Choikhonai Surkh: The Replacement of "Opium Dens" with Red Teahouses and the Limits of the Soviet Enlightenment Project in Tajikistan

Accepted version of an article published in *Central Asian Affairs*:
Latypov, Alisher. " Choikhonai Surkh: The Replacement of "Opium Dens" with Red Teahouses and the Limits of the Soviet Enlightenment Project in Tajikistan", *Central Asian Affairs* 7, 3 (2020): 236-266.

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Abstract

In this paper I trace sanitation, education, and cultural enlightenment practices in early Soviet Tajikistan, and reassess the role of red teahouses in addressing drug use and other health issues in the country. I examine the assertions of Soviet historians and physicians by drawing on extensive archival records from Russia and Tajikistan and local newspapers published in Tajikistan in the 1930s, and in doing so accentuate an alternative account that illustrates the limits of Soviet undertakings and the appalling gaps between the aspirations of Soviet leaders and reality. Red teahouses failed both to focus on health challenges and to tackle the use of narcotic intoxicants in early Soviet Tajikistan. The majority of these new Soviet facilities functioned as commercial socio-gastronomic entities until the late 1930s and beyond, rather than spreading health propaganda and engaging in the cultural construction and enlightenment of the Tajik people.

Keywords

Tajikistan – Soviet Central Asia – red teahouse – narcotic drugs – enlightenment – cultural construction – sanitation

doi:10.30965/22142290-bja10003

1 Introduction

Choikhonai surkh, or the red teahouse, has long been portrayed as the flagship of the early Soviet enlightenment project in Tajikistan. In writings of Soviet authors, red teahouses emerged as the loci of knowledge, culture, and sanitation; these writings evoke connotations of the Soviet authorities' victory over the "dark" and "backward" past and the liberation of people from poverty, illiteracy, ignorance, and disease. As ordinary teahouses often served as sites for the sale and consumption of opiates and various other products containing narcotic substances, Soviet historians and physicians have linked the liquidation of such "dens" by the Soviet authorities, and the opening of new red teahouses, to conquering drug addiction in this region.

Leonid Antsyferov, chief physician of the Republican Psychiatric Hospital in Tashkent, was among the first Central Asian physicians to propose the association between red teahouses and vanquishing drug addiction. Antsyferov declared in a 1934 posthumous publication that red teahouses had improved the everyday life of workers, making their lifestyle (*byt*) healthier due to enlightenment, hygiene, and sanitation measures, thus having considerably reduced drug use.[1] While Antsyferov was making a clear referral to his earlier pro-enlightenment appeals, he also echoed the *drug prevention through enlightenment* discourse that his senior colleagues in post-revolutionary Russia had laid out. Minhoj Ghulomov, Chief Psychiatrist of the Ministry of Health of the Tajik SSR, and the main figure in Tajik mental health care and education, later replicated and reinforced Antsyferov's statement in publications concerning the history of the Soviet struggle against drug addiction in Tajikistan.[2] Ghulomov and his co-authors claimed in numerous articles and books published in the 1980s, both in Russian and Tajik languages, that "in the very first years of the Soviet rule in Tajikistan" the Bolsheviks developed comprehensive measures against *narkomania*, or drug addiction, with "red teahouses playing a significant role in the enlightenment and raising cultural level of the

1 Leonid Antsyferov, *Gashishizm v Srednei Azii* (Tahskent: Prilozhenie k Zhurnalu *Za Sotsialisticheskoe Zdravookhranenie Uzbekistana* 8–9, 1934), 10. In Tsarist Russia, almost two decades prior to the Bolsheviks' October revolt, temperance movement activists held a similar belief that one can reduce alcohol use in the military by establishing canteens, tea rooms, reading rooms, and "intelligent" recreational activities such as entertainments, lectures, discussions and fresh-air games. See George Snow, "Alcoholism in the Russian military: The public sphere and the temperance discourse, 1883–1917," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 45, no. 3 (1997): 423–24.

2 With few exceptions such as in this sentence, the transliteration of proper names and toponyms in this paper mostly follows the same (Russophone) pattern as how they were referred to in the original sources cited hereafter.

population," thus contributing to the relegation of drug addiction in the 1930s to the realm of a mere "attribute of the criminal world."3

This narrative of the closure of *opium and hashish dens* (*kuknor-khonas, shira-khonas and nash'a-khonas*) and the replacement of private teahouses with red teahouses was instrumental for Soviet drug prevention, health propaganda, and enlightenment efforts. In this narrative, Soviet rule ostensibly liberated the locals from their drug habit, which was viciously imposed on them by Tsarist Russia and the feudal rule of the Bukhara Emirate.

As "one of the most important types of institutions for the cultural enlightenment" in early Soviet Tajikistan, red teahouses were of significant interest not only to psychiatrists and narcologists; they were, and still are, of major concern to Soviet and post-Soviet Tajik historians who write about *cultural construction* in Tajikistan under the leading role of the Communist Party. A volume published in 1979, edited by Konstantin Marsakov, was one of the first works to explore this issue in detail. It contains a chapter written by Rahim Masov, who focuses on the role of red teahouses and libraries in the "deployment of mass cultural enlightenment activities" in Tajikistan. Not surprisingly for a Soviet-era publication, its conclusions for a pre-World War ii period were that "many red teahouses have become true sources of political and cultural activities among the population," and that "overall, red teahouses played an important role in raising general political and cultural levels of the workers of the republic during the years of pre-war five-year plans."4

The myth of the red teahouse continues to persist in post-Soviet Tajikistan, where a glossy portrayal of *krasnaia chaikhana* dominates the scholarly discourse, including in the narratives of dissertations on cultural construction and enlightenment in the early decades of Soviet rule.5 In parallel, local

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3 Minkhodzh Guliamov, "Istoriia i sovremennoe sostoianie bor'by s narkomaniei v Tadzhikskoi SSR," *Zdravookhranenie Tadzhikistana* 3 (1980): 86–87; Minkhodzh Guliamov and Al'bert Pogosov, *Narkomaniia: Klinika, Diagnostika, Lechenie, Profilaktika* (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1987), 20; Minkhodzh Guliamov, "Gashishnaia narkomania," *Zdravookhranenie Tadzhikistana* 2 (1988): 37 M. Gh. Ghulomov, S. Sh. Sharofov, and M. I. Kleandrov, *Muborizai ziddi Nash'amandi va Zahrmandi* (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1989), 8–9.

4 See Konstantin Marsakov, ed., *Istoriia Kul'turnogo Stroitel'stva v Tadzhikistane (1917–1977gg.)*, vol. I (Dushanbe: Donish, 1979), 2–4, 197–250. A collection of archival documents and news- paper and journal articles related to the period between 1924 and 1941 is a more important source on the studies of cultural development of Tajikistan, published as Zarif Radzhabov, ed., *Iz Istorii Kul'turnogo Stroitel'stva v Tadzhikistane v 1924–1941gg*., vol. I (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1966). That volume, which omitted key materials critical of red teahouses on the grounds of being "irrelevant to the theme of the volume," would lead an unsuspicious reader of such carefully selected primary sources to similar conclusions as in Masov's chapter.

5 See, for example, Aiub Usmonov, *Stanovlenie i Razvitie Tadzhikskoi Sovetskoi Kul'tury (1917–1991 gg.). Dissertatsiia na Soiskanie Uchionoi Stepeni Doktora Istoricheskikh Nauk* (Khujand,

newspapers' *istoriia* columnists reproduce Antsyferov and Ghulomov's statements, only making a minor alteration to their histories by admitting that despite all the great successes of red teahouses achieved by the early 1930s, "it was not possible to completely root out narkomania in the country."6

The examination of red teahouses as the centers of culture, sanitation and enlightenment in early Soviet Tajikistan, however, lays bare numerous challenges Soviet administrators faced in launching and operating such entities throughout the 1920s and 1930s.

In this paper, I will therefore aim to trace the early Soviet enlightenment, sanitation, and cultural construction activities in Tajikistan, and reassess the role of *choikhonai surkh* in addressing drug addiction and other health issues. By drawing on archival records from Moscow and Dushanbe, and local newspapers published in Tajikistan in the 1930s, I will illustrate the limits of Soviet undertakings, and the appalling gaps between the aspirations of Soviet leaders and reality. I will accentuate an alternative account, arguing that contrary to the assertions of Soviet historians and physicians, red teahouses failed to tackle narcotic drug use in early Soviet Tajikistan, and that until the late 1930s and beyond, the majority of red teahouses functioned as commercial sociogastronomic facilities rather than providing red-coloured propaganda, cultural enlightenment activities, sanitation, and health education.

