(Un)making Détente: Yugoslavia, the United States, and the Global Cold War, 1968–1980

by Milorad Lazic

B.A in History, November 2004, University of Belgrade
M.A. in History, May 2012, Central Connecticut State University

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James Hershberg
Professor of History

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Milorad Lazic

Dissertation Research Committee:

James Hershberg, Professor of History, Dissertation Director

Gregg Brazinsky, Professor of History, Committee Member

Hugh Agnew, Professor of History, Committee Member

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Abstract of Dissertation

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The dissertation examines the global history of the Cold War and decolonization in the 1970s. It does so by connecting the histories of the so-called First, Second, and Third Worlds in the "long 1970s." Belgrade's foreign and domestic policy objectives required that Yugoslavia assume a disruptive role toward détente which it saw as an attempt by the superpowers to divide the spheres of influence (a "new Yalta"). This unease led the Belgrade regime to provide military and economic support to the regimes in Cairo and Addis Ababa but also to liberation movements in Lusophone Africa. Yugoslavia's activism underlined the significance of internationalist solidarity. Yet, as my dissertation demonstrates, Yugoslavia's military involvement in Egypt, Angola, and Ethiopia proved evidence of the country's inability to transcend the Cold War divisions imposed by the superpowers.

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A Note on Terminology, Translations, and Transliterations

In this dissertation, I often used the names of capital cities (e.g., Belgrade, Washington, Moscow) to refer to national governments. I did this for stylistic reasons.

I sometimes referred to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia as "the Party." At the 1952 Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the Party relinquished its monopoly on power and changed the name to reflect its new role in society. In my dissertation the terms Party and League are used interchangeably.

I used the terms "Third World" but with full awareness of its analytical impreciseness and political and racial associations. The Yugoslav government passionately disliked the term and insisted calling its partners in Africa, Asia, and Latin America "developing countries" (*zemlje u razvoju*, ZUR).

All English translations from Serbo-Croatian and Russian are mine. Documents from the Yugoslav archives are cited in Serbo-Croatian, as they appear in their original form.

All Yugoslav names, document, book, and article titles are in standard Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian spelling (in Latin alphabet) instead of their English transliteration, e.g., Krško instead of Krsko, Koča Popović instead of Koca Popovic, etc.

Abbreviations

AHP	Averell Harriman Papers
AJ	Arhiv Jugoslavije
AS	Arhiv Slovenije
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CWIHP	Cold War International History Project
ČSSR	Čehoslovačka socijalistička republika
d	*dosije*
DA	Diplomatski arhiv
DDO	Declassified Documents Online
DSIP	Državni sekretarijat inostranih poslova
DSPJ	*Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Jugoslavije*
f	*fascikla*
FRUS	*Foreign Relations of the United States*
GFPL	Gerald Ford Presidential Library
JCPL	Jimmy Carter Presidential Library
k	*kutija*
KPR	Kabinet Predsednika Republike
KSČ	Komunistická strana Československa
LCY	League of Communists of Yugoslavia
LJPL	Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library
LOC	Library of Congress
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
MSP RS	Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije
NAM	Nonaligned Movement
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSA	National Security Advisor
PAIGC	Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde
PMAC	Provisional Military Administrative Council
PSFRJ	Predsedništvo SFRJ
RG	Record Group
RNPL	Richard Nixon Presidential Library
s	*signatura*
SAD	Sjedinjene Američke Države
SIV	Savezno izvršno veće
SSIP	Savezni sekretarijat inostranih poslova
SSNO	Savezni sekretarijat za narodnu odbranu
SSSR	Sovjetski savez socijalističkih republika
SSRNJ	Savez socijalističkog radnog naroda Yugoslavije
UAR	United Arab Republic/Ujedinjena arapska republika
UN	United Nations

Introduction

Many Yugoslavs who lived through the late 1960s and the 1970s still remember those years with nostalgia. Compared to the 1980s, a decade marked by shortages, austerity, and overall material and spiritual decline leading to the bloody collapse of Yugoslavia, the 1960s and the 1970s were remembered as the "golden age." Much of the present-day Yugonostalgia – the social, cultural, and psychological phenomenon of longing for a lost utopia – focuses on these years that are remembered as the times of abundance and optimism. The Slovenian sociologist Mitja Velikonja noted that the concept of Yugonostalgia has relied on four interrelated myths: of partisan struggle, of Josip Broz Tito, of Yugoslav exceptionalism, and of prosperity and superiority ("better than the East and the West").[1] The sense of pride over Yugoslavia's position and role in the world became, in Svetlana Boym's words, one of those "recurrent narratives that are perceived as natural in a given culture but in fact were naturalized and their historical, political, or literary origins forgotten or disguised."[2] Ordinary Yugoslavs believed in the magic properties of the "red passport" that transcended the value of a mere travel document and gave its owner the ability to traverse the world with the same ease (but without splendor) as the country's beloved President Tito.[3] Those who enjoyed the privileges of the "red passport" would often say how back in the 1970s "we used to be

[1] Mitja Velikonja, "Politička mitologija nepostojećeg – narativni sadržaji jugonostalgije u postjugoslovenskim zemljama," in Ljubiša Despotović, Srđan Šljukić, Darko Gavrilović, Vjekoslav Perica, Mitja Velikonja, eds., *Mitovi epohe socijalizma* (Novi Sad i Sremski Karlovci: Centar za istoriju, demokratiju i pomirenje and Fakultet za evropske pravno-političke studije, 2010), 134-135.
[2] Svetlana Boym, *Common Places. Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 4.
[3] In 2000, one of the most popular Yugoslav pop singers, Đorđe Balašević, released a song "Devedeste" (the Nineties) that could be interpreted as the anthem of Yugonostalgia. Balašević's song has a verse that says "at least we had … the red passport without a flaw that crosses borders without much hassle ("*crveni pasoš bez mane što prolazi grane be puno njakanja*").

something" ("*bili smo neko i nešto*").[4] Surprisingly, this myth of Yugoslavia's importance in global politics was also accepted and perpetuated by those rare studies that dealt with the country's relations with the world in the 1970s.[5]

This dissertation questions the myth of Yugoslavia's prominent role in the world in the late 1960s and the 1970s. By examining Yugoslavia's position in the Cold War through the lens of the country's relations with the United States, but also the Soviet Union, China, and the nonaligned world, my dissertation aims to provide a critical assessment of Yugoslavia's global policy in the late 1960s and the 1970s. The scope of the dissertation is determined by two issues. The first issue was the question of Tito's succession that dominated Yugoslavia's domestic and foreign policies. In domestic affairs, Tito initiated a series of institutional transformations to establish political and constitutional mechanisms that would preserve Titoism and ensure that Yugoslavia's foreign policy would remain independent and nonaligned after Tito. The question of Tito's succession and the uncertainty surrounding it was inextricably tied to the larger context of the Cold War in the 1970s. Thus, the scope of this dissertation was also

[4] In 2017, people across the former Yugoslavia watched, with a mix of disdain and amusement, a viral video from a NATO summit where U.S. President Donald Trump pushed the Montenegrin Prime Minister Duško Jovanović aside. A majority of internet commentators agreed that something like that would not have been possible in Tito's time.

[5] The scholarship on Yugoslavia's foreign policy in the 1970s is almost exclusively in Croatian/Serbian. Tvrtko Jakovina's 2011 book, *Treća strana hladnog rata* [The Third Side of the Cold War] is the most comprehensive study about Yugoslavia's policy of nonalignment in the late 1970s and the 1980s. Jakovina stated that Yugoslav diplomacy was "excellently informed or important and influential in some of the key events in the late 1970s and the 1980s." Tvrtko Jakovina, *Treća strana hladnog rata* (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2011), 19. Similar to his Croatian colleague, Serbian historian Dragan Bogetić in his two studies on Yugoslav–U.S. relations that cover the period from 1961 to 1975, overemphasized the role of Yugoslavia in global affairs. For example, Bogetić claimed that the 1970 summit of the Nonaligned Movement in Lusaka confirmed Tito's and Yugoslavia's "extraordinaryly important role" that resulted, among other things, in Richard Nixon's decision to visit Yugoslavia in 1970. See Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko–američki odnosi 1961–1971* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2012) and *Jugoslovensko–američki odnosi u doba bipolarnog detanta, 1972–1975* (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike, 2016). In 1976, a former Yugoslav diplomat, Leo Mates, published a survey of Yugoslavia's foreign policy, *Međunarodni odnosi socijalističke Jugoslavije*, in which he exaggerated Yugoslavia's importance in global affairs.

determined by the processes and events in the global Cold War in the 1970s that highlighted Yugoslavia's precarious position in global affairs. These included the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Brezhnev Doctrine, the détente between the superpowers, the reemergence of China on the world stage, the 1973 war in the Middle East and the oil crisis, the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the decolonization of Lusophone Africa, the crisis in the Horn of Africa, the 1978 Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea, the Havana NAM summit, and, finally, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

My work seeks to make important contributions to the scholarship on Yugoslavia's and U.S. foreign relations, but also to the general literature on the global Cold War in the 1970s. By using Yugoslavia as a case study, my research offers a case study of how small states viewed and reacted to détente. Tito's foreign and domestic policy objectives required that Yugoslavia assume a disruptive role toward détente, because he saw it as an attempt of the superpowers to divide the spheres of influence (a "new Yalta"). This unease about the spheres of influence was exacerbated by the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine, but also by the events in the Eastern Mediterranean, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Horn of Africa, and South Asia, that seemingly confirmed Yugoslavia's fears about the secret agreements between the United States and the USSR. In addition, my dissertation charts Yugoslavia's responses to the perceived hegemony of the superpowers and examines the limitations of Yugoslavia's global activism in the 1970s. As my work shows, Yugoslavia's involvement in Egypt, Angola, and Ethiopia proved the country's inability to transcend the Cold War divisions imposed by the superpowers. Ultimately, by examining Yugoslavia's global activism, it critically reassesses the effectiveness of nonalignment as a means to achieve Yugoslavia's foreign

policy goals. One of the conclusions that my work makes is that in the 1970s the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) was far less influential than the Yugoslavs desired and wanted to believe.[6]

This dissertation also focuses on the evolution of U.S. foreign policy toward Yugoslavia. It traces the United States' response to Yugoslavia's disruptive role in global affairs, by showing how Washington reconciled Belgrade's attempts to spoil U.S. objectives to achieve détente with the USSR with its long-term goal of preserving Yugoslavia's independence. My dissertation also goes beyond U.S.–Yugoslav bilateral relations and provides insights into general themes in U.S. relations with the world in the 1970s by examining how the United States reacted to Yugoslavia's global activism in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The United States perceived a nonaligned Yugoslavia as both an asset and a liability in global affairs. Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Henry Kissinger disliked Yugoslavia's global activism that threatened to encumber U.S. foreign policy goals. Kissinger, in particular, showed no patience for Yugoslavia's escapades in the Third World and advised a tougher approach to Belgrade. In contrast, Jimmy Carter saw Yugoslavia as a valuable ally in suppressing Cuban radical impulses and assumed a flexible approach toward Yugoslavia's policy of nonalignment. My dissertation touches upon Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba. The three

[6] The German scholar Jürgen Dinkel claimed that in the 1970s the movement reached its "heyday in the context of the North–South conflict" and institutionalization. See Jürgen Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis, Organization and Politics (1927-1992)*(Leiden: Brill, 2018) and "'Third world begins to flex its muscles': the Non-Aligned Movement and the North–South conflict during the 1970s," in Sandra Bott, Jussi Hanhimaki, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, Marko Wyss, eds., *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War. Between or Within the Blocs?* (London and New York: Routledge, 2016). My interpretation, however, is closer to Lorenz M. Lüthi's assessment of the movement in the 1970s. He noted that in the 1970s, the movement suffered from "programmatic deficiencies," the lack of charismatic leadership, and internal struggles that diminished its effectiveness and "political gravitas." My dissertation shows that Tito's attempts to overcome these deficiencies were ultimately futile. See Lorenz M. Lüthi, "Non-alignment, 1961–74," in Bott, et al., *Neutrality and Neutralism*, 101–102.

communist countries each offered their alternatives to the global order that directly challenged Yugoslavia's policies. The Soviet efforts to reverse the clock back to 1948 and erase the damage caused by the Soviet–Yugoslav split and Khrushchev's humiliation in Belgrade in 1955 marked the last decade of Tito's life. The Brezhnev Doctrine that was promulgated after the invasion of Czechoslovakia hung like the sword of Damocles over the Yugoslavs' heads. The fears of Soviet interference were occasionally heightened by the Kremlin's alleged support for anti-Titoist groups, but also by Soviet interventions in Africa and Asia that practically expanded the reach of the doctrine and suggested that Moscow and Washington implicitly agreed on the division of the spheres of influence. To mitigate the Soviet threat and avoid a "new Yalta," Yugoslavia energized its policies in the Third World and normalized its relations with China. As the policies in the Third World damaged U.S.–Yugoslav relations, the Sino–Yugoslav rapprochement, instead of strengthening the Belgrade's position vis-à-vis Moscow, further harmed Yugoslav–Soviet relations. By examining the Belgrade–Moscow–Beijing triangle, my dissertation provides valuable insights into the Sino–Soviet competition in the context of the global Cold War in the 1970s.[7] Finally, the Yugoslav–Cuban competition that I address in my work allows us to observe, from at least the Yugoslav perspective, the role of Cuba in the Third World.[8]

[7] Robert Rakove noted the importance of nonalignment in the 1960s in the context of the Sino–Soviet split. In the 1970s, as the case of Yugoslavia demonstrated, nonalignment still mattered in the ideological battle between Moscow and Beijing. One of the problems of Yugoslavia's foreign policy was that in the 1970s it often found itself in the line of fire. For nonalignment and the United States in the 1960s see Robert Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
[8] Piero Gleijeses addressed Cuban involvement in the Third World in several works. See Piero Gleijeses, *The Cuban Drumbeat: Castro's Worldview: Cuban Foreign Policy in a Hostile World* (New York and Calcutta: Seagull Books, 2009); *Conflicting missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001); and *Visions of freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria and the struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2016). Yugoslav–Cuban competition constituted an important element in both countries' policies in

My work on Yugoslavia's relations with the United States in the global Cold War in the 1970s builds upon the works of Lorraine Lees, H.W. Brands, and John Campbell, who examined U.S.–Yugoslav relations in the Cold War in the aftermath of the Tito–Stalin split highlighting Washington's strategic goal to "keep Tito afloat."[9] Similar to Campbell's observation that Yugoslavia "attempted a role in world politics far beyond the capacity of the resources of the country to sustain," my dissertation indicates that Yugoslavia's role in the global Cold War was marked by Belgrade's often unsuccessful attempts to resolve the tension between its desires and its abilities. My dissertation also relies on the works of scholars such as Alvin Rubinstein, Tvrtko Jakovina, Rinna Kullaa, and Robert Niebuhr, who wrote about different aspects of Yugoslavia's policy of nonalignment.[10] Although my work agrees with these authors that the policy of nonalignment had an important function in Yugoslavia's foreign and domestic policies, it emphasizes the limitations of Yugoslavia's global activism by offering a new, critical reading of Yugoslav sources that often provide a triumphalist vision of the country's role

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the 1970s. The struggle for the soul of the NAM culminated in 1979 at the Havana summit. By illuminating Yugoslavia's perspective, my dissertation wants to contribute to a better understanding of Havana's efforts to play a global role in the 1970s.

[9] Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1993), H.W. Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), John C. Campbell, *Tito's Separate Road. America and Yugoslavia in World Politics* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1967).

[10] Rubinstein provided still unsurpassed genealogy of Yugoslavia's policy of nonalignment from its inception to 1970. My work, thus, represents a sort of an epilogue to the Rubinstein study. Alvin Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). Jakovina's study from 2011, *Treća strana hladnog rata*, mentioned above, represents so far the most comprehensive account of Yugoslavia's policy of nonalignment in the late 1970s and the 1980s published in Croatian/Bosnian/Serbian language. Despite its several methodological shortcomings, Jakovina's work highlights the importance of Yugoslav sources for the study of the global Cold War. Rinna Kullaa emphasized the European roots of nonalignment and Finland's and Yugoslavia's efforts to preserve their independence from the Soviet Union in the 1950s and the early 1960s. Rinna Kullaa, *Non-alignment and Its Origins in Cold War Europe: Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet Challenge* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012). Robert Niebuhr's book connects Yugoslavia's policy of nonalignment with the regime's quest for legitimacy at home. Robert Niebuhr, *The Search for a Cold War Legitimacy: Foreign Policy and Tito's Yugoslavia* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2018).

in the world affairs with little regard for reality. Finally, my work was inspired by, and benefited from, the scholarship on the global 1970s that highlighted the interdependence of the Cold War and decolonization and provided a critical assessment of détente.[11] By examining Yugoslavia's global activism and its unease with détente, my dissertation wants to provide a more complex account of the Cold War in the 1970s, one which accentuates the importance of small actors in (un)intentionally shaping the course of events. The examples of Yugoslavia's aid to Angola and Ethiopia show a remarkable degree of Belgrade's independence in global affairs.

This dissertation consists of three parts, each one divided into two chapters. Chapter 1 analyzes Yugoslav responses to the August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. It shows that the Soviet intervention profoundly influenced Yugoslavia's domestic and foreign policies in a fashion that was no less dramatic than the changes initiated after the 1948 Yugoslav–Soviet split. The Soviet intervention led the regime in Belgrade to redefine its positions vis-à-vis the superpowers, China, and the Third World. In addition, the sense of danger of foreign interventions catalyzed a series of domestic political and economic reforms that were geared toward providing long-term stability and an orderly transition of power in the event of Tito's death. Chapter 2 charts Yugoslavia's foreign and domestic policies in the first three years after the invasion. The chapter shows

[11] Odd Arne Westad wrote about distinct models of modernization that marked the superpowers' competition in the Third World. See Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). A volume edited by Robert McMahon explored interdependence between two separate processes of the Cold War and decolonization. Robert McMahon, ed., *The Cold War in the Third World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent, eds., *The Shock of the Global. The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2010) and Jussi M. Hanhimäki, *The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War* (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2012).

that Yugoslavia, to minimize the danger of Soviet interference, turned to the United States and China, but also tried to reinvigorate the NAM. It also explores the anxieties raised by the so-called Croatian Spring in 1971, especially as it created the possibility of domestic instability that could provide the pretext for foreign involvement.

The next two chapters analyze Yugoslavia's response to détente and the country's and its leadership's anxiety over the alleged superpowers' deal at the expense of Yugoslavia. Chapter 3 shows that in 1973 and 1974, Yugoslavia played a disruptive role in international relations, particularly in the cases of the 1973 October War and the 1974 Cyprus Crisis. This policy was designed to increase Yugoslavia's revolutionary credentials within the NAM but also to disturb détente and possible superpowers' arrangements about the spheres of influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Chapter 3 also explores political changes at home – the 1974 Constitution and the Tenth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) – that aimed at strengthening the regime's domestic position. The chapter shows that the consequences of these policies were the deterioration of U.S.–Yugoslav relations and a temporary Yugoslav–Soviet rapprochement. Chapter 4 discusses the limitations of Yugoslavia's activism abroad by focusing on the case study of Yugoslavia's involvement in Angola in the early 1970s and the beginning of the Yugoslav–Cuban competition for the primacy in the NAM. It shows that Yugoslavia's setback in Angola in 1975, the Cuban challenge, and Soviet efforts to homogenize the European communist movement at the 1976 East Berlin conference required Belgrade to redefine its foreign policy.

Chapters 5 and 6 discuss Yugoslavia's foreign policy during last three years of Tito's life. Chapter 5 follows Tito's trips to the Soviet Union, North Korea, and China,

explaining how the renewal of Sino–Yugoslav relations in 1977/8 led to another Yugoslav–Soviet split. It also turns to Yugoslav–U.S. relations that, despite the "misunderstanding" over Yugoslavia's role in Ethiopia, reached new heights in this period demonstrated by the unprecedented level of U.S. support for Yugoslavia's nonalignment. Chapter 6 analyzes the crises of Yugoslavia's foreign policy that were caused by the 1978 Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia (Kampuchea), Cuban attempts to take over the NAM, and, finally, the 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. These problems, together with Tito's incapacity in early 1980, intensified the anticipation of the country's demise through either a foreign intervention or internal disturbances or both. The conclusion offers a recapitulation of these issues in Yugoslavia's foreign and domestic policies from 1968 to 1980 with some reflections on the themes of Yugoslavia's post-1980 history.

What this dissertation is not about

For different reasons – for the sake of brevity, unavailability of sources, and methodological concerns – I mentioned some important issues only in passing. These issues, however, deserve to be acknowledged. One is the issue of Yugoslavia's relations with its neighbors. I often refered to Yugoslav–Bulgarian, Yugoslav–Romanian, or Yugoslav–Italian relations in the context of larger Cold War calculations about the future of Yugoslavia and the Balkans. Bulgaria's real or perceived role as a Soviet proxy in the Balkans ("Cuba of the Balkans" or, alternatively, "Vietnam of the Balkans") was a permanent topic in Belgrade's relations with Moscow. However, Yugoslavia's relations with its neighbors went beyond the Cold War issues in the 1970s and included problems that predated the Cold War and went back to the 19th century that this dissertation could

not address. The running joke in the 1970s and 1980s was that Yugoslavia was surrounded by B(ulgaria). R(omania). I(taly). G(reece). A(lbania). M(agyar). A(ustria) – an acronym that spelled "troubles." Although some scholarly works on this topic made significant efforts to illuminate Yugoslavia's relations with its neighbors, a comprehensive study is still lacking.[12]

Relations with neighbors overlapped with two other issues: Yugoslavia's relations with the European Economic Community and Western Europe and relations with Eastern European socialist countries. In Chapter 1, I discuss Yugoslav–Czechoslovak relations in a greater detail. After the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslav–Czechoslovak political relations declined and Czechoslovakia, together with Bulgaria, was often at the forefront of anti-Yugoslav campaigns. Yugoslavia's relations with East Germany and Poland were also under the shadow of Yugoslav–Soviet relations but by the end of 1970s, Belgrade, East Berlin, and Warsaw had managed to carve a space that

[12] The majority of these works is dedicated to Yugoslav–Italian relations in the context of the Yugoslav–Italian border dispute and the 1975 Osimo Agreement. See Massimo Bucarelli, Luca Micheletta, Luciano Monzali and Luca Riccardi, eds., *Italy and Tito's Yugoslavia in the Age of International Détente* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2018), Saša Mišić, *Pomirenje na Jadranu: Jugoslavija i Italija na putu ka Osimskim sporazumima iz 1975.* (Belgrade: Fakultet političkih nauka Univerziteta Beograd, 2018) and "Poseta Josipa Broza Tita Italiji 1971. godine," in *Tito–Viđenja i tumačenja*. Zbornik radova (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije and Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2011), Jože Pirjevec, Borut Klabjan, and Gorazd Bajc, eds., *Osimska Meja: Jugoslovansko-italijanska pogajanja in razmejitev leta 1975* (Koper: Založba Annales, 2006). For Yugoslav–Austrian relations see Petar Dragišić, "Operation Phoenix in Yugoslavia in the Summer of 1972 and Yugoslav-Austrian Relations" *Tokovi istorije* 3 (2018) and "Tito i Austrijanci. Susreti Josipa Broza Tita sa vodećim ličnostima austrijske politike 60-ih i 70-ih godina," in *Tito–Viđenja i tumačenja*. Karlo Ruzicic-Kessler and Michel Portmann, "Yugoslavia and its Western Neighbours 1945–1980," *Zeitgeschichte* 5 (2014): 296–310, Michael Portmann, "Yugoslavia and Austria: Paths of a Difficult Neighborhood (1955-1991)" in Arnold Suppan, Wolfgang Mueller, eds., *Peaceful Coexistence or Iron Curtain? Austria, Neutrality, and Eastern Europe in the Cold War and Détente, 1955-1989* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2009): 432–462. Yugoslav–Albanian relations in the 1970s were mentioned in Milorad Komatina, *Enver Hodža i jugoslovensko–albanski odnosi* (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 1996) and Aleksandar Životić, "Jugoslavija, Albanija, i čehoslovačka kriza, 1968–1971," *Tokovi istorije* 3 (2012): 62–86. Two Yugoslav ambassadors in Tirana in the late 1970s and the early 1980s left useful accounts on Yugoslav–Albanian relations.See Branko Komatina, *Jugoslovensko–albanski odnosi, 1979–1983. Beleške i sećanja ambasadora* (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 1995) and Trajko Lipkovski, *Četiri tiranske godine* (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike, 2008).

allowed them to conduct bilateral relations with minimal Soviet interference. Yugoslavia's relations with Poland after the emergence of *Solidarność* (Solidarity) in August 1980 were important for several reasons. The Yugoslav regime in the post-Tito period also struggled for legitimacy in the context of a severe economic crisis. Moreover, some in the Yugoslav leadership believed that the unrest in Kosovo that erupted in March 1981 had Moscow's fingerprints all over it. The premise was that the USSR instigated the riots to divert attention from Poland while contemplating whether or not to intervene militarily. Unfortunately, this dissertation could not address these important issues.

Similarly, I noted Yugoslavia's relations with Western European states only in passing, when discussing the CSCE summit in Helsinki (1975), the European communist parties' summit in East Berlin (1976), and the follow-up CSCE meeting in Belgrade (1977) and Yugoslavia's security concerns about hostile émigré groups. Yugoslavia's relations with Western European states and Western European communist and social-democratic parties constituted an important element of Yugoslavia's foreign, security, and economic policies in the 1970s.[13]

Finally, the interconnectedness of Yugoslavia's domestic and foreign policies requires further attention. My work addressed some of those issues (the Croatian Spring, the Tenth LCY Congress, etc.), but at the expense of some other important social, economic, and cultural phenomena that were inextricably tied to Yugoslavia's foreign policy.

[13] For Yugoslav–EEC relations see Benedetto Zaccaria, *The EEC's Yugoslav Policy in Cold War Europe, 1968-1980* (London: Palgrave 2016). Yugoslav–FRG relations in the early 1970s are addressed in a study published in Belgrade in Serbian, Vladimir Ivanović, *Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka 1967–1973. Između ideologije i pragmatizma* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2009).

A short note on sources

This dissertation draws upon records from the United States and the former Yugoslavia. In the United States, these include records from the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter Presidential Libraries and the records of the State Department in the National Archives, College Park, MD. In addition, I used personal papers of Vladimir Dedijer in the Bentley Historical Library at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, the W. Averell Harriman and the Patrick Moynihan papers in the Library of Congress, and the Walter Stoessel papers at the Georgetown University Library.

In the archives of the former Yugoslavia, I relied primarily on the records from the Archives of Yugoslavia and the Diplomatic Archive of the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Serbia, both in Belgrade. To a lesser extent, I used documents from the Archives of the Republic of Slovenia. I hope that I succeeded in resisting the siren song of Yugoslav archival sources. The archival materials that one can find in Belgrade, Ljubljana, or Zagreb are incredibly rich and often provide the only window into personae, events, and processes that are otherwise inaccessible to researchers. For example, an extensive collection of Yugoslav documents on Libya offer a window into the inner workings of the Gaddafi regime. However, the authors of these sources often consciously or subconsciously idealized Yugoslavia's and Tito's influence in global affairs or in bilateral relations with a particular country. Caution is advised.

In accessing these documents, I faced several other challenges. First, many government documents from the United States that I wished to see were unavailable to me. Namely, the entire boxes of material related to Yugoslavia in the Carter Library remain classified. For those records and many others, I filed numerous Mandatory

Declassification Review and FOIA requests that are still pending. Fortunately, some of the documents were published in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (*FRUS*) volumes. Second, I could not gain access to some manuscript collections in the United States that I believe would be useful for my research, such as Henry Kissinger's and Malcolm Toon's papers. Similarly, the personal collection of the Yugoslav ambassador to the United States, Dimče Belovski, that is kept in the State Archives of the Republic of North Macedonia, the Veljko Mićunović papers at the Archives of Serbia, and the Koča Popović papers at the Historical Archives of Belgrade were also beyond my reach because these materials were either unprocessed or under review and unavailable to researchers. Third, although the archives in Belgrade are fairly open to researchers, record management practices created some important gaps. One of the more egregious examples are the records of the fourth and the sixth NAM summits that do not have any memoranda of Tito's conversations with foreign leaders. I tried to surmount this obstacle by relying on memoirs and diaries of other participants of these key events.

Finally, a special challenge for me was that the relevant former Soviet archives were beyond my reach. I tried to bridge this gap by using online databases and published collections. I used some Soviet sources that are available through the Digital Archive of the Wilson Center's History and Public Policy Program, the Cold War International History Project *Bulletin*, the National Security Archive, and a collection of documents on Yugoslav–Soviet relations that was published by the Archives of Yugoslavia. I relied also on periodicals such as Moscow's *Pravda* for official statements and policy outlines. The lacunae of sources other than American and Yugoslav was even more critical in the case of countries such as Angola, Cuba, and Ethiopia with whom both Yugoslavia and the

United States had important interactions in the 1970s and to whom I dedicated considerable attention in my work. I was, however, able to supplement my research by superb scholarship on these topics by Piero Gleijeses, Radoslav Yordanov, and Nancy Mitchell. I am fully aware of the limitations that this lacunae of primary sources imposes on this study. Yet, I hope that my careful scrutiny of available sources helped in filling this gap.

PART I – The Years of Confusion, 1968–1972

Chapter 1: "The Elusive Summer of '68"

The 1984 Yugoslav film classic, coming-of-age comedy *Varljivo leto '68* (The Elusive Summer of '68) depicted the adventures of a young man, Petar Cvetković, who had to navigate between his authoritarian father and his own sexual awakening. The tumultuous political summer of 1968 served as a backdrop for boy's romantic and sexual escapades. Following many comic twists and turns, Petar falls in love with his female professor of Marxism, a librarian, his father's friend's new wife, and father's boss' twin daughters. However, every one of these relationships remains unfulfilled for different reasons that are beyond our hero's control. Petar finally finds his true love in a young Czechoslovak girl from the orchestra that was visiting his small town. Alas, their love affair gets interrupted by the Soviet invasion of her country and girl's sudden return to Czechoslovakia.[14]

The title is ambiguous. It is, at the same time, reference to ever-changing weather but also the turbulent political events – student protests in Belgrade and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Petar's father, who is the district judge and a domestic tyrant that believes in a "firm hand," anxiously watches how the whole world crumbles around him. As student protests develop, he bans newspapers and television in his home and avoids telephone calls from Belgrade ("Hang up! That must be a provocation!" he yells at

[14] The director, Goran Paskaljević (b. 1947), belonged to the so-called Prague School – the Yugoslav cinematographers who graduated from the Film and TV School of the Academy of Performing Arts in Prague (FAMU). In 1968, Paskaljević was in Czechoslovakia and after the Soviet invasion he returned to Yugoslavia. The movie can be read as Paskaljević's attempt to deal with his boyhood interrupted. "Paskaljevic finds the extraordinary in the reality of the everyday, and his realism, informed by the political transformations he has witnessed, is inflected with irony," wrote the organizer of Paskaljević's 2008 retrospective in the Museum of Modern Art, New York. Available at https://www.moma.org/calendar/film/578?locale=en (accessed October 25, 2019).

his unsuspecting wife). Worst of all, the father gets increasingly agitated with his son's irresponsible behavior in the times of political upheaval.

This chapter follows Yugoslavia's reactions to the Prague Spring and the invasion and how the events in Czechoslovakia influenced Yugoslavia's foreign policy. It outlines the initial responses of Yugoslavia, the United States, and the Soviet Union and its allies vis-à-vis the Prague Spring. It shows that the events leading up to the intervention did not precipitate a dramatic transformation of Yugoslavia's foreign and domestic policies. Yet, the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia was a catalytic event that reoriented Yugoslavia to seek a temporary rapprochement with the West and accelerated its efforts to create an international network of allies to counterbalance the threat to its sovereignty.[15] The Yugoslavs cautiously observed the changes in Czechoslovakia. Belgrade had equal reasons to be satisfied and anxious about the events in Czechoslovakia. Alexander Dubček, a relatively unknown First Secretary of the Slovak branch of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (Komunistická strana Československa, KSČ) ascended to the top of the KSČ after the Central Committee ousted Antonin Novotny at its January 5 meeting.

The West kept its distance from Dubček and assumed a policy of strict non–interference to preserve nascent détente but also to avoid public embarrassment. The USSR and its Eastern European allies took a hostile approach from the beginning, but it took over seven months for them to make the fateful decision to intervene. Yugoslavia, presumed a natural ally of the "new course," took a more cautious approach toward the

[15] One British diplomat noted that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia had done more to "Westernize" Yugoslavia's foreign policy than ten years of Western persuading. Cited in Hrvoje Klasić, *Jugoslavija i svijet 1968.* (Smederevo: Heliks, 2018), 313.

Prague Spring and up until the Soviet-led intervention largely tried to ignore the events in Czechoslovakia. However, the lukewarm Western response to the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia increased Belgrade's mistrust toward détente and a "new Yalta" that would be made at the expense of small, independent, and neutral and nonaligned countries such as Yugoslavia. The Soviet transgression of international norms and the Western response (or lack thereof it) created the conditions for Yugoslavia's activist foreign policy in the long 1970s. The main objective of this foreign policy was the transformation of an international political and economic order – "détente for the whole world" – that would provide equal rights to small and large states alike. "Détente for the whole world" rejected the spheres of influence and the attempts to limit one's sovereignty thus directly challenging the international order dominated by the superpowers.

"Communism in Czechoslovakia is(n't) in danger": Yugoslavia's ambiguous position toward the Prague Spring

The ghosts of 1956 haunted the memories of all of those involved in the Prague Spring, participants and observers alike.[16] Unlike Yugoslavia's ambiguous stance toward the new Czechoslovak leadership, the Soviets and their Eastern European allies perceived the events in Czechoslovakia as provocative and dangerous. Already in January 1968, the Hungarian ambassador in Prague told his Yugoslav colleague that the "Russians cheered for Novotny" and that with Dubček's election, they grew anxious because of possible changes in Czechoslovakia's foreign policy, namely its rapprochement with West

[16] Czech historian Vilém Prečan noted the complexity of the events in Czechoslovakia. He criticized the term the "Prague Spring" as confusing that "creates such difficulties for the historian trying to grasp the meaning of the period." Prečan suggested that the Czechoslovak crisis should be understood as a multidimensional "chain of crises" that converged in Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968. See Vilém Prečan, "Dimensions of the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1967–1970," *Europe-Asia Studies* vol. 60, no. 10 (December 2008): 1659–1676.

Germany.[17] Other socialist countries watched the events unfolding in Czechoslovakia with similar discomfort. The Yugoslav embassy in Warsaw reported that the Poles watched with particular anxiety Czechoslovak attempts to "rehabilitate Jews" and the implications of that policy for Poland.[18] Counselor Jan Patek from the Czechoslovak embassy in London said that the German Democratic Republic and the USSR reacted "negatively and with criticism" toward the events in Czechoslovakia, while Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania were publicly restrained but internally criticized Czechoslovakia's policy as "adventurist."[19] The April Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) at which international situation was discussed, characterized the events in Czechoslovakia as the consequence of "nationalist feelings of younger party cadres" and that Czechoslovak comrades had ideologically deviated from Marxism.[20] A particularly ardent critic of the new course in Czechoslovakia was the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Piotr Shelest, who was concerned about the spill-over of "anarchy" from his western neighbor. "The situation in Czechoslovakia has become so complex because certain leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia have failed to undertake a principled, class-based assessment of ongoing events," Shelest said, adding that the "Soviet Union and other socialist countries are taking all necessary measures to forestall the victory of

[17] Yugoslav source from the Polish embassy in Prague confirmed Soviet anxiety over Dubček's future foreign policy orientation. O reagovanju na najnovije promene u ČSSR, Državni Sekretarijat inostranih poslova (DSIP), Uprava za Istočnu Evropu, February 2, 1968, Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije (DA MSP RS), Politička arhiva (PA) 1968 ČSSR, fascikla 26, dosije 1, signatura 42923.
[18] Razgovor sa ministrom K. Olševskim, March 27, 1968, DA MSP RS, PA 1968 ČSSR, f. 26, d. 4, s. 411504.
[19] Ambasada SFRJ London DSIP-u, March 6, 1968,DA MSP RS, PA 1968, ČSSR, f. 26, d. 4, s. 48587.
[20] The Plenum was held on April 9-11, 1968. Informacija o aprilskom plenumu Centralnog komiteta KPSS, Odeljenje za medjunarodne veze CKSKJ, May 6, 1968, Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), Kabinet Predsednika Republike (KPR) fond 837, I–5–b/99–21 SSSR.

counterrevolution."[21] The conclusions of the Plenum vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia were probably sent to Soviet diplomatic outposts, and, in May 1968, the Soviet military attaché in Athens told a Yugoslav officer Tihomir Vilović that the Soviet embassy received a circular where it says that the situation in Czechoslovakia was out of control: "bourgeois elements and *kulaks* are raising their heads [there]."[22]

The developments in Czechoslovakia were blamed on domestic reactionaries but also on the West who, as the Soviets believed, instigated the "new course." Shelest in his speech pointed out that the events in Czechoslovakia were "being directed by a skillful hand from abroad," notably the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.[23] East Germans were more imaginative in their paranoia about alleged Western interference in Czechoslovakia. Colonel Heinrich Winkler, chief of the Foreign Relations Directorate of the Ministry of National Defense of the GDR, complained to the Yugoslav military attaché in Berlin that a large number of members of the armed forces of the United States and West Germany came to Czechoslovakia disguised as tourists. Moreover, said Winkler, in Czechoslovakia there were several American tanks with crews that participated in the making of a movie about the role of U.S. troops in the liberation of Czechoslovakia, and several more West German tanks for the same purpose. "To the Czechs that can look naïve… but it is not hard to guess what kind of tasks these people have and that tourism is not on their minds," Winkler said, adding that the

[21] Report by P. Shelest on the April 1968 Plenum of the CC CPSU, April 25, 1968, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 97, Ll. 1-62. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112163 (accessed June 28, 2019).
[22] Ambasada SFRJ Atina DSIP-u, May 18, 1968, PA 1968, ČSSR, f. 26, d. 5, s. 418620.
[23] Report by P. Shelest on the April 1968 Plenum of the CC CPSU, April 25, 1968, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsDAHOU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 97, Ll. 1-62. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112163 (accessed July 25, 2019).

neighboring countries are worried that this kind of behavior weakened the "defense chain of the socialist coalition."[24]

Contrary to this alarmist view from the East, the Yugoslavs noted that Western countries were ostentatiously reticent in their approach to Czechoslovak "new course" and its possible repercussions. As László Borhi wrote: "In 1968, Czechoslovakia's independence was not a high price to pay for Soviet cooperation."[25] According to Yugoslav reports, the British Foreign Office took a cautious approach because as they said, "no one can help the Czechs," probably hinting at Western failure to aid the Hungarians in 1956.[26] The Yugoslav embassy in Washington reported, based upon conversations with State Department officials, that the United States could not influence the events in Czechoslovakia and that these events were observed exclusively through the lens of American-Soviet relations. The embassy correctly concluded that the United States did not want to spoil its improving relations with Moscow for Czechoslovakia.[27] In March, the Political advisor in the U.S. Army Command in Berlin, David Anderson, said to the Chief of the Yugoslav Military Mission in Berlin, Anton Kolendić, that the local CIA station and the Command had "heated discussions" about the events in Poland and

[24] Iz razgovora jugoslovenskog vojnog izaslanika sa pukovnikom Vinklerom, May 10, 1968, DA MSP, PA 1968, ČSSR, f. 26, d. 5, s. 417497. It is unclear whether Winkler on purpose misinterpreted the nature of the film that was filming in Czechoslovakia. The film that Winkler was referring to was the *Bridge at Remagen* (1969) about one of the final battles in World War Two. Because of the Soviet intervention in August 1968, the movie crew had to leave Czechoslovakia. The United States also appeared to be worried about the movie and its political implications. The U.S. embassy in Rome that was in contact with the movie's producer, David Wolper, noted that the movie provided a "sensitive target for any communist attempts at creating foreign scapegoat for Czech takeover." See Embassy Rome to Department of State, Telegram 07810, August 21, 1968, National Security Council Czechoslovakia, box 180, folder 5, Lindon Johnson Presidential Library (LJPL), available at https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/40720 (accessed July 28, 2019).
[25] László Borhi, *Dealing with Dictators: The United States, Hungary, and East Central Europe, 1942-1989* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2016), 222.
[26] Ambasada SFRJ London DSIP, August 1, 1968, DA MSP, PA 1968 ČSSR, f. 26, d. 6, sign. 428085.
[27] Neke američke ocene o odnosima SAD–SSSR u svetlu čehoslovackih događaja, June 12, 1968, Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), Kabinet Predsednika Republike (KPR), fond 837, I–5–b/104–16 SAD.

Czechoslovakia, but that the U.S. embassy in Prague insisted on "utmost temperance" in assessing the events in Czechoslovakia.[28] The State Department also advised caution and instructed the embassy in Prague to take a "wait and see" approach. "[We] believe our posture at the moment should in general be one of responsiveness to positive Czech approaches without attempting to precipitate Czech action," a report stated.[29] Lonely voices within the administration who argued for a tougher approach, such as Undersecretary of State Eugene Rostow, were muted by consensus in Washington to take on a policy of "non-action."[30] "We had learned from the Eisenhower–Dulles experience," Charles "Chip" Bohlen wrote in his memoir, adding that they "did not want the United States to be shown up as impotent to deal with situation."[31] The U.S. consul general in Hamburg, Coburn Kidd, whose wife was of Czech origin, spent his vacation in Czechoslovakia and shared his impressions with his Yugoslav colleague. Kidd said that he advised "everyone with whom he got in touch" that they should not act in haste if they wanted to avoid the "repetition of the events that happened in Hungary in 1956."[32]

Belgrade's feelings toward the so-called Prague Springs were ambiguous. In January 1968, Yugoslav press reported that the decisions of the Plenum and the new leadership received the "widest support."[33] The Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat in its

[28] This conversation was one of rare instances of Yugoslav–American discussion about Czechoslovakia. Yugoslav sources show that until July Czechoslovakia rarely came as a topic of conversation between Belgrade and Washington. Zabeleška o razgovoru sa Anderson David-om političkim savetnikom pri američkoj Komandi, March 14, 1968, DA MSP, PA 1968 SAD, f. 173, d. 6, s. 410904.
[29] Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Czechoslovakia, February 13, 1968, Document 55, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (*FRUS*), 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe, ed. James Miller (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996).
[30] Thomas Alan Schwartz, *Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 214.
[31] Charles Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929–1969* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1973), 532.
[32] Zabeleška o razgovoru geenralnog konzula S. Todorovica sa generalnim konzulom SAD Coburn Kidd–om, na dan 2. jula 1968, July 16, 1968, DA MSP RS, PA 1968 SAD, f. 173, d. 6, s. 427150.
[33] "Odjeci poslednjeg plenuma CK KP ČSSR: Široka podrska rukovodstvu," January 14, 1968, *Politika*, 3.

analysis noted that the changes in the KSČ were "welcomed by the entire Czechoslovak public" who believed that Dubček would rectify the "deformations" committed in the past.[34] Based upon conversations with Czechoslovak diplomats, but also representatives of the French communist party, the Yugoslavs expected that the new leadership would take a "more realistic course" in Czechoslovakia's foreign policy, which would provide more independence from the USSR, and a "flexible approach" toward West Germany but also China.[35] Moreover, Czechoslovak officials noted that changes in Prague would "deepen" Czechoslovak–Yugoslav relations and that the current trends would "inevitably direct Czechoslovakia's toward 'the Yugoslav model'."[36] Economic Planning Minister Frantisek Vlasak confided in his Yugoslav interlocutor that Novotny opposed good relations with Yugoslavia because he did not like "elements of capitalism introduced in Yugoslavia." Vlasak hoped that the reforms in Czechoslovakia would improve the country's relations with Belgrade.[37] Kidd reported that, during his visit to Czechoslovakia, "everyone has the Yugoslav example in their mind."[38]

The Czechoslovaks praised the Yugoslavia's economic system as something they strived to emulate at home. However, they were careful to avoid any allusions to Yugoslavia's independent foreign policy or even its "separate road to socialism." The specter of 1956 loomed large in Dubček's thinking. Counselor Jan Patek, told his

[34] O reagovanju na najnovije promene u ČSSR, DSIP, Uprava za Istocnu Evropu, February 2, 1968, DA MSP RS, PA 1968 ČSSR, f. 26, d. 1, s. 42923.
[35] Ocene značaja zadnjeg plenuma KPČ i njegovih posledica na dalji razvoj događaja u ČSSR, Jan 31, 1968, Ambasada SFRJ Pariz DSIP-u, DA MSP RS, PA 1968 ČSSR, f. 26, d. 1, s. 44023.
[36] Iz razgovora Obućine sa G. Kulhanekom, referentom za Jugoslaviju u Planskoj komisiji, Feb 7, 1968, DA MSP RS, PA 1968 ČSSR, f. 26, d. 1, s. 45139.
[37] Ambasada SFRJ Prag DSIP-u, March 17, 1968, DA MSP RS, PA 1968 ČSSR, f. 26, d. 4, s. 410168.
[38] Zabeleška o razgovoru generalnog konzula S. Todorovića sa generalnim konzulom SAD Coburn Kidd–om, na dan 2. jula 1968, July 16, 1968, DA MSP RS, PA 1968 SAD, f. 173, d. 6, s. 427150.

Yugoslav colleague that Dubček wanted to avoid negative experiences akin to the developments in Poland and especially Hungary [1956] and to avoid any kind of "excesses" that would encourage the USSR to intervene or the West to try to influence the events in Czechoslovakia.[39]

Although the Yugoslavs intimately liked these sympathetic and affirmative statements coming from Czechoslovakia's officials, Belgrade avoided appearing too close to the new regime in Prague. Although initial reports from Czechoslovakia were affirmative of the "new course" (the Yugoslav press wrote about almost unanimous support for the new leadership and its policies), Belgrade's reticence to embrace openly Czechoslovak comrades stemmed from two reasons. First, the conservative members of the Yugoslav leadership, including Tito, disapproved the "excesses" of liberalization.[40] Twelve years earlier, Tito gave blessing to Khrushchev to end "counterrevolution" in Budapest because he believed that Imre Nagy lost control over the events there.[41] It appeared that the Yugoslavs watched with the same anxiety the events in Czechoslovakia

[39] Razgovor Savetnika čehoslovacke ambasade Pateka sa Pekićem, March 6, 1968, Ambasada SFRJ London DSIP-u, DA MSP RS, PA 1968 ČSSR, f. 26, d. 4, s. 48587.

[40] Tito's suspicion over the real intents or abilities of the new Czechoslovak leadership were fueled by some reports that the Prague Spring was instigated and lead by the Czechoslovak intellectuals and that working class was either disinterested or even against liberalization. Tito's dislike toward intellectuals was not new. However, in the late 1960s he was particularly bothered by the group of the Yugoslav Marxist thinkers, gathered around the theoretical journal, *Praxis*, who criticized Yugoslav reality. Himself lacking theoretical knowledge and with a sense of intellectual inferiority, Tito often derided intellectuals. "We don't have enough engineers … but the system works that way that more and more young people choose humanitarian (sic!) sciences… We could export you philosophers… with philosophers we only have problems," Tito complained to the Algerian president Houari Boumédiène in 1969. Zapisnik o razgovorima predsednika Tita sa predsednikom Bumedijenom prilikom zvanične posete Alžiru od 5. do 9. novembra 1969. Document 41, in *Dokumenta o spoljnoj politici Jugoslavije* (*DSPJ*), *Jugoslovensko–alžirski odnosi, 1956–1979* (Beograd: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2014), 212.

[41] "We explained that we were also concerned at the swing of events to the right, toward counterrevolution, when we saw the Nagy government allowing Communists to be murdered and hanged. There would be have to be intervention if there was a counterrevolution in Hungary," the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, Veljko Mićunović wrote, describing the secret meeting between Khrushchev and Malenkov and Tito and the Yugoslav leadership in November 1956. Veljko Mićunović, *Moscow Diary*, translated by David Floyd (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1980), 135.

and Dubček's inability to keep the things under control.[42] Second, Yugoslavia's measured response to the Prague Spring was determined by Belgrade's desire not to provoke the Soviet Union.

By the end of the April, a little over two weeks after the Plenum of the CPSU, Tito visited Moscow. After the honeymoon during the Six-Day War, relations between Moscow and Belgrade slightly deteriorated in 1968. The Kremlin did not like how the Yugoslav press treated the March events in Poland and the "new course" in Czechoslovakia, despite the restraint displayed by the government. This demonstrated less freedom of the press in Yugoslavia or Yugoslavia's ambitions to take an anti-Soviet position, but rather Moscow's sensitivity over these unsettling trends in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Therefore, the main purpose of Tito's visit to Moscow from April 28-30 was damage control.

Tito appeared meek and defensive. His lukewarm defense of Dubček ("he is a good person and a good communist") and appeals to help Czechoslovak comrades against the forces of counterrevolution did not appease Moscow. Moreover, the Soviets criticized Yugoslavia for its attitude toward the crises. Tito complained that political relations between the two countries were burdened by "certain mistrust toward us" and that the Soviets put too much emphasis on the writings of some "irresponsible elements."[43] Tito tried to downplay the importance of these alleged anti-Soviet writings in Yugoslav press,

[42] Jan Pelikan, "Jugoslavija i praško proleće posle pojačanja sovjetskog pritiska na Čehoslovačku (jul 1968)," in *1968 – četrdeset godina posle* (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju, 2008), 111.
[43] The Soviets were particularly sensitive to the articles about Stalinism. There is no evidence that suggests that the Yugoslav government or the Party instructed these anti-Stalinist "campaigns" in the press, but they certainly condoned them. The Soviets, however, did not like this "digging of the old wounds." Запись беседы советских руководителей с И. Броз Тито во время визита в Советский Союз 28-30 апреля 1968 г. April 29, 1968, Document 27, *DSPJ, Jugoslavija–SSSR. Susreti i razgovori na najvišem nivou rukovodilaca Jugoslavije i SSSR, 1965–1980*, vol. 2 (Beograd: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2016), 309.

adding that even the Yugoslavs had a hard time controlling journalists and editors of Yugoslav newspapers. Tito said that he was "very mad" at the official organ of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), *Komunist*, that published an open letter in which a group of Yugoslav philosophers condemned the "so-called persecution" of Jews in Poland. The same letter was published in the journal for Marxist theory, *Praxis*. "I can assure you that these do not reflect our policy toward the issue," Tito reassured Brezhnev.[44] Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, however, was not convinced and warned Tito that these sympathetic writings about Poland and Czechoslovakia could "mislead Yugoslav public" about the events in these two countries.[45] Brezhnev added that this support of the so-called reforms in Poland and Czechoslovakia raised the question of the real attitudes of Yugoslavia's government and party leadership. "One case [could be] an accident, [but] other ones [seem like] straight support," Brezhnev said.[46] As if he was talking about infectious disease, Brezhnev warned Tito that the events in Czechoslovakia if not stopped could spread around, even to Yugoslavia. "If we don't react now… It is very possible that like in Hungary in 1956, they will start to hang communists," Brezhnev said, adding that if a bourgeois Czechoslovakia is restored the CPSU, the LCY, and other communist parties would bear historical responsibility because of their failure to act.[47]

[44] Tito's likely interpreted this letter also as a critique of Yugoslavia's policy toward Israel. Moreover, he promised Brezhnev that he would "take care" of these elements as soon as he gets back to Yugoslavia. Запись беседы советских руководителей с И. Броз Тито во время визита в Советский Союз 28-30 апреля 1968 г. April 29, 1968, Document 27, *DSPJ, Jugoslavija–SSSR*, 309-310.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] In addition to the KSČ, Brezhnev was particularly critical toward the Romanian Communist Party. "The Romanians lead active, behind curtain, action against us," Kosygin said. Document 27, April 29, 1968, *DSPJ, Jugoslavija–SSSR*, 313, 322.

Tito's repentance displayed during the meeting in Moscow, however, meant very little in terms of Soviet and Eastern European views of alleged Yugoslavia's role in Czechoslovakia. The trauma of the 1948 schism ran deep and the Kremlin and its allies perceived any signs of "liberalism" in Eastern Europe as a Titoist aberration that needed to be stopped. Days before Tito's visit to Moscow, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) convened a Party plenum to discuss the situation in Czechoslovakia. BCP chief Todor Zhivkov complained about Dubček's ineffectiveness ("has neither the experience nor the intellectual capacity and willpower to take the leadership of the party") and feared that the counterrevolution could creep in to avoid the Hungarian scenario. According to Zhivkov, Western powers and Zionists played the decisive role, but "the Yugoslav leadership has a part in these events too."[48] "There is no need for us to use the Stalinist methods of the past, but we are obligated to take measures to introduce order in Czechoslovakia as well as in Romania. Afterwards we will introduce order in Yugoslavia, too," Zhivkov ominously concluded.[49] A poor state of Yugoslav–Bulgarian relations over the question of Macedonia contributed to Zhivkov's hostility toward Yugoslavia. However, even without this contentious issue between the two Balkan neighbors, Yugoslavia was guilty by association. The Yugoslav embassy in Moscow

[48] "Record of the Plenum of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Communist, Sofia," March 29, 1968, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Central State Archive (CDA), fond 1-B, opis 58, a. e. 4, l. 96-99. Obtained by Jordan Baev and the Bulgarian Cold War Research Group. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113070 (accessed July 29, 2019).
[49] Ibid. Frictions between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were obvious during a youth festival in Sofia. The organizers barred members of Yugoslav delegation from speaking at the festival. Moreover, Yugoslavia's name was erased from an aid package to Vietnam that was prepared by the Alliance of the Youth of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs suspected that it was done by the Bulgarian police. M. Maksimović, "Ko je brisao ime naše zemlje sa poklon-paketa Vijetnamcima," August 2, 1968 in *Borba*, 4.

reported that conservative members of the Soviet leadership criticized Yugoslavia for the events in Czechoslovakia: "All of this, it's your fault."[50]

In spring 1968, however, some members of the Yugoslav leadership were uneasy with the events in Czechoslovakia. Historian Jan Pelikan distinguished between two groups within Yugoslav leadership. One, a "conservative-centralist" group that included Tito, was reserved toward the Czechoslovak leadership, and believed, as the Soviets did, that the situation could get out of control. Tito's closest associate, Edvard Kardelj, was also anxious about the events in Czechoslovakia. Like Tito, Kardelj believed the Czechoslovak leadership could easily lose control over the working class, which would allow the "right-wing forces" to take charge like they did in Hungary in 1956.[51] Another, a liberal wing that included Foreign Secretary Marko Nikezić, condemned Moscow's neo-Stalinist policies.[52] The latter had the support of the Yugoslav press that was (to Brezhnev's great dismay) benevolent toward the Prague Spring.[53] These two groups finally converged in the early summer of 1968 after the increasing Soviet pressure on Czechoslovakia and unsettling reports from Moscow that showed that the USSR remained suspicious about Yugoslavia's true intents. On June 24, Secretary Nikezić summoned Yugoslav ambassadors in Eastern Europe to discuss the situation in Czechoslovakia. Ambassadors unanimously agreed that Yugoslavia should support

[50] Ambasada SFRJ Moskva DSIP-u, br. 113, July 26, 1968, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–21 SSSR.
[51] Klasić, *Jugoslavija i svijet*, 297. Tito's and Kardelj's concern echoed Brezhnev's suspicion that the Prague Spring encouraged counterrevolution.
[52] Pelikan, "Jugoslavija i praško proleće," 113.
[53] For example, the official daily of the Socialist Alliance of Working People, *Borba*, wrote affirmatively about the "Two Thousand Words" manifesto. Although *Borba*'s correspondent from Prague cautioned that the manifesto "contains anarchic elements," it revealed that conservative and Stalinist forces were still undefeated. "The true friends of Czechoslovakia would help the working class if they do not interfere in its internal affairs," *Borba* wrote. Risto Bajalski, "Zaoštravanje u Čehoslovačkoj," July 1, 1968 in *Borba*, 1-2.

Dubček and Tito accepted their recommendation.[54] To the Yugoslavs Soviet intervention seemed imminent: "They [the Soviets] are ready to risk their international prestige… rather than to lose control over the ČSSR, particularly because they have their hands untied [because] of Western attitude."[55] The rebuttal of Moscow's policy toward Czechoslovakia came from Tito in the interview he gave to the Egyptian daily *Al-Ahram*. Tito rejected Moscow's claims (which he patiently listened to in April) that socialism in Czechoslovakia was in danger and said that he believed that the USSR was not so shortsighted to use force in Czechoslovakia.[56] In the interview, Tito explicitly rejected any parallels between Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Yugoslavia in 1948. Yet, the influential Belgrade daily, *Politika*, on July 18 published an article that was boldly entitled "Informbiro, 1968" [Cominform, 1968] which likened the letter of five [Warsaw Pact countries] and Brezhnev's policy toward Czechoslovakia to Stalin's policy toward Yugoslavia.[57]

Tito's calls for peaceful resolution of the Czechoslovak crisis elevated his prestige in the West after it reached a low point during the Six-Day War. The Yugoslav embassy in Washington reported that Yugoslavia's (i.e. Tito's) principled attitude toward Czechoslovakia was greeted in the United States as another example of Yugoslavia's "independent policy and determination to encourage similar processes" in other socialist countries.[58] Yugoslavia's "realistic position" toward Czechoslovak comrades improved the relationship between Belgrade and Prague. Under immense Soviet pressure, Dubček

[54] Marko Vrhunec, *Šest godina s Titom (1967-1973): pogled s vrha i izbliza* (Zagreb: 2001), 58.
[55] O unutrašnjoj situaciji u ČSSR, Ambasada SFRJ Prag DSIP-u, July 8, 1968, DA MSP RS, PA 1968 ČSSR, f. 27, d. 5, s. 424640.
[56] "Tito: Socijalizam u Čehoslovackoj nije ugrožen," July 15, 1968 in *Borba,* 1.
[57] "Informbiro 1968," July 18, 1968 in *Politika*.
[58] Ambasada SFRJ Vašington DSIP-u, July 31, 1968, DA MSP RS, PA 1968 ČSSR, f. 27, d. 6, s. 428096.

needed allies. Already in July, he invited Tito to visit Czechoslovakia, but the two sides could not agree on the date of Tito's visit. After the end of talks between Dubček and Brezhnev in Cierna nad Tisou (July 29–August 1, 1968) and Bratislava (August 3), Tito and Ceausescu, as the leaders of their respective parties, were scheduled to visit Prague.

Tito's visit to Prague from August 9–10, was a propaganda success and reinforced Tito's reputation as a maverick, one that he earned in 1948.[59] Tito's personal secretary Marko Vrhunec wrote in his memoir that the purpose of Tito's trip to Prague was to stave off the worst – a Soviet intervention.[60] His visit, however, failed to achieve anything substantial in terms of aiding Dubček. One can argue that Tito's (and Ceausescu's) trip confirmed Soviet suspicion that a new Little Entente was in making.[61] The *Politika* correspondent from Prague, Jurij Gustinčič, wrote that the announcement of the Radio Prague about Tito's visit excited Czechs and Slovaks because he "symbolized their desires that started to become reality after the January plenum – to pursue their own [development], original, proud, and based on national history and socialist traditions."[62]

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[59] "For Czechs and Slovaks, Tito symbolizes independence and political honesty," *Borba*'s correspondent Bajalski wrote. See Risto Bajalski, "Smisao Titove posete Čehoslovačkoj," August 10, 1968 in *Borba*, 9.
[60] Vrhunec, *Šest godina s Titom*, 58. Vrhunec, however, erroneously stated that Tito went to Prague on August 28, a week after the Soviet-led intervention, when, in fact, he went to Prague on August 9.
[61] At the meeting in Warsaw in July 1968, Walter Ulbricht first raised the idea of a new Little Entente, a copy of the pre-war alliance of Yugoslavia, Romania, and Czechoslovakia that intended to keep Germany and the USSR in check.
[62] Jurij Gustinčič, "Prag očekuje Tita," August 8, 1968 in *Politika*, 1. Although Novotny had visited Yugoslavia in September 1967, Tito's visit to Prague reconnected Yugoslav-Czechoslovak relations disrupted by the 1948 split. In Bratislava, the Society of Slovak-Yugoslav Friendship was re-established after it was disbanded in 1948. Czechoslovak citizens sent letters to Yugoslav press in which they praised traditionally friendly relations between the Czechoslovaks and the Yugoslavs. A firefighter's organization from Uherske Hradiste thanked Yugoslavia for its support. The Workers' Council for the freedom of press of a clock factory in Prague said that from their press but also Czechoslovak tourists who visited Yugoslavia they found out about Yugoslavia's "understanding and positive attitude" toward Czechoslovakia's independence. Vjeroslav Krombholt, a driver from Trutnov in Czechoslovakia, sent a letter in which he wrote that his best friends at the 1938 Sokol congress in Prague were Yugoslav, and that he wanted to reaffirm that friendship. See "Tri pisma iz Čehoslovačke: Zahvaljujemo na pruženoj podršci," August 11, 1968 in *Borba*, 2.

Tito was greeted like a communist superstar.[63] The U.S. embassy in Prague reported that the "extremely warm welcome… seemed genuine and spontaneous," and that "cheers compelled" Tito to come out to the window of Prague Castle to greet the masses.[64] As the U.S. ambassador in Belgrade, Charles Burke Elbrick, noted, this exceedingly warm and enthusiastic welcome had a "salubrious effect at home" [Yugoslavia], but it created an undesired optic for ever-suspicious Moscow.[65]

Tito and his entourage that followed him to Prague were aware of the delicacy of their position and tried to avoid any provocative statements that could enrage the Soviets. Asked by a Czechoslovak journalist whether Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia would sign a friendship agreement, Tito responded that relations between the two countries were already good and that such an agreement would be redundant.[66] On the question about Yugoslavia's attitude toward a foreign intervention, Tito said that "that kind, of course, would be incorrect," but he approved of recently finished talks in Cierna nad Tisou and Bratislava as examples of "comradely" mutual understanding.[67] The Yugoslavs were satisfied with the visit and believed that the "worst was over," i.e. that the Soviets would not intervene. Yugoslav acting foreign secretary Pavićević told ambassador Elbrick that

[63] Henry Kamm, "Tito and Czech Leaders Confer as Prague Exults," August 10, 1968 in *New York Times*, 1.
[64] Embassy Prague to Department of State, Telegram 02903, August 10, 1968, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969, box 2841, Pol 7 Yugo, Record Group (RG)59, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
[65] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 03998, August 14, 1968, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969, box 2841, Pol 7 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[66] Ceausescu was less circumspect than Tito was and during his visit to Prague on August 14-15, he signed a treaty of friendship, co-operation, and mutual assistance.
[67] "Odnosi izmedju socijalistickih zemalja moraju se razvijati na principima ravnopravnosti," August 11, 1968 in *Politika*, 1.

Belgrade was relieved that Czechoslovakia and other Warsaw Pact members made a compromise in Bratislava and that possibility of Soviet intervention was remote.[68]

Pavićević's optimism, however, was unfounded. Despite Tito's balancing act in Prague, the Kremlin criticized Yugoslavia's policy toward Czechoslovakia. At a meeting with Yugoslav ambassador Dobrivoje Vidić on August 13, the Soviet deputy minister for foreign affairs, Leonid Ilichev, refused to comment on Tito's visit to Prague, adding that they were still studying the visit's "circumstances."[69] Yet, Ilichev berated Yugoslavia's press coverage of the events in Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia was wrong in its approach to Czechoslovakia, Ilichev said and continued: "In April [during Tito's visit to Moscow] we had an impression that we have a mutual understanding of the situation in the ČSSR." He added that the Yugoslavs failed to comprehend that the events in Czechoslovakia threatened the entire socialist system.[70] In the heated debate that ensued, Ilichev attacked Belgrade's and Bucharest's stance toward noninterference. Vidić warned that Ilichev's attitude reflected the real opinion of the Kremlin and that the Soviets would only nominally adhere to the agreements made in Cierna and Bratislava.

A day after the Vidić–Ilichev meeting in Moscow, Secretary of the Executive Committee of the LCY, Mijalko Todorović, met with the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade, Ivan Benediktov. Todorović provided Benediktov with a full report on Tito's visit to Prague (Todorović was also in the Yugoslav delegation) and his impressions about the situation in the ČSSR. Todorović said that Czechoslovak comrades have things under

[68] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 03998, August 14, 1968, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969, box 2841, Pol 7 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[69] Ambassador Vidić found the word "circumstances" particularly troublesome. See Ambasada SFRJ Moskva DSIP-u, August 13, 1968, DA MSP RS, PA 1968 SSSR, f. 159, d. 4, s. 428809.
[70] Ibid.

control and that they were determined to liquidate antisocialist elements such as Club 231.[71] Todorović said that Yugoslavia was against the interference in the internal affairs of other socialist countries, and warned that any deterioration in relations between Czechoslovakia and other members of the Warsaw Pact would damage the interests of the international socialist movement. "We felt that in our contacts with many communist parties… as well as in contacts with leaders of nonaligned countries and national-liberation movements," Todorović said, adding that the common task for all progressive forces was to "remove the scars that were made before Cierna and Bratislava" and to give support to Dubček.[72] Like Ilichev before him, Benediktov rejected the Yugoslav assessment of the situation in Czechoslovakia. He said that Czechoslovaks, as well as Yugoslavs, underestimated antisocialist forces. Benediktov said that some would send communists to the gallows and that Dubček's government provided them legitimacy. Moreover, continued Benediktov, after the January plenum, the Czechoslovak leadership lost control over the economy in their country – probably a not-so-thin jab at the Yugoslavs as well because of Czechoslovakia's flirting with self-management and market economy Yugoslav-style.[73]

"Comrade Brezhnev, take whatever measures your Politburo considers fit"

The same day Vidić met with Ilichev in Moscow, Brezhnev and Dubček had a tense conversation that turned out to be the writing on the wall for the Prague Spring. Cornered by Brezhnev, who threatened with "new, independent measures," Dubček

[71] Club 231 or K231 was the organization of former political prisoners.
[72] Zabeleška o razgovoru sekretara Izvršnog komiteta CK SKJ Mijalka Todorovića sa ambasadorom SSSR u SFRJ Ivanom Benediktovim, 14. avgusta 1968. godine u CK SKJ u Beogradu, August 16, 1968, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–21 SSSR.
[73] Ibid.

unadvisedly said: “With full responsibility I am telling you that if you don't believe me, if you believe we are deceiving you, then you should take the measures that your Politburo believes are necessary.”[74] The Yugoslavs were unaware of this conversation, but the Yugoslav-Soviet talks in Moscow and Belgrade demonstrated that Moscow remained unconvinced in Dubček’s ability to control the events at home. Despite these warning signs and renewed attacks on Dubček in the Soviet press, Belgrade believed that the worst period of tensions was behind them. After his return from Prague Tito, as he did every August, retreated to his summer residence on Brioni Island. Yugoslav Prime Minister Mika Špiljak left for Norway. Yugoslav soccer champion Crvena Zvezda (Red Star), without anticipating any incidents, went to Trnava to play against Spartak in the Central European Cup. Similarly, despite increased Soviet pressure, thousands of Czechoslovaks flocked, like they did every summer, to the Adriatic coast. Following their compatriots in search of Mediterranean sun, the chief architect of Czechoslovak economic reforms Ota Šik, foreign minister Jiri Hajek, planning minister Vlasak, and president of the Central Control Commission, Stefan Gašparik, also came to Yugoslavia on vacation.[75] However, on August 17, the day Ceausescu left Czechoslovakia, the Politburo of the CPSU finally decided to invade Czechoslovakia.

[74] Transcript of Leonid Brezhnev’s Telephone Conversation with Alexander Dubček, August 13, 1968, Document 81, Jaromir Navratil, ed., *The Prague Spring 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader*. Preface
by Vaclav Havel and foreword by H. Gordon Skilling (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998), 172–181.
[75] Paulina Bren called Šik the “heretic economist of the Prague Spring.” Paulina Bren, *The Greengrocer and His TV. The Culture of Communism after the 1968 Prague Spring* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 46.

In the late evening of August 20, an unusual pattern of Soviet flights taking on and off Prague international airport signaled that something was going on.[76] Just before midnight, the troops of the Warsaw Pact poured into Czechoslovakia. The Soviet-led intervention came, *Borba* daily wrote, "at the moment when the entire world believed that the meeting in Bratislava in a peaceful and comradely way resolved basic misunderstandings between the CSSR and five other members of the Warsaw Pact."[77] Tito immediately summoned the highest bodies of the LCY to his resort to craft the response to this unexpected development. In his first statement, Tito condemned the intervention, but called on the Yugoslavs to remain calm and avoid any demonstration that could be interpreted as a provocation. U.S. observers noted that Tito's initial reaction was milder than Ceausescu's because of his concern that the intervention could provoke unrest in Yugoslavia.[78] Unlike Tito, Ceausescu immediately called a large rally in Bucharest. Addressing his citizens from the balcony of the Central Committee, Ceausescu condemned the Soviet-led invasion.

On August 21, the Presidium and the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the LCY met on Brioni. In this emergency session, Yugoslav party leaders expressed solidarity with their Czechoslovak comrades and called the Yugoslavs to gather ("*zbiju*") around its communist party and to stop any provocations that could weaken the unity of the nation. "This intervention represents a heavy blow to socialist

[76] Mary Heimann, *Czechoslovakia: The State that Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 244.
[77] "Trupe Varšavskog pakta okupirale Čehoslovačku," August 22, 1968 in *Borba*, 1.
[78] Reactions of Communist States and Parties to the Military Entry into Czechoslovakia, Central Intelligence Agency to Lyndon Johnson, August 21, 1968, National Security Council, box 179, folder 10, LJPL, available at https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/38923 (accessed August 10, 2019). Tito's initial reluctance to allow demonstrations probably stemmed from his desire not to provoke the Soviets too overtly but also to avoid the repetition of student demonstrations from June.

and progressive forces in the world," the joint session concluded.[79] The federal emergency meeting was followed by a wave of emergency meetings at all levels: republican executive committees, city communist organizations, party cells in factories, universities and military units, trade unions, veteran associations, youth work brigades, and summer camps. In addition, Yugoslav citizens, organizations, and companies, apparently without any incentives from above, showed a remarkable level of socialist solidarity. Over 50,000 Czechoslovak tourists who got stranded in Yugoslavia were provided with free accommodation, coupons for gasoline and food, but also sympathy that, for some, meant more than material aid. Yugoslav newspapers printed bulletins of the Czechoslovak embassy and some radio stations prepared special news programs in Czech. Besides, the Yugoslav press provided a platform to the four high-ranking members of Czechoslovak leadership to communicate with their compatriots in Yugoslavia and abroad. This created a politically sensitive issue, so that the Yugoslav foreign secretariat had to issue an instruction to clarify Belgrade's position toward Šik, Hajek, Vlasak, and Gašparik. "We did not treat them as an embryo of some government in exile, but we gave them hospitality and allowed them to act as individual members of the [Czechoslovak] government," the document stated, adding that the USSR used this issue "to compromise Yugoslavia as a safe haven for 'counterrevolutionaries'."[80]

[79] "Puna solidarnost sa narodima Čehoslovacke, radničkom klasom, vladom i rukovodstvom Komunističke partije ČSSR s Dubčekom na čelu," August 22, 1968 in *Politika*, 2.
[80] DSIP svim diplomatsko-konzularnim predstavništvima, August 27, 1968, DA MSP RS, PA 1968 ČSSR, f. 26, d. 6, s. 428933. In the first hours of the invasion, the Yugoslav press took a confrontational stance and decried the Soviet-led invasion as the "occupation of Czechoslovakia," invoking some of the worst images of 1938/9. In many ways, like it did during the Prague Spring, the press went beyond the official statements and communiques that, during the initial confusion, were more cautious.

The first two days of fervor were capped by a massive rally in Belgrade. An estimated quarter-million demonstrators gathered on the Marx-Engels Square, in downtown Belgrade. *Politika*'s correspondents mused on the symbolism of the location. Yugoslavs were defending socialism from the place named after the "great teachers," but also from the place that was the gathering point for numerous demonstrations against U.S. intervention in Vietnam, thus establishing themselves as the true followers of Marxism but also fighters against imperialisms.[81] On the same day of the rally, the CC LCY was in session. Tito submitted a report from the August 21st meeting and, in a harsher tone than two days earlier, rebuked the Soviet-led intervention as short-sighted, irresponsible and damaging for the entire socialist world. "The glorious proletarian red flag was already stained in 1948, but we worked hard to remove that stain. That flag has fallen again," Tito said.[82]

The party and public meetings served to consolidate the internal situation and to create a consensus within the party and government leadership over the response (with Tito as the final arbiter). Moreover, the party and government used the events in Czechoslovakia to mobilize the domestic population, harness popular discontent over Soviet actions, and demonstrate unity between the Party and the people that was challenged by the student demonstrations in June. Finally, Yugoslav official and popular rebuttal of the Warsaw Pact intervention demonstrated to the outside world, friends and foes alike, Yugoslavia's independence, highlighted its internationalist solidarity, and, most importantly, positioned Yugoslavia as a defender of socialism and socialist values

[81] J. Vlahović, D. Ribnikar, B. Matić, "Simbolično: Na trgu Marksa i Engelsa," August 23, 1968 in *Politika*, 2.
[82] Sednica Centralnog komiteta SKJ, August 24, 1968 in *Politika*, 1-2.

on the global stage. “It is our duty now to rehabilitate, in the eyes of the world, democratic socialism,” said the president of the Union of the Yugoslav Youth, Janez Kocijančič at the session of the Central Committee.[83] Although the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia raised the specter of Soviet interference in Yugoslavia, with its long-term implications on domestic politics and culture, it also helped reinvigorate Yugoslavia’s foreign policy. From the second half of 1968, Yugoslavia redefined its relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and the nonaligned world. The events in and around Czechoslovakia launched Yugoslavia’s new global role as it assumed the mantle of an advocate of small state rights and an uncompromising fighter against big power imperialism.

The USSR, Yugoslavia and the end of the Prague Spring

The tension in the relationship between Yugoslavia and the USSR was palpable in mid-August, 1968. The Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, Dobrivoje “Baja” Vidić, reported that Yugoslav diplomatic staff was the subject of harassment by the Soviet authorities even before the Soviet invasion. On August 17, contrary to all diplomatic practices, the Soviet militia had stopped Vidić on his way to an art exhibit in Kaluga and ordered him to return to Moscow.[84] According to Vidić, the personnel of the Yugoslav embassy were under constant Soviet surveillance. Moreover, Soviet authorities interrupted communications of Yugoslavia’s news agency TANJUG. It seemed that 1948 was making its déjà vu.

[83] Diskusija na desetoj sednici Centralnog komiteta SKJ, August 25, 1968 in *Borba*, 3.
[84] Zabeleška o razgovoru savetnika državnog sekretara Lj. Babića sa ambasadorom SSSR I.A. Benediktovim, August 24, 1968, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–21 SSSR.

After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslav–Soviet relations further deteriorated. The Soviets halted deliveries of military equipment to Yugoslavia and postponed the signing of the trade agreement for 1969. Finally, the Soviets launched a public campaign against Yugoslavia. "Yugoslavia was one of the regular topics [in the press]… it was pointed out that Yugoslavia had supported counterrevolution in the CSSR, that Yugoslav socialism represents an intrinsic part of Bonn's new 'ostpolitik,' and that, evidently, there is a congruence between Belgrade's and Beijing's attitudes," Vidić wrote about Soviet propaganda attacks.[85]

The Yugoslavs felt Soviet pressure at home as well. The Soviet ambassador Benediktov went on a diplomatic offensive and in his contacts with Yugoslav officials, ostentatiously displayed Soviet displeasure over Yugoslav actions. On August 24, Benediktov met with a Yugoslav foreign secretariat official and threatened that if the Yugoslav press continues with the "tendentious misrepresentation" of the Soviet Union's foreign policy that Soviet press would have to respond in kind.[86] The Benediktov's threat was an opening salvo in a protracted battle between Belgrade and Moscow over the interpretation of the invasion. Six days later, Benediktov requested an audience with Tito. In a tranquil setting of the Brioni, Tito and Benediktov engaged in a shouting match over Czechoslovakia. While Benediktov, in a familiar manner of Soviet diplomats, read his previously prepared notes about the conduct of the Yugoslav leadership, Tito interrupted him several times, crying lies, lies, lies. Benediktov accused Yugoslavia of siding with "antisocialist forces" and that Yugoslavia joined the anti-Soviet campaign in the UN.

[85] Ambasada SFRJ Moskva DSIP-u, October 30, 1968, DA MSP RS, PA 1968 SSSR, f. 159, d. 4, s. 440303.
[86] Zabeleška o razgovoru savetnika državnog sekretara Lj. Babića sa ambasadorom SSSR I.A. Benediktovim, August 24, 1968, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–21 SSSR.

Moreover, continued Benediktov's litany of complaints, mass rallies in Belgrade and other cities and how the invasion was treated in Yugoslav media revealed the orchestrated anti-Soviet campaign that involved some high-ranking Yugoslav officials. "Yugoslavia's stance has nothing to do with the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, has nothing to do with the common interests of solidarity with socialist countries and workers' parties. With its anti-Soviet campaign, Yugoslavia is, objectively, on the same position with the imperialist forces that are conducting war against the Vietnamese people," Benediktov delivered his verdict.[87] "How dare you to repeat these obvious lies! It is simply astonishing that you can read that rubbish ("*bljuvotine*") about Yugoslavia in here!" Tito yelled.[88]

Tito called Benediktov's notes about Yugoslavia's conduct a "fake report" and the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia a "terrible mistake… that is hard to understand with common sense." He said that the USSR made a terrible mistake that would have detrimental consequences for the interests of socialism. "It appears that the Soviet leadership has poor advisers. You listen to the advice of those like Ulbricht and Zhivkov … these two are bad advisers, who, for their own reasons, give Soviet leadership poor advice," Tito criticized the ineptness of the Soviet leadership, simultaneously taking a jab at his archrivals.[89] This exchange of insults revealed the depth of the chasm between

[87] Zabeleška o prijemu sovjetskog ambasadora I.A. Benediktova kod predsednika Republike J.B. Tita, August 30, 1968, Document 29, *DSPJ, Jugoslavija–SSSR*, 330-331.
[88] "You should not think that I'm speaking [like this] because I'm nervous. I speak with peace and composure. But the fact is that after recent events there is a lot of bitterness in me … if Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny were here instead of you [Benediktov], I would be even harsher," Tito said. Zabeleška o prijemu sovjetskog ambasadora I.A. Benediktova kod predsednika Republike J.B. Tita, August 30, 1968, Document 29, *DSPJ, Jugoslavija-SSSR*, 331.
[89] Zabeleška o prijemu sovjetskog ambasadora I.A. Benediktova kod predsednika Republike J.B. Tita, August 30, 1968, Document 29, *DSPJ, Jugoslavija–SSSR*, 333,340.

Belgrade and Moscow but also showed Yugoslavia's resolve to resist Soviet hegemony. The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia forced Tito to change his pliant attitude that he displayed in Moscow with a defiant stance that he assumed at the meeting with Benediktov. Like in 1948, Yugoslav independence and security were at stake, but, as Tito stated to Benediktov, the Soviet "horrendous mistake" to move against Czechoslovakia went beyond the narrow Yugoslav interests and threatened to compromise socialism everywhere in the world. Tito said that he always reminded his interlocutors in Africa and Asia that they should consider the Soviet Union their friend. The USSR betrayed the trust of African and Asian nations that Tito took credit of building. One of the side-effects of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was that from 1968 Yugoslavia sought to distance itself from the Soviet Union in the so-called Third World.[90]

The Soviets, however, attacked Yugoslavia's nonalignment as phony and inherently aimed against the USSR. Moreover, Yugoslavia's increasingly friendly relations with the West led to Moscow's vitriolic attacks on Yugoslavia as an agent of West German interests and a proxy for imperialists.[91] The Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat noted that the press in the USSR and Eastern Europe used Nicholas Katzenbach's visit to "tendentiously attack" Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's negotiations with the European Economic Community (EEC) and Katzenbach's visit were interpreted as the signs of

[90] Tito's overinflated sense of his own importance aside, since the 1961 conference of the Nonaligned Movement in Belgrade, Yugoslavia did act in a manner that benefited Soviet foreign policy objectives in the Global South. This Yugoslavia's pro-Soviet stance should be interpreted in the context of the Sino–Soviet split and Beijing's attacks on Yugoslav "revisionism." The U.S. ambassador in Belgrade, George Kennan was infuriated by Tito's pro-Soviet attitude at the conference. In the 1970s, Cuba substituted Yugoslavia as a champion of "natural alliance" between the USSR and the "progressive forces" in Africa and Asia, thus setting the stage for Yugoslav–Cuban rivalry in the last decade of Tito's life.

[91] Soviet attacks on Yugoslavia as an imperialist agents were redux of the second Yugoslav–Soviet split in 1958. Khrushchev named Tito a "Trojan horse" [of imperialism]. See Dennison Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948–1974* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), 93.

Yugoslavia's "apostasy" and firm Western orientation.[92] In his memoir, Katzenbach stated that his visit was "scarcely necessary" to reassure Tito of U.S. support, "but perhaps it served to annoy the Soviets a little."[93] And annoyed them it did. The Soviet ambassador in Romania, Basov, said that it was incomprehensible how could the leading imperialist power supported the sovereignty and prosperity of a socialist country?[94]

Brezhnev repeated these harsh accusations in a letter to Tito on October 17 that Benediktov delivered a day after Tito's meeting with Katzenbach. The letter, written in the name of the CPSU Politburo, reminded in its tone and content of the exchange of letters between the two parties in the spring of 1948. Brezhnev accused Yugoslavia of conducting an anti-Soviet campaign and "distortion" of the events in Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev's accusation went beyond the conduct of the Yugoslav press, a permanent thorn in Soviet side, and mentioned Yugoslav officials and diplomats who helped spread these anti-Soviet feelings. According to Veljko Mićunović, the letter exemplified Soviet attitudes toward Yugoslavia. The Soviets tried, Mićunović wrote, "to silence Yugoslavia with threats, to stop Yugoslavia from calling the things by their real name."[95] Brezhnev said that the Soviets would like to improve their relations with Yugoslavia, but the Yugoslavs would have to take the "measures" against anti–Soviet hysteria. Brezhnev

[92] Jugoslovensko–američki odnosi u svetskoj štampi, November 4, 1968, DSIP, pov. br. 439340, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–16 SAD.
[93] Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, *Some of It Was Fun: Working with RFK and LBJ* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 289.
[94] Zabeleška o razgovoru ambasadora Petrića sa sovjetskim ambasadorom Basovom, October 25, 1968, DA MSP RS, PA 1968 SSSR, f. 162, d. 3, s. 438573.
[95] Veljko Mićunović, *Moskovske godine, 1969/1971* (Beograd: Jugoslovenska revija, 1984), 11–12. Soviet president Podgorny said that even worst Soviet enemies stopped using the words "occupation" and "intervention," but the Yugoslavs continued to do so. "That does not make us happy at all," Podgorny said. See Zabeleška o razgovoru ambasadora Vidića sa predsednikom prezidijuma VS SSSR Podgornim, br. 781, September 11, 1968, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–21 SSSR.

wanted to undo the humiliation of Khrushchev's mea culpa from June 1955 by putting the burden of responsibility on Yugoslavia and requesting its repentance.

If Brezhnev's plan was to undo the past, it spectacularly failed. Tito rejected Brezhnev's accusations and launched counter-accusations against the USSR and its allies. Tito said that the Soviets waged the campaign against Yugoslavia and that it was not an accident that Bulgaria came out again with its territorial aspirations toward Yugoslav Macedonia. We will not allow anti-Soviet propaganda, Tito told Benediktov, but we have to respond to the attacks against us.[96] Tito sent his official response in November, but with no effect. Ambassador Vidić delivered the letter in which Tito stated that Yugoslavia hoped for better relations with the Soviet Union, based on the 1955 Belgrade and the 1956 Moscow declarations, but remained firm in its insistence on sovereign rights. "We thought and we still think that cooperation and development of friendly relations are only possible on a basis of respect of the principles of sovereignty, independence, integrity, and equality among states," Tito wrote, adding that the Brezhnev's letter could not be interpreted in any other way than as a pressure on Yugoslavia to give up its independent policy.[97]

Obliviously, the Soviets were not satisfied. A Soviet diplomat in Bucharest asked his Yugoslav colleague if Tito would write a "nice letter" that would create a better climate in Yugoslav–Soviet relations.[98] However, Tito's letter, although polite enough, did not change Yugoslavia's position. It doubled down familiar Yugoslav attitudes

[96] Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika Republike J.B. Tita sa ambasadorom SSSR I.A. Benediktovom, October 19, 1968, Document 30, *DSPJ, Jugoslavija–SSSR*, 342–343.
[97] Poruka J.B. Tita L.I. Brežnjevu, November 5, 1968, Document 31, *DSPJ, Jugoslavija–SSSR*, 349.
[98] Zabeleška o razgovoru ambasadora Petrića sa sovjetskim ambasadorom Basovom, October 25, 1968, DA MSP RS, PA 1968 SSSR, f. 162, d. 3, s. 438573.

toward Czechoslovakia and the right of socialist states to decide their own way. Ambassador Vidić delivered the letter to the Politburo member, Andrei Kirilenko, who said that, personally, he "felt resentful" at the Yugoslav response. Moreover, Kirilenko said that he was surprised by "hysteria" in Yugoslavia over the allegations that the USSR wanted to attack Yugoslavia.[99] Yugoslavia's stubborn insistence on the sovereignty and independence enraged the Soviets who believed that in "today's world, there is no sovereignty and independence in the absolute sense [of those words]."[100] Besides, fumed Soviets, what kind of independence had Yugoslavia in mind when that independence relied on the United States?

The United States, Yugoslavia and the end of the Prague Spring

Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia that began before the end of the Prague Spring, forced Belgrade to look for support elsewhere. However, unlike in 1948 when the United States enthusiastically embraced this maverick socialist state, in 1968 the United States and the West were more circumspect. Lyndon Johnson feebly responded to the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia chiefly because he remained focused on détente with the Soviet Union and the arms control talks.[101] Yugoslav correspondents from Washington and New York dispatched reports that unequivocally confirmed that the United States

[99] Kabinet Pešića svim predstavništvima SFRJ, November 14, 1968, DA MSP RS, PA 1968 SSSR, f. 159, f. 1, s. 441360.
[100] Zabeleška o razgovoru ambasadora Petrića sa sovjetskim ambasadorom Basovom, October 25, 1968, DA MSP, PA 1968 SSSR, f. 162, d. 3, s. 438573. Moscow and its allies, the Yugoslavs noticed, started to relativize sovereignty by claiming that sovereignty in its purest sense could not exist in the Cold War. The former ambassador of Czechoslovakia in Belgrade, Antonin Krouzil, told his Yugoslav interlocutors that the "rough political reality of the modern world" imposed the necessity of alignment with two or three blocs. "About independence in the true meaning of that word one can't talk today, because there are no completely independent countries," Krouzil said at the dinner in the Yugoslav embassy in Prague. See Ambasada SFRJ Prag DSIP-u, September 27, 1968, DA MSP RS, PA 1968 ČSSR, f. 26, d. 6, s. 435914.
[101] Schwartz, *Lyndon Johnson and Europe*, 217–218.

was not going to react because it did not work to their or Soviet advantage to quarrel over the issue of Czechoslovakia. *Borba* reported that LBJ, just days after the invasion, went to his ranch in Texas, thus confirming that the United States would not provide anything else besides a mild rebuke of the Soviet action.[102] Although Yugoslavia commended the U.S. ostentatious hands-off approach during the Prague Spring, Washington's obvious approval of a fait accompli created a security dilemma for Belgrade: What is to be done in the case of a similar Soviet attack?

This question certainly was not new for Tito and comrades. After the 1948 Yugoslav–Soviet, Belgrade satisfied its defense needs by heavily relying on Western arms. The United States and its Western European allies supplied Yugoslavia with food, economic aid, and weapons in order to "keep Tito afloat" and drive a wedge into the Eastern bloc.[103] In 1968, although U.S. long-term policy objectives toward Yugoslavia remained the same as they were during the heights of the Cold War in the early 1950s, the context of international politics had changed. Stability was the order of the day.[104] Under those circumstances, Belgrade feared that the West would "sacrifice" Yugoslavia if that would contribute to the greater goal of easing tensions with the USSR. The prospects of a "new Yalta," i.e. a secret U.S.–Soviet agreement recognizing each other's

[102] "Džonson se vration na ranč u Teksasu," August 25, 1968 in *Borba*, 5.
[103] See Lorraine Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Global Cold War* (University Park: PennState University Press, 1997) and Bojan Dimitrijević, *Jugoslovenska armija, 1945–1954* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006).
[104] Five days after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Democratic Party's national convention convened in Chicago. The assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. in March and Robert F. Kennedy in June 1968 and the protests against the war in Vietnam created combustible atmosphere that led to the notorious clashes between demonstrators and the Chicago police. The Chicago riots created the sense of national crisis. Faced with domestic criticism over his handling of the war in Vietnam, Johnson sought stability abroad. Thus, confrontation with the USSR over Czechoslovakia was out of question. As Jeremi Suri explained, "détente was a mechanism for domestic fortification." "They used agreement with foreign adversaries to contain increasingly virulent internal pressures," Suri wrote. Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 213.

spheres of influence, became a sort of an obsession for Tito and his associates. Even more so because in 1967, Yugoslav–U.S. relations reached the nadir mostly because of Yugoslavia's position toward Vietnam and the Middle East and its closeness with the USSR. Moreover, other issues, such as the 1967 Greek coup d'état that Yugoslavs believed was instigated by the United States and terrorist attacks on Yugoslav diplomatic offices in North America, further soured the relationship. Some in Washington believed that Yugoslavia de facto became a member of the Warsaw Pact, citing Tito's participation in the 1967 meetings of the leaders of Eastern European communist parties in Moscow, and Yugoslavia's participation in the Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Bulgaria (albeit as an observer) – actions that were unimaginable during the Khrushchev years.[105] The U.S. ambassador Elbrick complained about this "atmosphere of mistrust and apprehension" in his report, blaming Yugoslavia for it because of Belgrade's erroneous perception of the United States as a "deus em (sic!) machina responsible for world events."[106] The U.S. embassy, in a memo entitled "Anti-Americanism Growing Stronger in Yugoslavia," noted that Yugoslav phobia of American influence in the world could make bilateral dealings with Belgrade "increasingly difficult in the period just ahead."[107]

However, the Czechoslovak crisis thawed frosty U.S.–Yugoslav relations. Already in the first half of 1968, Yugoslavia's position in the United States somewhat

[105] Yugoslav sources from Washington confirmed that both many on Capitol Hill and in State Department privately believed that Yugoslavia had returned to the pre-1948 position vis-à-vis the USSR. Yugoslavia's overly friendly attitude toward Moscow and its unrelenting anti-American stance were interpreted in Washington as an important change in strategic situation in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. See Ambasada SFRJ Vašington DSIP-u, June 27, 1967, DA MSP RS, PA 1967 SAD, f. 158, d. 2, s. 423459.
[106] Embassy in Belgrade to State Department, Telegram 146, July 15, 1967, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967–1969, box 2674, Pol US–Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[107] Embassy in Belgrade to State Department, Airgram A-877, June 22, 1967, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967–1969, box 2674, Pol 1 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

improved because of Yugoslavia's "principled attitude" toward the Prague Spring that signaled, despite its 1967 honeymoon with the Soviets, Belgrade's determination to maintain its independence from the Kremlin. The Soviet-led attack on Czechoslovakia forced Yugoslavs to soften their stance toward Washington, but also provided the opening for the United States to try to steer Yugoslavia toward the West. Fueled by these mutual political and strategic interests an extensive diplomatic activity ensued.

On August 23, Tito received ambassador Elbrick who, because of the Soviet intervention, canceled his trip back to the United States. Although Tito did not request material and political support, Elbrick left the meeting convinced that this request would emerge in the future. Moreover, Tito expressed readiness to receive Elbrick "at any time" if Washington desired so, to further clarify Yugoslavia's positions.[108] Six days after the Tito–Elbrick meeting, the Yugoslav ambassador in Washington, Bogdan Crnobrnja, met with Secretary Rusk. Crnobrnja, after explaining Yugoslavia's position toward Czechoslovakia, said that "Yugoslavia is neither frightened nor worried," adding that "if the need should come, the Yugoslav people… will defend their independence."[109] Rusk said that the United States was watching the movements of the Warsaw Pact troops and that there were no indications that the Soviets would move against Romania and Yugoslavia. He added that any further movement of Warsaw Pact troops would be a "matter of grave concern" to NATO, particularly against Yugoslavia. Although Rusk

[108] Telegram from the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State, August 23, 1968, Document 191, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, Vol. XVII, Eastern Europe.
[109] Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Crnobrnja, August 29, 1968, Document 192, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe.

invited Yugoslavia to submit any information about possible Soviet threats, he did not explicitly promise U.S. aid in the case of a Soviet attack.

Ambassador Elbrick was also noncommittal during his meeting with Yugoslav Secretary Nikezić on August 30. After a lengthy conversation with the U.S. ambassador, Nikezić concluded that Elbrick did not say anything new about the American position toward Yugoslavia, but expected that the United States, after these meetings, should "actualize ("*aktuelizira*") or at least repeat its interest [toward Yugoslavia]." "Understandably, even silence would mean something," Nikezić concluded.[110] However, one of the main purposes of Elbrick's visit to Nikezić was to clear the air over rumors that the United States and the USSR made a Yalta-like agreement on spheres of influence. According to that alleged agreement, the United States "gave" Czechoslovakia to the Soviets to recompense somewhere else.[111] "We are not against negotiations between big powers… I do not claim that there is an agreement, but I think that there is an understanding between them which gave Soviets confidence in this case," Nikezić said.[112] Elbrick vehemently rejected these allegations, adding that even in 1945 the

[110] Zabeleška o razgovoru državnog sekretara za inostrane poslove M. Nikezića sa ambasadorom SAD B. Elbrickom, 30. avgusta 1968, Kabinet DSIP, pov. br. 431739, August 31, 1968, AJ, KPR fond 837, I-5-b/104–16 SAD.

[111] Tepavac was curious about U.S. policy toward Cuba after the events in Czechoslovakia, implying that the two superpowers made a deal to "swap" Czechoslovakia for Cuba. During the Rusk–Crnobrnja meeting the U.S. Secretary said that "Moscow's black propaganda organs have been trying to manufacture the myth of a U.S.–USSR understanding on Czechoslovakia." See Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Crnobrnja, August 29, 1968, Document 192, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe.

[112] Zabeleška o razgovoru državnog sekretara za inostrane poslove M. Nikezića sa ambasadorom SAD B. Elbrickom, 30. avgusta 1968, Kabinet DSIP, pov. br. 431739, August 31, 1968, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–16 SAD. Yugoslavs were not alone in their paranoia about spheres of influence. The Yugoslav embassy in Paris wrote that its anonymous source from the French foreign ministry said that the Soviet-led invasion was clearly aimed toward protecting Soviet hegemony and it confirmed that the Yalta agreement was still in force. DSIP svim diplomatsko-konzularnim predstavništvima, August 25, DA MSP RS, PA 1968 SSSR, f. 159, d. 4, s. 428809. Chip Bohlen also wrote how de Gaulle's reaction to the Soviet invasion was to resort to his "classic formula" of blaming Yalta for spheres of influence. See Bohlen, *Witness to History*, 533.

United States rejected the notion of spheres of influence. "There was a certain agreement between Stalin and the Brits, however, the US never accepted it," Elbrick said, adding that the United States was not so cynical to be indifferent toward Czechoslovakia's fate.[113] As for Yugoslavia, Elbrick said, it was in the U.S. interest for it to remain independent. Nikezić agreed, noting that Yugoslavia's geographic position put it in the Soviet sphere of influence and that it would be better for the United States to deal with an independent socialist country than with a Soviet satellite.

On September 1, Elbrick requested another meeting with Nikezić to discuss U.S.–Soviet contacts related to the alleged Soviet plans to invade Romania, but also to find the details about Tito's meeting with the Soviet ambassador.[114] The rumors of a possible Soviet invasion of Romania had circulated in Washington since August 23.[115] Bucharest denied any connection with those rumors, but also publicly dismissed any possibility of a Soviet attack, probably with the intent not to provoke the Soviets. However, the Romanian embassy in Prague was a likely source of this hearsay. The Yugoslav ambassador in Romania received confidential information from a Romanian foreign ministry official Vasile Sandru about the talks between soon-to-be-dismissed chairman of

[113] Zabeleška o razgovoru državnog sekretara za inostrane poslove M. Nikezića sa ambasadorom SAD B. Elbrickom, 30. avgusta 1968, Kabinet DSIP, pov. br. 431739, August 31, 1968, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–16 SAD.
[114] Yugoslav diplomats carefully noted that the United States treated Yugoslavia differently from Romania. During the Rusk–Crnobrnja talks, Rusk said that Yugoslavia's strategic position on the Adriatic was of a greater strategic value to the United States and NATO than Romania's strategic position.
[115] On August 23, Under Secretary Bohlen met with Romanian ambassador Corneliu Bogdan. Bohlen wanted to know if Bucharest had any information about Warsaw Pact movements toward Romania. The same day, Rusk spoke with Soviet ambassador Dobrynin and asked him about a "number of alarming rumors about a possible Soviet invasion of Romania." Both Bogdan and Dobrynin said that they did not know anything about it. See Memorandum of Conversation between Under Secretary Bohlen and Ambassador Bogdan, August 23, 1968, Document 163, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe and Conversation between Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Dobrynin, August 23, 1968, Document 87, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe.

the National Assembly Joseph Smrkovsky and the Romanian ambassador in Prague. Smrkovsky was one of the Czechoslovak leaders who was detained, tortured and sent to Moscow by the Soviets. Smrkovsky said that on their way to Moscow, he saw a large concentration of Soviet troops in Ukraine on their way to Romania. Smrkovsky said that an invasion was canceled only thanks to Zhou Enlai's warning to the Soviets.[116] Smrkovsky's claims are hard to corroborate, yet Zhou Enlai repeatedly expressed China's support to its Balkan ally. "Resist, if you have need, we'll give you cannons!" Enlai said to the Romanian ambassador in Beijing.[117]

A Soviet-led attack on Romania would have enormous implications on Yugoslavia and Tito agreed to meet with Ceausescu on August 24 in border town Vršac. The Romanians wanted to know if they could count on Yugoslavia in the case of an invasion. Yugoslavia and Romania shared approximately 300 miles of the border and an expected three-thronged attack against Romania would make it strategically important for providing supplies for the besieged Romanian army. Ceausescu wanted firm commitments from Tito that Yugoslavia would not allow the movements of the Warsaw Pact troops across its territory. Tito promised Yugoslavia's neutrality, yet he did not want to commit too much – he would not allow the Romanian army to operate from Yugoslavia's territory.[118] Tito was cautious not to provoke the Soviets, but also he was

[116] Razgovor ambasadora Jakše Petrića sa Vasile Sandruom, August 31, 1968, broj 309, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/97–4 Rumunija.
[117] Telegrams from Romanian Embassy, Beijing, to Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22-24 August 1968, August 24, 1968, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Romanian Foreign Ministry Archives (AMAE), fond Telegrams, Peking 1968, Vol II, 272-274. Republished in Romulus Ioan Budura, coordinator, Relaţiile Româno-Chineze 1880-1974: Documente [Romanian-Chinese Relations 1880-1974: Documents], Bucureşti, Ministerul Afacerilor Externe [Foreign Affairs Ministry], Arhivele Naţionale [National Archives], 2005, 901-902. Translated for CWIHP by Mircea Munteanu. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113289 (accessed July 29, 2019).
[118] Vladimir Cvetković, "Jugoslovensko-rumunski odnosi u danima sovjetske intervencije u Čehoslovačkoj," in *1968–Četrdeset godina posle*, 172.

aware of Romania's indefensible position and did not want to tie his boat to a sinking Romanian ship.

Elementary military logic dictated that Romania was indefensible in the case of simultaneous attacks from Moldova, the Black Sea, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Moreover, the Yugoslavs knew that the West probably would not lift a finger if the Soviets attacked Ceausescu. Ivo Sarajčić, the Yugoslav ambassador in London, spoke with a British cabinet member, Richard Marsh, who said that if the Soviets attacked Romania, in the West, there would be only "political–propaganda noise," and nothing more than that. "However, in the case of a Soviet attack on Austria or Yugoslavia, [our] reaction would be totally different. There would be a counteraction, military response, which would, naturally, equal to a new world war," Marsh reassured his interlocutor.[119] The Romanians were also aware of their relatively smaller Cold War market value. Aurel Malnasan, the Romanian ambassador in Yugoslavia, commented how Yugoslavia's geopolitical position was easier than Romania's.[120] As Tito exclaimed in the summer of 1948: "The Americans are not fools. They won't let the Russians reach the Adriatic."[121]

Yet, despite this (self) assurance, the Yugoslavs pressed further for American support, particularly after the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine was announced in *Pravda* in September. Even before the idea of "socialist commonwealth" was declared *urbi et orbi* on the pages of *Pravda*, the Yugoslavs made a concerted effort to get U.S. support.

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[119] Zabeleška iz razgovora sa Richard Marshom, članom kabineta na večeri 1. septembra, September 2, 1968, br. 606, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/120–5 Velika Britanija.
[120] Zabeleška o razgovoru zamenika državnog sekretara za inostrane poslove M. Pavićevića sa ambasadorom Rumunije A. Malnašanom, 31. avgusta 1968. godine, August 31, 1968, Kabinet zamenika državnog sekretara, pov. br. 431733, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/97–4 Rumunija.
[121] Milovan Djilas, *Tito. The Story from Inside*, translated by Vasilije Kojić and Richard Hayes (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980), 125.

Attacks on Yugoslavia in Soviet (and Bulgarian) press and harassment of Yugoslav diplomats and citizens in the USSR, indicated that the Kremlin actively worked against Yugoslavia and its leaders. Moreover, Albania's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact opened a possibility of a Soviet action against Yugoslavia's southwest neighbor that would inevitably involve Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav chief of counterintelligence, Branko Andrijašević, met with the U.S. consul general in Istanbul, Douglas Heck, to find out how would the United States react in the case of a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia, asking also why did not Washington provide any statements, similar to those from after 1948, to confirm that they were still interested in preserving Yugoslavia's sovereignty and integrity.[122] Heck, however, said that the Johnson administration would not make any new commitments before the election. Similarly to Andrijašević's remarks, Mirko Bruner, Yugoslavia's Deputy Chief of Mission in Washington, complained to a State Department Foreign Service Officer John Campbell about U.S. indifference toward Yugoslavia. Bruner said the United States, after 1948, showed the "Russians and the world… that the United States supported Yugoslavia's independence," but now Yugoslavia appeared to be a "forgotten country."[123]

Just days after these conversations between Yugoslav and American officials, Sergei Kovalev on the pages of *Pravda* outlined the idea of limited sovereignty.[124] Although the threat of a direct Soviet attack subdued after the first few days of confusion, the Brezhnev Doctrine created a pseudo-legal basis for future Soviet interference in

[122] Zabeleska o razgovoru Branka Andrijaševića, načelnika Uprave za istraživanje i dokumentaciju, sa generalnim konzulom SAD u Istambulu Douglas Heck-om, dana 20. septembra 1968. god. u Splitu, October 7, 1968, DA MSP RS, PA 1968 SAD, f. 173, d. 7, s. 435531.
[123] Memorandum of conversation between John C. Campbell and Mirko Bruner, September 24, 1968, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967–1969, box 2674, Pol US–Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[124] See The Brezhnev Doctrine in Navratil, ed., *The Prague Spring 1968*, 502–503.

