EUROPEAN UNION PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: THE NEED FOR A NEW FRAME

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Abstract of Thesis

European Union Public Diplomacy: The Need for
a New Frame

This paper presents a new approach to looking at the EU and thereby a solution to the struggles of its public diplomacy to keep the EU at the forefront of foreign publics. The rhetoric that the EU lacks one voice does not apply because it is based on the assumption that the EU is a nation-state. Instead, the EU is a supranational institution, unlike any other international entity. EU public diplomacy needs to promote this new frame through which to view the EU by educating publics about the EU's unique structure and attributes, which are always improving and evolving and make the EU a global leader in innovative international governance.

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Introduction

The European Union, since its inception, has been criticized for its lack of unity. The effectiveness of its public diplomacy has come into question, evidenced by a lack of understanding, and more importantly, interest in, the EU, which has recently manifested in a weakening of relations with the U.S. This paper will look at the issue in terms of the EU's voice, how it is seen and interpreted by non-EU publics, reasons for this and how perception may be changed. Various reports say the EU's lack of a unified voice and message is the biggest challenge to its public diplomacy, and if it does not do more to rectify this problem of unity, it will never be the major global power it hopes to be; more specifically, it will continue to lose the beneficial and robust relationship it has fostered with the U.S. This paper explores this claim by broadly examining the public diplomacy actions and capabilities of the EU in the world, and specifically the U.S., through interviews and literature about EU public diplomacy; narrowing down specific problems and recommendations; looking at how the EU is, or is not, addressing the question of speaking with one voice; and understanding under what assumptions such recommendations are made and deemed valid. This paper endeavors to show that it is not the lack of unity that is missing from EU public diplomacy, but rather, the way it frames its own image, as a nation-state, which it is not, causing non-EU publics to have incorrect perceptions and expectations, which can never be fulfilled. It will offer recommendations for a new frame more suited to the EU's identity: a supranational institution, and ways to present this to the American public.

The European Union, set up following World War II under the desire for putting an end to the bloody wars that frequently erupted between European neighbors, has throughout its history been an experiment in governance and integration. In 1951, under the Treaty of Paris, its six founders, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, united into the European Coal and Steel Community for economic and security benefits.[1] In 1957 they integrated deeper, economically, into the European Economic Community. In 1973, the first new members, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, joined, followed by most of Western and Central Europe into the 1990s and 2000s. The last crop of members, some of who were Soviet Union republics, joined in 2004 and 2007. The union, now with 27 member countries, has proved prosperous for its members as they have benefited from each other's resources and from new opportunities presented to them through their collective strengths. The EU adopted and refined a set of criteria for those wishing to join to ensure that all members maintained certain standards in the areas of governance, economy and democratic norms. Though it was primarily an economic partnership at its beginning, the EU now unites its members in various policies and structures and has its own set of institutions and leaders. The integration process has not always been a smooth one and the EU continues to wrestle with problems of cohesion. As the EU borders have moved further East disagreements have arisen. Some have questioned the benefit of admitting member countries who have nothing to offer the group, whose human rights records are nothing short of atrocious, and whose economies, never able to stand on their own after the Soviet break up, have been even further ravaged by the recent economic crisis. The EU now is a true hodgepodge of characters – different languages,

[1] "The History of the European Union," Europa website.

cultures, beliefs, religions, people and experiences – united across the European continent to foster "peace, prosperity and freedom for its 498 million citizens — in a fairer, safer world."[2]

Throughout its development the EU has presented itself as a unique economic, social and political enterprise. It has sought to be a leader in modern policy-making, promoting itself as an example for developing and future regional unions.[3] In this respect, the practice of public diplomacy has always been an important aspect of its international diplomacy strategy. I use Bruce Gregory's definition of public diplomacy here: Public diplomacy is "a coherent blend of activities used by governments, groups, and individuals to understand attitudes, cultures, and mediated environments; engage in a dialogue of ideas between people and institutions, advise political leaders on public opinion implications of policy choices, influence attitudes and behavior through communication strategies, actions, and messages, and measure results."

The EU's individual member countries have had varied experiences with public diplomacy; what started out as a necessary means to counteract foreign publics' negative perceptions of them, has blossomed into an integral part of their foreign policies.[4] Germany used its public diplomacy to normalize relations and improve its reputation, tainted by the atrocities of World War II; France, in much the same way, used public diplomacy to save face after its humiliation in the war. More recently, new EU members, or those desiring to be part of the union, like Poland and Turkey, have used public diplomacy for specific foreign policy goals, to elevate their image and take their case for

[2] "Panorama of the European Union," Europa website.
[3] Hardacre and Smith, "The EU and the Diplomacy of Complex Interregionalism," 177.

accession to the public. Smaller countries, like Malta, have used public diplomacy mechanisms to raise the world's awareness about their existence, with the hopes of stimulating tourism.

The EU is seen as uniquely equipped to conduct public diplomacy because it possesses vast amounts of soft power, defined here as the ability to obtain desired effects through co-option and attraction, the "power of seduction," and hard power, the ability to influence behaviors through the use of economic incentives and or military strength;[5] though it must be noted that the lack of an EU military force has caused some to doubt the EU's capabilities in the areas of defense and security. The ability to combine the two powers into successful international strategies is smart power. The EU's smart power is achieved through the combination of the individual states' separate abilities, both in and outside of government, in soft and hard power areas. The European continent, home to some of the world's most famous artists, musicians, rulers and sights, among other hallmarks of the arts and history, has a wealth of cultural resources for self promotion at its disposal. Because the EU is endowed in this soft power area, its hard power sources and capabilities are often overlooked or taken for granted. The plethora of non-governmental organizations and actors in the EU who conduct public diplomacy through their international relationships and business agreements adds to the EU's smart power. Regular citizens also have the capacity to act as mechanisms of public diplomacy through their interactions with the many tourists who visit their cities.

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[4] Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy, 9.
[5] Nye, Jr., "Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century," January 20, 2010.

EU Smart Power

Specific factors which endow the EU with its enviable and unprecedented amounts of soft and hard power include: its role as facilitator of democratic change and as an advocate for human rights, through the EU's accession criteria; its large amounts of humanitarian aid and contributions to peace-keeping forces around the world; its role as economic powerhouse; its role as a leader in climate change initiatives; and its member countries' immense cultural capital and long experiences with public diplomacy.

The attraction of the EU is first and foremost measured by the number of people and countries wishing to be a part of it. This is most clearly seen by the admission into the union of 12 new countries in the last six years (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania), all enacting wide-ranging political, economic and legal reforms in order to become members.[6] Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey are candidates to join, while several others have expressed interest. The EU's conditions for ascension include a stable democracy that guarantees the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities, a functioning market economy, and a civil service capable of applying EU laws.[7] Conformation to these by all member states, especially those with struggling economies, lack of democratic norms and questionable human rights, has made the EU a global leader in the promotion of social-democratic values and a powerful force for positive reforms. The EU has developed into a normative power as its ability to shape perceptions of what is

[6] Nye, Jr., *Soft Power The Means to Success in World Politics*, 20.

normal in international relations has increased with its continued enlargement.[8] This image is then projected onto the individual member states, which benefit from new economic partnerships, improved governance, and an overall improved global image. Members are also attracted to the security of the union; the EU has continued to break away from its history of war, as no EU member nations have gone to war with each other since joining the institution.

> Hence, one of the primary motivations of diplomacy, i.e. ensuring national security from threats by other states in the anarchic interstate environment, is of diminishing importance in intra-European diplomatic relations and is in the process of being substituted by increased attention to other parts of the diplomatic agenda, such as trade, cultural issues, image promotion and human rights (Neuhoid 2002: 50—1; Pascbke 2003).[9]

Batora goes on to say that this "*intra-European mode of diplomacy,*" lacking national security concerns, has allowed for a change in relationships between member states as well as third countries.[10] For states less concerned about national security, at least in terms of inter-European threats, there is more time to focus on other issues, like strengthening the economy or fostering partnerships with third countries. The peaceful relations between member states and the sense of security it grants them may explain the EU's lack of a collective military force, though individual states maintain NATO and national military services. While the continued peace on the continent is touted as an achievement the world over, the lack of a collective EU military remains one of the reasons the EU is viewed as a weak global actor.

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[7] Keukeleire, Thiers, and Justaert, "Reappraising Diplomacy: Structural Diplomacy and the Case of the European Union," 159.
[8] Michalski, Anna, "The EU as a Soft Power: the Force of Persuasion," 126.
[9] Batora, "Does the European Union transform the institution of diplomacy?" 54.
[10] Ibid.

The absence of a separate EU military does not prevent the EU from spreading its tenets of peace, which it does by sending troops from member states to peacekeeping operations around the world, contributing to hard power. Almost 100,000 EU troops are involved in peace operations under multilateral organizations such as the UN and NATO.[11] This helps to reinforce the EU's image as a peacekeeper, and thereby adds to its attractiveness, especially among possible EU candidates, like the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where the EU was involved in peacekeeping operations.[12] The EU's ability to use its hard power for good in the international arena is further highlighted when contrasted with the increased militarization of major global powers like the U.S. and Russia. While these nations' large defense budgets allow them to convey a powerful image, the EU's less emphasized use of soldiers helps it to convey a less controversial image.

Further helping its image as a compassionate actor is the EU's record of overseas developmental assistance to poor countries. The EU's contribution to aid, both developmental and humanitarian, accounts for 60 percent of all aid in the world, and its contribution to the UN is higher than that of the U.S. or Japan.[13] Aid contributions are also used as leverage to promote structural changes based on EU values in impoverished countries, facilitating the spread of those values beyond its member states and helping the EU, through hard power, to establish its role as a normative power. Helping monetarily

[11] Spense, "Taking Stock: 50 Years of European Diplomacy," 239.
[12] The European Union launched a military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM/CONCORDIA) on 31 March 2003 to help with the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement.
[13] Spense, David, "Taking Stock: 50 Years of European Diplomacy," 239.

and with man-power fosters long-lasting relationships with recipient countries, making them indebted to the EU, and promoting the EU's global image as altruistic benefactor.

Not all of the EU's smart power manifests as benevolence to third countries. Though some of its members' economies have suffered in the recent global financial crisis aside, the EU's integrated economy has made it the world's largest trading power. Its' population of half a billion "relatively prosperous citizens," eight percent of the world's population, accounts for 25 percent of the world's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), making its internal market "greater than that of any other advanced country or similar regional grouping."[14] As a force to be reckoned with in the economic arena, the EU has the upper hand in trade negotiations with many of its partners, as well as raising its appeal among prospective ones. The EU's single monetary policy, to which 16 of the 27 members belong, has witnessed the Euro, the currency of the EU, become the second international currency, after the UK pound, just ten years since its inception. Adopting the EU's economic prescriptions has greatly added to the stabilization of the economies of the EU's new members, who are on track to adopt the Euro once all economic criteria are met.[15] The EU has used its economic security as leverage in agreements with third countries, calling on them, just like the recipients of its humanitarian aid, to enact certain structural changes according to EU values and norms, before signing on the dotted line; or punishing nations with sanctions for not enacting certain reforms.[16]

[14] Ibid.
[15] "EU Economic and Monetary Union," January 2009.
[16] Keukeleire, Thiers, and Justaert, "Reappraising Diplomacy: Structural Diplomacy and the Case of the European Union," 156.

On the environment, the EU has played a global leadership role, spearheading climate change initiatives.[17] It was involved in the development of the two United Nations climate treaties, the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The EU began reducing its greenhouse gas emissions in the early 1990s, and its goal under the Kyoto Protocol, which requires countries to reduce their collective emissions in the period 2008-2012 to eight percent below 1990 levels, is on track to be met.[18] EU leaders are constantly devising and implementing new policies towards the goals of offsetting climate change. Under the 2000 European Climate Change Programme, the EU has adopted new reforms and initiatives, including the EU Emissions Trading System. In 2007, EU leaders committed and passed legislation aimed at cutting emissions beyond the Kyoto Protocol goal by at least 20 percent of 1990 levels by 2020. Underlining its role as leader, the EU even offered to increase emissions reductions to 30 percent by 2020 if other major emitting countries would also commit by signing off on a global climate agreement. Although the most recent climate talks in Copenhagen, in December 2009, were seen as a disappointment because of the failure of the participants to approve a legally binding agreement, the EU is already trying to reinvigorate global climate negotiations by sending its.[19] Individual states' endeavors in the promotion of a global response to climate change also elevate the EU's image as a leader on this issue.

