Influence of Self-Schema on Applicant Faking

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M.A. in Human Resource Management, May 2003, The George Washington University

A Dissertation submitted to

The Faculty of
Columbian College of Arts and Sciences
of The George Washington University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May 15th, 2011

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Dedication

The author wishes to dedicate this dissertation to his wife, Allison Martin, his parents Marcie St. Germain and Barry Martin, his grandparents Merrill and Alene Martin and Raymond and Charlotte St. Germain, and to all of his family and friends. The infinite love and support you all have given me through the years is what made this body of work possible. I am forever grateful.

Acknowledgement

The author wishes to acknowledge Dr. Nicholas Vasilopoulos, Dr. David Costanza, Dr. Nils Olsen, and Dr. Charles Maclane for serving on my dissertation committee. Their guidance and support were integral throughout the development of this dissertation. A special thanks to Dr. Nicholas Vasilopoulos for all of his guidance and support throughout my doctoral journey. His wisdom and honesty has always been a reliable guide. I also acknowledge all of my classmates for their input and support over the years. I am especially grateful for all of the support my colleagues at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management have given me through the years. I would like to thank Dr. Brigitte Schay and Dr. Patrick Sharpe who supported my professional and academic development throughout my graduate career. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for without their love and support throughout my life, and especially during my graduate career, this dissertation would never have been accomplished.

Abstract of Dissertation

Influence of Self-Schema on Applicant Faking

In this study, the impact of faking on the criterion-related validity of and response latencies to a personality test were explored by taking into account an applicant's cognitive schema, as well as various individual difference and environmental variables that have received support in past research. A primary focus of this study was on the influence an applicant's cognitive schema had on item responses and response times to a personality measure. Cognitive schema, as defined by Markus (1977), has not been investigated with regard to its influence on applicant faking of personality responses. In addition, participant's cognitive ability, response motivation, and level of job familiarity, as well as the influence of a warning were investigated due to past empirical support. Six hypotheses were tested. Results were not supportive of the hypotheses. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The research demonstrating that personality tests offer a useful method for selecting employees has resulted in their increased use in organizational settings (Pace & Borman, 2006). While personality tests have been found to yield acceptable levels of criterion-related validity (see Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001), practitioners continue to express concern that the utility of self-report measures such as personality tests are compromised by applicant faking (Goffin & Christiansen, 2003) – the "vulnerability of psychological instruments to deliberate systematic distortion of answers by respondent's intent upon creating a particular impression of him or herself" (Gordon & Gross, 1978, p. 772). Indeed, there is ample evidence that respondents can significantly inflate their scores on personality tests when motivated to do so (e.g., Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy,, 1990; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Korbin, 1995; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin 1998; Stark, Chernyshenko, Chan, Lee, & Drasgow, 2001).

While it is clear that individuals can inflate their scores on personality tests, the impact of applicant faking on the utility of personality tests is a subject of debate. Researchers concerned about faking argue that it represents response distortion or error variance that limits the ability to interpret personality trait information (e.g., Stark et al., 2001). Another concern is the finding that applicants who fake are disproportionately represented at the top of the score distribution (Christiansen, Goffin, Johnston, & Rothstein, 1994; Rosse, et al., 1998; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2003). On the other hand, there are researchers who argue that measures of faking capture substantive trait variance (e.g., Block, 1965; Nicholson & Hogan, 1990; Smith & Ellingson, 2002). This position is supported by research that showed that statistical

controls for faking had little effect on criterion-related validity (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996). Despite the substantial amount of research, the effect of faking on personality tests used for selection purposes remains unclear.

This study attempts to provide unique insights into the impact of faking on the criterion-related validity of personality tests by considering the potential role of an applicant's self-schemas – cognitive structures constructed from information processed by the individual in the past and influence both input and output of information related to the self (Markus, 1977).

One of the primary benefits of incorporating the self-schema framework into our overall understanding of applicant behavior is its "whole person" approach to understanding the self. By examining an applicant's self-schema, we are able to understand full-circle how an applicant's cognitive structure influences and translates into behavior, and how this behavior in turn influences cognitive structures.

A key focus of this study is comparing the difference between an individual's "true-self" and "applicant" schemas. The true self is representative of a self-concept formulated when there is little to no influence from situational forces. In contrast, the applicant self is representative of a self-concept that reflects the influence of an applicant situation. Historically, researchers seeking to understand the cognitive structures and processes that underlie different manifestations of the self have compared differences in self-report item response latencies – the elapsed time between item presentation and item response. Response latencies have shown to be reliable indicator of schema strength (Markus, 1977) as well as an index of cognitive elaboration (Chaiken, 1980). Accordingly, several of the main hypotheses tested in this research explore moderators of

the relationship between item response latencies obtained in true self and applicant conditions. As described below, understanding the applicant self requires a consideration of the concepts and processes that define the true self.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Self-Concept

While the idea of a "self" dates back thousands of years, current notions of a self-concept were most clearly proposed in the twentieth century. Two of these theories, *trait (or disposition) theory* (Allport, 1955, 1961), and *self-schema theory* (Markus, 1977) are particularly relevant to understanding how examinees respond to items on a self-report personality test. Both of these theories are discussed next; however, more attention is given to self-schema theory because it is the model used to form hypotheses in this study.

Trait Theory

At the core of trait theory is the idea that the structure of the self is defined in terms of traits (Allport, 1937; 1955, 1961). Trait theory is lexically derived in that its roots are based on early work by researchers such as Allport and Odbert (1936) who identified nearly 18,000 terms in the dictionary that could be used to describe a person. The underlying rationale of the lexical approach to personality – and the reason that the dictionary was used to identify traits – is that relevant trait terms become embedded in that language of a given culture.

Allport (1936) argued that every individual could be defined in terms of a "disposition" that is defined in terms of a unique set of traits - *central traits*, *secondary*

traits, and *cardinal traits*[1]. He identified three trait types that can be used to define an individual – Central traits serve as the building blocks of an individual's personality and are considered stable across time and situation. The typical person has between five and ten central traits. Examples of central trait labels include smart, wild, and shy. S*econdary traits are* preferences, attitudes, and/or situationally based traits that are neither overt nor consistent. Examples of secondary traits include being kind most of the time but becoming selfish during other situations. Finally, *cardinal traits* dominate and shape a person and define his or her life. Cardinal traits are more the exception to the rule as most people do not have a single theme that shapes their life. An example of a cardinal trait is Mother Theresa's altruism.

Subsequent models of the self built on trait theory by incorporating information-processing models of cognitive functioning. Like trait theory, information-processing models propose that the self-concept is comprised of central and secondary cognitive structures. The distinguishing feature of information processing models is that that they include the presence of more elaborate cognitive structures, such as prototypes (Kuiper, 1981) and self-schema (Markus, 1977). In this way, the models address the underlying structure of self-knowledge as well as how this self-knowledge might be applied in everyday life (Fekken & Holden, 1992). For the purposes of this research, self- schema theory is used to understand the processes involved in making personality item responses.

Self-Schema Theory

[1] Allport originally used the term traits and later switched to dispositions. Fellow researchers of his time used the term 'trait' to describe how individuals viewed others, and the term 'dispositions' to describe characteristics within the individual. I use the term trait throughout my discussion as it is currently operationalized as internal characteristics of individuals, whereas dispositions are considered to be a "unique set of traits".

In her seminal work, Markus (1977) defined a *self-schema* as cognitive generalizations about the self derived from experiences that organize and guide the processing of self-related information contained in the individual's social experience. A self-schema includes cognitive representations derived from specific events and situations involving the individual (e.g., I hesitated before speaking in class this morning because I wasn't sure I was right, only to hear a classmate make the same point.) as well as the more general representations derived from the repeated categorization and subsequent evaluation of the person's behavior when alone and by others around him (e.g., I am very talkative in familiar groups, but tend to be shy in groups of strangers) and broad self-categorizations (e.g., I am talkative). Like any schema, self-schemas are dual natured in that they are viewed in terms of both structure and a process (Markus & Wurf, 1987).

Self-Schema Formation and Strength. Self-schemas are constructed from information processed by the individual in the past, influence both input and output of information related to the self, and represent the differentiation and articulation of the self in memory. A self-schema can form as a result of both a self-assessment and from comparisons to and/or direct interactions with others. One of the most powerful determinants of self-schema formation is the configuration of the immediate social environment (Markus & Wurf, 1987). In most situations, an individual focuses on the personal aspects that distinguish him or her from others. For example, an overweight child will notice his weight in a gym class full of children considered to be of normal weight. In this way, social comparisons can be a potent source of knowledge. Information about the self is also derived through direct interaction with others. For

example, having a cup of coffee with a friend who was at the same party could provide you feedback on your level of extraversion.

For any trait, the self-schema conceptualization defines three types of individuals (Markus, 1977). Schematic individuals are defined by one of the two ends of the trait continuum. These individuals view themselves as extreme on the trait, and consider the trait highly important to their self-conception. For example, individuals schematic on the introversion/extroversion trait (i.e., introverts and extroverts) view themselves as either extremely introverted (or extremely extroverted), and believe introversion (or extroversion) is highly important to their self-description. Aschematic individuals, on the other hand, do not view themselves in terms of the trait (i.e., they do not possess either an introversion or extroversion self-schema). Research suggests that individuals schematic in a domain have an elaborate and accessible self-schema that contains detailed knowledge about our trait-related behavior and that influences the way we process information about ourselves. In addition, a well-developed schema structure leads to more general expertise about the trait in consideration (Kunda, 1999).

The strength of a self-schema is based on the amount of experience in the domain as well as the amount of attention or importance attached to the domain. An established self-schema serves as a selective mechanism that determines the information attended to, how the new information is structured, the importance of the information, as well as the resulting behavior. While the strength of a self-schema largely determines the extent to which it is resilient to inconsistent and contradictory information, a self-schema is never totally invulnerable to change (Markus, 1977).

Self-Schemas, Information Processing, and Behavior. A strong self-schema can have a profound influence on how individuals process information as well as their patterns of behavior across situations. As previously mentioned, a self-schema is a representation of consistent patterns of behavior that provides a framework for generating inferences based on little information, or to quickly streamline and interpret complex sequences of events. Self-schemas support our understanding of intentions and feelings, and in identifying expected or appropriate patterns of behavior (Markus, 1977). Finally, self-schemas are more than a collection of past behaviors; they allow individuals to go beyond the information currently available to generate future judgments, decisions, and predictions about the self. Thus, a person with a developed self-schema is able to (a) process information about the self in the given domain (e.g., make judgments or decisions) with relative ease, (b) retrieve behavioral evidence from the domain, (c) predict his or her own future behavior in the domain, and (d) resist counter schematic information about the self. Consistency in patterns of response on multiple self-description tasks, as well as convergence in results from a number of diverse cognitive tasks involving self-judgments provides the evidence for the existence of an organization of self-knowledge on a particular dimension of behavior, or a self-schema (Markus, 1977).

The schematic concept has been supported in similar veins of research, namely in the area of *Traitedness Theory*. Baumeister and Tice (1988) defined the term metatrait or Traitedness as "the having versus not having a particular trait" (p. 573). Their research found that when a personality dimension is important to an individual, he or she is considered "traited" and would be expected to consistently exhibit trait-related behaviors

across situations. Measures of traitedness are based on the variance of self-ratings across items designed to assess a trait. An empirical link between the concepts of schemas and traitedness was provided by Siem (1998), who found that schematic individuals tend to be more behaviorally consistent in their item responses than are aschematic individuals. Thus, scale variability (i.e., meta-traits) and response latency to personality items (i.e., self-schemas) are related in that as item scale variability decreases, item level response latencies decreased (i.e., faster latency times).

In sum, while, Traitedness and self-schema models propose that the self-concept moderates the relationship between personality traits and behavior (Siem, 1998); the two concepts allude to the prediction of similarly moderated outcomes. As previously stated, the self-schema concept is used in this research because it offers a more complex and flexible understanding of the trait.

Working Self-Concept

While the previous discussion cast the self-concept as stable in nature (i.e., extroverts are outgoing in all situations), empirical findings suggested that self-conceptions often vary from one situation to another (e.g., Greenwald & Pratkamis, 1984; Kunda, 1999). These findings led to the proposal of models depicting the self in multidimensional terms, such as Markus and Kunda's (1986) *Working Self-Concept* (WSC). According to this model, the set of self-schemas active at any given moment are dependent on (a) environmental factors, (b) personal motivations, (c) the most recently active self-schemas. Thus, the WSC is best viewed as a continually active, shifting array of accessible self-knowledge that is both stable in that it includes one's enduring self-

knowledge and malleable in that different elements of self-knowledge are activated across different occasions (Kunda, 1999).

An important aspect of the WSC concept offered by Markus and Kunda (1986) differentiates between core self-schemas that provide the stability of the self and peripheral self-schemas that provide the malleability of the self. Core self-schema provides the stability of the self because they are relatively unresponsive to motivational factors and social circumstances. For example, many individuals suffering from depression possess a core self-schema of helplessness (Markus & Wurf, 1987). Due to their importance in defining the self and their extensive elaboration, core self-schemas are chronically accessible in the WSC. The chronic accessibility of core self-schemas makes them enduring personality or schema structures that contribute to stable patterns of individual experience and to differences among individuals (Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982). In contrast, peripheral self-schemas vary in accessibility depending on the individual's affective or motivational state and/or the prevailing social conditions. For example, the negative self-conception of feeling foolish or awkward may become salient when an individual makes an ill-considered comment to a co-worker. However, one's motivational state of wanting to seem emotionally stable in your co-worker's eyes can override the awkward feeling by recruiting from one's self-knowledge universe memories of the self as tactful and socially skilled. Thus, social circumstances, in conjunction with self-motives (e.g., self-other differentiation), can determine the contents of the WSC (Markus & Kunda, 1986; Markus & Wurf, 1987).

In short, the self is not a unitary structure that exists within a vacuum. Self-schema theory describes the self as a multidimensional entity comprised of enduring core

self-conceptions and temporally activated self-conceptions, namely the working self-concept. This theoretical postulate allows for both stability and the necessary malleability to function in an ever-changing world. The working self-concept also affords a framework for better understanding how individuals respond to stimuli in the environment and, for the purpose of this research, how individuals respond to self-report measures.

Self-Conceptions and Personality Item Responses

The Working Self-Concept provides an encompassing framework for understanding an individual's reactions and responses to environmental stimuli. In the following sections, the schema framework is used to understand the cognitive processes involved in responding to items on a self-report measure of personality.

A Latency-based Indicator of Cognitive Processes

The notion that latencies are reflective of respondent characteristics derives from the interpretation of projective tests such as the Rorschach, where deviations from average response times were considered a sign of unusual emotionality (Bartley, 1958). Longer response times were considered reflective of the subject's suppression of an initial, revealing answer and the subsequent search for substitute responses. Holden, Fekken, and Cotton's (1991) conceptualization of this relationship asserts that a systematic relationship exists between the presence of a schema and the speed of a personality item response. Neubauer and Malle (1997) found that individuals who respond habitually fast to items measuring a personality construct have more elaborate and well-structured self-schema for the measured construct and have higher validity coefficients than do individuals that respond more slowly. Further evidence that

differential test item response latencies are valid indices of schema structure across comes from research showing the relationship holds across (a) different scales and psychological factors, (b) criteria derived from both self-report and ratings by significant others, and (c) both non-clinical and clinical samples (Holden, Fekken, & Cotton, 1991; Holden and Kroner,1992; Vasilopoulos, Reilly, & Leaman, 2000). Finally, consistent with the idea that schematics represent the two ends of a trait continuum, Kupier (1981) reported significantly faster item response latencies for individuals scoring at either high or low on a scale measuring a trait than did individuals scoring in the middle of the scale (Kuiper, 1981).

There is also evidence that item response speed depends on whether the response is congruent or incongruent with the referenced schema (Holden et al., 1991). For example, a job applicant who possesses the cognitive structure of a qualified job candidate (QJC) schema can more effectively expedite the search for information justifying the endorsement of an item or items that are schema relevant. Conversely, the response decision is delayed when an applicant makes the decision that a particular QJC-relevant item is incongruent with his or her QJC schema. This delay occurs because the applicant must examine the breadth of information that makes up his or her QJC schema against the trait or behavior being described in the item and respond accordingly. Past research postulates that the endorsement of an item is a simpler process than rejection (Neubauer & Malle, 1997). An individual who endorses the item found a match between the item content and an element of his or her self-schema, which is a relatively simple similarity judgment. In contrast, an individual who rejects the item as self-descriptive failed to find this match. Consequently, the process of rejecting a schema relevant item is

slow because the applicant must wade through an unorganized and diverse amount of information to reach the decision. An aschematic's decision to reject the item is much slower because the search process reveals no match of the item content to the schema related information he or she has stored about the self. Research has found that when a response is congruent with a self-schema responses are faster than when a response is non-congruent with the self-schema (Ebbesen & Allen, 1979, Kuiper & Derry, 1981, and Holden, Fekken, & Cotton, 1991). In sum, these studies support an information-processing model specifying the existence of a cognitive structure influences the speed of responding to relevant stimuli and that differential response latencies are valid indicators of covert cognitive structure (i.e., schema).

Personality Item Response Process

Building on Roger's (1974a, 1974b) item response model, Holden et al. (1991) proposed a three-stage model of the cognitive processes involved in self-reports. At each stage, response latencies are influenced by both item characteristics and individual differences. In the first stage, *stimulus encoding*, response latency is a function of reading speed and item length, with faster reading speed and shorter items associated with faster item response latencies (Holden, Fekken, & Jackson, 1985; Tetrick, 1989). In the second sage, s*timulus comprehension*, response latency is a function of verbal ability and item ambiguity, with higher verbal ability and reduced item ambiguity associated with faster response latencies (Rogers, 1973). The third stage involves self-reflection and is labeled *self-referent decision*. In this stage, an individual compares the item content to the relevant self-schema, with response latencies a function of schema organization and item controversiality. Those items consistent with the referenced self-schema and items

that are less controversial (in comparison to the referenced self-schema) are associated with faster latencies (Cross and Markus, 1994; Holden et al., 1991; and Markus, 1977). This stage can be further broken down into two sub-stages, namely *referent decision* and *response selection*. While going through referent decision, a respondent compares the item content to a cognitive structure that defines the attributes of the image they intend to portray. The referent decision response is used by the participant to select the appropriate response among the given response options. During response selection, response latency is a function of motor skills and the number of response options. Better dexterity and fewer response options are associated with faster latencies (Holden et al., 1991).

Most test item respondents go through the same process during the first two stages of test item response. An example of a deviation would be when random responding occurs. It takes the successful completion of the first two stages to make an informed response. However, as previously discussed, not all respondents respond in a manner consistent with his or her true self. Some respondents will engage in faking versus an honest response.

Honest Item Response Process. Research suggests that a respondent who responds honestly to a personality item compares the item content to a relevant self-schema (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Popham and Holden (1990) extended the schema conceptualizations offered by Kuiper (1981) and Markus (1977) by hypothesizing that item response latencies for the MMPI would be consistent with the pattern of latencies reported for descriptive adjectives. They proposed that high scale scores would be associated with faster item response latencies to endorsed scale-keyed items (extremely close to schema) and that lower scale scores would be associated with faster response

latencies to rejected scale-keyed items (extremely distant from schema). Results revealed that response latencies for endorsed items were negatively correlated to MMPI scale scores, which indicated that schema consistent items (those keyed to scale) required less time to process and respond to. Further analyses revealed that response latencies for rejected items were positively correlated with scale scores, which indicated that longer response latencies resulted when high-scale score participants rejected schema-consistent items. The latter results can be considered indicative of "controversial" items (Rogers, 1974) as they are moderately like the self but not enough so to be endorsed.

Arguably the most comprehensive model of the honest response process was offered by Holden, Fekken and Cotton (1991)'s model of "differential test item responding" that states that respondents compare the personality item content with their cognitive schema and respond accordingly. As previously stated, schemas contain knowledge about the self that is highly integrated as well as information on how this knowledge should be applied (Rumelhart, 1984). The structural component of the schema is what is ultimately assessed and this structural component is generally operationalized in trait level terms (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). For example, an individual scoring high on the personality trait conscientiousness is assumed to possess a "conscientiousness schema." Schemas provide the cognitive structure and context for which social information is processed. Holden et al. (1991) stated that schemas are fundamental in determining an individual's personality test item responses. More specifically, these researchers postulated that the process of responding involves the comparison of item content with relevant schema.

To test their model, Holden, Fekken, and Cotton, (1991) extended the results of Popham and Holden (1990) using the Basic Personality Inventory (BPI). Although there was a non-significant negative correlation between scale scores and response latency for endorsed items, the results trended in the hypothesized direction. Fekken and Holden (1992) replicated these results using the BPI and extended their analyses to the Personality Research Form (PRF). Results revealed a significant negative correlation between response latency and scores for endorsed items, and significant positive correlation between response latency and scores for rejected items. The researchers concluded that the endorsement of personality items, and the high scale scores, was indicative of self-schemas consistent with the measurement instrument. Siem (1996) conducted research in which he examined the predictive relationship between latencies, as indicators of self-schema, and Air Force pilot training performance. Results offered some support for the previous research showing a correlation between personality scale scores and response latencies. This pattern was not consistent across all traits, with only two significant relations observed between emotional stability and trusting scale scores and corresponding latencies. Of great importance is the finding that response latencies for these two traits added incremental validity over scale scores in the prediction of pilot training performance.

In sum, the results described above demonstrate that response latencies are correlated with scores on personality scales, with a negative correlation between response latencies and scores when endorsing schema-consistent items and a positive correlation between the response latencies and scores when rejecting schema-consistent items. Taken together, these results support the schema model and the notion that personality

item response latencies contain trait-specific variance and therefore can be considered valid indicators of the presence of self-schema (Fekken & Holden, 1992). These results also support Kuiper's (1981) "inverted U" pattern showing that shorter response latencies are associated with either a close match with schema or an extreme disparity with schema, while longer latencies are associated with items that are controversial.

Faked Item Response Process. Researchers have also focused on the role of schemas when examinees fake responses to self-report measures of personality. Three models of applicant faking are relevant for this research - the *semantic exercise model*, the *self-schema model*, and *the adopted-schema model*. These models are similar in that examinees who engage in faking are assumed to utilize a cognitive structure other than a self-schema when responding. The models differ in the extent to which they make the case that faked versus honest decisions involve similar cognitive processes and differ in their explanation of results. These models will be discussed in more detail in the sections that follow.

Semantic Exercise Model of Faked Responses. Hsu, Santelli, and Hsu (1989) proposed the semantic exercise model of faked response. According to this model, honest versus faked responses involve different cognitive processes. Honest responses are based on a self-referent process that requires the examinee to evaluate the extent to which the attribute assessed by the item is consistent with his or her self-concept. On the other hand, faked responses involve a semantic process that requires the examinee to evaluate whether the attribute assessed by the item is included in the definition of an ideal respondent. The researchers argued that faked responses are made faster because less

complex cognitive processes are involved when making a semantic evaluation than when making a self-referenced evaluation (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977).

Consistent with the semantic exercise model, Hsu et al. (1989) found that participants instructed to appear either psychologically well adjusted or psychologically dysfunctional responded faster to items on the Subtle and Obvious response validity scales of the MMPI (Dubinsky, Gamble, & Rogers, 1985) compared to participants instructed to respond honestly. Items were considered *subtle* based on the perspective of a respondent who is attempting to fake to the extent that he or she perceives the true and false response to this item as equally indicative of psychopathology. Across four fake conditions, the raw mean response latencies were shorter (i.e., faster responses) than the raw mean latency in the standard-honest condition, regardless of whether the items were obvious or subtle in terms of perceived pathology. It was also found that latencies added significant variance in the prediction of faking above the Obvious and Subtle scale scores. While these results provide interesting insights with regard to cognitive structures, they also provide evidence that item response latency scores are a potentially viable method of faking assessment that can be used to enhance measurement using traditional response validity scales.

Self-schema Model of Faked Responses. Contrary to the semantic exercise model, the self-schema model postulates that faking is associated with slower response latency scores (McDaniel & Timm, 1990). According to this model, the process of faking a personality item response involves an extra cognitive step. All respondents go through the same (honest) response sequence outlined earlier if the resulting response choice does not fit the impression the respondent wishes to convey, he or she takes an

extra step to engage in a faked response thus resulting in slower response latency scores. In essence, the respondent has adopted an unfamiliar or "weak" schema that hinders rather than facilitates the response process. To test the self-schema theory of faking, McDaniel and Timm (1990) used a within-subject research design in which all participants were first asked to respond in order to appear qualified for a security guard job and then asked to respond honestly one week later. Consistent with their hypothesis, faking was found to be associated with slower response latency scores.

Adopted Schema Model. Holden et al. (1992) introduced the adopted schema model in an attempt to reconcile the conflicting results of previous research examining the relationship between faking and personality item response latencies. Specifically, they suggested the conflicting results from previous studies could be explained by individual differences in processing speed and the use of raw response latency scores. Research has shown that individual differences in processing speed account for a large proportion of variance in response latency scores (Rogers, 1974a; Tetrick, 1989). Raw response latencies do not account for the fact that item response latencies are, in part, a function of item length or complexity (Holden, Fekken, & Jackson, 1985). To address the influence of individual differences in processing speed and item characteristics, Holden and colleagues (1992) proposed that researchers use a "double standardization" procedure before analyzing response latency scores. To compute a double standardized latency score, item response latencies are first standardized across examinees and then standardized within examinee. The double standardized latencies are then used to compare latencies for non-congruent and congruent responses. This comparison is warranted based on research showing that distinguishing between latencies for non-

congruent and congruent responses for an ideal respondent significantly improved the classification of fakers provided by more traditional response validity scales (e.g., Holden 1998; Holden & Hibbs, 1995).

One practical outcome of the research by Holden et al. (1992) was the development of an index of faking that contains latency scores for responses consistent and inconsistent with the adopted schemas those who fake are likely to refer to when making a response decision. As noted earlier, Holden and colleagues (1992) incorporated a double standardization technique into the calculation of the faking index. This technique takes into account and controls for differences in participant processing speed as well as item characteristics when analyzing response latencies. The index also differentiates between congruent and non-congruent responses. Congruent item responses are those items participants endorse that align with or support their adopted schema while non-congruent responses are those that are not in alignment and do not support the adopted schema (e.g., endorsing an item that describes the participant as low in openness to new experiences when he/she has adopted an artistic schema). In all, the index includes latency scores for true adopted schema-consistent, false adopted schema-consistent, true adopted schema-inconsistent and false adopted schema-inconsistent responses. This technique was designed to resolve these issues and conflicting results of past assessments.

According to the adopted schema model, faking involves the adoption of a schema in addition to, or on top of, one's existing self-schema for a trait. The cognitive processes involved when making a faked response are similar to those involved when making an honest response. Specifically, respondents that fake on a self-report

personality inventory adopt a dissimulation schema and then engage in the same matching to schema process. This defines the image the respondent intends to present when responding to the item under honest or standard conditions. Thus, in place of using self-schemas to define the attributes of an ideal candidate, the respondent uses adopted schemas.

What differentiates an adopted schema from a self-schema is the extent to which it provides a favorable description of an ideal respondent for the situation. Impression managers are motivated to present an image of the self that accentuates the attributes of an ideal respondent. Unlike self-schemas, which include summaries of past experiences that represent attributes both consistent and inconsistent with an ideal respondent, an adopted schema consists entirely of attributes consistent with an ideal respondent. Self-schemas provide, on average, a less favorable description of the attributes related to an ideal respondent than an adopted schema. As a result, self-schemas can provide a moderate or negative description of attributes.

Applying the model, Holden et al. (1992) proposed it is possible to develop a latency-based index of faking. They hypothesized that the latencies obtained in a faking condition would be shorter (or faster) when the item response is consistent with the adopted schema and longer (or slower) latencies when the item response is inconsistent with the adopted schema. Response consistency is determined by the relationship between the attributes that define an ideal respondent and the scoring key for the self-report measure.