Yugoslavia's affairs. The idea of the "socialist commonwealth" under the Soviet hegemony served to provide a post facto justification of the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia. Yet, Kovalev's piece established a blueprint for future actions. "It must be emphasized that even if a socialist country tries to adopt a position 'outside the blocs,' it in fact retains its national independence only because of the power of the socialist commonwealth – and above all its chief force, the Soviet Union," Kovalev wrote, sending shivers down Yugoslavia's spine.[125] Even without a military intervention (that was never completely taken off the table), the Yugoslavs worried that the doctrine allowed Moscow to intervene in Yugoslavia using other, less overt methods. The mixed ethnic and religious structure of Yugoslavia that potentially presented a destabilizing factor could provide room for Soviet subversive activity. Tito's old age (76 at the time of the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia) and the expected power vacuum after his departure could encourage pro-Soviet elements within the Yugoslav party. Finally, economic and social problems that showed its face during the student protests in July, could easily translate into political crisis thus giving the Soviets a pretext for intervention.

These issues brought about by the Brezhnev Doctrine were discussed at a series of meetings between Yugoslav and American officials during October. Just two days after Nikezić's talk with Rusk in New York, Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Kiro Gligorov arrived in Washington for an International Monetary Fund meeting. Yet, Gligorov's visit received larger political significance. He met with several U.S. officials, including Commerce Secretary C.R. Smith, both Rostow brothers, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony Solomon and Deputy Secretary of State Katzenbach. The

[125] Ibid., 502.

Gligorov visit was topped with a meeting with President Johnson that served to publicly demonstrate U.S. interest in Yugoslavia's independence from Moscow. The Johnson–Gligorov meeting was a great opportunity to advertise Yugoslav–American friendship, but Johnson's anodyne statement that the United States "are concerned, and determined that aggression not spread" did not allay Yugoslav qualms.[126] According to Gligorov's reports, Johnson appeared pessimistic and agitated and complained about how he was duped by the Soviets.[127]

Gligorov's talks with other American officials were more substantial. Although he did not request U.S. military aid, Gligorov asked for American economic and financial aid in getting loans and providing more favorable conditions for loan repayments. Although Washington could not promise anything, it was "prepared to look sympathetically at any specific suggestions they [Yugoslavs] might have in the economic field."[128] This request for economic aid was repeated three days later. On October 7, Secretary Rusk met with Yugoslav Secretary Nikezić in New York. At the meeting, Nikezić called for support "through indirect means 'that will be understood by the other side'."[129] Nikezić noted that the danger of Soviet military intervention "now seems more remote." Yet, he said that Belgrade worried about long-term Soviet policy vis-à-vis

[126] Memorandum of conversation between President Johnson and Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minster Gligorov, October 4, 1968, Document 195, *FRUS*, 1964–1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe.
[127] Gligorov's report shows slightly different mood at the meeting than the U.S. memorandum of conversation would suggest. Gligorov said that Johnson spoke "roughly" about the Soviets, stating that "when animals starts to mangle their prey, the appetite grows." U.S. record stated: "when aggressors taste blood, the appetite grows." For comparison see Razgovor Kire Gligorova sa predsednikom SAD Lindonom Džonsonom, October 9, 1968, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–16 SAD.
[128] Memorandum of conversation between Deputy Secretary of State Katzenbach and Deputy Prime Minister Gligorov, October 4, 1968, Subject Numeric Files, 1967–1969, box 2841, Pol 7 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[129] Memorandum of conversation between Secretary Rusk and Secretary Nikezic, October 7, 1968, Subject Numeric Files, 1967–1969, box 2674, Pol US–Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

Yugoslavia and their formulation of "socialist commonwealth" that gave the Soviets "much more flexibility to intervene in the affairs of Socialist States like Yugoslavia."[130]

Although Nikezić was unclear what he meant by "indirect means," the West understood that it had to provide some sort of assurance to Yugoslavia short of direct military assistance in the case of an attack. A day after the Rusk–Nikezić meeting in New York, the United States and Great Britain discussed Yugoslavia contingency planning and agreed that, together with their NATO allies, "must do our utmost to deter Soviet move against Yugoslavia."[131] Proposed measures included high–level visits, public statements of support for Yugoslavia's independence, and economic assistance to Yugoslavia with a possible increase of NATO forces on the Alliance's Southern Flank.[132]

Economic assistance, Belgrade and Washington both implicitly agreed, would demonstrate U.S. interest in Yugoslavia's independence and provide a long-term economic and political stability of the Yugoslav regime. Particularly because the United States estimated that the Soviets and the satellites would, as they did after 1948, impose economic sanctions against Yugoslavia. Moreover, the shift from economic investments

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[130] Ibid.

[131] Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach's cable regarding contingency planning for Yugoslavia in the event of Soviet aggression in that country. Department Of State, October 8, 1968, U.S. Declassified Documents Online (DDO) (accessed March 27, 2019).

[132] Although Yugoslavia was not, of course, a member of NATO, some U.S. officials tried to invoke the long-forgotten 1953 Balkan Pact between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia that loosely associated Yugoslavia with NATO defense structure via defense agreement with two NATO members. In September, W.W. Rostow said to Yugoslav ambassador Crnobrnja that the United States have "studied current situation with the Balkan Pact and realized that its provisions are formally still in force." According to Rostow, this provided a legal basis for U.S. military aid in the case of a Soviet attack. "He said that we can count immediately on spare parts and weapons only if we made a request for them," Crnobrnja reported. See Reagovanje SAD na naš stav u vezi s okupacijom ČSSR i politika američke vlade prema Jugoslaviji u najnovijoj situaciji, October 15, 1968, DSIP-III uprava, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–170. Assistant Secretary John Leddy wrote a memorandum for Rusk in which he stated that the United States should not insist on reactivating the Balkan Pact but should support Yugoslavia's initiative to reactivate the Pact. See Memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk from John Leddy regarding Soviet intervention in Romania. Department Of State, August 28, 1968, DDO (accessed March 27, 2019).

to defense expenditures could slow down Yugoslav economic reform, with immense social and political consequences for the country's stability. After 1968, the United States supported Yugoslavia's efforts to obtain loans, but also initiated and encouraged joint-venture projects with Yugoslav companies and private investments in Yugoslavia.

The U.S. ambassador in Belgrade, Elbrick, repeated this issue of economic assistance to President Johnson during their meeting on October 14. Elbrick told LBJ that the Yugoslavs were more concerned about economic pressures from the Soviets than about a direct military intervention. Elbrick advocated for stronger support to Yugoslavia, and Johnson agreed. "We want to help the Yugoslavs, and don't want to let happen there what happened to Czechoslovakia," Johnson said.[133] The White House issued a statement after the meeting, confirming the U.S. interest in Yugoslavia's independence. Elbrick's "lobbying" led President Johnson to send Deputy Secretary Katzenbach to Belgrade. Initially scheduled to visit Western European allies, Katzenbach made an unexpected detour to Belgrade on October 18.

Katzenbach's visit to Yugoslavia demonstrated U.S. interest in Yugoslavia and Belgrade interpreted it as the sign of a "positive evolution of the U.S. attitude toward Yugoslavia." After all, Katzenbach was the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit Yugoslavia since 1963 Secretary Rusk's visit. Katzenbach's Yugoslavia journey in many ways replicated Gligorov's visit to Washington weeks earlier. He met with the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat officials, Deputy Gligorov, and, finally, with Tito.

[133] Summary of a White House meeting between President Lyndon B. Johnson, National Security Council (NSC) staff member Nathaniel Davis, and U.S. Ambassador Burke Elbrick. Discussion centered on Yugoslav concerns over the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and what this action might mean for the future of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. White House, October 14, 1968, DDO (accessed April 3, 2019).

Similarly to Gligorov's talks with LBJ, Katzenbach's meeting with Tito created a strong public image. Katzenbach repeated LBJ's message from the October 14 meeting and delivered personal greetings from President Johnson and Tito's old friend Averell Harriman, who had visited Tito in Belgrade three years earlier. Tito provided his assessment of the events in Czechoslovakia and attacks against Yugoslavia in Eastern European and Soviet presses. He said that Yugoslavia was against any further aggravations ("*zaoštravanje*") of Yugoslav–Soviet relations, but that Yugoslavia would resist the new doctrine of limited sovereignty. "We took appropriate measures… so in the case of an attack, we would have around 2 million people under arms," Tito said, refereeing to the doctrine of total people's defense.[134] According to Katzenbach, Tito seemed more relaxed than other Yugoslav officials whom he met. Tito, however, stressed the importance of Western economic aid for sustaining the 1965 Yugoslav economic reforms. Western economic assistance was particularly essential because the "attacks of the USSR and other Eastern European countries on Yugoslavia's separate road are chiefly directed to our economic system," Tito said.[135] Thus, the expansion of Yugoslav economic opportunities in the West would allow Yugoslavia to reach its economic goals and avoid dire political and social consequences of the economic downturn.

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[134] Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike sa državnim podsekretarom Sjedinjenih američkih država g. Nikolasom Kacenbahom, October 18, 1968, AJ, KPR fond 837 I–3–a/107–170.

[135] Ibid. Negotiations between Yugoslavia and the EEC begun on October 15, 1968. Yugoslavia wanted to increase its exports to the EEC, but the main problem was France's decision to refuse larger quotas for Yugoslavia's agricultural products – Yugoslavia's main exporting article. Other EEC members recognize political importance of a trade deal with Yugoslavia and insisted on a compromise between French demands and Yugoslav needs. For Yugoslavia's relations with the EEC see Benedetto Zaccaria, *The EEC's Yugoslav Policy in Cold War Europe, 1968-1980* (London: Palgrave McMillan, 2016).
Tito complained to Katzenbach how the Polish press wrote how in Yugoslavia children walk naked, that the people looked poor, and the streets were full of beggars. "Millions of tourists who visited our country this year, including those from Eastern European countries, could see how we live and work in Yugoslavia," Tito said, adding how it would be politically and economically damaging if Yugoslav economy stagnated.

Katzenbach discussed economic issues with his other Yugoslav interlocutors. His meeting with Gligorov was a continuation of their talks in Washington two weeks earlier. Katzenbach brought some good news to Belgrade. He told Gligorov that the World Bank was ready to extend a credit line to Yugoslavia. Moreover, other financial institutions such as the Ex-Im Bank also expressed their readiness to provide extensions for loan repayments. Katzenbach also said that the United States tried to sway the EEC to be more flexible in its trade negotiations with the Yugoslavs.[136]

Yugoslav Deputy State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mišo Pavićević, emphasized the political importance of Western economic assistance to Yugoslavia, particularly in the context of increasing defense expenditures. This aid was, as Pavićević said, "pivotal" to the success of domestic economic programs and "necessary for consolidation of Yugoslavia's international position."[137] Pavićević was more forthcoming than Tito in his conversation with Katzenbach. Although Katzenbach described Tito as "quite charming," his conversation revealed very little new.[138] Pavićević, however, divulged Yugoslav fears and hopes. Unlike Tito, Pavićević asked that the West should "make very clear to Moscow its interest in the preservation of Yugoslavia as an

[136] Beleška o razgovoru potpredsednika SIV–a Kire Gligorova sa podsekretarom u State Departmentu N. Kacenbahom, October 18, 1968, AJ, KPR fond 837 I–3–a/107–170.
[137] Summary of Under-Secretary Nicholas deB. Katzenbach's meeting with Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister Miso Pavicevic regarding: Yugoslav-Soviet relations; Soviet long-range intentions in Eastern Europe; situation in Albania; Western interest in the Balkans; Yugoslav economic relations with Western countries. Department Of State, October 22, 1968, DDO (accessed April 8, 2019).
[138] In his report Katzenbach highlighted just two points from his conversation with Tito. First, Katzenbach asked Tito if he knew about any discord in the Soviet leadership over the question of Czechoslovakia. Tito was evasive but said that he knew that some members of the Politburo were against military intervention. Second, in their discussion about the Middle East, Tito said that he did not have any influence on Nasser and that Nasser was under Moscow's influence. See Telegram From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to the Department of State, Document 196, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. XVII.

independent and nonaligned country."[139] Pavićević noted that Yugoslavia's independence would be in the best interest of the West and that Western countries should go beyond public statements to show their support of Yugoslavia. Yet, Pavićević added, the Yugoslavs also warned Moscow that they were ready to fight them "house-to-house if need be."[140]

Like the Soviet–Yugoslav split in 1948 that determined Yugoslavia's domestic and foreign policies, the violent end of the Prague Spring generated changes in Yugoslavia that marked the last two decades of the country's existence. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia led Yugoslavia to redefine its position vis-à-vis the superpowers, but also China, its neighbors, and the Third World. This sense of danger from foreign interference catalyzed a series of domestic reforms that were geared toward providing long-term political and economic stability and orderly transition of power in the event of Tito's departure from the scene. The Soviet intervention in that sense imposed urgently two interrelated questions that, in their various iterations, preoccupied Yugoslavia throughout the 1970s. First, it raised the issue of sovereignty and how small states such as Yugoslavia could define and defend their sovereignty rights in international relations. This issue became the top priority of Yugoslav diplomacy, and permeated Belgrade's appearances before international bodies such as the Nonaligned Movement, Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and the UN, but also its bilateral relations with other states. The emergence of détente reinforced these fears

[139] Summary of Under-Secretary Nicholas deB. Katzenbach's meeting with Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister Miso Pavicevic regarding: Yugoslav-Soviet relations, October 22, 1968, DDO (accessed April 8, 2019).
[140] Ibid.

because Yugoslavia believed that the agreement between the superpowers would amount to the "second Yalta", i.e. the division of the spheres of influence.

Egypt's humiliating defeat in June 1967, the escalation of U.S. intervention in Vietnam and the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia convinced the Yugoslavs that military internationalist solidarity was as necessary as ever. These events had demonstrated the inadequacy of the reliance on superpowers and the importance of solidarity among non-aligned countries and movements. The introduction of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine presented an existential threat to the Belgrade regime. Superpowers' interventions further emphasized the need for strengthening political and military networks between nonaligned governments and revolutionary movements that would serve to discourage imperialist interventions.

The 1967 Six-Day War, the escalation of the war in Vietnam, and, finally, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia showed that the sovereign rights of small states were under attack from the superpowers and their proxies and that small states should be militarily prepared to defend themselves and to support each other's defense effort. In the aftermath of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia redefined its defense doctrine, emphasizing the concept of the total people's defense. Moreover, it ramped up its military support to liberation movements and friendly states in the Third World thus aiming to underscore internationalist solidarity between small states in global affairs. As the example of Egypt had showed, dependence on the security umbrella of great powers came at a huge cost, therefore, the Yugoslavs reasoned, solidarity with fellow nonaligned regimes and movements created a wide network of political support that would make foreign intervention too costly. This policy orientation determined Yugoslavia's stance toward

détente. Although the regime publicly supported détente, Yugoslavia tried to offer its own vision of it that would encompass the whole world. When those constructive efforts failed, Yugoslavia aimed toward disrupting détente in its existing form. Many of these new policies were not new. Nonalignment had been present in Yugoslavia's foreign policy since the late 1950s. Also, the country had been exploiting the superpower competition since the Yugoslav–Soviet split in 1948. However, these policies needed a major overhaul in the context of superpowers' détente and their intervention against small, independent states. In this sense, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and the Western response (or lack thereof) marked a watershed moment that required, the Belgrade regime believed, new approaches in defining and conducting the country's foreign and domestic policies.

Chapter 2: Between Continuity and Change: Yugoslavia's Constructive Approach to Détente, 1969–1972

"Everything was different, without ceremony and without any hope that we felt in 1956," wrote Veljko Mićunović in his memoir, describing the atmosphere in Yugoslav–Soviet relations in 1969. In September 1969, Mićunović, a veteran of Yugoslav foreign service, was appointed as the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow. This was his second tour in Moscow after he served there during the critical years of Yugoslav–Soviet rapprochement in the mid-1950s.[141] This time around, however, Mićunović wrote: "Everything was different and much worse than before."[142] In a pre-departure conversation with Tito, Mićunović was pessimistic about his post: Brezhnev's Soviet Union was not a Khrushchev's Soviet Union. "Many doors in Moscow would be closed to me," Mićunović said, least because he was Khrushchev's friend. Moreover, the invasion of Czechoslovakia destroyed the trust between Yugoslavia and the USSR and to improve relations was not going to be easy. "We will have to start from the beginning," Mićunović told Tito.[143]

"In a certain sense we can talk about the end of one period and probably the beginning of a new period in international relations," wrote Mićunović's colleague in Washington, Bogdan Crnobrnja, in March 1969.[144] Like Mićunović, Crnobrnja had equally illustrious career in the Yugoslav diplomatic apparatus. In 1967, Crnobrnja replaced Mićunović in Washington. An astute observer of American politics, Crnobrnja believed that changes in the global context, such as the ascendance of multipolarity,

[141] See Mićunović, *Moscow Diary*.
[142] Veljko Mićunović, *Moskovske godine 1969/1971* (Beograd: Rad, 1984), 37.
[143] Ibid.
[144] Izlaganje druga Crnobrnje na sastanku kolegija DSIP-a održanog 6. marta 1969, March 18, 1969, DSIP-III Uprava, pov. 43327/3U, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–17 SAD.

triangular diplomacy ("the big triangle the United States–USSR–China as the domineering factor in global affairs"), but also changes in America caused by the war in Vietnam and the dollar crisis led the United States to redefine its global role. "The question is, however, how to establish the position of the leading power under these new circumstances" and what that would mean for Yugoslavia, Crnobrnja wondered?[145]

This sense of a new beginning that permeated Mićunović's and Crnobrnja's accounts revealed the main dilemma of Yugoslavia's foreign policy after the invasion of Czechoslovakia: How to position itself under these new circumstances? The changing world was full of threats to small countries as the events in the Middle East, Vietnam, and Czechoslovakia showed. Yet, it also offered many opportunities that were not available just a few years before. It was a new beginning for Yugoslavia as much as it was for the United States and the Soviet Union. This chapter will discuss how Yugoslavia redefined its foreign policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s to meet these global challenges. The chapter's main argument is that, from 1969 to 1972, Yugoslavia assumed a constructive approach to détente. The main tenets of this approach included: expansion of Yugoslavia's relations with the United States; rapprochement with China; the attempt to normalize the country's relations with the Soviet Union; normalization of its relations with neighboring countries; active participation in European security arrangements; and the revival of nonalignment. In this phase, the regime in Belgrade believed that the principles of détente should be applied universally and that small countries, such as Yugoslavia, had political and moral responsibility to participate in defining and implementing policies that would relax the tensions in international relations. Belgrade

[145] Ibid.

assumed that negotiations between the superpowers threatened to exclude small and emerging states from the policymaking process, thus allowing superpowers to dictate the terms of détente at the expense of the voiceless majority. This struggle for democratization of global political and economic affairs would become the hallmark of Yugoslavia's foreign policy during détente.

Several foreign and domestic factors influenced Yugoslavia's foreign policy in this period. After August 1968, the central issue of Yugoslavia's foreign policy was the Soviet threat. The Soviet challenge to Yugoslavia's independence and sovereignty assumed many different forms. Although the prospects of a direct military intervention seemed remote, the danger of Soviet interference in Yugoslav affairs through other means did not go away. The Soviets continued with their attacks on Yugoslav foreign and domestic policies; the Kremlin benevolently looked at, if not encouraged, Bulgaria's territorial pretensions toward Macedonia; the Soviets supported the activities of pro-Stalinist émigré groups; and, finally, it appeared that Moscow actively tried to sow discord between Yugoslav ethnic groups at home.

In the context of the Soviet threat, domestic political and economic problems became inextricably tied to the country's foreign policy. Economic problems fueled regional and ethnic differences. From 1969 to 1972, Yugoslavia went through several political crises that threatened its stability and provided an opportunity for foreign powers to meddle into the country's domestic affairs. In the shadows of these events lurked the issue of Tito's succession and transition of power in the post-Tito period. As Tito neared his eightieth birthday, both the East and the West developed contingency plans for post-Tito Yugoslavia. During this period, on Tito's initiative, the Yugoslav leadership

launched a set of internal constitutional and political reforms whose aim was to strengthen the Yugoslav federation and to allow a smooth transition of power when Tito left the scene.

Faced with outside threats and internal instability, Yugoslavia's main foreign policy objective was to create a world order that would impede foreign interventions and allow unobstructed political and economic development of small countries. Yugoslavia assumed a constructive approach to détente that positioned Yugoslavia as an active subject in global affairs. By the end of 1972, when the direct Soviet threat decreased, Yugoslavia abandoned this constructive approach and took a disruptive stance toward détente. This chapter describes Yugoslavia's efforts to regulate its relations with the great powers; the interaction between the country's foreign and domestic policies; and why, in 1972, Yugoslavia abandoned its constructive approach to détente.

The new beginning of an old friendship: Tito's attempt to bring Nixon to Yugoslavia

"A New Nixon," that was how the Yugoslav leading daily *Politika* described the Republican presidential candidate. According to *Politika,* Nixon managed to "go beyond parochial and sectarian views of America and the world." This "new" Nixon in his campaign suggested openness toward a more pragmatic and flexible policy toward friends and foes. "He is not chasing a 'communist bogeymen' anymore," *Politika* wrote. [146] The Yugoslav government was optimistic about Nixon's candidacy and the prospects of his non-ideological approach to foreign policy. Thus, when Nixon became the 37th

[146] Aleksandar Nenadović, "Niksonova druga šansa," August 11, 1968 in *Politika,* 5.

president of the United States, the pervasive feeling in Belgrade was cautious optimism. The Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat considered Nixon's inaugural address as "positive." "He [Nixon] emphasized efforts to achieve peace and the improvement of international peaceful cooperation, and I can confirm that those are the objectives that we also are trying to achieve," a Yugoslav diplomat said to the U.S. Embassy councilor C. Mudd.[147] Other Yugoslav officials stated that the new administration, "more flexible and pragmatic [,]… could bring to bear new ways of thinking about old problems."[148]

These "new ways" included détente with the U.S. main adversary, the Soviet Union, normalization with China, and the administration's apparent desire to end the war in Vietnam. Yugoslav ambassador Crnobrnja reported that Nixon's offer to negotiate with the USSR was not a tactical move, but rather a necessity because of a deep crisis of American foreign policy. One of the preconditions to begin the dialogue with Moscow was to recognize the status quo in Europe. "I think that America has already decided on the policy of a status quo in Europe," Crnobrnja wrote. Because of its consideration toward West Germany, Crnobrnja noted, that the United States could not argue more openly for a status quo.[149]

Washington's efforts to preserve stability in Europe, however, caused a great deal of concern in Belgrade. If the two superpowers decide on zones of influence in Europe, what would that mean for Yugoslavia? During the Czechoslovak crisis, Yugoslavia

[147] Zabeleška o razgovoru R. Brzića, v.d. pomoćnika načelnika sa K. Madom, savetnikom Ambasade SAD, January 24, 1969, DSIP-III Uprava, pov. 42448, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–17 SAD.
[148] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 02791, September 5, 1969, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967–1969, box 2674, Pol US–Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[149] Izlaganje druga Crnobrnje na sastanku kolegija DSIP-a održanog 6. marta 1969, March 18, 1969, DSIP-III Uprava, pov. 43327/3U, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–17 SAD.

assumed that the American lukewarm reaction to the Soviet violation of international law was probably because of some secret agreement between the USSR and the Johnson administration about spheres of influence. Although the Yugoslav government welcomed the change in Washington, the same uneasiness about a "new Yalta" remained. The Yugoslavs publicly supported the dialogue between Moscow and Washington because they believed that nuclear arms limitation was necessary to avoid another Cuban crisis-like event. Yet, Belgrade feared that any agreement between superpowers would be made at the expense of small states. As a neutral state, Yugoslavia was particularly vulnerable to these power-sharing deals because détente required solidification of their respective spheres of influence in Europe and elsewhere. The case of Czechoslovakia was a warning sign that stability in Europe would be paid by the sovereignty and independence of small states.

In response, Yugoslavia tried to improve its relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. To achieve this goal, the Yugoslav president engaged in high-level diplomacy that sought to bring American and Soviet leaders to Yugoslavia that would reaffirm Yugoslavia's independence and its importance in world affairs. The Kremlin, however, ignored Yugoslav peace overtures. Tito's calls to Brezhnev to "straighten the existing issues between us in a friendly atmosphere" remained unanswered because Brezhnev and other Soviet officials ignored ambassador Mićunović's attempts to deliver Tito's invitation. Tito hoped that Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia would normalize Yugoslav–Soviet relations after the 1968 fallout by reaffirming the principles of the 1955 Belgrade Declaration. Moreover, this visit, Tito and his associates believed, would effectively repudiate the doctrine of limited sovereignty. Although Soviet sources are not

available, Yugoslav reports suggest that anti-Yugoslav faction in the Soviet Politburo strongly argued against the normalization, perhaps still seething with discontent over Khrushchev's humiliating visit to the Yugoslav capital in June 1955.[150]

At the same time, Yugoslav officials ostentatiously displayed their resistance to foreign interference. In March 1969, the Ninth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia outlined the main tenets of Yugoslavia's foreign policy. In his lengthy speech to the delegates of the Congress, Tito condemned the Brezhnev Doctrine, but also rejected any possible division of the spheres of influence between two superpowers. Yet, Tito's speech before Congress demonstrated Yugoslavia's willingness to negotiate but without compromising its sovereignty and independence. An American observer noted that Tito's appearance before the Congress showed that he was "still a vigorous practitioner of a dangerous sport: Baiting the Russian bear."[151]

The Yugoslav government did not like this characterization. "We are surprised by certain theses [in American press] that we are irritating the Soviets too much, and that we could miscalculate," complained a Yugoslav diplomat to the U.S. embassy press councilor, H. Arnold.[152] Although the Yugoslavs noted that the treatment of Yugoslavia in the American press was better than a year before, writings such as the one that appeared on the pages of the *Evening Star* made Belgrade suspicious about the administration's plans toward Yugoslavia. The perennial question of the spheres of influence was still

[150] Yugoslav diplomats reported that pro-Stalinist "ideologues" such as Mikhail Suslov gained advantage in the Politburo. Yugoslavs circulated an unverified story that Suslov was so anti-Yugoslav that he refused to fly over the Yugoslav territory when he was traveling abroad.
[151] "Tito and the Kremlin," March 13, 1969 in *Washington Evening Star*, A-12.
[152] Zabeleška o razgovoru G. Joba, v.d. šefa odseka za SAD sa H. Arnoldom, savetnikom za štampu i kulturu ambasade SAD, March 21, 1969, DSIP-III Uprava, pov. br. 410434, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–17 SAD.

hanging like a dark cloud over Yugoslav–American relations. The U.S. embassy rejected any connection with the op-ed in the *Evening Star* that suggested that the Yugoslavs went too far in challenging the Soviets. Other American commentators, however, in their conversations with Yugoslav officials allowed that some of the attitudes expressed in the *Star* reflected pragmatic thinking of "certain circles" in Washington that believed that anything should be sacrificed, Yugoslavia's independence included, for an agreement with the Soviets. Yugoslavia's concern was further exacerbated by Nixon's polite refusal to visit Yugoslavia in 1969. By the end of spring 1969, it seemed that Tito lost his bet on high-level diplomacy as a solution for Yugoslavia's foreign policy problem.

Two days before his inauguration, Nixon sent a courtesy letter to Tito in which he stated his desire to meet with the Yugoslav president. Because of his overinflated sense of self-importance and under the pressure to obtain public support from the new administration in Washington, Tito, in his response, invited Nixon to extend his trip to Western Europe, scheduled for the last week of February and the first week of March, to include Yugoslavia in his itinerary. On March 10, Nixon sent another letter to Tito in which he stated that "someday in the future," he would be able to visit Yugoslavia. Although Nixon remained non-committal, his willingness to engage in correspondence with Tito "pleased [the Yugoslavs] greatly."[153]

Through more or less formal channels, however, the United States tried to assuage Yugoslavia's fears of abandonment. Charles Foltz of *U.S. and World News and Report* who followed Nixon on his trip to Western Europe said that Nixon firmly supported

[153] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 02791, September 5, 1969, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967–1969, box 2674, Pol US–Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

Yugoslavia's independence and that he would come to Yugoslavia either before or after his trip to the USSR that was yet to be scheduled. This visit, Nixon allegedly said to Foltz, would show the Soviets that Yugoslavia did not belong to their sphere of influence.[154] Tito's politely rejected invitation was certainly a diplomatic fiasco that showed that Yugoslavia was not, after all, among the administration's foreign policy priorities and that Yugoslavia and its president carried relatively little importance in Washington's foreign policy.[155] Thus, Washington believed, the exchange of letters between the two presidents, other high-level visits and American economic support would be sufficient expressions of American interest in Yugoslavia's independence.[156]

However, Tito's hubris suffered another hit in June when Nixon announced that he would visit five Asian and Pacific countries and Romania after Apollo 11 splashdown in the Pacific. Nixon's visit to Romania surprised everyone, including the Yugoslav government. "We did not get any information about it, neither from American nor from Romanian side," the Yugoslavs complained. To make things even worse, it appeared that the initiative for the visit came from Washington. A large collection of memoranda and analyses sent to Tito's desk delineating postmortem of Yugoslavia's invitation to Nixon and a possible explanation for Nixon's trip to Romania testified to Yugoslav (and Tito's)

[154] Zabeleška o razgovoru G. Joba, v.d. šefa odseka za SAD sa H. Arnoldom, savetnikom za štampu i kulturu ambasade SAD, March 21, 1969, DSIP-III Uprava, pov. br. 410434, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–17 SAD.
[155] Henry Kissinger wrote in his memoir that Yugoslavia was an "asset to us in the Balkans and to a lesser extent in Eastern Europe. It symbolized the possibility of independence. It relieved to some extent the threat to NATO. But outside of Europe Tito pursued his convictions, which on the whole were not hospitable to Western interests and ideas." Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 928.
[156] Memo, John Walsh to Henry Kissinger, February 27, 1969, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967–1969, box 2674, Pol US–Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

frustration over Nixon's decision to avoid Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs, though, misinterpreted Nixon's decision to meet Ceausescu instead of Tito.

The decision to meet with Ceausescu was part of Nixon and Kissinger's backchannel diplomacy toward China.[157] The Yugoslavs, however, underestimated their eastern neighbor, and believed that Romania was an "unlikely channel for the US to get to China."[158] In Belgrade's slightly condescending view, Romania also lacked the capacity to provide its assistance in negotiations with North Vietnam or the Middle East. Nixon's visit to Romania was, probably, Belgrade reasoned, a way for the new administration to show its interest in Eastern Europe and improve its bilateral relations with Romania.[159] The regime assumed that Nixon's decision to skip Yugoslavia was not an expression of American hostility and advised its diplomats and media to assume a "normal attitude." "We should not criticize it, or complain about it," a report stated, adding that some unfavorable comments about Yugoslavia's dwindling influence in the world should be expected.[160]

Some members of the Nixon administration, such as Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff understood how Nixon's snub could make Tito "feel let down," and that someone should "hold Yugoslav hands" and assure them that the

[157] For the Romanian role in mediating the Sino-American rapprochement, see Mircea Munteanu, "Communication Breakdown? Romania and the Sino-American Rapprochement," in *Diplomatic History* vol. 33 no. 4 (September 2009), 615-631.
[158] Informacija oko posete Predsednika SAD R. Niksona azijskim zemljama i Rumuniji, June 29, 1969, AJ, KPR fond 837 I–5–b/104–17 SAD.
[159] Some in the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat believed Nixon had to visit Romania because he felt personal debt toward Ceausescu who hosted Nixon in 1967.
[160] Informacija oko posete Predsednika SAD R. Niksona azijskim zemljama i Rumuniji, June 29, 1969, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–17 SAD.

President "still very much wants to make such a visit."[161] Sonnenfeldt suggested a response that would assuage Belgrade, but without disclosing the real reasons of Nixon's surprising visit to Yugoslavia's eastern neighbor. It appeared that the Yugoslavs reacted positively to Sonnenfeldt's remarks and concluded that "serious diplomats from the White House would not make these empty promises just to 'appease' us."[162] Additional confirmation of the American seriousness came just hours after Nixon's visit to Romania. On August 4, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Joseph Sisco came to Belgrade. The purpose of his trip was to discuss with the Yugoslavs the situation in the Middle East and to appeal for Yugoslavia's assistance in resolving the crisis in the region because of Tito's influence on Nasser. Sisco, however, informally, talked about Nixon's trip to Asia and Romania. He explained the so-called Nixon Doctrine and confirmed U.S. interest in continuing with its support to Yugoslavia. "We are under the impression that Nixon's trip to Asia and Romania is, first and foremost, of an explorative character, to gauge public opinion on the new direction of American expansion (using non-military means)," reported the Foreign Secretariat in its analysis.[163] Yet, it was clear that Tito's efforts to bring Nixon to Yugoslavia were futile. The Americans remained noncommittal and the most the Yugoslavs could get were vague promises that Nixon would visit Yugoslavia in the future, before or after his yet unscheduled trip to Moscow. The issue of Nixon's visit that permeated Yugoslav–U.S. relations in the first half of 1969 quietly died down by the end of August. The U.S. ambassador William Leonhart,

[161] Memo, Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), June 24, 1969, Document 216, *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean.
[162] Informacija oko posete Predsednika SAD R. Niksona azijskim zemljama i Rumuniji, June 29, 1969, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–17 SAD.
[163] Informacija u vezi sa posetom Džozefa Siskoa, pomoćnika državnog sekretara u Stejt departmentu SAD, August 6, 1969, DSIP-III Uprava, br. 428730, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–17 SAD.

who assumed his post in Belgrade in June 1969, mentioned it again during the lunch with the Yugoslav ambassador Crnobrnja. Leonhart suggested that instead of Nixon, Secretary Rogers could come to Yugoslavia in the spring of 1970.[164] Although Belgrade accepted Rogers as a consolation prize, Nixon's rebuttal was personally a humiliating defeat for Tito. Yet, on a more practical level, it showed that Yugoslavia's foreign policy needed more than one basket for its eggs. To achieve this diversification, in 1969 and early 1970, Belgrade energized its policy of nonalignment.

Belgrade's pivot to the Third World

Yugoslavia's efforts to revive the moribund Nonaligned Movement went back to the early days of 1968.[165] Nasser's military failure in the 1967 June War showed that any nonaligned state could become prey for the imperialists and their proxies. Although

[164] Zabilješka iz razgovora B. Crnobrnje sa W. Leonhartom, ambasadorom SAD u Jugoslaviji (za vrijeme ručka u stanu ambasadora, August 27, 1969), August 29, 1969, DSIP-III Uprava, br. 430046, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–17 SAD.

[165] After the end of the Cold War and Yugoslavia's bloody collapse, Yugoslavia's role in the Third World and the Nonaligned Movement itself were quickly forgotten as an oddity of the Cold War with little relevance to today's international relations. Although recent years saw a surge in scholarship about the relationship(s) between the Third World and the superpowers in the Cold War, the scholarship about nonalignment as an important facet of the Third World activism in global affairs is still sparse. Those rare accounts about nonalignment in the 1970s disagreed in their assessments of the importance of the movement. Some scholars like Jürgen Dinkel saw the 1970s as "the heyday of the movement." Dinkel argued that in the 1970s the movement emerged as a global force with concrete political and diplomatic influence on world affairs. See Jürgen Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis, Organization and Politics (1927-1992)* (Leiden: Brill, 2018.) and "'Third World Begins to Flex its Muscles' – The Non-Aligned Movement and the North-South-Conflict during the 1970s," in Sandra Bott, Jussi Hanhimaki, Janick Schaufelbuehl, Marco Wyss, eds., *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War. The Non-Aligned Movement in the East-West Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2016). Other scholars, like Lorenz Lüthi and Mark Atwood Lawrence, took a more pessimistic stance by pointing out the NAM's "programmatic emptiness" and its irrelevance in the context of détente that were further augmented by internal divisions and the lack of charismatic leadership. Lawrence noted that nonalignment "inspired a potent global movement in the 1950s and 1960s… [but] it faded into the background of global politics during the 1970s." Similarly, Odd Arne Westad wrote that by the 1970 Lusaka summit "the initial optimism [of the NAM was] long gone." See Lorenz Lüthi, "Non-alignment, 1961–74," in Bott, et al., *Neutrality and Neutralism*, 101–102, Mark Atwood Lawrence, "The Rise and Fall of Nonalignment," in Robert McMahon, ed., *The Cold War in the Third World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 140, and Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 107.

Yugoslavia aided Cairo in weapons, military materiel, and provided political support to Nasser, it was obvious that bilateral relations could not replace the collective action of nonaligned states. Moreover, Yugoslavia's actions toward Cairo, in concert with the USSR and Eastern European states (excluding Romania), carried significant political risks that Yugoslavia was not in a position to take. Tito's trip to Moscow in June 1967 deteriorated U.S.–Yugoslav relations to their lowest point since 1946. In need of foreign money to carry out the 1965 economic reforms, Yugoslavia could not afford to sever the ties with its Western creditors.

In January 1968, Tito's no. 2, Edvard Kardelj, embarked on a mission to mobilize African countries for a new summit of the NAM. At the same time, Tito visited several Asian states with the same objective in mind. In the early spring of 1968, Tito sent a circular letter to the governments of nonaligned countries, but also to Austria, Finland, France, Pakistan, Turkey, UN General Secretary U Thant, and Pope Paul VI, in which he outlined the plans for the new summit that was intended to be larger and more inclusive than both the Belgrade and Cairo summits. In it, Tito outlined Yugoslavia's main approach to global affairs that included democratization of international relations and the respect of sovereignty rights of small states. "That would be a conference for peace and independence, and against the use of force in international relations," Tito stated in the letter.[166]

This ambitious goal, however, was not an easy task to achieve. After the 1961 Belgrade and the 1964 Cairo conferences, the Nonaligned Movement, as one Yugoslav

[166] DSIP Ambasadi SFRJ Dar es Salam, Februar 29, 1968, DA MSP RS, PA 1968 "R," f. 144, d. 1, s. 46736.

author euphemistically wrote, "stagnated" and came to an "ebb in dynamism and ability to act together."[167] This dormancy was caused by disruptive Chinese role in the Global South that sought to rally African and Asian countries around a "second Bandung" and unite the Afro–Asian world.[168] Lorenz Lüthi noted that in the 1960s the challenge to the NAM's primacy in the Global South imposed by the PRC, despite Beijing's failure, caused the "wounds… to Non-alignment… [that] needed healing."[169] Second, after the Cuban crisis, the international environment became less hostile, while "Vietnam was a cloud that had not yet become ominous" thus keeping the movement without an obvious purpose.[170] Finally, the personal factor played an important role in the movement's inactivity. Many of the "founding fathers" of the movement, with an exception of Tito, Nasser, and Haile Selassie were either dead or no longer in power by the end of the 1960s.[171]

The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia accelerated Yugoslavia's efforts to revive the movement. In the second half of 1968, Yugoslavia began to pursue more aggressively its policy of nonalignment. For the first time after the Algerian War of Independence in the late 1950s, Yugoslavia began supplying African liberation movements with weapons and armaments to elevate the country's prestige abroad.[172]

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[167] Bojana Tadić, *Nesvrstanost u teoriji i praksi međunarodnih odnosa* (Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, 1976), 193.
[168] Gregg Brazinsky, *Wining the Third World. Sino-American Rivalry during the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 196.
[169] Lüthi, "Non-alignment, 1961–74," in Bott et al., *Neutrality and Neutralism*, 96.
[170] Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 299.
[171] Nehru died in 1964, while Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Ben Bela of Algeria, and Sukarno of Indonesia were all deposed between 1965 and 1967. Nasser died in September 1970.
[172] The only exception was the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, PAIGC) that received a small cache of weapons from Yugoslavia in 1966.

Moreover, a lively diplomatic activity that began with Kardelj and Tito's trips abroad continued with new vigor. In 1969, Yugoslav officials crisscrossed Africa and Asia, trying to gather nonaligned states around the common cause. Also, in 1969, Belgrade hosted the preparatory meeting that served to pave the way for the meeting in Dar es-Salaam in April 1970 and the main summit in Lusaka in September 1970. Ideological and propaganda work on explaining and defining nonalignment received strong support from Yugoslav mass organizations, governmental and quasi-governmental institutions and think-tanks who organized symposia and produced a large number of pamphlets, articles, and books on nonalignment.

At the same time, after a 12-year long hiatus, Belgrade normalized relations with Beijing. Beijing's criticism of Yugoslav "new revisionism" in 1958 (after the LCY adopted a new program at the Seventh Congress in April) and the Cultural Revolution that began in 1966 disrupted Sino–Yugoslav relations.[173] The first contacts between the two countries were established in March 1969, when a Yugoslav trade delegation visited Beijing.[174] These contacts continued throughout 1969 and both Beijing and Belgrade agreed that "new positive elements were present in relations between the two countries."[175] The Yugoslavs were interested in the Sino–Soviet border clashes and

[173] Chen Jian noted that Mao Zedong "linked his widespread domestic purges to the 'antirevisionist' and 'anti-social imperialist' [Soviet] struggles on international scene." Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 84. In this context, Sino–Yugoslav relations further deteriorated after the Yugoslav–Soviet rapprochement in the 1960s.
[174] In its report, the delegation noted that their hosts were "correct" but not too "talkative" or cordial, in "accordance with the political framework" of Beijing's relations with Belgrade. Preliminarna informacija o trgovinskim pregovorima sa NR Kinom, March 24, 1969, Pov. br. 410469, DSIP-Uprava za Aziju i Australiju, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/55–5.
[175] Zabeleška o razgovoru pomoćnika državnog sekretara za inostrane poslove dr Radivoja Uvalića sa otpravnikom poslova Ambasade NR Kine u Beogradu Yu Li-Hsuanom, October 10, 1969, br. 436682, DSIP-Kabinet dr R. Uvalića, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/55–5.

emphasized their support to a peaceful solution. In 1970, Belgrade and Beijing established full diplomatic relations and exchanged ambassadors.[176]

These diplomatic, political, and propaganda efforts reached its peak in the early months of 1970. 78-year-old Tito embarked on a strenuous four-week-long trip to Africa. Tito's itinerary included Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Egypt, and Libya. Already in December 1969, Belgrade sent a scouting propaganda mission to these countries to prepare Tito visit. Members of the Federal Secretariat of Information visited these countries with the main objective to coordinate "info–propaganda activities related to the President's visit." Although the main focus remained Tito's trip because of its political weight and numerous propaganda opportunities, another Yugoslav delegation went to West Africa with the same objective to rally African countries for the summit. Additionally, in March 1970, Yugoslav foreign secretary Mirko Tepavac went to Asia to promote the summit. Kardelj traveled to South America with the same task. The purpose of this extravagant diplomacy was to "encourage the intensification of activities related to the preparatory meeting in Dar es-Salaam" and the "exchange of opinions related to the platform for the conference of nonaligned."[177]

Tito planned to have a summit held before the 25th Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1970. That way, Tito reasoned, nonaligned states could appear

[176] Washington noted this improvement. In 1970, the U.S. consulate in Hong Kong reported that the Chinese press for the first time wrota about the observance of Yugoslav National Day. At a reception in the Yugoslav embassy, a Chinese official praised Yugoslavia's foreign policy "including the GOY's defense of national sovereignity and its support of Sihanouk." Consulate Hong Kong to Department of Stated, Telegram 04893, December 1, 1970, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2839, Pol 17–4 Yugo, RG 59, NARA. Aware of this surpising improvement in Yugo–Sino relations, in 1969 and 1970, Washington tried to use Belgrade as a back-channel to Beijing.

[177] Podsetnik o poseti Predsednika SFRJ Josipa Broza Tita Etiopiji, Tanzaniji, Zambiji, Ugandi, Keniji, Sudanu, Ujedinjenoj Arapskoj Republici i Libiji, January 14, 1970, DSIP-IV Uprava, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/44.

before the UN with a common platform. Tito suggested to his African partners that the 25th Session should be a "watershed moment that should solve the issues that have been bothering the world for the last 25 years."[178] Tito had in mind four main issues that required unified approach: decolonization; PRC's membership in the UN; economic and technical aid to developing states; and the safeguards for sovereignty rights and non-interference in domestic affairs. Although Tito's interlocutors generally agreed on these proposed topics some more specific issues divided potential participants. Among those issues was the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. In his conversations with the leader of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, MPLA) Agostinho Neto, in October 1968, Tito rebuked the Soviet actions and warned Neto that the Soviet doctrine of limited sovereignty was dangerous for small and medium countries and that nonaligned should give "deliberate resistance" to the doctrine.[179] Neto did not explicitly condemn the Kremlin because, he admitted, besides Yugoslavia only the USSR was assisting the MPLA.[180] Although Neto remained circumspect, other Angolan officials in private discussion with their Yugoslav interlocutors denounced the Soviet intervention and considered it a "huge blow to the progressive forces in the world." They, however, had to remain silent because of Soviet aid.[181] This example epitomized the feelings of many other African liberation movements and independent states who did not want to confront the Soviets.

[178] Izlaganje na sednici Izvršnog biroa SKJ, March 3, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/44.
[179] Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike sa dr. Agostinjom Netom, predsednikom Narodnog pokreta za oslobođenje Angole (MPLA), 29 October 1968, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/3–2.
[180] Ibid.
[181] Informacija o poseti predsednika Narodnog pokreta za oslobođenje Angole (MPLA) dr Agostinja Neta Jugoslaviji, no date 1968, AJ, SSRNJ fond 142, I–553.

Therefore, the main question for the NAM was "how under present conditions the unaligned countries should continue their constructive action and become even more efficacious."[182] A gathering of nonaligned states proved to be a daunting task. India and Ethiopia avoided hosting the summit because of high costs and because, as they believed, it was "unlikely to produce concrete results."[183] Similarly, the Arab countries ostentatiously lagged in preparations for the summit while Cuba was "completely passive." Only Asian and a few African and Latin American countries (Zambia, Tanzania, and also Chile, Peru, and Venezuela) demonstrated somewhat greater interest in the gathering.[184] Moreover, bilateral issues and conceptual differences among nonaligned threatened to derail the summit. Algeria was skeptical about the success of the summit, but also uneasy with Yugoslavia's courting of Nasser. The Algerian ambassador in Delhi complained to his Yugoslav colleague how Yugoslavia "does not pay enough attention to Algeria and underestimates the role of Algeria in Africa and only consults with the UAR."[185] Unbeknownst to the Algerians, however, Nasser remained reluctant to join Tito's initiative.

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[182] Josip Broz Tito, *Concerning the Visit to Some Countries of Africa and Some Current International Problems. Report to the Federal Assembly, March 31, 1970* (Novi Sad: Prosveta, 1970), 26.
[183] "Yugoslavs would have to invite and pick up check if they wanted conference." "Non-aligned conference," US Embassy in Addis Ababa to State Department, March 17, 1970, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-1973, box 2835, Pol 7 Yugo, RG 59, NARA. The Yugoslavs explained Ethiopian lackluster attitude toward the summit by pointing at Israel's influence on Addis Ababa.
[184] Pregled aktivnosti u završnoj fazi priprema za konferenciju, August 29, 1970, AJ KPR fond 837, I–4–a/9
[185] Ambasada SFRJ Delhi DSIP-u, March 1, 1968, br. 176, DA MSP, PA 1968 "R," f. 144, d. 1, s. 47967. Ahmed Ben Bella (1963–65) admired Yugoslavia's nonaligned policy, which he tried to emulate. Bella told a Yugoslav official that Algeria's foreign policy "owed much to the Yugoslavian example—balancing, on the one hand, opposing views with the Western group… with the conflict between China and the Eastern European communist countries on the other." Jeffrey James Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 245. Ben Bella's removal in 1965 created in Belgrade "great mistrust" toward Algeria's foreign policy that took some time to overcome. Ljubodrag Dimić, Dragan Bogetić, "Jugoslavija i Alžir," in *DSPJ, Jugoslovensko–alžirski odnosi*, xxiii.

The Yugoslav ambassador in Cairo met with Nasser in March 1968 and reported that Nasser was stubbornly noncommittal to a new summit. Nasser generally agreed to a new gathering of nonaligned, but he said that there was little he could do to make it happen.[186] During Tito's visit to Egypt in February 1970, Nasser simply ignored Tito's attempts to steer the conversation onto the summit.[187] Tito believed that the Soviet influence on Nasser contributed to the Egyptian lackluster attitude toward the new conference.[188]Although the Yugoslavs understood that one of the reasons for Nasser's pro-Soviet attitude was a strategic and tactical necessity, another factor that worried Belgrade was Soviet anti-Yugoslav campaign that accused Yugoslavia of siding with China in the Sino–Soviet border dispute that damaged Yugoslavia's image abroad. Although the Yugoslavs vehemently denied any coordination with Beijing, the Yugoslav ambassador Mićunović noted in his memoir that the Soviets achieved "serious propaganda success" with domestic public opinion by distorting Yugoslavia's position on the Sino–Soviet border clashes.[189] Dependent on the USSR for military and economic support, the Middle Eastern countries did not want to be too closely associated with Yugoslavia to avoid Soviet repercussions. Similarly, India, one of the founders of the

[186] Ambasada SRFJ Kairo DSIP-u, March 7, 1968, br. 140, DA MSP, PA 1968 "R," f. 144, d. 1, s. 48726.
[187] See Zabeleška o nastavku razgovora predsednika Tita i predsednika Nasera i njihovih saradnika, February 24, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/44–7.
[188] In October 1968, Tito mentioned to Katzenbach that Nasser listened the Soviets better than he listened him. Tito's personal secretary Marko Vrhunec confirmed Tito's disappointment with Nasser's pro-Sovietism. See Vrhunec, *Šest godina s Titom*, 74.
[189] "Our position [toward the border war] was described as pro-Chinese at the moment when the Chinese were treacherously murdering Soviet officers and soldiers (Soviet version of the events)." Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, 80. In September 1969, Tito met with the Soviet minister of foreign affairs Gromyko. Tito emphasized that Yugoslavia was concerned about deterioration of Sino–Soviet relations and denied the change of Yugoslav position toward China. He, however, admitted that some contacts between Belgrade and Beijing did exist, chiefly related to trade. "There are no reasons for any kind of suspicion about Yugoslavia's attitude toward China," Tito concluded. See Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika Republike J. B. Tita s ministrom inostranih poslova SSSR-a A. A. Gromikom, September 4, 1969, Document 34, *DSPJ, Jugoslavija–SSSR*, 389–391.

NAM, shared Soviet concerns about Chinese intentions thus assuming a reserved position toward Yugoslavia's initiative. Soviet diplomats criticized Yugoslav newspapers for publishing anti-Soviet pieces from the Chinese press stating how these writings caused "bitterness and confusion" among Soviet friends in the Arab and socialist countries.[190]

The Soviets perceived nonalignment exclusively through the lens of their competition with Beijing. From the Soviet perspective, the most problematic aspects of Yugoslav foreign policy was Sino–Yugoslav rapprochement. The Kremlin claimed that Yugoslavia, by condoning Chinese criticism of the USSR and Brezhnev personally, expressed hostility toward the Soviet Union and often reminded Belgrade that nonalignment survived the 1960s only thanks to the USSR.[191] Besides, the Kremlin disliked Yugoslavia's insistence on the policy of equidistance ("rightist revisionism") from both blocs and Yugoslavia's seeming adoption of the Chinese theory of "two imperialisms." Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin was particularly harsh in the attacks on Yugoslavia's policy of nonalignment and used every opportunity to insult the Yugoslavs. He called the Yugoslav policy "unrealistic and unsustainable," suggesting that Yugoslavia would have to decide whether it was a socialist country or a nonaligned country. In July 1970, Kosygin was ostentatiously late for the meeting with his Yugoslav counterpart Mitja Ribičič because he was meeting with Nasser. It was apparent that the Soviets picked their favorite among nonaligned and tried to divide the two founding members of the movement. The Yugoslav embassy reported about this slight, adding that

[190] Beleška o izjavama ambasadora SSSR I.A. Benediktova i savetnika ambasade SSSR J.A. Bragina u susretu sa S. Petrovićem, referentom u Upravi za istraživanje i dokumentaciju DSIP-a, na koktelu povodom boravka u Jugoslaviji sovjetske delegacije Komiteta za fizičku kulturu, January 9, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–23 SSSR.
[191] Veljko Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, 89.

the Soviets think of Yugoslavia's nonalignment as an "ordinary babble about peace, unity, and progress" while Belgrade was trying to take advantage from both blocs.[192]

Although the Yugoslavs did not have illusions about big powers' negative stance toward nonalignment, they characterized the Soviet attitude toward it as outright hostile. Ambassador Mićunović wrote a report about Yugoslav–Soviet relations in 1969/70 in which he described the USSR as the enemy of nonalignment.[193] Mićunović noted that Moscow held the movement in contempt following the logic of Stalin's question about the Vatican: how many divisions do they have. Yet, Mićunović wrote, the Soviets somewhat updated this Stalinist thinking and valued nonaligned countries only if they expressed their allegiance to the Soviet Union.[194] The Soviet charge d'affairs in Belgrade, P. Kuznetsov, unequivocally confirmed this position in his talk with the Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Tepavac. Kuznetsov said that the Lusaka summit would play its historical role only if the summit's participants reject imperialist attempts to "castrate [the movement's] anti-imperialist essence."[195] Yugoslav diplomats around the world reported that their Soviet interlocutors often expressed a derisive attitude toward Yugoslavia's nonalignment. The Yugoslav consul in Salzburg wrote about an unpleasant encounter with his Soviet colleague who criticized Tito's trip to Africa. "What nonalignment? There are only two roads and nothing else," the Soviet diplomat said.[196]

[192] Zvanična poseta predsednika SIV-a SSSR-u, July 6, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–23 SSSR.
[193] Izvestaj ambasadora – Osvrt na stanje odnosa SFRJ–SSSR početkom 1970., January 16, 1970, str.pov. 02-1, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–23 SSSR.
[194] Ibid.
[195] Iz razgovora M. Tepavca sa otpravnikom poslova SSSR P. Kuznjecovom, September 4, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/9.
[196] Zabeleška o razgovoru konzula Krste Donovskog sa vice-konzulom u konzulatu SSSR-a u Salzburgu Buldakovim, February 17, 1970, DA MSP RS, PA 1970 SSSR, f. 175.

Unlike the Soviets who vocally expressed their hostility toward Yugoslavia's vision of nonalignment, the United States looked at Yugoslavia's efforts to revive the movement with a mix of disdain, indifference, and a sliver of hope. Although Tito and Secretary Rogers met in Addis Ababa in February, Tito's "safari for friendship," as it was sarcastically dubbed by the U.S. ambassador in Belgrade, attracted relatively little attention in Washington. Nixon and Kissinger did not see Africa as strategically important and African policy was delegated to the marginalized State Department. In March 1969, Kissinger told the Yugoslavia's former foreign secretary Koča Popović that the United States looked at nonalignment in an "abstract way," without any particular opinion about the movement.[197] Other American diplomats were skeptical of Tito's success to revive the virtually moribund movement. Although they gleefully noted that the Soviets had a "jaundiced view" about Tito's winter trip because it undermined the Soviet influence in East Africa.[198] Ambassador Leonhart guessed that Tito's trip to Africa in the winter of 1970 served to tie the Arabs to the NAM, so Yugoslavia could "stay ideologically competitive with the USSR in area."[199]

The United States, however, hoped to use Tito as a messenger to Nasser, assuming that Belgrade and Washington shared the same goal of the stable region with limited Soviet influence. U.S. efforts to reach the settlement in the Middle East coincided with Yugoslavia's efforts to revive the NAM. Secretary Rogers was particularly

[197] Konstantin "Koča" Popović was in the United States for President Eisenhower's funeral. During his visit, he met with a number of former and current American officials. Zabeleška o razgovoru druga Koče Popovića sa Henry A. Kissinger-om, glavnim političkim savetnikom Niksona 2. aprila 1969. u Beloj kući, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–17 SAD.
[198] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 0186, January 27, 1970, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-1973, box 2835, Pol 7 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[199] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 302, February 6, 1970, National Security Council Files, folder 2, box 733, vol. I, Richard Nixon Presidential Library (RNPL).

interested to engage moderate or pro-U.S. leaning nonaligned states such as Yugoslavia to exert "a positive influence on Nasser."[200] Kissinger was less optimistic about Yugoslavia's moderating role. He noted that Yugoslavia "was a useful source of information about trends in both the Communist and developing worlds. It could convey our attitudes to its friends, though it had too many separate purposes to be a reliable intermediary on detail."[201] Nonetheless, Rogers believed that Tito's good offices were an avenue worthy exploiting in reaching the settlement in the Middle East.

Rogers's meeting with Tito in February 1970 in Addis Ababa revealed a deep chasm between Yugoslav and American views on the Middle East. The United States argued for the borders from June 1967 with some "minor corrections," while Belgrade believed, like its Arab allies, that Israel should return territories gained in the June war. Belgrade and Washington disagreed on other issues as well, such as the U.S. decision to provide F-4s to Israel and the status of the Palestinians. Both sides, however, agreed that both Israel and the Arabs should strive to reach a peaceful settlement. Rogers asked Tito to convince Nasser that the United States was sincerely interested in peace in the Middle East. "We don't need petroleum… we certainly don't want the USSR to spread [its influence] in the Mediterranean. If Nasser does not accept our suggested solution [today], he is going to find himself in big troubles tomorrow," Rogers said.[202]

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[200] Secretary of State memorandum for the President, June 9, 1970, The Richard M. Nixon National Security Files, 1969–1974, Middle East Negotiations, US peace initiative for the Middle East, June 10 – July 23, 1970, vol. I, folder 2, NARA, Microfilm, reel 1. Rogers told Tito that "99 percent of his time is dedicated to the Middle East."
[201] Kissinger, *White House Years*, 929.
[202] Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Tita sa Državnim sekretarom SAD W. Rodžersom, February 11, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/44–3.

Tito, however, rejected to act as an intermediary between Washington and Cairo. Although he transmitted Roger's message to Nasser, he told his Egyptian friend that the conversation with Rogers left a "bad impression on him." "It was obvious that Rogers insists on concessions from the Arabs, on their capitulation," Tito said, adding that personally, he did not expect any flexibility in the American stance toward the Middle East.[203] Tito stated that after the talk with Rogers, he was convinced even more that the peaceful solution for the Middle East was not an option. Tito's attitude toward the Middle East showed the limits of Yugoslav–American partnership. He did not only fail to exert a positive influence on Nasser, as Rogers had hoped, but he directly undermined U.S. efforts to bring Nasser to the negotiating table by encouraging him to prepare for a new war against Israel. He advised Nasser to continue with public peace diplomacy because it was beneficial for "the prestige of the UAR in the world." Yet, he said that Cairo should, at the same time, make preparations for a solution with a "different means."[204] Tito's duplicity went unnoticed in Washington, and in the next two to three years the United States persisted in encouraging Yugoslavia to exert a moderating influence on the Arabs. Finally, the 1973 October War and Yugoslavia's ardent support of Sadat's blitzkrieg dispelled this illusion that Yugoslavia could act as a moderating force in the Middle East.

Tito's suggestion that the UAR should resort to force in its dealings with Israel was rooted in two beliefs. First, the impasse provided a window for both the United States and the USSR to become even more involved in the Middle East – a situation that could potentially bring trouble to the nearby Balkans. Tito complained to Rogers about

[203] Zabeleška o nastavku razgovora predsednika Tita i predsednika Nasera i njihovih saradnika, February 24, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/44–7.
[204] Ibid.

the "arms race" between the United States and the USSR in the Middle East that threatened to destroy the balance in the region, but also made the UAR increasingly dependent on Soviet aid.[205] A successful campaign against Israel, thus would serve to curtail the need for further Soviet assistance, but would also show that nonaligned states do not need the patronage of superpowers to resolve their issues. Second, if Israel's use of force to change internationally recognized borders was condoned by the United States that would create a dangerous precedent in international relations and could have adverse consequences for Yugoslavia's territorial integrity. This was particularly important in the context of persistent Bulgarian territorial claims over Yugoslav Macedonia.

Therefore, the main Yugoslav goal of the summit in Lusaka was to reaffirm the principle of noninterference. Although the Middle East's geographic proximity made it one of the most important issues for Yugoslavia, it was not the only problem that bothered the Yugoslavs. On the other side of the world, the situation was similarly bleak. The ongoing war in Vietnam was a thorny issue in Belgrade–Washington relations. Yugoslavia, despite its poor relations with North Vietnam (Hanoi accused Yugoslavia of "revisionism"), frequently brushed its revolutionary credentials by criticizing American imperialism – a relatively cheap endeavor with large political benefits.[206] Naturally, Washington was sensitive to this public display of anti-Americanism. "It irritated the hell out of all of us," one State Department official later recalled. However, he admitted that the Yugoslav stance was not really "an issue" since the Yugoslavs only "played the

[205] Despite Yugoslavia's dispute with the USSR, Tito believed that Nasser's efforts to obtain weapons from Moscow were justified because the UAR lost a great deal of its military capacity during the Six-Day War.
[206] In 1970, a U.S. diplomat, Robert D. Murphy, wrote to Tito asking him to intervene with the Vietnamese authorities to release American POWs. Tito wrote on the margins that his "influence there would not accomplish anything because of the nature of our relations." See Beleška, Grupa za spoljnopolitička pitanja, July 22, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–6/104–18.

'sanctimonious' role."[207] As the Yugoslav ambassador in Washington Crnobrnja advised Under Secretary Sisco: "[the] US should not study Yugoslav declarations too carefully."[208] However, the situation in South East Asia was further complicated when in March 1970, the Cambodian Prime Minister Lon Nol ousted Tito's long-time friend, Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Nol's pro-American stance convinced Tito that the United States was behind the coup, thus emphasizing again the importance of the principle of noninterference. The nonaligned countries that gathered in Lusaka were divided on the issue of Cambodia's representation at the summit because both Nol's and Sihanouk's delegations showed up. The Soviets and Eastern Europeans (except Romania) recognized Nol's government mainly because Sihanouk found refuge in China. This Chinese support to the ousted prince was too politically toxic for both pro-Soviet and pro-Western nonaligned, so that countries such as Indonesia and Ethiopia objected to Sihanouk's participation because of his ties to Beijing.[209] Division on the question of Cambodia threatened one of the main Yugoslav goals in Lusaka. The problem of Cambodia transcended its regional importance because it created a precedent of superpower involvement in the affairs of a nonaligned country. Tito warned his interlocutors that the recognition of Lon Nol would not be "in

[207] Charles Stuart Kennedy and Donald C Tice, *Interview with Donald C. Tice*, February 10, 1997, Frontline Diplomacy: The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Library of Congress Manuscript/Mixed Material. Available at https://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib001180/ (accessed May 14, 2019).
[208] Secretary of State to Embassy Belgrade, Telegram 071802, May 12, 1970, NSC Files, folder 2, box 733, vol. I, RNPL.
[209] "Chinese, in conversation with ours [diplomats], estimated that suppression of Lon Nol [from participating in Lusaka] would be 'the bare minimum,' yet a positive outcome nevertheless." Pregled aktivnosti u završnoj fazi priprema za konferenciju, August 29, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/9. Emperor Selassie was particularly against nonaligned support to Sihanouk. Despite Yugoslav claims that Lon Nol was installed by foreign intervention, Selassie objected to Chinese support for Sihanouk. "It was obvious that the Emperor is reluctant to openly condemn aggression on Cambodia." See Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike sa carem Etiopije Haile Selasijem, September 7, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/9.

accords with the principles of nonalignment."[210] During his talks with Indira Gandhi, Tito emphasized the need that "every nonaligned country gives its support to another nonaligned country that falls the victim of aggression."[211]

After arduous lobbying efforts, the Yugoslavs managed to include in the final declaration a statement of solidarity in the case of foreign intervention. Although the statement was generally vague and promised only "to initiate effective and concrete measures against all forces that jeopardize and violate the independence and territorial integrity of the non-aligned countries,"[212] without offering any details, Tito was satisfied with it. However, despite the general elation in the ranks of Yugoslav diplomatic and political circles, the summit in Lusaka demonstrated that the nonaligned countries were able only to agree on general principles without any firm commitments. Moreover, the participants were not only divided over the issue of Cambodia, but also over Cyprus, the Palestinians, and the future direction of the movement. Also, as the case with Nasser demonstrated, the superpowers were having a harmful influence on the movement's members. Although Julius Nyerere and many others noted that the situation was better than in 1965 and 1966 when Ben Bella, Nkrumah and the other were toppled, the problems that occurred in Lusaka and many others that appeared on the horizon would trouble future summits and significantly debilitate the effectiveness of the movement. Looking at these problems in 1970, some more realistic Yugoslav officials were cautious in their estimates of the summit. In his dissent from his colleagues' overly optimistic

[210] Teze za govor Predsednika Republike na Trećoj konferenciji nesvrstanih zemalja, August 17, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/9.
[211] Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike sa Indirom Gandi, September 7, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/9.
[212] For the full text of the Declaration see, Jorge Oviedo Ruega, ed., *The Five Summit Conferences of the Non-aligned Countries. Documents* (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1979), 69.

assessments, Yugoslav diplomat Josip Djerdja noted that the summit failed to modernize nonalignment and create "new conceptual and strategic directions." Moreover, Djerdja said, the summit was focused too much on Africa while the events in Europe were not mentioned at all.[213]

Nonetheless, the summit "proved that non-alignment was still alive if not entirely healthy."[214] Additionally, the Lusaka meeting safeguarded the movement's continuity by establishing regular ministerial conferences between the summits. In its post-summit analysis, the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs noted that the gathering provided a good basis for Yugoslavia's activity in the nascent Conference for European Security and Cooperation and in the UN. The Yugoslavs hoped that the principles from the final Resolution would provide the cornerstone for the new détente that would go beyond power dynamics of the superpowers. However, the events between the summits in Lusaka and Algiers (1973) showed that Yugoslavia's vision for the world was largely untenable. Yet, as some Yugoslav officials claimed, the Lusaka summit revived the NAM, provided guarantees of its continuity, and reaffirmed the principle of noninterference, "chiefly thanks to Tito and Yugoslavia."[215] This overinflated sense of the summit's success and Yugoslavia's role in it was illustrated by Tito's conviction that "Lusaka brought" Nixon to Yugoslavia just weeks after the summit.[216]

Nixon in Yugoslavia

[213] Razgovor članova jugoslovenske delegacije, September 10, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/9. Djerdja's remarks could be interpreted in the context of the Croatian Spring and the attempts of the Croatian leadership to exert greater autonomy in conducting foreign policy that emphasized European connections.
[214] Dennison Rusinow, *Yugoslav Experiment, 1948–1974* (Berkley: California University Press, 1978), 267.
[215] Razgovor članova jugoslovenske delegacije, September 10, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/9.
[216] Cited in Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko–američki odnosi, 1961–1971* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2012), 291, fn. 694.

On the night of September 9, 1970, a telephone rang in the residence of the Yugoslav ambassador on 2410 California St NW. On the other line was Henry Kissinger with a piece of confidential information for the Yugoslav ambassador. Kissinger said that Nixon would like to visit Yugoslavia from September 30 until October 2. Fearing leaks, Kissinger asked Crnobrnja to keep this request secret because the White House did not share it even with the State Department.[217] One week after this conversation and numerous haggles where to put Yugoslavia in his schedule, Nixon's press secretary Ronald Zeigler finally announced that the President would visit Yugoslavia during his European tour.[218] Why this sudden change of heart? After Tito's January 1969 diplomatic fiasco, no one in Belgrade believed that Nixon would come to Yugoslavia any time soon. Tito assumed that the reason for this quick and surprising visit was the success of Yugoslav diplomacy in Lusaka. The Foreign Secretariat, when pondering about Nixon's sudden change of mind, assumed that one of the main reasons for Nixon's visit was to discuss the situation in the Middle East.[219] Among other reasons, the Secretariat assumed that Nixon's visit wanted to demonstrate American long-term commitment to Yugoslavia's independence and its importance as a factor of stability in Europe. Kissinger confirmed this in his memoir where he wrote that Nixon's visit to Yugoslavia served to "underline our interest in Yugoslavia's independence."[220]

Nixon's visit provided both sides with great publicity potential. As Kissinger noted, Nixon's friendliness with Ceausescu and Tito sent signals to Beijing about his

[217] Ambasador Crnobrnja lično za druga Tita i Tepavca, September 10, 1970, str. pov. 102/1, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–190.
[218] "Nixon's Plan for Yugoslavia Confirmed," *The New York Times*, September 17, 1970.
[219] Neke napomene o motivima posete predsednika SAD Niksona Jugoslaviji, Grupa za spoljno-politička pitanja, September 26, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–190.
[220] Kissinger, *White House Years*, 929.

readiness to negotiate. Another aspect of Nixon's carefully staged public events abroad was his attempt to gain domestic popular support. "The most obvious way in which domestic political considerations affected foreign policy was Nixon's obsession with presentation," Dominic Sandbrook noted.[221] Kissinger wrote how Nixon's visit to Yugoslavia "expose[d] our Communist hosts to the wonders of American public relations."[222] For Belgrade, the visit signaled to Moscow that the United States was genuinely interested in Yugoslavia's independence and would not condone any Czechoslovakia-like action against it in the name of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Moreover, as the first visit of an American president to Yugoslavia, it inflated Tito's already large sense of self-importance. The visit was so important to Tito that even the death of an old friend, Nasser, on September 1, 1970, did not stop Tito from meeting with the American president.[223] An American diplomat noted: "In the end, Tito showed that he preferred the living to the dead."[224]

The Soviets did take notice. Ambassador Mićunović wrote how anti-Yugoslav defamation campaign in the Soviet press intensified after the announcement of Nixon's visit. Yugoslavia was accused of being an extension of American militarism in the

[221] Dominic Sandbrook, "Salesmanship and Substance: The Influence of Domestic Policy and Watergate," in Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston, eds., *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969–1977* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 127.
[222] Kissinger, *White House Years*, 930.
[223] Max Frankel, "Saving an Awkward Day. Tito's Decision to Keep to Schedule Helped Nixon to Reduce his Loses," September 30, 1970, the *New York Times*, 17. Nixon's Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman, wrote that he and Kissinger debated about continuing the trip, because they believe that "Tito will undoubtedly go to funeral." See H.R. Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries. Inside the Nixon White House* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1994), 198. The Yugoslavs, who pondered about the timing of Nixon's visit, concluded that one of the reasons was the need to bolster popularity before mid-term elections in November 1970.
[224] Memorandum of conversation between Assistant Secretary Martin Hillenbrand and Minister for Political Affairs of the Indian Embassy M. K. Rasgotra, November 4, 1970, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2745, Pol US–Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

Mediterranean and, as such, the Soviets compared it to fascist Spain.[225] However, along with this unofficial anti-Yugoslav propaganda efforts, the Kremlin hurried to send its own high-ranking delegations to Belgrade. Mićunović complained that the Soviet embassy in Belgrade even disseminated false information on an impending Brezhnev visit to Yugoslavia. On September 30, the day of Nixon's arrival, Soviet ambassador Benediktov requested a meeting with the President of the Federal Executive Council (Prime Minister) Mitja Ribičič. Benediktov said that both Brezhnev and Kosygin would visit Yugoslavia on a date that was yet to be determined. Also, Benediktov informed Ribičič that Moscow approved a loan of 100 million U.S. dollars for the Yugoslav industry.[226] Vying for influence in Yugoslavia, the Soviets sought to use this tactic of pressure and concessions to neutralize the effects of the visit.[227]

The Soviet efforts, however, could hardly counter all the attention and flattery that Nixon gave his host. Kissinger suggested that Nixon include in his itinerary Zagreb, but also Tito's birthplace Kumrovec.[228] Yet, the Yugoslavs tried to look not too exuberant in order not to provoke the Soviets. The ceremony of Nixon's arrival to the Belgrade International Airport was decorous but with a "degree of restraint" that served to demonstrate differences in Yugoslavia's and U.S. views on various global issues, thus refute Soviet slanderous attacks on Yugoslavia as an American pawn. "The visit is in accordance with our policy toward great powers, [with our] readiness and desire to

[225] Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, 98.
[226] Razgovor Mitje Ribičiča sa ambasadorom SSSR Benediktovom, str. pov. 727/1, September 30, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–23 SSSR.
[227] Mićunović added that Nixon's visit was not the only reason for this "extraordinary activity." He believed that the Soviets increased their efforts in order to influence the decisions of the First Conference of the LCY that was scheduled for the end of October. Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, 98–99.
[228] In a handwritten note Tito stated: "Apparently, the political effect of the visit to Kumrovec is well understood." See Beleška o programu zvanične posete predsednika SAD Ričarda Niksona i supruge, September 17, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–190.

improve our relations [with great powers]… but without concessions on any principled issues, with the need to maintain equilibrium, and not to build relations with one side at the expense of the other," a Yugoslav analysis stated.[229]

Tito believed, however, that the benefits of Nixon's visit outweighed its political risks. After all, the decision to visit Yugoslavia, as Tito said, clearly affirmed Yugoslavia's role in global affairs. Moreover, as Moscow's October overtures showed, Nixon's visit provided Yugoslavia with leverage in its relations with the USSR. Besides, the Yugoslavs expected that the visit would help resolve some issues in bilateral relations. Namely, they hoped that Nixon's visit would further encourage the growth of trade, provide Yugoslavia with access to loans and credits, allow transfer of technology, but that it would also stymie the activity of South Slav émigré groups that were hostile to the regime in Belgrade.

The talks, however, revealed that the two sides disagreed on almost every global issue. Tito criticized the American approach to the Middle East and repeated the same points from his earlier conversation with Rogers. Moreover, Tito criticized Washington's Indochina policy and its neglect of Africa's developmental problems. Kissinger later told Yugoslav Secretary Tepavac that some of Tito's comments were inaccurate, notably about insufficient American aid to Africa and overestimation of American influence in Israel.[230] However, the two sides agreed on China and the Soviet Union. Nixon's visit was a symbolic gesture that sent signals to Beijing about his willingness to negotiate.

[229] Neke napomene o motivima posete predsednika SAD Niksona Jugoslaviji, September 26, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–190.
[230] Zabeleška o razgovoru sekretara Tepavca sa Henry Kissinger-om, vođenim u četvrtak 1. oktobra 1970. u avionu na povratku iz Zagreba, October 5, 1970, Kabinet DSIP, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–190.

Kissinger wrote in his memoir that one of the main reasons for Nixon's trip to Yugoslavia was China. "Nixon had now visited two capitals in Eastern Europe… The symbolism was inescapable. The United States would pay special attention to those Eastern European countries pursuing an autonomous foreign policy. The Chinese were to notice this," Kissinger stated.[231] Yugoslav documents show that Nixon went beyond this symbolic gesture and tried to use Yugoslavia (in addition to Pakistan and Romania) as a backchannel to China. During a face-to-face meeting with Tito, Nixon asked his host to tell the newly appointed Chinese ambassador in Belgrade that the United States was willing to "expand contacts [with China] at all levels."[232] Although Nixon's efforts to use Yugoslavia as a backchannel to Beijing were unfruitful, he and Tito agreed that China should not stay in international isolation.

Tito and Nixon did not discuss the Brezhnev Doctrine, but the question of possible U.S. assistance to Yugoslavia in the case of a Soviet intervention was raised in a confidential talk between Tepavac and Kissinger. [233] Aboard Air Force One returning from Zagreb to Belgrade, Secretary Tepavac asked if he could pose an "airplane question," i.e. "a question which he felt could be asked only in the strictly private and

[231] Kissinger, *White House Years*, 930. The Secretariat in its assessment of the motives for Nixon's visit mentioned China only once in the context of possible Nixon's interest in Sino–Yugoslav relations. See Neke napomene o motivima posete predsednika SAD Niksona Jugoslaviji, Grupa za spoljno-politička pitanja, September 26, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–190. As a symbolic gesture of his ideological flexibility and pragmatism, Richard Nixon wanted to designate Barry Goldwater as his personal representative at the Zagreb Fair.

[232] Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike sa predsednikom SAD Ričardom Niksonom, October 1, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–190.

[233] Kissinger suggested that Nixon should underline his "non-acceptance of the Brezhnev doctrine or other rigid 'spheres-of-influence' concepts but your recognition that nations have special security concerns and interests which cannot be ignored by others." Memo, Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, no date, 1970, Document 220, *FRUS*, 1969–1976, vol. XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972.

informal atmosphere of his joint flight with Dr. Kissinger."[234] Tepavac wanted Kissinger to clarify American position on possible Soviet intervention against Yugoslavia: Would the Americans be "angered" or would they confront the Soviets? Kissinger said that the United States would "give 'all necessary help' so that we [the Yugoslavs] could fight on our own." Tepavac, replied that the Yugoslavs "are not expecting them [the United States] to be protecting us nor do we feel insecure." He, however, wanted to know if there were some secret arrangements between two superpowers over the fate of Yugoslavia, which Kissinger denied. [235]

Besides improving Yugoslavia's diplomatic position, Nixon's visit provided a new impetus to economic relations between Yugoslavia and the United States. Yugoslavia was an instrumental part of American policy toward Eastern Europe. As Laszlo Borhi noted, for the Nixon administration "economics remained the cornerstone of relations between America and Eastern Europe."[236] Economic relations with European communist states were perceived as a means to encourage their emancipation from the USSR. Yet, the economic expansion across the Iron Curtain was a contested issue among Washington bureaucrats, with some fearing that economic liberalization would yield

[234] Memorandum of conversation between Henry Kissinger and Mirko Tepavac aboard President's aircraft, October 1, 1970, Kissinger Conversations: Supplement I, 1969-1977, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, 1969-1977, Kissinger Transcripts, 1968-1977, Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), ProQuest, http://proxygw.wrlc.org/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.proxygw.wrlc.org/docview/1679137626?accountid=11243 (accessed June 23, 2019).
[235] Zabeleška o razgovoru sekretara Tepavca sa Henry Kissinger-om, vođenim u četvrtak 1. oktobra 1970. u avionu na povratku iz Zagreba, October 5, 1970, Kabinet DSIP, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–190. Kissinger's account of the conversation is slightly different than Tepavac's. In Kissinger's account Tepavac appears more insecure. According to Kissinger, Tepavac asked whether the United States believed that a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia would lead to a third world war. He also said that "there would be probably some quislings in Yugoslavia" but that the majority of the Yugoslavs would fight against the Soviets. For comparison see Memorandum of conversation between Henry Kissinger and Mirko Tepavac aboard President's aircraft, October 1, 1970, DNSA.
[236] Borhi, *Dealing with Dictators*, 230.

small political benefits and even endanger national security.[237] Despite intra-agency bickering over the significance of the West–East economic cooperation, Nixon, Kissinger, and Rogers saw U.S.–Yugoslav economic relations as a model for American economic penetration beyond the Iron Curtain. Despite the relatively small volume of commerce between the two countries in 1970, Yugoslavia was America's largest trading partner in the socialist world. In the early 1970s, the United States was Yugoslavia's fourth largest trading partner behind Italy, West Germany, and the Soviet Union.[238]

As Daniel Sargent noted, for Nixon American foreign policy was inseparable from its economic interests.[239] Nixon aimed to preserve the American economic hegemony that was challenged by West Germany, and Japan, with the USSR and China on the horizon as rather distantly formidable economic powers. To strengthen the American economic position as a *sine qua non* of successful foreign policy, the Nixon administration enacted several far-reaching monetary policies that transformed the global economy.[240] One of Nixon's preoccupations was how to increase the competitiveness of American exporters in an unfavorable global environment. Although the Yugoslav market was relatively small, contributed to a partial solution to this problem. Moreover, successful Yugoslav–American economic cooperation effectively advertised the advantages of American technology and manufacturing.

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[237] Borhi, *Dealing with Dictators*, 232–233.
[238] Until the early 1960s, exports from the United States made roughly 20 percent of total Yugoslav imports, chiefly thanks to deliveries of American agricultural products under PL 480. By 1968 when the provisions of PL 480 expired, U.S. exports dropped to five percent of total Yugoslav imports. See Ljubiša Adamović, John Lampe and Russel Pricket, *Američko–jugoslovenski ekonomski odnosi posle Drugog svetskog rata* (Beograd: Radnička štampa, 1990), 92.
[239] Daniel Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed. The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 100–101.
[240] Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed*, 102.

Economic aid was one of the cornerstones of U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia in the years after the Yugoslav–Soviet split.[241] Besides, Washington believed that economic and financial aid would attract other socialist countries to follow the Yugoslav path and seek more independence from Moscow. In the early 1970s, the Nixon administration pursued this "wedge strategy" with a new vigor. The United States wanted Yugoslavia to become a poster child of successful cooperation between a socialist state and Western capital. Kissinger advised Nixon that the United States should encourage economic cooperation with Yugoslavia "particularly since this might be a device by which we could work with Romania and other East European countries."[242] Nixon repeated Kissinger's proposal to Tito, adding that the new forms of economic cooperation between the United States and Yugoslavia would encourage Eastern European states to expand their economic relations with the United States. He mentioned his conversation with Ceausescu, who cited certain examples of Yugoslav–American economic cooperation that he wished to transplant to Romania.[243] "Thus, if relations between our two countries continue to develop, that would… allow the expansion of our relations with Eastern Europe as a whole, and that can contribute to the relaxation of tensions in the world," Nixon said.[244]

[241] From 1948–1955, John Campbell estimated the value of U.S. economic aid to Yugoslavia to be around $600 million, with additional $600 million in military assistance. "It was a small price to pay for what was one strikingly successful policy the United States was able to conduct in Eastern Europe during the whole period since the war." John C. Campbell, *Tito's Separate Road. America and Yugoslavia in World Politics* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 28-29.
[242] Memo, Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, May 7, 1970, Document 219, *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972.
[243] Stenografske beleške sa razgovora Delegacije Sjedinjenih Američkih Država koju predvodi predsednik Ričard Nikson i Delegacije Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije koju predvodi predsednik Josip Broz Tito, October 1, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–190.
[244] Ibid.

The Yugoslav government and companies saw the American market as insufficiently tapped source of much-needed hard currency. For similar reasons, affluent Americans were highly desirable customers for the emerging Yugoslav tourist industry on the Adriatic Sea.[245] Two additional areas were of particular interest to the Yugoslavs that would help facilitate Yugoslavia's economic development: joint ventures with U.S. companies, and the transfer of modern technology to Yugoslavia. Taken together, improved economic relations with the United States would provide the country with considerable economic benefits, but also significant political gain, both at home and abroad. Yugoslavia's economic troubles resulting from the 1965 reforms were marked by inflation, a large deficit, high unemployment rates and ensuing massive economic migration to Western Europe, and arrested growth of the country's GDP. The market reforms also led to the growth of income disparities across the board, which exacerbated domestic social and political problems.[246] Thus, the expansion of economic relations with the United States was an attempt to address some of these social, economic, and political woes. As a member of the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council, Marko Bulc, emphasized to Assistant Secretary Martin Hillenbrand: "U.S. long-term strategic interests are served by a stable Yugoslavia, and the key to this stability is a strong economy."[247]

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[245] During his talks with Rogers in Addis Ababa in February 1970, Tito said that Yugoslavia needed more American tourists, but those with "deeper pockets." "Those who come now are pretty stingy. They apparently don't have much money. We need those with deeper pockets," Tito told Rogers.

[246] For a detailed account of Yugoslav economic problems in the late 1960s and early 1970s see Rusinow, *Yugoslav Experiment*, 202–209. Yugoslav historian Branko Petranović wrote that some workers felt that the economic reforms betrayed the principles the Yugoslav revolution and that income disparities allowed "alienation" of the ruling class into "red bourgeoisie." Individual income disparities aside, regional disparities created a combustible mixture that reawakened nationalism and regional particularism. Branko Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije*, vol. III (Belgrade: Nolit, 1988), 381. The Yugoslav embassy in Moscow noted how the Soviets emphasized these internal problems in their anti-Yugoslav propaganda. See Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, 97–98.

[247] Memorandum of conversation between Martin Hillenbrand and Marko Bulc, October 13, 1970, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2745, Pol US–Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

Despite differences over some international issues, Nixon's visit was a success. It confirmed Tito's status as a world statesman, and the United States appeared committed to preserving Yugoslavia's independence. Moreover, Kissinger denied the existence of power-sharing agreements between the United States and the USSR. Finally, Yugoslavia saw some concrete economic benefits from the visit because both Nixon and Kissinger advocated the expansion of economic and scientific cooperation with Yugoslavia. This achievement had special significance in the context of Yugoslavia's internal political and economic crisis, epitomized in the so-called Croatian Spring.

Yugoslavia's internal problems and the Soviet intervention that never happened

At the time of Nixon's visit to Yugoslavia, the country was going through a series of internal crises. Internal economic and social difficulties had exacerbated the nationalist and regionalist tendencies in the multi-ethnic state. Barely settled after student unrests in June 1968 and the shock of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, the regime in Belgrade faced a new challenge in Kosovo – Yugoslavia's poorest region, inhabited mostly by ethnic Albanians.[248] In November 1968, the riots broke out in Kosovo.[249] Although the authorities quickly suppressed the Kosovars by bringing tanks to the streets, the government and the Party became obsessed with the disruptive potential of domestic

[248] The US Ambassador William Leonhard noted in his dispatch that Kosovo was "a clue to the future of Yugoslavia." His words were prophetic. For Leonhard's assessment see Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Airgram A-366, July 26, 1971, Subject Numeric Files, 1970–1973, box 2835, Pol 2 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

[249] Dennison Rusinow noted that the riots of 1968 were not, for a change, instigated by Tirana because Enver Hohxa needed Yugoslav support if the Brezhnev Doctrine was to be applied to Albania. See Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, 382n. Milorad Komatina did not even mention the 1968 riots in his survey on Yugoslav–Albanian relations. Komatina stated that Yugoslav–Albanian relations were normalized after 1968. After Albania left the Warsaw Pact in September 1968, Enver Hoxha "took a series of measures to improve Albania's international position. He particularly showed readiness to improve relations with neighbors, especially Yugoslavia and Greece." Milorad Komatina, *Enver Hodža i jugoslovensko–albanski odnosi* (Beograd: Službeni list SRJ, 1995), 111.

disturbances. Moreover, hostile South Slav émigré groups increased their activity against the regime, hoping to exploit the country's difficulties to achieve their political objectives. Escalating ethnic and regional tensions at home and the attacks on Yugoslav citizens and property abroad turned into an urgent foreign policy problem for the Yugoslav government. There was mounting evidence that foreign powers, notably the USSR, actively encouraged ethnic and political divisions to destabilize the regime. This situation created the largest crisis since 1948 that shook the foundation of the regime and threatened the future of the South Slav union. The crisis that included domestic opposition, hostile émigrés, and foreign powers was the so-called Croatian Spring.[250]

The crisis in Croatia was quietly brewing since the mid-1960s.[251] The 1966 purge of powerful federal police chief Aleksandar Ranković (a Serb) created the conditions for greater liberalization of political and economic life in Yugoslavia. It was not an accident that Ranković's descent coincided with the rise of a younger generation of politicians in Serbia and Croatia who argued for decentralization and greater economic liberalism.

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[250] The Mass movement, or what was later called the "Croatian Spring" as an attempt to make analogy to the failed reformist efforts in Czechoslovakia, remains a controversial political issue in today's Croatia. The nature of the movement, its legacy, heroes, and villains, are subject of numerous debates in Croatian historiography and political science, that one Croatian scholar calls the phenomenon the "interpretative warzone," because of very little agreement among scholars how to describe the Croatian Spring (or even whether it warrants that moniker). Memoirs of Spring participants and contemporaries obfuscated rather than explained the phenomenon. There are, however, several works that provide a more coherent analysis of the events in Croatia in the late 1960s and early 1970s. See Ante Batović, *The Croatian Spring. Nationalism, Repression and Foreign Policy under Tito.* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), Jill Irvine, "The Croatian Spring and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia," in Lenard Cohen and Jasna Dragović Soso, eds., *State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia's Disintegration* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2008), Tvrtko Jakovina, ed. *Hrvatsko proljeće 40. godina poslije* (Zagreb: Centar za demokraciju i pravo Miko Tripalo, 2012), and Dennison Rusinow, *Yugoslavia: Oblique Insights and Observations* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008).

[251] A junior U.S. diplomat who served in Zagreb in early 1963 said that even before the "Croatian cultural revolution or whatever you want to call it … they still complained bitterly about the fact that the products of Croatia and Slovenia, the hardworking toilers of Zagreb and Ljubljana were sent down to develop the backward Serbs, [and] the good for nothing Albanians." See Charles Stuart Kennedy and Robert L Barry, *Interview with Robert L. Barry*, October 2, 1996. Frontline Diplomacy, LOC. Available at https://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000051/ (accessed July 25, 2019).

Although the new Croatian leadership remained faithful to the system and believed that it was possible to reform it from within, the idea of greater Croatian independence gained a life of its own in intellectual and cultural circles. Ever an astute observer of Yugoslav affairs, Dennison Rusinow remarked that from the very beginning, the "Croatian strategy had… two faces: one national, one socialist."[252] The expression of these cultural emancipation efforts has emerged already in April 1967 in the dispute between major cultural institutions in Belgrade and Zagreb over the status of the Serbo–Croatian language. Two elite Croat cultural institutions, the *Matica Hrvatska* and the Croatian Society of Authors opposed cultural unitarism and insisted on a separate Croatian language.[253] What started as an intellectual dispute over the form of the latest edition of the Serbo–Croat dictionary, became an important political question that mobilized the masses and further emboldened the Croatian communists to challenge the central government.[254] The Tenth Congress of the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC) in January 1970 showed that the political emancipation of the Croatian leadership was irreversible. The Congress broke many taboos by discussing openly Yugoslavia's nationalities problem and condemning unitarist and centralist concepts – a move that many interpreted as an attack on Serbian hegemony within the federation and its security apparatus (police and military). The Congress downplayed the importance and the strength of Croatian nationalism and launched a campaign against hardliners within the party who were accused of unitarism, etatism, bureaucratism, "*rankovićevština*"

[252] Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, 250.
[253] Batović noted that the U.S. consul in Zagreb believed that the so-called language affair was instigated by the Croatian leadership to "create an artificial crisis to weaken communist hardliners, in order to strengthen the position of the liberal wing of the party." Batović, *The Croatian Spring*, 75.
[254] Marcus Tanner, *Croatia. A Nation Forged in War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 191.

(allegiance to Ranković), and even "informbiroism" (Stalinism). The most prominent victim of this purge was a Croatian party official and the vice president of the Yugoslav parliament, Miloš Žanko, who was denounced as an exponent of these trends.[255] The program adopted at the conference called for a reckoning with "statist" elements in Croatia, particularly within republican security apparatus.[256] "The principal purpose of the LCC leadership in attacking Miloš Žanko and 'unitarism' [is]… to make it clear to all audiences, whether in Croatia or in Belgrade, that the LCC under its present leadership is firmly committed to a 'pro–Reform' policy," a report from the U.S. consulate in Zagreb noted.[257]

The U.S. Consulate in Zagreb showed some sympathy toward the young Croatian leadership and its reformist course.[258] U.S. consular officer Robert Rackmales who arrived in Zagreb in 1967 said the consular staff was "encouraged by the openness, and flexibility with which the Croatian leadership was handling the use of nationalism."[259] The U.S. consul in Zagreb, Robert Owen described the president of the LCC Central

[255] Milos Žanko was a Croat from Dalmatia and an old Partisan. In 1969, he wrote a series of editorials in the official organ of the SAWPY *Borba* in which he condemned the rise of Croat nationalism and implicitly accused the new leadership of passive and tolerant attitudes toward nationalist excesses. The Tenth Congress was called as the LCC's response to Žanko's editorials.
[256] Consulate Zagreb to Department of State, Airgram A-107, August 11, 1970, Subject Numeric Files 1970–73, box 2837, Pol 12 Yugo, RG 59, NARA. Scholar Dennison Rusinow, who lived in Yugoslavia in the 1960s and 1970s, wrote that security apparatus was naturally opposed to the liberal program. "Most opponents of the reform are Serbs or their nearer kinsmen; so were most of the security police … the dangers of a possible Serb reaction are obvious," wrote Rusinow in the aftermath of Ranković's removal. See Rusinow, *Yugoslavia: Oblique Insights*, 57.
[257] Consulate Zagreb to Department of State, Airgram A-17, February 5, 1970, Subject Numeric Files 1970–73, box 2837, Pol 12 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[258] The U.S. Commercial Attaché in Belgrade, William Whitman noted that the U.S. Consulate in Zagreb was "quite pro-Croat." See Charles Stuart Kennedy and William B Whitman, *Interview with William B. Whitman*, July 16, 2004, Frontline Diplomacy, LOC. Available at https://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib001483/ (accessed July 25, 2019).
[259] Rackmales, however, noted that politics in Yugoslavia quickly turned into African-type tribalism. Charles Stuart Kenedy and Robert Rackmales, *Interview with Robert Rackmales*, May 11, 1995, Frontline Diplomacy, LOC. Available at https://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000952/ (accessed July 25, 2019).

Committee, Savka Dabčević–Kučar, as an "attractive woman" with a knack for public speaking. "She is generally regarded as one of the few (if not the first) party leader to emerge in Croatia after the end of WW II who enjoys any degree of popularity among the public," Owen wrote.[260] He depicted Dabčević–Kučar's colleague Miko Tripalo in equally glowing terms: "an articulate and vigorous defender of the 'liberal' position."[261] Moreover, he wrote with admiration about the Tenth Congress as a proof "how far times have changed in Yugoslavia, toward openness and democracy in both Yugoslav society and in the party."[262] British diplomats in Croatia showed similar enthusiasm toward the reformist course of the Croatian leadership and admired the unusual openness of the LCC Tenth Congress.[263] Both British and American diplomats believed that this strong pro-reformist stance and the demands for greater autonomy within the Federation would alleviate intra-ethnic and intra-regional tensions. Yet, they noted that the rhetoric coming from Zagreb became increasingly "anti-Belgrade" although the LCC tried not to sound anti-Serb. Despite their optimism about the reform potentials of the new LCC, the U.S. embassy in Belgrade and the consulate in Zagreb reported about frequent "embarrassing nationalist incidents" and rising tensions between the Croats and the Serbian minority living in Croatia.[264]

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[260] Consulate Zagreb to Department of State, Airgram A-160, December 16, 1970, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2837, Pol 12 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[261] Ibid.
[262] Consulate Zagreb to Department of State, Airgram A-05, January 21, 1970, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2837, Pol 12 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[263] Ante Batović, "Titova Jugoslavija i Ujedinjeno kraljevstvo za vrijeme Hrvatskog proljeća," in Jakovina, ed. *Hrvatsko proljeće*, 84.
[264] In 1970 and 1971, the U.S. Embassy reported about a series of "chauvinist outbreaks" all over Croatia and how "such incidents are signs of the times in Yugoslavia and certain to become more frequent." See Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Airgram A-124, March 18, 1971, Subject Numeric Files 1970–73, box 2835, Pol 2 Yugo, RG 59, NARA. The U.S. consulate in Zagreb reported about "the unfortunate intensity of national tensions" in Baranja (northern Croatia) and the appearance of anti–Serbian slogans. According to the U.S. consul, the tensions in Baranja exemplified the state of affairs in various regions of

Richard Nixon got unintentionally embroiled in these local problems during his short visit to the Croatian capital on October 1, 1970. H.R. Haldeman wrote in his diary, "streets [of Zagreb] were jammed and people very enthusiastic, even in pouring rain."[265] Nixon, however, made a gaffe that underlined the regime's sensitivity to foreign influences on domestic affairs. Nixon's decision to visit Croatia many considered as a sign of U.S. affirmation of Yugoslavia's federal structure. A Slovene politician told the U.S. consul that, "while it was obviously impossible for the President to visit all the constituent republics of Yugoslavia, it was enough that he visited at least one city other than the Federal capital."[266] Nixon's remarks in Zagreb, however, raised suspicions about his real motives. At the end of his speech in the Zagreb Citi Hall, Nixon exclaimed: "Croatia will always live, Yugoslavia will always live! Živjela Hrvatska! Živjela Jugoslavija!"[267] Under different circumstances, Nixon's gaffe would be quickly forgotten as a minor diplomatic blunder. The political atmosphere in Croatia, however, was already tense, and some interpreted the Nixon's remark as his implicit support of Croatia's statehood.[268] The situation in Yugoslavia and outside of its borders provided a fertile

Croatia. The attempt of the local mayor, a Serb, to remove from his post a successful, and reform-oriented manager of the large agricultural enterprise who was a Croat, created a political crisis further exacerbated by mutual accusations. The Serbs who constituted a majority in the local party and police apparatus accused the Croats of unfaithfulness to socialism and their insincere allegiance to "brotherhood and unity." The Croats accused the Serbs of undermining the reformist course in Croatia, calling the mayor "neo-informbiroist." This local affair, wrote the consul, "unleashed the heat of nationalist feelings." Consulate Zagreb to Department of State, Airgram A-219, September 30, 1971, Subject numeric files 1970–1973, box 2838, Pol 13–3 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

[265] Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries*, 200.

[266] Consulate Zagreb to Department of State, Airgram A-146,October 13, 1970, Subject Numeric Files 1970–73, box 2838, Pol 15 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

[267] Cited in Jakovina, "Što je značio Nixonov usklik 'Živjela Hrvatska'?," *Društvena istraživanja: časopis za opća društvena pitanja*, vol. 8, no. 2 (1999): 347–371.

[268] President of the Croatian Peasant Party (in exile), Juraj Krnjevic wrote a letter to Nixon in which he stated that Nixon's visit to Croatia "has left deep and permanent impression especially the words that he spoke in Zagreb." Memorandum from the Croatian Peasant Party to Department of State, November 16, 1970, box 2840, Pol 17 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

ground for various other speculations. Already suspicious about some new Yalta that would carve Yugoslavia into two spheres of influence, certain Yugoslav officials understood Nixon's gaffe as a sign of U.S. interest in the western parts of Yugoslavia while the Soviets would "get" traditionally pro-Russian eastern parts.[269] This was particularly significant because there was some evidence that the Soviets actively exploited Yugoslavia's internal problems.

U.S diplomats reported about provocations in the "best Ohrana or Balkan tradition." The U.S. consulate in Zagreb kept a record of the contacts between the Soviets and Croatian and Slovene political organizations and businesses.[270] Moreover, in February 1970, right after the Tenth Congress, *Der Spiegel* published a piece about an impending coup in Yugoslavia. U.S. embassy officials could not corroborate this claim and concluded that, most likely, the Soviets planted the rumor. Similarly, the embassy reported that Czechoslovakia's senior diplomat in Belgrade was involved in spreading misinformation aimed at "stirring-up Serb–Croat antagonisms."[271] Ambassador Mićunović in his detailed annual assessment of Yugoslav–Soviet relations wrote that Yugoslavia's internal situation was the "most important factor in our relations with the USSR." He noted that Moscow tried to take advantage of Yugoslavia's troubles. Moscow, Mićunović said, significantly expanded the number of diplomatic personnel in Yugoslavia despite the overall decline in economic and political relations. According to

[269] Soviet diplomats, commenting on Yugoslavia's internal problems, said how the Serbs and Montenegrins were "true internationalists," while the Croats and the Slovenes were not so much. Zabeleška o razgovoru DS za inostrane poslove M. Tepavca sa ambasadorom SSSR-a I. Benediktovim, Beograd – 20. I 1971, January 22, 1971, pov. br. 42245, DSIP-Kabinet Državnog sekretara, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–24 SSSR.
[270] Consulate Zagreb to Department of State, Airgram A-08, January 14, 1971, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2839, Pol 23–11 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[271] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Airgram A-270, May 27, 1971, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2838, Pol 15-1 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

Mićunović, the Soviet consulate in Zagreb was larger than the entire Yugoslav embassy in Moscow. Moreover, the Soviets engaged in what he called "wild bilateral," i.e., informal, contacts with Yugoslav citizens and organizations, outside the proper diplomatic channels.[272] The Soviet actions went beyond Yugoslavia. Belgrade believed that Moscow instigated anti-Yugoslav campaign in Bulgaria. Moreover, there was some evidence that the Soviets used hostile émigré groups, ethnic and political ("cominformists"), to rattle the Yugoslav leadership.[273] The West Berlin-based Croatian National Committee, led by Branko Jelić claimed that he had established contacts with the Soviets. Jelić, through the Committee's journal *Hrvatska Država* [Croat State], called for an independent and neutral Croatia ("Finland of the Balkans") that would allow the Soviets to establish their naval bases in the Adriatic in return for Moscow's support for Croatia's independence.[274] Moreover, the State Department recorded that Jelić called the Soviet Union a "state of the future… whose leaders support nationalist aspirations of an independent Croatia."[275] Jelić allegedly wanted to form an alternative Croat communist

[272] Odnosi SSSR–Jugoslavija početkom 1971. godine, Ambasada SFRJ Moskva, Str. pov. 02–1, January 4, 1971, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–24 SSSR.

[273] Ondrzej Vojtjehovski wrote that the Soviets instructed Yugoslav cominformist émigrés in Czechoslovakia to cooperate with the Czechoslovak state security. Their primary role was to combat the spread of "Yugoslav revisionism" after 1968 but also to keep an eye on Yugoslav diplomats and citizens in Czechoslovakia. Ondržej Vojtjehovski, "Aktiviranje jugoslovenskih informbiroovaca u Čehoslovačkoj 1968," in *Tito – Viđenja i tumačenja* (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istorije Srbije i Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2011), 472–473. The Yugoslav embassy in Moscow reported that in the spring of 1971, cominformist émigrés held a series of public lectures in Moscow in which they denigrated Tito and Kardelj but also attacked the Yugoslav political and economic system. The embassy complained that some Soviet official institutions provided a platform for these anti-Yugoslav actions. Zabeleška o razgovoru pomoćnika državnog sekretara Jakše Petrića sa ambasadorom Sovjetskog Saveza L.I. Stjepakovim 2. juna 1971., June 4, 1971, br. 420736, DSIP-Kabinet PDS Jakše Petrića, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–24 SSSR.

[274] Steven Clissold, *Croat Separatism: Nationalism, Dissidence and Terrorism*. Conflict Studies no. 103 (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1979).

[275] Memo, Donald S. Tice to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard Davies, May 13, 1971, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2840, Pol 17 Yugo, RG 59, NARA. Jelić, apparently, tried to play both sides in order to achieve his goals. After his U.S. visa was denied, he wrote a letter to Nixon in which he said that if he does not receive support from the United State that he would turn elsewhere. Yugoslavia pressured the U.S. government to deny Jelić visa, stating that Jelić's visit to the US would be interpreted as "at least tacit support for the objectives of the émigré group he represents." See

party abroad that would work together with the LCC on Croatia's independence. The intelligence service of the Yugoslav foreign secretariat warned its superiors about contacts between the LCC and émigré groups, but these claims were dismissed as an attempt of "unitarist forces" to slander the LCC leadership.[276] A State Department report noted that Jelić "scored an extraordinary diversionary success" by revealing his correspondence with some high ranking Croat communist officials.[277]

Soviet interference in Yugoslavia's affairs culminated in late April 1971 with what appeared to be Brezhnev's attempt to pressure Tito to request Moscow's assistance to quash the internal disturbances. A series of events that preceded Brezhnev's telephone call to Tito probably convinced the Soviet leader that the situation was ripe for a Soviet intervention of some sort. In April 1971, students with no communist party affiliation seized control over the student organization at the University of Zagreb ("the first truly democratic election held in Yugoslavia since WWII").[278] The rise of a heterogeneous, independent student group brought back the specter of another 1968-like student rebellion. Moreover, it appeared that the Croatian party leadership was unable to control the events in their republic and that the "elements" outside of the party were taking initiative.

Memorandum of Conversation between Mirko Bruner and Richard Davies, December 11, 1970, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2745, Pol US–Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

[276] Yugoslav diplomat, Neđeljko L. Zorić, wrote that the Foreign Secretariat was "reluctant and reserved" in its response to these reports because it feared that it would be accused of unitarism. Neđeljko L. Zorić *Zapisi jugoslovenskog diplomate, 1948–1983* (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2011), 301–302.