2 Narkomania and the "Enlightenment" of the Tajik People in the "Very First Years of the Soviet Rule"

In 1932, when Leonid Antsyferov was working in Tashkent and possibly writing or conceiving his *Hashishism in Central Asia* monograph, Uzbekistan had some 1,322 red teahouses, although many of them might have offered tea and meals without any "cultural ingredients."7 The numbers of teahouses in

2018); Bakhtiior Gafforov, *Istoriia Kul'turno-Prosvetitel'nykh Uchrezhdenii Respubliki Tadzhikistan (1991–2011gg.). Aftoreferat Dissertatsii na Soiskanie Uchionoi Stepeni Kandidata Istoricheskikh Nauk* (Dushanbe, 2014); Gulnora Mukhabbatova, *Vklad Zhenschiny v Provedenie Kul'turnykh Preobrazovanii v Respublike Tadzhikistan (1924–1941 gg.). Aftoreferat Dissertatsii na Soiskanie Uchionoi Stepeni Kandidata Istoricheskikh Nauk* (Dushanbe, 2004); Gul'noz Shukurova, *Stanovlenie i Razvitie Vneshkol'nykh Uchrezhdenii v Tadzhikistane v 1924–1946 godakh. Aftoreferat Dissertatsii na Soiskanie Uchionoi Stepeni Kandidata Pedagogicheskikh Nauk* (Dushanbe, 2002).

6 Galina Dzutseva, "Ostanovka 'Chaikhana Rokhat'," *Vechernii Dushanbe*, June 12, 2008, History section.

7 William Fierman, *Language Planning and National Development: The Uzbek Experience* (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1992), 117.

Tajikistan were considerably smaller compared to what was available in this neighbouring republic.8 Soviet officials in Tajikistan often found themselves struggling to come up with a countrywide estimate of functional red teahouses.9 The Bolsheviks started initial works on setting up red teahouses in the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Tajik ASSR) in the mid-1920s, when *Glavpolitprosvet* (Main Committee for Political Enlightenment) opened a red teahouse in Karatag settlement. Although their original plan was to cover every region and settlement with such teahouses, clubs, and reading-rooms by the end of 1925, the government saw a "lack of red literature" as one of the rea- sons for opening only five more teahouses in Iangi-Bazar, Regar, Pendzhikent and Sarai-Kamar (Piandzh) as of April 1926. Many red teahouses existed only on paper, which *Glavpolitprosvet* refused to take into account for the purposes of reporting. These teahouses were similar to a dozen of pre-revolutionary "tea houses with opium dens" which Soviet workers encountered in Dushanbe (the official name of the capital was Diushambe between 1924 and 1929, then Stalinabad until 1961, when the original name of Dushanbe was again returned tothe city).10

Over the next three years, various administrative bodies and organizations including *Narkomzdrav*, *Narkompros* and *Narkomzem* (People's Commissariats for Public Health, Enlightenment and Land) became more involved

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8 According to two recent studies, this disproportion might be at least partially explained by the decisions of the government of the Uzbek SSR that led to withholding of some funds that were allocated for Tajikistan from Moscow, and were intended to be transferred through the Uzbek People's Commissariat for Finance between 1924 and 1928. In 1929, financial disagreements between officials in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan led to the establishment of a special Commission for the Analysis of Budgetary Disputes between the TaASSR and the UzSSR, whose final report was highly critical of the Uzbek government's actions. See Paul Bergne, *The Birth of Tajikistan: National Identity and the Origins of the Republic* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2007), 86–9, and endnotes 1–3; Rakhim Masov, *Tadzhiki: Istoriia Natsional'noi Tragedii* (Dushanbe: Irfon, 2008), 86–121.

9 The Russian State Archive of Social and Political History (RGASPI), f. 62, op. 2, d. 1171, ll. 40, 46.

10 *RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 680, ll. 134–5; RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 198, l. 102*; Nikolai Mikhailov, *Panorama of the Soviet Union*, trans. Glanys Ann Kozlov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), 230.

Among those teahouses which Soviet leaders in Tajikistan seemingly refused to ac- count for were some of the ten red teahouses included in an earlier report, covering the period between March and November 1925. See Radzhabov, ed., *Iz Istorii Kul'turnogo Stroitel'stva*, 407–8.

For an image of *choikhona* in early Soviet years in Tajikistan, see Gustav Krist, *Alone through the Forbidden Land: Journeys in Disguise through Soviet Central Asia*, trans. E. O. Lorimer (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1938), plate 60. Tea-shops in the Dushambah bazaar.

Figure 1 Places of Social Gathering. Tea House (Turkestan Album [1871–1872], Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, lc-dig-ppmsca-09953–00029).

in sponsoring culture and enlightenment institutions. However, given the plethora of challenges which the new Tajik government was facing in every imaginable area in those very first years of existence of the Tajik ASSR, there was only a modest increase of red teahouses.[11] In the Kuliab region, the special Party Commission that inspected the "least Sovietized" twelve border districts of the republic discovered only two red teahouses to satisfy the social and cultural needs of the local population. Located in larger towns, the red teahouses were up to seventy kilometres away from villages (*kishlaks*), and separated from about forty thousand residents of the region by the roads which "should not be considered as roads, but rather as donkey lanes."[12] In other places, such as Garm, red teahouses were found to be inappropriate, and in January 1928 the Soviet authorities proposed to replace them with other establishments for

11 The Bureau for Cooperative Cotton Growing (*Tadzhkhlopkoopbiuro*) was among the organizations to sponsor red teahouses in the Tajik ASSR. As of May 1929, the Bureau set up only seven red teahouses in Shokhmansur, Hissar, Aral, Iangi-Bazar, Kurgan-Tiube, Dzhilikul and Parkhar settlements. See *The Central State Archive of the Republic of Tajikistan (TsGA rt), f. 172, op. 1, d. 23, l. 52*.

12 RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, ch. ii, d. 2205, ll. 69–71.

political enlightenment (*politprosvetuchrezhdeniia*) deemed to be more relevant to the "everyday life peculiarities" of the region, whatever they might have been.13 In Gorno-Badakhshan, where some of its population spent most of its time herding yaks, red teahouses had to be organized along with the so- called red yurts, which had a similar mission of reaching and enlightening the nomads of the Pamirs and providing access to biomedicine and red propaganda.14 The first red teahouses appeared in Gorno-Badakhshan in 1928, where the local executive government (*ispolkom*), failing to receive any support from the center and still cherishing the last hopes to claim the money back, eventually had to invest its own 400 roubles to set up a red teahouse in the town of Khorog. However, two months after its initial resolution to open a red teahouse in Khorog, the presidium of *ispolkom*, in view of the availability of a pre-existing club "capable of satisfying cultural demands of peasants and professional unions" in Khorog, decided to shut down the newly opened red teahouse, to send whatever "cultural materials" it had to a teahouse in Vandzh, and to sell all the untransferable equipment to a local canteen for cash.15 As of 1930, only seven red yurts and red teahouses served the entire Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast.16

While remoteness and harsh terrain prevented many from visiting red teahouses, gender was another obstacle to access for those few who happened to have a red teahouse in their own town. As was customary in the region, teahouses were common spaces for Central Asian men. Even women who were serving the new Soviet power, who wore a militia uniform instead of a veil in the late 1920s, were unwilling to go to the *choikhona* since they would immediately discover "a large tail" of men behind them making sexual proposals and treating them as prostitutes.17 Many non-native Europeans, who came to work in Tajikistan by the 1930s and were stationed in distant towns such as Sarai- Kamar, considered the local climate "harmful" for female European bodies and refused to take their wives with them. These men, who were busy during the

13 *RGASPI, f. 17, op. 28, d. 14, ll. 14, 16, 22*. At that time there were about six red teahouses in Garm district. See Radzhabov, ed., *Iz Istorii Kul'turnogo Stroitel'stva*, 414.

14 On the red yurts politics in Kazakhstan see a chapter on "'Islands in the Steppe': Red Yurts and Communist Policy" in Paula Michaels, *Curative Powers: Medicine and Empire in Stalin's Central Asia* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003), 154–64.

15 TsGA rt, f. 10, op. 1, d. 289, ll. 47, 69, 130–1.

16 RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, ch. ii, d. 2308, ll. 1, 7.

17 For extensive accounts of seclusion of Muslim women in early Soviet Central Asia, see Marianne Kamp, *The New Woman in Uzbekistan: Islam, Modernity, and Unveiling under Communism* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2006), and Douglas Northrop, *Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004).

Figure 2 "My Husband Smoked Opium. I Learnt that a Silk Factory Was Being Opened. [So, I] Gave Up On Him and Went to Work [There]" (SSSR Na Stroike *10 [1931]*).

daytime, killed their time at a local red teahouse every evening since there were no other cultural entertainments, such as cinemas and theatres. For local people, those non-native European men sitting in red teahouses appeared to them as "hunters" awaiting their daughters.18 Women, however, were especially valued by the regime as conduits of new policies and practices, through whom the regime also hoped to gain more trust among men and to achieve wider changes in the community. The government therefore began to establish women's clubs in various parts of Tajikistan in the second half of the 1920s.

