PROSPECTS OF MANKIND
SEASON 3, EPISODE 7, THE FUTURE OF FRANCE
February 25, 1962

Description: ER, Maurice Schumann, Raymond Aron, Stephanie Hessel, and Alfred Grosser talk about the future of France. This program was recorded in Paris at the Radiodiffusion-Television Française on February 15, 1962.

Participants: Maurice Schumann, Raymond Aron, Stephanie Hessel, and Alfred Grosser

[Introduction music begins 0:08]

[Unknown announcer 1:] [As announcer speaks, film rotates through images related to the announcer’s comments] Recorded in Paris on February 15, 1962, National Educational Television presents the WGBH-TV production, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind, produced in cooperation with Brandeis University. Mrs. Roosevelt came to Paris at the critical moment in French history, when the truce with Algeria seemed imminent, to discuss with some leading French political and intellectual figures their assessment of France’s future.

Only seventeen years after the liberation, France is again torn by political unrest. At the same time, France is enjoying perhaps the greatest prosperity and growth in her history. Keeping pace with expanding affluence is a booming population. By 1970, France will be the youngest country in Europe.

French schools and universities are bursting at the seams. French architects and engineers have creating daring new forms, like the Rond-point de la Defense in Paris. And Paris is still the leader when it comes to women’s fashions.

After the war, French national pride suffered as the old French empire was lost piecemeal. The Fourth Republic could survive Dien-Bien-Phu and the loss of Tunisia and Morocco. But it could not cope with a protracted war in Algeria.

In May 1958, Charles de Gaulle was brought back to power by the French Army and the French Algerians. Since then, de Gaulle has tried to settle the Algerian war, but it has gone slowly, too slowly. Twice, the very people who brought him back tried to overthrow him. After the last attempt, General Salan founded the Secret Army Organization, OAS, a terrorist organization whose favorite weapon is the plastic bomb. The settlement of the Algerian war will lessen the tensions, but much remains to be done before normal political life is re-established in France, and Frenchmen are given a choice other than the extremes of right and left.

Here, with Mrs. Roosevelt, to discuss France’s future are: Maurice Schumann, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly. A journalist and leader of the French Catholic Liberal political party, MRP, Monsieur Schumann appears regularly as a commentator on French television.

Raymond Aron, France’s leading political commentator and editorial writer for the morning newspaper, Le Figaro. The author of many books on varied subjects, Monsieur Aron now holds the Sociology Chair at the Sorbonne.

Stephane Hessel, Director of the Office of International Cultural Exchanges in the French Ministry of National Education. Monsieur Hessel is one of the founders and directors of the Jean Moulin Club, an organization of young civil servants and technicians, both in and outside government, whose chief purpose is to revive what they call ‘civic pride’ in the French people.
Alfred Grosser, Professor of Political Science at the University of Paris, and is also Visiting
Professor at the John Hopkins University Center in Bologna, Italy. Today, he will assist Mrs. Roosevelt in
directing the discussion. Now here is Mrs. Roosevelt. (04:10)

[ER:] I’m so glad to welcome you, gentlemen, and to be here with you. And now I’m going to ask you,
Mr. Aron, the first question: how do you see the situation today, and can you give us any indication for
the future?

[Raymond Aron:] it’s not easy to answer your question, Mrs. Roosevelt. We sociologists, or journalists,
we are better at explaining the past than at foreseeing the future. And we are living in a difficult time
where it is almost impossible to analyze the present without taking into consideration the future. Because
in a few days or weeks we will know if an agreement between the French government and the Algerian
nationalists is possible.

In both cases there will be a new fact. Either there will be a paper agreement between two of the
main parties or not. In both cases, there will be trouble in metropolitan France, and certainly more in
Algeria. Because, quite probably, there will be protests and explosions from the French population, with
the help or under the organization of the OAS. But in once case, we will see in the future a progressive
peace. In the other case, I’m afraid nobody will see clearly what is the prospect. What do you think about
that?

[Maurice Schumann:] You are now asking me the question?

[Raymond Aron:] Yes.

[Maurice Schumann:] I think the analysis is perfectly accurate. If, on the one hand, there is an agreement-
-and we hope today that there will be that there will be one--whatever happens, whatever the problems
are, I think we can take an optimistic view of the future. Otherwise, if there is no agreement, if you excuse
me, Mrs. Roosevelt, for using a vulgar expression, I think we shall remain in the soup for a long time.
[laughter]

[Raymond Aron:] Yes, what do you call optimistic--I would add long-term optimism.

[Maurice Schumann:] Long-term, but not very long-term.

[Alfred Grosser:] Because, in the short run, whatever might be the solution in Algeria in the sense of an
agreement, don’t you think that we’ll have a long period of trouble in Algeria, perhaps in France; and
definitely it will need years before the Algerian question can be considered as settled?

[Maurice Schumann:] Yes. It will require years before the Algerian problem is definitely settled. I agree
to that. But at the same time, I believe in to what I’d call the ‘dynamics of peace’.

[Raymond Aron:] So you belong to the optimistic school?

[Maurice Schumann:] I do definitely. And I think that even, uh in Northern Africa--even in Algeria--as
soon as the European population realizes that the guarantees are serious--and there will be no agreement
unless the guarantees are serious--I think that a great part of them might understand that the best thing
they can do, for France and for their own sake, is to accept the agreement.

