.  Do any courses taught at your institution deal with the field of **<u>intelligence</u>**?

    (NOTE:  For purposes of this survey, the term "intelligence" refers to that area of government activity related to national security, international security, homeland security, law enforcement and/or business, not some of the more modern meanings this term has taken on in the era of high technology, such as "artificial intelligence" or "emotional intelligence."  Courses not titled "intelligence" as such should be included if intelligence issues represent a significant portion of course content.)

    a.  Yes                   b.  No                    c.  Not sure

    Obviously, if the answer to Question #1 is "No," there is no need to continue with the rest of the survey.  Thank you for your help, and please return the survey in the envelope provided.  Providing your name and other data on the last page is optional, but is encouraged since it would assist in tabulating the results.  If the answer is "Not sure," please pass the packet along to someone who might be knowledgeable of this topic.

2.  What is the title or titles of the intelligence or intelligence-related course(s) taught?

    a.  _____
    b.  _____
    c.  _____
    d.  _____

(NOTE:  If more than one intelligence course is taught, please duplicate the survey and complete the remaining questions for <u>each</u> applicable course.)

3.  How long has the course been taught (e.g., 3 years, 1 semester, still in course development phase, projected to begin next academic year)?

_____
_____
_____

4.  What or who was the impetus for creating the course?  If unknown, please indicate.

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

5.  Who teaches the course and what are his/her qualifications related to intelligence? Did he/she previously do intelligence-related work for the government?   If unknown, please indicate.

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

(NOTE:  If you do not wish to identify a specific individual, request you at least indicate what discipline or department he/she represents.)

6.  Is it a core course required for graduation or an elective?

   a.  Required      b.  Elective      c.  Other: _____

7.  The course is designed primarily for:

   a.  Undergraduates       b.  Graduate students          c.  Both

8.  The course is associated with what degree program or programs?  Does the program include a major or minor in intelligence?  Are there plans to upgrade the visibility/size of the intelligence-related course?  If so, please explain.

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

9. The course focuses mainly on:

   a. Historical themes     b. Current issues     c. Both a & b     d. Other: _____

10. Are simulations/exercises/case studies utilized in the course?

   a. Yes  (Circle all that apply)          b. No                c. Not sure

11. Is legislative/judicial control and oversight of intelligence covered in the course?

   a. Yes               b. No                c. Not sure

12. What sorts of students typically enroll in this course?  (Circle all that apply.)

   a. Political science/government majors
   b. International relations majors
   c. Public policy/public administration/business/management/leadership majors
   d. Law students
   e. Freshmen satisfying a core requirement
   f. Others:  _____
               _____
               _____
               _____
               _____
               _____
               _____

13. Has the intelligence course changed significantly since its inception?

   a. Yes               b. No                c. Don't know

   If so, how?  _____
   _____
   _____

14. The enrollment in the intelligence course has recently:

   a. Increased          b. Decreased          c. Remained fairly constant

   What is the approximate current enrollment?  _____

15. Are there significant changes to the course anticipated in the near future?

   a. Yes               b. No                c. Don't know

   If so, why?  _____

16. Is critical thinking a key element in the teaching of the course? _____
It is incorporated by_____
_____
_____

The concept of critical thinking is "operationalized" in our classrooms by _____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____

17. Students are attracted to the course by _____
_____
_____

The course is advertised/marketed by _____
_____
_____

18. Does your institution routinely test students involved in programs requiring critical thinking/analysis-related coursework?

   a. Yes, pre-test upon arrival or prior to acceptance     c. Yes, both before and after
   b. Yes, post-test after completion of core curriculum   d. No

Is the test nationally-normed?     a. Yes     b. No

19. Is the course more popular or more heavily subscribed now as a result of the aftermath of events of September 11?

   a. Yes     b. No     c. About the same

20. How would you characterize the current state of the teaching of intelligence studies in American colleges and universities? (Circle all that apply.)

   a. Excellent
   b. Good
   c. Satisfactory
   d. Needs improvement
   e. Unsatisfactory
   f. Should not be taught at all in civilian institutions
   g. Should only be taught in government/military training courses
   h. Don't know
   i. Other: _____
      _____

Please explain the reason(s) behind your response: _____
_____
_____
_____

21.  To enhance or improve the teaching of intelligence I would _____
_____
_____

22.  How does your school assess learning outcomes with respect to other pre-professional studies where there are presently no standardized tests in that field?
(Circle all that apply.)

   a.  Rely entirely on faculty initiative
   b.  Maintain ties to related professional organizations to build toward systematic outcomes assessment
   c.  Assign the task to an institutional research office
   d.  Track accomplishments of graduates
   e.  Other (specify): _____
_____
_____