The faster latencies for adopted schema consistent item responses occurs because these responses are likely to reflect the adopted schemas employed by respondents

engaging in faking than the self-schemas employed by respondents engaging in honest responding. The slower latencies for adopted schema inconsistent item responses occur because these responses are more likely to reflect an adopted self-schema employed by respondents engaging in honest answering than the adopted schemas employed by respondents engaging in faking. As an example, imagine respondents engaging in faking who are expected to adopt a schema for conscientiousness. Those respondents endorsing items reflective of conscientiousness and rejecting items reflective of the opposite are considered *adopted-schema consisten*t. In contrast, responses rejecting items reflecting conscientiousness and endorsing items reflecting a lack of conscientiousness are considered *adopted-schema inconsistent*.

Holden et al (1992) provided support for their model in a simulated clinical lab setting where participants were instructed to either fake good (i.e., appear psychologically healthy), fake bad (i.e., appear pathological), or answer honestly. Among participants instructed to fake good, the response latencies for items with non-pathological content (e.g., I am kind to animals) were shorter than the response latencies for items with pathological content (e.g., I am a very intolerant person). In contrast, among participants instructed to fake bad, the response latencies for items with pathological content were shorter than the response latencies for items with non-pathological content. Together, these findings are consistent with data from the self-schema research under standard condition procedures, and demonstrated that the relationship between item response latency and adopted schemas is partly a function of response motivation and the item content, resulting in an interaction between faking type and item type.

Subsequent work by Holden and his colleagues showed that the index of response latencies could be used in a personnel selection setting (Holden, 1995; Holden & Hibbs, 1995; Holden & Kroner, 1992; Holden & Samuel, 1993). In this research (Holden & Hibbs, 1995), participants were told to respond in a manner that made them appear qualified for a government job that required the handling of money and confidential material. Counter to the adopted schema model, faking was not associated with item latency scores for responses consistent with being a successful employee. Consistent with the model, however, faking was associated with slower latency scores for item responses inconsistent with being a successful employee. Most importantly, the index added significantly to the prediction of faking above response validity scales.

In sum, a possible explanation for the conflicting results from previous studies investigating the relationship between faking and item response latencies is that researchers did not consider the influence of individual differences in processing speed and item characteristics. To address this limitation, Holden et al, (1992) proposed that response latencies should go through a "double standardization" procedure before conducting analyses to control for these differences. As hypothesized, the value of using the double standardization approach to detect faking was supported in both clinical and personnel selection settings.

Hybrid Model of Impression Managed Responses. To address the shortcomings of the adopted schema model, Vasilopoulos, Reilly, and Leaman (2000) developed a model of self-reporting behavior that borrowed from both the adopted schema and semantic exercise models of impression management, but built in methodological and conceptual aspects to bolster its robustness and improve upon past

models. Specifically, they proposed that faking involves a semantic evaluation to determine how the assessed trait relates to an ideal respondent, whereas responding honestly involves a self-referenced evaluation to determine how the assessed trait relates to one's self-concept. The main contribution of the model was the incorporation of job familiarity.

According to the hybrid model, applicants who fake adopt schemas that define attributes of an ideal job candidate. When making a response decision, these applicants must determine whether the attribute assessed by an item is used to define an ideal respondent. Thus, adopted schemas that define the attributes of an ideal respondent are employed in order to perform the semantic task of engaging in impression management. As previously mentioned, research has shown that a semantic evaluation is made more quickly than a self-referenced evaluation (Kuiper, 1981; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977; Vasilopoulos, McFarland, Cucina, & Ingerick, 2002), suggesting that faking is associated with faster latencies. The caveat has been argued that semantic evaluations are faster than self-referenced evaluations only when the applicant understands the meaning of the item statement or stimulus. It follows that those who engage in faking and who are familiar with the job are able to develop a more well defined schema of a QJC which allows for an easier and thus quicker response. However, those who fake and are not familiar with the job develop a convoluted, ambiguous schema of a QJC. The lack of a well-defined schema structure leads to a memory search for relevant and related information resulting in slower response latencies. This model has received support in a lab and field study (Vasilopoulos, et al., 2000).

Vasilopoulos, McFarland, Cucina, and Ingerick (2002) explored the moderating roles of job familiarity and warning of response verification on the relationship between faked and honest self-report response latencies. Overall hypotheses were not supported, however results showed that faking was associated with slower response latencies. This research also extended the model by incorporating the implications of using a warning of response verification in the personality test instructions. It was proposed that warnings increase the complexity of the response strategy as well as emotional arousal. Emotional arousal alone has been shown to increase performance on simple tasks yet decreases performance on complex tasks (Zajonc & Sales, 1966). These aspects of the model will be discussed in more detail in subsequent paragraphs.

Problematic Aspects of Past Faking Models

The semantic exercise, self-schema, adopted schema, and hybrid models helped lay the groundwork for the development of a cognitive process model of faked responding; however, these models are not without shortcomings. The semantic exercise and self-schema models do not adequately explain the conflicting results of previous studies that examined the relationship between item response latency and faking. While the adopted schema model attempts to address the shortcomings of the semantic exercise and self-schema models of faking, it is not without methodological limitations. For example, research on the adopted schema model has been conducted exclusively using personality tests with a true/false item response format. While this format allows for a clearly distinct determination of adopted schema-consistent and adopted schema-inconsistent response it does not align with the more popular Likert scale (e.g., a 5-point

scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) used in most self-report measures. Unlike a true/false response scale, Likert scale responses may not result in an absolute rejection or endorsement of the item (i.e., the response options “strongly disagree” and “disagree” are both considered adopted schema-inconsistent responses on items assessing attributes used to define a qualified job candidate). The increased variance of these scales makes it difficult to identify responses consistent and inconsistent with adopted schemas. In addition to scale construction complications, applicants might display individual differences in response style (Nunnally, 1967) that would further tangle the complicated process of understanding schemas. For example, extreme-response style is the tendency to give extreme responses. On a five point Likert scale, this response style could manifest itself in an applicant rating all items as either a 1 or a 5. Satisficing is a cognitive shortcut to item response where an applicant would, for example, only select the ‘no-opinion’ response option (e.g., Neither Agree nor Disagree) (Krosnick, Narayan, & Smith, 1996).

A theoretical limitation of the adopted schema model is the assumption that all respondents engaging in faking adopt schemas of equal strength. Likewise, respondents engaging in honest responding are assumed to hold schemas of equal strength. As previously noted, schema strength (at least for honest responding) is built upon past experiences and how important the given trait is in defining one-self. In addition, past research has repeatedly supported a positive schema strength-response latency relation (Kunda, 1999). Thus, it is possible that schema strength moderates the relationship between response latency and impression management.

The adopted schema model is often limited because its application requires using the double standardization approach to compute response latency scores described earlier. One problem with the index is that it uses mean and standard deviation for honest responses to standardize response latencies across items response. In an applied setting, it is impossible to clearly identify "honest" respondents using self-report measures, although this delineation can be accomplished in a laboratory setting (Vasilopoulos, et al., 2002). Another limitation of the index is that latency scores are computed by averaging item response latencies for an entire scale. Holden and his colleagues have consistently found that the majority of respondents who fake provide adopted schema-consistent responses (Holden, 1995; Holden & Hibbs, 1995; Holden & Kroner, 1992; Holden et al., 1992). Thus, the effect of the slower latencies associated with the already noted limited adopted schema-inconsistent response was most likely diminished by the faster latencies associated with many adopted schema-consistent responses. Research has also found the "double standardization" procedure creates artificial negative correlations among sub-scale latencies if the mean subscale latencies differ from each other - latencies from slower subscales become positive after standardization and the latencies from faster subscales, negative, resulting in a negative correlation between the two (Neubauer & Malle, 1997). In addition, while within examinee or person variance might reflect individual differences, for example with reading speed, it may also reflect individual differences in self-knowledge (Neubauer & Malle, 1997), which is of extreme interest in the current study. Finally, the index is limited because, in practice, it relies on latencies for responses incongruent with a QJC (Vasilopoulos et al., 2000). Unfortunately, the best or most effective fakers are likely to provide few, if any responses that are

incongruent with an ideal job applicant (Vasilopoulos et al., 2000). Consequently, the response latencies that are most useful in classifying fakers are likely to be highly unreliable for the best fakers. For this reason, the inclusion of response latency scores where some may not be available across all applicants makes it difficult to recommend adopting the index in a selection context.

The previous paragraphs described and discussed problematic aspects of three cognitive-based faking response models. The semantic exercise, self-schema, and adopted schema models advanced our understanding of applicants' cognitive schemas and how these affected their selection measure performance and more specifically their willingness and ability to engage in faked responding. As previously noted these models are limited in their application to a true applied setting and are shortsighted in their scope. The hybrid model addressed some of these issues, for example, by utilizing the traditional Likert scale and expanded the evaluative scope by incorporating moderating variables such as applicant job familiarity; however, the hybrid model was not without limitations. For example, the model utilizes a schema consistency approach, regardless of whether the schema is the self or an adopted schema. What is missing is the possibility that the formation of the adopted schema is a function of an applicant's self-schemas as well as his or her understanding of the attributes of a qualified job candidate (such that your applicant schema is based on existing core schema structures). The self-schema model took into account differences between self and faked responses; however, it did not account for job familiarity. In contrast, the hybrid model accounted for job familiarity but did not account for true versus faked responses. The failure to address the role seems to be a potential confound that has yet to be addressed. This source of variance derives

from the overlapping influence and resulting confound of a person's currently operating self-schema, or the working self-concept, and the adopted schema. While it has been noted that people have many schemas operating at any given time (e.g., Markus & Kunda, 1986; Markus and Wurf, 1987) there has been no known discussion of how these schemas might interact and how job familiarity could influence this interaction.

The interaction between self and adopted schemas can be inferred from past research by Kuiper (1981), Lewicki (1984), and Markus, Smith, and Moreland (1985). In an investigation of self-referenced evaluations, Kuiper (1981) found the "inverted-U response time effect" when individuals were asked to make personality judgments about unknown others. Specifically, items that were "low-middle" and "high-middle" in terms of self-description had slower response latencies than items that were extremely self-descriptive or not self-descriptive. This finding was interpreted as evidence that the self provides a basis for making (personality) judgments about others, and it is this self-referencing that accounts for the latency pattern. He proposed that, when faced with judging a stranger, the perceiver supplements the limited input by including information stored in general cognitive structures, such as stereotypes or implicit personality theories.

Making personality judgments about strangers by relying on stereotypes is akin to the process of adopting a schema about that stranger, and very similar to adopting a schema when instructed to fake responses to items on a personality test. Thus, when a respondent adopts a fake schema that is unlike the self-schema (e.g., a pacifist who tries to appear violent), he or she is attempting to make a personality judgment about a "stranger", and Kuiper's research reveals that the self-schema in large, guides these judgments. Lewicki (1984) found a similar effect in a study of "other" judgments.

Participants were asked to rate the desirability of 15 personality traits. Subsequently, participants rated various pictures of strangers on these traits. Results revealed that the response latency for the endorsement of personality attributes for strangers was a function of how the attribute was self-rated by the participant. The shortest response latencies were found when highly desirable self-rated attributes were endorsed for strangers (i.e., schema consistent) and when undesirable traits were rejected (i.e., schema inconsistent). The longest response latencies were found for those attributes self-rated as desirable, but rejected, and for those attributes self-rated undesirable but endorsed.

In a similar study of the role self-concepts play in the perception of others Markus et al., (1985) found that the perceptual and organizational structure of another person's relevant behavior is in large driven by the structure of the observer's self-concept for the behavior in question. This "ego-driven" effect influenced the entire person-perception process, including the memory for and inferences about the behavior, and the evaluation of it. These results mimic Kuiper's (1981) findings and provide further support for the idea that self-schemas are utilized when making judgments in the absence of job familiarity.

In sum, these findings support the idea that the there is an interaction between self-schema and an adopted schema. Past studies investigating models of faking have used either a between-subjects or within-studies design but have not incorporated a robust design where both are included.

Focus of the Current Study

As previously discussed, the current study seeks to contribute to the small but growing body of research that has examined applicant cognitive structures and more specifically, applicant schemas. This study will build on the "hybrid" model of impression managed responding offered by Vasilopoulos et al. (2000) and will be the first study to examine applicant schemas using both a within-studies and between-studies design. The study will also measure the schema concept as originally prescribed by Markus (1977) - first by asking participants to rate how accurate a statement is in personifying the self, and second by asking participants to rate how important this characteristic is to the self. This operationalization of schema has not been utilized in past faking research. The current study will also incorporate individual difference variables hypothesized to effect applicant's ability to engage in faked responding.

The following sections will further build upon the previous discussion as well as elaborate on the extensions of the Vasilopoulos et al. (2000) hybrid model of impression managed responding. Hypotheses will be presented subsequent to the discussion.

Influence of Applicant Response Motivations

The following section will discuss various types of motivation that can drive applicant responses to personality test items. The research discussed earlier by Holden and his colleagues (i.e., Holden et al., 1992; Holden & Hibbs, 1995) suggests that an applicant setting naturally results in people putting their best foot forward or adopting a "fake good" strategy, however it is not necessarily appropriate to characterize all applicants as those who fake. An alternative explanation is that individuals who have an

overly favorable view of themselves are unable to "remove" this self-serving bias from influencing their responses, even when asked to respond in an honest manner. This is referred to as *self-deception enhancement*, which is an unconscious response style that results in respondents providing inflated responses for which they truly believe are reflective of the self (Paulhus, 1984). This style is differentiated from impression management, which is a consciously biased response that is geared towards the respondent attempting to create a favorable impression of the self (i.e., faking). Research by Cucina, Martin, Thibodeaux, Vasilopoulos, Sehgal, and Morewitz (2007) showed that subject matter expert's task importance ratings were influenced by their perceived ability level for a given task. In other words, individuals are more likely to say a particular task is important when they are themselves more proficient in performing the task.

Another explanation for the inflated responses in applied settings comes from Tversky's (1977) *contrast model of similarity judgments*, which suggests that perceived similarity decreases with the number of attributes that are unique to each comparable person in question. When applied to a selection context, the model suggests that applicants will down play his or her similarities with other applicants and accentuate his or her uniqueness. This effect was demonstrated by Holyoak and Gordon (1983), who found that participants judged a friend to be more similar to the self than the self is to the friend. That is, participants emphasize their uniqueness when the self (or "I) was the subject of comparison. Thus, when an applicant's unique attributes are made salient, which should be the case in an applicant setting, they are likely to view themselves as uniquely different from other applicants and cast themselves as being "stronger" on the

trait in question. Given this, it is safe to consider the applicant condition inherently a "fake good" condition in a traditional faking study approach.

In sum, one can assume that applicants are attempting to "fake good" or put their best foot forward in an effort to be perceived as a qualified job candidate. However, the fact that there is variance in applicants' scores on personality tests regardless of whether responding in a laboratory or "live" setting (Ones et al., 1995) is evidence that applicants are not equally adept at presenting a favorable impression.

One reason for this difference is that applicant's differ in their possession of a working self-concept that is comprised of trait levels representative of a qualified job candidate. Those who do not possess a qualified job candidate schema (characterized as a working self-concept) will have to engage in faking behavior in order to be considered for the given job. In other words, the candidate will have to adopt a schema of a qualified job candidate.

Based on the preceding discussion, it is possible to consider the interaction between the self- and adopted schemas. Applicants who must fake because they do not possess job-relevant self-schemas should have longer response latencies than those obtained in a standard response setting. A standard response setting is equivalent to a setting where no obvious motivational aspects are inherent to the setting (e.g., taking a personality test battery at a job recruitment fair). The longer response latencies observed for applicants who must fake to appear qualified for the job occur because they have to first search for something in their past related to the job in question, and then filter how they respond to appear qualified. In other words, the applicant who is forced to fake will have to think about the appropriate response because his or her true response would not

result in a good score. This extra step results in increased response latencies. In contrast, applicants who do not need to fake to appear qualified for the job (i.e., posses job-relevant self-schemas), will have response latencies equal to (or not significantly different from) those recorded in the standard setting. Regardless of the response motivation, applicants who possess job-relevant self-schemas will have little difficulty determining whether the trait assessed by an item is in-line with his or her working self-concept of a qualified job candidate, allowing him/her to make an effortless response.

In sum, there is reason to expect that the difference in response latencies between honest and faked responses depends on whether the applicant possesses self-schemas for job relevant traits. If yes, the applicant is likely to have those self-schemas salient or more easily accessible in both honest and applicant settings. However, as discussed next, this relationship might be further influenced by the amount of job familiarity.

Influence of Job Related Information

The following section will discuss the effects of job familiarity on the relationship between true self and applicant self (i.e., working self-concept or adopted self). McManus (1990) conducted one of the first studies to investigate the effects of information on applicant's responses latencies. In this study, the instrument used was a biodata inventory developed to select life insurance sales representatives. Overall, there was no difference in the response latency scores between participants instructed to fake and participants instructed to answer honestly. However, participants who faked had faster response latency scores when they were given personal characteristic information describing a successful life insurance sales representative.

Similar results were obtained by Kluger, Reilly, and Russell (1991), who found that regardless of condition (i.e., honest or faked) participants provided with a job title responded faster than participants who were not provided with a job title. The pattern of mean response latency scores suggested that the provision of a job title had a larger effect on participants instructed to engage in impression management (d = .43) than on those subjects instructed to answer honestly (d = .07), although the interaction term was not statistically significant.

Most recently, Vasilopoulos, et al (2000) found that in both a lab and field study, job familiarity moderated the relationship between faking and response latencies to a personality assessment. Faking was generally associated with faster item response latencies when job familiarity was high and with slower response when job familiarity was low. Low job familiarity was operationalized as the job title alone. A description of the job, to include the job title was used in the high job familiarity condition. Job familiarity and faking were associated with personality item responses that would have more likely led to job offers.

These studies demonstrate the influence of job familiarity when making between-subject comparisons. That is, among applicants who fake, those with high job familiarity have faster response latency scores than those with low job familiarity. Moreover, when job familiarity is high, applicants who fake have faster response latencies than honest respondents. In contrast, when job familiarity is low, applicants who fake have slower response latencies than honest respondents. These results suggest that the impact of job familiarity on faked responses may depend on the image being portrayed (Vasilopoulos et al., 2000). While these between-subject comparisons are insightful, the current study

addresses the need to examine the effect of job familiarity on within-subject comparisons of response latencies.

In the current study, the effect of job familiarity on within-subject comparisons of response latencies is expected to differ depending on whether or not the participant possesses the self-schemas that define a 'qualified job candidate'. Job familiarity is not expected to have an effect on the response latencies for participants who possess a 'qualified job candidate' working self-concept (WSC). The rationale being that an honest response decision involves a simple evaluation of an item in terms of whether the trait assessed is consistent with his or her working self-concept of a 'qualified job candidate' (Vasilopoulos, Reilly, & Leaman, 2000, pg. 52). Recall that a WSC is a temporal representation of the more stable self-schema(s) that comprise an individual. If a participant possesses the self-schemas that comprise a QJC, there is no need to go beyond the response decision provided by the WSC. Job familiarity would only result in making the QJC-WSC more salient, but would not prompt the participant to respond in a manner that is counter to his or her true self. While past research (Kunda & Santioso, 1989) has shown that when participants know the purpose of an assessment they are more likely to inflate their scores, those with a QJC-WSC already "know" the purpose of the test and will not need to inflate scores to appear qualified. Thus, there should be no difference in response latency scores in the standard and applicant conditions for participants that possess a QJC-WSC. In contrast, participants who do not possess a 'qualified job candidate' working self-concept will have to fake responses (i.e., engage in faking). Among these participants, those with a low level of job familiarity (i.e., job title only) will have longer latencies compared to their standard (i.e., honest) condition responses.

As suggested by the hybrid model (Vasilopoulos et al., 2000), low job familiarity results in longer responses for participants that fake because they are unclear which traits constitute a qualified job candidate. On the other hand, high job familiarity (i.e., job description) results in shorter response latencies for participants that fake because they are able to develop a stronger working self-concept that "provides an integrated description of a qualified job candidate by identifying and defining the relationships among the important traits" (Vasilopoulos et al., 2000, p 3). The stronger working self-concepts (or adopted schemas) allow fakers to perform a semantic evaluation of items. As mentioned earlier, research by Kuiper (1981) showed that semantic evaluations are made faster than self-referent evaluations.

Influence of Warnings of Response Verification

Within personnel selection, warnings of lie or faking detection are sometimes included in the instructions in an effort to convince applicants to answer honestly. A warning is typically a statement that tells applicants that submitted responses will be verified either through a second source validation or a lie scale embedded in the selection inventory. Very often applicants are told that anyone caught providing distorted responses will be removed or disqualified from the selection process (Dwight & Donovan, 2003). Warnings of a lie detection scale have historically been used in self-report measures, especially those involving personality assessments (Hough, 1998). Some of the most popular personality assessments utilize such scales. For example, the California Psychological Inventory (Gough, 1996), the Hogan Personality Inventory

(Hogan & Hogan, 1992), and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (Dahlstrom, Welsh, & Dahlstrom, 1975) all contain response validity or lie scales.

Overall, research suggests that the use of a warning reduces the amount of faking on self-report measures. For example, a meta-analysis conducted by Dwight and Donovan (2003) showed that the inclusion of a warning was associated with nearly a quarter of a standard deviation decrease in scores on self-report measures. The researchers did not consider the effects of the different types of warning; however, they did offer explanations for their findings. One rationale was that the presence of a warning motivates some applicants who would have originally inflated their responses to answer honestly. An alternate explanation is that a warning increases the cognitive complexity of responding to personality items thus making it increasingly difficult for applicants to determine the best response.

The effect of using a warning is further understood by considering the results of primary studies. For example, Paulhus, Bruce, and Trapnell (1995) examined personality scores obtained under different self-presentational or response styles that were considered viable for a job applicant. Styles or strategies such as *fake the best job candidate*, *fake without arousing suspicion*, *play up good points*, and *answer honestly* were assessed. Participants warned of response verification are assumed to adopt a 'fake without arousing suspicion strategy' when completing a personality inventory. Results revealed that participants in the honest condition had the lowest scores, whereas participants in the fake best condition had the highest scores. An interesting finding was that participants instructed to fake without arousing suspicion scored only slightly higher than did participants instructed to play up good points. In addition, results were similar across

conditions in that within each condition the same personality scale had the highest mean score. This suggests that a warning of verification can lead to similar scores for applicants who attempt to fake without appearing disingenuous and applicants who honestly accentuate their strengths.

Of particular relevance to the current research are the primary studies that examined the within-subject effect of warnings. In one of the first studies, Doll (1971) found that when compared with their honest responses, participants instructed to fake who were not given a warning inflated their responses on biodata items more often than participants who were instructed to fake and were warned of a lie scale or a follow-up interview. An additional finding involves the use of response strategies when a warning is presented. Participants warned of a follow-up interview inflated their responses to non-verifiable items more so than verifiable items.

In their study of response processes Vasilopoulos et al. (2002) examined how item response latencies varied because of differing job familiarity conditions and being warned against faking. Results revealed that a warning had little impact on latencies, where effects were only found for two of five personality scales (i.e., Emotional Stability and Conscientiousness). The researchers speculated that the fakability of these two personality scales might have impacted participant's response latencies noting that responses to these scales are the most influenced by attempts to present oneself in a favorable light.

A recent study by Pine and Vasilopoulos (2007) found that the use of a warning of a lie scale was associated with significantly lower scores on a conscientiousness scale among participants instructed to answer honestly. Counter to past research, the warning

of a lie scale had no effect on the scores of participants instructed to respond as an applicant. The findings for participants in the honest condition are interesting in that they suggest that using a warning of a lie scale might actually harm those applicants who respond honestly.

Warnings are thought to increase the cognitive complexity of an applicant's decision-making process. Warnings of response verification are thought to increase the cognitive load on applicants because they have to consider the thoughts and feelings of others when responding as well as the verifiability of each of their item responses. A similar relationship is expected when a warning of a lie scale is included in an applicant setting (Kluger & Collela, 1993). Recent research (Vasilopoulos et al., 2005) called for the inclusion of a warning of a lie scale in order to assess whether similar cognitive complexity effects are present when applicants respond to a self-report measure of personality. As previously described, the warning of lie scale is thought to increase an applicant's cognitive load. This effect will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections.

Influence of Cognitive Ability

Cognitive ability should influence applicant responding in that it facilitates the speed in which an applicant responds to an item. Vernon's research (1983) demonstrated that measures of response latency assess basic cognitive operations that are a part of many types of intellectual behavior and that intelligence or cognitive ability, is related to the efficiency or speed of these basic components of information processing. Higher levels of cognitive ability will serve to further reduce response latencies in comparison to

those who posses lower levels of cognitive ability. Those applicants higher in cognitive ability will have smaller response latencies across all job familiarity conditions.

Further support for this notion can be found from research of personality item response models that suggests most variance in response latencies is accounted for during the two stages that precede item response decisions, namely *stimulus encoding* and *stimulus comprehension* (Holden et al., 1991; Rogers, 1974, Vasilopoulos, et al., 2000). Stimulus encoding is the process of identifying letters and the words they form, whereas comprehension is the process of understanding the meaning of the words presented. Effective stimulus encoding and comprehension are a function of cognitive abilities such as processing speed (Tetrick, 1989, Vasilopoulos et al., 2005) and verbal ability (Dunn, Lushene, & O'Neil, 1972). Given this, it can be hypothesized that high cognitive ability applicants should respond faster to personality items than low cognitive ability applicants regardless of environmental factors (e.g., warning of a lie scale) because most of the variance in response latencies accounted for by cognitive ability happens before the item response decision stage (Vasilopoulos et al., 2005).

Interactions Between Individual Difference and Environmental Factors

Cognitive Ability and Job Familiarity

There is reason to expect that cognitive ability will interact with 'level of job familiarity' for applicants who fake. Applicants with higher levels of cognitive ability should have faster response latencies across 'job familiarity conditions'. This relation will be further moderated (i.e., reduced response latencies) in the high job familiarity

condition for those who are high in cognitive ability. The rationale behind this is that those who are high in cognitive ability and have an increased level of job familiarity will be better equipped to make connections between the behaviors described in the job description and what personality traits are indicative of these behaviors, enabling them to respond faster and more accurately than their counterparts.

Cognitive Ability and Warning of a Lie Scale

The earlier discussions surrounding 'warnings of a lie scale' and cognitive ability suggest that warning of verification and cognitive ability will moderate the relationship between personality response latencies and scale scores. Vasilopoulos et al. (2005) revealed that, in the presence of a warning of verification by others, those higher in cognitive ability had higher personality scale scores. While personality and cognitive ability have historically been considered independent, research by Vasilopoulos at al. (2005) revealed the inclusion of a warning of verification served to moderate this relationship. These researchers theorized that this type of warning increased applicants cognitive load because they had to consider the thoughts and feelings of relevant others when responding as well as the verifiability of each of their item responses. Unlike a warning of response verification by others, including a warning of a lie scale does not require the applicant to take into consideration views of others or response verifiability. This may reduce the complexity of the response decision; however, research has provided indirect evidence that lie scales can increase the cognitive load. Doll's (1971) research has shown that notifying participants of the inclusion of a lie scale reduces, but does not completely eliminate inflated responses. Vasilopoulos and Cucina (2006) proposed that

if applicants wanted to successfully (i.e., not be caught by lie scale) inflate item response levels to a certain degree would require them to accurately identify traits that are (a) most relevant for the job, and (b) understand how these traits are measured by the items on the inventory. This familiarity would then allow applicants to inflate only the job-appropriate items.

Research (Pine & Vasilopoulos, 2007) incorporating the use of a 'lie scale' warning found an interaction occurred between warning presence and cognitive ability when respondents were instructed to respond honestly. Given these findings, an interaction is expected to occur between cognitive ability and warning presence such that in the presence of a warning of a lie scale, personality scale scores will be moderated by cognitive ability level. Personality scale scores and cognitive ability will not be related when there is no warning presented.