[277] Department of State to US Mission NATO, November 7, 1970, box 2835, Pol 2 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

[278] The U.S. consul in Zagreb noted that the new student government was overwhelmingly pro-American and anti-Soviet and that it displayed "intense Croat nationalism." Consulate Zagreb to Department of State, Airgram A-151, July 14, 1971, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2835, Pol 2 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

This internal problems were accompanied by revived activity of anti-Titoist Yugoslav émigré groups, particularly Croat. On April 7, a group of Croat nationalist assassinated the Yugoslav ambassador in Sweden, Vladimir Rolović. Attacks on Yugoslavia's property and its representatives by émigré groups were not new or unusual.[279] Rolović's murder, however, was particularly brutal (he was tortured and died several days later in the hospital) and the arrest of assassins who defiantly sang Croat patriotic songs was shown on the Swedish television. Rolović's assassination heightened the regime's sense of insecurity. Secretary Tepavac told the ambassador Leonhart that Rolović's murder was "clearly directed to internal situation… and pointed to central direction of these hostile émigré groups by 'a certain owner' seeking to use these old enmities to… divide or destroy Yugoslavia."[280] Although Tepavac did not name that "certain owner," he was implicitly referring to the Soviet Union.

Moreover, Rolović's assassination coincided with the LCC's accusation that the Foreign Secretariat was the "federal center of conspiracy" against the Socialist Republic of Croatia. The LCC accused the Secretariat of creating and distributing false reports about alleged ties between the Croatian party and émigré organizations.[281] At the LCC's request, the federal government formed a commission to investigate the charges. The

[279] In 1967 a Serb émigré group bombed six consulates in the United States and Canada. In 1968, a Croat extremist group planted a bomb in one of Belgrade's movie theaters. In 1969, a member of a Croat émigré group tried to assassinate the Yugoslav military attaché in West Berlin, Anton Kolendić. In the 1970s, these attacks grew in frequency.
[280] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 1275, April 16, 1971, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2838, Pol 13–10 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[281] Forty five years after the assassination, Rolović's daughter blamed the secret service for her father's death. She alleged that the ambassador was murdered because he sent numerous reports about contacts between Croat émigré groups, the LCC, and Croat cultural organizations. Her testimony, however, cannot be substantiated by any accessible documents. "Spomenik Barešiću je promocija fašizma," Interview with Žana Rolović, August 13, 2016, in *Novosti*. Available at https://www.portalnovosti.com/ana-rolovi-spomenik-bareiu-je-promocija-faizma (accessed June 7, 2019).

commission's findings exonerated both sides – it cleared the Secretariat from conspiratorial behavior, but also cleared the LCC from any suspicious contacts with anti-Yugoslav groups abroad. The whole affair, however, as Rusinow noted, demonstrated the "breakdown in mutual confidence and communications between Zagreb and Belgrade and the fraying nerves everywhere, particularly in the Croatian capital."[282]

Tito was unhappy with the developments in the country and abroad. He lashed out at his unruly underlings at rally in Priština (Kosovo). "On April 15 in Pristina for the first time he reminded children there is woodshed and papa does spank," the U.S. embassy reported.[283] Without naming names, Tito complained about disunity in the Party, particularistic interests of the republican party elites and poorly conducted a program of economic stabilization. He threatened "administrative measures" against those who refused to toe the party line, which, in communist lingo, meant a return to undemocratic practices of the past. Carefully observing Tito's public remarks, the U.S. embassy concluded that the crisis was so deep that it was not clear that even Tito with his authority would be able to resolve it.[284] This sense of despair was, as Mićunović suggested in his reports from Moscow, did not escape Soviet attention.

To address problems of internal disunity, on April 28, 1971, Tito summoned in Brioni an emergency meeting of the LCY Presidium (the 17th Meeting). The Presidium discussed future constitutional amendments that would provide further decentralization of the federation as a way to resolve increasing inter–republican differences and divisions

[282] Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, 288.
[283] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 1287, April 19, 1971, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2838, Pol 15–1 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[284] Ibid.

and escalating nationalistic incidents.[285] On the last day of the meeting, April 30, Brezhnev phoned Tito. Although there are no verbatim transcripts of the phone call in the Yugoslav archives, a summary of the conversation was subsequently prepared for Mićunović. This memo of the Tito–Brezhnev conversation, as well as recollections included in Mićunović's memoir, indicate that in the spring of 1971, the Soviets considered interfering in Yugoslav affairs—if not outright military intervention.[286]

The call came as a surprise to Mićunović, who inadvertently learned of it from a member of the Soviet Politburo during a reception at the Canadian embassy.[287] While he pretended that he was informed about the conversation, he quickly consulted with superiors in Belgrade. Tito approved a summary of the conversation to be sent to the ambassador in Moscow. In his memoir, Mićunović corroborated the claim that Brezhnev expressed readiness to "assist" Tito in quelling domestic disturbances. According to the memo sent to Mićunović, Brezhnev characterized the situation in Yugoslavia as "very important" and inquired about alleged movements of the Yugoslav army toward Belgrade.[288] Similarly, a report from Mićunović's three-hour long meeting with Brezhnev in Yalta in August 1971 provides the details of the April phone call. Mićunović

[285] From 1967 to 1971, 41 constitutional amendments were added to the 1963 Constitution. These amendments constituted a "revolutionary prelude to the 1974 Constitution." The most important amendments in 1971 (20–41) limited the role of the federal government and instituted the organ of collective presidency that served to provide a smooth transition after Tito's death. Moreover, these amendments instituted the so-called "ethnic key," i.e. proportional distribution of federal civil and military positions between different ethnic groups. A legal scholar who participated in creation of the amendments and the 1974 Constitution later described them as a concession to nationalism and dogmatism. Boro Krivokapić, *Jugoslavija i komunisti: adresa Jovana Đorđevića* (Belgrade: Mladost, 1988), 75. Also, John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a country* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 304–305.

[286] Unfortunately, I did not have access to Soviet documents that could provide the definitive answer about Moscow's intentions.

[287] Memorandum Izvršnog biroa SKJ ambasadoru Veljku Mićunoviću za ličnu upotrebu, May 28, 1971, pov. 483/1, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–24 SSSR and Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, 129.

[288] Memorandum Izvršnog biroa SKJ ambasadoru Veljku Mićunoviću za ličnu upotrebu, May 28, 1971, pov. 483/1, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–24.

characterized his 1971 talk with Brezhnev as "pretty uncomfortable" and "difficult," noting that Brezhnev was disgruntled by the ineffectiveness of Soviet actions toward Yugoslavia. Mićunović mentioned "the one from April," likely a reference to Brezhnev's call to Tito. Mićunović concluded that the Soviets overestimated the crisis in Yugoslavia and underestimated Yugoslav resilience. He wrote that the Soviet Politburo was in session during Brezhnev's phone call to Tito and that they "expected the result of the 'phone calling'." Mićunović noted in his August 1971 report that "here, they acted in a similar way, more than once, concerning Czechoslovakia in 1967–68."[289]

Was the threat of a Soviet intervention real? The Yugoslavs were convinced that Moscow tried to use Yugoslav domestic instability to weaken Tito and install pro-Soviet cadres within the Yugoslav leadership and thus finally resolve the Yugoslav–Soviet dispute dating from 1948. A week before Brezhnev's call to Tito, Mikhail S. Zimyanin, editor-in-chief of *Pravda* told a Yugoslav journalist that the survival of a socialist Yugoslavia was not a Yugoslavia's internal issue only. "We cannot be indifferent and stay on the sidelines in the name of noninterference. If we watch passively Yugoslavia's dissolution, that would mean the betrayal of internationalism," Zimyanin said.[290] Moreover, according to the Yugoslav security services, the staff of the Soviet embassy and the Cultural Center increased their anti-Yugoslav propaganda around the time of the Brioni meeting, allegedly making a list of Yugoslav functionaries who "need to go."[291]

[289] Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Mićunović and Secretary Brežnjev held on August 10, 1971, August 13, 1971, no. 756, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/101–131. Did Brezhnev offer Soviet help like he did in the fateful telephone conversation with Dubček from August 13, 1968? Although the summary is not conclusive in this regard, Tito, unlike Dubček, firmly rejected Brezhnev's offer to assist. Some authors assumed that Tito exaggerated the Soviet threat in order to achieve unity.
[290] Iz razgovora Save Kržanca sa glavnim urednikom *Pravde*, Zimjaninom, April 23, 1971, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/101–103.
[291] Neke napomene o aktivnosti predstavnika SSSR-a, Doma sovjetske kulture i sovjetskih novinara akreditovanih u Jugoslaviji, September 17, 1971, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/101–103.

Thus, Yugoslav sources do not only indicate that Soviet intervention was on the table, but also why such a maneuver ultimately did not come to fruition. Tito firmly rejected Brezhnev's offer and asserted that the party and state leaderships were capable of dealing with their own domestic problems: "We are strong enough to solve [the problems] by ourselves… for you [the Soviets] it is enough to know that we are going to take care of our own troubles."[292]

The Brioni meeting did not resolve any of the issues, but it rather established a truce between different factions within the Yugoslav leadership. To outside observers, it seemed that the leadership "recovered its political poise and regained its momentum" and that the warring factions adhered to "new polemical restraint."[293] The meeting, however, postponed many of concrete decisions such as new constitutional amendments, stabilization measures, and personnel changes for the summer, thus giving enough time to local party organizations to convey the conclusions of the meeting to the base. Moreover, the order of the day became renewed insistence on brotherhood and unity. However, the spanking in the woodshed that the U.S. embassy predicted in its report of April 1971 had to wait until the end of the year. Before domestic showdown, Tito had to regulate Yugoslavia's relations with the superpowers.

Brezhnev comes to Yugoslavia…

As Mićunović repeatedly had informed his superiors, a stable domestic situation was the most important precondition for Yugoslavia's normal relations with the USSR.

[292] Memorandum Izvršnog biroa SKJ ambasadoru Veljku Mićunoviću za ličnu upotrebu, May 28, 1971, pov. 483/1, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–24.
[293] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, May 19, 1971, Telegram 01717, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2838, Pol 15–1 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

Brezhnev's unsuccessful attempt in April to increase Moscow's influence in Yugoslavia and temporary resolution of Yugoslavia's internal disputes made the Soviets change their approach to Yugoslavia. A clear sign of this new approach was Brezhnev's decision, after almost three years of ignoring Tito's invitation, to visit Yugoslavia. Another factor that contributed to Brezhnev's change of mind was that Belgrade and Washington announced Tito's visit to the United States in the fall.[294] Nixon's visit to Yugoslavia the previous year and Tito's trip to the United States implied Yugoslavia's tilt toward the West. Moreover, internal troubles, despite providing the Soviets with an opportunity to meddle in Yugoslav affairs, combined with the rise of liberal party factions, seemed to confirm Moscow's fears that, after Tito's death, the country could drift away from socialism. With the Prague Spring still fresh in memory, the Soviets feared that this outcome could disrupt the unity of the Soviet bloc.

"It is obvious that during 1970, the Soviet leadership was not ready for political contacts," Mićunović wrote in his report, adding that none of the Soviet party officials had visited Yugoslavia and Brezhnev even refused to receive Tito's messages.[295] This wait-and-see course was taken, Mićunović assumed, because the Soviets were expecting Yugoslavia's domestic crisis to intensify. Moreover, Mićunović continued, the Soviets systematically had spread rumors about an impending Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia and Tito's possible attendance at the CPSU 24th Congress (planned for spring 1971). In the

[294] In December 1970, the United States proposed April for Tito's visit. In February 1971, Washington suggested the first half of May. Tito, however, rejected these proposals because, as he said, he could not leave the country before the constitution was amended and "that means until mid-August this year." See Tito's handwritten note, no date, February 1971, Grupa za spoljno–politička pitanja Kabineta Predsednika Republike, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/50–1.

[295] Odnosi SSSR–Jugoslavija početkom 1971. godine, Ambasada SFRJ Moskva, str. pov. 02–1, January 4, 1971, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–24 SSSR.

context of domestic crisis in Yugoslavia, the proliferation of these false news reports underlined the Soviet (and Brezhnev's) role as a *deus ex machina* that would resolve Yugoslavia's internal problems and buttress socialism in Yugoslavia.

Mićunović, who finally met with Brezhnev in February 1971, described an unusually friendly atmosphere of the meeting. Brezhnev, however, remained noncommittal about his visit to Belgrade. Brezhnev said that he could not visit Yugoslavia in 1969 and 1970 because he was ill and had to postpone trips to Yugoslavia, Cuba, and some other countries. As for 1971, Brezhnev continued, he could not do it before the CPSU 24th Congress. A trip to Yugoslavia immediately after the congress was also out of the question. "In a case of extraordinary circumstances (in Yugoslavia) he would be prepared to visit Yugoslavia, even for just a day or two," even before the 24th Congress, Mićunović wrote in his diary.[296]

From Mićunović's account it appears that Brezhnev wanted to time his visit to Yugoslavia to precede a Tito's trip to the United States.[297] The two meetings between Tito and Nixon in less than a year created an image of Yugoslavia's tilt toward the West. Soviet sources, however, show that the Yugoslavs also wanted to arrange a meeting between Tito and Brezhnev before Tito's trip across the Atlantic. "Before he goes to the

[296] Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, 122.

[297] In the archives in Belgrade I was unable to find a record of Mićunović's February 4 conversation with Brezhnev. The only available source in Serbian/Croatian about this meeting is Mićunović's diary, *Moskovske godine*. A collection of documents from Russian and Serbian archives, however, provides a Soviet record of the meeting. Both Mićunović's and Soviet account of the meeting agree on the main conversation's points. Yet, there are some important differences. For example, Mićunović did not mention in his diary that Tito wanted to meet with Brezhnev before his trip to the United States. Moreover, Mićunović did not mention Brezhnev's suggestion that Tito should postpone or even cancel his trip to the United States.

USA, J. Tito would like to meet and talk with you," Mićunović told Brezhnev.[298] Thus, for the both sides Brezhnev's visit would provide a counterbalance. Moreover, for the Soviets, it would underscore Moscow's long-term interests in Yugoslavia. Brezhnev tried to discourage Tito from the visit to the United States. He warned the Yugoslavs, "as Comrade Tito's personal friend," that Tito's visit would have "different political consequences around the world… [and] different countries would interpret it in different ways."[299] Although Brezhnev did not elaborate, this implied that Yugoslavia's flirting with the United States would undermine its position as a nonaligned country and its socialist credentials in the world. Moreover, Brezhnev warned Mićunović that Nixon was a "big demagogue" and that was hard to see "what concrete benefit one can have from meeting him now." "Evidently, all of this is useful to weigh again and again," Brezhnev said, adding that he could meet with the Yugoslav president first and then Tito could decide when to go to the United States.[300] "He apologized and said that he was talking in his own name and as a personal friend of Comrade Tito, and repeated that this [Tito's trip to the US] should be nobody's business," Mićunović wrote.[301]

Tito's visit to the United States was scheduled for October 1971, and Soviet diplomacy hurried to arrange Brezhnev's trip to Yugoslavia before Tito's departure for Washington. By the end of August, however, it was not clear when would Brezhnev come and for how long he would stay in Yugoslavia. A frustrated member of the LCY

[298] Запись беседы Л. И. Брежнева с послом СФРЮ в СССР В. Мичуновичем о возможном визите Л. И. Брежнева в Югославию, February 4, 1971, Document 39, *DSPJ, Jugoslavija–SSSR*, 414.
[299] Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, 122. Brezhnev's "advice" was particularly important in the context of Tito's upcoming trip to the Middle East and Yugoslavia's prestige in the region where anti-American sentiments ran high after the 1967 war.
[300] Запись беседы Л. И. Брежнева с послом СФРЮ в СССР В. Мичуновичем о возможном визите Л. И. Брежнева в Югославию, February 4, 1971, Document 39, *DSPJ, Jugoslavija–SSSR*, 414.
[301] Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, 122.

Executive Committee wrote Tito a letter in which he expressed dissatisfaction about the confusion surrounding the Brezhnev visit. He said that the postponement in releasing details about the visit caused numerous political problems. "Speculations in foreign press… are not accurate or well-meaning," he said, noting that the Soviets seized the narrative of the visit and fed information to the press in the Arab world.[302]

The Soviets emphasized the visit's informal, working character. The Soviet leader requested a visit to a large economic enterprise and a meeting with the "Yugoslav working people."[303] Despite the visit's unofficial character, the regime called its citizens to come out and greet the Soviet leader "because the Soviets expect that."[304] Moreover, the same spectacle was provided to Nixon, and the Yugoslavs wanted to provide the equal treatment to Washington and Moscow even in protocolar matters. Although Belgrade agreed to the visit's informal character, the Foreign Secretariat noted that the Soviets insisted on this nature of the visit because it was advantageous to them. Soviet bargaining over the visit's date and unofficial nature served to confuse. By emphasizing its unofficial character "they think here [Moscow] that is the best way to muddy [the waters], so that Europe and the world think that an ideological rapprochement is

[302] Beleška Predsedavajućeg u Izvršnom odboru SKJ druga Nijaza Dizdarevića, August 20, 1971, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/101–103.
[303] The Yugoslavs planned to show him the shipyard in Pula (Croatia) and to bring him to Brioni. This treatment of the Soviet leader would accomplish several goals. First, by visiting Brioni Brezhnev would receive the same treatment as Khrushchev who met Tito there in 1956. Second, by showing him the Pula shipyard, the Yugoslavs wanted to advertise one of their most successful companies that. Finally, the tense domestic political situation required that Brezhnev visit other places than Serbia – preferably in Croatia – to dispel speculation about special Soviet interest in the eastern part of Yugoslavia but also to avoid the marginalization of Croatia in foreign policy making. It is unclear, however, if Nixon's visit to Croatia contributed to this way of thinking.
[304] Zabeleška na sastanku u I Političkoj upravi Saveznog sekretarijata za inostrane poslove (SSIP)* povodom posete SFRJ Generalnog sekretara KPSS Leonida Brežnjeva, September 4, 1971, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/101–103. *After constitutional reforms and reorganization of state bureaucracy, State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (Državni sekretarijat inostranih poslova) was renamed to Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (Savezni sekretarijat inostranih poslova).

happening." Moreover, the visit's character would give the Soviets a certain latitude and not require any improvement in Yugoslav–Soviet relations.[305]

Mićunović, counting his last days in Moscow, sent several lengthy reports about what to expect from Brezhnev's visit. "We are not able to predict what kind of issues Brezhnev will raise in Belgrade," Mićunović wrote. He, however, listed contentious issues in Yugoslav–Soviet relations: Yugoslavia's domestic problems; problems with Cominformist émigrés in the USSR; unfavorable writing of the Yugoslav press; and, finally, Belgrade's foreign policy. Mićunović said that Yugoslav foreign policy led to distancing between Belgrade and Moscow. "Our activity… augmented the differences between us," Mićunović said, adding that the latest Yugoslav foreign policy endeavors, such as Nixon's visit to Yugoslavia, Tito's upcoming trip to the United States, and Secretary Tepavac's trip to China in June 1971 were interpreted as "anti-Soviet."[306]

Mićunović said that Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia in the context of Tito's trip to Washington and Nixon's trip to China (in mid-July, Nixon's forthcoming visit to China was announced) put Yugoslavia in the center of global diplomacy. "We should not have illusions that Yugoslavia can influence relations of big powers," Mićunović wrote, "but we should, as much as we can, talk openly about these issues with Brezhnev." Particularly, he suggested, Yugoslavia should strive to make a positive influence on Soviet policy toward China because normalization between Moscow and Beijing would be beneficial to Yugoslav–Soviet relations.[307] Moreover, Brezhnev's visit raised the

[305] Povodom posete Brežnjeva Jugoslaviji (mišljenja i predlozi), August 25, 1971, Ambasada SFRJ Moskva, Str. pov. 02–5, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/101–103.
[306] Ibid.
[307] Mićunović based this logic on a parallel between Stalin's policy toward Yugoslavia after 1948 and Brezhnev's toward China in the early 1970s. Soviet "general approach, arguments and methods" toward China were similar to Stalin's approach to Yugoslavia. "Only now, everything is bigger and new, although

stakes for Tito's trip to the United States. The purpose of his visit, Mićunović wrote, was to undermine Yugoslavia's position and "create an unfavorable atmosphere" before Tito's trip to Washington.

Despite these political risks for Yugoslavia's global position, Belgrade also saw the potential benefits of Brezhnev's visit. The regime assumed that Brezhnev's visit would elevate Yugoslavia's prestige in the world and strengthen its position before Tito's trip to the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Moreover, Belgrade hoped to improve its economic relations with the USSR and reaffirm the 1955 Declaration as the basis for inter-party and interstate relations. Finally, Belgrade wanted to clarify its position on several issues such as its relations with China, détente, European security, nonalignment, Yugoslav–Bulgarian relations, and Yugoslavia's stance toward the events in Czechoslovakia and the Brezhnev Doctrine.[308]

The meetings with Brezhnev turned out to be acrimonious beyond Yugoslav expectations. At the first meeting, in a three-hour-long monologue, Brezhnev harshly criticized the Yugoslav leadership for their transgressions. He lambasted the Yugoslav model of self-management ("nobody denies that Yugoslavia has chosen its own way, some sort of, I don't know how to call it – I don't remember its name – self-management") as the source of Yugoslavia's economic troubles. Brezhnev rejected

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it reminds on old," Mićunović wrote. Moreover, he continued, Moscow's frustration with China led the USSR to "take it out" [*iskaliti*] on other communist parties, including the LCY. Izveštaj Ambasade SFRJ Mosvka povodom posete Brežnjeva Jugoslaviji (mišljenja i predlozi), August 25, 1971, str. pov. 02–5, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/101–103.

[308] Many of these issues, Mićunović noted, the Soviets avoided in their conversation with the Yugoslavs. He said that the reason for this was Soviet dissatisfaction with Yugoslavia's policies toward each of these issues. "As far as I know Russians, they usually avoid to talk to us about uncomfortable issues … This is how they behaved in relation to Nixon's visit to Yugoslavia. Russian silence shows rather the intensity of their outrage than their indifference," Mićunović wrote. Razgovor sa Brežnjevom 10. avgusta, August 12, 1971, Ambasada SFRJ u Moskvi, br. 755, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/101–103.

Yugoslavia's accusations that the Soviets encouraged Cominformist émigrés and accused Yugoslav media and government officials of anti-Sovietism. "Certain forces are trying to spread the fear of the Soviet Union… There is a lot of talk about sovereignty, noninterference. You give me an example that we are meddling in your internal affairs," Brezhnev said.[309] Even more damning was Brezhnev's attack on Yugoslavia's foreign policy. He condemned Yugoslavia's rapprochement with China, "even though they [Chinese] are revisionists and traitors." For this sad state of affairs, Brezhnev accused unnamed Yugoslav party and government officials who actively worked to spoil Yugoslav–Soviet relations. "I am full of anger because someone is obstructing our relations," Brezhnev said. "For example, I write a letter to Tito: Dear Comrade Broz, dear such and such, [then] he writes back to me, dear Brezhnev, and after a while, I write another letter, like some miss writing to her boyfriend," Brezhnev said, adding that while he had a cordial relationship with Tito someone was poisoning their relationship behind their backs.[310] Brezhnev blamed the deteriorating relations on the Yugoslavs and, moreover, tried to sow discord between Tito and his associates.[311]

On the second day of the talks, Tito had a chance to respond to Brezhnev's accusations. "He scolded us a little," Tito said, "but we are accustomed to that."[312] Tito rejected Brezhnev's charges, yet he admitted that those responsible for a poor state of

[309] Stenografske beleške sa razgovora Josipa Broza Tita, predsednika Saveza komunista Jugoslavije i Leonida Iljiča Brežnjeva, generalnog sekretara Centralnog komiteta Komunističke partije Sovjetskog Saveza, September 23, 1971, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/101–131.
[310] Ibid.
[311] Brezhnev's attempt to play Tito against other members of the leadership was not new. During his April talk with a Yugoslav journalist, Zimyanin said that the Soviets "know that Tito is on our side, i.e. on the side of progress and communism" but that he is surrounded by the people who represent the stronghold of anti-Sovietism and anti-communism. See Iz razgovora urednika Komunista Save Kržanca sa glavnim urednikom Pravde Mihailom Zimjaninom, April 23, 1971, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/101–131.
[312] Stenografske beleške sa nastavka razgovora Josipa Broza Tito i Leonida Iljiča Brežnjeva, September 24, 1971, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/101–131.

Yugoslav–Soviet relations could be found on all sides, including some in Yugoslav media.[313] Tito denied that Yugoslavia was in crisis, but that some "negative elements" surfaced in the process of political and economic transformation. "I just want to say, once again, that there is no point or need to be worried that Yugoslavia will fall apart," Tito assured his interlocutor.[314] Tito's adamant claim about Yugoslavia's ability to deal with its internal issues, echoed their telephone conversation from April when Tito rejected Brezhnev's offer to assist him.

Despite these known differences, Tito and his associates considered Brezhnev's visit as a relative diplomatic and political success. Tito held the line firmly and politely rebuffed Brezhnev's suggestions to establish a closer intra-party cooperation the LCY.[315] Yugoslavia's insistence on the expansion of economic relations signaled that Belgrade wanted to emphasize state-to-state relations instead of party ties – doctrinal differences have proven to be insurmountable since, at least, 1955. Tito agreed that Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia (first since 1966) provided a basis for future relations and allowed the Yugoslavs to underline their commitment to protect the country's independence. Yet, in its assessment of Brezhnev's visit, the Foreign Secretariat noted that Brezhnev displayed

[313] The Soviets were especially dissatisfied with the Yugoslav press. During the Prague Spring and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslav newspapers and magazines wrote affirmatively about Dubcek's reforms and took a highly critical stance toward the USSR. In the 1968 meeting with Brezhnev, Tito expressed his personal dissatisfaction with an independent foreign policy course of the Yugoslav media. Brezhnev emphasized to Mićunović in February and August that the Soviets were unhappy with anti-Soviet stance of Yugoslav reporters. He repeated the charges to Tito during their Belgrade meeting in 1971. Tito defended press freedom in Yugoslavia but allowed that certain elements in Yugoslav media should be put under control.

[314] Stenografske beleške sa nastavka razgovora Josipa Broza Tita i Leonida Iljiča Brežnjeva, September 24, 1971, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/101–131.

[315] As predicted by Mićunović, Brezhnev suggested a Soviet–Yugoslav friendship society. The Society of Yugoslav–Soviet Friendship existed in the first post-war years, when Yugoslavia was one of the most ardent followers of Stalin. The Yugoslav government disbanded the Society after the 1948 split because it was considered a vehicle for Soviet influence in the country.

the "well-known reserve toward and misunderstanding of our system of self-management."[316] Thus, the Secretariat warned, the visit should not be interpreted "too optimistically." As Secretary Tepavac confidentially told Secretary Rogers: "I want you to know, for your own ears, and your ears only, the meeting with Brezhnev did not go well."[317]

... and Tito visits the United States

As soon as Brezhnev left Belgrade, Tito embarked on a world tour. He went to Iran to attend the 2,500 year celebration of the Persian Empire. From there he went to India and returned to Belgrade from where he proceeded to Washington. After Washington, on his itinerary were Canada and the United Kingdom – an impressive schedule for the 78-year old statesman. His visit to the United States was the most important stop on his journey. This would be his third visit to the United States (in 1960 he visited the UN and briefly met with Dwight Eisenhower and in October 1963, Tito saw John F. Kennedy in the White House).This time he was coming as the official guest of the U.S. president with all theatrics and pomp included. After Nixon's visit to Yugoslavia in 1970, U.S. – Yugoslav relations were exceptionally good. Tito's visit in his official capacity as the president of Yugoslavia elevated his prestige in the world and at home – particularly important in the context of internal problems. The only dark cloud that threatened to rain on Tito's parade was the issue of anti-Titoist émigré groups. In 1963, these groups besieged his hotel in New York and, in fear for his safety, the

[316] Informacija o jugoslovensko–sovjetskim razgovorima, vođenim 22–25. septembra 1971, October 11, 1971, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/101–131.
[317] Editorial note, Document 233, October 29, 1971, *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972.

Kennedy administration sent its guest to Williamsburg, Virginia, on a sightseeing tour and far away from the enraged crowds.

The Yugoslav embassy in Washington, to avoid similar embarrassment, launched a propaganda campaign to "secure positive publicity." "This is particularly important in the context of numerous writings that appeared lately that created an impression of a crisis in Yugoslavia," the embassy wrote.[318] Moreover, the Yugoslav ambassador Crnobrnja insisted with Kissinger that the U.S. government should prevent any sort of hostile activity of these émigré groups, and "stressed how sensitive Tito was on this whole subject."[319] Kissinger was aware of Yugoslavia's frustration and he promised Crnobrnja that the government would do everything in its power to prevent incidents. Yet, Kissinger noted that the Yugoslavs "should not make the mistake of believing that if no demonstrations occur, it proves that the Administration runs the groups involved."[320]

[318] Ambasada SFRJ Vašington SSIP-u, June 10, 1971, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/50–1. The Embassy noted that the *New York Times* was particularly hostile toward Yugoslavia because "it was extremely oriented toward bilateralism of the superpowers, and Yugoslavia is seen as an obstacle to that policy." Moreover, the *New York Times* regularly provided a platform for Yugoslav dissidents (Milovan Djilas, Mihaijlo Mihajlov) and anti-Yugoslav émigrés (Radica, Đermanović).

[319] Crnobrnja said that Tito did not want to visit New York City because of his unpleasant experience in 1963. Memorandum of conversation between Crnobrnja and Kissinger, September 13, 1971, Document 231, *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972. This was Crnobrnja's last meeting as the Yugoslav ambassador because he was called off right before Tito's visit. Crnobrnja (just like a few other Yugoslav officials, such as Veljko Mićunović and Lazar Koliševski) had a poor relationship with the Yugoslav first lady because he believed that she was commandeering and involved too much in policymaking. Allegedly, Tito's wife, Jovanka Broz, made an ultimatum to Tito that she would not go to the United States if Crnobrnja was the ambassador there. Choosing between two potential diplomatic scandals, Tito decided to sacrifice Crnobrnja as a less costly decision.

[320] Memorandum of conversation between Crnobrnja and Kissinger, September 13, 1971, Document 231, *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972. Yet, the South Slav ethnic groups put a lot of pressure on the Nixon administration. In the months before Tito's visit, State Department held several meetings with the members of Croat émigré organizations who were also active in the Republican Party. "As time has passed and the Administration has not lived up to the expectations held by the ethnics – and to the expectations held out by last election – the ethnic leaders have become increasingly restive, and more and more have felt the heat of criticism from their constituencies. They in turn have brought increasing pressure to bear on the Republican National Committee." See Memo, Donald C. Tice to Richard Davies, May 13, 1971, RG 59, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, Box 2840, Pol 30–2 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

Just in case, Crnobrnja unofficially requested that Tito be housed in Camp David to avoid possible protests in Washington.

The issue of émigré groups was the only contentious issue between Belgrade and Washington. In its political assessment of the upcoming visit, the Foreign Secretariat concluded that, except anti-Yugoslav activities and some negative writing in the American press, Yugoslav–American relations were at the highest point since World War II. In addition to Tito's cordial relationship with Nixon, as demonstrated during their meeting in Yugoslavia in October 1970, the United States demonstrated its good will toward its Balkan friend in a variety of other ways. The United States supported Yugoslavia's economic stabilization program by extending loan payments. Moreover, Washington used its influence in the IMF, the World Bank but also West Germany and Italy to provide Yugoslavia with new loans and better trade deals with the country's main trading partners.[321] The Ex-Im Bank also expressed its willingness to finance capital industrial projects in the amount of several hundred million U.S. dollars. One of these projects included the financing of Yugoslavia's first nuclear power plant – a project of a great importance for both Yugoslavia and the United States.[322] "We should seek to extend our cooperation in functional fields, to emphasize projects relevant to Yugoslavia's economic and industrial needs, and to broaden our direct associations with the institutions

[321] Preliminarni materijali za posetu PR SAD-u i Kanadi – sumarne teze, October 3, 1971, str. pov. 43, SSIP-Uprava za Severnu i Južnu Ameriku, Str. Pov. 43, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/50–1.
[322] Henry Kissinger personally urged the Atomic Energy Commission to allow U.S. companies to bid on this project because their failure "would be in conflict with our policy of extending cooperation with Yugoslavia in all areas, including the peaceful uses of nuclear energy." Message from Kissinger to Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Glenn Seaborg, no date, 1971, NSC Files, box 733, folder 1, RNPL.

and enterprises of the constituent Republics. In some cases, yield has been substantial," the U.S. ambassador in Belgrade suggested in his annual policy assessment.[323]

Despite this mutual enthusiasm toward their bilateral relations, particularly in the realm of economics, the Yugoslavs felt that, before Tito's trip, their position was somewhat weakened. Belgrade estimated that Nixon was in a much better position than he was in September 1970 when he visited Yugoslavia, chiefly because of his China diplomacy and the measures to stabilize the domestic economy. "At this moment, Nixon leaves the impression of a high-profile statesman, more than he was last year, and the Soviet will certainly take the notice" a Yugoslav report stated.[324] This threatened, the Yugoslavs feared, to lessen Yugoslavia's importance in overall U.S. strategy. Moreover, several setbacks at home and abroad, including the April crisis and (yet another) passivization and fragmentation of the NAM, weakened Yugoslavia's position. Despite some positive achievements, such as the normalization of Belgrade's relations with Beijing, constitutional reforms, and the improvement of Yugoslavia's relations with the Western Europe, "in totality, in comparison with the situation from September–October last year, the Americans can see our balance as somewhat negative."[325]

Under these circumstances, the main goals of Tito's visit included a reaffirmation of Yugoslavia as an international factor that "conducts world politics ([and] do not accept to be limited to the role of a local factor)." Besides, it served to sustain and reinforce U.S.

[323] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Airgram A-151, March 30, 1971, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2746, Pol 1 US–Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[324] Preliminarni materijali za posetu PR SAD-u i Kanadi – sumarne teze, October 3, 1971, str. pov. 43, SSIP – Uprava za Severnu i Južnu Ameriku, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/50–1.
[325] Ibid.

interest in preserving an independent and nonaligned Yugoslavia.[326] To accomplish these goals, Belgrade admitted that it would need to take more initiative because other socialist countries, such as the USSR, Romania, and China, also wanted to "enter into a more active relationship with the US." In the Yugoslav view, Nixon's non-ideological approach to foreign policy threatened to diminish Yugoslavia's favored position that the country enjoyed since 1948. This interest-based foreign policy, Belgrade feared, could lead to Washington's "indifference" toward Yugoslavia. Thus, good Yugoslav–American relations were not "a priori given" or guaranteed, some diplomats warned.

The Nixon administration, however, did not lose interest in Yugoslavia. Despite differences over the Middle East and Southeast Asia, Washington and Belgrade sought to preserve the status quo in the Balkans, i.e. to contain Soviet influence in the region. "The basic U.S. aim, however, is relatively simple – although not necessarily easy to accomplish. That is to prevent the political diversity in the Balkans from being transformed into a Soviet dominated uniformity, while preserving the peace in a traditionally unpeaceful part of the world," a U.S. report stated.[327] Yugoslavia, along with Romania and Albania, presented the "strongest barrier to Soviet hegemony" in the region, thus warranting Washington's support. The administration correctly assumed that Tito would want both public and private assurances of U.S. support, and agreed to a Yugoslav request to, contrary to its diplomatic practice, issue a joint public statement. Although a similar statement, remarkable in its blandness, was issued during Nixon's visit to Yugoslavia in 1970, the Yugoslavs wanted the United States to confirm its interests in

[326] With the usual caveat that the United States should respect Yugoslavia's foreign policy on a basis of "mutual understanding, noninterference, and equality." Ibid.
[327] Memo, William Rogers to President Nixon , October 22, 1971, Nixon National Security Files, 1969–1974, Meetings with Foreign Leaders, Microfilm C 234, Reel 18, NARA.

Yugoslavia's independence, but also to reaffirm the Yugoslavia's status as an equal in discussion about world issues.[328] "We want to show that we cannot be crammed into a local framework… and that in the world of large transformations and initiatives, particularly among the big [powers], Yugoslavia and President Tito are still treated as an important, active and peaceful factor," the Yugoslavs noted.[329]

Right before his trip to the United States, Tito met with Pakistan's leader Yahya Khan with whom he discussed the crisis in South Asia. From Iran, he proceeded to India, where he discussed the same subject with Indira Gandhi. The United States was interested in Tito's assessment of the situation in South Asia and the Middle East. Particularly because in May 1971 Egypt and the USSR signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, and India followed suit in August. The two countries that founded the movement seemed to tilt toward Moscow, a development that seriously compromised their nonaligned position.[330] Before Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade, the United States was concerned that the Soviets would try to propose the same treaty to Yugoslavia, "to complete major non-alignment circuit of India and UAR."[331]

These issues were discussed during the Nixon–Tito talks in Washington. Tito told Nixon that he appealed to both Khan and Gandhi to avoid military confrontation. Yet, he said that in India there was a "strong pro-war faction in India, although not within the government itself."[332] Although the Soviets also argued for a peaceful solution, Tito was

[328] Ibid.
[329] Poseta Predsednika Republike SAD – Svodni papir, October 25, 1971, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/50–1.
[330] Povodom zaključivanja sovjetsko–egipatskog ugovora o prijateljstvu i saradnji, June 10, 1971, AJ, KRP fond 837 I–5–b/117–6 Egipat.
[331] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 03351, August 20, 1971, NSC File, box 733, folder 1, vol. II, RNPL.
[332] Memorandum for the President's File, October 28, 1971, Document 232, *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972.

concerned about the Indo–Soviet treaty and possible Soviet attempts to pit its ally against Beijing's ally Pakistan. Soviet interference, directly or via proxies, and Moscow's use of domestic difficulties, such as economic problems and ethnic tensions, to advance its objectives resembled Soviet efforts to expand its influence in Yugoslavia. Moreover, Soviet (or any other power) efforts to use nonaligned and neutral countries to advance their goals, further undermined the strength of nonalignment in international affairs.

Although Tito had more sympathies for India, he wanted to appear impartial. He, however, abandoned any semblance of neutrality when discussing the Middle East. Tito's stance toward the solution of the crisis was rigid and he often blindly defended Egypt's position regardless of the consequences for Yugoslavia's foreign policy. While in Washington, he urged the United States to pressure Israel to retreat to the pre-1967 borders and the way to do that was to stop the supply of weapons to Israel. Under these conditions, Tito said, Sadat would open the Suez Canal and, moreover, the Soviets would agree to remove their military advisors from Egypt. Tito "pointed out that he was not trying to be a mediator, but was merely conveying what he had heard."[333] Tito's stance toward the Middle East revealed a stubborn consistency of Yugoslavia's policy toward Egypt and his open distaste toward Israel, but also his genuine misunderstanding of the U.S. ability to influence Israel. "There is a misunderstanding that the USA speaks in the name of Israel and that the US can influence Israel to do whatever the US want it to do," Rogers cautiously reminded Tito.[334]

[333] Ibid.
[334] Razgovor Predsednik Tito – Državni sekretar Rodžers, October 28, 1971, pov. 212/40, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/50–1.

Despite these disagreements on international issues, Tito's visit was an unmitigated success. A joint statement confirmed U.S. interest in preserving an independent Yugoslavia and further development of U.S.–Yugoslav relations based on equality.[335] Always fond of pageantry, Tito received a warm reception in the U.S. capital. Moreover, "'pomp and protection' were the watchword during his first full-dress state visit in the capital," the *New York Times* wrote.[336] Although his visit, as the State Department noted, "evoke[d] a highly emotional reaction among a small minority of ethnic Americans," no incidents were reported. Tito stayed in Camp David (an honor previously reserved only to Willy Brandt), and after the talks in Washington, he was whisked to Houston and Los Angeles. Although plans to attend an Astros' game and visit Disneyland did not come to fruition (the Foreign Secretariat advised against Disneyland because "Walt Disney's wonderful idea had turned into commercialized tourists kitch"), Tito visited NASA's Mission Control in Houston, the McDonnell–Douglas Corporation in Los Angeles, and met with pro–Yugoslav émigrés in California. "My reception [in the US] was beyond every expectation," Tito scribbled in his notebook. Yugoslav officials confirmed that Tito was "very, very pleased" by the visit, and emphasized their

[335] Similar to the 1955 Belgrade Declaration that Yugoslavia cited as the basis for its relations with the USSR, the 1971 Joint Statement served as the basis for U.S.–Yugoslav relations in the 1970s and beyond. For the full text see Joint Statement Following Discussions With President Tito of Yugoslavia, October 30, 1971, The American Presidency Project (available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/joint-statement-following-discussions-with-president-tito-yugoslavia). The United States appeared less enthusiastic about the statement. The Assistant Secretary of State, Martin Hillenbrand, told the Norwegian ambassador: "As is customary with Eastern European countries, the Yugoslavs placed great store on a joint statement. They drafted it, we made some changes, and they were pleased with the result." Memorandum of conversation between M. Hillenbrand and Ambassador Arne Gunneng, November 4, 1971, box 2836, Pol 7 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

[336] Nan Robertson, "Tito in Capital: Hearty, Funny and Difficult to View," October 30, 1971, in the *New York Times*, 16.

satisfaction with the joint statement and its long-term significance for bilateral relations.[337]

From the United States, Tito continued to Canada and the United Kingdom. Although his visits to Toronto and London did not produce anything substantial (his visit to London lasted less than 24 hours and did not even have a set schedule because the Brits suggested "tour d'horizon" talks). Tito's Anglo-American diplomatic offensive confirmed that Yugoslavia's foreign policy "has inclined more and more towards the West since 1968."[338]

Yet, Tito's elation because of these foreign policy successes was short-lived. The domestic problems that shook the foundation of the South Slav state in the spring of 1971 returned in full force in late fall and destroyed the façade of unity. Although a tentative truce was established after the Brioni meeting, the crisis in Croatia was quietly brewing throughout the summer and fall. Despite Tito's repeated warnings to the Croatian party leadership to clean up its act, the LCC 22nd Session, held on November 5 (while Tito was in Canada), reaffirmed the leadership's support for the mass national movement as an expression of "positive, socialist orientation."[339] At the session, Savka Dabčević-Kučar condemned both Serbian and Croatian chauvinism, but she reiterated the point that the main danger came from within the party, from the so-called "unitarist" and "statist" elements. Massive support confirmed the correctness of the leadership's course,

[337] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 04829, November 5, 1971, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2836, Pol 7 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[338] Memo, William Rogers to President Nixon, October 22, 1971, Nixon National Security Files, 1969–1974, Meetings with Foreign Leaders, Microfilm C 234, Reel 18, NARA.
[339] Rusinow, *Yugoslavia*, 209.

Dabčević-Kučar concluded.[340] Moreover, she used the opportunity to attack Croatia's economic inequality within the Federation, and called for the reforms of the foreign currency and trade system that would better serve Croatia's economic interests.

After the 22nd Session, "events moved rapidly toward a climax," an astute observer noted.[341] The groups outside the LCC called for the amendments to the Croatian constitution that would provide sovereign rights to Croatia in the areas of defense and economy. In the second half of November, at a public meeting where constitutional amendments were discussed, student leaders called for Croatia to become a sovereign state with its seat in the UN. On November 23, the day Tito left for Romania, students called a strike until their demands for the fairer foreign currency system were met.

The strike at the University of Zagreb forced Tito to shorten his visit to Timisoara. He initially planned to spend four days in Romania, but the events in Zagreb and the LCC leadership's inability (or unwillingness, as some thought) to control the situation led Tito to return to Yugoslavia. U.S. diplomats in Romania noted that Tito's toast to his host included Tito's unusual reference to internal difficulties and the need to concentrate attention "toward the resolution of our internal problems."[342] It was unclear to which internal problems in Romania he was referring to, but it was obvious that the events in Croatia preoccupied Tito. Instead of staying additional two or three days for boar hunting, Tito, to Ceausescu's disappointment, returned to Yugoslavia. Foreign Secretary Tepavac described Tito's gloomy mood on the train back to Belgrade. While

[340] Consulate Zagreb to Department of State, November 12, 1971, Subject Numeric Files, 1970–1973, box 2837, Pol 12–3 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[341] Rusinow, *Yugoslavia*, 213.
[342] Embassy Bucharest to Department of State, November 24, 1971, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2836, Pol 7 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

discussing the events at the University of Zagreb, Tito told his associates: "If you saw what I see for the future in Yugoslavia, it would scare you."[343]

Tito's response was swift. On December 1, he summoned the LCY Presidium to his hunting lodge in Karadjordjevo, to discuss the situation in Croatia. He accused the LCC leadership of a lack of vigilance, passivity, and "rotten liberalism," which allowed the elements of counterrevolution to take control. "With their activity, they compromise us before the world. Today, many stories are going around beyond our borders, and there is a danger of Yugoslavia losing its prestige. We can't allow that to happen," Tito said.[344] The twenty-hour-long meeting led to the resignation of the liberal wing of the LCC leadership several days later. A police crackdown ensued, resulting in more than 300 arrests.[345] The Croatian Spring was over and it "collapsed with a speed and completeness which Bakarić and others later admitted was a pleasant surprise."[346]

1972 and the end of Yugoslavia's constructive approach to détente

After the inglorious end of the Croatian Spring, the regime assumed a more authoritarian direction in its domestic policies with unavoidable implications for Yugoslavia's foreign policy. The Soviets applauded the resolute action against Croatian liberals. Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Baibakov, who visited Belgrade less than a week after the Karadjordjevo meeting, to negotiate a new trade agreement, commended Tito's firmness in dealing with the "enemies of the revolution." "The enemy never sleeps.

[343] Mirko Tepavac, "Tito," in Jasminka Udovički and James Ridgeway, eds., *Burn This House. The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997), 73.
[344] Autorizovane stenografske beleške sa 21. Sednice Predsedništva SKJ, December 1, 1971, AJ, Predsedništvo SFRJ (PSFRJ) fond 803, kutija 8.
[345] Tanner, *Croatia*, 201; "Purge in Croatia Follows Rioting," December 16, 1971, in the *New York Times*, 22.
[346] Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, 309.

If you wait, they are going to develop their dirty business. Actions against them had to be taken time to time," Baibakov said to Tito.[347] A few weeks later, the Soviets, not without *schadenfreude,* concluded that the 21st Meeting showed that the Yugoslavs had arrived to the positions that the Soviets held all along. "If we would try to tell you only a small fraction of those things that Comrade Tito is publicly saying right now, we would be accused of Stalinism," a Soviet party official told a Yugoslav colleague.[348] Moscow's satisfaction with Yugoslavia's conservative turn was obvious. Tito's authoritarian approach testified, as the Soviets believed, that Yugoslavia's liberal model had failed to fulfil its promise and that the Soviet critique was justified. Moreover, it was reasonable to expect that with this new course, Yugoslavia would move closer to the Kremlin. The Sovietization of Yugoslav politics seemed in a full swing when, less than a year after the purge of the Croatian leadership, the liberals in the Serbian, Macedonian, and Slovenian parties (and media) were axed too, including Foreign Secretary Tepavac who resigned in protest. By the end of 1972, the liberal coalition had been thoroughly defeated.[349] The Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist League of Serbia, Latinka Perović, who was removed in 1972, later wrote that the events of 1971/2 were a "self-defense reflex of gerontocracy" that looked for salvation in returning to the past, to its "historical being," i.e. a more authoritarian form of rule.[350]

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[347] Zabeleška o razgovoru J.B. Tita sa potpredsednikom vlade i predsednikom GOSPLAN-a SSSR-a N.K. Bajbakovom, December 9, 1971, Document 51, *DSPJ*, *Jugoslavija–SSSR*, 520–521.
[348] Ambasada SFRJ Moskva SSIP-u, February 11, 1972, DA MSP RS, PA 1972 SSSR, f. 113, d. 16, s. 46339.
[349] Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 298–304. Koča Popović who resigned from all party and state functions in protest, characterized this purge of liberal cadres as a "palace coup." "That was a conspiracy against legitimate representatives of democratic orientation in the League of Communists in Serbia but also in Yugoslavia." Aleksandar Nenadović, *Razgovori s Kočom* (Zagreb: Globus, 1989), 157–158.
[350] Latinka Perović, *Zatvaranje kruga. Ishod političkog rascepa u SKJ, 1971/1972* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1991), 8.

The main goal of the purges in Croatia in 1971 and Serbia in 1972 was to strengthen the LCY central authority. Domestic and foreign observers feared that Yugoslavia was sliding toward a Romania-like authoritarian model. Particularly alarming, Tito publicly complained that the root of Yugoslavia's problems was the 1952 CPY congress that established Yugoslavia's separate road to socialism. "Either because of foolishness or because of lack of knowledge of historical development, there were attempts to thrust LCY aside and to let everything proceed along some democratic paths," Tito said in December 1971. The U.S. embassy, reporting on his December speech, correctly noted that with it, Tito had practically announced major changes in the country that would go in a less liberal direction. The embassy detected Tito's increasingly anti-Western attitude, whom he implicitly blamed for Yugoslavia's troubles, namely Western influences on youth, and certain business and party officials.[351] Pluralism within the party, encouraged by the reforms in the 1960s and sustained by the fear of a Soviet intervention after 1968, was rejected in the name of unity. As one Serbian functionary wrote, there was no room for "unprincipled compromises" when answering the question: socialism or no socialism.[352]

There were several reasons for Yugoslavia's anti-Western turn. One of them was related to its domestic situation and the ascendance of conservative cadres who instinctively mistrusted the West. Other, more structural reasons, however, carried even

[351] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, December 24, 1971, box 2838, Pol 15 Yugo, RG 59, NARA. A U.S. diplomat in a conversation with a Yugoslav official expressed his concern about "centralist tendencies," but said that the return to the regime of the Stalinist type was a somewhat oversimplified characterization of the events in Yugoslavia. Zabeleška o razgovoru referenta za SAD B. Lončara sa sekretarom ambasade SAD u Beogradu A. Tompsonom 29. decembra 1971. godine, January 4, 1972, DA MSP RS, PA 1972 SAD, f. 102, d. sign. 4126

[352] Dragoslav Draža Marković, *Život i politika, 1967–1978*, knjiga I (Beograd: Rad, 1987), 378.

larger importance. By 1972, Yugoslavia, despite American assistance and the steady increase of Yugoslav exports to the United States (53 percent in the first six months), had to turn to the East to ease the effects of the seemingly unsolvable economic crisis. Unable to fulfil its obligations to foreign (Western) creditors, with ever-increasing deficits, and unable to achieve economic stability in domestic markets, the Yugoslav government began discouraging purchases abroad that required hard currency.[353] This decision inevitably led Yugoslav enterprises to turn over to Eastern European and Soviet markets. In December 1971, Yugoslavia and the USSR signed a trade protocol that provided for a 50 percent increase of trade volume in comparison to the 1966–70 level.[354] As Dennison Rusinow noted, the regime concluded that "Yugoslavia would never achieve the economic integration into the developed world's 'international division of labor'… The attempt should therefore be abandoned and the system should be reoriented towards the less demanding markets of the Communist bloc."[355] The Soviets welcomed Yugoslavia's re-orientation toward the East. Moscow readily facilitated Yugoslavia's needs. For example, a Soviet company, Cvetmetpromexport, provided a US $130 million loan with a relatively low interest rate of 4. 5 percent (the largest loan provided to a foreign company), for aluminum production and bauxite mining. Instead of repaying in cash, Yugoslavia made a deal to deliver aluminum and bauxite to the USSR.[356] More than 60 Yugoslav enterprises organized an exhibition in Moscow that advertised Yugoslav

[353] On the reports that Yugoslavia's borrowing in the United States had increased dramatically, Tito wrote to the President of the Executive Council (government): "Stop going wild (*divljati*) and stop with borrowing and loan requests." October 2, 1972, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–19 SAD.
[354] Protokol o pregovorima po pitanjima daljeg razvoja ekonomske saradnje izmedju SSSR i SFRJ, December 10, 1971, AJ, Savezno izvršno veće (SIV), fond 130, f. 1428.
[355] Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, 319.
[356] Pismo Izvršnog vijeća Bosne i Hercegovine Predsedniku Republike Josipu Brozu Titu, March 18, 1972, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–25 SSSR.

consumer goods such as shoes, furniture, and home appliances to Soviet citizens. This fair confirmed mutual interest in expanding economic cooperation and the desire of Soviet citizens to see Yugoslav products in their shops.[357] Although Yugoslavia's exports to the United States grew in the first months of 1972, Washington was uneasy with Yugoslavia's economic direction and its implications for the country's position in global affairs.[358] These fears were not unfounded, because the Yugoslavs themselves stated that economic and political relations went hand in hand. During the purges of liberal cadres, many successful managers were demoted (and some arrested) because the regime believed that their alleged economic dependence on the West could easily be transformed into political dependence.[359]

The Yugoslavia's turn toward the Eastern bloc for economic consolidation was out of necessity not desire. The Yugoslavs were aware that economic dependence on either the West or the East carried significant risks for the country's independence. Therefore, to avoid foreign subjugation through economic means, Yugoslavia turned toward undeveloped countries in Africa and Asia. In 1972, the SFRY Presidium analyzed the global economic and political situation that urgently raised the question of cooperation between small and medium states to avoid encroachment of their sovereign rights. International division of labor made the existing state boundaries "too narrow for unobstructed economic development." This led to the "intensive process of integration, but within the framework of the existing socioeconomic systems and blocs," which had

[357] "Jugosloveni u Moskvi," July 4, 1972 in *Politika*, 4.
[358] In a briefing paper for Secretary Rogers' visit to Yugoslavia in July 1972, Tito's cabinet indicated that Yugoslav sources in Washington confirmed American concern about Yugoslavia's direction. Teme koje bi državni sekretar Rodžers mogao pokrenuti u razgovoru sa Predsednikom, July 8, 1972, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–201.
[359] Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 304.

detrimental effects on freedom and independence of smaller nations.[360] "Tendencies toward strengthening the world division are perpetually reproduced not only by military and political hegemony of the superpowers, but also by their economic hegemony via economic integration," a Yugoslav analysis stated.[361] Under these circumstances, the Yugoslavs reasoned, it was necessary to turn again toward nonaligned countries whose independence and sovereignty was threatened by their economic integration with either of the blocs. Moreover, markets in underdeveloped countries could absorb Yugoslavia's industrial products that were uncompetitive in the Western market and, unlike the USSR, provide raw materials for Yugoslavia's industries, thus helping avoid Yugoslavia's political and economic dependence on either "capitalist-imperialist" or "bureaucratic-etatist" models. "Although our country has better economic structure and it is more developed, we have similar difficulties in international exchange that are characteristic of other developing countries," a report noted. Economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and developing countries (*zemlje u razvoju*, ZUR) thus became a political and economic imperative for the regime in Belgrade. To accomplish this goal, Yugoslavia had to increase its presence in the Third World and resuscitate economic cooperation with the Third World countries that, according to Yugoslavia's admission, were in constant decline.

Yet, the development of détente provided the strongest impetus for Yugoslavia's detachment from the West. Nixon's trip to Beijing in February and to Moscow in May 1972, reignited the old fears that small countries, such as Yugoslavia, would fall victims

[360] Međunarodni položaj socijalističke Jugoslavije i aktuelni spoljnopolitički zadaci, June 29, 1972, AJ, PSFRJ fond 803, k. 6
[361] Ibid.

to secret arrangements of big powers. As Tito once warned: "We wanted them to talk, but now, they are talking too much [with each other]." There were plenty of reasons for Yugoslavia's concern. The escalation of the war in Vietnam in the spring of 1972, and a tepid Soviet response suggested to the Yugoslavs that détente would be established at the expense of small countries. Nixon's decision in spring 1972 to "blast the living bejeezus of North Vietnam," as Robert Dallek pointed out, was designed to preserve American credibility, but also to get Nixon reelected.[362] Although the Soviets complained against the U.S. bombing campaign, the "sense of responsibility for world peace" precluded any dramatic reaction that would derail the upcoming Moscow summit. "Similar adventuristic measures are not the real alternative," The CPSU CC Secretary, Konstantin Katusev told the new Yugoslav ambassador Milorad Pešić.[363] The Soviets were, wrote Pešić, "apparently firmly oriented toward the 'negotiating alternative', i.e. Nixon's visit."[364] Moreover, the Yugoslavs noted two tendencies in Soviet foreign policy: its increased interest in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean as strategically important regions; and efforts to consolidate the socialist bloc for joint actions on various foreign policy issues such as the conference on European security.[365] It was unclear what that would mean for Yugoslavia, and Tito postponed his visit to Moscow until after the Nixon–Brezhnev summit, likely in order to assess better the implications of superpowers' agreements for his country.[366]

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[362] Robert Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger. Partners in Power* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 371–373.
[363] Razgovor Ambasadora Pešića sa K. Katuševim, May 15, 1972, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–25 SSSR.
[364] Ibid.
[365] Informacija u vezi sa predstojećom posetom Predsednika Republike Sovjetskom Savezu, May 9, 1972, SSIP, AJ, KPR, fond 837, I–2/53. The Yugoslavs noted that the Soviets invited Yugoslavia to a number of multilateral meetings that they held with other socialist countries, in an obvious effort to tether Yugoslavia to the Eastern bloc.
[366] On February 2, 1972, Brezhnev sent an invitation to Tito to come the USSR a "winter vacation." In his response, however, Tito agreed to visit the Soviet Union, but said that he was unable to travel for some

In June 1972, the Yugoslav ambassador in Washington, Toma Granfil, discussed the summit and its influence on Eastern European affairs with State Department officials. From this conversation, Granfil concluded that the United States implicitly recognized the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe because a State Department official confirmed that the United States was interested in economic and scientific contacts with Eastern Europe, but "without giving them any kind of anti-Soviet dimension or to create a situation that would lead to the [another] Prague Spring and a Soviet intervention." Moreover, the Americans confirmed that the summit created a "qualitatively new [Soviet] approach" toward the United States because Moscow stopped criticizing ("without epithets and insults") Washington's actions in Vietnam.[367] The Yugoslavs interpreted these attitudes as an indirect admission of spheres of influence. Moreover, Belgrade recognized that the both sides shared the interests in preserving the status quo in Europe that would "untie their hands" for actions elsewhere. The foremost task for the Yugoslavs was to find out whether or not there was a deal between Moscow and Washington about Yugoslavia's fate, if not at the moment, then after Tito's departure.

Five days after the summit, Tito went to the Soviet Union. The Yugoslavs noted the significance of the timing that, in their belief, put Yugoslavia in the center of the world diplomacy. Moscow encouraged Tito's self-aggrandizing visions. Konstantin Katushev said that Tito's visit came at the "particularly interesting moment" and that Brezhnev would "openly and in detail" inform his Yugoslav colleague about talks with

time. "Recently I had a flu, and before that I was considerably tired from many duties here, and from a series of visits to and meetings with heads of foreign states. On doctors' advice, I am not allowed to travel anywhere and to change the climate for some time." Pismo J.B. Tita L.I. Brežnjevu povodom poziva da poseti Sovjetski Savez, February 25, 1972, Document 53, *DSPJ*, *Jugoslavija–SSSR*, 538.

[367] Ambasada SFRJ Vašington SSIP-u, June 15, 1972, DA MSP RS, PA 1972 SAD, f. 102, d. 5, s. 423244.

Nixon. Moreover, he informed the Yugoslavs that Brezhnev would decorate Tito, for his 80ths birthday, with the prestigious Order of Lenin.[368] As the U.S. embassy in Belgrade reported, the Soviets were "obviously intent on 'buttering up' Tito," and "played heavily on ego factor."[369]

The visit provided Yugoslavia with an opportunity to voice its concerns about the division of Europe. Belgrade supported triangular negotiations, but with a caveat that Yugoslavia's support would extend only so long as Moscow, Washington, and Beijing did not make decisions on "issues of general interest" and at the expense of the third parties.[370] In addition, Yugoslavia wanted to emphasize the "invisibility of peace" in Europe and that certain regions (e.g. the Balkans) could not be excluded from the talks about European security. Although the Yugoslavs applauded the agreements signed in Moscow by Nixon and Brezhnev (SALT I and ABM) as the right step in reducing the danger of a nuclear war, they warned that the "risk and danger of bilateralism and monopolism" were present. Because of "democratization" of international relations, "classic division of the spheres of influence (a new Yalta)" was less likely, a Yugoslav report noted. Yet, despite this, both the United States and the USSR established unspoken recognition of their respective zones of interest.[371]

Brezhnev defended his decision to meet with Nixon. He said that the whole world, with the exception of China, approved it. "We did not have only our interests in mind… but we defended the interest of the entire socialist bloc, and [the interest of] the

[368] Razgovor ambasadora Pešića sa K. Katuševim, June 11, 1972, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/53.
[369] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 02866, June 13, 1972, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2836, Pol 7 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[370] Informacija u vezi sa predstojećom posetom Predsednika Republike Sovjetskom Savezu, May 9, 1972, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/53.
[371] Preliminarni osvrt na sastanak na vrhu u Moskvi, June 1, 1972, SSIP, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/53.

matters of peace," Brezhnev said.[372] Not only socialist countries supported Brezhnev–Nixon meeting, but also North Vietnam and the "Middle East" (Brezhnev probably refereed to Egypt and Syria) who were assured that the Soviets would not abandon them. "We told them not to be anxious," Brezhnev said, adding that "life confirmed the correctness" of the Soviet policy of détente.[373] The Yugoslavs noted that this Soviet attitude meant that the Kremlin's global interests would not be determined by regional issues. Moreover, Brezhnev said to Tito, only the Soviet Union had enough power – political, economic, and military – to counter American imperialism. Therefore, this suggested, that Yugoslavia should forget its differences with the USSR and join the anti-imperialist front led by the Soviets.

The 1972 Tito–Brezhnev talks showed that Yugoslav–Soviet relations were normalized after reaching their nadir in 1968/9. Although Tito and his Soviet hosts sparred over perennial issues of the Yugoslav press and its alleged anti-Sovietism and the activity of Cominformist émigré groups, it was clear that the Soviets were satisfied with the regime's new policy of "democratic centralism." The Soviets even suggested that Tito should "slap across the nape" those who did not want to listen.[374] Despite these misunderstandings and Soviet attempts to bring Yugoslavia closer, the Yugoslavs concluded that Brezhnev's stance toward Yugoslavia was "more flexible and cooperative

[372] Stenografske beleške sa razgovora vođenih između Predsednika SFRJ i Predsednika SKJ Josipa Broza Tita i Generalnog sekretara CK KPSS Leonida Iliča Brežnjeva, June 6, 1972, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/53.
[373] Ibid.
[374] Brezhnev primarily referred to those Yugoslav managers who did not want to buy Soviet goods. In the Yugoslav transcript Tito's response is missing, but in the Soviet transcript, Tito said that he was busy with political issues, rather than with the economy. Stenografske beleške sa razgovora vođenih između Predsednika SFRJ i Predsednika SKJ Josipa Broza Tita i Generalnog sekretara CK KPSS Leonida Iliča Brežnjeva, June 6, 1972, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/53; Запись переговоров Л.И. Брежнева и Н.В. Подгорног с И. Броз Тито во время его визита в Советский Союз, June 6, 1972, Document 58, *DSPJ, Jugoslavija–SSSR*, 572.

than before." "Regardless of the motives of this Soviet approach, this situation matches Yugoslavia's interests," a Yugoslav report stated.[375] Belgrade was satisfied that the visit confirmed that, in the context of the Nixon–Brezhnev talks, the status of Yugoslavia as an independent country had stayed the same, but that there were no reasons for "excessive optimism or for excessive caution." American sources confirmed that the Yugoslavs were generally enthusiastic about the visit, and that Tito's trip confirmed steady improvement in Yugoslav–Soviet relations.[376]

Just weeks after Tito's return from Moscow, an incident within Yugoslavia's borders reignited the mistrust that the regime had toward alleged foreign aiding and abetting of anti-Yugoslav elements at home and abroad. This time, however, the Yugoslav government suspected that the West instigated internal troubles. In June 1972, a group of 19 Croat extremists crossed the Austrian–Yugoslav border, and, after an adventurous journey, reached Bugojno in Western Bosnia.[377] Its plan, named "Operation Phoenix," was to use alleged public discontent in the country in the wake of the Croatian Spring and start an armed uprising against the regime. Although the group was never able to accomplish its goal – it grossly misinterpreted the situation in Yugoslavia and

[375] Informacija o poseti predsednika SFRJ i predsednika SKJ J.B. Tita SSSR-u, no date, June 1972, Document 57, *DSPJ, Jugoslavija–SSSR*, 565.
[376] Intelligence Note, June 16, 1972, Subject Numeric Files 1970–73, box 2836, Pol 7 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[377] Although the Yugoslav government was very careful with disclosing the information about the event, it served as an inspiration to Yugoslav filmmakers. In 1985, TV Sarajevo made a popular mini-series, "Killing Zone" (*Brisani prostor*) that provided a fictionalized account of Ustaša's brutality and heroic struggle of the common people against the group. Moreover, the series featured the Yugoslav army as a modern force, equipped with the most modern Western weapons. One of the Ustašas in the series, pinned down by the Yugoslav soldiers in a U.S.-made Bell helicopter, cries: "We heard that they [the Yugoslavs] don't have any weapons, but these are American helicopters." In reality, the whole incident was embarrassing to the Yugoslavs. It took more than a month to liquidate the whole group, at the high cost of 13 casualties on the Yugoslav side. Moreover, Yugoslav government secrecy led to speculations about the seriousness of the problem and Yugoslavia's capability to resolve it.

underestimated the strength of the regime – its presence revived Yugoslavia's fears of foreign interference via proxies. The group's aim and strategy was identical to the strategy employed by the Crusaders (*Križari*) who in 1946–47 infiltrated Yugoslavia from Austria with the plan to start an uprising. In the 1940s, the Crusaders received support from the United States and the Great Britain.[378] In 1972, the Yugoslavs discerned a similar pattern.

The Yugoslav government provided very few details about the event. On July 3, the Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs briefly announced that a group of terrorists was broken up and a majority of its members eliminated by the security forces and the local population.[379] Government officials hinted that the group certainly received foreign support. A majority of insurgents came from Australia, but they received weapons and training in West Germany and Austria.[380] The Yugoslavs accused Canberra of tolerating Croat extremists who, according to the Yugoslav press, prepared for terrorist actions with knowledge if not outright support of the Australian government.[381] An anonymous Yugoslav official told the U.S. ambassador, Malcolm Toon, that an "armed group of this size must have financial help of major power, perhaps a 'conservative socialist country'."[382] However, as more details about the group emerged, the Yugoslav government became convinced that Western powers were behind it. The group members had Australian, West German, and Swedish passports, and, moreover, carried the most

[378] Paul Hockenos, *Homeland Calling. Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 29.
[379] The incident was a test for the doctrine of total people's defense.
[380] Historian Petar Dragišić showed that the incident significantly jeopardized relations between Yugoslavia and Austria. Petar Dragišić, "Operation Phoenix in Yugoslavia in the Summer of 1972 and Yugoslav-Austrian Relations," *Tokovi istorije* no. 3 (2018): 87–106.
[381] D. Simić, "Istina o logorima u Australiji," in *Politika*, July 15, 1972, 2.
[382] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 03252, July 5, 1972, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2838, Pol 13–10 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

modern U.S.-made weapons. In July, the U.S. consulate in Zagreb reported about rumors that circulated within the Croatian government that linked the CIA to the terrorist group.[383] Yugoslav officials accused Western governments of condoning terrorist activities on their territory despite Yugoslavia's warnings. The terrorist group was, according to the Yugoslavs, the latest attempt of "certain circles" to take advantage of the situation in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, "to create a feeling of uncertainty and demoralization so that pressure tactics in international relations prove more effective."[384] The infiltration of the terrorist group and allegedly benevolent attitude of Western governments toward anti-Titoist extremist groups, contributed to the regime's anti-Western sentiments.

This new orientation was evident during Rogers's visit to Belgrade in July and during the NAM ministerial conference in Georgetown in August 1972. Although Belgrade rebuffed Soviet attempts to establish themselves as the vanguard of anti-imperialism, Yugoslavia understood that it had to refurbish its anti-imperialist credentials to preserve its influence in the Third World. After the USSR, Tito went to Poland, and from Poland back to Yugoslavia, to meet with Emperor Haile Selassie, who, besides Tito, was the only remaining of the NAM founding fathers. Moreover, Yugoslav diplomacy made thorough preparations for the ministerial meeting of the movement that was planned to convene in August in Georgetown, Guyana. Tito's meeting with Selassie, their 12th, signaled Yugoslavia's increasing orientation toward Africa and the nonaligned

[383] Consulate Zagreb to Department of State, Airgram A-135,August 10, 1972, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2839, Pol 23–9 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[384] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 03732, July 29, 1972, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2838, Pol 13–10 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

world. As *Politika* noted, "Africa listens when Selassie speaks."[385] "In the rapidly changing world, the belief about unified and synchronized activity of the nonaligned states came to the fore in the meeting Tito–Selassie."[386] Soviet aspirations to represent anti-imperialist forces threatened the unity of the movement as well as Yugoslavia's position. These issues were exacerbated further by the re-emergence of Cuba's revolutionary diplomacy in Africa. Yugoslav diplomats in Africa reported about Fidel Castro's trip to Guinea in May 1972 as Havana's attempt to achieve the "maximum political and propaganda effect" and as a "prelude to an active Cuban policy toward Africa."[387] It was also a prelude to the Yugoslav–Cuban competition for the hearts and minds of the Third World that would shape Yugoslavia's relations with the superpowers and its policy toward nonalignment in the years to come.

Faced with Soviet and Cuban challenge(s), to retain and augment its revolutionary and anti-imperialist credentials, Yugoslavia had to assume a more anti-Western and anti-imperialist stance. The Yugoslav position was stated by Tito in his talk with Secretary Rogers during Rogers' visit to Brioni in July 1972. Although the main purpose of Rogers' trip to Yugoslavia was to assure Yugoslavs that no secret deal that included Yugoslavia was made at the Moscow summit, the discussion about the Middle East and the Mediterranean revealed the chasm between Yugoslavia and the United States. Both sides agreed that their bilateral relations were good, with an exception of anti-Titoist émigrés. Yet, in an unusual remark, Tito implicitly accused the United States for intentionally exacerbating Sino-Soviet differences. Moreover, Tito butted against the

[385] "Nesvrstani u drukčijem svetu," in *Politika*, July 2, 1972, 3.
[386] Ibid.
[387] Ambasada SFRJ Konakri SSIP-u, May 5, 1972, DA MSP RS, PA 1972 Gvineja, f. 41, d. 14, s. 417286.

American presence in the Mediterranean. “If all of the Mediterranean countries ask you nicely to leave the Mediterranean, would you leave?”, Tito asked Rogers, adding that the Soviets came to the region only after the Sixth Fleet significantly increased its advantage there.[388] Besides, Tito said, the Soviets had military bases neither in the Mediterranean nor the Indian Ocean.

This conversation showed that Yugoslavia assumed a radical stance toward the Third World issues. A month after the Rogers’ visit, Yugoslavia participated at the NAM Ministerial conference (preparatory meeting) in Guyana. The conference signaled that the movement’s general direction toward more extreme, anti-Western positions and Yugoslavia was merely hopping on the bandwagon. The Georgetown meeting was an acrimonious affair. The issue of South Vietnam divided the movement, and three Asian states (Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia) made an unprecedented move of leaving the meeting because they disagreed with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam’s membership in the movement. This also meant that radical (i.e. pro-Soviet) members would dictate the agenda. According to a Yugoslav diplomat who participated in the meeting, Živojin Jazić, Yugoslavia went with the flow because there was no effective resistance to the radicals. “The radicals were the most organized [group], and nobody opposed their suggestions (India and Egypt stood aside), so I could not stay alone,” Jazić wrote.[389] The meeting in Georgetown signaled Yugoslavia’s shift toward a confrontational stance vis-à-vis U.S. interests in the Third World.

[388] Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike sa državnim sekretarom za inostrane poslove Sjedinjenih Američkih Država Vilijamom Rodžersom, July 9, 1972, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–201.
[389] Živojin Jazić, *Moj pogled na diplomatiju* (Beograd: Čigoja, 2010), 86.

Yugoslavia's "thirdworldism" received an additional boost when in October 1972, Tito, aided by resurgent conservatives, purged liberals in Serbian, Slovenian, and Macedonian parties. Secretary Tepavac, known for his liberal views and balanced foreign policy (some even characterized it as pro-Western), resigned in protest. His position was awarded to a well-known hard-liner, Miloš Minić, who had an obsession with nonalignment that sometimes bordered on political irrationality.[390] Under Minić's leadership, Yugoslav foreign policy assumed an increasingly anti-Western stance. The purges that allowed the emergence of Minić and other conservatives were the logical finale of the "democratic centralization" process that begun in Karadjordjevo in December 1971. Tito's showdown with the liberal elements within republican parties, first in Croatia, followed by other republics, effectively removed domestic political issues from the foreign policy agenda for the time being.

By the end of 1972, the regime assumed a more authoritarian position in internal affairs and anti-imperialist (i.e. anti-Western) stance in its foreign policy. To Western observers, Yugoslavia seemed to be on the "backward trek of a constantly swinging political pendulum."[391] Yugoslavia's domestic and foreign policies were the country's response to the changing and challenging environment of the Cold War in the late 1960s and early 1970s. To respond to these challenges, Yugoslavia devised a set of foreign and domestic policies that served to preserve its status as an independent and nonaligned country. Yugoslavia's political swings gave an appearance of inconsistency and even

[390] Jazić, *Moj pogled na diplomatiju*, 88.
[391] Secretary of State (Rogers) to NATO, Telegram 022045, February 6, 1973, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2835, Pol Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

duplicitness. Yet, Yugoslavia's goal, despite its various foreign policy appearances, remained the same.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia acted as a catalyst for Yugoslavia's rapprochement with the West. The danger of a Soviet intervention was exacerbated by Yugoslavia's obsessive fear of a "new Yalta," i.e. superpowers' agreement at the expense of nonaligned and neutral states such as Yugoslavia. Therefore, the main objective of Yugoslavia's foreign policy was to redefine and establish political and economic global orders that would provide a less hostile environment for small and medium-size countries. Means to achieve that objective were sometimes contradictory, but served the same purpose. Multitrack diplomacy included: Yugoslavia's effort to regulate its relations with the superpowers through high-level diplomacy; the revival of the nonaligned movement as a counterbalance to superpowers' designs; and the normalization of its relations with China.

This diplomacy was accompanied by set of reforms at home that served to strengthen the country's international position and provide an orderly succession of power after Tito's death. Similarly to Yugoslavia's foreign policy endeavors, internal reforms carried in itself glaring contradictions. Liberalism Yugoslav-style served to distinguish Yugoslavia from the Soviet "etatist-bureaucratic" concept. Yet, at the same time, liberalism slowly eroded the authority of the party and revealed regional differences that the regime was unable to resolve. These developments caused internal instability that provided Yugoslavia's adversaries with an opportunity to meddle in its domestic affairs. Moreover, domestic instability suggested that foreign powers would use Tito's departure

to accomplish their goals that, in the most nightmarish vision, included the territorial dismemberment of the country with two or more distinctive spheres of influence.

Yugoslavia's turn toward more authoritarian policy at home and more anti-Western policy abroad was, in the view of the regime, necessary to strengthen its legitimacy in the international arena. As it was necessary after the invasion of Czechoslovakia to go in the opposite direction. The development of détente and negotiations at the top did not dispel Yugoslav fears of secret arrangements. Moreover, the ascendance of the radical wing of the NAM, and Soviet aspirations to become a vanguard of the world's "progressives" (mainly to counter China), forced Yugoslavia to assume a more critical stance toward imperialism. Finally, Yugoslavia's abortive attempts to join the "international division of labor" dictated the country's increasing orientation toward the markets of socialist countries and the Third World. After 1972, Yugoslavia embarked on this new course, but its objective remained the same: to preserve its independence and sovereignty.

PART II – Years of Confrontation, 1973–1976

Chapter 3: Against a "New Yalta," 1973–1974

"Thank you, Mr. Nixon swine!" stated a leaflet left at the door of the U.S. Information Center in Belgrade in the last days of December 1972. "Comrades, the world imperialism won't stop on killing only in Vietnam. After all, aren't we surrounded by its crimes in South America, Africa?! … In Europe?! In the USA themselves!"[392] The U.S. embassy wrote in its report that the leaflets were scattered in front of the USIC building in downtown Belgrade by an unknown group that signed as "antifascist students." Similarly, the U.S. consulate in Zagreb reported that around Christmas, the building of the consulate was vandalized with red paint and anti-American slogans. Moreover, a British journalist, on his way back from a Christmas party in downtown Belgrade, was assaulted by unknown assailants because they took him for an American.

These attacks on U.S. property came as a reaction to the so-called Christmas bombing campaign in Vietnam. The bombing was intended to break a stalemate in the Paris peace talks and its ferocity created widespread indignation, both in the United States and around the world.[393] Tito condemned the bombing, and Tito in his New Year's address, calling it a "challenge to the entire humankind."[394] Although the regime plausibly denied any involvement in the attacks on U.S. diplomatic outposts, the State Department sent a demarche in which it accused the Yugoslav government of inciting

[392] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Airgram A-17, January 5, 1973, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2839, Pol 23–8 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[393] Mark Atwood Lawrence, *The Vietnam War. A Concise International History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 158–159.
[394] "Odlučno protiv sile," January 4, 1973, *Narodna armija*, 2.

violence.[395] Yugoslavia's dissatisfaction with the U.S. policies in Vietnam was not new, but the attacks on American property, obviously condoned by the regime (a policeman who guarded the consulate disappeared during the incident), signaled the beginning of Yugoslavia's confrontational stance toward U.S. policies in the Third World.

This chapter discusses this confrontational phase in the Yugoslav–U.S. relationship when Belgrade and Washington butted against each other on almost every international issue. Since the last days of 1972, Yugoslavia had been a relentless critic of American, real or perceived, actions in the Third World, but also in southern Europe and the Mediterranean. Yugoslavia assumed this position for two interrelated reasons. First, international crises seemingly confirmed Yugoslavia's fears that détente, if not transformed or even completely derailed, would be detrimental to small and medium-size states. This attitude was best summarized in an op-ed in the official organ of the Yugoslav army, *Narodna Armija*: "In today's world, there are two parallel and contradictory processes… One [process] is what we called relaxation… another [process] is only seemingly contradictory (my emphasis) with the first one, that, with relaxation in international relations, there is the increase in meddling in internal affairs of small countries."[396]

[395] State Department warned Yugoslavs that their request for security of Yugoslav property and personnel would be treated reciprocally in the way the Yugoslavs treated American requests to protect their property. Izvod iz telegrama naše ambasade u Vašingtonu o demaršu Stejt departmenta zbog stava Jugoslavije u vezi sa situacijom u Vijetnamu, December 29, 1972, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–19. The USIS officer, William Kiehl, later said that the Vietnam protests in Yugoslavia were not "really an issue." Kiehl said that Nixon was admired by the ordinary Yugoslavs more than he was admired in the United States. See Charles Stuart Kennedy and William P Kiehl, *Interview with William P. Kiehl*, September 15, 2003, Frontline Diplomacy, LOC. Available at https://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib001382/ (accessed September 18, 2019).
[396] R.V., "I popuštanje i veće mešanje," October 4, 1973, in *Narodna Armija*, 6.

Second, Soviet competition with China threatened to undermine one of the pillars of Yugoslavia's foreign policy, nonalignment, because the Soviets perceived the NAM as a useful tool to combat Chinese influence in Africa and Asia. Therefore, Yugoslavia concentrated its efforts to undermine détente (at least its concept as envisioned by the superpowers); it also "radicalized" its activities in the Third World to augment and preserve its revolutionary and progressive credibility, thus combating Soviet efforts to hijack the movement for its objectives. This policy, or rather a set of policies, required Yugoslavia to assume a vaguely defined anti-imperialist posture that was by the definition anti-American. As this chapter shows, Yugoslavia's stance vis-à-vis Cold War hot spots, such as the 1973 October War, the 1973 coup in Chile, the 1974 Cyprus crisis, and the Angolan war for independence, was more "extreme" than even the Soviet position because Belgrade purposely acted to undermine détente. "On many of those issues, Yugoslavia always went further and it was harsher [toward the United States] than the USSR," a U.S. official complained to his Yugoslav colleague.[397]

Although the United States did not change the main direction of its foreign policy toward Yugoslavia – support for its independence and integrity – Belgrade's anti-Americanism caused a great deal of frustration in Washington. The United States devised a two-track policy toward Yugoslavia that relied on incentives and pressures on its unruly "friend." The main objective of this policy was to suppress and limit the damaging effects of Yugoslav radicalism, yet without compromising Washington's long-term strategic goal of preserving Yugoslavia's independence.

[397] Zabeleška or razgovoru V. Matića, referenta u Upravi za Severnu Ameriku sa A. Thompsonom I sekretarom ambasade SAD, na dan 7. XI 1973, November 8, 1973, DA MSP RS, PA 1973 SAD, f. 93, d. 18, s. 448629.

In 1973, the United States were particularly annoyed by Yugoslavia's efforts to handicap Washington's policies in Latin America. Yugoslavia's activism in Latin America served to elevate Yugoslavia's credentials on the continent. Latin American states' interest in nonalignment promised a quick expansion of the movement, but also its larger influence in international affairs. Yugoslavia hoped to harness that power in order to secure its leading position within the movement – an important task in the context of the upcoming summit of the NAM and Algerian and nascent Cuban aspirations to lead the movement. This Yugoslav policy meant interference in Washington's traditional sphere of influence, something that the Nixon administration could not tolerate. Moreover, Yugoslavia, a non-permanent member of the Security Council, used the United Nations as a bully pulpit to denounce American policies in Latin America.

The first clash came in the early spring of 1973 over the status of the Panama Canal. Belgrade did not have any particular interests in Panama. Yet, the issue of the new canal treaty provided a good opportunity for Yugoslavia to score propaganda points and rebrand itself as the advocate for the rights of small states. Yugoslavia's representative in the UNSC, Lazar Mojsov, to American chagrin, supported the initiative to hold the meeting in Panama City instead of New York in March 1973.[398] Washington was reasonably concerned that the meeting in Panama City would turn into an "anti-American donnybrook."[399] Moreover, the United States alleged that Mojsov had made a "particularly distasteful statement" in which he described the situation in Panama as a

[398] Dragan Bogetić, *Jugoslovensko–američki odnosi u vreme bipolarnog detanta, 1972–1975* (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i ISI, 2015), 56.
[399] Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), February 23, 1973, Document 3, *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama.

threat to world peace and security and "contained intimations of incitation to violence."[400] Yugoslavia's ardent pro-Panamanian position and Mojsov's activity before and during the meeting enraged many in Washington. The State Department sent a demarche to Belgrade and a source from the administration told the Yugoslav ambassador that Mojsov's name "became a dirty word" in the White House.[401] Although the United States was accustomed to Yugoslavia's anti-imperialist rhetoric, Yugoslav behavior before and during the Panama meeting threatened "immediate, direct and very significant" American interests.[402] As the U.S. ambassador in Yugoslavia, Malcolm Toon, noted, a new characteristic of Yugoslavia's activism was that it was happening in U.S. "own backyard" with all implications to the American strategic, political, and economic interests.[403] The Security Council meeting produced, in American words, a "tendentious and unbalanced declaration" that the United States expressly vetoed. The meeting, as the Governor of the Panama Canal Zone Davis S. Parker feared, encouraged communist elements in Panama and motivated Torrijos to seek connections with socialist and nonaligned countries in order to emphasize Panama's independence from the United States.[404] Moreover, Yugoslavia's anti-imperialist call demonstrated the power of the UN to frustrate U.S. strategic interests and created a poor image of the United States in the world.

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[400] Department of State to Embassy Belgrade, Telegram 061953, April 4, 1973, 1973STATE061953, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed July 7, 2019).
[401] Ambasada SFRJ Vašington SSIP-u, April 11, 1973, DA MSP RS, PA 1973 SAD, f. 96, d. 5, s. 415995.
[402] US Mission UN to Department of State, Telegram 1163, April 3, 1973, 1973USUNN01163, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed July 10, 2019).
[403] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 01923, May 04, 1973, RG 59, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2746, Pol US–Yugo.
[404] Backchannel Message From the Governor of the Panama Canal Zone (Parker) to the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Koren), April 11, 1973, Document 9, *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume XXII, Panama. Later that year, to American dismay, Torrijos visited Yugoslavia, an occasion that the Yugoslavs used to take another jab at the "imperialist forces."

In his assessment of bilateral relations, Toon noted that Yugoslavia's "running with the radical pack in the nonaligned movement" and its anti-Americanism displayed in Panama City wore U.S. patience thin.[405] "It [Yugoslavia] is pulling out all stops as it seeks converts to the cause and brings world attention to bear on the Algiers Nonaligned Summit this September," Toon wrote, adding that "Yugoslavia portrays itself as the leader of the struggle of the developing have-nots against the greedy developed countries."[406] Toon reminded that despite the "hills and valleys" in U.S.–Yugoslav relations, the U.S. objective should remain the same – a stable, independent Yugoslavia, economically tied to the West. He suggested that the United States should, in dealing with "this frequently mercurial society," tolerate Yugoslavia excesses because nonalignment was the best way for Belgrade to assert its independence from Moscow. Yet, he advised, the United States should make the Yugoslavs suffer the consequences whenever Belgrade violates U.S. interests.[407] The proposal outlined Washington's stance toward Yugoslavia, but Yugoslav policies in subsequent years tested it several times. The first significant opportunity to test Toon's approach came in September 1973 with the fourth summit of the Nonaligned Movement.

The 1973 NAM Summit

As Toon correctly noted, Belgrade's maneuvering around the Panama Canal was intended to elevate the country's position at the upcoming summit. In addition, Yugoslavia's radicalism intended to reaffirm nonalignment as a force in international

[405] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Airgram A-385, July 23, 1973, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2746, Pol 1 US–Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[406] Ibid.
[407] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 01923, May 4, 1973, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2746, Pol US–Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

relations to be reckoned with. The main purpose of nonalignment was to dictate détente on its own terms – a long-held Yugoslavia's foreign policy goal. "Nonalignment is the most adequate platform for small and developing countries in the struggle to preserve and strengthen their independence," a Yugoslav foreign policy analysis stated.[408] The summit held in Algiers from 5–9 September 1973, presented an opportunity to outline a new vision for détente, beyond the dynamic of superpower relations. In the words of the final resolution of the summit: "Détente would remain precarious if it did not take into consideration the interests of the other countries."[409]

Yugoslav officials were optimistic in their assessment of the world situation before the summit. The Paris peace agreement that concluded one chapter of the war in Vietnam created, at least in theory, an opportunity for nonaligned to extend their influence in South East Asia. Moreover, African liberation movements relatively successfully conducted a war against Portugal. The beginning of the talks about a conference on European security in November 1972, reaffirmed, as Belgrade believed, universal appeal of the principles of nonalignment. Finally, U.S.–Soviet détente "augmented the Arabs' mistrust" toward superpowers, which inevitably lead to their greater interest in nonalignment.

Yet, there were also problems. The perennial issue of the movement's unity had plagued the organization from its inception in 1961. Asian countries disliked the

[408] Izveštaj Saveznog sekretarijata za inostrane poslove, March 7, 1973, br. 46980, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/15.
[409] Final Document (Political Resolution) of the 4th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, September 9, 1973, 8. Available at http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/4th_Summit_FD_Algiers_Declaration_1973_Whole.pdf (accessed July 10, 2019).

emphasis on Africa and the Middle East – one of the factors that shaped the acrimonious meeting in Georgetown in August 1972. Moreover, the unity of the movement was fraught with numerous bilateral rivalries and conflicts between its members. Finally, although the very purpose of the movement was to transcend the bipolar division of the world, a strong gravitational pull of the United States, China, and the Soviet Union threatened to debilitate movement's effectiveness or, in a worst-case scenario, turn the movement into a tool of one of these superpowers. Besides, some of the members and prospective members of the movement openly questioned the relevance of the NAM in the context of détente.

"The summit in Algiers did not occur under the cloud of the unfavorable events," Tito's press secretary wrote, adding, however, that one of the negative aspects were obvious Soviet and Cuban efforts to establish its influence over the movement.[410] The Soviet Union did show a larger interest in the summit, but Yugoslav diplomats noted that the Kremlin approached nonalignment with "more flexibility" than before.[411] Two interlocking reasons determined this approach. One was Soviet fear of Chinese influence in the Third World. Another was the Soviet attempt to preserve détente with the United States without damaging its status as the vanguard of the anti-imperialist struggle. The Soviets, however, did not perceive the movement in its own right – as an independent factor in international relations, but rather as its "reserve" and an "ally."[412] This Soviet attitude, the Yugoslavs believed, significantly diminished the importance of nonalignment. "The USSR accepts the nonalignment [movement's] anti-imperialist

[410] Mandić, *S Titom*, 218–219.
[411] SSSR i nesvrstanost, July 25, 1973, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/15.
[412] Ibid.

orientation, but only tactically, in the context of its own needs and the interests of the anti-imperialist front under the leadership of the USSR," a Yugoslav report noted.[413] Under Chinese attack and with damaged revolutionary credentials because of détente, the Soviet Union "focus[ed] on creating a 'natural alliance' between the developing world and the socialist camp against the West."[414]

A "natural alliance" that the Soviets sought to become a rallying point for some nonaligned countries. The Foreign Secretariat that was in charge of political consultations with other nonaligned states noted that Cuba toed the Soviet line on this and many other issues. "Their positions are pretty rigid," stated in a report prepared for Tito.[415] For example, the Cubans stated that the aims of nonalignment should be identical with the aims of socialist countries (minus China). Yugoslav officials feared that these and other Cuban pro-Soviet attitudes could exacerbate fissures within the NAM that would, "in the context of complex and dynamic international situation and external pressures," weaken the effects of the summit.[416] Despite the thaw in Yugoslav–Cuban relations – the secretary of the LCY Executive Bureau, Stane Dolanc, visited the island in June for party talks – the Secretariat's assessment of Cuban positions predicted that Yugoslavia and Cuba would inevitably collide over the questions of the NAM's future orientation.[417] The Yugoslav–Cuban competition for the soul of the movement set the tone of subsequent

[413] O stanju priprema za konferenciju nesvrstanih zemalja, August 27, 1973, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/15.
[414] Jeffrey Friedman, *Shadow Cold War. The Sino–Soviet Competition in the Third World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 183.
[415] O stanju priprema za konferenciju nesvrstanih zemalja, August 27, 1973, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/15.
[416] Ibid.
[417] Dolanc delivered Tito's invitation to Fidel Castro to visit Yugoslavia after the summit.

meetings of the NAM and turned into one of the most important issues of Yugoslavia's foreign policy.

These ideological and programmatic differences, not only between Yugoslavia and Cuba, were obvious when the summit concluded on September 9. The members came up with an almost 100-page long final declaration that tried to incorporate and reconcile many divergent positions, which, ultimately, showed the movement's "emptiness."[418] Members' determination, as outlined in the declaration, to strengthen solidarity and provide aid to those whose sovereignty and independence was jeopardized, proved hollow just days after the summit, during the crises in Chile and the Middle East.

Yet, the summit established a certain framework for economic cooperation among nonaligned countries that Yugoslavia hoped to use to its advantage. The summit in Algiers marked the beginning of a concerted effort to create the so-called New International Economic Order (NIEO) that would, analogously with the redefinition of global political order, destroy the hierarchical structure of the world economy. The nonaligned countries complained about "overt and covert economic aggression" that was carried out by developed countries and multinational companies that proved as dangerous for sovereignty and political stability of nonaligned countries as other forms of aggression. Yugoslavia warned that "economic imperialism [is] the new source of domination and the cause of international conflicts."[419] An economic declaration issued at

[418] Lüthi, "Non-alignment, 1961–74," in Bott, et al., *Neutrality and Neutralism*, 90–108.
[419] Nacrt jugoslovenske deklaracije o miru, nezavisnosti, no date, 1973, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/15.

the end of the summit addressed these concerns and called to establish a "new system of world economic relations based on equality and common interest of all countries."[420]

Although Yugoslavia's economy was well-integrated into the Western economy (despite the issues that were addressed in Chapter 3), and did not have the problem of dependence on a former metropole as many other nonaligned states did, Yugoslavia became a champion of the NIEO. The Yugoslav government believed that the NIEO would benefit the Yugoslav economy without detrimental political consequences of economic dependence on either the West or the East. Also, Yugoslav advocacy for the NIEO – particularly after Algerian president Boumediene's 1974 speech before the UN in which he, for the first time, explicitly called for the establishment of a New International Economic Order – came as the country's attempt to stay ahead in its competition with Algeria for the primacy in the NAM. As Yugoslav diplomat Živorad Jazić noted in his memoir, Boumediene's initiative surprised the Yugoslav government and despite some skepticism, the Yugoslav delegation at the UN decided to jump on a bandwagon. "Already then, to some of us, including me, it [Boumediene's initiative] seemed like an

[420] Final Document (Economic Resolution) of the 4th Summit, 89–90. These efforts to create a new economic order begun in the 1960s. In 1964, the developing countries formed the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Group 77 (G–77) to address the issues of global economic inequality, development, and to promote South–South economic cooperation. These institutions, as Johanna Bockman demonstrated, sought to transcend the colonial world economic system that emphasized the connections between (former) colonies and metropoles. See Johanna Bockman, "Socialist Globalization against Capitalist Neocolonialism: The Economic Ideas behind the New International Economic Order," in *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring 2015): 109-128. Mark Mazower claimed that the NIEO threatened the unity of the West, but that the project ultimately failed because of U.S. opposition. See Mark Mazower, *Governing the World. The History of an Idea* (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 311,315. Daniel Sargent also pointed out that the NIEO endangered the unity of the Western alliance. Hostile toward the NIEO, Kissinger devised, what Sargent called, the "southern strategy" to stabilize the existing economic order but without aggravating the proponents of the NIEO. See Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed*, 178–179.

unrealistic endeavor," Jazić wrote, adding that the Yugoslav delegation nonetheless voted for it although some believed that it was against the country's best interest to do so.[421]

Less than a year before Boumediene's speech, the 1973 oil crisis proved Jazić's point. Yugoslavia's efforts to build its credibility in the Third World and readiness to support any initiative of the NAM's radical members failed to provide tangible results. The embargo that oil-producing states imposed in October 1973 and oil shortages that hit hard Yugoslav consumers showed that the idea of South-South cooperation was an elusive goal. Faced with the reluctance of its nonaligned allies to provide it with oil, Yugoslavia had to turn to the USSR.

The coup in Chile and the decline of U.S.–Yugoslav relations

Yugoslavia's anti-Western stance during and after the summit led to further deterioration of Belgrade's relations with the United States. American growing dissatisfaction with Yugoslavia's anti-Westernism had been slowly accumulating since early 1973. The unhelpful Yugoslav position on the Panama Canal issue perplexed and annoyed even the staunchest supporters of good U.S.–Yugoslav relations. Yet, the Panama Canal question was just a benign skirmish that would pale in comparison to U.S.–Yugoslav disputes over the coup in Chile and the October War in the Middle East.

Two days after the end of the Algiers summit, the Chilean armed forces deposed the government of Salvador Allende. It was widely believed that the United States instigated the coup in Chile. The Yugoslav regime readily accepted this view and several of its members, including Foreign Secretary Miloš Minić, criticized the alleged U.S.

[421] Jazić, *Moj pogled*, 90.

involvement in the coup. A high-ranking LCY official, Jure Bilić, wrote an op-ed in *Komunist,* in which he suggested that the U.S. military was directly involved in the events in Chile. Even Tito, in his speech in Osijek, Croatia, accused "imperialists" of instigating "hireling generals" to stage a coup against Allende. In the parlance of the Yugoslav communists, "imperialist" was the code word for the United States, and Tito, without saying it explicitly, accused Washington of overthrowing Allende. "We have lost one of the most faithful members of the nonaligned movement," Tito said, adding that "as a result of international reaction and imperialism, the legitimate Government has been overthrown."[422] Tito said that the coup in Chile once again showed the necessity of the unity of the NAM and alluded to the perilous effects of détente on the sovereignty of small, independent states. The nonaligned states must be included in decisions affecting their interests, Tito concluded.[423]

Yugoslavia, however, could do very little to help Allende, besides joining the chorus of nonaligned and socialist countries that cried against American imperialism. What became a tradition when U.S.–Yugoslav relations deteriorated, a "spontaneous" demonstration in front of the U.S. consulate in Zagreb left the building of the consulate vandalized. Besides these measures, the Yugoslav government provided a haven for Chilean refugees and financed the activities of the Popular Unity (*Unidad Popular*). Moreover, in 1974, the Yugoslav government financed the opening of an information center that functioned as an informal embassy of the exiled Allende's supporters.[424] Also,

[422] Raymond H. Anderson, "Tito Hints That U.S Is to Blame in Chile," The *New York Times,* September 15, 1973, 10.
[423] Ibid.
[424] Besides the Popular Unity (PU), only the MPLA and the PLO had similar "information centers" in Yugoslavia. These institutions, completely financed by the Yugoslav government through the Socialist Alliance, acted as informal embassies and propaganda hubs for these movements. Moreover, the Yugoslav

the Yugoslav press continued to cover the plight of Chilean socialists, regularly reminding its readers about the evils of the Pinochet regime and its international backers.

Similar to the problem of the Panama Canal several months earlier, Belgrade's reaction to the coup in Chile outraged U.S. officials. Although some of them understood Yugoslavia's pivot in Latin America (in May, Secretary Minić visited Chile and Peru and Vice President Rato Dugonjić went to Argentina) in the context of Yugoslavia's struggle for primacy in the NAM, Washington policymakers were genuinely uneasy with Yugoslavia's potentially disruptive activity in the American backyard. The State Department characterized Minić's speech at the UN as a not-so-thinly veiled attack against the United States.[425] On October 3, 1973, Assistant Secretary Walter Stoessel composed a set of punitive measures against Belgrade to "induce the Yugoslavs to be more mindful of our interests." Stoessel suggested to Kissinger that the United States should rebuke Yugoslavia in public forums; recall Toon for consultations; postpone or cancel high-level meetings with Yugoslav officials; downgrade economic relations with Yugoslavia ("to level of Hungary and Poland"), and restrict military sales to the

government provided financial aid to the PU and lobbied for its interests with other nonaligned and socialist countries. In 1974, General Secretary of the Socialist Party of Chile and a representative of PU, Carlos Altamirano Orrego, visited Belgrade to ask for Yugoslavia's additional support that included training in the areas of guerilla warfare and clandestine operations for the members of the Socialist Party. The Yugoslav government, however, did not provide military aid to the Chileans in exile. Zabeleška o zahtevima koje je postavio Karlos Altamirano, March 3, 1974, AJ, Savez socijalističkog radnog naroda Jugoslavije (SSRNJ), fond 142, A–226.

[425] Zabeleška o razgovoru v.d. načelnika Uprave za Severnu Ameriku sa savetnikom ambasade SAD D. Tice-om, October 1, 1973, DA MSP RS, PA 1973 SAD, f. 93, d. 18, s. 441562.

Yugoslav army.[426] Kissinger, who approved Stoessel's proposals, refused to meet with Minić in New York – an act that "shocked and surprised" the Yugoslavs.[427]

Following Stoessel's suggestions, the U.S. government made "representations to the Yugoslavs" to voice its dissatisfaction with their anti-Americanism. Stoessel delivered a demarche to ambassador Granfil about Yugoslavia's activity in the UN, namely the "innuendo concerning US responsibility for Chilean coup."[428] Granfil tried to downplay Yugoslavia's anti-Americanism, somewhat evasively responding to Stoessel's accusations: "If Yugoslav officials speak of American involvement, they do not mean USG involvement. Rather, they are referring to certain elements in American society that influenced events in Chile."[429]

The Americans found Granfil's response unsatisfying. Nine days later, Toon had a meeting in the Foreign Secretariat to reiterate the points from Stoessel's demarche. The Yugoslavs again rejected American accusations, claiming that the United States tried to pressure Yugoslavia using bilateral issues. "This 'linkage' does not serve to better mutual understanding," Yugoslav Assistant Secretary Jakša Petrić said.[430] Toon repeated U.S. readiness to improve U.S.–Yugoslav bilateral relations, but only if Yugoslavia would become more mindful of American interests. "Without wishing to appear paternalistic," Toon said "Yugoslavia should exercise caution" when taking actions in the areas that

[426] Stoessel also suggested that the United States should not participate in Yugoslav trade fairs and postpone the opening of the USIS Center in Sarajevo. Action Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary Stoessel to Secretary of State Kissinger, October 3, 1973, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2746, Pol US–Yugo, RG 59, NARA.
[427] SSIP Ambasadi SFRJ Vašington, October 19, 1973, DA MSP RS, PA 1973 SAD, f. 95, d. 2, s. 445115.
[428] Telegram 200523 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia, October 10, 1973, Document 64, *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973–1976.
[429] Ibid.
[430] SSIP Ambasadi SFRJ Vašington, October 19, 1973, DA MSP RS, PA 1973 SAD, f. 95, d. 2, s. 445115.

touch upon U.S. vital interests. Moreover, Toon continued, the Yugoslavs should "avoid innuendos and speculations concerning United States' behavior" and "refrain from statements and actions which could only exacerbate situations already fraught with danger and raise international tensions."[431]

"If we had them, we would send 1,000 tanks to Egypt": Yugoslavia and the October War

Toon's last point from his conversation with Petrić did not relate to Yugoslavia's policy toward the Chilean coup, but rather to Belgrade's role in the Middle East. The United States perceived Yugoslavia's role in the region as damaging to American interests as its actions in Latin America. All Washington's efforts to harness Yugoslavia's (real or perceived) influence in the region failed. Despite Tito's cordial relationship with Nasser, Yugoslavia did not have enough influence in Egypt to steer its policies. Moreover, unlike Romania, Yugoslavia's hostile attitude toward Israel made it a poor intermediary, with an obvious bias toward the Arabs. More importantly, Secretary Rogers's attempts to use Yugoslavia as a moderating factor had failed because Yugoslavia actively worked on undermining U.S. policy in the region. War and peace in the Eastern Mediterranean were among the most important security issues for Yugoslavia.[432] Although generally uneasy with superpowers' presence in the region,

[431] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, October 19, 1973, Subject Numeric Files, 1970–1973, box 2746, Pol US–Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

[432] The Yugoslav government and Yugoslav People's Army with other "responsible social–political" organizations created several contingency plans in a case of all-out war in the Middle East. For example, in 1975, the Yugoslav government created a plan codenamed "Bridge" that outlined possible consequences and Yugoslavia's response to the war in the Middle East. The plan, updated in 1977, concluded that the failure of the peace negotiations was imminent, therefore the country should be prepared for a new war that would be "more dangerous [for Yugoslavia] that the 1973 war was." See Osnovi plana "Most," April 13, 1977, AJ, PSFRJ fond 803, k. 495.

Yugoslavia considered U.S. hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean dangerous. Besides, if the United States pushed the Soviets out, the Yugoslavs reasoned, that would leave the Yugoslav and Albanian Adriatic coast as the only possible area where Moscow could establish its military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, despite principal anxiety over spheres of influence, Yugoslavia had no incentives to help the United States to achieve its objectives in the Middle East.