Almost everywhere, communists had to first address a major problem of finding suitable premises for their future hubs and the so-called *red corners* of culture, education, and health care delivery, resorting at times to converting mosques into red teahouses and further antagonising the locals.19 The infrequent openings of facilities for Tajik women were often scheduled to commemorate March 8th, with the name of Lenin's wife usually featuring on the

18 RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, ch. ii, d. 2205, l. 222.

19 *Ovozi Tojik*, October 30, 1928, in Radzhabov, ed., *Iz Istorii Kul'turnogo Stroitel'stva*, 413.

top of the list of candidate names for the new clubs.20 While in Dushanbe most of the club members were Russians and other European women, in Garm, Pendzhikent, Ura-Tiube and Khorog towns, which hosted some of the first female clubs in Tajikistan, the membership consisted mainly of local women. Each of these clubs had about 20 regular visitors, except for Khorog and Ura-Tiube, where the membership was as high as 64 and 85 people, respectively.21

Archival records point to a negligible number of red teahouses operating in Tajikistan in the late 1920s. According to one source, as few as 30 red teahouses operated in Tajikistan in 1927/28, with the largest number of them based in Ura-Tiube region in the northern part of the country.22 These quantitative aspects, however, reveal only part of the story. For the study of red teahouses as drug prevention facilities, issues such as the nature of cultural material, the types of activities, the content of messages delivered at red teahouses, and the competence of people involved in the making of new, drug-free citizens in early Soviet Tajikistan is highly relevant.

After Tajikistan was recognized as an autonomous republic within the Uzbek SSR in 1924, the Bolsheviks were troubled, among other major problems, by the dramatic shortage of both Tajik texts and Soviet workers who were native speakers or who could at least operate in Tajik. Devastated by the military struggle between the Bolsheviks and the *Bosmachiion*, Tajikistan had no industry, and more than 90 percent of its land was covered by mountains. Large numbers of households had to leave the country for Afghanistan, with some escaping the new regime and others fleeing from *Bosmachiho*. The paucity of personnel and near-total illiteracy of the local population plagued the activities of each institution during this period. Unable to speak to its native audiences, *sanitary enlightenment* could achieve little. The work among women, for example, was fruitless without the knowledge of language.23 By the end of 1925, the Tajik ASSR People's Commissariat for Enlightenment decried that all the teaching in the new Soviet schools of Tajikistan at that time would be carried out in the Uzbek language by non-native Uzbek teachers, who did not

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20 *RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 1026, l. 86; RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 812, ll. 19, 30–2*; L. V. Shansky, "Razvitie zdravookhraneniia na Pamire," *Zdravookhranenie Tadzhikistana* 2 (1954): 10.

21 RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 680, ll. 129–30; RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 812, ll. 19, 21–23, 107ob, 144, 144ob, 147; RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 1026, ll. 69–70.

22 *The Party Archive, Tajik Branch of Marxism-Leninism Institute at the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – currently paipi TsK kp rt (pa tf iml pri TsK kpss), f. 1, op. 1, d. 570, l. 94*, in Radzhabov, ed., *Iz Istorii Kul'turnogo Stroitel'stva*, 414, and Maksud Shukurov, *Istoriia Kul'turnoi Zhizni Sovetskogo Tadzhikistana (1917–1941 gg.)*, vol. I (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1970), 158.

23 *RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 337, l. 22; RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 1524, l. 86; RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 812, ll. 18, 20, 144ob, 145, 146*; Radzhabov, ed., *Iz Istorii Kul'turnogo Stroitel'stva*, 29–39.

speak Tajik. Some Communist activists believed this discouraged many families from bringing their children to schools and only "harmed the cause of educational affairs" in Tajikistan.24 It also meant that, in the face of dramatic shortage of interpreters of red propaganda, the regime was initially unable to rely on recruiting local workforce. The Soviet authorities often had to resort in- stead to a lengthier process of outsourcing these cadres from the Tajik-speaking areas of Uzbekistan, who then needed time and effort to adjust to their new posts.

On a similar note, in the mid- and late 1920s, red teahouses and other clubs for political enlightenment struggled to deliver messages understandable to ordinary Tajiks. The initial lack of Tajik literature coupled with apparent reluctance of the Uzbek State Publishing Office to supply materials in the Tajik language forced the Tajik government to continue sending Uzbek language publications to red teahouses throughout the Tajik republic, including Gorno- Badakhshan, where the Pamiri languages differed from one area to another and even Tajik was for many as foreign as Russian.25 In May 1925, the Tajik Communist Party Organizational Bureau Unit for Agitation and Propaganda (*Agitpropotdel Orgbiuro*) also requested red teahouses to make use of the Tajik newspaper *Bedorii Tojik* (The Awakening of the Tajik) in their work during market days, and yet at the same time acknowledged that it had not been written in "popular, folk language." The newspapers were sometimes employed as wrapping on those market days, a phenomenon also observed in neighbouring Uzbekistan.26 As of June 1927, *Bedorii Tojik* continued to use "Persian ('*farsidskii*'), little understood by the peasants," leaving the majority of Tajik people beyond the reach of textual propaganda yet encouraging them to gaze at images of the new power. When sent from Dushanbe, educational materials took months to arrive at remotely-located red teahouses; under the above circumstances, this delay was barely important in terms of ineffectiveness of these "tea drinking clubs" in persuading Tajiks not to use narcotics.27

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24 RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 198, ll. 87–89, 94.

25 *RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 812, l. 108ob; RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 680, l. 115; RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 198, l. 102*; Bergne, *The Birth of Tajikistan*, 89; Masov, *Tadzhiki: Istoriia Natsional'noi Tragedii*, 88–9.

26 William Fierman, *Language Planning and National Development: The Uzbek Experience* (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1992), 118.

27 *RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 396, ll. 2–4; RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 1026, ll. 67, 86, 87; RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 680, l. 132, 135*; O. A. Aknazarov et al., ed., *Istoriia Gorno-Badakhshanskoi Avtonomnoi Oblasti*, vol. ii (Dushanbe: Paivand, 2005), 91–2. One also needs to keep in mind that *Bedorii Tojik*'s editors have been changed ten times within twelve months prior to April 1926.

In the face of appalling illiteracy rates among Tajiks and the dearth of appropriate materials in the mid-1920s, Soviet women activists (*zhenrabotnitsy*) had to resort to oral propaganda and sewing workshops to engage local members in political and cultural enlightenment project of the Party. Those few women who regularly attended women's clubs meetings were grouped in *cultural*, *legal*, and *political circles*, where they discussed all sorts of questions, ranging from civil rights, polygyny, bride price, and arranged marriages, to smallpox and women's reproductive health problems, albeit without any reference to the consumption of drugs. Often those circles would cease to exist soon after opening either because the weather was getting too hot or too cold or for some other reason such as the departure of a convenor.28 Nevertheless, according to the plan of the Tajik People's Commissariat of Public Health for 1927–28, Tajik women were supposed to learn from physicians about the harm- fulness of giving poppy-head tea to their babies. Narkomzdrav asked medical workers to pay the most serious attention to this issue along with other "unhealthy" practices such as underage marriage and wearing a veil. This plan, however, proved to be too optimistic. Narkomzdrav had to acknowledge when reporting on its implementation of sanitary enlightenment that it had been limited to sporadic lectures and discussions, "mainly due to the lack of specialpremises."29

In 1928, in its attempts to bring some order to sanitation activities in Tajiki- stan, the Tajik ASSR Council of People's Commissars issued a resolution "On Sanitary Organs," which further reinforced the authority of medical professionals to conduct sanitary enlightenment of the population through fighting against "social diseases," including drug addiction.30 The Bolsheviks where expecting to see initial results by the end of 1928, but the responses they received from the local public health administrations were full of disappointment. Although seven sanitary commissions were newly established in Ura-Tiube region in this time, they failed to perform any work until December. The Dushanbe-based public health inspector reported that only one commission was created in Karatag settlement, while other medical units were then re- quested to follow suit. A sanitary inspector from Pendzhikent wrote that there

28 RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 812, ll. 21–26, 107ob, 108, 147; RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 1026, l. 70; RGASPI,
f. 62, op. 2, d. 680, ll. 129–130.

29 *TsGA rt, f. 172, op. 1, d. 14, ll. 9, 13; TsGA rt, f. 172, op. 1, d 38 t. 2, l. 184*; With Narkompros focusing on the cultural enlightenment, Narkomzdrav responsible for the sanitary enlightenment, and the Party "playing a leading role" and supervising the political enlightenment, the enlightenment of Soviet citizens was at the heart of the Bolshevik's modernization project.