[17] Lamy "Global Governance is a challenge for democracy (but an EU opportunity)," Spring 2010.
[18] "Climate Change," Europa website.
[19] Harrison, "EU's Hedegaard to embark on climate diplomacy tour," February 18, 2010.

On the level of publics, thanks to the rich and pervasive histories of its member states, as well as the nations' attention to the benefits that accompany them, the EU has extensive connections to and credibility among the people of the world.

> Half of the ten most widely spoken languages in the world are European. Spanish and Portuguese link Iberia to Latin America, English is the language of the United States and the far-flung Commonwealth, and there are nearly 50 Francophone countries who meet at a biannual summit at which they discuss policies and celebrate their status as countries having French in common.[20]

The EU's vast diaspora networks, made up of European immigrants and nationals, spread throughout every corner of the globe, ensure the propagation of European languages and cultures through generations. The EU member states' collective cultural capital is unrivaled in the world. Europe has for centuries been admired as the seat of art, music and history, with hundreds of thousands of tourists visiting its palaces, museums and basilicas every year. Most European nations have long had thriving tourism industries, with the EU policy of open borders easing inter-European travel for Europeans and outsiders. According to the 2009 United Nations World Tourism Organization, seven of the world's top 10 travel destinations, by arrivals and receipts, were in Europe.[21] Despite being the region most negatively affected by the economic crisis, Europe accounted for 53 percent of the world's 922 million tourist arrivals and 50 percent of international tourism receipts.[22] This speaks volumes about Europe's attraction: the economic crisis and the strength of the Euro have not dissuaded curious travelers from exploring its many sights.

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[20] Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, 19.
[21] France, Spain, Italy, UK, Ukraine, Turkey, Germany (arrivals); Spain, France, Italy, UK, Turkey, Germany, Austria (receipts)
[22] "Tourism Highlights," United Nations World Tourism Organization, 2009, 4, 6.

Adding to their already high cultural profile is the member nations' vast experience and involvement in public diplomacy.[23] Britain and France, though much smaller, spend about the same as the U.S. on public diplomacy, with France having the highest per capita spending on international cultural relations.[24] Public diplomacy institutions of EU members, like the cultural institutes Alliance Francaise, the British Council, and the Goethe Institute, have for many years brought information and awareness to world publics. Most EU countries participate in exchange programs with other countries, bringing students and scholars from around the world to its world famous universities and research institutions. Several EU countries participate in international broadcasting with their own radio and or television channels, and some nations' websites, like that of Sweden, which has been commended for its ingenuity and user-friendliness, serve as examples of the importance the countries put on their public diplomacy endeavors.[25] The accumulation of the member states' individual attraction capabilities gives the EU an array of soft power unlike any other country or organization. Foreign publics have obviously embraced the nations individually, though their union is not always understood, especially beyond cultural and economic aspects.

[23] Fiske de Gouveia and Plumridge, *European Infopolitik*, 10-11.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid., 30.

Confusion About the EU

Because the EU is a unique and ever-changing institution, U.S. and other non-EU government officials and publics have had a difficult time understanding its structure, policies and collective identity, leading some to consider the EU to be ineffective and weak, and others to simply ignore it. This fosters negative opinions of the EU and its future endeavors. Confusion extends to the EU's own citizens, who also seem to be in the dark about EU aspects and do not think highly of the union. Such responses have caused the EU to lose face and have interfered with its goals of conveying the image of a normative power.

Points of confusion include the EU's complex institutional structure and lack of a single, clearly identifiable leader.[26] The governing mechanisms of the EU consists of three main bodies: the European Parliament, which represents, and the members of which, are directly elected by European citizens; the Council of the European Union, composed of national ministers from each member state; and the European Commission, which is the executive body, made up of one commissioner from each member state.[27] Other institutions in the EU include the European Council, made up of the heads of member states, which is responsible for outlining the direction and priorities of the union, the European Court of Justice and the European Central Bank. The Commission has a President, who is appointed by the European Council, determines the Commission's policy agenda and assigns portfolios to commissioners.[28] The presidency of the Council rotates

[26]Merritt, "Why Europe should go for Blair," November 19, 2009.
[27] "Panorama of the European Union," Europa website.
[28] "Spanish Presidency Website."

every six months between the member states. The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 2009, created the post of President of the European Council, who is appointed by its members for a two and a half year term. The Lisbon Treaty also created the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, appointed by the European Council to represent the Common Foreign and Security Policy and sit on the European Commission. The Foreign Affairs Council, which is a configuration of the Council of the European Union, and is made up of member state's foreign ministers, is also chaired by the High Representative.

Henry Kissinger's famous question, "Who do I call when I want to call Europe?" as he asks for a single phone number for the union, sums up the way these structures and officials are seen by American, as well as other non-EU, governments and officials.[29] The presence of so many officials, many of whom, like the new President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, though they have substantial political experience, are unknown to the world, impersonalizes the EU's international relations, leaving outsiders feeling overwhelmed and confounded by all the unfamiliar faces and names. The number of leaders now representing the EU at summits like the G20 is seen as over-representation and a weakness in the EU's political weight.[30] Accustomed to dealing with individual member states and their governments, officials and politicians are now faced with an entirely new bureaucracy and a plethora of rotating bureaucrats of varied positions and titles.[31] Some counteract this by distancing from

[29] "Europeans Hide Behind the Unpopularity of President Bush," Spiegel, February 18, 2008.
[30] Merritt, "Why Europe should go for Blair," November 19, 2009.
[31] Smith, "Time for the EU to Show More Muscle," May 11, 2007 .

relations or by continuing to deal with individual leaders instead of the EU, showing a disregard for the legitimacy of the EU's institutions and officials.

The large constituency of the EU, and its varied politics, is viewed as detrimental to its policy making process. Some are skeptical of the EU's policies, considering them the "lowest common denominator," as they require a consensus from all member states.[32] Because decisions must be passed from one body to the next, and require approval on a variety of levels, governments are apprehensive to trust, or take part in, such time-consuming processes. The lack of understanding of the EU's decision-making process, which some contend is due to the EU's lack of transparency, as well as EU member states' "blame avoidance" for EU decisions they help to make, degrades the EU's credibility as a significant results-oriented power.[33] The most contested topic is that of EU foreign policy. The union is divided on several important and highly visible issues, causing non-EU nations to exclude it from international relations for fear that it will interfere with and delay important decisions. Examples of contentious issues include the war in Afghanistan, over which member nations have differing opinions in terms of engagement and deployment, Turkey's proposed membership and the legal status of an independent Kosovo.[34] The EU's relevance is even further put into question when member nations speak out on issues individually.

The confounding of their leaders is naturally mirrored by publics, most of whom have minimal awareness or understanding of the EU's various structures and policy positions.

[32] Glencross, "The Grand Illusion Continues: What the Lisbon Treaty Means for the European Union and Its Global Role," March1, 2010.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.

Knowledge of the EU differs across the globe. In some countries, the EU is more familiar to political elites than the general public, an obvious comment on public diplomacy campaigns. Because foreign publics are not aware of a difference between the European continent, the EU or its individual members, this leads to outdated and incorrect views and assumptions about the EU. The limited public knowledge of the EU is often based on the historical relationships with its individual member countries.[35] Past colonial relationships with member countries, for example, cause previously colonized publics to project their negative feelings about nations onto the union. Because it is the negative aspects that often get the most attention, the EU's achievements outside of the cultural realm are often overlooked.[36] These negative feelings, coupled with a lack of knowledge, have also led many to simply ignore the EU. A 2009 survey found levels of interest and debate about the EU to be particularly low in India, China and South Africa.[37]

The EU's vast humanitarian aid to developing countries has allowed it to maintain visibility there. Western publics, already influenced by their leaders' confusion about the EU, and not privy to such aid, are consequently less aware, and therefore disinterested. Surprisingly, a 2005 poll showed that North America had the least percentage of people who have heard about the EU; thirty-eight percent, compared with 65 percent in Africa and 89 percent in the Middle East.[38] Because of ignorance and confusion, there is no clear conception of the EU outside of its individual members. Although the EU's policies and initiatives are in line with many of the concerns of Americans, representing the two actors'

[35] Lucarelli, "The External Image of the European Union," 8.
[36] Merritt, "Why Europe should go for Blair," November 19, 2009.
[37] Lucarelli, "The External Image of the European Union, 330.

similar values, because they do not understand what the EU stands for, Americans are ignorant of these similarities. Because the EU's many faces and institutions are seen as a detriment to a cohesive decision and policy making process, its continued enlargement is seen as a disadvantage, especially in terms of global political impact. "Americans no longer fear a stronger EU. In fact, many Americans now fear the opposite - a weaker EU, one that allows the debates over the future of the Constitutional Treaty to inhibit its ability to act."[39] Also, because the political and economic stability of its new members, and prospective members, is at times questionable, the EU's enlargement also leads to questions about its credibility as a global power.

Unfortunately, the publics of the EU are no different from the rest of the world, they too do not know much about the EU's institutions and policies.[40] In a 1999 Eurobarometer survey, EU citizens were asked to rate their EU knowledge on a scale of one to 10, with one being no knowledge at all.[41] Only 26 percent of EU citizens said they feel they know quite a lot to a great deal about the EU. In the same survey, 23 percent of respondents said they were unable to tell whether their countries had benefited from joining the EU; this was proportionally the same as in 1983.[42] By individual countries, knowledge levels ranged from a low of 3.4 in the UK, to a high of 5.25 in Austria.

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[38] "Gallup International –Voice of the People 2005," cited in "Taking it to the US: The European Union's Greatest Public Diplomacy Challenge," 2005.
[39] Smith, "Time for the EU to Show More Muscle," May 11, 2007.
[40] Fiske de Gouveia and Plumridge, *European Infopolitik*, 4.
[41] "How Europeans see themselves: Looking Through the Mirror with Public Opinion Surveys," September 2000, 16-17.
[42] These answers represent those respondents who chose the numbers 6 through 10 on the scale.

Table 1: EU citizens' self-perceived knowledge of EU affairs. Autumn 1999 (in %, EU-15)

Scale	**%**
1(know nothing at all)	10
2	12
3	16
4	15
5	18
6	12
7	8
8	4
9	1
10 (know a great deal)	1
Don't know	2
Average Score	**4.24**

Graph 1: Levels of perceived knowledge about the EU among EU citizens (10 = know a great deal; 1= know nothing at all)



In a 2009 Eurobarometer survey on attitudes towards the EU in the UK, 18 percent of respondents felt informed about the EU and 83 percent said they knew little or nothing about it.[43] Only four percent of the British public "strongly" agreed that the information available on EU affairs was simple and clear. In addition, and perhaps due to the varied knowledge levels of the EU in member states, the opinion of the EU also differs with each member nation. In that same 1999 survey, 57 percent of respondents in Portugal said they

[43] "Attitudes towards the EU in the United Kingdom" Flash Eurobarometer No. 274, 4.

trusted the EU, while only 21 percent in Sweden said the same.[44] Opinion is even divided among citizens of the same member country. In the 2009 UK survey, 37 percent of respondents felt the economic benefits for the UK as a member of the EU outweighed the costs, while 40 percent did not.[45]

Graph 2: Trust in the EU



	A	D	DK	L	FIN	I	EL	F	B	NL	S	EU-15	IRL	E	P	UK
% tend to trust	32	31	32	52	36	53	45	39	41	43	21	39	42	55	57	20
% tend not to trust	48	46	58	33	45	23	47	44	46	40	61	40	25	29	21	48

Member countries and citizens have experienced the same kind of changes as witnessed by outsiders: an increase in government departments and a multiplying of officials. Their knowledge of policies and leaders has had to be stretched beyond those of their own countries, which for some has obviously been an impossible, and perhaps

[44] "How Europeans see themselves: Looking Through the Mirror with Public Opinion Surveys," 16-17.
[45] "Attitudes towards the EU in the United Kingdom," 4.

insignificant, endeavor. The simple existence of the EU, with its ever-growing number of members, and thereby, officials, policies and citizens, is a feat in itself. However, this does not preclude the need for fostering understanding and awareness among both EU and non-EU publics. The EU is painfully aware of its image among EU and non-EU publics and governments.[46] EU officials understand that because of its complex structure more must be done to explain the EU's identity and policies than perhaps would be for a single nation-state. The EU has taken great steps to combat this lack of understanding through its communication strategies, aiming to promote the EU as a united front and to bring more awareness to its achievements.