23.  In reference to the analytical core competencies recently promulgated by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), how do you or would you address learning outcomes at your institution with respect to these competencies?

| Competency | What you do | What you would do (ideally) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| a.  Engagement & collaboration | | |
| b.  Critical thinking | | |
| c.  Personal leadership & integrity | | |
| d.  Accountability for results | | |
| e.  Technical expertise | | |
| f.  Communication | | |

24.  In brief, how would you go about assessing your intelligence studies students' abilities to perform work in the Intelligence Community, in view of the ODNI core competencies?_____
_____
_____
_____

**Thank you for your kind cooperation!!!**

**Please check here if you would like to receive a summary of the survey results: _____**

**Request you forward a copy of your latest intelligence studies course syllabus(i) to the researcher along with this survey or, if you prefer, separately at the return address indicated on the outside envelope.  Please, however, do not delay return of the survey due to waiting for publication of a new syllabus.**

**Any additional comments:**

NAME OF RESPONDENT (optional): _____

POSITION/TITLE (optional): _____

DEPARTMENT/PROGRAM (optional): _____

NAME OF INSTITUTION (optional): _____

PUBLIC OR PRIVATE (optional): _____

APPROXIMATE TOTAL ENROLLMENT OF INSTITUTION (optional): _____

WOULD YOU BE INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT FURTHER IN AN INTERVIEW (either face-to-face or by telephone)?

                a.  Yes             b.  No

If "Yes," please provide a phone number and best time to call to facilitate coordination: _____

## **POTENTIAL SURVEY RECIPIENTS**

| STATE/TERRITORY | PUBL INSTIT (enrolled) | PRIV INSTIT (enrolled) |
|---|---|---|
| Alabama | Univ of Alabama (23,878) | Samford Univ (4,478) |
| Alaska | Univ of Alaska Anchorage (17,390) | Alaska Pacific Univ (739) |
| Arizona | Arizona State Univ (51,234) | Thunderbird School of Global Mgmt (1,105) |
| Arkansas | Univ of Arkansas Main Campus (17,926) | Harding Univ (6,108) |
| California | Univ of California, Los Angeles (38,218) | Univ of Southern California (33,000) |
| Colorado | Univ of Colorado at Boulder (28,942) | Univ of Denver (10,791) |
| Connecticut | Univ of Connecticut (28,481) | Yale Univ (11,416) |
| Delaware | Univ of Delaware (20,380) | Wesley College (2,500) |
| Florida | Univ of Florida (50,912) | Univ of Miami (15,351) |
| Georgia | Univ of Georgia (33,959) | Emory Univ (12,358) |
| Hawaii | Univ of Hawaii at Manoa (20,357) | Hawaii Pacific Univ (8,080) |
| Idaho | Idaho State Univ (12,679) | Brigham Young Univ-Idaho (14,116) |
| Illinois | Univ of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (30,457) | Northwestern Univ (18,486) |
| Indiana | Purdue Univ (39,228) | Univ of Notre Dame (11,603) |
| Iowa | Univ of Iowa (29,979) | Drake Univ (5,366) |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Kansas | Univ of Kansas (29,613) | Baker Univ (3,932) |
| Kentucky | Univ of Kentucky (26,382) | Spalding Univ (1,706) |
| Louisiana | Louisiana State Univ (24,589) | Tulane Univ (10,606) |
| Maine | Univ of Maine (11,797) | Univ of New England (3,379) |
| Maryland | Univ of Maryland College Park (35,102) | Johns Hopkins Univ (19,760) |
| Massachusetts | Univ of Massachusetts (25,593) | Boston Univ (32,212) |
| Michigan | Michigan State Univ (45,520) | Univ of Detroit Mercy (4,313) |
| Minnesota | Univ of Minnesota-Twin Cities (50,402) | Walden Univ (27,472) |
| Mississippi | Mississippi State Univ (16,110) | Mississippi College (4,038) |
| Missouri | Univ of Missouri-Columbia (28,253) | Webster Univ (20,620) |
| Montana | Montana State Univ (16,274) | Rocky Mountain College (898) |
| Nebraska | Univ of Nebraska-Lincoln (22,106) | Creighton Univ (6,981) |
| Nevada | Univ of Nevada-Las Vegas (27,912) | Sierra Nevada College (677) |
| New Hampshire | Univ of New Hampshire (13,957) | Dartmouth College (5,753) |
| New Jersey | Rutgers the State Univ of New Jersey (34,392) | Seton Hall Univ (9,522) |
| New Mexico | Univ of New Mexico (25,348) | College of Santa Fe (1,848) |
| New York | State Univ of New York at Albany (17,434) | New York Univ (40,870) |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| North Carolina | North Carolina State Univ (31,130) | Duke Univ (13,197) |
| North Dakota | Univ of North Dakota (12,834) | Univ of Mary (2,765) |
| Ohio | Ohio State Univ (51,818) | Univ of Dayton (10,502) |
| Oklahoma | Univ of Oklahoma Norman Campus (26,020) | Univ of Tulsa (4,125) |
| Oregon | Univ of Oregon (20,388) | Univ of Portland (3,478) |
| Pennsylvania | Pennsylvania State Univ (42,039) | Univ of Pennsylvania (19,492) |
| Rhode Island | Univ of Rhode Island (15,062) | Brown Univ (8,125) |
| South Carolina | Univ of South Carolina (27,390) | Furman Univ (2,679) |
| South Dakota | South Dakota State Univ (11,377) | National American Univ (5,325) |
| Tennessee | Univ of Tennessee (26,490) | Vanderbilt Univ (11,607) |
| Texas | Univ of Texas at Austin (49,738) | Baylor Univ (14,040) |
| Utah | Univ of Utah (28,619) | Brigham Young Univ (32,679) |
| Vermont | Univ of Vermont (10,828) | Norwich Univ (1,987) |
| Virginia | George Mason Univ (29,889) | Univ of Richmond (4,496) |
| Washington | Univ of Washington (43,428) | Seattle Univ (7,226) |
| West Virginia | West Virginia Univ (27,115) | Mountain State Univ (4,826) |
| Wisconsin | Univ of Wisconsin-Madison (39,873) | Marquette Univ (11,548) |
| Wyoming | Univ of Wyoming (13,205) | Wyoming Technical Institute (1,500) |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Puerto Rico | Univ of Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras Campus (19,500) | Univ del Turabo (14,698) |
| District of Columbia | Univ of the District of Columbia (5,534) | George Washington Univ (24,531) |

