

THE ELEANOR ROOSEVELT PROGRAM

June 4th, 1951

Description: In the opening segment, ER and Elliott Roosevelt respond to a listener's question regarding the role of economic sanctions in the United Nations. In the following segment, ER's guests, Brigadier General C. T. Lanham, Colonel Lionel Cross, and Lt. Colonel Jean Brice de Bary, discuss their roles in SHAPE, or the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.

Participants: ER, Elliott Roosevelt, Brigadier General C. [Charles] T. [Trueman] Lanham, Colonel Lionel Cross, Lt. Colonel Jean Brice de Bary

[ER:] How do you do? This is Eleanor Roosevelt speaking to you from Europe, where I am attending the meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Commission.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] It is with a great deal of pride and pleasure that we present today the first of two programs, recorded especially for your listening at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; SHAPE, as it is popularly called, General Eisenhower's headquarters here in Paris. We're going to take a few moments first to have a discussion between ourselves and we hope you'll- which we hope you'll find interesting. And we'll come to it as soon as we've heard what our sponsors have to say today.

[Break 0:51-1:00]

[Elliott Roosevelt:] And now Mother, for our mail answering discussion, the subject today comes from Mrs. George L. Parker of Niantic, Connecticut . She writes: "Your most interesting program is a source of education on vital issues and very helpful to anyone trying to understand our present situation. Have you ever discussed the role of economic sanctions in the United Nations? If so, I missed it, and if not, would you do so? It seems to a housewife who doesn't know much about such things that here is a force which is non-violent yet tremendous, and I wonder why the United Nations does not invoke its use. Would it cripple the economic situation of the nations who do not send goods to the nation being punished? Would it be less expensive than war, or would it simply provoke war? If this question cannot be included in your discussions, would it be too much trouble to suggest that I could wri-- uh-uh- what I could read to inform myself? Thank you for the privilege of writing you and for the vital service you perform for all women by representing the best in achievement, including the award from the Ch-Charm Institute presented to you today."

[ER:] Well, that's a very kind letter, and she's asked an interesting question. Sanctions-- economic sanctions, of course, are a power, and they've just been invoked in the war with communist China by the United Nations. They have just uh received a unanimous vote practically, except with the Russian bloc left out, [Elliott Roosevelt: Yeah.] um to uh put economic sanctions onto China. But, of course, with the Russian bloc left out um, that leaves a tremendous hole so that your sanctions uh won't be as effective as they would otherwise have been. And um it has always been envisioned, if possible, that one would isolate an aggressor, and not uh--and be able to really use economic sanctions very quickly and very effectively because it would just be one person. As it now is, you have with the aggressor uh a group of nations because they happen to have the same ideology and they happen uh to want to hang together. Now um it's particularly complicated by the fact that the people who are really aiding hold to a fiction that uh, while they will talk about how badly we treat uh communist China and how illegal many things are, um they of course do many illegal things because they are uh not neutral for a minute [ER laughs]. And they supply on the other side as much as they possibly can, and so that in this case, we will not have a

clear-cut case of what all-out imposition of sanctions on one aggressor might mean. And I've always hoped that if that ever did happen, we would find it a very effective weapon. [Elliott Roosevelt: Mhm.] Uh but um at the present time uh I can't say that uh I think we're going to get a complete answer to that question.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Mhm. Well uh, I feel that uh economic sanctions could very seriously uh affect the entire Chinese uh war, for the very simple reason that it would place upon the Soviet Union and the satellite nations the necessity of providing all of the raw materials required for the Chinese to carry on the battle. (5:04)

[ER:] Well, I hope that we're going to find that, I hope that it's uh going to prove that they were getting enough from other sources to make a very real difference. Now on the part of the question as to whether asking the other nations to accept a policy which restricted their trade naturally and-and had a repercussion on their economy, um I'm not an economist, therefore uh I can't give you in detail what the effect might be, but I doubt if it will seriously upset any country's economy because um there is always a possibility eh of planning when you go into a situation of this kind, to take up that slack and divert those things, because much came back from China. Well now you will look to get what was in China or in the China trade from other areas, and you will try to distribute it so that any country which is very much hit um will not suffer [Elliott Roosevelt: Yes, disproportionately.] uh so as to upset the whole economic balance [Elliott Roosevelt coughs] of the world.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Well, I have uh one question that is um--has been occurring uh more and more frequently in my conversations with people. They feel that [Jawaharlal] Nehru [1889-1964] and the Indian government has uh definitely uh been uh pro the Chinese communists and that they have been a very bad element in uh- uh in the entire picture as far as bringing the Chinese to task so that they will sit down and negotiate for a peace. I wish you'd express your views on that.