[Raymond Aron:] I don’t agree completely. I would say, in any case, there is another school, which I
would call the school of the dynamism of explosion, or the dynamism of violence. Because after a paper
agreement, quite probably, there will be a tentative of the OAS, of the Secret Army Organization, to
demonstrate that it is impossible to apply it. And you say there will be a dynamism of peace. I hope you are right. I am not sure you are wrong. But I’m not sure, either, you are right; because there is also a dynamism of violence, and there may be situations where it will be impossible for the forces of order, or the so-called forces of order, to restore peace. And in that case, your optimist may be premature.

[Alfred Grosser:] Don’t you think that it will be quite important to know who will be the forces of order. That is, how far will people of OAS trying to make an explosion, find help or not find help among the forces of order?

[Maurice Schumann:] You both mean to say that there will be a fundamental difference between the post cease-fire period and the April situation [Alfred Grosser: Yes, certainly, I suppose.] when-when when the putsch was wrecked in a few days?

[Raymond Aron:] Yet that was a putsch without violence. And now the people of the OAS, they have crossed the Rubicon. They are now desperate people. They have no prospects but to fight to the end. They have already assassinated a few people. In the road they have chosen there is no way back: they have to go further. And when some few thousand people are determined to go to the end, there may be trouble--and very serious trouble--for the community.

[Maurice Schumann:] Yes, that is just the point. But don’t you believe that a good agreement, a sound agreement might give a new prospects? Of course, not to the desperadoes. But to the bulk of the European population?

[ER:] If the bulk of the people feel there is hope of a peaceful settlement, won’t you have a growing group of people really trying for that settlement?

[Alfred Grosser:] Yes.

[Maurice Schumann:] Just what I hope, Mrs. Roosevelt.

[Raymond Aron:] May I say one word? You say serious guarantees. I would say first that it is doubtful that in the long run there may be any serious guarantees. And we know that by experience. And admitting that you are right, and that the guarantees will be serious, nobody in Algeria will believe the guarantees are serious. They will say it is one word more for a government which has used so many words. (10:10)

[Alfred Grosser:] And one type of guarantee cannot be serious that is-- the sociological situation of most of the poor people, the European people in Algeria--is such that a true social equality will deprive them of their past jobs. It is the same situation as that of true equality being installed in the Southern states of the United States. The little white is threatened in his social status by true equality.

[Stephane Hessel:] Well, it is quite clear. I think, from the beginning of the discussion, how very deeply important the Algerian problem is for the future of France. Nevertheless, I think it is not only Algeria that we must look at, but also the future of France herself.

And here I would agree that there are these two dynamisms to be expected: the dynamism of violence, which certainly is a very definite fear in many people’s minds and probably a very serious possibility; and the dynamism of peace, which I very much hope will be the prevailing one. But I don’t think they are enough. I think there is another dynamism that must come out, and which I would, if I may be allowed to, call the dynamism of democracy, of more civic participation.

Because violence, of course, we don’t need to discuss that. But peace may also be a demobilizing factor for the French citizens. They may continue to leave it all to the government, and not participate themselves. And this, I think, may be a real danger in the long run.
[Alfred Grosser:] Well, that’s to say that whatever the solution in Algeria will be, we have to consider what will be the future of the metropolitan French government and institutions.

[Maurice Schumann:] I think that one depends on the other to a very large extent. The results of last night, if you don’t mind, Mrs. Roosevelt, the Algerian situation, may I say that if the cease-fire entails the entire stoppage of rebel action, for example in the towns, if there are no longer any murders or attacks even on the Moslem part. Well, that might at the same time result into a change in the general outlook. Let’s never forget when we refer to the dynamism of peace, let’s never forget that the Mediterranean population change very easily, overnight, out of all recognition.

[Raymond Aron:] Yes, that is the extreme optimistic view; and we may let it at that. It’s, in any case, a good prospect; and as we all hope that you are right, we may dismiss the argument which would show that it’s not so sure that you are right. So let’s admit it. [ER laughs] And in any case, we have, certainly, a second problem, which is the future of the French political regime. And quite clearly the future of the French political regime is linked with the future of Algeria. But the problem exists beyond Algeria. And I would like to put to you the question—because you are more informed than I am about what the French provence thinks, you are a political man and you have a unique experience which a Parisian professor does not have—so what do you think is the attitude, feelings, of the French provence in relation to the French political regime, which is normally a Parisian phenomenon?

[Maurice Schumann:] Oh, my answer, I think, can be very easy. I think that the provinces as a whole accept the present regime in how as much they consider it is the only way of settling the Algerian problem, in however as much they feel—insofar as they feel that any other regime would be too weak to overcome the resistance which we are now seeing, the resistance which would prevent any other government from restoring peace in Algeria.

[Raymond Aron:] Do you mean that--

[ER:] So you’d have stability.

[Raymond Aron:] --do we have stability of one man?

[Alfred Grosser:] But do you think that the French population, finally, likes a strong government in case of emergency, and dislikes strong governments as soon as the danger is past?

[Maurice Schumann:] That’s just about what I meant.

[Alfred Grosser:] Just about?

[Maurice Schumann:] I could even say that was exactly what I meant. But--

[Raymond Aron:] So as a consequence, if there is peace in Algeria, de Gaullism will be dead.

[Maurice Schumann:] Well, I wouldn’t say dead. But de Gaullism will be--

[Raymond Aron:] Will be on the decline?

[Maurice Schumann:] I wouldn’t say will be on the decline; but it would certainly have to think himself all over again.
[Raymond Aron:] That’s a very fine expression, not so far from my own. Your language is more delicate and more political. [Maurice Schumann: For once.] But in any case, you believe that the faithfulness to de Gaulle is linked with the Algerian crisis and not to the regime?

