Description: ER and her guests discuss the prospects of US coexistence with the Soviet Union and with China, as well as the role of independent nations like India in the Cold War.

Participants: ER, V.K. Krishna Menon, Robert, R. Bowie, and Harrison Salisbury.

(0:29)

[NBC announcer:] Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, one of the great world respected figures of our time, speaks of new possibilities for coexistence, on this the first in a series of programs on Prospects of Mankind. Her guests are V.K. Krishna Menon, Indian Defense Minister and head of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly Harrison Salisbury, Pulitzer Prize winning New York Times correspondent who has spent many years in Russia; and Robert Bowie, Director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard and former Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning.

[Introduction music begins 1:11]

[Bob Jones:] [As announcer speaks, film rotates through images related to the announcer’s comments] Coexistence, a word first hurled on to the stage of world history by the revolutionary leader of a young weak country. A term used to denote the necessity of getting along with hostile nations encircling the USSR in 1920 when Vladimir Ilyich Lenin addressed the fifth party congress. Coexistence, thirty years and a world war later, Stalin brought out the word as a foundation stone of his peace campaign. A move for breathing time for a war-exhausted people. The breathing time has brought the transformation of a vast sprawling nation into the world’s second industrial power. Her military strength has been crowned by success in nuclear and rocket technology. Khrushchev’s Russia is strong and growing stronger. Together with its allies it encompass one third of the globe. This is what we must exist with. A formidable expanse of the Earth’s surface. Khrushchev in America has said [Unknown speaker: “We have challenged the capitalist countries to peaceful competition. But I warn you, look out; we shall inevitable win.”] What does coexistence mean from the American viewpoint? [Theme music begins 2:42] What does it mean to the independent nations? What are the new possibilities for coexistence?

[Title Sequence:] [Text overlaid on Prospects of Mankind logo] National Educational Television/ Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt/ Prospects of Mankind

[NBC Announcer:] Recorded on the campus of Brandeis University in Waltham, Massachusetts. National Educational Television presents the WGBH TV production Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt in Prospects of Mankind. Now here is Mrs. Roosevelt.

[Theme music ends and applause from audience 3:20]

[ER:] I am very happy to welcome this audience today, and I am glad that we are going to discuss something which I think a great many of us have talked about very often without very much understanding. Coexistence is a word, which because of Mr. Khrushchev’s visit, has become more familiar to every one of us in this country. But the meaning of coexistence is very different, and in the
dictionary it says to exist at the same time. Past present, future, we exist at the same time, but differences in how we think uh we should exist are very great, and so we’ve gathered together today to discuss some of these differences. I am first going to introduce to you a gentleman who will discuss the question of what this word means to Americans. Mr. Bowie, will you begin.

[Robert Bowie:] I’m very glad to start things off anyway. I think as you say, Mrs. Roosevelt, the term is a very confusing one because it seems to mean different things at different levels. I’m afraid some people feel that it simply means to live and let live uh which would be quite natural and normal as we would do things, and this would lead them to feel that is really was an acceptance of the status quo, and perhaps an end to the rivalry between ourselves and the Soviet Union. But I think if we examine the statements of Mr. Khrushchev and the official documents of the Communist Party we will see that they do not view it in this light. Perhaps the most interesting exposition of the communist view was given by Mr. Khrushchev’s interviews with Mr. [Walter] Lippman and Mr. [Averell] Harriman and Mr. [Adlai] Stevenson and really with yourself, I suppose. They view the status quo as something that is evolving in their favor, and when they say they want coexistence they mean to allow this process to go on unimpeded. Uh so that it really amounts to an acceptance by us of the ultimate triumph of communism, and I think that they would like to see this occur by peaceful means, but certainly their own statements indicate that they don’t rule out the use of force under certain circumstances. Now it seems to me that this is the inherent difficulty of understanding the term because so many people think of it in the dictionary sense.

[ER:] Well, I think that is true, and Americans don’t all understand how they take this. But now I’d like to ask someone who has watched the Soviet scene for a very long while and who knows it intimately to continue uh giving us some more idea of how the Soviets really regard coexistence. Because we Americans haven’t thought this through very carefully, and I think that we can learn a little more about the Soviet point of view. Mr. Salisbury, will you tell us your thoughts on this subject?

[Harrison Salisbury:] Why I think that perhaps uh the most interesting thing about coexistence concept is that it has changed, so far as the Soviets are concerned depending on the given international situation and their own uh relative power situation at one time or another. I think that when Lenin first talked about coexistence he talked about it because the Soviet Union was extraordinarily weak and threatened by a very strong and powerful alliance of capitalist powers whom he thought at any moment might descend on this communist regime and wipe it out. He wanted coexistence in order to be able to live in the world. I think that perhaps Stalin thought of coexistence in a different sense, he thought of it uh as a breathing spell. He used the word only intermittently and only when he thought that it might possibly cool down tensions in the very seriously over-tense world that followed World War II. I think Mr. Khrushchev, on the other hand, uses in perhaps a third meaning. Always the same word but different meaning attached to it. I think he thinks of it, as Mr. Bowie has said, as uh a sort of maintenance of the status quo. I think he goes a little further than that, I think that he would --he would recognize our side of the status quo if we would recognize his, and then as he himself has often said let’s go ahead and compete and let the best side win. We think we’re going to win. That’s Mr. Khrushchev speaking. Uh, I don’t believe that he really conceives the world too much in terms of a forceful uh domination by communism at the present time. I think he is perhaps uh to some extent a little bit of an isolationist period. Thinking a great deal about the future of his own country and its development.