As previously described, a warning of lie scale is thought to increase an applicant's cognitive load. Not only is this warning thought to moderate cognitive ability and personality relations it is also thought to increase latency response times for those applicants actively engaged in faking. The warning increases the amount of decision making time an applicant, who's engaged in faking, will take in responding because he or she will have to decide if an item is a lie scale item or a normal personality item. The increased latency occurs due to the increased amount of cognitive processes involved in responding.

When no warning is present, the applicant need not worry about lie detection and is able to respond more naturally, whether this is in an honest manner or while engaged in faking. As a result responding requires the applicant to identify the relationship between

the characteristic assessed by the item and the characteristic used by the organization to define a qualified job candidate. After this connection is determined, the applicant can strategically shift each item response in the direction consistent with the organization's definition of an ideal job incumbent (Vasilopoulos et al., 2005). For the purposes of this research, a warning of a lie scale will be incorporated.

Response latencies (i.e., elapsed time between item presentation and response) can be considered one measure of the increased cognitive load a warning induces. Social cognition researchers have used time measures as an index of cognitive elaboration when responding (Chaiken, 1980). In the current research, latencies provide an index of complexity that allows for a comparison of the personality item responses in the warning and no warning conditions. If warnings increase, the complexity for all applicants it should be associated with longer response latencies at all levels of cognitive ability (Vasilopoulos et al., 2005). Given the discussion above, the following hypotheses are relevant:

Hypotheses

Impact of Applicant Self-schema

H1. Applicant self-schema will determine self-judgments with regard to 'qualified applicant' and these judgments will vary in latency depending on the presence and content of self-schemata.

H1a. Among participants who possess a working self-concept that is consistent with the traits of a qualified job candidate, there will be no difference in item response latencies obtained in the applicant and standard conditions. Among participants who do not

possess a working self-concept that is consistent with the traits of a qualified job candidate, there will be faster item response latencies in the applicant condition than in the standard condition.

Impact of Job Familiarity

H2a. Among participants who possess a working self-concept that is consistent with the traits of a qualified job candidate, job familiarity will not lead to differences in response latency scores obtained in the applicant and standard conditions.

H2b. Among participants who do not possess a working self-concept that is consistent with the traits of a qualified job candidate, difference in job familiarity will influence the relationship between response latency scores in the applicant and standard conditions. Thus, among participants who do not possess a working self-concept that is consistent with the traits of a qualified job candidate and have low levels of job familiarity, there will be slower item response latencies in the applicant condition than in the standard condition. Among participants who do not possess a working self-concept that is consistent with the traits of a qualified job candidate and have high levels of job familiarity, there will be faster item response latencies in the applicant condition than in the standard condition.

Warning x Cognitive Ability – Three-way interaction

H3. Cognitive ability will be associated with higher personality scale scores when a warning of a lie scale is present. Cognitive ability will not be associated with personality scale scores when warning of a lie scale is not present

H4. Cognitive ability will be associated with faster response latency scores when a warning of a lie scale is present.

Warning x Job Familiarity x Cognitive Ability – Five-way interaction

H5. When no warning of a lie scale is provided, impression management will be associated with faster response latency scores for high levels of job familiarity and slower response latency scores for low levels of job familiarity in the applicant condition, and cognitive ability will moderate across job familiarity levels such that higher levels will increase (or result in faster) latency scores in the applicant condition

H6. When a warning of a lie scale is provided, impression management will be associated with slower response latency scores regardless of job familiarity level, however cognitive ability level will moderate this relationship.

Chapter 3: Methods

Participants

The sample consisted of 506 undergraduate students from introductory psychology classes who participated to fulfill a research participation requirement. Participant's age ranged from 18 to 22 years, with 67.6% reporting they were 18 or 19 years of age. Seventy-six percent of participants were female, and 70% classified themselves as Caucasian, while 11% classified themselves as Asian-Pacific Islander. The proportion of participants in each condition did not differ in terms of race, gender, or age.

The initial sample consisted of 600 undergraduate students from introductory psychology courses. Over the course of reviewing and subsequently cleaning the data, 94 participants were removed. Ninety participants were removed because they left key variables blank, for instance a response to the personality measure. The decision was made to remove the entire participant record due to the large sample that remained. In addition, four participants were removed due to certain demographic responses. For example, one participant was removed because his response to the "year in school" variable identified him as a graduate student. Additionally, three participants were removed because in one of the two conditions he or she marked that a dial-up modem was used to connect to the on-line survey.

Independent Variables

Five independent variables were used to assess the primary hypotheses. These are: applicant self-schema, cognitive ability, response motivation, warning of lie scale, and job familiarity. Each independent variable is described in the section below.

Applicant self-schema. Participant's self-schemas were measured using the methodology prescribed by Markus (1977). Participants were first asked to respond to 100 items from the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP), a marker of the Big Five personality structure, (International Personality Item Pool, 2009) using an eleven-point accuracy scale. Participants rated how accurate a statement was in describing him or herself. They were then asked to respond to the same 100 items using an eleven-point importance scale for which they were asked to describe how relevant or descriptive a personality item is in defining his or her personality. Research suggests that the 100-item IPIP measure of the Big Five personality factor structure is a reliable measure of the five-factor structure of personality ($\alpha = .90$) and that each of the five factors are reliable measures in and of themselves (Extraversion, $\alpha = .91$; Agreeableness, $\alpha = .88$; Conscientiousness, $\alpha = .88$; Emotional Stability, $\alpha = .91$; Openness, $\alpha = .90$) (International Personality Item Pool, 2009). The 100-item IPIP scale items used in this study are presented in Appendix A.

Applicant self-schema scores for the "qualified job candidate" were computed from participant's responses to the personality scale items and both response scales (i.e., accuracy and importance) in the standard condition. The computation of schema scores within the standard condition is described in detail in the "Response Motivation" section.

Cognitive ability. Cognitive ability was measured using self-reported overall SAT score, as well as the individual verbal and quantitative scores. Participants were also asked to report which version of the SAT the reported scores are based upon. Research in self-report SAT score accuracy indicates that students' self-reports correlate with actual scores in the range of .60 - .80 (Godlman, Flake, & Matheson, 1990; Trice,

1990; Frucot & Cook, 1994). More recent research by Cassidy (2001) found a significant correlation between self-reported overall and subscale SAT scores (overall scores: r = .88, p = .0001; verbal subscale: r = .73, p = .0001; quantitative subscale: r = .89, p = .0001).

Response Motivation. General instructions were given independent of whether or not participants received the "standard" or "applicant" condition first. Those in the both the "standard" and "applicant" condition were given the general instructions (see Appendix A) prior to taking any assessment.

Since this study utilized an undergraduate sample, the test setting was manipulated in the instructions, and participants were randomly assigned to each condition. Those in the "standard" condition were instructed to "*respond as you normally would to all questions. In determining a response, you should consider how you are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Please answer all items and note that you will not be able to return to an item after you answer*." The applicant condition was manipulated by instructing participants to: (1)"*Imagine you are applying for the job of an Executive Sales Manager with an established global firm. The firm offers competitive pay starting in the mid $100's and full benefits. In addition, bear in mind that job applicants who score in the top 5% will receive $20. The following are the pertinent job characteristics that are measured by the personality assessment.*" The financial motivation was included to enhance the competitive nature typically found in an applicant setting and to motivate participants to fake good, without explicitly instructing them to fake good. Previously in the manuscript applicant settings were characterized as those that naturally elicit a fake good sense amongst applicants.

Warning of a lie scale. Participants were randomly assigned to a warning or a no warning condition within the applicant condition only. Those in the warning condition received the following instructions before completing the personality inventory:

> "When deciding on a response, note that the inventories include questions designed to detect false or inaccurate responses. Please note that points will be deducted from your score if you are identified as having provided false or inaccurate responses."

Job Familiarity. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two job familiarity conditions within the applicant condition. The "High Job Familiarity" condition provided a description of the personal characteristics necessary to perform the job of an executive sales manager based on the definition provided by O*Net[1] (U.S. Department of Labor, 2009). The "Low Job Familiarity" condition provided only the title of the job "Executive Sales Manager." The various job descriptions (to include the inclusion of a warning) presented to participants can be found in Appendix B. Job familiarity was measured using a five-point scale with the following item and response options:

How familiar are you with the personal characteristics of a sales manager?

1. Not at all familiar
2. Slightly familiar
3. Moderately familiar
4. Very familiar
5. Extremely familiar

Preliminary analyses revealed that only a small number of participants selected the Extremely Familiar option (n = 11). The decision to combine response options 4 and 5 (very familiar & extremely familiar) was made in order to address the study hypotheses (n = 54). For example, certain hypotheses called for selecting a subset of participants, namely those with qualified job candidate schemas. This limited analyses to 96 participants. When the job familiarity item was restricted to analyses involving just these participants, only one participant selected the extremely familiar response option.

The job descriptions were edited to focus on the three personality constructs research has found are supportive of performance for sales management. These constructs are Conscientiousness, Extroversion, and Emotional Stability (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Mount & Barrick, 1995; Salgado, 1997; Hurtz & Donovan, 2000). These descriptions operationalized what the current study refers to as a "Qualified Job Candidate schema." In other words, a participant was considered to have the schema of a qualified job candidate if his or her personality schema scores for the three personality traits previously mentioned, were above the cut score set in accordance with traditional schema research (Markus, 1977). Within this study, identification of a qualified job candidate schema was operationalized by a participant marking a response that indicates that one, the item measuring the construct of interest was accurately describing him or herself and that the item was also considered important in describing him or herself. Specific to the scales used in this study, endorsing scale points 7 – 11 on the three personality factors outlined above contributed to a participants qualified candidate schema score because these points represent a positive endorsement that the item is accurate and important in describing a participant. Per Cross and Markus (1994), a

similar approach was taken such that the scale scores for the twenty items that make up each personality factor were summed Given that an item score of 7 represented the minimum acceptable endorsement for identifying a candidate schema and that there were 20 items for each factor, a total factor score of 140 indicated a participant was schematic for that personality factor. Given the three personality factors identified by research as indicative of sales management performance, a total score of 420 or more for a participant resulted in him or her being labeled as having a qualified job candidate schema (hereafter referred to as candidate schema). Those participants who scored below the established cut score are considered aschematic.

Dependent Variables

Personality test scale scores. Participants were first asked to respond to 100 items from the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP), a marker of the Big Five personality structure, (International Personality Item Pool, 2009) using an eleven-point accuracy scale. Participants rated how accurate a statement was in describing him or herself. They were then asked to respond to the same 100 items using an eleven-point importance scale for which they were asked to describe how relevant or descriptive a personality item is in defining his or her personality. Item scale scores are summed across all items within a scale to create a total scale score. Mean scale scores were computed for each personality dimension. Item scale scores as well as mean scale scores are based on the summation of responses to the accuracy and importance scales previously described.

Response latencies. Mean response latency scores were computed for each personality dimension and all of the personality items. The mean response latency scores were normalized using Blom's transformation. Within item normalization was conducted because research has shown that response latencies tend to produce highly skewed distributions (Vasilopoulos, 1997) and within item normalization controls for item characteristic differences (e.g., length) that impact results, and finally normalization removes outliers. This transformation is appropriate because the statistical procedures employed in this study assume a normal distribution.

Covariates

To control for individual differences in processing speed, the following covariates were incorporated into the analyses of response latency scores.

Instruction response latency. The amount of time spent reading the introduction instructions presented at the beginning of the assessment battery was used to control for individual differences in information processing such as reading comprehension and reading speed. The response latency for the instructions was normalized using Blom's transformation.

Dummy item response latency. Personality items from Saucier's (1997) Big Seven personality inventory that are markers of personality constructs also measured in the IPIP were used in the analyses of response latencies to control for individual differences in processing speed. Twenty items from the Big Seven inventory were included. The first fifteen were provided so participants could gain familiarity with the format of the item stems and response scale (the item stems are similar to the IPIP stems

and the same response scale used in the IPIP inventory was used in this section of the experiment). The last five were used in the analyses of response latencies to control for individual differences in processing speed. The response latency for the last five items was normalized using Blom's transformation.

To control for self-presentation style the following covariates were incorporated into analyses:

Impression Management. To measure impression management the 20-item Impression Management scale of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) was included in the battery of assessments (Paulhus, 1988). Research that has included this measure in a similar context (McFarland & Ryan, 2006) suggests that this scale provides a reliable measure of impression management (α = .76 - . 90). The 20-item BIDR scale of Impression Management used in this study is presented in Appendix C.

Given that participants could take part in the assessment anywhere they had a connection to the Internet "Participant Location" and "Noise Level" were considered covariates of interest.

Participant Location. To control for the potential influence of where participants accessed the Internet to take the assessment battery, they were asked to indicate where they were when they participated. The following options were given: "dorm room", "library", "on-campus computer lab", "off-campus location", or "other." If they marked "off-campus location" or "other" they were asked to describe the location in a text box provided on the survey.

Noise Level. To control for the potential influence of noise distraction on response latencies, participants were asked to rate the noise level of the location where they took part in the assessment. A five point scale was provided (e.g., 1 = Very Noisy, 5 = Very Quiet).

Manipulation Checks

The following items were included to assess each applicant's familiarity with the personal characteristics of an executive sales manager as well as their concern with the lie scale capturing any score inflation. These items were included in the applicant condition demographic questionnaire and were used as a check on the familiarity and warning manipulation:

> How familiar are you with the personal characteristics of an executive sales manager?
>
> 1. Not at all familiar
> 2. Slightly familiar
> 3. Moderately familiar
> 4. Very familiar
> 5. Extremely familiar
>
> How confident are you with your knowledge of the personal characteristics that are necessary to perform the job of an executive sales manager?
>
> 1. Not at all confident
> 2. Slightly confident

3. Moderately confident
4. Very confident
5. Extremely confident

How concerned were you that the embedded lie scale would indicate that you increased your scores on the personality assessment?

1. Not at all concerned
2. Slightly concerned
3. Moderately concerned
4. Very concerned
5. Extremely concerned

Procedure

An HTML and JavaScript based website was developed to facilitate the administration of this study. Richard Turbeville, a Master Programmer with over 30 years of programming experience programmed the website, while the author designed the layout and flow, or progression, of the individual web pages. An HTML and JavaScript based software program was written to display survey content and capture scale and latency scores. A database of randomly created unique identifiers was developed for the purposes of assigning login information to participants and to be able to track their progress across the various conditions and to facilitate database management. Participants signed up for the study using GWU's psychology subject pool system, which among other pieces of information provided the author with each participant's email address. Participants were then randomly assigned first, to either the standard condition or the applicant as their first half of the assessment. They were then assigned a login for

the specific condition. Within the applicant condition, four different conditions exist. These are low job familiarity/warning of lie scale, low job familiarity/no warning of lie scale, high job familiarity/warning of lie scale, and high job familiarity/no warning of a lie scale. Participants were told that they would be required to complete the current assessment as well as one that would be e-mailed to them 48 hours after completing the current assessment to receive full credit. An email system was built by the programmer that allowed for the management of participants conditions due to its ability to track a participants progress and to automatically alert the author when the 48-hour timeframe between assessments had passed. This system helped to ensure accurate tracking and timely delivery of the participant's assessments. The progression participants went through for each condition (standard or applicant) is described below.

Prior to being assigned to a condition, participants were presented with a welcome page followed by the general instructions that are noted above. They were then asked to electronically sign a consent form as well as a transcript release form. Next, participants were presented an assessment containing 20 Big Seven personality items not considered in computing personality scores and response latencies. These items were constructed in a manner similar to the IPIP items and used the same response scales as the IPIP items. The first 15 items were intended to allow participants to become familiar with the on-line assessment format. The last five items were used in the analyses of response latencies to control for individual differences in processing speed. These items served as a baseline measure of item response latency. Upon completing the baseline measure, the first condition the participant was assigned to (i.e., standard or one of the applicant conditions) was introduced.

In the standard setting condition, participants were presented instructions that explained the difference between accuracy and importance ratings and provided examples to illustrate this difference. They were instructed to click the "NEXT" button at the end of the instructions to advance to the personality assessment (i.e., IPIP). Participants were then presented with the first personality item and were asked to rate the item on the accuracy scale. After completing the first item rating participants were then presented with the same personality item but asked to rate the item on the importance scale. Once a response option was selected, the next item in the sequence automatically appeared. This resulted in participants alternating between rating the same item first, on accuracy and then on importance. After completing the personality assessment participants were presented with brief instructions on how to complete the BIDR assessment. Upon completion of the BIDR, participants were presented with a demographic item section. Instructions were given to answer all items. These items can be found in Appendix B. Participants were then presented with text thanking them for their participation. Once participants in the standard condition finished the battery of assessments they were e-mailed another link to their randomly assigned applicant condition 48 hours later.

In the applicant condition, participants were told to imagine they were applying for the job of an executive sales manager and to respond in order to get the job. They were also told that the top 5% of participants would receive $20. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of four Job Familiarity x Warning conditions. Those in the low familiarity-warning condition were told to imagine they were applying for the job of an executive sales manager and that a lie scale was inserted to ensure their responses were valid. Participants in the high familiarity-warning condition were told to imagine they

were applying for the job of an executive sales manager, presented with a description of the personal characteristics necessary for successful performance as a sales manager, and told that a lie scale was inserted to ensure their responses were valid. Participants in the "no warning" conditions were only given the appropriate level (low vs. high) of job familiarity information and were not presented with a warning of lie scale inclusion. They were instructed to click the "NEXT" button at the end of the instructions to advance to the personality assessment (i.e., IPIP). Participants were presented with the first personality item and were asked to rate the item on the accuracy scale. After completing the first item rating participants were then presented with the same personality item but asked to rate the item on the importance scale. This resulted in participants alternating between rating the same item first, on accuracy and then on importance.

After completing the personality assessment, participants were presented with brief instructions on how to complete the BIDR assessment. Upon completion of the BIDR, participants were presented with a section of items measuring environmental conditions as well as the manipulation items described earlier. Similar to the standard condition, upon completion of the applicant condition participants were presented with text thanking them for their participation.

Chapter 4: Results

Manipulation Checks

Analyses of the manipulation check items were conducted to determine if conditional manipulations had expected effects. For example, one would expect that those participants in a condition that contained the warning of a lie scale would express greater concern of being detected by the lie scale than those who did not receive the warning. Means and standard deviations across the four applicant response conditions are shown in Table 1. Across conditions, participants expressed a Slightly Familiar – Moderately Familiar understanding of the personal characteristics of the targeted position, and a Slight Confidence – Moderate Confidence in their understanding of the personal characteristics necessary to perform the job of the targeted position. On average, participants in the two conditions that contained a warning indicated that they were only "Slightly Concerned" that the lie scale would indicate they inflated their responses.

There was one significant difference between the study condition groupings. Participants in the High Job Knowledge – Warning condition indicated a significantly higher level of knowledge about the personal characteristics of an Executive Sales Manager than did participants in the Low Job Knowledge – Warning condition (see Table 1). These results suggest that the manipulations included in this study (i.e., varying levels of job knowledge and inclusion of a warning) did not result in all of the expected effects.

Table 1

Manipulation Item Analysis for the Total Sample

	High Job Knowledge – Warning *(n = 121)*		*High Job Knowledge – No Warning* *(n =122)*		*Low Job Knowledge – Warning* *(n = 164)*		*Low Job Knowledge – No Warning* *(n = 99)*	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Position Characteristic Familiarity	2.40**	1.01	2.43	.978	2.15**	.944	2.21	1.01
Position Characteristic Familiarity Confidence	2.61	.978	2.70	.961	2.48	1.00	2.54	1.03
Lie Scale Concern	2.02	.880			1.91	.955		

**p < 0.05

Preliminary Analysis

Analyses were conducted to determine if the independent and dependent variables differed by demographic characteristics. Analyzed characteristics were gender, race, and age. Modifications regarding the inclusion of covariates were made based upon correlation analysis. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, pg. 200 – 202), covariates should be related to dependent variables of interest and they should not be related to one another. The covariates Participant Location and Noise were found to have an inconsistent, non-significant relationship with a majority of dependent variables of interest. The covariates Instruction Response Latency and Dummy Item Response Latency were found to have violated the rule that covariates not be related to independent variables. In this study, independent variables were latencies captured in the standard condition. Correlation analysis revealed that these two covariates had significant relationships with independent variables. In the case of correlated covariates and

independent variables, one runs the risk of reducing the independent variable's effect on the dependent variable, resulting in a biased adjustment of the dependent variable (Miller & Chapman, 2001). Correlation matrices can be found in Appendix E. These covariates were removed from the final analyses.

The variable job familiarity was recoded due to a small cell size. The highest level of job familiarity, represented by the fifth response option, Extremely Familiar, only had 11 endorsements across the study. This response option was combined with the fourth response option, Very Familiar, for a combined total response of 54 participants.

Hypotheses proposed that providing a warning of a lie scale and job familiarity would impact scale and response latency scores. Before testing the hypotheses, demographic group analyses were conducted separately for each condition combination (e.g., Warning – High Job Familiarity, No Warning – Low Job Familiarity). A summary of these results is presented below.

Gender. Analysis revealed there is no proportional differences for females across the standard and four experimental conditions (i.e., Low Job Familiarity – No Warning (LJK_No), Low Job Familiarity – Warning (LJK_Yes), High Job Familiarity – No Warning (HJK_No), High Job Familiarity – Warning (HJK_Yes). In the Standard condition (i.e., no manipulation) females constituted 76% of the sample. In the HJK_No condition females constituted 78%, in the HJK_Yes condition 80%, in the LJK_No condition 75%, and in the LJK_Yes condition 72%. Analyses involving participants in the Standard condition revealed that males had faster response latency scores on the Neuroticism accuracy, Extroversion accuracy, Openness to Experience importance, BIDR-IM, and Qualified Job Candidate accuracy scales than females. Analyses

involving participants in the HJK_No condition revealed that females had higher scale scores on the Extroversion importance, Conscientiousness importance, and Agreeableness importance scales. Analyses involving participants in the HJK_Yes condition revealed that females had higher scale scores on the Neuroticism Importance scale. Analyses involving participants in the LJK_No condition revealed that males had higher scales scores on the Openness to Experience importance scale and had significantly higher job familiarity scores. Analyses involving participants in the LJK_Yes condition revealed that females had higher scale scores on the Agreeableness importance scale and responded faster on the Extroversion accuracy scale and Qualified Job Candidate accuracy scales. Males in the LJK_Yes condition, responded faster on the Neuroticism importance scale, Extroversion importance, and Qualified Job Candidate importance scales. In addition, analyses revealed that males self-report SAT scores were significantly higher than females.

Race. The original race variable was recoded because multiple response options had small sizes resulting in analyses that could not be performed. The original 10 response options were collapsed into five such that African-American, Asian-Pacific Islander, and Caucasian remained in their original configuration. However, Indian and Native American Indian were collapsed into one category and Mexican, South American, Central American, Puerto Rican, and Cuban were collapsed into one category labeled Latino. Analysis revealed there are no proportional differences for race across the various conditions.

Results revealed that within the standard condition Indian/Native American Indian's had a significantly lower scale score for Conscientiousness accuracy scale than

the Latino participants. Additionally, African-American's had significantly faster responses to the last five baseline items in comparison to Caucasians. Within the LJK_No condition, Indian/Native American Indian's had significantly higher scale scores on the Conscientiousness importance scale.

Results revealed that self-report SAT scores differed across race categories. Results revealed that African-American's self-report SAT scores were significantly lower than the four other race categories.

Age. Analysis revealed no proportional differences in the age of participants across the various conditions. Results revealed that within the standard condition older participants responded faster. Specifically, 21 year olds responded faster than 18 year olds on the Extroversion importance scale and the Qualified Job Candidate importance scale. Twenty year olds responded faster than 18 year olds did on the Conscientiousness importance scale. Within the HJK_Yes condition younger participants scored higher, specifically 18 year olds had higher scale scores than 20 year olds on the Conscientiousness accuracy scale and the BIDR-IM scale. 19 year olds had higher scale scores on the Extroversion importance scale than 20 year olds. In addition, results revealed an age difference for self-report SAT. 19 year olds self-report SAT scores were significantly lower scores than 21 year olds.

Relationships Between Independent and Dependent Variables

Correlation matricies for independent, dependent variables, and covariates can be found in Appendices E - I. Table 2 contains the standard condition and the amalgamation of the four applicant conditions. Appendices F, G, H, and I contain correlation matrices

for the HJK_No, HJK_Yes, LJK_No, and LJK_Yes, respectively. The main diagonals contain the coefficient alphas for the personality scale scores. Standard condition alphas ranged from .74 for the Neuroticism importance scale to .94 for the Extroversion accuracy scale.

Correlations were calculated for each personality/schema scale (i.e., accuracy and importance, respectively) and the associated scale response latency. Values were small, ranging from .001 for the Agreeableness importance scale, to -.21 for the Extroversion importance scale. Negative relationships suggest that higher scale scores were associated with faster response latencies.

Multicollinearity amongst indpendent variables was investigated using the recommended correlation of .90 or greater (Ott & Longnecker, 2001, p. 708) as an indicator of collinearity issues. No correlations between independent variables were found to be .90 or greater.

Analyses of Latency and Scale Scores

Tables 2a and 2b contain the personality scale and latency score means and standard deviations. Table 2a presents means and standard deviations for the standard condition and the combination of all four applicant conditions. Table 2b contains the means and standard deviation according to a 2 X 4 job familiarity by warning format.

Table 2a.

Means and Standard Deviations for Personality Scale Scores and Latency by Condition

	Standard Scale Score		*Standard Response Latency*		*All Applicants Scale Score*		*All Applicants Response Latency*	
*Scale**	*(n = 506)*		*(n = 506)*		*(n = 506)*		*(n = 506)*	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Neuro-Acc	5.10	1.58	.054	.627	4.22***	1.62	-.055***	.661
Extro-Acc	7.63	1.66	.061	.654	8.01***	1.70	-.063***	.706
Open-Acc	7.95	1.43	.049	.625	7.93***	1.43	-.052***	.707
Agree-Acc	7.49	1.32	.076	.631	7.68***	1.37	-.077***	.713
Cons-Acc	7.60	1.53	.079	.653	8.12***	1.71	-.088***	.725
Neuro-Imp	5.42	1.00	.050	.632	5.33***	1.07	-.047***	.633
Extro-Imp	6.78	1.21	.065	.654	6.89***	1.22	-.064***	.654
Open-Imp	6.95	1.14	.039	.619	6.98**	1.05	-.036***	.636
Agree-Imp	7.23	1.10	.044	.637	7.18**	1.14	-.032***	.650
Cons-Imp	6.82	1.22	.065	.629	6.90***	1.31	-.069***	.661

Note. *Neuro-Acc = Neuroticism Accuracy rating; Extro-Acc = Extroversion Accuracy rating; Open-Acc = Openness Accuracy rating; Agree-Acc = Agreeableness Accuracy rating; Cons-Acc = Conscientiousness Accuracy rating; Neuro-Imp = Neuroticism Importance rating; Extro-Imp =

Extroversion Importance rating; Open-Imp = Openness Importance rating; Agree-Imp = Agreeableness Importance rating; Cons-Imp = Conscientiousness Importance rating.

Standard vs. Applicant Condition Latency Difference **p < 0.05; ***p < .001

Table 2b.