[46] Michalski, "The EU as a Soft Power: the Force of Persuasion," 133.

EU Public Diplomacy Structure and Practice

Acknowledging the confusion and lack of knowledge that exists about its policies and activities, the EU it taking active steps to employ public diplomacy as the mechanism through which it harnesses its smart power to better present itself to the world. It exhibits an awareness of the changing nature of communication with foreign publics and its leaders freely disclosing this, seeking to expand the EU's image beyond its cultural capital. The EU has a complex network of institutions through which it carries out various public diplomacy strategies. The following will outline and highlight the main state-based mechanisms of public diplomacy and some of their most visible activities, followed by a focus on the EU's public diplomacy in the U.S.

It must be noted that the use of the term public diplomacy is rather a new phenomenon for the EU. Observers and scholars have noted that the concept of public diplomacy was not employed or recognized among EU officials or communication materials in the recent past.[47] Perusal of the EU website finds no mention of the term. However, the EU's methods are in line with common perceptions of public diplomacy and EU leaders, aware as always of the changing discourse on international relations, especially in the U.S., have begun to employ the term more readily. The EU is actively involved in new public diplomacy, moving away from the one-way communication model, often seen as propaganda, and toward two-way communication, seeking to engage publics. According to Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, "Public diplomacy encompasses all activities which have an impact

on the perceptions and the public opinion in third countries about the country or institution engaging in public diplomacy. They are therefore not only aimed at the media and the political actors of third countries but at their societies at large."[48] The EU stresses that EU public diplomacy is "not for domestic consumption" [49] and must be seen as separate from its communication with its members. This, naturally, leads to some confusion because the definition of domestic is not understood by all in the EU to mean internal to the union, as their fellow member countries are still considered foreign. The EU, aware that its own citizens also serve as public diplomacy disseminators, engages in extensive internal communications efforts, linked to its external communications, to inform and educate its member citizens, on the same level as non-EU publics, to eliminate confusion.[50] The EU's aim is "to tackle the sentiment expressed by Madeleine Albright that 'To understand Europe you have to be a genius.'"[51] This is accomplished by voicing a few, simple messages and answering fundamental questions, such as what defines the EU on the world stage. At the heart of the EU's public diplomacy has been its humanitarian aid to, and trade and cooperation agreements with, non-EU countries. Its recent public diplomacy has been focused on broadening this picture; moving away from the image of its global impact as only "trade and aid," so that global publics recognize its efforts toward economic and human rights reforms in other countries as well.[52]

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[47] Michalski, "The EU as a Soft Power: the Force of Persuasion," 126.
[48] Ferrero-Waldner, "The EU in the World," February 2, 2006.
[49] Wallstrom, "Public Diplomacy and its role in the EU's external relations," October, 2008.
[50] Michalski, "The EU as a Soft Power: the Force of Persuasion," 125. And Rasmussen, "Discourse Analysis of EU Public Diplomacy Messages and Practices," 11.
[51] Ferrero-Waldner "The EU in the World," February 2, 2006.
[52] "External Relations," Europa website.

The European Commission, as the executive body, is responsible for representing the EU to the world. The Commission is composed of departments called Directorate-Generals (DGs), of which DG-External Relations (DG RELEX) is tasked with managing relations, including public diplomacy, with countries outside of the EU and international and regional organizations.[53] DG RELEX coordinates the work of the 136 Delegations of the EU around the world. These representations act as the voice of the EU. They promote EU values and interests and their activities, which include printed and digital information materials aimed at the general public, the hosting of events, the operation of information centers, and communications with businesses and media, are similar to those of embassies.[54] Because of the difference in sizes and resources of each of the Delegations, as well as the difference of circumstances of the third countries, it is difficult to speak in narrow terms of Delegations' varied activities.[55] Other DGs also participate in the EU's international communication. These include ECHO, Development, Enlargement, Trade and ECFIN, who have their own information and communication units.

The EuropeAid Cooperation Office (DG ECHO) is responsible for implementing external aid programs and projects across the world.[56] The mission of its communications is to promote the EU's extensive humanitarian aid, for which it allots 0.5-3 percent from every aid contract.[57] The DG Development and Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States devises the EU's development policy for all developing countries and coordinates political relations with sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific

[53] "European Commission External Relations," Europa website.
[54] Bruter, "Diplomacy without a state: The External Delegations of the European Commission,"185.
[55] Rasmussen, "Discourse Analysis of EU Public Diplomacy Messages and Practices," 14.
[56] "About EuropeAid," DG ECHO, Europa website.

(ACP), the African Union, regional economic communities, and the overseas countries and territories in all the areas for which it is responsible.[58] It is imbued with a great deal of soft power stemming from the EU's large amounts of humanitarian aid to developing countries. In 2005 it launched the campaign "Europe Cares" to publicize its efforts in support of the Millennium Development Goals.[59] The DG Enlargement is responsible for the expansion process of the EU, carrying out the implementation of enlargement policies. Within the framework of the Communication Strategy for Enlargement, it communicates with and about candidate and potential candidate countries, as well as EU citizens, to promote the benefits of enlargement. It uses the mediums of EUROPA, the official European Union website, as well as EU Tube, the Commission's official You Tube channel, the TV service "Europe by Satellite," and the question and answer service Europe Direct.[60] This DG has obvious public diplomacy potential through its work dealing with the prospect of EU ascension. DG Trade promotes the EU's interests through the EU's trade policy. Its international communications arise out of negotiations on bilateral and multi-lateral trade agreements.[61] The DG for Economic and Financial Affairs' (DG ECFIN) mission is to improve the economic wellbeing of the citizens of the EU, by developing and promoting policies that lead to sustainable economic growth, a high level of employment, stable public finances and financial stability.[62] It concentrates its communication resources on the

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[57] Fiske de Gouveia and Plumridge, *European Infopolitik*, 17.
[58] "DG Development Mission and Role," Directorate General Development and Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States, Europa website.
[59] "Europe Cares" - European Commission launches information campaign on its support to the MDGs (Millennium Development Goals)," European Commission, September 6, 2005.
[60] "European Commission Enlargement," Europa website.
[61] "Mission of the European Commission Directorate General Trade," Europa website.
[62] "ECFIN Mission Statement," Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs," Europa website.

financial centers of Washington, DC, Tokyo, Singapore, New York, and Kuala Lumpur, where its representatives organize conferences on issues relating to the Euro.[63]

Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the newly created position of High Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, or Foreign Minister, also serves as the Vice-President of the Commission. The current representative, Catherine Ashton, serves as the coordinator and representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and is expected to increase the visibility and impact of the EU.[64] Also, under the auspices of the Treaty, the DG Development, the DG Enlargement, the DG Trade and ECHO come under the jurisdiction of the newly created European External Action Service (EEAS), which will serve as the Foreign Office for the EU. The EEAS is intended to present the voice and implement the foreign policy of the EU in a more coherent and unified way. The EEAS will coordinate national foreign ministries and diplomatic corps in support of EU policies and communicate with foreign governments in bilateral negotiations. The new organization, under the direction of the new Foreign Minister, will also take responsibility for the EU's delegations around the world.[65] The EEAS is expected to help the EU in a number of ways, including, consolidating its foreign policy, increasing its global influence, and helping those member states not large enough to have their own embassies.[66]

In addition to the appeal of ascension into the union, the EU extends its other smart power mechanisms to strike up partnerships with neighboring countries outside of the EU.

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[63] Fiske de Gouveia and Plumridge, *European Infopolitik*, 17-18.
[64] "The Treaty at a Glance," The Treaty of Lisbon, Europa website.
[65] Glencross, "The Grand Illusion Continues: What the Lisbon Treaty Means for the European Union and its Global Role" March 1, 2010.

One such public diplomacy endeavor is the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), developed in 2004, to strengthen and build positive relationships with the EU's neighboring countries. The central elements of the ENP are the bilateral ENP Action Plans agreed to between the EU and each of the 16 partners, which build upon a mutual commitment to the common values of democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development.[67] Similar to the requirements the EU demands of its candidate states, it also uses its prestige and positive image in the world to enact reforms among its neighbors, with the incentive of becoming a partner through the ENP. In the realm of the ENP, its public diplomacy focuses on fostering ties with neighborhood country publics by relaxing travel restrictions for certain categories of the population, instituting exchange programs for students, and scholars and the building of networks between different civil society groups. In this way, the EU ensures the spread of its values and ideas throughout the European continent and beyond. Another similar program of note is the Euro-Med Partnership, which provides for a dynamic and comprehensive relationship along the lines of politics, economics, culture, environment and society between the EU and its 15 partners from the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East.[68] It has its own ENPI Information and Communication Support Project, launched by the European Commission in January 2009, to bring awareness to the relationship between the EU and its Euro-Med partners.

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[66] Grant, "Making a Success of the EAS," May 21, 2009.
[67] "The Policy: What is the European Neighborhood Policy," European Neighborhood Policy, Europa website.
[68] "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership," The Euro-Med, Europa website.

The EU does a great deal of work in people-to-people communication and exchanges through its European Union Visitors Program (EUVP), which brings young professionals and future leaders from all over the world to the EU so that they may learn first-hand about EU institutions, functions and policies, and foster long-term relationships with their counterparts in the EU.[69] The Erasmus Mundus program, which promotes European higher education, offers grants and scholarships towards educational endeavors, and fosters partnerships with non-EU institutions of higher education. Programs aimed at youth point to a strategic focus on reaching out to future opinion leaders of the world, building understanding early on so as to continue solid relationships into the future.

The EU's Delegation to the U.S, which functions like an embassy, has been in Washington, DC for 50 years, and was granted diplomatic status in 1971. The Delegation's activities cover all major areas of the U.S.–EU relationship, including trade, political, economic and financial, development, agriculture, consumer policy, transport, energy, environment, science and technology, press and media, and communications and public affairs. Its public diplomacy efforts are carried out by a separate Press and Public Diplomacy (PPD) section, currently headed by Anthony Smallwood, Counselor and Head of Press & Public Diplomacy, who also serves as spokesperson of the Delegation.[70] The PPD section is the only EU Delegation sections in the world to employ the term "public diplomacy" in its title; all other delegations use "public affairs," "press/media," or "information," speaking to the relevance of the term to the U.S. The PPD section informs the U.S. media about the Commission's positions on issues and provides them with

[69] "European Union Visitors Program," European Union Delegation to the United States of America website.
[70] "Washington Delegation Staff," European Union Delegation to the United States of America website.

information about current developments in the EU. It also monitors the U.S. media and provides information on news and events of interest to the EU. In his 2005 analysis, Fiske De Gouveia wrote,

> …the delegation has identified four distinct areas of public diplomacy activity: general perception-oriented public diplomacy (e.g. correcting American public misperceptions of contemporary Europe); specific issue public diplomacy (for instance, lobbying for the extension of the US visa waiver scheme to all 25 (now, 27) EU member states); co-operative EU-US public diplomacy (identifying ways of working with the US government on, for example, public diplomacy strategies in the Middle East); competitive and conflictual EU-US public diplomacy (relating to issues of dispute between the EU and US such as the Airbus-Boeing rivalry or lifting of the EU-China arms ban).[71]

Current issues that drive the public diplomacy efforts of the EU Delegation include the strengthening of EU-U.S. trade, dispelling the image of the EU as solely an economic bloc, the promotion of the EU as a leader in the dialogue on climate change and the promotion of its status as one of the world's larger aid donors. Smallwood affirms, as previously stated, that the EU Delegation to the U.S., recognizing the need for communication to be two-way, has moved away from traditional public diplomacy and the role of propaganda disseminator. Public diplomacy is no longer seen as only communication with elites, but as interaction with the public and non-traditional elites, like leaders from non-governmental organizations. Smallwood also points out the EU's recognition of the changing demographics of the U.S. and the need for the EU's public diplomacy activities in the U.S. to project messages differently depending on demographics. Touching on what many EU observers have opined, Smallwood acknowledges there is awareness that the EU is no longer the dominant power it once was, and that it "can't afford to let history and culture

guide relationships always." This is why its U.S. public diplomacy operates with the understanding that there is a "need to invest heavily in understanding each other better."[72] Aside from the media, specific public diplomacy targets identified by the EU Delegation include "next generation leaders" (opinion leaders), with the intent to build relationships.