30 TsGA rt, f. 17, op. 1, d. 250, ll. 261–267.

was no data on the activities of sanitary commissions. In Gorno-Badakhshan, local authorities were not even aware of the need to set up such commissions until before they received another letter from Narkomzdrav in November 1928. By January 1929, 28 sanitary commissions seemed to have been established throughout the country, with five aiming to cover the Uzbek-speaking population and one aspiring to address the needs of all Kyrgyz people living in Tajikistan.31

On January 23, 1929, public health officials in Dushanbe received a circular letter issued a month earlier by the Uzbek People's Commissar of Public Health. The letter, while admitting that sanitary enlightenment activities have so far been almost completely lacking in villages in both republics, also called for getting the work on sanitary enlightenment off the ground by reaching out to villagers at red teahouses and other places of mass congregation.32 Several weeks later, another letter reached Dushanbe. Sent for information only, this directive of the Kashka-Daria Regional Public Health Department to its subordinate units was a follow-up to the Uzbek Narkomzdrav's circular and pointed to the shared use of *chilim* as evidence of sanitary and hygienic illiteracy of the population. It was the Kashka-Daria letter that served as a template for Tajik authorities when on February 26, 1929, the Tajik Narkomzdrav issued its own letter "On Strengthening Sanitary Enlightenment Activities in *Kishlaks*." De- spite reproducing many paragraphs from the Kashka-Daria document word- for-word, Tajik health care administrators removed the reference to *chilim*, as well as other specific examples of poor hygiene, and did not include an allusion to red teahouses as sites for sanitary enlightenment activities as proposed by the Uzbek Narkomzdrav. Echoing authorities from Kashka-Daria, the Tajik Narkomzdrav preferred not to spell out mandatory methods and forms for such activities, and encouraged medical workers to feel free "to resolve this issue on" by choosing those types of sanitary enlightenment which suited their local conditions best.33 As one can imagine, this lax control of sanitary activities in *kishlaks* commonly led to the submission of exaggerated figures and false reports, leaving many villagers "unenlightened" on health care issues, including the "perils" of drug use. Heavily relying on non-native European doctors, all three letters on sanitary enlightenment in *kishlaks* failed to acknowledge that it was in the rural areas where people were least exposed to the Russian language and could barely understand it. Once the authorities sent out the letters for further implementation, the feedback from the fields soon reminded

31 TsGA rt, f. 172, op. 1, d. 23, ll. 5, 6, 9, 20, 21.
32 TsGA rt, f. 172, op. 1, d. 23, ll. 17–19.
33 TsGA rt, f. 172, op. 1, d. 23, ll. 27–30.

Communist workers that for overcoming the lethargy of the population with regard to sanitary enlightenment, and for gaining the trust of villagers, not only the availability but also the *moral outlook* (*moral'nyi oblik*) of an interpreter was of paramount importance.34

In this moment where red teahouses had done nothing to address the use of opiates among Tajik people, the Tajik Narkomzdrav had to face another drug that was destined to later become the "true opium of the masses" in Tajikistan: vodka.35 In its letter to the Dushanbe City Council dated January 2, 1929, just after the New Year celebrations, the Sanitary Inspection of Narkomzdrav expressed concerns about the "inculcation" of alcohol consumption habit in the minds of the natives, which took place "as a matter of acculturation." Narkomzdrav also blamed cooperative shops for the spread of alcoholism in the capital; the shops, which carried out the policy of *compulsory assortment*, made every customer who wished to buy vodka pay for and get an extra bottle of wine as well.36 On April 16, 1929, when the Tajik ASSR was still part of Uzbekistan, the Uzbek SSR Council of People's Commissars issued a resolution on measures against alcoholism. By then, Tajik authorities were already preparing to launch their own measures.

These measures, however, were deeply misled by observations made in the capital city of Dushanbe, which pointed toward increasing use of alcohol among the local residents of the capital, and assumed that this observation would apply to the entire country. On April 22, 1929—six days after the

34 TsGA rt, f. 17, op. 1, d. 23, l. 26.

35 I borrow this expression from Kate Transchel, *Under the Influence: Working-Class Drinking, Temperance, and Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1895–1932* (Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), 153.

In February 1928, the Tajik Communist Party formed the Central Commission on Clubs at the Agitation and Propaganda Unit to "establish a contact between Soviet organs and public organizations" and to guide the activities of red teahouses and similar clubs. The Commission was entrusted with ample powers, including the guidance of activities at "*izbakh-chital'niakh*": a village reading hut called *izba*. *Izba-chital'nia* was mentioned as a place for conducting anti-alcohol enlightenment in the resolution adopted at the Second All-Russian Conference on the Questions of Psychiatry and Neurology in November 1923. Yet, the term *izba*, borrowed from the Russian vocabulary and culture, was hardly appropriate for Tajikistan, and was rather a reflection of the limits of understanding of the local culture by non-native European activists who were responsible for leading the cultural enlightenment in the country. Nonetheless, given the situation in the early 1930s, it is obvious that many instructions and directives of the Commission remained unfulfilled. See Shukurov, *Istoriia Kul'turnoi Zhizni Sovetskogo Tadzhikistana (1917–1941 gg.)*, 156–8; L. Prozorov, "Narkotizm i bor'ba s nim," *Izvestiia Narodnogo Komissariata Zdra- vookhraneniia*, no. 2–3 (1924): 21–2.

36 TsGA rt, f. 172, op. 1, d. 27, l. 44.

Uzbek Sovnarkom's resolution and one month before receiving the Uzbek Narkomzdrav's letter "On the Introduction of Anti-Alcohol Propaganda"—the Tajik Narkomzdrav sent out anti-alcohol posters and album-type exhibitions to different corners of the republic "for use in sanitary enlightenment activities," including Cheptura, the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, Ura-Tiube, Pendzhikent, Kuliab, Kurgan-Tiube and Garm. However, these materials were developed based on the heavy drinking culture of Russians and were written in Russian language, as were all the remaining books, journals, models, albums, slogans, posters, slides, and exhibitions. Materials depicting, for instance, "The Court Trial of Ivan Lobachev on Charges of Drunkenness and Hooliganism," could be ordered directly from Moscow or through the Book Kiosk of the State Medical Publishing House in Uzbekistan.37 When presented to the local audience in settings with predominant use of opiates and hashish, this arsenal of propaganda elicited little more than "expressions of regrets" by many Tajiks at not being able to understand what this was all about.38

Finally, red teahouses experienced enormous difficulties in locating and recruiting permanent paid workers since the very first days of their existence. The Bolsheviks, in an attempt to add some "cultural powers" to the activities of red teahouses, pushed in 1926 for militia and *Komsomol* to more widely participate in reaching out to the local population of Tajikistan.39 Facing major drain- age of non-native cadres, along with a nearly complete absence of suitable employees inside Tajikistan, the Party also had to keep increasing the flow of external personnel to the republic to ensure that at least some of its ambitious plans were fulfilled. However, many non-native workers viewed a posting to Tajikistan, remote, insecure and lacking even most basic infrastructure, as an "exile" in the 1920s. Even Tajik speakers of neighbouring Uzbekistan regarded Tajikistan as a "hardship posting." Soviet leaders in Tajikistan repeatedly complained that many of those who wanted to come to Tajikistan were drunkards (*p'ianitsy*), incapable of any work, and whom nobody would wish to have. Others had to come to Tajikistan because their local party comrades wanted to get rid of them, and at least some of them were banished for various misdeeds, one example being "staging a drunken orgy with a couple of nurses in Samarqand." In a desperate attempt to remedy the situation and improve the moral state of the Party, the Bolsheviks placed a "strict filter" by asking everyone coming to work for the regime in Tajikistan whether he or she drinks spirits and makes

37 TsGA rt, f. 172, op. 1, d. 67, ll. 163–165; TsGA rt, f. 172, op. 1, d. 23, ll. 43–49.

38 *TsGA rt, f. 172, op. 1, d. 23, l. 54*; see also A. K. Anvarov, "Propaganda meditsinskikh znanii v Tadzhikistane," *Zdravookhranenie Tadzhikistana* 5 (1977): 46–8.

39 RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 680, l. 135; RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 751, l. 38.

troubles (*skloki*).40 Many workers started consuming alcohol in large quantities after arriving in Tajikistan to cope with numerous pressures, as their worst expectations of the republic were proving true. For workers who came from outside of Tajikistan without any knowledge of local culture and language, conducting their Soviet cultural enlightenment activities must have been an extremely bizarre and uneasy task.41

The Komsomol and militia, recruited mainly from the locals, had even more problems; Tajik militia men raped women and "cultivated prostitution," and their younger Komsomol fellows sold their Komsomol cards and engaged in sex with other males, or what was then referred to as "*bachebazstvo – pederastiia*." In June 1928, the ogpu report on the situation in Tajik Komsomol concluded that such activities were common to the entire organization. *Tojikistoni Surkh* (The Red Tajikistan) newspaper aired similar concerns later that year in describing how Mirkhon Zabirzoda, chief of a red teahouse and secretary of Komsomol in Garm, kept disappearing on a daily basis (*gum shudanash har ruz ast*, "his disappearance is a daily occurrence") and spending all the membership dues paid by other fellows for his personal needs.42

However, in sharp contrast to criminalization and stigmatization of homosexuality in Soviet Central Asia, before the conquest of the region by the Tsarist Russia, there seems to have been little, if any, shame attached to same-sex relationships in the context of *bachabozi*. Pre-Soviet Central Asia was famous for its dancing boys (*bacha*) and their male lovers (*bachaboz*), who together played the *bachabozi* (or *bachabozlik* in Uzbek), literally translated as "boygame" and implying "boylove." The use of local intoxicants was also one of the many facets of male entertainment culture, with opiates and cannabis often present in set- tings where the dancing performances of *bacha* took place.

With the conquest of Central Asia, the Russified *bachebazstvo* came to be constructed as "sodomy," "prostitution," and "pederasty," as "sinful," "depraved," and "disgraceful," and as "backward," associated with the Islamic seclusion of indigenous women. The first generation of modern Central Asian intellectuals,

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40 *RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 1524, ll. 78, 81*; Bergne, *The Birth of Tajikistan*, 58–9; Masov, *Tadzhiki: Istoriia Natsional'noi Tragedii*, 88.