APPENDIX F

### CORE COMPETENCIES FOR
### NON-SUPERVISORY IC EMPLOYEES AT GS-15 AND BELOW

This Appendix provides the established labels and definitions for core competencies applicable to all GS-15 and below (that is, at or below General Schedule grade 15 or equivalent or comparable personal rank and below), non-supervisory IC civilian employees, regardless of IC component, mission category, or occupational group.  Note, the competencies identified and defined for GS-15 and below non-supervisory IC civilian employees are expected to apply to supervisors and managers and senior officers, since knowledge, skills, and abilities build on each other over time.

Table B-1 [NOTE:  ODNI numbering of tables not in consonance with researcher's table numbering for overall study] provides the labels and definitions of the core competencies organized by the six IC performance elements for non-supervisory IC civilian employees GS-15 and below, as detailed in ICD 651.  [NOTE:  ICD is abbreviation for Intelligence Community Directive.]

**Table B-1.  Core Competencies for Non-Supervisory IC Employees at GS-15 and Below**

| | **Core** | **Definition** |
|---|---|---|
| **Non-Supervisory Employees at GS-15 and Below** | **Engagement and Collaboration** | IC employees have a responsibility to share information and knowledge to achieve results, and in that regard are expected to recognize, value, build, and leverage diverse collaborative networks of coworkers, peers, customers, stakeholders, and teams within an organization and/or across the IC. |
| | Building Professional/Technical Networks | Develops collaborative information and knowledge sharing networks and builds alliances with colleagues and counterparts within area of professional/technical expertise. |
| | Influencing/Negotiating | Persuades others, builds consensus through give and take, and gains cooperation from others to obtain information and accomplish goals. |
| | Interpersonal Skills | Develops and maintains effective working relationships, especially in difficult situations (e.g., when defending or critiquing a position).  Demonstrates and fosters respect, understanding, courtesy, tact, and empathy.  Considers varied cultural backgrounds, work experience, and organizational roles in working with others. |
| | Information Sharing | Identifies opportunities to increase information sharing, as appropriate, with customers, colleagues, and others.  Recognizes the responsibility and takes action to provide information within the IC, to other federal, state and local law enforcement or authorities, the private sector, and/or foreign partners, as appropriate. |