[ER:] Yes but he does also think of-of the final ends of communism.

[Harrison Salisbury:] In the final ends, of course he does. Uh, but I don’t believe he expects to see those occur in his lifetime or perhaps that of his successor.

[ER:] Well, I think that is true. Well now, we have a guest today who can give us, I think, an entirely different point of view because his country has kept their own independence. And in spite of that
however, as a major power, they have become very much involved. So we’re very anxious to get the views of Mr. Krishna Menon.

[V. K. Krishna Menon:] Mrs. Roosevelt, I am very glad to be with you here and before what I am told is an audience of university students, to-to me and to us; this word coexistence is not to be discussed in an etymological or other controversy. It cannot be a strategy either for-for gaining dominance for one nation or be thought of in terms of how any one nation, ours or anybody else’s, will gain mastery of the world. How else would we exist? Coexistence is the only way of survival. The alternative to coexistence is conflict. But we cannot create a world and then say we shall begin to coexist. Coexistence may change the character of the world. May maybe change its quality. So we take the world as it is. In one way it means neighborliness in another way it is really the extension of the democratic way of our national life into the international sphere. We accept the differences We expect other people not to interfere with us, and we don’t interfere with them. In a way, it is a process, I don’t mean to say an achievement, a way of looking at this planet of ours, where we-we have to be together. The recognition of fact, that is not a strategy as far as I can see.

[ER:] That is a very interesting point of view. And now that each of you have made an initial statement, I think we should come to a general discussion. Which one of you would like to begin and talk about any particular point of view? How, for instance, do you feel about the Cold War? (11:01)

[Robert Bowie:] May I ask Mr. Salisbury to elucidate just a little bit more how he sees the Soviet point of view? I am thinking of the statement which was issued at the time of the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet Union’s coming to power, in which the Communist Parties gave an elaborate statement of their conception of the world and the way in which they approached it. And they spoke of the Leninist meaning of coin-coexistence, and perfectly clearly it seems to me in that statement it indicated that they expected to continue by the usual means of subversion and other means to try to make the historic process work uh in the direction of communist domination. Do you feel that in the period since that time, which is just about two years, that they have modified this view?

[Harrison Salisbury:] Well I -- Perhaps I approach this from a slightly different angle, Mr. Bowie, I have in my own thinking and in efforts to analyze the Soviet Union generally proceeded from this basis: I lay on one side the-the so-called ideological documents of the nature of this particular one that you are talking about and the practical policies. Now there are at certain times and certain areas in which these two things overlap each one, at other times there are documents which are issued, I would any more or less almost uh from an historical standpoint, rather than from any application to contemporary problems. My own feeling has always been that Soviet domestic and foreign policy is primarily activated by considerations of reality, of the actual situation in the Soviet Union at a given moment, without regard, necessarily, to a stated ideology or stated program. That is to say, I would expect until his dying day, Mr. Khrushchev to say that his grandchildren all our grandchildren, are going to live under communism. But I wouldn’t expect Mr. Khrushchev to make day to day or even year to year policy decisions based on that. I think that the relative forces in the world have a great deal more to do with this question than these uh doctrinaire considerations. And I think this is particularly true of a man, like Mr. Khrushchev, who while he proclaims himself to be a communist and surely is to the--right down to his toes, still in every single concrete decision that he makes, he makes it on a pragmatic rather than a doctrinaire approach. This is, I think, is the difference in my approach uh rather to the one you suggested.

[ER:] You mean he takes the practical situation as it is into consideration each time. [Harrison Salisbury: Yes. Very-very much into consideration.] Now I’d like to know what Mr. Menon thinks about this.
[V. K. Krishna Menon:] I very broadly agree with him on that, and I would not think that any responsible statesmen of that stature could follow a policy of that kind as a kind of snare to catch someone else. After all he must have at least sufficient common sense to think another fellow would find it out.

[ER:] Well, that’s, uh, true.

[Robert Bowie:] Well, of course, uh I don’t think that anybody would suggest that Mr. Khrushchev doesn’t take account of the realities of the world. One of the reasons, obviously, that he is so eager now, and I think hopefully eager to prevent all-out war is that— is that he is taking account of the realities of the character of warfare. But, of course, we have had to be active in order to create part of that reality. And so it seems to me that it isn’t -- and in creating that reality that we have had to make certain judgements of what the Soviet Union was about. Now, of course, Mr. Khrushchev acts on the basis of practicality but it is practicality for something, while I don’t doubt at all that he is interested terrifically in building up his own country, it does seem to me that one can’t explain attitudes toward East Germany, or towards Hungary, or toward Yugoslavia, for that matter, except in terms of something over and above what we would normally think of simply as the isolated interests of the Soviet Union.

[ER:] Don’t you think that perhaps that can be explained somewhat in the fear that the Soviet Union has had in the past of invasion and uh that perhaps that attitude is uh an old -- the result of an old feeling and uh may continue and become the desire for— for real power to spread out more quickly, but at the moment it might just be a desire for security.