Means and Standard Deviations for Personality Scale Scores and Latency: Warning by Job Knowledge Condition

	High Job Knowledge								*Low Job Knowledge*							
	No Warning Scale		*No Warning Latency*		*Warning Scale*		*Warning Latency*		*No Warning Scale*		*No Warning Latency*		*Warning Scale*		*Warning Latency*	
*Scale**	*(n = 122)*		*(n = 122)*		*(n = 121)*		*(n = 121)*		*(n = 99)*		*(n = 99)*		*(n = 164)*		*(n = 164)*	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Neuro-Acc	4.02	1.55	-.078	.619	4.17	1.63	-.076	.632	4.37	1.61	-.054	.669	4.31	1.66	-.023	.709
Extro-Acc	8.18	1.68	-.097	.670	8.07	1.74	-.063	.651	8.00	1.70	-.082	.691	7.85	1.68	-.028	.780
Open-Acc	7.84	1.38	-.087	.659	8.00	1.41	-.089	.702	8.15	1.43	-.004	.657	7.82	1.49	-.029	.774
Agree- Acc	7.74	1.37	-.115	.677	7.70	1.39	-.100	.716	7.67	1.31	-.044	.635	7.64	1.39	-.051	.782
Cons-Acc	8.33	1.72	-.123	.703	8.08	1.72	-.082	.683	8.10	1.65	-.048	.676	8.02	1.72	-.091	.802
Neuro-Imp	5.30	1.08	-.099	.615	5.34	1.13	-.069	.575	5.37	1.06	-.035	.648	5.31	1.03	-.001	.679
Extro-Imp	6.94	1.23	-.099	.611	6.97	1.28	-.021	.605	6.89	1.26	-.069	.700	6.80	1.16	-.067	.692
Open-Imp	7.06	1.06	-.101	.610	7.01	1.09	-.038	.563	6.93	1.01	.000	.658	6.92	1.03	-.009	.690
Agree-Imp	7.08	1.17	-.086	.620	7.22	1.18	-.058	.607	7.18	1.07	-.016	.616	7.22	1.15	.017	.719
Cons-Imp	6.99	1.35	-.091	.613	6.96	1.25	-.092	.618	6.79	1.29	-.029	.666	6.87	1.33	-.058	.726

*Neuro-Acc = Neuroticism Accuracy rating; Extro-Acc = Extroversion Accuracy rating; Open-Acc = Openness Accuracy rating; Agree-Acc = Agreeableness Accuracy rating; Cons-Acc = Conscientiousness Accuracy rating; Neuro-Imp = Neuroticism Importance rating; Extro-Imp = Extroversion Importance rating; Open-Imp = Openness Importance rating; Agree-Imp = Agreeableness Importance rating; Cons-Imp = Conscientiousness Importance rating.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 were tested using a 2 x 2 x 5 mixed-design ANOVA, with condition as the within-subjects factor, and candidate schema and job familiarity as the between-subjects factors. The results of the analyses are presented in Table 3.

Hypothesis 1 states that an applicant's self-schema will influence item response latencies, and is supported if there is a significant Condition x Schema interaction. Specifically, it is expected that there will be no differences in the response latencies observed in the standard and applicant conditions among participants who possess a schema consistent with a qualified job candidate, and faster response latencies observed in the applicant condition compared to standard condition among qualified job candidate aschematics. In general, the results do not support hypothesis 1, with nonsignificant Condition x Schema effects observed for 11 of the 12 response latencies. The only exception is the significant interaction observed for the Conscientiousness – Importance latency score [$F(1, 498)=4.39$, $p =.04$, $\eta p2 = .01$)]. A comparison of the mean response latencies reveals that aschematics had slower response latencies in the applicant condition than schematics, where schematics response latencies were $x\square = -.207$ for the standard and $x\square = -.238$ for the applicant condition and aschematic's response latencies were $x\square = .129$ for the standard condition and $x\square = -.029$ for the applicant condition.

Taken together, hypotheses 2a and 2b state that the effect of an applicant's schema on response latencies between conditions is moderated by the applicant's level of job familiarity, and are supported if there is a significant three-way interaction between condition x schema x job familiarity. Hypothesis 2a states that, among participants who possess a schema consistent with a qualified job candidate, job familiarity will have no effect on the response latencies observed in the standard and applicant conditions.

Hypothesis 2b states that, among those applicants who do not possess a schema consistent with the traits of a qualified job candidate, high job familairity will be associated with faster response latencies in the applicant condition, while low job familiarity will be associated with slower response latencies in the applicant condition. Consistent with the hypotheses, a significant interaction was found for Emotional Stability – Importance, $F(3, 498) = 2.64$, $p = .05$, $\eta p2 = .02$ and for Extroversion – Importance, $F(3, 498) = 2.85$, $p = .04$, $\eta p2 = .02$. For Hypothesis 2a to be supported profile plots for schematics across job familiarity levels should be flat. An examination of profile plots (see Figures 1 – 8) revealed that this was not the case. For Hypothesis 2b to be supported profile plots for aschematics should have an upward curve for low levels of job familarity, indicating a slower response time, from the standard to applicant condition and a downward curve for high levels of job familiarity, indicating faster response times, from the standard to the applicant condition. An examination of the profile plots (Fig 1 – 8) revealed that this was not the case. Therefore, hypotheses 2a and 2b were not supported.

Table 3

Mixed Analysis of Variance Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Partial Eta Squared
Qualified Job Candidate - Accuracy					
Model 1 – All Main Effects					
Schema	7.48	1	7.48	12.73***	.025
Job Fam	2.80	3	.94	1.60	.009
Within Vars					

RL	2.07	1	2.07	11.02***	.022
RL*Schema	.010	1	.010	.053	.000
RL*Job Fam	.190	3	.063	.338	.002
RL*Schema*Job Fam	1.33	3	.443	2.36	.014
Error	93.41	498	.188		
Qualified Job Candidate - Importance					
Between Vars					
Schema	8.02	1	8.02	14.86***	.029
Job Fam	2.08	3	.692	1.28	.008
Within Vars					
RL	1.40	1	1.40	8.88**	.018
RL*Schema	.150	1	.150	.973	.002
RL*Job Fam	.354	3	.118	.764	.005
RL*Schema*Job Fam	1.04	3	.347	2.25	.013
Error	76.79	498	.154		
Conscientiousness - Accuracy					
Between Vars					
Schema	6.16	1	6.16	8.66**	.017
Job Fam	1.61	3	.537	.756	.005
Within Vars					
RL	3.15	1	3.15	13.43***	.026
RL*Schema	.204	1	.204	.869	.002
RL*Job Fam	.588	3	.196	.836	.005
RL*Schema*Job Fam	.621	3	.207	.883	.005
Error	116.70	498	.234		

Table 3 (continued)

Mixed Analysis of Variance Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Partial Eta Squared
Conscientiousness - Importance					
Between Vars					
Schema	9.28	1	9.28	14.68***	.029
Job Fam	.878	3	.293	.463	.003
Within Vars					
RL	1.44	1	1.44	7.93**	.016

RL*Schema	.796	1	.796	4.39**	.009
RL*Job Fam	.714	3	.238	1.31	.008
RL*Schema*Job Fam	.362	3	.121	.665	.004
Error	90.23	498	.181		
Extraversion – Accuracy					
Between Vars					
Schema	11.77	1	11.77	17.70***	.034
Job Fam	4.73	3	1.58	2.37	.014
Within Vars					
RL	1.60	1	1.60	6.76**	.013
RL*Schema	.007	1	.007	.030	.000
RL*Job Fam	.086	3	.029	.121	.001
RL*Schema*Job Fam	1.65	3	.550	2.33	.014
Error	117.65	498	.236		
Extraversion – Importance					
Between Vars					
Schema	11.72	1	11.72	19.08***	.037
Job Fam	3.55	3	1.18	1.93	.011
Within Vars					
RL	1.47	1	1.47	6.70**	.013
RL*Schema	.107	1	.107	.489	.001
RL*Job Fam	.643	3	.214	.979	.006
RL*Schema*Job Fam	1.87	3	.624	2.85**	.017
Error	109.09	498	.219		

Table 3 (continued)

Mixed Analysis of Variance Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Partial Eta Squared
Emotional Stability – Accuracy					
Between Vars					
Schema	5.25	1	5.25	8.86**	.017
Job Fam	2.92	3	.972	1.64	.010
Within Vars					
RL	1.63	1	1.63	7.16**	.014
RL*Schema	.056	1	.056	.247	.000
RL*Job Fam	.124	3	.041	.183	.001

RL*Schema*Job Fam	1.99	3	.662	2.92	.017
Error	113.12	498	.227		
Emotional Stability – Importance					
Between Vars					
Schema	4.11	1	4.11	7.21**	.014
Job Fam	2.37	3	.790	1.39	.008
Within Vars					
RL	1.21	1	1.21	5.41**	.011
RL*Schema	.003	1	.003	.015	.000
RL*Job Fam	.296	3	.099	.440	.003
RL*Schema*Job Fam	1.78	3	.592	2.64**	.016
Error	111.50	498	.224		
Openness – Accuracy					
Between Vars					
Schema	4.86	1	4.86	7.62**	.015
Job Fam	6.07	3	2.03	3.18**	.019
Within Vars					
RL	1.87	1	1.87	7.78**	.015
RL*Schema	.183	1	.183	.762	.002
RL*Job Fam	.163	3	.054	.226	.001
RL*Schema*Job Fam	1.04	3	.348	1.45	.009
Error	119.86	498	.241		

Table 3 (continued)

Mixed Analysis of Variance Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

Source	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Partial Eta Squared
Openness – Importance					
Between Vars					
Schema	8.37	1	8.37	14.19***	.028
Job Fam	3.68	3	1.23	2.08	.012
Within Vars					
RL	.497	1	.497	2.73	.005
RL*Schema	.135	1	.135	.744	.001
RL*Job Fam	.696	3	.232	1.27	.008
RL*Schema*Job Fam	.826	3	.275	1.51	.009
Error	90.70	498	.182		

Agreeableness – Accuracy					
Between Vars					
Schema	4.99	1	4.99	7.66**	.015
Job Fam	4.32	3	1.44	2.21	.013
Within Vars					
RL	4.36	1	4.36	17.81***	.035
RL*Schema	.068	1	.068	.279	.001
RL*Job Fam	.886	3	.295	1.21	.007
RL*Schema*Job Fam	1.34	3	.446	1.82	.011
Error	121.90	498	.245		
Agreeableness – Importance					
Between Vars					
Schema	7.64	1	7.64	12.05***	.024
Job Fam	1.67	3	.557	.878	.005
Within Vars					
RL	.657	1	.657	3.63	.007
RL*Schema	.007	1	.007	.041	.000
RL*Job Fam	.276	3	.092	.508	.003
RL*Schema*Job Fam	.472	3	.157	.869	.005
Error	90.22	498	.181		

**p < 0.05

***p < .001



Figure 1. Interaction between Standard and Applicant condition response latencies on Emotional Stability – Importance ratings for "Not at all familiar" Job Familiarity rating.



Figure 2. Interaction between Standard and Applicant condition response latencies on Emotional Stability – Importance ratings for "Slightly Familiar" Job Familiarity rating.



Figure 3. Interaction between Standard and Applicant condition response latencies on Emotional Stability – Importance ratings for "Moderately Familiar" Job Familiarity rating.



Figure 4. Interaction between Standard and Applicant condition response latencies on Emotional Stability – Importance ratings for "Very-Extremely Familiar" Job Familiarity rating.



Figure 5. Interaction between Standard and Applicant condition response latencies on Extraversion – Importance ratings for "Not at all Familiar" Job Familiarity rating.



Figure 6. Interaction between Standard and Applicant condition response latencies on Extraversion – Importance ratings for “Slightly Familiar” Job Familiarity rating.



Figure 7. Interaction between Standard and Applicant condition response latencies on Extraversion – Importance ratings for “Moderately Familiar” Job Familiarity rating.



Figure 8. Interaction between Standard and Applicant condition response latencies on Extraversion – Importance ratings for "Very-Extremely Familiar" Job Familiarity rating.

Hypotheses 3 and 4. Hypotheses 3 and 4 were tested using hierarchical regression with applicant scale scores (hypothesis 3) and applicant response latencies (hypothesis 4) as the dependent variables. For hypothesis 3, warning condition, SAT, and standard scale scores were entered at step 1, two-way interactions were entered at step 2, and the three-way interaction was entered at step 3. For hypothesis 4, warning condition, SAT, and standard response latency scores were entered at step 1, two-way interactions were entered at step 2, and the three-way interaction was entered at step 3.

VIF and Tolerance collinearity statistics revealed that there was no evidence of multicollinearity. The results of the analyses are presented in Table 4.

Table 4

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Scale Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Qualified Job Candidate - Accuracy				
Model 1 - Main Effects	.401			(3,502)
Warning			-.054	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			.071*	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.627***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.411*	.011		(6,499)
Warning			-.050	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			.057	(1,499)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.626***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			-.016	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.012	(1,499)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.102**	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.423**	.011		(7,498)
Warning			-.053	(1,498)
Self-report SAT			.064	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.622***	(1,498)

Warning X Self-report SAT			-.034	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.013	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.082	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.109**	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued)

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Scale Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Qualified Job Candidate - Importance				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.170			(3,502)
Warning			.009	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			-.106**	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.395***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.188*	.018		(6,499)
Warning			.012	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			-.130**	(1,499)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.374***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.013	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.044	(1,499)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.125**	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.193	.006		(7,498)
Warning			.008	(1,498)
Self-report SAT			-.124**	(1,498)

Standard Condition Mean Response		.382***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT		-.005	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response		-.057	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response		-.106*	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response		-.081	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued)

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Scale Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Conscientiousness - Accuracy				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.406			(3,502)
Warning			-.053	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			.085*	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.630***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.411	.005		(6,499)
Warning			-.045	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			.075*	(1,499)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.623***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			-.035	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.050	(1,499)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.044	(1,499)

Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.413	.001		(7,498)
Warning			-.046	(1,498)
Self-report SAT			.079*	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.626***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT			-.047	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.047	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.038	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.041	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Scale Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Conscientiousness - Importance				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.299			(3,502)
Warning			.021	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			-.064	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.539***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.301	.002		(6,499)
Warning			.022	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			-.071	(1,499)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.533***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			-.003	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.004	(1,499)

Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.045	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.314	.013**		
Warning			.011	(7,498)
Self-report SAT			-.053	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.548***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT			-.030	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.017	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.013	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.122**	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Scale Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Extraversion - Accuracy				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.426			(3,502)
Warning			-.052	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			.074*	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.647***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.431	.005		(6,499)
Warning			-.045	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			.059	(1,499)

Standard Condition Mean Response			.646***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.003	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.038	(1,499)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.059	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.436	.005*		
Warning			-.046	(7,498)
Self-report SAT			.068	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.644***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT			-.017	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.039	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.046	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.074*	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Scale Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Extraversion - Importance				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.229			(3,502)
Warning			.008	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			-.078*	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.471***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.240	.012		(6,499)

	Warning		.006	(1,499)
	Self-report SAT		-.101*	(1,499)
	Standard Condition Mean Response		.458***	(1,499)
	Warning X Self-report SAT		.039	(1,499)
	Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response		-.031	(1,499)
	Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response		-.104**	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction		.243	.003	
	Warning		.006	(7,498)
	Self-report SAT		-.092*	(1,498)
	Standard Condition Mean Response		.458***	(1,498)
	Warning X Self-report SAT		.026	(1,498)
	Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response		-.037	(1,498)
	Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response		-.092*	(1,498)
	Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response		-.054	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Scale Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Emotional Stability - Accuracy				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.289			(3,502)
Warning			.033	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			-.069	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.531***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.296	.007		(6,499)
Warning			.009	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			-.072	(1,499)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.520***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.018	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.086*	(1,499)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.000	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.298	.002		(7,498)
Warning			.008	(1,498)
Self-report SAT			-.079*	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.524***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.036	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.085*	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.010	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.047	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued)

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Scale Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Emotional Stability - Importance				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.178			(3,502)
Warning			-.011	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			-.006	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.422***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.179	.001		(6,499)
Warning			-.009	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			-.003	(1,499)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.424***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			-.016	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.009	(1,499)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.034	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.179	.000		
Warning			-.008	(7,498)
Self-report SAT			-.004	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.424***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT			-.013	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.009	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.032	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.012	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Scale Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Openness - Accuracy				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.503			(3,502)
Warning			-.001	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			.043	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.702***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.504	.001		(6,499)
Warning			-.001	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			.044	(1,499)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.705***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			-.021	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.022	(1,499)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.004	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.505	.001		
Warning			.003	(7,498)
Self-report SAT			.043	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.707***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT			-.023	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.024	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.001	(1,498)

Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.032	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Scale Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Openness - Importance				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.267			(3,502)
Warning			-.010	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			-.047	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.512***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.281	.014*		(6,499)
Warning			-.007	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			-.048	(1,499)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.510***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			-.025	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.062	(1,499)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.094*	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.281	.000		
Warning			-.008	(7,498)
Self-report SAT			-.048	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.511***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT			-.026	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.063	(1,498)

Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.092*	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.013	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Scale Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Agreeableness - Accuracy				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.469			(3,502)
Warning			.015	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			.025	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.687***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.477	.008*		(6,499)
Warning			.018	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			.028	(1,499)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.686***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			-.023	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.086**	(1,499)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.026	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.478	.001		
Warning			.020	(7,498)
Self-report SAT			.027	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.684***	(1,498)

Warning X Self-report SAT			-.020	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.088**	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.025	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.025	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Scale Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Agreeableness - Importance				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.289			(3,502)
Warning			.069	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			-.070	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.527***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.293	.004		(6,499)
Warning			.067	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			-.075*	(1,499)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.524***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			-.020	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.034	(1,499)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.046	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.293	.000		

Warning			.068	(7,498)
Self-report SAT			-.077*	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.523***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT			-.018	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.032	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.049	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.014	(1,498)

Table 4(continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Qualified Job Candidate – Accuracy Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.529			(3,502)
Warning			.034	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			-.067	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.528***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.542	.013*		(6,499)
Warning			.039	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			-.051	(1,499)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.538***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.043	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.021	(1,499)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.109**	(1,499)

Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.544	.003		(7,498)
Warning			.043	(1,498)
Self-report SAT			-.050	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.540***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.034	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.024	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.124**	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.055	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Qualified Job Candidate - Importance Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.570			(3,502)
Warning			.042	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			-.082*	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.037***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.582	.014*		(6,499)
Warning			.049	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			-.066	(1,499)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.569***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.028	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean			-.045	(1,499)

Response				
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.111**	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.582	.000		(7,498)
Warning			.049	(1,498)
Self-report SAT			-.066	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.569***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.027	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.044	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.113**	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.009	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Conscientiousness - Accuracy Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.267			(3,502)
Warning			.015	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			-.072	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.515***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.280	.013*		(6,499)
Warning			.016	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			-.059	(1,499)

Standard Condition Mean Response			.518***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.034	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.020	(1,499)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.108**	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.281	.002		(7,498)
Warning			.019	(1,498)
Self-report SAT			-.058	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.520***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.028	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.017	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.122**	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.046	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Conscientiousness - Importance Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.318			(3,502)
Warning			.007	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			-.051	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.565***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.324	.007		(6,499)
Warning			.007	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			-.054	(1,499)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.571***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.075*	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.027	(1,499)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.003	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.326	.001		
Warning			.011	(7,498)
Self-report SAT			-.060	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.576***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.085*	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.020	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.007	(1,498)

Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.040	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Extraversion - Accuracy Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.244			(3,502)
Warning			.045	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			-.045	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.493***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.256	.012*		(6,499)
Warning			.049	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			-.033	(1,499)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.503***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.049	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.024	(1,499)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.100*	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.261	.005		
Warning			.054	(7,498)
Self-report SAT			-.032	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.505***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.039	(1,498)

Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.029	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.116**	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.074	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Extraversion - Importance Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.241			(3,502)
Warning			.054	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			-.057	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.490***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.264	.022**		(6,499)
Warning			.059	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			-.035	(1,499)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.493***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			-.010	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.071	(1,499)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.130**	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.264	.000		
Warning			.059	(7,498)

Self-report SAT			-.035	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.493***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT			-.011	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.071	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.134***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.014	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Emotional Stability - Accuracy Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.206			(3,502)
Warning			.033	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			-.063	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.454***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.216	.010		(6,499)
Warning			.036	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			-.047	(1,499)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.463***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.032	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.016	(1,499)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.097*	(1,499)

Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.220	.003		(7,498)
Warning			.040	(1,498)
Self-report SAT			-.045	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.466***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.021	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.021	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.108**	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.059	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Emotional Stability - Importance Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.208			(3,502)
Warning			.048	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			-.113**	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.445***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.223	.015		(6,499)
Warning			.050	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			-.089*	(1,499)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.447***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.006	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.018	(1,499)

Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.123**	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.224	.001		
Warning			.051	(7,498)
Self-report SAT			-.089*	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.448***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT			-.001	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.019	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.129**	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.036	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Openness - Accuracy Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.219			(3,502)
Warning			.021	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			-.055	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.465***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.230	.011		(6,499)
Warning			.022	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			-.036	(1,499)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.480***	(1,499)

Warning X Self-report SAT			-.001	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.018	(1,499)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.106**	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.234	.003		
Warning			.023	(7,498)
Self-report SAT			-.038	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.484***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT			-.010	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.026	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.129***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.064	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Openness - Importance Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.294			(3,502)
Warning			.065	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			-.023	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.543***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.312	.018**		(6,499)

	Warning		.068	(1,499)
	Self-report SAT		.000	(1,499)
	Standard Condition Mean Response		.535***	(1,499)
	Warning X Self-report SAT		.026	(1,499)
	Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response		-.078*	(1,499)
	Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response		.119**	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction		.312	.000	
	Warning		.068	(7,498)
	Self-report SAT		-.002	(1,498)
	Standard Condition Mean Response		.536***	(1,498)
	Warning X Self-report SAT		.024	(1,498)
	Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response		-.076*	(1,498)
	Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response		.121**	(1,498)
	Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response		-.018	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Agreeableness - Accuracy Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.215			(3,502)
Warning			.057	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			.000	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.045	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.229	.013*		(6,499)
Warning			.006	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			-.001	(1,499)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.465***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.032	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.037	(1,499)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.102*	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.234	.005		
Warning			.010	(7,498)
Self-report SAT			.006	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.470***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.021	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.032	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.122	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.074	(1,498)

Table 4 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Agreeableness - Importance Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.322			(3,502)
Warning			.039	(1,502)
Self-report SAT			.022	(1,502)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.566***	(1,502)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.330	.009		(6,499)
Warning			.043	(1,499)
Self-report SAT			.036	(1,499)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.560***	(1,499)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.030	(1,499)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.024	(1,499)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.088*	(1,499)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interaction	.331	.001		
Warning			.044	(7,498)
Self-report SAT			.037	(1,498)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.561***	(1,498)
Warning X Self-report SAT			.025	(1,498)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.022	(1,498)
Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response			.091*	(1,498)

Warning X Self-report SAT X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.027	(1,498)

Hypothesis 3 states that the presence of a warning will moderate the extent to which cognitive ability is related to score inflation in the applicant condition, and is supported if there is a significant Warning x Cognitive Ability x Standard Condition interaction. Specifically, among participants who do not receive a warning, cognitve ability will not be associated with higher scores in the applicant condition compared to the standard condition. Among participants who receive a warning, higher levels of cognitive ability (i.e., self-report SAT) will be associated with higher scores in the applicant condition compared to the standard condition. The significant negative three-way Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition scale scores interaction on Qualified Job Candidate – Accuracy, Conscientiousness-Importance, and Extroversion-Accuracy scales suggests in the presence of a warning and as cognitive ability increased and standard and applicant scale scores were related, applicant condition scale scores decreased (see Table 4). Thus, Hypothesis 3 was not supported.

Hypothesis 4 states that the presence of a warning will moderate the relationship between cognitive ability and differences in response latencies in the standard and applicant conditions, and is supported if there is a significant Warning x Cognitive Ability x Standard Condition interaction. Specifically, while cognitve ability will be associated with faster response latencies in the applicant condition compared to the standard condition regardless of whether a warning is presented, the effect will be larger when participants are given a warning. No significant three-way interactions were found (see Table 4). Thus, hypothesis 4 was not supported.

Hypotheses 5 and 6 were tested using hierarchical regression with applicant response latencies as the dependent variables. Warning condition, cognitive ability, impression management, job familiarity and standard response latency scores were entered at step 1, two-way interactions were entered at step 2, three-way interactions were entered at step 3, four-way interactions were enterted at step 4, and a five-way interaction was entered at step 5. VIF and Tolerance collinearity statistics revealed that there was no evidence of multicollinearity. The results of the analyses are presented in Table 5.

Hypothesis 5 states that in the absence of a warning cognitive ability will moderate the extent to which impression management will interact with job familiarity in the applicant condition and is supported if there is a significant Warning x Impression Management x Job Familiarty x Standard Condition x Cognitive Ability interaction. Specifically, among participants who do not receive a warning, high levels of job familiarty will interact with impression management resulting in faster response latencies, while low levels of job familiarity will interact with impression management resulting in slower response latencies in the applicant condition. Cognitive ability (i.e., self-report SAT) will moderate both of these relationships resulting in faster response latencies. No significant five-way interactions were found. Thus, Hypothesis 5 was not supported.

Hypothesis 6 states in the presence of a warning, impression management will result in slower response latencies in the applicant condition, irrespective of job familiarity levels, and that cognitive ability would moderate this relationship. This hypothesized relationship is supported if there is a significant Warning x Impression

Management x Job Familiarity x Standard Condition x Cognitive Ability interaction. Specifically, among participants who do receive a warning, increased impression management will result in slower response latencies in the applicant condition, however cognitive ability will moderate this relationship. No significant five-way interactions were found. Thus, Hypothesis 6 was not supported.

