PROSPECTS OF MANKIND

January 15th, 1951

[No ERP ID] Rethinking our Allies, Season 2, Episode 14

NBC Television Network

Description: ER and her guests discuss the legitimacy of NATO and the use of nuclear weapons in the global sphere. Her guests include Albert Gruenther, Richard Crossman, Hans Morgenthau, and Saville Davis

Participants: ER, Albert Gruenther, Richard Crossman, Hans Morgenthau, and Saville Davis

[Theme music begins 0:06]

[Title Sequence:] [overlaid on show logo:] National Educational Television/ Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt

Prospects of Mankind.

[David Mackey:] [Voice Over] Recorded on the campus of Brandeis University in Waltham, Massachusetts, National Educational Television presents the WGBH-TV production, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Prospects of Mankind.

[Motion picture images related to Mackey’s commentary]

[David Mackey:] [Voice Over] As a new administration begins, American foreign policy is up for critical reexamination. President Kennedy’s Secretary of State says, [theme music ends 0:40]

[Dean Rusk:] [Pre-recorded motion picture footage] This great country of ours is not like the cork that is tossed on the waves over which we have no control. Our enormous capacity to act imposes upon us a responsibility to make history and to take a large part in the shaping of events.

[David Mackey:] [Voice Over] A system of worldwide alliances was built up after World War II to meet conditions which have since undergone radical changes. After the formation of the two major families of alliances, NATO and SEATO, the United States lost its atomic monopoly. America’s umbrella of protection has given way to an uneasy teetering of the nuclear stalemate. Another important change in the world picture has been the shift in the nature of Soviet foreign policy since 1949. Stalin’s militancy which unified Western Europe has been superseded by Khrushchev’s more subtle appeal to the non-communist world as the bearer of peace and as a leader backed by great economic and technological power. Thus, some nations question the advantage of allying with America when this country’s acts seem provocative and its position insecure and indecisive. Japan, with whom we have a defense treaty, appears to be moving towards neutralism. On the other hand, the neutral nations of Asia criticize us for our support of anti-democratic regimes within SEATO. Again in the Middle East, we have been frustrated in our efforts to stop Russia’s non-military aggression. At our doorstep in Cuba, the Soviet offensive precipitated the rupture of our relations with that nation.

What are the alliances at the heart of American defense policy? NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is made up of fifteen nations stretching from Canada to Turkey [Motion picture footage features a map of NATO countries.]. SEATO, the South East Asia Treaty Organization, is made up of eight nations, [countries are listed on screen: SEATO/ Australia/ New Zealand/ Pakistan/ Philippines/
Thailand]. These five Southeast Asian countries are joined by three major allied powers [countries are listed on screen: SEATO/ France/ United Kingdom/ United States] to afford joint security. Three small countries, are listed on the screen: SEATO/ Laos/ Cambodia/ South “Viet Nam”]. Laos, Cambodia, and South Viet Nam are not full members of SEATO, but are under its protection. The eruption of hostilities in Laos is the most serious recent example of the fast moving events that make it necessary to update these alliances to meet new challenges. In the military field, NATO Supreme Commander Lauris Norstad has proposed the creation of a nuclear armed strategic force, directly under NATO. Should this, and other policies of the Eisenhower administration, be continued by President Kennedy? Or, will the assignment of a nuclear striking power to our allies be deemed excessively and dangerously provocative? (3:50)

[Camera pans to ER talking with guests. Camera zooms in on each individual as they are announced.]

[Bob Jones:] [Voice Over] Today Mrs. Roosevelt and her special guests discuss the timely subject of rethinking our alliances. Joining Mrs. Roosevelt are General Alfred Gruenther, who was the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe from 1953 to 1956 and Deputy to President Eisenhower during the eighteen months he was the Supreme Commander. He was director of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1947 to 1949. General Gruenther is now President of the American Red Cross in Washington, D.C. Richard Crossman, member of parliament, is this year’s chairman of the British Labour Party. During World War II, he was in charge of psychological warfare under Eisenhower in North Africa and Europe. He is a well-known journalist and author. Hans Morgenthau is a professor of political science at the University of Chicago. He is author of Politics Among Nations, and his most recent book is The Purpose of American Politics. He is a naturalized American citizen who came here from Germany in 1937. Saville Davis, who will assist Mrs. Roosevelt in questioning her guests, is a former foreign correspondent and now the managing editor of the Christian Science Monitor. Now, here is Mrs. Roosevelt. (5:02)

[Audience applause]

[ER:] Of the many changes that have come about since NATO came into existence ten years ago, perhaps the most important is that the United States has no longer a monopoly in nu-nuclear weapons, and this also means that the Soviet advance in technology has made a very great difference. And so we wonder, some of us, whether NATO still has real validity, eh from a purely military point of view. General Gruenther, as the former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, what is your present judgement on this question?

[Alfred Gruenther:] Well my judgement on that would be that it does have validity from the purely military point of view. But having said that, I want to add that I feel that it’s mission is wider including other fields. But no matter how much we think of these other fields, it would be a mistake if we forget about the military aspect of NATO. (6:31)

[ER:] That’s very interesting. What would be your point of view, [Hans Morgenthau begins speaking] Dr. Morgenthau?

[Hans Morgenthau:] Well I would say first of all, uh raise the question whether the original conception of NATO has ever been uh worked out to the satisfaction of our overall strategy. Eh this it seems, is my impression that we have never really made up our mind what the military purpose of NATO is supposed to be. Is it supposed to be a shield or is it supposed to be a sword? Is it supposed to be a tripwire, or a plate glass, or has it any real substantive military importance in terms of the-of the defense on the ground of Europe against a Russian attack?
[Alfred Gruenther:] I would answer that by saying that it does have a purpose on the ground. Uh to take one of your questions, “is it a tripwire?” The answer to that is no, it is not a tripwire. Now, here is one of the problems that you run into as I see it in analyzing this, and that is until we get enough strength, then our ability on the ground is-is-is going to be limited. It’ll always be limited, but it’s not even going to be effective. And we’re in that problem, but as the German forces are coming on, uh as uh French forces are restored to the alliance, we will be able to perform both the functions of the uh the sword and the shield. (8:09)

[Saville Davis:] Will that strength on the ground, General Gruenther, come from ground troops, from conventional armaments or from atomic weapons?