[Robert Bowie:] Well, of course, I think the Soviet policy is a blend of historic uh attitudes carried over really from Czarist times of the strategic problems of the Soviet Union and of ideology. I think it would be a mistake to assume that is solely and simply ideology, it couldn’t be. But it seems to me equally a mistake to neglect the ideological aspect of his policy.

[Harrison Salisbury:] I wouldn’t propose to neglect the ideological aspect of it, but I do think that our tendency has been in this country perhaps to overemphasize the ideology and overlook the pragmatic side. Just to segregate out one question here that you mentioned, you mentioned the question of Hungary. Uh I don’t honestly believe that it was ideology that was the strongest motivating factor in the Soviet intervention in Hungary. I think that is was—it was security considerations. Security blended in a curious way perhaps with ideology, since what the Soviet Union was actually faced with in Poland and in Hungary was a—a revolution against the type of regime which these countries has been subject to for a long period of time. Now they didn’t intervene forcibly in Poland, although they escaped it only by—by a very narrow margin, they did do this in Hungary. I’ve always felt that the reason that they did this was not because they uh wanted to uh maintain a strong stamp of an ideology on Hungary but because they were uh frightened to death that if Hungary broke out of this mold the whole security structure that they had built up in Europe, which they set great store by, would begin to crumble away and almost vanish overnight. And indeed, I think this would have happened, and I think this is [swings fist] what pushed them in.

[ER:] That is—that is—That’s a little of what I think, but I wonder whether any of you have any feeling that Mr. Khrushchev’s visit has in any way changed his general point of view.

[Robert Bowie:] Probably Mr. Salisbury could comment best on that. He went on the trip didn’t you?

[Harrison Salisbury:] Well I’ve been — I went all around with Mr. Khrushchev. And I have some impressions, they’re only impressions because you—you don’t get a chance to sit down with Mr. Khrushchev and bat a question like that back and forth, but if you watch him, I think, and listen to him speak and listen to the changes in the points that he emphasizes you can get at some impressions. I think
that the visit impressed Mr. Khrushchev tremendously with certain things, which uh I had expected he would be impressed with. I think he was impressed by the vitality of our economy, the diversity of our country. I think he was amazed at the things we have here every day, but to him are extraordinarily -- well they’re miracles, [ER: Yes.] our highway system, and our--the modern organization of our society, because he compares them with his own. I think this inevitably made an enormous impression upon him. He had other impressions too, I’m sure, but this one I think is very important for him to take back to his country, because I expect to see this then translated into policy in various ways, again from the pragmatic standpoint. The other thing which, I think, impressed him enormously was our president. I haven’t the faintest doubt that as a result of the conversations the two men had -- and they spent a great deal of time just the two of them with an interpreter, I would estimate they eight or nine hours of conversation together -- and he went back to Moscow with a very firm conviction that uh Mr. Eisenhower was as dedicated to the cause of peace as he is himself, and I believe myself that Mr. Khrushchev is dedicated to the cause of peace in perhaps an unusual way but still this is sure.

[ER:] I-I can’t help feeling that it’s the cause of peace as he would like to see it.

[Harrison Salisbury:] I’m sure that he wants it as he would like to see it.

[V. K. Krishna Menon:] That describes most people, doesn’t it?

[ER:] That’s the way most of us naturally want it.

[Harrison Salisbury:] I agree.

[V. K. Krishna Menon:] It comes back to the same thing; subconsciously we all have this uh varying degrees of a claim on monopoly of virtue, that is our trouble.

[ER:] Yes, Mr. Bowie what--?

[Robert Bowie:] But one can recognize that there is not any likelihood of human infallibility and still feel that there is something to choose between one view and another, and I would be inclined to feel that while Mr. Khrushchev uh came here and may well have been impressed with the things Mr. Salisbury mentions, that in the essentials with the way he sees the world he didn’t go back very different than he came. If you examine what he -- his conversations at Mr. Harriman’s home with the business leaders and the conversations with the labor leaders and the things he said in the economic club, it pretty clear that he still considers that the United States is under the direct control of a small group of capitalists, that the parliamentary institutions are really just a facade, and that basically the labor leaders are just lackeys of the capitalists. And it seems to me that the relevance of this is to the point that Mr. Salisbury made about the eastern European satellites. Fundamentally, it doesn’t matter whether you say he acted from security reasons or for ideological reasons because the way he sees his strategic problem is that you can’t trust anybody that isn’t dominated by a communist party. Well, if you look at the world that way then security becomes completely blended with the necessity that you should expand your own domination, and so I-I agree with this. It seems that they have fundamentally blended into one.