Yugoslavia's interest in the Middle East continuously grew after 1955.[433] As Rinna Kulla noted, the nonaligned movement "was born in the Mediterranean… when superpowers threatened both Yugoslav and Egyptian security."[434] Ever since the 1956 Suez Crisis, Yugoslavia had been an ardent supporter of the Arab states, but at the center of Yugoslavia's policy toward the Arab world was its relationship with Cairo. As Alvin Rubinstein wrote, the "Belgrade-Cairo entente conditions Yugoslavia's approach to the Arab world."[435] Belgrade's support of its Arab allies reached its zenith in 1967 when Yugoslavia, following suit of other European socialist states (minus Romania), cut its diplomatic ties with Israel over the Israeli attack on the UAR in the Six-Day War. As mentioned earlier, Yugoslav actions around the June War led some in Washington to question the sincerity of Yugoslavia's nonalignment.[436]

In the years after the 1967 war, Yugoslavia continued its pro-Arab policy. Although Tito was dissatisfied with Nasser's increasingly pro-Soviet stance, Egypt

[433] See Vladimir Petrović, *Jugoslavija stupa na Bliski Istok. Stvaranje jugoslovenske bliskoistočne politike 1946–1956* (Beograd: ISI, 2007) and Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, 234–235, 240.
[434] Rinna Kulla, *Non-Alignment and its Origins in Cold War Europe: Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet Challenge* (London: Tauris, 2011), xiv.
[435] Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, 229.
[436] An Egyptian journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal quoted Tito who allegedly said that "when [the fate of] Egypt is in question, I'm not nonaligned."

continued to be one of Yugoslavia's chief partners in the Middle East and the nonaligned world. Moreover, Tito's personal friendship with Nasser helped smooth some of the political differences between the two countries.[437] Nasser's death did not change Yugoslavia's policy, although the Yugoslav delegation already at the Nasser's funeral reported that the Egyptians showed some reserve toward Yugoslavia because of Cairo's dependence on the USSR.[438] Moreover, when in May 1971, the USSR and the UAR signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Belgrade interpreted it as the final stage of the Soviet encroachment of Egypt's independence. "Provisions of the treaty give to the USSR the opportunity to exert a larger influence on the UAR's foreign policy and to direct it in accordance with its objectives," a Yugoslav analysis stated.[439] The Yugoslav government admitted, however, that Sadat did not have much choice because of the country's dependence on Soviet armaments and his insecure domestic position in the wake of Nasser's death.

By early 1972, Sadat was ready to break up with Moscow. In February 1972, on his way back from the Soviet Union, Sadat made an unofficial visit to Belgrade. His conversation with Tito revealed Sadat's deep dissatisfaction with the Soviets. "This time, our talks were difficult and contentious," Sadat reported on his trip to the USSR, adding that he was outraged by the Soviet decision to stop arms deliveries to Egypt. Brezhnev

[437] Besides Nasser, Tito appeared to have cordial personal relationships only with Ben Bella and Haile Selassie. Some other leaders of the nonaligned states, such as Gaddafi and Sadat, appeared to annoy Tito despite inter-state good relations. Rubinstein noted that Tito's and Nasser's personal friendship was a "major factor in their international relations" and that the "two have developed a friendship unique among the leaders of the nonaligned world, and perhaps even in the international relations of the postwar period." See Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World*, 229.

[438] Izveštaj o boravku delegacije SFRJ, na čelu sa članom Saveta federacije i ličnim izaslanikom Predsednika Republike druga Edvardom Kardeljem, na sahrani Predsednika UAR Gamala Abdela Nasera, no date, October, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/117–6 UAR.

[439] Povodom zaključivanja sovjetsko–egipatskog ugovora o prijateljstvu i saradnji, June 10, 1971, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/117–6 UAR.

told Sadat that he personally had stopped arms transfers because he did not want "anything to happen in the Middle East before Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union."[440] Sadat informed the Soviets that the only option left was a war against Israel, and he wanted to know if the Soviets were ready to give him modern weapons, notably strategic bombers TU-22 capable of attacking targets in Israel. If not, Sadat told Brezhnev, he would have to look elsewhere to acquire modern armament and build its military industry. Tito wholeheartedly supported Sadat's efforts to conduct an independent foreign policy. He cited Yugoslavia's experience from 1948 and the country's decision to develop its military industry. Furthermore, he offered Yugoslavia's assistance in building Egypt's military-industrial capacities.[441]

This conversation showed that Tito and Sadat shared the same anxiety over détente. Sadat said that Egypt still depended on Soviet military aid and "counted on it," but that his goal was to develop its own forces as the "best guarantee for the fulfillment of its legitimate rights."[442] Although Tito knew that Egypt and the USSR did not share the same strategic goals, Sadat's decision in July 1972 to expel Soviet military advisers surprised Belgrade. Moreover, Soviet–Egyptian relations suffered from certain personal animosity that existed between Brezhnev and Sadat. In June 1972, Brezhnev complained about Sadat's inability or unwillingness to control the domestic reaction and his

[440] Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike sa predsednikom Arapske Republike Egipta Anvarom El Sadatom 4. i 5. februara, 1972. na Brionima, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/121–58.
[441] Egypt was already the largest buyer of Yugoslavia's military equipment. From 1967 to 1970, Egypt purchased various equipment in the value of U.S. $30 million dollars and received around U.S. $2, 5 million dollars in donations from Yugoslavia. In December 1971, Yugoslavia provided Egypt with a U.S. $15 million-dollar loan for purchases of Yugoslav military equipment. See Informacija o vojnim odnosima sa EAR, no date, 1972, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/121–58.
[442] Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike sa predsednikom Arapske Republike Egipta Anvarom El Sadatom 4. i 5. februara, 1972. na Brionima, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/121–58.

impulsiveness. “He [Sadat] is a temperamental man,” Brezhnev said. “Our common task is… how to keep Sadat and the situation from escalating into a new war,” Brezhnev told Tito.[443]

The Egyptians, however, saw this Soviet benevolence as a ploy to sacrifice the legitimate Egyptian interests in the name of U.S.–Soviet understanding. In a speech before the congress of the Arab Socialist Union, Sadat said that the status quo in the Middle East that the Soviets wanted to sustain was “draining the Arab blood, drop by drop.” He concluded that the Soviet military mission was not needed anymore because the Soviets did not send weapons that Egypt requested.[444] This decision created confusion in Belgrade. In October, Sadat met with the Chairman of the Executive Council (Prime Minister), Džemal Bijedić, and he explained that the “Russians are rigid, suspicious, and inclined to meddle into Egypt’s internal affairs.” Moreover, Sadat continued, although Moscow had helped Egypt, Cairo had “opened the doors to the Arab world” for them, and provided them with a strategically important position in the Eastern Mediterranean. “However, the USSR has shown that it did not appreciate enough what Egypt has done for it,” Sadat said.[445] Moreover, Sadat complained how Brezhnev never bothered to inform him about his May meeting with Nixon, which caused “suspicion toward the Soviets.” Sadat said that Egypt was interested in improving its relations with the Kremlin, but he was pessimistic about the prospects for rapprochement. This attitude was repeated by the Egyptian Prime Minister Aziz Siddiqi, who said that it was obvious that the United

[443] Stenografske beleške sa razgovora vođenih između Predsednika SFRJ i Predsednika SKJ Josipa Broza Tita i Generalnog Sekretara KPSS Leonida Iljiča Brežnjeva, June 6, 1972, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/53.
[444] “Govor predsednika Sadata na zasedanju Kongresa ASU,” July 25, 1972, *Politika*, 1.
[445] Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika SIV-a, Džemala Bijedića sa Predsednikom Arapske Republike Egipat, Anuarom El Sadatom, October 7, 1972, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/117–6 UAR.

States and the USSR made a secret agreement about the Middle East, thus Soviet reluctance to deliver offensive weapons to Egypt.[446]

Yugoslavia welcomed Cairo's attempts to conduct independent foreign policy. Bijedić shared with his Egyptian interlocutors Yugoslavia's experience with the Soviets. "You know all the difficulties in the relationship with the Soviets that Yugoslavia had been through in the past," Bijedić said, adding that Yugoslavia told the Soviets that if they want good relations with Yugoslavia, they "have to accept us for who we are."[447]

Bijedić's visit to Cairo in October 1972 showed that Yugoslavia was ready to bet on Egypt. Both Cairo and Belgrade feared détente and appeared ready to spoil superpowers' agreement. The Yugoslav–Egyptian alliance was confirmed in January 1973 when Sadat came to Yugoslavia to "exchange opinions" with Tito about the situation in the Middle East. Sadat told Tito that Egypt and Syria were preparing for war because the status quo was working to Israel's advantage. He said that Egypt counted on Yugoslavia's help to mobilize the world's public opinion for Egypt's cause, but also, "in the military sphere," to share its experience in organizing the total people's defense.

At the time of Sadat's visit to Yugoslavia, Egypt pursued secret diplomatic contacts with the United States. Sadat informed Tito about these contacts, but said that Egypt did not trust Washington. "The Americans are trying to buy some time," Sadat said, referring to Nixon's focus on the Paris peace talks. Tito was uneasy about these contacts and he asked Sadat whether or not Moscow was informed about these U.S.–

[446] Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika SIV-a, Džemala Bijedića sa Predsednikom vlade Arapske Republike Egipat Dr Azizom Sidikijem, October 7, 1972, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/117–6 UAR.
[447] Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika SIV-a, Džemala Bijedića sa Predsednikom Arapske Republike Egipat, Anuarom El Sadatom, October 7, 1972, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/117–6 UAR.

Egyptian talks, advising him to keep the Soviets in the loop.[448] "Americans can't be trusted. Any agreement with them, as the example of Vietnam has proven, does not offer any guarantees," Tito warned.[449]

Despite this uncertainty about Sadat's contacts with the Americans, Tito promised his support to the Arab cause and even encouraged Sadat to prepare for a war against Israel. Tito said that preparation should be carried out "around the entire country without pause but also without publicity." Moreover, he suggested that Syria and Egypt should "adequately respond" to Israel's provocation by bombing Israeli cities because "it is well-know how they are sensitive to human casualties because of their small number."[450] Besides this verbal encouragement, Tito promised Yugoslavia's military assistance "within the limits of our abilities."[451] In June 1973, Yugoslav Defense Secretary Nikola Ljubičić traveled to Egypt to discuss the details of Yugoslav–Egyptian military cooperation.[452] Ljubičić's visit attracted a lot of attention and the Indian ambassador in Egypt half-jokingly wondered if the visit meant that Yugoslavia gave the "green light" to Cairo for the war with Israel.[453]

Nine months after the Tito–Sadat meeting, Yugoslavia got a chance to test the limits of its military internationalism. Although Belgrade was aware of Sadat's

[448] Sadat privately suggested that Tito should act as an intermediary between Egypt and the USSR, asking Tito to set up a tripartite meeting with him and Brezhnev.
[449] Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike sa predsednikom ARE Anvar El Sadatom, January 11, 1973, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/121–65.
[450] Ibid.
[451] Informacija o razgovorima za vreme posete predsednika ARE Anvara El Sadata Jugoslaviji, 11. i 12. I 1973, January 24, 1973, SSIP, Str. pov. br. 17, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/121–65.
[452] From 1960–1972, Egypt was the largest recipient of Yugoslavia's military aid of all other nonaligned countries and liberation movements. Also, in the same period, Egypt was the third largest buyer of Yugoslav military equipment. Nesvrstanost i pitanja odbrane, Prilog br. 13 i Prilog br. 15, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/15.
[453] Ambasada SFRJ Kairo SSIP-u, June 8, 1973, DA MSP RS, PA 1973 Egipat, f. 117, d. 22, s. 425367.

intentions, the attack on Israel was a surprise. The Foreign Secretariat received first information from press agencies because it was unable to communicate with the embassy in Cairo. After 6 pm (Yugoslav time) on the day of the attack, the Egyptian ambassador in Belgrade delivered the first official assessment of the situation. He said that the Egyptian and Syrian forces responded to Israeli provocation and that the situation on the front was "satisfactory." On October 9, an Egyptian general met with the Yugoslav military attaché in Cairo to provide the first account of the war. He was satisfied with the development on the frontline, but asked that the Yugoslav army intelligence provide information about the activity of U.S. troops in Europe and the movements of the Sixth Fleet.[454]

As Tito and Ljubičić had promised the Egyptians, Yugoslavia began almost instantly to send military materiel to the frontline. On October 11, Yugoslavia sent the first delivery of medical supplies and soon thereafter first shipments of ammunition. Besides, the Yugoslav government made an extraordinary measure to pull out 120 T-55 tanks from its regular military units to send them to Egypt. To transport these enormous quantities of military and medical material to Egypt, Yugoslavia had to ask for Soviet airplanes, which meant that it had to allow the Soviet to fly over the Yugoslav territory.

The issue of the Soviet overflights caused another crisis in U.S.–Yugoslav relations. On October 15, Tito complained to Algerian president Boumédiène that the Americans "are already exerting pressure on us" because of the overflights, threatening with their own supply operation to Israel.[455] The Yugoslavs, however, tried to keep this

[454] Ambasada SFRJ Kairo SSNO-u, October 9, 1973, str. pov. 174, AJ, KRP fond 837, I–5–c/88.
[455] Zabeleška o jugoslovensko–alžirskim razgovorima vođenim 15. Oktobra 1973. u Starom dvoru u Beogradu, October 15, 1973, Document 54, *DSPJ, Jugoslovensko–alžirski odnosi*, 250. Unknown to Tito,

joint Yugo–Soviet operation secret because it compromised Yugoslavia's nonaligned stance, threatened its relations with the West, but also it made some of Yugoslavia's neighbors uneasy. Tirana was particularly disturbed because, as the Albanian foreign minister said, the overflights established a precedent that could allow Moscow to use that "corridor without asking… and for aggressive purposes against someone else."[456] The main problem was, however, Washington's dissatisfaction with the Yugoslav–Soviet joint venture and Yugoslavia's ardent pro-Arab stance.

The Stoessel demarche that was composed three days before the war, was updated to include the latest Yugoslavia's transgression. On October 12, Stoessel called again Granfil to express his government's concern over the Soviet use of Yugoslav airspace, warning Belgrade that its actions did not "contribute to peace and stability in the Middle East."[457] On October 19, Toon told Petrić that the United States was "disturbed by the haste with which Yugoslavia had facilitated this massive airlift by according what seemed to be unlimited overflight privileges to the Soviet Union."[458] Furthermore, Toon complained, Yugoslavia was not helpful in "taking the heat out" of the situation in the region.[459]

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already on October 9, Washington had approved military shipments to Israel. Kissinger assured Israeli ambassador Simcha Dinitz that the United States would replace all Israeli aircraft and tank loses. See Memo, Henry Kissinger with Simcha Dinitz, October 9, 1973, Document 21B, in William Burr, "The October War and U.S. Policy," National Security Archive. Available at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-21b.pdf (accessed September 3, 2019).

[456] Zabeleška o razgovoru zamenika šefa Sektora za Afriku, Aziju i Latinsku Ameriku, Nusreta Šeferovića sa alžirskim ambasadorom Larbiem Demaghlatrousom 14. Decembra 1973, DA MSP RS, PA 1973 Alžir, f.3, d. 4, s. 456053.

[457] Secretary of State to Embassy Belgrade, Telegram 203693, October 15, 1973, 1973STATE203693, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed September 4, 2019).

[458] Yugoslavia was not the only state criticized by the United States over Soviet flights. The United States protested to the Hungarian ambassador over the same issue, but also the Turkish foreign minister because Turkey "facilitated Soviet efforts in the Middle East." Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Airgram A-623, October 19, 1973, Subject Numeric Files, 1970–73, box 2746, Pol US–Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

[459] Ibid.

Another reason for contention was Yugoslavia's activity in the UN. With Panama and Chile still fresh in memory, the United States expected that Yugoslavia would again use the UN to spew anti-American invectives. Secretary Kissinger at the staff meeting said that Yugoslav–U.S. relations would depend on Yugoslavia's reaction to Stoessel's notes but also Belgrade's behavior in the UN. "The practical fact is that in international forums, the Yugoslavs are more obnoxious than the Soviet Union," Kissinger said, adding that Washington should "bring home the facts of life to the Yugoslavs that opposition to the United States is no longer free."[460] The Yugoslav representative, Mojsov, managed again to enrage the Americans by spreading misinformation about alleged Kissinger's ultimatum to the Egyptian UN ambassador, El Zayat. Mojsov's "last-minute plotting," as the Americans described it, led to the postponement of the Security Council meeting on October 9. U.S. representative John Scali wrote that Mojsov "played his usual trouble-making activist role."[461]

Mojsov's actions in the UNSC at the beginning of the war when the Egyptian and Syrian forces accomplished military successes were calculated to sabotage Washington's efforts to reach a cease-fire. In his talk with Boumédiène, Tito said that the United States wanted to buy some time with ceasefire talks. "They [the Americans] want to prepare well and supply Israel with weapons, pilots, and everything else, and that is why they need half-baked solutions and that is why they launch ideas about a ceasefire," Tito

[460] United States Department, of State. Secretary's Staff Meeting, Wednesday, October 10, 1973, at 3:15 p.m. [Attached to Summary of Conclusions Dated October 12, 1973], 1973. ProQuest. (accessed September 4, 2019).
[461] US Mission UN to Secretary of State, Telegram 9973, October 9, 1973, Richard Nixon National Security Files, 1969–1974, Middle East Negotiations, Reel no. 17, img. 0184, NARA.

said.[462] Secretary Minić added that this alleged synchronized action of the United States and its allies in the UN required a counter-action of the Arab and nonaligned states to force Israel to retreat to the pre-June 1967 borders.[463]

Yugoslavia's unrealistic position was not only designed to frustrate the United States' and Israel's efforts. It also made any possible Soviet–American agreement at the expense of Egypt and Syria practically impossible. Despite its cooperation with the Soviets in supplying Egypt, Belgrade was mistrustful toward the Soviet desire to preserve détente. Boumediene confided in Tito and Minić that during his visit to Moscow (Boumediene stopped in Belgrade after the trip to the USSR) he realized that the Soviets also wanted a cease-fire "at any cost."[464] "The Soviets talked about political action and came up with an idea, similar to the American one, how to end the war and [about] Israel's retreat in phases," Boumediene described his meeting with Brezhnev.[465] "The idea of [Israel's retreat in] phases is nonsensical," Tito responded, adding that "it is obvious that the big game is on and we have a lot of experience [about that]… he reminded about our conflict with Italy over Trieste, when the situation critically deteriorated [and] Stalin was silent."[466] Tito noted that Yugoslavia's readiness to fight forced Italy to withdraw. "It is a similar thing now with the Middle East," Tito concluded.

[462] Zabeleška o jugoslovensko–alžirskim razgovorima vođenim 15. Oktobra 1973. u Starom dvoru u Beogradu, October 15, 1973, Document 54, *DSPJ*, *Jugoslovensko–alžirski odnosi*, 250.
[463] Zabeleška o jugoslovensko–alžirskim razgovorima vođenim 15. Oktobra 1973. u Starom dvoru u Beogradu, October 15, 1973, Document 54, *DSPJ*, *Jugoslovensko–alžirski odnosi*, 252.
[464] Zabeleška o jugoslovensko–alžirskim razgovorima vođenim 15. Oktobra 1973. u Starom dvoru u Beogradu, October 15, 1973, Document 54, *DSPJ*, *Jugoslovensko–alžirski odnosi*, 246.
[465] Zabeleška o jugoslovensko–alžirskim razgovorima vođenim 15. Oktobra 1973. u Starom dvoru u Beogradu, October 15, 1973, Document 54, *DSPJ*, *Jugoslovensko–alžirski odnosi*, 245.
[466] Zabeleška o jugoslovensko–alžirskim razgovorima vođenim 15. Oktobra 1973. u Starom dvoru u Beogradu, October 15, 1973, Document 54, *DSPJ*, *Jugoslovensko–alžirski odnosi*, 247, 255.

All peace talks, Tito and Boumediene agreed, should be conducted with Egyptian and Syrian consent.[467]

One day after Boumediene's visit to Belgrade, Minić went to Cairo to consult with Sadat. Minić reported on the Tito–Brezhnev and Tito–Boumediene talks. Sadat noted that his and Belgrade's views on a truce were similar and that he "sharply and categorically" rejected Brezhnev's plan to stop the war without Israel's withdrawal. He told Brezhenv that Cairo would turn toward China if the United States and the USSR continue to negotiate about the Middle East behind his back.[468]

By the time of Minić's visit to Cairo, a reversal of fortune on the battlefield changed Egypt's position vis-à-vis the superpowers. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) crossed the Suez Canal, threatening Cairo. In response, oil-producing Arab states cut oil production and imposed an embargo on oil exports. Sadat, who just days earlier adamantly refused to start a ceasefire talk, showed more interest in ending hostilities with the Egyptian 3rd Army in the Sinai encircled by the IDF. Under these new circumstances, Moscow and Washington saw the opportunity to begin peace talks each side fearing that "if the war continues the consequences will be incalculable."[469] Kissinger's talks with Brezhnev in Moscow on October 20 created a temporary solution that was accepted by

[467] Before Boumediene's visit Tito spoke over the telephone with Brezhnev. I was unable to find a memorandum of the Tito–Brezhnev conversation. Moreover, this conversation is not published in the volume on Yugoslav–Soviet relations either. Tito and Minić, however, often referred to this conversation in their talks with Boumediene and Sadat. According to these fragmentary accounts, Tito emphasized Yugoslavia's position that a cease-fire should be followed by Israel's withdrawal to pre-June 1967 borders and that any peace talks should be conducted with the consent of Sadat and Assad.
[468] Zabeleška o razgovoru SS M. Minića sa predsednikom Sadatom, 16. X 73. u Kairu, Str. pov. br. 147, October 18, 1973, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/117–7.
[469] Telegram from Secretary of State Kissinger to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), October 21, 1973, Document 220, *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Vol. XXV, Arab–Israeli Crisis and War, 1973.

Egypt and Israel and, after Soviet nudging, by Syria. The result was Resolution 338 of the UN Security Council. Resolution 338 was adopted on October 22 and called on all actors to end hostilities, the implementation of Resolution 242, and the beginning of negotiations "under appropriate auspices."[470]

As a non-permanent member of the UNSC, Yugoslav representative Mojsov voted for Resolution, yet it was obvious that Belgrade was not satisfied with this conditional peace settlement. In a call to Secretary Minić, Mojsov said that the members of the UNSC were "ambushed" by the decision to call a Council meeting. Mojsov told Minić that even the Egyptian representative, El Zayat, was not informed about the meeting until 15 minutes before its beginning. He said that the Egyptians begged nonaligned states not to interrupt the meeting (like Mojsov did on October 9) and to vote for the document. Moreover, Mojsov said, it was apparent that the Americans, unlike the Soviets, kept their allies informed about the Kissinger–Brezhnev talks, noting that the pervasive feeling among nonaligned was that the Soviet–American agreement went beyond the Resolution and consisted of a "package of other concrete solutions" at the expense of the Arab states.[471] "This agreement between the superpowers… is a warning to all small states that their destiny should not be decided by big powers," Mojsov concluded.[472]

[470] Full text of this short resolution available at http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/338 (Accessed on September 5, 2019).
[471] Zabeleška o telefonskom razgovoru Saveznog sekretara M. Minića sa ambasadorom L. Mojsovom iz Njujorka, October 22, 1973, Str. pov. br. 153, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–c/88.
[472] Neki elementi za procenu situacije posle donošenja Rezolucije Saveta bezbednosti o prekidu vatre, October 22, 1973, no. 1749, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–c/88.

"The Egyptians think that Resolution [338] is in the Arabs' best interest regardless of its vagueness, while other Arabs are depressed," Mojsov said.[473] Damascus did not know about Resolution and, according to Mojsov's report, the Algerians were also "surprised and angry" because the document was biased toward Israel and "obviously [the result of] a superpowers' agreement."[474] Before Mojsov's call in the early morning hours of October 22, Secretary Minić met with the Egyptian and the Syrian ambassadors in Belgrade to find out more about the peace talks. Minić confirmed that Yugoslavia would vote for Resolution 338 "in accordance with its position to support any initiative that suits Egypt and Syria," but he said that Belgrade still believed that the complete Israeli withdrawal should be the precondition to any peace negotiations. Moreover, Minić wanted to know if the Egyptians gave the Soviets the right to negotiate in their name as Moscow claimed.[475] The Egyptian ambassador confirmed that Sadat agreed with Kosygin (Minić and Kosygin visited Cairo on the same day) that Moscow should "commence negotiations with the Americans."[476] Minić's early morning conversation with the Syrian ambassador, however, revealed the fissures in the Arab camp. The Syrian front was stable for some time, and aid from other Arab states made a successful Israeli counter attack less likely. Damascus was surprised by Sadat's peace overtures. "Why did we begin anything if we are not going to get anything more than

[473] Ibid.
[474] Okolnosti u kojima održana sadašnja sednica SB, October 22, 1973, no. 1751, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–c/88.
[475] Minić met with the Soviet ambassador Stjepakov at 1.30 am, the Egyptian ambassador an hour later, and with the Syrian ambassador at 3.30 am. Four hours later, Mojsov called Minić to report about the atmosphere in the UN.
[476] Zabeleška o razgovoru SS M. Minića sa ambasadorom ARE S. Afrom, October 22, 1973, Str. pov. br. 151, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/117–7.

Resolution 242, and why did we suffer all these casualties if we are going to let the two powers to decide about the Arabs' fate," wondered the Syrian ambassador.[477]

The resumption of fighting almost immediately after Resolution 338 was adopted, however, brought the United States and the USSR to the brink of a nuclear war. The prospect of direct Soviet involvement required Kissinger's swift response. Nixon, consumed by the Watergate affair and likely on sedatives, was incapacitated to act and Kissinger, on the night between October 24 and 25, raised the level of readiness to DefCon III.[478] The escalation in the Middle East and the threat of intervention by one or both superpowers led Belgrade to elevate the Yugoslav army combat readiness.[479]

Yugoslavia's policy toward the Middle East during the October War further damaged its already poor relations with the United States. Kissinger characterized Yugoslav policy as "undilutedly partisan with no indication Yugoslavia has sought to induce restraint or encourage process of negotiated settlement."[480] Fuming about Yugoslavia's persistent anti-Americanism, Kissinger complained about the country's "obtrusive role" and that Yugoslavia's nonalignment "doesn't do us much good."[481] Thus, Yugoslavia's Middle Eastern policy provoked Washington's punitive measures as

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[477] He said that the Syrians refused to ask for a ceasefire when the situation on the Syrian front was difficult and that the IDF's crossing of the Suez Canal was not a good reason to accept the truce. Zabeleška o razgovoru SS M. Minića sa ambasadorom Sirije Kadurom, October 22, 1973, Str. pov. br. 152, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/117–7.

[478] Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger*, 530–531.

[479] Ambassador Toon tried to find out about Yugoslav military exercises south of Belgrade. "You should not imply we consider Yugoslav alert as triggered by the U.S. alert," Kissinger advised Toon. Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy Belgrade, Telegram 216208, November 2, 1973, 1973STATE216208, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/ Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed September 5, 2019).

[480] Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy Belgrade, Telegram 216208, November 2, 1973, 1973STATE216208, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/ Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed September 5, 2019).

[481] United States Department, of State. Secretary's Staff Meeting, Wednesday, October 10, 1973, at 3:15 p.m. [Attached to Summary of Conclusions Dated October 12, 1973]. ProQuest. (accessed September 6, 2019).

outlined in the Stoessel October memo. The United States suspended all forms of military cooperation with Yugoslavia until Belgrade "takes actions which are compatible with U.S. national security interests."[482]

"The Americans are, of course, dissatisfied with our policy," Secretary Minić stated in his post-mortem analysis of the October War. Yet, he correctly noted that U.S. dissatisfaction with Yugoslavia began earlier than October 6. "Therefore, their current dissatisfaction was not caused by Yugoslavia's stance toward the crisis [in the Middle East], but rather by Yugoslavia's general stance toward international problems," Minić said. His assessment was shared by Defense Secretary Ljubičić who expected that the pressure of the "imperialist aggressive forces will increase."[483] The Yugoslavs did try to normalize relations with the United States, claiming that these differences over international issues should not be an obstacle for good bilateral relations. Certain U.S. officials also argued for better relations by asking the Yugoslavs to dial down their anti-Americanism in international forums, but they also blamed Kissinger for the lack of understanding of Yugoslavia's international position. In November 1973, the First Secretary of the U.S. embassy, Alan Thompson, a proponent of closer U.S.–Yugoslav cooperation, hoped that "the worst period [in U.S.–Yugoslav relations] has passed." Thompson said that Kissinger's hostile position toward Yugoslavia was the result of

[482] Memorandum from the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Wickham) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hill), October 17, 1973, Document 65, *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Vol. E–15, part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973–1976. One of the first issues was the sale of the Internal Navigation System for use in Yugoslav Boeing 707s. The Department of Defense was reluctant to transfer this civilian aviation equipment with potential military use because Yugoslavia's "recent actions relating to the Middle East." The DoD, however, suggested that the United States should not link the sale of the INS because of Middle Eastern policy differences because it wanted to avoid the reputation of a "capricious supplier." See Memo, Denis Clift and David Elliot to General Scowcroft, November 15, 1973, NSC, box 734, f. 1, RNPL.

[483] Izlaganje General-pukovnika N. Ljubičića na sednici Saveta za spoljne poslove Predsedništva SFRJ, October 31, 1973, AJ, PSFRJ fond 803, k. 10.

Kissinger's inexperience in "complex foreign policy issues" (sic!) and the influence of his long-time friend John Scali, who did not like Yugoslavia's posture in the UN.[484] A member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Minnesota, John Blatnik,[485] who visited Yugoslavia in the first days of November 1973, also criticized Kissinger for pressuring Yugoslavia and assured his hosts that "Kissinger's hysteria cannot last long."[486]

Toward a new Yugoslav policy in the Middle East

Washington's pressure did not lead Yugoslavia to stray from its course. According to Yugoslav officials, the attempts to coerce Yugoslavia confirmed the correctness of its position and called for greater vigilance and increased activism. Minić said that the "entire international situation points at the necessity to resist… visible tendencies of the US and the USSR to… identify their relations with the relaxation of the [tensions in] international relations and with the interests of all states and peoples, demanding that they follow them without question."[487] Despite the deterioration of U.S.–Yugoslav relations, Belgrade believed that Yugoslavia's unreserved support to Egypt

[484] Zabeleška o razgovoru V. Matica referenta u Upravi za Severnu Ameriku sa A. Thompsonom I sekretarom ambasade SAD na dan 7. XI 1973, November 8, 1973, DA MSP RS, PA 1973 SAD, f. 93, d. 18, s. 448629.
[485] Blatnik's family was from Slovenia. John Blatnik served as an OSS officer in Yugoslavia during World War II.
[486] Beleška o razgovoru potpredsednika SIV-a Antona Vratuše sa kongresmenom J. Blatnikom 3. novembra u Ljubljani, November 5, 1973, pov. br. 76/72, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–19.
[487] Autorizovano izlaganje druga M. Minića na 66. (proširenoj) sednici Izvršnog biroa PSKJ, October 25, 1973, AJ, PSFRJ fond 803, k. 10.

earned the country an enormous prestige in international relations.[488] Moreover, the crisis showed that détente was not stable and that it could be further undermined.[489]

These developments, together with what the Yugoslavs called an "unfavorable settlement" in the Middle East, called for Yugoslavia's greater activism in the Arab world. "We will assist other states that are asking for the assistance from us, [such as] Libya… particularly in weapons, military training, and the assistance for creating and strengthening their defense," Minić said.[490] Yugoslavia continued to support Cairo and Damascus by replenishing their destroyed military equipment, but also by accepting over 200 wounded Egyptian soldiers for treatment in Yugoslav hospitals. After the war, however, Yugoslav–Egyptian relations began to deteriorate mainly because Belgrade did not approve Sadat's conduct of the war and its abrupt conclusion. The Yugoslav government believed that the situation on the front did not warrant Egyptian retreat and that the truce exacerbated the existing problems, namely the status of Palestine. Moreover, the apparent signs of Sadat's attempts to switch sides Belgrade uneasy.

Sadat's "political capitulation" and socioeconomic problems imposed by the oil embargo forced Yugoslavia to further improve its relations with the USSR, but also to find new friends in the Arab world. In the first half of November, Tito traveled to Kyiv to meet with Brezhnev. The meeting was arranged on Tito's request from October. The Soviets positively responded on October 10 and both Moscow and Belgrade agreed to keep the date of the meeting secret until they could agree on the details of the visit. The

[488] Exalted Minić once said that Yugoslavia "if it had, would send 1,000 tanks to Egypt." Also, Yugoslavs officials even entertained the idea of sending volunteers from nonaligned countries to the front.
[489] Autorizovano izlaganje druga M. Minića na 66. (proširenoj) sednici Izvršnog biroa PSKJ, October 25, 1973, AJ, PSFRJ fond 803, k. 10.
[490] Ibid.

purpose of the meeting was to discuss the events in the Middle East, European security, but also to facilitate Yugoslav requests for oil deliveries. Tito's entourage was unusually small, and he did not bring a translator because he wanted to speak with Brezhnev directly. Although their initial positions toward the war were different, Yugoslavia and the USSR detested Sadat's turn toward the United States. Besides, Moscow's and Belgrade's unsuccessful bet on Sadat undermined both Tito's and Brezhnev's authority at home.[491]

"The Arabs did not succeed, not to use other, harsher words," Brezhnev assessed the situation in the Middle East. He said that the Six-Point Agreement[492] gave the Arabs "charity" while it strengthened Israel's position. "That complicates our situation," Brezhnev concluded.[493] Tito agreed, adding that the Six-Point Agreement would not solve any problems. On the second day of the meeting, Brezhnev continued with his tirade against Sadat and the Arabs. "There is no working class in the Middle East, no real party, there are no warrior traditions. They only pray to Allah and just ask and ask for things, and we just give and give," railed Brezhnev against the Arabs. "There will be no solution without our participation in the Middle East," he said, adding menacingly that that the Soviets could change their friendly policy toward the Arabs and "there won't be

[491] A source from the Indian foreign ministry confided in the Yugoslav ambassador that Delhi's sources in Moscow confirmed that some members of the Soviet Politburo were unsatisfied with Brezhnev's conduct in the Middle East and because Brezhnev allowed the Americans to take advantage of him. Ambasada SFRJ Delhi SSIP-u, November 22, 1973, DA MSP RS, PA 1973 SSSR, f. 102, d. 1, s. 450746.
[492] The Six-Point Agreement was the agreement signed by Israel and Egypt on November 11, 1973. The Agreement strengthened the observation of the cease-fire, provided relief to the citizens of Suez, the exchange of all prisoners of war, and replaced Israeli checkpoints with UN checkpoints. This agreement was facilitated by Kissinger and Sisco.
[493] Stenografske beleške sa razgovora vođenih između Predsednika SKJ i Predsednika SFRJ Josipa Broza Tita i Generalnog sekretara CK KPSS L. I. Brežnjeva, November 12, 1973, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/55.

Sadat anymore."[494] Tito's response to Brezhnev's rant confirmed the congruence of Yugoslav and Soviet attitudes toward the Middle East. He said that the Soviets must stay in the Middle East. "We all think that it should be that way," Tito said; it is unclear whether he referred to other nonaligned states or the members of his delegation who earlier expressed their suspicion about the Soviets.[495] These talks did not produce anything substantial in bilateral relations (with the exception of Brezhnev's promise to supply Yugoslavia with oil), although they confirmed the closeness of Yugoslav and Soviet positions toward the Middle East and reinforced mutual concerns about advancing imperialism.

For Yugoslavia, the most pressing issue after the war was the chronic shortage of oil that threatened severe domestic economic and political disruptions.[496] Oil shortages affected productivity, but also had important domestic political implications because ordinary citizens grumbled about seemingly aimless foreign policy that failed to keep their apartments warm and their cars filled with gas.[497] Although security services kept

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[494] Stenografske beleške sa razgovora vođenih između Predsednika SKJ i Predsednika SFRJ Josipa Broza Tita i Generalnog sekretara CK KPSS L. I. Brežnjeva, November 13, 1973, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/55.
[495] Ibid.
[496] Stephen Kotkin argued that the 1973 oil shock had a profound effect on the Eastern European states because it dramatically increased energy costs for their industries and that despite Soviet aid "worsened intrasocialist terms of trade." "The regimes lacked the political legitimacy to take the necessary hard measures of structural adjustment," Kotkin wrote. Stephen Kotkin, "The Kiss of Debt: The East Bloc Goes Borrowing," in Niall Ferguson, Charles Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel Sargent, eds., *The Shock of the Global. The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2010), 80–81. Similarly, Marie-Janine Calic pointed out that the economies of European socialist states with their "outmoded economic structure and chronic resistance to reform" were "more susceptible to the global structural crisis than their Western counterparts, as they failed to open up new export sectors by adjusting their production structures." Marie-Janine Calic, "The Beginning of the End – The 1970s as a Historical Turning Point in Yugoslavia" in Marie-Janine Calic, Dietmar Neutatz, and Julia Obertreis, eds., *The Crisis of Socialist Modernity. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the 1970s* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2011), 72.
[497] In November, the Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs that was in charge of federal police and security services reported "negative reactions by certain individuals" who criticized Yugoslavia's support of the Arabs by saying that Yugoslavia's engagement would push the country into deeper problems. The Secretariat also recorded that some citizens reacted to the increase in the price of gasoline and general price increases related to the oil shortage. "Occasional reaction in factories were contained and … there was no

tight control over dissident groups and population at large, a prolonged shortage of oil and a general increase in prices undermined the regime's political legitimacy. Therefore, the utmost task was to provide relief. Already on October 31, the Yugoslav government sent an urgent plea to the Algerian government asking for 500 thousand metric tons of oil and to provide additional deliveries in November, December, and January. An Algerian official, "extremely business-oriented and not too fond of us," rejected the Yugoslav plea, but the Algerian government relented after Boumédiene's intervention.[498] Moreover, Yugoslavia turned to the USSR requesting in advance deliveries that were scheduled for 1974, which Brezhnev promised during his talks with Tito in Kyiv. Finally, in its search for oil, the Yugoslav government turned to Libya, but the erratic Gaddafi regime provided 120 thousand metric tons instead of promised 200 thousand because the difference was shipped to an unknown Eastern European socialist state.[499]

Despite this snag, the prospects of Yugoslav–Libyan relations held promise because Tripoli appeared able to satisfy Tito's political and economic needs. First, with Egypt's slow exit from the "progressive camp," Libya appeared as a new force in the Arab world. Thus, good relations with Tripoli were necessary if Yugoslavia wanted to preserve its status among the Arabs. Particularly because Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, aspired to assume the mantle of the pan-Arab leadership and become Nasser's heir. Second, the nationalization of the oil industry in 1971 and the 1973 oil

need for the organs of internal affairs to intervene, except to examine the cause of these occurrences," Secretary Luka Banović reported. Magnetofonske beleške sa XXIV sednice Predsedništva Socijalističke federativne republike Jugoslavije, November 7, 1973, AJ, PSFRJ fond 803, k.10.

[498] Ambasada SFRJ Alžir SSIP-u, October 31, 1973, DA MSP RS, PA 1973 Alžir, f. 3, d. 22, s. 447339; Ambasada SFRJ Alžir SSIP-u, November 5, 1973, DA MSP RS, PA 1973 Alžir, f. 3, d. 22, s. 448140.

[499] Ambasada SFRJ Tripoli SSIP-u, November 12, 1973, DA MSP RS, PA 1973 Libija, f. 189, d. 7, s. 449216.

embargo filled the Libyan coffers. Tripoli appeared ready to spend that money on weapons and military and civilian infrastructural projects, which created numerous business opportunities for the Yugoslav military-industrial complex. Besides, the Libyans expressed willingness to buy for hard currency large quantities of Yugoslav consumer goods that were otherwise uncompetitive on Western markets or were exchanged for the goods that Yugoslav consumers did not need or want.[500] In return, the Libyans saw Yugoslavia as a desirable partner, willing to provide goods and services without ideological strings attached. Moreover, as Gaddafi once said, "social and spiritual factors" contributed to this closeness because of millions of Muslims who lived in Yugoslavia.[501] This combination of religious, political, and economic factors in the aftermath of the October War draw the Yugoslav and the Libyan regimes closer together.

Just days after Tito's return from Kyiv, on November 18, Gaddafi arrived for his first visit to Yugoslavia. This was the third meeting between Tito and Gaddafi – Tito went to Libya in February 1970 and the two met in Algeria during the NAM summit. Although Yugoslavia's assessment of Libya occasionally took a paternalistic attitude toward the "inexperienced leadership of the young republic," Belgrade regarded

[500] Yugoslav exports to Libya were larger than Yugoslav exports to Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco combined. Moreover, the Libyans did not insist on reciprocity, thus Yugoslavia's balance of trade with Libya was always positive. Unlike other nonaligned trade partners, Libya paid for Yugoslav goods and services in hard currency, which had a special appeal to the Yugoslav government and companies. For example, the Algerians insisted that the Yugoslavs accept Algerian wine as a form of payment for Yugoslav tractors. Yugoslav companies complained that nobody in Yugoslavia wanted to drink Algerian wine and it was nearly impossible to re-export it somewhere else. With the Libyans, there were no such problems.

[501] Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita sa predsednikom Saveta Revolucije Libijske Arapske Republike, Muamerom el Gadafijem, November 18, 1973, AJ, KRP fond 837, I–3–a/69–13. After meeting with Tito, Gaddafi went to Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of Yugoslav republics with considerable Muslim population. In Bosnia, Gaddafi visited Sarajevo, Mostar, and Konjic – towns that coincidentally housed the training center for infantry, a military airplane factory, and ammunitions and explosives factories.

Gaddafi's position toward international issues as "positive" and "realistic." For example, the Yugoslavs and the Libyans shared the same goal of turning the Mediterranean into the zone of peace, free of foreign (i.e. American and Soviet) military presence. Besides, similar to Yugoslavia, Libya held the same concern about the division of spheres of influence at the expense of small states.[502]

Gaddafi's visit to Yugoslavia further strengthened the ties between the two regimes. The main purpose of his visit, the first one to a country outside the Arab world, was to purchase weapons and military material from Yugoslavia. Gaddafi's shopping list included submarines, boats, airplanes, but also all sorts of ammunition, spare parts, and know-how. The Libyan leader visited the military research and testing center in Nikinci near Belgrade where he was shown over 500 different pieces of military equipment.[503] The Libyans highly respected the achievements of the Yugoslav military industry. Gaddafi's secret talks with Tito, however, revealed much larger ambitions. At the end of the tête-à-tête meeting with Tito, Gaddafi said that Libya was interested in expanding military cooperation with Yugoslavia. "President Gaddafi said that his country is ready to finance the production of a nuclear weapon because Israel is getting ready to make it and that Israel, if needed, could get that weapon from America in the case they are unable to

[502] Yugoslavia and Libya, however, differed on many other issues, notably on the status of Israel and the Palestinian question.

[503] Soon after the 1969 revolution in Libya and Tito's first visit to the country in February 1970, Libya became one of the largest buyers of Yugoslav military equipment and services. By 1973, around 200 Libyan officers were enrolled in Yugoslav military schools and academies. During the October War, Yugoslavia delivered 110,000 mortar grenades and 500 naval mines to Libya. Moreover, the Libyans asked for Yugoslavia's assistance in building a naval base in Khoms, a military hospital, and an air force academy. Vojno-ekonomski odnosi sa Libijom, November 17, 1973, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/69–13.

produce it." Tito called for the utmost discretion, but said that "only a tactical weapon could be taken into consideration."[504]

"Who says we are here to buy weapons?" Gaddafi asked journalists at the press conference in Belgrade.[505] Public and private attention that Gaddafi's visit received (Tito's protocol even made sure that the Libyan president and his entourage were not served fruits from Israel) testified to cordial relations between the two states and their leaders. In addition, the Yugoslavs scored several lucrative deals that, besides military contracts and construction projects in Libya, included a Libyan pledge to satisfy one-quarter of Yugoslavia's oil needs – an issue of great domestic political importance. Finally, Yugoslavia and Libya forged an informal alliance whose aim was to steer the course of the nonaligned movement. Gaddafi's distaste toward superpowers had special appeal to Tito, who appeared willing to mentor his 50 years younger partner. The U.S. embassy reported that for the Yugoslavs Gaddafi's visit was a "tangible dollar and cents return from their all-out support of Arab cause since 1967."[506]

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[504] Zabeleška o razgovoru koji je drug Predsednik vodio nasamo sa predsednikom Libijske Arapske republike Gadafijem 20og novembra 1973. godine u Belom dvoru, November 25, 1973, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/69–13. The atomic weapons were not mentioned in any subsequent Tito–Gaddafi meetings. Yugoslav ambitions to build nuclear weapons go back to the late 1940s and the Yugoslav–Soviet split. Jacques Hymans wrote that Yugoslav efforts were doomed because mismanagement and general inefficiency. Dragomir Bondžić who wrote the most comprehensive study of Yugoslavia's nuclear program does not mention the 1973 Tito–Gaddafi talks and noted that Yugoslavia revived its nuclear weapons program only after India tested a nuclear bomb in May 1974. See Jacques Hymans, *Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) and Dragomir Bondžić, *Između ambicija i iluzija. Nuklearna politika Jugoslavije, 1945–1990* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2016).

[505] Raymond Anderson, "Qaddafi Sees Virtual Alliance Between Libya and Yugoslavia," in the *New York Times*, November 21, 1973, 16.

[506] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 05283, November 26, 1973, 1973BELGRA05283, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed September 10, 2019).

The Yugoslav-Libyan summit capped a tumultuous year for Yugoslavia and its relations with the world. At the end of 1973, it seemed that Yugoslavia had irrevocably assumed an anti-Western course. Yugoslav conduct from the beginning until the end of the year provided ample evidence that supported this claim. The regime's engagement in the Middle East and its subsequent foreign policy moves led Western journalists and commentators to question Yugoslavia's independence and its nonaligned status.[507] In this context, Tito's surprising visit to Kyiv was interpreted as yet another sign of Yugoslavia's close alignment with the Warsaw Pact. The U.S. embassy in Moscow reported that the Kyiv meeting provided Brezhnev with an opportunity to advance his position within the Politburo after the Middle East fiasco, but also to show Soviet audiences "that Yugoslavia is back in the fold, more or less."[508] Tito's trip to Kyiv reinforced these concerns, particularly because Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin was in Yugoslavia in September.

Gaddafi's visit to Yugoslavia just days after Tito's trip to the USSR was also interpreted in the context of Soviet efforts to keep a foothold in the Arab world. Brezhnev's, Tito's, and Gaddafi's dissatisfaction with Sadat made them, in theory, political bedfellows, despite the Soviets' distaste for Gaddafi's style.[509] Washington's efforts to link Gaddafi's visit to Yugoslav–Soviet relations were, however, refuted by

[507] The Yugoslavs rejected these accusations as "tendentious" and "provocative."
[508] Embassy Moscow to Department of State, Telegram 14390, November 19, 1973, 1973MOSCOW14390, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed September 10, 2019).
[509] During his visit to Yugoslavia, Kosygin said that Gaddafi is "a strange man and it appears that he is not normal." Kosygin commented on Libyan Prime Minister Abdessalam Jalloud's visit to Moscow and how the Soviet's noticed "his anti-Soviet but also Muslim feverishness." "During the meeting, he asked for a short break so he can pray, and he prayed in front of a Marx's photograph," Kosygin joked. Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika Republike J.B. Tita sa predsednikom Saveta ministara SSSR-a A. Kosiginom, September 28, 1973, Document 61, *DSPJ, Jugoslavija–SSSR*, 594–595.

Belgrade. A Yugoslav diplomat denied any connection between Tito's trip and Gaddafi's visit, but admitted that "energy situation [was] not good in Yugoslavia and Yugoslavs hoped to swing oil deal with Libya."[510] Yet, even in its own right, Yugoslavia's association with the so-called radicals and the implications for the country's foreign policy raised concerns about Yugoslavia's foreign policy direction. Toon said that Gaddafi's statements "do not contribute to the solution of the Middle Eastern crisis" and wondered if Yugoslavia could "calm down Gaddafi."[511] Toon's interlocutor agreed that "it was not the time to be noisy and clamorous," but added that "not all the radical elements were on one side" and mentioned Israel's Foreign Minister Abba Eban and Prime Minister Golda Meir whose statements were not "at all times the essence of tranquility."[512]

Yugoslav anti-Americanism so often on display throughout 1973 and the country's association with Libya (and large publicity it received in the United States) diminished Yugoslavia's image abroad. U.S. citizens and companies shared their government's concern about the orientation of Yugoslavia's foreign policy. Selby Furniture Hardware Company of New York that cooperated with Yugoslav supplier, Metalka, sent a letter to the Yugoslav embassy, in which it protested the "recent political developments." "In going to bed with Qaddafi, Tito has turned his back on decency, morality, and simple humanitarian ideals," Selby Furniture wrote in a memo, adding that

[510] Embassy Moscow to Department of State, Telegram 14439, November 19, 1973, 1973MOSCOW14439, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed September 10, 2019).
[511] Zabilješka o razgovoru V. Milatovića sa američkim ambasadorom M. Toon-om, November 20, 1973, DA MSP RS, PA 1973 SAD, f. 95, d. 17, s. 450055.
[512] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Airgram 668, December 13, 1973, Subject Numeric Files 1970–1973, box 2835, Pol 2 Yugo, RG 59, NARA.

the company would use its influence to obstruct Yugoslavia's relations with other American firms.[513] The U.S. embassy in Belgrade denied its connection with Selby, emphasizing that the policy of the U.S. government was to "promote the expansion of trade and economic cooperation with Yugoslavia in any way."[514]

"We want no confrontation with the US": Attempts at normalization of U.S–Yugoslav relations

As 1973 ended, some U.S. diplomats cautiously believed that the worst period in Yugoslav–American relations was over. After all, economic relations between the two countries continued unimpeded despite their acrimonious political and diplomatic relations.[515] Belgrade hoped that bilateral political and diplomatic relations with Washington could follow their economic relations. This change in attitude was noticeable already in the first days of 1974. As Toon noted: "Yugoslav behavior had been abominable. However, there appear to have been some results from plain talking in Belgrade."[516] In January 1974, Granfil met with Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush and suggested that "exchanges of views should be enriched," which would help "clarify

[513] Memorandum Saveznog sekretarijata za inostrane poslove, January 14, 1974, DA MSP RS, PA 1974 SAD, f. 122, d. 2, s. 41396.
[514] Ibid.
[515] In January 1973, Yugoslavia and the United States signed an agreement that insured U.S. investors through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). This was the first such an act signed with one communist government. OPIC created opportunities for U.S. companies to make joint ventures with their Yugoslav partners. This agreement was discussed during the Tito–Nixon meetings in 1970 and 1971, but it was only signed in 1973. Moreover, Yugoslav trade relations with the United States improved during 1973 and the first months of 1974, with 46 percent increase in Yugoslav exports in the first three months of 1974.
[516] Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Toon with Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Peet, February 15, 1974, Document 67, *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Vol. E–15, part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973–1976.

[differing] viewpoints."[517] Granfil continued with this peace offensive during the meeting with his American colleague Toon. Granfil said that "Tito had instructed him personally to carry a message to Washington that Yugoslavia wants 'no confrontation with the US'," Toon reported, adding that Granfil told him that Tito made a political decision to award the contract for Yugoslavia's first nuclear power plant to a U.S. company.[518] Granfil repeated the necessity of increased high-level contact between Washington and Belgrade "at time when Soviets were being 'very flattering' toward Yugoslav leadership."[519]

Briefing policymakers in Washington, Toon confirmed that the "Yugoslav–Soviet relationship had warmed up, but as a result of change in Soviet behavior, not in Yugoslav behavior," and said it would be in the U.S. interest to counter Soviet influence there.[520] The Yugoslavs, however, had different ideas about why the United States appeared ready for the rapprochement. In its analysis of Yugoslav–U.S. relations, the Foreign Secretariat noted that Washington's greater flexibility was the result of weakened Nixon's position because of Watergate, but mostly because the administration and "particularly Kissinger" realized that the existing policy toward Yugoslavia did not produce any results but created the opposite effects.[521] The reasons for the rapprochement were, however, less flattering for the Belgrade regime. Despite agreements with Algeria, the USSR, and

[517] Secretary of State to Embassy Belgrade, January 14, 1974, Telegram 008113, 1974STATE008113, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed September 12, 2019).
[518] Secretary of State to Embassy Belgrade, Telegram 036993, February 23, 1974, 1974STATE036993, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed September 12, 2019).
[519] Ibid.
[520] Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Toon with Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Peet, February 15, 1974, Document 67, *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Vol. E–15, part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973–1976.
[521] Informacija o nekim najvažnijim momentima iz bilateralnih jugoslovensko-američkih odnosa za period januar-maj 1974. godine, no date, 1974, DA MSP RS, PA 1974, f. 122, d. 1, s. 421553.

Libya that provided oil to Yugoslavia, an increase in production costs and higher prices of consumer goods continued to sap the economy.[522] In addition, the EEC's protectionist measures effectively closed the Western European market for Yugoslavia's beef products.[523] Thus, some sort of foreign aid, through credits or joint investments, was necessary to avert an economic crisis with potential social and political consequences. Besides, political and diplomatic reasons also dictated rapprochement. Soviet cajoling made Yugoslav officials suspicious about their motives and interpreted it as Moscow's attempt to secure its position for a post-Tito period. Finally, the LCY was preparing for the Tenth Congress – one of the most important political events since 1948 – that was planned, with the 1974 Constitution, to establish ideological and political guidelines for the transition into the post-Tito period. This combination of external and internal factors required the regime to steady its foreign policy after the tumultuous 1973.

The United States positively responded to Yugoslavia's peace offerings. Heeding to Yugoslav desires for more high-level contacts, Kissinger proposed a meeting with Secretary Minić during the General Assembly session of the UN in April. Just several months earlier, Kissinger refused to meet Minić in New York because of Yugoslavia's

[522] An unnamed Yugoslav official confided in a U.S. diplomat that "much-publicized oil supply agreements of last fall with Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Algeria are not 'as good news as they seemed to be'." Moreover, he said that the Soviets decided to deliver additional quantities of oil but that they also doubled the price of it. "Yugoslav leadership can hardly be comfortable about estimates indicating that bill for imported crude oil may be over four times 1973 total," a report noted. Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 0247, January 17, 1974, 1974BELGRAD0247, WikiLeaks (accessed September 13, 2019).

[523] In February, the U.S. embassy reported that "any extended comprehensive ban of this sort would be a real blow to Yugoslav foreign trade account, already hard-pressed due to steeply rising bill for imported oil." Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 0897, February 26, 1974, 1974BELGRAD0897, WikiLeaks (accessed September 13, 2019). Benedetto Zaccaria wrote that Yugoslav beef exports to the EEC constituted 50 percent of Yugoslav agricultural exports to Western Europe. Affected by the oil crisis, Western European states introduced protectionist measures that led to a ban on beef imports from Yugoslavia. "From Belgrade's viewpoint,
enhanced cooperation [with the EEC] was needed for political reasons, since it served to counterbalance Yugoslavia's relations with COMECON." Zaccaria, *The EEC's Yugoslav Policy*, 79.

anti-Americanism. Belgrade thought that Kissinger's willingness to meet Minić this time around should be interpreted as the reaffirmation of Yugoslavia's independence. At the same time, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) who was scheduled to visit West Germany, Poland, and the USSR, expressed his desire to meet with Tito. The Foreign Secretariat considered these two prospective meetings "without doubt, the most important political events" in bilateral relations with the United States in the first half of 1974, particularly because Belgrade expected that Kennedy could be the next to take up the White House.[524]

The Minić–Kissinger and Tito–Kennedy meetings in April 1974 occurred during a crisis in Yugoslav–Italian relations over Trieste. In 1954, Italy and Yugoslavia had reached an agreement that established the demarcation line between Zones A (Italy) and B (Yugoslavia) in the Trieste area. Although Italy was satisfied with the arrangement that left Trieste on its territory, it never ratified the agreement. Thus, the status of Zone B remained technically unresolved, a fact that both Belgrade and Rome used for various domestic purposes. In the early months of 1974, the regime in Belgrade, faced with the unfavorable economic situation, internal criticism of its foreign policy adventures, and preparing for the Tenth Congress, stirred a minor crisis on the northwestern border by reclaiming the rights to Zone B. As in previous occasions, an external crisis served to mobilize the domestic population. In response, Rome requested territorial adjustment and claimed sovereignty rights in Zone B.

[524] "Right now Kennedy is … without doubt the most respected person in the United States. It is certain that if he decides to run in 1976, he will be the next Democratic Party nominee; that would be important for our relations, particularly because of Kissinger's arrogant attitude [toward Yugoslavia]," a report from the Yugoslav embassy stated. Ambasada SFRJ Vašington SSIP-u, April 1, 1974, no. 421, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–211.

The crisis coincided with earlier scheduled NATO maneuvers in the northern Adriatic, a fact that ever-paranoid Yugoslavs interpreted not as a mere coincidence but rather as a carefully calculated attempt to pressure Yugoslavia.[525] The regime's cry against imperialism at the gates was, however, a useful tool to pressure the United States to publicly reaffirm the Yugoslav sovereignty and territorial integrity. A Yugoslav official told Toon that "some in Yugoslavia" believe that NATO encouraged Rome's "revanchist posture" and reminded the U.S. ambassador that Washington was one of the guarantors of the 1954 London Agreement. "U.S. and U.K. had stated at the time of signing the London Agreement (1954) they would never support 'appetites' of either Yugoslavia or Italy," the Yugoslav diplomat said.[526]

Minić's meeting with Kissinger on April 15 served to reiterate Yugoslavia's points. Kissinger denied that America had encouraged Italian territorial demands and repeated that the United States did not support Italian requests for territorial adjustments. "Kissinger's response was the most determined American statement so far," the Yugoslavs concluded with satisfaction.[527] "Our resolute reaction toward the maneuvers in the northern Adriatic was useful," a Yugoslav report stated, adding that Yugoslavia's firmness toward the matter had put Washington on defensive.[528]

[525] NATO exercise code-named "Dark Image '74" was an amphibious assault exercise that took place from March 29 to April 5 in the Gulf of Trieste.
[526] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 01437, March 28, 1974, 1974BELGRA01437, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed September 13, 2019).
[527] Informacija o nekim najvažnijim momentima iz bilateralnih jugoslovensko-američkih odnosa za period januar-maj 1974. godine, no date, 1974, DA MSP RS, PA 1974, f. 122, d. 1, s. 421553.
[528] Informacija o odnosima Jugoslavia–SAD (Povodom prijema senatora Kenedija), April 16, 1974, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–211.

Toward domestic consolidation: the 1974 Constitution and the Tenth LCY Congress and

"Pressure and strong anti-Yugoslav campaign and accusations about alleged anti-Americanism, Yugoslavia's closeness with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, suppression of democracy and liberties in Yugoslavia, military maneuvers on our borders… that is all obviously calculated to create the impressions in the world opinion about the failure of our policies of nonalignment and self-management socialism, about our isolation and our difficulties, but also to affect our preparations for the 10th [LCY] Congress, implementation of constitutional changes, i.e. our future development in general," an analysis prepared for Tito summarized the country's international position before the 10th LCY Congress.[529] The congress that gathered at the end of May in Belgrade provided the political and ideological framework for the regime and affirmed the continuity of the country's separate road to socialism and its nonaligned foreign policy orientation. Together with the new constitution that was declared in February, the 10th Congress confirmed and showed the stability of the regime after several tumultuous years.[530]

The 1974 Constitution was the logical outcome of the constitutional reforms that were enacted between 1967 and 1971. The new constitution, at the time the world's longest, further reduced the role of federal government and created a "far-reaching redistribution of competences… in favor of republics and autonomous provinces."[531] As

[529] Ibid.
[530] Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, 332.
[531] Najdan Pašić, *The Socio-Political System of Yugoslavia* (Beograd: Federal Committee for Information, 1975), 62.

Sabrina Ramet wrote, under the constitution, the "federal units enjoyed quasi-confederal autonomy."[532] The constitution was the brainchild of Edvard Kardelj who believed that decentralization would allow the republics to resolve "certain objectively contradictory interests."[533] This would be achieved through unanimous agreement between six constituent republics and two autonomous provinces. President of the Federal Assembly and Chairman of the Joint Constitutional Commission, Mijalko Todorović, optimistically concluded that the constitution would provide the foundation "of the new relationships within the Federation, based on agreements and compacts, respect for differences, but also on the deepening of mutual trust and mutual solidarity, were laid in the common National Liberation War and Revolution." "They form a basis for the further development of equality among the nations and nationalities, and it is this which constitutes a guarantee of the unity and stability of our Federation."[534] Instead of fostering unity, trust, and solidarity, the constitution encouraged the centrifugal forces and "in place of the unified party elite that dominated the communist system in its initial postwar phase, the regime was now characterized by six republican and two provincial elites that skillfully utilized decentralized authority for their respective parochial interests."[535] To provide equal representation for all local communities, working units,

[532] Sabrina Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962–1991* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 74.
[533] Cited in Audrey Helfant Budding, "Nation/People/Republic: Self-Determination in Socialist Yugoslavia," in Cohen, Dragović-Soso, eds., *State Collapse*, 103.
[534] Todorović, however, noted that "one not need not be a Utopian and believe that the entire mechanism of agreements and compact among the republics and provinces will succeed by itself, that there will be no difficulties… In this respect subjective socialist forces have a very great role." Mijalko Todorović, "Report on the Final Draft of the S.F.R.Y. Constitution," January 22, 1974, *The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia* (Ljubljana: Dopisna delavska univerza, 1974), 42–43.
[535] Lenard J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 33. The legal scholar, Jovan Đorđević, who worked with Kardelj on constitutional amendments in the late 1960s and the early 1970s later argued that the 1974 Constitution was the "triumph of nationalism" and the expression of the interests of republican and provincial oligarchies. Instead of facilitating the

Yugoslav regions, constitutional nations, and nationalities, the constitution provided "the most complicated electoral system seen anywhere during the twentieth century."[536] Intended to democratize socio-political order and decentralize Yugoslav economic and administrative systems, the constitution, however, increased the LCY role as a cohesive factor. Moreover, it emphasized Tito's central importance for the stability of the whole system. Article 333 of the Constitution, "in view of the historic role of Josip Broz Tito in the National Liberation War and the Socialist Revolution, in the creation and development of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia… the consolidation of the independence of the country and its position in international relations and in the struggle for peace in the world," made Tito president for an "unlimited term of office."[537]

Held three months after the promulgation of the new constitution, the 10th LCY Congress also emphasized the centrality of Tito's personality in the political life of the country. Dennison Rusinow noted how Tito's image appeared "even on Congress documents and lapel badges." "Titoist myth and symbols had never been as exaggerated and omnipresent as in 1974," Rusinow wrote, adding that Tito's ubiquity could be interpreted as an "unconscious reversion to magic, a parading of icons with their intimations of immortality and divine protection and a conjuring with the personification of unity and stability to frighten away the demons of divisive ethnic nationalisms, political pluralism, and foreign intrigues."[538] Tito's vigorous appearance during the four-

"withering away of the state," the constitution was the "triumph of the state over the society." Krivokapić, *Jugoslavija i komunisti*, 81.

[536] Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 306.

[537] *The Constitution of the SFRY*, 265.

[538] Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment*, 335.

day event served to dispel rumors about a debilitating stroke.[539] To further accentuate Tito's role, the Congress re-elected the 83-year-old leader as president of the LCY "without term limits." As the U.S. embassy reported, the Congress was the "capstone of four-year effort by Tito and his closest confidants to so mould (sic!) Yugoslav governmental and political institutions that Titoism will survive Tito."[540]

The 10th LCY Congress was also the occasion to rehash Yugoslavia's foreign policy positions. "Many times we were pressured to give up or change our policy. We could always resist those attempts because we were united and ready to defend our independence. It will be the same in the future," Tito said in his opening remarks, greeted by frenetic applause from the several thousand delegates from all over Yugoslavia.[541] The Congress issued four foreign policy resolutions related to the Middle East, Chile, Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos), and liberation movements that, by default, criticized "international imperialism." One of the documents, however, warned that socialism as a historical force would prevail only if relations between socialist states were based on the principles of equality, independence, mutual respect, and non-interference – implicit rejection of Soviet hegemony and the Brezhnev Doctrine.

The Cyprus Crisis

[539] In March, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, Lucien Nedzi, asked the Yugoslav ambassador whether or not Tito's left side was paralyzed from the stroke he suffered. Ambasada SFRJ Vašington SSIP-u, March 28, 1974, DA MSP RS, PA 1974 SAD, f. 123, d. 1, s. 414317. Rumors about Tito's incapacity stemmed from his conspicuous absence from the Constitution proclamation ceremony on February 21.
[540] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Document 03127, June 27, 1974, 1974BELGRA03127, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed September 13, 2019).
[541] Josip Broz Tito, "Borba za dalji razvoj socijalističkog samoupravljanja u našoj zemlji i uloga Saveza komunista Jugoslavije," *Deseti kongres Saveza komunista Jugoslavije. Dokumenti* (Beograd: Izdavački centar "Komunist," 1975), 19.

The LCY Congress, in theory, created internal unity that was the prerequisite for any successful resistance to foreign meddling in Yugoslav affairs. The Congress condemned both imperialism and hegemony – code words for both superpowers – and reaffirmed Yugoslavia's nonaligned position. Yet, the international situation offered little respite. In June and July 1974, Nixon and Brezhnev met in Moscow to discuss a host of issues, including SALT II, the Middle East, and the conference on European security. Beleaguered by Watergate, Nixon hoped that his foreign policy success would save his presidency, but, despite personal affinity between him and Brezhnev, the Moscow summit did not produce the desired effect.[542] Yet, as with prior Nixon–Brezhnev summits, Belgrade dreaded the prospect of a "superpower condominium." This concern was augmented by some unfounded reports in Western media that Nixon and Brezhnev discussed Yugoslavia. Also, some embassies in Washington disseminated the rumors that Nixon had raised the issue of Yugoslavia's future at the summit, reports the State Department rejected as "disinformation peddled by certain intelligence services trying to advance their own interests."[543]

This hearsay created a fertile ground for another sprouting of Yugoslav paranoia, particularly in the context of the crisis in Cyprus that happened just days after the Moscow summit. On July 15, a coup instigated by the regime in Athens and the rightist paramilitary organizations removed the president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios. Makarios was one of the NAM's founding fathers who attended the 1961 summit in Belgrade and although the Tito-Makarios relationship never reached the level of intimacy

[542] Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger*, 598.
[543] Memorandum of Conversation, "Discussion of Yugoslavia at recent Nixon–Brezhnev Summit," August 21, 1974, P740097-2060, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/P-Reel Printouts, RG 59, NARA.

that Tito established with Nasser, Makarios was considered an important ally. At the time of the coup, Tito was finishing his three-day visit to Croatia, and Kardelj was in Egypt. With Tito and Kardelj out of town, the remaining members of the Yugoslav party and government leadership convened an emergency meeting to discuss the situation on the island. The Foreign Secretariat formed a task force to watch the situation in Cyprus and the Yugoslav army and police forces were put on high alert.[544]

With Belgrade's telephone connection with Nicosia interrupted and the Yugoslav embassy under surveillance, the Yugoslavs scrambled to form a full picture of the events in Cyprus. Initial accounts stated that Makarios was murdered, but some radio stations from Cyprus reported that he survived the attack.[545] "With the deepest bitterness I received the news that the coup instigators aimed their criminal action to physically liquidate (murder) my great friend and a great friend of Yugoslavia, President Makarios," Tito said in a statement.[546] Although the Yugoslav embassy in Nicosia had been reporting about rumors of a coup since the beginning of the year, the events of July 15 surprised Belgrade.[547] One possible explanation seemed to point at a secret deal between Moscow and Washington to carve their respective spheres of influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly because the Cyprus crisis not only coincided with the Moscow Summit but also with the turmoil in another nonaligned state, Ethiopia (more on

[544] Informacija o preduzetim merama u vezi sa situacijom na Kipru, July 15, 1974, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/56–3.
[545] "Ubijen Makarios?," July 16, 1974, *Politika*, 1.
[546] Nacrt izjave Predsjednika Republike, no date, 1974, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/56–3.
[547] Members of the rightist military groups tried to assassinate Makarios several times in 1970, 1973, and 1974. In March 1974, the embassy reported that the Cypriot National Guard was engaged in activities to overthrow Makarios. In June, the embassy noted that the National Guard acted "more openly and more aggressively" against Makarios and that the "panic seized the ambassadors of the socialist countries" when they heard rumors of a coup during Makarios's visit to China. Ambasada SFRJ Nikozija SSIP-u, March 11, 1974, DA MSP RS, PA 1974 Kipar, f. 85, d. 12, s. 413954 and Ambasada SFRJ Nikozija SSIP-u, March 11, 1974, DA MSP RS, PA 1974 Kipar, f. 85, d. 12, s. 428931.

Ethiopia in Chapter 5). Initial analyses from Cyprus and Ethiopia suggested that Washington and Moscow were solidifying their respective spheres of influence in the regions uncomfortably close to Yugoslavia. Moreover, these attacks on nonaligned states and their leaders created a dangerous precedent for Yugoslavia's independence. As the Yugoslav ambassador in Washington reported, in the context of the Cyprus crisis, members of the press corps began "implicitly repeating old speculations" in reference to Tito's old age and the future of the country.[548]

Yugoslav reaction to the crisis included a diplomatic offensive that went in several directions, as outlined at the July 15 emergency meeting. The first step was to mobilize nonaligned countries to preserve Cyprus's independence. The second measure included diplomatic efforts to commit Moscow and Washington to reject power-sharing deals. Finally, in the later stage of the crisis, the Yugoslavs tried to mediate between Greece and Turkey. Belgrade's efforts to gather nonaligned proved difficult to achieve. Yugoslavia urged the Algerian government who presided over the NAM Coordination Bureau to call an emergency meeting of the Bureau to discuss joint action toward the crisis. Yet, to Belgrade's dismay, the nonaligned states were divided over their approach to Cyprus. On July 16, the heads of the diplomatic mission of nonaligned countries in the UN in Geneva composed a vague letter in which they expressed "deep concern" but without proposing any concrete actions. Endless meetings continued but these only highlighted the divisions within the movement and its political ineffectiveness. Moreover, the crisis revealed Yugoslav and Algerian differences in tactics and style. Although

[548] Kiparska kriza – viđenja u Vašingtonu, July 22, 1974, Ambasada SFRJ u Vašingtonu, no. 941, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–19 SAD.

Boumédiene condemned the aggression in his statement from July 21, the Yugoslavs fumed that the NAM reacted when it was already too late and "acted in a disorganized manner." "The Coordination Bureau has to act quickly and with more efficiency," a Yugoslav diplomat advised his Algerian colleague.[549] Similarly, the Indian Foreign Ministry confided in the Yugoslav ambassador in Delhi that they were dissatisfied with Algeria's slow reaction and the overall efficiency of the movement in a time of crisis.[550] Yugoslav sources suggest that Algeria's dawdling during the crisis should be attributed to the country's and its leader's desires to affirm their leadership position within the Movement. Besides, Boumédiene's bold actions on the international stage, such as the proclamation of the NIEO, without consultation with other nonaligned states, threatened the Tito's leadership authority in the NAM. The Cyprus crisis revealed frictions between Yugoslavia and Algeria over the primacy in the movement and Belgrade had to repeatedly remind its Algerian partner that nonaligned states "must coordinate their activities."[551]

Despite these differences, Yugoslavia and Algeria agreed that the crisis in Cyprus was caused by "imperialist forces" who sought to strengthen their influence in the

[549] Ambasada SFRJ Tunis SSIP-u, July 31, 1974, DA MSP RS, PA 1974 Kipar f. 88, d. 1, s. 437035.
[550] Ambasada SFRJ Delhi SSIP-u, August 23, 1974, DA MSP RS, PA 1974 Kipar, f. 88, d. 10, s. 440120.
[551] In the spring of 1974, the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat noted that Boumédiene's trips to Asia and Cuba had a "political and manifestational character (*političko-manifestacionog karaktera*)" that served to confirm the new, prominent role of Algeria and Boumediene in the Global South. In the context of this Boumédiene's diplomatic offensive, one day before Boumediene's speech before the UNGA in which he outlined the NIEO, Secretary Minić met with the Algerian leader to deliver Tito's message in which Tito emphasized the importance of the unity of the NAM and urged for close cooperation between nonaligned states. During the conversation, Minić repeated several times these points. Alas, to Yugoslav surprise, Boumédiene delivered the famous speech in the UN in which he called for the NIEO, without previously consulting Belgrade. Zabeleška o razgovoru druga M. Minića sa predsednikom Republike Alžira H. Bumedijenom 9. Aprila u Njujorku, April 22, 1974, SSIP Kabinet Saveznog sekretara, DA MSP RS, PA 1974 Alžir, f. 2, d. 32/2, s. 418136.

region.[552] Yugoslavia perceived the coup in Cyprus as a logical extension of the Greek military coup seven years earlier. Belgrade, however, believed that the events in Cyprus in 1974 and Greece in 1967 were the elements of the larger plan to install puppet regimes and establish strategic control in the Eastern Mediterranean. The puppet-master, of course, was in Washington. Although Yugoslav officials demonstrated some restraint in the first days of the crisis, their statements suggested that the coup was instigated by the regime in Athens with the tacit approval if not the encouragement of "certain NATO countries."

On July 17, Sisco discussed the situation in Cyprus with Granfil and he expressed Washington's concern about stability in the region. Sisco said that the United States advised all sides to show some restraint, a piece of advice that included Yugoslavia too.[553] Belgrade, however, did not heed Sisco's advice. On July 19, Toon met with Minić to brief him on the Moscow summit, but the Yugoslav Secretary used the opportunity to discuss the Cyprus crisis and air Yugoslav grievances about the situation on the island. "No one can convince us that [the coup] was not a premeditated plan to change violently the status of this independent and nonaligned state," Minić told Toon.[554] Minić said "that prompt action [should] be taken to force the Greeks and 'whatever forces may stand behind them' to withdraw."[555] Toon replied that he was puzzled by Minić's reference to

[552] Algeria's ambassador in Tunisia told his Yugoslav colleague that the events in Cyprus were a "dangerous game" played by the United States, adding that Cyprus could be a spring-board to the Balkans. Ambasada SFRJ Tunis SSIP-u, July 31, 1974, DA MSP RS, PA 1974 Kipar, f. 88, d. 1, s. 437035.
[553] Ambasada SFRJ Vašington SSIP-u, July 17, 1974, DA MSP RS, PA 1974 Kipar, f. 85, d. 6, s. 434649.
[554] Zabeleška o razgovoru potpredsednika SIV-a i saveznog sekretara za inostrane poslove M. Minića sa ambasadorom SAD M. Toon-om 19.7.1974. godine, July 20, 1974, SSIP Kabinet Saveznog sekretara, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–19 SAD.
[555] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 03563, July 19, 1974, 1974BELGRA03563, Central Foreign Policy Files 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed September 19, 2019).

"other forces" and rejected U.S. knowledge or participation in the coup. The Minić–Toon exchange showed Yugoslav insecurity but also that Yugoslav hostility toward the United States and its alleged misdeeds, after a short respite, continued.

The Turkish invasion of the island on July 20 Belgrade interpreted as a positive development that had tilted the power balance in Cyprus. Moreover, the Yugoslavs hoped that the invasion would force the United States to assume a "more cautious position" toward Makarios.[556] This Yugoslav assessment was confirmed three days later when the junta in Athens collapsed – a turn of events that Belgrade enthusiastically supported because it believed that Greece was the "key for the situation in Cyprus."[557] Besides, political change in Athens made anti-Americanism the order of the day and Greek politicians, especially those on the left, openly accused the CIA of instigating the coup. The Yugoslav embassy in Athens reported that a new Greek Prime Minister, Constantine Karamanlis, did not directly accuse Washington but hinted that those who supported the junta were also responsible for the "Cyprus tragedy."[558] Moreover, the Greeks seemed united in their distaste toward superpower diplomacy and spheres of influence – as several Greek and Cypriot officials confirmed in their conversations with the Yugoslavs. "Soviet reaction to the coup that was slow and [in]efficient (sic!) gave both the left and the right a reason to suspect a deal between the United States and the USSR," a report from the Yugoslav embassy in Nicosia stated.[559] A Greek diplomat confided in his Yugoslav colleague that the new government was concerned about an

[556] Kiparska kriza – viđenja u Vašingtonu, July 22, 1974, Ambasada SFRJ u Vašingtonu, no. 941, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–19 SAD.
[557] Ambasada SFRJ Nikozija SSIP-u, August 13, 1974, DA MSP RS, PA 1974 Kipar, f. 88, d. 8, s. 439492.
[558] Ambasada SFRJ Atina SSIP-u, September 20, 1974, DA MSP RS, PA 1974 Kipar, f. 85, d. 12, s. 445083.
[559] Ambasada SFRJ Nikozija SSIP-u, August 13, 1974, DA MSP RS, PA 1974 Kipar, f. 88, d. 8, s. 439492.

alleged deal that would put Greece and Yugoslavia after Tito's death in the Soviet sphere and that Washington had "traded" Greece for Egypt.[560]

Yet, Greece's anti-Americanism and Athens's flirting with nonalignment as a possible foreign policy direction encouraged Belgrade to ramp up their anti-Americanism that somewhat had abated in early 1974. In addition, the disarray in Washington caused by the Watergate scandal that resulted in Nixon's resignation on August 8, 1974, made the Yugoslavs believe that they could criticize the United States without consequences while, at the same time, burnish their credentials in the Third World. Yugoslav press, particularly the official *Borba* and *Komunist*, began speculating about the alleged role of the CIA in the Cyprus coup. The U.S. embassy remarked that "these comments are not useful" particularly in the context of the President Ford's message to Tito that the United States would continue to support Yugoslavia's independence and sovereignty.[561] Although the old Yugoslav trick was to claim that the press was not under government's control, this anti-American stance was confirmed from the highest post of the Yugoslav government – Tito himself. On September 12, in a speech in Jesenice, Tito said that the main instigators of the coup were the CIA, the Greek junta, and NATO who wanted to kill Makarios and turn this nonaligned state into a NATO base. Despite mentioning in his speech Ford's letter as a sign of positive Yugoslav–U.S. relations, Tito's attack on the CIA and NATO caused indignation in Washington. Malcolm Toon called the speech

[560] The Yugoslav embassy in Athens reported extensively about these and similar rumors that circulated among state officials, diplomats, and journalists. Some of these scenarios were too wild even for the ever-paranoid Yugoslavs so that the ambassador admitted how "it's really hard to figure out what is the truth in all of this." Ambasada SFRJ Atina SSIP-u, September 12, 1974, DA MSP RS, PA 1974 Kipar, f. 85, d. 12, s. 443639.

[561] Zabeleška o razgovoru V. Matića, samostalnog referenta u Upravi za Severnu Ameriku sa K. Hill-om, I sekretarom ambasade SAD na dan 4. 9. 1974. godine, SSIP IV Uprava, September 9, 1974, DA MSP RS, PA 1974 SAD, f. 124, d. 10, s. 443240.

"distasteful" although, he admitted, it added "little new to previous Yugoslav positions."[562] The State Department at the press briefing called Tito's allegations "utter nonsense."

On August 14, Assistant Secretary Arthur Hartman called Granfil to tell him that Kissinger was "extremely upset" by Tito's remarks. Hartman said that Tito's statements were "entirely untrue" and wondered why Tito did not say anything about the alleged CIA and NATO involvement in his letter to Ford. "It is imperative that public and private communications between our two governments be in accord," Hartman emphasized, adding that Tito's statement "could very easily call into question Secretary's intended trip to Yugoslavia."[563] Hartman's harsh rebuke (and his remark that Tito was lying) had so upset Granfil that he was "literally shaking," as Hartman later told Kissinger.[564] Four days after the Hartman–Granfil talk, Toon delivered a demarche to Minić's deputy Mojsov. Toon said that the Yugoslav government should "through some channels express its regret… because otherwise it will be very hard for Kissinger to come to Yugoslavia." Toon explained that he would not like to repeat the situation from 1973 when Yugoslavia and the United States almost ceased their bilateral political relations.[565] Mojsov, the old American nemesis from his UN days, proved a much tougher interlocutor than Granfil.

[562] Toon noted that Tito's points were not new, yet for the first time a ranking Yugoslav figure uttered such harsh accusations. Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 04533, September 13, 1974, 1974BELGRA04533, WikiLeaks (accessed September 20, 2019).
[563] Department of State to Embassy Belgrade, Telegram 202839, September 14, 1974, 1974STATE202839, Central Foreign Policy Files 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed September 19, 2019).
[564] United States Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and United States. Department of State. Secretary. [Yugoslavian Statement on U.S. Plot to Murder Archbishop Makarios], 1974. ProQuest. (accessed September 26, 2019).
[565] Iz zabeleške o razgovoru zamenika saveznog sekretara L. Mojsova sa ambasadorom SAD M. Toon-om na dan 18. septembra 1974. godine, September 20, 1974, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–19.

He “energetically and resolutely” rejected to even talk about his suggestion about the regime’s hypothetical apology, adding that the State Department’s characterization of Tito’s statement as “nonsense” amounted to an insult of the head of the state and demanded from Washington to officially withdraw their statement.

These threats were repeated by Kissinger in his conversation with Minić on September 24. “Whenever relations improve, someone [in Yugoslavia] makes a speech,” Kissinger said to his Yugoslav colleague. Kissinger said that the U.S. government was extremely dissatisfied with Tito’s speech and warned that it “cannot agree to sharp attacks on American policy.”[566] The United States supported nonalignment but if nonaligned states were always against the United States, “what do we get out of it,” Kissinger wondered.[567] Moreover, on Minić’s insistence to confirm the date of his visit to Yugoslavia, Kissinger said that his schedule was not set yet and that his plans were “tentative.” Minić was stubborn as always and insisted on the semantical meaning of Tito’s statement – the Yugoslav leader was accusing the CIA and not the entire American government.

In the postmortem of the Kissinger-Minić conversation, the Yugoslav embassy in Washington made conclusions consistent with its previous assessments. Ambassador Granfil noted that Tito’s statement had hurt Kissinger personally because his foreign policy was already under intense scrutiny on Capitol Hill and by American public at large. Under these circumstances, Granfil wrote, Kissinger needed Yugoslavia to tone down its attack on the U.S. government. Moreover, Kissinger’s position was a clear

[566] United States Department of State Bureau of European Affairs Office of Eastern, European Affairs. U.S.-Yugoslav Relations and the Cyprus Crisis [Meeting with Vice President Minic of Yugoslavia], 1974. ProQuest. (accessed September 26, 2019).
[567] Ibid.

manifestation of "linkage" and Washington's attempt to use pressure in bilateral relations to restrain Yugoslavia's nonaligned policy. Granfil concluded that Kissinger's pressure policy was rooted in his understanding of détente as the exclusive domain of superpowers. Thus, the pressure on any nonaligned state, including Yugoslavia, was the logical outcome of that narrow understanding of détente.[568] Granfil could not say whether or not Kissinger would follow up on his threat and cancel his visit to Belgrade, but noted that the visit would improve Kissinger's and U.S. image in the world.

Bringing Yugoslavia back: Kissinger's mission to Belgrade

Granfil sensed Kissinger's bluff and just days after the Kissinger–Minić meeting, Washington announced that the Secretary, on his way to the Middle East, would visit Romania and Yugoslavia in November. Kissinger's trip to Yugoslavia, however, was not so much intended to improve the U.S. image abroad as it was a calculated attempt to exploit troubles in Yugoslav–Soviet relations that created a narrow opening for American diplomacy to regain influence in the country. The latest Yugoslav–Soviet dispute involved the issue of alleged Soviet interference in Yugoslavia's internal affairs via Cominformist émigrés. The row with Washington over its alleged role in Cyprus and spat with Moscow over its attempts to undermine the regime's position at home put Belgrade at odds with both the United States and the Soviet Union. By mid-September, Yugoslavia's mistrust toward superpowers and their intentions became a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The first signs of trouble in Yugoslav–Soviet relations appeared in April 1974. On April 6, a group of Cominformist émigrés convened in Bar, a small port town on the

[568] Ambasada SFRJ Vašington Kabinetu Predsednika Republike, Telegram no. 1211, September 25, 1974, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–19.

Montenegrin part of the Adriatic coast. The so-called Group from Bar (*Barska grupa*) proclaimed itself the "New Communist Party of Yugoslavia" and called its gathering the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia – a clear rejection of the post-1948 LCY's legitimacy.[569] The Group wanted to create a parallel political structure as the only legitimate political and ideological force that would assume power after Tito's departure. The "New Communist Party" formed various party organs and elected a well-known émigré, Mileta Perović, as its general secretary.[570] The decision to meet just weeks before the Tenth Congress of the LCY was considered particularly provocative.

The appearance of this group in Yugoslavia for the first time in an organized form raised dark prospects for the future. Although the Group from Bar consisted of only 12 members, the formal existence of a parallel political structure directly challenged the LCY's political monopoly and created the embryo of "healthy forces" whose mere existence could trigger the invocation of the Brezhnev Doctrine.[571] There were indications that the Bar Group was connected to émigrés in the USSR who had been on the radar of the Yugoslav security forces for a while. The group was quickly apprehended

[569] The Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was held from June 21–28, 1948. The Congress unanimously rejected the Resolution of the Cominform and marked the beginning of the Yugoslav–Soviet split. The Group from Bar considered the 1948 Congress illegitimate.

[570] Mileta Perović was a prominent Montenegrin communist. He served as a diplomat in Tirana in 1946. In 1949, Perović was arrested and sent to the notorious Naked Island prisoner camp where he was tortured. He was released in 1956, but two years later he defected to Albania and from there to the Soviet Union. He received a doctorate in the USSR and lived with his wife in Kyiv until 1975. In 1977, Perović was kidnapped in Italy by the Yugoslav secret service and tried for his role in the Bar congress. He was sentenced to 20 years and released in 1989 after serving one half of his sentence. See Rajko Danilović, *Upotreba neprijatelja. Politička suđenja u Jugoslaviji, 1945–1991* (Valjevo: Agencija Valjevac, 1993), 130–131.

[571] Serbian scholar Srđan Cvetković estimated that the number of alleged Cominformists and their sympathizers in Yugoslavia never exceeded 1,000 people and that the government had exaggerated the number of those who were arrested after the Bar congress. See Srđan Cvetković, "Neoibeovci: Obračun sa sa prosovjetskom opozicijom u SFRJ i kidnapovanje Vlade Dapčevića," *Istorija 20. veka* vol. 2 (2012): 147–164.

by the Montenegrin secret police, followed by a wave of arrests of alleged Cominformists and their sympathizers all over Yugoslavia.

The reemergence of communist anti-Titoist groups was interpreted by the regime as a form of Soviet pressure before the 10th LCY Congress. The events seemed to follow a similar pattern of Soviet conduct in 1968 and 1971. Soviet attempts to tie Yugoslavia closer were apparent even before April. In February 1974, the Yugoslav embassy in Moscow reported that Yugoslav–Soviet negotiations about cultural cooperation did not go well because of Soviet insistence to include formulations unacceptable to the Yugoslav side. "There is a tendency to 'ideologize' cultural exchange … to include representatives of the APN [the Novosti Press Agency] in activities that are not in accordance with our laws, to affirm Soviet aesthetic criteria, and to coordinate activities to expose the bourgeois propaganda and ideological diversions against the socialist countries," the embassy reported.[572] Moreover, Yugoslav–Soviet military cooperation that was discussed during the 1973 Tito–Brezhnev meeting had stalled, leading Belgrade to question Soviet motives. The Yugoslavs assumed that the Soviet conduct stemmed from the Kremlin's approach to détente and foreign policy setbacks in 1973 that necessitated Moscow's tougher approach to socialist countries. Despite considerable improvement in Yugoslav–Soviet relations in 1973, as demonstrated by Tito's trip to Kyiv and close coordination during the October War, the Soviets wanted to put Yugoslavia back in the fold.[573]

[572] Ambasada SFRJ Moskva SSIP-u, February 8, 1974, DA MSP RS, PA 1974 SSSR, f. 132, d. 3, s. 46003.
[573] The Yugoslavs indicated that Soviet insistence on unity of the socialist world came about because Brezhnev faced internal criticism for his conduct of foreign policy. According to some reports, Party hardliners, veterans, and "certain circles within the Red Army" believed that Brezhnev's policy of détente had weakened the Soviet hand in international affairs and led to unacceptable ideological compromises. Thus, in order to appease his domestic detractors, Brezhnev had to reaffirm the Soviet status as the leading

Belgrade, however, resisted. On July 25, at the peak of the Cyprus crisis that consumed much of the Yugoslav diplomatic capacity, the CC LCY Presidium sent a pro memoria to the CPSU Politburo in which the Yugoslavs warned the Soviets that any further tolerance of anti-Titoist émigré groups would negatively affect Yugoslav–Soviet relations. The Soviet response came less than a month later in which they denied any connection with Cominformist émigrés and rejected claims about their involvement in the Bar congress as a "serious provocation against Yugoslav–Soviet friendly relations." Moreover, the Kremlin claimed, the Soviet organs had "sharply warned" Mileta Perović and others that any activity against Yugoslavia was not permitted.[574] The Yugoslavs wanted to underline the seriousness of the entire affair and on September 10, Kardelj went to Moscow to discuss various international and bilateral issues. Kardelj told Brezhnev that the Yugoslav organs determined that the anti-regime materials came from the émigré circles in Kyiv, Prague, and Budapest. Brezhnev gave a vague promise that the Soviets would take additional measures to prevent similar occurrences.[575]

The importance of the Kardelj trip did not escape Washington's attention. "This in itself was a signal of Belgrade's seriousness; it was Kardelj who had gone to Moscow in 1948 to stand up to Stalin," Deputy NSA Brent Scowcroft reported.[576] Moreover, the Yugoslav government's decision to discuss the affair publicly was important in itself.

communist state by insisting on the universal acceptance of the Soviet ideological model. Ambasada SFRJ Moskva SSIP-u, January 15, 1974, DA MSP RS, PA 1974 SSSR, f. 133, d. 1, s. 41671.

[574] Zabeleška o razgovoru člana Izvršnog komiteta CK SKJ Dragoljuba Stavreva sa ambasadrom SSSR u Beogradu V. Stjepakovom, August 21, 1974, Str. pov. 1906, Odeljenje za međunarodne odnose i veze Predsedništva SKJ, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–26.

[575] Запись беседы Л.И. Брежнева с членом Президиума ЦК СКЮ, членом Президиума СФРЮ Э. Карделем, September 10, 1974, Document 71, *DSPJ*, *Jugoslavija–SSSR*, 668–669.

[576] Memo, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft to President Ford, no date, November, 1974, National Security Adviser Country Files for Europe and Canada, "Yugoslavia (1)," box 22, Gerald Ford Presidential Library (GFPL).

Toon remarked that it was "noteworthy" that Tito in his infamous Jesenice speech did not mention the Soviet Union, but when he talked about internal enemies mentioned the Cominformists who "even tried to organize some sort of a party."[577] "We believe absence of favorable mention of Moscow is not accidental and probably related to revelation of Cominformists," Toon wrote.[578] U.S. diplomats, however, could not figure out whether the revelation of the affair served to put additional pressure on the Soviets after Kardelj's unsuccessful trip or someone from the Yugoslav government purposely leaked it to pressure Tito to assume a more confrontational stance toward Moscow.[579]

Another Yugoslav–Soviet split, albeit somewhat muted and less acrimonious than the earlier ones, provided an opening for Kissinger. Brent Scowcroft noted that in all likelihood the Yugoslavs "will deliberately open the door to the West slightly."[580] Similarly, Toon wrote to Kissinger that the "convergence of events… may provide us with a good opportunity to advance our interests in Yugoslavia," and that the Cominformist affair caused a "critical revaluation" of the country's policy toward the USSR.[581] Reports from Washington and U.S. diplomatic posts confirmed that the Yugoslavs were deeply disturbed by the Cominformist affair and that they were actively trying to decouple themselves from Moscow. Toon noted that the embassy received some

[577] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 04528, September 13, 1974, 1974BELGRA04528, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed September 29, 2019).
[578] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 04533, September 13, 1974, 1974BELGRA04533, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed September 29, 2019).
[579] Since the beginning, the Yugoslavs had kept the incident secret. Tito tried to resolve the issue without openly disrupting Yugoslav–Soviet relations. Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 04761, September 26, 1974, 1974BELGRA04761, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed September 29, 2019).
[580] Memo, President from Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Scowcroft to President Ford, no date, November, 1974, NSA Country Files for Europe and Canada, "Yugoslavia (1)," box 22, GFPL.
[581] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 5119, October 16, 1974, NSA, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger (Kissinger Trip File), f. 2, box 3, GFPL.

signals that the Yugoslavs were interested in buying certain quantities of military equipment, which was further corroborated by the U.S. embassy in Budapest that reported on Yugoslav overtures to buy anti-aircraft missiles from the West.[582] Toon suggested that the United States should encourage Yugoslav–U.S. military cooperation because of the growing importance of the Yugoslav army in the political life of the country and its expected role after Tito's death.[583] The country officer for Yugoslavia at the Department of State, Henry Gilmore, reported on an informal meeting with Yugoslav diplomats who went to great lengths to explain the affair. One Yugoslav official said that the government had a "conclusive proof" that the Cominformists received aid from certain security organs in the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary but that Yugoslavia could not afford "an across-the-board confrontation" because it could not "shoulder all of the USSR by itself."[584]

Yugoslavia's dissatisfaction with the Soviet conduct and its inability to confront the Soviets openly had increased the importance of Kissinger's visit for both sides. For the Yugoslavs, the visit presented an opportunity to stabilize their relations with the United States by reaffirming the principles of the 1971 Tito–Nixon joint declaration.[585]

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[582] Embassy Budapest to Department of State, Telegram 02597, September 17, 1974, 1974BUDAPE02597, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed September 30, 2019)

[583] Toon a great proponent of the U.S.–Yugoslav cooperation because he believed that it was in American national interest to provide the Yugoslav Army with sophisticated weapons in order to cut Yugoslavia's dependence on the Soviets and regardless of "any intermittent downturns in our relations with Yugoslavia." Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Airgram A-362, July 11, 1974, P740073-2108, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/P-Reel Printouts, RG 59, NARA.

[584] Memorandum of Conversation, "Yugoslav Embassy Officers on Cominformist Affair," September 30, 1974, P740117-0022, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/P-Reel Printouts, RG 59, NARA.

[585] Although the Yugoslav government closely followed the Watergate affair and Nixon's ignominious end, Yugoslav officials believed that the Ford Administration would have the same strategic goals. Kissinger's political survival guaranteed continuity in American foreign policy, therefore there was no need to recalibrate Yugoslav foreign policy toward the United States or in general.

"Good, stable relations and cooperation between our country and the United States represent an important element of Yugoslavia's position in global affairs," a memo from the Office of Foreign Affairs of the Tito Cabinet stated, but also warned that certain positions would remain irreconcilable, namely the U.S. and Yugoslav divergent understandings of détente and nonalignment.[586]

Ambassador Toon advised his boss to avoid a polemical and confrontational approach toward Tito's recent statements (e.g. his allegation about the CIA's role in Cyprus) and remind again his Yugoslav interlocutors about American sensitivity. Also, Toon wrote, "it would help dispel any lingering Yugoslav nervousness that our dedication to Yugoslav survival, firm and unswerving since 1948, has somehow eroded in the era of détente."[587] Toon hoped that his last suggestion would help repair U.S.–Yugoslav relations by reassuring Belgrade that the country was not sacrificed on the altar of détente.

Kissinger heeded his ambassador's advice and in his November meetings with Yugoslav officials, he underscored U.S. support to Yugoslavia's independence. "The United States respects the independence of Yugoslavia, including its independence from the United States," Kissinger told Yugoslav Prime Minister Bijedić.[588] He reiterated this point in his conversation with Tito, adding that the U.S. goal was to go on with détente but "without sacrificing the interests of the United States or other countries," obviously

[586] Memorandum, "Cilj i sadrzaj posete Kisindžera," November 25, 1974, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–212.
[587] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 5119, October 16, 1974, NSA, Kissinger Trip File, f. 2, box 3, GFPL.
[588] Beleška o razgovoru Predsednika SIV Džemala Bijedića sa državnim sekretarom SAD dr. H. Kisindžerom, November 4, 1974, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–212.

referring to Yugoslavia.[589] Tito and the Yugoslavs appeared pliant. Tito underscored his desire for good Yugoslav–U.S. relations, adding that Yugoslavia would not sacrifice its principles, but would find a way to mend fences with the United States.[590] Moreover, Tito assumed a surprisingly constructive approach to the Middle East and, as Kissinger reported to Ford, "strongly supported our activities and said nothing about usual Arab claims." Kissinger concluded that constructive talks with the Yugoslavs "helped to clear the air" and created an opportunity to expand U.S.–Yugoslav relations in the areas of high-level political exchanges, economic, scientific, and military cooperation.[591]

The rapprochement, however, was only a tactical move for both sides and sources show that deep mistrust toward each side's motives remained. One of Senator Edward Kennedy's aides transmitted a summary of a conversation between Kennedy and Kissinger to the Yugoslav embassy in Washington just before Kissinger's trip to Yugoslavia. Kennedy said that the United States should support Yugoslavia's independence, but should not try to promote democracy in Yugoslavia because "we could lose everything." Kissinger agreed, although he insisted that the United States should encourage democratic tendencies in all socialist countries. "In Yugoslavia, there is a very strong disposition toward Western democracy," Kissinger allegedly said, adding that the western parts of the country, Slovenia and Croatia, were through their history better

[589] Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika SFRJ J.B. Tita sa Državnim sekretarom SAD H. Kisindžerom, November 4, 1974, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–212.
[590] Ibid. According to the U.S. record of conversation Tito said: "We shall certainly do our part but you must understand that we cannot renounce our principles but we can always discuss specific issues." See Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary Kissinger and President Tito, November 4, 1974, Document 71, *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Vol. E–15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973–1976.
[591] Memo, Henry Kissinger to President Ford, November 5, 1974, GFPL, NSA, Kissinger Trip File, f. 2, box 3, GFPL.

connected to the West than Yugoslavia's eastern parts.[592] This conversation made the Yugoslav uncomfortable for several reasons. It implied that the United States might interfere in Yugoslavia's domestic affairs by supporting pro-Western elements. Moreover, Kissinger's point about traditionally pro-Western parts of Yugoslavia reinforced the fears that a deal was made that would carve the spheres of influence after Tito's death or even earlier.

If the Yugoslavs did not fully trust Kissinger's sincerity, Kissinger also did not have a reason to believe in Yugoslavia's frankness. The CIA reported about Mojsov's briefing of Arab ambassadors on the Tito–Kissinger meeting as a "pro-Arab sermon" by Tito that largely misconstrued the content and tone of the meeting. The Agency noted that Mojsov's assessment of the talks was for Arab consumption, but that Tito had "advanced the standard Yugoslav line" that was critical of Israel and the United States.[593]

Yet, despite this lingering mistrust, the temporary truce that was established during Kissinger's short visit to Belgrade served both sides. For Belgrade, the visit in itself confirmed U.S. interest in Yugoslavia that was especially important in the context of the Cominformist affair and the evidence of Moscow's interference in Yugoslavia's internal affairs. Moreover, Kissinger reaffirmed the principles of the 1971 declaration and offered the prospects for new high-level meetings, including President Ford's trip to Yugoslavia[594] and Prime Minister Bijedić's trip to the United States in 1975. Finally,

[592] Kisindžerove ocene jugoslovensko–američkih odnosa i unutrašnje situacije u Jugoslaviji, no date, November, 1974, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–212.
[593] Memorandum, Denis Clift to Henry Kissinger, "Yugoslav Version of Your Meeting with Tito," December 27, 1974, NSA, box 22, GFPL.
[594] In his letters from August 21 and September 6, Tito invited Ford to visit Yugoslavia. The controversy over the alleged CIA involvement in Cyprus delayed Ford's response. After Kissinger's trip to Belgrade and normalization in U.S.–Yugoslav relations, President Ford generally accepted the invitation.

Kissinger's visit opened new opportunities for economic and military cooperation between the United States and Yugoslavia.

For Kissinger and Ford, stable relations with Yugoslavia corresponded with the administration's desire to stabilize its foreign policy after the tumultuous last two years of the Nixon presidency. The new administration wanted to continue with the previous administration's policy and preserve détente with the Soviet Union.[595] During 1973 and 1974 Yugoslavia proved its disrupting potential and in order to achieve the main foreign policy objective, it was important to, at least temporarily, tamp down distractions coming from this maverick state. As Yugoslavia Desk Officer Harry Gilmore noted, the "U.S.-Yugoslav relationship was not an easy one. You had to work at it."[596] Faced with increased Congressional scrutiny at home, especially after the Democrat overwhelming victory in November 1974 midterm elections that significantly impeded its ability to conduct foreign policy, the Ford administration and Kissinger sought to calm the periphery to achieve their main goal. With the Vladivostok Summit in sight, Kissinger's tour made sure that no surprises would ruin Ford's first meeting with Brezhnev.

This chapter began with the description of (staged) outbursts of anti-Americanism all over Yugoslavia. This demonstration against imperialism, i.e., American foreign policy, served several purposes. First, it functioned as an internal cohesive factor in the aftermath of a series of domestic crises and in preparations for the 1974 constitutional and political reforms (the 10th LCY Congress). Since the Soviet danger gradually abated

[595] George Herring, *From Colony to Superpower. U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 815.
[596] Charles Stuart Kennedy and Harry Joseph Gilmore, *Interview with Harry Joseph Gilmore*, February 3, 2003, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project. Available at https://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Gilmore-Harry-Joseph.pdf (accessed September 18, 2019).

after 1972, anti-Americanism offered an effective way to mobilize the domestic populace. Second, in 1973 and 1974, anti-Americanism was the least costly way for the regime to burnish its anti-imperialist credentials in the Third World. Yet, elevating the country's position in the Third World was not an end in itself, but rather a means to achieve the country's main objective: to disrupt U.S.–Soviet détente by encouraging and supporting regional and local disputes. This attitude was clearly visible in Yugoslavia's surprising engagement in Latin American (Panama, Chile, and, occasionally, Puerto Rico) and not-so-surprising activity in the Eastern Mediterranean (the 1973 Yom Kippur War and Cyprus) and sub-Saharan Africa (Angola and Mozambique). Cuba was yet to emerge as the chief competitor in the NAM and its retreat from global affairs provided Yugoslavia with a maneuvering space to promote its ideas of détente or, at least, to disrupt alleged deals between the superpowers.

Chapter 4: An untenable truce, 1975–1976

After 2almost two years of crisis, the first half of 1975 provided a short interval of tranquility in the U.S–Yugoslav relations. This period of calmness was marked by high-level exchanges between Belgrade and Washington, but also, as Washington saw it, Yugoslavia's "constructive role" before and during the CSCE in Helsinki. A truce, however, did not last long. By late 1975, U.S.–Yugoslav relations declined again because of Washington's disapproval of and suspicion about Belgrade's aid to the MPLA. Moreover, the case of a U.S. citizen, Laszlo Toth, who was imprisoned in Yugoslavia created a small crisis in Belgrade's relations with Washington. Angola and the Toth case led to a "tougher approach" toward the Belgrade regime. The new U.S. ambassador in Belgrade, Laurence Silberman, who was supported by Henry Kissinger, advocated harsh measures against unruly Yugoslavs. Silberman quickly gained notoriety in the Yugoslav capital and during his tenure in Belgrade U.S.–Yugoslav relations suffered a new blow.

Belgrade perceived Washington's criticism over Angola and pressure to release Toth as attempts to meddle in Yugoslavia's foreign and domestic affairs. Belgrade's suspicions about Washington's intentions were deepened by the so-called Sonnenfeldt Doctrine that advocated a "more natural and organic" relationship between the USSR and socialist Eastern European states. The Doctrine implicitly confirmed the existence of the spheres of influence in Europe. Belgrade's uneasiness with a "new Yalta" was heightened by Yugoslavia's deteriorating relations with the USSR. The 1974 Cominformist affair showed the transient nature of the Belgrade–Moscow rapprochement in 1972/3. Unbeknown to Washington, Belgrade was uneasy with the Soviet and the Cuban advancements in Angola. Although Yugoslavia initially had supported Havana's and

Moscow's assistance to the MPLA, their influence in Angola threatened to alter the character of the NAM. Also, Moscow's attempt to solidify its authority in Europe, demonstrated at the 1976 East Berlin conference of European communist parties, revived the memory of the Cominform. The Ford administration could not fully recognize these signs of another Yugoslav–Soviet split. Despite Kissinger's and Ford's efforts to normalize U.S–Yugoslav relations in early 1975, Washington's heavy-handed approach toward Yugoslavia fed Belgrade's mistrust toward American intentions, thus making normalization impossible.