Table 5

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Qualified Job Candidate – Accuracy Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.280			(5,500)
Warning			.034	(1,500)
Cognitive Ability			-.067	(1,500)
Impression Management			.005	(1,500)
Job Familiarity			.002	(1,500)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.528***	(1,500)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.296	.016*		(5,495)
Warning			.043	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability			-.049	(1,495)
Impression Management			.003	(1,495)
Job Familiarity			.001	(1,495)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.542***	(1,495)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.041	(1,495)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.034	(1,495)

Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.115**	(1,495)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.048	(1,495)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.014	(1,495)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interactions	.309	.013		(6,489)
Warning			.047	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability			-.054	(1,489)
Impression Management			.019	(1,489)
Job Familiarity			-.009	(1,489)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.580***	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.035	(1,489)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.043	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.126	(1,489)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.045	(1,489)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.028	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.065	(1,489)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response (H6)			-.081	(1,489)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.013	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.018	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response (H5)			.045	(1,489)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response (H5)			-.066	(1,489)

Model 4 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, and Four-Way Interactions	.323	.013*		(4,485)
Warning			.048	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability			-.041	(1,485)
Impression Management			.012	(1,485)
Job Familiarity			-.014	(1,485)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.596***	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.017	(1,485)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.042	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.038	(1,485)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.066	(1,485)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.030	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.031	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.098*	(1,485)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.002	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.044	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.003	(1,485)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.111*	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.189**	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.015	(1,485)

Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.013	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.068	(1,485)
Model 5 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, Four-Way Interactions, and Five-Way Interaction	.325	.002		(1,484)
Warning			.049	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability			-.038	(1,484)
Impression Management			.019	(1,484)
Job Familiarity			-.014	(1,484)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.591***	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.022	(1,484)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.034	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.040	(1,484)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.052	(1,484)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.035	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.049	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.070	(1,484)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.012	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.007	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.034	(1,484)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.120*	(1,484)

Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.146*	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.000	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.011	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.058	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.104	(1,484)

Table 5

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Qualified Job Candidate – Importance Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.325			(5,500)
Warning			.039	(1,500)
Cognitive Ability			-.083*	(1,500)
Impression Management			.015	(1,500)
Job Familiarity			-.021	(1,500)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.567***	(1,500)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.342	.017*		(5,495)
Warning			.048	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability			-.065	(1,495)
Impression Management			.005	(1,495)

Job Familiarity			-.018	(1,495)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.568***	(1,495)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.025	(1,495)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.048	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.117**	(1,495)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.038	(1,495)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.033	(1,495)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interactions	.350	.008		(6,489)
Warning			.047	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability			-.059	(1,489)
Impression Management			.017	(1,489)
Job Familiarity			-.029	(1,489)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.589***	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.023	(1,489)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.042	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.113**	(1,489)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.037	(1,489)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.034	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.011	(1,489)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.048	(1,489)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.008	(1,489)

Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.004	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.081*	(1,489)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.025	(1,489)
Model 4 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, and Four-Way Interactions	.354	.004		(4,485)
Warning			.047	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability			-.053	(1,485)
Impression Management			.016	(1,485)
Job Familiarity			-.032	(1,485)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.598***	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.014	(1,485)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.033	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.091*	(1,485)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.038	(1,485)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.046	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.010	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.051	(1,485)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.016	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.027	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.061	(1,485)

Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.052	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.070	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.008	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.030	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.029	(1,485)
Model 5 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, Four-Way Interactions, and Five-Way Interaction	.354	.000		(1,484)
Warning			.047	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability			-.053	(1,484)
Impression Management			.015	(1,484)
Job Familiarity			-.032	(1,484)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.598***	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.013	(1,484)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.034	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.091*	(1,484)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.039	(1,484)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.045	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.011	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.054	(1,484)

Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.016	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.031	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.065	(1,484)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.051	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	.074	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.007	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.029	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.030	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.009	(1,484)

Table 5

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Conscientiousness – Accuracy Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.268			(5,500)
Warning			.017	(1,500)
Cognitive Ability			-.072	(1,500)

Impression Management			-.022	(1,500)
Job Familiarity			-.035	(1,500)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.519***	(1,500)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.283	.015		(5,495)
Warning			.023	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability			-.057	(1,495)
Impression Management			-.022	(1,495)
Job Familiarity			-.035	(1,495)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.528***	(1,495)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.031	(1,495)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.007	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.114***	(1,495)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.039	(1,495)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.020	(1,495)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interactions	.293	.010		(6,489)
Warning			.027	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability			-.064	(1,489)
Impression Management			-.014	(1,489)
Job Familiarity			-.043	(1,489)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.557***	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.033	(1,489)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.000	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition			.119***	(1,489)

Mean Response				
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.038	(1,489)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.024	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.056	(1,489)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.062	(1,489)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.021	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.037	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.041	(1,489)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.046	(1,489)
Model 4 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, and Four-Way Interactions	.316	.023***		(4,485)
Warning			.020	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability			-.046	(1,485)
Impression Management			-.020	(1,485)
Job Familiarity			-.051	(1,485)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.580***	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.010	(1,485)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.003	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.015	(1,485)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.063	(1,485)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.027	(1,485)

Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.032	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.073	(1,485)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.010	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.023	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.012	(1,485)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.097*	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response [H7]			.213***	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.066	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.030	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response [H6]			.141*	(1,485)
Model 5 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, Four-Way Interactions, and Five-Way Interaction	.319	.004		(1,484)
Warning			.021	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability			-.042	(1,484)
Impression Management			-.013	(1,484)
Job Familiarity			-.049	(1,484)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.576***	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.015	(1,484)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.011	(1,484)

Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response	.019	(1,484)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	.053	(1,484)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.031	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.055	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.046	(1,484)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.015	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	.020	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.028	(1,484)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.112*	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	.172**	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.057	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.031	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.141*	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.112	(1,484)

Table 5

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	B	df
Conscientiousness – Importance Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.321			(5,500)
Warning			.011	(1,500)
Cognitive Ability			-.051	(1,500)
Impression Management			-.034	(1,500)
Job Familiarity			-.044	(1,500)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.569***	(1,500)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.328	.008		(5,495)
Warning			.013	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability			-.056	(1,495)
Impression Management			-.029	(1,495)
Job Familiarity			-.048	(1,495)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.572***	(1,495)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.072	(1,495)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.025	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.000	(1,495)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.034	(1,495)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.011	(1,495)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interactions	.332	.004		(6,489)
Warning			.016	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability			-.065	(1,489)
Impression Management			-.033	(1,489)

Job Familiarity			-.046	(1,489)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.584***	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.085*	(1,489)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.019	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.009	(1,489)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.033	(1,489)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.015	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.041	(1,489)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.022	(1,489)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.016	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.053	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.017	(1,489)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.007	(1,489)
Model 4 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, and Four-Way Interactions	.342	.010		(4,485)
Warning			.010	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability			-.051	(1,485)
Impression Management			-.031	(1,485)
Job Familiarity			-.052	(1,485)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.594***	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.073	(1,485)

Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.022	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.001	(1,485)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.020	(1,485)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.007	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.037	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.014	(1,485)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.011	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.041	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.004	(1,485)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.027	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.100	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.003	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.047	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.025	(1,485)
Model 5 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, Four-Way Interactions, and Five-Way Interaction	.343	.000		(1,484)
Warning			.010	(1,484)

Cognitive Ability	-.050	(1,484)
Impression Management	-.029	(1,484)
Job Familiarity	-.052	(1,484)
Standard Condition Mean Response	.593***	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability	.074	(1,484)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.022	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response	.000	(1,484)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	.019	(1,484)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.010	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response	.036	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.008	(1,484)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.011	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	.049	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.012	(1,484)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.032	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	.090	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.002	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.051	(1,484)

Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.026	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.026	(1,484)

Table 5

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Extraversion – Accuracy Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.245			(5,500)
Warning			.041	(1,500)
Cognitive Ability			-.046	(1,500)
Impression Management			.032	(1,500)
Job Familiarity			.024	(1,500)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.491***	(1,500)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.258	.013		(5,495)
Warning			.047	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability			-.033	(1,495)
Impression Management			.035	(1,495)
Job Familiarity			.025	(1,495)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.503***	(1,495)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.051	(1,495)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.029	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition			.102**	(1,495)

Mean Response				
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.024	(1,495)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.004	(1,495)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interactions	.268	.009		(6,489)
Warning			.051	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability			-.031	(1,489)
Impression Management			.047	(1,489)
Job Familiarity			.021	(1,489)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.522***	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.039	(1,489)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.037	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.118***	(1,489)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.019	(1,489)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.018	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.078	(1,489)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.049	(1,489)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.013	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.014	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.040	(1,489)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.021	(1,489)

Model 4 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, and Four-Way Interactions	.277	.010		(4,485)
Warning			.054	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability			-.021	(1,485)
Impression Management			.039	(1,485)
Job Familiarity			.013	(1,485)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.530***	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.029	(1,485)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.031	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.053	(1,485)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.036	(1,485)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.021	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.050	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.053	(1,485)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.009	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.044	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.006	(1,485)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.056	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response [H7]			.149*	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean			.023	(1,485)

Response				
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.021	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.062	(1,485)
Model 5 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, Four-Way Interactions, and Five-Way Interaction	.278	.001		(1,484)
Warning			.054	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability			-.020	(1,484)
Impression Management			.044	(1,484)
Job Familiarity			.011	(1,484)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.527***	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.032	(1,484)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.027	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.052	(1,484)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.024	(1,484)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.024	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.058	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.038	(1,484)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.015	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.020	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.031	(1,484)
Impression Management X Job			-.062	(1,484)

Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response		.120	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response		.035	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response		-.020	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response		.051	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response		.072	(1,484)

Table 5

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Extraversion – Importance Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.243			(5,500)
Warning			.047	(1,500)
Cognitive Ability			-.059	(1,500)
Impression Management			.043	(1,500)
Job Familiarity			-.010	(1,500)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.485***	(1,500)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.269	.026***		(5,495)
Warning			.055	(1,495)

Cognitive Ability			-.032	(1,495)
Impression Management			.026	(1,495)
Job Familiarity			-.002	(1,495)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.490***	(1,495)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			-.011	(1,495)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.071	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.138***	(1,495)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.029	(1,495)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.055	(1,495)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interactions	.280	.011		(6,489)
Warning			.055	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability			-.024	(1,489)
Impression Management			.034	(1,489)
Job Familiarity			-.011	(1,489)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.500***	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			-.014	(1,489)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.071	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.140***	(1,489)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.033	(1,489)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.040	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.008	(1,489)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.026	(1,489)

Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.017	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.014	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.098*	(1,489)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.019	(1,489)
Model 4 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, and Four-Way Interactions	.284	.004		(4,485)
Warning			.057	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability			-.020	(1,485)
Impression Management			.034	(1,485)
Job Familiarity			-.015	(1,485)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.509***	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			-.026	(1,485)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.061	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.121*	(1,485)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.029	(1,485)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.055	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.006	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.027	(1,485)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.008	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.030	(1,485)

Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.083	(1,485)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.003	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.058	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.015	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.032	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.001	(1,485)
Model 5 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, Four-Way Interactions, and Five-Way Interaction	.284	.000		(1,484)
Warning			.057	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability			-.020	(1,484)
Impression Management			.035	(1,484)
Job Familiarity			-.016	(1,484)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.508***	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			-.026	(1,484)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.059	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.120*	(1,484)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.027	(1,484)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.056	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.005	(1,484)

Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.023	(1,484)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.009	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.025	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.078	(1,484)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.005	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	.053	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.016	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.034	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.001	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.013	(1,484)

Table 5

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Emotional Stability – Accuracy Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.207			(5,500)
Warning			.031	(1,500)
Cognitive Ability			-.063	(1,500)

Impression Management			.016	(1,500)
Job Familiarity			.021	(1,500)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.452***	(1,500)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.223	.016		(5,495)
Warning			.041	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability			-.044	(1,495)
Impression Management			.013	(1,495)
Job Familiarity			.017	(1,495)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.465***	(1,495)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.030	(1,495)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.040	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.099*	(1,495)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.081	(1,495)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.023	(1,495)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interactions	.234	.011		(6,489)
Warning			.048	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability			-.048	(1,489)
Impression Management			.018	(1,489)
Job Familiarity			.010	(1,489)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.490***	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.020	(1,489)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.051	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition			.114**	(1,489)

Mean Response				
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.075	(1,489)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.005	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.078	(1,489)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.061	(1,489)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.050	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.019	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.011	(1,489)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.041	(1,489)
Model 4 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, and Four-Way Interactions	.245	.011		(4,485)
Warning			.049	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability			-.038	(1,485)
Impression Management			.013	(1,485)
Job Familiarity			.009	(1,485)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.501***	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.012	(1,485)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.065	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.043	(1,485)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.100*	(1,485)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.016	(1,485)

Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.035	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.084	(1,485)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.044	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.041	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.015	(1,485)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.058	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response [H7]			.161*	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.015	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.090	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.040	(1,485)
Model 5 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, Four-Way Interactions, and Five-Way Interaction	.248	.003		(1,484)
Warning			.050	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability			-.034	(1,484)
Impression Management			.020	(1,484)
Job Familiarity			.009	(1,484)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.496***	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.019	(1,484)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.056	(1,484)

Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response	.049	(1,484)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	.085	(1,484)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.008	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.057	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.052	(1,484)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.054	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.006	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.055	(1,484)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.069	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	.118	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.007	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.087	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.031	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.109	(1,484)

Table 5 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Emotional Stability – Importance Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.211			(5,500)
Warning			.039	(1,500)
Cognitive Ability			-.115**	(1,500)
Impression Management			.055	(1,500)
Job Familiarity			-.004	(1,500)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.438***	(1,500)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.228	.017		(5,495)
Warning			.040	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability			-.091*	(1,495)
Impression Management			.051	(1,495)
Job Familiarity			-.006	(1,495)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.440***	(1,495)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.009	(1,495)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.012	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.129**	(1,495)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.024	(1,495)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response				(1,495)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interactions	.235	.007		(6,489)

Warning			.043	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability			-.081	(1,489)
Impression Management			.066	(1,489)
Job Familiarity			-.016	(1,489)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.457***	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			-.003	(1,489)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.010	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.125**	(1,489)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.020	(1,489)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.042	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.012	(1,489)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.043	(1,489)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.016	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.019	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.065	(1,489)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.014	(1,489)
Model 4 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, and Four-Way Interactions	.237	.002		(4,485)
Warning			.045	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability			-.074	(1,485)
Impression Management			.060	(1,485)

Job Familiarity	-.017	(1,485)
Standard Condition Mean Response	.464***	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability	-.005	(1,485)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.009	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response	.114*	(1,485)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	.036	(1,485)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.041	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.013	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.048	(1,485)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.020	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.052	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.055	(1,485)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.031	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	.050	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.009	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.012	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.054	(1,485)

Model 5 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, Four-Way Interactions, and Five-Way Interaction	.238	.001		(1,484)
Warning			.046	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability			-.073	(1,484)
Impression Management			.053	(1,484)
Job Familiarity			-.017	(1,484)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.467***	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			-.013	(1,484)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.015	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.115*	(1,484)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.045	(1,484)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.035	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.002	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.069	(1,484)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.025	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.081	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.081	(1,484)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.021	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.083	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean			.001	(1,484)

Response		
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.005	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.059	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.074	(1,484)

Table 5 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Openness – Accuracy Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.220			(5,500)
Warning			.018	(1,500)
Cognitive Ability			-.056	(1,500)
Impression Management			.025	(1,500)
Job Familiarity			.015	(1,500)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.463***	(1,500)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.233	.013		(5,495)
Warning			.025	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability			-.035	(1,495)
Impression Management			.020	(1,495)
Job Familiarity			.016	(1,495)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.482***	(1,495)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			-.001	(1,495)

Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.032	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.109**	(1,495)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.044	(1,495)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response				(1,495)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interactions	.250	.017		(6,489)
Warning			.034	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability			-.034	(1,489)
Impression Management			.011	(1,489)
Job Familiarity			.009	(1,489)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.508***	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			-.015	(1,489)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.046	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.130**	(1,489)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.026	(1,489)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.021	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.090	(1,489)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.066	(1,489)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.063	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.076	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.034	(1,489)

Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.067	(1,489)
Model 4 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, and Four-Way Interactions	.257	.007		(4,485)
Warning			.034	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability			-.025	(1,485)
Impression Management			.008	(1,485)
Job Familiarity			.001	(1,485)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.523***	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			-.019	(1,485)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.044	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.067	(1,485)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.034	(1,485)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.029	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.062	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.060	(1,485)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.061	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.069	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.011	(1,485)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.026	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard			.108	(1,485)

Condition Mean Response				
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.044	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.022	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.028	(1,485)
Model 5 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, Four-Way Interactions, and Five-Way Interaction	.260	.003		(1,484)
Warning			.036	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability			-.020	(1,484)
Impression Management			.013	(1,484)
Job Familiarity			.001	(1,484)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.514***	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			-.021	(1,484)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.036	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.064	(1,484)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.014	(1,484)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.036	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.073	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.041	(1,484)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.066	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.082	(1,484)

Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.032	(1,484)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.029	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	.071	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.019	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.019	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.043	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.117	(1,484)

Table 5(continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Openness – Importance Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.294			(5,500)
Warning			.061	(1,500)
Cognitive Ability			-.024	(1,500)
Impression Management			.018	(1,500)
Job Familiarity			-.022	(1,500)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.542***	(1,500)

Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.313	.019		(5,495)
Warning			.068	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability			-.002	(1,495)
Impression Management			.007	(1,495)
Job Familiarity			-.017	(1,495)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.535***	(1,495)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.027	(1,495)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.082*	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.116**	(1,495)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.016	(1,495)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.020	(1,495)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interactions	.318	.005		(6,489)
Warning			.071	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability			.003	(1,489)
Impression Management			.016	(1,489)
Job Familiarity			-.027	(1,489)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.546***	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.018	(1,489)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.087*	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.113**	(1,489)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.005	(1,489)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.014	(1,489)

Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.014	(1,489)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.013	(1,489)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.001	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.052	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.053	(1,489)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.002	(1,489)
Model 4 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, and Four-Way Interactions	.320	.002		(4,485)
Warning			.072	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability			.003	(1,485)
Impression Management			.015	(1,485)
Job Familiarity			-.027	(1,485)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.554***	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.017	(1,485)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.087*	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.107*	(1,485)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.005	(1,485)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.005	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.009	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.012	(1,485)

Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.010	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.042	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.050	(1,485)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.019	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.003	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.020	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.051	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.019	(1,485)
Model 5 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, Four-Way Interactions, and Five-Way Interaction	.325	.005		(1,484)
Warning			.071	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability			.011	(1,484)
Impression Management			.031	(1,484)
Job Familiarity			-.035	(1,484)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.550***	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.016	(1,484)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.075	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.094*	(1,484)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.013	(1,484)

Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.011	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response	.009	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	.021	(1,484)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.004	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.018	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.014	(1,484)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.041	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.035	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.024	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.071	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.042	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.131	(1,484)

Table 5 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Agreeableness – Accuracy Latency				

Model – 1 All Main Effects	.215			(5,500)
Warning			.008	(1,500)
Cognitive Ability			-.012	(1,500)
Impression Management			.003	(1,500)
Job Familiarity			-.001	(1,500)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.464***	(1,500)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.229	.014		(5,495)
Warning			.004	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability			-.002	(1,495)
Impression Management			.011	(1,495)
Job Familiarity			-.003	(1,495)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.465***	(1,495)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.033	(1,495)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.036	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.101*	(1,495)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.005	(1,495)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.004	(1,495)
Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interactions	.235	.006		(6,489)
Warning			.008	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability			.007	(1,489)
Impression Management			.017	(1,489)
Job Familiarity			-.007	(1,489)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.474***	(1,489)

Warning X Cognitive Ability			.023	(1,489)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.033	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.116**	(1,489)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.009	(1,489)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.000	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.073	(1,489)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.017	(1,489)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.024	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.003	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.022	(1,489)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.006	(1,489)
Model 4 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, and Four-Way Interactions	.259	.024**		(4,485)
Warning			.009	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability			.015	(1,485)
Impression Management			.009	(1,485)
Job Familiarity			-.017	(1,485)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.506***	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.006	(1,485)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			.029	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition			.004	(1,485)

Mean Response				
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.009	(1,485)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.018	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.036	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.027	(1,485)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.013	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.036	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.024	(1,485)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.063	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response [H7]			.228**	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.028	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.028	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.075	(1,485)
Model 5 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, Four-Way Interactions, and Five-Way Interaction	.262	.004		(1,484)
Warning			.011	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability			.024	(1,484)
Impression Management			.015	(1,484)
Job Familiarity			-.018	(1,484)

Standard Condition Mean Response	.499***	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability	.008	(1,484)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response	.039	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response	.008	(1,484)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.007	(1,484)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.023	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.059	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	.003	(1,484)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.020	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	.005	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.072	(1,484)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.076	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	.178*	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.011	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.030	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.076	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean	.140	(1,484)

Response

Table 5 (continued).

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Involving Personality Factor Latency Scores for the Total Sample

	R^2	ΔR^2	*B*	df
Agreeableness – Importance Latency				
Model – 1 All Main Effects	.322			(5,500)
Warning			.038	(1,500)
Cognitive Ability			.021	(1,500)
Impression Management			.002	(1,500)
Job Familiarity			-.013	(1,500)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.566***	(1,500)
Model 2 – Main Effects and Two-Way Interactions	.333	.011		(5,495)
Warning			.044	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability			.038	(1,495)
Impression Management			-.002	(1,495)
Job Familiarity			-.008	(1,495)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.561***	(1,495)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.028	(1,495)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.028	(1,495)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.091*	(1,495)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.028	(1,495)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.044	(1,495)

Model 3 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, and Three-Way Interactions	.339	.006		(6,489)
Warning			.044	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability			.044	(1,489)
Impression Management			.007	(1,489)
Job Familiarity			-.012	(1,489)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.570***	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.018	(1,489)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.030	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.094*	(1,489)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.034	(1,489)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.047	(1,489)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.016	(1,489)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.004	(1,489)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.009	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.077	(1,489)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.049	(1,489)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.032	(1,489)
Model 4 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, and Four-Way Interactions	.345	.006		(4,485)
Warning			.045	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability			.049	(1,485)

Impression Management	.004	(1,485)
Job Familiarity	-.015	(1,485)
Standard Condition Mean Response	.587***	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability	.016	(1,485)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.026	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response	.070	(1,485)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	.034	(1,485)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.060	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response	.013	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.003	(1,485)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.015	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.096	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.025	(1,485)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.057	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response	.073	(1,485)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.012	(1,485)
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.061	(1,485)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X	.057	(1,485)

Standard Condition Mean Response				
Model 5 – Main Effects, Two-Way Interactions, Three-Way Interactions, Four-Way Interactions, and Five-Way Interaction	.350	.004		(1,484)
Warning			.042	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability			.055	(1,484)
Impression Management			.019	(1,484)
Job Familiarity			-.020	(1,484)
Standard Condition Mean Response			.583***	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability			.020	(1,484)
Warning X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.018	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.061	(1,484)
Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.023	(1,484)
Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.071	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Standard Condition Mean Response			.000	(1,484)
Warning X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.026	(1,484)
Warning X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			.007	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.056	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.014	(1,484)
Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response			-.083	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Standard Condition Mean Response			.028	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Job			.013	(1,484)

Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response		
Warning X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	-.075	(1,484)
Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.068	(1,484)
Warning X Cognitive Ability X Impression Management X Job Familiarity X Standard Condition Mean Response	.133	(1,484)

Chapter 5: Discussion

The purpose of this study was to investigate the influence of environmental and individual difference variables on simulated applicants' responses and response times to a personality measure. Specifically, the study tested various hypotheses that examined the interactive effects of the self-schema and working self-concept, with the later defined here as a qualified job candidate schema (WSC-QJC), as well as cognitive ability levels and warnings and job knowledge, using a mixed within-between design. In large part, the six main hypotheses were not supported. However, the findings of this study suggest that additional research into applicant responding, and specifically schemas and faking, is warranted.

Theoretical Implications. As previously stated, this study built upon the Hybrid Model of Impression Managed Responding, which itself was an extension of previously developed models (Vasilopoulos et al., 2000). Although the design of the current study differed from that used in past research, it is useful to discuss the results within the context of models offered to describe the applicant response process (Vasilopoulos, et al., 2000).

One aspect of the current study that sought to build upon the theoretical base for understanding applicant responding was the impact of one's self-schema on responding. Past studies and associated models, such as the Adopted Schema and Hybrid Model, have typically assumed that when prompted to respond as an applicant respondents must step outside themselves to "adopt" a schema and that all applicants are equal in their ability to adopt the schema commensurate with a qualified job applicant. Thus, this research has not taken into account the effect of existing self-schemas or more precisely the effect of working self-concepts. Results of the current study help to shed some light on the impact self-schemas/working self-concepts might have on applicant responding. For instance, lower level main effects indicate that (see Table 3, for an example see Standard Condition Response) the responses participants provided in the standard condition (where no direction was given to respond in any specific manner) had a consistent significant effect on responses provided during the applicant condition. In fact, this variable had the largest effect on examined outcomes. This suggests that the responses provided in one instance strongly influence our responses on subsequent responding, even when conditions are experimentally manipulated, as was the case in the current study. An examination of Table 3 (H1/H2) and 4 (H3/H4) reveals that even the influence of job familiarity and warnings paled in comparison to the effect of self-schema (noted by Standard Condition Response and Schema, respectively). This finding supports the notion that self-schemas are cognitive structures that play a large part in how we interpret stimuli and how this effects our response to stimuli. Past models assume that participants are able to adopt an applicant schema based on the amount of information presented or because they have been instructed to do as such, the results of this study suggest

otherwise. The current study's findings suggest that any schema an applicant attempts to adopt is in large part guided by pre-existing (core) schemas.

An indirect indicator of participant's ability to adopt an applicant schema commensurate with someone who would be qualified for a job is to compare the number of participants whose schema scores reflected a qualified job candidate in the standard and applicant conditions. Applying the score criteria for a qualified job candidate in the standard condition resulted in 96 participants who qualified based on their responses. To examine the ability to adopt the schema we can look at the difference between the standard and applicant condition. Applying the score criteria for a qualified job candidate in the applicant condition resulted in 106 participants who qualified. This is an increase of only 10 participants from the standard to the applicant condition. This finding is interesting given that the applicant conditions contained at least some level of job related information, which should have provided participants with an increased amount of information on how to respond to appear qualified. Given the standard condition contained no such information, the small increase of only 10 participants appearing qualified is interesting and seems to suggest that even when given pertinent information, people are only able to slightly depart from their core self-schemas.

Consistent with the Semantic Exercise Model of Faked Responses and the Hybrid Model, response latencies tended to be faster in the applicant condition than in the honest condition. While the current study did not have an explicit Honest vs. Fake condition design, past research supports the notion that an applicant condition can be considered a "fake good" condition by its nature (Holden et al., 1992; Holden & Hibbs, 1995). Tables 2a and 2b contain the means and standard deviations of the standard and applicant

condition (across all applicant conditions) personality and response latency scores. As per the Hsu et al. (1989) and Vasilopoulos et al.'s (2000) finding, response latencies across all five personality traits were significantly faster in the applicant condition than the standard condition latencies.

The finding that latencies for all personality scales were faster in the applicant condition runs counter to the Adopted Schema (e.g., Holden et al., 1992) and Self-Schema (e.g., McDaniel & Timm, 1990) models of applicant faking. The Adopted Schema Model postulates that faster response latencies are observed when applicants answer questions that tap traits considered job-relevant. The Self-Schema Model postulates that faked responses would be slower when compared to honest responses.

Impression management was not related to personality scale response latencies in the standard condition. However, Neuroticism – Importance and Extraversion – Importance response latencies were both positively related to impression management scores in the applicant condition, indicating that as latencies increased so too did impression management scores. This seems to indicate that as a participant's willingness to respond in an expected manner increased so too did his or her response time. Put another way, those higher in impression management took longer to respond in the applicant condition. While the other latency – impression management correlations were not significant they all trended in the same direction in the applicant condition. The finding that those labeled as impression managers took longer to respond in an applicant setting supports postulates of McDaniel & Timm's (1990) Self-Schema Model of Faking. Specifically, the Self-Schema Model of Faking claims that faking takes an extra cognitive step, where the applicant must think about the right response. It is possible that

impression managers take longer to respond in general as they must process the information presented to them within a certain environment and determine the best response, which would lead to longer lag time between question presentation and subsequent response. As has been discussed individual difference variables are not the only factor that has been found to impact response latencies. Environmental variables (e.g., levels of job knowledge or presence of warning) have also been found to impact the speed with which an applicant responds.

Vasilopoulos et al. (2000) examined the impact differing levels of job knowledge had on the applicant response process, to include faking. These researchers found that those participants who responded within a low job knowledge condition, in comparison to a high job knowledge condition, had slower response latencies. While these authors instructed participants to fake and utilized an adopted schema framework, similar results were found in the current study. Results in Table 2b reveal that in large respondents responded more quickly in the high job knowledge condition (as indicated by the larger negative means). However, as previously noted (H2, Table 3), results show that job familiarity did not have a significant effect on response latencies. Thus, the differences in latencies between high and low job knowledge, while trending in a manner that is consistent with past research, cannot be attributed to actual job knowledge level differences in this study.

Faking can also be examined as an individual difference variable as opposed to an environmental condition variable. For instance, the BIDR's Impression Management scale has been used to measure individual's propensity to respond in the manner in which the respondent believes he or she should respond (Paulhus, 1984). Personality scale

scores in large part were significantly and positively related to impression management in the standard and applicant conditions, except for Neuroticism, which had significant negative correlations for both the Accuracy and Importance scales and for Extraversion – Importance in the applicant condition. All but Extraversion – Importance, Openness – Accuracy/Importance, and Conscientiousness – Importance were significantly related to impression management scores in the standard condition. Additionally, all but Neuroticism – Importance, Openness – Accuracy/Importance, and Conscientiousness Importance were significantly related to impression management scores in the applicant condition. This could indicate that as a participant's willingness to respond in an expected manner increased so too did their personality scale scores. Interestingly, this relationship held up almost identically across condition manipulations. This finding, in part, supports the notion that an applicant condition is commensurate with "fake good" scenario. Perhaps of more interest, is that those who have a natural tendency to manipulate impressions behave similarly in a non-competitive environment and one where competition exists, which lends credit to those who say that the BIDR – IM is more akin to a measure of individual difference than one of faking.