[Alfred Gruenther:] Well I think it’s going to have to come from both. Uh just (clears throat) to make my position clear on that, uh and uh it is entirely possible that my friend Mr. Crossman may jump out of his chair on this--

[Saville Davis:] I’ll hold him down.

[Alfred Gruenther:] I feel-I feel that the conventional forces are going to have to be equipped with the uh atomic weapons. Now the size, the uh-uh times when these weapons will be used, is another question. But uh conventional weapons without atomic armament uh I think would be completely obsolete under current conditions.

[Richard Crossman:] Well of course we are, General, really in the middle of what I suppose is the biggest cause of division in NATO at the moment, which is this problem of the role of nuclear weapons. And um as you know in our country, curiously enough there isn’t as big a division as you might think between the parties on this. Broadly speaking I would say, that those people of us who’ve, you know, made a special study of defense in the House of Commons, whether they’re Conservative or Labour, would question your statement there straight away and say, “Now look, of course you need a nuclear defense. But you must have forces which are trained to be able to defend themselves without immediate reliance on nuclear weapons”. Because if you don’t have these forces, all you’re producing is a situation where you are compelled, by the nature of your defense, to try to wipe the world out at the first day of a war.

Now this seems just absolutely crazy! The point of NATO, General,--well I mean I left you quiet for a moment at the beginning--the point of NATO, we can tell you this because we invented it, was to drag the Americans across the Atlantic before the War started. That is what NATO was for. [Unknown speaker: To liberalize--] It is to see-to see that America is committed before the war, so as to prevent the war. You know it’s no good being committed to blow the world to pieces on the first day of the next war. I’d rather not have you there at all! [laughter from the audience] (10:17)

[Saville Davis:] That would be most un-British! [ER laughs] [Robert Crossman nods]

[Hans Morgenthau:] Well of course by saying this, Mr. Crossman, you raise the uh the urgent point of the present discussion about NATO, [Richard Crossman: Yeah.] which comes back to what Mrs. Roosevelt said about the new situation we have in the nuclear field. Uh before the Russians had a nuclear capability, their main deterrent was perfectly plausible [Richard Crossman: Certainly.]. And it was really the umbrella under which NATO could perform certain limited functions on the ground, but how plausible is the American deterrent today? And I think the whole problem, and the whole dispute within NATO today as to who should have what nuclear weapons stems from this fundamental uneasiness as to-to what extent does the American deterrent remains plausible [Richard Crossman: Right.] under present conditions. In other words, are we going to blow ourselves up over-over Denmark, let me say? (11:17)
[Richard Crossman:] But-but could we put this question to the General, because I may have misunderstood him. Couldn’t-wouldn’t you--you must agree, General, that you don’t want your forces equipped with nuclear weapons to the extent that the nuclear weapon is a substitute for conventional forces.

[Alfred Gruenther:] No, I agree with that. As a matter of fact, what you have said uh, I-I agree with uh and just to be sure that uh I am summarizing [Richard Crossman: Yeah.] it correctly, let me say it again [clears throat]. Uh I believe that our forces must be able to use uh conventional means and nuclear means if the situation requires it. You have said you don’t want them to be in a situation where they have to do it uh if a situation does not require it [Richard Crossman: I said--]. With that situation--with that statement, I agree. (12:05)

[Richard Crossman:] Well I’ve gone further, I said I wanted to push back the reliance on nuclear weapons as far back as possible. That’s to say I want to have forces which can quite seriously consider the possibility of containing um quite a considerable attack against themselves without the cost of nuclear weapons.

[Alfred Gruenther:] Yes, well I wouldn’t get into an argument about that, but I want to say that there is a considerable degree of academic discussion about this because to get any forces at all who are going to be able to stand up with-even with nuclear weapons is going to be very difficult uh considering the type of uh opposition that they might be up against. So when you say “push back” uh this is a question [Richard Crossman: Well--], because as you are well aware, your own country now is facing up to a situation where you abolished uh conscription, you feel uh that the army uh that you’re going to be able to get enough people by volunteers--

[Richard Crossman:] But I don’t, and I mean it’s been quite clear, I don’t think anybody who seriously considers this, and is not tied by being a henchman of the government, seriously believes we can get the requisite number of troops without conscription in the next two or three years.

[Alfred Gruenther:] Well don’t you say anything against the British government, you’re in America now--[laughter from panel]

[Richard Crossman:] I know. I’m saying- I’m saying to you very carefully, I’m saying I don’t think myself that it-uh-it would be wise to assume that we think we can get the right number--I think it was a terrible mistake to abolish conscription. (13:30)

[Hans Morgenthau:] Yeah but you see then you are-you are up against the whole problem of NATO all over again [Richard Crossman: Right.]. If we start from the assumption that NATO needs sufficient divisions, let me say the Lisbon Goals uh to defend Europe on the ground without atomic weapons.. But then you say it can’t get those troops, and then we come back to the General’s argument, is it--if you can’t get the number of troops sufficient to-to control uh Europe on the ground, you need a smaller amount of troops armed with atomic weapons.

[Richard Crossman:] Yes, but let’s be quite clear about this number of troops. We are take--leave your America out altogether. We have roughly the same population in Western Europe as Russia. Therefore, we have the right number of people. The difficulty is that in free democracies, people don’t voluntarily opt to do the national service. Now if you say to me, we have to rely on blowing the world to pieces, because we’re not prepared to be voluntarily willing to defend ourselves, this will be a division of such decadence on our part that I don’t see how you can possibly accept the view that the West is not prepared to look after itself by ordinary means of defense and therefore has to blow the whole world to pieces.
Well but I-I think you’re all ignoring the fact that probably you will never be called upon-in Europe itself to have what might be called a small war. I think we’re all familiar with the fact that Russia tries to bring about small wars in different areas of the world where she thinks it will annoy the United States the most and be the most difficult. That’s why, from-from my point of view, I believe we in the United States should have well trained ground forces in the use of ordinary weapons, the usual weapons, because I think one of Russia’s tactics has been to start little wars that she--but always to withdraw when she thinks it’s getting to the point where nuclear weapons might be used.