In January 1975, Kissinger nudged Ford to visit Yugoslavia because Tito would value such a visit as a "fresh and clear U.S. endorsement of Yugoslav independence and non-alignment." Moreover, continued Kissinger, "such a visit will contribute positively to your foreign policy objectives not only toward Yugoslavia, but also in terms of maintaining stability in East-West relations."[597] As a prelude to this meeting at the top, President Ford invited Prime Minister Bijedić to visit the United States in March.

The affable Bosnian had been Prime Minister (the official title was the Chairman of the Federal Executive Council) since 1971. In 1972, then-Secretary of State Rogers invited Bijedić to visit the United States. That trip, however, was never realized because of de facto suspension of political relations between Belgrade and Washington. The normalization that occurred in the last months of 1974 reactivated Roger's invitation. Bijedić's visit, the first by a Yugoslav prime minister to the United States, was an opportunity to again reassure Belgrade of Washington's good intentions but also to

[597] Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford, January 10, 1975, Document 72, *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Vol. E–15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973–1976.

encourage the expansion of economic cooperation. Toon warned that the Bijedić visit comes at a "propitious time, a time when the Yugoslavs particularly need a visible vote of confidence from someone that counts."[598] His itinerary included meetings with President Ford, Kissinger's deputy (Kissinger was in the Middle East at that time), members of Congress, and American businessmen – the program that was "tailored to satisfy Yugoslav psyche."[599]

"We want Yugoslav–American cooperation to be as durable as that bridge in the town of Mostar," President Ford said in his toast to the Prime Minister, referring to Bijedić's birthplace and its famous landmark (destroyed by the Croat forces in the Bosnian civil war in 1993, but later rebuilt).[600] At the luncheon in Bijedić's honor, Ford repeated his administration's commitment to Yugoslavia's independence, unity, and territorial integrity. Bijedić received similar assurances from other interlocutors in Washington who, tacitly, suggested that good relations would depend on Yugoslavia's "constructive approach" and larger sensitivity toward American interests in global affairs. Kissinger's deputy, Acting Secretary Robert Ingersoll, who met with Bijedić in Kissinger's absence, confirmed Washington's interest in Yugoslavia's independence, but also suggested that Yugoslavia should use its leadership position within the NAM to temper the movement's most radical impulses.[601]

[598] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 01080, March 1, 1975, NSA, Presidential Briefings, "Yugoslavia – Prime Minister Bijedic (2)," box 6, GFPL.
[599] Ibid.
[600] President's Toast, March 19, 1975, NSA, Presidential Briefings, "Yugoslavia – Prime Minister Bijedic (1)," box 6, GFPL.
[601] Informacija o razgovorima Predsednika SIV-a Džemala Bijedića za vreme posete SAD, March 25, 1975, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–20 SAD.

The visit did not bring anything substantial in terms of economic and military cooperation between Yugoslavia and the United States. However, as Toon suggested, it gave a boost of confidence to the Yugoslav leadership. Moreover, President Ford confirmed to Bijedić that he would visit Yugoslavia after the summit in Helsinki that was yet to be scheduled. The successful conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and Ford's visit to Yugoslavia were expected to dispel any suspicions about Yugoslavia's stability at the present moment and in the future.

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the limits of détente

The CSCE negotiations that began in November 1972 in Helsinki created an opportunity for Yugoslavia to promote its vision of détente. One of the chief creators and interpreters of Yugoslav diplomacy, Leo Mates, wrote that Yugoslavia's participation in the conference was motivated by its desire to improve relations in Europe, but also by certain particular interests that were, in Mates' words, "generously interpreted."[602] These included the issues of inviolability of state borders and territorial integrity, the status of ethnic minorities, and military-security issues.

In November 1954, when the Soviets, for the first time, proposed a summit on European security, the Yugoslav government rejected the Soviet overture although it supported the idea in principle.[603] In the subsequent years, Tito entertained the idea of a

[602] "Generous interpretation" suggested that Yugoslavia's identified some of its own problems with European problems in general, thus by insisting on their resolution it did not betrayed its principal positions toward European security. Leo Mates, *Međunarodni odnosi socijalističke Jugoslavije* (Beograd: Nolit, 1976), 178.

[603] At the time, Yugoslav–Soviet relations were under the shadow of the 1948 split. The Soviets were unsatisfied with Yugoslavia's noncommittal tone, despite Yugoslavia's general support of the idea. The Yugoslav Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Veljko Mićunović, stated in bewilderment that the Soviet representative was visibly dissatisfied with his response "despite that, for the first time in diplomatic correspondence between us and the USSR since 1948, we said something [positive] like about the act of the

conference on European security with other foreign leaders but those plans never came to fruition.[604] The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia created a strong impetus for Yugoslavia's larger interest in a conference that would discuss the problems of European security. When initial negotiations began in November 1972, Yugoslavia enthusiastically joined in.

The 1972 Platform for the conference outlined Yugoslavia's main objective. "We should direct our activities that are within our abilities so that we contribute to the continuation, deepening and extension of positive processes in Europe, having in mind that these processes should encompass all Europe and extend to its neighboring areas [and]… create new democratic relations in Europe… that would guarantee political and economic independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all European states," the Platform stated.[605] The conference would be able to achieve that goal, the Yugoslavs argued, only if it transcended "interbloc arrangements," i.e. superpowers' deals at the expense of small and neutral European countries.

The second phase of the conference that started in January 1973 outlined the agenda for the meeting that would be ironed out later that summer during the third phase in Geneva. Yugoslavia was cautiously optimistic about the success of the conference. The lukewarm U.S. attitude was visibly displayed to the conference attendants.[606] The

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Soviet government."Zabeleška o razgovoru Državnog podsekretara Veljka Mićunovića sa ambasadorom SSSR Valjkovim, November 25, 1954, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–d/1–1.

[604] Rinaa Kulla wrote that in 1967, Tito and Urho Kekkonen of Finland discussed the idea. See Rinaa Kulla, "The Birth and Development of the CSCE: Finnish and Yugoslav Models of Neutrality in the Early Cold War," in Vladimir Bilandžić, Dittmar Dahlmann, Milan Kosanović, eds., *From Helsinki to Belgrade: The First CSCE Follow-up Meeting and the Crisis of Détente* (Bonn: Bonn University Press, 2012), 53.

[605] Nacrt Platforme SFRJ za Konferenciju o evropskoj saradnji i bezbednosti, November 21, 1972, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/63 KEBS.

[606] Sarah B. Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War. A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 22. In October 1973, "against

Yugoslav delegation reported that during the second phase the United States also acted "passively" and left the initiative to its allies.[607] In addition to Washington's weak interest in the conference, other factors contributed to Yugoslavia's cautious attitude. Although Moscow's position toward various issues (security, borders, and human contacts) "evolved" during the second phase, the Yugoslavs reasonably suspected that the Soviets desired the conference to rubber stamp the postwar European status quo. Moreover, the Yugoslav initiative to include the Mediterranean security issues in the conference proceedings did not find much understanding. The Soviets, whose political investment in the conference (and risk) was large, found the initiative unhelpful because it threatened to bring the always sensitive issue of the Middle East thus decrease the chance of an agreement.

Sarah Snyder noted that negotiations stalled because Western European countries were unwilling to compromise over some politically sensitive issues in the so-called Basket III that dealt with human contacts.[608] The Yugoslav delegation reported that Western Europe's attitude generally and "objectively" contributed to the "weakening of the bilateralism of the USSR and the United States," but warned that the European Nine tried to use its influence to bring "ideological and polemical tones" to the conference.[609] Besides, Washington's continued disinterest in the conference further contributed to this

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background of [the] Middle East crisis, the State Department asked the U.S. Delegation to CSCE in Geneva to take a posture "which will be passive and which to extent possible will ensure that no positive action or forward movement is taken." "It is not desired that you explicitly link our go-slow attitude to their [Soviet] actions in [the] Middle East," the State Department wrote. Department of State to US Delegation to CSCE, Telegram 204233, October 14, 1973, Walter Stoessel Papers, folder 13c, box 5, Georgetown University Lauinger Library.

[607] Izveštaj o drugoj fazi multilateralnih pripremnih razgovora za KEB u Helsinkiju od 15. januara – 9. februara 1975, February 15, 1975, str. pov. 171/1, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/63 KEBS.

[608] Snyder, *Human Rights Activism*, 26.

[609] Konferencija o evropskoj bezbednosti i saradnji (KEBS), January 15, 1974, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/63 KEBS.

stagnation and ignited Yugoslav suspicions that the United States and the USSR were negotiating directly, behind the backs of other participants.[610] Because of these factors, in spring 1975, the Yugoslav delegation reported that the conference achieved very little progress. Yet, at the same time, the Yugoslavs were satisfied with what had been achieved. In a self-congratulatory note to all Yugoslav diplomatic outposts, the Foreign Secretariat wrote that the conference despite its lack of progress was a success because the Yugoslav delegation managed to "incorporate the factor of nonalignment [in the conference program]" and to assert certain Yugoslav interests such as the issues of national minorities and migrations. Besides, concluded the report, "We, during numerous contacts that we have established at the conference and outside of it, confirmed our independent position and our commitment to the principles of nonalignment."[611]

Belgrade had some good reasons to be satisfied with the conference. In July 1975, during the final days of the third phase, the participants supported the idea (despite Finland's objection) that Yugoslavia should host a follow-up meeting in 1977. That idea, if realized, would reaffirm Yugoslavia's (and Tito's) reputation and elevate their prestige in Europe and beyond. "We think that it is particularly important that continuity [of the CSCE] begins in one nonaligned country," Yugoslav Assistant Secretary, Borislav Badurina, wrote to the Yugoslav delegation in Geneva.[612] The final stage of the CSCE held in Helsinki in August gave the Yugoslavs and especially Tito many reasons to be satisfied.

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[610] Stalna misija SFRJ Ženeva SSIP-u, April 5, 1975, DA MSP RS, PA 1975 KEBS, f. 181, d. 2, s. 411179.
[611] SSIP Grupa za KEBS svim ambasadama u Evropi, SAD, i Kanadi, February 18, 1975, DA MSP RS, PA 1975 KEBS, f. 181, d. 1, s. 47149.
[612] SSIP Kabinet PSS B. Badurine Stalnoj misiji SFRJ Ženeva, July 19, 1975, DA MSP RS, PA 1975 KEBS, f. 181, d. 6, s. 434753.

"One of the busiest statesmen in Helsinki today is President Tito," wrote the Yugoslav weekly *NIN*. Tito's secretary Mandić later recalled, with much nostalgia, that Tito's popularity in Helsinki had reached "planetary proportions" and that the respect toward Tito was palpable. When Tito entered the conference hall in Helsinki, Mandić wrote, the crowd parted before him "without anyone's… intervention."[613] Tito was satisfied that the Conference and that meeting signaled a "new spirit that reflects a positive process of democratization of international relations." Yet, Tito warned that the main problems of European security remained unsolved, which gave greater importance to the follow-up meeting in Belgrade.[614] Despite Tito's warning, Yugoslavia could be satisfied with the results of the Conference. The Helsinki Final Act confirmed the inviolability of state borders – an issue with particular importance in the context of Bulgarian and Italian territorial pretensions. Moreover, the Third Basket guaranteed protection for South Slav ethnic minorities in neighboring countries.[615] The Final Act adopted measures to ease military tensions in Europe, also an issue that Yugoslavia and other European neutrals found important. Finally, the decision to organize the follow-up meeting in Belgrade gave enormous propaganda potential that elevated Yugoslavia's and

[613] Hari Štajner, "Trenutak istorije," August 3, 1975, *NIN*, 11. Mandić, *S Titom,* 169–170. Ivanji made a direct reference to Moses in his book. "If Tito would like to go somewhere, out of respect, a mass of statesmen would part before him like the Red Sea before Moses," Ivanji wrote. Ivan Ivanji, *Titov prevodilac* (Beograd: Laguna, 2014), 187.
[614] Tanjug, "Početak nove etape," August 3, 1975, *Politika*, 1.
[615] The sources suggest that Yugoslavia thought that the Third Basket was not as important as the Baskets One and Two. Yet, the Yugoslavs recognized its possible impact on "delicate political and ideological relations" between the two blocs and its potential misuse for propaganda. "One moderate formulation is needed that would take in consideration real possibilities," a report stated. See Izveštaj o drugoj fazi multilateralnih pripremnih razgovora za KEB u Helsinkiju od 15. januara – 9. februara 1975, February 15, 1975, Str. pov. 171/1, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/63 KEBS.

its leader's stature in European and global affairs but also further strengthened Tito's position at home.[616]

"Their 24 hours": President Ford visits Belgrade

Tito's and Yugoslavia's prestige (if one was able to disentangle one from another) received an additional boost just hours after the Helsinki meeting. On August 3, Ford and Kissinger landed in Belgrade for one-day meeting with Tito and other Yugoslav officials. Yugoslavia was one stop on Ford's European tour that included West Germany, Poland, Finland, and Romania. The White House in its internal documents referred to Poland, Yugoslavia, and Romania as the "favored trio" but noted that Yugoslavia was a "class in itself." "Our strategic interest in holding Soviet influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans to the minimum level possible heavily influences our policy toward Yugoslavia and Romania," an NSC report stated.[617] In the case of Yugoslavia, the primary goal was, as outlined in the Kissinger's January memo to Ford, to buttress the Tito regime and Tito's successors by demonstrating a "fresh and clear" reaffirmation of the U.S. interest in Yugoslavia's independence. Ford's advisers reminded the president that Yugoslavia was a "country waiting for the end of an era." Therefore, Ford's visit needed to demonstrate Washington's continuing interest in Yugoslavia's viability as an independent country. This, of course, would require Yugoslavia's better understanding of

[616] Calic, "The Beginning of the End," in Calic, Neutatz, and Obertries, eds. *The Crisis of Socialist Modernity*, 78.
[617] Memo, Denis Clift to Henry Kissinger, July 2, 1975, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Country File: Europe General, box 1, GFPL.

U.S. positions on various international issues, the point that numerous U.S. officials, including Kissinger, emphasized in their talks with the Yugoslavs.[618]

Belgrade wanted to keep its anti-imperialist posture, yet it recognized that it had to show more sensitivity to U.S. interests. "Our country still has to unmask U.S. policies whenever these are conducted from the positions of imperialism, hegemony, and neocolonialism. Yet, the problem is how to do it without the direct confrontation with the United States and deterioration of bilateral relations," stated in the Platform prepared for Ford's visit. "We should make sure to avoid automatic and instinctive criticism of U.S. policies when we don't have reason to do so."[619] To justify this new approach, the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat argued that the Ford administration showed a "more flexible approach" toward many international issues and particularly toward the developing countries (i.e. nonaligned). Yet, the Secretariat warned that the main strategic direction of the new administration remained the same and that this flexibility was the result of Ford's and Kissinger's difficult position at home, but also the consequence of a series of setbacks that U.S. foreign policy suffered lately, including American defeat in Indochina, the deadlock in the Middle East peace process, and the decline of U.S. influence among NATO allies.[620]

This perception of Ford's and Kissinger's difficulties at home and abroad but also the signs of American goodwill toward Yugoslavia demonstrated during the Kissinger–

[618] Memo, Henry Kissinger to the White House, no date, 1975, NSA, NSC Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff: Files, 1974–1977, box 70, GFPL.
[619] Informacija (Platforma) za predstojeću posetu Predsednika SAD Džeralda Forda Jugoslaviji, July 1, 1975, broj 431697, SSIP, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–215.
[620] Informacija o američkoj spoljnoj politici i unutrašnjim kretanjima u SAD, July 1, 1975, broj 431697, SSIP, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–215.

Minić and Ford–Bijedić meetings made Belgrade more assertive in extracting benefits from the Ford administration. The Foreign Secretariat composed a list of request for the administration that accentuated the Yugoslav main goals to acquire modern military and civilian technology from the United States; continue credit arrangements with the Ex-Im Bank and other American financial institutions; make the administration more forthcoming in suppressing the activity of anti-Titoist émigré groups; and, lastly, purchase Nazi documentary movies about the Yugoslav Partisans that had been out of Yugoslavia's reach for decades.[621] The use of Ford's visit for the regime's domestic and foreign propaganda purposes was implied.

"Their 24 hours," stated below the photograph of Tito and Ford standing next to each other on the cover page of *NIN*. With Tito in focus, appearing slightly taller than Ford, the title suggested that the meeting was between two equal partners. Moreover, "their 24 hours" meant that two world statesmen could finally dedicate some time to each other, after the gaggle of heads of state in Helsinki. "We heard from other heads of state [in Helsinki] that Ford was often asking Tito for his opinion on certain issues and then he would listen carefully what Tito has to say," wrote the *NIN*'s correspondent from Helsinki.[622]

Ford's short visit was an extraordinary public event. Similar to his predecessor five years earlier, a large crowd greeted the American president. On August 4, the city of Belgrade awarded him a golden plaque and after the ceremony, he met with ordinary citizens at one of the busiest city streets. Although it was apparent that the Yugoslav

[621] Podsetnik za razgovore za vreme posete Predsednika SAD Dž. Forda i DS H. Kisindžer-a Jugoslaviji, July 31, 1975, SSIP-Uprava za Severnu Ameriku, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–215.
[622] Miodrag Marović, "Njihova 24 časa," August 10, 1975, *NIN*, 36.

government wanted to give as much publicity to Ford's visit as possible, some Yugoslav officials judged Ford's appearance as phony. "Ford seems more measured, more stable, more 'European' than Nixon. Yet, in his manners, there is something that is for our taste, and European taste in general, peculiar and barely acceptable," chief Serbian communist, Draža Marković, wrote in his diary. He mentioned that Ford's interactions with his family and the ordinary Yugoslavs were particularly appalling.[623]

Marković also disliked Kissinger's directness in communication with the Yugoslav officials. Belgrade was bothered by Ford's and Kissinger's insistence that Yugoslavia should be more mindful of U.S. interest in the Third World. On August 3, during the first Tito–Ford meeting, Kissinger and Ford pressed the Yugoslavs on their role in the NAM. Kissinger criticized the NAM because, in his opinion, it was an anti-American bloc. Tito's aspirations to lead the Movement gave Yugoslavia a better position, but also the responsibility to tone down criticism of American policies and détente. Moreover, as Ford told his Yugoslav counterpart, Americans' love and admiration for Yugoslavia did not warrant harsh rhetoric coming from some Yugoslav officials.

Although Tito rejected the notion that the NAM was a separate bloc – a "dirty word" for Yugoslav politicians and IR scholars – he agreed that policy differences could be expressed with "very nice words" and promised to his interlocutors that Yugoslavia would assume a less confrontational stance in the future. Tito said that Yugoslav–U.S. cooperation was crucial for the success of the 1977 Belgrade conference, but that it was

[623] Marković, *Život i politika*, vol. 1, 137.

also necessary to keep the press under control. In other words, if Belgrade was going to be less critical toward the United States, Washington would have to cease the "negative campaign" in the press against Yugoslavia.[624]

The administration's goal was to encourage Yugoslavia to act as a moderating voice at the NAM foreign ministers conference in Lima, Peru, from August 25–30 but also at the 30th UNGA Session that was scheduled for September. The main issue for Washington was to avoid any disturbance in the Middle East, particularly in the context of Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy and efforts to convince Egypt and Israel to sign an agreement over the Sinai Peninsula. On August 30, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, John Armitage, warned Granfil that at the meetings in Lima and New York nonaligned "must do nothing to jeopardize chances of reaching Middle East settlement." Moreover, Armitage said that he "could not stress enough" U.S. concern about the plan to expel Israel from the UN.[625]

The Yugoslavs delivered in Lima. The new U.S. ambassador in Belgrade, Lawerence Silberman, (who replaced Malcolm Toon in May), often argued for a hardline approach toward Belgrade. This time, however, he was satisfied with Yugoslavia's

[624] Yugoslav officials believed that the Western press led an "orchestrated campaign" against the regime. The aim of this alleged "campaign" was to magnify Yugoslav problems. They were particularly sensitive to the discussions about Yugoslavia's stability, certain internal economic and political issues, or matters that potentially could embarrass the regime. For example, the 1974 "Case of Eight" related to the expulsion of eight professors from the University of Belgrade for their alleged anti-regime activity received wide publicity in the West.

[625] Department of State to Embassy in Belgrade, Telegram 207466, August 30, 1975, 1975STATE207466, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed October 7, 2019). The Yugoslav "radical" stance toward Israel was infamous in Washington. Unlike its Arab allies, Belgrade did not want to abolish the Israeli state. Tito told Ford that he believed the Arabs should recognize Israel. "Israel is a fact, and you cannot push it into the sea," Tito said. He said that Israel's "privileged status" in the UN enraged Yugoslavia's Arab allies. He, however, said that Israel's explusion from the UN would be an "unfortunate thing." Stenografske beleške sa razgovora Predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita sa Predsednikom Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, Njegovom ekselencijom gospodinom Džeraldom Fordom, August 3, 1975, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–a–3/107–215.

appearances in Lima and at the UNGA. Silberman noted that as the result of the January Kissinger's meeting with Minić and Ford's trip to Belgrade, the Yugoslavs "have been more helpful to us on issues of fundamental importance than at any time in memory."[626] Silberman's endorsement of Yugoslavia's new, non-anti-American course was particularly important because some members of the administration did not see Yugoslavia's role in Lima and New York as constructive. For example, the U.S. representative in the UN, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, based on a false report from the Associated Press (AP), accused Yugoslavia of leading a verbal attack against the United States and suggested to the State Department punitive measures against Belgrade. Silberman noted that "someone in N.Y. has private war with GoY," but reminded Moynihan that, contrary to the AP report, Yugoslavia played a crucial role in preventing Israel's expulsion from the UN.[627] However, Moynihan's attack on Yugoslavia was part of the new policy of resisting attacks in the UN and other international forums. "The tactic, initiated at this mission on the instructions of the President and the Secretary of State, has been to respond to attack by counterattack," Moynihan wrote.[628] Moynihan chose Yugoslavia to demonstrate this new policy. He accused Belgrade of supporting an "insurgency in Puerto Rico" by supporting observer status of Puerto Rico in the UN Special Committee on Decolonization and at the Lima conference. "In the most placatory way I suggested that he certainly would not like the United States to start supporting

[626] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 04979, September 20, 1975, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, "Yugoslavia – State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE–EXIDS," box 22, GFPL.
[627] Department of State to US Mission UN, Telegram 225257, September 22, 1975, 1975STATE225257, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed October 7, 2019).
[628] US Mission UN to Department of State, Telegram 243, January 23, 1976, Daniel P. Moynihan Papers, folder 3, box I–334, LOC.

some Croatian liberation movement at the United Nations," Moynihan reported.[629] According to Moynihan, the Yugoslav representative "turned purple" but his actions had the "effect that was hoped for – that governments are beginning to think that anti-American postures at the UN and elsewhere are not without cost and that the cost has to be calculated."[630]

Kissinger, who met with Minić in Washington on September 25, commended the Yugoslavs for taking "better account of our viewpoints."[631] In his report, Minić pointed out how Kissinger's attitude was ostentatiously friendly and that his friendliness should be attributed to Yugoslavia's growing importance in international affairs. Minić agreed that bilateral relations between the United States and Yugoslavia were on a good track, but warned his American colleague that nobody would be able to change Yugoslavia's policy of nonalignment and complained again about "distortions" in the American press.[632]

Kissinger's and Ford's meetings with the highest-ranking Yugoslav officials in the second half of 1975 suggested that the period of confrontation between Belgrade and Washington was over. However, as the Moynihan case demonstrated, the administration's new policy of "responding to attacks by counterattack" meant that there would be little tolerance in Washington toward Belgrade's anti-imperialist rhetoric. Just

[629] Ibid.
[630] Ibid.
[631] Department of State to Embassy Belgrade, Telegram 229874, September 26, 1975, 1975STATE 229874, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed October 7, 2019).
[632] Kissinger replied how Minić should understand that the American press was constantly undermining the administration's position as well. Izveštaj o radnoj poseti Potpredsednika SIV-a i Saveznog sekretara za inostrane poslove M. Minića Vašingtonu i razgovorima sa državnim sekretarom H. Kisindžerom, September 25, 1975, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–20 SAD.

weeks after the last Kissinger–Minić meeting, U.S.–Yugoslav relations went through another crisis, this time because of Yugoslavia's role in Angola that endangered U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa. Yugoslavia's involvement in Angola offers a good vantage point to observe global ambitions of Yugoslavia's foreign policy and how it collided with the interests of the superpowers but also other nonaligned states.

The Yugoslavs in Angola[633]

In New Belgrade, slicing through Blocks 58 and 70a, runs a street named after Dr. Agostinho Neto. The Angolan poet, revolutionary and the country's first president after Portugal's withdrawal in 1975, is largely forgotten by the inhabitants of this post-socialist metropolis. Yet, thanks to the present day connections between the Serbian military-industrial complex and the Angolan Armed Forces, Neto's name escaped the decommunization that purged names associated with socialist Yugoslavia.[634] Neto's presence in the topography of the former Yugoslavia's capital stands not only as a symbol of the lucrative business deals of today, but also as a resilient reminder of the connections between Yugoslavia and Angola that went back to the early 1960s.

The first contacts between the Angolan liberation movements and Yugoslavia were not established with the MPLA but with the Union of Angolan Peoples (União das

[633] A longer version of this sub-chapter was published under the title "Comrades in Arms: Yugoslav Military Aid to Liberation Movements of Angola and Mozambique, 1961-1976," in Lena Dallywater, Helder Adegar Fonseca, Chris Saunders, eds., *Southern African Liberation Movements in the Global Cold War "East": Transnational Connections between Activists and the Eastern Bloc, 1960 - 1990* (Munich: Oldenbourg DeGruyter, 2019).

[634] Because of these contemporary links, in 2010, Serbian and Angolan officials dedicated a small plaque dedicated to Neto. "This plaque will be important for the New Belgradians because a number of them who live on this street do not know who was Dr. Agostinho Neto", the official website of the Novi Beograd municipal government stated. See "Otkrivena spomen-ploca u ulici Dr. Agostina Neta", 17 September 2010, http://back.novibeograd.rs/otkrivena-spomen-ploca-u-ulici-dr-agostina-neta (accessed October 10, 2018). The plaque was stolen and re-dedicated in 2014.

Populações de Angola, UPA) whose leader Holden Roberto visited Yugoslavia in 1960. However, the first summit of the NAM in 1961 brought both anti-colonial Angolan political factions, the UPA, and the MPLA, represented by Mario de Andrade, to Belgrade. Although the Yugoslavs maintained relations with both movements, in the early 1960s Belgrade tilted slightly toward the UPA for a number of reasons. The Yugoslavs believed that Roberto's movement was better organized and stronger militarily. Also, the FNLA received wider support from other African countries than the MPLA. Yet, the Yugoslavs were wary of its connections with the West and its supposed pro-American stance.[635]

By 1964, however, Yugoslavia completely abandoned the FNLA and concentrated its political and material support on the MPLA. The reasons for this shift were twofold. First, the MPLA gave more attention to courting Yugoslav officials. Roberto twice postponed his visit to Yugoslavia in 1963 and 1964, which annoyed Belgrade.[636] In contrast, MPLA officials used every opportunity to meet with the

[635] Despite this suspicion, Yugoslavia continued to send a majority of its aid to the UPA. In 1961, the UPA was renamed the National Liberation Front of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, FNLA. One of the reasons of Belgrade's support to the UPA/FNLA was that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) recognized Roberto's movement as the Angola's only legitimate liberation movement. In 1962/63, Belgrade sent US$ 3,000 to the FNLA (roughly equivalent to US$ 26, 000 in 2020) and a half of that sum to the MPLA; over 1,700 kg of medical material was divided evenly; Yugoslavia provided six scholarships for members of the FNLA and only three for members of the MPLA. Informacija o Robertu Holdenu, predsedniku Nacionalnog fronta za oslobodjenje Angole (FNLA) i ciljevima njegove posete Jugoslaviji, no date 1964, AJ, SSRNJ fond 142, I–553. The MPLA's president Mario Andrade told his Yugoslav interlocutors in 1961 that the UPA was militarily stronger because of the military aid from the US and Tunisia. Moreover, he accused the UPA of participating in the conspiracy against Patrice Lumumba. Zabeleška o razgovoru sa angolskom delegacijom koja je učestvovala na konferenciji neangažovanih zemalja, September 14, 1961, AJ, A CKSKJ fond 507, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze, Angola, IX, 3/I–2.

[636] After 1961 Roberto never visited Yugoslavia again. However, in late 1973, the Yugoslav Embassy in Kinshasa re-instated contacts with Roberto. These contacts extended throughout 1974 but without results. Yugoslavia's reasons for these talks were pragmatic because Belgrade believed that the FNLA would participate in government after Angola's independence. Yet, "our sympathies and our support should go to the MPLA, but in the future we should not ignore other two movements", a report stated Ambasada SFRJ Luanda SSIP-u, January 31, 1975, DA MSP RS, PA 1975 Angola, f. 226, d. 1, s. 44740.

Yugoslavs. The second factor that led to Yugoslavia's shift from Roberto to his competitors was linked to larger Cold War issues of the 1960s. In the context of the Sino-Soviet split, Beijing intensified its attacks on nonalignment and tried to counter the alleged Soviet influence over the movement with calls for Afro-Asian solidarity. This Chinese interference led to divisions within the NAM that escalated around the October 1964 summit in Cairo. Under the Chinese influence, the "militants" such as Cuba, Indonesia, and Algeria, challenged Yugoslavia's position within the movement.[637] To enhance their revolutionary credentials, the Yugoslavs turned toward movements such as the MPLA that were more "progressive" in their ideological orientation.

Prior to 1968, Yugoslav aid to the MPLA consisted mostly of money, food, and medical supplies.[638] Despite pleas for guns, the Yugoslavs refused to send any because, as one Yugoslav report stated, "it would be easy to establish their origin," which could create political problems for Belgrade.[639] Moreover, the Yugoslavs believed that liberation movements should send their requests for weapons to independent African countries, in order to avoid the appearance of outside interference in African affairs.[640]

In many ways, 1968 represented a watershed moment in Yugoslav-MPLA relations. Superpowers' interventions (Vietnam, Czechoslovakia) further emphasized the need for strengthening political and military networks between nonaligned governments and revolutionary movements that would serve to discourage imperialist interventions.

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[637] Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and Non-aligned World*, 303–304.
[638] Predlog pomoći MPLA, February 5, 1965, AJ, SSRNJ fond 142, I–553.
[639] Informacija o Robertu Holdenu, predsedniku Nacionalnog fronta za oslobođenje Angole (FNLA) i ciljevima njegove posete Jugoslaviji, no date 1964, AJ, SSRNJ fond 142, I–553.
[640] In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Yugoslavia furnished the Algerian National Liberation Front with infantry and artillery weapons. These actions elevated Yugoslavia's status in Africa, but also endangered Yugoslavia's relations with France. However, until 1974/5, Yugoslavia did not have diplomatic relations with Portugal.

Also, during his visit to Yugoslavia in early 1968 Neto informed his interlocutors that the MPLA would intensify its armed struggle.[641] These factors elevated the movement's prestige among the "progressive forces" in the world. During Neto's visit to Belgrade, in January 1968, the Yugoslavs mulled over the idea of supplying the MPLA with some weapons and providing assistance in moving MPLA troops and ordnance from Brazzaville to Dar es-Salaam.[642] In September 1968, Belgrade dispatched the first shipment of arms (consisting mostly of Yugoslav-made bolt-action rifles and WWII-era machine guns) to the Angolan revolutionaries. Neto visited Belgrade in October 1968 – his fourth visit since 1966 – and was given an audience with Tito, something Neto had sought for years.

Yugoslavia's Angolan policy was critical to the country's success in mobilizing African and Asian countries for the Third Summit of the NAM in Lusaka in September 1970 because it lifted Belgrade's revolutionary credentials in Africa. A Yugoslav confidential report stated proudly that 1970 was the most "fruitful year" for the Yugoslav-MPLA relationship.[643] In 1970, the Yugoslavs sent additional quantities of light weapons and ammunition that included 3,000 rifles, 230 machine guns, 200

[641]Apparently, the Yugoslavs took MPLA propaganda at face value. Yugoslav documents suggest that Belgrade believed in Neto's claims that the MPLA controlled large swaths of Angola and that its leadership would continue struggling from within the country. See Zabeleška o razgovoru druga Josipa Đerđe sa Dr. Agustinom Netoom, predsednikom Narodnog pokreta za oslobođenje Angole, January 18, 1968, AJ, SSRNJ fond 142, I–553. However, these statements largely inflated MPLA's successes. John Marcum noted how "at times of declining fortunes and increased frustration," the MPLA resorted to "military claims so exaggerated as to defy credence." Moreover, Neto's pledge to move to Angola was "only partially realized." See John Marcum, *Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare, 1962-1976*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), 181–183.

[642] Predlog za dodeljivanje pomoći Narodnom pokretu za oslobođenje Angole (MPLA), January 24, 1968, AJ, SSRNJ fond 142, I–553.

[643] Informacija o pomoći SFR Jugoslavije Narodnom pokretu za oslobođenje Angole (MPLA), March 5, 1971, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/3–3. Records of the Yugoslav Secretariat of Defence show that the value of Yugoslavia's increased five times from 1969 to 1970 (from YUN 1,186.371 to YUN 6,047.089), and in 1971 dropped in half (to YUN 2,995.273). See Nesvrstanost i pitanja odbrane, Prilog br. 13, AJ, KPR, fond 837, I–4–a/9.

bazookas, and 1, 5 million pieces of ammunition. This ordinance was largely obsolete for Yugoslavia's defense needs, but gave the MPLA an edge over its competitors.[644] Moreover, Belgrade increased the amount of money allocated to the MPLA, and, in the fall of 1970, the movement opened an Information Center in Belgrade. Finally, Yugoslavia continued to provide medical treatments for MPLA functionaries and fighters, and, for the first time, training for its military cadres.

In summer 1972, the Socialist Alliance (SSRNJ) sent a five-member delegation to visit liberated territories in Angola. The primary task was to gain first-hand experience about the situation in Angola and to appraise the effectiveness of Yugoslav aid. A month-long trip was the "culmination of friendly relations" between the SSRNJ and the MPLA.[645] Moreover, the Yugoslavs took pride in the fact that their delegation was the first one from the socialist world to visit Angola. The delegation included representatives from different organizations such as the youth alliance, trade unions, and the Yugoslav People's Army. Yugoslav sources, unfortunately, provide few details about this trip. The Yugoslavs believed that it further advanced the relationship between Yugoslavia and the MPLA and that the delegation had visited about "200 km of liberated territories and was

[644] The Angolans praised the quality of these weapons, particularly a Yugoslav copy of the German K98 Mauser rifle. Other weapons like bazookas and recoilless guns the Angolans did not know how to use properly, while some old German guns were prone to misfire and jamming that the Yugoslavs suspected was the result of poor maintenance. However, the structure of Yugoslav aid made the MPLA entirely dependent on Yugoslavia for parts and ammunition. The Angolans noted that only Yugoslavia had ammunition in 7, 9 mm caliber and suggested that it would be better if Belgrade sent them US-made weapons that were delivered as military aid to Yugoslavia in the 1950s. See Poseta vojnog rukovodioca NOP Angole Henrika Kareire – izveštaj, October 16, 1970, AJ, SSRNJ fond 142, I-553; Informacija o pomoći SFR Jugoslavije Narodnom pokretu za oslobođenje Angole (MPLA), March 5, 1971, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/3–3.

[645] Delegacija SSRNJ u poseti oslobođenoj teritoriji Angole, July 21, 1972, AJ, SSRNJ fond 142, I–468.

assured of the successes of the liberation movement… and the difficulties that the movement faced."[646]

Although the trip was a political success, in 1972 Yugoslavia's aid to the MPLA dwindled from the 1970/71 levels. Belgrade continued with its political support, which was demonstrated at the August 1972 NAM Ministerial Conference in Georgetown and in bilateral contacts.[647] However, because of the economic crisis at home, the Yugoslav organizations were unable to allocate money for their partners in Africa. "The situation is absurd: [our] country promises that it will give all possible aid to L[iberation]M[ovements] […] but then fails to provide a means to do so," a Yugoslav report complained.[648] This situation caused dire political consequences for Yugoslavia's position in Africa and other countries took advantage of that to increase their influence. "During this period that coincides with unresolved issues of the Fund's financing, begins massive delivery of Soviet and Chinese aid," a memo noted, warning about Yugoslavia's diminishing influence in Africa.[649] These financial issues were resolved only in the summer of 1973 when Yugoslavia needed to enhance its position in the Global South before the Fourth Summit of the NAM in Algeria.

[646] Saradnja SSRNJ sa oslobodilačkim pokretima i pomoć Jugoslavije, May 23, 1973, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/15

[647] The Yugoslavs served as an intermediary between the MPLA and the West German Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) and, on Neto's behalf, asked for financial aid from the SPD. Belgrade believed that the MPLA's connections with European social-democrats would "soften the combative edge" of the movement. Informacija o oslobodilačkim pokretima Afrike, October 5, 1971, AJ, SSRNJ fond 142, I–452; "Under the impulse of Sweden, European social democratic parties show an increasing interest in L[iberation]M[ovements] and intervene with significant humanitarian, cultural and financial aid", a report stated. Zabeleška o nekim pitanjima saradnje i pomoći antikolonijalnim, nacionalno-oslobodilačkim i drugim pokretima u svetu, 12 September 1972, AJ, SSRNJ fond 142, A–226.

[648] Informacija o oslobodilačkim pokretima Afrike, October 5, 1971, AJ, SSRNJ fond 142, I–452.

[649] Zabeleška o nekim pitanjima saradnje i pomoći antikolonijalnim, nacionalno-oslobodilačkim i drugim pokretima u svetu, September 12, 1972, AJ, SSRNJ fond 142, A–226.

In 1973, Yugoslavia managed to send 300 semi-automatic rifles and a significant amount of ammunition and rockets to Angola. However, the MPLA's military commander, Henrique Teles "Iko" Carreira, who visited Belgrade in the fall of 1973 urged the Yugoslav government to provide additional aid. According to Carreira, the Soviets were reluctant to help them because of alleged Neto's attempts of rapprochement with China. Moreover, the Soviets did not want to internationalize the Angolan struggle, and the Angolans believed that Moscow's reluctance was the result of détente with the United States.[650] Carreira noted that the movement's position was precarious because the United States increased its presence in the region, now its military involvement in Vietnam was over. "The USA invests a lot in oil, and they want to make Angola a second Kuwait," Carreira said.[651] Moreover, the MPLA (correctly) suspected that the president of Zaire, Mobutu, was on the CIA payroll and, by association, Mobutu's friend Roberto.[652] Carreira's allegations about the secret American influence (facilitated by the Soviet complicity) reinforced Belgrade's mistrust toward détente and fueled Yugoslavia's outbursts of anti-Americanism in 1973 and 1974.

This hazardous international position was coupled with the internal crisis of the movement that made Yugoslav aid essential to the movement's survival. The 1974

[650] O stanju u oslobodilačkom pokretu Angole i uslovima u kojima deluje, November 20, 1973, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/3–1; Neto believed that the United States and the USSR made a secret deal at Angola's expense. See Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, vol. 2, 229.
[651] O stanju u oslobodilačkom pokretu Angole i uslovima u kojima deluje, November 20, 1973, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/3–1; Neto during his meeting with Tito in February 1973, expressed his fear that with the end of the war in Vietnam, the United States would shift its attention toward Africa. Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike sa Agostinom Netom, predsednikom Narodnog pokreta za oslobođenje Angole na Brionima, February 20, 1973, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/3–4.
[652] Belgrade commended the 1972 agreement between the MPLA and FLNA that established a truce between the two organizations and called for joint military operations but remained suspicious about its effectiveness. During his meeting with Tito in February 1973, Neto said that the agreement had "softened" Mobutu's attitude toward the MPLA.

Carnation Revolution in Portugal that toppled the Estado Novo opened the last chapter of the Portuguese domination over Angola but also exacerbated the divisions among the MPLA, FNLA, and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, UNITA) over the future of an independent Angola. Furthermore, the MPLA was bitterly divided by internal struggles that debilitated its already limited combat capabilities. Neighboring countries seized the opportunity to promote their own interests, providing support to different parties within Angola. Furthermore, the Soviets, wary of the MPLA's internal tussles and Neto's "leadership style," pulled their support from Neto and sent money to his challenger Daniel Chipenda.[653]

Yugoslavia, however, showed its dedication to Neto by supporting the MPLA even when other countries suspended their aid in 1974 due to the so-called "Eastern Revolt" led by a faction within the movement.[654] During Neto's visit to Yugoslavia in February 1974, the Yugoslavs assured him that they "clearly understood the situation in his country and in his movement." Belgrade advised "decisiveness in action," and promised political and military aid.[655] Tito promised to an MPLA delegation at the Tenth LCY Congress in May 1974 that Yugoslavia would "act in the direction that they [the MPLA] want us to act," thus affirming Yugoslavia's willingness to continue with its

[653] Natalia Telepneva, "Our sacred duty: the Soviet Union, the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, and the Cold War, 1961-1975," Ph.D. Dissertation, London School of Economics, 2014, 202–203. Available at http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3081/1/Telepneva_Our_sacred_duty.pdf (accessed June 15, 2019).
[654] Interview with Paulo Jorge, MPLA Secretary of Information, Luanda, 15 April 1996, in Tor Sellstrom, ed., *Liberation in Southern Africa – Regional and Swedish Voices. Interviews from Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, the Frontline and Sweden* (Upsala: Nordiska Afrikaninstitutet, 1999), 17.
[655] Beleška o razgovoru potpredsednika Predsedništva SFRJ Mitje Ribičiča sa Agostinom Netom, predsednikom arodnog pokreta za oslobođenje Angole, February 5, 1974, AJ, A CKSKJ fond 507, IX, 3/I–26a.

political and military support.[656] The MPLA delegation visited one of the largest steel mills in Yugoslavia and in an emotional impromptu speech, a member thanked the workers of the mill for making the steel for the guns. "There are Western countries and there are socialist countries, but Yugoslavia has a special place in our hearts," he told the gathered workers.[657]

International isolation of the MPLA and internal disputes resulted in the movement's decreasing military capacities and the ascendance of the FNLA as the militarily strongest of the three movements. The Yugoslavs understood the urgency and in April 1975, Belgrade sent uniforms, weapons, and ammunition in quantities sufficient to equip 1,000 soldiers. Moreover, Yugoslavia delivered trucks, all-terrain vehicles, a mobile ambulance bus, 200 tons of food, and US$ 60,000 in cash.[658] A majority of this aid was sent by the ship *Postojna* to the port of Pointe-Noire. Although at this time the MPLA received some aid from Algeria and the USSR, as Pierro Gleijeses wrote, their aid was of "lesser importance." One of the MPLA leaders, Paolo Teixeira Jorge, said that, "Until August 1975, the country that helped the MPLA the most was Yugoslavia."[659] The MPLA delegation (Carreira, Loy, and Andrade) that visited Yugoslavia in September

[656] Zabeleška o prijemu delegacije Narodnog pokreta za oslobođenje Angole (MPLA) kod Predsednika Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, May 30, 1974, AJ, A CKSKJ fond 507, IX, 3/I–27.
[657] As in previous years, Yugoslavia widely popularized the Angolan struggle through media and cultural events. In 1974, one local SSRNJ chapter reported how a Yugoslav citizen contacted them with a request to join the MPLA as a volunteer. The SSRNJ did not know if that individual was "too idealistic, a provocateur, or simply insane." A local official lectured him about the nature of Yugoslavia's aid to the MPLA before sending him home. Savez socijalističke omladine Jugoslavije SSIP-u, February 4, 1976, DA MSP, PA 1976 Angola, f. 224, d. 4, s. 45951.
[658] One report estimated that the value of this shipment was around US$ 1,700,000 (equal to, approximately, $ 8, 100,000 in today's U.S. dollars). Beleška o realizaciji pomoći oslobodilačkim pokretima MPLA Angole i FRELIMO Mozambika, March 24, 1975, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/3–1, Informacija o pomoći Narodnom pokretu za oslobođenje Angole (MPLA) u 1975. godini, July 26, 1975, DA MSP RS, PA 1975 Angola, f. 226, d. 7, s. 440855.
[659] Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 349. Gleijeses wrote that a model of the *Postojna* is displayed in the Museum of the Armed Forces in Fortaleza de São Miguel, Luanda.

1975 said that Yugoslav aid in critical the months of 1975 served as an example to "some other friends [i.e., Cuba and the USSR] of the MPLA who, after that, became more engaged."[660] However, on Carreira's repeated request for additional aid, the Yugoslavs said that after the large shipment in April, there was no money left for additional arms transfers in 1975.

The USSR and Cuba quickly filled this vacuum and their greater engagement spelled the end of Yugoslavia's significant influence in Angola. Although the Soviets were reluctant to intervene directly in the Angolan civil war in the late summer of 1975, they encouraged their allies such as Bulgaria, Poland, and the GDR to send money and military aid.[661] Piero Gleijeses wrote that in July 1975, the Cuban response to MPLA's requests for aid was "sluggish."[662] However, in August 1975, Cuba decided to send 480 instructors to the MPLA, significantly more than Neto requested.[663] When in October 1975 South Africa invaded southern Angola, Havana's aid in personnel and the Soviet in armaments proved essential for the MPLA's survival, and continued control of the capital, Luanda. "It is true that the Russian weapons saved the People's Republic [of Angola]," a representative of the MPLA told a Yugoslav diplomat in Algeria.[664] Unable to send additional aid, Yugoslavia, like it did during the 1973 October War, opened up its sky for Soviet transports to Luanda. This new example of the Yugoslav–Soviet cooperation led the United States to reexamine its policy toward Belgrade.

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[660] Boravak delgacije MPLA u Jugoslaviji od 4. do 12. septembra, 1975. godine, October 10, 1975, DA MSP RS, PA 1975, Angola, f. 226, d. 7, s. 448206.
[661] Telepneva, "Our Sacred Duty," 256–257.
[662] Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 254.
[663] Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 256.
[664] Ambasada SFRJ Alžir SSIP-u, December 21, 1975, DA MSP RS, PA 1976 Angola, f. 224, d. 1, s. 4581.

"In 1975, Angola exploded upon American consciousness," John Marcum wrote.[665] The United States was long aware of Yugoslavia's influence in Angola. Washington knew about the Yugoslav shipment of war materials to the MPLA in April 1975 but that issue did not appear in conversations between Yugoslav and American officials. The U.S. embassy in Dar es-Salaam expressed its concern that the influx of Yugoslav weapons would fuel the civil war, but, generally, believed that Yugoslavia had a moderating influence on the MPLA and Neto. The U.S. ambassador in Tanzania, William Beverly Carter, Jr., spoke with the Yugoslav liaison with the MPLA who said that the Yugoslavs advised Neto to "stop castigating the U.S. as an imperialist power," adding that Belgrade believed that it would be beneficial for all sides to reach a peaceful settlement.[666] Even Silberman commended the Yugoslav government's public support for a unified Angolan government and Belgrade's caution in recognizing the MPLA government as the only legitimate representative of the Angolan people.[667] Yugoslavia's permission to Soviet overflights that began in October, however, changed Washington's tolerant posture toward the Yugoslav government and its role in Angola.

In December 1975, Henry Kissinger instructed the U.S. embassy in Belgrade to express his indignation over Yugoslavia's "collusion in fueling Soviet intervention in Angolan civil strife by permitting Soviet overflight of Yugoslav air space."[668] Silberman repeatedly raised the issue with Yugoslav officials. At the lunch with Yugoslav Assistant

[665] Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution*, xiii.
[666] Embassy Dar es Salaam to Department of State, Telegram 014019, May 9, 1975, 1975DARES01419, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed October 8, 2019).
[667] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 05920, 1975BELGRA05920, November 10, 1975, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed October 8, 2019).
[668] Memo, Henry Kissinger to Laurence Silberman, December 21, 1975, NSA, Country Files for Europe and Canada, "Yugoslavia – State Department Telegrams, To SECSTATE NODIS (2)," box 22, GFPL.

Secretary Milićević, Silberman characterized Yugoslavia's policy toward Angola as duplicitous and "inconsistent with non-aligned principle of noninterference in internal affairs of other countries."[669] Silberman also delivered Kissinger's note to Minić's aide Mirko Ostojić. The meeting was, according to Ostojić's account, contentious. Allegedly, Silberman appeared very nervous and delivered the note in a "very loud voice."[670] The Yugoslavs condemned Silberman's attitude, but also the content of Kissinger's letter that stated how the United States "does not see how it is in the interest of a nation itself vulnerable to Soviet power… to acquiesce in a Soviet attempt to assert domination over Angola."[671] Kissinger also threatened to pull economic and military support from Yugoslavia that was promised during high-level bilateral meetings in the first half of 1975.

A Yugoslav split with the Soviets and the Cubans was in the making, but it would not become apparent until the second half of 1976. This split was partially postponed by another deterioration of U.S.–Yugoslav relations that began over the issue of Angola and reached its peak with the controversy over the so-called Sonnenfeldt Doctrine that again stoked fears about a deal at Yugoslavia's expense. Besides, the behavior of ambassador

[669] Memorandum of Conversation, Laurence Silberman to Henry Kissinger, December 23, 1975, NSA Country Files for Europe and Canada, "Yugoslavia – State Department Telegrams, To SECSTATE NODIS (2)," box 22, GFPL.
[670] Iz zabeleške o razgovoru PSS Mirka Ostojića sa ambasadorom SAD L.H. Silberman-om, December 24, 1975, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–20, SAD; Silberman's account of the meeting is, however, different. Silberman wrote that Ostojić "clearly implied that Yugoslav recognition and support of the MPLA was based on notion of realpolitik – they had been and were the strongest political force in Angola." "He made no response at all […] nor did he respond to my discussion of the implications for US-Yugoslav relations", Silberman concluded. Memo, Laurence Silberman to Henry Kissinger, December 24, 1975, NSA Country Files for Europe and Canada, "Yugoslavia – State Department Telegrams, To SECSTATE NODIS (2)," box 22, GFPL.
[671] Memo, Henry Kissinger to Laurence Silberman, December, 21, 1975, NSA Country Files for Europe and Canada, "Yugoslavia – State Department Telegrams, To SECSTATE NODIS (2)," box 22, GFPL.

Silberman considerably aggravated the Yugoslavs. After a short honeymoon marked by high-level exchanges, in 1976, Yugoslav–U.S. relations reached another low.

The Sonnenfeldt Doctrine –the inverse Brezhnev Doctrine?

As the Yugoslav–U.S. dispute over Belgrade's role in Angola quieted down in the first months of 1976, another controversy led Yugoslavia to review its relations with the United States. In December 1975, at a closed meeting of U.S. ambassadors in Europe in London, senior NSC staff member Helmut "Hal" Sonnenfeldt gave a speech in which he advocated an "organic" relationship between the USSR and Eastern European states. In March 1976, Sonnenfeldt's speech that instantly became known as the "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine" was leaked to and published in the *Washington Post*.[672]

Expectedly, the Yugoslavs were alarmed by the provisions of the so-called Sonnenfeldt Doctrine. The embassy in Washington speculated that the doctrine should be interpreted in the context of Ford's and Kissinger's attempts to send the Soviets a message to be more "understanding" and "restrained" toward U.S. foreign policy interests. The most recent setback in Angola had exposed the administration to the attacks from the Right. "In fact, the administration found itself between the hammer – interest in keeping its relations with the USSR [i.e. détente], and the anvil – efforts to keep the

[672] Leo Ribuffo explained that Sonnenfeldt's remarks were made in a brain-storming session. Warren Zimmerman, who would serve as the last U.S. ambassador in Yugoslavia, took notes of Sonnenfeldt's remarks and created a summary of his points that served as the basis for the State Department report that was sent to the participants of the meeting. Ribuffo argued that Sonnenfeldt's remarks did not significantly depart from the established U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe. See Leo Ribuffo, "Is Poland a Soviet Satellite? Gerald Ford, the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine, and the Election of 1976," *Diplomatic History* vol. 14 no. 3 (Summer 1990): 385–403. Similarly, Marvin Kalb argued that Sonnenfeldt "was not proclaiming a new 'doctrine'," but "helpful reflection" on U.S. foreign policy. Kalb wrote that U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe was outlined in Helsinki in August 1975, several months before Sonnenfeldt's speech. Marvin Kalb, "The 'Sonnenfeldt Doctrine' that wasn't," October 17, 2019, The Brookings Institution. Available at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/10/17/the-sonnenfeldt-doctrine-that-wasnt/ (accessed January 8, 2020).

status quo in the areas of the vital interest to the United States (Western Europe, NATO southern flank, Far East, Latin America)," the Yugoslav embassy in Washington reported.[673] In that sense, Sonnefeldt's speech should be interpreted as Washington's attempt to establish the "rules of the game" in its relations with Moscow, i.e. to reaffirm the spheres of influence in order to avoid frictions as in the case of Angola and Cuba. Therefore, the speech was "the inverse Brezhnev Doctrine," the embassy concluded. [674]

What about Yugoslavia? The Yugoslavs instinctively cried foul and denounced any divisions of spheres of influence. Even though the State Department denied that the doctrine was its official policy, Yugoslav officials believed that Kissinger was personally behind it. Moreover, the Yugoslavs did not see the original copy of the text and based their conclusions on erroneous press reports. In one (incorrect) version of the speech that was further distorted by unfortunate translation, Sonnenfeldt allegedly said that the Yugoslavs "should be less obnoxious toward the Soviets." In the context of Sonnenfeldt's remark about an "organic Soviet-Eastern European" relationship, in the Yugoslav view, this statement implicitly suggested that Yugoslavia was in the Soviet sphere of influence.[675] The "Doctrine" received a lot of publicity in Yugoslavia, so that the U.S. embassy had to do some damage control and reassure the regime that the United States remained committed to Yugoslavia's independence.

[673] Dileme američke spoljne politike, April 2, 1976, No. 373, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–21 SAD.
[674] Ibid. Borhi suggested that it was possible that the United States intentionally disseminated the problematic speech to reassure the Soviets about its policy toward the Eastern Europe. See Borhi, *Dealing with Dictators*, 291.
[675] Informacija u vezi sa izjavom savetnika Stejt departmenta H. Sonenfelda na savetovanju američkih ambasadora u evropskim zemljama u Londonu sredinom decembra 1975, April 5, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–21.

On April 2, the embassy delivered a copy of the original note (likely Zimmerman's summary) and clarified Sonnenfeldt's alleged remark about Yugoslavia's need to be less obnoxious toward Moscow that was "in fact in reverse of GOY understanding."[676] Sonnenfeldt personally called the new Yugoslav ambassador in Washington, Dimče Belovski, to explain the "distortions" of his speech and confirm the U.S. dedication to Yugoslavia's independence from Moscow. Sonnenfeldt said that Washington's commitment to Yugoslavia (as well as Romania and Poland) was confirmed by the visits of two U.S. presidents to these countries. "The United States never negotiates about nor it accepts spheres of influence," Sonnenfeldt said.[677]

Accepting these assurances, Belgrade concluded that the doctrine was nothing but the latest expression of Kissinger's understanding of détente that was formulated by Sonnenfeldt. Belgrade believed that the wide publicity that the doctrine received around the world was a good thing (although the Yugoslavs admitted that the case was likely publicized because of U.S. elections in November 1976) because it forced President Ford and the State Department to denounce spheres of influence and distance themselves from the Sonnefeldt Doctrine. Belgrade concluded that the doctrine did not bring anything new in the U.S. approach to Yugoslavia. "In practice, the United States are still guided by the

[676] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 02190, April 2, 1976, 1976BELGRA02190, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed October 8, 2019). According to the text of the original note, Sonnenfeldt said that the U.S. objective should be "keeping Yugoslavia in a position of substantial independence from the Soviet Union," adding, that at the same time "we would like them to be less obnoxious." For the full text of the "Doctrine" see Telegram from the Department of State to All European Diplomatic Posts, February 1, 1976, Document 68, *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVIII, Part 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976.

[677] Informacija u vezi sa izjavom savetnika Stejt departmenta H. Sonenfelda na savetovanju američkih ambasadora u evropskim zemljama u Londonu sredinom decembra 1975, April 5, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–21.

principles adopted at the meeting between President Tito with Ford and Minić's meeting with Kissinger in September last year," a report stated.[678] Why, then, such a fuss?

Belgrade believed that Sonnenfeldt's speech was leaked to signal the administration's willingness to redefine U.S.–USSR relations. Besides, the Yugoslav officials were convinced that "certain circles in Washington" used the controversy over the doctrine to pressure Yugoslavia before the upcoming NAM summit in Colombo. Belgrade did not have to look far for additional proof of this sinister play against nonalignment. Amid the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine controversy, the U.S. Representative on the Human Rights Commission, Leonard Garment, gave a speech at a meeting of the American Jewish Congress, entitled "Conspiracy of Majority," in which he denounced nonaligned states, including Yugoslavia, for various violations of human rights and political liberties.[679] Garment's speech in which he implied that nonaligned states "conspired" against the West was, due to a bureaucratic error, circulated by the U.S. Mission in the UN. Naturally, Belgrade perceived Garment's accusations as another example of the administration's attempts to undermine the importance of the meeting in Colombo. The Yugoslav embassy protested with the State Department arguing that the speech was "entirely out of keeping with a joint statement of our presidents."[680] The Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat summoned Silberman to express its disgust with Garment's

[678] The Yugoslavs noted that the United States expressed its willingness to continue high-level exchanges (Kardelj was invited to visit the United States) and that Washington made some concrete steps to revive military cooperation. Ibid.
[679] Garment referred to the case of a Yugoslav attorney Srđa Popović who was sentenced to a year in prison for supposedly siding with his client, dissident Dragoljub Ignjatović. Popović's client, Ignjatović, was accused of "maliciously and falsely representing the socio-economic situation in the country," by saying that the Yugoslav government was "absolutistic" and that the system was in stasis. His lawyer was sentenced to one year in prison for spreading false information, i.e. because he said that his client's claims were not wrong. Danilović, *Upotreba neprijatelja*, 44.
[680] Department of State to Embassy Belgrade, Telegram 091269, April 15, 1976, 1976STATE091269, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed October 9, 2019).

remarks. “Garment’s and Sonnenfeldt’s statements are one and the same. Those came from the same school,” a Yugoslav diplomat told Silberman, adding how those times when big powers could lecture small states how to behave were gone.[681] Belgrade warned that these incidents if continued, would damage U.S.–Yugoslav bilateral relations and diminish the accomplishments of the Tito–Ford meeting.

However, in the coming days relations deteriorated even further because of the case of a dual citizen, Laszló Toth, who was imprisoned in Yugoslavia on espionage charges. The Toth affair and the way how it was handled by ambassador Silberman deepened Belgrade’s mistrust toward the Ford administration.

The Toth affair and Laurence Silberman

“You son-of-a-bitch traitor! You sold your brain, your conscience, and your mother country for dollars! Shut up! You forgot whose bread you have been eating. I don’t want to listen to you! You son-of-a-bitch!” a secret police interrogator yelled at the 44-year-old engineer Laszló Toth.[682] A dual citizen of Yugoslavia and the United States, Toth came to Yugoslavia for a family vacation in July 1975. Toth was a chemical engineer at the Great Western Sugar Company in Denver, CO. He planned to visit several sugar factories, including his former employer, the Sugar Factory Vrbas in northwest Serbia. His troubles began when he, with the manager’s approval, wanted to take photographs of the refinery. Yugoslav secret police, the notorious SDB (*Služba državne bezbednosti*), confiscated his camera and brought him for interrogation. On August 6, two

[681] Iz zabeleške o razgovoru PSS D. Bernardića sa ambasadorom SAD L. Silbermanom, April 27, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–21.
[682] Laszlo Toth, *Stars Too Far: A Memoir of Diplomatic Confrontation in Yugoslavia* (Boulder, CO: Eastern European Monographs, 2001).

days after President Ford departed Belgrade, Toth was imprisoned and, after a short trial, sentenced to seven years in a maximum-security prison.

Toth's wife managed to leave Yugoslavia and she informed the State Department about Toth's arrest. Moreover, on August 19, 1975, Toth's sister visited the U.S. embassy and delivered Toth's message to President Ford: "Dear President, I am American citizen and innocently accused with espionage. I am sure you have many ways to check that I don't belong and never belonged to any intelligence or similar organization. Please help. Laszlo Toth, 9778 Orangewood Dr. Denver, Colorado."[683] Although the State Department and the Embassy were "appalled" by the harshness of Toth's sentence, the Toth case was one of many that involved dual citizens and their legal status in Yugoslavia. The United States considered these consular issues an "irritant" in U.S.–Yugoslav relations and advised American citizens of Yugoslav origin to avoid, if possible, travel to Yugoslavia. Moreover, some U.S. officials pointed out, cases like this one required a new consular protocol that would provide better protection of the American citizens. It was apparent that many in the State Department did not want to jeopardize U.S. – Yugoslav relations over the issue of a sugar refinery engineer.

In 1976, however, thanks to Laurence Silberman, the Toth affair created a deep crisis in Yugoslav–American relations. The real reasons behind Toth's arrest were unclear. Multiple explanations – personal vendetta of Toth's enemies (it was reported that Toth while working in Vrbas, had poor relations with some of the workers), the paranoia of the local SDB agents, or government's attempt to acquire leverage in its relations with

[683] Embassy Belgrade to Secretary of State, Telegram 04422, August 22, 1975, 1975BELGRA04422, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed October 9, 2019).

the United States – appear comparably plausible. It is clear, however, that Silberman used the Toth case to pressure Belgrade.

Silberman's tenure in Belgrade was marred by scandals. A non-career diplomat, Silberman came to Yugoslavia in May 1975 after serving as Deputy Attorney General.[684] Soon after his arrival, Silberman fired the Deputy Chief of Mission, Dudley Miller, because Miller was against his appointment.[685] Silberman's decision to fire his DCM also revealed his mistrust toward the State Department's approach toward Yugoslavia. Silberman believed that the European Bureau of the State Department was too soft toward Yugoslavia and that the policy of accommodation did not advance U.S. interests. "My own view, after I went to Yugoslavia, was that Tito was beginning to lose a good deal of respect for the United States as a major power and thought the tide was running against us," Silberman recalled.[686] In order to rectify this situation, Silberman assumed a tougher approach toward the regime in Belgrade. "We should be much tougher with Tito

[684] A consular officer who served in Belgrade in the early 1970s de described Silberman as a "very militant republican who had been an acting member of the cabinet practically when he was Deputy Secretary of Labor." Thomas Dunnigan and Lowell Ronald Fleischer, *Interview with Lowell Fleischer*, January 31, 1995, Frontline Diplomacy, LOC. Available at https://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000381/ (accessed October 18, 2019). Silberman said that Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft wanted him in Belgrade. "It was perfectly obvious that I was rather close to President Ford as well as Kissinger. Kissinger had begged me to go into the White House to run intelligence, which I refused to do because he at that point distrusted [Director of Central Intelligence William Egan] Colby." Charles Stuart Kennedy and Laurence H Silberman, Interview with Laurence H. Silberman, September 23, 1998. Frontline Diplomacy, LOC. Available at https://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib001061/ (accessed October 18, 2019). Silberman's successor in Belgrade, Lawrence Eagleburger, said that Ford and not Kissinger recommended Silberman for the ambassadorial post in Belgrade. "Silberman was Ford's personal choice, not Kissinger's," Eagleburger told a Yugoslav official. Zabilješka o razgovoru potpredsjednika Skupštine SR BIH Dž. Muminagića i sekretara Komisije za odnose sa inostranstvom Z. Telelbašića sa ambasadorom SAD u Jugoslaviji L. Iglbergerom prilikom njegove protokolarne posete SR BIH 13. februara 1978, Skupština SR BIH – Komisija za odnose sa inostranstvom, Pov. br. 09-4/78, Feburary 27, 1978, DA MSP RS, PA 1978 SAD, f. 125, d. 4, s. 412007.

[685] Silberman claimed that Miller and Miller's wife were the "core of the resistance" to his appointment. Moreover, Miller's wife was "palpably nasty" toward Silberman's wife. Charles Stuart Kennedy and Laurence H Silberman, *Interview with Laurence H. Silberman*, September 23, 1998. Frontline Diplomacy, LOC. Available at https://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib001061/ (accessed October 18, 2019).

[686] Ibid.

and much more unyielding and much more aggressive, because I thought he was a man who reacted to power above all else and his perception of strength. And I thought that the more accommodating we were to Tito the more he was inclined to move towards the Soviet Union," Silberman said.[687]

The Toth affair provided Silberman with an opportunity to "ruffle Tito's feathers," as one U.S. diplomat described it. Silberman saw the Toth case as a perfect example of Yugoslavia's contempt toward U.S. interests and decided to take a stand on the issue. What was novel in Silberman's tough approach to Yugoslavia was his willingness to use Yugoslavia's economic dependence on the United States as leverage against the regime. With his connections in Washington, Silberman managed to derail several business deals that Yugoslav enterprises had with the U.S. government, such as the sale of Yugoslav beef to the U.S. armed forces in Europe – a lucrative business that was important in the context of the EEC's ban on Yugoslav meat imports. Moreover, Silberman advised postponing previously planned visit by Treasury Secretary William Simon in the light of Yugoslavia's actions in Angola and Toth's imprisonment. "We must be prepared to back up diplomatic remonstration with concrete actions which suggest that major benefit GoY gets from bilateral relations with the US – financial and investment support – is not immune," Silberman wrote.[688] In June, at the meeting of the Yugoslav–American Economic Council in Bled (Slovenia), Silberman warned American executives about the legal risks of visiting and doing business in Yugoslavia.

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[687] Ibid.

[688] His words echoed Moynihan's remark "that governments are beginning to think that anti-American postures at the UN and elsewhere are not without cost and that the cost has to be calculated." Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 02781, April 27, 1976, NSA Country Files Europe and Canada, box 22, GFPL.

Silberman's attempt to "ruffle Tito's feathers" did not find a lot of understanding or support from the State Department's career diplomats. If some advocates of U.S.–Yugoslav cooperation in Foggy Bottom grumbled about Silberman's tough approach, his actions, however, caused a great deal of frustration in Belgrade. His general demeanor and complete disregard for Yugoslavia's sensitivities appalled Yugoslav officials. At the same time when Silberman was persuading U.S. companies not to invest in Yugoslavia, a Serb émigré group bombed the Yugoslav embassy in Washington, causing extensive damage. The Foreign Secretariat tried to summon Silberman, who was at the time in Bled to deliver its protest over the bombing, but the ambassador refused to travel back to Belgrade and went to Dubrovnik instead.

In June 1976, the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat made a list of Silberman's transgressions. In the file that the Secretariat created for Tito, Silberman was described as arrogant, rude, and overbearing toward Yugoslav officials and his own staff (the Miller case was cited). "He was disdainful toward our system of self-management… he ridiculed our leadership… and intrigued against the Secretariat's officials," a report noted, listing every Silberman slight.[689] The Secretariat concluded that Silberman's behavior created serious obstacles for good bilateral relations between Yugoslavia and the United States.

Toth's release from prison on July 23, 1976, after Tito pardoned him, did not resolve the U.S.–Yugoslav dispute. Silberman was triumphant and he used the occasion to remind his detractors in Washington and Yugoslav officials about the new direction of

[689] Informacija o ambasadoru SAD H. L. Silbermanu, June 11, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–21 SAD.

U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia as long as he was there as the ambassador. "I was criticized by the Eastern European Section for being too zealous in this case… to these people diplomacy apparently is the passive pursuit of American interest. And I don't accept that," Silberman said to the press on the release of Toth.[690] He said that his approach to the Toth case had Kissinger's full support. The main message, however, was that the pressure worked and that the United States would use it again if the Yugoslavs continue to misbehave.

Silberman's talk with the press caused outrage in Belgrade. Ambassador Belovski complained to Under Secretary Philip Habib how Silberman's statement on Toth's release was "insulting and inexpedient."[691] The main attack on Silberman came from Tito himself. In an unprecedented move, Tito in an interview with TANJUG denounced Silberman and the "politics of pressure." "This is also a part of the attempts in some way to compromise our country among the nonaligned nations, pending the Colombo Conference," Tito said in the statement.[692] Tito and other Yugoslav officials believed that Silberman's behavior was a part of the larger plan to "pressure and intimidate

[690] Secretary of State to Embassy Belgrade, Telegram 190965, August 2, 1976, 1976STATE190965, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed October 9, 2019). "Those in EE [Eastern European Section] who have regarded my pressing of this case as too zealous should be reminded in this bicentennial year – that early American flag carried phrase 'Don't tread on me'," Silberman wrote to Washington. See Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 04719, July 17, 1976, 1976BELGRA04719, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed October 9, 2019).

[691] Odnosi SFRJ i SAD i Kisindžerov govor, August 4, 1976, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–21 SAD.

[692] Malcolm W. Browne, "Tito Attacks U.S. Envoy For 'Pressure Campaign'," The *New York Times*, August 1, 1976, 1. Tito's attack on Silberman started the rumors that the Yugoslav government would declare Silberman a persona non grata. Yugoslav sources do not suggest that that idea was ever considered. Silberman, however, offered to resign but Brent Scowcroft dissuaded him because he did not want to create an appearance that Ford abandoned his ambassador who was tough on communists. White House to Embassy Belgrade, August 27, 1976, Ford Library Project File of Documents Declassified Through the Remote Archive Capture (RAC), Backchannel Messages, box 18, GFPL.

Yugoslavia" before the NAM's Fifth Summit in Colombo.[693] Moreover, the regime perceived Silberman's, Sonnefeldt's, Garment's, and other officials' critical statements about Yugoslavia together with the alleged "anti-Yugoslav" campaign in the American press, as the sign of a widespread conspiracy within "certain circles" in Washington who wanted to revamp U.S.–Yugoslav relations in accordance to their concept of détente. The Office for Foreign Affairs of Tito's Cabinet composed a lengthy report (entitled "Unfair American behavior toward Yugoslavia") that listed Belgrade's grievances. "The entire Toth case, Silberman's behavior, [Malcolm] Browne's [the *NYT* correspondent from Belgrade] statements and articles, etc., these are all attempts to create a crisis in U.S.–Yugoslav relations and to redefine U.S. policy toward us… The point of these acts is to enforce the Moynihan–Silberman line and the concept of this group that, through Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt, dominates the State Department's attitude toward nonaligned states," stated in the report.[694]

Harriman's visit and Yugoslavia's stake in the 1976 U.S. presidential elections

This deep mistrust toward the Ford administration's plans for Yugoslavia explains Belgrade's rooting for the Democratic candidate in the 1976 election. The regime closely followed U.S. domestic and electoral politics and understood that these sudden hostilities coming from the Ford administration were partially motivated by domestic political reasons, namely Ford's attempt to appease his right-wing critics. The fact that the Yugoslavs understood these intricacies of the American political system in the election

[693] SSIP IV Uprava Ambasadi SFRJ Vašington, Jun 9, 1976, DA MSP RS, PA 1976 "R", f. 175, d. 3, s. 431213
[694] Nekorektni američki postupci prema Jugoslaviji, July 28, 1976, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–21 SAD.

year did not mean that they were willing to tolerate them. Already in 1974, the Yugoslavs expected that Edward Kennedy was all but certain to become the next U.S. president and tried to cultivate their relationship with him. Moreover, in 1976 the regime noted that the "clique" around Kissinger, Moynihan, and Silberman wanted to undermine the "positive mood" toward Yugoslavia on Capitol Hill. The Democratic Party was ready, it appeared from the reports of the Yugoslav embassy, to change American foreign policy in fundamental ways and curtail the role of the United States as a "world gendarme."[695] Yet, the nomination of Jimmy Carter prompted caution because the Yugoslavs did not know his foreign policy program or inclination. In summer 1976, the Yugoslav embassy advised a "wait-and-see" approach because Carter's foreign policy program was not precisely defined or understood.

The opportunity to find out more about Carter's foreign policy direction came very soon. In September, Carter's emissary Averell Harriman expressed his desire to meet with Tito after his trip to Moscow. The purpose of this meeting, Harriman told the Yugoslav embassy, was to deliver Carter's deep respect to Tito and discuss with the Yugoslav president some of the most important international issues. This meeting would be private and would not include Silberman.[696] Tito, however, was unable to receive Harriman because he allegedly contracted hepatitis while he was in Colombo. Yet, Tito

[695] Politika SAD u Africi, April 7, 1976, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–21 SAD.

[696] Averel Hariman po nalogu Kartera traži susret sa Predsednikom, September 1, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–221. According to the Carter–Harriman telephone conversation from August 31, Carter wanted Harriman to find out from Tito "how best to deal with the Eastern European countries and the communist parties in some Western countries." Harriman suggested that he should tell him that Carter and his administration would strongly support a united Yugoslavia. Memorandum for Record of WAH's Talk with Governor Carter, August 31, 1976, W. Averell Harriman Papers (AHP), folder 8, box 596, LOC.

instructed Kardelj, Minić, and rotating head of the SFRY Presidium, Vidoje Žarković, to meet with the American diplomat during his 5-day stay in Yugoslavia.

Harriman confirmed Carter's interest (if elected) in improving U.S.–Yugoslav ties. Harriman told Minić that the Democrats would make special efforts to overcome the recent difficulties in Belgrade–Washington relations. "He specifically emphasized that within the Democratic Party there is nobody who would be interested in the deterioration of [U.S] relations with Yugoslavia," Minić reported about his conversation with Harriman.[697] Harriman said a similar thing to Kardelj. "One desire which Governor Carter has, should he become President, is that the Yugoslavs could look to America for help as they did when President Truman was president," Harriman said, asking Kardelj to deliver this message to Tito.[698] Moreover, Harriman promised that the new administration would pay special attention to the terrorist attacks against Yugoslav diplomatic posts, officials, and property.[699] As for Carter's foreign policy in general, Harriman informed his Yugoslav interlocutors that the new president would pay more attention to those in need, namely developing countries, and he hoped to use Tito's influence and wisdom in reinventing U.S. foreign policy toward the developing world. Yet, Harriman advised the Yugoslavs that their criticism of the United States in international forums such as the last

[697] Zabeleška o razgovoru PP SIV-a i Saveznog sekretara M. Minića sa Averelom Harimanom, specijalnim savetnikom demokratskog kandidata za predsednika SAD, Dž. Kartera, September 24, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–221.
[698] Memorandum of Conversation between W. Averell Harriman and Edvard Kardelj, September 25, 1976, AHP, box 597, folder 2, LOC.
[699] Two weeks before Harriman's visit, a group of Croat extremists hijacked a TWA airplane on its way from New York to Chicago. One of their demands was Croatia's independence from Yugoslavia. The groups promised to surrender if major U.S. newspapers publish its manifesto. The *New York Times*' decision to publish it seemed to confirm Belgrade's belief of an "orchestrated anti-Yugoslav campaign." Besides, the hijacking was interpreted as the sign of Ford administration's lax approach to terrorism of these anti-Yugoslav groups.

NAM summit in Colombo had to be toned down or at least more balanced because it could affect Yugoslavia's standing among the members of Congress.[700]

Although Harriman reported to the State Department about his talks in Yugoslavia, the administration believed that the whole trip was Carter's ploy to undermine Ford's reelection efforts. An ardent Republican, Silberman wrote to the National Security Adviser Scowcroft that he had a reason to suspect that Harriman was "up to something" despite Harriman's claims that he was on a private trip to the USSR and Yugoslavia. Silberman suggested that the administration should launch a preemptive strike and reveal Harriman's trip as Carter's attempt to "undercut U.S. policy vis-à-vis Yugoslavia."[701] At the same time, Silberman believed that Belgrade had duped Harriman. In a confidential letter to Sonnenfeldt and Ford's counselor Robert Hartman, Silberman wrote that the Yugoslavs were trying to play a "Democratic Party card" and that Harriman did not realize "palpably obvious effort on part of GoY to exploit American election campaign politics."[702]

Harriman's visit in the middle of the presidential campaign, despite his failure to meet with his old acquaintance Tito, created preconditions for normalization of U.S.–Yugoslav relations during the Carter administration. The regime believed that Carter would not dramatically transform U.S. policy on the issues of mutual interest. Yet, in Harriman's visit, Belgrade found some encouraging signs that the Carter administration would show more sensibility toward Yugoslavia's foreign and domestic policies.

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[700] Memorandum of Conversation between W. Averell Harriman and Edvard Kardelj, September 25, 1976, AHP, box 597, folder 2, LOC.
[701] Embassy Belgrade to White House, September 15, 1976, RAC, Backchannel Messages, box 18, GFPL.
[702] Embassy Belgrade to Secretary of State, Telegram 06795, September 16, 1976, NSA, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, box 22, GFPL.

Belgrade even tried to downplay Carter's gaffe when he said in the debate with Ford that the United States would not militarily intervene in the case of a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia.[703] The Yugoslavs accepted Carter's explanation (delivered via one of Harriman's aides) that his statement could have been "better formulated" but that he assumed that the Yugoslavs did not want to see any foreign troops in their country, including the American. Carter's running mate, Walter Mondale, who in Belgrade's corridors of power figured as a "friend of Yugoslavia," went further into damage control and said that Carter only wanted to distance himself from the policy of interventionism.[704] Although Belgrade disliked any sort of public "bidding" over the future of the country, they were satisfied that the presidential debate reaffirmed Yugoslavia's independence and demonstrated the trust in its internal stability. Thus, the Yugoslav government greeted Carter's election as the 39th president of the United States with great enthusiasm. The U.S. embassy reported that the Yugoslav officials and members of the press were satisfied with the election's outcome. The embassy's source

[703] On October 22, 1976, during the third Ford–Carter debate, Carter said that the United States would not militarily intervene if the Soviet Union attacked Yugoslavia, but added that that scenario was unlikely. "I think it's accurate to say that there is no uh – prospect in their [Harriman and James Schlesinger] opinion, of the Soviet Union invading uh – Yugoslavia should uh – Mr. Tito pass away. The present leadership uh – there is uh – is fairly uniform in – in their purpose, and I think it's a close-knit group, uh – and uh – I think it would be unwise for us to say that we will go to war uh – in Yugoslavia uh – if the Soviets should invade, which I think would be an extremely unlikely thing. I have maintained from the very beginning of my campaign, and this was a standard answer that I made in response to the Yugoslavian question, that I would never uh – go to war or become militarily involved, in the internal affairs of another country unless our own security was directly threatened. And uh – I don't believe that our security would be directly threatened if the Soviet Union went uh – into Yugoslavia." Transcript of the Third Carter-Ford Presidential Debate, October 22, 1976, Commission on Presidential Debates. Available at https://www.debates.org/voter-education/debate-transcripts/october-22-1976-debate-transcript/ (accessed on November 22, 2019).

[704] Debata o Jugoslaviji u SAD, Telegram 1276, October 27, 1976, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–21. Some Yugoslav officials privately expressed their dissatisfaction with Carter's statement. According to the U.S. embassy, some officials expressed a fear that Carter's statement showed the old "spheres of influence thinking" while some official called it simply "stupid" and "garbage." Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 07114, November 2, 1976, 1976BELGRA07114, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed October 9, 2019).

from the Romanian embassy said that a Yugoslav official told the Romanians that Belgrade "had wanted Carter all along."[705]

This Yugoslav enthusiasm toward the new administration had, however, other important reasons. As the 1974 Cominformist affair signaled, Yugoslav–Soviet relations, after years of harmony, were slowly deteriorating. Moreover, the setback that Yugoslavia suffered in Angola under the Soviet and the Cuban offensive and Cuban efforts to "hijack" the NAM required the reassessment of Yugoslavia's foreign policy. In this context of Ford administration pressures and Yugoslavia's receding role in the Third World due to the Soviet-Cuban influence, Belgrade saw in the Carter administration a willing partner in Yugoslavia's efforts to stabilize its foreign policy.

Yugoslavia's Third World challenge and the 1976 Colombo Summit

Silberman's and Kissinger's discontent over the Yugoslav role in Angola suggested that the two of them saw Yugoslavia as a Soviet auxiliary in Africa. Yugoslavia's cooperation with the 1973 and 1975 Soviet airlifts reinforced their view that Tito was hypocritical in his policy of nonalignment. Thus the pressure that Kissinger and his ambassador exerted on Belgrade over the Angola problem. As Silberman reported, Belgrade's response to U.S. threats was "geared toward avoidance of slippage in friendly GOY–US bilaterals."[706] The United States, however, misinterpreted Yugoslavia's

[705] The embassy reported, however, that ordinary Yugoslavs were not so happy with the choice. "A very sophisticated lawyer" told them that many ordinary Yugoslavs were disturbed by Carter's debate statement. He quoted his aunt who told him: "We are finished. The United States will not defend us and Brezhnev is coming." Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 07234, November 8, 1976, 1976BELGRA07234, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed October 9, 2019).
[706] Memo, Laurence Silberman to Henry Kissinger, December 31, 1975, NSA Country Files for Europe and Canada, box 22, GFPL.

position toward Angola. Piero Gleijeses noted that Kissinger saw Havana's role in the same way: "it made more sense, and was more satisfying, to conclude that Castro was just a Soviet proxy, acting on Brezhnev's orders."[707] More insightful U.S. diplomats and analysts, however, realized that Soviet and Cuban actions in Angola went directly against Belgrade's long-term interests. The U.S. embassy counselor, Brandon Sweitzer, wrote that Yugoslav objectives in southern Africa diverged from those of the USSR and that despite many parallel policies vis-à-vis Angola, greater Moscow involvement widened the chasm between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.[708]

In the last months of 1975 and the first months of 1976, it was apparent that the Yugoslav government was losing ground in Africa. Even before Yugoslavia's retreat from Angola, Sadat's pivot toward the United States decreased Yugoslavia's influence on the continent. Consequently, this negatively affected Yugoslavia's leadership aspirations in the NAM. Abandoned by its traditional allies such as Egypt and with Ethiopia in flux, Yugoslavia had to respond to the Cuban challenge that threatened to steer the NAM to the left and to make a "natural alliance" with the USSR. The case of Angola was a case in point.

Although in February 1976 the Yugoslavs helped with the transport of four T-34 tanks and six MIG airplanes from Guinea-Bissau, Yugoslav influence in Angola quickly waned. The Yugoslav embassy in Luanda noted that the Angolans were wary of the Soviet and Cuban influence, yet "life was taking its toll – the Soviets are here, they performed and still perform delicate jobs… the fact that in state and party leadership

[707] Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 306.
[708] Memo, Brandon Sweitzer to State Department, Telegram 01460, March 5, 1976, 1976BELGRA01460. Available at http://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1976BELGRA1460b.html (accessed December 15, 2018).

there are a lot of Angolans who studied in the USSR, reflects on current thinking about domestic developments."[709] Besides, the Cuban presence in Angola threatened Yugoslavia's position in the NAM. Yugoslavia initially supported Cuban engagement in the war against South Africa.[710] However, Cuba's presence in Angola threatened Yugoslavia's revolutionary credentials and established a dangerous precedent in international affairs.[711] Many Angolan officials, including Neto's wife Maria Eugenia da Silva, tried to reassure the Yugoslavs how their country had a "special place in our hearts" but, by mid-1976, Belgrade had lost the position in Angola it had built since 1961.[712] A correspondent of the Yugoslav news agency TANJUG, D. Blagojević, reported from Luanda in June 1976 that "hardly anyone talks about Yugoslavia anymore", and that other than Prime Minister Lopo de Nascimento and Neto, nobody talked about nonalignment either.[713]

[709] Ambasada u Luandi SSIP-u, April 17, 1976, DA MSP RS, PA 1976 Angola, f. 224, d. 11, s. 423423.
[710] "Our relations with Yugoslavia have traditionally been bad … [but] they [the Yugoslavs] took a correct stand on the problem with Angola, supporting and helping Cuba's position", Castro told Todor Zhivkov (Minutes of the Meeting between Todor Zhivkov and Fidel Castro in Sofia, March 11, 1976, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Central State Archive, Sofia, Fond 1–B, Record 60, File 194. Translated by Assistant Professor Kalina Bratanova. Edited by Dr. Jordan Baev, Kalin Kanchev. Obtained by the Bulgarian Cold War Research Group. Available at https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112241 (accessed December 15, 2018).
[711] This fear was best summarized by Secretary Minić who told Guyana's foreign minister: "If you wish to export revolution than counterrevolution can be exported too … the Americans will find their own Cuba. We have to resist Sovietization of the Nonaligned Movement." Zabeleška o razgovoru između sekretara Minića i ministra spoljnih poslova Gvajane E. Wilsona, May 10, 1977, DA MSP RS, Str. Pov. 1977, f. 5, d. 218, s. 218.
[712] Maria de Silva visited Belgrade in April 1976. She tried to downplay Cuban and Soviet influence in Angola and said that the Angolans "will never forget that the Yugoslavs, in the most difficult moments, stayed our friends." Zabeleška o razgovoru Babić Dimitrija, specijalnog izaslanika u Predsedništvu CK SKJ sa Marijom Eudjenjijom Neto, suprugom Predesednika Narodne republike Angola dr. Agostinja Neta, April 7, 1976, AJ, A CKSKJ fond 507, IX, 3/I–31.
[713] Izveštaj iz Luande dopisnika Tanjuga D. Blagojevića, June 2, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/3–3. The Yugoslav military-industrial complex, however, continued with commercial arrangements with Luanda. From 1976 to 1984, Yugoslavia delivered various military equipment whose total value was around $140,000,000. See Društveno-politička kretanja u Africi sa osvrtom na mesto i ulogu SFRJ i odnose sa afričkim zemljama, no date, April 1985, br. 421092, SSIP, Arhiv Slovenije (AS), fond 1271, kutija 6.

The March 1976 meeting with Fidel Castro provided Tito with an opportunity to raise Yugoslav concerns about Cuban actions in Angola. This was the second meeting between Tito and Castro, after they briefly met at the 1973 NAM summit in Algeria. Tito approved Cuba's actions in southern Angola, yet he cautioned that the Cubas should not cross the border with Namibia (then known as South West Africa, with a white minority government controlled by Pretoria). "We should avoid by all means to turn Angola into a revolutionary center that will export revolution to Africa," Tito urged Castro.[714] Tito emphasized that the priority was to consolidate the Neto regime and that any wider further military actions would devalue current accomplishments. "You should not enter Namibia… or America will intervene," Tito warned.[715]

Despite the public display of cordiality between these two revolutionaries, Castro's visit, as the U.S. embassy correctly reported, "dramatized traditional Yugoslav and Cuban ideological differences."[716] The regime believed that Castro's visit to Yugoslavia went beyond the single issue of bilateral Yugoslav–Cuban relations.[717] The Cuban engagement in Angola and Havana's decision, after the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba

[714] Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita sa prvim sekretarom KP Kube Fidelom Kastrom, March 4, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/63–9.
[715] Ibid. Yugoslav diplomatic intelligence however found out from their sources that the United States was unable to intervene in Africa for two reasons: the administration was afraid of Congressional veto and of spoiling its relations with other African states. Tito's prediction likely served to discourage Castro from intervening. Ambasada SFRJ Brisel SSIP-u, March 12, 1976, DA MSP RS, PA 1976 Angola, f. 224, d. 8, s. 414600.
[716] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 01555, March 10, 1976, 1976BELGRA01555, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed October 14, 2019).
[717] Since the 1959 Cuban Revolution, Yugoslav–Cuban relations had been exceptionally poor. The Yugoslavs noted that the Cubans were "always critical toward us … [and] did not treat Yugoslavia as a socialist state." "Very often they accused us of collaborating with the 'American imperialism'." Yugoslav–Cuban relations reached its nadir in 1968 because of Havana's support of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Yet, with Yugoslav–Soviet rapprochement in 1972/3, Yugoslav–Cuban relations also gradually normalized. In 1973, a high-ranking LCY delegation visited Cuba for the first time. See Informacija o odnosima SFRJ–Kuba i nekim pitanjima unutrašnjeg razvoja i međunarodnog položaja Kube, February 23, 1976, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/63–9.

in December 1975, to align its foreign policy goals with the imagined interests of the socialist world (i.e. the USSR) imposed important questions of the NAM's identity. "The very clear manifestation of Cuban's firmer attachment to the Soviet policy after the Congress," a Yugoslav analysis stated, led many nonaligned states to wonder whether or not Cuba still belonged to the NAM.[718] Therefore, the Tito–Castro meeting served to discover more about Havana's direction, but also to convey Yugoslavia's concern about the unity of the movement and its effectiveness in the context of the upcoming summit in Colombo.

The Fifth NAM Summit, held in the capital of Sri Lanka from August 16–19, signaled the beginning of the Yugoslav–Cuban competition for the soul of the movement. Already in February 1976, the Yugoslav embassy in Havana reported on talks with the Cubans about the summit. Havana said that the summit participants had two alternatives: either to strive for the unity of the movement or to break the movement in order to preserve the "progressive core," adding that they would prefer the second option. "It appears that the Cubans, in their preparations for the 5th Summit, insist more on these positions than before," the embassy reported.[719]

The primary Yugoslav goal was to safeguard the movement's unity that was challenged by the Cubans and other "radical" members. In combating Cuban divisive influence, the Yugoslavs focused on the host of the summit. The Sri Lankan government hoped to use the summit to improve its domestic position and reached out to Yugoslavia for aid in organizing the conference. Belgrade enthusiastically responded to this call

[718] Informacija o odnosima SFRJ–Kuba i nekim pitanjima unutrašnjeg razvoja i međunarodnog položaja Kube, February 23, 1976, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/63–9.
[719] Ambasada SFRJ Havana SSIP-u, February 9, 1976, DA MSP RS, PA 1976 "R," f. 174, d. 2, s. 47455

because it provided them with an "opportunity to influence the [summit's] political agenda."[720] Minić lobbied the Sri Lankans to moderate some of Cuba's pro-Soviet positions, but also India and Algeria to counter Cuban influence. In his report home, Minić noted that Cuba was not alone. According to the Yugoslav foreign secretary, Vietnam and Laos also toed the Soviet line and he dedicated "special attention to the talks with the main bearers of these [pro-Soviet] tendencies" to explain them the dangers that their positions created for the NAM.[721]

The old problems of disunity and particularism were exacerbated by new tendencies – hegemonic and leadership aspirations and various forms of political and religious extremism. Even without Cuba's disruptive influence, disunity at the summit was so pervasive that Tito complained to King Birendra of Nepal: "It is like the devil possessed some people, I don't know if it is the sun, this heat, or what is going on. They said that sometimes the sun affects the brain."[722] The ASEAN countries openly demonstrated their pro-Western attitudes, while the Arabs increasingly grouped on a religious basis. Moreover, since the Algeria summit, several bilateral issues threatened to take over the agenda of the gathering. Bangladesh and India disputed over border issues, Syria's intervention in Lebanon created discord in the Arab world, and the question of the independence of the Western Sahara opened a crisis in Algerian–Tunisian relations. To

[720] Informacija o pripremama Sri Lanke za V konferenciju sefova drzava ili vlada NZ i o nasoj pomoci i saradnji, October 6, 1975, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/26. The Yugoslavs delivered to Sri Lanka 49 cars for the delegates, short-circuit television for the conference hall, 80 typewriters, and 2,800 flags. The total value of this aid was $830,000 but as the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat noted "its effect was greater than its extent." Naša pomoć vladi Šri Lanke za samit u Kolombu, July 26, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/26.
[721] Dosadašnji tok Konferencije, no date, August, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/26.
[722] Stenografske beleške sa sastanka predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita sa kraljem Nepala Birendra Bir Bikram Shahom, August 15, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/26.

achieve particular bilateral objectives, nonaligned leaders tried to entice Tito by emphasizing his leadership authority and "fatherhood" of the movement. Tito was obviously flattered, yet he complained how he "cannot be the 'father' when the Russians do not recognize Yugoslavia" and "what kind of a father am I when my children are not listening to me?" Belgrade believed that these divisions were created and encouraged by those "forces who are interested in preserving the status quo in the world," i.e. the superpowers.[723]

Tito's disappointment occasionally turned into despair and at the summit the Yugoslav president grew increasingly pessimistic. "I lost my faith that it [the NAM] is the conscience of humanity. People are too preoccupied with their own issues; they do not see the big picture."[724] Blažo Mandić, confirmed in his memoir that Tito was never as pessimistic as before Colombo.[725] Another sign of disunity that threatened to weaken the movement was the absence of many nonaligned leaders from Colombo. The volatile political situation at home prevented many of them from attending the summit. "They have to keep their 'houses' safe," Tito said with some jest. However, Tito believed that these chiefs of state from "problematic spots" betrayed the main principles of nonalignment and stayed home to prepare for the "wars among themselves."[726]

"We never have experienced such pressure like we do now," Tito complained to Khieu Samphan of Cambodia.[727] In the draft of his speech, Tito painted a gloomy picture

[723] Josip Broz Tito: *Nesvrstanost – izraz interesa cijelog čovječanstva* (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1977), 49.
[724] Stenografske beleške sa sastanka predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita sa kraljem Nepala Birendra Bir Bikram Shahom, August 15, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/26.
[725] Mandić, *S Titom*, 219.
[726] Stenografske beleške sa sastanka predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita sa kraljem Nepala Birendra Bir Bikram Shahom, August 15, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/26.
[727] Razgovor predsednika republike sa Kijom Sampanom, August 14, 1976, AJ, KPR, fond 837, I-4-a/26.

of global affairs. He mentioned "the chain of crises" in Africa, Asia and the Mediterranean that threatened to extend to Latin America and even Europe. Moreover, state sovereignty rights were still endangered by various forms of interference, interventions, subversions, and the "depravations of internal stability."[728] Before the summit, Belgrade complained how both the United States and the Soviet Union increased their pressure on Yugoslavia in order to weaken its position before Colombo. Although Yugoslav-Soviet relations were fairly normal, the Yugoslav complained how the Kremlin ostentatiously ignored Yugoslavia's policy of nonalignment or showed a demeaning attitude toward it. Although Belgrade's stance toward Washington's role in the developing world was particularly negative, Tito realized that the main danger for Yugoslavia's role in the NAM came from the East. The Yugoslav sensed that Moscow's goal was to undermine Yugoslav legitimacy in the movement. "The Russians generally do not recognize Yugoslavia nor nonalignment… they want to suppress Yugoslavia, it bothers them too much… If Yugoslavia behaves like Cuba, they [the Soviets] would 'lionize' ("*kovati u zvezde*") it," Tito told Makarios.[729] Moreover, this Soviet support of Havana was obvious to the Yugoslavs who saw it as an attempt to make the NAM an auxiliary force of Soviet diplomacy. Despite relative normalization, Belgrade was aware that the Soviet long-term goal included bringing the NAM into line with Moscow's foreign policy objectives. After all, the Kremlin had applied the same strategy just weeks earlier at the East Berlin conference of European communist parties.

[728] Nacrt Titovog govora sa dopunama, no date, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/26.
[729] Stenografske beleške sa razgovora predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita sa arhiepiskopom Makariosom, August 17, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I-4-a/26.

Toward another Yugoslav–Soviet split: The East Berlin Conference and Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia

The 1976 Conference of Communist and Workers Parties of Europe held in East Berlin on June 29–30 was a Soviet attempt to solidify the principles of the Brezhnev Doctrine but also the Helsinki Act. Moreover, challenged by the emergence of Eurocommunism, the Soviets hoped to maintain their ideological dominance over Western European communist parties who had begun to assert greater independence from Moscow.[730] The preparations for the conference began already in 1974 and continued throughout 1975 with consultative meetings in Warsaw, Budapest, and East Berlin.

The long-standing policy of the LCY was to avoid multilateral communist meetings because its participation would imply that Yugoslavia was a part of the "socialist commonwealth." Therefore, the Yugoslavs reluctantly agreed to participate in preparation for the Berlin conference without committing their presence at the final meeting. The LCY envisioned the conference as a place where the European communist parties could "freely exchange opinions on the problems of peace, cooperation, security, and social progress." The conference should not be reduced, argued the LCY, to a single document that would provide a plan of action for the communist parties on the

[730] The Conference included members of Eastern and Western European communist parties with exceptions of Albania and Iceland. The Soviet ideological dominance was challenged by the policies of the Italian, Spanish, and, to some extent, French communist parties who rejected Soviet ideological monopoly but also their own earlier polices as inadequate. This led to the emergence of a new strategy of broad social and political coalitions that emphasized gradual political and social reforms within existing socio-political structures. The best example was the Italian Communist Party that achieved the so-called "historical compromise" with the Christian Democratic Party. See Tony Judt, *Postwar. A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 495 and Robert Service, *Comrades! A History of World Communism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 388–389.

continent.[731] The reality was, however, different. With the notable exceptions of the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano or PCI) and the Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de España or PCE), Yugoslav suggestions found little support from the participants. The Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands or SED), which was in charge of drafting the program for the conference, insisted on the unity of the movement and disregarded the "objective social, political, and economic circumstances" in which different parties operated. The LCY suspected that this revival of the ideas from the "old ideological arsenal" ultimately served to sustain the Soviet policy of détente by establishing control of and "disciplining" European communist parties, particularly the LCY, PCI, PCE, and the Romanian Communist Party (Partidul Comunist Român or PCR).[732]

The draft prepared by the SED was unacceptable to these parties who rejected it as an attempt to create a "new Cominform."[733] Tedious meetings that ensued showed that the participants disagreed on almost every question: the CSCE, disarmament, détente and U.S.–Soviet cooperation. Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu effectively summarized this period of negotiations by stating: "If we are only going to applaud to the 24th Congress of the CPSU and the agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union then there is no point of getting together."[734]

[731] Uvodno izlaganje Aleksandra Grličkova sekretara u Izvršnom komitetu na Devetoj sednici Predsedništva CKSKJ o daljem toku priprema za konferenciju komunističkih partija Evrope, April 5, 1975, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/68.
[732] Ibid.
[733] Sastanak radne grupe za pripremu konferencije KP Evrope, April 9, 1975, Sluzba za spoljno-politicka pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/68.
[734] Razgovori druga Grličkova u Bukureštu, May 26, 1975, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/68.

These preparations for the conference also revived the issue of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. The LCY was particularly bothered by the Soviet definition of "proletarian internationalism" that, as the Yugoslavs argued, sanctioned the intervention, but also provided ideological justification for potential future Soviet interventions. A heated exchange between the Secretary of the LCY Presidium's Executive Committee, Stane Dolanc, and the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Konstantin Katushev, revealed Yugoslavia's uneasiness with Soviet proposals that wanted to normalize Soviet interventions (military and otherwise) under the guise of "proletarian internationalism." "If Lenin could hear your interpretation of proletarian internationalism, he would certainly distance himself from it," Dolanc told Katushev.[735] Dolanc wondered if Soviet definitions of proletarian internationalism and "fraternal assistance" included the right to intervene in the internal affairs of other states, adding that the case of Czechoslovakia led many parties, including the LCY, to believe so. Katushev said that some people were "simplifying" the concept of proletarian internationalism and that the theory of limited sovereignty was "Western speculation" but he defended the intervention as necessary. "That [the intervention] was a normal political process," Katushev responded.[736] Belgrade's principal problem with the theoretical and doctrinal definition of proletarian internationalism showed deep concern over its practical implications. The Dolanc–Katushev conversation showed that the old grievances were not forgotten by either side. Dolanc complained that the Soviets condoned the activity of Cominformist émigrés who tried to secure their participation at the conference as the

[735] Zabeleška o razgovoru između sekretara Izvršnog komiteta Predsedništva CK SKJ Staneta Dolanca i sekretara Centralnog komiteta KPSS Konstantina Katuševa, June 6, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/68.
[736] Ibid.

New Communist Party of Yugoslavia.[737] Katushev replied that the Soviets did not have any connections with these "provocateurs" but he also accused the Yugoslavs of tolerating anti-Soviet activity in the press.[738]

These seemingly unresolvable issues brought into question Tito's trip to East Berlin. According to his translator Ivan Ivanji, after long deliberations and at the last moment, Tito decided to go to East Berlin.[739] Yugoslav–Soviet discussions continued there where Tito met with Brezhnev. Their conversation was significantly less confrontational than the Dolanc–Katushev talk several weeks earlier, yet it showed that neither Belgrade nor Moscow wanted to concede on certain political issues. Tito again raised the problem of Cominfromist émigrés while Brezhnev, in his response, complained about the Yugoslav press and its alleged anti-Sovietism. The Tito–Brezhnev meeting showed that Yugoslav–Soviet differences on other issues in bilateral and international relations were increasing. With Yugoslav preparations for the Colombo summit underway, Brezhnev attempted to influence Yugoslavia's position at the summit and the NAM's general posture toward the USSR. "It is important that the Conference in Colombo does not 'slip away' (from its anti-imperialist position), i.e. not to adopt certain attitudes that could damage the common cause," Brezhnev advised Tito.[740] Moreover,

[737] Dolanc said that the so-called New CPY sent a letter to the East German embassy in Paris asking that its materials be included in the conference program. Dolanc said that the Yugoslavs did not know whether or not the SED would do this, but warned that if any of materials of the New CPY appear in Berlin, the LCY would boycott the conference.
[738] Katushev told Dolanc that the Soviets were particularly affronted by Yugoslavia's constant need to revisit Stalinism and the "horrors of the past." "Young generations [in Yugoslavia] are forming their image of the Soviet Union on the account of these horrors of the past. For example, 'Start' [a Yugoslav version of *Playboy* magazine, M.L.] prints the stories about these horrors right next to images of naked women… Millions of people had died for this system and this country, and in the Yugoslav press it says that the 'cult of personality' is the natural product of the Soviet system," Katushev said. Ibid.
[739] Ivanji, *Titov prevodilac,* 188.
[740] Zabeleška o razgovoru između Predsednika SFRJ i predsednika SKJ druga Josipa Broza Tita i generalnog sekretara CK KPSS Leonida Brežnjeva, June 28, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/68.

Brezhnev said that the summit should not assign equal responsibility to the USSR and the West for global developmental problems because "what the West does to developing countries is a robbery. Therefore the equalization of responsibility is the method that imperialists use to divide socialist and nonaligned states."[741]

The conference in East Berlin was inconclusive. Yet, the Yugoslavs saw it as their political victory simply because the Soviet position did not prevail. *Borba* wrote on its front page that the conference reaffirmed the right to choose different roads to socialism and the "new forms of cooperation between revolutionary and democratic forces."[742] Ivanji's highly subjective account of the event described Tito's appearance in the conference hall of Hotel Stadt Berlin and Brezhnev's forced applause for Tito as the affirmation of Tito's prestige and Yugoslavia's independence.[743] The Berlin Conference, however, marked not the end of the Yugoslav–Soviet dispute over doctrinal issues, but rather its beginning that would fully blossom in the last three years of Tito's life. Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia at the end of 1976 showed that the East Berlin conference had deepened the differences between Moscow and Belgrade.