As well as the standard informational website (http://www.eurunion.org/eu/) and publications, including magazines *EU Focus*, "an in-depth treatment of important European issues and the transatlantic relationship" and *EU Insight*, "a timely EU issue brief with special attention to EU/US relations," the Delegation conducts more pro-active activities, such as regular meetings by the ambassador with members of Congress, students and academics, as well as speaking tours around the nation. The EU's Centers of Excellence, located in universities throughout the U.S., promote the study of the EU and its policies through research, teaching and activities.[73] The Delegation also hosts and organizes, sometimes in partnerships with member state embassies, cultural programs and activities, like Euro Week and the European film festival, and also hosts a year-round internship program for college students.[74]

Though publics are often confused about EU policies and decisions, this has not affected public opinion, as its public diplomacy has succeeded in fostering a favorable image. According to a 2005 poll, 41 percent of people in the world had a positive opinion of the EU, while 31 percent were neutral.[75] However, because this image is guided by soft power, the EU is rarely seen as a formidable power in the area of global affairs, which has

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[71] Fiske de Gouveia and Plumridge, *European Infopolitik*, 15.
[72] Interview with Anthony Smallwood, August 3, 2009.
[73] "Taking it to the US: The European Union's Greatest Public Diplomacy Challenge," 2005.
[74] Interview with Stacy Hope, July 30, 2009.

come to hurt its global standing and crucial international relationships.[76] Additionally, one survey found a gap between how the EU presents itself and how publics actually see it. The EU is actually not seen "as a 'normative power' exporting universal values of democracy and human rights;" it seems to no longer be regarded "as a social model to be imitated."[77] The EU's long standing role as a cultural behemoth seems to not be enough for it to maintain a leadership role in the world; it is instead viewed as harmless and insignificant.

[75] "Gallup International –Voice of the People 2005," cited in "Taking it to the US: The European Union's Greatest Public Diplomacy Challenge," 2005.
[76] Michalski, Anna, "The EU as a Soft Power: the Force of Persuasion," 125.
[77] "The External Image of the European Union," 2007, 8.

EU's Image in the U.S.

This same phenomenon can be seen in the EU's image in the U.S. Its public diplomacy efforts, its immense cultural capital and its long history of partnership with the U.S. have paid off, as the EU has a great deal of acceptance and a positive image among the U.S. public, even if they may not understand its nuances. This may be seen as an example of how global publics base their attitudes toward the EU on past experiences with its individual countries. The U.S. has always had good relations with European countries and Americans, though they may not understand the union or its achievements look at it positively. However, the lack of understanding has caused the U.S. to see the EU with less and less confidence in its leadership role.

In a 2008 poll, Americans gave positive ratings to the EU.[78] Fifty-seven percent of respondents said the EU has a positive influence in the world, while 20 percent said the influence was negative. A 2009 survey showed 63 percent of Americans had a favorable view of the EU. That same survey also reported 75 percent of Democrats, 57 percent of Independents and 47 percent of Republicans as viewing the EU favorably.[79] Individual assessments of EU member countries also tend to be positive, though there is some variance. In the same poll, 72 percent of American respondents said the UK has a positive influence; even more than the 64 percent who said the U.S. has a positive influence. Germany is also viewed positively by 62 percent, while France and Spain received 48 and 47 percent, respectively. Overall, the EU's image in the U.S. is one of an unthreatening

[78] "Nine-Country Poll Finds Europeans and Americans Desire Closer Relations," March 18, 2008.
[79] "Transatlantic Trends 2009," June 2009.

and indistinct actor.[80] While this has helped the EU in terms of security and partnerships, it has also led to recent assertions that it is weak. One report called the European attitude to the U.S. as "infantile and fetishistic," pointing to a dependency rather than a partnership between the two allies.[81] This dependency has caused the U.S. frustration, and it appears to be taking steps to withdraw from the close relationship.

In a 2008 report, Brimmer predicted that "Whoever is elected President in 2008, the U.S. is likely to maintain its supportive yet ambivalent approach to the EU," citing the union's constitutional disagreements and enlargement fatigue as possible factors that may hinder cooperation.[82] Her predictions, it seems, are coming to fruition, as the media hones in on the EU's weaknesses as explanations for a weakened U.S.-EU relationship. The EU has been shown as losing its high position in the global order, perhaps because of this lull in relations with the U.S. – something the EU is aware of. Reports marginalized and ridiculed the EU's frustrated attempts at attaining superpower status, citing its "pervasive gloom" at the realization that the new world order would instead be dominated by the U.S. and China."[83] The EU's failure to dominate talks at the global warming conference in Copenhagen was used as evidence that its power is waning and being relinquished, involuntarily, to China and the U.S.[84] The failure of the countries to reach a concrete agreement on climate change issues was partly attributed to the EU, since it has taken on the role as a leader on these issues. Its lack of leadership at the conference was further exacerbated by China, the new global darling, which garnered a great deal of press for

[80] Fiske de Gouveia and Plumridge, *European Infopolitik*, 20.
[81] Shapiro and Witney, "Towards a Post-American Europe: A Power Audit of EU-US Relations," 61.
[82] Brimmer, "Seeing Blue: American Visions of Europe," 75.
[83] Ibid.,

taking the lead in the talks. EU climate chief Hedegaard's climate diplomacy tour was an obvious attempt by the EU to reassert that role, though little has come of it.

The EU's lack of a military force, held up as a symbol of peace, has recently been criticized (by U.S.Defense Secretary Robert Gates) as "an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st [century]."[85] Because of its unwillingness to build "military muscle," like the U.S., the EU is presented as fearful and helpless in a new global order, no longer able to get by on its normative power.[86] Such assertions, as well as ongoing wars, confirm that the new global order is dominated by military might and although the EU's member nations have troops in warzones, the issue of a unified EU force marginalizes this. Assertions like Gates,' made to perhaps solicit greater military aid from the EU, convey to the American public that the EU is not the U.S.' true partner in bringing peace and security to the world. The assumption is then made that the EU is either incapable or unwilling to do so. Either way, the EU is seen as weak and no longer a beneficial partner for the U.S. and its interests, especially in regards to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. With these wars as the most salient issues for officials, and subsequently, U.S. citizens, relations with the EU are not seen as a top priority.

The U.S. media reports of disagreements between members and criticism of the EU's reforms, have counteracted EU public diplomacy endeavors to highlight the reforms as a step forward in the creation of a more coherent and unified EU. The EU's attempts to assert its role in international affairs have been met with skepticism. It has, time and time again, been criticized for its failure to make crucial foreign policy decisions because of its

[84] Underhill, "Europe's Superpower Hopes Dim," March 8, 2010.
[85] Cohen, "Gone, Solid Gone," March 8, 2010.

member states' failure to come to consensus on sensitive issues. Because of this, the EU's policy positions have been characterized as "watered-down," serving the lowest common denominator, and, therefore, inconsequential. This has added to the EU's image in the U.S. as a weak partner. It is seen as not only lacking in military strength, but decisiveness as well – traits not helpful to U.S. interests. Attention to the EU's internal problems has only exacerbated this image.

Coverage of the EU members' lack of agreement on internal issues, like aspects of the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative's abilities, and the new diplomatic corps' organization has come into conflict with EU efforts to present a united foreign policy.[87] The states have been blamed for being self-serving; media outlets contending that their focus on national interests, instead of those of the EU, has prevented the EU from making important decisions, which has continued to hurt the EU and kept it from attaining the powerful role in the global sphere it had hoped to reclaim.[88] The EU's open attempts to fix its problems have been have been met with skepticism and critiques. As soon as the Lisbon Treaty went into force and the EU's public diplomacy machine began to explain and sing its praises to the world, the U.S. media was filled with stories singling out its drawbacks and how it was, already, unsuccessful. Reports pointed to the redundancy and inutility of the newly created posts of Commission President and High Representative, contending that it would make the EU even less efficient and coherent.[89] The new appointees have been

[86] Stephens, "A fearful Europe trails petulantly in US wake," January 21, 2010.
[87] Barber, "Diplomatic uncertainty casts gloom on Brussels," March 10, 2010.
[88] Reuters, "EU's Foreign Policy Chief Seeks to Spell Out Agenda ," March 8, 2010.
[89] Underhill, "Europe's Superpower Hopes Dim ," March 8, 2010,

criticized as well, their lack of notoriety hailed as a step in the opposite direction in the EU's quest for greater world attention.[90]

President Obama's actions have added fuel to the fire. His decision not to attend the EU-U.S. summit, scheduled for May 2010 in Madrid, elicited assertions that the EU lacks political and international relevance and the U.S. is no longer going to waste its time on supporting its insubstantial endeavors.[91] EU officials were disappointed and alarmed by Obama's decision; they saw it as a sign of the EU's loss in credibility and standing in the world, and among the U.S. government and public. The EU has not shied away from acknowledging this change in relations and has instead made public its attempts to get back into the good graces of the U.S. EU officials have personally become vocal about the EU's quest to repair EU-U.S. relations.

The EU's stepped up public diplomacy in the U.S. is clearly seen in several speeches made by European Commission president, José Manuel Barroso. Announcing João Vale de Almeida's appointment as the EU's new ambassador to the U.S. in February, Barroso called the U.S.-EU relationship a "top priority" and pointed to the appointment of Vale de Almeida as a testimony "to our political commitment to enhance and deepen the transatlantic relationship in a crucial moment for bilateral relations."[92] Then, in March, at the Brussels Forum, which focused on U.S.-EU relations, he said the U.S. and EU find themselves at a "crossroads" in their relationship, needing "to adjust to new realities if it is to continue to flourish."[93] He mentioned the "multipolarist argument," which relegates the

[90] Volker, "The 'Obama effect' has been to lay bare deep transatlantic tensions," Spring 2010.
[91] Mallet and Barber, "Setback for EU as Obama snubs summit," February 2, 2010.
[92] Chaffin, "Barroso aide named EU ambassador to US," February 17, 2010.
[93] Barroso, "A New Atlanticism for the 21st Century," March 26, 2010.

transatlantic partnership to the same category as all others, as “misguided” because it ignores the shared values which unite the EU and U.S. Barroso’s words show that the EU is aware of changes in the world order, especially that of a more balanced distribution of power. While it is actively endeavoring to change with the times, the EU uses its soft power tool of shared values to remind the U.S. of their unique connection, thereby highlighting its importance and loyalty to the U.S. so as to reinvigorate relations. While this kind of tactic, putting to use the EU’s extensive soft power arsenal, may promote a more robust public image in the short-term, some say it is not enough because the EU can no longer hide or shy away from the realistic inconsistencies of its identity and policies.

Challenges for EU Public Diplomacy

Despite EU public diplomacy's best efforts to enhance the EU's image in the eyes of the American public, as well as increase awareness of and refine its efforts in the realm of global politics, it has failed to completely deliver on its goals. Though public diplomacy tries to combat the global public's confusion and lack of awareness about EU specifics through initiatives of information dissemination, the lack of coherence among the EU's structures and policies serves as a direct adversary. One of the most commented on challenges faced by the EU's public diplomacy is the EU's lack of a unified voice. While public diplomacy touts the EU's efforts at reaching consensus on issues, global media report on the member states' disagreements. In this way, the EU's public diplomacy, much like the EU, is deemed unreliable and confusing, leading to questions about its credibility.