Practical Implications. The findings in this study suggest that additional research into various aspects of the applicant response process is warranted. This study took into consideration environmental aspects as well as applicant individual differences. Given the differences in findings between this study and past research in areas such as the use of warnings, varying levels of job knowledge, the influence of cognitive schemas, cognitive ability, impression management, and response latencies, the application of these variables to a live applicant setting is cautioned.

While faking has received much attention, future research should explore how practitioners define and then utilize the concept of faking to better understand and enhance their applicant selection processes. Numerous studies have examined the criterion validity impact of impression management or faking validity scales. A difference of opinion has arisen with regard to the impact faking can have on personality measures. Some researchers have reported that faking has little to no impact on validity (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996; Hough, Eaton Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990). Other researchers have argued that faking does impact validity (Goffin & Christiansen, 2003). While there is a debate about the impact of faking on the validity of personality measures, there seems to be less disagreement that applicants can and do inflate their scores (Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin 1998; Stark, Chernyshenko, Chan, Lee, & Drasgow, 2001) and that these applicants can be found at the top of rank-ordered selection lists (Christiansen, Goffin, Johnston, & Rothstein, 1994; Rosse, et al., 1998; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2003). In the current study, results revealed that as applicant's impression management scores increased so too did their scores on personality traits. More specifically, correlations reveal (Appendix E) that impression management was significantly correlated with traits considered indicative of a qualified job applicant (i.e., Conscientiousness, Extraversion, and Emotional Stability). While no applicant selection process would be well served to use a single selection measure, the current study's results would indicate that those who fake are also going to display personalities that appear more attractive to the selecting official. Even if a personality measure is but one of a multi-hurdle approach those who drift to the top of the personality

measure due to score inflation will have a greater chance of moving forward in the selection process, perhaps undeservingly.

In addition to the operationalization of faking, how we measure faking is in need of additional research. Research has examined the use of latencies in conjunction with response validity scales to measure impression management (Holden, 1995; Holden & Hibbs, 1995; Hsu et al., 1989). The current study did find that response latencies for Neuroticism – Importance and Extraversion – Importance were correlated with impression management scores. While analyses did not reveal any interactive effect between latencies and impression management, the current study's results provide some support for the relationship between impression management and latencies and the use of latencies in conjunction with response validity scales to assess impression management.

Researchers have used other means to assess faking behavior with greater success. Bogus item scales have received support in the literature as valid indicators of faking and their use has been found to increase the criterion-related validity of biodata inventories (Anderson, Warner, and Spence, 1984; Panonne, 1984). Researchers have also started to look into the profile of fakers. Recent research found that through the use of discriminant analysis fakers could be correctly identified and that they had lower levels of integrity and an external locus of control (Lee, Piccone, Isaacson, Trejo, & Griffith, 2010). Given the practitioner's need to have tools at hand that can help them to identify and handle fakers, additional research into the approaches discussed is warranted.

As discussed earlier, the use of impression management, as measured by response validity scales, as an indicator of purposeful faking behavior, as opposed to an individual difference variable, has been called into question (Griffith & Peterson, 2009). While the

question of how to operationalize faking is being considered in the literature, practitioners are still left in a lurch as to how to identify and once identified, what to do with faker's and/or faked scores. Given the different approaches to understanding, identifying, and dealing with faked scores, the field needs to continue to pursue this area of research to support and help to ensure future selection processes that are both fair and valid.

An implication of the current study concerns the impact of an applicant's self-schema on his or her development of an adopted schema. As noted earlier, past models of faked responding had not taken into consideration the impact of an applicant's existing self-schemas on subsequent adoption of a an applicant schema. Results of the current study consistently show that both latency speed and self-schema (as measured in the standard/honest condition) significantly influenced subsequent response time and schema ratings. This finding implies that an interaction occurs between self-schemas, or working self-concepts as measured at time 1, and adopted schemas or the working self-concept as measured at time 2. Given the current study's design, an explanation of this finding could be that the core self-schema provides as a basis when making ratings about the self, even in the face of altered job knowledge related materials (as noted by lack of significant effect for job knowledge variable), and our core self-schemas guide subsequent self-ratings. The current findings support past research (Kuiper, 1981, Lewicki, 1984, & Markus et al., 1985) where findings were interpreted to mean that the self-schema in large drives ratings of the self when participants were asked to appear in a certain manner. Past research coupled with the current study's findings can be used to help further develop models of faked responding.

Future Research. The results of this study and related implications raise a number of questions and issues that warrant attention. Additional research is needed to better understand the response process of those applicants who fake. Multiple models exist and very little research has been conducted to better understand which model or aspects of multiple models best explain the faked response process. One aspect that runs central to existing models is that some applicants fake. However, as noted above, the operationalization of how faking is measured and subsequently identified varies. For instance, some researcher's use response validity scales or social desirability scales (e.g., Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding) to measure faking. Others define faking in terms of the departure from a "true" score as an indicator of faking, while others believe latencies serve as a behind-the-scenes indicator of a faked response. Regarding identification, some researchers consider any departure from a "true" score above some estimated standard deviation to be faking, while others who focus on latency-based indicators consider faster or slower responding in an applicant condition compared to an honest or standard condition to be indicative of faking. The finding in the this study that impression management levels were similar in both the standard and applicant conditions lends credit to the discussion that the BIDR-IM scale is a better measure of an individual difference as opposed to its use as a measure of faking. Research into the individual difference variable self-monitoring characterizes those high in self-monitoring as individuals who are socially ambitious and have a strong desire to project positive images of themselves (Barrick, Park, and Mount, 2005). Those high in self-monitoring display behaviors similar to those, if not near identical to impression managers (Turnley & Bolino, 2001). The corroboration of this research strongly suggests that impression

management, as measured by socially desirable responding scales, should be considered an individual difference variable as opposed to one measuring faking. With this much diversity in the operationalization of faking measurement and identification, progress towards understanding the process by which applicants engage in faking and how this behavior impacts selection decisions will continue to be hampered. Future research should focus on attempting the replication of the competing models described in this study in lieu of advancing additional models.

A related topic in need of additional research is schema measurement. Prior to the current study, faking research that took into account self-schema relied on the notion of adopted schemas to explain the cognitive processes of applicants. In doing so, past research has assumed that all applicants adopt the same applicant schema at equal levels. While the current study sheds some light on this notion, finding that self-schemas, as measured in a standard setting, greatly impact subsequent schema formation, additional research on the operationalization of schemas is necessary. The current study was the only known applicant faking research to measure schema in the traditional sense. Given that the majority of past schema research has been conducted in a lab setting and that schema measurement designs typically employed some sort of manipulation to activate (or not) schemas, future research should investigate applicants schema formation in a more naturalistic manner, given the real-world implications of this research. Individual differences as well as environmental variables should be examined. For example, those high in self-monitoring may react to and use job related information differently and may focus on different types of job-related information than those low in self-monitoring.

Finally, due to both the similarities and differences in this study's findings with past research, future research is warranted due to the differences in study design alone. The current study in large part resembled what is becoming a popular applied approach of using unproctored internet testing. Given that the majority of past applicant faking research has occurred in lab settings, where the utmost control and influence can be achieved one might expect differences. For example, in the current study, of those participants that received a warning, 72% were only "slightly concerned" to "not at all concerned" about being identified as someone who faked their scores. Another difference could be the amount of focused attention participants devoted to their responses. Given participants could take the assessment battery whenever they wanted it is possible that they had more than one thing going on at the time of participation, which could result in lower levels of attention being given to the study itself. While 72.5% and 73.5% of standard condition and applicant condition participants, respectively, reported that their test setting was "quiet" to "very quiet", this does not mean participants were not working on other assignments, for example. Given the differences in study design and the potential differences this could have on participant performance future research is warranted.

Limitations. A potential limitation to this study was the use of a more open, semi-structured lab setting, such that participants were able to participate in the study on their own time and at a location of their choosing. While instruction was given to participants suggesting they find a quiet location and not take breaks and parameters were set with regard to how quickly participation must be executed, the participants ultimately "controlled" their environment. While this approach does call into question the departure

from a highly controllable lab-based setting, it does reflect a more life-like applicant setting. Given the rise in the use of unproctored internet testing (UIT), due to the rising cost of test administration, office/testing space, and equipment maintenance (Beatty, 2010), the current study's design does not differ all that much from reality. In a selection environment that utilizes UIT, there are generally three types of UIT designs. An Open design, which involves little to no human interaction with the applicant, an Invitation design, which involves some review of applicant information by automated or human processes, or both, and a Supervised design where applicant identity is actively confirmed by a human reviewer. Given this, the current study most resembled an Invitation design where the primary researcher reviewed participant (or applicant) information and then an invitation was sent to the accepted participants. The participants still took the assessments on their own, under no further supervision. Given the differences in this study's results from that of past research, these differences could be attributed to study design.

This study used a single item as a measure of job familiarity, which represents another limitation. While this approach does mimic past research that has examined the influence of job familiarity on applicant faking (Vasilopoulos et al., 2000) it could be the case that this single item was not sensitive enough to detect the expected moderating effects. A non-significant correlation between job familiarity and impression management indicates that participants were honest in answering the question, which alleviates some concern. It is possible though that the use of a more robust measure of job knowledge could have led to different findings. Along the same lines, the use of self-report SAT scores is a potential limitation. Unfortunately, due to policy changes within

the university's registrar's office, the author was unable to obtain participant transcripts to serve as verification to the reported SAT scores. Past research has found self-report SAT scores to be reliable indicators of actual scores (Godlman, Flake, & Matheson, 1990; Trice, 1990; Frucot & Cook, 1994), however given the lack of an expected moderating effect for cognitive ability (where SAT served as the proxy cognitive ability measure) scores remain suspect.

A monetary incentive was used to motivate participants to respond in a manner commensurate with an applicant who is trying to achieve employment. It could be the case that this type of incentive or the monetary amount associated with the incentive was not motivating or motivating enough to illicit the expected inflation. While personality scores in the applicant condition were significantly different from those in the standard condition, scores were not always increased in the direction that would lead one to believe the participant was a qualified job applicant. Festinger and Carlsmith's (1959) research in cognitive dissonance might shed some light on this unexpected finding. Their research found that subjects who were induced to say something contrary to their own private opinion had the tendency to change their opinion so as to bring it in-line with what they said. In other words if you are motivated to make a false claim about your personality, such as the motivation the applicant condition instructions hoped to impart in this study, you will change your opinion about your personality in order to bring it in-line with what you said about yourself. The intriguing finding from this classic study was that the larger the monetary value used to pressure participants into saying something they did not believe about themselves, the less likely they would actually change their own opinion about themselves. In their study, Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) found that

those offered one dollar in comparison to twenty dollars were more likely to engage in the experimentally induced behavior. In the current study, participants were offered $20 to present themselves in a manner that was not potentially aligned with their true impression of the themselves. It could be the case that this amount was too high an amount for them to actually convince themselves through cognitive dissonance, that they were higher on a personality trait and thus mark a higher rating than what they truly believe.

Another potential limitation to the current study was the job knowledge manipulation. Job knowledge, while following past research designs (Vasilopoulos et al., 2000; Kluger et al., 1991), was only manipulated with regard to the amount of information provided. Given the proliferation in the use of the internet by advertising organizations and job seekers alike, the amount and how information is presented can be greatly modified according to the type of internet site (e.g., advertising organization's website vs. generic job posting site), for example. It might also be the case that job advertisements are not presented with different levels of information to potential applicants. It could very well be the case that organizations present the same information across the different advertisement mediums and that the use of a high vs. low job knowledge condition is not reflective of actual practice. In addition, it might have been shortsighted to assume that all participants in either the high vs. low job knowledge condition would process the information in a similar fashion. Given the open design of the study, as previously noted, it could very well be the case that those in the low job knowledge condition partook in their own research to better understand the job during their actual study participation. Additionally, an interaction might be expected within the

high job knowledge condition, for example, based on a participant/applicant's level of conscientiousness with regard to how much information is attended to and subsequently processed.

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Appendices

APPENDIX A

General Instructions

"**Instructions:** Thank you for participating in this study. Today you will be answering various questionnaires. The length of time it takes for you to respond to each question will be recorded. Therefore it is **ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL** that you:

1) Have **reliable Internet** access (e.g., we would prefer you use any of the computer labs on campus)

2) Are in a quiet location **without distractions** (i.e., no cell phones, friends nearby, and/or crowded area)

3) **DO NOT** take breaks or pauses during a questionnaire (you will have opportunities to take breaks between questionnaires)

4) Click on your response options **only once** and allow the next survey item to load (this may take a second or two depending on your internet connection).

INSTRUCTIONS FOR RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS

For all of the questions presented throughout this experiment, you will be given a number of options from which to select an answer. To make your response, use your mouse to point to the desired option and click the circle next to this option.

Please note that once you select your response option you WILL NOT be able to change your response. It is important for you to read the entire statement before you respond.

Please click the "NEXT" button below once you understand how you are to proceed through this portion of the assessment. Please note that you will NOT be able to come back to these instructions once you have started the assessment. Once you click the "NEXT" button this portion of the assessment will begin."

APPENDIX B

NEO-IPIP BIG FIVE PERSONALITY MEASURE

Please read these instructions carefully. Unlike some of the other parts of the study, you will not be able to refer back to these instructions

Instructions: This part of the study asks you to complete a 100-item personality inventory. You will be providing two types of ratings for each item: Agreement ratings and Importance ratings. Each item will appear twice (in a row). At the top of the screen the word "Agreement" or "Importance" is displayed to indicate which type of rating you should provide.

Describe yourself as you **generally are now**, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as you are, and roughly your same age. Your responses will be kept in absolute confidence. When you are finished reading these instructions, click the "NEXT" button at the bottom of this page to start the assessment. Please be sure to answer all items without taking a break.

Accuracy Ratings

An item is accurate if it states something that is correct or true for your personality. Accuracy ratings are a measure of where you fall on a dimension (ranging from 1 to 11) for an item. For each item, please provide a rating ranging from 1 (Very Inaccurate) to 11 (Very Accurate) indicating how accurate the statement shown is in describing you.

Importance Ratings

Importance ratings refer to how relevant or descriptive a personality item is in defining your personality. For instance, you will find that some personality items do a good job, while others do a poor job of describing your personality.

You should rate items that refer to ideas that are very related to and have much bearing on your personality as important. However, items on this assessment that refer to ideas that are unrelated to and have little bearing on your personality, should be rated as unimportant. For each item, please provide a rating ranging from 1 (Very Unimportant) to 5 (Extremely Important) indicating how important the item is to describing you.

NOTE: Accuracy and Importance are separate ideas. You might think that a statement is accurate in describing you but doesn't represent an important part of your personality. Alternately, you might think that a statement is inaccurate but that it does represent an important part of your personality. Consider the following examples:

Example 1: I like classical music.

If you like classical music, you would answer that the statement is accurate in describing you. However, even if you do like classical music, you may feel that this item is not important to describing your personality. In other words, there may be other items in the

test that are better in describing your personality than this item. Your liking of classical music might not be a very important and central part of your personality. In that case, you would answer that this item is unimportant to describing you.

Example 2: I can't stand weak people

Once again, if you cannot stand weak people, you would rate that this statement is accurate in describing you. Depending on how important this item is to describing you, you would rate it as important or unimportant. For example, you may rate that this this statement is inaccurate in describing you (if you can stand weak people). However, if your feelings about how weak or strong another person is are not a very important and central part of your personality, you rate it as unimportant.

NOTE: The items will follow on the next screen. We are also interested in learning more about the thought and decision-making processes people use when answering personality inventories. In order to help us out, please answer the items as quickly and as accurately as possible. As soon as you think of an answer to an item use your mouse to select the circle corresponding to the response you have selected. Please note that once you select the corresponding circle the screen will automatically advance to the next item. You should then read the item and select the corresponding circle as quickly as possible. You will not be able to change your responses to any items once you have made your selection.

Please click the "NEXT" button below to begin the assessment.

1--------2----------3--------4--------5--------6--------7--------8--------9--------10--------11
Very Inaccurate Moderately Inaccurate Neither Moderately Accurate Very Accurate

1	Often feel blue.	+	NEUROTICISM
2	Dislike myself.	+	NEUROTICISM
3	Am often down in the dumps.	+	NEUROTICISM
4	Have frequent mood swings.	+	NEUROTICISM
5	Panic easily.	+	NEUROTICISM
6	Am filled with doubts about things.	+	NEUROTICISM
7	Feel threatened easily.	+	NEUROTICISM
8	Get stressed out easily.	+	NEUROTICISM
9	Fear for the worst.	+	NEUROTICISM
10	Worry about things.	+	NEUROTICISM
11	Seldom feel blue.	-	NEUROTICISM
12	Feel comfortable with myself.	-	NEUROTICISM
13	Rarely get irritated.	-	NEUROTICISM
14	Am not easily bothered by things.	-	NEUROTICISM
15	Am very pleased with myself.	-	NEUROTICISM
16	Am relaxed most of the time.	-	NEUROTICISM
17	Seldom get mad.	-	NEUROTICISM
18	Am not easily frustrated.	-	NEUROTICISM
19	Remain calm under pressure.	-	NEUROTICISM

1--------2----------3--------4--------5--------6--------7--------8--------9--------10--------11
Very Inaccurate Moderately Inaccurate Neither Moderately Accurate Very Accurate

20	Rarely lose my composure.	-	NEUROTICISM
21	Feel comfortable around people.	+	EXTRAVERSION
22	Make friends easily.	+	EXTRAVERSION
23	Am skilled in handling social situations.	+	EXTRAVERSION
24	Am the life of the party.	+	EXTRAVERSION
25	Know how to captivate people.	+	EXTRAVERSION
26	Start conversations.	+	EXTRAVERSION
27	Warm up quickly to others.	+	EXTRAVERSION
28	Talk to a lot of different people at parties.	+	EXTRAVERSION
29	Don't mind being the center of attention.	+	EXTRAVERSION
30	Cheer people up.	+	EXTRAVERSION
31	Have little to say.	-	EXTRAVERSION
32	Keep in the background.	-	EXTRAVERSION
33	Would describe my experiences as somewhat dull.	-	EXTRAVERSION
34	Don't like to draw attention to myself.	-	EXTRAVERSION
35	Don't talk a lot.	-	EXTRAVERSION
36	Avoid contacts with others.	-	EXTRAVERSION
37	Am hard to get to know.	-	EXTRAVERSION
38	Retreat from others.	-	EXTRAVERSION
39	Find it difficult to approach others.	-	EXTRAVERSION
40	Keep others at a distance.	-	EXTRAVERSION
41	Believe in the importance of art.	+	OPENNESS
42	Have a vivid imagination.	+	OPENNESS
43	Tend to vote for liberal political candidates.	+	OPENNESS
44	Carry the conversation to a higher level.	+	OPENNESS
45	Enjoy hearing new ideas.	+	OPENNESS
46	Enjoy thinking about things.	+	OPENNESS
47	Can say things beautifully.	+	OPENNESS
48	Enjoy wild flights of fantasy.	+	OPENNESS
49	Get excited by new ideas.	+	OPENNESS
50	Have a rich vocabulary.	+	OPENNESS
51	Am not interested in abstract ideas.	-	OPENNESS
52	Do not like art.	-	OPENNESS
53	Avoid philosophical discussions.	-	OPENNESS
54	Do not enjoy going to art museums.	-	OPENNESS
55	Tend to vote for conservative political candidates.	-	OPENNESS
56	Do not like poetry.	-	OPENNESS
57	Rarely look for a deeper meaning in things.	-	OPENNESS
58	Believe that too much tax money goes to support artists.	-	OPENNESS
59	Am not interested in theoretical discussions.	-	OPENNESS
60	Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas.	-	OPENNESS
61	Have a good word for everyone.	+	AGREEABLENESS
62	Believe that others have good intentions.	+	AGREEABLENESS

1--------2----------3--------4--------5--------6--------7--------8--------9--------10--------11
Very Inaccurate Moderately Inaccurate Neither Moderately Accurate Very Accurate

63	Respect others.	+	AGREEABLENESS
64	Accept people as they are.	+	AGREEABLENESS
65	Make people feel at ease.	+	AGREEABLENESS
66	Am concerned about others.	+	AGREEABLENESS
67	Trust what people say.	+	AGREEABLENESS
68	Sympathize with others' feelings.	+	AGREEABLENESS
69	Am easy to satisfy.	+	AGREEABLENESS
70	Treat all people equally.	+	AGREEABLENESS
71	Have a sharp tongue.	-	AGREEABLENESS
72	Cut others to pieces.	-	AGREEABLENESS
73	Suspect hidden motives in others.	-	AGREEABLENESS
74	Get back at others.	-	AGREEABLENESS
75	Insult people.	-	AGREEABLENESS
76	Believe that I am better than others.	-	AGREEABLENESS
77	Contradict others.	-	AGREEABLENESS
78	Make demands on others.	-	AGREEABLENESS
79	Hold a grudge.	-	AGREEABLENESS
80	Am out for my own personal gain.	-	AGREEABLENESS
81	Am always prepared.	+	CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
82	Pay attention to details.	+	CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
83	Get chores done right away.	+	CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
84	Carry out my plans.	+	CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
85	Make plans and stick to them.	+	CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
86	Complete tasks successfully.	+	CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
87	Do things according to a plan.	+	CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
88	Am exacting in my work.	+	CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
89	Finish what I start.	+	CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
90	Follow through with my plans.	+	CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
91	Waste my time.	-	CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
92	Find it difficult to get down to work.	-	CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
93	Do just enough work to get by.	-	CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
94	Don't see things through.	-	CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
95	Shirk my duties.	-	CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
96	Mess things up.	-	CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
97	Leave things unfinished.	-	CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
98	Don't put my mind on the task at hand.	-	CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
99	Make a mess of things.	-	CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
100	Need a push to get started.	-	CONSCIENTIOUSNESS

Appendix C

Job Descriptions

Low Job Knowledge – Warning

Job Application for Executive Sales Manager

Instructions:
Imagine you are applying for the job of an **Executive Sales Manager** with an established global firm. The firm offers competitive pay starting in the mid $100's and full benefits. In addition, bear in mind that job applicants who score in the top 5% will receive $20.

Please Note:

When deciding on a response, note that the following assessment includes questions designed to detect false or inaccurate responses. Please note that points will be deducted from your score if you are identified as having provided false or inaccurate responses in your application for an Executive Sales Manager.

Remember:
Imagine you are applying for the job of an **Executive Sales Manager** when taking the next assessment.

Please click the "NEXT" button below to start the assessment. Please note that you will NOT be able to come back to these instructions once you have started the assessment. Once you click the "NEXT" button this portion of the assessment will begin.

Low Job Knowledge – No Warning

Job Application for Executive Sales Manager

Instructions:
Imagine you are applying for the job of an **Executive Sales Manager** with an established global firm. The firm offers competitive pay starting in the mid $100's and full benefits. In addition, bear in mind that job applicants who score in the top 5% will receive $20.

Remember:
Imagine you are applying for the job of an **Executive Sales Manager** when taking the next assessment.

Please click the “NEXT” button below to start the assessment. Please note that you will NOT be able to come back to these instructions once you have started the assessment. Once you click the “NEXT” button this portion of the assessment will begin.

High Job Knowledge – Warning

Job Application for Executive Sales Manager

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Please Note:
When deciding on a response, note that the following assessment includes questions designed to detect false or inaccurate responses. Please note that points will be deducted from your score if you are identified as having provided false or inaccurate responses in your application for an Executive Sales Manager.

Personal Characteristics

A high performing sales manager tends to be a person who aims to achieve his or her goal, whether he or she set the goal or it was set for them. A successful sales manager will construct a plan to accomplish his or her goals, is self-disciplined enough to take care of the assigned responsibilities and remains committed to accomplishing goals and everyday responsibilities.

A successful sales manager should be a positive person who is full of energy and seeks out interaction with both customers and employees. He or she should be even tempered and should be able to handle difficult situations with a calm and steady approach.

Skills

Active Listening: Giving full attention to what other people are saying, taking time to understand the points being made, asking questions as appropriate, and not interrupting at inappropriate times.

Social Perceptiveness: Being aware of others' reactions and understanding why they react as they do.

Critical Thinking: Using logic and reasoning to identify the strengths and weaknesses of alternative solutions, conclusions or approaches to problems.

Judgment and Decision Making: Considering the relative costs and benefits of potential actions to choose the most appropriate one.

Abilities

Oral Expression: The ability to communicate information and ideas in speaking so others will understand.

Reasoning: The ability to apply general rules to specific problems to produce answers that make sense. The ability to combine pieces of information to form general rules or conclusions (includes finding a relationship among seemingly unrelated events).

Problem Sensitivity: The ability to tell when something is wrong or is likely to go wrong. It does not involve solving the problem, only recognizing there is a problem.

Work Styles

Integrity: Job requires being honest and ethical.

Dependability: Job requires being reliable, responsible, and dependable, and fulfilling obligations.

Achievement/Effort: Job requires establishing and maintaining personally challenging achievement goals and exerting effort toward mastering tasks.

Initiative: Job requires a willingness to take on responsibilities and challenges.

Persistence: Job requires persistence in the face of obstacles.

Self Control: Job requires maintaining composure, keeping emotions in check, controlling anger, and avoiding aggressive behavior, even in very difficult situations.

Stress Tolerance: Job requires accepting criticism and dealing calmly and effectively with high stress situations.

Attention to Detail: Job requires being careful about detail and thorough in completing work tasks.

Remember:
Imagine you are applying for the job of an **Executive Sales Manager** when taking the next assessment.

Please click the "NEXT" button below to start the assessment. Please note that you will NOT be able to come back to these instructions once you have started the assessment. Once you click the "NEXT" button this portion of the assessment will begin.

High Job Knowledge – No Warning

Job Application for Executive Sales Manager

Instructions:
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A high performing sales manager tends to be a person who aims to achieve his or her goal, whether he or she set the goal or it was set for them. A successful sales manager will construct a plan to accomplish his or her goals, is self-disciplined enough to take care of the assigned responsibilities and remains committed to accomplishing goals and everyday responsibilities.

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Remember:
Imagine you are applying for the job of an **Executive Sales Manager** when taking the next assessment.
Please click the "NEXT" button below to start the assessment. Please note that you will NOT be able to come back to these instructions once you have started the assessment. Once you click the "NEXT" button this portion of the assessment will begin.

Appendix D

Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR)
Version 6 – FORM 40 (Impression Management)

Please read these instructions carefully. Unlike some of the other parts of the study, you will not be able to refer back to these instructions.

Instructions: This part of the study asks you to complete a 40-item inventory about personal characteristics. Using the scale below, please rate how personally characteristic each item is in describing you.

Scale:
Extremely Uncharacteristic (EU), Uncharacteristic (U), Sometimes Characteristic (SC), Characteristic (C), and Extremely Characteristic (EC)

If a statement is very correct or true about yourself select EXTREMELY CHARACTERISTIC. If a statement is very unlike or false about yourself select EXTREMELY UNCHARACTERISTIC. Please note that the response options start with EXTREMELY UNCHARACTERISTIC and end with EXTREMELY CHARACTERISTIC. It is important that you answer as frankly and as honestly as you can. Your answers will be kept confidential.

Please be sure to answer all items without taking a break. As soon as you think of an answer to an item use your mouse to select the circle corresponding to the response you have selected. Please note that once you select the corresponding circle the screen will automatically advance to the next item. You should then read the

item and select the corresponding circle as quickly as possible. You will not be able to change your responses to any items once you have made your selection.

Please click the “NEXT” button below to begin the assessment.