Now, I think the realer fact that we have to face is um that um if Russia really should make up her mind uh that by one blow she could wipe out her real enemy [ER laughs] which is the United States, from her point of view, uh she might try it if she thought there could be no retaliation. I don’t think she will try it because so far she’s quite sure that there would be, from somewhere, retaliation. And um I think actually that is the problem that we come to in NATO. Uh-uh can we rely any longer um just on-- aside from the balance of nuclear power which I think is extremely important--can we rely on uh just a military outlook? I think we fight the war of the present on a political, economic, and cultural front. And I think that unless we wake up in the West to the fact that this is the way it is being fought, we might someday wake up to the fact that Russia had acquired without any nuclear war uh a great part of the peoples of the world. Now this I think is one [Alfred Gruenther: Oh I quite agree with you.] of the things that NATO has to consider. And that all-all that all these um different forces that we think about as military forces, have to now consider.

In other words, the unity of the West goes much deeper than can be defined in merely military [ER: [Nods] In military--] dispositions. What we are really defending is Western civilization in which we all in different measure have uh a share. And NATO does not reflect, in its present uh, uh, organization, this underlying unity, and this underlying, unifying interest in the preservation of Western civilization.

Professor Morgenthau, is there any reason why the NATO alliance shouldn’t add to its military functions these political functions that Mrs. Roosevelt is talking about? Is there a basic inconsistency between the two, or can they fit together?

There is no basic inconsistency, but as long as you have quarrels in the military field alone, you are not-not likely to get any unity on the cultural or the political level. So in other words, our concentration upon the mere military aspects of NATO, stands in the way of fashioning a more profound unity on the cultural and political and economic levels.

Well Professor, do you feel it would be a good thing--of course I agree entirely with Mrs. Roosevelt that the military thing should be always secondary to the other methods of defending democracy. But you think that we should try and develop this cultural and economic defense through NATO. I’m extremely dubious whether we should. I think NATO is a military organization, should be regarded as such. And should be not--

Well it was not regarded originally so. If you look at the Charter of NATO, there are uh clauses about cultural and political, and economic collaboration [Richard Crossman: Yes.]. Well this is a technical matter. I wouldn’t commit myself to NATO particularly, if you could create a-a different kind of organization. But NATO is there with all kinds of agencies, committees and so forth, and uh I would think it rather uh wise and practical to build on what you have got, rather than to start from scratch.

Yeah but the question I was asking, was all the more precise. If you take our relationship with the uncommitted peoples, which I suppose we all agree was-was the basic issue of the
next fifty years, is as Mrs. Roosevelt says, which side are the going to be on in thirty years’ time? Now it does seem to be a minor matter to ask ourselves whether our assistance to the underdeveloped areas should be as NATO or as members of the United Nations not through a regional organization, it--

[Hans Morgenthau:] I fully agree Mr. Crossman [Hans Morgenthau nods].

[Richard Crossman:] But I would have thought in that case we might agree that NATO was not a suitable vehicle for our relationships on that major issue.

[Hans Morgenthau:] Because it is stamped with the military [Richard Crossman: Stamped with--] character. [unclear phrase]

[ER:] I think that’s a question that should be discussed. (19:53)

[Alfred Gruenther:] Well I would agree-I would agree with that point of view that Mr. Crossman has expressed, uh adding though to it that uh since the NATO nations, the fifteen of them, are in constant uh communication with each other, that in these other fields, they can develop a considerable degree of understanding whether they have the formal setup for it or not. And take just the one, the question of economic understandings, a very complicated problem, and to have NATO take that on formally is going to be very difficult. In fact, to have the United Nations take it on formally is going to be extremely--

[Richard Crossman :] So then when we talk about NATO we can’t help it, we’re bound to litter affairs [Alfred Gruenther: Yeah.] I think we’re talking of it chiefly military terms because we have to resolve these disagreements on the military sphere, if we’re going to do our job in the other sphere. And-and I mean after all, the military does unfortunately now, doesn’t it, take up our time because we are basically in disagreement about it. (20:54)

[Saville Davis:] How far do you think the political function ought to go, as the political function of NATO, General Gruenther? Should it be confined, or at least should it confine itself by and large to such questions as uh who will give the order to fight and under what circumstances? And how can allied unity on the political level be created essentially for military decisions?

[Alfred Gruenther:] Well first of all, on the question of who will give the order to fight, that would very definitely, that is a NATO decision, and that would have to, whether you want to call that political or military, I call it political, but that decision will have to be made by the political authorities. Now you say, “to what extent should we go?” Well uh I think that the uh North Atlantic Treaty Council, as you know there’s a council in permanent session in Paris all the time. They have made a good deal of progress in the last two years in this field by discussing issues that are going to come up between country A and country B, uh discussing them there. Even though they do not have the formal machinery for settling them. Now I think this should be continued, and continued as far uh-uh as possible. And I would say ten years from now, five years from now, we will have gone much much further in that direction than we are right now. (22:06)

[Saville Davis:] Let’s take an issue like disengagement. Is disengagement something that ought to be worked out within the NATO alliance, Mr. Crossman?

[Richard Crossman:] Well I would have thought yes, disengagement is so closely linked with defense problems that it’s quite clear that you can’t responsibly discuss disengagement unless you’re agreed about the strategic defenses of Western Europe. And-and that’s why this was an issue that we should discuss as NATO countries in the NATO council.
[Alfred Gruenther:] And if you want to have a good one to divide them, that’ll be a good one to start on. [Richard Cross: Yes.] . [Davis, Crossman and Gruenther laugh] Because they’re going to be thoroughly divided on that.