[ER:] Well, I don't think that's entirely true. I think we have to realize in the first place that Nehru is opposed to all military uh action of any kind. It is true that they are um uh supporting a considerable military um armament program, but primarily for what we would consider almost a civil war, the war between Pakistan and India, [Elliott Roosevelt: Yes.] uh because that's an immediate uh thing and it touches their emotions. But I think Nehru himself believes that you should not have any kind of force used where possible. I also feel that we have to reckon with the fact that there has been uh a history of centuries of uh intercourse and mutual support between India and China. That uh their- they would be much quicker to accept uh a new government in China regardless of its um uh [Elliott Roosevelt: Ideology.] communist ideology because they've been very close to the difficulties of China. They know uh that for years China has struggled for reforms which they themselves have struggled for, and are now under their own government trying bitterly because they find it very hard, and are not succeeding very well, to achieve for themselves.

Now they know that that really is at the basis um of what the Chinese people want. Um they as a people, in China, have decided that they will get it, or a few people who seized leadership have decided they will get it with communist aid and under communist doctrine. Um I'm afraid many of us fear that it's just another disillusionment coming to the Chinese people, that they may have bread for a little while, but it'll be bread without freedom, [Elliott Roosevelt: Mhm.] and the Chinese people have a tradition of freedom. [Elliott Roosevelt: Yes.] But uh nevertheless, that's what they think they have, and without a question, that's a big factor in India's attitude. They feel that um they have great sympathy with the strivings and they're not as upset by the fact that they temporarily seem to be turned uh to communists. They think it's temporary. Now I don't know whether temporary and you don't know whether it's temporary, but you have to understand Nehru's background and the history between those two countries uh to look at the present situation with a little more patience [Elliott Roosevelt: Yes.] than we would look at ordinary situations.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] I'd like to just-- we have just a few seconds left -- I'd like to ask you, are there any particular books that would help to inform one on this subject?

[ER:] Well, there are books written by Nehru. All of them, I think, are valuable to read. Now I don't know about other books, but I- there are a number of books that Nehru himself has written that are well worth reading in the present situation.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Well, thank you very much, I'm sorry we haven't got any further time for this section of the program, so we'll go on to another part of our program in just a minute.

[Break 10:42-10:52]

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Today Mrs. Roosevelt and I are in Paris, and through the courtesy and cooperation of Radiodiffusion Française, the French broadcasting company, you will hear the first of two very exciting broadcasts. But I'll let Mrs. Roosevelt tell you about it. Mother, will you now introduce your guest please?

[ER:] With pleasure, Elliott. More and more throughout the civilized world, people are becoming information minded. But what actually is public information? Why does an army, a navy, an air force, a Supreme Allied Headquarters, have a staff section devoted to public information? Why should SHAPE, the most unusual multinational coalition in history, need public information? To answer these questions, I've invited Brigadier General C. T. Lanham [1902-1978], chief of SHAPE Public Information. [ER clears throat] To the soldiers of the famous 22nd Infantry Regiment of the United States Army who fought under him in France, he was known as Buck Lanham. General Lanham has brought with him his British deputy, Colonel Lionel Cross, and a French officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jean Brice de Bary, chief of the SHAPE News Division. And now first, General Lanham, would you tell us just what is the work you're setting out to do with SHAPE under the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General of the Army, Eisenhower?

[Charles T. Lanham:] Well, Mrs. Roosevelt, uh our job in the public information division of SHAPE is to see that the free people of the free world are kept fully informed of all transactions that take place at SHAPE; that is those transactions that uh are not uh hedged in by security considerations. In fact I might say that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself will stand or fall on that concept. General Eisenhower, for example, has pointed out more than once that this great alliance of ours must rest on a foundation of fact and understanding, and it's this that we seek to provide. For without these, there cannot conceivably be that mutual confidence and that public support that this coalition must have if it is to survive. Truth and understanding, then, must be the very cement of this alliance. (13:35)

[ER:] Well that is, I think, perfectly true, General Lanham, [coughing] but uh do these- how-how do these principles relate to your work in public information?