[Maurice Schumann:] If I asked-- that’s right-- If I asked one of my average constituents, who is against the government--I mean, against the General, for one reason or another, either because he doesn’t approve of the government’s social policy, or because he doesn’t approve of the government’s European policy--in the end the final conclusive sentence will always be the same: but of course, if he can restore peace in Algeria, which nobody else could do. (15:53)

[Stephane Hessel:] But doesn’t that really bring us to the conclusion that if peace is made in Algeria this will be a tremendous support for General de Gaulle, and will make him again quite as popular as he has ever been at all--

[Maurice Schumann:] Just what Raymond Aron was forgetting five minutes ago. [Schumann laughs]

[Raymond Aron:] No, I was not forgetting. I asked you--I asked you with a certain degree of irony--but uh I will ask you again: don’t you believe that the French people is ungrateful, like any great people?

[Alfred Grosser:] Like the British people in forty-five?

[Raymond Aron:] So if there is peace in Algeria, de Gaulle will have done the job. So there will be no necessity any more of the great man?

[Maurice Schumann:] Yes. You are both right. For a short time, he will enjoy such popularity that he will be able to start afresh. But he must start afresh.

[Raymond Aron:] What do you mean by that--another Prime Minister?

[Maurice Schumann:] I don’t mean only another Prime Minister, I mean a bolder social policy.

[Raymond Aron:] That’s obscure.

[Maurice Schumann:] A different--it’s not obscure--it’s uh-- said a bolder social policy.

[Raymond Aron:] Yes, yes--that’s too political for me.

[Maurice Schumann:] By which--that’s right, it wasn’t obscure, it was political. [laughter] A different thing altogether. A different European policy. Which is not quite so obscure is it?

[Raymond Aron:] Oh no, no, no. Quite clear. Quite clear.

[Maurice Schumann:] [Schumann laughs]A different European policy. And, uh finally, a different democratic style.

[Raymond Aron:] But why do you think that after--

[Maurice Schumann:] Larger powers for the Parliament.
Raymond Aron: --after twenty years, General de Gaulle should suddenly change his very personality?

Maurice Schumann: I don’t want the General to change his personality. However, I think that he’s quite able to change his views on uh certain points without changing in style. And he’s done it very, very, very many times. [Raymond Aron: But do you think--?] You don’t at the same time accuse him, as so many people do, of changing his views every day, and accuse him--

Alfred Grosser: No, no we don’t.

Raymond Aron: No, no.

Maurice Schumann: or even every year--and accusing him of not being able to change a bit over twenty years. It’s contradictory.

Alfred Grosser: Some-- sorry-- Some fundamental-- some fundamental things remain, especially the idea of de Gaulle that between the head of state and the people as such there is no place for intermediary bodies to play an active part like parties, unions, and so on. That is a completely different political style from what any contemporary democracy is trying to do.

Raymond Aron: I would like to intervene. We should not enter into a heavy discussion on de Gaulle. Because I believe that the big question that we all have in mind-- is after all the question which is put, I would say, all over the world by so many papers-- is there a danger of fascism in France? Because if there is a future democracy, is it a democracy of the Gaullist style with a very strong president with a very weak prime minister, or it’s back with a very strong prime minister and very weak president of the Republic, is quite interesting that it is to a large extent a secondary question in relation to the big question mark: is there a future for democracy in France?

And there is no paper in the world which has not put the question during the last years. And the question goes beyond Algeria and even beyond de Gaulle. And I would like to hear what you think about that.

Alfred Grosser: Can’t we demonstrate first that the dark future is perfectly possible, and then that we have a lot of reason to think that a bright future might be possible, too?

Maurice Schumann: Yes, but the two questions are linked. You refer to the intermediary powers. Each time I have had a conversation on that special point with General de Gaulle he never answered, never, that he was against all intermediary powers. [Unknown speaker: No.] He just questioned whether the so-called intermediary powers are truly representative or whether-- or whether future democracy was to give birth to new intermediary powers. Whether he is right or wrong is a different question altogether.

Raymond Aron: What sort of new--?

Maurice Schumann: For example, the last time I had a conversation with him on that special point, he questioned whether the parties--the four parties which met recently in uh in Paris, and you probably know, Mrs. Roosevelt, that meeting of the four older parties created a lot of havoc in Paris for a short time.

Raymond Aron: No, no.

Maurice Schumann: For a short time.

Alfred Grosser: What, the four parties of the Fourth Republic?

Maurice Schumann: That’s right. Exactly. Well, they questioned whether those four parties were still truly or entirely representative--which I personally think they are, to a certain extent--or whether the trade unions, for example, the students, I remember you referred to student organizations, or new associations
of that kind were not more representative of modern democracy than the older parties. This is a problem.

[Raymond Aron:] Yes, but I would say that these so-called new bodies or powers are more active, or have been more active in the recent years, because the parties were in a difficult position. They were in and out. They were active and dead, as they did not know exactly what to do, because General de Gaulle has nothing against them; but he does not feel any necessity to associate them. So you of the older parties of the Fourth Republic--because you belong at the same time to the Fourth--uh to the Fifth--[Maurice Schumann: I do?] you are asking yourself what to do. And when you say the students--I like very much my students, and I like to a certain extent the students’ organization--but I don’t believe they can play a very active role in organizing the state. They have to learn a little bit about it first, no?
[ER:] Perhaps not students, but young people play a very active role in every country today, don’t they?
[Maurice Schumann:] Oh yes!
[Stephane Hessel:] Wouldn’t-wouldn’t you say that at least one thing has been quite clear from the experiment of the Fifth Republic. And that is that the young generations in France do not wish to go back to the Fourth Republic institutions, to the kind of parliamentarism that has worked and, [Maurice Schumann: Oh [unclear]] let us be fair, has worked quite well, after all, but that has become uh completely disregarded as a possibility, I would say, to come back to. And that there is a need for new thinking on institutions regardless of whether it will be under the Fifth Republic--and let me say here to make it quite clear that I am of course speaking entirely as a private citizen and not at all as an official of that government--but uh that regardless of the fact whether it would be this Fifth Republic or any other, there will be no going back to the kind of parliamentarism that we knew?
[Raymond Aron:] May I say one word? We have a peculiarity in France, in that each time we change our regime we say, never go back to the previous one. So after the death of the Third Republic, there was a general motto, never go back to the Third. I am afraid that in the Fourth there was some elements of going back to the Third.