[Saville Davis:] What is your uh position on this, on disengagement, Mr. Crossman?

[Richard Crossman:] Well uh I want, I-I have to be very careful here.

[Alfred Gruenther:] You are in still in the United States.

[Richard Crossman:] I was just remembering that, yes [Gruenther, Davis, Crossman and audience laugh]. I just got here, but--

[Alfred Gruenther:] There-there is--

[Richard Crossman:] It’s-it’s difficult. I want to say something here, and hope General Gruenther will correct me. We have been a bit surprised, in the British Labour party at the sort of blank American hostility towards all notions of what I would call regional disarmament in the center of Europe. Now disengagement is a form of regional agreement for relaxing tension in Europe. I have never seen why it was thought so dangerous to-to say that the Reputschen Plan, which suggested we should have a purge an area of Europe where nuclear weapons was something that you shouldn’t even consider at all. It may be a difficult, it is, but it seemed principle a good thing to discuss it. In principle, the thinning out along the partition line in Germany and trying to get the troops fifty miles back does seem to me the kind of thing which Europeans would make sense to us to say let us try in Europe where we have such enormous packing of troops where, as Mrs. Roosevelt says are most unlikely, thank God, ever to be used. Isn’t that the very place where we should try methods, experiments, in trying to trust each other about nuclear weapons, about numbers of forces. Now what is your real objection to doing this? (23:58)

[Alfred Gruenther:] Well if you say ‘your’, speaking to me as an individual, uh I would say my basic objection comes to this. Now first of all, I am in favor of disarmament, I hope we can have a whole disarmament. If we can’t have a whole, a seventy-five percent disarmament. But I feel that basically, we--there has to be an agreement. [Richard Crossman: Yes.] Uh there has to be a climate of opinion, and to be taking measures which are as significant as those would be, in the attitude of hostility, I think is starting at the wrong end.

Now you can argue-I recognize that the way to create the climate, getting into the hen versus egg theory, that the way to create the climate is to have this measure of disarmament. I do not subscribe to that uh school of thought, although I recognize there’s-there’s some validity to it. And uh that is one of the reasons, it would give a false hope. And uh--

[Hans Morgenthau:] It would also be uh dangerous both politically and militarily, and I think it is also fundamentally unsound.

[Saville Davis:] Could you pin that down [Morgenthau begins speaking], Professor Morgenthau? (25:13)

[Hans Morgenthau:] I shall, I was just going to make a speech taking about ten minutes, uh but I shall restrain myself. Uh you see, first of all, you see advocates of disengagement assume uh that the political tensions in the world are the result of the lack of disengagement. That is to say, one army opposing another army in direct contact. This creates tension. Now this probably was so before the first World War, but it isn’t so today. The tensions in the world do not arise from the confrontation of armies, but from the confrontations of ideologies and ambitions. And you’re not going to solve any of those uh cosmic
problems, uh which today confronts the world, by thinning out some troops in the center of Europe. Uh this is the unsoundness, as I see it, of the idea. The idea is also dangerous, for when, if you create in the heart of Europe, a military vacuum, somebody’s going to fill it. There is a great virtue in the present situation in which both sides know exactly where the line of demarcation is. And each side knows if a soldier takes a step beyond that line of demarcation, the world will be blown up. This is a great advantage under present conditions, which we ought not to easily forgo.

[Richard Crossman:] Well I’d like, if I may, just to reply to those two points the other way around. First of all the second, of course I wish that they did, but they don’t, my dear boy. They don’t know. [Hans Morgenthau: What was it?] My second point was that the world knows quite clearly--[Hans Morgenthau: Who does what?]. You claim that the world-- people know quite clearly that if a soldier moves an inch to the West, [Hans Morgenthau: Oh, yes.] the world’s blown to pieces. I wish to heavens they did! But you know the position of West Berlin isn’t exactly like that, by any means [Hans Morgenthau: But it still is.]. There are great uncertainties--I will answer you, there are great uncertainties about Berlin for the reason you gave, that the [unclear terms] is getting increasingly incredible; ie: people don’t believe that you are going to blow the world to pieces, and we’re very relieved at the thought that you are not by the way, so that doesn’t work.

Now the point-the first point. You said that all this wasn’t to be done because we have to remove the sources of tension. This, of course, would be an argument against any kind of disarmament anywhere. Now I--you can of course argue that no form of disarmament discussion is worth anything, until you resolve the issues of disagreement. I just thought it was an unreasonable thing to say, it was more reasonable to say let us proceed about the sources of disagreement on the one side and disarmament on the other, not on big scale, not cosmmically. We’re not such cosmic people in Europe as the Americans. We want a little local job to be done. [Laughter from panelists and the audience] We’re quite concerned, if you have difficulties in China for example, that’s your affair, we shan’t be worried about them.

[Hans Morgenthaur:] No sir! (28:15)

[Richard crossman:] Right, so we’re concerned with our affair. We’re not cosmic there. Now we are very concerned, unlike you, about Germany. We know that if we go on like this, Germans will have nuclear weapons. We want neither Germany to have nuclear weapons, neither West nor East. I would do a very great deal, take a great many risks, in order to avoid the appalling prospect of a Germany, with both sides of the partition line both having nuclear weapons. And your way [points to Hans Morgenthau] they’re bound to have it in the next four years. Bound to.

[Hans Morgenthau:] Not necessarily.

[Richard Crossman:] How not?

[Han Morgenthau:] Why not? Why should-why should--

[Richard Crossman:] Because-because the directive of-of-of the present moment of NATO is to arm all our weapons, as Gruenther was saying, we’re going to be all armed. And the Germans are going to be armed too [ER: Course--] in the next four years and then the East Germans will be armed too.