41 RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 680, l. 132.

42 *RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 1524, l. 72; RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, ch. ii, d. 2205, l. 181; RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 827, l. 51; RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 1391, ll. 127–130*; *Tojikistoni Surkh*, December 5, 1928, "Goosh- mol" section; For further discussions of a "highly unsatisfactory" state of affairs in the Tajik militia and related resolution which the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan adopted on August 9, 1931, see *The Party Archive of the Institute for Political Research of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Republic of Tajikistan (paipi TsK kp rt), f. 3, op. l, d. 69, ll. l39–141ob*.

the Jadids, lamented the practice of "playing games with the beardless boys" (*besoqolbozlik*) and criticized the practice not so much because it was forbidden by the Shariat and because the "morals of individuals were at stake," but because it was a sign of "the worst depths of degradation" of society and led to the "dereliction of duty to the community." Yet, *bachabozi* was an acceptable and popular avenue for sexual and erotic relations and encounters between males, stretching far beyond the settled areas of Central Asia to other Muslim countries including Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey. Recent historical studies of pre-Soviet Central Asia also suggest that, along with bringing in legal female prostitution and the sale of alcohol, the Russian rule had made the *bachebazstvo* even more widespread.43

While the demonization of dancing boys had been part of the colonial administration's agenda in pre-revolutionary Central Asia, the Bolsheviks proceeded with both an outright criminalization of male same-sex relations and a sophisticated propaganda campaign against the lovers of dancing boys. As Soviet Central Asian republics adopted their first criminal codes broadly modelled after the 1922 Russian Criminal Code, *bachabozi* was stripped of its cultural meanings and erotic manifestations (not always involving male sexual relations), prohibited, and interpreted exclusively in the context of "sodomy." Contrary to the Soviet European heartland, where the biomedical model of explaining homosexuality was deemed to be more appropriate and the language of "modernity" was used for drafting the penal codes, male same-sex relations in Central Asia came to be viewed as socially constructed and "primitive."44

In the local Soviet press of the 1920s, *bachabozlik* was often exposed together with other sorts of "game playing," such as gambling and womanizing, in the context of "depravity" and symbolizing "ever-lasting backwardness." The press later complemented this portrayal with a "modernized" package of stereotypes, which demonized the "boylover" with the purpose of promoting various

43 Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1998), 145–47; Alisher Latypov, *The Administration of Addiction: The Politics of Medicine and Opiate Use in Soviet Tajikistan, 1924–1958. PhD Dissertation* (London: University College London, 2011), 130–38; for a further discussion of the social and historical contexts of homosexuality in Central Asia, see Alisher Latypov, Tim Rhodes and Lucy Reynolds, "Prohibition, stigma and violence against men who have sex with men: Effects on HIV in Central Asia," *Central Asian Survey* 32, no. 1 (2013): 52–65.

44 Latypov, *The Administration of Addiction*, 132–35; Dan Healey, *Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia: The Regulation of Sexual and Gender Dissent* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), 158–62.

political aims. Drugs were also present in these exposures, embodied in the image of a demon emanating from *chilim*, a water pipe.45

As more non-native doctors were arriving in Tajikistan to become the "pioneers" of biomedicine at the "back of beyond," the Bolsheviks wanted them increasingly involved in the enlightenment of the local population via delivering health care education lectures at red teahouses and elsewhere. Yet, the Bolsheviks also had to face drug use among some doctors who, according to one report from Kalai-Khumb dated March 14, 1929, were forming cannabis smoking companies and submitting themselves to the action of narcotics on a daily basis instead of fulfilling their duties.46

Although the Soviet authorities mobilized an articulated political campaign of conflating the "evils" of opium and *tabibs* (the native medical practitioners), and constructing narkomania as a disease that resulted from the indiscriminate administration of opiates by indigenous traditional practitioners of *tibb* (who allegedly "treated all diseases with opium"), they were reluctant to ac- knowledge the nexus between biomedicine and opiate use. While few available records from Tajikistan point to a moderate prescription of opiates by *tabibs*, and in cases such as Porshnev settlement-based Sho-Zoda Muhammad *tabib's* and Askalon settlement-based Eshoni Maleh *tabib's* very minor pre- scription, biomedicine, however, was somewhat implicated in both sustaining drug addiction and transforming local intoxicant practices in early Soviet Central Asian territories.47

In Tajikistan, the first psychiatric hospital was operational in 1941, and the first specialized alcohol and drug treatment unit (*kabinet*) was opened in the late 1950s.48 To amend this situation, the Soviet authorities allocated Tajiki- stan's residents as few as two to three bed-places in the Tashkent-based psychiatric and drug treatment institutions. When the first description of 162 opium addicts attending an outpatient neuro-psychiatric dispensary in Tashkent be- tween July 1927 and January 1929 was published in *Vrachebnaia Gazeta* in 1930, ten of them were classified as biomedical workers. A much larger group of

45 Ingeborg Baldauf, "Bačabozlik: Boylove, Folksong and Literature in Central Asia," *Paidika* 2, no. 2 (1990): 12–31; Ingeborg Baldauf, "Die Knabenliebe in Mittelasien: Bačabozlik," *Ethnizität und Gesellschaft Occasional Papers*, no. 17 (1988): 113.

46 TsGA rt, f. 172, op. 1, d. 27, l. 84.

47 For an overview of indigenous medical practices and the construction of narkomania in Soviet Central Asia, see Alisher Latypov, "Soviet psychiatry and drug addiction in Central Asia: The construction of 'narcomania'," in *Psychiatry in Communist Europe*, eds. Mat Savelli and Sarah Marks (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 73–92, and Latypov, *The Administration of Addiction*, 150–74.

48 Alisher Latypov, "Healers and psychiatrists: The transformation of mental health care in Tajikistan," *Transcultural Psychiatry* 47, no. 3 (2010): 419–51.

thirty-four patients reported that their *narkotization* was a result of having undergone a surgical operation, or that it occurred "after an illness" or after using opiates "as a method of treatment as advised by acquaintances." The author of this study criticized biomedical doctors, not *tabibs*, for their inconsiderate prescription of morphine. One year later, Kondratchenko and Ioffe published another report of 134 opium addicts receiving inpatient drug treatment in Tashkent between May 18, 1929 and January 1, 1931. In this sample, as many as 15 of the 93 "Europeans" were described as biomedical workers.49

While early Soviet drug use was commonly portrayed as part of Central Asian custom and daily life (*bytovoe potreblenie narkotikov*), thus reinforcing the notion of an utterly 'traditional' drug use in Central Asia, a great deal of early Soviet medical literature on drug addiction in Central Asia was instead informed by the profiles of Russian and other non-native patients. The opiate users occasionally referred from Tajikistan to the Uzbek SSR happened to be non-native Europeans. Many were insured, which became a very important factor in the late 1920s in terms of receiving a priority access to any kind of medical care.50 When the Institute of Physical Methods of Treatment (or Republican Physiotherapeutic Institute) was established in the northern part of the Tajik SSR in the early 1930s, a small number of Russian morphine users who lived in the country at that time were referred to this facility as well.51 Yet none of the early Soviet Central Asian physicians seemed to be willing to accept drug addiction as a European malady. Instead, they claimed that "the idea of treatment of *narkotism*" was just "not popular enough" among the locals, who could supposedly become addicted because of their "lack of culture" (*nekul'turnost'*). Meanwhile, a minority group of Russian addicts who injected opiates were referred to as "psychopaths," and because their addiction was perceived as "incurable," they were able to receive morphine prescriptions from Soviet doctors at least until the mid-1930s.

The differences between Central Asian patients and non-patients were reflected not only in their ethnicities and greater access or trust with Soviet

49 A. N. Kondratchenko, "Obsledovanie gruppy opiomanov," *Vrachebnaia Gazeta*, no. 17–18, September 15–30 (1930): 1339–46; A. N. Kondratchenko and Kh. Ioffe, "Opyt 1 ½–godich- noi raboty narkostatsionara Tashkentskogo nevro-psikhiatricheskogo dispansera," *Zhurnal Nevropatologii i Psikhiatrii*, no. 6 (1931): 83–9; Latypov, "Soviet psychiatry and drug ad- diction in Central Asia," 83.

50 See, for example, *TsGA rt, f. 172, op. 1, d. 25, ll. 7, 8; TsGA rt, f. 20, op. 3, d. 20, l. 93; TsGA rt, f.279, op. 7, d. 271; TsGA rt, f. 279, op. 7, d. 272; TsGA rt, f. 172, op. 1, d. 44*.

51 The types of therapies provided at this Institute included 'light therapy' (*lechenie svetom*), 'warmth therapy' (*lechenie teplom*), electric therapies, hydrotherapies, therapeutic mud- baths, massage and procaine block, while some diseases were also treated with "weakly radioactive waste of the local polymetallic industry."

doctors, but also in patterns of opiate use. Importantly, many local and non- native people, who later became patients in specialized psychiatric establishments, initiated their use of opium through smoking. However, as one could more likely present severe manifestations of addiction and end up as a patient in a drug treatment entity by using a certain opiate in a certain way or combi- nation and for a certain period of time, so were the preferences of European drug users divergent from those of the locals.