It’s not to say that there will be a return to the Fourth. I don’t think it’s probable. I don’t think it’s desirable in any way. But I would say, in a paradoxical way, that I am in favor of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, but applied in normal circumstances by more normal people [Unknown: hm!] . And in that case it may be a workable regime. We could try to apply a constitution once.

[Maurice Schumann:] When you refer to the present situation--and to the parties--

[Raymond Aron:] Mhm.

[Maurice Schumann:] You always forget one fact. Whether we like it or not, there is a new party, and a strong party which is called the UNR.

[Raymond Aron:] Yes.

[Maurice Schumann:] The Gaullist party. I don’t belong to that party.

[Raymond Aron:] No no.

[Maurice Schumann:] But it is a fact that this party does exist, and has practically, with the support of a certain number of members of parliament, a majority in the present National Assembly. We are so accustomed to parliaments with no majority at all that we can’t believe it. [Raymond Aron: Yes.] [ER laughs] That system is actually the English system. There is a majority in the parliament. And if there-if there was no majority in the present parliament, neither the president nor the government could last, because the government is responsible to the parliament, and because the president is--and directly responsible to the National Assembly. [Raymond Aron: If there were--] In other words, the democratic system is functioning now.
[Alfred Grosser:] In a certain way. If there were some of the young people you were alluding to listening to our conversation, I am not quite sure that they would think we are discussing the most vital points of French present and future life.

[Maurice Schumann:] That’s what we are going to do here.

[Raymond Aron:] May I say just one word about your very dangerous comparison between the French system and the British system. I would say, in Britain, they have a majority party and they have an opposition party. In the French parliament, we have now a majority party. I’m not quite sure we have a clear-cut opposition. And B--

[Maurice Schumann:] I couldn’t agree more.

[Raymond Aron:] Let me—let me finish. We have a majority party which got at the first ballot only about nineteen percent [Maurice Schumann: nineteen, yes.] of the votes. So the majority party in the British House is representative of the majority of the voters. In France, the majority party in the assembly is a representative of [Unknown: one-fifths] 20 percent of the voters. That’s a fact.

[Maurice Schumann:] No, 20 percent—no, it is not a fact. Because if we had the one ballot system the first ballot would have resulted in the same figures as the second ballot.

[Raymond Aron:] Let me quote to you the figures of the second ballot. How many votes got the UNR at the second ballot? 25 percent. And with 25 percent, they get almost a majority of the deputies. I do not say it’s bad: I say it’s different from Britain.

[Alfred Grosser:] Well, at the same time the Communist Party was approximately 20 percent of the first ballot, got ten seats. So we have, I think, whatever the constitutional system will be, to ask ourselves what will be in the new political structure the future of the 20 percent of those Communist voters. Whether France is going Fascist or not, they will still exist.

[Maurice Schumann:] The answer to that is that the only time since the end of the war when the Communist party lost votes—and lost a considerable number of votes--

[Raymond Aron:] And regained them after.

[Maurice Schumann:] lost a considerable number of votes, was the two referendums.

[Alfred Grosser:] Yes.

[Maurice Schumann:] When they had to choose between the Gaullist policy and the Communist Party’s policy they chose against their own party—many of them, not all of them, far from it—but the great proportion of them. Never did the fellow travellers or the leftist intelligentsia succeed into taking any vote back from the Communists. For example, in 1956—as we can remember—the so-called Republican Front—Premier Mendes-France and his associates—secured for themselves an important number of votes. But at the same time, the Communist party gained votes instead of losing any votes. On the contrary, de Gaulle was the only one who could take votes back from the Communists.

[Raymond Aron:] Yes, in a definite condition when there was a voting between for or against de Gaulle personally. But each time we went back to the ordinary voting for representatives. In the last months you have seen that the Communists regained the votes that they had lost when it was a question of being for or
against one man. And as you well know, a referendum of a plebiscite is different in nature of voting from an ordinary election.

[Maurice Schumann:] Just what I meant. That’s why-[Raymond Aron: But--] that’s why I think that direct democracy is probably a better fight-- a better way to fight communism peacefully than any other.

[Raymond Aron:] What do you mean by direct democracy?

[Alfred Grosser:] That another personality after de Gaulle will have the same political sex appeal as de Gaulle to attract Communist votes.

[Maurice Schumann:] Ah, at last the rude question--the real question. That’s why, Mrs. Roosevelt, as you probably know, the president wants his successor to be elected directly by the people. That’s at the same time the answer to Raymond Aron’s question. Now the president is not being elected by the people.

[ER:] That would mean greater democracy in the vote.

[Maurice Schumann:] Thank you for your appreciation, Mrs. Roosevelt! It settles the question, greater democracy.

[Raymond Aron:] Just a minute, just a minute. this raises a question--[laughter]

[Alfred Grosser:] [Unclear terms] more like the American system.