[ER:] Course I-I agree very much with you on the point that uh if we could withdraw nuclear weapons from states, it would be far better. I think the original situation, when few people had it, uh even if it’s-even if it’s Russia and the United States [Richard Crossman: Oh yeah.], it’s better than when [Richard Crossman: Much better.] a lot of small countries are granted them. But they’re getting them [Richard Crossman: We’ve got to stop them.] whether we like it or not. I hope we don’t give it to German because
I still have a great sense of uncertainty. Germany did start two wars, we seem to forget it, but she did start two world wars [ER laughs] and occasionally we forget it and I’m very uncertain when there’s a question of giving nuclear arms to Germany, not only from that point, but from the point that it will arouse, in the satellites, so much fear and justifiy much of what Russia says uh today about our being more inclined to want a war than the Russians are, and-and put a great many people of the war in fear of us rather than in sympathy with us. But I uh-I have a feeling that um you can’t consider this just. I do think Germany is one of the difficult and most important things that we have to settle, and I think it’s got to probably some way of finding solutions to our difficulties has to come before too long. We can’t go on in the way we are going on now. (30:46)

[Hans Morgenthau:] You see my main argument against disengagement is exactly your [points to Richard Crossman] argument, the fear of a rearmed Germany. Uh I have been opposed to the rearment of Germany from the very beginning, and I am uh opposed to the nuclear armament of either Germany. But if you create a militarily and politically empty space which is covered by Germany, you are creating the very preconditions for the situation which all of us want to avoid. That is to say you will have a-you will have laid the foundations of a new German empire. And it is exactly because of the presence of Russian troops in East Germany, and the presence of American troops in West Germany, is that there is a restraint upon German ambitions which would be absent if they were removed. (31:45)

[Richard Crossman:] Well I would agree with that, Morgenthau, of course, I’d like to see, I-I mean until we can get a unified Germany which is neutralized in some sense, I’d much rather have the present situation. Though would you agree therefore-- that we ought to therefore question Gruenther, say to him let him agree with us, the most important thing now is to get an agreement that neither Germany shall be allowed-- neither the East Germans, nor the West Germans, should be equipped with nuclear weapons. But it’s been quite clear if we make that agreement, we’re tearing up most of the military directives which are now operating in Western Europe. For the military [unclear term] that is now operating are training the Germans already. Already German troops are now being trained to use these weapons, and-and-and as soon as they are trained and the weapons are there as things go now, I think I’m right, those weapons will be in their hands, they’ll be dual purposed, Americans will have the keys and all that. But the fact really remains, in the next two or three years, this disaster will take place according to the present decisions of Anglo-American policies, isn’t that right? (32:41)

[Alfred Gruenther:] Yes but uh [clears throat] I want to uh come back at one point that Mrs. Roosevelt mentioned here, that she is afraid of Germany. Um uh Professor Morgenthau refers to some of that same fear, he uh was born in Germany and knows a great deal about it and-and these are real points. But [clears throat] the whole concept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as it has developed has been to take Germany as a first class power. And if we are going to use them as second class citizens, we are going to be in real trouble. Now, I don’t want to be put in the position of arguing that I want any nation to have atomic weap-weapons indiscriminately. I feel that in-in NATO, they’re going to have to be operated under controls, those controls apply to Germany, but they don’t apply to Germany any more than they apply to Belgium, than they apply to the Netherlands, than they apply to France, than they apply to any country in NATO. I would not want to discriminate against the Germans there. And I-I do want to get that point in because there have been a couple references there to fear from Germany, if we’re going to let our fears of Germany predominate, then we’d better take a better look at this alliance. (34:06)

[Richard Crossman:] General-General, I would agree with you, you cannot keep Germany as your ally for long in a cold war situation such as this, and discriminate against her about nuclear weapons. That’s why the leading disengagement, that’s why I tell you, you’d better not rely on the Germans as your ally. Your aim should be to have a neutralized Germany, which is not an ally of either us or them. Because if there are allies, I quite agree with you, it’s totally unrealistic militarily, to ask the Germans to be your full-scale
ally, and provide twelve divisions and then say, “but of course one little thing, old boy, you won’t be allowed to have the most important weapon.” [Audience laughs] That’s totally unrealistic.

But on the other hand, let’s be clear, the present policy of making Germany a full ally will arm the Germans with nuclear weapons within the matter of three years in the West. This will mean the reactions as Mrs. Roosevelt says in Eastern Europe, and once you’ve done this, in my view, it’s very difficult to undo it. This is my case for disengagement, for saying this is something so dangerous that you’ve got to reconsider it. (35:05)

[Alfred Gruenther:] You’ve got two dangers there [Richard Crossman: Mhm.] because the other danger, the danger in disengagement, the danger of having this vacuum there [Richard Crossman: There’s a real danger.] is going to be a very very serious one.

[Richard Crossman:] I don’t deny it [unclear term]. Of course it’s a danger, but we’re measuring one danger against another. Their politics consists of this, after all [Alfred Gruenther: That’s right.]. And we’ve got to see to ourselves which of those dangers, over the next five years, is likely to destroy the world.

[ER:] Well I--

[Saville Davis:] You’ll have to tear us-[to ER] excuse me.

[ER:] I-I should say, I don’t know, but I should say that um you are balancing two rather serious dangers because um you’re balancing it against the possibility that if you do not treat Germany as an ally, uh she will become an ally of Russia. You can’t be too sure of that. And this is a-- this has to be faced. Um so then it is-it is a real danger. The dangers are really nearly pretty equal. And um I should think the disengagement was something that had to be thought about very carefully, and perhaps done very, very gradually and only as general steps toward disarmament were taken in the world as a whole. I mean as agreements came on--we would say, I suppose today, that they came on-on tests first, that that was um--then you might take in the different areas--and this isn’t the only area, I hope we’re not going to forget that there are other areas even though this is for you, Mr. Crossman, the most interesting. Um as you come to the whole thing, then perhaps you take step-by-step in Europe. But I don’t believe you can do it, do you, sir? Before? I mean I don’t think you can do it by itself. (36:57)

[Hans Morgenthau:] Well I- Well, of course, this is another argument which I should have made and which I think is-is uh-uh very much to the point, that you cannot really think of disengagement as a separate, isolated measure [other panelists overlap here] divorced from the overall tensions existing in the world. This can only come as an integral part of an overall detente in the whole world.