External communication strategies are hindered by EU problems with consistency, focus and integration, which prevent EU public diplomacy from having a substantial or ever-lasting effect on the hearts and minds of non-EU publics because the union's image, as portrayed to foreign publics, is inconsistent with the picture they see in the media.[94] The multiplicity of EU actors and their lack of consensus on issues has caused many to speculate that this is, and will continue to be, the EU's obstacle to achieving super power status. The EU has presented the opposite of a united front on issues, and this has led to questions about its strength as a global actor; some reducing it to the status of an immature player, which greatly reduces it integrity and impact.[95] The member states' allegiance to their national interests over those of the EU, which is often the reason for the lack of

[94] "Teresa La Porte: The Public Diplomacy of the EU," September 24, 2009.
[95] "Taking it to the US: The European Union's Greatest Public Diplomacy Challenge," 2005.

consensus, has called into question their commitment to the EU's values and their actual investment in its success. Sometimes member states' position is different from that of the EU on certain issues, which is acceptable in the tenets of the EU, but as this is accepted by outside publics as the stance of the EU, they are left even more confused and critical of the EU's lack of unity. For example, on the issue of genetically modified crops, the EU has recently allowed for some forms to be cultivated, while France and Greece oppose.[96] Depending on which voice they hear, foreign publics will get a different message, obviously causing confusion and frustration. The EU's inability to forge a coherent and consistent foreign policy serves as a counter to what EU public diplomacy has attempted to convey – a united and decisive global actor.[97] For example, seeking influence in the war in Afghanistan, Germany, France and Britain each claimed to speak for the EU, against the objections of the Belgian Presidency (in 2006) and smaller member states.[98] Because the EU is at times represented by various voices, both state and non-state based, and because there is a lack of a clear designation as to who really represents the EU, calling into question the much-debated concept of European identity, non-EU publics fall victim to incorrect information and information bombardment.

In addition to disagreements between members on issues, which negatively affects EU public diplomacy's goal of projecting a unified position, the lack of collaboration between the EU and the member countries' public diplomacy also complicates EU public diplomacy work.[99] As the union is comprised of 27 extremely different countries, there is no doubt

[96] "EU foiled in bid to force France, Greece to allow GM crop." February 16, 2009.
[97] Michalski "The EU as a Soft Power: the Force of Persuasion," 139-41.
[98] Gross, "European Foreign Policy and the War in Afghanistan..."
[99] Fiske de Gouveia and Plumridge, *European Infopolitik*, 22.

that this is the case. Many of the states, especially the more prosperous ones, have had their own public diplomacy strategies for a number of years.[100] They have become skilled in the practice of public diplomacy and having reaped its benefits, are reluctant to share or give up their information monopolies. This clearly supports the assertion about member states' overarching commitment to national interest, over that of the EU, which, while natural and expected, like their differing positions on issues, does nothing to legitimize EU public diplomacy. It actually discredits the EU's public diplomacy as simply in the business of covering up the EU's true image or trying to silence its individual members. It also shows a lack of awareness and understanding about the benefits of cooperative public diplomacy, like eliminating redundant campaigns or establishing cooperation in other areas.[101]

Because of the lack of collaboration on public diplomacy efforts, misunderstandings arise out of confusing the EU's public diplomacy strategy with those of its member states.[102] When non-EU publics are overwhelmed with competing messages, the messages are either all ignored, leading to a complete lack of impact, or, the ones which are most familiar, often times, the ones coming from the individual member states that already engender awareness or have relationships with the public, are accepted. In either case, the EU is the one that suffers and is marginalized.[103] With information already being so plentiful, EU public diplomacy is often trumped by its secondary status to member states' more experienced and already established initiatives. The EU benefits, in terms of soft

[100] "Taking it to the US: The European Union's Greatest Public Diplomacy Challenge," 2005.
[101] Fiske de Gouveia and Plumridge, *European Infopolitik*, p. 11.
[102] Justaert, Keukeleire, and Thiers, "Reappraising Diplomacy: Structural Diplomacy and the Case of the European Union," 143-165.

power, from its members' experience with public diplomacy, which adds to its visibility and ensures a positive global image, while, at the same time, because those members continue to practice their own public diplomacy, that of the EU's is ignored, co-opted or misinterpreted. While general public diplomacy goals, for both the EU and individual members, pertain to the increase of awareness among global publics, more specific goals of member states differ, depending on several factors, including the nation's global standing and relationships. For example, as previously mentioned, a country like Malta, well aware of its attraction as a tourist destination, will focus on this aspect in its public diplomacy, while Romania may perhaps be focused on conveying the image of a new and improved economy. While such images are not detrimental to the EU, they are distracting from the union as a whole, facilitating the foreign publics' continued ignorance of the union, thus perpetuating their confusion out of lack of knowledge.

A reason for the EU members' lack of desire to unify their public diplomacy endeavors may be a flaw in the EU's internal communications, which has also been criticized as insufficient. The number of years it took to ratify the Lisbon Treaty, first devised in 1999 and rejected in referendums by French and Dutch voters in 2005 and Irish voters in 2008, is a testament to this.[104] Clearly, member citizens did not see the need for the reforms the treaty would enact because they were not properly informed of its benefits; or perhaps did not like what they saw. In either case, this portrays to foreign publics an inconsistency in EU policies, as EU publics are not informed or not taken into consideration. The member countries' publics are equally as confused as the non-EU ones, as previously stated, about

[103] Missiroli, "Stand and deliver: the European 'message' abroad," 7.
[104] Missiroli, "Stand and deliver: the European 'message' abroad," 5.

the EU's identity and policies, as well as their roles and contributions to them. As Howorth points out,

> … among the current EU member states there are two very different visions of the Union itself. One sees the EU as a project that is explicitly political, with clear strategic objectives, that requires the application of serious political will, the designation of definitive borders and a discernible finalité. The other sees it as essentially a process that is primarily commercial and is explicitly apolitical, that is focused on regulatory frameworks and progressive enlargement, with no definitive borders and no sense of finalité.[105]

The EU public diplomacy's unsuccessful attempts to foster awareness of its policies in the world are an extension of this same lack of success internally. Whether from lack of trying or lack of action, the EU has not cultivated an understanding and embodiment of a united EU identity among its members. The question of a solitary EU identity is a hotly contested topic, and while this paper does not address the issue, it must be said that the concept of an EU identity is not necessarily separate from a European identity, arising out of continental boundaries, histories and relationships. Because this issue is not addressed by EU public diplomacy, or rather, gets lost amidst its other issues, publics, both EU and non-EU alike, understand it to be in question. Member states continue to push their own agendas with, what seems like, little regard for the implications for their collective EU image. The EU members' lack of awareness is also seen as a lack of engagement, and therefore, interest in the EU, which in turn negatively shapes non-EU publics' levels of interest and curiosity.[106]

On a broader scale, the EU's structure is also blamed for the failure of its public diplomacy in presenting to the public a coherent new voice. The confusions about its

[105] Howorth, "What Europe badly needs is a 'Grand Strategy,'" Autumn 2009.
[106] Michalski, "The EU as a Soft Power: the Force of Persuasion," 140.

institutions and officials previously alluded to prevent any public diplomacy efforts to counteract them. The rotating presidency of the Commission is cited as a major disadvantage for the EU's public diplomacy. The half-yearly change in leaders requires a level of vigilance from non-EU publics which very few are willing to dedicate to, especially since they are already skeptical of the position's benefits for the union. The fact that a different country is given the title of president every few months only continues to enable the critique that individual member states are more apt to favor their own national interest above that of the union.[107] While EU communication has sought to present the EU institutions to non-EU publics in a simple and comprehensive way, EU headlines override this attempt by featuring stories of the EU's never-ending bureaucratic complexities. Competing with local and global media to correct EU portrayals has been a thorn in the side of EU public diplomacy. The issue of lack of credibility among foreign publics arising out of its relatively new and confusing identity explains the EU's perpetual second place finish in this competition.

Additionally, the EU's reliance on soft power is now seen as a hindrance to its attempts at reasserting itself as a major player in international affairs, and, subsequently, to its public diplomacy. The EU's centuries-old "historical capital" is no longer enough to survive in a world where military powers rule, especially with its demographic decline, energy dependency and lack of key natural resources.[108] With the advent of several wars and an economic crisis, the EU's promotion of culture and language is seen as insignificant and overused. Its public diplomacy requires a contemporary spin, which must include the

[107] Howorth, "What Europe badly needs is a 'Grand Strategy,'" Autumn 2009.
[108] Ibid.

presentation of the EU as a more powerful union, in terms of collective strength, both as a united and military power. The lack of a collective military force only exacerbates what many deem as the EU's problem. EU public diplomacy is greatly hindered in this area as its expounding of the benefits of soft power to a public that has witnessed the rise of war is seen as irrelevant and out of touch. The EU member states' disagreements on engagement, and reluctance to get involved, in military operations angers publics, especially those whose countries are actively involved in wars, like the U.S. This perpetuates the opinion of the EU as elitist, weak and, even cowardly, causing publics to lose affinity and interest. EU public diplomacy's promotion of its soft power, in countries whose own internal communication aims at building support among its citizens for their wars is seen as completely contradictory to state aims and is, naturally, ignored, or derided.

Recommendations and the EU's Response

These identified challenges to the success of EU public diplomacy have elicited obvious recommendations, which may be summarized as calls for greater unification of EU voice and action, as well as more efforts toward presenting itself as a smart power. The EU has been well aware of critiques and recommendations and has taken steps to implement them.

Scholars contend that EU member states are far better off, in terms of public diplomacy and all other aspects, together than they are separately, and so must unite and integrate their separate public diplomacy initiatives.[109] States, while they may have robust public diplomacy mechanisms already in place, can only benefit from a combined effort. As it has been noted, the EU has a positive image in the world as a result of its members, and so member states need not be afraid of losing their clout; they will only gain by having a higher profile as recognized members of the EU. Smaller members who have a low or no global profile will benefit from the collective image even more. As Fiske de Gouviea points out, in this post-Cold War world, collective public diplomacy will not weaken member states' public diplomacy, but will instead limit the criticism of individual states' initiatives as foreign propaganda.[110] He argues for centralization of public diplomacy efforts. Specific recommendations from Fiske de Gouviea's report include creating an EU Public Diplomacy Strategy Committee to centrally review and co-ordinate strategy; creating a database of all EU public diplomacy and external communications activity; increasing polling, surveying, and media monitoring of how the EU is perceived in non-EU

[109] Ibid.
[110] Fiske de Gouveia and Plumridge, *European Infopolitik*, 21.

countries; and continuing to improve commissioners' visibility outside the EU including, foreign tours and interviews to foreign newspapers.[111] In this same vein of collectivity, the argument for smart power also speaks to the EU's need to branch out its public diplomacy endeavors in terms of new ideological territories. However, since arguments for the greater utilization of smart power rest on the EU's collective military capabilities, the calls for change in this respect are based on prescribed policy changes, as opposed to reforms in external communications, which preclude public diplomacy initiatives.

The EU, as always, has not remained passive to critiques and has undertaken new strategies to respond to them. To show publics that the EU us aware of their confusion and desires for change, EU public diplomacy has been promoting and highlighting its new attempts at unification of voice and action, and at utilizing its smart power, bolstered especially by the long-awaited ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. This is evidenced in a December 2009 article, by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, in which she stressed the need for "a European Union which thinks and acts globally, which speaks with one voice and pools its strengths, and which pursues a truly common external policy."[112] EU leaders are not blind to the world's criticism and their frank words confirm the EU's admission that it needs to reform the way it conducts foreign relations by centralizing and unifying its voice. The Lisbon Treaty has been promoted as the solution to many of the EU's perceived problems in terms of unification and cohesive communication and action. EU leaders have come out excitedly praising the treaty, including Commission President Barroso, who stated that after the treaty's "difficult birth," "all the pieces of the jigsaw are in place for a qualitative leap in the transatlantic

[111] Ibid., 22-8.
[112] Ferrero-Waldner, "The challenges ahead for external relations," November 5, 2009.

relationship."[113] While reaffirming the EU's awareness of a respite in U.S.-EU relations, the EU, via Barroso, offers the treaty as the solution, conveying that the EU is not only aware of the U.S.' grievances but has also taken steps to mollify them. The posts of President of the European Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy have been presented as solutions to the EU's difficulties of speaking and acting collectively.[114] Commissioner Ashton, upon taking up her new post of High Representative, wasted no time proclaiming it her job "… to make our voice stronger and more unified."[115] In her first major security policy speech, to the Munich Security Conference, Ashton speaks of mobilizing all the EU's levers of influence - political, economic, plus civil and military crisis-management tools - in support of a single political strategy."[116] In this way, she presents all of the EU's capabilities equally, while affirming that they will be unified to present one strategy to the world. She also mentions the EEAS as the manifestation of the EU's "joined-up thinking." The diplomatic corps is presented as a solution to the EU's lack of a unified voice, as exhibited by the various and, at times, disjointed external communications of the member nations. As the EU's voice, Ashton reiterated the rhetoric of unity built around the new reforms of the Lisbon Treaty to show the world that the EU is actively making reforms to become a single actor.