| Core | Definition |
|---|---|
| **Critical Thinking** | IC employees are expected to use logic, analysis, synthesis, creativity, judgment, and systematic approaches to gather, evaluate, and use multiple sources of information to effectively inform decisions and outcomes. |
| Creative Thinking | Develops new insights into situations and applies innovative solutions to problems and to improve processes. Designs new methods and tools where established methods and procedures are inapplicable, unavailable, or ineffective. |
| Exploring Alternatives | Seeks out, evaluates, and integrates a variety of perspectives. Seeks to increase own and others' understanding of an issue based on new information and alternative perspectives. Listens to and shows appreciation for alternative ideas and approaches. |
| Enterprise Perspective | Understands the interrelationships among organizations and components of the IC. Understands how one's own work impacts, and is impacted by, the mission and operations of IC organizations and components, and uses this information to maximize contribution to mission accomplishment. |
| Situational Awareness | Maintains awareness of changing conditions, current events, and cultural and historical contexts as they affect one's own work. |
| Synthesis | Identifies and uses principles, rules, and relationships to construct arguments or interpret facts, data, or other information. Dissects problems into meaningful parts and uses logic and judgment to determine accuracy and relevance of data. Identifies and reconciles gaps, uncertainties, and key assumptions of data. Integrates evidence/information, evaluates and prioritizes alternatives, and assesses similarities and differences in data to develop findings and conclusions. Understands potential implications of these findings or conclusions. |
| **Personal Leadership and Integrity** | IC employees are expected to demonstrate personal initiative and innovation, as well as integrity, honesty, openness, and respect for diversity in their dealings with coworkers, peers, customers, stakeholders, teams, and collaborative networks across the IC. IC employees are also expected to demonstrate core organizational and IC values, including selfless service, a commitment to excellence, and the courage and conviction to express their professional views. |
| Courage and Conviction | Exhibits courage when conveying views, presenting new ideas, and making/executing decisions irrespective of potentially adverse personal consequences. Does not alter judgments in the face of social or political pressure. |
| Dedicated Service | Strives for excellence and demonstrates commitment to serve the IC. Ensures own actions meet mission needs and protects classified and sensitive information. |

**Non-Supervisory Employees at GS-15 and Below**

| | Core | Definition |
|---|---|---|
| **Non-Supervisory Employees at GS-15 and Below** | Innovation | Questions conventional approaches, and supports an environment that encourages new ideas. Participates in the design and implementation of new or cutting edge programs/processes. |
| | Integrity/Honesty | Behaves in an honest, fair, and ethical manner. Shows consistency in words and actions. Models ethical standards. |
| | Resilience | Deals effectively with pressure. Remains optimistic and persistent, even under adversity; and recovers quickly from setbacks. |
| | Respect for Diversity | Values and leverages diversity and individual differences to achieve the vision and mission of the organization. |
| | **Accountability for Results** | IC employees are expected to take responsibility for their work, setting and/or meeting priorities, and organizing and utilizing time and resources efficiently and effectively to achieve the desired results, consistent with their organization's goals and objectives. |
| | Adaptability | Adapts behavior and work methods in response to new information, changing conditions, or unexpected obstacles. Adjusts rapidly to new situations warranting attention and resolution. Is open to change and new information. |
| | Continual Learning | Uses experiences and challenges as opportunities to improve and become more effective. Pursues assignments and other developmental opportunities to stretch skills to further professional growth. Seeks ways to improve the capacity of others and the organization through mentoring, coaching, and knowledge sharing. |
| | Initiative | Displays resourcefulness, self-reliance, energy, effort, and commitment in achieving results. |
| | Resource Management | Organizes work, sets priorities, and appropriately identifies resource requirements to accomplish the work. Develops realistic project goals and develops a plan to achieve these goals using available and/or shared resources. |
| | Rigor | Is conscientious, diligent, and thorough. |
| | **Technical Expertise** | IC employees are expected to acquire and apply knowledge, subject matter expertise, tradecraft, and/or technical competency necessary to achieve results. |
| | Professional Tradecraft | Demonstrates technical knowledge and skills common to a mission or occupational group to accomplish work. |
| | Subject Matter Expertise | Demonstrates technical knowledge and skills to accomplish specialized work. |

| | Core | Definition |
|---|---|---|
| **Non-Supervisory Employees at GS-15 and Below** | **Communication** | IC employees are expected to effectively comprehend and convey information with and from others in writing, reading, listening, and verbal and non-verbal action.  Employees are also expected to use a variety of media in communicating and making presentations appropriate to the audience. |
| | Multimedia Communication | Develops, receives, and conveys information using computers, software applications, and multi-media and other technologies and techniques. |
| | Oral Communication | Expresses ideas, facts, or other information effectively to individuals or groups, taking into account the audience and nature of the information (e.g., technical, sensitive, controversial).  Makes clear and convincing oral presentations using the proper briefing protocols.  Listens to others, attends to non-verbal cues, and responds appropriately. |
| | Written Communication | Recognizes and uses correct grammar, punctuation, and spelling.  Communicates information (e.g., facts, ideas, or messages) in a succinct and organized manner in the proper format.  Produces written material that is appropriate for the intended audience. |