[ER:] It seems to me--

[Saville Davis:] Mr. Morgenthau, we’re going to have to tear ourselves loose by main force from this perplexing and difficult argument which certainly illustrates the problems that NATO is up against in order to be able to talk about uh some of the alliance problems in other parts of the world, out in Asia, for example, in the SEATO alliance. But before we do that, we should have the word of a student of history and a philosopher of uh current political and military matters on-on the basic issue that we’re discussing. What is a military alliance for, Professor Morgenthau?

[Hans Morgenthau:] I wasn’t quite sure to whom you looked when you--[laughter from panelists and audience]. Uh--

[Saville Davis:] The professor is always vulnerable to such a question. (37:58)
[Alfred Gruenther:] You seem to be nodding while he was giving that introduction!

[Richard Crossman:] We had no doubt it was you.

[Hans Morgenthau:] Your intelligence is faulted then. [laughter]

[Saville Davis:] Now he is going to promote his latest book.

[Hans Morgenthau:] Alright, now an alliance is a uh an agreement among two or more nations for the common furtherance of a particular uh interest which they have in common. For instance a typical example is an alliance in wartime when two nations get together, threatened by a common enemy, for the common purpose to defeat that enemy. And once that objective is achieved, uh the alliance generally is dissolved. And this is the example you had in the second World War between uh the Soviet Union on the one hand and uh other nations on the other.

[Saville Davis:] But this is a military definition—(38:48)

[Hans Morgenthau:] This is-- all alliances are essentially military. And it is exactly for this reason that the conception of alliances does no longer completely fix the present world situation. And I think it was one of the great weaknesses of Mr. Dulles’ foreign policy that he looked at the struggle between East and West in primarily military terms. That he tried to extend the policy of containment which had been eminently successful in Europe, to the rest of the world. That in other words, he tried to surround the enormous periphery of the Russian-Chinese empires with a kind of Maginot line of American allies which would man the ramparts, uh supported by an American military might against Communist expansion.

[Saville Davis:] We could find a very good example of the weakness of this policy, it seems to me, if we go over to the SEATO uh alliance, where the political problems are of uh-uh enormous size, and perhaps in some- to some degree, overriding the-the military problems. (40:01)

[Hans Morgenthau:] You see, SEATO is really not a working alliance to begin with. Uh you will remember that after the Indo-China debacle of uh 1954, uh we thought that we had somehow to redress the balance, we had somehow to prop up our prestige, and so we extended an open-ended invitation to all Asian countries to make an alliance with us against Communist aggression or subversion. It was-- uh Mr. Dulles approached this problem of alliances was really what I call the collectors approach. He approached the problem as a stamp collector uh uh approaches stamps. The more exotici and colorful they are, the better he likes them. [Laughter from audience]

[Saville Davis:] Why don’t we, let-let’s ask General Gruenther, then, how much he feels this is an alliance and-and resembles the classic qualities of a military alliance.

[Alfred Gruenther:] Well, [clears throat] it misses the classic qualities, but I want to-I want to uh say that I uh do not agree with this collector’s approach concept. Mr. Dulles and the people who were studying this problem, and I was not one of them so I have nothing to defend on my own side here, recognize that the situation there was completely different. And the efforts which have been made in the SEATO area, and there are eight countries in that area, three of them not in the area at all, but three of them in the treaty, England--the United Kingdom, France and uh the United States. The others are in that area after you bring in Australia. But the whole setup that has taken place there, the whole language of the treaty, has uh put less emphasis on the military side, and has tried to stir up the uh other aspects, just one thing that I have here, what the-what the language is on on SEATO. It simply says here [reads from paper document] that “each party recognizes that an aggression would endanger its own peace and safety.” And agrees that. And here’s a point that I’d like to compare with the NATO treaty, “agrees that it will in that event”, an the
event of an aggression, “act to meet the common danger in accordance its constitutional processes”. This is a very weak statement, showing that no uh-no wrong idea about how effective the military side was going to be. Because if you compare that Mr. Dulles had no uh no uh wrong idea about how effective the military side was going to be because if you compare that with the uh the NATO side, and I’m not going to read the whole thing, it says uh say that [reads from document], “any party so attacked will individually and in concert with other parties, take such action as is deemed necessary including the use of armed force to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” Uh with a very strong prelude here indicating that the strength of the military situation is an important aspect to this. So I-I think that uh in considering just what we’ve done in the Southeastern Asia, the SEATO organization, I don’t think we went in there-into that with any delusions that this was going solve all the problems and that we could set a military-set up a military organization that was going to solve difficulties. (43:32)

[Richard Crossman:] Eh uh isn’t there something in what the Professor was saying, in this sense, NATO made sense, because although we were very weak at the time that it was made, the European nations are nations which are capable of-of fighting for themselves, capable of resisting, doing home defense. Now the worst of the Middle East and the Far East, were that the nations we called allies were, most of them, incapable of raising a finger in their own self-defense. This is you couldn’t put the phrases at the beginning, which are in NATO. And this is why I rather agree, I don’t see what's the point of having a so-called military alliance with people who, by definition, can’t defend themselves.

[Hans Morgenthau:] And furthermore, uh you see, fundamental unsoundness of the procedure in my view, lies in the unilateral extension of invitation so that it isn’t we who choose our allies in terms of our interests, that the other nations choose us as the allies in terms of theirs. I remember very vividly having had, a couple of years ago, a uh-an interview with a foreign minister of one of the SEATO uh uh countries. And I asked him, in military terms, what is your interest in the alliance? And he said, “we have no military interest in the alliance, we have interest in American dollars”. And, of course, this is a very expensive way in getting allies which are really of no use for you in military or any other terms. And furthermore, take-take the example of Pakistan for instance. Our military support of Pakistan, which has been very considerable, creates continuously a problem for India. You see, India has to match the support we give to Pakistan by detracting from its own scarce resources which it needs for the Five Year Plan. Now we realize, of course, uh that India is much more important in the overall scheme of things than Pakistan is. And so we support India in order to make up for the deficit India is suffering by virtue of our support of Pakistan. So we are-we are engaged in a kind of armaments race with ourselves [laughter from audience] which I submit is not a very rational way of going about the problem [Richard Crossman laughs]. (45:46)

[Saville Davis:] Uh General Gruenther, don’t we have containment policy behind all of this which makes a certain amount of basic sense? And don’t we have to do certain things if there- if a containment policy [Alfred Gruenther: I-I think--] is going to work?