	Extremely Uncharacteristic	Uncharacteristic	Sometimes Characteristic	Characteristic	Extremely Characteristic
1. I sometimes tell lies if I have to. *	○	○	○	○	○
2. I never cover up my mistakes.	○	○	○	○	○
3. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.*	○	○	○	○	○
4. I never swear.	○	○	○	○	○
5. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. *	○	○	○	○	○
6. I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught.	○	○	○	○	○
7. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. *	○	○	○	○	○
8. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.	○	○	○	○	○
9. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.*	○	○	○	○	○
10. I always declare everything at customs.	○	○	○	○	○
11. When I was young I sometimes stole things. *	○	○	○	○	○
12. I have never dropped litter on the street.	○	○	○	○	○
13. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit. *	○	○	○	○	○
14. I never read sexy books or magazines.	○	○	○	○	○
15. I have done things that I don't tell other people about. *	○	○	○	○	○
16. I never take things that don't belong to me.	○	○	○	○	○
17. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn't really sick. *	○	○	○	○	○
18. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.	○	○	○	○	○
19. I have some pretty awful habits. *	○	○	○	○	○
20. I don't gossip about other people's business.	○	○	○	○	○
21. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.	○	○	○	○	○
22. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits. *	○	○	○	○	○
23. I don't care to know what other people really think of me.	○	○	○	○	○
24. I have not always been honest with myself. *	○	○	○	○	○
25. I always know why I like things.	○	○	○	○	○
26. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking. *	○	○	○	○	○
27. Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.	○	○	○	○	○
28. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit. *	○	○	○	○	○
29. I am fully in control of my own fate.	○	○	○	○	○
30. It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.*	○	○	○	○	○
31. I never regret my decisions.	○	○	○	○	○
32. I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up	○	○	○	○	○

my mind soon enough. *					
33. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference.	○	○	○	○	○
34. My parents were not always fair when they punished me. *	○	○	○	○	○
35. I am a completely rational person.	○	○	○	○	○
36. I rarely appreciate criticism. *	○	○	○	○	○
37. I am very confident of my judgments.	○	○	○	○	○
38. I have sometimes doubted by ability as a lover. *	○	○	○	○	○
39. It's all right with me if some people happen to dislike me.	○	○	○	○	○
40. I don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do. *	○	○	○	○	○

* Item is reverse scored.

Appendix E

Correlation Matrix for Overall Standard and Applicant Conditions

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
1. Neu-Acc	.91	.304(**)	-.595(**)	-.226(**)	-.241(**)	-.158(**)	-.454(**)	-.105(*)	-.550(**)	-.129(**)	-.175(**)	-0.077	-.126(**)	-0.061	-0.082	-.118(**)	-0.036	-.189(**)	-0.072	-.179(**)	-0.044	-.114(**)	-0.010	-.112(*)	-.102(*)	-0.042	-0.041	-0.036
2. Neu-Imp	.392(**)	.74	-.205(**)	-.538(**)	-.090(*)	-.318(**)	-.124(**)	-.325(**)	-.093(*)	-.410(**)	0.013	0.009	-0.008	0.042	0.049	0.042	0.074	-0.011	0.042	-0.020	0.054	-0.031	0.059	-.134(**)	0.005	0.061	0.026	-0.001
3. Ext-Acc	-.455(**)	-.233(**)	.94	.425(**)	.369(**)	.219(**)	.438(**)	.188(**)	.532(**)	.160(**)	.099(*)	0.074	.150(**)	.135(**)	.102(*)	.104(*)	0.033	.212(**)	0.047	.184(**)	0.027	.164(**)	0.021	.149(**)	.158(**)	0.078	.090(*)	.093(*)
4. Ext-Imp	-.176(**)	-.473(**)	.464(**)	.84	.138(**)	.461(**)	.158(**)	.419(**)	.116(**)	.554(**)	-.091(*)	-0.082	0.073	-0.080	-.087(*)	-.109(*)	-.163(**)	-0.064	-.158(**)	-0.080	-.170(**)	-0.036	-.144(**)	0.036	-0.080	-.150(**)	0.027	0.014
5. Op-Acc	-.091(*)	-.117(**)	.278(**)	.132(**)	.89	.497(**)	.342(**)	.216(**)	.295(**)	.114(*)	0.052	.137(**)	.117(**)	.209(**)	.120(**)	.168(**)	.099(*)	.117(**)	0.065	.192(**)	0.048	.196(**)	0.054	.116(**)	.181(**)	0.040	0.073	.138(**)
6. Op-Imp	-0.070	-.303(**)	.174(**)	.467(**)	.482(**)	.78	.193(**)	.366(**)	.179(**)	.409(**)	-0.069	-0.079	.119(**)	0.011	-0.054	0.020	-.107(*)	-0.004	-.137(**)	0.003	-.148(**)	0.017	-.136(**)	-0.003	-0.019	-.101(*)	0.074	0.024
7. Agr-Acc	-.367(**)	-.162(**)	.327(**)	.137(**)	.151(**)	.135(**)	.89	.499(**)	.499(**)	.163(**)	.363(**)	-0.028	0.080	.202(**)	.218(**)	.221(**)	.173(**)	.255(**)	.140(**)	.168(**)	0.054	.217(**)	0.072	.144(**)	.178(**)	.095(*)	0.014	.126(**)
8. Agr-Imp	-.093(*)	-.306(**)	.205(**)	.386(**)	.148(**)	.340(**)	.521(**)	.81	.142(**)	.492(**)	.147(**)	-.107(*)	0.010	.131(**)	.143(**)	.158(**)	.095(*)	.169(**)	0.070	.128(**)	-0.006	.207(**)	0.082	.109(*)	.176(**)	0.080	0.009	0.041
9. Con-Acc	-.304(**)	-.186(**)	.300(**)	.095(*)	.164(**)	.120(**)	.339(**)	.173(**)	.94	.296(**)	.258(**)	0.081	.176(**)	.155(**)	.113(*)	.169(**)	0.039	.257(**)	0.057	.219(**)	0.048	.098(*)	-0.050	.149(**)	.107(*)	0.043	.109(*)	.141(**)
10. Con-Imp	-.128(**)	-.413(**)	.130(**)	.512(**)	.096(*)	.454(**)	.168(**)	.452(**)	.403(**)	.83	0.028	-.104(*)	0.085	-0.039	-0.059	-0.032	-.128(**)	-0.007	-.122(**)	-0.013	-.129(**)	-0.036	-.160(**)	0.034	-0.061	-.179(**)	.102(*)	0.034
11. BIDR-IM	-.213(**)	-.109(*)	.089(*)	-0.072	0.037	-0.023	.444(**)	.183(**)	.331(**)	0.068	.76	0.048	-0.008	0.059	.103(*)	0.067	.094(*)	0.045	0.068	0.041	0.056	0.032	0.017	-0.002	-0.006	0.023	-0.046	0.004
12. SAT	-0.016	0.035	0.002	-0.008	.133(**)	-0.062	-0.078	-0.072	-0.006	-0.075	-0.060	--	-0.018	-0.035	-.097(*)	-0.020	-0.037	-0.058	-0.002	0.006	0.035	-0.049	-0.011	0.054	-0.022	0.008	0.027	0.003
13. Job Fam	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	--	0.026	-0.014	0.025	-0.013	0.034	-0.008	0.017	-0.014	-0.007	-0.046	-0.049	-0.011	-0.057	0.066	0.073
14. Neu-Acc RL	0.009	-0.028	0.033	-0.072	.124(**)	-0.037	0.075	0.047	.100(*)	-0.031	0.038	0.062	.(a)	--	.780(**)	.851(**)	.696(**)	.785(**)	.624(**)	.776(**)	.615(**)	.770(**)	.578(**)	.355(**)	.691(**)	.525(**)	0.012	0.040
15. Neu-Imp RL	0.069	0.008	0.001	-.097(*)	.102(*)	-0.059	0.077	0.071	0.074	-0.025	0.063	0.035	.(a)	.782(**)	--	.716(**)	.844(**)	.657(**)	.770(**)	.647(**)	.736(**)	.666(**)	.710(**)	.331(**)	.613(**)	.647(**)	-0.064	0.005
16. Ext-Acc RL	0.049	0.030	-.088(*)	-.163(**)	0.071	-0.076	0.063	0.027	0.059	-0.060	0.014	0.050	.(a)	.851(**)	.711(**)	--	.766(**)	.865(**)	.664(**)	.845(**)	.653(**)	.819(**)	.593(**)	.307(**)	.745(**)	.546(**)	-0.001	0.038
17. Ext-Imp RL	0.083	0.055	-0.082	-.214(**)	.096(*)	-0.082	0.067	0.020	0.062	-0.086	0.076	0.040	.(a)	.696(**)	.852(**)	.757(**)	--	.692(**)	.844(**)	.677(**)	.808(**)	.691(**)	.770(**)	.294(**)	.639(**)	.689(**)	-0.033	0.008
18. Op-Acc RL	-0.009	-0.020	0.036	-0.058	-0.061	-.099(*)	0.079	0.049	.088(*)	-0.027	-0.014	-0.007	.(a)	.787(**)	.626(**)	.852(**)	.632(**)	--	.712(**)	.880(**)	.667(**)	.833(**)	.603(**)	.343(**)	.764(**)	.566(**)	-0.012	0.041
19. Op-Imp RL	0.058	0.050	-0.012	-.153(**)	0.051	-.170(**)	0.020	-0.034	0.012	-.127(**)	0.059	0.036	.(a)	.651(**)	.767(**)	.684(**)	.845(**)	.683(**)	--	.687(**)	.853(**)	.677(**)	.791(**)	.273(**)	.621(**)	.702(**)	-0.019	0.003
20. Agr-Acc RL	-0.013	-0.048	0.048	-0.041	.093(*)	-0.046	0.016	0.050	.105(*)	-0.021	0.007	0.038	.(a)	.792(**)	.650(**)	.831(**)	.661(**)	.854(**)	.661(**)	--	.744(**)	.869(**)	.652(**)	.338(**)	.780(**)	.600(**)	-0.011	0.016
21. Agr-Imp RL	0.049	-0.011	0.012	-.114(*)	0.068	-.103(*)	0.010	0.001	0.027	-.104(*)	0.059	0.022	.(a)	.613(**)	.758(**)	.645(**)	.823(**)	.606(**)	.849(**)	.696(**)	--	.703(**)	.848(**)	.250(**)	.628(**)	.738(**)	-0.023	-0.016
22. Con-Acc RL	-0.031	-0.066	0.068	-0.038	.117(**)	-0.033	.108(*)	.096(*)	0.003	-0.080	0.020	0.044	.(a)	.769(**)	.651(**)	.802(**)	.654(**)	.816(**)	.671(**)	.858(**)	.679(**)	--	.743(**)	.333(**)	.902(**)	.665(**)	-0.034	-0.002
23. Con-Imp RL	0.067	0.018	-0.021	-.124(**)	0.065	-.118(**)	0.035	0.029	-0.068	-.167(**)	0.052	0.071	.(a)	.582(**)	.733(**)	.613(**)	.785(**)	.578(**)	.823(**)	.626(**)	.856(**)	.712(**)	--	.271(**)	.675(**)	.870(**)	-0.062	-0.048
24. Instr RL	-0.044	-0.081	0.001	-0.079	0.021	-0.058	0.087	.120(**)	0.054	-0.028	.101(*)	.101(*)	.(a)	.433(**)	.424(**)	.401(**)	.405(**)	.411(**)	.390(**)	.396(**)	.369(**)	.402(**)	.387(**)	--	.299(**)	.242(**)	0.065	0.067
25. Dum-Acc RL	-0.019	-0.077	0.075	-0.034	.096(*)	-0.050	.107(*)	.096(*)	0.045	-0.074	0.033	0.051	.(a)	.670(**)	.551(**)	.694(**)	.553(**)	.718(**)	.572(**)	.747(**)	.585(**)	.888(**)	.622(**)	.364(**)	--	.671(**)	-0.007	-0.020
26. Dum-Imp RL	0.040	0.019	-0.011	-.140(**)	0.015	-.174(**)	0.038	0.030	0.031	-.166(**)	0.087	.100(*)	.(a)	.480(**)	.610(**)	.519(**)	.659(**)	.489(**)	.685(**)	.520(**)	.716(**)	.595(**)	.845(**)	.339(**)	.616(**)	--	-0.052	-0.064
27. Stud Loc	-0.022	0.030	0.023	0.016	0.038	0.079	0.010	0.035	0.001	0.036	-0.023	0.024	.(a)	-0.039	-0.056	-0.043	-0.069	-0.044	-0.070	-0.043	-0.060	-0.026	-0.062	-0.012	0.013	-0.076	--	-0.050
28. Stud Loc NL	-0.018	-0.037	0.054	0.045	-0.012	-0.015	.095(*)	0.050	.108(*)	0.063	0.074	0.034	.(a)	-0.039	-0.009	-0.065	-0.016	-0.028	0.018	0.005	0.024	-0.041	-0.010	0.066	-0.002	-0.006	-.138(**)	--

Note. Upper-right correlations are for all applicant conditions and lower-left correlations are for standard condition

Figures along the diagonal represent reliability coefficients

.(a) Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant.

Neu = Neuroticism, Ext = Extraversion, Op = Openness, Agr = Agreeableness, Con = Conscientiousness, Acc = Accuracy Rating, Imp = Importance Rating, RL = Response Latency, Instr = Instructions, Dum = Dummy Item, Stud Loc = Study Location, NL = Noise Level

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Appendix F

Correlation Matrix for High Job Knowledge – No Warning Condition

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
1. Neu-Acc	1	.322(**)	-.647(**)	-.265(**)	-.228(*)	-0.102	-.330(**)	-0.119	-.502(**)	-0.104	-.201(*)	-.232(*)	-0.050	-0.068	-0.075	-0.097	-0.015	-.251(**)	-0.092	-.237(**)	-0.100	-0.136	-0.033	-.225(*)	-0.075	-0.100	.247(**)	-0.169
2. Neu-Imp	.322(**)	1	-.257(**)	-.624(**)	-0.105	-.356(**)	-.181(*)	-.406(**)	-0.111	-.454(**)	0.062	-0.049	-0.069	0.107	0.118	0.099	0.111	0.047	0.060	0.036	0.037	0.075	0.091	-0.153	0.130	0.132	0.073	-0.045
3. Ext-Acc	-.647(**)	-.257(**)	1	.360(**)	.285(**)	0.166	.427(**)	0.158	.516(**)	0.141	0.124	0.097	0.055	.201(*)	.206(*)	0.160	0.109	.339(**)	0.160	.257(**)	0.155	.227(*)	0.114	.238(**)	0.116	0.154	-0.103	0.092
4. Ext-Imp	-.265(**)	-.624(**)	.360(**)	1	0.082	.417(**)	0.158	.432(**)	0.060	.578(**)	-.217(*)	-0.109	0.033	-0.054	-0.108	-0.114	-0.165	-0.087	-.191(*)	-0.098	-0.165	-0.044	-0.135	0.024	-0.138	-0.124	-0.113	-0.038
5. Op-Acc	-.228(*)	-0.105	.285(**)	0.082	1	.485(**)	.315(**)	.210(*)	.245(**)	0.100	0.082	.208(*)	0.069	0.170	0.083	0.141	0.062	0.064	-0.050	0.132	-0.014	.209(*)	-0.055	0.057	.212(*)	0.000	-0.058	0.089
6. Op-Imp	-0.102	-.356(**)	0.166	.417(**)	.485(**)	1	0.126	.373(**)	0.086	.428(**)	-0.116	-0.025	-0.020	-0.055	-.216(*)	-0.084	-.243(**)	-0.125	-.337(**)	-0.095	-.317(**)	-0.024	-.202(*)	-0.049	-0.034	-0.097	-0.014	0.010
7. Agr-Acc	-.330(**)	-.181(*)	.427(**)	0.158	.315(**)	0.126	1	.568(**)	.334(**)	0.158	.284(**)	0.081	-0.039	.300(**)	.315(**)	.263(**)	.244(**)	.315(**)	.260(**)	.212(*)	.198(*)	.286(**)	0.166	.188(*)	.257(**)	0.142	-0.134	.235(**)
8. Agr-Imp	-0.119	-.406(**)	0.158	.432(**)	.210(*)	.373(**)	.568(**)	1	0.107	.455(**)	0.052	-0.082	0.022	0.138	0.173	.205(*)	.193(*)	.184(*)	0.145	0.152	0.097	.264(**)	0.144	0.097	.295(**)	0.095	-0.127	0.093
9. Con-Acc	-.502(**)	-0.111	.516(**)	0.060	.245(**)	0.086	.334(**)	0.107	1	.317(**)	.218(*)	.198(*)	.202(*)	.258(**)	.192(*)	.262(**)	0.079	.391(**)	0.092	.339(**)	0.109	.184(*)	-0.047	0.169	0.128	0.071	-0.069	.256(**)
10. Con-Imp	-0.104	-.454(**)	0.141	.578(**)	0.100	.428(**)	0.158	.455(**)	.317(**)	1	-0.123	-0.123	0.170	-0.006	-0.084	0.046	-0.097	0.050	-0.132	0.036	-0.127	0.029	-0.151	0.031	-0.029	-.212(*)	0.065	0.051
11. BIDR-IM	-.201(*)	0.062	0.124	-.217(*)	0.082	-0.116	.284(**)	0.052	.218(*)	-0.123	1	0.130	-0.072	0.073	0.098	0.108	0.077	0.076	0.019	0.038	0.033	0.028	-0.028	-0.151	0.033	0.022	-0.132	0.089
12. SAT	-.232(*)	-0.049	0.097	-0.109	.208(*)	-0.025	0.081	-0.082	.198(*)	-0.123	0.130	1	-0.045	-0.035	-0.046	-0.031	0.021	-0.024	0.037	0.008	0.109	-0.064	-0.085	0.019	-0.060	-0.009	0.028	0.028
13. Job Fam	-0.050	-0.069	0.055	0.033	0.069	-0.020	-0.039	0.022	.202(*)	0.170	-0.072	-0.045	1	0.095	0.026	0.094	0.090	0.129	0.106	0.131	0.086	0.104	0.014	0.112	0.076	0.043	0.022	.210(*)
14. Neu-Acc RL	-0.068	0.107	.201(*)	-0.054	0.170	-0.055	.300(**)	0.138	.258(**)	-0.006	0.073	-0.035	0.095	1	.799(**)	.826(**)	.699(**)	.759(**)	.602(**)	.741(**)	.593(**)	.713(**)	.544(**)	.278(**)	.625(**)	.477(**)	-0.030	0.018
15. Neu-Imp RL	-0.075	0.118	.206(*)	-0.108	0.083	-.216(*)	.315(**)	0.173	.192(*)	-0.084	0.098	-0.046	0.026	.799(**)	1	.720(**)	.855(**)	.646(**)	.803(**)	.659(**)	.769(**)	.670(**)	.728(**)	.244(**)	.640(**)	.651(**)	-0.093	-0.040
16. Ext-Acc RL	-0.097	0.099	0.160	-0.114	0.141	-0.084	.263(**)	.205(*)	.262(**)	0.046	0.108	-0.031	0.094	.826(**)	.720(**)	1	.774(**)	.837(**)	.627(**)	.810(**)	.623(**)	.798(**)	.548(**)	.243(**)	.708(**)	.483(**)	-0.032	0.027
17. Ext-Imp RL	-0.015	0.111	0.109	-0.165	0.062	-.243(**)	.244(**)	.193(*)	0.079	-0.097	0.077	0.021	0.090	.699(**)	.855(**)	.774(**)	1	.694(**)	.866(**)	.702(**)	.833(**)	.710(**)	.752(**)	.277(**)	.695(**)	.646(**)	-0.040	-0.027
18. Op-Acc RL	-.251(**)	0.047	.339(**)	-0.087	0.064	-0.125	.315(**)	.184(*)	.391(**)	0.050	0.076	-0.024	0.129	.759(**)	.646(**)	.837(**)	.694(**)	1	.678(**)	.869(**)	.656(**)	.819(**)	.601(**)	.356(**)	.739(**)	.548(**)	-0.061	0.074
19. Op-Imp RL	-0.092	0.060	0.160	-.191(*)	-0.050	-.337(**)	.260(**)	0.145	0.092	-0.132	0.019	0.037	0.106	.602(**)	.803(**)	.627(**)	.866(**)	.678(**)	1	.660(**)	.861(**)	.652(**)	.788(**)	.327(**)	.633(**)	.678(**)	-0.001	0.007
20. Agr-Acc RL	-.237(**)	0.036	.257(**)	-0.098	0.132	-0.095	.212(*)	0.152	.339(**)	0.036	0.038	0.008	0.131	.741(**)	.659(**)	.810(**)	.702(**)	.869(**)	.660(**)	1	.754(**)	.829(**)	.620(**)	.306(**)	.761(**)	.588(**)	-0.062	0.058
21. Agr-Imp RL	-0.100	0.037	0.155	-0.165	-0.014	-.317(**)	.198(*)	0.097	0.109	-0.127	0.033	0.109	0.086	.593(**)	.769(**)	.623(**)	.833(**)	.656(**)	.861(**)	.754(**)	1	.681(**)	.813(**)	.273(**)	.662(**)	.723(**)	-0.023	-0.051
22. Con-Acc RL	-0.136	0.075	.227(*)	-0.044	.209(*)	-0.024	.286(**)	.264(**)	.184(*)	0.029	0.028	-0.064	0.104	.713(**)	.670(**)	.798(**)	.710(**)	.819(**)	.652(**)	.829(**)	.681(**)	1	.735(**)	.289(**)	.903(**)	.661(**)	-0.083	0.026
23. Con-Imp RL	-0.033	0.091	0.114	-0.135	-0.055	-.202(*)	0.166	0.144	-0.047	-0.151	-0.028	-0.085	0.014	.544(**)	.728(**)	.548(**)	.752(**)	.601(**)	.788(**)	.620(**)	.813(**)	.735(**)	1	.285(**)	.718(**)	.846(**)	-0.044	-0.104
24. Instr RL	-.225(*)	-0.153	.238(**)	0.024	0.057	-0.049	.188(*)	0.097	0.169	0.031	-0.151	0.019	0.112	.278(**)	.244(**)	.243(**)	.277(**)	.356(**)	.327(**)	.306(**)	.273(**)	.289(**)	.285(**)	1	.231(*)	.181(*)	0.125	0.029
25. Dum-Acc RL	-0.075	0.130	0.116	-0.138	.212(*)	-0.034	.257(**)	.295(**)	0.128	-0.029	0.033	-0.060	0.076	.625(**)	.640(**)	.708(**)	.695(**)	.739(**)	.633(**)	.761(**)	.662(**)	.903(**)	.718(**)	.231(*)	1	.715(**)	-0.106	-0.035
26. Dum-Imp RL	-0.100	0.132	0.154	-0.124	0.000	-0.097	0.142	0.095	0.071	-.212(*)	0.022	-0.009	0.043	.477(**)	.651(**)	.483(**)	.646(**)	.548(**)	.678(**)	.588(**)	.723(**)	.661(**)	.846(**)	.181(*)	.715(**)	1	-0.110	-0.087
27. Stud Loc	.247(**)	0.073	-0.103	-0.113	-0.058	-0.014	-0.134	-0.127	-0.069	0.065	-0.132	0.028	0.022	-0.030	-0.093	-0.032	-0.040	-0.061	-0.001	-0.062	-0.023	-0.083	-0.044	0.125	-0.106	-0.110	1	-0.091
28. Stud Loc NL	-0.169	-0.045	0.092	-0.038	0.089	0.010	.235(**)	0.093	.256(**)	0.051	0.089	0.028	.210(*)	0.018	-0.040	0.027	-0.027	0.074	0.007	0.058	-0.051	0.026	-0.104	0.029	-0.035	-0.087	-0.091	1

Note. Neu = Neuroticism, Ext = Extraversion, Op = Openness, Agr = Agreeableness, Con = Conscientiousness, Acc = Accuracy Rating, Imp = Importance Rating, RL = Response Latency, Instr = Instructions, Dum =