[V. K. Krishna Menon:] Yes, but may I respectfully suggest that we should start out thinking from there. It is not a question merely whether you have more refrigerators or more ice cream plants [Unknown speaker: Absolutely.] or anything, but the fact that Mr. Khrushchev who has responsibilities, just like your president must realize, that in this world at the present time laden with these terrible instruments of destruction capable of being operated by individuals who may go off their heads, capable of destroying the whole civilization as we know it. These things are to be put to one side and the [unclear] the
concomitant of it is, world disarmament. World disarmament, by which I mean not by cutting down the size of guns. You can be killed by a nine inch gun as a nineteen inch gun, no particular--it’s just like saying I want to be run down by a Rolls Royce not a Ford or something like that... [Guests and audience laugh]

But the main thing is that disarmament is a step to the only way we can live in a warless world. Outlawing a war, that I believe -- I do not want to enter into a discussion about Khrushchev’s visit to America because that is neither -- a Soviet-American problem on which I may not comment. But so far as the world is concerned this is the main thing -- May I have a another second? -- and that is this: in the previous--in part of the previous exchanges, it appeared to be thought that if we would accept coexistence then all problems are solved. There will still be problems of frontiers, there will still be problems of Berlin or whatever they are, but those solutions will be approached from another point of view. Now if we solve all problems what will we do next?

[ER:] Well, that’s a wonderful idea, but now, for instance, how would you approach Berlin from this new idea?

[V. K. Krishna Menon:] Well, you are -- I’m afraid I’m --perhaps, I am entering into a field I shouldn’t, but after all Berlin is part of this word and if there is trouble in Berlin that you get it everywhere. I suppose uh if you really believe in coexistence, and what is more saw the alternative - -unfortunately the fear element comes even into good things --and if you saw that without coexistence the alternative is conflict. Conflict not in the sense of an old tournament, not even in the sense of the last world war, but in a sense of something different. But then we will say whatever happens, we can’t have ultimatums, we can’t have domination. Both sides would know that. And I believe gradually the European countries will realize that the withdrawal of foreign powers, foreign forces, cannot be confined to any particular part of the world. That withdrawal will come in the whole system of you pacts--what--what my prime minister called the Pact of [unclear could be Mania.]

[ER: [unclear]] When you come out from all of these places. And then you would say, perhaps after all the Germans may have a say in this matter; it’s their country. They might live in some form and uh the present division of Germany may become impractical even from the point of view of the protagonists. And in quite an unthought of way we might find a solution to it. The main thing is that if coexistence is strong enough then the approach by ultimatum must disappear.

[ER:] Well--

[Robert Bowie:] But I think you should recall, Mr. Menon, that the ultimatum and the -- or seeming ultimatum in the Berlin case came not from the West but from the Soviets.

[V. K. Krishna Menon:] I am not saying anything to the contrary.

[Robert Bowie:] I know you didn’t, I’m not arguing with you I’m carrying your argument one step further. Uh in the case of Berlin, the West, as a practical matter, has been quite prepared for some time in reality to let things stand as they are, and it was Khrushchev, in November of last year, who insisted on trying to change the situation as I see it in his favor, in the favor of the side of the communists. Now it seems to me that this is hard to fit in with the notion that really what he wants is merely letting things alone. [V. K. Krishna Menon: I think you--] I’m not--I’m addressing really myself to Mr. Salisbury more than you [Mr. Menon: I’m sorry.] because I don’t think that this is what you were saying. I don’t think what I’m saying is in conflict with what you said.

[Harrison Salisbury:] I would make one comment on that. I-I wouldn’t be prepared to say that I had much of a clue as to exactly what goes on in Mr. Khrushchev mind [ER laughs], but I think that there are two questions involved here. The first one is, uh you mentioned that we were quite prepared to let things go on in Berlin. I think that Mr. Khrushchev has felt, in fact, I think that this is one of the facts we can be
pretty certain about, that he has felt and does feel that so far as the threat of possible war is concerned in Europe and in the area which he thinks is most sensitive to this sort of thing that Germany holds the central place, and that the most likely place for the seeds of a new war to be sewn and indeed he sometimes suggest that they have already been sewn is Germany. I think that taking this viewpoint and this is rather a common viewpoint held by many Russians other than Mr. Khrushchev. Russians generally speaking feel that Germany is an area of great threat. Looking at the situation as it existed in Germany and looking at the imminent possibility of Germany, a Western Germany armed with nuclear weapons and looking at the obviously unstable situation of uh Berlin. I think that Mr. Khrushchev deliberately provoked a crisis. He says that he didn’t uh submit an ultimatum on Berlin. I think he submitted a quasi-ultimatum on Berlin with a design of forcing a discussion on this and forcing some solution or something, naturally, as much in his favor as possible because he always wants things to be in his favor. But not ruling out a decision or a settlement which might be a compromise of the present position.

[ER:] Of course, changes could come about with more trade, which is one of the things he talked of, and also with a little lifting of the Iron Curtain, which uh seems to be happening. Wouldn’t you say?

[Harrison Salisbury:] This is possible--

[Robert Bowie:] It seems to me, particularly if we can promote exchanges, that this would be one of the more creative things that you can attempt to do in this rather limited area for action.

[ER:] What-do you feel, for instance, about the exchanges in real development of understanding? Do you think we have hope along those lines?

[Robert Bowie:] Well, I certainly think we should encourage it as much as we can. I think, in particular, we should exchange--encourage the kind of exchanges which don’t merely deal with technical issues or with the purely cultural sorts of things like ballet. They’re all right, but it seems to me really what we ought to try to do is exchange students, teachers, and professors, and other people who are in the intellectual life of the country, in the--both ways, in the hope that it will encourage real understanding of the problem.