[Alfred Gruenther:] I think it makes sense and when uh, when you analyze this, the question is what could you do that was better? Considering the fact that you do have a military threat facing you of tremendous proportions, that this is a question of survival. Now, I would be the first to admit that an org--having been connected to an organization that has a tight set up, by a tight set up I mean, we have in NATO-we have troops that are under the command of the Supreme Commander, uh where all you really have to do is give the orders and they will be obeyed, uh the people who are dealing with SEATO don’t have that. It is a very flabby type of organization from a military standpoint. But the question is what is a better way? (46:49)

[Richard Crossman:] Well can I put it to you in another question?
[ER:] I-I-I beg your pardon--

[Richard Crossman:] Go ahead, Mrs. Roosevelt.

[ER:] No you go ahead, just--

[Richard Crossman:] But surely one of our problems is this: SEATO is attempting to defend a status quo in Southeast Asia, which is, in my view, absolutely indefensible. You’re trying to build a lot of, a-a-an alliance of people all around China to hold the present line. Now if China is a great power, as it is, you are merely committing yourself to defeat. That’s all you’re doing in the long run.

[Alfred Gruenther:] Well then do we withdraw from there, Dick? (47:20)

[Richard Crossman:] Let us look at something at something like Laos.

[Alfred Gruenther:] What?

[Richard Crossman:] I’m looking at Laos. [Panelists begin talking at the same time]

[Alfred Gruenther:] I think we all should understand, and I’m sure you understand it very well, but just for to be sure that our viewing audience understands, Laos is not a part of the SEATO organization [Richard Crossman: No.]. There are eight countries [Richard Crossman: That’s right.] and Laos is not one of them, but by uh protocol, by an attachment to the treaty, they agreed that they would defend free Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia.

[Richard Crossman:] Yes but it’s the--

[Alfred Gruenther:] Oh and excuse me for that interruption.

[Richard Crossman:] But it’s the impression created, the impression created on me is, that we thought it was very unwise for you to--

[Alfred Gruenther:] We meaning? The British.

[Richard Crossman:] The British--to commit yourselves in any way to the defense or the-- of an independent Laos that was not neutral for the Chinese [Saville Davis: But Mr.--]. And you seemed to commit yourselves to it, and now when the crisis comes, you agree with us. And I would say there’s a loss of prestige in coming to a sensible position of this sort, which is really a different position from that which you took up in creating SEATO. (48:20)

[Alfred Gruenther:] When you say “we” though, uh [Richard Crossman: British--] the United Kingdom are a part of this alliance.

[Richard Crossman:] Yes, but as you will remember, we did advise you throughout on the unwisdom of the policy in Laos.

[Saville Davis:] I think we made some mistakes in Laos, but I think we ought to remind Mr. Crossman that uh-uh Laos is to be sure a country which is not able to defend itself. World War II began in two countries which were unable to defend themselves, namely Manchuria and uh Ethiopia. What should we do then in Laos? (48:53)
[Hans Morgenthau:] Uh may I come to the defense of Mr. Crossman, just for a change? [Audience laughs].

[Alfred Gruenther:] No, let him be embarrassed for a while. [Panelists laugh]

[Hans Morgenthau:] No I--He just arrived on such hospitable shores [Richard Crossman laughs] so I want to do something for him. Uh I think the conception of the peripheral containment of China, a little bit here, a little bit there, a little bit elsewhere, is utterly unsound if I may say in your [gestures to Alfred Gruenther] presence, from a military point of view. If you want to defend Laos, you’re not going to defend it in Laos, you're going to defend it in the United States. This policy is no more feasible than were to--then would the reverse policy be if China, let me say, were trying to contain the United States in the Western hemisphere by reforming, say, army of Panama. This simply cannot be done. If you want to--if you want to defend Asia again Chinese power, you have to strike at the core of Chinese power. You cannot nibble against it and-and eh--

[Saville Davis:] The piecemeal aggression is inevitable. (49:59)

[Richard Crossman:] No-No. May I also say, I don’t want to be self-righteous, we made exactly the same mistake in the Middle East, where we thought we could defend the whole Middle East by a series of treaties of this sort. The Communists jumped over our little wall and got in- into Egypt. And the defense is, as Mrs. Roosevelt said, the fundamental defense isn’t having a divisions parcelled out, it is an economic, political and military defense-- political and social defense.

[ER:] I-I’m coming more and more, as I listen to you all, to the strengthening of my own belief that this cannot be fought on a military basis, [Richard Crossman: That’s Right.] that it has to be fought, [Richard Crossman: Yes.] first of all, by what democracy can do in its own country, for it’s own people, and then fought on the broad surface of what you do for other countries. Because you’re not going to do this on a- [Richard Crossman: Absolutely. Absolutely] on a military bases. And China is winning, I’d imagine, as the Soviets have won in certain areas by holding out the hope that certain things can be achieved in other ways.

[Hans Morgenthau:] Not alone, it also uses- it also uses military aggression. I would not quite discount the military aspect in this-in this situation. But what I am saying is if you want to contain China militarily, you have to face the fact of the situations, that is that you cannot defend a particular piece of territory within this particular territory. You have to strike at the-at the core of Chinese power [ER nods] if this is what you want to do! (51:26)

[Richard Crossman:] But-but isn’t there a second point, that if you are looking at the Southeast Asia, haven’t you also got to ask yourself at least the question whether the status quo now that China has become a great power, is something tenable, whether there isn’t something of negotiation to be done in China, rather than mere defense? This is where we feel, again on our side of the Atlantic, that there is this terrible deficiency of the unreadiness to see in negotiation, sensible, realistic power negotiation of our Southeast Asia [panelists begin talking at the same time] which is the best kind of defense.