[ER:] It is the American system.

[Raymond Aron:] It is not the American system. Because in America, there is no right of dissolution of the Congress by the president. If you had the election of the president by universal suffrage, plus the right of dissolution, you are no more in a democratic system. You cannot combine both without going outside any democratic system. So if de Gaulle proposes the election of the president of the Republic by universal suffrage, and accept that the Congress should not be dissolved by the President, I’m all for this tentative. I’m not quite sure it’s the right one, but in any case I would accept it. But if he wants to retain the present power, plus direct election, that’s going too far.

[Maurice Schumann:] And anyway-anyway, it doesn’t concern himself, since he is saying that his successor was to be elected by the people. So far as he is concerned, he is being practical.

[Alfred Grosser:] I am not quite sure that he will not be the successor of General de Gaulle.

[Maurice Schumann:] I hope he will! (29:56)

[ER:] I have to be the American public, and it looks to me as I look at this that it’s still a very complicated question. And when you deal purely with the political side of France that you still depend largely on what will happen in Algiers. You are still in a state of movement, let us say.

[Raymond Aron:] Yes, quite right.

[ER:] And I wonder if there isn’t another picture that you want to talk a little about for a little while, which is brighter perhaps than the political picture. If there isn’t um an economic and social side to all of this which ought to be considered in this context am I right in thinking that that should come up and is perhaps a brighter picture?
[Alfred Grosser:] Yes-- no I think that especially there has been a kind of intellectual revolution about economics and about social problems. And that’s--

ER: Well, of course it’s a revolution in the world.

[Alfred Grosser:] No, and that was the first time in France, for instance, that people who were qualified as a rightist are not only speaking about balanced budget and the people who were on the left are not only speaking about repartition of the social product but both are speaking of terms of production, modernization, rationalization of production and so on. And the young people who are speaking about uh are by far more interested, for instance a young peasant and the farmers, about productivity, about how not to deal with agriculture as their fathers have done-- that is just to ask the state to give more help, but to transform completely their way of living and here I think we have a true revolution in the last ten years in France. (31:42)

[Maurice Schumann:] There’s not the slightest doubt about the fact that the economic picture is very bright. And if it were not bright, I shouldn’t have taken, in the long run, uh the optimistic view of the political situation which I took. If on the top of all the rest, we had for example a recession and unemployment. Then I wonder what would happen, don’t you agree? (32:04)

[Raymond Aron:] Yes, we agreed so much that we were inclined to forget about it. [ER laughs] Because, after all, it’s much less interesting to discuss about the points we are in agreement about --and we are in full agreement about A, the great change in the French economic system since the war, about the quick tempo of expansion, about the fact that France is going into the industrial time full speed--so uh the quite interesting fact is the combination of this acute political crisis and this profound prosperity of the nation.

And I would say for a sociologist, it is almost the first experience of that kind. Because, uh after all, all the Fascist experiments between the two wars did happen at a time of acute economic crisis. Here we are in France, in a pure form, a political crisis without real economic background. Of course, here and there in certain classes of the nation there may be protest against modernization. But on the whole I would say that 80 to 90 percent of the French population is feeling the results of economic progress. And still political turmoil is there.

[Maurice Schumann:] Political turmoil because of Algeria, that’s one more reason why there is no real Fascist danger.

[Alfred Grosser:] No, but I think that even on the ideological level, it is practically ambivalent. You can predict, looking at the Common Market, which has been accepted in a marvelous way by French public opinion --nobody, even the most optimistic had thought that it would be accepted and so easily--you can predict a kind of oven-door ideological attitude and--open-door attitude. And from Algeria, you can predict that there might be a kind of xenophobic reaction to the loss of Algeria with a lot of nationalistic resentment. Both developments are possible.

[Stephane Hessel:] I-I think-- I very much agree with that. I think it’s very important to consider that if France goes through the process of decolonization, which is so difficult for any country, and which after all, France has gone through not-not as badly as one might have feared, although with some bravure--

[Maurice Schumann:] It was a great success.

[ER:] But very successfully in many cases.
[Stephane Hessel:] In many cases quite successfully, I think. Yet there is, of course, a coming-up of nationalistic feeling in such a situation. And since we entered the European adventure right at the same moment, it may be a sort of case of loss of personality for the French people as such. And if they do not recapture it by some new approach, not so much through institutions perhaps, but through a new form of democratic life—that I think is very important. And here I think French people, the young generation in France, tends to look far more to America for interesting experiments there as it did, I think, in the past decade. We are interested in what the new American administration will promote and do. And we believe that it is not because America has a-a system of institutions and of economic institutions that are very different from those of France, but we cannot take interesting examples and experiments from there. This I think is a new fact.

[ER:] You have some of the same difficulties that we have. For instance, you have difficulties, I think, that are even worse than ours, in housing, for instance—at present.

[Raymond Aron:] Yes. But don’t you believe that in spite of everything the nationalistic feeling will remain in a minority and that the European ideology has taken very strong roots in France? [Stephane Hessel, Alfred Grosser, and Maurice Schumann: yes.] And I would say that an immense majority of the new generation will not go back to the rather stupid nationalism of conquest and colonies and will go—[Maurice Schumann: Yes, that’s true.] advance in the direction of something new and not go back to something old and dead. And, of course, there is a possible danger coming from a minority of people repatriated from Algeria. Something may happen in the coming years. I am normally saying it will take ten years and digest Algeria, in one way and another way in France. But, after all, it’s a very short period for a nation.