[ER:] I couldn’t help thinking, as we were talking, that we did not show a great deal of understanding of the Russian interest in art when we showed the kind of a motion picture in Los Angeles that we showed. And I think perhaps we should have--we should learn a better understanding of the standards of art in-in other countries. We don’t -we don’t know and it is important I think. Now we have only a few minutes left, and I think we should review, perhaps, the um things we’ve talked about. On the whole, it seems to me that we-we feel that we might have coexistence uh with the Soviet Union with a number of reservations and changes, but the changes that are coming about, we think, are hopeful. Now we’ll have a little pause, and when we come back we will discuss the more difficult question of whether we can have uh coexistence with Communist China.

[Theme music begins 29:00]

[Unknown announcer:] [screen shows Prospects of Mankind title] Mrs. Roosevelt and her guests will resume their recorded discussion of new possibilities for coexistence after station identification.

[Theme music ends 29:22]

[Unknown announcer:] [Image of NET logo] This is National Educational Television.

[Music begins 29:30]
These parading youths are, photographed by Harrison Salisbury, are in far off Mongolia between and the Soviet Union. They are Chinese mechanics sent to meet the scarcity of skilled labor and to increase Chinese influence in the area.


[ER:] I think we should just review briefly the fact that we have already discussed the possible coexistence between the Soviet Union and the United States with points of a possibility for peaceful understanding and increased exchange between the two countries with slight lifting of the Iron Curtain. Now we come to the question, which is I think a very important one, of coexistence with the Communist Chinese because they are perhaps at uh not quite the same point that the Soviet Union is at the present time, and so I would like to ask Mr. Bowie how he feels about our ability to coexist perhaps with the Soviet Union and perhaps greater difficulty with the Chinese or does he think it easier?

[Robert Bowie:] Well, I have already indicated um some of the problems as I see them, as Mr. Menon said at one point, obviously we’ve got to do our very best to coexist if it means to avoid the outbreak of large scale war which would be a disaster for everybody. Uh but it does seem to me that as you have said the Chinese are perhaps in a more ebullient mood than the Soviet Union. At least, as indicated by what they have done in the border--on the border of China, what they most recently done a while back in Tibet, and some of the other things which they have done, and their most recent threats to try to take Formosa by force. I think that the uh perhaps the danger of actually resort to physical violence to expand may be more serious in the case of the Chinese than it is currently in the case of the Soviet Union, and I don’t know that there is any easy answer as to whether we will be able to deter them from the rash use of force uh for these purposes. In some ways it seems to me that both Mr. Salisbury and Mr. Menon are in a better position to comment on this issue from the immediate point of view than I am.

[ER:] Well, Mr. Salisbury, what have--what would you say?

[Harrison Salisbury:] Well, I would share Mr. Bowie’s opinion that -- and I think your own -- that China is a more difficult problem than the Soviet Union. Uh I think that by and large, difficulties though they may be, one can at least plot out in one’s mind the possibilities for coexistence with the Soviet Union. So far as China is concerned, particularly as far as Americans are concerned, there are so many blank spaces and our knowledge of China, that we’re-we’re stumbling over things all the time, we’re very much in the dark. Unfortunately, the evidence that we have to base uh our conclusions on suggests that the Chinese are in a much more aggressive and nationalistic phase of their revolution than the Russians are at the present time. In part this may stem from the fact that their revolution is only ten years old, as against the forty odd of the Soviet Union. The Russians are middle-aged revolutionaries. The Chinese are very young. I must say that I was struck this past summer in going out to Mongolia and seeing in a country, a small country that lies between the Russia and China, so much visible evidence of the conflict between the Chinese and the Russians themselves. This is something which is very carefully plastered over and buried. We don’t see much evidence of this ordinarily. Neither country feels it in their interest to disclose that sort of thing. I myself, have noticed among many Russians a feeling of concern about the future policies of China.

Now I think if you were to ask Russians can we coexist --can Russians coexist with the Chinese, you’d get a discussion that might be in some terms much the same as our discussion. Part of this I
suppose comes from the fact uh-that that by the very nature of what has happened out there in the Far East, China has been isolated from the rest of the world, and a country which is isolated from the rest of the world is bound to develop in a different way than one which is in the full stream of world affairs. So from that standpoint perhaps if we could bring the Chinese into the world picture it might be of some help. On the other hand the attitudes that I have seen among the Chinese frighten me a little bit. They don’t seem to be very anxious to get into the world, they seem to be pretty self-sufficient and-and-and in uh a rather domineering mood. This is the personal attitudes of some of the Chinese.

[ER:] Well, isn’t that a little bit the attitude that some other nations have had at different times? And sometimes, I think we have it a little of ourselves. [Harrison Salisbury: Oh, yes. Only too much so.] We sometimes behave as though we thought nobody knew anything except our way and we were going to show people our way, never thinking perhaps they could adapt to something better than we could. [Harrison Salisbury: Sure.] So I sometimes think that one of the confusions, though, that I find in many people’s minds is the-putting together of two things that should not be put together. Namely, you equate um capitalism with um democracy and you are given the choice of capitalism or communism and actually this isn’t so. We-we should look at that from the point of view of two economies which can be changed and adapted and used in different ways. There is a deeper--there is a deeper difference.