[Saville Davis:] Now what you’re talking about is a form of political containment as opposed to military containment?

[Richard Crossman:] Well I wouldn’t use--

[Alfred Gruenther:] He’s talking about a recognition of China, [Richard Crossman: Yes, of course I am.] to start out with, that’s what. Let's get this cards on the table.
[Richard Crossman:] A recognition of China, yes, and the recognition that China is a great power who will see that her interests are going to be looked after in her neighbor countries, and we have to face that. (52:13)

[Saville Davis:] Well, the Kennedy administration is at least going to see whether or not this turns out to be practical on terms that—that we can accept. But what happens in the case of Laos, where American policy has been backing a government, now we’re talking about political containment, which is an unpopular government, and is becoming more unpopular all the time and is bound to be overthrown the way uh our friends uh or at least our-our allies in Iraq were overthrown by a political revolution. Isn’t that the uh-uh essence of the [Alfred Gruenther: Yes.] a political problem, you see?

[Alfred Gruenther:] I don’t know what the answer to this problem is. The main thing I want to say is it’s an extremely difficult problem. Mrs. Roosevelt says she is sure that it is not a military problem [ER: Alone, alone] uh alone, that it is a broader problem. I agree with that. But having said that, and taking what Dr. Morgenthau says, that the way to attack China is back here from Brandeis University, put the guns out here. What do you do as they start penetrating? He doesn’t have an answer to that.

Now, none of these are going to be simple to answer. Uh Mr. Crossman refers to negotiation, and he’s got a big hook on there, because he’s really talking about moving into the United Nations, and this is a tremendous, tremendous step. And uh with the new administration about to tackle this problem in a few days, I just hope that we’ll be as little critical of what they’re doing as we can, because uh it’s really a very, very tough one. And I don’t see how we can put the power in there to do it. (53:56)

[ER:] I think- I think suddenly we have reached a point instead of really um surveying only what alliances, what these military alliances really can do for us, we’ve reached the point of trying to settle the whole difficulties of the world which are before us and which of course will be before the United States um in a new administration, as they have been before the United States in the past administration. Now, uh there may-there evidently must be some new approaches, and that’s where your negotiation comes in, I think. But let’s just um uh consider I think again, for a minute, whether these alliances really are any good. Now, let’s you say what you [to Hans Morgenthau] think for the last few minutes. (54:44)

[Hans Morgenthau:] Well I think uh, one cannot uh give a general answer to this question, as we have said before, NATO is not only a worthwhile alliance, it is an indispensable alliance. It conforms with the uh national interest of the United States as it has been expressed in word and deed sin-uh virtually since the beginning of the republic, that is to say the maintenance or if need be the restoration of the European balance of power.

I am much less certain about the usefulness of alliances in regions of the world where the issue is not miliatr-military primarily, but is psychological, cultural, economic, political and what have you. And I think we have slowly come around to this point of view. The President, uh President Eisenhower in uh his uh speech to the delegates of the African nations in uh New York, said that we don’t want you to be our allies, we want you to stay neutral, which is of course-it is a complete reversal of the position as the government took only a few years before. And I agree with that.

[Richard Crossman:] I find myself, to-to what the Professor said of balance, agreeing altogether with him. I think NATO is indispensable now. On one condition, by the way General, and that is that we cease to have our nuclear obsession. I’d like to see NATO with no NATO power except America having nuclear weapons, and the rest of us having strong conventional forces. We are far healthier-- think they’ll let me advise you of this?-- we should be much more reliable allies, if we don’t have to have nuclear weapons, and if we don’t have to have American bases in our countries [ER: I’m--]. Much happier. (56:23)
[ER:] I’m sorry, I wanted to have General Gruenther to have the last word, but our time has unfortunately drawn to a close. Can you say one word?

[Alfred Gruenther:] I’d just say thanks for-for not- for not making me say the last word.

[ER:] Making you say the last word. Well I want to thank you all uh it’s been very kind of you to come such a long ways, some of you. Right across the ocean, Mr. Crossman. And General Gruenther I thank you because you’ve made a hurried trip, and Professor Morgenthau, it’s been very kind of you.

[Alfred Gruenther:] He shouldn’t be thanked much, he just had to come a few miles--

[ER:] Oh he just had to come a few miles. And of course, we always thank Mr. Saville Davis for his contribution. And now, in summing up, I would say that we had set before the people who are listening to us, what the difficulties of this problem are. And next month we will set another problem, which will be very difficult indeed. And so, I say to you ‘til then, au revoir. (57:26)

[Audience applauds]

[Credit sequence:] (Overlaid on show logo) Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt’s Prospects of Mankind.

[Theme music begins 57:39]

[Credit sequence:] [Overlaid on show logo]

[Bob Jones:] [Voice Over] General Gruenther, President of the American Red Cross, was formally NATO Supreme Commander. Richard Crossman, member of parliament, is this year’s chairman of the British Labour Party. Hans Morgenthau is professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Saville Davis is the Managing Editor of the Christian Science Monitor. Viewers who wish further reading on this subject, can receive the Foreign Policy Association’s recent pamphlet “U.S. Foreign Policy Goals: What the Experts Say,” by sending thirty five cents to Intercom 345 East 46 Street, New York 17, New York.

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[Bob Jones:] [Voice Over] On next month’s program, Mrs. Roosevelt and her guests will discuss the Test Ban as the first step toward in arms control.

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[Bob Jones:] [Voice Over] This program is a video tape production of WGBH-TV Boston.

[Theme Music ends 59:05]
[Bob Jones:] [Voice Over] This is NET. National Educational Television.