The use of *kuknor* (a liquor made by soaking the dried and bruised capsules of the poppy in water) as a "traditional" native intoxicant, for example, has been widely reported in pre-Soviet and Soviet Central Asia. Yet one could not find a single local *kuknarist* among addicted patients in the early Soviet medical texts, which also stressed that "only a declassed and decayed European opium addict, who is in a state of *khumar* [*khumor*, a local term for withdrawals commonly used throughout Central Asia], would consent to [consume] *kuknar*." Similarly, raw opium, *ter'iak* (also known as *tar'iok* and *tariak*), which the locals often used by dissolving it in tea, was avoided by non-native Europeans because it had an "unattractive flavour."

Non-native Europeans' tastes for varieties of purified local opiates with high morphine content (*chakida*, *shira and sukhta* [also known as *chugar*]), and hypodermic and intravenous consumption of opiates in Central Asia in the 1920s and 1930s, were both important predictors of receiving a diagnosis of *opiomania* and becoming a patient of the Soviet doctor. With cannabis, cocaine, heroin, morphine, dionine and codeine all available in early Soviet Central Asia, psychiatrists also decried the concurrent use of multiple substances among Russian patients and noted a nearly complete absence of this pattern of consumption among the locals.52

Furthermore, the differences between internal, lower-level centers and peripheries within the Central Asian region and individual republics also proved to be as striking and illuminating in terms of consumption patterns and the diversity of responses. In the early decades of the Soviet rule, Tashkent and Ashkhabad were the main specialized psychiatric and drug addiction treatment centers in Central Asia, while remaining areas often lacked any material or human resources to address the issue. Some of the peripheries, like the Gorno-Badakhshan region of Tajikistan, were considerably more disadvantaged due to their remote location, geographical isolation, and proximity to the

52 For an extensive account of the establishment of Soviet narcology and the transformation of opiate use in early Soviet Central Asia, see Alisher Latypov, "The Soviet doctor and the treatment of drug addiction: 'A difficult and most ungracious task'," *Harm Reduction Journal* 8 (2011): 32. doi:10.1186/1477-7517-8-32.

Figure 3 Tajik Pamiri Woman Smoking Opium, 1927 *(Krysha Mira. Ekspeditsiia na Pamir*. Directed by Vladimir Erofeev [Sovkino, 1929]).

major sources of opium production.53 Soviet authorities had to adopt an ar- ray of punitive and restrictive "administrative" measures against drug users in Gorno-Badakhshan, which had an extremely high prevalence of opium smok- ing among the local population in the 1920s and 1930s and not a single drug treatment facility in place. Eventually, when the Great Terror reached the Tajik SSR in 1937, the authorities repressed some of those who were unable to quit.54 It is in this broader context that we must look at the fiasco of red teahouses as champions of drug prevention and enlightenment, and at the regime's succinct account of the state of affairs in Tajikistan in 1930, when the Soviet leaders acknowledged that

> until this time, red teahouses [there were 106 red teahouses in Tajikistan in the fiscal year of 1929/3055] have not been the hubs for enlightening political education of the masses. They were just places for tea drinking.

53 Latypov, "Soviet psychiatry and drug addiction in Central Asia," 75.

54 For an overview of drug consumption in the Pamirs in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the evolution of the early Soviet responses to opium smoking in Soviet Badakhshan, see Alisher Latypov, "The opium war at the 'roof of the world': The elimination of addiction in Soviet Badakhshan," *Central Asian Survey* 32, no. 1 (2013): 19–36.

55 *TsGA Tadzhikskoi SSR, f. 488, op. 1, d. 10, l. 7*, in Radzhabov, ed., *Iz Istorii Kul'turnogo Stroitel'stva*, 416.

> Nearly all teahouses have neither newspapers nor books. Propaganda and agitation activities are lacking. The chiefs of red teahouses, in most of the cases, are themselves illiterate.56

This report did not mention, however, that in the late 1920s, instead of radiating health, culture and knowledge, red teahouses also served as what the regime viewed as "crime scenes." Based on available court records, they were a convenient place for Tajiks to not only discuss the latest news over a bowl of tea or, on some occasions, alcohol, but also to strike their common "business deals," though the new Soviet law made some of them illegal.57

3 Staging a Victory

Yet, the story of red teahouses as the cornerstone of drug prevention certainly did not end after "the very first years of the Soviet rule in Tajikistan." A wider recognition of the failure of red teahouses to radiate culture and to enlighten Tajiks came in the mid-1930s, when the Tajik People's Commissariat for Enlightenment reviewed the activities of red teahouses and submitted its report to the Tajik SSR Council of People's Commissars. The Commissariat's report was highly critical and suggested that despite a widespread network of red teahouses, most of them were anything but cultural hubs in a village. Admitting that Narkomats, local authorities, and other institutions had not been doing any work on "turning teahouses into true sources of culture," on March 22, 1936, the Tajik SSR Sovnarkom issued a resolution No. 394 "On the State of Activities of Red Teahouses."

The resolution, which consisted of 12 activity areas to be focused on in the future, revealed that the key components distinguishing an "ordinary" teahouse from a red teahouse, such as propaganda materials to be accessed by both men and women, staff involved in delivering this propaganda and not in selling goods at higher prices, literacy courses, and health care advice, were all either missing or unsuitable. To remedy this profoundly disturbing environment, Sovnarkom obliged all Narkomats which sponsored red teahouses to conduct a universal screening of the workers of red teahouses and to replace the unqualified ones. In anticipation of high numbers of the latter, the People's Commissariat for Enlightenment was requested to "expeditiously train" 180 cultural workers over the next two months. Red teahouses were now required to provide

56 RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, ch. ii, d. 2205, l. 201.
57 TsGA rt, f. 493, op. 3, d. 49; TsGA rt, f. 493, op. 3, d. 51.

a mandatory *cultural minimum* (*kul'tminimum*) to their unsuspicious visitors, which included a small library with a reading room (*biblioteka-chital'nia*), chess and checkers circles, corners of hard workers (*Stakhanovtsy)* stuffed with appropriate literature, and "so on." In a desperate move to ensure that women accessed and made use of these premises, Sovnarkom ordered every red teahouse to establish the *ugolok kolkhoznitsy* (a corner for female kolkhoz workers) and involve female teachers and female doctors in the "deployment of mass cultural activities." To foster a speedy change, Sovnarkom announced a socialist competition for the best red teahouse in the country.58 However, a myriad of problems awaiting participants of that competition at every possible red corner could leave no one in doubt that ensuring a minimum of what the Soviet leadership defined as culture would be easier said than done.

Tajikistan had 529 red teahouses all over the country by summer 1936, according to one estimate. However, many of them were relatively small and constructed in a traditional way to suit the tastes of Central Asians.59 Teahouses usually consisted of a single hall (apart from facilities for cooking meals and preparing tea) where people sat on the floor covered with carpets, or where wooden platforms served the function of tables for customers seated on the floor, and occasionally featured hand-carved columns and ceilings. The teahouses were initially established as socio-gastronomic institutions for the native males, rather than political and educational facilities as the regime had wanted them to be. As the Tajik government required to establish all sorts of designated red corners and circles in a red teahouse focusing on the needs of various groups, the existing architecture and furnishing of teahouses caused the whole plan of converting teahouses into "true sources of culture" to be almost unfeasible. Changing the architecture of an old teahouse, which according to one contemporary correspondent of *Kommunist Tadzhikistana* newspaper, "has already done its time, was uncomfortable, crowded and un- hygienic," and installing tables, chairs, musical instruments and other similar attributes of a canteen-type club also had a hidden political agenda of serving

58 *TsGA rt, f. 18, op. 8, d. 257, ll. 50–53*; "O Rabote krasnykh chaikhan," *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, March 29, 1936, V snk Tadzh SSR section.

59 Khavkin, "Krasnaia chaikhana – tsentr vsei kul't-massovoi raboty v kishlake," *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, June 4, 1936. As of October 1, 1939, the total number of all sorts of vari- eties of cultural clubs in Tajikistan including red teahouses was downgraded to 432 (of which 216 were *kolkhoznye* red teahouses) due to "significantly increased requirements" for determining the eligibility of red teahouses as "political enlightenment entities." See Tsentral'noe Upravlenie Narodnokhoziaistvennogo Ucheta Gosplana Soiuza SSR, *Kul'turnoe Stroitel'stvo sSSR. Statisticheskii Sbornik* (Moscow and Leningrad: Gosplaniz- dat, 1940), 259.

the minority needs of non-native Europeans and could not be accomplished as smoothly as the Party activists had hoped.60

Even more unrealistic at that time was the expectation of the Tajik Council of People's Commissars for women to enter a teahouse full of men and run their own activities at their designated corner (*ugolok*). In fact, party activists of Kanibadam district had realized that such expectations were naive nearly two months prior to Sovnarkom's resolution, when they decided that the only way to get women into a teahouse would be by declaring a "women's day" on a weekly basis. *New in New*, an article describing what the women's day innovation meant and how this could be implemented in practice, appeared in the *Kommunist Tadzhkistana* on February 17, 1936. Celebrating the victory of "the spring of a new relationship" over "the dark and wily past," the author of *New in New* pointed out that in order to have women offer tea to each other outside of their homes "for the first time in their lives," not only would a couple of dozens of men have to be expelled from a teahouse, but also an experienced, male teahouse attendant (*chaikhanschik*), Iusuf-aka, had to be "successfully" re- placed with his female counterpart, Oi-Lola. Yet the article claimed that it took only a short while for women to feel comfortable without their veils, which they had to take off at the doorstep upon the "kind, but insistent request" of a certain Iakubova, and to start treating male artists as doctors, in front of whom women supposedly have already been used to uncovering their bodies.61 By the twentieth anniversary of the October revolt, the regime's struggle with local Muslim culture and customary practices in Tajikistan was still at its early stages; as the Communists sought some compromise over women's access to red teahouses, they had to admit that even in places where a women's day at *choikhonai surkh* could be sustained, the degree of exposure of women to enlightening propaganda would be considerably less than that of men.