[Alfred Grosser:] And I think that especially there, there is a kind of cut between generations that had not existed between the preceding ones. Normally in France the inheritance of ideological quarrels has remained from generation to generation. I think maybe for the first time, through technical transformation, and so on, the young generation is not identifying itself with the ideological quarrels of the preceding ones, [Maurice Schumann: Yes.] and looking more to future than to past ideological division.

[Maurice Schumann:] But, at the same time, I think Monsieur Hessel gave us the deep reason why General de Gaulle is against European integration. You probably know that there is one point upon which I disagree with him in principle, but I can understand his point, especially after what you have said. At the same time, uh decolonizing and going to the very end of the decolonizing process, and at the same time merging French personality into the United States of Europe, is probably ask too much—to ask for too much, any man of seventy, even if he is a genius, [laughter] and especially when he has spent most of his life in the army.

[Raymond Aron:] Do you believe “merging personality” is a right expression, even for integration, even for the very cautious integration which General de Gaulle refuses? Merging of personalities—a marvelous expression, but certainly romantic.

[ER:] I think it’s also in peace—

[Alfred Grosser:] Yes.

[Maurice Schumann:] Well, it is not romantic. I was just—I was just trying to explain his deep feeling about the problem.

[Raymond Aron:] The French losing the sense of their personality.
[Maurice Schumann:] But you know-you know very well that if your interpretation is right, nobody will be more pleased about it than I. [Laughter]

[Alfred Grosser:] I think the difficulty is quite easy to explain. We are since fifteen years required by our friends, especially the Americans, not to be nationalistic in Europe and to practice European integration and at the same time to show deep understanding for nationalism in Africa and Asia. [Raymond Aron: Yes.] And it’s not always easy for the average Frenchman to follow both at the same time.

[Raymond Aron:] Yes, but it’s not impossible to reconcile these great contradictions.

[Alfred Grosser:] That’s not true.

[Raymond Aron:] with a small of degree of dialectic, it scores very well. You may say that uh nationalism in Africa and Asia is a phenomenon of the nineteenth century, and by good luck, Europe has the nineteenth century behind it. So the nationalism of the small states is perhaps a necessary phase in the development of the new states. But it’s certainly not a very hopeful prospect for the future. So we may recover a sort of pride of being beyond nationalism [Maurice Schumann: but--] by retaining national consciousness.

[Alfred Grosser:] but--

[Maurice Schumann:] The implication of what you said seems to be that the uh United States of Europe can be built up without integration.

[Raymond Aron, Maurice Schumann, and Alfred Grosser overlap]

[Raymond Aron:] What do you mean by that? No, no, no, certainly not.

[Maurice Schumann:] Let us discuss what you mean.

[Alfred Grosser:] If we start-- If we start discussing exactly what integration means, I think we should need at least one more hour. [Maurice Schumann: yes, but--] I prefer by far to come to what Mr. Hessel has said about the Americanization in the good sense of French people [Maurice Schumann: but those questions aren’t easy-- ] [Unknown speaker: No, not quite.] . But to counter-attack on the part--on the point which has to deal with Europe, too. Our American friends should know that all those young people we are speaking about are violently against the free enterprise ideology. (40:02)

[Raymond Aron:] No, no. I don’t agree.

[Alfred Grosser:] No, no. because the idea of revolution--

[Raymond Aron:] They don’t like the word, “free enterprise.”

[Alfred Grosser:] Yes, they like free enterprise--

[Maurice Schumann:] But they love the thing. [laughter]

[Alfred Grosser:] No, no. Aspects--
Stephane Hessel: This, I think, is very important, this question of words. If I may interrupt you one minute, I think the real revolution in France is not so much a revolution of institutions or any such thing, but it’s a revolution of terminology, of words. France--you said that Europe has had its nineteenth century behind it and I quite agree with you. But it hasn’t yet evolved its terminology for the twentieth century. And in that new terminology I think words like ‘responsible participation’ play a far greater role than those of ideologies or isms of any kind, even, I would think, greater than the fight between free enterprise and controlled state-planning.

[Alfred Grosser:] No, that’s besides what I mean. When I say--it is a sense of political responsibility, the idea of people that you have to participate in the organization of the economic future of the nation. That means participation, too, with provision to--

[Maurice Schumann:] Planning and free enterprise.

[Alfred Grosser:] Yes, exactly.

[Maurice Schumann:] And not planning against free enterprise.

[Raymond Aron:] Yes, in any case, free enterprise is rather an English expression. I don’t know exactly what you mean in French by that.

[Alfred Grosser:] But the idea of planning, of provision, you find really everywhere where you have the young--younger generation organizing its own future.

[ER:] [unclear terms]

[Maurice Schumann:] A Roosevelt revolution, a New Deal, that’s what we are.

[ER:] It really is a facing of the modern situations of the--of what has been created in the world as a whole. You have to have planning because you couldn’t meet it otherwise. And so I think that’s what we’re now discussing really, where France--France’s influencing Europe, and I can’t imagine that you gentlemen really believe that France could lose her personality at any time. I can’t uh see that. It would always seem to me that France’s personality was much too strong to be merged, even though many other things were merged.

[Raymond Aron:] Yes, I fully agree with that.

[ER:] And now I would like to--you fully agree with that, all of you. But I do think that there--that because of the personality the influence is very great of France. And I notice, for instance, in the United Nations now that the influence with the colonies that have become free is greater I think than it ever was. It’s-it’s a tremendous feeling of-of association.

[Maurice Schumann:] yeah.

[Alfred Grosser:] it is since the French former French African states uh in Manhattan that the French language is again really used as a second language in Manhattan. The pity is--and that is a major difficulty with de Gaulle’s foreign policy--that we have brought those countries to United Nations, asked them to enter, and then we have said this institution hasn’t any value.