In a detailed policy analysis before Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia, the Yugoslavs noted that Yugoslav–Soviet relations were developing unevenly. While economic relations reached new heights in 1975/6, political relations between the two countries and parties were still burdened with the problems from the past. This report implied that a

[741] Ibid. In his talk with the General Secretary of the CPI, Enrico Berlinguer Tito said that Brezhnev's attitude toward the global developmental issues was wrong. Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika SKJ Josipa Broza Tita i generalnog sekretara KP Italije Enrika Belingera, June 28, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/68.
[742] *Borba*, July 1, 1976, 1.
[743] "I look at him. He suddenly realizes what is going on, for whom he applauses, than stops, puts his hands down, and looks somewhat confused. Of course he did not want to show his respect for rebellious Tito who disputes the USSR's hegemony over other 'socialist' states." Ivanji, *Titov prevodilac*, 188.

definite sign that Yugoslav–Soviet political relations were in decline was the Soviet media coverage of Yugoslav themes. Yugoslavia's international activity in 1976 was barely mentioned in the Soviet press. "The participation and activity of the LCY delegation and especially of comrade Tito in [East] Berlin received insignificant publicity," stated in the report. Moreover, even when Tito was mentioned, his statements were withheld or distorted.[744] Also, Radio Moscow in its programs in Serbo-Croatian disseminated information that was critical toward Yugoslavia's domestic and foreign policies and tried to "create an impression about the superiority of the Soviet practice, i.e. the defectiveness of our practice."[745] Yet, the main bellwether of declining Yugoslav–Soviet relations was a Soviet interpretation of the Yugoslav role in World War II.[746]

The meeting in Belgrade created an opportunity to normalize political relations between the two states and parties, but it would turn out that neither side was willing to back down. "There is a lot of nonsense in how the world talks about Yugoslav–Soviet relations," Tito said, greeting his Soviet guest.[747] Brezhnev commended the good developments in Yugoslav–Soviet relations ("these are the facts that nobody can deny") but said that he was worried about some "recent tendencies." "We have an impression that some in Yugoslavia doesn't like the development of Yugoslav–Soviet relations, cooperation, and mutual understanding [between us]," Brezhnev said, forcing his hosts to

[744] Tretman Jugoslavije u sredstvima javnog informisanja SSSR (novembra 1975–novembar 1976), no date, November 1976, Prilog 14, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/101–135.
[745] Ibid.
[746] Podsetnik za razgovore prilikom posete generalnog sekretara CK KPSS L. I. Brežnjeva SFR Jugoslaviji od 15. do 17. novembra 1976, November 9, 1976, Str. pov. 331/a, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/101–135. The Soviet negation of the Yugoslav role in World War II served to emphasize the Soviet role in liberation of Yugoslavia but also to undermine the legitimacy of the Tito regime. Tito underlined this section of the report with a blue marker, suggesting its significance for Yugoslavia and him personally.
[747] Zabeleška o razgovoru između Predsednika SFRJ i Predsednika SKJ Josipa Broza Tita i Generalnog sekretara CK KPSS Leonida Brežnjeva vođenom 15. XI 1976. godine u Belom dvoru, November 15, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/101–135.

defend themselves.[748] According to the Soviet leader, these "negative tendencies" were visible in three aspects of Yugoslav–Soviet relations. First, recent Yugoslav publications about "some episodes from the recent past," i.e. Stalinism and the cult of personality, were used to problematize and to question current Yugoslav–Soviet relations. "Yugoslav authors are falsifying the character of reality in today's Soviet Union," Brezhnev said, adding: "They do not care about historical truth… we, in the USSR, care about historical truth."[749] Second, Brezhnev was dissatisfied with some "allusions" to the connection between the USSR and Cominformist émigrés. "I gave such a hard time to [the KGB chief Yuri] Andropov in relation to that issue, but he could not find a single person who would be engaged in such activity. The Politburo discussed it and agreed [with Andropov]. Even if Andropov was lying, the Politburo cannot lie," Brezhnev assured Tito. Finally, Brezhnev was dissatisfied with the distortions about Soviet foreign policy and wondered why the Yugoslavs did not make a difference between Soviet and U.S. foreign policy. "I don't understand who is behind this? Which forces are inspiring all of this?" wondered Brezhnev.[750]

This criticism of "some" in the Yugoslav leadership who were against good Yugoslav–Soviet relations had two purposes. Using the old Stalinist trick, Brezhnev tried to sow discord between Tito and his associates. More importantly, by claiming that "some" in Yugoslavia were against Yugoslav–Soviet friendship, he hoped to squeeze concessions from the Yugoslavs. Right after his tirade about these transgressions against the USSR, Brezhnev suggested that, in order to strengthen their ties, Yugoslavia and the

[748] Ibid.
[749] Ibid.
[750] Ibid.

Soviet Union should form reciprocal friendship societies that would include individual citizens, organizations, and enterprises. These societies, as the Yugoslavs correctly suspected, would serve as vehicles of Soviet influence. Besides, Brezhnev suggested that the Yugoslavs should participate in the party meetings together with other members of the Warsaw Pact. "You should think again about this issue," Brezhnev said, emphasizing its importance for the international workers' movement.[751] Finally, Brezhnev asked that Yugoslavia adjust its policy of nonalignment, reminding his host that the socialist community was a natural ally of nonalignment. In other words, Yugoslavia should become more like Cuba or Vietnam.

The next day, Tito gave a vigorous response. He said that Brezhnev did not understand Yugoslavia and its domestic and foreign policies. Tito emphasized the unity of the Yugoslav party and leadership and rejected Brezhnev's accusation of alleged anti-Sovietism in the ranks of the party or Yugoslav media. "We cannot accept your positions that every criticism of the cult of personality, Stalinism, etatism, etc. is anti-Soviet," Tito said.[752] He resolutely shot down Brezhnev's propositions of friendship societies and his invitation to the LCY to participate in the Pact's meetings. "We develop cooperation with socialist states on the principles of independence, sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs… To push us, to say that bluntly, to drag our country into the socialist community, that can only have negative effects on our mutual trust and cooperation," Tito stated, reminding Brezhnev that the USSR never abandoned the notion of

[751] Ibid.
[752] Stenografske beleške sa razgovora Predsednika SFR Jugoslavije i Predsednika Saveza komunista Jugoslavije Josipa Broza Tita i Generalnog sekretara CK KP Sovjetskog Saveza Leonida Iljiča Brežnjeva odrzanih 16. XI 1976. godine u Beogradu, November 16, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/101–135.

Yugoslavia's "revisionism."[753] Soviet requests for military overflights and docking rights for the Soviet navy were also rejected.

Public pleasantries and the lavish reception of the Soviet delegation could not disguise the tension between the two sides. The Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs (federal police) composed a summary of intelligence and surveillance reports from foreign and domestic sources about the meeting. The general impression, both in the East and the West, was that Brezhnev had "cowered before Tito."[754] According to this report, the British ambassador in Belgrade, Douglas Stewart, allegedly said that "certain repulsiveness" between the Soviets and the Yugoslavs was noticeable and that the Soviets complained about anti-Soviet younger cadres who surrounded Tito (probably referring to Dolanc). Yugoslav sources noted that the Soviets disseminated false information about Brezhnev's alleged success in Belgrade, but that, at the same time, their embassy banned all internal discussions about the visit. Moreover, some members of the Soviet Politburo led by Suslov demanded a "tougher course" in Yugoslav–Soviet relations.[755] According to the police report, only the regime's domestic enemies saw the Brezhnev visit as a sign of larger Soviet influence that was encouraged by Carter's statement from October.

Usually tightlipped, this time the Yugoslavs leaked a large number of details about the Tito–Brezhnev talks. The report made by the federal police offers some clues about this decision. The regime wanted to refute false claims that the Soviets had been spreading around how Yugoslav–Soviet relations had entered a "new phase," i.e. that the

[753] Ibid.
[754] Informacija iz Biltena SSUP-a br. 185. Najnoviji komentari o razvoju jugoslovensko–sovjetskih odnosa nakon posete L. I. Brežnjeva, January 4, 1977, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/101–135.
[755] Ibid.

Kremlin managed to subdue the obstinate Yugoslavs. Moreover, it allowed the Yugoslavs to control the narrative of Brezhnev's visit.

Likely using these Yugoslav sources, the CIA reported that the Yugoslav–Soviet negotiations were tough and that Brezhnev and his entourage were "hostile and impolite." Yet, the Yugoslavs rejected all Soviet demands. Moreover, dispelling the rumors about his feeble state, Tito was "at his best… exceedingly resolute and strong in his dealings with the Soviet leader." "It is generally accepted that Tito also viewed this as possibly his last meeting with a Soviet leader and wanted to leave a positive legacy for his people," the CIA report concluded.[756]

Silberman, however, remained skeptical about the Yugoslav–Soviet split. He carefully collected various reports coming from the different Yugoslav officials and concluded that the Yugoslavs leaked conflicting reports on purpose. He allowed that some of these reports reflected internal power struggles within Tito's immediate circle between pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet groups. Silberman, however, believed that the Yugoslav leadership was and would continue to be in the future inherently anti-Western. He even stated that the "strain in the Yugoslav–Soviet relationship is frequently a function of their very closeness." Silberman rejected other agencies' reports about alleged Yugoslav–Soviet dispute as "wishful thinking." "This is not to say that I believe that Yugoslavia is slipping into Warsaw Pact membership; we have no evidence which would substantiate this abandonment of national identity – so important to the Yugoslavs," said

[756] Intelligence information cable, Central Intelligence Agency, December 28, 1976, NSA, NSC Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff Files, 1974–77, box 41, GFPL.

Silberman, adding, however, that Yugoslav fear of Western ideological influence coexisted with the country's disrespect toward U.S. power.[757]

Despite Silberman's skepticism and his obsessive focus on Yugoslavia's contempt for the U.S. power, the Brezhnev visit showed that Yugoslav–Soviet relations did enter a "new phase" but not the one that the Soviet hoped for. This new Yugoslav–Soviet split that would culminate in 1978/9 meant that Belgrade had to, once again, recalibrate its policy toward the United States. Yugoslav hostility toward U.S. foreign policy that reached its peak in 1973/4 had to be abandoned in the name of a new policy that would be more accommodating to the U.S. interests. Still fearing a "new Yalta," Yugoslavia remained suspicious toward superpower diplomacy in general. Yet, by the end of 1976, the circumstances of the Cold War and détente dramatically changed, prompting a definite realignment of Yugoslavia's position vis-à-vis the NAM, the United States, the USSR, and, as we will see, China.

In 1975 and 1976, the Yugoslavs realized that détente came to a standstill and the country faced Soviet nudging to join the forces of "proletarian internationalism." The Yugoslavs positively regarded the accomplishments of the 1975 Helsinki Conference. They, however, realized that the conference encouraged the Soviets to strengthen their dominance in Eastern Europe including Yugoslavia. The East Berlin Conference dispelled all doubts about Soviet intentions. Besides, the emergence of Cuba as a global factor and forced Yugoslav retreat from Angola under the pressure from the Cubans and the Soviets created an impression that Yugoslavia's domestic and foreign policies were

[757] Embassy Belgrade to Secretary of State, Telegram 0465, December 21, 1976, RAC, Backchannel Messages, box 18, GFPL.

under the siege of the East. The 1976 NAM summit in Colombo confirmed that the Soviets were actively working, via Cuba and Vietnam, to turn the movement into an auxiliary force of "proletarian internationalism."

Under these circumstances, it was predictable that Yugoslavia would shift toward the West. This development, however, was stymied by the failure of American diplomacy to perceive the growing rift between Yugoslavia and the East. Laurence Silberman believed that pressure rather than accommodation was the way to deal with the Tito regime. This approach was shared by some other members of the Ford administration, such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and tolerated if not encouraged by Kissinger. Silberman's unusual diplomatic practices "helped" set back Yugoslav–U.S. relations to the lowest level since 1948. "Kissinger's policy of pressure," as it was called in Belgrade, made normalization of U.S.–Yugoslav relations improbable and forced the regime to wait for the administration change in Washington to begin its shift toward the West. The story of the last three years of Tito's life shows that Yugoslav–Soviet differences were indeed insurmountable creating an opening for rapprochement between the United States and Yugoslavia in the crucial times when the country was preparing for the end of an era.

Part III–The Age of Uncertainty, 1977–1980

Chapter 5: Diplomacy on steroids, 1977–1978

1977 began with a tragedy. On January 18, a Learjet of the Yugoslav government crashed in central Bosnia, killing Prime Minister Bijedić, his wife, and their entourage. Hours before the crash, Bijedić said goodbye to Tito, who was on his way to Libya and Egypt. After a prolonged farewell ceremony that was delayed because of poor weather, the prime minister, despite related warning, continued to Sarajevo. Bijedić's accidental death shook Yugoslavia. Bijedić was a genial character, liked beyond his native Bosnia and Herzegovina. The government organized a lavish funeral in his honor and burial ceremonies extended several days. Yugoslav radio and television followed suit and stopped playing music (other than classical) for days. "There were too many unusually grandiose ceremonies surrounding his [Bijedić's] death and the funeral," a Serb communist leader wrote in his diary.[758]

Public displays of mourning that followed Bijedić's death soon would pale in comparison to two other deaths – Kardelj's in 1979 and Tito's in 1980. In some ways, the spectacle of Bijedić's death represented a general rehearsal before the main show, the death of the "greatest son of the Yugoslav people" Josip Broz Tito.

In a symbolic sense, Tito's death marked the end of an era. Yet, the last three years of his life showed the signs that Yugoslavia was already in crisis. The foreign policy challenges that appeared in 1975/6 by 1978/9 were in full swing. Although Yugoslavia repaired its relationship with the United States (after a hiccup in Ethiopia)

[758] Marković, *Život i politika* vol. 2, 324.

and its relations with China significantly improved, the Yugoslav policy of nonalignment suffered a series of setbacks that showed that, along with Tito's health, Yugoslavia's role in the Third World was dissipating. Moreover, Moscow increased its pressure on Yugoslavia to secure its influence once when Tito departed the scene. The December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan showed to the Yugoslavs that the Soviets were determined to use military force if needed, but also that nonalignment, riddled with internal strife and Cuban influence, was ineffective in securing the country's interests. Finally, the second oil crisis deepened Yugoslavia's existing economic woes with inevitable political implications so severe that even Tito, in the last months of his life, gloomily ascertained the need for a new social contract or else the regime would perish under the strain of foreign and domestic problems.

This chapter deals with the period that was marked by two opposite conditions. Yugoslavia's foreign policy showed an extraordinary degree of vitality and activity. Even more remarkable was the energy of the octogenarian president who traversed the continents searching for allies and confronting adversaries. Tito's monopoly on foreign policy decision-making, however, revealed the structural weakness of the Yugoslav diplomacy that would be obvious in the last days of 1979 mid the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Moreover, Tito's focus on foreign affairs that some contemporaries interpreted as his way to escape a gloomy situation at home and Kardelj's illness and death in 1979 left domestic policy decisions to medium-level cadres incapable of or disinterested in making systemic changes.[759] These, together with structural problems that

[759] Marie-Janine Calic argued that in the 1970s, the Yugoslav system was "no more than a façade concealing the economic problems and behind which internal conflicts of interest were reaching dangerous levels." Calic, "The Beginning of the End," in Calic, Neutatz, and Obertreis, eds., *The Crisis*, 79.

the 1974 Constitution and the 10th LCY Congress failed to solve, contributed to the social and economic decline. By the end of 1979, the Yugoslav domestic policy was in crisis. With Tito's departure, foreign policy would soon follow suit.

Yet, in 1977 and 1978, Yugoslav diplomacy was in the midst of a series of successes. The election of Jimmy Carter in November 1976 elections made U.S.–Yugoslav rapprochement possible. Belgrade repaired its relations with the United States, despite occasional frictions over Yugoslavia's role in Ethiopia and the activity of anti-Titoist émigré groups. Also, the end of power struggles within the Chinese leadership allowed Belgrade to revive its relations with Beijing. At the same time, however, Yugoslavia's relations with Moscow suffered several setbacks because of Tito's stubborn insistence on independence (as demonstrated in 1976) but also because Yugoslavia's friendly policy toward China that was interpreted in the Kremlin as outright anti-Sovietism. If the Soviets were dissatisfied with the Sino–Yugoslav close relationship, the Yugoslavs were unhappy with the Soviet attempts to take over the NAM through Cuba. Soviet efforts to steer the course of the movement through its "radical" members were unwelcome enough, but it took a more ominous turn with the 1979 Soviet invasion of a nonaligned Afghanistan. These events and processes in 1977 and 1978 redefined the parameters of Yugoslavia's foreign policy in Tito's last years.

Between communism and social democracy: Carter's new approach to Yugoslavia

From Belgrade's perspective, the Carter administration was the big unknown. Jimmy Carter, a foreign policy neophyte, appeared without a coherent foreign policy strategy. His secretary of state Cyrus Vance, through more experienced (he served as

Secretary of the Army in the early 1960s), also seemed unclear in his foreign policy direction. A source in the U.S. embassy said to the Yugoslavs that Carter's national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski was expected to have a larger role in defining administration's foreign policy because he was the "only 'philosopher' in the new administration, i.e. a person who, unlike Carter and Vance, has a coherent concept of foreign policy." Yet, this source cautioned, Vance would not be Brzezinski's William Rogers.[760]

The first signals from Washington were encouraging for the future of U.S.–Yugoslav relations. The U.S. embassy in Belgrade said that Washington wanted to establish regular contacts with the LCY – the first time that the United States asked for a contact with the LCY, which elevated its international prestige.[761] Moreover, in March, upon Belovski's request, Vance and Brzezinski agreed to meet with the ambassador, a move that signaled a departure from the practices of the previous administration who often ignored such requests.

Belovski reported that his March talks with Vance and Brzezinski confirmed that the administration took a qualitatively new approach to Yugoslavia but also to international questions of mutual interests. Belovski was satisfied with Vance's general support for nonalignment so long as it was not confrontational and the secretary's support for détente that would go beyond U.S.–USSR relations – something on which Belgrade

[760] Memorandum, Odeljenje za međunarodne odnose i veze Predsedništva CK SKJ, January 20, 1977, DA MSP RS, PA 1977 SAD, f. 126, d. 5, s. 413973.
[761] Washington wanted to establish closer contacts with the LCY younger cadres. "We need to break through the fear of association with communists to establish the kind of ideological dialogue required to bring Yugoslavia fully into the mainstream of Western democratic politics," a 1977 report stated. The plan was to make contacts through the Democratic Party instead of the State Department. See Memo, Policy Action Agenda Yugoslavia, no date, 1977, National Security Affairs (NSA), Brzezinski Material – Country Files, "Yugoslavia 1-9/77," box 86, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (JCPL).

insisted for a long time. Moreover, the Yugoslav ambassador commended Vance's "constructive" approach to the CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade, scheduled for October 1977.[762] The ambassador's meeting with Brzezinski assured Belgrade that the administration wanted to improve the relationship with Yugoslavia because Brzezinski, like Vance earlier, said it would be one of the administration's prime concerns. Brzezinski told Belovski that Carter's foreign policy had three priorities: relations with allies and friends, North-South relations, and relations with the East and further development of détente. "He emphasized that Yugoslavia is included in the first two groups," Belovski reported back to Belgrade.[763] The change from the days of Kissinger and Silberman was noticeable, particularly because Silberman again reminded the Yugoslavs why they hated him so much by publishing an article in *Foreign Policy* arguing for a tougher course against Belgrade.[764]

Secretary Vance noted that the tone of the meeting with Belovski was "upbeat, and Belovski was obviously pleased."[765] The United States showed understanding and interest in Yugoslav opinions. Moreover, two issues that Belovski raised – one about the delivery of equipment for the Yugoslav nuclear power plant, the other about émigré activities in the United States – the new administration seemed willing to resolve to Yugoslavia's satisfaction. Vance's and Brzezinski's friendly attitude was indeed a reflection of a new policy toward Yugoslavia. This new policy was outlined in a memo

[762] Razgovor ambasadora Belovskog sa američkim MIP-om Vensom, March 13, 1977, no. 213, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–22 SAD.
[763] Razgovor Belovskog sa Bžežinskim, March 28, 1977, no. 265, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–22 SAD.
[764] Laurence Silberman, "Yugoslavia's 'Old' Communism: Europe's Fiddler on the Roof," *Foreign Policy* no. 26 (Spring 1977): 3–27.
[765] Secretary of State to Embassy Belgrade, Telegram 055958, March 12, 1977, 1977STATE055958, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA.

from 1977 and its policy proposals guided the administration's policy toward Yugoslavia until the end of Carter's mandate in 1981.[766]

This new stance in a way radically departed from previous administrations' policies toward Belgrade not so much in methods as in its ultimate objective. The Carter administration proposed further development of military and political contacts between Yugoslavia and the United States. The administration reported that military cooperation has been at the lowest level since 1948 chiefly because of the Pentagon's reluctance to provide Yugoslavia with sophisticated weapons. "Given the critical role the military will play in holding this country together post-Tito, lack of cooperation in this field is the most serious weakness in our present policy," stated the memo.[767] It suggested that any delays in military cooperation made Belgrade reasonably suspicious and would directly play into Soviet hands. The memo also suggested closer contacts with the younger generation of the LCY cadres through intra-party contacts. "If Margaret Thatcher can do it there is no reason why should we be afraid."[768] Similarly, the memo noted, political relations required increased bilateral contacts and the establishment of the relationship with Tito's potential successors. Vice President Mondale was designated as the "ideal man to develop the kind of close, continuing relationship with Tito's potential

[766] The memo appears in the Brzezinski Material – Country Files for Yugoslavia 1-9/77 but it does not include information about the author's or authors' name(s) or for whom it was prepared. However, the memo is significant because it establishes the administration's policy toward Yugoslavia.
[767] Memo, Policy Action Agenda Yugoslavia, no date, 1977, NSA, Brzezinski Material – Country Files, "Yugoslavia 1-9/77," box 86, JCPL.
[768] The Yugoslavs boasted about "special relations" with the British conservatives that went back to World War II. In 1977, Margaret Thatcher visited Yugoslavia as the leader of the British opposition. On December 6, she met with Tito and they discussed a wide range of issues from human rights to Sino–Soviet relations and situation in Africa. Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita sa liderom Konzervativne partije Velike Britanije Margaret Tačer, 6.decembra 1977. godine u Beogradu, str. pov. 643/2, December 12, 1977, DA MSP RS, Str. Pov. 1977, f. 8, d. 357, s. 357.

successors."[769] To facilitate these military and political contacts, the memo suggested that the United States should accommodate Yugoslavia's requests to curb émigré activity and agree to the Yugoslav proposal to establish direct liaison between the Yugoslav federal police and the Department of Justice. This package would also include the deportation of known war criminal Andrija Artuković. "His actual deportation would be a dramatic signal to the Yugoslavs that we have adopted a new policy of opposition to Croatian separatism," the proposal concluded.[770]

The ultimate goal of this policy was Yugoslavia's "gradual absorption into the mainstream of European social democracy." To achieve that goal, the memo advised, Yugoslavia should not be treated like any other Eastern European state and suggested that the State Department should "bureaucratically" treat Yugoslavia as a Southern European state rather than an Eastern European one. Moreover, the United States should stress Yugoslavia's links with European neutrals and conceptual similarities between self-management and "what is going on in West Germany, France, and Sweden." "We should… encourage our Western friends further along this same path."[771] The memo rejected the erroneous definition of Yugoslavia's future that circulated in academia, media, and the government "in terms of only one question – whether the Soviet Union would swallow Yugoslavia post-Tito or this country will continue with its present political system."

[769] Ibid.
[770] Memo, Policy Action Agenda Yugoslavia, no date, 1977, NSA, Brzezinski Material – Country Files, "Yugoslavia 1-9/77," box 86, JCPL.
[771] Ibid.

The first step in achieving this ambitious goal was Mondale's visit to Yugoslavia in May 1977. Mondale's trip to Yugoslavia was the first of the many high-level exchanges that would ensue, including Tito's trip to the United States in March 1978. It sent a signal to the Yugoslav government and its detractors that the United States was interested in preserving Yugoslavia's integrity and independence and that a new era in Yugoslav–U.S. relations was on the horizon.

Mondale's visit to Yugoslavia

In April 1977, U.S. chargé d'affaires Charles York informed the Yugoslav government that Vice President Mondale would like to visit Yugoslavia during his Western European tour. York said that Mondale would like to meet Tito, but also some other Yugoslav functionaries to discuss various international issues such as the CSCE meeting in Belgrade, Africa, and West-East relations.[772] The main goals of Mondale's visit were to reassure the Yugoslavs of U.S. commitment to their country's independence and territorial integrity and to express American support for Yugoslavia's policy of nonalignment. "Of importance, the visit to Belgrade should give me the opportunity to talk some of the government's upcoming leaders, people we can expect to have increased dealings with in coming years," Mondale wrote.[773] Besides, the visit served to "restore" high-level exchanges between the United States and Yugoslavia that were on a hiatus since 1975.

[772] Zabeleška o razgovoru S. Starčevića, načelnika Uprave za Severnu Ameriku, sa C. York-om, otpravnikom poslova ambasade SAD u Beogradu, April 29, 1977, no. 423415, SSIP Uprava za Severnu Ameriku, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–222.
[773] Memo, Walter Mondale to Jimmy Carter, May 10, 1977, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, "Vice President's Trip to Portugal, Spain, Austria, Yugoslavia and England [5/16-23/1977], box 12, JCPL.

Mondale confirmed the administration's interest in developing good bilateral relations with Yugoslavia. He mentioned that, thanks to Carter's engagement, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved the delivery of the nuclear equipment to Yugoslavia that was stalled for some time. Also, Mondale said that the new administration was ready to allow the transfer of military equipment to Yugoslavia that had been stuck for various reasons since 1975.[774] Finally, the Vice President noted, to Tito's great satisfaction, that the Justice Department prosecuted the perpetrators of terrorist attacks on Yugoslavia's property and citizens. "It is without doubt that one of Mondale's goals was to impress [us] with his openness toward Yugoslavia, to demonstrate his cooperativeness and his readiness for a political dialogue, to manifest his respect of Yugoslavia's independence, integrity, and its nonaligned status, assuming that that would be beneficial for U.S. global policy," the Foreign Secretariat concluded in its analysis of the visit.[775]

Besides improving bilateral relations, Mondale's visit also proved that the Yugoslav government and the Carter administration agreed on many global issues. Mondale informed his hosts about his talks with the Prime Minister of South Africa, B. J.

[774] In 1975, the Yugoslav government made inquiries about the purchase of the BGM-71 TOW anti-tank missile. The Ford administration noted that the Yugoslavs, "probably for political reasons – playing a cautious and cozy game, often not following up information we give them on availability of U.S. equipment." However, the decision to provide the missiles to Yugoslavia, "an outgrowth of the President's decision following his visit to Belgrade last August," was suspended because of Yugoslavia's permission to Soviet overflights to Angola. "While there has been no reversal of the President's decision to improve U.S.–Yugo military relations, State and Defense have instituted a temporary freeze on further military dealings with Yugoslavia." Memo, Denis Clift to Brent Scowcroft, January 10, 1976, NSA Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, "Yugoslavia (3)," box 22, GFPL. In May 1976, Belgrade sent a list of 50 items of interest that included anti-tank missiles, torpedoes, unmanned aircraft, guided missiles, and various communication equipment.

[775] Izveštaj o zvaničnoj i prijateljskoj poseti potpredsednika SAD Voltera Mondejla Jugoslaviji od 20. do 22. maja 1977. godine, May 25, 1977, Str. pov. br. 423415, SSIP Uprava za Severnu Ameriku, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–222.

Vorster, that he had a day earlier in Vienna.[776] The Vice President told Tito that he made clear to Vorster that the United States would conduct a new policy toward South Africa that would include the U.S. support for the independence of Namibia and majority rule in Rhodesia. "Unfortunately, in the past, the United States had been telling South Africa that it can conduct any policy it wants," Mondale said, adding that the administration believed that every nation has the right to be independent. "After all, it is your policy too," Mondale said.[777] Although Tito and Mondale disagreed on the Middle East – Tito remained pessimistic that the settlement was possible – it appeared that the administration was more sensitive to the problems of the Arabs and the Palestinians. The discussions with Tito and other Yugoslav officials revealed that the Carter administration took, as the Yugoslavs noted, a "more flexible" approach to all major global issues. Moreover, the administration "demonstrated a positive attitude toward Yugoslavia and [toward] further development of cooperation whose importance goes beyond bilateral relations." Yet, the Secretariat cautioned that the practice should confirm this orientation because this administration belonged to the system that was, by its very nature, antagonistic toward countries such as Yugoslavia.[778] The controversy over Yugoslavia's involvement in the

[776] Scholar Nancy Mitchell explained in her path breaking study of the Carter presidency the importance of South Africa for Carter. The policy toward South Africa was outlined at the NSC meeting on March 3. Nancy Mitchell, *Jimmy Carter in Africa. Race and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA and Washington DC: Stanford University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center, 2016), 133, 150.

[777] Stenografske beleške sa razgovora Predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita sa potpredsednikom Sjedinjenih američkih drzava Walter Mondale-om održanih 21. maja 1977. godine sa početkom u 11,00 časova u Belom Dvoru, May 21, 1977, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–222. In the U.S. transcript of the conversation, Mondale's line appears differently: "In our country in the past, unfortunately, we have not made this an issue, but we have made it an issue now." See Memorandum of Conversation between Mondale and Tito, May 21, 1977, Document 236, *FRUS*, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe, 1977–1980.

[778] Izveštaj o zvaničnoj i prijateljskoj poseti potpredsednika SAD Voltera Mondejla Jugoslaviji od 20. do 22. maja 1977. godine, May 25, 1977, Str. pov. br. 423415, SSIP Uprava za Severnu Ameriku, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–222.

Horn of Africa in July 1977 proved to Belgrade that "certain circles" in Washington were indeed against Yugoslavia.

"Our debt toward one honest, although pretty radical revolution": Yugoslavia's military aid to Ethiopia

Tito, Minić, and Kardelj discussed with Mondale the situation in the Horn. The trio expressed Yugoslavia's desire for a peaceful settlement of the Eritrean question, but also emphasized the need to keep Mengistu in power. "No matter what, that regime has to stay," Tito told Mondale. Any other solution – including foreign intervention – would lead to direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Secretary Minić confirmed that Belgrade has sent to Ethiopia "some military aid, according to our ability" but he failed to mention to the Vice President that Yugoslavia was sending U.S.-made weapons.[779]

Unknown to Washington, in early 1977, Belgrade delivered 75 M-47 Patton tanks to Addis Ababa. The United States claimed that the tanks had been unlawfully delivered to Ethiopia, and that Yugoslavia – by delivering them to Addis Ababa – had breached the Charter of United Nations and the 1951 Mutual Defense Aid Program (MDAP), under whose provisions Yugoslavia had received weapons from the United States in the 1950s. Under the provisions of the MDAP, Yugoslavia was not allowed to transfer American weapons to "any person not an officer or agent of that Government, or to any other nation," without the prior consent of Washington.[780] The decision to deliver these

[779] Stenografske zabeleške razgovora između predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita i potpredsednika SAD Valtera Mondejla održanim 21. maja 1977 sa početkom u 11 časova u Belom dvoru, May 21, 1977, AJ, KPR, fond 837, I–3–1/107–222.

[780] Military Assistance Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia, November 14, 1951. Available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/yugo001.asp. (accessed October 25, 2019). Under this agreement, Yugoslavia received 319 M-47s and more than 30,000 Thompson submachine guns – the very same weapons that they delivered to Ethiopia in 1976/77. For more details about U.S. arms deliveries to

weapons to the Mengistu regime produced a small crisis in Yugoslav-U.S. relations that some in Belgrade gloomily interpreted as the redux of Kissinger's policy toward Yugoslavia. Brzezinski's deputy, David Aaron, told Belovski, that the Yugoslav delivery of U.S. tanks had "perturbed the administration, but also Carter [personally]." Aaron continued: "The main problem here is… uncertainty if the Yugoslav deliveries had been made with Soviet knowledge and in collaboration with them."[781] Yugoslavia, however, like it did in Angola in 1975, conducted an independent policy in the Horn, whose main objective was to prevent superpowers' involvement. Yugoslavia's relations with Ethiopia went back to the late 1950s and the beginnings of the NAM. After the 1974 coup, these relations became even more important because of Yugoslavia's concerns about détente and superpowers' involvement in the Horn – a region that was uncomfortably close to the Eastern Mediterranean theatre.

Before 1974, however, Yugoslav military aid to Ethiopia did not figure prominently in the relationship between the two countries.[782] Although Yugoslavian-Ethiopian relations had been cordial before 1974, Ethiopian reliance on U.S. military supplies made Yugoslav equipment obsolete.[783] Yet, the coup of September 12, 1974

Yugoslavia in the 1950s see Bojan Dimitrijević, *Jugoslovenska armija, 1945-1954* (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006), 389.

[781] Zabeleška o razgovoru između Arona, zamenika Brežinskog u Nacionalnom savetu za bezbednost i ambasadora Belovskog, July 7, 1977, DA MSP RS, PA 1977 SAD, f. 125, d. 3, s. 438020.

[782] According to the (incomplete) records of the Federal Secretariat of Defense, between 1960 and 1972, Yugoslavia provided training and education to 15 members of the Imperial Ethiopian Army and sold various military materials in the meager amount of US $1,000.77 (only 0.005% of all Yugoslav military sales in the period between 1960 to 1972). Nesvrstanost i pitanje odbrane, Prilog br. 15, no date, April 1973, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/9.

[783] In 1971, the Ethiopian Navy considered purchases in Yugoslavia, but that arrangement never materialized. A report from the Yugoslav embassy in Addis Ababa noted: "The Army is professional and for African conditions very strong, very well armed and modernly organized thanks to the United States." See Događaji u Etiopiji, March 8, 1974, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/25–8 Etiopija. Yet, Paul Henze noted that although Ethiopa was dependent on the United States, it was not "generously supplied." Also, Henze wrote, military expenditures per person under arms before 1977 were

opened new opportunities for Yugoslav active diplomacy. Initial reports from Addis showed confusion about changes in Ethiopia. "For now, we are not in a position to offer a more reliable assessment of the events and prospects of future developments of the situation in Ethiopia," the Yugoslav embassy in Addis reported.[784] The embassy described the situation in Addis as "chaotic" and the Foreign Secretariat advised caution until they could understand what was going on there. A wave of arrests and cyclical internal purges within the Provisional Military Government (the PMAC or Derg) caused confusion in Belgrade about who was really in charge in Addis. Moreover, the coup ousted Tito's longtime friend and ally, Haile Selassie, who was one of the founding fathers of the NAM. Selassie's removal urgently raised the question of Ethiopia's future foreign policy orientation. "That is a big deal for us. That is one of the most important issues [for us] now," Tito said.[785] The Yugoslavs assumed that the CIA instigated the coup in Addis Ababa as it allegedly did in Cyprus earlier that year. Belgrade believed that the turmoil in Ethiopia could provide a window of opportunity for the United States to further increase its influence in the Horn, particularly because of the Soviet domination in Somalia.[786] With the situation in flux, Yugoslavia's most important task was to provide economic, political, and humanitarian assistance to the new regime in order to preserve

lower than in any other country in the region. See Paul Henze, *Arming the Horn, 1960-1980*, The Wilson Center Working Papers No. 43 (Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center, 1982), 21-23.

[784] The Yugoslavs did not know much about Mariam Haile Mengistu except that he appeared to be a "resolute man, firmly devoted to the Ethiopian revolution. See Preliminarna informacija o dogadjajima u Etiopiji. Sluzba za spoljno-politicka pitanja, November 26, 1974, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/25–8 Etiopija.

[785] Stenografske beleške sa X sednice Predsedništva Socijalističke federativne republike Jugoslavije, October 17, 1974, AJ, PSFRJ fond 803, k. 18.

[786] Although Belgrade recognized that the United States "had acquired its influence" in Ethiopia during the Selassie regime, turmoil in the country threatened to pull out Ethiopia from the NAM. "The biggest danger to the [revolutionary] movement comes from the activitity of the United States who will try to destroy the movement and infiltrate its own people in the [revolutionary] movement and, by doing that, extract Ethiopia from the circle of nonaligned states and turn it into a new American stronghold." Stenografske beleške sa X sednice Predsedništva SFRJ, October 17, 1974, AJ, PSFRJ fond 803, k. 18.

Ethiopia's nonaligned status and prevent the United States from augmenting its influence in the country. The Yugoslav government decided that its two chief tasks in Ethiopia were to support "progressive forces" and contain the U.S. influence there.[787]

Although Tito privately condemned the treatment of Haile Selassie and his family, Belgrade quickly embraced the PMAC.[788] In an internal memo, the SSIP instructed its diplomats about how to justify the abandonment of Tito's long-time ally, Selassie: "[With] our desire for Ethiopia to remain an independent and nonaligned country, with our help, within our capabilities… we can always… explain and defend consistency in our attitude toward Ethiopia and the people of Ethiopia."[789] While the Yugoslavs pondered the ways to establish contact with the new government, the Derg soon reached out to Yugoslavia for assistance in "these crucial moments in history."[790]

The new regime had to fight on several fronts: against forces of counter-revolution, against separatist groups in Eritrea aided by some Arab countries, and against Somali insurgents in Ogaden. As Radoslav Yordanov claimed, foreign military aid "was an urgent matter of survival" for the PMAC but until the spring of 1977, the Kremlin had been unwilling to support the new regime and, by Addis' own admission, in the early

[787] Ibid. Moreover, the Yugoslavs urged the Arab states to support the new regime in Addis, hoping that a joint action of nonaligned would disrupt Ethiopian relations with Israel.
[788] Yugoslav attempts to establish contact with the new government were further complicated by the fact that Yugoslav diplomats did not know members of the new, revolutionary regime while the members of the Selassie regime were in prison. "All our friends are under arrest," Tito stated at the meeting of the Presidium of the SFRY. See Stenografske beleške sa X sednice Predsedništva SFRJ, October 17, 1974, AJ, PSFRJ fond 803, k. 18.
[789] Preliminarna informacija o događajima u Etiopiji, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja Kabineta Predsednika Republike, November 26, 1974, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/25–8 Etiopija.
[790] Informacija o najnovijim događajima u Etiopiji, SSIP–Uprava za Afriku južno od Sahare, December 10, 1974, AJ, KPR, fond 837, I–5–b/25–8 Etiopija. As Major Dawit Wolde Giorgis described these early days of ideological confusion, "delegations were sent to Tanzania, Yugoslavia, China, and India to shop for one [ideology] for Ethiopia." Cited in Ermias Abebe, "The Horn, the Cold War, and documents from the former East-bloc: An Ethiopian view," in Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) *Bulletin*, issues 8–9 (Winter 1996/1997), 40.

days of the coup, "a revolutionary people's army has not yet been formed."[791] Belgrade understood that the question of military assistance was decisive for the success of the revolution and, consequentially, for Ethiopia's foreign policy orientation. In the first months after the coup, the Derg desperately searched for weapons, reaching out to Moscow and Washington. Moderate members of the Derg, however, wished to continue to receive arms from the United States and tried to use their contacts with Moscow as leverage in negotiations with Washington.[792] Yet, the radical faction of Derg demanded closer ties with communist countries. Aware of these inner struggles over the course of the Ethiopian revolution, Belgrade understood that Yugoslav assistance was crucial for the stabilization of the new regime but also as a means to extract Ethiopia from the U.S. sphere of influence.[793] Thus, Yugoslavia enthusiastically responded to the Derg's inquiry about an ammunition factory. The Yugoslav ambassador in Addis, Aleksandar Vojinović, urged his government to send a group of experts that would help Ethiopians build the factory as soon as possible because this was "one of the key issues in preserving Ethiopia's independence and its status as a nonaligned country."[794]

Yugoslav willingness to help the PMAC, and Belgrade's "objective stance" toward Eritrea and Ogaden (i.e. Belgrade's refusal to recognize their independence),

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[791] Radoslav Yordanov, *The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War* (New York: Lexington Books, 2016), 119-120.
[792] Intelligence materials for President Nixon, October 16, 1974, White House Situation Room. Former President Nixon's Briefings, 1974–1977, box 1, GFPL.
[793] The Yugoslavs concluded that the United States would continue with arms transfers to Ethiopia. Ambasada SFRJ Adis Abeba SSIP-u, September 11, 1974, DA MSP RS, PA 1974 Etiopija, f. 33, d. 32/3, s. 443681.
[794] Ambasada SFRJ u Adis Abebi SSIP-u, October 31, 1974, DA MSP RS, PA 1974 Etiopija, f. 33, d. 33/3, s. 452262. To facilitate Yugoslav–Ethiopian cooperation, particularly in the military sphere, in 1974 Belgrade appointed Brigadier General Aleksandar Vojinović as the new Yugoslavian ambassador. Vojinović had graduated from military schools in both the Soviet Union and the United States, and he was the highly acclaimed author of several books on military tactics and strategy. Until the end of his post in 1979, Vojinović was an ardent proponent of arming the PMAC.

made Yugoslav-Ethiopian relations, as one elated report from the Yugoslavian embassy in Addis noted, "exceeding normal, regular, good relations between two countries."[795] In return, the new regime showed enthusiasm for nonalignment and the Yugoslav domestic models of economic, political, and administrative organization. "The people of Ethiopia admire the success of the Yugoslav people and comrade Tito and want to take the same road … when they [the Ethiopians] decided to build socialism, they took as an example Yugoslav experience and accomplishments," said the President of the Committee of International Relations of the PMAC, Captain Sissay Habte, during his visit to Belgrade in 1975.[796] For example, the Derg requested guidance how to organize youth volunteer brigades that would stamp out illiteracy in the countryside, build infrastructure and eradicate infectious diseases and, like in Yugoslavia's case, accelerate modernization of a backward state.[797] Ethiopian readiness to emulate the Yugoslav model created an opening for Yugoslavia's greater political influence in the Horn.

In a January 1975 conversation with ambassador Vojinović, Ethiopian Defense Minister, Ayalew Mandefro, expressed his desire to ease Ethiopian dependence on U.S. weapons by arranging Yugoslav military deliveries and providing Yugoslav assistance in building military-industrial capacities. Mandefro said that the Ethiopians did not want to bind themselves to China or the Warsaw Pact, thus replacing one big power with another, and that is why they selected Yugoslavia "as a sincere and ideologically the most suitable

[795] Aktuelna zbivanja u Etiopiji i njenim spoljno-političkim odnosima (kratak osvrt), July 11, 1975, AJ, KPR, fond 837, I–5–b/25–8 Etiopija.
[796] Rezime razgovora vođenih između jugoslovenske delegacije na čelu sa drugom Cvijetinom Mijatovićem i delegacije PVS Etiopije na čelu sa kapetanom Sissay Habte na I plenarnom sastanku održanom 25. Februara, 1975, March 3, 1975, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/24–31.
[797] Ambasada SFRJ u Adis Abebi SSIP-u, November 5, 1974, DA MSP RS, PA 1974 Etiopija f. 33, d. 32/2, s. 453004.

friend."[798] The Yugoslavs understood that the question of arms transfers was essential for the survival of the new regime, or as Vojinovic noted, it was "to be or not to be for the Ethiopian revolution." Belgrade was also aware that the Ethiopians were equipped with U.S. weapons and that their replacement with arms from the USSR or China would be impractical and politically dangerous, because it would require larger involvement of Soviet and Chinese trainers, which could lead to their political domination. To overcome this obstacle, Belgrade even considered urging the Hanoi-dominated Provisional Government of South Vietnam in Saigon to sell captured U.S. weapons to Ethiopia, either directly or through Yugoslavia, to bridge shortages until the Yugoslavs were able to build an ammunition factory.[799]

Along with these efforts to arm the PMAC, Yugoslavia also launched a diplomatic offensive to help its ally. Yugoslav efforts had previously been mostly directed toward Syria, Iraq, Somalia, and Egypt, the members of the NAM who supported some separatist factions in Eritrea. "Around you there are a lot of interested parties. We know what the imperialists want. They want: to divide and conquer. Others have their selfish interests. The unity of the people is important," Tito stated, advising Addis Ababa to avoid interference with the imperialist "or any other" powers.[800] Yugoslavia urged Ethiopia and Somalia to reach a peaceful resolution of the Ogaden problem in order to avoid interference of foreign powers and preserve the unity of the NAM. Moreover, in an effort to strengthen the country, Belgrade suggested federal status

[798] Zabeleška or razgovoru sa ministrom odbrane Mandefrom, January 25, 1975, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/25–8, Etiopija.
[799] Telegram ambasade SFRJ u Adis Abebi Saveznom sekretarijatu inostranih poslova, November 6, 1975, no. 671, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/25–8 Etiopija.
[800] Razgovor Predsednika SFRJ J.B. Tita sa delegacijom PVS Etiopije u Belom dvoru, March 4, 1975, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/24–31.

for Eritrea as the best way to resolve the national question and to prevent further instability, thus encouraging Ethiopia to replicate the Yugoslavian constitutional reforms of 1974 that had previously, as Belgrade liked to believe, resolved Yugoslav regional and ethnic tensions.

These Yugoslav efforts to preserve Ethiopian unity and stability also demonstrated that, for Belgrade, Ethiopia was a testing ground for the future of the NAM. From the Yugoslav perspective, the competition for the soul of the Ethiopian revolution did not only include the superpowers, but also included other nonaligned countries that pursued their own interest in the Horn. The involvement of nonaligned countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Somalia pointed at the possibility of factionalism within the movement, such as regionalism and gathering on a religious basis (a group of Muslim states) that, in Yugoslav opinion, undermined the movement's strength in terms of its international relations. Furthermore, at the outset of the 5th Summit of the NAM in Colombo in 1976, the unity of the movement was essential, particularly in the context of the Cuban efforts to "ideologically divert" the NAM and turn it into a Soviet proxy in the Global South. [801]

Therefore, Yugoslavia's goals in Ethiopia were to prevent the involvement of big powers, but also to preserve the unity of the NAM and the movement's influence in Africa. As Tito's "domino theory" stated, if Ethiopia falls [to imperialists], the entirety of Africa will follow. Bilateral exchanges after 1974 reinforced the sense of commonality between Belgrade and Addis Ababa, and from 1974 until 1977, Yugoslavia sent military aid (through donations and commercial agreements) in the amount of 5 million U.S.

[801] Nacrt platforme za V konferenciju nesvrstanih zemalja u Kolombu, February 26, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/26.

dollars (roughly 24 million U.S. dollars in 2019).[802] Therefore, in the period between 1974 and 1977, the stage was set for one of the most important issues of Yugoslavian foreign policy in the late 1970s that touched upon Yugoslav relations with the superpowers and other nonaligned countries, demonstrating the limits of Yugoslav internationalism.

"Exposed to the dangers from outside and inside, the revolution does not have any other choice… it is necessary now to arm peasants who are, after the agrarian reforms, the most reliable dam against counterrevolution."[803] A Yugoslav journalist used these words to describe the 1977 coup and the subsequent challenges faced by the revolutionary government. In February 1977, a shootout in the former royal palace between two factions of the Derg eliminated a majority of Colonel Haile Mengistu's opponents. The coup happened only two weeks after Minić visited Addis Ababa. According to U.S. sources in Belgrade, Minić assessed the Ethiopian internal situation as "extremely dangerous" with the potential for long-term instability.[804] The ascendance of Mengistu did not dispel this fear of instability in Ethiopia and the region, but the Mengistu faction appeared ready to embrace socialism and nonalignment.

The events of February 1977 led Belgrade to believe that their aid to Mengistu was more important than ever. A week after Minić's return from Ethiopia, the SFRY Presidium held a meeting that concluded to continue to support the Mengistu regime. The Presidium agreed to invite the Vice President of the PMAC, Atnafu Abate, to visit

[802] Informacija o Etiopiji povodom posete Potpredsednika SIV i Saveznog sekretara za inostrane poslove Miloša Minića, January 4, 1977, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/24–33.
[803] Dušan Miklja, *Etiopija. Od imperije do revolucije* (Beograd: Sloboda, 1977), no page number.
[804] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 00838, February 11, 1977, 1977BELGRA00838, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed May 25, 2019).

Yugoslavia in late February. Minić's visit to Ethiopia and Abate's visit to Yugoslavia confirmed that Addis was practically isolated from the U.S., and yet without firm support from the Kremlin – a situation that likely encouraged Belgrade to provide energetic support of the Mengistu regime in an effort to fill this vacuum. During his January talks with Mengistu, Secretary Minić promised the expansion of military cooperation "all to the extent that you [Ethiopians] feel comfortable with."[805] As a report from the Yugoslav embassy confirmed, the main goal of Abate's visit was to obtain weapons from Yugoslavia, since the Soviets refused to send them tanks and airplanes. Despite Yugoslavia's efforts to keep arms transfers to Ethiopia secret, the U.S. embassy in Belgrade reported that it was obvious that Abate's visit to Yugoslavia was for "arms shopping" because he visited arms exhibit and testing center in Nikinci. Yet, Belgrade still denied any military transfers to Addis, except some "kitchen utensils [and] communication equipment."[806]

However, Vojinović reported that the Ethiopians were interested in more than the forks and spoons for their army cafeterias. On their shopping list were ammunition and heavy weapons. Moreover, Vojinović said that the Ethiopians wanted to learn about the Yugoslav military doctrine of territorial defense and the use of people's militia in combat operations against foreign aggressors.[807] At the same time, as the Ambassador of Cuba in

[805] Stenografske beleške razgovora potpredsednika SIV-a i Saveznog sekretara za inostrane poslove M. Minića sa Mengistu Haile Mariamo-om, prvim potpredsednikom Privremenog vojnog administrativnog saveta Etiopije i predsednikom Saveta ministara u Adis Abebi, January 23, 1977, DA MSP RS, Str. Pov. 1977, f. 3, d. 38, sign. 38.
[806] The Embassy reported that Sudan and Somalia, both nonaligned countries, expressed their concern over Yugoslavia's military ties with Ethiopia. Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 01549, March 15, 1977, 1977BELGRA01549, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed May 25, 2019).
[807] Ambasada SFRJ u Adis Abebi SSIP-u, February 11, 1977, DA MSP RS, PA 1977 Etiopija, f. 35, d. 17, sign. 47657 and Ambasada SFRJ u Adis Abebi SSIP-u, February 11, 1977, DA MSP RS, PA 1977, Etiopija, f. 35, d. 17, s. 48663.

Ethiopia, Jose Novoa, explained to his Soviet colleague Ratanov in February 1977, Mengistu expressed his interest in emulating Cuba's experience of creating committees for the defense of the revolution, and requested military aid from Fidel Castro.[808] It is unclear if Addis tried to play all sides in order to seek concessions, but Yugoslav records show that Belgrade did not need any cajoling to send weapons to the Horn.

Vojinović in particular advocated strongly for Yugoslav involvement, and he urged his superiors in Belgrade to accelerate shipments and to increase the quantity of military aid sent to Ethiopia. "Any reluctance to deliver the equipment could be interpreted in a wrong way," Vojinović warned.[809] In January, Vojinović reported that weapons from other countries – notably China and the USSR – had begun to trickle into Ethiopia. Although he noted that neither China nor the Soviet Union was willing to provide heavy weapons, Vojinović perceived these developments as alarming and dangerous for Yugoslav interests in the country.[810] Records obtained by Yordanov and Cold War International History Project from the socialist camp show that the Ethiopians sent the requests for weapons throughout the communist world. Although bloc members agreed that the situation in Ethiopia "warrants… civilian and military help," the Soviets were worried that larger shipments to Addis would complicate Soviet–Somali relations.[811] During this period, the Soviet reluctance to plunge into the conflict was

[808] Record of conversation between Soviet Ambassador in Ethiopia A.P. Ratanov and Cuban Ambassador in Ethiopia Jose Peres Novoa, February 10, 1977, CWIHP *Bulletin*, 53.
[809] Ambasada SFRJ Adis Abeba SSIP-u, February 10, 1977, DA MSP RS, PA 1977 Etiopija, f. 35, d. 17, s. 47469.
[810] Zabeleška o razgovorima sa ministrom odbrane Ayalew Mandefro, January 13, 1977, DA, MSP RS PA 1977 Etiopija, f. 35, d. 17, s. 42042.
[811]"Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Urgent note on Aid to Ethiopia from the Countries of the Socialist Community, Including Poland's'," January 29, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych [Warsaw], D.V, 13/81, W-6, 1977, B-20, 2. Obtained and translated by Radoslav Yordanov. Available at http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/134776 (accessed October 10, 2019).

motivated by their quest for stability in the Horn.[812] Ethiopian requests and the Yugoslav sense of urgency in the context of competition with the bloc countries led to the expansive and financially (and politically) expensive - albeit short - program of Yugoslavian military aid to Ethiopia.

During their February meeting, Tito told Abate that Yugoslavia was ready to help, but also warned him that purely military measures cannot be successful without diplomacy. Despite Tito's mild admonishment of Ethiopian military strategy, the Defense Secretariat provided generous support to Ethiopia in the areas of both armament and training. The Secretariat provided 2 million U.S. dollars for purchases of Yugoslav military equipment, and furnished 22.500 Yugoslav-made bolt-action rifles with over 7 million pieces of ammunition. Yet the most important part of the agreement had been the Yugoslav promise to deliver 145 US M-47 Patton tanks, as well as a number of tank destroyers M-18 Hellcat, together with ammunition.[813] Furthermore, the Federal Secretariat pledged to send Yugoslav military instructors to Ethiopia. Although these weapons were mostly outdated, they complemented the existing Ethiopian weapons systems.[814] In March, the Ethiopians requested additional ammunition for other models of U.S. tanks and some other light infantry weapons of U.S. origin.

In addition, Belgrade delivered Yugoslav-made trucks and mobile repair shops, handguns, uniforms, and other war equipment. A number of Ethiopians came to

[812] See Yordanov, *The Soviet Union and the Horn*.
[813] Informacija o poseti delegacije Privremnog vojnog administrativnog saveta Etiopije uz Sporazum o besplatnoj pomoći NVO u visini od US $2,000,000, February 28, 1977, DA MSP RS, PA 1977, Etiopija, f. 35, d. 17, s. 412205.
[814] Ambasada SFRJ u Adis Abebi SSIP-u, March 28, 1977, DA MSP RS, PA 1977 Etiopija, f. 35, d. 17, s. 417104. In addition, in 1976 and in 1977 the SSUP donated old U.S. "tommy guns," allegedly for prison guards. See Sedmo odeljenje SSIP-a ambasadi SFRJ u Adis Abebi, January 25, 1977, DA MSP RS, PA 1977 Etiopija, f. 35, d. 14, s. 43297.

Yugoslavia, where they received training in Yugoslav military and police schools. Also, as promised, Yugoslav instructors went to Jijiga to train Mengistu's soldiers on the proper use of the M-47s. Ambassador Vojinović often commended Yugoslav instructors for their success and "extraordinary camaraderie" with Ethiopians officers and soldiers.[815] Yet, because of U.S. pressure, this aid had to stop. The United States learned about Yugoslavia's delivery of M-47s to Ethiopia in June 1977. The new U.S. ambassador, Lawrence Eagleburger, requested a meeting with Minić to confirm whether or not the Yugoslavs sent these tanks to Mengistu. As Eagleburger noted, Minić was as evasive as always in his answer. He gave a lengthy explanation of Yugoslavia's policy toward Ethiopia and said that Yugoslavia "did send some military equipment."[816] Minić, however, could not confirm that Yugoslavia sent American tanks to Mengistu but that he would look into the question.[817] Minić's non-answer was, of course, disingenuous. After all, he participated in negotiations with Mengistu and Abate about Yugoslavia's military aid to Ethiopia. "I suspect that Minic knows," Eagleburger pointed out, adding that Minić's unusually soft stance could be an "indication that he knew Yugoslavia had been caught with its hand in the cookie jar."[818]

The regime was taken aback by the severity of Washington's reprove. Cordial meetings with Vance and Brzezinski in March and Mondale in May, led Belgrade to

[815] Ambasada SFRJ u Adis Abebi SSNO-u, July 28, 1977, DA MSP RS, PA 1977 Etiopija, f. 35, d. 18, s. 442079.
[816] Zabeleška o razgovoru PP SIV-a i Saveznog sekretara za inostrane poslove M.Minića sa novoimenovanim ambasadorom SAD u Jugoslaviji Iglbergerom, June 24, 1977, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–22, SAD.
[817] Embassy Belgrade to State Department, Telegram 04263, June 24, 1977, 1977BELGRA04263, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59: NARA (accessed May 25, 2019).
[818] Embassy Belgrade to State Department, Telegram 04284, June 25, 1977, 1977BELGRA04284, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed May 27, 2019).

believe that the Carter administration was more approachable and sensitive to Yugoslav needs than the previous two administrations. As Minić remarked to the Canadian foreign minister, Don Jamieson, his feeling was that "this administration [Carter's] approaches Yugoslavia in a different way than the previous. My impression is that they are more ready to respect our independence, our nonaligned position today, to accept us for who we are and to develop better relations with us."[819]

Both sides, however, did not want to escalate the matter. The United States was afraid that the issue would become a "major obstacle in Yugoslavia's relations with the US, and more broadly, with other Western countries" and tried to keep it confidential.[820] President Carter penciled on a memo that his "inclination is not to embarrass Yugoslavia."[821] Washington's goal was to preserve Yugoslavian independence and territorial integrity, and—just like it had in the 1950s—the U.S. perceived arms transfers to Belgrade as both a politically and militarily effective means to do so. After 1968 and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslavs wanted to both diversify their armaments and decrease their reliance on Soviet technology. Also, as Belgrade (correctly) assumed, U.S. arms transfers would "enhance American stake in Yugoslav independence."[822] However, "*the Yugoslav transfer of old U.S. M-47 tanks to Ethiopia this summer stands as a caution*," Brzezinski warned President Carter.[823]

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[819] See Zabeleška o razgovoru između sekretara Minića i ministra Jamiesona, June 28, 1977, DA MSP RS, Str. Pov. 1977, f. 5, d. 216, s. 216.
[820] Secretary of State to Embassy Paris, Telegram 185683, August 06, 1977, 1977STATE185683, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed May 27, 2019).
[821] Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Eagleburger and Secretary Minic, July 8, 1977, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, box 86, JCPL.
[822] Department of State to Embassy in Belgrade, Telegram 169695, July 20, 1977, 1977STATE169695, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-79/Electronic telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed May 27, 2019).
[823] Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter, September 20, 1977, Document 242, *FRUS*, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe, 1977–1980.

However, after Yugoslavia's explanation that the transfer of tanks was a "bureaucratic error"—which Brzezinski called "disingenuous," particularly because in October 1975, Yugoslavia had requested a permit to transfer F-86 Sabers to Honduras—and Belgrade assurances that re-transfers would not occur in the future, the United States continued with talks about providing the Yugoslav military with torpedoes, radars, and short-range missiles, holding to the belief that "*the risk of such a re-transfer in the future can be minimized*."[824] The Presidential Directive 13 provided a legal basis for arms transfers to Yugoslavia in order "to promote our security and security of our allies and close friends."[825] In addition, the State Department "minimized the case" and made information about it confidential, as Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher promised to Minić.[826] When the information about the transfers leaked to the press in November 1977, Belgrade, in typical fashion, accused the CIA and the "reactionary circles" within the State Department of sabotaging U.S.–Yugoslav arms negotiations. Yugoslavia's interest in keeping the whole issue secret was obvious. Secretary Minić tried to contain the damage and said to Eagleburger that some officials in Belgrade had applied the MDAP too "liberally." "We [should] not allow a bunch of old iron fit only for a military museum to spoil our relations," Minić told Eagleburger.[827]

[824] Ibid.
[825] Presidential Directive/NSC 13, May 13, 1977, Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program. Available at https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pd/pd13.pdf. (accessed March 12, 2019).
[826] Zabeleška o razgovorima između sekretara Minića i zamenika državnog sekretara Vorena Kristofera, July 20, 1977, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–22. The Yugoslavs asked if the administration could keep the issue away from Congress, aware of Congress' traditional hostility toward Yugoslavia. The administration officials, however, did not comply with Yugoslavia's request.
[827] Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Eagleburger and Secretary Minic, July 8, 1977, NSA, Brzezinski Material, "Yugoslavia, 1-9/77", box 86, JCPL.

This American willingness to continue arms negotiations with Yugoslavia meant that Belgrade had to halt the transfer of U.S. weapons to Ethiopia. For Mengistu, the Yugoslav decision to cut military aid came at a particularly bad moment, when the Somalis had just invaded Ogaden, but Moscow was still reluctant to send significant quantities of arms.[828] In August 1977, Mengistu repeatedly met with Vojinović, urging Yugoslavia to send the remaining tanks. "The Ethiopian revolution is fighting against enemies armed by both socialist and Western-capitalist countries," Mengistu complained.[829] He told Vojinović that Ethiopia understood "difficulties with regards to U.S. protests," but that Yugoslavia should know that the tanks were a "life or death issue." On his behalf, Vojinović urged his superiors to send the remaining 75 tanks, because "the Americans in their present efforts to somewhat improve relations with Ethiopia are not going not make big problems. For us is also useful to get rid of the old equipment."[830] Moreover, continued Vojinović, Mengistu—"with great bitterness"—had complained about Soviet attempts to pay their debt to Somalia with Ethiopian territories, and about the destiny of the Ethiopian revolution. Vojinović believed that Mengistu's requests for the Yugoslav tanks were motivated by Soviet "extortions" related to Ogaden. "And because of that situation and their disappointment with big powers, we believe that we should give them total assistance… because that is, in our opinion, our debt toward one honest, although pretty radical and rigid revolution," Vojinović concluded.[831]

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[828] Yordanov, *The Soviet Union and the Horn*, 160.
[829] Ambasada SFRJ Adis Abeba SSIP-u, August 5, 1977, DA MSP RS, PA 1977 Etiopija, f. 35, d. 12, s. 443410.
[830] Ambasada SFRJ Adis Abeba SSIP-u, August 26, 1977, DA MSP RS, PA 1977 Etiopija, f. 35, d.19, s. 446547.
[831] Ambasada SFRJ Adis Abeba SSIP-u, August 5, 1977, DA MSP RS, PA 1977 Etiopija, f. 35, d. 12. Soviet records paint a slightly different picture. On August 9, Mengistu met with Soviet ambassador Ratanov and stated that the PMAC "consider ourselves accountable to the revolutionary debt inhering in the obligation to take into account the interests of the Soviet Union in this region." Yet, from this record is

However, despite Vojinović's and Mengistu's pleas, tanks from Yugoslavia never arrived. Ironically, U.S. efforts to keep the Soviets away from the Horn were directly undermined by the administration's efforts to halt Yugoslavia's actions there. The abrupt cessation of Yugoslav deliveries was one of many factors that contributed to Mengistu's fateful turn toward the Kremlin. Therefore, by the end of the summer of 1977, Yugoslav efforts to keep both superpowers out of Ethiopia had failed. Surrounded by hostile regional powers that were perceived as exponents of U.S. interests in the region, Ethiopia inevitably turned to the Soviet Union.[832] During Tito's visit to Moscow in the summer of 1977, Yugoslavia for the last time tried to help its African ally but to no avail.

Tito's Big Eastern tour

While the Foreign Secretariat was dealing with the fallout from Yugoslavia's arms transfers to Ethiopia, Tito was on his way to the USSR, North Korea, and China. Ethiopia was one of the topics on Tito's agenda. Tito wanted to confirm that neither the Kremlin nor Havana planned to send their troops to Ethiopia. "We can't send military, but we already gave them instructors," Tito said in the meeting. "We can't send military and neither can Cubans, but instructors, that's a different thing," Brezhnev responded.[833] Tito told Brezhnev that all "progressive" countries should help Ethiopia: "Imagine what would happen if Ethiopia falls. There would be the rule of reactionaries, imperialism, the

clear that Mengistu rejected the Soviet plan for a Somali-Ethiopian settlement and that the PMAC would not grant any territorial concessions to Somalia. See Memorandum of converstion between Ratanov and Mengistu, July 29, 1977, in CWIHP *Bulletin*, 69-70.

[832] Sadašnje stanje na području "Roga Afrike," SSIP - Grupa za analizu i planiranje, June 23, 1977, DA MSP RS, Str. pov.1977, f. 4, d. 117, s. 117.

[833] Stenografske beleške razgovora između predsednika Tita i Brežnjeva, August 18, 1977, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/70–1.

USA, and the Arabs would have the Red Sea." He asked Brezhnev for permission to send Yugoslav weapons made under Soviet license. "That is up to you," Gromyko replied.[834]

Despite Soviet approval, Yugoslav records show that after the summer of 1977, Yugoslavia's aid to Ethiopia tapered off altogether, and there is no evidence that Yugoslavs ever delivered either Yugoslav or Soviet weapons from the Yugoslav arsenals. Furthermore, despite its own anti-imperialist rhetoric and calls for communist solidarity, Yugoslavia refused to allow Soviet military overflights to Ethiopia.[835]

The reasons for the Yugoslav decision to stop arms transfers could not be interpreted only through the lens of Washington's pressure on Belgrade to cease its deliveries to Mengistu. Although American dissatisfaction played an important role in shaping Yugoslavia's policy toward the Horn, even more important was Yugoslavia's uneasiness with the Soviet influence there. The Foreign Secretariat and the Yugoslav embassies around the world in their reports showed this anxiety about Soviet involvement in Ethiopia and its implications. A policy memo from July 1977 stated that Ethiopia's increasing reliance on the USSR and the countries of the Warsaw Pact, most notably East

[834] Ibid. Belgrade negotiated the purchase of a license for T-72 tanks, wire-guided anti-tank guided missiles ("Malyutka"), and other various weapons. Under the agreement, Yugoslavia was not allowed to transfer these Yugoslav-made weapons to third parties without prior Soviet approval. This provision limited Yugoslavia's military internationalism and forced it to transfer outdated World War II weapons that were captured in 1944/5.

[835] Reasons for this decision were many, but the main reason was that Belgrade did not want to spoil successful US–Yugoslav negotiations about deliveries of U.S. arms. When Belgrade allowed Soviet overflights during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the United States suspended previously arranged delivery of howitzer shells. See Department of State to Embassy in Belgrade, Telegram 169695, July 20, 1977, 1977STATE169695, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed on May 28, 2019).

Germany and Bulgaria, had "objectively weakened the nonaligned component of Ethiopian foreign policy… and presents a danger for all of Africa."[836]

A policy analysis prepared for Tito before his trip to the USSR similarly warned that Soviet policy in Africa was characterized by Moscow's efforts to establish its zone of influence on the continent. According to this assessment, Soviet policy was "deeply contradictory" in its nature – Soviets did give support to "progressive" movements and regimes, but also "abusively" interfered with their internal affairs – and its final objective was to break up the Nonaligned Movement.[837] Considering this, Tito's request for Soviet approval of Yugoslavia's aid to Mengistu was inexplicable. Tito was as concerned about U.S. influence in the Horn (directly or via its proxies such as Saudi Arabia) as he was worried about the Soviet presence there. His request for Soviet approval, however, could be interpreted not so much in the context of Yugoslavia's policy toward Africa as much as in the context of Tito's upcoming trip to China. By deferring to Brezhnev on the issue of the Horn, Tito likely wanted to reaffirm Yugoslavia's solidarity with global anti-imperialist forces. Besides, it was well known that the Soviets disapproved of Tito's trip to Beijing and Tito's "consultation" about Ethiopia served to appease Moscow.

[836] Najnoviji razvoj događaja u Etiopiji i region Roga Afrike, SSIP Uprava za Afriku južno od Sahare, July 21, 1977, DA MSP RS, Str. Pov. 1977, f. 5, d. 218, sign. 218. One year later, the Yugoslavs bitterly concluded that the "discourse of the Ethiopian leadership is [now] dominated by the Cuban concept of nonalignment." Moreover, closer Ethiopian relations with the Soviets, Cubans, and Eastern European countries had "limiting effects on the development of Yugoslav–Ethiopian relations. As a consequence of Soviet arms deliveries, Ethiopian interest in developing military cooperation and collaboration with our security organs has diminished." See Informacija o socijalističkoj Etiopiji, unutrašnja i spoljnja politika i bilateralni odnosi, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja Kabineta Predsednika Republike, November 28, 1978, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/24–35 Etiopija.

[837] Informacija (Platforma) povodom zvanične prijateljske posete druga Predsednika Sovjetskom Savezu od 16. do 26. avgusta 1977. godine, July 16, 1977, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/70–1.

"Today's policy of PR China represents a danger to all humankind," Brezhnev told Tito. He said that the new Chinese leadership rejected Soviet overtures for normalization and opted for war preparations instead. This policy, continued Brezhnev, was directly against socialism and world peace and security.[838] Tito explained that the purpose of his China trip was not to make Soviet–Chinese relations worse, but to "hear their [Chinese] side too." "With China, we do not have any intra-party relations and we are not planning to start them now," Tito reminded his Soviet colleague.[839] "Comrade Tito, I understand what you said, thinking that your visit to China provokes such a feeling in us that you are going to do something ugly there," Brezhnev said advising Tito not to be too upset. Yet, despite these soothing words, Brezhnev and other Soviet officials attacked Yugoslavia for its China policy and writings in the Yugoslav press. Why, Brezhnev asked, a friendly country such as Yugoslavia allowed its press to discredit Soviet policies? "Who benefits from that?" Brezhnev wondered.[840]

Although Brezhnev said that his intent was not to influence Yugoslavia's policy toward China, the Yugoslavs interpreted his "advice" as an attempt to control Belgrade's relations with Beijing. "In an indirect way he [Brezhnev] expressed reserves toward our policy and to avoid the direct polemic he harshly criticized our press," the Foreign

[838] Stenografske beleške razgovora između predsednika Tita i Brežnjeva, August 18, 1977, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/70–1.
[839] Ibid. In fact, Belgrade was willing to establish intra-party relations with the Chinese Communist Party, yet, as a report stated, the Chinese were "not ready." Thus, the LCY advised not to raise that issue in the talks with Beijing "until the situation in the CP of China changes." Informacija o odnosu KP Kine prema međunarodnom komunističkom pokretu i SKJ u svetlu promena u kineskom rukovodstvu, December 1, 1976, Pov. br. 806/1, Odeljenje za međunarodne odnose i veze Predsedništva CK SKJ, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5– b/55–6 Kina.
[840] In addition to alleged anti-Sovietism in the Yugoslav press, the Soviets were dissatisfied with Yugoslavia's siding with Santiago Carrillo in the dispute between the Communist Party of Spain and the Soviet Union. In fact, the LCY did not entirely agree with Carrillo – the Yugoslavs rejected the idea of Eurocommunism that was outlined by Carrillo – but argued that communist parties should exercise their right to act independently and in "accordance with objective circumstances."

Secretariat stated in its analysis.[841] Yet, despite several contentious issues such as China, Eurocommunism, and the alleged anti-Sovietism of the Yugoslav press that were discussed during the talks, the Yugoslavs noted that Brezhnev assumed a friendlier stance than he did during the November 1976 meeting. This was only a tactical move, the Yugoslavs thought, because Moscow's foreign policy faced several challenges that included difficulties with the United States, a series of setbacks in the Middle East and Africa, the ideological dispute with the Spanish communists, and deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. Under these circumstances, the Yugoslavs concluded, the Kremlin did not want to reopen another front with Yugoslavia even if its long-term goal remained the same.[842] The improvement of Yugoslav–Chinese relations, however, was something that Moscow could not swallow. A year later, this Soviet resentment of Sino–Yugoslav cooperation would come back in full force and lead to another crisis in Moscow's relation with Yugoslavia.

Tito in North Korea

While another Yugoslav–Soviet crisis quietly simmered, Tito enjoyed the spotlight that his ambitious tour afforded him. From Moscow, he went by train to Lake Baikal to recuperate and adjust to Asia time zones. From Baikal, Tito proceeded to Pyongyang, where he was met with a lavish welcome ceremony that included thousands of performers. "It appears that the mobilization of all inhabitants of Pyongyang who

[841] Izveštaj o zvaničnoj i prijateljskoj poseti Predsednika SFRJ i Saveza komunista Jugoslavije Josipa Broza Tita Sovjetskom Savezu od 16. do 24. avgusta 1977. godine, September 14, 1977, Str. pov. 238, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/70–1.
[842] Ibid.

know how to dance was extraordinary," North Korean president Kim Il Sung told Tito.[843] Although Tito apparently enjoyed the show, his visit had several important objectives related to Yugoslavia's position in international affairs.

Tito's trip to the USSR, North Korea, and China reasonably attracted a lot of attention in Washington. Days before Tito's journey, Secretary Vance sent a message to the Yugoslav president to convey U.S. "special interests in his trip, especially the Korean stop."[844] Vance wanted to explain U.S. policy toward the Korean question, but also to "specifically avoid any implications of making Tito our intermediary." The U.S. embassy in Belgrade assumed that Tito's trip to North Korea had two main purposes. One was to provide a "neutral transition point, allowing Tito to visit both Moscow and Peking." Another was to encourage greater North Korean participation in the NAM that would include softening Pyongyang's stance on Korean reunification.[845] Yugoslav sources confirm that Tito's visit to North Korea would "widen Korea's horizons," i.e., that Tito's talks to Kim Il Sung about the international situation and the NAM could be useful to the Korean leadership, to encourage its "more flexible behavior in international affairs."[846]

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[843] Zabeleška o razgovoru između Predsednika SFRJ i predsednika SKJ Josipa Broza Tita i generalnog sekretara CK Radničke partije Koreje i predsednika DNR Koreje Kim Il Sunga održanih u Pjongjangu, August 25, 1977, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/70–1:2. Tito said that he never saw a reception like that. Other Yugoslav officials were equally impressed but it created a certain problem – massive welcome ceremonies arranged for Tito's returns from foreign trips paled in comparison with the Korean one. "I found it necessary to point out that it would be wrong to imitate the DPR of Korea … because that is not our style, our culture and our tradition, and even if we want to do it like Koreans and Chinese did, that would be still weak," Draža Marković wrote in his diary. Marković, *Život i politika* vol. 2, 398.

[844] Memo, Peter Tarnoff to Zbigniew Brzezinski, July 29, 1977, NSA Brzezinski Office File Country Chron, "Yugoslavia 1977," box 56, JCPL.

[845] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 05504, August 15, 1977, 1977BELGRA05504, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed November 1, 2019).

[846] Informacija povodom posete predsednika SFR Jugoslavije i predsednika Saveza komunista Jugoslavije Josipa Broza Tita Narodnoj Demokratskoj Republici Koreji, July 21, 1977, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/70–1:2.

Tito supported Pyongyang's desire for unification, yet he cautioned that it should be achieved peacefully. Despite Washington's efforts to dissuade Tito from assuming the role of an intermediary, Yugoslav president said that Carter was ready to meet with everybody who was interested in solving the problem of Korean unification, as long as both Koreas were present.[847] Belgrade wanted to steer Pyongyang away from joining any "camps" within the NAM. The Yugoslavs assumed that North Korea joined the movement because its geopolitical position was somewhat analogous to Yugoslavia's, i.e. between two large powers and surrounded by hostile neighbors. Tito emphasized the importance of the movement's unity and criticized attempts to create "ideological divisions" within the movement. Finally, Tito addressed the situation in the "international worker's movement" and reported on the East Berlin Conference and Eurocommunism.[848] "We are worried by some occurrences that emerged after the East Berlin Conference – to negate the principles of the conference, to negate the existence of different roads to socialism, to impede the equality of the revolutionary and other progressive forces," Tito complained to his host.[849] Yugoslav president would rehash these two last points during his trip to China – the high point of Tito's tour to the East.

Tito in China

The Sino–Yugoslav friendship was forged out of necessity and not love (see Chapter 1). Although two countries reestablished full diplomatic relations in 1970,

[847] Stenografske beleške sa zvaničnih razgovora između Predsednika SFRJ i predsednika SKJ Josipa Broza Tita i generalnog sekretara CK Radničke partije Koreje i predsednika DNR Koreje Kim Il Sunga održanih u Pjongjangu, August 25, 1977, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/70–1:2.
[848] The Conference of Communist and Workers Parties of Europe held in East Berlin in June 1976. For Yugoslav–Soviet contacts before and at the conference see Chapter 4.
[849] Stenografske beleške sa zvaničnih razgovora između Predsednika SFRJ i predsednika SKJ Josipa Broza Tita i generalnog sekretara CK Radničke partije Koreje i predsednika DNR Koreje Kim Il Sunga održanih u Pjongjangu, August 25, 1977, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/70–1:2

ideological differences between the two communist parties remained irreconcilable. Normalized state-to-state relations in the first half of the 1970s provided some basis for economic cooperation that, despite the good wishes on both sides, did not achieve much. The trade balance favored the Yugoslavs who exported ships, engines, and other equipment for the Chinese merchant marine. Yet, the total volume of trade in 1975 dropped to U.S. $25,6 million from U.S. $140 million a year earlier.

In October 1975, Prime Minister Bijedić went to China to try to revive the slumping economic exchange between the two countries. Bijedić spoke with his Chinese colleague Deng Xiaoping and suggested that Yugoslavia and China form a joint committee for trade development to "stabilize economic relations."[850] The Bijedić visit was, however, more important for establishing political contacts between Yugoslavia and China that led to Tito's 1977 visit. Bijedić even met Mao Zedong – a gesture that was "practiced only toward statesmen from 'friendly countries'."[851] Mao sent his greetings to Tito ("'Tieto' in Chinese means 'iron' thus Tito is like iron. He is not afraid of the Soviet pressure," Mao told Bijedić) and Kardelj whom he, just years earlier, had considered "imperialist lapdogs."[852] "The way how they talked to us it should be considered as an important step and certainly as the first recognition of Yugoslavia's social being," a

[850] Pregled depeša – Poseta predsednika SIV-a Kini, October 14, 1975, br. 585, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/55–6 Kina.
[851] Informacija o odnosu KP Kine prema medjunarodnom komunističkom pokretu i SKJ u svetlu promena u kineskom rukovodstvu, December 1, 1976, Pov. br. 806/1, Odeljenje za međunarodne odnose i veze Predsedništva CK SKJ, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/55–6 Kina.
[852] Razgovor predsednika SIV-a Džemala Bijedića sa predsednikom Mao Ce Tungom u Pekingu, October 8, 1975, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/55–6 Kina.

report on Bijedić's visit stated, adding that it was "particularly characteristic that they publicly emphasized the role of President Tito."[853]

Yugoslav–Chinese relations took a short hiatus in 1976 because of the deaths of Zhou Enlai in January, Zhu De in July, and Chairman Mao in September and the power struggle that ensued. The defeat of the so-called Gang of Four and the ascendance of Hua Guofeng as Mao's successor allowed the stabilization of China's domestic and foreign policies and the expansion of Sino–Yugoslav relations. Moreover, as a Chinese official confirmed to his Yugoslav colleagues, the ousted Gang of Four opposed good Yugoslav–Chinese relations.[854]

The Yugoslavs believed that the Chinese invitation to Tito to visit their country served to elevate the status of the new leadership in Beijing. "The visit of a prestigious person such as comrade President [Tito] contributes to the strengthening of the prestige of the present leadership in China and beyond it," a report stated. With this visit, Beijing wanted to achieve a "wider affirmation of its policy and to [create] new opportunities for itself in global affairs."[855] This analysis, in the typical Yugoslav manner, served a self-aggrandizing purpose. Yet, the Yugoslavs acknowledged that their own interest in the visit was equally important. Tito's visit, the first in the history of Sino–Yugoslav relations, further affirmed the "main tenets of our foreign policy, the influence and prestige that Tito and Yugoslavia enjoyed."[856] Outside observers noted that Tito's trip to

[853] Pregled depeša – Poseta predsednika SIV-a Kini, October 14, 1975, br. 585, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/55–6 Kina.
[854] Kina–Jugoslavija, June 15, 1977, Br. 391, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/70–3.
[855] Informacija povodom posete druga Predsednika Narodnoj Republici Kini, July 20, 1977, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/70–3.
[856] Ibid.

China would likely produce little in terms of economic, military, or cultural relations, but it would greatly improve Tito's standing in the communist world and Yugoslavia's bargaining position toward the USSR. Thus, as the U.S. embassy in Belgrade reported, Tito's visit to Beijing "is clearly the high point of the journey in terms of drama and history."[857]

In June, the Yugoslav ambassador in Beijing, Milojko Drulović, reported how the representatives of Eastern European countries conducted a propaganda campaign against Tito's visit. His Polish colleague told him that Warsaw saw Tito's visit as "protocolarly speaking illogical" because nobody from China went to Yugoslavia after the Bijedić trip in 1975. Moreover, the Pole said, China did not recognize Yugoslavia as a socialist state.[858] In addition to the controversy in the East, Tito's trip to China included an unlikely personal and family drama that involved the Yugoslav first lady, Jovanka Broz, who allegedly opposed Tito's China policy.[859]

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[857] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 05504, August 15, 1977, 1977BELGRA05504, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed on October 28, 2019).

[858] Kina–Jugoslavija, June 15, 1977, Br. 66, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/70–3.

[859] Some contemporaries later claimed that Jovanka Broz was a part of the palace intrigue and that she wanted to interfere in Tito's foreign policy decisions. She allegedly demanded that Tito drop Dolanc from the passenger list for China. Other contemporary accounts claim that Jovanka made a scene because Tito wanted to bring his young masseuse. Jovanka's behavior so enraged Tito that he ordered her to stay in Belgrade. See Ivana Pantelić, *Uspon in pad "prve drugarice" Jugoslavije* (Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2018), 111–113. In the early 1980s, the chief court gossiper and Tito's hagiographer, Vladimir Dedijer, wrote that Jovanka was a protégé of a well-known KGB asset and that the main reason for Tito's breakup with Jovanka was her effort to prevent him from going to China. Zabeleška o razgovoru između Vladimira Dedijera i predstavnika Njujork Tajmsa, November 18, 1985, Vladimir Dedijer Papers 1881-1987, box 7, University of Michigan Bentley Historical Library. In October 1977, the U.S. embassy reported that Jovanka disappeared from the public eye since Tito's trip to the USSR, N. Korea, and China and about the rumors that Jovanka was detained in a military hospital. Consulate Zagreb to Department of State, Telegram 00895, October 7, 1977, 1977ZAGREB00895, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA. Years later, Jovanka told Tito's press secretary that her marriage with Tito was "harmonious until the crooks ("*lopuže*") got involved," the crooks being Dolanc and Defense Secretary Ljubičić. Mandić, *S Titom*, 189.

Soviet concerns were, however, well-founded. The Sino–Yugoslav rapprochement further undermined Soviet influence in Yugoslavia but also Moscow's sway over the international communist movement that was already challenged by the emergence of Eurocommunism. Tito's tet-a-tet meeting with Guofeng on September 3 showed that Yugoslavia and China still disagreed on different international issues – in principle as well as in style. For example, Tito criticized Beijing's insistence that a new world war was inevitable. Yugoslav president thought that that attitude created a "dark psychosis," although he stressed Yugoslavia's readiness to fight if needed. Yet, the meeting also confirmed that China and Yugoslavia had a lot in common. "The main danger for China and Yugoslavia comes from the Soviet Union. Our two countries came forward against Soviet hegemony," Guofeng told Tito.[860] Both sides agreed that the "imperialists" calls for peace were hypocritical since in practice they actively undermined the independence and sovereignty of other countries. He said that for that reason Yugoslavia was ready to defend itself like it was ready to do so in 1948. "The people were with us then and the people do not recognize any 'limited sovereignty'," Tito said.[861]

The Tito–Guofeng and Minić–Huang Hua (the Chinese foreign minister) talks showed that Yugoslavia and China largely agreed in their approach to the Third World. Belgrade disliked the Chinese theory of the "three worlds" but believed that China's "positive evolution" toward nonalignment "objectively contributed" to the movement's

[860] Stenografske beleške sa zvaničnih razgovora između predsednika SFRJ Josipa Broza Tita i predsednika CK KP Kine i predsednika Državnog saveta Hua Kuo Fenga – nastavak razgovora, September 1, 1977, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/70–3.
[861] Zabeleška sa odvojenog razgovora predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita sa predsednikom CK KP Kine i Državnog saveta NR Kine Hua Kuo Fengom, September 3, 1977, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/70–3.

strength in global affairs. Tito encouraged China to get more involved in global issues, citing the example of Angola and its "increasing dissatisfaction with those who try to interfere," likely referring to Cuba and the USSR. "I noticed that if the USSR is present in a certain country, China withdraws like it did in Angola. In these matters, one should be principled and support any movement that strives toward socialism. It is necessary to be present everywhere and act in a positive way," Tito told Guofeng.[862] Moreover, both Tito and Minić encouraged China to reconcile with India. "Both China and India are our friends, and I don't see why they cannot solve their problems," Minić told Hua.[863] Normalized Sino–Indian relations, the Yugoslav reasoned, would prevent India's drifting toward one or another superpower – a move that could significantly weaken nonalignment.

Tito's visit to China opened a new, friendly phase in Sino–Yugoslav relations. For the first time, the Yugoslav embassy in Beijing reported in its bulletin, major Chinese newspapers wrote affirmatively about the leading role of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (the former name of the LCY) and President Tito in the liberation of Yugoslavia and its postwar development. Moreover, for the first time, Chinese television played Yugoslav blockbuster movies that were also distributed around the country. "This is the first time that our movies are screened publicly," the embassy noted, adding that Tito's visit was crucial to bringing Yugoslavia closer to the wider Chinese public.[864] The

[862] Ibid. Guofeng, however, said that China did not want to be in Angola as long as the USSR and Cuba were there. He explained that Chinese recognition of the Neto government would imply that China sanctioned the Cuban and Soviet intervention.
[863] Zabeleška sa razgovora M. Minića, PP SIV-a i saveznog sekretara za inostrane poslove sa Huang Hua, ministrom za inostrane poslove NR Kine u Pekingu, 2. septembra 1977. godine, September 9, 1977, Str. pov. 234, SSIP Kabinet saveznog ministra, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/70–3.
[864] Jugoslavija u kineskim sredstvima informisanja pred i u toku posete predsednika Tita Kini, Specijalni bilten ambasade SFRJ u Pekingu, br. 2, August 29, 1977, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/70–3.

visit also paved the way for more high-level exchanges, including Guofeng's visit to Yugoslavia in August 1978.

Kardelj goes to Washington

"He [Tito] has quite a great trip to Moscow, Peking [and] Pyongyang," President Carter remarked to Kardelj in September 1977.[865] "The trip was very good," confirmed the Yugoslav master ideologue, mentioning that Tito was planning to come to the United States sometime in the following spring. Kardelj's trip to the United States in September 1977 showed that the tank-transfer affair did not alter the trajectory of Yugoslavia's relations with the Carter administration. The Yugoslavs, always fond of high-level exchanges, used the Kardelj visit to demonstrate to the world the respect that Tito's Yugoslavia enjoyed in all corners. Tito's charm offensive in the East and Kardelj's trip to the United States proved, the Yugoslavs firmly believed, the strength and the prestige of the country and its leader. In that context, Kardelj's visit previewed Tito's anticipated trip to the United States.

For Washington, Kardelj's visit provided an opportunity to learn about the details of Tito's Eastern tour, particularly his talks with North Korea. Other topics of interest included the follow-up CSCE meeting in Belgrade and various bilateral issues such as arms purchases, the Krško nuclear power plant, and the perennial issue of anti-Titoist émigré groups. Finally, the administration wanted to establish a closer relationship with Kardelj, who was considered Tito's heir apparent.[866] Even if the chronically ill Kardelj

[865] Memo, Remarks of the President during Photo Session with His Excellency Edvard Kardelj, September 30, 1977, NSA Brzezinski Material Trips/Visits File, "9/28/77-10/2/77 Kardelj (Yugoslavia) Visit," box 13, JCPL.

[866] Even some Yugoslav officials hoped that Kardelj would "take over the leadership… [and] remain at the helm for at least one or two years to provide continuity and cohesiveness to the Yugoslav State."

would fail to replace Tito, Washington found him a useful interlocutor. Earlier that year, his new book, *Trends in the Development of the Political System of Self-Management,* although a tedious and dense read ("not destined to be an international best seller," the U.S. embassy predicted), provided a map of Tito's orderly succession that would rely on the systemic structures rather than on an individual. Moreover, in his book, Kardelj outlined Yugoslavia's policies on various global issues such as Eurocommunism and human rights and provided ideological guidelines for the post-Tito period.[867]

To signify his importance as Tito's likely successor, Kardelj was given the "first-class treatment" in Washington that included meetings with members of Congress, Brzezinski, Mondale, and the audience with Carter who commended Kardelj's latest book. Weeklong talks with various U.S. officials confirmed that U.S.–Yugoslav relations had entered a new phase marked by greater mutual understanding. On his way back home, Kardelj told journalists that U.S.–Yugoslav relations were "better than ever" and described his talks with U.S. officials as the "longest and broadest exchanges of views between us and the United States since 1950."[868]

Kardelj's optimism was well founded. For the first time after 1959, the United States appeared ready to approve the sale of sophisticated weapons to Yugoslavia, as Vice President Mondale signaled during his visit in May. A week after Kardelj's return, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, came to Yugoslavia to discuss the conditions of arms transfers. "I am not coming here as an arms salesman," Brown told the Vice

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Memorandum for the record with Yugoslav ambassador to the FRG, Budimir Loncar, July 21, 1977, Walter Stoessel Papers, folder 5a, box 2, Georgetown University Lauinger Library.

[867] Memo, Kardelj's Latest Book, no date 1977, NSA Brzezinski Material VIP Visits File, "Yugoslavia, Presidency Member Edvard Kardelj 9/28/77-10/5/77," box 15, JCPL.

[868] David Binder, "Top Tito Aide Finds U.S. Ties Improving," October 7, 1977, *New York Times*, 7.

President of the SFRY Presidium, Stevan Doronjski. "The interest of the United States to increase arms deliveries to Yugoslavia comes, among other things, from the great importance of Yugoslavia's independence, security, and its territorial integrity," Brown said.[869] Brown's visit also absolved the Yugoslavs from their transgressions in Ethiopia. The Yugoslav Secretary of Defense Ljubičić assured Brown that Yugoslav actions were entirely independent, i.e., without previous consultations with the Soviets. "He [Ljubičić] pointed out, however, that when the Yugoslavs provided tanks to Ethiopia, Soviet military instructors were not in Ethiopia but only in Somalia; that at that time the Ethiopians were more involved with nonaligned countries and less with the Soviet Union. Now there are Russian tanks and Russian military instructors in Ethiopia; the country is more under Russian control. *Brown* interjected that the problem was solved."[870] Brown's visit showed that the Carter administration, unlike the previous administration, did not impose any political conditions on weapons transfers to Yugoslavia. As if they needed a reminder of the acrimonious past, the Yugoslavs heard back from Kissinger who privately met with ambassador Belovski. In a frank conversation, Kissinger said that during his tenure, he was against the sale of sophisticated weapons to Yugoslavia because he was not sure about the "future orientation of Yugoslavia."[871]

Arms transfers were a politically sensitive issue for both sides. On October 16, in a Serbo-Croatian broadcast, BBC reported that arms transfers from the United States

[869] Beleška o razgovoru potpredsednika Predsedništva SFRJ Stevana Doronjskog sa dr. Haroldom Brown-om, sekretarom odbrane SAD, 13. oktobra 1977, Str. pov. 158/1, Predsedništvo SFRJ Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, Strogo poverljiva prepiska, AJ, PSFRJ fond 803, f. 158/77.
[870] Memorandum of conversation between Secretary Brown's Meetings in Limited Sessions with Yugoslav Federal Secretary of National Defense Ljubicic, October 13-14, 1977, Document 245, *FRUS*, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe.
[871] Ambasada SFRJ Vašington SSIP-u, August 31, 1977, DA MSP RS, PA 1977 SAD, f. 125, d. 2, s. 445204.

would be a "difficult endeavor."[872] Doronjski told Brown that the Yugoslavs would prefer if this new U.S.–Yugoslav cooperation "does not get spectacular, propaganda effect in the press."[873] Belgrade was concerned about how this cooperation would be perceived by the Soviets who were the main suppliers of sophisticated weaponry to the Yugoslav armed forces. The United States also had the interest to downplay this aspect in its relations with Yugoslavia because arms sales to a communist country made Carter's human rights campaign look hypocritical. Moreover, the issue of arms transfers to Yugoslavia threatened to undermine both U.S. and Yugoslavia's position at the CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade that began in October 1977.[874]

The CSCE Meeting and the issue of human rights

The Belgrade follow-up meeting was a "turning point for the United States in the Helsinki process," Sarah Snyder wrote.[875] According to Snyder, at the Belgrade meeting, the Carter administration demonstrated its commitment to human rights, although it tried to avoid antagonizing the Soviets. Yet, even before Carter assumed the presidency on January 20, 1977, the Yugoslavs noted how "the West is still focused on the 'Third Basket'." The Yugoslavs called the issue of human rights "controversial" and perceived it

[872] O poseti ministra odbrane SAD Harolda Browna, no date, 1977, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–22.
[873] Beleška o razgovoru potpredsednika Predsedništva SFRJ Stevana Doronjskog sa dr. Haroldom Brownom, sekretarom odbrane SAD, 13. oktobra 1977, Str. pov. 158/1, Predsedništvo SFRJ Služba za spoljnopolitička pitanja, Strogo poverljiva prepiska, AJ, PSFRJ fond 803, f. 158/77.
[874] In February 1978, while the Belgrade conference was still on, under the provisions of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act and the 1976 Arms Exports Control Act, the Department of State sent a report to Congress about the status of human rights in 105 countries with whom the United States had military relations or who received U.S. military assistance. The Yugoslav government complained that the report stated numerous "false qualifications" about the status of human rights in Yugoslavia. "The fact that Yugoslavia is not the object of the human rights campaign contributes considerably to our relations. However these incidents are very damaging," Belovski complained. George Vest from the State Department said that the report caused problems to the both sides, adding that the report did not reflect Department's positions on U.S.–Yugoslav relations but that the Department had certain responsibilities toward Congress. Ambasada SFRJ Vašington SSIP-u, February 11, 1978, DA MSP RS, PA 1978 SAD, f. 127, d. 8, s. 48180.
[875] Snyder, *Human Rights Activism*, 81.

as a Western attempt to "penetrate Eastern European states and influence their socio-political structures."[876] At the same time, the regime believed that Yugoslavia acted "in the spirit of the principles of the 'Third Basket'… and in this area, our practice went beyond the CSCE conclusions [from Helsiniki]."[877]

This self-congratulatory tone was not accidental. Some Yugoslav officials thought that the human rights campaign in the West was "brazen and hypocritical," citing numerous examples of human rights violations in the West, including the systemic discrimination against African-Americans in the United States.[878] At the same time, the limits on human liberties in the East, particularly restriction of free movement, some in Yugoslavia interpreted as "inherently against the character of a socialist society."[879] Thus, the only logical solution for this Goldilocks' dilemma was the Yugoslav socio-political system that allowed openness, the free circulation of people and information, and equal status of all ethnic minorities.[880] Yet, despite this self-assured assessment of the status of human rights in Yugoslavia, the regime was uneasy with the American focus on

[876] Beogradski sastanak KEBS-a 1977. godine, January 5, 1977, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–d/1–2.
[877] Ibid.
[878] Tito said to Margaret Thatcher that the United States moved too fast on the issue of human rights. "If we go too fast, that some negative consequences should be expected. This problem is very complicated and requires maximal realism. One cannot treat all things the same way… Everywhere you can find individual cases that you can criticize. Can the United States say for itself that everything there is the best, when we all know about the status of the black people [in the United States]." Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita sa liderom Konzervativne partije Velike Britanije Margaret Tačer, 6.decembra 1977. godine u Beogradu, str. pov. 643/2, December 12, 1977, DA MSP RS, Str. Pov. 1977, f. 8, d. 357, s. 357.
[879] Marković, *Život i politika* vol. 2, 331–332.
[880] Informacije – III Korpa, October 28, 1977, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–d/1–2. Draža Marković noted in his diary that you could not instill socialist patriotism with the force. "What happened after we opened our borders? The enormous influx of tourists, enormous profits, great positive influences. There are, of course, some negative things. But the balance overall is positive." Marković, *Život i politika* vol. 2, 332. Although the Yugoslav citizens enjoyed relative freedom of movement, after the Croatian Spring, the regime increased repression against real and perceived political opponents. Calic wrote that in the mid-1970s over 4,000 people were imprisoned for various political crimes. "Only Albania and the Soviet Union had a greater number of detainees as a proportion of the total population," Calic noted. Calic, "The Beginning of the End," in Calic, Neutatz, and Obertreis, eds., *The Crisis*, 76.

the issue. The publicity that some Yugoslav dissidents such as Milovan Djilas and Mihajlo Mihajlov received in the West caused Yugoslavia to suspect the human rights campaign was a means to interfere in the country's internal affairs.[881]

Yugoslavia even more disliked the Kremlin's "restrictive approach" to the meeting that meant reaffirmation of selected principles of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act related to the inviolability of boundaries. These "one-sided" approaches by both superpowers threatened the success of the follow-up meeting and reduction of the CSCE's role in relaxation in Europe. Thus, the Yugoslav objectives for the follow-up meeting included Belgrade's insistence on equal implementation of the Final Act and the continuity of the CSCE. By achieving this, the Yugoslavs hoped to confirm the CSCE and its Final Act as "objective alternatives for European developments" but also as a conduit for introducing the ideas of nonalignment into European affairs.[882]

The difficulty of achieving these goals showed itself during the preparatory meeting that began on June 15. The purpose of the preparatory meeting was to establish a procedural framework for the main meeting scheduled for October. Yet, soon it was clear that even technical and procedural issues became contentious because of the "unfavorable international situation," i.e. the crisis of détente between the United States and the USSR.[883] Instead of planned four, the meeting extended over seven weeks because of irreconcilable positions between the East and the West.

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[881] In November 1977, Mihajlov gave an interview to Voice of America. Robert Hunter from NSC wrote that "on the merits, it is clear that it would be most unhelpful [Mihajlov's interview]." Yet, "turning off the broadcast could raise a storm on the Hill." Memo, Hunter to Aaron, November 28, 1977, NSA Brzezinski Material Country File, "Yugoslavia 10/77–12/78," box 86, JCPL.
[882] Beogradski sastanak KEBS-a 1977. godine, January 5, 1977, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–d/1–2.
[883] Izveštaj o pripremnom sastanka za organizovanje beogradskog sastanka KEBS, August 12, 1977, Str. pov. 444438, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–d/1–2.

These attempts to "impose blocs' interests" on the CSCE led to the strengthening of the influence of the neutral and nonaligned states. A Yugoslav report noted that the joint action of the nine neutral and nonaligned states (N+N) was the main factor that contributed to the successful conclusion of the preparatory meeting.[884] This activity of the N+N group the Yugoslavs considered a good sign for the success of the main meeting, yet they acknowledged that its future depended on the developments of the international situation between August and October.

Despite its reserves toward the Western concept of human rights, Yugoslavia's general position toward CSCE was closer to that of the United States than to the Soviet Union. In March 1977, the Yugoslavs talked with the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Arthur Hartman. He assured his Yugoslav interlocutors that the United States would assume a "constructive approach" to the follow-up meeting. Hartman commended Yugoslavia's "seriousness and responsibility" in organizing the meeting and concluded that Yugoslavia and the United States generally agreed on every important issue. At the same time, the Yugoslavs elatedly concluded that they never had such a "wide and thorough exchange of opinions" about the CSCE than the one that they had with Hartman.[885]

Regardless of this mutual understanding between Belgrade and Washington about the general direction of the meeting, Yugoslavia conducted its policy independently or in

[884] Ibid.
[885] Jugoslovensko–američke konsultacije o KEBS, March 18, 1977, br. 240, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b /104–22 SAD.

coordination with other N+N states.[886] The regime was invested in the success of the meeting, among other things, because of its propaganda value. Belgrade considered the follow-up meeting as the "most important political event in Europe in 1977" and "objectively contributes to further affirmation of its [Yugoslavia's] nonaligned policy in Europe."[887] In this context, Belgrade was reasonably dissatisfied with the Soviet attempts to devalue the importance of the meeting and obstruct its work. In January 1978, the Yugoslav delegation reported that the meeting came to an impasse because of Soviet machinations over the final document of the meeting. "The actions of the Soviet representatives… [they] either block any activity in working groups or they suggest the formulation that serves to devalue the results of the Belgrade meeting and prevent it from being a model for the future meetings," a report stated.[888] The head of the Soviet delegation, Yuri Vorontsov, told a Yugoslav diplomat that he had "firm and precise instructions from Moscow to stay 'until the end' on the principal positions." Vorontsov said that the sole purpose of the Western approach was to turn the Helsinki Agreement into a means to interfere in the internal affairs of socialist states. "[Andrei] Sakharov, [Anatoly (Natan)] Sharansky, and [Alexander] Ginzburg are 'peeking' from behind every Western suggestion related to the 'Third Basket'," Vorontsov complained.[889] Although

[886] The conference showed the limitations of joint actions of the members of N+N group. The Yugoslavs noted that some states from the group, such as Malta, paralyzed some of the group's actions because of their pursuance of individual interests.
[887] Informacija o predstojećem Beogradskom sastanku KEBS, September 28, 1977, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–d/1–2; Izveštaj o pripremnom sastanka za organizovanje beogradskog sastanka KEBS, August 12, 1977, Str. pov. 444438, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–d/1–2.
[888] Informacija o trenutnim teškoćama u radu Beogradskog sastanka KEBS, January 25, 1978, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond, 837 I–4–d/1–2.
[889] Vorontsov commended a constructive approach of the Yugoslav delegation and said that the Kremlin "always considered our desires and motives." Zabeleška o razgovoru PSS M. Vereša sa šefom sovjetske delegacija na BS KEBS-a J. Voroncovom dana 30. januara 1978. godine, January 31, 1977, Pov. br. 45397, SSIP Kabinet PSS Vereša, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–d/1–2.

Belgrade sympathized with the Soviet concerns about dissidents, Soviet obstinacy over the final document threatened the meeting's success. Vorontsov accused the West of undermining the meeting with its "one-sided" approach, i.e. the insistence on human rights – a point that the Yugoslavs partially agreed on – and said that it was "sad that they use Belgrade to conduct their campaign."[890]

The meeting finally ended on March 8, 1978 – more than two months later than planned. The final act, a short document with "modest ambitions" as the Yugoslavs themselves noted, failed to meet the expectations that it would facilitate the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. It, however, provided the continuity of the Helsinki process that had long-term consequences for the Cold War in Europe.[891] Yet, when the final document was signed in Belgrade on March 8, the Yugoslavs had many reasons to be satisfied. The meeting elevated their country's status in global affairs but also reaffirmed, as the Yugoslavs believed, the power of the N+N group as "the only force that can help overcome the deadlock imposed by the two superpowers."[892] Moreover, Yugoslavia successfully lobbied for the "Mediterranean aspect" of the CSCE, which led to the inclusion (as observers) of nonaligned Mediterranean states and the injection of Yugoslavia's nonaligned polices into the Helsinki process. The meeting that lasted over five months confirmed Yugoslavia's extraordinary organizational skills. Finally, despite their objections over the "one-sided" approach to human rights, Yugoslavia was excluded from Western criticism of other socialist countries. On the

[890] Ibid.
[891] Snyder noted that the Belgrade meeting "did not produce new commitments but it did facilitate an international debate about human rights in Eastern Europe." Snyder, *Human Rights Activism*, 107.
[892] Trenutna situacija u radu Beogradskog KEBS, February 25, 1977, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–d/1–2.

coattails of the (relatively) successful Belgrade meeting, Tito embarked on his final trip to Washington.

Tito's last trip to Washington

Tito's three-day-long visit to the United States from 6–9 March, 1978 was the climax of "even by his standards – a remarkable year," the *Washington Post* reported, adding that this was possibly Tito's "farewell tour of world capitals."[893] The 86-year old statesman appeared to impress his American hosts. At the welcome ceremony, Carter said that Tito was a "contemporary of great world leaders… and a friend and associate" of Churchill, Roosevelt, and De Gaulle.[894] Yet, what impressed the Americans even more was the vitality of the Yugoslav president and his ability to maintain relations with all major powers. "He's an amazing man – eighty-six years old, appears to be about sixty, vigorous, very confident of himself, good hearing, strong voice, and helpful with advice concerning the Soviets, Ethiopia, Somalia, Korea, Egypt, and eastern European countries," President Carter jotted in his diary.[895]

The Foreign Secretariat remarked that with this trip, Tito's extraordinary diplomatic activity in 1977/8 "came full circle."[896] Elated by Tito's recent diplomatic triumphs, Belovski exaggerated Tito's role claiming that this visit was "significant for

[893] After Washington, Tito went to London. Michael Dobbs, "Tito's Visit Here to Top Grand Tour of Capitals," March 5, 1978, *Washington Post*,
[894] Carter did not mention Stalin, but Tito would mention him later in the conversation when he talked about the issue of human rights in the USSR. Exchange of Remarks between the President and His Excellency Marshal Josip Broz Tito, March 7, 1978, NSA Brzezinski Material Trips/Visits File, "3/7-8/78 Tito (Yugoslavia) Visit," box 13, JCPL.
[895] Jimmy Carter, *White House Diary* (New York: Picador, 2010), 175.
[896] Informacija o Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama i o jugoslovensko – američkim odnosima, February 15, 1978, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/73–1.