While the EU has also undertaken the task of tapping into its smart power capabilities, combining soft and hard power, its public diplomacy has been given the task of promoting this, using EU leaders to openly persuade publics of the EU's military strength; to see the

[113] Barroso, "A New Atlanticism for the 21st Century," March 26, 2010.
[114] Ferrero-Waldner, "The challenges ahead for external relations," November 5, 2009
[115] Ashton, "Quiet diplomacy will get our voice heard," December 17, 2009.
[116] "Ashton calls for the EU's soft power to be smart power too," February 14, 2010.

EU as more than an economic and or cultural power, but as a multi-faceted global power. As early as 2007, the EU's external relations website mentioned defense as an important part of the EU's bid to bring world stability.[117] The EU was already aware of the changing global power structure as a result of wars and weapons acquisitions and took steps to assert its place in the realm of security. More recently, it has shown an awareness of the marginalization of its soft power in the wake of the economic crisis, and has taken steps to publicize its military capabilities.[118] Wallstrom states that the EU model has not been one exclusively based on soft power by listing examples of the EU's use of member states' militaries to support its humanitarian and democracy promotion efforts. These include support of the elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo as well as deployment of troops to the capital to safeguard the process; supplying humanitarian aid to the victims of the Tsunami in Indonesia, while putting in place "a military-backed peace process that enabled guerrillas to put down their guns and go home;" and supporting Moldova's efforts to reform, while stationing police on its border to combat smuggling."[119] She shows that even without its own military force, the EU, through that of its members, is able to be a relevant defense actor. Wallstrom confirms that through its Foreign Security Policy, the EU is slowly moving to guide its hard power towards its international policy objectives, "when all other options fail."[120] In showing hard power as a last resort option, Wallstrom makes sure to convey that soft power is still very much a large part of the EU's repertoire and that it does not intend to abandon it, but rather continue to combine it with its hard

[117] "How the EU conducts its external relations," Europa website.
[118] Moran, "Opinion: US, Europe should mend rift," March 12, 2010.
[119] Wallstrom, "Public Diplomacy and its role in the EU's external relations," October 2, 2008.
[120] Wallstrom, "Public Diplomacy and its role in the EU's external relations," October 2, 2008.

power. In a different article, Ferrero-Waldner praises the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as an example of the EU's smart power, listing all the aspects, in the service of both soft and hard power, the policy encompasses, like democratization assistance and defense aid.[121] In his speech, Barroso directly answers critics of the EU's lack of engagement with the U.S.'s anti-terrorism initiatives when he reiterates the EU's involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan as a foreshadowing of more to come, since "the EU and the U.S. are just at the beginning of a more dynamic partnership in dealing with security challenges."[122] This again conveys that the EU has always been aware of a need for military strength, though has chosen to rely on its soft power instead. Now that the world needs it, the EU has and will continue to offer military aid, especially to its long-time partners like the U.S. These officials' clear statements in the service of public diplomacy reiterate the EU's new aims at correcting its mistake of relying too long on its cultural capital and signal the move to a more open and aware EU, willing to accept, and even implement, constructive criticism.

[121] Ferrero-Waldner "The challenges ahead for external relations," November, 2009.
[122] Barroso, "A New Atlanticism for the 21st Century," March 26, 2010.

A New Approach

Critiques about the EU's public diplomacy as well as the failure of its attempts to change point to the need for a different perspective about the way the EU communicates with non-EU publics and governments. Examination of the rubric under which the EU is judged and the assumptions this elicits shows that, because they have no other frame of reference, publics see the EU, mostly, as a nation-state, and, at times, as an international organization. As evidenced by the failure of communication strategies to promote an image of the EU as a unitary actor, the portrayal of a nation-state does not sufficiently or correctly convey the EU's unique identity and the decisions which arise out of it. This is the fundamental challenge for EU public diplomacy: the image of the EU is faced with a problem of political definitions.[123] Although the EU acts as a state in some respects, it is not a state. Though it may share functions or approaches with those of international organizations, it is also not exclusively an international organization.[124] It is, instead, a supranational institution, spanning nation-state boundaries and, therefore, traditional concepts of states' or organizations' functions, identities and expectations. EU watchers and critics, as well as the EU itself, have failed to adopt, or perhaps ignored, this characterization. Because of this, recommendations have been made under the auspice that the EU must be more like a nation-state. Reacting to critics, EU public diplomacy has promoted attempts to fit into this identity, though because such an identity is not appropriate, the endeavors have been deemed insufficient.

[123] "Teresa La Porte: The Public Diplomacy of the EU," September 24, 2009.
[124] Lucarelli. "The External Image of the European Union," 325.

The EU is comprised of 27 distinct states, which have their own, separate governments and cultures. While the EU also has a separate government and officials, they are not independent of member states, as their citizens have a direct say in many of their appointments and decisions. The EU is the sum of its parts, though it does not negate or interfere with the individuality of its members. Portrayals of the EU as a nation-state evoke certain expectations about actions and policies that would be characteristic of states.[125] However, because the EU is not a solitary, unified state, these expectations are not always fulfilled, resulting in criticism of the EU as lacking and insufficient in its organization and policy-making, as well as confusion among non-EU publics.

An image of the EU as an international organization, like that of the UN, endangers the EU of being seen, like the UN, as an "irrelevant debating society."[126] This image is also false for the following reasons: the EU serves the interests of its member states, acting as their collective representative, while the UN is a forum, bringing states together for discussions and amassing their separate powers. The EU unites its members for political, economic and security benefits, representing a region of the world, and therefore having a clear regional interest. The UN can remain nonpolitical, in theory, because it serves all regions of the world and also benefits countries who are not its members.[127] A major difference between the EU and international organizations like the UN is that the EU has its own robust economy, like that of a nation-state. Refuting commonly held characterizations may seem surprising, but, considering that the EU is unlike any other international entity in

[125] Batora, "Does the European Union transform the institution of diplomacy?" 60.
[126] Center, "Supranational Public Diplomacy: the Evolution of the UN Department of Public Information an the Rise of Third World Advocacy," 136.
[127] Ibid., 136,138.

the world, the need for a new classification is obvious. "The fluidity and complexity of the 'experimental union' seems to defy simple categorizations. It is obviously more than a traditional international organization, but less than a federal state in the making."[128] As the EU straddles the two conventional descriptions of governance structures, there is a need for a broader understanding of the EU that takes into account the EU's composition of separate nation-states, and acknowledges their retention of separate identities as a unique characteristic of the EU. Such a characterization, rarely used and not widely known by publics, is that of a supranational organization.

> Supranationality implies that there are bodies – in the European Union, the Commission, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and, to a lesser degree, the European Parliament – that enjoy a degree of autonomy from member-state governments, insofar as they have the capacity to define and pursue a politically relevant agenda….In short, they are more than 'passive,' structures merely reflecting the interests of the member state.[129]

Such a classification underlies the distinction between the EU and nation-states or international organizations. Lamy calls it a "space of pooled sovereignty."[130] A space in which EU governments, without devising international treaties, collectively construct the institutions which unify their voices and produce collective benefits, while surrendering some of their authority to newly instituted policies and laws, yet maintaining their own, separate institutions and bureaucracies in their home countries.

While the EU member states have transferred a great deal of their decision-making powers over to EU institutions, their sovereignty, government structures and officials, cultures, languages and histories, as well as a host of other unique characteristics, are left

[128] Jonsson, and Hall, "European Union," 151.
[129] Ibid.,

intact.[131] This is why the EU is above classification of a nation or a multi-member organization. It acts as its members' representative while having its own institutions and decision-making capacities; and its members maintain, through EU policies and their own prerogatives, separate identities while benefitting from the partnerships and policies fostered by the union. The institutions of the EU have a certain degree of power, separate from members. This is also what makes the EU not a nation-state or an international organization, but rather a supranational one. Institutions that exhibit the EU's unique brand of governance include the European Parliament, which is directly elected by member citizens and works with member governments and diplomats.[132] No other international institution has an equivalent body which presides over such a vast network of nations, who all have their own parliaments or law making bodies. This is another tool for the EU's soft power arsenal of democracy promotion. The EU's collection of such different political and economic players into one functioning institution has been hailed as an experiment in collective authority, radical, yet more beneficial to the future of international governance than the experience of traditional nation-states.[133] This structure is why the EU is a post-modern entity and role model for international cooperation, calling for the construction of new frames through which to view multination partnerships and institutions. While some of the EU's characteristics have been highlighted as hindrances to its ability to communicate coherently with outside publics, it is actually these characteristics, when they are seen as contributors to and examples of the EU's unique and novel identity, that help EU public

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[130] Lamy "Global Governance is a challenge for democracy (but an EU opportunity)," Spring 2010.
[131] Slaughter, *A New World Order*, 134.
[132] Address by John Bruton, March 31, 2008.
[133] Slaughter, *A New World Order*, 10.

diplomacy. The EU has been regarded as "…the most advanced form of voluntary integration between sovereign states in history."[134] The ability of the member states to leave the union, as well as their prerogative to join, is evidence of the member states' retention of sovereignty - something the EU does not share with even the U.S.

The EU conducts relations with other countries separate from its member states' relations with those same nations. Though this has been seen as one of the hindrances to the EU's unified voice and policy, it is a consequence of EU structure and is, in fact, an aspect of the EU that is extremely promotable as an example of how the EU is a model of democratic norms. By allowing its member to maintain their own, separate relationships with third countries, the EU exhibits its recognition of the benefits of these already established relationships, instead of being threatened by them. This is what makes it so extraordinary and forward-thinking; its members are able to come to decisions and adhere to common policies while maintaining their individuality, even asserting it.[135] Something else which prevents the EU from becoming fully integrated (as in the dissolution of borders) in order to appear more like a state is the absence of a common language and culture.[136] Though this is seen, through the nation-state lens, as a reason for the EU's difficulties in presenting and maintaining one voice, it illustrates the union's difference from its counterparts in the global arena and is actually beneficial in the building and maintaining of relationships with foreign countries. It conveys the EU's diversity and openness to difference, something many nations struggle to show.

[134] Address by John Bruton, March 31, 2008.
[135] Jonsson, and Hall, "European Union," 152.
[136] Shore, *Building Europe: the Cultural Politics of European Integration.*

In failing to recognize that the EU is actually not a nation-state, but an incomparable kind of institution encompassing characteristics of both a nation state and a multi-member organization, recommendations for EU public diplomacy, like those mentioned, only scratch the surface of the EU's public diplomacy challenges. Publics and governments are confined by their accepted frames of either nation state or multi-state organization in their judgments of EU public diplomacy. This is why EU public diplomacy, despite the EU's high and positive global standing, is seen as ineffective and disjointed. In saying that the EU does not have a unified voice, the EU is judged according to the standards for a nation state, which require the actor's public diplomacy to convey a unitary message, or at least messages that convey a unified stance. These judgments, in ascribing to the EU the properties of a nation-state, overlook that the EU's developments in its foreign policy capabilities are actually signs of its identity as a new kind of global actor, outside of the nation-state concept.[137] The EU's public diplomacy may be partly to blame for this as it has shown the EU's acceptance of the categorization of the EU as a nation-state by failing to promote the aspects that actually say otherwise; more specifically, the aspects that make it stand out as a new kind of global actor, accomplishing global governance on new levels never before seen in the world.