[Robert Bowie:] In some ways, it seems to me that Mr. Khrushchev--one of Mr. Khrushchev’s purposes in coming here was to try to give this image, that the only choice was between communism, which as he described in rather idealized terms at the end of his visit, and on the other hand, capitalism, which he said he couldn’t see was any different than what Marx had described. Now it seems to me that actually the Indian economy is an example of the very fact that this is a absolutely false dichotomy and the Indians are trying to create, as Mr. Menon can tell you better than I, a mixed economy which is partly socialist, partly private, and has a variety of techniques and means and is still trying to pursue a democratic route. It seems to me that the fundamental choice here isn’t between a particular form of economy, it’s between whether you try to achieve human welfare and human freedom together, or whether you’re prepared to use coercive means, such as the Soviets have done quite successfully, in order to build up the economy. And it seems to me that, therefore, the real choice, and we we ought to make it clear is that for the new countries who want so desperately to improve their conditions, the real choice is between whether this can be done only by coercive means and the police-state techniques, or whether there is a route which enables the combining of human welfare and human freedom and human dignity all at the same time. And it seems to me this is really one of crucial issues of our time.

[ER:] What is your feeling about that? Mr. Menon?

[V. K. Krishna Menon:] About economies?

[ER:] Yes. (38:05)

[V. K. Krishna Menon:] Well, it’s not possible to answer this question in a very short time, but each country must develop its own economy that suits it. If you--

[ER:] But it does not through necessity really mean that you must have a communist, a complete communist economy, because you--

[V. K. Krishna Menon:] No, I don’t, that’s what I’m saying. Each country must develop what it requires. And I don’t think capitalism so-called or communism so-called in 1959 is not the same as in 1949 much less as it was in 1939. And since we are speaking largely to a university audience, I think, if I may say so, it would be rather unacademic to suggest there’s any economy in which there is not a considerable element of coercion. It depends on what you mean by coercion, um especially as in the modern world, we
must—we have to move to certain extents toward world-economy. Now, as far as we are concerned, we did these things, I hope, pragmatically. Our main concern is the standards of life of our people. Our main concern is, how to make the six-hundred thousand villages of India comparatively prosperous in the sense of being, as your husband said, not having the fear of starvation, the fear of various things in that way, and to enable them to live like modern people in the sense of material achievement. Therefore, we take it pragmatically, but our orientation is socialist, because it is not possible to maintain a political democracy except in the context of socialists’ economies as far as we are concerned. But we don’t say that--

[ER:] As far as economies go?

[V. K. Krishna Menon:] Yes, but as an objective. As an objective. And that is why our national movement has accepted the socialist objective. But a socialist objective and democracy don’t go together if you—employ violence to achieve it. It would be like, what Rousseau was supposed to have said, that after a very passionate plea for toleration, and he said at the end, those who don’t believe in toleration ought to be hanged. [Audience laughs]

[ER:] Well, if you are a carefree visitor, though, visiting the two countries, India and the Soviet Union, uh I would say that in India, uh you exemplify the lack of real compulsion. Whereas, in the Soviet Union, the things that are good for you are still something you have to do whether you want to or not. For instance, the great great changes made in health which are certainly good for you and very valuable, would not be possible probably under a completely voluntary basis because human beings are as they are and they don’t always do what is good for them. And the fact that in the Soviet Union, you must take your child every month to be examined in the clinic has made an enormous difference to health. Now that—I think that’s what you meant by a completely compulsory system in many other ways.

[Robert Bowie:] Well, as Mr. Menon says, any society has some elements of coercion, inevitably. We all—we know perfectly well that if we drive on the wrong side of the road we’re going to be fined or put in jail. The question, really though, is again, one of degree. It seems to me that any realistic appraisal of the Soviet experience would show that it has essentially relied, and certainly in the period of maximum development in the first thirty or so years, on a terrible use of police methods to coerce savings, really. It was in effect to force the standards of living to be kept so low that the amount of savings would be very high and would be funneled through the state. And I think as you say that one can’t go to India without feeling that the atmosphere is utterly different. That the atmosphere there is of course some coercion as there as there is in this country or in any other country. But basically, the approach is to try to bring about a democratic order which also tries to bring about growth and development for the benefit of the standards of living.

[V. K. Krishna Menon:] That’s what I previously tried to suggest to be a question of degree. A question in degree and method would have to suit the genius, the people, and circumstances, and what uh what the economists would say, what the traffic would bare.

[ER:] Well, in the Asian countries, generally, what is the future direction as regards political and economic development?

[V. K. Krishna Menon:] By and large, it would have to be changes by consent, but an element of compulsion would become a necessity. For example, I cannot imagine that land reforms can be brought about without exercise of state power. And if land—there are no land reforms, there are bound to be violent revolutions, apart from everything else, in part from our incapacity to feed the people. I think it is a great mistake to think that in the Eastern countries, China included, people are not totalitarianistic minded sometimes. I don’t say the whole lot of people, but so far as we are concerned, with our historical
background, the diversity of our country, the orientation of our leadership, and the modest successes we have attained, we lead in the direction of a large scale revolution basically by consent.