Although significant, women's participation and teahouses' architecture were not the only barriers which the Soviet authorities had to overcome in Tajikistan. In 1936, only one person out of the entire pool of red teahouse workers had some training in political enlightenment. Ninety percent of these workers were still illiterate. Two districts shut down their libraries and converted them into residential buildings for drivers, while 25 districts of Tajikistan had no libraries at all. The shortage of health and sanitary enlightenment literature translated into local languages was still of major concern. Despite the growing circulation of 52 newspapers published in Tajikistan by that time,

60 "Arkhitektura krasnoi chaikhany," *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, February 11, 1936.

61 K. Dziubailo, "Novoe v novom: Zhenskii den' v kolkhoznoi chaikhane," *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, February 17, 1936.

some teahouses had only a few old copies collecting dust in their red corners, to say nothing of journals and posters. Some even lacked the essential mandatory attributes of red propaganda: portraits of Lenin and Stalin.62 It was due to the teahouses' commercial nature that the presence and scope of red culture and enlightenment materials did not matter for the majority of sponsoring agencies. As of summer of 1936, over one-third of the 529 red teahouses known to the Tajik authorities were established in towns and settlements, where they could serve more clients and gain more money. Khavkin, the Head of the Cultural Enlightenment Unit of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, decried in one section of his article entitled *Against the Underestimation of Red Teahouses*, that half of urban red teahouses were sponsored by the administrations of *kolkhozes*, which cared more about "additional income lines" of their budgets when setting up *choikhonas* in towns, leaving their own rural kolkhoz workers with no red teahouses to enjoy. Party was particularly troubled by a "significant number" of other sponsoring organizations (such as the Industrial and Handicraft Union, Savings Bank, the Municipal Administration of Public Utilities, the Agency for Supply and Distribution and the Council of Trade Unions) which, as Khavkin thought, had nothing to do with culture of the masses and had been exclusively profit-driven when establishing their red teahouse businesses. For Khavkin, all teahouses, except some located in the northern part of the country, were a sad spectacle:

> filth, spider webs hanging down all the way from the ceiling to the floor, rags draped over surfaces in the absence of slogans, no library and, of course, no activities. In a number of places, a red teahouse has been turned into a night shelter, where people fight with each other, drink alcohol and smoke *anasha* [cannabis].63

62 Khavkin, "Krasnaia chaikhana – tsentr vsei kul't-massovoi raboty v kishlake," *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, June 5, 1936, continued from *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, June 4, 1936; "O razvertyvanii kul'turno-prosvetitel'noi raboty v krasnykh chaikhanakh," *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, June 5, 1936, V TsK kp(b) Tadzhikistana section; Bagrov, "Krasnaia chaikhana prevraschena v nochlezhku," *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, March 29, 1936; Rakhim Khamidi, "Kolkhozniki trebuiut organizatsii krasnoi chaikhany," *Kommunist Tadzhikista- na*, May 21, 1936; Rakhim Khamidi, "V chaikhane net kul'turnoi raboty," *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, June 9, 1936; T. Fazimi and R. Khamidi, "Net kul'turnoi chaikhany," *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, June 29, 1936; *TsGA rt, f. 279, op. 2, d. 112, l. 75*.

63 Khavkin, "Krasnaia chaikhana – tsentr vsei kul't–massovoi raboty v kishlake." In 1937, as the Great Terror swept across Tajikistan, Khavkin was arrested and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. See Mustafakul Nurmukhamedov, "Tak bylo…iz vospominanii," *Pamir* 11 (1988): 126.

To put this in other words, the only difference between pre-revolutionary "opium dens" and many red teahouses functioning in Tajikistan by mid-1936 was only the addition of an adjective to the title, and not even the change of decorations. The gradual growth of those kinds of red dens in the late 1920s and early 1930s might have actually encouraged the use of alcohol, opiates and cannabis among the male population of Tajikistan of that time.

This belated recognition of the graveness of the situation, rather than mixed responses to the resolution of the Tajik Council of People's Commissars (including an unfortunate decision of Leninabad City Council to organize a for-profit teahouse trust [*chaikhannyi trest*]) urged the Party leaders to take far more radical measures two months after the Sovnarkom resolution.

The resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan titled "On the Deployment of Cultural Enlightenment Activities in Red Teahouses," published in *Kommunist Tadzhikistana* on June 5, 1936, was essentially a re-making of the red teahouse enterprise in Soviet Tajikistan. Party leadership in Tajikistan adopted the new approach of treating some of the unsuitable staff members of red teahouses as 'class enemies' who allegedly "wanted to utilize a red teahouse as a means of struggle against us," and ordered city and district party committees to cleanse these profit-driven '*kulatsko-torgash-eskie* elements' within one month. Calling off the impotent plan for setting up special corners for female kolkhoz workers, the Party insisted on the replication of Kanibadam's women's day drastic experience in every single teahouse of the Tajik republic. Finally, the Party further broadened and refigured the notion of cultural minimum at each red teahouse to include at least 250–300 books which were to be read by kolkhoz workers both at the teahouse and at home, a set of fresh republican and local press to be read out loud on daily basis (as many people's literacy levels were still poor), and a gramophone with some 15–20 records. Additionally, red teahouses were required to have an information desk, to arrange talks on political and cultural enlightenment topics, to run sanitation, hygiene, drama, music, and other circles, to issue their own biweekly wall newspapers, to show movies and put on amateur theatrical performances on a weekly basis, and to install radio receivers or radio points wherever possible.64

Fighting, drinking vodka, and committing crimes at cultural clubs and teahouses were the most flagrant blows to the Soviet enlightenment discourse, which continued to leak to the Tajik public press throughout the 1950s. See an article written by the Tajik SSR Prosecutor General: Kh. Khuseinov, "Ot riumki – k prestupleniiu," *Komsomolets Tadzhiki-stana*, April 13, 1958.

64 *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, June 5, 1936. The Party's resolution was adopted earlier in May and was then '*oformleno v sovetskom poriadke*' through the resolution of the Tajik Council

Figure 4 Model Red Teahouse – The House of Kolkhoz Culture *(*Kommunist Tadzhikistana, *June 6, 1936)*.

On the next day, Shadunts, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, publicly addressed the architectural aspect, which was allegedly necessitated by the "growth in the wealth and culture of kolkhoz workers." In his *Kommunist Tadzhikistana* article, the country's Party Leader presented an envisioned model red teahouse that was then elevated to the status of the "house of kolkhoz culture" and had both summer and wintertime levels, a pool with a fountain, a stage and "all the premises for cultural enlightenment activities."65

If we are to believe these resolutions and statements, the long-promised Soviet culture and enlightenment was supposedly about to materialize in Tajikistan's red teahouses by 1936, and although Tajik newspapers continued to publish occasional stories on "non-cultural" teahouses for the rest of 1936, with time, the Soviet authorities were able to equip some of them with posters, portraits of leaders, gramophones, chessboards and newspapers.

However, the fundamental problems facing Tajikistan on the "cultural front" in the 1930s remained mostly unresolved. Without committed and adequately trained staff, increased supply of propaganda materials and equipment had

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of People's Commissars issued under the same title on May 28, 1936, ref. no. 808. See *TsGA rt, f. 18, op. 8, d. 241, ll. 34–38*.

In 1935, it was only the "privileged" ones, ten "show red teahouses," which might have had gramophones and radio receivers installed thanks to the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan "On Organizing Show Red Teahouses." See *pa tf iml pri TsK kpss, f. 3, op. 6, d. 203, l. 41*, in Radzhabov, ed., *Iz Istorii Kul'turnogo Stroitel'stva*, 433–4.