EU public diplomacy, by highlighting the ways in which the EU is streamlining its processes and policies to appear as a cohesive state actor, confirms that the EU agrees with a world view of it as a unitary actor, inefficient in meeting specified guidelines, and in need of more integration. While the EU is making strides in blending its many voices through its new reforms, by promoting this to the world as steps to appease critiques, it shows its

[137] Batora, "Does the European Union transform the institution of diplomacy?," 62.

approval in being labeled a nation-state, and therefore in being judged against a certain rubric, which is actually not applicable to it. The EU's public diplomacy is geared to convey an image of a cohesive organization reforming its structure and policies to resemble its counterparts in the global arena, i.e., nation states; instead of promoting the benefits of its disjointed identity and different voices, alongside those policies on which members reach consensus. This is problematic, however, because the EU is not a nation state. By ignoring or deemphasizing the distinct voices of its members, it ignores the unique advantage these voices bring to the EU's image as a novel and unrivaled global entity. Its conformity to the expectations for a sole voice affirms its self-characterization as a nation-state and its willingness to promote this image.

Reforms such as changing the names of Commission Delegations to EU Delegations, undertaken under the Lisbon Treaty, in order to make the Delegations appear more like traditional embassies, show that the EU is assimilating into the world's narrow definitions of nation-state and the resulting expectations for the structure of their representations.[138] The name change is obviously a result of awareness about global confusion concerning EU structures and institutions. While this approach shows an understanding of third publics and a desire to be relevant to them, it also draws attention away from the EU's unique structure and functions, assimilating into status quo world classifications of states and multilateral institutions. In communicating the ways that the EU is coming in line with expectations that arise out of an incorrect classification of the EU as a nation-state, its public diplomacy assures that the EU will never carve its own niche in the world order and

[138] Cross, "A European Foreign Service: Turning Diplomacy Inside-Out," February 17, 2010.

will always have to define and reform itself along those terms. This also serves to detract from the public diplomacy strategy of promoting the EU as a model of global governance.

The EU's new approach of emphasizing its hard power, especially its military capabilities, shows that it is not using its individuality to its advantage, but is instead trying to conform be like every other nation-state. The EU exhibits an abandonment of its solely soft power approach, affirming its ineffectiveness, and takes away from its active role in reforming global norms to be less based on military might. This calls into question the EU's role as a normative power because it is, as evidenced by its public diplomacy, conforming to others' standards, no longer a maverick championing a unique brand of government. The EU is taking the defeatist approach in trying to conform. Its public diplomacy is promoting and highlighting ways the EU is becoming more like other nations, so as to make it more relatable to outside publics by framing it in a context they understand. Though this approach may create some acceptance in the short term, it will only serve to further equate the EU with every other nation-state, forcing it to assimilate into expectations even further, possibly eroding the distinct qualities it possess through its various members.

Such a move away from presenting the EU as unique, and instead publicizing its assimilation into the world-prescribed view, is not viable because the EU is not, or intended to be, a unified state. Highlighting its similarities with a nation state, and never mentioning the differences, the EU's public diplomacy does a great disservice because it misrepresents the EU and causes foreign publics to have expectations about its policy and identity that may never be fulfilled. Because it may never meet the expectations tied to the nation-state identity, the EU's image will be mired in criticism and disappointment. Efforts at orienting

its public diplomacy according to critics' demands show that the EU is trying to be a state, because this is the image and classification projected on it, instead of trying to change the frame of reference by which it is seen. Its radical identity as a model of post-modern international governance is actually eroded by its attempts to fit into traditional classifications. Critics' expectations may never be satisfied, as can be seen by recent attacks on the reforms brought forth by the Lisbon Treaty, and the EU's quest is bound to fail, because the EU, while it may have similarities to one, is not made to be a nation-state.

Proving that the EU can never do enough to make itself appear as a nation-state, because it is not, its endeavors of presenting a unified voice, undertaken as a response to calls for greater integration, have already received criticism. EU attempts at presenting a unified position in foreign policy are discredited with allusions to the individuality of its members. Glencross points out the difficulty in a common European position at the UN on account of France and Britain holding permanent Security Council seats.[139] Here, the EU's members are considered on an individual basis, showing that their identities and characteristics prevent the EU from a constant, unified voice; obstacles not known to a nation-state as it only has one representative to international organizations. The EEAS, the EU's attempt at a diplomatic corps in line with nation-states' representations, has also garnered speculation as to whether it will be able to promote a single EU identity and policies, or crumble under the individual member's fight to promote their national interests.[140] States are again seen as independent actors able to assert their interests and

[139] Glencross, "The Grand Illusion Continues: What the Lisbon Treaty Means for the European Union and Its Global Role," March1, 2010.
[140] Grant, "Making a Success of the EAS," Centre for European Reform, May 21, 2009. And Behr, Nykänen, and Siitonen, "Rewriting the Ground Rules of European Diplomacy," March 31, 2010.

interfere with a unified image of the EU. Nation-states do not have the problem of such interference as their representations to other countries are made up of citizens of the nation who represent only its interests. These examples show that the EU's attempts to appear as a nation-state, while in line with recommendations, and therefore approved of, are still seen as feeble. EU's public diplomacy must, first and foremost, make publics aware of the EU's true identity, its unique status, position and the qualities which separate it from any traditional classifications, so that they do not fall into the same old assumptions and expectations. Then, it must promote the EU as an unprecedented embodiment of the future of global cooperation, elevating the EU to the status of role model and highlighting its work and achievements toward this end.

Recommendations

It is true that the EU member states' often lack of agreement on EU policies and actions limits its public diplomacy, but this is because the characterization of the EU as a nation-state leads to expectations of a categorical unity across all issues. The EU must move away from the generally accepted view that its public diplomacy is fractured because of its structure and, instead, must see the advantages of its novel structure, and communicate them to publics. In fact, some even consider the EU's public diplomacy better adapted to the fluidity of international relations and the pursuit of EU objectives than a more traditional organization with a single voice.[141] An unconventional institution like the EU must employ an unconventional public diplomacy strategy. Its focus should move away from proving that the EU is integrated, and more to highlighting how, with 27 member states, the EU is still able to make effective policy decisions without stifling the member states' separate identities. It is up to public diplomacy to reframe the image of the EU from an incoherent and discordant institution, lacking in military power, to that of an unprecedented global achievement in governance and security that is, and always will be, a work in progress, so that its many voice may be seen as unique benefits. It must promote a new classification of itself as a supranational institution, which leaves room for, and even welcomes, different voices. EU public diplomacy practitioners must be fully aware of the challenge of explaining and garnering credibility for such a novel classification.[142] This is why EU public diplomacy must present an honest picture of the various aspects of such a characterization, highlighting positive aspects of the EU and showing how, by using the

[141] Rasmussen, "Discourse Analysis of EU Public Diplomacy Messages and Practices," July 2009.
[142] Interview with Jozef Batora, March 14, 2010.

distinct tools at its disposal, it is making strides in changing the way the world thinks about international relations.

Change in Approach

EU public diplomacy must educate publics as to the true image and identity if the EU: a collection of different, separate voices which have come together for mutual benefit, to serve as an example of solidarity and good governance, who are, at the same time, able to maintain their distinct characteristics and identities. EU public diplomacy must make it a priority to reorient the public's characterization of the EU as a nation-state by highlighting the EU's distinct characteristics which separate it from a nation-state as evidence for the need for a new set of standards and, therefore, the new classification of a supranational institution. It would be most useful to introduce this term into its communications, making sure to thoroughly explain and define it, so that its usage increases and, overtime, it becomes part of the global lexicon. By pioneering the use of this term, the EU can shape the public's understanding and maintain the role of expert over its use. Instead of constantly communicating the unity rhetoric, EU public diplomacy must do a better job of acknowledging its varied composition. It is important for the EU to communicate its differences from a nation-state, thereby, separating itself from its members, yet it must be aware that in doing so, it creates confusion; a confusion which can be helped with promotion of the EU's identity as a supranational institution.

EU and its Members: One Voice Does Not Apply

The EU and its members must view each others' public diplomacies as mutually beneficial. To achieve this, they must build transparent and collaborative public diplomacy partnerships. Instead of vying for attention with individual member states' public diplomacy efforts, EU public diplomacy must integrate them more dynamically into its own endeavors. By partnering on public diplomacy initiatives, something that has already been done on a small scale, it will show the member states that it is not trying to take over but rather enhance their relationships with non-EU countries. In this way, it will benefit from the expertise, resources and existing relationships of EU countries' public diplomacy, and ensure a double platform for its communications. For their part, member states, while maintaining their public diplomacy voices, must be more pro-active in educating publics about their EU membership and new identities as members. Using the public's affinity for EU members' cultural aspects, public diplomacy should promote the construction of the new culture of the EU as a salad, not a melting pot, of the nations' distinct cultures, underlining the members' retention of their distinct characteristics coupled with an openness to new influences.[143]

It is important to counteract the image of the member states as constantly fighting to be heard by presenting the ways that they have maintained, and even complimented, their sovereignty as a benefit of EU membership. To do this, EU public diplomacy must more readily and openly present their separate voices, acknowledging and supporting them. One way of doing this is through the promotion of the reforms under the Lisbon Treaty that

allow for more state involvement in the decision making processes of the EU. This would foster the image of the EU as an inclusive entity and connect it more seamlessly to the images of the member states. By bringing to light this equal relationship, the EU's voice will be seen not in opposition to its members, but as a complement.

It is also important for EU public diplomacy initiatives to show that the EU is different from its member states, in that while the EU represents, as a whole, the views of its members, its members, as individuals, do not necessarily represent the views of the EU. The proliferation of different voices across the EU spectrum should not be viewed as a detriment, but should instead be promoted as a unique characteristic beneficial to the EU's continued success in directly representing its members. In understanding the EU as a supranational institution, publics should reject the one-voice scenario as irrelevant for the EU because it is not a nation state, but rather a collection of nation states with separate voices. The public should be made aware that public diplomacy has room for varied voices because there is so much distinct cultural capital across the EU that, at times, individual member states are more adapt at promoting it than the EU.

As for the new EEAS, the diplomatic corps, as representatives of the EU, must collaborate with member nations' representatives with the understanding that their goals are not in opposition, but rather, interlaced. Embassies and delegations must combine their efforts to not only show the world a united front, but also to increase their resources and capabilities in host countries. At the same time, member state representations and embassies need not disappear, as their existence is testament to the EU's allowance, and even need, for individual identities.

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[143] Interview with Prof. Teresa La Porte, e-mail correspondence, March 26, 2010.

EU as a Role Model

Another task facing EU public diplomacy is the reinvigoration of the eroding role of the EU "as a social model to be imitated."[144] First, in promoting a new characterization of the EU as a supranational institution, public diplomacy has the potential to stake out a separate niche for itself in the public's consciousness, apart from any other entities. With this in mind, EU public diplomacy must portray the EU as a positive force for reform in the way that states and institutions conduct inter and intra state relations. Publics should view it as a model for other, similar, institutions as well as all international actors. Public diplomacy should focus on how, "Despite the barbarity of wars and devastating national rivalries, the people of Europe have managed to build a zone of peace, democracy, freedom and prosperity the like of which mankind had never seen before."[145] While the U.S. and its development is similar to the EU model, the individual identities and the language differences of EU members serve as distinguishing points. The EU stands as an extraordinary achievement in economic and political integration. Its 27 distinct members, as well as the several others waiting anxiously to join, serve as a testament to its strength as a normative power.[146] Its ability to lead political and economic reforms, especially in countries of the former Soviet Union, is made even more extraordinary by the fact that its coercive mechanisms have relied on non-aggressive tactics.

[144] "The External Image of the European Union," 2007, 8.
[145] Varvitsiotis, "Europe's Future," March 8, 2010.
[146] Adler, "Europe as a civilizational community of practice," 75.

Public diplomacy should highlight the EU's achievements in overcoming nationalism and neocolonialism, as well as its dual embrace of integration through unity and diversity through enlargement.[147] Its brand of diversity due to its varied composition is unlike any in the world and is a testament to its citizens' growing acceptance of different publics, eroding characterizations of Europeans as discriminating and elitist. The member state's transition to the EU governance structure while preserving individual sovereignty can best be conveyed through more collaborative projects between the EU and member states in third countries. This way, publics can witness, first hand, the dynamic partnerships at work. Public diplomacy should employ tools of contrast and comparison to convey the message of EU distinction, positing the EU of the present with the Europe of the past, to show how far the union and its individual members have come. The EU's public diplomacy strategy must center on education and transparency, presenting the EU in a more sincere and, perhaps, vulnerable light. By admitting its faults and failures, the EU will show the world a more honest image, not shying away from the occasional lack of coherence and adding to the novelty and distinction of a picture of the EU as an experiment and a work in progress. Such honesty and vulnerability will actually make publics more accepting and forgiving of the EU's struggles and endear the EU to them.