[Maurice Schumann:] We’ve got different reasons to say that. And anyway, we’ll join them one day, don’t you worry.
Well, I hope you’ll join them with the realization of how much you can do and they can do. Because--

Raymond Aron:] I would say a word about that. It would be completely wrong to believe that the end of the colonies is the end of French influence in Africa. [Maurice Grosser: yeah.] We all belong here to the school which was convinced that to lose was to win, and the so-called “loss of colony” was a conquest of good-will and influence of the future. It may be that in certain parts of what was the colonial empire in the past the loss is a complete loss because the way in which independence came was such that it was impossible to maintain a part of our presence. But in Africa south of the Sahara I would say the decolonization has been a great success. And I would even say, with some doubt but some hope, that it’s not yet demonstrated that decolonization in North Africa is a complete failure. [Maurice Schumann: of course not!] [Alfred Grosser: No!] It is not and the last word has not been said.

[Maurice Schumann:] May I say that there are nine thousand French teachers in Morocco and three thousand French officials in the Moroccan government, the Moroccan administration, rather.

[Alfred Grosser:] And to speak in very cynical terms of money, the expenses of the French budget in 1961 for overseas--independent overseas, one is--about 5 percent of the budget is about 1.2 percent of the French national gross product. That is by far more than what United States do in the foreign help. And to add even--one more, what gives us an advantage in Africa compared with the United nation-- uh States is that sometimes United States appear as being present only because there is a Communist danger. In African states, former French colonies, there is a kind of common view, the language first, and then a lot of cultural, technical, economic understanding, and the influence is greater than before decolonization.

[Maurice Schumann:] Do you understand better now, Mrs. Roosevelt, why I was taking a rather optimistic view of the final outcome of the Algerian problem? You used the word ‘association’ yourself, and it’s been illustrated by all of my friends here.

[Stephane Hessel:] And this, I think, really shows that we are at a very crucial moment, because if this process of decolonization on Algeria gets through, then I really think that the whole vocation of France to be a country of international cooperation and assistance and training for the underdeveloped world will come out. And I already believe that it is one of the things on which young people in France are extremely, keenly interested and quite ready to put their conviction, their-their-their faith, into an arrangement of that kind, a great work of the kind of helping train the future elites of these new, developing countries.

[Alfred Grosser:] Yes, but on the other side, you need public help that is on one side a kind of pedagogy of foreign help that means that the other tendency that is perfectly present in French public opinion, we keep everything for ourselves and develop only the metropolitan France will be fought [Stephane Hessel: capitalist--] against. And secondly that the government itself expands, is ready to put into the budget a lot of means, that we have generally more technicians, teachers, professors, and so on, because we need them badly in metropolitan France, too. And what the African states ask we are not ready, we are not able to give it, because we haven’t enough people.

[ER:] That is the same everywhere.

[Alfred Grosser:] It’s the same thing in the United States.

[ER:] Same thing in the United States. But you would have--
[Maurice Schumann:] We cannot have it both ways.

[Raymond Aron:] I would say a word about that. I am feeling intensely the contradiction between the two parts of our discussion, because on one side we are fundamentally optimistic about the long-term future of France. We are all convinced that if, by a miracle, the Algerian problem would be settled--

[Maurice Schumann:] Not by a miracle, thanks to de Gaulle’s entire--

[Raymond Aron:] Yes, yes, that’s in your personal profession, but, okay, let’s say by miracle of de Gaulle, the Algerian problem is settled, there would be no obstacle on the road towards a future for France. And we would be able not only to build a new Europe but to diffuse European influence with the world. But at the same time we are also intensely conscious of the tragedy which a small minority, obstinate, unable to understand, is able to provoke in France. And I would like that no single element of this antinomy should be forgotten because it is perfectly true that the present situation may become tragic but it’s also perfectly true that if there would be a tragedy it would be the most absurd of French history, because it would be a tragedy without meaning, because it’s perfectly clear the role we must choose, and there is an immense majority in France determined to choose it. But still there is a violent minority. (48:45)

[Maurice Schumann:] In any case, the last word will not rest with absurdity.

[Alfred Grosser:] Well--

[ER:] Well now I think there’s one thing that should be--a word should be said about the American public, and that is the nuclear striking force which you believe in here. Because you--

[Raymond Aron and Alfred Grosser:] No!

[Maurice Schumann:] Which I believe in! [laughter]

[Raymond Aron:] Let us say in which General de Gaulle believes, with the support of some political men and with the opposition of a majority of the--

[Maurice Schumann:] Yes, well, here I entirely disagree. [unclear words] I’ll tell you why. I belong to the French government, which during the Fourth Republic, ten years ago, [Raymond Aron: yes. That’s very true.] decided to build up the striking force. It’s got nothing to do, absolutely nothing to do with de Gaulle [Raymond Aron: yes.]. And on that special point, de Gaulle is just carrying on [Raymond Aron: Maybe.] with-the decisions which had been taken far before. Long before--

[Maurice Schumann and Raymond Aron Overlap, some crosstalk]

[Raymond Aron:] Not on the fourth republic. Not entirely.

[Maurice Schumann:] Entirely, entirely.[Unknown speaker: Just a minute] I know better, I was a member of the government. It’s got nothing to do with de Gaulle but it’s got a lot to do with American legislation.

[ER:] Oh. Now, that’s the point I’d like you to explain to the American people.