Carter because he will talk with the most respected world leader."[897] The visit did provide an opportunity for both sides to reassess the quality of bilateral relations after the first year of the Carter presidency but also to discuss international issues of mutual interest. The Yugoslavs appeared optimistic about the future of U.S.–Yugoslav relations. The embassy and the Foreign Secretariat remarked that Yugoslavia's relations with Washington considerably improved after Carter's election. "The differences between the Carter administration's and the Ford administration's approaches to Yugoslavia are significant," stated in a report.[898] The Ford administration did not consider Yugoslavia as an "independent factor" in international affairs and its efforts were directed toward limiting Yugoslavia's role in the world. The Carter administration brought a new approach that was, as the Yugoslavs believed, more appreciative toward Belgrade's independent role and interests. "The new administration does not treat us as an object in international relations, but as a factor in them," the Yugoslav embassy in Washington reported. Two remaining bilateral issues – delivery of nuclear fuel for Krško and the perennial problem of hostile émigrés – did not cause much friction because the administration showed a genuine interest to solve them both.[899]

Belgrade noted that the Carter administration assumed a more expansive view of détente that was more in line with Yugoslavia's thinking. During the welcome ceremony,

[897] Telegram ambasadora Belovskog uoči posete druga predsednika Americi, February 25, 1978, br. 196, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/73–1.
[898] Informacija o Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama i o jugoslovensko–američkim odnosima, February 15, 1978, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/73–1.
[899] The Slovenian and Croatian republican governments, with the guarantees of the Federal Government, took a loan from the ExIm Bank and in cooperation with Westinghouse began building the Krško nuclear power plant in November 1974. The plan was to make it operational by the end of 1979. This was one of the largest foreign investments in Yugoslavia that was supposed to be a blueprint for similar future projects. Informacija o gospodarskih odnosih SR Slovenije z ZDA, February 10, 1978, številka 34, SR Slovenija Republiški komite z ekonomske odnose s tujino, AS, fond 1134, k. 272.

Carter praised Tito's vision of détente and the "true significance of this misunderstood word."[900] In its assessment of the first year of the Carter presidency, the Yugoslav embassy reported that Carter's foreign policy included a new approach to global issues. "His approach oozes with non-aggressivety [*neagresivnoscu*] but also with strength," Belovski said, concluding that on many global issues such as the Panama Canal, the Middle East, and South Africa, the administration accomplished more in its first year than the previous administrations.[901] Yet, Yugoslav observes acknowledged that the internal situation in the United States significantly reduced the administration's maneuvering space in foreign policy, particularly in its relations with the USSR.[902]

The Tito–Carter talks focused on four global issues: détente, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and North Korea. Bilateral issues were discussed separately by Minić and Vance. Talking about détente, Tito and his foreign secretary raised the issue of human rights as an important factor in deteriorating U.S.–Soviet relations. "The Soviet Union has the impression that the main goal of your [human rights] campaign is the dissidents in the Soviet Union," Minić told Carter, adding that in Moscow they believe that the whole issue of human rights was "calculated to destabilize Eastern European states."[903] According to Minić, human rights, Washington's reluctance to sign SALT II, and the Middle East were the three main issues that led to a deterioration of U.S.–Soviet relations. As always, Belgrade offered solutions. Minić urged Carter to sign SALT II and

[900] Exchange of Remarks between the President and His Excellency Marshal Josip Broz Tito, March 7, 1978, NSA Brzezinski Material Trips/Visits File, "3/7-8/78 Tito (Yugoslavia) Visit," box 13, JCPL.
[901] Informacija o Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama i o jugoslovensko–američkim odnosima, February 15, 1978, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/73–1.
[902] Ambasada SFRJ Vašington SSIP-u, May 20, 1978, DA MSP RS, PA 1978 SAD, f. 127, d.2, s. 429709.
[903] Stenografske beleške sa razgovora Predsednika Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije Josipa Broza Tita i Džimi Karter-a, Predsednika Sjedinjenih Američkih Država – nastavak razgovora 9. III 1978. godine u 9,30 casova, March 9, 1978, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/73–1.

suggested that negotiations in the Middle East should run on "two tracks," i.e. provide the Soviets with a role in the process to allay their mistrust. As for human rights, Minić said that it was important not to "pervert the essence of that important problem" and reduce it to the problem of dissidents in the USSR and Eastern Europe. "As you said, and President Tito agreed, that is the problem of the entire world," Minić said.[904] Tito added that the Soviet Union made significant progress in the area of human rights, recalling his experiences in Moscow in the 1930s. "That dissidents can speak freely like they are doing today, that would not happen during the Stalin years – none of them would survive, they all would be 'removed'," Tito commented, advising patience. He suggested that Carter should meet with Brezhnev to overcome mutual suspicions.[905]

About the situation in the Horn, both sides agreed that Ethiopia and Somalia should peacefully resolve their territorial problems. Earlier that year, the administration used Belgrade as a backchannel to Mengistu. In January, Carter sent a letter to Tito in which he said that Yugoslavia's good relations with Addis Ababa provided it with a "channel of communication not available to us." Carter pleaded for Tito's good offices to Mengistu in resolving the conflict. "If an Ethiopian–Somali settlement can be achieved –

[904] Ibid.

[905] Ibid. Tito endorsed Brezhnev's negotiation skills and said that he "always had good talks with Brezhnev." Brezhnev's adviser, Andrei Alexandrov-Agentov, confirmed that Brezhnev and Tito had a cordial personal relationship. He wrote: "I could not understand how exactly Brezhenv could find a common languge with Tito so easily." Alexandrov-Agentov said that Brezhnev's personal characteristics ("soft, tolerant, and willing to compromise") helped but that Brezhev was also fascinated by Tito's extravagant life style that "enraged Stalin's ascetic nature but impressed Brezhnev." А.М. Александров-Агентов, *От Коллонтай до Горбачева. Вспоминания дипломата* (Москва: Международные Отношения, 1994), 160. Vladislav Zubok provided a detailed pshychological profile of Brezhnev. According to Zubok, Brezhnev's relatives described him as a "careful dresser and ladies' man." Yet, Tito and Brezhnev shared more than the inclination toward fancy clothes and women. As Zubok noted, Brezhnev was a "centrist politician and an enemy of radical political moves in any direction." The same thing could be said for Tito. Vladislav Zubok, *A Failed Empire. The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 203–204.

along with the withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban forces from Ethiopia – we will redouble our efforts to restore and improve good relations with that country."[906] Moreover, Carter continued: "It would also be very helpful to me if, in your own contacts with the Soviet Government, you could convey my concern about deepening Soviet and Cuban involvement in Ethiopia."[907] Tito responded on February 14, emphasizing the role of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in resolving the conflict, "in spite of currently very unfavorable conditions for its successful performance."[908] As Brzezinski noted, by favoring the OAU Belgrade chose to remain "silent" about Carter's recommendations to reach out to Addis Ababa and Moscow.[909] However, Yugoslav sources show that Belgrade embraced the opportunity to mediate between Washington and Addis Ababa. Deputy Secretary of State, Christopher Warren, thanked ambassador Belovski for Belgrade's "readiness to help" with Carter's emissary David Aaron's visit to Addis Abeba in February.[910]

Tito commended the Carter initiative to normalize U.S.–Ethiopian relations and hoped that Aaron's trip to Addis was successful. Minić, in the meeting with Vance, said that the United States should send a new ambassador to Addis as soon as possible without

[906] Letter, Jimmy Carter to Josip Broz Tito, January 31, 1978, NSA Brzezinski Material President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Files, "Yugoslavia: Josip Broz Tito 5/77–5/79," box 21, JCPL.
[907] Ibid. U.S. ambassador in Nairobi, Wilbert J. Le Melle, told his Yugoslav colleague that Belgrade, and "especially President Tito" should be intermediaries in the Somaili–Ethiopian conflict. Le Melle said that because of Tito's reputation in the world, "nobody could do that better than him." Ambasada SFRJ Najrobi SSIP-u, February 8, 1978, DA MSP RS, PA 1978 SAD, f. 125, d.4, s. 48235.
[908] Letter, Josip Broz Tito to Jimmy Carter, February 14, 1978, NSA Brzezinski Material President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Files, "Yugoslavia: Josip Broz Tito 5/77–5/79," box 21, JCPL.
[909] Memo, Zbignie Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, February 15, 1978, NSA Brzezinski Material President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Files, "Yugoslavia: Josip Broz Tito 5/77–5/79," box 21, JCPL.
[910] Ambasada SFRJ Vašington SSIP-u, Feburary 14, 1978, DA MSP RS, PA 1978 SAD, f. 125, d. 1, s. 48825. Nancy Mitchell noted that Aaron's mission in February 1978 was Carter's attempt to improve U.S.–Ethiopian relations. Although Aaron described his mission as a "fairly fruitful," it did not slow down Soviet–Cuban–Ethiopian advances. See Mitchell, *Jimmy Carter in Africa*, 387–388.

waiting for Soviet and Cuban withdrawal. At the same time, Minić criticized the U.S. withdrawal from Ethiopia because it forced the Ethiopians to look for aid elsewhere.[911] Minić urged ambassador Vojinović to seek a meeting with the Ethiopian foreign minister Feleke to inform him about the talks that the Yugoslav delegation had in Washington. "The U.S. government wants to send a selected career diplomat to Addis so that the dialogue that began with Aaron's visit could be continued," Minić wrote in his message, adding that both he and Tito believed that the Ethiopians should accept this initiative because it would strengthen their international position.[912] However, despite the Yugoslav efforts to moderate Ethiopia's policy and remove it from the Soviet orbit, Minić's initiative ultimately failed.

Tito tried to avoid any criticism of U.S. policy, but suggested that linking SALT II with the situation in the Ogaden would be wrong if the administration wanted to build the trust with the USSR.[913] He reminded Carter about the long history of Yugoslav–Ethiopian relations (and his alleged positive influence on Haile Selassie) and Yugoslavia's desire for peace in the region because further escalation could involve many other countries, "and that is very dangerous." Tito probably referred to Saudi Arabia, whose influence in the Horn the Belgrade regime found particularly dangerous for the power balance in the region. Carter agreed that Somalia should leave the Ogaden, but that

[911] Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary Vance and Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Minic, March 8, 1978, Document 254, *FRUS*, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe, 1977–1980.
[912] Ambasada SFRJ London SSIP-u, March 11, 1978, DA MSP RS, PA 1978 SAD, f. 126, d. 12, s. 414587.
[913] There is no U.S. record of the Tito–Carter conversation. However, Averell Harriman made a record of conversation with Tito and Minić at the dinner at Blair House on March 8. According to Harriman, Minić said that Moscow belived that Carter was insincere in "wanting an agreement on SALT." Morevoer, the Soviet mistrust was exacerbated by their belief that Carter wanted to "push them out of the Middle East negotiations," and the Carter administration's manner how it dealt with human rights. Memorandum of conversation between W. Averell Harriman and President Tito of Yugoslavia at Blair House dinner, March 8, 1978, AHP, box 596, folder 2, LOC.

any peaceful resolution of the war should include the withdrawal of Cuban and Soviet military personnel from Ethiopia after a truce between Somalia and Ethiopia. Carter said that the Organization for African Unity should be involved in the conflict ("if the Soviets and the Cubans allow that") because "we don't want that this region becomes the scene of the battle between us and the Soviet Union."[914] Yet, as Nancy Mitchell pointed out, in this period, the U.S. policy toward the region was unclear with Brzezinski and Vance disagreeing over the right approach.[915]

The Soviet and Cuban presence in Ethiopia worried both Belgrade and Washington even if for different reasons. For Yugoslavia, it was inextricably connected to the larger issues of the character of the Ethiopian revolution, but also the soul of the NAM. With the next NAM summit scheduled for 1979 in Havana, the Cuban presence in Ethiopia threatened to "flip" another influential member of the movement to the "progressive" side, as in Angola two years earlier. The Yugoslavs hoped to use the preparatory ministerial meeting in Belgrade in July to set the agenda for Havana that would prevent Castro from dividing the movement. Carter applauded Yugoslavia's efforts to limit the Cuban influence, but remained skeptical about Havana as the "right place to have the summit."[916] "Cuba worries us too, but what can we do about that?" Tito wondered, emphasizing the importance of the preparatory meeting. "We think that your platform is excellent," Carter reassured him.

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[914] Stenografske beleške sa razgovora Predsednika Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije Josipa Broza Tita i Džimi Karter-a, Predsednika Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, održanih 7. marta 1978. godine u 10 časova u Beloj Kući, March 7, 1978, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/73–1.
[915] Mitchell, *Jimmy Carter in Africa*, 396–397.
[916] Stenografske beleške sa razgovora Predsednika Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije Josipa Broza Tita i Džimi Karter-a, Predsednika Sjedinjenih Američkih Država – nastavak razgovora 9. III 1978. godine u 9,30 casova, March 9, 1978, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/73–1.

The issue of NAM unity permeated other discussions as well. In the case of North Korea, Tito transmitted Kim Il Sung's message about Pyongyang's willingness to talk so long as South Korean president Park Chung Hee was not involved in these talks. Other than that issue, Tito said that Sung was very flexible in his approach to the reunification of Korea and that he promised that North Korea would not "infiltrate" the South. He suggested that North Korea, South Korea, and the United States should begin between low-level talks to avoid controversy over Park's participation.[917] Tito's proposal about low-level talks was new. If the Americans would agree to it, Minić and Tito offered to notify North Korea about Washington's willingness to participate in negotiations. Tito's proposal caused some confusion and Secretary Vance had to check with Minić what exactly Tito had in mind.[918] Tito said that the United States should also show its flexibility toward the Korean problem because North Korea was a nonaligned state and should be assisted (or, at least, not obstructed) in making its independent foreign policy. Thus, the United States should try to accommodate some of Pyongyang's needs to prevent its reliance on the Soviets and possible shift to the "progressive" camp of the NAM.

Tito's conversations with Carter and Minić's with Vance showed Belgrade's ambitions to play a larger role in world affairs. Although the Yugoslav paid lip service to

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[917] Stenografske beleške sa razgovora Predsednika Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije Josipa Broza Tita i Džimi Karter-a, Predsednika Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, održanih 7. marta 1978. godine u 10 časova u Beloj Kući, March 7, 1978, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/73–1.

[918] Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary Vance and Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Minic, March 8, 1978, Document 254, *FRUS*, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe, 1977–1980.
Since Tito announced his trip to North Korea and offered his good offices, Brzezinski and Vance agreed that the United States should be careful not to offer an intermediary role to Tito since the administration "already have determined that we will pursue that initiative through the Chinese in connection with Cy's trip to Peking in August [1977]."Memo, Brzezinski to Carter, August 5, 1977, NSA Brzezinski Material President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Files, "Yugoslavia: Josip Broz Tito 5/77–5/79," box 21, JCPL.

détente, its decline offered numerous possibilities for Yugoslav diplomacy – one of them to act as an intermediary between the superpowers and in regional conflicts. Besides, the often paternalistic attitude that Tito had toward Carter (who unwittingly encouraged it with his accolades) and Tito's attempts to play as an intermediary suggested that the Yugoslav president wanted to steer and moderate American foreign policy. Frequent exchanges of letters between him and Carter during the first twelve months of the administration fostered intimacy between the two leaders. Besides, Tito's ongoing successful tour around the world instilled a sense of self-confidence in the power of Yugoslav diplomacy.[919] Carter's inexperience in foreign policy created a delusion that he could be influenced by Tito's charm and experience. Some Yugoslav diplomats, like Belovski, went so far as to claim that Tito's trip to Washington had a larger political importance for the host than for the guest.[920]

Tito's "farewell tour" was calculated to build confidence in Yugoslavia's future after his departure from the scene. Yet, it would be neither Tito's farewell tour nor the end of Yugoslavia's foreign policy troubles. By the second half of 1978, Yugoslav–Soviet relations deteriorated to the lowest level since 1971, chiefly because of further improvement in Sino–Yugoslav relations, but also because the improvement of U.S.–

[919] Like he did in 1971, Tito from Washington flew to London where he dined with Queen Elizabeth and met with Prime Minster James Callaghan. From London he came back home. The Foreign Secretariat mentioned Tito's visit to the United Kingdom as a side note to the more important visit to the United States. See Rezime i zaključci sa Kolegija održanog 14.3.1978. godine – Preliminarna informacija o posetama Predsednika Republike Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama i Velikoj Britaniji (usmeno izlaganje), SSIP, Kabinet podsekretara B. Lončara, March 14, 1978, DA MSP RS, PA 1978 SAD, f. 129, d. 14, s. 415997.

[920] Telegram ambasadora Belovskog uoči posete druga Predsednika Americi, February 25, 1978, br. 196, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/73–1.

Yugoslav relations. It appeared that the very success of Yugoslav diplomacy in 1977 and the first half of 1978 spelled trouble for it as well.

Harriman's visit and the prelude to the Havana Summit

This façade of confidence that foreign travels and pageantry of high-level visits projected, was reinforced at the 11th LCY Congress in June 1978.[921] At the same time, however, Yugoslavia's role in global affairs came under the assault from Cuba and the Soviet Union. Cuban–Yugoslav competition over the influence in the NAM escalated in the summer of 1978 with Belgrade's preparations to host a ministerial meeting of the movement. Washington saw this as a chance to buttress Yugoslavia's moderating influence in the NAM, particularly because Belgrade encouraged a proactive U.S. stance toward the movement. During his visit to Belgrade, U.S. ambassador to the UN, Andrew Young, was approached by a Yugoslav official who suggested that Carter should send a message to help the Yugoslavs "in their efforts to play a moderating role at the Belgrade meeting."[922] This was the second time that Washington sent a message to the NAM.[923]

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[921] The U.S. embassy reported that the 11th LCY Congress "predictably" did not set a new course but rather reinforced the message to the world not to expect any change after Tito's departure. "In contrast with the atmosphere in 1974 when the 10th Congress was held, we perceive in the preparations for the 11th Congress and in its execution a distinct relaxation in the climate of tension and uncertainty." Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 05289, June 27, 1978, 1978BELGRA05289, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed November 8, 2019).

[922] Memo, Peter Tarnoff to Zbigniew Brzezinski, July 21, 1978, NSA Brzezinski Material Country Files Yugoslavia, "Yugoslavia 10/77–12/78," box 86, JCPL.

[923] In August 1961, John F. Kennedy sent a message to the first NAM summit in Belgrade. "The peoples represented in Belgrade are committed to achieving a world of peace in which nations have the freedom to choose their own political and economic systems, to live their own way of life. Since 1776 this has been one of our fundamental purposes," Kennedy stated. Proposed statement by President Kennedy about the conference of unaligned states at Belgrade, August 28, 1961, Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President's Office Files - Non-Aligned Nations summit meeting, Belgrade, Available at https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKPOF/104/JFKPOF-104-004 (accessed December 20, 2019). Rob Rakove showed how the "Kennedy administration sought, at the peak of the Berlin crisis, to sway the opinions of attendees to the Belgrade Conference." See Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World*, 63.

Both the White House and the State Department were aware of its political risks, but proceeded anyway because it could encourage the "moderates" but also score some points in the area of U.S.–Yugoslav relations.[924]

Harriman's meeting with Tito provided another opportunity for the United States to encourage Yugoslavia's independent foreign policy. Harriman's visit to Brioni in July 1978 and a lengthy conversation with Tito confirmed that contentious Yugoslav–Cuban relations were the symptom of Belgrade's larger problem that was the Soviet influence in the NAM. According to the new Foreign Secretary, Josip Vrhovec, the principal issue at the ministerial meeting was the character of the movement and its ideological orientation. As Vrhovec told Harriman, the Cubans came to Belgrade in a "very aggressive mood," but that his government was ready for a "major battle."[925] Tito also described the Cuban behavior as an attempt to "dilute the concept of non-alignment established in 1961." "Where was Cuba in 1961 when we began things [?]" Tito seethed.[926] He said that Yugoslavia would make sure that Castro would not "dominate" the movement during his presiding over the NAM. "We are not afraid… and we are ready to do battle," Tito assured Harriman.[927] This was not just empty talk: to Cuba's dismay and Washington's satisfaction, Yugoslavia and its allies managed to stifle many of Cuba's radical proposals. Instead of backing down, on July 26 Castro delivered a speech where he failed to mention

[924] On July 24, ambassador Eagleburger delivered Carter's message to Yugoslav Secretary Vrhovec. While members of the Non-aligned Movement sometimes disagree with the United States and other non-members on specific issues, there is fundamental agreement on broad goals," Carter stated. Department of State to Embassy Belgrade, Telegram 185993, July 24, 1978, 1978STATE185993, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed October 27, 2019).
[925] Embassy Belgrade to Secretary of State, Telegram 05557, July 29, 1978, AHP, box 599, f. 6, LOC.
[926] Memorandum of Conversation between Averell Harriman and Josip Broz Tito, July 28, 1978, AHP, box 599, f. 6, LOC.
[927] Ibid.

Tito's and Yugoslavia's role in the movement which the Yugoslavs took as a "deliberate insult and it was not well-received in Belgrade."[928] The Belgrade meeting, however, was just a prelude to the showdown in Havana. As U.S. observers predicted, Yugoslav resistance to Soviet attempts to hijack the movement via Cuba led to another cooling in Yugoslav–Soviet relations.

The Belgrade – Moscow – Beijing Triangle

"I want to say that our relations with the Soviet Union symbolically, every ten years happen to cool down. 1948, 1958, 1968, and now we have 1978. The reasons are different, but they are always within the framework of relations between socialist states," a member of the LCY Central Committee said.[929] In 1978, the main reason was China. After Tito's visit to China in August 1977, Sino–Yugoslav relations continued to improve. Besides high-level visits, Sino–Yugoslav cooperation took some unusual forms. Yugoslavia and China discussed cooperation in the area of nuclear technology that also included secret discussions about a joint project to build an atomic bomb for Yugoslavia. Also, China became one of the staunchest advocates of "genuine" nonalignment and the harshest critics of the Yugoslav chief competitor in the NAM, Cuba.

In December 1977, a delegation of Yugoslav nuclear scientists and "socio-political workers" went to China to familiarize themselves with the Chinese nuclear program. For the Yugoslav side, this visit served several purposes. The delegation explored the possibility of obtaining enriched uranium for the nuclear power plant Krško

[928] Memo, Nicholas Gonzales Revilla and Robert Pastor, August 2, 1978, NSA Brzezinski Material Country Files Yugoslavia, "Yugoslavia 10/77–12/78," box 86, JCPL.
[929] Magnetofonske beleške sa četvrte sednice Predsedništva Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, September 19, 1978, AJ, A CKSKJ, fond 507, III/225.

from China. This issue Belgrade had been trying to resolve with the United States since the early 1970s but with little success. The Yugoslavs noted that China was "forthcoming toward our need to solve some short-term problems with Krško."[930] Another purpose of the visit was Yugoslavia's attempt to acquire the technology necessary to build a nuclear bomb. Uranium enrichment in China and its re-processing in Yugoslavia in a facility built with Chinese technology, the Yugoslavs estimated, would allow Yugoslavia to produce enough plutonium for a nuclear bomb as early as 1985.[931] At the same time, the Chinese side was interested in Yugoslav experiences with building and operating nuclear power plants because China had no experience in operating nuclear facilities other than for military purposes.[932]

In April 1978, a Chinese delegation came to Yugoslavia to continue the talks. It toured Yugoslavia's only uranium mine, nuclear research institutes, and the Krško power plant. The Chinese wanted to learn about training, safety, and the environmental impact of nuclear energy. Also, the Chinese delegation asked the Yugoslavs to provide them with the complete technical documentation for the Krško nuclear plant.[933] This Sino–Yugoslav nuclear cooperation was a "part of the overall development of our state and party relations… on every occasion the Chinese and our side emphasized that this visit

[930] The Chinese offered to enrich 16,000 kilograms of uranium per year, beginning with 1981. Informacija o poseti grupe nasih eksperata za nuklearnu energiju NR Kini, December 30, 1977, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/55–7 Kina.
[931] Ibid.
[932] Iz Izveštaja grupe eksperata SIV-a za nuklearnu energiju o poseti NR Kini koja je obavljena od 5. do 20. decembra 1977. godine – Zapisnik sa razgovora delegacija 6. decembra, no date, December, 1977, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/55–7 Kina.
[933] The Yugoslavs expressed a "generally positive attitude" toward this request but were reluctant to provide it because of the obligations toward the United States. "We must not breach these obligations," a report cautioned. Informacija o boravku delegacije kineskih nuklearnih strucnjaka u Jugoslaviji u vremenu od 7. do 21. IV 1978, April 24, 1978, SIV Kabinet potpredsednika Dobroslava Ćulafića, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/55–7 Kina.

was the result of the friendly talks between presidents Tito and Hua Guofeng."[934] Chinese desire to acquire expertise and use Yugoslavia as an intermediary for the acquisition of Western technology coincided with Beijing's modernization efforts after the years of the Cultural Revolution. In May 1978, Chinese First Vice Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping told the Yugoslavs that in the next 22 years China wanted to achieve the "Four Modernizations" to bridge the gap between China and developed countries in the West. "China has a lot to learn from Yugoslavia," Xiaoping said.[935] Guofeng's visit to Belgrade in August confirmed that the Sino–Yugoslav relationship was stronger than ever.

Guofeng's trip to Yugoslavia had a strong symbolic value. It confirmed mutual interest in good Sino–Yugoslav relations, but also reaffirmed Yugoslavia's unique status in world affairs that Tito carefully crafted during his 1977/8 world tour. Yet, the ever-improving Sino-Yugoslav relationship, enriched with the official establishment of intra-party contacts, overstepped the limits of Soviet tolerance. The remarkable Chinese *volte face* on the issue of Yugoslav communism gave legitimacy to Tito's separate road. The Chinese Communist Party (CPC) sent a warm message to the 11th LCY Congress in which it stated that the Yugoslav communists "applied the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete practice of Yugoslavia."[936] Beijing's approval of self-management meant that Yugoslavia was not responsible for the 1948 split. Tito compared Guofeng's visit to the Khrushchev visit in 1955 because it made Beijing admit that it was

[934] Informacija o poseti grupe naših eksperata za nuklearnu energiju NR Kini, December 30, 1977, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/55–7 Kina.
[935] Razgovor Teng Hsiao Pinga sa Marinom Cetinićem, May 4, 1978, br. 345, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/55–8 Kina.
[936] The Chinese noted that their message to the Congress was greeted with tumultuous applause that "resounded like ocean waves blown up by the powerful spring winds." U.S. Liaison Office Beijing to Department of State, Telegram 01916, June 26, 1978, 1978PEKING01916, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed November 8, 2019).

wrong and Yugoslavia was right. With the visit, "they admitted that they were unfair to us when they were accusing us of revisionism, etc. This is not a small victory," Tito said.[937]

In 1977/8, the China issue was arguably the most important factor in the dynamic of Yugoslav–Soviet relations. Guofeng's visit decreased Yugoslavia's ideological dependence on the USSR and the Soviets were clear that Yugoslav–Chinese party relations were for Moscow a line in the sand. In April 1978, the Soviet ambassador in Singapore told his Yugoslav colleague that he had to be "honest" and say that the Kremlin was "very dissatisfied with the establishment of relations between the LCY and the CPC." That was, he stated, "objectively [speaking] an anti-Soviet move" that could be detrimental for some other communist parties.[938] But the signs of another Yugoslav–Soviet split had been apparent since 1976 and a series of events and numerous small (even petty) grievances in 1977 and 1978 slowly led to the crisis. Guofeng's visit to Belgrade in August 1978 acted as a catalyst for another Yugoslav–Soviet break.

The latest Yugoslav–Soviet dispute started in a bookstore. In October 1977, the former Yugoslav two-time ambassador to the USSR, Veljko Mićunović, published a memoir about his first stint in Moscow in the 1950s. The book, *Moskovske godine 1956/58* (in 1980 translated into English as *Moscow Diary* with George Kennan's foreword), was released at the International Belgrade Book Fair and instantly became a best seller in Yugoslavia. Mićunović sent signed copies of the book to Tito and Kardelj and Kardelj responded with a warm thank you note. Yet, Kardelj warned the author that

[937] Magnetofonske beleške sa četvrte sednice Predsedništva Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, September 19, 1978, AJ, A CKSKJ fond 507, III/225.
[938] SSIP Ambasadi SFRJ Peking, April 21, 1978, DA MSP RS, PA 1978 SSSR, f. 143, d.6, s. 422450.

the book "will provoke strong reactions on the 'other side'." It did not take very long for the Soviet to react. Mićunović recalled that soon after the book was published, the rumors started how he had revealed state secrets and that the book would be banned. He was certain that the Soviets were behind these attempts to silence him. The *Washington Post* correspondent in Belgrade, Michael Dobbs, wrote that Soviet journalists privately described Mićunović's diary as a "dreadful… anti-Soviet" book.[939]

Faced with increasing Soviet pressure through official and unofficial channels – the Yugoslav government noted that the Soviets even harassed the Yugoslav publisher – the SFRY Presidium discussed the book in one of its meetings. The general conclusion was that the book should not be either praised or criticized.[940] On November 10, the Yugoslav chargé in Moscow, Jože Smole, went to the Kremlin to explain that the Yugoslav government had nothing to do with the writing, publication, and distribution of the book. The official plausible deniability, however, was not enough. In January 1978, Soviet chargé d'affaires, Vinogradov, delivered Moscow's official demarche to Deputy Foreign Secretary Mojsov. Vinogradov said that the book was "unobjective," "bad," and directly insulted the Soviet leaders "some of them who, after 1964, came to the most prominent positions."[941] Vinogradov said that the Kremlin expected that the Yugoslav comrades would take necessary steps to limit its distribution.[942] "It is not an accident that

[939] Michael Dobbs, "Envoy's Book Discloses Soviet Pressures on Yugoslavia," December 21, 1977, the *Washington Post*.
[940] I did not have access to the records of that meeting and I referred here to Mićunović's claim stated in his book *Moskovske godine 1969/71*, 56–57. However, a fair assumption can be made that the Yugoslavs did not want to stir controversy in the middle of the CSCE meeting in Belgrade.
[941] This was a reference to Mikhail Suslov.
[942] Zabeleška o razgovoru zamenika saveznog sekretara za inostrane poslove L. Mojsova sa otpravnikom poslova Ambasade SSSR u Beogradu Vinogradovom 9. januara 1978. godine, January 13, 1978, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–30 SSSR.

certain organs of Western propaganda are using this book for their objectives," Vinogradov told Mojsov.

The controversy over the book was still in its full swing when *Start* magazine (the Yugoslav counterpart of *Playboy* that was published in Zagreb), in the issue from January 25, published Western press speculations about Brezhnev's health and the internal struggles within the Soviet leadership.[943] The Foreign Secretariat publicly distanced from the magazine and informed the Soviet embassy that the government would take seriously this "act against Yugoslavia's interests and Yugoslav–Soviet relations." Moreover, the Secretariat summoned editors of the Yugoslav press and warned them that the *Start* article along with the "existing large difficulties with Mićunović's book represents an additional negative element in Yugoslavia's relations with the USSR." The Secretariat noted that these and similar incidents weakened Yugoslavia's position and suggested "restraint" in writing about and commenting on Mićunović's book because the Soviets were convinced that the LCY was behind it.[944]

Soon enough, it was clear that the Yugoslav press did not heed the Secretariat's advice. The book was sold out quickly and its second edition promised good sales for

[943] Soviet ambassador Stjepakov vehemently denied these rumors. He said that he met Brezhnev in the Barvikha health resort on January 19 and that Brezhnev was in a good mood and that he "joked and laughed." Zabeleska o telefonskom razgovoru PSS Milana Vereša sa ambasadorom SSSR Vladimirom Stjepakovim, January 25, 1978, SSIP Kabinet PSS za inostrane poslove M. Vereša, DA MSP RS, PA 1978 SSSR, f. 144, d. 1, s. 43808. The Yugoslav embassy in Moscow, however, reported that Brezhnev allegedly suffered from the complications from the flu. It reported that Brezhnev, who appeared on state television on January 5, "looked tired, read the text with difficulty, and appeared unstable during handshake." Stanje zdravlja Brežnjeva, January 22, 1978, br. 91, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–30 SSSR.
, Beograd januara 25

[944] Beleška povodom pisanja revije "Start" od 25 januara 1978, SSIP, DA MSP RS, PA 1978 SSSR, f. 143, d. 1, s. 43801. Despite the efforts to disassociate from the book and its author, Mićunović was invited to the 11the LCY Congress held in June 1978. This was a clear signal that, despite the book, Mićunović did not fall from grace.

publishing companies. In January-February, the Slovenian weekly *Naši razgledi* began publishing excerpts from the book and promised a new edition, this time in Slovenian. A member of the CPSU Politburo, Konstantin Rusakov, met with Smole to voice his dissatisfaction. Rusakov said that the Soviets believed that the "Mićunović affair" was closed but then the Yugoslavs decided to release the second edition. "This book makes us uncomfortable… if we want good relations, everything that makes us uncomfortable should make you uncomfortable as well," Rusakov said.[945]

There were many reasons for this Soviet discomfort over Mićunović's book. First, by directly revealing methods and the extent of the Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia it encouraged anti-Soviet feelings in the country. Second, it was used as a propaganda tool in the West and possibly in China. Mićunović wrote that the "guests from the Far East," i.e. the Chinese were particularly interested in the book and used to buy as many copies as they could carry in their arms.[946] Finally, the book was important in the context of internal troubles with dissidents in the USSR and elsewhere in Eastern Europe because of its critical tone against the Soviet system. The book was smuggled into the USSR, copied and disseminated in intellectual circles.[947]

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[945] Rusakov also mentioned the *Start* article and asked Smole how he would feel if the Soviet press speculated about Tito's health. Rusakov accused the Yugoslavs of condoning these anti-Soviet attacks and said that if somebody in the USSR wrote anything bad about Tito he would "personally break his skull." Razgovor ambasadora Smolea sa sekretarom CK KPSS Rusakovom, February 2, 1978, Služba-za spoljnopolitička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–30 SSSR.

[946] Mićunović, *Moskovske godine 1969/71*, 54.

[947] A Ukrainian journalist told the Yugoslav consul in Kyiv that journalists and intelligentsia showed "huge interest in the book." He said that parts of the book were translated, typed and distributed among trusted friends. Konzulat SFRJ Kijev SSIP-u, June 23, 1978, DA MSP RS, PA 1978 SSSR, f. 144, d.3, s. 437181. Mićunović, who was recuperating on the Adriatic coast, wrote that his friends complained how they could not find a copy of the book because "Russians bought them all." As it turned out, Soviet sailors who were visiting Dubrovnik bought all available copies because they saw the image of the Kremlin on the book cover. Mićunović, *Moskovske godine, 1969/71*, 57.

The story about Mićunović and his book exemplified the level of mistrust between Belgrade and Moscow that would unfold after Guofeng's visit to Yugoslavia. Although the Yugoslavs did not want to escalate the confrontation with the Soviets – Minić went to Moscow twice in the spring of 1978 to "exchange opinions" with Brezhnev and Kosygin – Yugoslav–Chinese relations led to that outcome anyway. Tito said that the reason for Yugoslav–Soviet dispute was Guofeng's visit to Yugoslavia. "That was definitely what provoked this sharp course," Tito said, concluding that the Soviets did not want a modern China ("The Soviet Union benefits the most from a sleepy China") and that was the reason why they were against "Chinese penetration in Europe."[948] In August and September, Moscow launched an anti-Yugoslav campaign in the press, but also, as the Yugoslavs believed, instigated Bulgarian irredentist claims over Macedonia. "We know that the Soviet Union is behind it too [because] if the Soviet Union did not have the same attitude, then they would not be able to attack us," Tito commented on Bulgaria's territorial claims.[949] Moreover, while Guofeng was in Yugoslavia, Brezhnev and Zhivkov met in the Crimea. Brezhnev and Zhivkov issued a joint statement in which they condemned Chinese interference in the Balkan affairs and expressed hope that the Balkan people would not allow the "agitation of the forces that are against peace and détente."[950] The Bulgarians found Guofeng's visit to the

[948] Magnetofonske beleške sa četvrte sednice Predsedništva Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, September 19, 1978, AJ, A CKSKJ fond 507, III/225.
[949] Ibid. Tito believed that the Soviets were using Bulgaria to achieve their plan to get to the Adriatic.
[950] Saopštenje o razgovorima Brežnjev – Živkov, August 15, 1978, br. 1212, Sluzba za spoljno-politicka pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–30 SSSR. Historian Spyridon Sfetas wrote that Zhivkov was afraid that Guofeng's visit to Romania and Yugoslavia served to "isolate" Bulgaria. Spyridon Sfetas, "The Fusion of Regional and Cold War Problems: The Macedonian Triangle Between Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, 1963–80" in Svetozar Rajak, Konstantina E. Botsiou, Eirini Karamouzi, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, eds., *The Balkans in the Cold War* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), 315–316.

Macedonian capital Skopje especially provocative in the light of their territorial dispute with Yugoslavia.

The attacks on Yugoslavia continued in the USSR, Bulgaria, but also other Eastern European countries. The Czechoslovak press speculated about a "tactical alliance" between NATO and China that implicitly included Yugoslavia.[951] The Yugoslav embassy in Moscow noted that the Soviets devised a "two-track tactic" in dealing with Yugoslavia. While government and party officials "avoided any critical allusion" to Guofeng's visit, the Soviet press launched a full-scale attack on Romania, China, and Yugoslavia.[952] TASS transmitted an article from the British *Observer* that warned about Western arms sales to China and criticized China's attempts to divide the socialist community, intimating Yugoslavia's and Romania's complicity in these efforts.[953] The Soviet press reported about the letter that was published in Albanian daily *Zeri e populit* in which the Albanian communist party claimed that in 1968 China nudged Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia to form an alliance against the USSR. *Pravda* commented that the letter revealed Beijing's "long-term objectives in the Balkans" and demonstrated its "hegemonistic methods that they want to introduce in international relations."[954] The attention that *Pravda* gave to the letter signaled to the Yugoslavs the possible improvement of Soviet–Albanian relations that was "very dangerous" for Yugoslavia. "The East found an opportunity in one such slander about the alleged

[951] Embassy Prague to Department of State, Telegram 02312, August 29, 1978, 1978PRAGUE02312, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed November 8, 2019).
[952] Ambasada SFRJ Moskva SSIP-u, September 19, 1978, DA MSP RS, PA 1978 SSSR, f. 144, d. 4, s. 451838.
[953] "Близорукая и опасная политика," August 24, 1978, *Правда*, 4.
[954] А. Петров, "Политика гегемонизма," August 12, 1978, *Правда*, 6.

military alliance to create negative mood in the Soviet public," Vrhovec said.[955] The Soviet tactic worked because the Yugoslav consulate in Kyiv reported about systematic abuses of Yugoslav construction workers in Ukraine. "After Guofeng's visit, one can hear from the ordinary people how Yugoslavia is again against the Soviet Union… sells weapons that China is going to use against the Soviet Union, and takes Guofeng to the cities near Bulgarian and Albanian borders to intimidate its neighbors."[956]

Because of these attacks on Yugoslavia in the Soviet press, the government in Belgrade sent a demarche to the Kremlin demanding an explanation of the "political background of surprising treatment of Yugoslavia in their press."[957] Soviet officials reiterated Moscow's commitment to good relations with Yugoslavia ("particularly personal relations between Brezhnev and President Tito") but that they cannot control every "irresponsible" journalist. "Anyway, your press often picks on us too," a Soviet official said.[958] Soviet ambassador Rodionov repeated that journalists often create obstacles for the diplomats, but conceded that the Soviets often "very emotionally take

[955] In May 1978, Vrhovec replaced Minić as the new secretary for foreign affairs. Minić was appointed to the CC LCY where he continued to deal with the LCY's international policies. Magnetofonske beleške sa četvrte sednice Predsedništva Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, September 19, 1978, AJ, A CKSKJ fond 507, III/225.
[956] The consulate reported how ordinary citizens harassed Yugoslav citizens. In Yalta, one Soviet worker asked to borrow a wheelbarrow from a Yugoslav worker and when he refused, the Soviet told scolded him. "You can sell weapons to the Chinese to fight against the Soviet Union, but you can't lend us a wheelbarrow when we ask you." Konzulat SFRJ Kijev SSIP-u, September 12, 1978, DA MSP RS, PA 1978 SSSR, f. 144, d. 4, s. 450547.
[957] One of the Soviet "sins" was their misrepresentation of the ministerial conference of the NAM in Belgrade where the Soviets, among other things, failed to mention Tito's name. Jugoslovensko – sovjetski odnosi (naši zvanični koraci i sovjetsko reagovanje), August 15, 1978, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–30 SSSR.
[958] Ibid.

everything related to China… and that the USSR, naturally, could not watch peacefully the visit of the Chinese statesman to a friendly country such as Yugoslavia."[959]

This newest Yugoslav–Soviet spat naturally received a lot of attention in Washington. The Carter administration closely followed Sino–Yugoslav–Soviet triangular relations as a possible indicator of the Soviet reactions to U.S. normalization with China, but also the implications of Soviet–Yugoslav quarrels on the NAM. Washington understood that China was one (albeit the most important) factor of the most recent Yugoslav–Soviet confrontation but that other circumstances contributed as well. In October 1978, Eagleburger pointed out that "there has been a steady and increasingly visible erosion in Soviet–Yugoslav relations over the past several months." Eagleburger discerned three main factors that led to the deterioration of the Soviet–Yugoslav relationship. First, Yugoslavia's "widening policy differences" with the USSR over a whole host of issues that included Africa, the NAM and the role of Cuba, and intra-party relations. Second, Yugoslavia's growing relationship with China. Finally, the expansion of Yugoslav–U.S. relations. "These have converged over the course of 1977, reinforcing each other, sharpening Yugoslav perceptions of a broad Soviet challenge to basic Yugoslav policies, and stiffening Yugoslav resolve to pursue an independent course," Eagleburger reported.[960]

Although Eagleburger believed that neither the Soviets nor the Yugoslavs had the interest to escalate their dispute, his assessment pointed out at some structural problems

[959] Iz zabeleške o razgovoru podsekretara B. Lončara sa ambasadorom SSSR N. Rodionovom, September 13, 1978, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–30 SSSR.
[960] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 07234, October 3, 1978, 1978BELGRA07234, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed November 8, 2019).

in the Belgrade–Moscow relationship that would be hard to overcome. The Yugoslav sources confirm that the country's long-term interests lay in the normalization of its relations with the USSR (and other big powers, as the usual Yugoslav caveat stated). At the September meeting of the LCY CC, Tito said that he "would have to go there," i.e. to the USSR, to talk to Brezhnev. Also in September, Minić, now in a new role as the chief conductor of the party's foreign policy, met with Soviet ambassador Rodionov (he replaced Benediktov in May) and confirmed Yugoslavia's desire to have good relations with the USSR based on the 1971 Tito–Brezhnev joint declaration and the principles of "openness and frankness" but without abandoning its independence. Minić emphasized Yugoslavia's dissatisfaction with the Soviet support of Bulgaria and the treatment of Yugoslavia in the context of the Guofeng visit, but assured Rodionov that good Sino–Yugoslav relations were not aimed against the USSR. In fact, Minić said, Tito advocated for a Sino–Soviet rapprochement.[961] "We had certain cautiousness in relation to the appearance of the Chinese clouds on the clear horizon of Soviet–Yugoslav relations, but that does not mean that the Chinese typhoon will destroy our friendship," Rodionov replied, but added that China was an emotional issue for the Soviets because China's foreign policy was, by its definition, anti-Soviet. Rodionov again mentioned the alleged arms deals between Yugoslavia and China and said that ordinary Soviet citizens were justifiably worried that the Soviet weapons – i.e. Yugoslav weapons made under Soviet licenses – would be used to enhance China's military potential.[962] The Minić–Rodionov conversation showed that, despite a mutual desire for normalization, Yugoslav–Soviet

[961] Stenografske beleške sa razgora druga Miloša Minića sa ambasadorom SSSR u Jugoslaviji, Rodionovom, September 21, 1978, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–30 SSSR.
[962] Ibid.

relations reached an impasse. An LCY functionary, Aleksandar Grličkov, optimistically indicated that every dispute with the Kremlin Yugoslavia successfully solved in a "year or two and a half years" with a "positive program."[963] The events in 1979 showed that this time normalization would not be easy even with a "positive program."

In 1977 and 1978, Yugoslavia's foreign policy showed enormous self-confidence. Uncertainty about détente, the new administration in Washington, and the opening of China provided Yugoslavia with a more maneuvering space. Yugoslavia did not have to play a disruptive role in global policy like it did in the first half of the 1970s. On the other hand, Soviet renewed efforts to "centralize" the international workers' movement at the expense of the independence of national communist parties and the rise of Cuba's revolutionary internationalism created strong incentives for Yugoslavia to conduct its foreign policy that (intentionally or not) accommodated some U.S. foreign policy objectives. Yet, Yugoslavia's foreign policy inevitably overstepped the limits of Soviet tolerance that led to another break between Moscow and Belgrade.

Tito's trips to the USSR, China, and North Korea in 1977 and the United States in 1978, together with the CSCE follow-up meeting in Belgrade, were the heights of Yugoslav foreign policy. The regime seemed to enjoy universal recognition and the country and its 86-year old leader projected influence disproportionate to their real power. These foreign policy successes, however, created a self-illusion of the country's importance in global affairs. Tito and his immediate circle deluded themselves with the idea that Yugoslavia could influence global affairs and guide the policies of the United

[963] Magnetofonske beleške sa četvrte sednice Predsedništva Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, September 19, 1978, AJ, A CKSKJ, fond 507, III/225.

States and China. Based on this assumption of the country's and his own importance, Tito willingly assumed a role of an intermediary in Ethiopia, Korea, and in the Sino–Soviet dispute. A series of events in 1979, however, showed that Yugoslavia's foreign policy was a house of cards. The successes of 1977 and 1978 were in equal measures a mix of circumstances and the one-man show ran by the charismatic Yugoslav leader. By the end of 1979, with Tito on his deathbed and international context dramatically transformed, Yugoslavia's foreign policy was in disarray.

Chapter 6: The death of Tito's diplomacy, 1978–1980

"Honorable comrade Tito! Do whatever is in your power to condemn the invasion of Kapucia [sic!]! So that something like that never happens among nonaligned states or anywhere else in the world! Comrade Tito! The Russians are preparing to do the same to us via Bulgaria!" wrote Yugoslav citizen Ivica Stupin from Rijeka to his president.[964] We do not know anything about Stupin (his writing suggests poor education), but his letter – a common method for Yugoslav citizens to communicate with their leader – shows deep anxiety over the international situation and its possible consequences for Yugoslavia. At the same time when Stupin was typing his letter to the President, in Belgrade, Eagleburger reported to Washington that the Yugoslav leadership "wrestles (somewhat nervously) with problems," in domestic and foreign policy alike.[965]

On December 25, 1978, after years of hostilities, Vietnamese forces attacked Kampuchea (Cambodia). The reasons for this attack included frequent incursion of the Khmer Rouge to Vietnam and Pol Pot's decision to expel Vietnamese from Kampuchea – an act that Odd Arne Westad characterized as probably "the most harebrained strategic plan of the century."[966] The Vietnamese *blitzkrieg* against Pol Pot brought about a swift victory for Hanoi. This short and limited war, however, induced a lot of anxiety in Belgrade. The intervention showed that Moscow was persistent in applying the Brezhnev Doctrine, but that the doctrine now extended to nonaligned states as well. "From the

[964] Pismo Ivice Stupina Predsedniku Titu, January 30, 1979, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/74 (1–4).
[965] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 0030, January 3, 1979, 1979BELGRA00030, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed November 15, 2019).
[966] Odd Arne Westad, *The Cold War. A World History* (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 490.

beginning, it was obvious that the Soviet Union was behind the Vietnamese aggression," soon-to-be Yugoslav ambassador in the USSR, Marko Orlandić, wrote.[967]

Yugoslavia's response, however, was relatively muted. Internal deliberations about how to respond to the intervention showed the regime's insecurity about the future. Yugoslav fears ranged from the perennial concerns about a re-energized pro-Soviet "fifth column" to the specter of Soviet intervention via Bulgaria as the "Vietnam of the Balkans." Moreover, Vietnam's action threatened to polarize the NAM – pro-Soviet members of the movement and India recognized the pro-Vietnamese government while Belgrade took a wait-and-see approach.

Yugoslav–Soviet relations reached a nadir in September 1978 and in that context, Yugoslavia's harsh condemnation of Vietnam could be interpreted as an attack on the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia's attempt to have it both ways – to stand behind its principled policy of non-intervention but not to damage its relations with Moscow any further – proved futile. Belgrade's concern about the war between two socialist states and its vague criticism of "any kind of foreign intervention" did not win the favor of the Kremlin. The Chinese intervention against Vietnam in February 1979 further complicated Yugoslavia's relations with the USSR, because the Soviets accused Yugoslavia of hypocrisy because it did not condemn a "clear aggression against one independent country."[968]

The Vietnamese intervention against the Khmer Rouge in the last days of 1978 and Belgrade's inability to find an appropriate response showed that, after the heyday of

[967] Marko Orlandić, *U predvečerje sloma (sjećanja jugoslovenskog ambasadora u Moskvi, 1979–1982)* (Podgorica: Pobjeda, 2002), 47.
[968] Razgovor ambasadora Orlandića sa Kuznjecovom prilikom predaje akreditivnih pisama 21. februara, February 23, 1979, br. 173, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–31 SSSR.

Tito's globe-trotting diplomacy in 1977/8, Yugoslavia's foreign policy arrived at a *cul-de-sac*. The active phase of Yugoslav diplomacy was over. This chapter focuses on Yugoslavia's response to several challenges that Yugoslav diplomacy faced in the last year and a half of Tito's life, such as the continuous struggle for primacy in the NAM, fear of the Soviet interference, and the crises in Iran and Afghanistan. Belgrade's answers to these problems showed that its foreign policy became reactive. Tito's last diplomatic feats in 1979 – his trips to the Middle East, the USSR, and Cuba – proved insufficient to buttress Yugoslavia's role in international affairs. It appeared that the activism of Yugoslav diplomacy sapped together with vitality and vigor of its chief architect. A few days before he went to the hospital never to come out alive, the Soviets intervened in Afghanistan. The invasion and Yugoslavia's response to it showed that together with Tito, Yugoslav diplomacy also went into a coma.

There were several reasons for Yugoslavia's shift from the subject to the object of the global Cold War developments. First, the context of international politics changed. Détente slowly corroded, then collapsed. Despite Yugoslavia's distaste for "limited détente," its demise provided the Soviets with an opportunity to act more aggressively in protecting their interests around the globe, as the cases of Kampuchea and, later, Afghanistan proved. The Sino–U.S. rapprochement that culminated with Washington's official recognition of the PRC deepened Soviet suspicions about Carter's commitment to détente. Second, Moscow's efforts to increase its influence in the Third World included its attempts to take over the NAM. A primary Soviet ally, Cuba, used its influence to rally the so-called progressives within the movement and steer the NAM closer to Moscow. This policy was not new – the Yugoslavs detected these Cuban attempts already

in 1973 – but this time around Cuba, as the host of the summit, had a bully pulpit for its views. Moreover, as the Yugoslav ambassador in Havana recalled in his memoir, the Cubans believed that "time was on their side" because of Tito's age.[969] Third, a series of developments in the Middle East and adjacent areas showed that Yugoslavia's influence in that part of the world that had been in decline since 1973, by the end of the decade evaporated. The September 1978 Camp David Accords effectively ended the Yugoslav–Egyptian friendship that went back to the 1950s. The 1979 revolution in Iran was met with a mix of confusion and anxiety about its consequences. The events in Iran and the second oil crisis led to a sharp economic decline in Yugoslavia that threatened internal political and social disruptions similar to those in Poland. Finally, these fears of foreign threats and domestic disturbances were only heightened by Tito's departure from the political scene in early 1980. For a long time, Tito acted as a cohesive factor in domestic policy and the face of Yugoslavia's diplomacy. With his departure, socioeconomic problems and foreign policy challenges were left to mediocre party and government bureaucrats with little or no authority or ability to solve these issues. However, as the issue of the Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea showed in 1978/9, many of these problems were present before Tito's death.

Saving nonalignment: Tito's pivot to the Middle East

"Vietnam's aggression against Kampuchea delivered the strongest blow to nonaligned states," Tito told the Emir of Kuwait Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah. "We suffered a lot of damage from the [Somalian] aggression against Ethiopia, but this is even

[969] Jazić, *Moj pogled*, 98.

worse."[970] Tito repeated this several times to his Arab interlocutors during his last trip to the Middle East in February 1979. Tito's 12-day long journey to Kuwait, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan had an ambitious agenda. First, the situation in South East Asia, as Tito told al-Sabah and others, threatened the NAM's unity. Thus, one purpose of Tito's trip was to rally the Arab states against the attempts to divide the movement. Second, the region itself was going through dramatic changes. Sadat's November 1977 visit to Israel and the September 1978 Camp David Accords, showed that Egypt – not so long ago before of the cornerstones of the NAM – was conducting an increasingly pro-Western foreign policy that undermined the unity of the Arab world and, inter alia, of the movement. Besides, the unrest in Iran that led to the ouster of the Shah in January 1979 created fresh prospects for instability. Under these circumstances, Tito's trip served to reaffirm Yugoslavia's influence in the Arab world and establish contacts with other Arab NAM members such as Saudi Arabia. Finally, Kuwait and Iraq were two of Yugoslavia's most important economic partners. Iraq supplied around 50 percent of Yugoslavia's total oil purchases, while Kuwait was one of the largest of Yugoslavia's creditors. These two states were also among the biggest purchasers of Yugoslavia's military equipment and construction services. The combination of these factors brought the 87-year old statesman on an arduous journey.

The erosion of Yugoslavia's influence in the Middle East began in the aftermath of the October War (see Chapter 3). One has to look back to the period 1974–1977 to understand how Yugoslavia's traditional alliance with Egypt withered. With a mix of

[970] Stenografske beleške sa razgovora Predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita i kuvajtskog Emira Al Sabaha, February 3, 1979, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/74–1.

disdain and anger, Yugoslavia watched Sadat's shift to the West and his willingness to negotiate directly with Israel. The Yugoslavs considered Sadat's dissatisfaction with the Soviet conduct before, during, and after the 1973 war somewhat "objective." The Soviet stance toward the Middle East was, the Yugoslavs then thought, dictated by the exigencies of détente and Moscow's desire to preserve its relations with the United States.[971] Thus, Sadat's "opening" toward the West and the United States after the war was seen as a tactical move rather than Egypt's strategic orientation. Belgrade decided that regardless of these changes in Egypt's policy, Yugoslavia's long-term interest was to "strengthen its presence in Egypt and all possible forms of cooperation with Egypt."[972] Tito's meeting with Sadat in March 1974 served to underscore Yugoslavia's dedication to Egypt.

However, subsequent meetings between Tito and Sadat in 1975 and 1976 showed that the Yugoslavs grew increasingly dissatisfied with Egypt's policy. In September 1975, the Yugoslav embassy in Cairo reported that the commemoration of the fifth anniversary of Nasser's death took an unusual turn. In a three-and-a-half-hour speech, Sadat, as usual, harshly criticized the USSR, but, uncharacteristically, he used the speech to attack Nasser's legacy. This speech, the embassy noted, created the atmosphere of anti-Marxism, anti-Sovietism, and anti-Nasserism.[973] It is hard to gauge whether or not Tito

[971] Craig Daigle showed that, contrary to Belgrade's obsession with détente and alleged secret deals between Washington and Moscow, "détente rarely, if ever, extended to the Middle East." Craig Daigle, *The Limits of Détente The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969–1973* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 5.
[972] Primedbe druga Minića na informaciju UID-a, March 25, 1974, Kabinet Saveznog sekretara, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/121–69.
[973] "It is very surprising that Nasser's commemoration was used for this, because it [commemoration] is usually an opportunity to speak about death in a more humane way," the embassy concluded. Govor predsednika Sadata prema izveštaju ambasade iz Kaira br. 963, October 4, 1975, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/117–7 UAR.

was offended by this dismantling of Nasser's legacy, but Sadat's increasingly anti-Soviet stance was considered "objectively damaging" for Egypt's interests. Moreover, Sadat's new course alienated Cairo from other Arab states and the PLO. Before Sadat's visit to Yugoslavia in April 1976, some Egyptian officials such as Cairo's ambassador to Moscow secretly urged Tito to influence Sadat to "get things back to normal," i.e. to reconcile with the USSR.[974] The Arab League representative in Delhi, an Egyptian, approached the Yugoslavs with a similar appeal. He said that under the American influence Sadat worked at discrediting the NAM and that Tito was "the only person able to openly point out to Sadat the dangers of capitulation to the United States." As the Yugoslav embassy in Delhi reported, the Egyptian was "very emotional" while he was delivering his message, repeating that the fate of Egypt, the Arab world, and the nonaligned movement was at stake.[975]

The April 1976 Tito–Sadat talks revealed that Yugoslavia and Egypt had grown apart. Sadat complained about how the USSR and some nonaligned states such as India did not want to supply Egypt with spare parts for military equipment. He informed Tito about his Western European tour and successful efforts to replace Soviet military technology with the Western. Tito was, however, interested in Egypt's relations with other Arab states and the PLO. "I think that Arab unity is very important," Tito reminded his guest, adding that the most important task was to prevent further breaking up of Arab unity. Sadat responded that he was "tired of his Arab brothers" who did not help him

[974] Ambasada SFRJ Moskva Kabinetu Predsednika Republike, br. 490, April 1, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/121–74.
[975] Pred posetu predsednika Sadata – pregled depeša, Delhi br. 329, April 7, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/121–74.

enough like Iran did.[976] In a private conversation, Tito urged Sadat to mend his relations with Moscow, as Yugoslavia did after years of confrontation, offering his good offices.[977]

1977, however, signaled the complete break between Tito and Sadat. Unlike his cordial personal relationship with Nasser, Tito's relationship with Sadat became increasingly uneasy. Fragmentary sources suggest that Tito disliked Sadat and saw him as ideologically unreliable, deceitful, and untrustworthy.[978] In January 1977, Tito was scheduled to visit Libya and Egypt. Because of the riots in Egypt, however, Tito canceled his trip to Cairo. A confidential conversation between Gaddafi and Tito shows that both of them were dissatisfied with Sadat's conduct. Tito said that the riots were the result of Sadat's "wrong policies" and that his trip to Egypt would create a bad impression because ordinary Egyptians still "identified him with Nasser." "We have shown a lot of patience and understanding, but it is hard to accept that the Egyptian military used force against its own people," Tito fumed, adding that his visit to Egypt would not happen any time soon.[979] Gaddafi and Tito agreed that Sadat's internal and foreign policies shifted Egypt into the "reactionary" camp and that, under Sadat, Egypt slowly became an extended arm of American imperialism in Africa. This opinion was shared by other Arab and African officials who believed that Sadat offered to the United States to combat the Soviet

[976] Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike J.B. Tita i predsednika ARE Anvara Sadata, April 9, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/121–74.
[977] Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita sa predsednikom Arapske Republike Egipat Anvarom el Sadatom na Brionima u vili "Brionka," April 9, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/121–74.
[978] The Yugoslav embassy in Cairo began to take an anti-Sadat stance. One of more bizarre examples was its lengthy report about Sadat's alleged ties with the Nazis during World War Two and his pro-Nazi sentiments.
[979] Zabeleška o razgovoru izmedju druga Predsednika i predsednika Libije Gadafija o političkim pitanjima za vreme intimne večere 19. januara u Tripoliju, January 29, 1977, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/69 (1–2).

influence in Africa in return for Washington's support in resolving its dispute with Israel, i.e. getting back the Sinai Peninsula.[980]

The Yugoslav embassy in Cairo reported after Sadat's April trip to the United States that Israel was not among Egypt's foreign policy priorities anymore and that Cairo now focused on Libya, Ethiopia, Angola, and combating the Soviet influence in Africa. "It is indicative that together with Morocco… and with Sudan, Egypt is one of three (out of 60 Afro-Arab states) that is the loudest and the most engaged in promoting pro-American, pro-French, and pro-Saudi policies in Africa."[981] Egypt's shift to the right and association with the "conservative forces" in Africa and the Arab world impacted our bilateral relations, the embassy concluded.

Yugoslav–Egyptian relations suffered another blow in July when Egypt attacked Libya. The so-called Four Day War climaxed the tensions between two former allies. Sadat's and Gaddafi's mutual dislike was well-known. At the 1976 NAM summit, Sadat told Tito that Gaddafi was a "lunatic with a lot of money" and that somebody needed to "spank him."[982] That spanking came on July 21, with Egyptian attacks on airfields and military compounds in eastern Libya as a response to Gaddafi's "provocations."[983] The Yugoslavs were against the war because of its detrimental effect on the unity of the movement. However, as in the case of the Ogaden War, Yugoslav activism was perceived as hypocritical and their general position biased against Egypt. The Egyptian Air Force

[980] Ambasada SFRJ Kairo SSIP-u, April 13, 1977, DA MSP RS, PA 1977 Egipat, f. 12, d. 2, s. 420613.
[981] Ambasada SFRJ Kairo SSIP-u, May 7, 1977, DA MSP RS, PA 1977 Egipat, f. 12, d. 3, s. 425882.
[982] Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika Tita sa predsednikom Anvarom El Sadatom, August 15, 1976, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/26.
[983] Sadat accused Libya of incursions into the Egyptian territory but also its alleged role in the 1975 OPEC hostage crisis and Libya's connections with transnational terrorist groups.

destroyed on the ground several Yugoslav-made J21 jets of the Libyan Air Force and although Yugoslav instructors refused to participate in military operations (despite Gaddafi's request), the Egyptians grumbled about Yugoslav–Libyan collaboration. Also, the rumors spread about a Yugoslav–Soviet joint operation to resupply Libya with ordnance.[984]

However, it was Sadat's surprising trip to Jerusalem in November 1977 that convinced Belgrade that Egypt was only nominally a nonaligned state. The Yugoslav embassy in Tananarive, Madagascar, sent a disturbing report about the ambassador's conversation with his Egyptian colleague. He said that the Egyptian had ridiculed nonalignment and said that in the future Egypt would only be present at the NAM summits but without participating. The embassy reported that the Egyptian ambassador talked with scorn about the so-called progressives. "Who decides who is progressive and who isn't," he asked, adding that the Egyptians thought that the Mengistu regime was the "darkest fascist regime." If that was not enough, the Egyptian tried to provoke the ambassador asking about Djilas and the current state of civic and political liberties in Yugoslavia.[985] Sadat's trip to Jerusalem was the logical outcome of this policy, the Yugoslavs reasoned. The Foreign Secretariat in its preliminary analysis noted that the United States and Israel benefited from direct Egyptian–Israeli dialogue. Sadat's decision to talk with the Israelis was forced by his weak hand in Geneva and domestic

[984] Zabilješka iz razgovora sa Dr. M. Galeb-om, ambasadorom ARE u Beogradu 14. oktobra 1977. godine, October 15, 1977, Str. pov. br. 278, DA MSP RS, Str. Pov. 1977, f. 7, d. 278, s. 278. Gaddafi did ask for additional supplies from Yugoslavia, which the government agreed to send but these purchases were made before the war and the Soviets did not have any influence in the Yugoslav–Libyan arms deals.
[985] Yugoslav ambassador reported that his Egyptian colleague spent most of his time at diplomatic receptions with Western diplomats and he "often kisses them when they meet, which is unusual here. Here, they think that this is the demonstration of his pro-Western political orientation." Ambasada SFRJ Tananarive SSIP-u, November 1, 1977, DA MSP RS, PA 1977 Egipat, f. 12, d. 7, s. 458887.

socioeconomic problems. “It is already obvious that Sadat’s action represents a blow to Arab unity,” the Secretariat stated in its report.[986] However, the Secretariat advised caution: “We should not be dragged into inter-Arab disputes; our cooperation with Egypt, particularly economic, cultural, and military-technical, should develop normally. Political cooperation should continue as well, depending on further developments; the current phase requires that we intensify our actions” in the region. For now, the Secretariat concluded, Yugoslavia should not criticize or support Sadat’s decision.[987]

Attempts of the Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister, Boutros Ghali, to assure Belgrade of Egypt’s commitment to nonalignment (“that is the only possible option for Egypt”) were unsuccessful. Ghali wanted to know why the Yugoslavs were reserved about, what he called, Sadat’s “revolutionary step,” adding that Cairo was interested in Tito’s positive reaction. Ghali said that Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem was not a betrayal of the Arab cause and suggested that Tito should help “sell” Sadat’s move to other nonaligned. “He wanted to ‘think aloud’ in front of me,” the ambassador wrote, “because he was not authorized to suggest anything – how it would be good if President Tito could send some words of encouragement.” “That could influence others to realize the importance of Sadat’s step,” Ghali said.[988] The Yugoslavs were not persuaded. The Yugoslav ambassador was visibly reserved toward Ghali’s overtures and criticized the Egyptians for failing to inform Belgrade about Sadat’s intentions.

[986] Poseta Sadata Jerusalimu (preliminarni prikaz), November 22, 1977, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–c/90.
[987] Ibid.
[988] Razgovor ambasadora Božovića sa v.d. egipatskog MIP-a Butrosom Galijem, November 26, 1977, br. 1167, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/117–8 UAR.

Sadat's decision to go to Jerusalem caused consternation in the Arab world. The PLO chairman, Yasser Arafat, in a conversation with the Yugoslav ambassador in Beirut, condemned Sadat's trip. Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr called Sadat's action "stupid."[989] Even some Egyptian officials were dissatisfied with Sadat's decision. In what Salim Yaqub called "Cairo's version of the Saturday Day Massacre," several Egyptian officials, including Foreign Minister Fahmi, resigned in protest.[990] The long-time Egyptian ambassador in Belgrade and a proponent of Yugoslav–Egypt cooperation, Murad Ghaleb, also sent his resignation. Ghaleb told the Yugoslavs that he resigned not only because he disagreed with Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, which he did, but because he was certain that Sadat wanted to reach a separate peace agreement with Israel at the expense of the Palestinians. Ghaleb accused Sadat of capitulation and said that his policies were in the function of the American objectives to marginalize the PLO and create an axis of pro-American powers in the Middle East that would include Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt.[991] Asked about who could be behind this Sadat's policy, Ghaleb said that he was certain that the United States via Saudi Arabia worked against the Arab unity.

"Sadat is an American dog, and a dog has to listen to its master," President of Algeria, Boumédiène told Tito, apologizing for his coarse language.[992] Boumédiène said

[989] Razgovor iračkog predsednika Bakra sa novoimenovanim ambasadorom Živkom Mučalovom, March 18, 1978, br. 102, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/41–4 Irak.
[990] Salim Yaqub, *Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and U.S.–Middle East Relations in the 1970s* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), 254.
[991] Zabeleška o razgovoru PSS Miljana Komatine sa ambasadorom Egipta u ostavci, Murad Ghalebom, 2. decembra 1977. godine, December 5, 1977, Kabinet PSS Miljana Komatine, DA MSP RS, Str. pov. 1977, f. 8, d. 322, s. 322.
[992] Stenogram sa zvaničnih razgovora predsednika Socijalističke Republike Jugoslavije Josipa Broza Tita i predsednika Demokratske i Narodne Republike Alžira i predsednika Saveta revolucije Huari Bumedijena, održanih 14. i 15. januara 1978. u Igalu – Hercegnovi, Document 88, *DSPJ*, *Jugoslavija–Alžir*,334.

that Sadat's action was aimed against a pan-Arab, pan-African, and nonaligned unity and that the main task of Arab and nonaligned states was to establish a new equilibrium in the Middle East, to balance Israel. "To us, Egypt is politically dead," Boumédiène declared. Tito agreed with Boumédiène and said that he and Sadat still occasionally exchanged messages, but that Sadat never asked him for advice. "He reeks of hopelessness," Tito concluded.[993] He said that because of that he refused to meet with him in October 1977 with an excuse of illness. "I was ill, but I was never that ill that I could not see him. I knew that he was up to something, but I didn't want to be involved. If he had met with me and then went to Israel, I would be stained like I did something. I did not want to fall into that trap," Tito said.[994]

The signing of the Camp David Accords in September 1978 confirmed that, as far as Tito and some other nonaligned leaders were concerned, Egypt was "politically dead" to them. Egypt asked Belgrade, as the host of the NAM ministerial conference, to distribute Cairo's official statement on the accords but the Yugoslavs politely declined, saying that their mandate expired with the end of the Belgrade meeting. The Yugoslavs also criticized the agreement because it excluded the PLO and it did not take into account the interests of other Arab states.[995]

Under the circumstances of the Yugoslav–Egyptian split and the Cuban challenge, Tito's trip to the Middle East had particular importance.[996] If Yugoslavia could not count

[993] Ibid., 342.
[994] Ibid., 343. Yugoslav documents does not suggest that Tito or anyone else in the Yugoslav government was informed about or knew of Sadat's trip to Jerusalem.
[995] Zabeleška o razgovoru podsekretara B. Lončara sa G. Mansurom, ambasadorom ARE u Beogradu, 2. X 1978. g., October 3, 1978, SSIP – Kabinet podsekretara, br. 453568, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/117–8 UAR.
[996] The Middle East is "one of the most important regions in the world… [with] its geo-strategic and political significance, enormous sources of energy, growing financial power and the attractiveness of its markets." Informacija sa 27. sednice Saveznog društvenog saveta za međunarodne odnose, održane 28. i

on Egypt in the NAM, it had to find new allies and revive old connections. Tito's visits to Jordan and Kuwait accomplished the former while his trip to Iraq and Syria did the latter. These states showed "determined orientation" toward nonalignment and it was necessary to mobilize them for the Havana summit. Already in December 1978, the Yugoslav chief policeman, Franjo Hreljević, went to Iraq to discuss security and intelligence cooperation with the Iraqis. His Iraqi counterpart, Sadun Shakir, told him that in the past Baghdad did not entirely comprehend the importance of the NAM. However, Shakir said, Iraq was actively preparing for Havana and promised Baghdad's support to Yugoslavia's positions.[997] Iraq's enthusiasm for the summit and unconditional support for Yugoslavia that Shakir promised to Hreljević was motivated not so much by ideological closeness (although both Baghdad and Belgrade disliked Castro) but rather with Iraq's desire to host the 1983 summit.[998]

It appeared that the Cubans had been spreading rumors about Yugoslavia's alleged opposition to Baghdad's hosting of the summit to undermine the Yugo–Iraqi relationship. Tito told Vice President of the Revolutionary Council, Saddam Hussein that these "intrigues" were false. "That's a big lie, I would even like it to be here this year," Tito assured his host.[999] During his conversations with Iraqi officials, Tito often emphasized the need for unity and complained that "certain states" were trying to divide

29. februara 1980. godine, March 26, 1980, Str. pov. br. 1/13, Savezni društveni savet za medjunarodne odnose, AS, fond 1271, k. 6.

[997] Informacija o poseti Franje Hreljevića, saveznog sekretara za unutrašnje poslove i člana Saveznog izvršnog veća Republici Iraku od 20. do 24. decembra 1978. godine, January 17, 1979, str. pov. 9/1, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/74–2.

[998] To cajole his hosts, Tito said that, "if life allows," he would like to participate in the 1983 Baghdad conference.

[999] Stenografske beleške sa razgovora Predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita i Sadam Husein-a, potpredsednika Saveta revolucionarne komande Iraka, održanih 6. februara 1979. godine u 10,20 casova u Bagdadu – Irak, February 6, 1979, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/74–2.

the movement. Thus, the Yugoslav president advised his hosts, the nonaligned states should be well prepared for the summit. "That is how they [nonaligned] will able to achieve success regardless of where the conference will be held, in Havana or not."[1000] Tito was obviously satisfied with his talks and he told Yugoslav workers who came to see him that he believed that Iraqis would work with Yugoslavia to strengthen the movement.

On February 10, as Tito wrapped up his lobbying efforts in the Middle East, Edvard Kardelj died. One of Tito's closest aides (despite occasional frictions in their relationship), the chief architect of self-management, and the father of the 1974 Constitution, Kardelj's death was a personal loss for Tito and a big blow to Yugoslavia's domestic and foreign policies. However, Kardelj's passing provided Tito with an opportunity to assess Yugoslavia's position in world affairs and as his "funeral diplomacy" showed, it was not so good.

Kardelj's death and funeral Diplomacy

Tito learned about Kardelj's death while he was in Syria. The rumors about Kardelj's death started circulating several days earlier. Allegedly, the Yugoslav government did not want to announce Kardelj's death so Tito would not have to interrupt his Middle Eastern tour.[1001] Unlike Bijedić's tragic end two years earlier, the death of

[1000] Zabeleška o razgovoru koji je drug Predsednik vodio sa potpredsednikom Republike Iraka Tah Mohiedin Maaruf-om 6. februara 1979. godine u njegovoj Rezidenciji u Bagdadu, February 27, 1979, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/74–2.

[1001] Sources from the Belgrade journalist circles believed that Kardelj had died three days before the official announcement. On February 8, a Yugoslav correspondent in Moscow informed ambassador Orlandic that, according to his sources, Kardelj had passed away a day before. See Orlandić, *U predvečerje sloma*, 72. Eagleburger reported that his sources confirmed Kardelj's death on February 7 but it was not announced because Tito wanted to complete his trip to the Middle East. Eagleburger stated that confusion about Kardelj's death meant little but the "uncertainty surrounding Kardelj's passing could be duplicated (in spades) when Tito main event occurs." "Observers of Yugoslav crisis-management should take note," Eagleburger warned. Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 01966, March 15, 1979,

Kardelj, even if expected, came at a particularly sensitive moment for Yugoslavia. Soviet–Yugoslav relations were at their lowest level since 1971, Cuba's influence in the NAM was growing at Yugoslavia's expense, and the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia was a bad omen for Yugoslavia because it offered a blueprint for a Soviet–Bulgarian intervention one day. Besides, Kardelj was one of Tito's most trusted associates, the only one of the big three Tito's lieutenants – Djilas, Ranković, Kardelj – who managed to avoid political death and to profoundly influence Yugoslavia's domestic and foreign policies. Foreign observers saw him as Tito's heir apparent or at least as the person who would provide a "legitimate and safe focus for a post-Tito collective leadership."[1002] A U.S. diplomat in Bucharest confided in his Yugoslav colleague that Kardelj's death was a "huge loss because there were no other persons with that kind of authority who could serve as an arbiter in the collective leadership."[1003] Although Kardelj's involvement in day-to-day foreign policy-making was limited because of his focus on domestic reforms, he was seen as the man of Tito's greatest confidence and participated in several important diplomatic missions to Moscow and Washington. His premature death (Kardelj was 18 years younger than Tito) complicated the issue of Tito's orderly succession and thus Yugoslavia's stability and future foreign policy orientation.

Kardelj's death and funeral clearly displayed Yugoslavia's foreign policy priorities. The Kremlin's muted response to the news of Kardelj's passing testified to poor Yugoslav–Soviet relations. Besides, many in Moscow disliked Kardelj because of

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1979BELGRA01966, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed November 15, 2019).

[1002] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 0030, January 3, 1979, 1979BELGRA00030, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed November 15, 2019).

[1003] Ambasada SFRJ Bukurešt SSIP-u, February 21, 1979, DA MSP RS, PA 1979 SAD, f. 122, d. s. 410009

his association with the 1948 split and Yugoslavia's subsequent separate road to socialism. On February 11, *Pravda* published a one-sentence report that the member of the SFRY Presidium and LCY CC had passed away. Two days later, the Soviet Central Committee and the Presidium of the Republic sent brief condolences to the Yugoslav government and party. Yugoslav ambassador Orlandić noted that only after three days, a delegation of mid-ranking Soviet officials showed up at the embassy to sign the book of condolence. "In their behavior, one could sense the strictly official and unusually cold atmosphere," ambassador Orlandić wrote, noting that Moscow's reaction to Kardelj's death was one of "indifference, if not even malevolence."[1004] Fittingly to this Soviet attitude, the Kremlin did not even send anyone to attend the funeral in Ljubljana.[1005]

In contrast with this ostentatious Soviet display of displeasure toward Yugoslavia and Kardelj personally, the United States saw in Kardelj's death an opportunity to bring Yugoslavia closer. As some U.S. officials noted, since Kardelj's death, the Yugoslavs "have been increasingly jumpy about the Soviet Union."[1006] To assuage Belgrade's fears, the United States engaged in both public and secret diplomacy. Jimmy Carter sent Tito a telegram expressing his condolences for the loss of a "great innovative social and

[1004] Orlandić, *U predvečerje sloma*, 74, 73.
[1005] A dark joke circulated around Yugoslavia captured well this general uneasiness with the Soviet intentions. According to this joke, when a Soviet official was asked why Moscow had sent no one to the funeral, he responded: "Don't worry, when Tito dies we will all come."
[1006] Memo, Robert Hunter to Zbigniew Brzezinski, March 30, 1979, NSA Brzezinski Materials – Country Files Yugoslavia, "Yugoslavia 1–12/79," box 86, JCPL. In his memo, Hunter referred to Mihajlo Mihajlov's request to meet with Brzezinski. He stated that Mihajlov's request was untimely because of Yugoslavia's heightened sensitivity after Kardelj's death. One day after Kardelj's death, the Soviets informed Belgrade that, despite their earlier promise, they would not provide coal that was crucial for Yugoslavia's steel industry. This decision was interpreted as another example of the Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia. See Beleska o razgovoru Gojka Ubiparipa, potpredsednika SIV-a i predsednika jugoslovenskog dela Međuvladinog jugoslovensko–sovjetskog komiteta za ekonomsku i naučno-tehničku saradnju, sa M. Vinogradovim, ministrom-savetnikom Ambasade SSSR u SFRJ, February 14, 1979, br. 100/79, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–31 SSSR.

political thinker and a proud advocate of Yugoslavia's independence."[1007] Mondale, Vance, and Harriman also sent letters that were read on Yugoslav television and reprinted in the press. Moreover, Carter named Harriman as his special representative to the Kardelj funeral. A Yugoslav diplomat commended Carter's message and the "extremely favorable" Yugoslav reaction to selecting Harriman and a "good delegation" to attend the funeral.[1008] In addition to this public display of solidarity in mourning that served to assuage Yugoslavia's nerves, the goal of Harriman's mission to Yugoslavia was to exchange opinions with Tito on various global issues, including the situation in the Middle East and Iran, the conflict in South East Asia, nonalignment, but also on Yugoslav–Soviet and Yugoslav–U.S. relations.

"Tito was clearly jarred by the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia with obvious Soviet support," Harriman later reported. He said that Tito was "seriously concerned" with poor Yugoslav–Soviet relations that turned for the worse after the Vietnamese intervention. However, U.S. efforts to encourage Yugoslavia to initiate an international conference that would deal with the Kampuchean crisis went nowhere because Tito advised "caution."[1009] Harriman noted that the Yugoslavs were determined to defend the movement from Soviet and Cuban influence.

[1007] Secretary of State to Embassy Belgrade, Telegram 035727, February 10, 1979, 1979STATE035727, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed November 15, 2019).

[1008] Other members of the delegation included ambassador Eagleburger, Senator Joe Biden, and Pamela Harriman. Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 1033, February 12, 1979, AHP, box 599, f. 1, LOC.

[1009] On January 24, Eagleburger met with Secretary Vrhovec to express Washington's concern about the situation in South East Asia. He said that he wanted to "encourage Yugoslavia and nonaligned states" to bring up the issue in the UN. On February 8, Eagleburger talked to Vrhovec's deputy, Milorad Pešić. Eagleburger said that Yugoslavia, because of its authority in the nonaligned world, should lead the efforts to resolve the conflict in South East Asia. The United States suggested an international conference that would include Vietnam, Kampuchea, and other powers interested in peaceful resolution of the crisis.

Tito told Harriman that he went to the Middle East to discuss the situation in the region, bilateral issues, and the NAM. The principal issue, however, was to talk about the NAM and prevent splits within it, Tito said, adding that his talks were "good." "I am the only one left, I am alone, and it is up to me to struggle alone to preserve the original concepts of nonalignment," Tito said, adding that the "large majority" of nonaligned states supported him.[1010] Tito told Harriman that he did not know whether the Havana summit would be successful, but that the Yugoslavs would work to "assure the proper outcome."[1011] Harriman was satisfied with Tito's assurances and said that Carter would be also happy to hear about Yugoslavia's commitment to "true nonalignment" and Tito's efforts to strengthen moderation at the summit. Tito said that the majority of the nonaligned states opposed Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea. The invasion further eroded Yugoslav–Soviet relations and the Soviet "ignored my recent trip to the Middle East," Tito complained. "They know that we do not agree with the policy toward the non-aligned, which they are conducting through Cuba."[1012]

Harriman also wanted to know about Tito's recent trip to the Middle East. Although Yugoslavia and the United States differed on almost every issue, Harriman found Tito's observations useful. Tito informed him that the situation in the Middle East was "satisfactory" – at least from the Yugoslav point of view. Yugoslav president said that the Arabs were still united against Israel, but believed the Camp David Accords

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Zabeleška o razgovoru saveznog sekretara druga J. Vrhovca sa ambasadorom SAD L. Eagleburgerom 24. januara 1979. Prisustvovao je i T. Dunlop, politicki savjetnik Ambasade SAD, January 24, 1979, SSIP, Kabinet SS, pov. br. 42145, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–24 and Iz zabeleške o razgovoru zamenika saveznog sekretara za inostrane poslove Milorada Pešića, sa ambasadorom SAD Lorensom Iglbergerom, 8. februara 1979. February 12, 1979, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–24.

[1010] Embassy Belgrade to Secretary of State, Telegram 01152, February 15, 1979, AHP, box 599, f. 1.

[1011] Ibid.

[1012] Embassy Belgrade to Secretary of State, Telegram 01153, February 15, 1979, AHP, box 599, f. 1.

provided only a "temporary solution" to the Middle Eastern problems. "Time does not work for Israel," Tito told Harriman, warning him about the prospects of Iraqi–Syrian unification. "With [Arab] unification, Iraq will be – unlike in the past – a direct participant in the war against Israel," Tito said.[1013] Harriman urged Tito to support the Accords, but the Yugoslav remained unconvinced. In fact, Tito suggested that the separate peace process was bad for the region and that the United States should seek a comprehensive solution instead. There is "great distrust of Israel," Secretary Vrhovec added.[1014]

Yugoslav–U.S. disagreement over the Middle East was not new and despite the differences on the issue of the settlement, the Tito–Harriman talks confirmed that the Yugoslavs were unnerved by the Soviet actions but also determined to defend their interests. Besides, Tito's determination to fight Castro's influence in the NAM greatly pleased the Carter administration.

Tito's last trip to Moscow

Harriman reported that Tito "deeply resented the fact" that Moscow largely ignored Kardelj's death. Personal grievances aside, Tito knew that if his experiment was to survive him he had to normalize Yugoslavia–Soviet relations. In the context of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia (and the possibility that the Bulgarians would replicate it in the Balkans), Tito wanted the Kremlin to reaffirm its guarantees of Yugoslavia's independence as it did in 1955 and 1971. Already in the second half of 1978, when

[1013] Ibid.
[1014] Ibid.

Belgrade was dealing with the fallout of the Guofeng visit, Tito told his associates that his trip to the USSR would be necessary to "clear the air."

In April, Tito sent his trusted adviser Minić to Moscow to test the waters before the Tito–Brezhnev summit. Orlandić wrote that Soviet–Yugoslav relations were "in the process of deterioration" and that Minić's visit to Moscow would ensure the success of the Tito–Brezhnev summit.[1015] Besides, because of Brezhnev's poor health, Belgrade feared that his meeting with Tito would be delayed. Minić's visit thus served to "clarify" Yugoslavia's positions and ease the tensions in case Tito's visit was postponed or canceled. The Soviets were reluctant to agree to Minić's mission because they did not understand its purpose.[1016] Yet, the Kremlin finally agreed to invite Minić and delegated its foreign minister and a Politburo member, Gromyko, to talk to him, making it uncertain until the last moment whether or not it would be a party or a government meeting.

During the six-hour-long conversation over two days – the transcript of their talks is 69-page long – Gromyko and Minić often reminded each other why Soviet-Yugoslav relations were in such a poor state. Minić said that the LCY and the Yugoslav government favored normalization of Yugoslav–Soviet relations but that since 1978 these relations were burdened with a number of issues. He mentioned alleged Soviet support to Bulgaria's territorial aspirations toward Macedonia, Soviet criticism of Yugoslavia's policy toward China, and an anti-Yugoslav "campaign" in the Soviet media. "We in the

[1015] Orlandić, *U predvečerje sloma*, 97.
[1016] Orlandić wrote that even some in the LCY CC did not see the purpose of Minić's trip to the USSR, but that Tito personally insisted on it.

leadership thought that it would not be good if these problems continue to accumulate," Minić told Gromyko.[1017]

Gromyko said that Yugoslavia and the USSR agreed on many international issues, but that two "delicate" issues dominated their relations. First was the issue of the Yugoslav press and publishing and their alleged anti-Soviet bias. Second was the Sino-Yugoslav relationship in the context of the Vietnamese-Kampuchean conflict. Gromyko accused the Yugoslavs of allowing anti-Soviet propaganda and brought up the problem with Mićunović's book that had gained a lot of publicity in the West. As for Sino–Yugoslav relations, Gromyko said the Soviet reaction to Guofeng's visit to Yugoslavia was expected. "You ought to know how the Soviet Union would react to that visit," Gromyko said.[1018] Moreover, he accused Yugoslavia of downplaying the danger of Chinese intervention in South East Asia. "We are disappointed that you put Vietnam and China in the same pile," Gromyko noted, adding, "if anyone was interfering in Kampuchea's internal affairs, it was China."[1019] According to Gromyko, the Vietnamese intervention was necessary to topple the "fascist" regime of Pol Pot that China was supporting.

Gromyko's remarks about the situation in Kampuchea showed to Minić that the Soviets did not abandon the concept of unjustified and justified interventions, i.e. those that could be characterized as "aggression" (China) and those that could be qualified as a fulfillment of internationalist duty (Vietnam). "Our talks confirmed the correctness of our

[1017] Zabeleška o razgovorima između člana Predsedništva CK SKJ Miloša Minića i člana Politbiroa CK KPSS i Ministra inostranih poslova SSSR Andreja Gromika koji su vođeni u Moskvi 24. i 25. aprila, April 24, 1979, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/75.
[1018] Ibid.
[1019] Ibid.

assessment of Soviet global foreign policy and the dangers of that policy for other socialist states, therefore we should not consider the case of Czechoslovakia in 1968 or the case of the Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea… as some sort of an exception," Minić reported to the LCY CC Presidium.[1020] We should not expect any changes in this Soviet policy in the foreseeable future, Minić warned, adding that a permanent feature of Soviet policy was the expansion of its sphere of influence through military interventions and interference in the internal affairs of other states.

Minić's report to the Presidium showed that some of the differences in Yugoslav–Soviet policies were irreconcilable. Minić underscored several points of departure: Soviet denial that they were behind Bulgaria's attack on Yugoslavia, Soviet hostility toward the Yugoslav concept on nonalignment, Soviet efforts to change Yugoslavia's policy toward China, and Soviet attempts to control Yugoslav media and publishing. Although Minić characterized his marathon talks with Gromyko as "open, constructive, very substantial, and conducted in a good and constructive atmosphere," and stressed the need for improvement in Yugoslav–Soviet relations, the main conclusion was that Moscow would not abandon its foreign policy objectives toward Yugoslavia or its "great power behavior." The Secretary of the Presidium, Dolanc, commented that after reading the transcript of the Minić–Gromyko talks, he thought that Gromyko's accusations were the "most cynical" thing that he ever read in his life. "That kind of cynicism we rarely see in international relations," Dolanc fumed.[1021]

[1020] Stenografske beleske 25. Sednice Predsednistva Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, May 8, 1979, AJ, A CKSKJ fond 507, III/246.
[1021] Ibid.

Despite these evident disagreements, the Yugoslavs considered the Minić mission to be a success. First, it reestablished the practice of high-level contacts that was interrupted in 1978 and prepared Tito's visit in May. Second, it helped temporarily ease the tensions in Yugoslav–Soviet relations because attacks on Yugoslavia in the Soviet media abated after the visit.[1022] Third, the ever stubborn Minić showed to the Soviets that Yugoslavia would not change its policies regardless of their external pressure. Finally, the Minić visit assuaged domestic fears about the future of Yugoslav–Soviet relations and possible Soviet interference in Yugoslavia's domestic affairs.[1023]

Tito's trip to the USSR from May 16–21, 1979 rehearsed main points from the Minić–Gromyko talks. Tito's talks with Brezhnev, however, were important in the sense that Tito believed, without a sliver of self-awareness, that Brezhnev was old and ill, and that it was important to establish the principles in Yugoslav–Soviet relations before he was replaced with someone less flexible toward Yugoslavia and less sympathetic toward Tito, such as Suslov. Besides, the Yugoslavs were certain that frequent high-level visits would "keep the Soviets realistic" in their policy toward Yugoslavia.

Belgrade hoped that the Minić–Gromyko talks would clear the air and allow Tito and Brezhnev to talk about less contentious issues and international problems on which both sides generally agreed, such as the Middle East. Yet, the two-day talks between Tito

[1022] Some observers noted that the Soviets continued their "campaign" against Yugoslavia indirectly. They cited the Soviet decision, just days after Minić's visit, to award a medal to a Bulgarian communist known for her anti-Yugoslav views. Also, one of the most trusted Soviet allies, Czechoslovakia, increased its negative coverage of Yugoslavia's affairs.

[1023] The Presidium of the LCY CC pondered about sending a memo to all regional and municipal organizations of the LCY in which they would explain the purpose and the outcome of Minić's trip because there was some confusion and great interest in Yugoslav–Soviet relations among LCY members. Moreover, this memo would prepare members for Tito's trip to the USSR because his trip "would be a surprise to our member because they do not know what is going on." Stenografske beleške 25. Sednice Predsedništva Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, May 8, 1979, AJ, A CKSKJ fond 507, III/246.

and Brezhnev showed that both sides were not ready yet for compromises. Both Brezhnev and Tito listed familiar grievances, but neither of them wanted to make concessions. Brezhnev told Tito that despite Soviets' best efforts to be friendly toward Yugoslavia "there is an occasional fever in our relations." It was clear whom to blame for these bouts of fever. "Openly speaking about the things that worry us I want to say that more than anything else, we are worried about the existence of the influential Yugoslav circles that have a critical and a malevolent attitude toward Soviet internal and foreign policies."[1024] Brezhnev blamed the West for spreading false rumors about alleged Soviet plans to intervene in Yugoslavia, but also the Yugoslavs who seriously discussed these "fantasies." "Comrade Tito, you know that there is no Soviet threat to Yugoslavia," Brezhnev said, adding that he, as the supreme commander, was not aware that Yugoslavia was in any of the Soviet war plans. "Yugoslavia is not treated as an enemy, nor do we plan to use Yugoslavia's territory [for military operations]," Brezhnev assured Tito.

However, Brezhnev criticized the Sino–Yugoslav rapprochement and Yugoslavia's support for, what he called, Beijing's "adventurist and militarist" policies. Brezhnev accused China of creating an international anti-Soviet front whose purpose was to sow disunity among socialist states and to turn nonaligned states against the Soviet Union, referring to China's "pretentious and provocative" policies toward Vietnam. As if he was reminded of something, Brezhnev continued with the criticism of Yugoslavia's nonalignment policy. "In Yugoslavia, there are claims that we exert pressure on the

[1024] Stenografske beleške sa razgovora predsednika Republike i predsednika Saveza komunista Jugoslavije Josipa Broza Tita sa Generalnim sekretarom CK KPSS i predsednika Prezidijuma Vrhovnog Sovjeta SSSR Leonida Iljiča Brežnjeva odrzanih 17. i 18. maja u Kremlju, May 17, 1979, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/75.

independence of the nonaligned movement, that we divide nonaligned states on the basis of those that are progressive and those that are reactionary," Brezhnev said. The truth was, he continued, that those differences already existed ("life created them") and that the USSR would support the NAM as long as it remained oriented against imperialism. Yet, he said that Moscow was concerned with some attempts to exclude Cuba and Vietnam from the NAM. "In the West, they believe that that is Yugoslavia's policy and its idea and its plan," Brezhnev coyly remarked, encouraging Tito, as the founder of the movement, to prevent those "intrigues"[1025]

By accusing "certain influential circles" in the Yugoslav leadership, the Soviets aimed at sowing discord in the ranks of the Yugoslav party and government. The criticism of Sino–Yugoslav rapprochement served to change or reverse Yugoslavia's policy toward China. Finally, the Soviet goal was to pressure Yugoslavia to join the ranks of the so-called progressives in the NAM so that Moscow could establish absolute control over the movement.

The Yugoslavs understood these Soviet attempts as an element of larger Moscow's global policy. "It was obvious that the Soviet leadership sees everything through their interests as a big power. We should not have illusions there and that's why we, by conducting nonaligned policy, are going to be in a permanent conflict with them," a Yugoslav report stated.[1026] In response, Tito and other Yugoslav officials showed remarkable defiance. Although the Yugoslavs internally agreed to put some restraints on the media to avoid further provoking the Soviets, Tito and Dolanc sharply criticized

[1025] Ibid.
[1026] Kratko saopštenje o rezultatima posete J. B. Tita SSSR-u, May 22, 1979, Document 101, *DSPJ, Jugoslavija–SSSR*, 870.

Soviet positions toward Yugoslavia, China, and nonalignment. Tito accused Moscow of conducting a campaign against Yugoslavia, citing false information that was spread by the Soviet press about the alleged Sino–Yugoslav military cooperation. Moreover, Tito said that the Soviets "unobjectively" [*neobjektivno*] treated Yugoslav–Bulgarian relations, taking the "one-sided" approach, i.e. tolerating and even encouraging Bulgarian territorial claims against Yugoslavia. All of this, Tito concluded, caused many ordinary Yugoslavs to question Soviet intentions. Responding to the Soviet criticism of Yugoslavia's "non-class approach" to nonalignment, Tito said that Yugoslavia would always advocate the original principles of nonalignment as these were established in 1961 in Belgrade. "There is no need to come up with some new principles… it is strange when Castro says: We Cubans are fighting against imperialism. And we have been fighting against it from the beginning," Tito said.[1027] Yugoslav defiance and counter-accusations led to Brezhnev's occasional outbursts of anger. As Tito later noted: "I openly talked about our positions… they were angry, but couldn't do anything because they didn't have counterarguments. They can't have counterarguments," Tito reported to the LCY and SFRY Presidiums.[1028]

Tito was generally satisfied with the meeting, yet remained skeptical about the long-term improvement of Yugoslav–Soviet relations. "We accomplished [with this visit] that, despite differences, our relations will be calm for some time," Tito said and continued: "But I can't guarantee for how long." However, Yugoslav interest was, Tito

[1027] Stenografske beleške sa razgovora predsednika Republike i predsednika Saveza komunista Jugoslavije Josipa Broza Tita sa Generalnim sekretarom CK KPSS i predsednika Prezidijuma Vrhovnog Sovjeta SSSR Leonida Iljiča Brežnjeva održanih 17. i 18. maja u Kremlju – Drugi dan razgovora, May 18, 1979, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–2/75.
[1028] Magnetofonske beleške sa zajedničke sjednice Predsjedništva SFRJ i Predsjedništva CKSKJ (28. Sjednice Predjsedništva CKSKJ), May 22, 1979, A CKSKJ fond 507, III/249.

reminded his associates, to normalize its relations with the USSR. Tito emphasized the importance of Yugoslav–Soviet dialogue while Brezhnev was still in power because other members of the leadership were not sympathetic toward Yugoslavia.[1029] Finally, Tito warned that the Yugoslav press should tone down its anti-Soviet rhetoric because it was counterproductive for Yugoslav foreign policy objectives.[1030]

Washington's assessment of the visit agreed with Tito's main points. Eagleburger reported that Belgrade had "minimum expectations" and accomplished "minimum satisfaction." Although it improved the atmosphere in Yugoslav–Soviet relations, it did not substantially resolve any of the problems. Besides, Eagleburger mused, one could say that Tito's trip to Moscow was a failure because the final document did not invoke the "sacred" documents – the 1955, 1956, 1971 declarations – that affirmed Soviet commitment to Yugoslavia's independence.[1031] The U.S. embassy in Moscow reported that the Yugoslavs tried to control the damage and disseminated claims that Yugoslav–Soviet relations were in a "mature phase" thus not requiring additional declarations.

Washington's fight for influence

[1029] Yugoslav sources suggest that Tito had a soft spot for Brezhnev. He found him more tolerant and flexible than other Soviet leaders and believed that Brezhnev acted as a moderating force in the Politburo, especially when it came to Soviet policies toward Yugoslavia. Reports about Brezhnev's health raised the problem of his succession and Tito and other Yugoslav officials believed that possible successors were unfriendly toward Yugoslavia. During his meeting with Brezhnev in May, Tito and Dolanc noted that Brezhnev was often not alert, unable to speak, confused, and, apparently, uninformed about many issues. They concluded that Yugoslav–Soviet problems were partially due to malevolent influence of the people around Brezhnev, such as Suslov, who fed him with false information.
[1030] Magnetofonske beleške sa zajedničke sjednice Predsjedništva SFRJ i Predsjedništva CKSKJ (28. Sjednice Predjsedništva CKSKJ), May 22, 1979, A CKSKJ fond 507, III/249.
[1031] Embassy Washington to Department of State, Telegram 03889, May 25, 1979, 1979BELGRA03889, Central Foreign Policy Files 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed November 21, 2019).

Tito's inability to improve relations with the USSR provided an opportunity for Washington to further enhance its position in Yugoslavia. Besides Yugoslav failure to reconcile with Moscow, one unexpected event out of control of either Belgrade, Moscow, or Washington, provided an opening for the United States to expand its influence in Yugoslavia. In the early hours on April 15, a strong earthquake shook the Montenegrin part of the Adriatic Coast. Seismological stations recorded the strength of the earthquake as 7 on the Richter scale, slightly higher than the 1963 Skopje earthquake. The earthquake left devastation in its wake – the ancient cities of Kotor, Bar, and Ulcinj were completely ruined. Private houses, schools, hospitals, hotels, and the port of Bar were leveled to the ground or pushed into the sea. Telephone lines, water, and power supplies were interrupted, and roads and the main railroad line were severely damaged. The earthquake killed 110 people (ten times less than the Skopje earthquake) and left several thousand Montenegrins without their home. The fact that the earthquake happened on Sunday prevented even a larger tragedy. Also, Tito, who was recuperating in the Igalo medical facility on the Adriatic Coast, left Montenegro just days before the hit.

The devastating effects of the earthquake brought about the problems of immediate relief. Montenegro was the smallest and the poorest Yugoslav republic with problematic infrastructure even before the earthquake. Interrupted air and ground transport made relief efforts extremely difficult. However, the larger problem was the earthquake's long-term effect on the whole country. Tito immediately called other Yugoslav republics to show solidarity with Montenegro and assist the victims of the earthquake. "Solidarity that we show whenever some part [of Yugoslavia], region, or republics is hit with some calamity makes our community stronger," Tito stated in his

appeal to the Yugoslav citizens. The Yugoslavs heeded Tito's call and money, foodstuffs, construction equipment, and blood plasma soon poured into Montenegro from all corners of Yugoslavia.

This support had two aims: to speed up the recovery and to demonstrate the unity of the Yugoslav people. Similar to the Skopje earthquake 16 years earlier, the 1979 Montenegro earthquake led to the demonstration of international solidarity. Ambassador Orlandić recalled that the Soviet government sent various construction materials whose value was around 50 million U.S. dollars.[1032] The International Committee of the Red Cross sent rescue teams and various national Red Cross organizations offered their aid as well. However, aid to Montenegro became an important issue in U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia.

For ambassador Eagleburger, the Montenegro earthquake was a kind of déjà vu experience. When the earthquake shook Skopje in 1963, Eagleburger worked in the economic section of the U.S. embassy in Belgrade. Eagleburger urged his superiors in Washington to send aid to Yugoslavia and soon thereafter, he was assigned as a liaison to a medical military unit that the U.S Army had sent from West Germany. As Eagleburger's colleague later recalled, he performed his job in Skopje "brilliantly." "The work was done fast, with less than the normal friction, and we ended up looking pretty

[1032] Orlandić, *U predvečerje sloma*, 115. Yugoslav sources do not confirm this high amount. The U.S. estimates were, however, much lower. According to a U.S. report, Soviet aid was close to U.S. $19 million, followed by West German aid of U.S. $1, 5 million, and Washington's of U.S. $1, 2 million dollars. For U.S. estimates see Emergency Earthquake Relief for Yugoslavia, no date, NSA Brzezinski Material Country Files, "Yugoslavia 1–12/79," box 86, JCPL. Moreover, a Yugoslav official complained that the Soviets were the last ones to send their aid and without firm guarantees when this aid would be delivered. See Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 03159, April 27, 1979, 1979BELGRA03159, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed November 26, 2019).

good."[1033] His engagement in the Skopje relief efforts earned him the moniker "Lawrence of Macedonia."

As he did in 1963, Eagleburger pressed the State Department to send aid to the ravaged Yugoslav republic. Already on April 16, he took U.S. $25, 000 from the embassy's emergency fund and gave it to the Yugoslavs. Moreover, the United States prepared over 1,500 tents, 650 cots, and 20,000 blankets to airlift to Montenegro.[1034] Eagleburger went to Titograd (today Podgorica) to help unload the material. As one U.S. diplomat recalled: "The head of the foreign relations department is standing there with his hands in his pocket, watching, and Eagleburger has his sleeves rolled up, and is offloading boxes… the Montenegrins loved him."[1035] He also wanted to establish an earthquake relief fund under the U.S. embassy management that would collect and distribute aid from the U.S. and European private companies.[1036] Although Eagleburger's public diplomacy won the hearts of the Yugoslav citizens, the ambassador knew that U.S. reluctance to give substantial aid would diminish the effects of his public diplomacy. However, the State Department was unwilling to commit any additional resources. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) proposed legislation that would provide U.S. $20 million in aid to Yugoslavia, but because this proposal did not have the administration's support, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did not approve it. To the dismay of

[1033] Horace Torbert and Robert G Cleveland, *Interview with Robert G. Cleveland*, June 8, 1990, Frontline Diplomacy, LOC. Available at https://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000211/ (accessed November 25, 2019).
[1034] Situation Report, Department of State Agency for International Development, April 18, 1979, NSA Brzezinski Material Country Files, "Yugoslavia 1–12/79," box 86, JCPL.
[1035] Charles Stuart Kennedy and Robert E McCarthy, *Interview with Robert E. McCarthy*, February 4, 2003, Frontline Diplomacy, LOC. Available at https://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib001403/. (accessed November 25, 2019).
[1036] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 03197, April 28, 1979, 1979BELGRA03197, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed November 27, 2019).

some State Department officials, Secretary Vance was against the proposed aid "on budgetary grounds." The National Security Council urged the State Department to support the program "in the view of genuine humanitarian purposes – plus the importance of the Yugoslav relationship" because "the Yugoslavs will never understand why we refused to support it."[1037] The moment was particularly sensitive because of Tito's upcoming trip to Moscow. Moreover, as Eagleburger reported from Belgrade, Yugoslav public expectations "have been aroused through Senator Kennedy's proposal."[1038]

Vance's reluctance to support Kennedy's legislation greatly frustrated Eagleburger. Yugoslav pleas for help remained unanswered and Eagleburger was afraid that the silence in Washington over the 20 million U.S. dollars would destroy two years of his efforts to "build a sense of confidence and trust in the US so that when the inevitable crisis occurs we will not be considered irrelevant or impotent." "A decision to provide no assistance – or continued silence in the face of the Yugoslav appeal – will go a long way to undercut the psychological progress that we have made," Eagleburger warned his superiors.[1039] Moreover, the issue of aid threatened to embarrass the administration but also Mrs. Mondale, who was scheduled to tour Montenegro in mid-June. As Jim Rentschler from the NSC suggested, Mrs. Mondale's visit should serve as a "politically effective focal point for assuring the Yugoslavs," but that her mission would fail if she showed up empty-handed.[1040]

[1037] Memo, Robert Hunter and Jim Rentschler to Zbigniew Brzezinski, May 8, 1979, NSA Brzezinski Material Country Files, "Yugoslavia 1–12/79," box 86, JCPL.
[1038] Memo, Jim Rentschler to Zbigniew Brzezinski, May 30, 1979, NSA Brzezinski Material Country Files, "Yugoslavia 1–12/79," box 86, JCPL.
[1039] Embassy Belgrade to Secretary of State, Telegram 4053, June 1, 1979, NSA Brzezinski Material Country Files, "Yugoslavia 1–12/79," box 86, JCPL.
[1040] Memo, Jim Rentschler to Zbigniew Brzezinski, May 30, 1979, NSA Brzezinski Material Country Files, "Yugoslavia 1–12/79," box 86, JCPL.