EU as a Learning Process

In line with a more honest representation of the EU, EU public diplomacy should present the EU as a learning process; a blending and testing of ideas about governance. As

[147] Ibid.

an experiment in international governance, the EU should be seen as an evolving institution, constantly looking for ways to streamline and improve.[148] As an "unfinished political system,"[149] the EU has more room for maneuvering and fluidity. Through this kind of portrayal, its constant reforms should be seen as a testament to its commitment to achieving the best possible model of governance, adding to its image as role model and innovator. While a large part of public diplomacy already communicates new reforms and policies, this should be reframed, not as an attempt to conform the EU to the expectations of others, or as a symbol of the EU's lack of coherence, but as part of its constant self-reevaluation and improvement. In being open about the bumps in the road, EU public diplomacy will be more in line with the realities and actions of the EU, and therefore gain more credibility.[150] Admitting the EU's inconsistencies and disagreements will allow its achievements to be framed in terms of unprecedented progress in the realm of global integration, adding to its role model identity.

The EU has exhibited its awareness of this, most recently, by Barroso's acknowledgement of the EU members' divergence of opinion on the SWIFT Agreement, reached in 2009, between the EU and the U.S. to allow access to U.S. law enforcement authorities to the payment database of the financial consortium SWIFT. While he acknowledged and called for respect for the differing opinions in the EU on this topic of privacy, he also reiterated that this does not have to mean delay, adding that the EU has already presented a negotiating mandate to the member states. This approach shows the

[148] Varvitsiotis, "Europe's Future," March 8, 2010. And Lamy "Global Governance is a challenge for democracy (but an EU opportunity)," Spring 2010.
[149] Michalski, "The EU as a Soft Power: the Force of Persuasion," 126.
[150] Nye, Jr., "Diplomacy Key to Power Politics," February 14, 2010.

EU's honesty about the realities of its unique composition and the challenges it presents, while showing that the challenges are being overcome.[151] Publics must be treated as informed actors privy to the disagreements and inconsistencies within the EU. Covering this up with an image of a cohesive multilateral institution only makes the EU dishonest and exposes and highlights inconsistencies. Letting the world know that the EU is, and continues to be, an experiment in global governance will prompt publics to move away from focusing on the negative to seeing the actions of the EU in a new light, as examples of its identity as an innovator. As a new kind of supranational institution, the EU should be presented as a leader, faced with challenges, but forging ahead. With a new, more honest tone, EU public diplomacy should be open about the challenges the EU faces, even acknowledging others' critiques and why and how they do not pertain to the EU's true identity.

EU as A Soft Power

Instead of trying to adopt and foster an image, like many of its counterparts in the world, of a militarily strong actor, the EU should continue to foster the image which has continued to garner it support and favorable standing in the world, using its new identity of supranationality as reason for this divergence. Though there is some advantage to being a hard power in the world, this advantage is fleeting, and rests on one's constant ability to reassert one's strength. In contrast, soft power, when focused on cultivating dialogue and fostering partnerships is more constant and permanent, much more advantageous in the

[151] Barroso "A New Atlanticism for the 21st Century," March 26, 2010.

long term. Copeland opines that the EU has no place for hard power as this will not be the mark of dominance in an increasingly multipolar world. [152] While this is a rather radical view, it underscores the importance of not succumbing to the world's obsession with military might, as this will not last. While national security should remain a significant issue for the EU, its public diplomacy need not highlight the EU's military strength, as this takes away from its image as a unique actor. The EU's public diplomacy is much better off not focusing on the attempts to devise a common defense policy and continuing to harness the EU's soft power. Under its new classification as a supranational institution, public diplomacy must give more credibility to the unique attributes of the EU. Its economic strength will bring political influence, and, eventually, international clout.

> With its peace, prosperity, safe and livable cities, social safety net, excellent public infrastructure, rich historical heritage and thriving artistic and cultural life, in the era of heteropolarity, Europa seems destined to lead the world in soft power, the power of attraction. The source of Europe's strength and the basis of its comparative advantage will reside in the demonstration effect, in the ability to project its success by example internationally.[153]

The EU, in its attempts to assert its military power, especially in the present time of heightened awareness of the dangers of war, is only eroding its face as a peaceful actor in an increasingly chaotic world. EU public diplomacy has so much in its smart power arsenal that far outweighs asserting its military muscle, like its vast humanitarian aid, democracy promotion and cultural capital, that there is no need to resort to controversial actions which are out of its character.[154] Its subtle approach to power assertion is much

[152] Copeland, "The Year Ahead: A Strategic Opportunity for European Public Diplomacy," January 5, 2010.
[153] Copeland, "The Year Ahead: A Strategic Opportunity for European Public Diplomacy," January 5, 2010.
[154] Adler, "Europe as a civilizational community of practice," 76.

more affective, long-lasting and, more importantly, does not wane with its ability to exert force. The crucial public diplomacy goal of building relationships will present itself much more easily to the EU under the non-menacing image cultivated by its soft power-heavy approach, than under the hostile image often evoked through hard power. Relationships built on shared values, like those of the EU members, should be brought to light as more sustaining and mutually beneficial than ones struck out of fear or dependence.

EU public diplomacy must champion the move away from the perception that military force is somehow associated with strength. It must promote itself as the first global power, while having the capabilities to do so, actively chooses not maintain a collective military force. It may do so by highlighting the lack of war between any EU countries since their ascension into the union with a celebration of an anniversary every year. By promoting the EU as a force for change, public diplomacy will usher in the idea of a new kind of strength, based on the ability to influence global norms; one that is far more stoic than strength derived from military power. Furthermore, in the competition for the public's attention in an increasingly information saturated environment, the EU, vis-à-vis its soft power, would garner more lasting attention as a nonconformist.[155] Such an approach underlines the EU's unique identity as a leader among followers: while everyone resorts to flashing their weapons, the EU, by flashing peace signs, champions a new approach.

[155] Nye, Jr., "Diplomacy Key to Power Politics," February 14, 2010.

EU Public Diplomacy in the U.S.

In terms of its public diplomacy in the U.S., the EU has a great comparison at its disposal: some have coined the phrase, the United States of Europe to refer to the EU. This is something EU public diplomacy can use to its advantage to make U.S. publics more aware and informed about the EU's unique structures and attributes; by comparing the two. The EU needs to reorient and reinvent its public diplomacy strategy in a way that highlights its differences from the U.S., which despite differences among member states, is, collectively, a nation state with a common language and history. This will show the American public that the EU is a new and novel entity that must be given due credit and attention, causing them to reevaluate their previous assumptions and expectations. Americans clearly like the EU, on account of its culture and history, but view skeptically its role in international affairs. This is why the focus can move away from simply conveying the attraction of the EU, though this of course must remain as the underlying principle behind all EU public diplomacy initiatives, and toward fostering greater understanding of the nuances of the EU that make it a model and distinct actor on the global scene. While it is true that all aspects of the EU's complex structure do not need to be known or understood by the U.S.,[156] by continuing, and even broadening, the EU's focus on educating the American public about the EU's distinct characteristics in comparison to the U.S., the EU will reinvigorate the interest of the public. This new information and framing will be welcomed after years of traditional fact dissemination in support of the unity rhetoric, which has evidently lost its luster and has fallen on deaf ears.

[156] Interview with Anthony Smallwood, August 3, 2009.

At the same time, reiterating the shared values the two partners have, in spite of their institutional and cultural differences, is also needed to cement the relationship on all levels. It is important for Americans, especially since they may not understand certain aspects like the structure or policies of the EU, to be reminded of the shared values of democracy and freedom, economic freedom and respect for human rights they and their European counterparts possess. This would make the EU more relatable and not so foreign. This is something that EU public diplomacy has endeavored to do, though there is room for expansion. First, presenting the broader shared values in order to establish a connection, then, narrowing down the institutional and structural differences in order to guide Americans away from believing the EU is exactly the same as the U.S., will be helpful in maintaining the respect and positive opinion Americans already have of the EU. Barroso has made allusions to an awareness of this approach in his recent speech, where he mentioned similarities of the EU and the U.S., as well as room for disagreements, pointing out that this was normal.[157] Publics, though they may not understand the nuances of the EU, will be conscious of honesty, because it shows that they are being treated as active partners, who are important to the EU, instead of just the receptors of propaganda. Since Americans have already aware of the EU's stumbles, it is best if the EU comes clean and talks about them openly instead of just glossing over or denying them. Publics will attribute more credibility to the EU for being honest and be more open to hear what it has to say.

As for specific public diplomacy efforts, the numerous actions of the EU Delegation to the U.S., as detailed above, are sufficient in educating and maintaining

[157] Barroso, "A New Atlanticism for the 21st Century," March 26, 2010.

relationships with the public. Future endeavors, however, should convey the aforementioned reframing of the EU's identity. This must be done with the awareness that such a shift in discourse will take time and will not happen overnight. With this in mind, there are several changes to the EU Delegation website that can be made to better inform the American public of the EU's identity and better orient them to its shift.

The EU Delegation website is comprehensive, thorough and informative, requiring little modification.[158] That being said, there are a few minor additions, centering on accessibility and the presentation of the EU's distinctiveness, from which it may benefit. The EU Delegation website should be enhanced to be on par with the Europa website, geared toward EU publics, by making it more creative, vibrant and interactive. The front page is rather cluttered and can have less text, perhaps choosing one prominent aspect to focus on, such as "News," or the "Spotlight" section. It would be advisable to remove the left "Policy Areas" sidebar, as it is already a link at the top. Front page news can also feature more EU-U.S. relations-centered information, as it is assumed that Americans visiting the site will be more interested by news they can relate to more readily. One page that can be featured more prominently is the "EU in the US Events Calendar - From the 27 EU Member States" page. The inclusion of this page highlights the EU's support and collaboration with its member states and is very effective in educating the public about the EU structure and composition as diverse and all encompassing. The website needs more direct interaction with the public. In line with educating the American public about differences between the EU and the U.S., a simple "Test Your Knowledge" quiz can be placed on the website. In this same respect, although requiring less interaction, and

perhaps more attractive to an older audience, would be the addition of a "Fact of the Week/Month" page centering on some aspect of the EU-U.S. relationship.

[158] Website of the European Union Delegation to the United States of America.

Conclusion

EU public diplomacy is faced with a host of dilemmas as the EU prepares to enter into a new stage of reforms. Although it has always attempted to educate non-EU publics about the EU, the union's structure and policies have confused and frustrated them, causing some distancing, especially on the part of the U.S. While the EU shows extraordinary awareness of its waning image in the U.S., it has failed to see that this image rests on incorrect assumptions, by both EU and non-EU publics, about the EU's identity. This is why there is a grave need for the reframing of its public diplomacy to show that its true identity is actually that of a supranational institution. Its new message must present the EU, not as a unified state, but as a world leader in the innovation of supranational relationships, constantly testing new avenues of global governance. The changing of the frame must occur, subtly, through the EU's regular public diplomacy mechanisms. By informing publics of this change in its identity, EU public diplomacy will breathe life back into its relationships and reclaim its role as a normative power.

It must be understood that the EU, because of its unique position and identity, is not in danger of losing the U.S. as its ally. The two partners have too much to lose in severing ties, and, furthermore, there is no reason for them to do so. Currently, the distancing of the U.S. signals a preoccupation with other, more pressing events. This is not necessarily a negative. The U.S. is concerned with countries and publics that require its assistance and or attention. The EU is not one of them. This speaks to the EU's stability as an institution and as a reliable U.S. partner. Because the U.S. media does not report on stable relationships, the American public is not constantly focused on the EU, and this is just fine. With its immense power of attraction, the EU is not in danger of losing the attention of the

American public, though it may not always be on its immediate radar; a position that is over rated, due to its lack of constancy, anyway. The EU can be sure that Americans will continue to visit its sights, consume its products and learn its languages, even without completely understanding its policies.

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