[Raymond Aron:] I would just say first that what Maurice Schumann is saying is perfectly right. The decision to produce the atomic bomb was taken by governments of the Fourth Republic [Maurice Schumann: yes, that’s right.]; possibly the first one to decide it was Mendes-France. [Unknown speaker:
But there was an absolute continuity during the Fourth Republic, and every government has taken the decision to build the bomb. But certainly it’s also true that the Loi-programme as a framework, law, for national defense was never approved by the parliament last year, and that one of the main reasons of the opposition of the majority of the parliament was the organization of the striking force. You may say that the deputies were opposed to the law because they knew that in any case the law would be adopted. [Maurice Schumann: of course.] That is an interpretation. But it is also true as a fact that there was no majority in the Assembly to ratify it.

[Maurice Schumann:] It was only-- The situation was slightly different from the situation which Raymond Aron describes. In fact, the motion of censureship was never voted; it was always rejected. And the reason why it secured a rather important number of votes was that through the striking force, through the so-called striking force, many members of parliament were expressing their lack of confidance into de Gaulle’s foreign policy and European policy at large. [Unknown speaker: Yes.] But if there had been a clear-cut vote on the striking force, no member of any of the Fourth Republic parties would have been able to vote against it because otherwise they would have voted against themselves.

[Raymond Aron:] No, no, no. that’s not true. It’s too complicated to discuss.

[Crosstalk]

[Alfred Grosser:] It’s too complicated to discuss. But just to add one point about the striking force, to relate [Maurice Schumann: They would have voted against it themselves.] it to Africa. Coming back from Africa, I get quite the impression that it is one of the most destroying forces of French policy in Africa.

[Maurice Schumann:] Simply because it hasn’t been explained yet. But as soon as it is --as it has been explained, the impression is different. And I can tell you you’re wrong, since the last-- since there was in Madagascar two and a half years ago a discussion of that special point with all the prime ministers of the African states. And they all understood the point. What is the point? The point is, as I said, American legislation. American legislation says, under federal law, that you can’t share the atomic secrets unless you’ve reached, off your own back, by yourself, substantial progress. Well, we’re just trying to fill the conditions without which we shall never be full partners because you can’t be full partners in the world as it is if you don’t share the nuclear secrets.

[Raymond Aron:] Yes. I would say one other word which is in my view extremely important. There are very deep disagreements between the French on the question of the atomic striking force. But I am vastly convinced that it is a great illusion in America, even among the advisors of the president, to admit for one minute that the French government, and tomorrow the other European governments, would accept to leave the monopoly of the atomic force to the United States, with just [Unknown speaker: What did --] the association of the privileged Great Britain. If you want to have a common atomic policy for the future, you must explain more clearly what you expect from Europe, and not believe that the rest of the world will accept as trustees of atomic power the United States on one side and the Soviet Union on the other side, with just Britain somewhere in between. And whatever our disagreements may be, on that point, I am sure, that all Frenchmen would agree.

[Maurice Schumann:] In other words, the atomic striking force is not a real bone of contention between us.

[Raymond Aron:] That is an extreme politicization. [laughter] Very good for parliament, disputable for education.
[Alfred Grosser:] No, but I think it’s true in the sense that for our American auditors, it’s important to know that it is not agreeable for the Europeans to see their very lives in the hands just of the push-button possibility of the American president. And I think, that so, we come to a very agreeable conclusion that is we don’t know what the future of France will be—(laughter)—that we are perfectly ready in the future, as Raymond Aron said at the beginning, to demonstrate that it couldn’t happen otherwise. Because we have all the elements to show that the Algerian situation—that the consequences of the Algerian situation—can lead us to a lot of political turmoil, a lot of political trouble, even with some threat of a purely authoritarian, dictatorial regime.

On the other side, that the general outlooks on economics, on what young French people—organized French people especially want uh leads us to be extraordinarily optimistic, perhaps by far more, than if we had discussed it in the interwar period; and that the opening to the outside world, especially to Europe and to Africa, is enormous. And the last point of the conversation has showed us how far American policy has responsibilities too in the future of France. So that the auditors, for whom we are speaking, to whom we are speaking, are co-responsible with us for the future of France.

[ER:] I think that um is a very interesting summary. And I, again, I think will have to take the point of view of the American public and say that I am extremely grateful for your willingness, gentlemen, to elucidate for us many of the questions that I think um are extremely important for the American public to understand. We have a traditional love of France. And um that goes back to Lafayette. [ER laughs] But we have also, I think, great misunderstanding in the last few years. And I’m very happy [Theme music begins 56:36] that we should have this program. And um I hope that it will mean a great deal in the understanding at home. And now I want to thank each and every one of you, Mr. Hessel, Mr. Schumann, and you Mr. Aron, and Professor Grosser, for having been with us and tell you that I hope this will be one of the really uh milestones in greater understanding in our country. And now, until our next program, I will say au revoir to the audience. (57:13)

[As announcer speaks, film rotates through images related to the announcer’s comments]

[Unknown announcer 1:] [Speaking while names appear on credit sequence] Maurice Schumann is Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly. Raymond Aron is France’s leading political commentator. Stephane Hessel is a director and founder of an important French political discussion group. Alfred Grosser is Professor of Political Science at the University of Paris. Next month the subject of discussion for Mrs. Roosevelt and her guests will be “Europe: Rival or Partner.” Her guests will be Robert Marjolin, Vice President of the European Economic Community, Albert Kervyn, of the Belgian Planning Unit, Kenneth Younger, Director General of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and Edwin Dale, of The New York Times.

This program was recorded in Paris through the facilities of Radiodiffusion Television Francaise. [Theme music ends 58:50.]

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[Unknown announcer 2: This is NET, National Educational Television]