The issue of U.S. aid to Yugoslavia as Eagleburger, Rentschler, and other noted was directly tied to the problem of Yugoslavia's long-term stability and independence. In late 1978, the Yugoslav economy began showing worrying signs. In 1979, the already high inflation rate has increased to 30 percent annually. Moreover, the Yugoslav foreign trade deficit soared and oil shortages led to unpopular restrictions (one reason for Tito's February trip to the Middle East was to provide cheap oil from Iraq and Kuwait). The earthquake in Montenegro made a bad situation worse because Yugoslavia could not expect the influx of hard currency from foreign tourists. Moreover, the recovery efforts put additional strain on the country's budget and directly undermined the government's efforts to restrain foreign borrowing. Under these circumstances, foreign aid was essential for easing domestic economic tension. Three days after the earthquake, Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Secretary Pešić met with Eagleburger and pleaded for U.S. long-term support for Montenegrin recovery, i.e. Washington's assistance in rebuilding the basic infrastructure and restoring cultural and historical monuments. Pešić also noted that the U.S. demonstration of goodwill would create a "positive atmosphere" and motivate other countries to participate in the recovery effort.[1041] Eagleburger later wrote that the meeting with Pešić "had come as close to begging for help as a Yugoslav will ever come."[1042]

Kennedy's and Eagleburger's efforts to provide aid to Yugoslavia ultimately swayed Vance and, in June, he agreed to support Kennedy's amendment to the AID Development Assistance Authorization bill. Moreover, the administration decided to

[1041] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 03697, May 18, 1979, NSA Brzezinski Material, Country Files, "Yugoslavia 1–12/79," box 86, JCPL.
[1042] Embassy Belgrade to Secretary of State, Telegram 4053, June 1, 1979, NSA Brzezinski Material Country Files, "Yugoslavia 1–12/79," box 86, JCPL.

provide additional money – up to 2 million U.S. dollars – from disaster relief funds. "Politically, Yugoslavia is a pivotal country whose independence, unity and economic viability are vital to peace and stability in Europe. Our relations with Yugoslavia have improved significantly over the past two and one-half years, and participation in earthquake reconstruction will further cement this positive trend," Vance wrote to Kennedy, explaining his decision to support the amendment.[1043] Vance's letter to Kennedy and his support to aid package after months of haggling should be seen also in the context of Joan Mondale's visit to Yugoslavia that was scheduled for June 10–14. As Eagleburger and numerous other State Department officials warned earlier, Mrs. Mondale's visit to Yugoslavia and Montenegro threatened to turn into a publicity and a policy disaster if the United States continued to defer its decision on aid. On May 29, Belovski visited the Mondales and told them that the question of aid was very important for Yugoslavia and suggested that Mondale should encourage the administration to support the Kennedy amendment. "It is not good that the competition between the administration and Kennedy reflects on [U.S] relations with Yugoslavia," Belovski said, adding that reconstruction would add enormous strain on the Yugoslav economy that was already "going through tough times."[1044] The decision to provide aid allowed Mrs. Mondale to deliver the good news to grieving Montenegrins, although the administration did not know whether the Congress would approve the entire amount that Kennedy had asked for and advised Mrs. Mondale to discuss the Kennedy amendment on an "if-asked-only basis." However, she was advised to emphasize the U.S. role in early aid efforts and

[1043] Letter, Cyrus Vance to Edward Kennedy, June 5, 1979, NSA Brzezinski Material Country Files, "Yugoslavia 1–12/79," box 86, JCPL.
[1044] Ambasada SFRJ Vasington SSIP-u, May 29, 1979, DA MSP RS, PA 1979 SAD, f. 122, d. 12, s. 429890.

to tell her host that Exim Bank opened a 90 million U.S. dollar line of credit loan to assist the Montenegrin government in rebuilding industry.[1045]

Another opportunity to expand U.S. influence in Yugoslavia came in July when an LCY delegation came to the United States. The visit was by many standards, historic. For the first time, the Democratic and the Republican National Committees officially invited a communist party to visit the United States. This visit was the realization of the administration plan that was outlined in the first months of 1977 (see Chapter 5) to foster a closer relationship with the Yugoslav party as one of the most important political factors in the post-Tito period. As the 1977 policy memo suggested, intra-party contacts would help to establish U.S. influence with the next generation of Yugoslav politicians with the ultimate goal of Yugoslavia's transition from a communist one-party state to a socio-democracy of the Western European type. Besides, in the light of Tito's visit to the USSR, the LCY visit to the United States provided balance and the delegation was treated as Tito's substitute.[1046]

Eagleburger believed that this visit was a "milestone" in U.S.–Yugoslav relations and that the impression that the LCY delegation would "gain from the visit will be a factor influencing our relations for a long time to come."[1047] The ambassador suggested that the delegation should be received by high-level government officials because that would be the way for the "protocol-conscious" Yugoslavs to measure the success of their

[1045] Secretary of State to Embassy Belgrade, Telegram 152031, June 13, 1979, 1979STATE152031, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed November 27, 2019).
[1046] It was even considered that the delegation should visit the space center in Houston, TX because in May the Soviets took Tito to their space research facility near Moscow.
[1047] He emphasized that the members of the delegation were relatively young ("average age 46"). Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 04367, June 13, 1979, NSA Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chronological, "Yugoslavia, 1–8/79," box 57, JCPL.

visit. The government heeded Eagleburger's advice, and the delegation's two-week itinerary from June 25 to July 9 included meetings with Mondale, numerous congressmen, local and state officials, members of academia, and business people but also trips to California, Chicago, and New York City. "All of this, together with the Preservation Hall, jazz band among the Mondavi vines, Fourth of July fireworks from a penthouse overlooking Soldiers' Field in Chicago, genuine awe at the size and variety of America and the cordiality and interest among those they met made this first party-to-party contact memorable," the State Department reported.[1048]

This assessment suggested that the form of the visit was more important than its substance. "Exchanges of opinions in the spirit of full openness underlined a large degree of respect of Yugoslavia's position and policy, particularly that of nonalignment," the members of the delegation reported.[1049] The administration and members of Congress showed great interest in and understanding of the Yugoslav socio-political system and praised Tito's role in international affairs.[1050] The visit, both sides agreed, opened a new phase in the U.S.–Yugoslav relations. The Yugoslavs were happy that the United States finally recognized Yugoslav socialism in its own right, outside the framework of its relations with the socialist bloc.[1051] At the same time, Washington was satisfied that after

[1048] Department of State to Embassy Belgrade, Telegram 187636, July 20, 1979, 1979STATE187636, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed November 27, 2019).
[1049] Razgovori delegacije SKJ u SAD, July 2, 1979, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–24 SAD.
[1050] Delaware Senator Joseph Biden said that his meeting with Tito after the Kardelj funeral was the "most exciting political event" of his career and praised Tito's "wisdom as a statesman." Ambasada SFRJ Vasington SSIP-u, June 28, 1979, DA MSP RS, PA 1979 SAD, f. 123, d. 5, s. 435901.
[1051] The only contentious event occurred in Stanford, CA where the delegation met with the members of the Hoover Institution. One of them, Richard Staar, wrote a book about communist regimes in Eastern Europe in which he included Yugoslavia. Belovski and other members of the delegation "complained bitterly" about Staars decision. Department of State to Embassy Belgrade, Telegram 187636, July 20, 1979,

a two-year effort it managed to establish a relationship with the "most important institution in Yugoslavia, and access to it has been difficult."[1052]

This story about U.S. assistance to earthquake-stricken Montenegro showed that despite internal differences largely unrelated to Yugoslavia, Washington was determined to preserve its good bilateral relations with Belgrade and to increase its influence there in the post-Tito period. Similarly, the first official visit of an LCY delegation to the United States provided an opportunity to expand contacts with the Yugoslav political elite that was expected to play a significant (if not the most important) role in Yugoslavia after Tito. However, Tito's trip to Moscow in May and the upcoming NAM summit in Havana in early September made the Yugoslav issues a matter of urgency, something that ambassador Eagleburger repeatedly raised in his "Eaglegrams" to the White House and the State Department. He warned his bosses in Washington that "when Tito dies, and for some time thereafter, we will surely be searching for ways to show our support… we will, I predict, regret any earlier lost opportunities – such as the one now before us – to demonstrate that we can be counted upon."[1053]

The Havana NAM Summit

U.S. efforts to win the hearts and minds of Yugoslav people and leadership had two main tasks: the long-term one was to safeguard U.S. influence in the country for the post-Tito period and the short-term one was to encourage Yugoslavia to combat Cuban

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1979STATE187636, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed November 27, 2019).

[1052] Memo, Peter Tarnoff to Zbigniew Brzezinski, June 20, 1979, NSA Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chronological, "Yugoslavia, 1–8/79," box 57, JCPL.

[1053] Embassy Belgrade to Secretary of State, Telegram 4053, June 1, 1979, NSA Brzezinski Material Country Files, "Yugoslavia 1–12/79," box 86, JCPL.

and Soviet influence in the Third World. Although Belgrade did not need any special incentives to confront Cuba and wanted to avoid its association with the United States, Washington's support was important because it demonstrated Yugoslavia's and Tito's global significance and respectability that the Yugoslavs hoped to translate into political influence among nonaligned "moderates."

Tito's main goal in Havana was to defend "authentic principles of non-alignment" from Castro's concept of revolutionary radicalism with a Soviet bent. Already in 1978, to better prepare for the summit, the Yugoslav government appointed Živorad Jazić as its new ambassador to Havana. Jazić was considered an expert on nonalignment and his mission was to "soften" Cuban pro-Soviet orientation. Belgrade believed that it was important to resist Cuban attempts to "change the nature of nonalignment" but also to engage in a "constructive dialogue" with Havana in order to prevent fissures in the movement.[1054] Moreover, before the September 1979 summit, Tito launched a diplomatic offensive in the Arab world to promote Yugoslavia's concept of nonalignment and emphasize the importance of the movement's unity. As a part of these extensive lobbying efforts, the Foreign Secretariat also organized wide consultations with "moderate" nonaligned states. At one point, as a Yugoslav official confided in his American colleague, Belgrade seriously considered canceling its participation at the summit because of the fear that Castro would steal the show in Havana.[1055] Yugoslavia tried to establish some basic principles before the summit out of fear that Castro would use the gathering to promote his own and Moscow's interests. Ambassador Jazić noted that the

[1054] Jugoslovensko–kubanske konsultacije, April 8, 1978, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/61–3 Kuba.
[1055] US Mission UN to Department of State, Telegram 01301, March 24, 1979, 1979USUNN01301, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed November 27, 2019).

Cubans believed that "promises don't need to be kept all the time," and tried to manipulate the final resolution so it could better fit their (and Soviet) political objectives. Yugoslavia, India, and other moderates complained that the Cuban draft insisted too heavily on the concept of a "natural alliance" of progressive forces, and deemed the draft as "unbalanced," "too dark," and "with too much emphasis on anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism."[1056] Moreover, the Cubans brazenly manipulated procedures to exclude the Pol Pot government from the summit despite Yugoslav protests.[1057] Finally, regardless of Yugoslavia's flagging relations with Cairo, Belgrade strongly opposed the Cuba-led efforts to expel Egypt from the NAM.

As the Croatian historian Tvrtko Jakovina wrote, Belgrade was "almost obsessively preoccupied" with Castro, because it believed that Castro's victory in Havana would mean larger Soviet influence in the NAM.[1058] Overall, Moscow's policy toward the NAM was viewed as treacherous, and not too different from the imperialist tactic to divide the movement. "The USSR advances in a more organized way toward nonaligned countries, by using, just like the U.S., all available means. Especially skillfully they [the Soviets] use their 'ideologically' like-minded [countries] among nonaligned, in the first place Cuba, who lately openly leads a series of actions from the position and in benefit of the USSR."[1059] Months before the Havana summit, Yugoslav diplomats reported about a

[1056] Informacija o konsultacijama sa Indijom o kubanskom nacrtu dokumenta, August 6, 1979, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/35 (1-3).
[1057] Tito complained to Julius Nyerere that the problem was not the issue of Kampuchea per se but the "method of imposing" Cuban opinions. SSIP VII Uprava Ambasadi SFRJ Dar es Salam, September 10, 1979, DA MSP RS, PA 1979 "R", f. 192, d. 1, s. 446400.
[1058] Tvrtko Jakovina, *Treća strana Hladnog rata* (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2011), 11.
[1059] Informacija o ponašanju velikih sila prema nesvrstanim zemljama, SSIP, Grupa za analizu i planiranje, no date 1977, DA MSP RS, Str. pov. 1977, f. 3, d. 99, s. 99.

concerted effort by the Cubans and the Soviets to influence its outcome. Orlandić mentioned in his diary that the Soviets tried to undermine Yugoslavia's prestige before the summit by disseminating misinformation.[1060] He reported a conversation with the Chief of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, General Alexei Yepishev, who criticized Yugoslavia's policy of equidistance and its "desperate resistance" to the "natural alliance" between the NAM and the USSR.[1061] Federal Assembly Foreign Policy Committee Chairman, Nijaz Dizdarević, complained to Eagleburger about "'tremendous Soviet pressures on Yugoslavia and other NAM states to tone down their opposition to Cuba."[1062] With the summit approaching, Bulgaria also intensified its attacks against Yugoslavia. The Bulgarian press criticized those states who wanted to "separate" the NAM from the USSR. Some Bulgarian officials condemned Yugoslavia's "chauvinist and hegemonistic" policy. "Depending on the Soviet needs and developments in Havana, similar qualifications could be mentioned at the conference by some of 'natural' allies of the socialist community," a report warned.[1063] Similarly, the Polish United Workers' Party attacked Yugoslavia and a group of "conservative" nonaligned states for a campaign against Castro and Cuba. The Poles interpreted Tito's early arrival in Havana as Yugoslavia's

[1060] Orlandić, *U predvečerje sloma*, 200.
[1061] Služba za informisanje saveznih i republičkih organa Ambasadi SFRJ Havana, Str. pov. br. 188/79, August 30, 1979, AJ, KRP fond 837, I–4–a/35 (1–3).
[1062] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 06361, August 27, 1979, 1979BELGRA06361, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed November 27, 2019).
[1063] Služba za informisanje saveznih i republičkih organa Ambasadi SFRJ Havana, br. 183/79, August 28, 1979, AJ, KRP fond 837, I–4–a/35 (1–3).

attempt to "break" Castro before other delegations arrive.[1064] Even some communist fellow-travelers such as a world-famous writer Gabriel García Márquez said that the "quarrel" between Belgrade and Havana had weakened the NAM and decreased Cuba's "maneuvering space" in Latin America.[1065] Faced with pressures from the left, Tito's most important (and as it turned out, final) diplomatic task was to counter Moscow's and Castro's baleful influences on the movement and preserve the legacy of the 1961 summit.

Although the 87-year old Tito displayed an impressive amount of energy for a statesman of his age, in Havana, Yugoslav president, according to eyewitnesses, appeared tired, absent-minded, and feeble. The trip to Cuba in late August was particularly arduous for the octogenarian president. Yugoslav diplomats in charge of organizing the trip to Havana warned the members of the Yugoslav delegation about harsh climate ("there is no difference between day and night temperatures and humidity is between 85% and 100%"), infectious and parasitic diseases ("avoid salads, shellfish, and ice cream") and local mosquitoes (not carrying malaria yet "causing stronger allergic skin reactions than our [mosquitoes])."[1066] However, the greatest challenge was Castro. Yugoslav diplomats noted how Havana tried to manipulate the conference program, but also counted Cuban insults toward Tito that were designed to undermine and reduce Yugoslav influence at the summit. For example, as a personal affront to Tito, the official newspaper of the Cuban

[1064] Pregled informacija Službe za informacije i dokumentaciju, September 4, 1979, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/35 (1-3).
[1065] Iz zabeleske o razgovoru pomoćnika saveznog sekretara Ignaca Goloba sa poznatim latino-američkim piscem Gabrijel Garsia Markesom, February 22, 1979, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/61–3 Kuba.
[1066] Informacija u vezi sa putovanjem i boravkom u Havani, August 21, 1979, AJ, KRP fond 837, I–4–a/35 (1–3).

communist party, *Granma*, excluded Tito from the list of the NAM founders.[1067] Ambassador Jazić pointed out that the Cubans obviously counted on Tito's imminent departure and easily ignored Yugoslav initiatives before and during the summit. "The Cubans were not interested because they believed that time works for them (Castro was relatively young and Tito was old), therefore there was no need for them to talk with us," Jazić later recalled.[1068]

Tito's efforts to moderate Castro's approach were futile. His meeting with Castro before the summit did not resolve their differences.[1069] Tito reported that the Cubans were "wavering" (*kolebljivi*) on many issues, but firm on Kampuchea because they "certainly received orders from the Soviet Union."[1070] Tito later told King Hussein of Jordan that he was dissatisfied with Castro's behavior and efforts to tie the NAM to the Soviet bloc.[1071] In a lengthy tirade, Castro criticized U.S. imperialism, China, but also without mentioning it, Yugoslavia. "Efforts to sabotage the Havana sixth summit were useless," Castro said. "The pressure, diplomatic activities and intrigues to prevent the conference from meeting in our country were useless. The Yankee imperialists, their old and new allies – in this case I am referring to the Chinese Government – did not want this conference in Cuba. They also contrived the repugnant intrigue that Cuba would turn the nonaligned countries' movement into an instrument of Soviet policy."[1072] Castro accused

[1067] Jakovina, *Treća strana*, 102.
[1068] Jazić, *Moj pogled*, 98.
[1069] Jazić, *Moj pogled*, 150. Unfortunately, I was unable to find a memorandum of conversation between Tito and Castro. The only available sources for their talks are Jazić's recollections and Tito's report to the joint session of the LCY and SFRY Presidiums.
[1070] Zajednička sednica Predsedništva SFRJ i Predsedništva CK SKJ (34. Sednica PCKSKJ), October 5, 1979, AJ, A CKSKJ fond 507, III/255.
[1071] Ambasada SFRJ Aman SSIP-u, September 30, 1979, DA MSP RS, PA 1979 "R", f. 192, d. 1, s. 451409.
[1072] Opening address by Cuban President Fidel Castro at the Sixth Conference of the Nonaligned Countries Movement at the Palace of Conventions in Havana, September 3, 1979, Latin American Network

"some" of opposing the expulsion of Egypt from the NAM despite Cairo's "alliance" with the United States and Israel and open betrayal of the "noble Arab cause and the Palestinian people." In the final rebuttal of Yugoslavia's policies, Castro said that Vietnam was the "victim of the intrigues, slanders, and encirclement" – obvious criticism of the United States and China, but also echoing Soviet dissatisfaction with Yugoslavia's position toward the Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea. Castro's invectives apparently were not to Tito's liking who did not allow the members of the Yugoslav delegation to applaud the speech.[1073] "Castro's speech at the beginning of the conference, you saw it, was extremely sharp, it was insulting and one-sided, particularly against the Americans," Tito later told his associates. "It left a distasteful feeling."[1074]

Tito's response the next day was measured, but less vigorous. He reminded the attendants about the first days of the NAM and the movement's determination not to be anyone's "transmission or reserve." Without explicitly criticizing Cuba, Vietnam, or the USSR, Yugoslavia insisted on the non-intervention principle, which, above all, included the removal of foreign troops from other countries' territories and noninterference in the domestic affairs of other countries. "We especially cannot tolerate the imposition of foreign will with military interventions," Tito said.[1075] He rejected Castro's confrontational stance and called for a global détente and wider democratization of

Information Center (LANIC) at the University of Texas at Austin. Available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1979/19790903.html (accessed November 29, 2019).
[1073] Jazić, *Moj pogled*, 151.
[1074] Zajednička sednica Predsedništva SFRJ i Predsedništva CK SKJ (34. Sednica PCKSKJ), October 5, 1979, AJ, A CKSKJ fond 507, III/255.
[1075] Govor Predsednika Tita na VI konferenciji šefova država ili vlada nesvrstanih zemalja, September 4, 1979, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/35(1–3).

international relations.[1076] The NAM's ultimate goal, Tito concluded, should be its return to its original principles and on their basis to strengthen its unity, solidarity, and "action capacity." "Those were my guiding principles because of which I embarked on this long and for me a very arduous trip. I was also guided by my responsibility as one of the founders of the movement and my firm belief that we should bear any burden for those high goals and noble ideals."[1077] "My speech calmed down the delegates, but the Cubans did not like it, that was obvious," Tito said.[1078] Yet, he claimed that his speech had a certain effect on Castro, who approached him at the airport and said that Yugoslavia and Cuba should stick together, repeatedly saying how Cuba was not anyone's satellite. "We have many things in common, he said, we have two revolutions that are similar, we have many things in common and we should fight together," Tito reported. He said that Fidel probably "learned the lesson" but that many around him, such as his brother Raul, were "extremists" who worked under the orders from the USSR to tie the NAM to the socialist bloc.[1079] Tito concluded that these efforts of the movement's "extreme wing" ultimately failed and that the NAM showed its vitality and independence. He estimated that the so-called progressive group consisted of 20 states and that half of them were there out of necessity, not a conviction. The defeat of the "progressives" also meant Yugoslav victory. Despite Havana's efforts, Egypt remained in the movement. Moreover, the question of the representation of Kampuchea – Havana and Vietnam argued that Heng

[1076] Tito said to Nyerere that people around Castro were young and extreme "who talk only about revolutions." "The nonaligned movement is a peace movement, for peaceful resolution of problems." SSIP VII Uprava Ambasadi SFRJ Dar es Salam, September 10, 1979, DA MSP RS, PA 1979 "R," f. 192, d. 1, s. 446400.
[1077] Govor Predsednika Tita, September 4, 1979, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/35(1–3).
[1078] Zajednička sednica Predsedništva SFRJ i Predsedništva CK SKJ (34. Sednica PCKSKJ), October 5, 1979, AJ, A CKSKJ fond 507, III/255.
[1079] Ibid.

Samrin was the legitimate representative of Kampuchea, while Yugoslavia and some others believed that the seat belonged to the Pol Pot government – remained unresolved, i.e., it was sent to an ad-hoc committee "to continue analyzing this question."[1080] "Simply said, we succeeded," Tito said, adding that the summit reaffirmed Yugoslavia's prestige in the world and its role in global affairs.[1081]

Yugoslav media celebrated Tito's performance in Havana as a triumph of Yugoslav diplomacy that also confirmed Tito's reputation as the NAM's patriarch. The special *NIN* correspondent, Mirko Klarin, wrote that Tito's response to Castro's opening speech was "calm and without any polemical tones" and that some delegates were disappointed with it until they realized that they were "witnessing the historical testament of the continuity of the movement."[1082] "We, the Yugoslavs, have more reasons than others to be satisfied with the outcome of the summit," one Yugoslav commentator wrote, "particularly because the summit adopted a special resolution in which nonaligned states recognized Yugoslav President for his activity in the movement."[1083]

Belgrade's self-congratulatory mood was, however, unfounded. Or, at least, that was what Washington believed. Tito appeared feeble and weak, unable to copy the youthful vigor of his 34-year younger challenger. "At the summit, Tito's performance was a poor second to Castro's. The 87-year-old Yugoslav President's role as the

[1080] "Decision of the Conference on the Question of Kampuchea," in Documents of the Sixth Conference of Heads of' State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Havana, Cuba, from 3 to 9 September 1979. Available at http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/6th_Summit_FD_Havana_Declaration_1979_Whole.pdf (accessed November 27, 2019).
[1081] Zajednička sednica Predsedništva SFRJ i Predsedništva CK SKJ (34. Sednica PCKSKJ), October 5, 1979, AJ, A CKSKJ fond 507, III/255.
[1082] Mirko Klarin, "Ničija rezerva," September 9, 1979, *NIN*, 3.
[1083] Hari Štajner, "Jači od razlika," September 16, 1979, *NIN*, 4. The Cubans, however, did not want to sign that resolution.

standard-bearer for the NAM's moderates undoubtedly has come into question," stated in a U.S. intelligence report. Tito's "lackluster" performance in Havana did not bode well for Yugoslavia or the NAM, the report noted, concluding that Belgrade "seems to have won the battle on NAM principles… but it may have lost the war in the process."[1084] Nevertheless, the United States publicly commended Tito's appearance at the summit. Secretary Vance told Belovski that Yugoslavia had won a "historic battle" in Havana and that the most important thing was that Yugoslavia succeeded in defending the movement's character.[1085] Mondale said that Tito played a "magnificent role" in Havana and that was "now clear that he and his positions had won."[1086] Even Kissinger, who had earlier disputed Yugoslavia's nonalignment policy, praised its "constructive role" in Havana and Tito's appearance there.

In October, Henry Kissinger visited Yugoslavia as a private citizen. Despite the acrimonious history, Kissinger was still considered an influential figure in Washington. Besides, Carter's reelection chances seemed slim – he was challenged from the Right but also from within his own party – and the Yugoslavs predicted that Kissinger would have an important role in a future administration. Kissinger also offered to introduce the new Yugoslav ambassador in Washington, Budimir Lončar, to some key figures in the Republican Party. On condition not to "open the discussion about his earlier views and

[1084] Intelligence Assessment, Implications of the Nonaligned Summit for Yugoslavia: A Preliminary Look, no date, September 1979, NSA Brzezinski Material Country Files, "Yugoslavia 1–12/79," box 86, JCPL.
[1085] Razgovor Vensa sa ambasadorom Belovskim, br. 794, September 24, 1979, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–24 SAD.
[1086] Razgovor ambasadora Belovskog sa Mondejlom i Bžežinskim, br. 856, October 19, 1979, Služba za spoljno-politička pitanja, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/104–24 SAD.

activities," the Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat agreed to give Kissinger access to high Yugoslav officials that included Secretary Vrhovec and President Tito.[1087]

The last Tito–Kissinger conversation focused on Cuba and the Soviet Union. "From the American viewpoint, you pretty much saved nonalignment," Kissinger told Tito. He accused Cuba of acting as a Soviet proxy. To Tito's comment that U.S. policy toward the island had pushed Cuba into the Soviet arms, Kissinger replied that mistakes were made, but the problem was that Castro did not want to be the "Swiss president in the Caribbean," i.e. neutral but rather to have a role in global affairs.[1088] He cited Cuba's incursions in Angola and Ethiopia and said that the Soviets had been taking advantage of the Carter administration because of its "soft" stance toward Cuban interventions.

Tito agreed with Kissinger that Cuban policies were dangerous. He added that the Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea was "unacceptable" and that he reminded Castro about the inviolability of the principle of sovereignty. If that principle was abandoned, Tito said, then stronger states would be able to attack weaker ones.[1089] He reminded Kissinger about the Brezhnev Doctrine and noted that the Soviets were trying to give it a "wider application." "In any case, Yugoslavia is determined to advocate the principle of noninterference."[1090]

A new Brezhnev Doctrine? Soviet intervention in Afghanistan

[1087] Informacija povodom posete bivšeg državnog sekretara SAD Henry Kissinger-a Jugoslaviji od 12. do 15. oktobra 1979. godine, October 2, 1979, SSIP, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–228.
[1088] Zabeleška o razgovoru predsednika Republike Josipa Broza Tita sa bivšim državnim sekretarom za inostrane poslove SAD prof. Henrijem Kisindžerom, October 14, 1979, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–3–a/107–228.
[1089] Ibid.
[1090] Ibid.

Little more than two months after Tito's conversation with Kissinger, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan tested Yugoslavia's determination to advocate noninterference but also the country's ability to resist possible Soviet aggression. The Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea in December 1978 caused considerable anxiety in the Yugoslav leadership. However, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan showed that the Brezhnev Doctrine, as Tito was concerned during his meeting with Kissinger, did not apply only to the members of the Socialist Commonwealth, but also to nonaligned and neutral states that now owed ideological or political allegiance toward the USSR. Faced with this existential foreign policy issue, the regime also had to solve numerous domestic social and economic issues that reached their apex in the last months of 1979. Tito's press secretary, Blažo Mandić, recalled that by the end of 1979 Tito was preoccupied with two issues: the poor economic situation in Yugoslavia and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.[1091] The final test for the regime came in the first days of 1980 when Tito was admitted to the hospital never to come out. The Yugoslav system seemed to reach the breaking point.

In the days after the Havana summit, Tito's closest associates described that he was sometimes depressed and in a bad mood. During a hunting trip in Bosnia in November, Tito confessed to his hosts, members of the Bosnian and Federal leadership, that he suffered from insomnia because of economic and political troubles in the country. "I sometimes think that we are going down a very hazardous road," Tito told them.[1092] He

[1091] Mandić, *S Titom*, 190.
[1092] Raif Dizdarević, *From the Death of Tito to the Death of Yugoslavia*, translated by Saba Risaluddin (Sarajevo: Šahinpašić, 2009), 6. Tito's German translator Ivan Ivanji recalled in his memoir that Tito started to suffer from insomnia at the summit in Havana. Tito claimed that good sleep was a "question of discipline" and that he was able to sleep well even in the trenches during World War I and as the Partisan commander. Ivanji, *Titov prevodilac*, 264.

cited high inflation, an enormous deficit, and uncontrollable expenditures. "The underlying cause of all this is the lack of accountability; no one is made to suffer the consequence of failing to carry out policies that have been agreed upon," he concluded, avoiding any responsibility for this mismanagement.[1093] In a conversation with his biographer, Tito ranted about the misuse of public funds for business trips abroad, foreign imports ("Do we really need that much whiskey?"), and debt. He suggested that a new social contract was needed and planned to call an all-Yugoslav Congress of Workers' Councils in the second half of 1980.[1094]

After 1973, the Yugoslav economy sustained a high level of consumption and investment through cheap foreign loans, but in the process became addicted to "petrodollars." Although some of this foreign investment helped modernize Yugoslavia's industrial and energy sector (the most successful example was the Krško nuclear plant), a majority of cheap foreign money went to finance local elites' pet projects that often did not have any economic rationale behind them but rather served to alleviate social and economic pressures.[1095] This unfavorable economic (and political) situation that kept Tito

[1093] Ibid.
[1094] Mandić, *S Titom*, 192.
[1095] In 1979, the negative balance of payments reached the record amount of 3.7 billion U.S. dollars. See Savezni zavod za statistiku, *Jugoslavija, 1945–1980. Statistički prikaz* (Beograd: Savezni zavod za statistiku, 1986), 164. Susan Woodward in her seminal work, *Socialist Unemployment. The Political Economy of Yugoslavia* (1995), argued that 1979 was a watershed moment "when the trade deficit and skyrocketing foreign debt forced the government to draw emergency credit from the IMF." Woodward, however, noted that the Yugoslav economy suffered from congenital problems. "The fundamental trap lay in the leaders' Faustian bargain between their strategic positions internationally and access to foreign capital (both credits and trade). The symbiosis between the two increased the probability of unpredictable external shocks, because trends in global capital and trade on the one hand and superpower conflict on the other did not run parallel." Besides, internal political tensions were "translated" into economic competition between local elites who "focused… on redistribution and control over capital." See Susan Woodward, *Socialist Unemployment. The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945–1990* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 257. Similarly, Marie-Janine Calic wrote that Yugoslavia, like other Eastern European countries, tried to make up for poor productivity with excessive borrowing abroad. "Because of this, paradoxically, the multinational state saw its greatest wave of investment during this decade. Hundreds of new roads, hotels, sports centers and libraries shot up, deluding the public into believing in a prosperity

sleepless was coupled with an external threat. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan somewhat surprised the Yugoslavs. Orlandić claimed that, in April and May 1979, he had warned his superiors in Belgrade that the situation in Afghanistan was quickly deteriorating and that "other forms of Soviet engagement should not be excluded."[1096] Yet, in August, the Yugoslav embassy in Kabul reported that the situation in the country was "very difficult" but that the regime was not endangered by the insurgency. The embassy noted that the West, China, and some Muslim countries supported insurgent groups while the USSR was "very active in supporting the present regime."[1097] However, in September 1979, the internal struggle between two factions led to the removal of President Nur Muhammad Taraki and the ascendance of Hafizullah Amin.[1098] Westad

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that in no way reflected the country's actual economic performance." Calic, "The Beginning of the End," in Calic, Neutatz, and Obertreis, eds., *The Crisis of Socialist Modernity*, 73. David Dyker also underlined this dependence on foreign money markets. He showed that Yugoslavia's deficit that reached its peak in 1979 was a result of a combination of factors that included the 1973 oil crisis and drop in remittances. The deficit cause by the 1979 oil crisis thus "reflected a parallel incapacity to adjust to changing international trading patterns." See David Dyker, *Yugoslavia. Socialism, Development, and Debt* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 182. Adamović, Lampe, and Prickett noted that Yugoslavia's increasing dependence of foreign money in the 1970s came as an "unfortunate combination of internal and external factors." Decentralization of political and economic power in the early 1970s and constitutional limitations imposed on the Federal Executive Council allowed local, regional, and republican enterprises and governments to seek foreign loans without federal oversight. See Adamović, Lampe, and Prickett, *Američko–jugoslovenski ekonomski odnosi*, 134–137. As Patrick Hyder Patterson showed in *Bought & Sold* (2011), that foreign borrowing was used to finance consumption that served as an important element of the regime's legitimacy. The expansion of consumption in 1960s and the 1970s, Patterson argued, "unleashed expectations that could not be satisfied indefinitely." "Once prosperity became only a fondly remembered thing of the past, the consumerist dream no longer seemed to have any real chance of coming true, and support for the system began to slip away." Patrick Hyder Patterson, *Bought & Sold. Living and Losing the Good Life in Socialist Yugoslavia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 318–319. Ambassador Eagleburger noted in one of his "Eaglegrams" that consumerism represented one of the most important cohesive factors. "Yugoslavia has become a nation of consumers, many of whom remember when there was nothing to consume. It is a country of the weekend house, the Fiat in the garage, radio and television in the apartment, plentiful if expensive food and clothing, virtually unconstrained travel abroad, and the credit card. The steady growth of the consuming class… is a strong incentive for stability." Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 4427, February 18, 1980, NSA Brzezinski Material, Country File, "Yugoslavia: Briefing book for the Tito funeral, 5/80," box 87, JCPL. Scholar Dejan Jović noted how the economic crisis in the late 1970s "provided a context in which the wider issues of the political system reemerged in the 1980s." Dejan Jović, *Yugoslavia. A State that Withered Away* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2009), 147.

[1096] Orlandić, *U predvečerje sloma*, 223.

[1097] Pregled depeša, Situacija u Avganistanu br. 247, September 1, 1979, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/35 (1-3).

[1098] Taraki was executed several weeks later. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 313.

noted that the Soviets began a discussion about intervention already in March 1979. However, it was Amin's victory against Soviet-backed Taraki that "set the Soviet leadership on the course to intervention."[1099] Although ambassador Orlandic suspected that the Soviets might do something in the future to oust Amin, he decided to go on a 10-day vacation.

The similar mood was in Yugoslavia where ordinary Yugoslavs and their president were preparing for the New Year celebration – one of the most extravagantly celebrated holidays in Yugoslavia. On December 26, the Red Army attacked Kabul. Amin was captured and executed with several of his associates and instead of him, the Soviets installed Babrak Karmal as the new prime minister of Afghanistan. Orlandić heard the news on radio and promptly returned to Moscow. Similarly, the Yugoslav government found out about the intervention from agency news because communication with Kabul was interrupted. A day after Amin's assassination by the KGB, Soviet ambassador Rodionov delivered the official Soviet statement to Prime Minister Veselin Đuranović. Rodionov said that, as the Yugoslav government was already aware, foreign powers interfered in Afghanistan's internal affairs with the goal of overthrowing the "democratic order that was established after the victory of the April Revolution in 1978… under those circumstances, the Afghan leadership appealed to the Soviet Union for assistance in fighting foreign aggression."[1100] In the first reactions to intervention, the Foreign Secretariat noted that the Soviets carried out military action during the holidays to avoid reaction of the global public and advised Yugoslav media to avoid

[1099] Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 316.
[1100] Beleška o razgovoru predsednika Saveznog izvršnog veća Veselina Đuranovića sa ambasadorom SSSR-a N. Rodionovom, December 28, 1979, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–31 SSSR.

"commentaries" and "objectively report" about the events in Afghanistan.[1101] On December 29 and 30, members of the Yugoslav state and party leadership who were still in Belgrade met to discuss Yugoslavia's response to the invasion.

"They ruined your holiday mood," Tito's biographer Tihomir Stanojević stated during the last interview session with Tito. "Not only mine," Tito replied, "they had ruined it for the whole world… All kinds of surprises are possible. Everywhere you can find some stinker (*smrdljivac*) who will, in someone's name, call for foreign intervention."[1102] With Tito's approval, on December 30, Deputy Secretary Pešić summoned Rodionov to express Yugoslavia's concern about the events in Afghanistan. Pešić told Rodionov that the Soviet intervention directly threatened global stability and the security of NAM countries. Following Tito's orders, he demanded that the Soviets immediately pull out their troops from Afghanistan.[1103] The same day, the Foreign Secretariat issued a statement that condemned the use of force in international affairs and called other nonaligned states to work together toward universal détente and for strengthening of the world's peace, security, and stability.

Pešić's demarche to Rodionov was much harsher than the Secretariat's statement. Tito made several critical interventions to Pešić's note, agreeing with Vladimir Bakarić that the Yugoslav request about a Soviet retreat from Afghanistan should not be included in the statement but rather delivered to Rodionov personally. The Yugoslav reluctance to

[1101] SSIP - Informacija o daljem razvitku događaja oko Avganistana, December 29, 1979, DA MSP RS, PA 1979 Avganistan, f. 18, d. 12, s. 466082.
[1102] Mandić, *S Titom*, 192.
[1103] Zabeleška o razgovoru Zamenika saveznog sekretara druga Milorad Pešića sa ambasadorom SSSR-a u SFRJ drugom N. Rodionovim na dan 30.12.1979. (18,00), pov. br. 466077, December 31, 1979, SSIP – Kabinet ZSS, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–5–b/99–31 SSSR.

publicly demand Soviet retreat could be explained by Belgrade's desire not to further worsen its relations with Moscow, but also by scant knowledge of what was going on in Kabul. Secretary Vrhovec reported that the first information about troop concentration along the Soviet-Afghan border Yugoslavia received from the United States. Besides, the Yugoslavs speculated that the United States and the USSR had an "unspoken agreement" about spheres of influence that would allow the United States to resolve its problem with Iran while Moscow was busy in Afghanistan. These suspicions warranted caution because Yugoslavia did not want to risk its position by intruding in superpowers' power arrangements. Carter's letter to Tito did not assuage Yugoslavia's fears that the events in Afghanistan and Iran were part of a larger scheme to divide zones of influence in South-West Asia. Besides, Yugoslavia wanted to avoid the impression that it acted in coordination with the Western countries who condemned intervention.[1104]

The Yugoslav position was further complicated on January 3 when Tito was admitted to the Clinical Center in Ljubljana because of the problems with blood vessels in his leg. On January 4, the secret joint session of the LCY and SFRY Presidiums convened to discuss Tito's health and the situation in Afghanistan. Although the records of the meeting are incomplete (the first part of the meeting, about Tito's health, was not recorded), this gathering revealed confusion and even despair of the top Yugoslav leadership. Belgrade, however, was dismayed by the response (or lack thereof) of nonaligned countries to the invasion. "In regards to the actions of nonaligned countries, unfortunately, things

[1104] In the first two days after the invasion, only the CPI criticized Soviet military action. See SSIP - Informacija o daljem razvitku događaja oko Avganistana, December 29, 1979, DA MSP RS, PA 1979 Avganistan, f. 18, d. 12, s. 466082.

there are not favorable," Secretary Vrhovec said, adding that Yugoslavia should try to use the intervention as an "opportunity to awaken nonalignment." Alas, he admitted, any type of coordinated action was improbable because of Cuba and India.[1105] "The most striking point is that almost the entire black Africa is silent… everybody is silent… if we make a list of the countries where the Cubans are present... and where the Soviet Union is present… that list is pretty long. The situation is very difficult. If the movement does not react… it is going to be very difficult," Minić added.[1106] Because of the reluctance of the nonaligned states to condemn the intervention, both Vrhovec and Minić suggested that Yugoslavia should not join the initiative to summon the UN Security Council because that action was initiated by the West. "In a different situation, it would be normal that Yugoslavia sponsors that initiative," Minić said, "but the action was initiated by the Western bloc (*na blokovskoj linij*) to that extent that we cannot stand behind it." "It is not accidental that a majority of nonaligned states is abstaining, they are abstaining just because the initiative in the Security Council was launched entirely by the West," Minić concluded, adding, however, that Yugoslavia should appear in the UNSC. As Vrhovec remarked, Yugoslavia's absence from the discussion in the UN would mean that Yugoslavia had "given up."[1107]

The caution that Vrhovec and Minić advised did not satisfy all members of the two presidiums. A member of the LCY Presidium, Branko Mikulić, said that

[1105] "India is … our old problem. It always looks after its own interest, it is always opportunistic," Minić commented regarding India's reluctance to condemn the intervention. Stenografske beleške sa 43. zajedničke sednice Predsedništva Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije i Predsedništva Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, January 4, 1979, AJ, A CKSKJ fond 507, III/264.
[1106] Ibid.
[1107] Ibid.

Yugoslavia reacted publicly against intervention during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. “I think that the situation in Afghanistan is a larger warning for us, a bigger lesson for us than one in Czechoslovakia,” Mikulić cautioned. Similarly, a member of the SFRY Presidium, Cvjetin “Majo” Mijatović, agreed that Yugoslavia should not do anything “unnecessary” that would worsen its position but that the situation was different from Czechoslovakia. “250 people died [in Afghanistan] and in Czechoslovakia that went without a drop of blood spilled, the army of one superpower went into a nonaligned state,” Mijatović said. “We always had honesty, a ‘spine,’ and now we also have to speak up, without insulting [anyone], we have to measure every word, but we have to state explicitly our positions,” he concluded.[1108]

Despite Mikulić’s and Mijatović’s suggestion that Yugoslavia should assume a more assertive posture, the secret meeting did not produce any far-reaching conclusions, but rather postponed Yugoslavia’s actions after another meeting that was called for January 10. Moreover, although Tito’s condition was described as serious, his associates accustomed to the President’s role of the chief arbiter believed that he would be able to provide some guidelines.[1109] However, the January 4 emergency meeting showed that in the absence of Kardelj and Tito there was no unifying force that could resolve internal disagreements. This impromptu session remained secret to the LCY membership and the public at

[1108] Ibid.
[1109] It was agreed that an ad hoc committee of five (Grličkov, Ljubičić, Mijatović, Minić, and Vrhovec) compose a comprehensive report about the situation in Afghanistan and to present it to Tito.

large because the attendees could not agree on a statement, but also because, as one participant admitted, they were not prepared well for the meeting.

Six days later, on January 10, the LCY and SFRY Presidiums held another meeting that established the parameters of Yugoslavia's foreign and domestic policies in the context of the invasion and Tito's illness. Ambassador Orlandić described the atmosphere at the meeting and after it as "tense" because of Tito's quickly deteriorating health.[1110] Secretary Vrhovec reported on the international situation and the NAM. He said that the Soviet intervention jeopardized the nonaligned countries' most vital interests because its goal was to subjugate the policy of nonalignment to Moscow's aggressive global policies. "That Soviet penetration into the nonaligned world we have been observing for the last two years and, ultimately, that is the reason why we came into serious conflict with the Soviet Union," Vrhovec said. He added that Yugoslavia could not react "directly and clearly" because of Cuba's interference and that other nonaligned states, for various reasons, did not want to condemn the Soviet actions. Vrhovec said that both blocs tried to harness the movement for their goals which led to the NAM's "passivization." As Vrhovec noted, the Soviets succeeded in convincing many nonaligned states that the intervention was a problem between the superpowers that did not require the involvement of the nonaligned states. Algeria, India, Sri Lanka, Zambia, and some other nonaligned

[1110] Orlandić wrote that the meeting was interrupted several times so the members could hear the most recent health bulletins. After the last bulleting that described Tito's condition as critical, the meeting was interrupted and the Vice President Koliševski left for Ljubljana. Orlandić recalled the gloomy mood of the Yugoslav leadership. "Often we talked to each other – what will happen after him? And subconsciously we were showing that we in the SFRY were much weaker than we thought we were." Orlandić, *U predvečerje sloma*, 242–243.

states that constituted the "core of the movement" (*matica pokreta*) abstained from the debate in the UN because it was, as they characterized it, "one-sided." This created a daunting task for Yugoslav diplomacy. Yugoslavia's insistence on condemning the Soviet intervention could lead to the accusation of Yugoslavia's alleged pro-Western bias, anti-Sovietism, and suspicions that Yugoslavia "preoccupied the individual fear of the Soviet Union, cries and pushes the entire world into action [against the USSR]."[1111]

The meeting also reflected on the internal situation. Admiral Branko Mamula reported that the units of the Yugoslav People's Army were put on alert, particularly anti-tank and anti-aircraft units. The Army also activated certain elements of the defense plan code-named "Zenith" that included winter-warfare training.[1112] However, Mamula said that the combat readiness of the Yugoslav armed forces was weakened by the shortages of fuel and food. Moreover, Mamula complained, Yugoslavia's military-industrial complex was running out of raw materials and that a shortage of hard currency impeded purchases abroad.[1113] Yet, Mamula said that there was no imminent threat to Yugoslavia because Moscow

[1111] Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa zajedničke sednice Predsedništva Saveza komunista Jugoslavije i Predsedništva SFRJ (44. sednica Predsedništva SKJ), January 10, 1979, AJ, A CKSKJ fond 507, III/265.
[1112] The operation "Zenith" is mentioned in Yugoslav documents but I could not find any additional information. From the context it is possible to conclude that "Zenith" was devised as a response to the Warsaw Pact intervention and included military and other measures in accordance to the doctrine of total defense.
[1113] Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa zajedničke sednice Predsedništva Saveza komunista Jugoslavije i Predsedništva SFRJ (44. sednica Predsedništva SKJ), January 10, 1979, AJ, A CKSKJ fond 507, III/265.

could not open another front, but he cautioned that the Soviets could intervene in the future if "something wobbles (*zaljuljalo*) in our country."[1114]

"For now we do not have any indications that our internal security situation has deteriorated," Secretary of Internal Affairs, Hreljević, told his colleagues. He said that the internal enemies of the regime and hostile émigré groups could not jeopardize Yugoslavia's constitutional order without foreign military assistance. Hreljević, however, said that these positive security estimates counted on the absence of "larger disruptions" in the economy that could negatively affect the "workers class" and encourage domestic and foreign enemies to act. The Secretary listed all accomplishments of the security organs since 1945 ("in the struggle to preserve the legacy of our revolution and the independent road to socialism we waged several large battles") but said that a certain number of hostile elements continued to exist despite these efforts but that the security services were able to keep them under control.[1115] Hreljević said that the anti-regime elements lately began spreading rumors about an impending crisis of self-management after Tito's departure. "In this respect, different speculations have been launched that Tito's creation will disappear with him… the recent events in Afghanistan and the statement about President Tito's health caused a new wave of speculations on the subject of the so-called post-Tito period," Hreljević briefed

[1114] Mamula cautioned, however, that some information indicated troop groupings in Moldova and that Romania was "characteristically" silent. "There were some regroupings in the Carpathian region, and that means directly in gravitational operational direction toward the Yugoslav front. We will vigilantly follow those." Ibid.

[1115] On January 16, a source told the U.S. embassy that pro-Soviet elements were under surveilance and that a certain number of them was arrested. Memo, National Foreign Assessment Center, Yugoslavia: Managing without Tito, no date, February 1980, NSA Brzezinski Material, Country File, "Yugoslavia 2/80," box 86, JCPL.

the members of the two Presidiums.[1116] He said that hostile powers had been using economic difficulties and encouraging nationalism of different Yugoslav nations to weaken the country internally.[1117]

One result of the meeting was a statement for the LCY membership in which the party and the government explained how the invasion damaged the "interests of communist and workers' movement and represents a new blow to the strengthening of the world socialist process." Besides, it called on LCY members to "fight for consistent implementation of all measures that have the aim of strengthening economic and political stability of our society."[1118] Also, for the first time after December 30, 1979, the government issued a public statement that did not explicitly mention the USSR but vaguely condemned all foreign interventions. It underscored the need for a larger NAM's role in international affairs and called for national unity as the "safest way to strengthen the independence of our country."[1119]

Soviet response

These 10 days of relative silence between two public statements showed the difficulty of Yugoslavia's position.[1120] On one hand, the Yugoslavs were wary

[1116] Ibid.
[1117] Hreljević noted in his briefing that foreign powers actively encouraged nationalist sentiments among the Serbs, Croats, and Albanians. The Yugoslav consul in New York, an ethnic Albanian from Kosovo, reported about Soviet "provocations." A Soviet diplomat in the UN approached the consul and asked him whether he represented Albania or Yugoslavia. "As you can see, it is obvious that the Russians wanted to provoke some inadequate response from our representatives that could create a scandal." Generalni konzulat SFRJ Njujork SSIP-u, January 16, 1980, DA MSP RS, PA 1980 SSSR, f. 120, d. 4, s. 42922.
[1118] Informacija o vojnoj intervenciji SSSR u Avganistanu – za članove SKJ, str. pov. 2/1, January 11, 1980, AJ, A CKSKJ fond 507, III/265.
[1119] Predlog saopštenja za javnost, January 10, 1980, AJ, A CKSKJ fond 507, III/265.
[1120] Ambassador Orlandić later characterized the Yugoslav reaction as insufficient and "half-step" in condemning the Soviet invasion.

of Moscow's reaction and did not want to agitate the Soviets. On the other hand, because of political and security reasons, they were determined to uphold the policy against foreign interventions that by default entailed criticism of the Soviet military action. At the January 10 meeting, ambassador Orlandić reported that Soviet–Yugoslav relations were "restrained" and that was reasonable to expect "certain effects" of the intervention in Afghanistan on these relations. However, he warned that Yugoslavia should avoid confrontation with the USSR. Although he believed that economic and military relations would continue without disruptions, Orlandić said that "negative economic tendencies" in Yugoslav–Soviet relations, i.e., the Yugoslav trade deficit that reached almost a half billion U.S. dollars in 1979, provided Moscow with an opportunity to pressure Yugoslavia.[1121] Thus, he advised, Yugoslavia should not agitate Moscow because it can use this as a pretext for economic and political measures against Yugoslavia. Although he believed the Soviets would like to avoid public controversies with Belgrade, Orlandić mentioned Soviet psychological warfare against Yugoslavia that increased Yugoslav "nervousness."[1122]

The first battle in this psychological war happened on January 4. The Yugoslav leadership requested one of the best Soviet cardiovascular surgeons, Marat Knyazev, to join a medical council that consisted of Yugoslav doctors and

[1121] Othmar Nikola Haberl wrote that the global economic crisis in the late 1970s "impared Yugoslav efforts to maintain also economic independence of the USSR… The simultaneous climb, by leaps and bounds, of the world market price for crude oil further deepened Yugoslavia's dependence on Soviet supplies." Othmar Nikola Haberl, "Yugoslavia and the USSR in the Post-Tito Era," in Pedro Ramet, ed., *Yugoslavia in the 1980s* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 288–289.
[1122] Neautorizovane magnetofonske beleške sa zajedničke sednice Predsedništva Saveza komunista Jugoslavije i Predsedništva SFRJ (44. sednica Predsedništva SKJ), January 10, 1979, AJ, A CKSKJ fond 507, III/265.

the famous American surgeon Michael DeBakey.[1123] In the night between January 4 and January 5, Orlandić frantically tried to locate Knyazev but ended up in a Kafkaesque nightmare of evasive Soviet officials who allegedly did not have Knyazev's phone number and offered to call a hospital clerk named Tamara instead. In the early morning hours Knyazev appeared, prepared to go to Yugoslavia. Orlandić suspected that Suslov was behind this "game" to unnerve the Yugoslavs.[1124] Despite Belgrade's efforts not to provoke the Soviets, in January and February, Yugoslav officials reported numerous Soviet "provocations." The Yugoslav embassy in Conakry informed the Secretariat about an incident that involved the Soviet consul in Guinea who accused Yugoslavia of siding with imperialist powers. The consul said ("in an aggressive manner") that Amin had worked for the CIA and that he murdered Afghan communists. "You too in Yugoslavia were liquidating communists during the Cominform [i.e. after 1948] and you persecute them today as well," the consul said, citing the case of the Bar group (see Chapter 3). "We note that in similar situations representatives of socialist countries, particularly the USSR and Cuba, are rude and aggressive," the embassy reported.[1125] Yugoslav diplomats, who participated in the 1980

[1123] The issue of Tito's medical team was politicized from the beginning. The core of the medical council consisted of the best Yugoslav doctors, but for the purpose of transparency and balance, the leadership decided to invite one Soviet and one American doctor. They decided on Michael DeBakey who had a superstar status in Yugoslavia because of widely publicized heart surgeries that he offered to Yugoslav citizens free of charge. General Nikola Ljubičić even suggested that Yugoslavia should bring an acupuncturist from China. Bringing foreign doctors was clearly a political decision as Dragoslav Marković later confirmed, to "soothe" the domestic population and their own conscience. Stenografske beleške sa 47. zajedničke sednice Predsedništva Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije i Predsedništva Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, January 17, 1979, AJ, A CKSKJ fond 507, III/268.
[1124] Orlandić, *U predvečerje sloma*, 236. Orlandić believed that Brezhnev did not know about this.
[1125] Ambasada SFRJ Konakri SSIP-u, January 24, 1980, DA MSP RS, PA 1980 SSSR, f. 120, d. 4, s. 45742.

meeting of the Special Committee on the Charter of the UN in Manila, reported about a heated verbal altercation with the Soviet delegates who approached them "very aggressively and nervously" and accused Yugoslavia of "speaking the language of American imperialism." The Soviet delegates insisted that Yugoslav public was under the influence of the Western media and that Yugoslavia often toed the line of reaction and imperialism like in the cases of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.[1126] These attacks on Yugoslavia's policies continued in the Soviet press. In the aftermath of Vrhovec's visit to India in the last days of February, Moscow's *Pravda* on March 13 reprinted an op-ed from the official organ of the Vietnamese Army, *Quân đội nhân dân*, in which Yugoslavia was accused of conducting policies against the USSR and "just struggles" of the Kampuchean and the Afghan peoples. The Vietnamese newspaper wrote that the Yugoslav press and some members of the leadership were in cahoots with China and the United States.[1127] The Yugoslav embassy in Moscow interpreted this article as a part of the "synchronized campaign" against Yugoslavia whose main objective was to isolate Yugoslavia in the NAM and discredit its policies by accusing Belgrade of working accordingly to the directions of Beijing and Washington.[1128] A Foreign Secretariat official said that the *Pravda* article went beyond press polemics and was reminiscent of Soviet

[1126] The Yugoslavs protested against this Soviet behavior and the same day one the Soviet delegates came to apologize and said that some of the things were said because of the heat in Manila. SSIP – Uprava za međunarodne odnose, March 3, 1980, DA MSP RS, PA 1980 SSSR, f. 120, d. 5, s. 413290.
[1127] "Комментарий вьетнамской газеты," March 13, 1980, *Правда*, 5.
[1128] Ambasada SFRJ Moskva SSIP-u, March 28, 1980, DA MSP RS, PA 1980 SSSR, f. 120, d. 5, s. 419527.

attacks on Yugoslavia after the Tito–Stalin split in 1948.[1129] Moreover, ordinary Yugoslav citizens in the USSR reported "unusual" treatment by the Soviet security organs, although not at the level of harassment as during the 1978 Guofeng visit.[1130]

The Soviets particularly disliked how the Yugoslav press treated the situation in Afghanistan. In February, Gromyko's deputy, Victor Maltsev, met with his Yugoslav colleague Milorad Pešić to discuss the international situation but also bilateral relations. Maltsev said that differences in Yugoslav and Soviet positions "were possible" but criticized the Yugoslav press for its treatment of the Soviet Union. "You said you want [good] relations, but what is the purpose of these writings?" Maltsev asked, noting that the Yugoslav newspapers disseminated Western "lies" about alleged Soviet preparations to attack Yugoslavia. "They are out of their head, this is nonsense, lies… and people believe it and that is very dangerous," Maltsev fulminated.[1131] Similarly, other Soviet officials complained about "attacks" in the Yugoslav press and the government passivity (if not complicity) in disseminating the anti-Soviet feelings among ordinary Yugoslavs. "With concern, we follow the creation of this artificial fear psychosis in Yugoslavia about the alleged Soviet threat that

[1129] Telegram, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, "Yugoslavia 3 – 4/80," box 57, JCPL.
[1130] SSIP – II Uprava Ambasadi SFRJ u Moskvi, February 26, 1980, DA MSP RS, PA 1980 SSSR, f. 120, d. 5, s. 411783.
[1131] Ambasada SFRJ Moskva SSIP-u, February 12, 1980, DA MSP RS, PA 1980 SSSR, f. 120, d. 4, s. 49348. Just days before the Pešić–Maltsev meeting, someone had erected a banner on one of the Belgrade's busiest streets that read: "Today the Russians are in Afghanistan, tomorrow they will be in your apartment ("*Danas su Rusi u Avganistanu, sutra u vašem stanu*"). A Soviet citizen reported this "provocation" to the Yugoslav embassy in Moscow. The Yugoslav government denied any involvement and even the idea that something like that was possible. Ambasada SFRJ Moskva SSIP-u, February 7, 1980, DA MSP RS, PA 1980 SSSR, f. 120, d. 4, s. 480058.

encourages anti-Soviet sentiments among Yugoslav cadres and ordinary people," the Soviet counselor in Sofia told the Yugoslav ambassador.[1132]

These incidents showed that the Yugoslav efforts to conduct "principled policy" but without provoking the Soviets were largely unsuccessful. Ambassador Orlandić claimed that one of the problems of Yugoslavia's policy vis-à-vis Moscow was its inconsistency. He wrote about Ljubičić's personal initiative to bring Soviet Defense Minister Dimitri Ustinov to Yugoslavia in January/February. Orlandić and the Foreign Ministry were kept in the dark about this Ljubičić's invitation despite general agreement that all high-level contacts with the Soviets should be postponed. "I asked myself whether post-Tito time has already started and with it, 'every man for himself' type of behavior," Orlandić wrote, adding that only Moscow benefited from this rogue action of the Yugoslav Defense Secretary.[1133] However, Yugoslavia's efforts were also unintentionally undermined by the Carter administration. Washington's loudly expressed commitment to Yugoslavia's security likely raised suspicions in Moscow that the Yugoslav leadership without Tito made some arrangement with the United States that would decrease the Soviet presence in Yugoslavia.[1134] The incessant criticism of the Soviet Union in the Yugoslav press further convinced Moscow that some members of the Yugoslav leadership encouraged Yugoslavia's shift toward the West and tried to turn public opinion against the USSR to make this transition possible. "There is one moment that complicates relations [between Yugoslavia

[1132] Ambasada SFRJ Sofija SSIP-u, April 18, 1980, DA MSP RS, PA 1980 SSSR, f. 120, d. 5, s. 424331.
[1133] Orlandić, *U predvečerje sloma*, 246.
[1134] Ambasada SFRJ Moskva SSIP-u, March 28, 1980, DA MSP RS, PA 1980 SSSR, f. 120, d. 5, s. 419527.

and the USSR]… and that is a demonstrative expression of Western support to Yugoslavia, particularly from the United States," Secretary Vrhovec stated.[1135]

The United States and the quest for Yugoslavia's security

The Afghan crisis and Tito's illness reactivated Washington's contingency plans for Yugoslavia.[1136] Already in November 1979, the administration outlined its response to the event of Tito's death or incapacity. "Tito's death will bring both opportunities and perils for U.S.–Yugoslav relations and for the future stability of the Balkans and of Europe," stated an analysis that was prepared for the White House. This analysis suggested that the U.S. task after Tito's death was to "project a sense of support to the new Yugoslav leaders" and further strengthen bilateral U.S.–Yugoslav relations.[1137] The memorandum suggested a consultation with U.S. allies and coordination of activities to support the new Yugoslav government. Moreover, Brzezinski indicated that some sort of coordination with the Soviets was necessary in order to reaffirm U.S. support for Yugoslavia's independence while, at the same time, the United States "must avoid any hint of collusion with the Soviets over the fate of Yugoslavia."[1138] On November 2, the

[1135] Stenografske beleške sa 29. proširene sednice Predsedništva Socijalističke federativne republike Jugoslavije, April 29, 1980, AJ, PSFRJ fond 803, k. 78.
[1136] In 1976, the Ford administration discussed a contingency plan in the case of Tito's death and concluded that a "major objective of Soviet policy will be to bring post-Tito Yugoslavia under its control" thus the Western approach would be to deter the Soviet Union from infringing upon Yugoslavia's sovereignty and independence. According to this analysis, the forms of Soviet pressure would include everything from diplomatic pressures and encouragement of the pro-Soviet elements within the LCY to a limited military intervention to support a possible secessionist movement to a full-scale military intervention. See Briefing Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, Document 82, undated, *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Vol. E–15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973–1976.
[1137] Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, November 6, 1979, NSA Brzezinski Material, Country File "Yugoslavia 1–12/79," box 86, JCPL.
[1138] Ibid.

Department of State proposed a draft statement that President Carter would deliver in the case of Tito's death that reassured the Yugoslavs of Washington's continuing support. The statement reaffirmed "the long-standing U.S. policy of support for the independence, the territorial integrity, and the unity of Yugoslavia" and expressed confidence in the new leadership.[1139] However, Eagleburger argued for a stronger message and proposed significant changes to the draft that emphasized the continuity of U.S. commitment to Yugoslavia's independence and a pledge that the United States "will do what we must to meet that commitment."[1140]

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Tito's admission to hospital in the early days of January 1980, made the quest for Yugoslavia's security one of the Carter administration's top priorities. Besides, the administration hoped to use Yugoslavia's influence in the NAM to condemn the Soviet invasion.[1141] On December 29, 1979, a State Department official from the Bureau of European Affairs, Harry Gilmore, told ambassador Lončar that the Soviet intervention undermined the basic principles of international order, adding that he hoped that

[1139] Department of State to Embassy Belgrade, Telegram 286331, November 2, 1979, 1979STATE286331, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed December 6, 2019).
[1140] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 08224, November 2, 1979, 1979BELGRA08224, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–79/Electronic Telegrams, RG 59, NARA (accessed December 6, 2019).
[1141] It is probable that the administration often overestimated Yugoslavia's real influence in the Third World. In November 1979, the administration hoped that Belgrade could use its influence in Iran and among nonaligned states to help with the release of the American hostages in Teheran. However, Yugoslavia's influence in Teheran was minimal and, in addition, because of the Yugoslav ambassador's poor health the country was represented by low-ranking diplomats. Also, U.S. efforts to use alleged Yugoslav influence were undermined by the U.S. government itself. Secretary Vance who planned to visit Belgrade in November indefinitely postponed his visit because of the hostage situation. The Yugoslavs who enjoyed high-level contacts obviously did not appreciate this Vance's gesture. For U.S. requests for Yugoslavia's aid see Zabeleška iz razgovora ambasadora SAD L. Eagleburger-a i ZSS M. Pešića obavljenog 16. XI 1979. SSIP – IV Uprava, November 19, 1979, DA MSP RS, PA 1979 Iran, f. 53, d. 4, s. 458719.

individual nonaligned states and the whole movement would react against this violation of Kabul's sovereignty rights.[1142] Jimmy Carter sent a letter to Tito on December 31 in which he expressed his concern about the events in Afghanistan and encouraged Tito to continue with their correspondence about current global issues.[1143] In January 1980, Brzezinski met with Lončar to see whether or not Yugoslavia would use its influence in the NAM to mobilize the movement against the Soviet invasion, reminding the Yugoslav ambassador that the issue of U.S.–NAM relations was of "great interest" for the administration.[1144]

Although the United States did not believe that a Soviet intervention against Yugoslavia was probable, Tito's illness and grim prognoses about his recovery presented a security dilemma of another kind. The policymakers in Washington correctly predicted that Tito's departure would be a serious trauma for the Yugoslav psyche. Yet, Washington expected that there would be a "relatively smooth transfer of power to a collegial leadership." An intelligence report stated that, in fact, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan created a certain sense of unity and underscored the need to fight Moscow's attempts to play a decisive role in Yugoslavia. "The Soviet-sponsored Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have revived Yugoslav fears

[1142] Ambasada SFRJ Vašington SSIP-u, December 29, 1980, DA MSP RS, PA 1980 Avganistan, f. 19, d. 12, s. 466465.
[1143] The Tito–Carter conversation continued despite Tito's poor health. Tito's miraculous yet short recovery in February and the specific writing style convinced the White House that Tito was actually behind some of those letters and not some of his associates.
[1144] Lončar politely rejected Brzezinski's overtures by saying that the NAM cannot replace the idea of "natural alliance" with the idea of "some other alliance." Yet, he advised Brzezinski that "now is the moment for the United States to take certain steps to satisfy legitimate and acute [economic] needs of developing countries." Ambasada SFRJ Vašington SSIP-u, February 9, 1980, DA MSP RS, PA 1980 SAD, f. 111, d. 13, s. 48757.

– never far from the surface – of Soviet expansionist activities in the Balkans, and these concerns will probably serve as the glue that keeps the leadership together," the report stated.[1145] The threat of Soviet intervention – both political and military – created an opening for U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia. As many in Washington predicted, the Yugoslavs would be looking to "us and our allies for reassurance" but warned that they would "not want to be embraced" or would "not welcome a US or allied over-reaction."[1146] Too overt U.S. support could unnerve the Yugoslavs always wary of being used as an object in the superpower competition, but also of provoking the Soviets if they see that Yugoslavia was decisively tilting toward the West. As Gromyko warned Vance in February 1980, the United States could "gravely burn its fingers in Yugoslavia."[1147]

This Yugoslav uneasiness with U.S. support that already created political and public relations problems for Belgrade in the Third World and the problem of triggering the Soviets determined the forms of U.S. assistance to Yugoslavia.

[1145] However, Washington did not believe in the ability of the collective presidency to provide long-term stability. Intelligence Memo, no date, January 1980, NSA Brzezinski Material, Country File "Yugoslavia 1/80," box 86, JCPL.

[1146] Memo, Peter Tarnoff to Zbigniew Brzezinski, January 19, 1980, NSA Brzezinski Material, Country File "Yugoslavia 1/80," box 86, JCPL, Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Vest), the Director of Policy Planning (Lake), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Bartholomew) to Secretary of State Vance, January 18, 1980, Document 277, *FRUS*, 1977–1980, Vol. XX, Eastern Europe.

[1147] On February 8, Secretary Vance sent a letter to Gromyko in which he stated that the United States and its allies "have no intention of interfering in Yugoslavia's internal affairs and would view any effort to weaken Yugoslavia's internal cohesion or undermine its independent foreign policy with gravest concern, as we understand you would." Letter From Secretary of State Vance to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, February 8, 1980, Document 260, *FRUS*, 1977–1980, Vol. VI, Soviet Union. Gromyko's response was harsh: "And what is the meaning of the sudden mention in your letter of Yugoslavia? Presumably it is not just because such a country exists on geographic maps? The fact that the US side for some reason deems it necessary to launch into a discourse about Yugoslavia inevitably prompts us to think that the US itself has some sort of ill-intentioned plans in this regard. But if this is so, the United States runs the risk of gravely burning its fingers in Yugoslavia." Letter From Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary of State Vance, February 16, 1980, Document 261, *FRUS*, 1977–1980, Vol. VI, Soviet Union.

First, the United States informed Yugoslavia that it would be more "forthcoming" toward Yugoslav requests for modern military technology that had been stalled for some time.[1148] Second, the U.S. government tightened its control over various émigré groups that were expected to increase their activities against Yugoslav diplomatic and economic offices and personnel. Third, the United States largely understood that Yugoslavia's economic problems could lead to the country's political instability. The CIA noted in its analysis that the "danger is minimal that Tito's passing from the scene… will cause serious disruption to the Yugoslav economy in the first several months." However, the Agency said that Yugoslavia's economic stability depended on two factors: internal political stability and the appropriate Western response to the country's economic problems.[1149] The Yugoslavs also urged the United States to provide greater support and understanding for Yugoslavia's economic troubles. Lončar told Brzezinski that unfavorable trade and financial arrangements were "pushing" Yugoslav economic enterprises toward the USSR.[1150] Finally, the United States

[1148] In January 1980, Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs Matthew Nimetz traveled to Belgrade. Before his trip he met with Lončar and signaled that he would bring "good news" about certain military equipment that Yugoslavia had requested, including the "Dragon" anti-tank guided missile system. See Ambasada SFRJ Vašington SSIP-u, January 4, 1980, DA MSP RS, PA 1980 SAD, f. 111, d. 13, s. 4584. The purchases of new military equipment required additional borrowing. In April, the Federal Executive Council agreed to increase expenditures for new military equipment, mostly anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons that would be purchased from the United States. The Secretariat of Defense even considered purchasing F-5F fighter jets from the United States.

[1149] Private Western banks expressed reluctance to lend money to Yugoslavia fearing its ability to pay it back due to possible internal disruptions in the event of Tito's death. The White House noted that the United States and its Western allies should "have a role in reassuring the business community and quieting alarmist concerns." The CIA indicated that the ability of the U.S. government to promote economic stability in Yugoslavia was "limited" and that the main role of the U.S.G. was to persuade the international financial community that Yugoslavia "remains credit-worthy." Memo, Peter Tarnoff to Zbigniew Brzezinski, February 2, 1980, NSA Brzezinski Material, Country File "Yugoslavia 2/80," box 86, JCPL.

[1150] Ambasada SFRJ Vašington SSIP-u, April 17, 1980, DA MSP RS, PA 1980 SAD, f. 111, d. 13, s. 424213.

started to make plans for Tito's funeral as an opportunity to engage in public diplomacy with tangible political benefits. "What we do in the first few days and weeks after Tito's death will have a major psychological and political impact on the Yugoslav leadership and on future Yugoslav attitudes."[1151]

Tito's last diplomatic feat

On May 4, the Yugoslav television interrupted its regular program. The screens went black for 30 seconds, followed by the announcement: "Comrade Tito has passed away."[1152] The Yugoslavs, at home and abroad alike, mourned the death of their beloved president. "People were running in all directions. . . Some were crying," later recalled one Yugoslav.[1153] The Yugoslav consulate in New York reported about a group of 50 Yugoslav citizens from Kosovo who gathered on Staten Island and "aware of the irreplaceable loss, crying, spontaneously started singing 'Comrade Tito, we swear to you'."[1154] The funeral four days later turned into a media and diplomatic spectacle that brought to Belgrade more than 200 delegations from 128 countries. This impressive attendance led the Yugoslav news agency TANJUG to call the funeral the "summit of mankind." Tito's funeral provided the Yugoslav leadership with an opportunity to display unity, to

[1151] Memorandum From Stephen Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), February 14, 1980, Document 282, *FRUS*, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe, 1977–1980.
[1152] The video of the announcement is available at https://youtu.be/92NR7S2YhsU (accessed December 7, 2019).
[1153] Cited in Marie-Janine Calic, *A History of Yugoslavia*, Translated by Dona Geyer (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2019), 251.
[1154] Konzulat SFRJ Njujork SSIP-u, May 6, 1980, DA MSP RS, Str. pov. 1980, f. 248, d. 866, s. 866.

advertise the vitality of the Titoist system and the accomplishments of Yugoslavia's self-management.

"The atmosphere, organization, and spontaneity of the event was imposing and serious," said António Lopes Cardoso from the Portuguese Left Union of Socialist Democracy.[1155] Members of other delegations also expressed their amazement at how the government organized the funeral. A functionary of the Greek Party of Democratic Socialism was astonished by the near-impeccable organization of the funeral and asked his hosts where they got "so many black Mercedeses?" Another Greek delegate admired the architecture of Novi Beograd – the crown jewel of Yugoslavia's socialist urbanism.[1156] "Everything is new [and] beautiful, one can sense Europe. You know, in Greece one can still sense the Orient."[1157] Similarly, delegates from other parties and organizations were satisfied with the organization of the funeral, collective expressions of grief, and the accomplishments of Yugoslavia's socialist modernity. Yugoslav officials who chaperoned these foreign delegations were tasked with reporting about their contacts with the foreigners but also with showing them around Belgrade in order to "acquire appropriate impressions" about Yugoslavia. The ultimate purpose of

[1155] Informacija o boravku u Jugoslaviji druga Antonio Poppe Lopes Cardoso, May 11, 1980, AJ, SSRNJ fond 142, A–298.
[1156] "The Partisan regime that had newly secured its hold on power [1944] did not merely want to recreate the Belgrade of the past – it wished to profoundly transform the city and to refashion it in the image of the new political and social order," Brigitte Le Normand wrote. Brigitte Le Normand, *Designing Tito's Capital: Urban Planning, Modernism, and Socialism in Belgrade* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2014), 25.
[1157] Informacija o prisustvu delegacije grčke Partije demokratskog socijalizma (KO. DI. SO.) na sahrani druga Tita 8. maja, May 10, 1980, AJ, SSRNJ fond 142, A–298.

this "funeral tourism" was to convince the world of Yugoslavia's stability and that the country would continue Tito's policy of nonalignment.[1158]

Funeral pomp not only displayed Yugoslavia's love for its president and the country's ability to carry on after the death of its founding father, but the impressive list of foreign dignitaries seemingly reaffirmed Yugoslavia's global role that Tito established. After deliberations in the Soviet Politburo, Brezhnev came to Belgrade.[1159] His decision motivated several other Eastern European leaders such as Zhivkov and Husak to attend the funeral.[1160] Castro, however, did not come "which showed that he isn't nonaligned," one guest remarked.[1161] However, to the dismay of the Yugoslav leadership, Jimmy Carter also did not come. Carter's decision to send Mondale, Harriman, and his mother, Lillian Carter, not only disappointed the Yugoslavs but also led to criticism at home that the U.S. administration let down Yugoslavia at the crucial moment for its future.

On February 13, Tito's condition was so critical that his death was expected at any moment. Ambassador Eagleburger wrote that Tito's death "would come as a severe shock to the Yugoslav government and people." He said that the

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[1158] Yugoslav officials reported only few protocolar gaffes, e.g. no one showed at the airport to meet Czechoslovak president, Gustáv Husák; somebody invited two factions of the French Socialist Party which led François Mitterrand to complain to his hosts: "How would you feel if you come to some congress and you find Djilas there?" Despite these minor issues, the funeral succeeded in displaying Yugoslavia's organizational abilities. The funeral, however, showed a distorted image of Yugoslavia. Luxury cars that the Greek delegate mentioned were recquisitioned from the companies and private citizens from all over Yugoslavia. The government made special arrangements to keep shops in Belgrade stocked with merchandise and foodstuffs so foreing delegates could see that there were no shortages in Yugoslavia.
[1159] Brezhnev's aide, Aleksandar-Agentov, wrote that Brezhev, ill himself and against the advice of his physicians, went to the funeral. Brezhnev's attendance showed that he personally liked the Yugoslav president. "Barely able to stand on his feet, he bravely stood as a pallbearer," Aleksandar-Agentov wrote. Александров-Агентов, *От Коллонтай до Горбачева*, 160–161.
[1160] Orlandić, *U predvečerje sloma*, 286.
[1161] Beleška o razgovoru predsednika SIV Veselina Đuranovića sa predsednikom Narodne republikanske partije Turske B. Edževitom, 9.5.1980. br 261/80, May 9, 1980, AJ, SSRNJ fond 142, A–298.

Yugoslavs "will be frightened" and that "they will need to be shown, and quickly, that the U.S. is a friend… the most effective way to demonstrate that support and friendship – and to show those who may doubt it that the USG is wholly committed to the survival of a stable and free Yugoslavia is for President Carter to head the U.S. delegation to President Tito's funeral."[1162] Although Eagleburger did not know who else would attend the funeral, he advised his superiors in Washington that the United States "should be leading." "Yugoslavia is strategically important to us and to the West… [and] the stakes for us are here high," Eagleburger pleaded.[1163] Stephen Larrabee from the National Security Council also argued that Carter should attend the funeral. In the last days of February, he wrote to Brzezinski that Trudeau, Schmidt, and Thatcher would be there. Besides, Larrabee wondered if the Rose Garden strategy could be temporarily suspended so that Carter could go to Tito's funeral.[1164] Carter's presence in Belgrade was important for U.S. prestige, particularly because, according to Larrabee's information, Brezhnev was not going to be there. Thus, Carter's visit would boost U.S. prestige in Yugoslavia and help the administration's objective to permanently tie the country to the West.

The uncertainty about Brezhnev's attendance and the domestic political issues related to Carter's reelection campaign made some administration officials reluctant to endorse Carter's trip to Yugoslavia. Brzezinski argued against it,

[1162] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 1165, February 13, 1980, NSA Brzezinski Material, Country File, "Yugoslavia 2/80," box 86, JCPL.
[1163] Ibid.
[1164] Memo, Stephen Larrabee to Zbigniew Brzezinski, February 28, 1980, NSA Brzezinski Material, Country File, "Yugoslavia 2/80," box 86, JCPL.

citing Carter's decision to skip the New Hampshire primary. However, Brzezinski was mostly concerned about the foreign policy implications of Carter's trip to Belgrade. Although it was unclear whether or not Brezhnev would attend the funeral, Brzezinski warned that if both Brezhnev and Carter went to Belgrade, a meeting between them would be a "major issue." "If you do not meet him, you will be severely criticized for refusing to deal with the Soviets at a dangerous time and you will bear the onus or any further deterioration in our relationship. If you do meet with him, the meeting is likely to contribute to a further aggravation of our relationship because of the positions you will have to take," Brzezinski cautioned.[1165] To avoid the controversy, Brzezinski advised, Vice President Mondale should go.[1166]

"Your presence in Yugoslavia as the head of an impressive U.S. delegation to Tito's funeral is an important symbol for the Yugoslavs – and for the Soviets," Acting Secretary of State Christopher Warren told Mondale. Warren said that Mondale's visit would reaffirm U.S. commitment to Yugoslavia's independence and territorial integrity.[1167] Although the administration claimed that the United States had been "ably represented," the decision to send Mondale was criticized as negligent. George H.W. Bush, who competed in Republican primaries slammed Carter's decision. Despite Carter's May 4th message to the Yugoslav people in which he reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to Yugoslav

[1165] Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, February 12, 1980, NSA Brzezinski Material, Country File, "Yugoslavia 2/80," box 86, JCPL.
[1166] Ibid. Jimmy Carter wrote on the memo: "My present inclination is to send Mondale and my mother."
[1167] Memo, Christopher Warren to Walter Mondale, May 6, 1980, NSA Brzezinski Material, Country File, "Yugoslavia: Briefing Book for the Tito Funeral, 5/80," box 87, JCPL.

sovereignty, Bush, said that Carter made a "big mistake" for failing to attend Tito's funeral. He suggested that the president's absence "slighted" the Yugoslavs, "at the time when that country has pulled away from the Soviet Union."[1168] Yet, Mondale's visit did provide some much-needed assurances to the Yugoslavs about U.S. confidence in the new government. Mondale met with the Chairman of the SFRY Presidium, Lazar Koliševski, and confirmed the administration's "enormous confidence in the new leadership and the future of the country."[1169] Mondale repeated Washington's commitment "to stand ready, as your friend, to be of assistance in ways you might think proper and appropriate, to achieve your objectives" and informed Koliševski that the administration was prepared to give economic aid to Yugoslavia and curb the activities of hostile émigré groups – two issues of enormous political and security importance for Yugoslavia.[1170] In June 1980, ambassador Lončar told Mondale that his visit was a good thing, particularly because he could see "where we are and where are we going, but also [Yugoslav] self-confidence and determination in regards to the future."[1171]

Many observers of the Yugoslav affairs in the late 1970s and the early 1980s resorted to a popular cliché that Tito's departure signaled the end of an era.

[1168] "Bush Says President Erred in Shunning Tito's Funeral," May 9, 1980, The *New York Times*, A22. Also, some attacked president's mother, Lillian, for wearing a white dress while she was paying respect to Tito. A. Harriman wrote that the Yugoslav government did not comment on her fashion choice, but added that she wore a black dress at the funeral. Note for file, June 10, 1982, AHP, box 600, folder 1, LOC.
[1169] SSIP IV Uprava Ambasadi SFRJ u Vašingtonu, May 27, 1980, DA MSP RS, PA 1980 SAD, f. 113, d. 23, s. 429687.
[1170] Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State, May 7, 1980, Document 290, *FRUS*, , 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe, 1977–1980.
[1171] Ambasada SFRJ Vasington SSIP-u, June 11, 1980, DA MSP RS, PA 1980 SAD, f. 111, d. 14, s. 434928.

Depending on their point of view, some predicted a post-Titoist apocalypse that would wipe out Tito's legacy, whether through internal disputes and/or foreign intervention.[1172] Those who were more optimistic believed that the Yugoslav leadership was capable of preserving Yugoslavia's independence and that the Titoist system would be able to operate without Tito. The Yugoslav leadership was certainly convinced of the latter and, as in the Koliševski–Mondale talks, tried to convince everyone else that in Yugoslavia it would be business as usual.[1173] Jimmy Carter, who visited Yugoslavia in June 1980 noted in his diary that the Yugoslav leaders were "all eager to carry on Tito's heritage" and that they were still referring to their country as "Tito's Yugoslavia."[1174]

The last year and a half of Tito's life was marked by both domestic and international crises that raised questions about the future of Yugoslavia. The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan one year later created the sense of insecurity that Yugoslavia might be next. The Yugoslavs believed that these acts created dangerous precedents in

[1172] This category included numerous émigré groups who believed that Tito's death would inevitably lead toward Yugoslavia's dissolution. In February, the Yugoslav consulate in New York reported about the announcement of the Croatian National Council (Hrvatsko nacionalno vijeće, HNV) that called the Yugoslav Croats to "stay put in a case of a foreign attack on Yugoslavia" and preserve their forces for the liberation of Croatia. On March 14, the HNV also bought a half-page add in the *New York Times* that read: "Yugoslavia will not survive." A few days later, the offices of Jugobanka in New York were bombed. Similarly, the Serbian Liberation Movement "Fatherland" (Srpski oslobodilački pokret "Otadžbina," SOPO) called on its sympathizers "to be ready because the changes are coming." Yugoslav diplomatic posts in Cleveland, OH, New York, Chicago, and Vancouver reported about increased Serb, Croat, but also Kosovar Albanian activities. Konzulat SFRJ Njujork SSIP-u, February 16, 1980, DA MSP RS, Str. Pov. 1980, f. 244, d. 309, s. 309.

[1173] In their talks with Brezhnev before the funeral, the members of the top LCY and state leadership told Brezhnev that they would "firmly" continue on Tito's road. "Our policies will still lay on three principles: unity and equality of [Yugoslav] nations and nationalities, self-management, and nonalignement." Запись беседы Генерального секретара ЦК КПСС Председателя Президиума Верховного Совета СССР Л. И. Брежнева с югославскими руководящими деятелями во время визита Л. И. Брежнева на похороны И. Броз Тито, May 7, 1980, Document 103, *DSPJ*, *Jugoslavija–SSSR*, 882.

[1174] Carter, *White House Diary*, 442.

interpreting and applying the doctrine of limited sovereignty that at a suitable moment could be used against Yugoslavia. Besides, Yugoslavia's foreign policy was on a defensive under the pressure of Cuba, which tried to "hijack" the NAM in the name of a "natural alliance" between the so-called progressive core of the movement and the USSR. Tito's efforts to preserve the movement from the progressives' encroachment came with a cost. The Havana Summit that the Yugoslavs quickly declared as their diplomatic victory showed that Tito's influence in the NAM was dissipating along with his health. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Yugoslavia's inability to rally nonaligned states proved that Yugoslavia's self-proclaimed victory in Havana was elusive. This crisis of the country's foreign policy combined with the economic crisis at home presented an existential threat to the regime and the future of the country. Kardelj's death in 1979 and Tito's incapacity in the first days of 1980 augmented these fears by raising the question of orderly succession in this multinational state.

These circumstances, however, provided favorable conditions for further improvement of U.S.–Yugoslav relations. During this period, as the Yugoslavs noted, U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia "experienced positive evolution." Beginning with the Tito–Carter meeting in 1978, the United States became more accommodating toward Yugoslavia's policy of nonalignment. The administration's interest in curbing Castro's and Soviet influence in the Third World coincided with Yugoslavia's struggle for primacy in the movement. The United States saw Yugoslavia not only as the counterbalance to Cuba's malevolent influence, but also as a useful intermediary in the Third World. The

United States (unsuccessfully) tried to use Belgrade's, as it turned out, nonexistent influence to resolve the Iran hostage crisis and also it encouraged Yugoslavia's efforts to mobilize nonaligned states against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In return, the Carter administration showed more sensitivity toward Yugoslavia's concerns about anti-Titoist émigré groups in the United States. Finally, Yugoslavia was largely spared from criticism about its human rights record. To the dismay of the enemies of the regime, the administration often commended the conduct of the Yugoslav government in the area of human rights. Those rare voices (Western NGOs, some journalists, and dissidents) who criticized the Yugoslav government were marginalized and toned down. In the first months of 1980 when the regime increased its repression against and surveillance of the real and perceived enemies, Eagleburger noted that the government "has acted with commendable restraint."[1175]

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Tito's illness increased the importance of U.S. diplomatic, political, and economic support to Yugoslavia. "In this phase of relations it is visible that [the United States] through its emphasis on the belief in the continuity of Yugoslavia's internal stability, its support of Yugoslavia's independence, territorial integrity, unity, security, and, what is novel, nonaligned position… reflects [U.S.] effort to consider our interests and the specific position of Yugoslavia, and in some cases even the evolution in their attitudes (particularly related to terrorism)," stated in an analysis prepared before

[1175] Embassy Belgrade to Department of State, Telegram 1725, March 4, 1980, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Country File, "Yugoslavia, 3–5/80," box 87, JCPL.

Carter's visit to Belgrade in June 1980.[1176] Carter's failure to attend Tito's funeral despite nudging of some members of his administration and criticism from his political opponents, did not undermine U.S.–Yugoslav relations as some feared. In the end, he visited Yugoslavia several weeks after Tito's death to demonstrate his support for the new leadership. This was, at the same time, the last visit of a U.S. president to Yugoslavia. Although inconsequential in practical terms, Carter's visit to Yugoslavia was a symbolic expression of U.S. support of Tito's project and his epigones. The Carter administration's plan to help Yugoslavia's transition from communism to social democracy was abandoned by the Reagan administration and with it an opportunity to prevent Yugoslavia's bloody dissolution ten years later.

[1176] Platforma povodom zvanične posete predsednika Sjedinjenih Američkih Država Džimi Kartera, June 10, 1980, Str. pov. br. 299/1, SSIP, AJ, PSFRJ fond 803, k. 80.

Instead of an Epilogue

In the 1970s, Yugoslavia went through a series of external and internal crises that led many foreign observers to be skeptical about the country's survival in the long run. The primary goal of my dissertation was to contextualize those crises within a larger framework of the global Cold War and Yugoslavia's relations with the United States and examine how Yugoslavia navigated the treacherous waters of détente while preparing for Tito's departure from the scene.

Yugoslavia's relations with the world were incoherent and full of contradictions that reflected the country's many identities and "in-betweenness" (East and West, European and nonaligned, socialist and independent, Mediterranean and Eastern European).[1177] This lack of coherent strategy had put Yugoslav foreign policy in the 1970s in a permanent crisis-management mode. Although the Belgrade regime welcomed Moscow's and Washington's initiatives to reduce the threat of nuclear annihilation (demonstrated during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis), it was uneasy with alleged power-sharing agreements. "We wanted them to talk, but now they are talking too much [with each other]," Tito often complained in the early 1970s.[1178] Belgrade offered its own vision of détente ("détente for the whole world") that would transcend superpower agreements. The Titoist regime reasoned that "limited" détente likely amounted to power-

[1177] One of these dilemmas was summarized by a LCY functionary: "We want to be a socialist state when we need the shop window in Gorky street [one of the most prestigious business and entertainment districts in Moscow], but we don't want to be under the umbrella of the Brezhnev Doctrine. That is a very complicated thing." Stenografske beleške sa 29. proširene sednice Predsedništva Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije održane 29. aprila 1980. sa početkom u 9,00 časova u Palati federacije, April 29, 1980, AJ, PSFRJ, fond 803, k. 78.

[1178] "At the [1961] Belgrade summit we said that the two superpowers should at least establish contacts. In regards to that they went further than we expected or wanted them to do." Tito told Sirimavo Bandaranaike in 1970. Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike sa premijerom Cejlona, gospođom Bandaranaike, September 7, 1970, AJ, KPR fond 837, I–4–a/9.

sharing deals that would be detrimental for small, neutral, and nonaligned states such as Yugoslavia. This conceptual difference over the character and scope of détente made Belgrade one of the staunchest critics of superpowers' détente.

Belgrade's response to détente was twofold. The constructive approach included the promotion of "détente for the whole world" at various multilateral forums (the NAM conferences, the UN, the CSCE) and through bilateral contacts with other countries. A more controversial aspect of Yugoslav policy included attempts to disrupt and undermine détente by interfering in regional political and military conflicts in Angola, Egypt, Cyprus, Ethiopia, and also Panama and Chile. This disruptive role tested U.S.–Yugoslav relations that by the mid-1970s reached the lowest point since 1948. However, despite these frequent frictions between Belgrade and Washington, the regime understood that the main danger for Yugoslavia's independence and sovereignty came from the East. From 1968 and 1980, the quality of U.S.–Yugoslav relations depended on how big of a threat the Soviet Union appeared to be to the Belgrade regime.

Why 1968?

1968 represented in many ways a watershed year in Yugoslav history. In 1968, a confluence of factors, a long time in the making, posed an existential problem for the regime.[1179] Faced with troubles at home (all-Yugoslav student protests and unrests in Kosovo) that questioned the regime's political legitimacy and the danger from abroad (the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia) that threatened Yugoslavia's independence, Tito

[1179] As Judit Bodnar aptly noted, the "global moment of '68 builds on trajectories influenced by earlier patterns of development." Judit Bodnar, "Making a Long Story Longer: Eastern Europe and 1968 as a Global Moment, Fifty Years Later," *Slavic Review* 77, no. 4 (Winter 2018): 873–880.

and his associates began elaborate and uncertain experiments in domestic and foreign policy. Tito's ultimate objective was to strengthen the country from inside by granting greater political and economic autonomy to different regions. A series of constitutional amendments from 1967 to 1971 created a basis for decentralization. These amendments also instituted a collective leadership that guaranteed, at least in theory, a smooth transition of power after Tito's death.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the doctrine of limited sovereignty (the Brezhnev Doctrine) forced Tito to redefine its foreign policy. The Western muted response to the intervention exacerbated Belgrade's fears that a "new Yalta" was in making. Under these circumstances, Yugoslavia had to expand and revive old and make new informal alliances to counterbalance the threat to its sovereignty. After 1968, Belgrade repaired relations with Washington and Beijing, strengthened its informal alliance with Romania and mended relations with Tirana, revived the NAM, began expansive (and expensive!) programs of foreign military aid to African liberation movements, and used its reputation to promote the concept of universal détente.

The honeymoon with the West, 1969–1972

The threat of Soviet interference that extended beyond the panicky days of August 1968 compelled Yugoslavia to seek support in the West. Similar to 1948, this rapprochement was, in Dennison Rusinow's words, "born of necessity, not of conviction."[1180] Although Soviet military intervention seemed remote, Belgrade was anxious about other forms of Soviet interference. Moscow criticized Yugoslavia's

[1180] Rusinow, *Yugoslav Experiment*, 32.

domestic and foreign policy, but also supported hostile émigré factions and encouraged discord among Yugoslav ethnic groups. Faced with Moscow's hostility, Belgrade turned to the United States. Moreover, Belgrade exercised its version of triangular diplomacy and, after a 12-year long hiatus, normalized relations with Beijing. Finally, Yugoslavia revived the moribund NAM.

Belgrade, however, remained wary of an agreement between Washington and Moscow that would be made at the expense of the independence and sovereignty of countries such as Yugoslavia. Détente as a power-sharing agreement became an obsession for the Yugoslav leadership. Yet, because of the Soviet threat, Belgrade assumed a constructive approach to détente. The main objective of this what I call constructive approach was to expand the meaning and practical implementation of détente. Yugoslavia promoted an international system that would democratize global affairs and include neutral and nonaligned states, small and large, in the process of relaxation. Belgrade called this plan "détente for the whole world."

The limitations of a constructive approach were apparent already in late 1971 and 1972. Moreover, the domestic political situation and "liberalism" that seemingly was getting out of control required the regime to assume a more authoritarian direction. The crisis in Croatia, the so-called Croatian Spring, shook the foundation of Tito's edifice and threatened its stability. In December 1971, Tito accused the Croatian leadership of "compromising us [Yugoslavia] before the world." "We can't allow that to happen," Tito said, putting the Croatian Spring to an inglorious end.[1181] Domestic instability provided

[1181] Autorizovane stenografske beleške sa 21. Sednice Predsedništva SKJ, December 1, 1971, AJ, PSFRJ fond 803, k. 8.

Yugoslav adversaries an opportunity to interfere in the country's domestic affairs but also portended greater foreign involvement after Tito's departure.

The disruptive phase, 1973–1976

Tito's, what Marie-Janine Calic called, "Bonapartist reaction" contributed to an increasingly anti-Western stance in its foreign policy. The removal of liberals in Croatia and Serbia in the process that was euphemistically called "democratic centralization" left many positions in the government and foreign policy apparatus to hardliners who disliked the West but were not necessarily pro-Soviet. Moscow was satisfied with (and felt vindicated by) Tito's suppression of liberal tendencies in Yugoslavia. After high-level meetings in 1971 and 1972 between the Soviet and the Yugoslav leaders, the Soviet threat to Yugoslav independence temporarily abated. These factors contributed to what I call a disruptive approach to détente. In 1973 and 1974, Belgrade became the harshest critic of Washington's global policies. The purpose of this Yugoslav vague "anti-imperialist" stance that amounted to unrestrained criticism of the United States was to enlarge Yugoslavia's revolutionary and "progressive" credentials in the Third World. Détente but also the Sino–Soviet competition in the Third World threatened to tear apart the NAM. In this context, Belgrade concentrated its efforts to undermine détente, i.e., to spoil the establishment of the alleged spheres of influence. In 1973/4, Yugoslavia engaged in political crises and military conflicts in Latin America, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa by providing diplomatic, material, and military assistance to nonaligned governments and liberation movements. "On many of those issues,

Yugoslavia always went further and it was harsher than the USSR," a U.S. official remarked.[1182]

Yet, in 1975, Belgrade moderated its radical position toward the Third Word. The success of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in Helsinki in August 1975, in which Yugoslavia played an important role, temporarily reduced Belgrade's anxiety over a "new Yalta." The Helsinki conference confirmed the inviolability of state borders and allowed some reduction of forces in Europe. At the same time, however, Moscow increased its efforts to "bring back" Yugoslavia. The April 1974 Cominformist affair confirmed that the Soviet long-term interest was to turn to the status quo ante 1948. Similarly, the 1976 East Berlin Conference of European communist parties once again demonstrated Moscow's desire to strengthen its ideological and political influence in Yugoslavia.

Although a truce between Belgrade and Moscow began to crumble in 1974/5, the United States was unable to perceive the growing gap between the two communist countries. First, consumed by Watergate and other larger foreign policy priorities, the Nixon and the Ford administrations did not fully grasp the intricacies of Yugoslavia's international position. Second, Yugoslavia's involvement in Angola enraged U.S. policymakers, but also spurred them to look at Belgrade's engagement in the context of Moscow's policy in Sub-Saharan Africa and not in its own right. Finally, the U.S. ambassador in Belgrade, Laurence Silberman, a political appointee who replaced the

[1182] Zabeleška o razgovoru V. Matića, referenta u Upravi za Severnu Ameriku sa A. Thompsonom I sekretarom ambasade SAD na dan 7. XI 1973, November 8, 1973, DA MSP RS, PA 1973 SAD, f. 93, d. 18, s. 448629.

capable Malcolm Toon, believed that pressure rather than accommodation was the best way to deal with the Belgrade regime.

The end of Tito's diplomacy, 1977–1980

The election of Jimmy Carter in November 1976 but also the stabilization of China's domestic and foreign policies after the removal of the so-called Gang of Four allowed Belgrade to normalize its relations with Washington after three tumultuous years and renew contacts with Beijing. The Carter administration took a new course toward Yugoslavia, with the ultimate goal of transforming this socialist state into a "social-democracy of the Western European type." The administration assumed a more tolerant attitude toward Yugoslavia's Third World policy (demonstrated in the administration's mild admonishment of Belgrade's involvement in the Horn of Africa) and fostered cordial relations with the state and party leadership.

However, these diplomatic victories that Belgrade scored in Washington and Beijing came at a price. Moscow was uneasy with Belgrade's rapprochement with Washington, but even more with the development of Sino–Yugoslav relations. Already in decline, Soviet–Yugoslav relations rapidly deteriorated after Tito's trip to China in 1977 and the 1978 Hua Guofeng visit to Yugoslavia.

Poor Yugoslav–Soviet relations marked Tito's last three years. This time, however, Yugoslavia also had to ward off Havana's influence in the Third World. After Cuban success in Angola in 1975/6, Fidel Castro assumed a more assertive policy toward the Third World. Castro promoted the theory of a "natural alliance" between the Nonaligned Movement and the USSR that undermined one of the main tenets of

Yugoslavia's foreign policy. His revolutionary zeal not only threatened to tear the NAM apart, but also undermined Tito's revolutionary prestige. Despite diplomatic successes in improving its relations with the United States and China, Yugoslavia faced Soviet and Cuban threats that limited its maneuvering space in the Third World. These threats culminated at the 1979 Havana Summit.

Yugoslavia's position further deteriorated in December 1979 when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, thus reactivating, in a way, the Brezhnev Doctrine. With the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea a year earlier, these two events created the sense of insecurity that the Soviets, directly or via Bulgaria, would attack Yugoslavia if given the opportunity. The situation further worsened a few days later when the 88-year old Yugoslav president became practically incapacitated. Tito's illness dealt an enormous psychological blow to the Yugoslavs but also had put in charge a collective body of the party and state bureaucrats – a group of indistinguishable men in polyester suits without a trace of personal charisma. "When Tito was active in international affairs, we could fail to do many things, here and there, but his presence, his statement, and his restless activity would fix that. We could even allow ourselves to make many mistakes, but those were easily fixed by Tito's actions," one member of the SFRY Presidium confessed.[1183] After 1980, they were on their own.[1184]

[1183] Stenografske beleške sa 29. proširene sednice Predsedništva Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije održane 29. aprila 1980. sa početkom u 9,00 časova u Palati federacije, April 29, 1980, AJ, PSFRJ fond 803, k. 78.

[1184] After Tito's departure, Yugoslav foreign policy priorities changed. In 1985, a Yugoslav report noted that since 1982 none of the members of the SFRY Presidium or the Federal Executive Council visited Sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, the report stated that more Yugoslav diplomats worked in the consulate in Munich than in all countries of Sub Saharan Africa combined. Društveno-politička kretanja u Africi sa osvrtom na mesto i ulogu SFRJ i odnose sa afričkim zemljama, no date, April 1985, br. 421092, SSIP, AS, fond 1271, k. 6.

U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia in this period showed a remarkable consistency and patience. Washington's long-term goal was to preserve Yugoslavia's independence and stability. Although the Balkans did not figure prominently in U.S. foreign policy, instability in Yugoslavia (internal or caused by Soviet intervention) threatened to destroy the balance of power in Europe that could even lead to a world war. A U.S. diplomat said that Yugoslavia was "one of the three or four most likely areas which, if mishandled, could spark a third World War or a U.S.-Soviet confrontation."[1185] Thus, the country required Washington's special attention that was reflected in U.S. political and economic support of Yugoslavia's independence and nonalignment, but also American tolerance of Yugoslavia's "anti-imperialist" escapades in global affairs.

In the 1960s, John Campbell wondered if preserving Yugoslav independence was worth it. His answer was yes. However, the history of U.S.–Yugoslav relations in the 1970s would require a more nuanced response. Yugoslavia provided stability on NATO's Southern Flank, but it also undermined the American interests elsewhere. Kissinger, Stoessel, and others were aware of this, but still could not resist the appeal of the "wedge strategy" that the Yugoslav example offered. The Nixon and the Ford administration wanted to preserve the status quo in Yugoslavia, still believing that the benefits of Yugoslav independent position in Europe outweighed the disruptions that it caused elsewhere. The Carter administration approached Yugoslavia in a different manner, but, by 1977, Belgrade's position also had changed. Carter, Brzezinski, and Vance found

[1185] Charles Stuart Kennedy and Ronald J. Neitzke, Interview with Ronald J. Neitzke, no date, 2010, Frontline Diplomacy, LOC. Available at https://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib001607/. (accessed December 23, 2019).

Yugoslavia a useful ally in the Third Word. The administration believed that Belgrade could suppress and moderate Havana's influence in the NAM.

These issues demonstrated that Washington's policy toward Yugoslavia went beyond bilateral relations and included larger issues in U.S. relations with the world in the 1970s, such as its policy toward the Balkans and Eastern Europe, European security, the Middle East, and the Third World in general.

Was Yugoslavia important?

The question that every analysis of Yugoslav foreign policy must ask is, did Yugoslavia matter? Yugoslav sources offer a story of triumph, often inflating Tito's and the country's influence and importance in global affairs. Applying rigorous critical analysis of Yugoslav documents and personal narratives, this dissertation tried to provide a fresh appraisal of Belgrade's foreign policy. Yugoslavia was a good example of a small country punching above its weight. Its policies, demonstrated in the cases of the Middle East, Angola, and Ethiopia, often directly influenced local dynamics on these Cold War battlefields. Belgrade's engagement in the CSCE provided a louder voice to European neutral and nonaligned states in determining the collective destiny of the continent. Nonetheless, these policies also showed the limitations of Yugoslavia's global activism. By the end of the decade, Yugoslavia's influence in Egypt, Angola, and Ethiopia all but evaporated.

Despite Belgrade's failure to transform global order, the case of Yugoslavia offers a good opportunity to observe and study phenomena and processes that marked the 1970s. A look into the Yugoslav ambivalent attitude toward détente offers an

opportunity to rethink détente as a global process. As the Yugoslav case suggests, détente was not only criticized as "immoral" by domestic audiences, as Jusi Hanhimäki had showed, but also globally.[1186] One can argue that Yugoslavia's idiosyncratic position does not allow general conclusions about global attitudes toward détente. I argue, however, that Yugoslavia's anxiety over a "new Yalta" – specific to Yugoslavia's unique historical experience in World War II – tapped into the existent and prevalent fears (particularly in the Third World) about spheres of influence. Yugoslavia's geopolitical position, its prominence in multilateral organizations, and Tito's flair for diplomacy made Belgrade one of the staunchest and loudest critics of détente. Thus, my dissertation proposes to look at the collapse of détente not only through the lens of domestic politics or superpower relations but from the perspective of détente's international detractors and a global lack of interest in superpower agreements.

[1186] Hanhimäki wrote that in the United States détente was criticized as "immoral" and that it was weakening U.S. hand in its relations with the Soviet Union. For these reasons, Hanhimäki said, détente became a "political liability." Hanhimäki, *The Rise and Fall*, 77.

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