[Charles T. Lanham:] Well, if you mean the actual process by which we spread [ER: Yes.] the information --

[ER:] How can you know it? [Charles T. Lanham: Mrs. Roosevelt--] How do you spread it out to people?

[Charles T. Lanham:] Well, we spread it out here in-in Paris via the correspondents, and there are a great many of them in Paris. [Elliott Roosevelt and ER laugh] There are more than uh more than four hundred here, and that is a most inaccurate uh count. And they represent the press of the entire world. Not only the great news services, but the uh broadcasting companies, television, radio, so forth. Now it's with these people that we deal. They're really the eyes and the ears of the free world and the guardians of our liberty.

As a matter of fact, if you boil it down to its final essence, I suppose that that is one of the reasons that SHAPE came into existence: to defend this, perhaps the greatest of our freedoms. (14:46)

[ER:] Well now, you spoke a few minutes ago about military security, and, of course, I suppose that all of these gentlemen who are the press and the information people of the world know all about that. But um I don't think the general public knows much about uh-uh what military security really means, so I wonder if you'd explain that, General Lanham.

[Charles T. Lanham:] Well, to try to do it briefly uh may be a bit difficult, Mrs. Roosevelt, but I'll tell you this: in my opinion uh military security has sometimes been abused by military headquarters -- not very often and certainly not as much abused as some people think. As a matter of fact, I think that a glance any day at our newspapers will show that more often than not, if a mistake is made, it's made the other way.

[ER:] I have a feeling it's made very much the other way, very often! [ER laughs]

[Charles T. Lanham:] I think so too. Now actually uh, by military security, I would say that that [coughing] refers to those matters that would compromise our military advantage if they fell into the hands of a potential [coughing] [term unclear], and such matters as that much obviously be safeguarded, not only in our national interests, but in the international interests in which we all work today. As a matter of uh as a matter of interest to the general public, these uh security matters have divided into the following classifications: the lowest of all is restricted. That simply means it cannot be published. The next step up is confidential, which means that uh-uh that fewer people see it. Then secret, then top-secret, and very occasionally, there is one that is marked eyes-only, which means that only the most important people can see it, and it's carried by senior officers from hand to hand. This has given rise incidentally, Mrs. Roosevelt, to some wisecrack to the effect that the highest of all categories is marked "burn before reading." [All laugh]

[ER:] Well, I've had some sad experiences when um- with top-secret. I've had some top-secret papers handed to me and then seen them --practically everything in them -- in the papers the next day! [ER and Charles T. Lanham laugh] And I've wondered sometimes just how that happens when they were kept apparently under lock and key, so I'm very much interested in um how you do it, [Charles T. Lanham: Of course, you know--] and I'm interested in one other thing, and that is: how do you differentiate between military and political matters. And how is political security, for instance, handled? [Elliott Roosevelt laughs] Is it forced into the hands of the military? [All laugh] (17:38)

[Charles T. Lanham:] Mrs. Roosevelt, that's a very tough question at this time. Uh let me- let me state-state it this way. I think just about everyone in the world knows General Eisenhower, and I'm certain that they all know his views on these matters. This headquarters that General Eisenhower has set up here is like all of his headquarters: it's a military headquarters, and not a political one. Now, needless to say, everyone in his headquarters is intimately aware of the fact that virtually any decision taken here, no matter how minor it is, has its political aspect. But they are not made in a political vacuum. There are many civilian agencies that sit on top of General Eisenhower. There's the North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself, there's the North Atlantic Council, as you know, there's the council deputies, uh and various other organizations of that sort in the North Atlantic Treaty structure. And matters that affect the governments of these countries, politically, are decided there. General Eisenhower's decisions are taken purely in the military sphere. Now that does not mean to say, Mrs. Roosevelt, that our good friends the correspondents do not address questions to us that are loaded, and that are chock full of political implications. Those matters we quite frankly cannot handle, and do not attempt to handle them, and we refer them to the proper agencies, which are--