[Harrison Salisbury:] I think there’s there’s another point, thought, that I would like to make that seems to be lost sight of a little bit here, and that is we assume that communist systems are all the same; I don’t think this is a valid assumption particularly at the present time. I don’t think for example the Chinese communist is the same as the Russian, nor is the Russian the same as the Polish, nor is the Polish the same as the Yugoslav. We re we’re going to get a diversity of communists systems just as we have a diversity of democratic systems or a diversity of capitalist or mixed economies. And I think that when we are talking about the question of Asia that perhaps it would be more profitable to look at the new type of communism which has developed in China and which the Chinese are very active in propagating beyond their borders as being one of the competitors in this system--this situation. I think actually that to some extent you have a balance of power situation in Asia in which the Russians not nearly so effective as the Chinese are attempting to promote their type of of communism and their particular uh approaches to problems, while the Chinese with enormous energy and vitality of a new movement uh seem to be pressing theirs forward along with their other aggressive policies. (44:47)

[ER:] Actually, then you think that there is a uh competitive type between two kinds of communism. Competitive um effort going on in the uncommitted areas of the world. The countries that are uncommitted--

[Robert Bowie:] I believe that this is literally true and that we will see it develops very much more clearly and plainly in the next few years. I don’t know--

[ER:] Now that-that’s interesting. Do you feel that?

[V. K. Krishna Menon:] Well, I can’t prophesy what would happen in the next few years, that depends very much on the balance of forces in the world. If coexistence succeeds in a degree of disarmament and a uh receding of the war forces then it means that there must be effective and dynamic cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union, which would certainly alter the character of the world. Small country as we are, ineffective to make any dynamic contribution to policy, we have said in the United Nations for the last five years there are only two great powers in the world. They must come and sit together and talk to each other and come to an agreement, the rest of us can support, the rest of us obstruct. Therefore, what will happen in Asia to a certain extent depends upon that situation. At the present moment there is no question of various forms of communism competing in our country. We have got a communist party which is by no means in the majority and what is more it has not got majority assent, and we shall resist an attempt at infiltration in our land. If our people want communism, that’s their business. If through parliamentary processes, they return communist governments, unless we sacrifice the parliamentary system, we’ll have to accept it. But that will be a different kind of communism.

[ER:] Well--

[Robert Bowie:] It seems to me that we ought really be quite clear that if really you had adoption of communism quotes unquotes by parliamentary system you wouldn’t have communism either as seen by the communists of China or the communists of the Soviet Union. [V.K. Krishna Menon: That-that-that--] You did, but I’m trying again to take off from what you said to deal with Mr. Salisbury.

[ER:] If you kept your parliamentary system you could not have communism really. You would have something that you evolved of your own but it would not be communism.
[V. K. Krishna Menon:] We don’t call it that; I mean we don’t want to call it that. We want to progress towards a society that is more equitable, that’s more humane. After all, when you get a society with a vast degree of inequality you get a great degree of inhumanity with it. The wealth of the few made on the wealth coercion on the others. It’s all very well to speak about coercion; it’s not merely the secret police.

[ER:] Well, now that’s—that rather clearly stated and what does that mean to us as a challenge to our United States policies generally in uncommitted areas of the world? I’d like to ask both of you gentlemen to answer that.

[Robert Bowie:] Well, my uh feeling is that Mr. Menon has raised very well, very clearly, what seems to me the basic challenge is in that part of the world. I think some of us are also—I was criticizing Mr. Khrushchev for being too doctrinaire in his view of kinds of societies and kinds of economies, but I think there are too many of us are equally doctrinaire in seeing things as if everything had to be either our pattern or something else. It’s quite clear that the societies of Asia are going to evolve in their own terms and it seems to me--

[ER:] And Africa.

[Robert Bowie:] And Africa, in other words all of the new countries are going to have to make new solutions, which are based on their traditions, their attitudes, their particular problem. They are not going to look like the things that we are familiar with.

[V. K. Krishna Menon:] That—that is only a very small part of it, if I may, it’s not really my [unclear term] One of our main problems is the direct and indirect of intervention of the Cold War apparatus, be it Africa, Asia, or anywhere else. I think even if we develop slowly even if we make our mistakes, it is far better for us to make our mistakes by and large. That whatever cooperation comes must come in the context of coexistence must come not because something is wanted for political purposes. But the general prosperity of the world is a requisite of world peace as such. I think the main difficulty in Africa and Asia will be, as is in the days of the old imperialism when there were the Napoleonic wars, when there was a battle between the French and British which was fought on the plains of India for no reason.

[Robert Bowie:] But it--

[Harrison Salisbury:] It seems to me that we are going to have to have to recognize this reality that Mr. Bowie is talking about of these countries, and halt what seems to me to be almost a rubber stamp application or effort to apply American methods, American ways, American standards uh to the area. Also I think that because of the tensions of the Cold War we’ve had a great tendency to separate out the world into into sheep and goats, and to say that only those who are all the way for us are—are are on our side. Well, this isn’t true really a great number of countries in Africa and Asia have no desire to be on either side. They are interested in their own future. Well, this it seems to me is healthy. I think that this deserves our support. Perhaps just as much as being all out for us.