65 "Dom kolkhoznoi kul'tury," *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, June 6, 1936.

almost no impact, and even some "cosy" clubs with piano and radio were some- times despised by workers who suffered from boredom.66 The regime could afford only two model red teahouses for the whole country and, with most improvements first taking place in the capital city, rural residents had to be content with ordinary *choikhonas* and were usually left behind by the "genuine" "cultural revolution" in Tajikistan.67 The overriding issue of accommodating women, which in this particular case the Communists hoped to address by forcing men out of teahouses, continued to trouble the regime and was hardly ever removed from the agenda. Revealing the painful limits of what both the Party and Sovnarkom's resolutions could achieve in practice, a new directive of the Tajik Council of People's Commissars issued on March 31, 1937 – a year after initial resolutions had been adopted in Tajikistan – bemoaned that despite allprior efforts,

> "narkomats, administrative organs, city councils and district executive committees, until now, have not been paying enough attention to the activities of red teahouses. While in the northern districts…the number of red teahouses in kolkhozes has considerably increased as did the quality of work there, the number of red teahouses in central and southern districts is still extremely insignificant…In some districts the number of operational red teahouses even decreased in 1937.68 …The majority of red teahouses, especially those sponsored by administrative organizations, are still pursuing commercial goals alone and conduct almost no mass cultural activities at all. Teahouses of Dushanbe *gorkomkhoz* [municipal communal administration] serve only tea; a teahouse of the *artel'* of dis- abled people at Dushanbe station has been converted into a night shelter; in a teahouse of *bazarkom* in Kurgan-Tiube, playing cards and

66 Semenov, "Pochemu v klube skuchno?" *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, July 14, 1936.

67 As Sheila Fitzpatrick formulated, at the xviii Communist Party Congress held in 1939, Stalin described the previous five years as "'genuinely a period of cultural revolution' characterized by establishment of universal compulsory elementary education among all nationalities of the USSR, expansion of secondary and tertiary education, and the creation of a new Soviet intelligentsia" and thus gave the term of 'cultural revolution' a new meaning different from the "proletarian cultural revolution of 1928–32." See Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Cultural revolution in Russia 1928–32," *Journal of Contemporary History* 9, no. 1 (1974):33–52.

68 Here the reference is made to Ura-Tiube district. In 1936, the heads of Ura-Tiube city organizations came up with "an idea of genius" to establish a for-profit teahouse trust, which was subsequently banned by the Tajik SSR Central Executive Committee. As a result of this ban, the red teahouse business in Ura-Tiube shrank from 77 teahouses in 1936 to 44 in 1937. See *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, June 4, 1936.

> performing religious rites have been admitted. In a number of teahouses there is only one technical staff member, the one serving customers with tea; only 20–25% of red teahouses have specially designated chiefs…Of those 180 people trained through the courses for [future] chiefs of red teahouses, only 20–25 are [now] working in teahouses."69

The drive for the transformation of "ordinary opium dens" into "true sources of Soviet culture and enlightenment" concluded with a photographic survey of red teahouses, commissioned in Tajikistan in the late 1930s, to celebrate what can now be termed a staged victory over the "backward vestiges of the tsarist and emirate past." Many photographs were taken in a more advanced northern part of the country and occasionally featured a male crowd seated in a room with political propaganda materials, chessboards and gramophones complementing brand new, unused tea kettles and bowls. These images often reflected the problems that the regime had failed to fully overcome in Soviet Tajikistan through its cultural construction and enlightenment project.

Figure 5 In a Kolkhoz Teahouse, Leninabad District (The Central State Archive of Cinematic, Photographic, and Audio Documents of the Republic of Tajikistan (TsGA kffd rt), Card No. 018446).

69 The resolution of the Tajik SSR Council of People's Commissars "On the Work of Red Teahouses," as of March 31, 1937. *TsGA Tadzhikskoi SSR, f. 360, op. 3, d. 3, ll. 1–2*, in Radzhabov, ed., *Iz Istorii Kul'turnogo Stroitel'stva*, 448–51.

4 Conclusion

By the end of the 1930s, the state declared its triumph over social illnesses, and the subject of Soviet citizens' narcotics use disappeared from the public discourse. With Soviet physicians claiming a nearly complete "liquidation" of narkomania in the USSR, political enlightenment instructors were no longer expected to mention drug abuse in their health propaganda speeches, except than as "one of the many vices of decaying capitalism." In the absence of meaningful drug treatment and psychiatric care in Soviet Tajikistan between the 1920s and early 1940s, the struggle against narkomania was conducted instead on the administrative front, and ended with the repression of opium users in the late 1930s.

The initiation of narcotic drug use among young people decreased considerably due to the limited availability of opiates, while the tastes of locals and their consumption of other intoxicants also changed dramatically due to the increased availability of alcohol. Red teahouses did not even have to start fighting narkomania among the Tajiks, since the only message that they could deliver by the time they were urged to ensure cultural minimums in the late 1930s was that "drug addiction did not exist in the Soviet Union." With increasing numbers of health and education institutions in Tajikistan, the state's reliance on red teahouses gradually diminished and they continued to function as commercial, socio-gastronomic entities for the rest of the Soviet era.

Red teahouses were not the only tool which the state was willing to engage in the 1930s for raising the local population's awareness of narkomania as a social evil. In the draft of the second five-year plan, public health officials in Tajikistan envisaged organization of the Institute for Improvement of Occupational and Lifestyle Health (*Institut Ozdorovleniia Truda i Byta*), which would be responsible for scientific and practical coordination of the struggle against social diseases, including venereal diseases, tuberculosis, drug addiction, and alcoholism. As is the case with many other undertakings proposed for the years 1933–1937, this institute was to never materialize.70

Yet, following the decree No. 1301 of the USSR People's Commissariat of Public Health, an agency with similar functions entitled the Republican House of Sanitary Enlightenment was finally established in Dushanbe (then Stalinabad) sometime between 1938 and 1940.71 With the task of elimination of drug

70 TsGA rt, f. 279, op. 2, d. 112, l. 69.

71 TsGA rt, f. 279, op. 7, d. 740, ll. 1–5; TsGA rt, f. 1567, op. 1, l. 2.

addiction formally completed by then, in the 1940s and 1950s, public health and hygiene education in Tajikistan was mainly focused on tuberculosis, brucellosis, malaria, venereal diseases, typhoid, diarrhoea, influenza, measles, mother and child health, physical education, personal hygiene, workplace safety, etc., whereas the subject of alcohol abuse was almost completely absent from lectures, posters, leaflets, radio programs and films.72

Although the coverage and technical capacity of public health propaganda increased considerably in the post-war years, many old problems set back the efforts of the new sanitary enlightenment organization and its units.73 According to numerous internal reports and resolutions, despite the significance attached to health education by the state, the numbers of lectures and visual materials delivered in local languages were always smaller than those available in the Russian language. Lecturers and administrators often tended to substantially inflate the coverage rates. For instance, reports submitted by local staff in Kurgan-Tiube suggested that medical documentary films had been seen on average by up to three thousand people per show. However, cinema houses of that town could barely accommodate several hundred people in 1958 unless organized in an open air. On other occasions, medical workers used the blank sides of health literature as a writing paper instead of disseminating it to the public and made no use of slides and other equipment even if such resources were available. With vacancies at regional houses for sanitary enlightenment activities often unfilled for long periods of time, and with physicians and nurses generally treating sanitary enlightenment activities as a burden that they had to bear in addition to fulfilling their main duties, the exposure of rural residents to health propaganda was considerably lower. Even when reaching Tajiks, given a limited accessibility of biomedical facilities outside of the capital

72 Tajik sanitary enlightenment activists eventually had to start open discussions of narcotic drugs only during *perestroika*, when widespread drug use among Soviet citizens was no longer denied by the state. In those rare publications they employed the same categories as were used with regard to alcohol abuse in Tajikistan in the 1950s and referred to narkomania as nothing less than an "ugly phenomenon" in our society. See Dom Sani- tarnogo Prosvescheniia Tadzhikskoi SSR, "O vrede alkogolia," *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, August 25, 1954; A. Anvarov and V. Tkhostova, "Nekotorye sotsial'no-gigienicheskie aspekty alkogolizma, narkomanii i toksikomanii," *Zdravookhranenie Tadzhikistana* 4 (1987):68–75.

73 According to the 1948–1951 activity report of the Tajik Ministry of Health submitted to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, it was only after 1948 that the scale of sanitary enlightenment activities increased in Tajikistan. See *paipi TsK kp rt, f. 3, op. 88, d. 25, l. 13*.

city, the impact of sanitary enlightenment was severely curtailed and couldlead only to modest changes in personal hygiene practices.74

74 *TsGA rt, f. 1567, op. 1, d. 32, ll. 12–34, 40–62, 97–128; TsGA rt, f. 1567, op. 1, d. 8, ll. 31–32ob, 51, 67–68, 84–87, 166; TsGA rt, f. 1567, op. 1, d. 124, ll. 33–39; TsGA rt, f. 1567, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 2, 29, 76; TsGA rt, f. 1567, op. 1, d. 7, ll. 1–7, 10–16, 20–22; TsGA rt, f. 1567, op. 1, d. 37, ll. 13–22; TsGA rt, f. 1567, op. 1, d. 6, ll. 2–4, 47–53, 56–64*; for an overview of the same problems in Kazakhstan see Michaels, *Curative Powers*, 64–8. For a Soviet account of the history of sanitary enlightenment in Tajikistan see S. I. Iskhakov, "K istorii sanitarnogo prosvescheniia v Tadzhikskoi SSR," *Zdravookhranenie Tadzhikistana* 5 (1964): 52–54.