[ER:] Well, I just wonder if they can always be recognized, because I've had long experience with correspondents, and I [ER laughs] sometimes think it quite hard to recognize what's behind the question. (19:24)

[Charles T. Lanham:] It's becoming uh it's-it's a very difficult thing to recognize in here, Mrs. Roosevelt. Not from the point of view of the correspondents so much, as it is just from our own point of view. Of course with twelve nations, uh the difficulties are multiplied twelve times. What might not be considered political in my frame of reference, as a United States citizen, might well be in Colonel de Bary's here, or in Colonel Cross, from the United Kingdom. So that uh every one of these things has to be examined; often, I admit, to the discomfiture of our good friends the press, who think that we are being too reticent or too shy.

[ER:] Well, I'd like to know uh-I-I know that Colonel de Bary speaks perfect English, but you have other languages, uh I imagine, that you have to um-to know. Do you ever have problems that arise purely out of the different understanding in languages? Even with our British friends sometimes words uh mean two different things. [Lionel Cross laughs] I always remember a soldier in-in '42 who told me in England, yes, he'd liked the British; yes, he'd had a good time; sometimes he had difficulty in understanding what they meant. When I said how, he said, well, he was talking to a guy the other day, and he talked about a flat, and he thought of course it had to do with his tire. He found out it was a place in London! [ER and Lionel Cross laugh] So that's one of my favorite stories, I've told it many times. But uh I've just wondered, because I often have such difficulty with translations, and I wondered if you didn't have uh particularly with your various correspondents that must come from different areas--?

[Charles T. Lanham:] I wonder if you would answer that, Lionel.

[Lionel Cross:] Yes, certainly, Mrs. Roosevelt. Since I've been here, I've found this difficulty very real. I've very often had to translate American into English, and English back into American. [All laugh] And when you think that we've got officers of nine different countries here, you can see that- the difficulties we're up against. Actually, we-we have had, more or less, to lay down that everything in SHAPE is conducted in the two languages of English and French, and we're gradually getting, I think, everybody to speak one or other of those languages. Uh the var-various British and American officers are taking French lessons, and the French officers are taking English lessons. I'll tell you-uh give you a small illustration of something that happened in our own division the other day: We had a charming young Italian sailor report to us who didn't speak a word of-of English or French, nothing except his own language. We've also got a very good yeoman in the US Navy. The yeoman took a liking to the Italian boy, took him in hand, and now, only about three weeks later, he can speak really very reasonable English and is a valuable international member of our staff. [All laugh]

[Elliott Roosevelt:] That's a wonderful story, Mother, and uh I'd like to come back to more of these stories in just a moment. We'll pause to hear from our announcer, and then we'll come right back to this most important interview of yours today.

(Break 22:37-22:43)

[Elliott Roosevelt:] And now, Mother, we return to this very, very interesting interview that you're having here in Paris today, with officers from SHAPE headquarters, from General Eisenhower's command. And I feel that the American people can learn a great deal from the information which these gentlemen have to impart.

[ER:] Well, I certainly believe that the people should have the facts. And big operations must be adequate- adequately explained to the public in order to avoid very serious misconceptions.

Misconceptions can be very harmful, even to serious deterrent sometimes to success. I wonder if uh you, General Lanham, or one of those you've brought with you, um can tell me how you prevent um misconceptions when you give out uh your- your um information, or even misinformation, or half-truths. Are you bothered much with that factor in SHAPE?

[Charles T. Lanham:] Well, Mrs. Roosevelt, we're not bothered as much with uh half-truths uh and misinformation as one would think, in an operation of this size. On the other hand, there is a bit of it in the United States, I'm afraid. Fortunately, we deal here with a core of correspondents of very high integrity and great devotion to this tremendous task in which we are all involved, in trying to build a barrier of security, behind which we may live in peace and tranquility. But unfortunately, there are always a certain number of people who I think employ a species of crystal ball to divine, at some three thousand mile distance, precisely what General Eisenhower is thinking at any given moment on any given subject. As far as I'm concerned, I would like to suggest to those people that they turn this crystal ball in on a new model, because it's not working very well, not working very well. Actually, gossip, speculation, rumor as to what is in General Eisenhower's mind can be a very distressing uh- can have a very distressing effect on-on this great enterprise. Because it bounces back over the Atlantic at once, and our allies here wonder just what is going on in this headquarters that they don't know. In point of fact, I assure you, Mrs. Roosevelt, as I said earlier, that our job is to put out everything that can conceivably be put out within the limits of military security, and such stories as carry sometimes a Washington date line and sometimes others, and that purport to read General Eisenhower's innermost thoughts on the great transactions in the world today and, in particular, those of a political nature, are pure speculation. But they are not many, and we're happy for that. (26:01)