N = 122

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Appendix G

Correlation Matrix for High Job Knowledge - Warning Condition

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
1. Neu-Acc	1	.392(**)	-.595(**)	-.305(**)	-.258(**)	-.258(**)	-.469(**)	-0.068	-.474(**)	-0.074	-0.130	-0.059	-0.003	-0.133	-.184(*)	-.278(**)	-.179(*)	-.242(**)	-0.115	-.268(**)	-0.098	-.211(*)	-0.061	-0.061	-.213(*)	-0.122	0.055	-0.072
2. Neu-Imp	.392(**)	1	-.289(**)	-.477(**)	-.264(**)	-.383(**)	-0.122	-.302(**)	-0.097	-.403(**)	-0.056	-0.066	-0.043	-0.045	-0.022	-0.096	-0.012	-0.109	-0.032	-0.124	0.022	-0.119	0.040	-.189(*)	-0.103	-0.031	-0.055	-0.043
3. Ext-Acc	-.595(**)	-.289(**)	1	.500(**)	.405(**)	.241(**)	.306(**)	0.022	.380(**)	0.076	0.005	.191(*)	0.153	0.138	0.058	0.157	0.071	.197(*)	0.017	0.172	-0.033	.186(*)	0.002	0.095	.193(*)	0.093	0.068	.211(*)
4. Ext-Imp	-.305(**)	-.477(**)	.500(**)	1	.204(*)	.470(**)	0.025	.272(**)	0.046	.475(**)	-0.057	0.040	0.085	-0.067	-0.080	-0.008	-0.042	-0.015	-0.136	-0.016	-0.159	0.018	-0.115	0.062	0.009	-0.077	-0.030	0.079
5. Op-Acc	-.258(**)	-.264(**)	.405(**)	.204(*)	1	.575(**)	.307(**)	.218(*)	.216(*)	.225(*)	0.101	0.162	0.151	.230(*)	0.091	.285(**)	0.077	.268(**)	0.140	.321(**)	0.081	.288(**)	0.054	0.120	.253(**)	0.030	0.114	0.082
6. Op-Imp	-.258(**)	-.383(**)	.241(**)	.470(**)	.575(**)	1	.226(*)	.397(**)	.212(*)	.482(**)	0.028	0.000	.192(*)	-0.044	-0.055	0.083	-0.094	0.048	-0.051	0.043	-0.105	-0.025	-.197(*)	-0.015	-0.029	-0.142	0.093	0.017
7. Agr-Acc	-.469(**)	-0.122	.306(**)	0.025	.307(**)	.226(*)	1	.437(**)	.693(**)	0.155	.468(**)	-0.083	0.070	.274(**)	.268(**)	.365(**)	0.159	.394(**)	0.173	.232(*)	0.024	.233(*)	0.036	0.170	.186(*)	0.115	0.050	0.096
8. Agr-Imp	-0.068	-.302(**)	0.022	.272(**)	.218(*)	.397(**)	.437(**)	1	0.149	.567(**)	.252(**)	-0.172	-0.024	0.159	.203(*)	.200(*)	0.154	.236(**)	0.169	0.132	-0.017	.183(*)	0.081	0.112	0.137	0.128	0.035	0.130
9. Con-Acc	-.474(**)	-0.097	.380(**)	0.046	.216(*)	.212(*)	.693(**)	0.149	1	.190(*)	.424(**)	0.076	0.123	.188(*)	.188(*)	.266(**)	0.165	.288(**)	0.178	.203(*)	0.110	0.097	0.004	0.103	0.096	0.178	0.124	0.156
10. Con-Imp	-0.074	-.403(**)	0.076	.475(**)	.225(*)	.482(**)	0.155	.567(**)	.190(*)	1	0.161	0.004	0.032	-0.106	-0.011	-0.049	-0.095	-0.025	-0.004	0.020	-0.078	-0.015	-0.113	0.121	-0.015	-0.054	0.080	0.021
11. BIDR-IM	-0.130	-0.056	0.005	-0.057	0.101	0.028	.468(**)	.252(**)	.424(**)	0.161	1	0.036	0.112	0.165	0.152	0.171	0.102	0.130	.180(*)	0.137	0.093	0.102	0.028	0.096	-0.022	0.036	0.024	0.004
12. SAT	-0.059	-0.066	.191(*)	0.040	0.162	0.000	-0.083	-0.172	0.076	0.004	0.036	1	0.122	-0.092	-0.164	-0.105	-0.142	-.181(*)	-0.077	-0.094	-0.066	-0.097	-0.089	0.061	-0.026	-0.067	0.021	-0.064
13. Job Fam	-0.003	-0.043	0.153	0.085	0.151	.192(*)	0.070	-0.024	0.123	0.032	0.112	0.122	1	-0.007	-0.082	0.013	-0.064	0.001	0.011	-0.033	-0.039	-0.097	-0.109	-0.100	-0.064	-0.098	0.111	-0.074
14. Neu-Acc RL	-0.133	-0.045	0.138	-0.067	.230(*)	-0.044	.274(**)	0.159	.188(*)	-0.106	0.165	-0.092	-0.007	1	.751(**)	.848(**)	.646(**)	.802(**)	.589(**)	.775(**)	.538(**)	.754(**)	.491(**)	.437(**)	.666(**)	.410(**)	0.018	.205(*)
15. Neu-Imp RL	-.184(*)	-0.022	0.058	-0.080	0.091	-0.055	.268(**)	.203(*)	.188(*)	-0.011	0.152	-0.164	-0.082	.751(**)	1	.706(**)	.821(**)	.664(**)	.737(**)	.636(**)	.706(**)	.618(**)	.649(**)	.401(**)	.583(**)	.583(**)	-0.110	.187(*)
16. Ext-Acc RL	-.278(**)	-0.096	0.157	-0.008	.285(**)	0.083	.365(**)	.200(*)	.266(**)	-0.049	0.171	-0.105	0.013	.848(**)	.706(**)	1	.737(**)	.867(**)	.630(**)	.794(**)	.565(**)	.753(**)	.459(**)	.293(**)	.700(**)	.404(**)	0.041	.203(*)
17. Ext-Imp RL	-.179(*)	-0.012	0.071	-0.042	0.077	-0.094	0.159	0.154	0.165	-0.095	0.102	-0.142	-0.064	.646(**)	.821(**)	.737(**)	1	.657(**)	.807(**)	.589(**)	.720(**)	.577(**)	.647(**)	.270(**)	.551(**)	.570(**)	-0.045	0.079
18. Op-Acc RL	-.242(**)	-0.109	.197(*)	-0.015	.268(**)	0.048	.394(**)	.236(**)	.288(**)	-0.025	0.130	-.181(*)	0.001	.802(**)	.664(**)	.867(**)	.657(**)	1	.663(**)	.834(**)	.559(**)	.784(**)	.498(**)	.330(**)	.691(**)	.455(**)	-0.021	.186(*)
19. Op-Imp RL	-0.115	-0.032	0.017	-0.136	0.140	-0.051	0.173	0.169	0.178	-0.004	.180(*)	-0.077	0.011	.589(**)	.737(**)	.630(**)	.807(**)	.663(**)	1	.625(**)	.800(**)	.620(**)	.684(**)	.241(**)	.526(**)	.573(**)	-0.077	-0.009
20. Agr-Acc RL	-.268(**)	-0.124	0.172	-0.016	.321(**)	0.043	.232(*)	0.132	.203(*)	0.020	0.137	-0.094	-0.033	.775(**)	.636(**)	.794(**)	.589(**)	.834(**)	.625(**)	1	.699(**)	.884(**)	.577(**)	.359(**)	.766(**)	.474(**)	-0.010	0.096
21. Agr-Imp RL	-0.098	0.022	-0.033	-0.159	0.081	-0.105	0.024	-0.017	0.110	-0.078	0.093	-0.066	-0.039	.538(**)	.706(**)	.565(**)	.720(**)	.559(**)	.800(**)	.699(**)	1	.649(**)	.797(**)	.229(*)	.540(**)	.649(**)	-0.100	0.000
22. Con-Acc RL	-.211(*)	-0.119	.186(*)	0.018	.288(**)	-0.025	.233(*)	.183(*)	0.097	-0.015	0.102	-0.097	-0.097	.754(**)	.618(**)	.753(**)	.577(**)	.784(**)	.620(**)	.884(**)	.649(**)	1	.690(**)	.359(**)	.892(**)	.568(**)	-0.060	0.105
23. Con-Imp RL	-0.061	0.040	0.002	-0.115	0.054	-.197(*)	0.036	0.081	0.004	-0.113	0.028	-0.089	-0.109	.491(**)	.649(**)	.459(**)	.647(**)	.498(**)	.684(**)	.577(**)	.797(**)	.690(**)	1	.192(*)	.642(**)	.863(**)	-0.150	0.069
24. Instr RL	-0.061	-.189(*)	0.095	0.062	0.120	-0.015	0.170	0.112	0.103	0.121	0.096	0.061	-0.100	.437(**)	.401(**)	.293(**)	.270(**)	.330(**)	.241(**)	.359(**)	.229(*)	.359(**)	.192(*)	1	.323(**)	.247(**)	0.013	-0.022
25. Dum-Acc RL	-.213(*)	-0.103	.193(*)	0.009	.253(**)	-0.029	.186(*)	0.137	0.096	-0.015	-0.022	-0.026	-0.064	.666(**)	.583(**)	.700(**)	.551(**)	.691(**)	.526(**)	.766(**)	.540(**)	.892(**)	.642(**)	.323(**)	1	.596(**)	-0.017	0.148
26. Dum-Imp RL	-0.122	-0.031	0.093	-0.077	0.030	-0.142	0.115	0.128	0.178	-0.054	0.036	-0.067	-0.098	.410(**)	.583(**)	.404(**)	.570(**)	.455(**)	.573(**)	.474(**)	.649(**)	.568(**)	.863(**)	.247(**)	.596(**)	1	-0.068	0.135
27. Stud Loc	0.055	-0.055	0.068	-0.030	0.114	0.093	0.050	0.035	0.124	0.080	0.024	0.021	0.111	0.018	-0.110	0.041	-0.045	-0.021	-0.077	-0.010	-0.100	-0.060	-0.150	0.013	-0.017	-0.068	1	-0.062
28. Stud Loc NL	-0.072	-0.043	.211(*)	0.079	0.082	0.017	0.096	0.130	0.156	0.021	0.004	-0.064	-0.074	.205(*)	.187(*)	.203(*)	0.079	.186(*)	-0.009	0.096	0.000	0.105	0.069	-0.022	0.148	0.135	-0.062	1

Note. Neu = Neuroticism, Ext = Extraversion, Op = Openness, Agr = Agreeableness, Con = Conscientiousness, Acc = Accuracy Rating, Imp = Importance Rating, RL = Response Latency, Instr = Instructions, Dum = Dummy Item, Stud Loc = Study Location, NL = Noise Level

N = 122

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Appendix H

Correlation Matrix for Low Job Knowledge – No Warning Condition

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
1. Neu-Acc	1	.327(**)	-.631(**)	-.260(**)	-.375(**)	-.228(*)	-.564(**)	-0.189	-.604(**)	-0.078	-.206(*)	0.003	-.311(**)	-0.089	-0.065	-0.020	0.045	-.205(*)	-0.063	-0.111	-0.011	-0.143	-0.081	-0.182	-0.134	-0.058	-0.097	0.024
2. Neu-Imp	.327(**)	1	-.231(*)	-.578(**)	-.207(*)	-.369(**)	-0.168	-.388(**)	-0.131	-.418(**)	0.002	0.037	0.017	0.080	0.067	0.174	0.150	0.026	0.126	0.059	0.127	-0.043	0.018	-.259(**)	-0.006	0.075	-0.076	-0.154
3. Ext-Acc	-.631(**)	-.231(*)	1	.488(**)	.415(**)	.339(**)	.521(**)	.350(**)	.682(**)	.220(*)	0.122	-0.016	.293(**)	0.136	0.011	0.012	-0.161	0.179	-0.059	0.109	-0.092	0.115	-0.066	0.170	0.118	-0.065	0.051	0.053
4. Ext-Imp	-.260(**)	-.578(**)	.488(**)	1	.258(**)	.494(**)	0.185	.509(**)	.231(*)	.662(**)	-0.075	-0.109	0.129	-0.134	-0.119	-.228(*)	-.310(**)	-0.127	-.215(*)	-.210(*)	-.219(*)	-0.092	-0.166	0.067	-0.100	-.232(*)	0.170	0.129
5. Op-Acc	-.375(**)	-.207(*)	.415(**)	.258(**)	1	.507(**)	.489(**)	.351(**)	.374(**)	.204(*)	-0.023	0.064	.250(*)	.199(*)	0.067	0.040	-0.066	0.011	-0.066	0.081	-0.091	0.129	-0.033	0.154	0.144	-0.046	0.012	0.158
6. Op-Imp	-.228(*)	-.369(**)	.339(**)	.494(**)	.507(**)	1	.274(**)	.448(**)	.271(**)	.446(**)	-0.128	-0.133	.204(*)	0.047	-0.040	-0.056	-0.197	0.006	-0.185	-0.024	-0.142	0.063	-0.130	0.076	0.018	-0.109	0.060	0.126
7. Agr-Acc	-.564(**)	-0.168	.521(**)	0.185	.489(**)	.274(**)	1	.414(**)	.449(**)	0.060	.367(**)	0.039	.219(*)	0.161	0.102	0.112	0.044	0.172	0.017	0.084	-0.020	0.178	0.009	0.085	.205(*)	0.017	-0.021	0.093
8. Agr-Imp	-0.189	-.388(**)	.350(**)	.509(**)	.351(**)	.448(**)	.414(**)	1	0.174	.493(**)	0.087	-0.002	0.073	0.016	-0.057	-0.037	-0.154	-0.022	-0.186	-0.013	-0.156	0.089	-0.013	0.098	0.047	-0.047	-0.023	0.100
9. Con-Acc	-.604(**)	-0.131	.682(**)	.231(*)	.374(**)	.271(**)	.449(**)	0.174	1	.288(**)	0.078	0.084	.221(*)	0.127	-0.008	0.093	-0.110	.218(*)	-0.049	0.131	-0.040	0.073	-0.121	0.147	0.093	-0.135	.205(*)	0.138
10. Con-Imp	-0.078	-.418(**)	.220(*)	.662(**)	.204(*)	.446(**)	0.060	.493(**)	.288(**)	1	-0.076	-0.063	0.078	-0.059	-0.095	-0.094	-.210(*)	-0.092	-0.189	-0.149	-0.138	-0.076	-0.131	0.062	-0.124	-.281(**)	0.186	0.135
11. BIDR-IM	-.206(*)	0.002	0.122	-0.075	-0.023	-0.128	.367(**)	0.087	0.078	-0.076	1	.214(*)	-0.117	0.047	0.111	0.070	0.147	0.066	0.053	0.042	0.105	0.131	0.105	0.116	0.103	0.073	-0.106	-0.054
12. SAT	0.003	0.037	-0.016	-0.109	0.064	-0.133	0.039	-0.002	0.084	-0.063	.214(*)	1	-0.038	-0.094	-0.164	-0.097	-0.075	-0.099	-0.113	-0.094	-0.101	-0.081	-0.042	0.127	-0.112	-0.098	-0.022	0.038
13. Job Fam	-.311(**)	0.017	.293(**)	0.129	.250(*)	.204(*)	.219(*)	0.073	.221(*)	0.078	-0.117	-0.038	1	-0.008	-0.049	0.022	-0.080	0.084	-0.031	0.063	0.026	-0.020	-0.044	-0.003	-0.037	-0.135	0.050	0.167
14. Neu-Acc RL	-0.089	0.080	0.136	-0.134	.199(*)	0.047	0.161	0.016	0.127	-0.059	0.047	-0.094	-0.008	1	.813(**)	.909(**)	.735(**)	.848(**)	.674(**)	.840(**)	.675(**)	.833(**)	.596(**)	.282(**)	.728(**)	.558(**)	-0.111	-0.083
15. Neu-Imp RL	-0.065	0.067	0.011	-0.119	0.067	-0.040	0.102	-0.057	-0.008	-0.095	0.111	-0.164	-0.049	.813(**)	1	.783(**)	.873(**)	.732(**)	.817(**)	.734(**)	.783(**)	.748(**)	.722(**)	.315(**)	.639(**)	.681(**)	-0.173	-0.030
16. Ext-Acc RL	-0.020	0.174	0.012	-.228(*)	0.040	-0.056	0.112	-0.037	0.093	-0.094	0.070	-0.097	0.022	.909(**)	.783(**)	1	.818(**)	.886(**)	.740(**)	.883(**)	.733(**)	.830(**)	.624(**)	0.158	.738(**)	.567(**)	-0.127	-0.124
17. Ext-Imp RL	0.045	0.150	-0.161	-.310(**)	-0.066	-0.197	0.044	-0.154	-0.110	-.210(*)	0.147	-0.075	-0.080	.735(**)	.873(**)	.818(**)	1	.714(**)	.873(**)	.736(**)	.867(**)	.741(**)	.801(**)	.251(*)	.637(**)	.748(**)	-.208(*)	-0.042
18. Op-Acc RL	-.205(*)	0.026	0.179	-0.127	0.011	0.006	0.172	-0.022	.218(*)	-0.092	0.066	-0.099	0.084	.848(**)	.732(**)	.886(**)	.714(**)	1	.755(**)	.904(**)	.709(**)	.853(**)	.622(**)	.198(*)	.777(**)	.572(**)	-0.128	-0.078
19. Op-Imp RL	-0.063	0.126	-0.059	-.215(*)	-0.066	-0.185	0.017	-0.186	-0.049	-0.189	0.053	-0.113	-0.031	.674(**)	.817(**)	.740(**)	.873(**)	.755(**)	1	.736(**)	.897(**)	.747(**)	.850(**)	0.161	.656(**)	.802(**)	-.243(*)	-0.034
20. Agr-Acc RL	-0.111	0.059	0.109	-.210(*)	0.081	-0.024	0.084	-0.013	0.131	-0.149	0.042	-0.094	0.063	.840(**)	.734(**)	.883(**)	.736(**)	.904(**)	.736(**)	1	.727(**)	.866(**)	.648(**)	.209(*)	.755(**)	.598(**)	-0.136	-0.113
21. Agr-Imp RL	-0.011	0.127	-0.092	-.219(*)	-0.091	-0.142	-0.020	-0.156	-0.040	-0.138	0.105	-0.101	0.026	.675(**)	.783(**)	.733(**)	.867(**)	.709(**)	.897(**)	.727(**)	1	.711(**)	.858(**)	0.196	.582(**)	.763(**)	-.200(*)	-0.005
22. Con-Acc RL	-0.143	-0.043	0.115	-0.092	0.129	0.063	0.178	0.089	0.073	-0.076	0.131	-0.081	-0.020	.833(**)	.748(**)	.830(**)	.741(**)	.853(**)	.747(**)	.866(**)	.711(**)	1	.759(**)	.258(**)	.886(**)	.660(**)	-0.187	-0.075
23. Con-Imp RL	-0.081	0.018	-0.066	-0.166	-0.033	-0.130	0.009	-0.013	-0.121	-0.131	0.105	-0.042	-0.044	.596(**)	.722(**)	.624(**)	.801(**)	.622(**)	.850(**)	.648(**)	.858(**)	.759(**)	1	.225(*)	.643(**)	.881(**)	-.227(*)	-0.101
24. Instr RL	-0.182	-.259(**)	0.170	0.067	0.154	0.076	0.085	0.098	0.147	0.062	0.116	0.127	-0.003	.282(**)	.315(**)	0.158	.251(*)	.198(*)	0.161	.209(*)	0.196	.258(**)	.225(*)	1	.206(*)	0.138	-0.002	0.138
25. Dum-Acc RL	-0.134	-0.006	0.118	-0.100	0.144	0.018	.205(*)	0.047	0.093	-0.124	0.103	-0.112	-0.037	.728(**)	.639(**)	.738(**)	.637(**)	.777(**)	.656(**)	.755(**)	.582(**)	.886(**)	.643(**)	.206(*)	1	.600(**)	-0.104	-0.180
26. Dum-Imp RL	-0.058	0.075	-0.065	-.232(*)	-0.046	-0.109	0.017	-0.047	-0.135	-.281(**)	0.073	-0.098	-0.135	.558(**)	.681(**)	.567(**)	.748(**)	.572(**)	.802(**)	.598(**)	.763(**)	.660(**)	.881(**)	0.138	.600(**)	1	-.246(*)	-0.103
27. Stud Loc	-0.097	-0.076	0.051	0.170	0.012	0.060	-0.021	-0.023	.205(*)	0.186	-0.106	-0.022	0.050	-0.111	-0.173	-0.127	-.208(*)	-0.128	-.243(*)	-0.136	-.200(*)	-0.187	-.227(*)	-0.002	-0.104	-.246(*)	1	0.026
28. Stud Loc NL	0.024	-0.154	0.053	0.129	0.158	0.126	0.093	0.100	0.138	0.135	-0.054	0.038	0.167	-0.083	-0.030	-0.124	-0.042	-0.078	-0.034	-0.113	-0.005	-0.075	-0.101	0.138	-0.180	-0.103	0.026	1

Note. Neu = Neuroticism, Ext = Extraversion, Op = Openness, Agr = Agreeableness, Con = Conscientiousness, Acc = Accuracy Rating, Imp = Importance Rating, RL = Response Latency, Instr = Instructions, Dum = Dummy Item, Stud Loc = Study Location, NL = Noise Level

N = 122

N**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Appendix I

Correlation Matrix for Low Job Knowledge – Warning Condition

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
1. Neu-Acc	1	.207(**)	-.534(**)	-0.107	-.174(*)	-0.071	-.466(**)	-0.087	-.604(**)	-.201(*)	-.182(*)	-0.047	-0.136	-0.001	-0.048	-0.093	-0.009	-0.123	-0.055	-0.130	-0.007	-0.036	0.066	-0.032	-0.053	0.041	-.273(**)	0.042
2. Neu-Imp	.207(**)	1	-0.080	-.500(**)	0.117	-.202(**)	-0.058	-.247(**)	-0.052	-.379(**)	0.040	0.099	0.057	0.040	0.038	0.026	0.062	0.000	0.026	-0.023	0.048	-0.040	0.074	0.007	-0.007	0.074	0.114	0.140
3. Ext-Acc	-.534(**)	-0.080	1	.366(**)	.380(**)	.163(*)	.498(**)	.262(**)	.568(**)	.194(*)	.161(*)	0.033	0.103	0.100	0.131	0.095	0.081	.171(*)	0.067	.194(*)	0.060	0.141	0.028	0.111	.192(*)	0.107	.271(**)	0.027
4. Ext-Imp	-0.107	-.500(**)	.366(**)	1	0.050	.465(**)	.245(**)	.486(**)	0.140	.531(**)	-0.025	-0.140	0.038	-0.070	-0.050	-0.102	-.154(*)	-0.044	-0.112	-0.042	-0.149	-0.036	-.157(*)	0.005	-0.087	-.171(*)	0.093	-0.073
5. Op-Acc	-.174(*)	0.117	.380(**)	0.050	1	.454(**)	.308(**)	0.147	.350(**)	0.010	0.056	0.109	0.048	.230(**)	.192(*)	.188(*)	.229(**)	0.104	.161(*)	.198(*)	0.137	.163(*)	.159(*)	0.128	0.140	0.111	.177(*)	.183(*)
6. Op-Imp	-0.071	-.202(**)	.163(*)	.465(**)	.454(**)	1	.170(*)	.300(**)	.164(*)	.318(**)	-0.074	-0.144	0.097	0.078	0.058	0.090	0.029	0.039	-0.023	0.057	-0.061	0.054	-0.054	-0.008	-0.019	-0.072	0.131	-0.019
7. Agr-Acc	-.466(**)	-0.058	.498(**)	.245(**)	.308(**)	.170(*)	1	.546(**)	.504(**)	.227(**)	.360(**)	-0.096	0.085	0.119	.193(*)	.167(*)	.215(**)	.170(*)	0.117	0.141	0.024	.186(*)	0.071	0.132	0.118	0.098	0.115	0.092
8. Agr-Imp	-0.087	-.247(**)	.262(**)	.486(**)	0.147	.300(**)	.546(**)	1	.158(*)	.477(**)	.164(*)	-0.137	0.003	.166(*)	.187(*)	.196(*)	0.128	.202(**)	0.090	.172(*)	-0.001	.240(**)	0.092	0.133	.187(*)	0.106	0.114	-0.084
9. Con-Acc	-.604(**)	-0.052	.568(**)	0.140	.350(**)	.164(*)	.504(**)	.158(*)	1	.355(**)	.299(**)	0.008	.155(*)	0.089	0.091	0.098	0.025	.182(*)	0.033	.203(**)	0.026	0.062	-0.045	.166(*)	0.112	0.037	.177(*)	0.058
10. Con-Imp	-.201(*)	-.379(**)	.194(*)	.531(**)	0.010	.318(**)	.227(**)	.477(**)	.355(**)	1	0.107	-.183(*)	0.048	-0.005	-0.042	-0.039	-0.123	0.019	-0.139	0.005	-0.151	-0.068	-.205(**)	-0.035	-0.069	-.180(*)	0.092	-0.024
11. BIDR-IM	-.182(*)	0.040	.161(*)	-0.025	0.056	-0.074	.360(**)	.164(*)	.299(**)	0.107	1	-0.103	0.021	-0.019	0.065	-0.037	0.058	-0.038	0.038	-0.022	0.017	-0.059	-0.001	0.002	-0.065	-0.004	-0.004	-0.023
12. SAT	-0.047	0.099	0.033	-0.140	0.109	-0.144	-0.096	-0.137	0.008	-.183(*)	-0.103	1	-0.072	0.031	-0.064	0.078	0.020	0.016	0.069	0.114	0.110	0.002	0.099	0.021	0.041	0.120	0.069	0.026
13. Job Fam	-0.136	0.057	0.103	0.038	0.048	0.097	0.085	0.003	.155(*)	0.048	0.021	-0.072	1	0.038	0.046	0.001	-0.005	-0.013	-0.065	-0.032	-0.062	-0.008	-0.035	-.158(*)	-0.014	-0.040	0.062	0.018
14. Neu-Acc RL	-0.001	0.040	0.100	-0.070	.230(**)	0.078	0.119	.166(*)	0.089	-0.005	-0.019	0.031	0.038	1	.767(**)	.837(**)	.705(**)	.762(**)	.629(**)	.770(**)	.641(**)	.785(**)	.635(**)	.402(**)	.726(**)	.598(**)	0.106	0.020
15. Neu-Imp RL	-0.048	0.038	0.131	-0.050	.192(*)	0.058	.193(*)	.187(*)	0.091	-0.042	0.065	-0.064	0.046	.767(**)	1	.685(**)	.839(**)	.624(**)	.741(**)	.610(**)	.708(**)	.654(**)	.726(**)	.363(**)	.604(**)	.667(**)	0.048	-0.047
16. Ext-Acc RL	-0.093	0.026	0.095	-0.102	.188(*)	0.090	.167(*)	.196(*)	0.098	-0.039	-0.037	0.078	0.001	.837(**)	.685(**)	1	.754(**)	.874(**)	.666(**)	.881(**)	.678(**)	.862(**)	.673(**)	.455(**)	.795(**)	.643(**)	0.060	0.032
17. Ext-Imp RL	-0.009	0.062	0.081	-.154(*)	.229(**)	0.029	.215(**)	0.128	0.025	-0.123	0.058	0.020	-0.005	.705(**)	.839(**)	.754(**)	1	.711(**)	.839(**)	.697(**)	.820(**)	.723(**)	.835(**)	.363(**)	.661(**)	.751(**)	0.081	0.011
18. Op-Acc RL	-0.123	0.000	.171(*)	-0.044	0.104	0.039	.170(*)	.202(**)	.182(*)	0.019	-0.038	0.016	-0.013	.762(**)	.624(**)	.874(**)	.711(**)	1	.742(**)	.904(**)	.715(**)	.862(**)	.655(**)	.426(**)	.812(**)	.638(**)	0.089	-0.007
19. Op-Imp RL	-0.055	0.026	0.067	-0.112	.161(*)	-0.023	0.117	0.090	0.033	-0.139	0.038	0.069	-0.065	.629(**)	.741(**)	.666(**)	.839(**)	.742(**)	1	.719(**)	.856(**)	.688(**)	.818(**)	.334(**)	.643(**)	.733(**)	0.132	0.027
20. Agr-Acc RL	-0.130	-0.023	.194(*)	-0.042	.198(*)	0.057	0.141	.172(*)	.203(**)	0.005	-0.022	0.114	-0.032	.770(**)	.610(**)	.881(**)	.697(**)	.904(**)	.719(**)	1	.773(**)	.887(**)	.717(**)	.419(**)	.816(**)	.683(**)	0.085	0.003
21. Agr-Imp RL	-0.007	0.048	0.060	-0.149	0.137	-0.061	0.024	-0.001	0.026	-0.151	0.017	0.110	-0.062	.641(**)	.708(**)	.678(**)	.820(**)	.715(**)	.856(**)	.773(**)	1	.743(**)	.892(**)	.285(**)	.675(**)	.784(**)	0.117	-0.004
22. Con-Acc RL	-0.036	-0.040	0.141	-0.036	.163(*)	0.054	.186(*)	.240(**)	0.062	-0.068	-0.059	0.002	-0.008	.785(**)	.654(**)	.862(**)	.723(**)	.862(**)	.688(**)	.887(**)	.743(**)	1	.769(**)	.394(**)	.917(**)	.725(**)	0.091	-0.048
23. Con-Imp RL	0.066	0.074	0.028	-.157(*)	.159(*)	-0.054	0.071	0.092	-0.045	-.205(**)	-0.001	0.099	-0.035	.635(**)	.726(**)	.673(**)	.835(**)	.655(**)	.818(**)	.717(**)	.892(**)	.769(**)	1	.340(**)	.684(**)	.883(**)	0.071	-0.057
24. Instr RL	-0.032	0.007	0.111	0.005	0.128	-0.008	0.132	0.133	.166(*)	-0.035	0.002	0.021	-.158(*)	.402(**)	.363(**)	.455(**)	.363(**)	.426(**)	.334(**)	.419(**)	.285(**)	.394(**)	.340(**)	1	.383(**)	.337(**)	0.107	0.119
25. Dum-Acc RL	-0.053	-0.007	.192(*)	-0.087	0.140	-0.019	0.118	.187(*)	0.112	-0.069	-0.065	0.041	-0.014	.726(**)	.604(**)	.795(**)	.661(**)	.812(**)	.643(**)	.816(**)	.675(**)	.917(**)	.684(**)	.383(**)	1	.721(**)	0.114	-0.025
26. Dum-Imp RL	0.041	0.074	0.107	-.171(*)	0.111	-0.072	0.098	0.106	0.037	-.180(*)	-0.004	0.120	-0.040	.598(**)	.667(**)	.643(**)	.751(**)	.638(**)	.733(**)	.683(**)	.784(**)	.725(**)	.883(**)	.337(**)	.721(**)	1	0.093	-0.147
27. Stud Loc	-.273(**)	0.114	.271(**)	0.093	.177(*)	0.131	0.115	0.114	.177(*)	0.092	-0.004	0.069	0.062	0.106	0.048	0.060	0.081	0.089	0.132	0.085	0.117	0.091	0.071	0.107	0.114	0.093	1	-0.055
28. Stud Loc NL	0.042	0.140	0.027	-0.073	.183(*)	-0.019	0.092	-0.084	0.058	-0.024	-0.023	0.026	0.018	0.020	-0.047	0.032	0.011	-0.007	0.027	0.003	-0.004	-0.048	-0.057	0.119	-0.025	-0.147	-0.055	1

Note. Neu = Neuroticism, Ext = Extraversion, Op = Openness, Agr = Agreeableness, Con = Conscientiousness, Acc = Accuracy Rating, Imp = Importance Rating, RL = Response Latency, Instr = Instructions, Dum = Dummy Item, Stud Loc = Study Location, NL = Noise Level

N = 122

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).