[ER:] This is—this is the way we developed ourselves.

[Robert Bowie:] Precisely. It seems to me that this is one of the places again that we must be clear that our interest isn’t to try to dominate anybody. Our real interest is in the independence of these other countries and their ability to maintain it in a viable form. {ER: Well-} And that it seems to me is the real fundamental at least as I see it between our interests as we should see them and the interests of the Soviet Union as it seems to see them. It doesn’t seem to see—to feel safe unless it dominates other people. We ought to have the trust in our own values and our own way of life enough to realize that if other countries
can follow their own independent way they will want to have societies which won’t be like ours but will be quite congenial as I see it with our society.

[ER:] Well of course, they may have to go through uh various stages that other countries have gone through, for instance, there is much more nationalism as far as I can see it in Africa today [Unknown speaker: Yes.] than actually probably should exist there.

[Harrison Salisbury:] This is - this is a part of being young, being a young country. [ER: Exactly.] This is one of the first things you begin to feel when your is a young country. [ER: Yes.] We ought to condition ourselves to expect that sort of thing.

[ER:] Well--

[V. K. Krishna Menon:] That is created by pressures from without. If you don’t -- if people without feeling about them quite unconsciously--I believe you used speak in the days of our none of our independence that our unconscious Englishman who is even more insufferable than the conscious one. [General laughter] You see? No evil is meant. But the reaction is such. You know the kind of phrase which says there is fog in the English Channel the continent is isolated. You see? [Audience laughs] [ER: That’s quite true.] I mean they are very hearty people, friendly people, and any kind of economic or other development has very largely been based upon the people, and I personally think any-any-any foreign assistance that goes to any country must see that there is sufficient indigenous effort to support it, otherwise this spoon feeding goes on, and a new economic system develops which neither helps the feeding country nor the fed country.

Now in a few minutes, I think perhaps we should go to this question of China which we left off. [ER: Yes.] It was said something about young countries and revolutionaries and so on. There is no doubt that in the last two or three years particularly may be due to general changes in China, maybe due to the fact of despondency though they do not quite realize it, the policy of encirclement. The language that the Chinese use is extremely arrogant and a country like ours which is an old-world country that creates reactions. So while we concerned our policy towards China, the dual policy, that is to say we will not tolerate arrogance, we will not be subjected to intimidation. Sometimes we may ourselves be louder than we should be. Naturally we should not [unclear term] yield any political claims of that kind to the best of our ability. But at the same time we recognize that you can’t have a people of six hundred and fifty million outside the world contexts with us except in friendly terms. And that is why we keep on plugging it at both ends, and it would be a great mistake, therefore, to exaggerate one thing or the other. It is one of those things that try to whole policy or coexistence.

[ER:] I-I always remember my husband’s great affection for China and feeling that there was a great deal in the Chinese people of dignity and to be deeply admired, but I think, perhaps, the arrogance which has now come about is partly because they are trying to do what the Soviets are trying to do, catch up. Catch up with the Soviets. [laughter] Catch up with everybody else, and they are rightly thinking of a great many people, and I wonder if your feeling isn’t that the population pressure has a good deal to do with what China does at present.

[Robert Bowie:] Certainly, the Chinese population pressure is enormous, and while their ability to feed this population is expanding very rapidly, still when you consider that the country has something like six hundred and fifty million people--

[ER:] Well, [Unclear terms.]

[V. K. Krishna Menon:] I-I would disagree with that. There is nothing in Chinese aggressive or undesirable aspect of Chinese policy which has got an economic element. She has no economic conflicts
with us or the rest of Asia. [ER: No.] I think it’s very largely, if you take the charitable view of it, it’s very largely due the policies of encirclement and as you say the aggressive youth of theirs, and uh what is more the feeling that they would likely to be heard if they kick their heels around a bit. [Unknown speaker: This is certainly true.] and if you tell them they can kick their heels but not against people that have defended them.

[ER:] And now I am sorry today our time is drawing very near its end and I think that we must sum up a little: that in the first place, we, I hope, have learned something of the point of view that Mr. Menon has for part of the world that he understands better than we do today, and then I think we have also, in that light, been led to look at our own policy. My own feeling is that for a very long time we have suffered from not having enough information about the world as it is today. That that is one of our greatest lacks. I suppose it can only come from the top, and I hope it’s going to come more and more because we need to know to have a realization of the challenge of what we really want to do, which is lead but lead for the good of all the peoples of the world.

[Audience applause]

[Theme music begins 56:30]

[NBC Announcer:] [speaking while names appear on credit sequence] Mr. Menon is Indian defense minister and head of the Indian delegation for United Nations General Assembly. Mr. Bowie is director for the Center of International Affairs, Harvard, and former assistant secretary of State for policy planning. Mr. Salisbury is the Pulitzer Prize winning New York Times correspondent, who has spent many years in Russia.

[Credits roll]

[Theme music ends 58:25]

[Unknown announcer 2]: This is National Educational Television

Transcribed from holdings at Library of Congress (LOC)
File(s): 071210

Transcription: Kellie Menzies (from typed transcript: Morgenthau III Papers Box 1, Folder 10 FDRL ERP #071210)
First Edit: Seth LaShier
Final edit: Christy Regenhardt