[ER:] Well, that's uh- that's very satisfactory. I- I wondered really whether sometimes the public um shouldn't be more careful about checking the facts on these stories that they read, which are, as you say, pure speculation, and if they really were trained to do that, how would they go about it? Is there any way that you think that the public could check?

[Charles T. Lanham:] Well, of course, there's no way Mrs. Roosevelt, that we can make sure that the public checks. Uh I would say, off-hand, that that's a job for our great educational system, to teach us in school, to teach us in our great colleges, how to evaluate the news and how to tell an article that is factual news from one that is heavily editorialized.

[ER:] You are asking a lot, that's the question that I have asked me more often than any other question: how do I know when a thing is true and when it isn't? [Charles T. Landham laughs] I read it in the papers, and how do I now whether it's true or not? So that I-I-I sometimes feel sorry for newspaper people, because I think sometimes even the headlines that are put on articles are misleading headlines, and then the people read only headlines, and they get a completely different picture. But I'd like--

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Mother, could I just [ER: Yes.] on that very subject uh ask uh because we do have uh three different nations represented here around the table today, uh do these misleading stories sometimes have quite an effect within the uh- the uh political and military headquarters of the other nations that are participating in this great operation? Uh do sometimes these newspaper stories that in fact are without foundation or are misleading uh lead to difficulties in your headquarters?

[Charles T. Lanham:] Well, I suppose that question falls to - falls to me again. I would say not a great deal to date. I remember one story that came out about a month ago, that was a matter of speculation as to certain negotiations between the United States and France. Uh the story uh was based on rather shrewd speculation, but it was not so at the time. Uh it could have been eh embarrassing to the French government at that particular time; uh there was a denial issue because-- not because uh it was a political denial or a diplomatic denial, [Elliott Roosevelt: But it was plain untrue.] but was a plain denial, it was

just not-not the truth! But a matter of that sort can obviously uh react on one government or another, depending upon the timing of any-any military uh decision, and you've seen some of them in the press. Colonel de Bary who's the chief of our news branch here, I'm sure can corroborate that.

[Jean Brice de Bary:] Yes, I-I quite agree.

[ER:] Well, I just wondered whether -- you, Colonel de Bary, probably can tell me this -- you try to do any sort of uh, in SHAPE, any kind of propagandizing? (29:22)

[Jean Brice de Bary:] Oh, well no, we don't do any propaganda here. We do merely information, and uh-um of course, the great difficulty, I think, here is we have to deal with, of course, twelve different um nations, but- especially three different--great different opinions and three different presses-- well, I don't know if I speak quite clearly. I'm sure Colonel Cross will explain that.

[Charles T. Lanham:] I suppose you mean the United States, France, and the United Kingdom.

[ER:] But you have other presses too, that you must--?

[Lionel Cross:] Oh yes, well we-we-we're gradually expanding to try and cover the presses of all the NATO countries. So far in our own particular division we've only got American, French, British and Italian representation, but we're getting a-a Dutch officer and uh another Italian officer, and gradually we have to be able to-to read the press of all these countries so as to get the reactions of those countries to General Eisenhower's policy, because without knowing that of course we cannot do our positive job.

[ER:] No well, Colonel Cross, I can-I can well understand that, but it must be a real study because um you have- you have those that are really represented here, [coughing] but what you send out must go far beyond those [Lionel Cross: Mhm, yes.] that are just represented here. [Lionel Cross: Oh yes, indeed.] And-and there you must have to check at least because you must want to know what uh-what is said, what comes apparently as a result of what you've given out. [Lionel Cross: Oh--]

[Charles T. Lanham:] Well, we receive summaries, you see, of uh news analysis from virtually every place where there are diplomatic missions. We draw these in through ECA [Economic Cooperation Agency] channels, we get them from the various embassies here who make analyses of these things, until our own staff has-has been set up. And they're extremely helpful uh-uh to this uh-to this operation, because we are here on a temporary basis, as you know Mrs. Roosevelt, we're not yet at Marly [Marly-le-Roi], [ER: Right.] and we haven't been at our facilities. We're operating truly on an austere basis in these headquarters. [ER: Well, uh-uh--] Primitive. (31:49)

[ER:] Well uh, how-how do you, Colonel Cross, go about the disseminating, or the spreading of what public information you want to have--

[Lionel Cross:] Of what news we have? [ER: Yes.] Well, let me take a recent case: when General Eisenhower came back to Europe uh in March after consulting the various NATO governments he decided on the uh staff officers who would fill the senior appointments at SHAPE. Uh how was that uh information to be given out? Well now, first of all, that sounds very simple. Eh it sounds very simple if you just were to announce that General X had become commander in chief of such and such land force. It isn't really simple at all, as we well know. We have to be absolutely certain of the truth. We have to check the Christian names, the names and spelling of these people, how often does one see one's or people's name in print wrongly spelled? Isn't it irritating to the individual? Then we have to check up on what job he has been doing and exactly what his new job is going to be and give a brief and factual eh-uh illustration or description of that job in our handout. Then we have to collect biographical details of uh

what he's done all his life, military et cetera, so we can answer the many questions that we always get from the press immediately after these announcements. Then we have to let the various NATO countries know that we're going to make this announcement, so that they can be ready to answer questions that-that they will get. And we have to check the accuracy of all of this within our own headquarters -- even a comma wrongly placed can have international complications. [Charles T. Lanham: Very true.] [All laugh] Then uh then we put it out to the world and we hope for the best. [ER laughs]

[ER:] That-that hope I'm sure is-is a very heart felt one. Could you, Colonel de Bary, give us an example of-of uh- from your point of view too?

[Jean Brice de Bary:] Well, yes, about a recent case. Uh Mr. Charles E. Wilson [1890-1961], the defense mobilizer for the United States, announced in Washington that in response to an invitation extended by General Eisenhower several n-several weeks ag-earlier, he was coming to Paris. Well, immediately our telephones were busy with calls from the press representing countries in all parts of the world wanting more details. We tried to get whatever information we could for them. Then the photograph-photographers and newsreels wanted to take pictures of General Eisenhower with Mr. Wilson. General Eisenhower works uh many hours a day on a very tight schedule. We asked his office to arrange a time so that we might take these pictures. Many questions were asked us. Some of these questions, of course, were considered to be political rather than military questions. We tried to guide the questioners to government agencies outside SHAPE, which might be qualified to answer such political questions. Of course, all day interviews are requested with various staff officers with SHAPE, who are specialists in various military fields. Wherever possible we try to arrange such meetings. All the interviews or meetings with the press are arranged by the public information division in order to coordinate SHAPE's activities. We issue every release in two languages, English and French. They are, of course, the two official languages of our headquarters. I think that's all I can actually say.

[ER:] I know-I know that habit of-of two [coughing] languages, we do that in the United Nations too. [ER laughs] So I'm quite familiar with it! And now I'm sorry to say that our time has come to an end, and I want to thank you, Colonel Lanham, for coming out--

[Lionel Cross:] General Lanham. [Charles T. Lanham laughs]

[ER:] General Lanham, yes. [unclear terms] General Lanham very much for coming today, and for bringing Colonel Cross and Colonel de Bary, and I'm very grateful to you all.

[Charles T. Lanham:] Yes, thank you, Mrs. Roosevelt, it's a great honor to be here. [Speakers overlap: unclear]

(Break 36:09-36:20)

[Elliott Roosevelt:] This is Elliott Roosevelt speaking and reminding you that you've been listening to the Eleanor Roosevelt Program, which comes to you each Monday through Friday at this same time. Today's program was recorded in Paris, and we wish to thank the French broadcasting system for making their facilities available to us.

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