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nt in Pre-k Programs, 2001-2010: A Mixed-Methods Evaluation of the Influence of Policy Networks

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State Investment in Pre-k Programs, 2001-2010:
A Mixed-Methods Evaluation of the Influence of Policy Networks
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ñState Investment in Pre-k Programs, 2001-2010:
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Between 1980 and 2000, the majority of U.S. states adopted pre-k programs, such that by the end of the millennium, 39 states had programs in place. In the subsequent decade, while only a handful of new programs were enacted, National Institute for Early Education Research data show that average levels of both access for four-year-olds to state pre-k programs and the quality of those programs increased at substantial and approximately equal rates. This pattern represents an unusual instance of program expansion without a loss of quality, or ñscaling up.ò At the same time, state levels of access and quality in 2010 still varied widely. This research combines statistical analyses with qualitative work to determine the roles played by factors both internal and external to states in scaling up, and in differential types and levels of investment across states. In particular, it explores the influence of the evolving national pre-k policy network and the distinct strategies that emerged within it and have divided it to some extent.

The quantitative analyses fail to support the hypothesized influence of national policy networks. Nor do the statistical results suggest strong influences from state economic capacity or political ideology. However, a closer look suggests that the impact of these factors may be mediated by the impact of the Great Recession on state budgets between 2007 and 2010. Case studies of Arizona, Connecticut, Ohio, and Virginia illustrate those impacts. They also suggest that the national pre-k policy network has, indeed, had a greater influence on some states than on others, and that state early childhood policy communities and the policy entrepreneurs embedded within them vary in their cohesiveness and capacity. These latter findings help explain differential state success in scaling up pre-k and suggest avenues for both policy advocacy and future research.

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Introduction

State prekindergarten, or pre-k, policymaking in the United States is a relatively new phenomenon. California, the first U.S. state to fund a pre-k program, did so in 1965, followed by New York in 1966. Maryland was the next state to enact a program, in 1979, and the subsequent two decades saw the majority of other states follow suit. By 2000, 39 states had a program in place. As total state investments in pre-k grew substantially over these 35 years, policymaker and public perception shifted; the program came to be seen as an appropriate public responsibility, rather than the largely private one that it had been prior. The ten years from 2001 to 2010 mark a different and particularly interesting period in pre-k policymaking. Substantial new investment continued to occur, but not in the form of new enactments, as in the two decades prior. Rather, this decade constitutes a period of adaptation and, specifically, of the ñscaling upò of state programs. Those ten years also saw the emergence and evolution of a national policy network that has largely promoted pre-k as a child development, rather than parental support, policy. Within the network, there has been an increasing distinction between two pre-k camps, both with an ñearly childhood programs as a child developmentò foundation, but with different perspectives on which pre-k program aspects are critical and strategies on promoting them.

At the same time, at the end of these ten years of pre-k enhancement efforts and several decades of investment in state pre-k programs, state programs vary substantially in two key respects: percentage of four-year-olds served (access), and program quality, as measured by a number of factors shown to improve the outcomes of children served by the program. Eleven states still had no state-funded pre-k program at all as of 2010 (though two of the eleven had pilots). This research seeks to identify the major determinants for those differences among state

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policy networks that scholars of state policymaking and of the diffusion of innovative policies have found to be critical to policy emulation and learning.

First, this chapter presents a brief history of the national-level forces that have promoted overall increases in pre-k investment, but that do not explain the substantial differences among states. The history includes relevant federal policies, shifts in national economic and social circumstances, and pertinent early childhood and brain development research. It concludes with a depiction of the current status of pre-k programs across the U.S. states.

Brief Trajectory of U.S. Pre-k Programs

While the earliest origins of public pre-kindergarten in the United States generally have little bearing on todayôs state pre-k programs, divisions among camps of pre-k advocates that presage current rifts within the early childhood policy community merit a brief summary.

In the 1880s, emerging research on how young children should be educated spurred the establishment of settlement and other philanthropic kindergartens to care for and protect poor children alongside new public kindergartens for middle-class children (Wortham 1992, 45). As Emily Cahan emphasizes in her 1989 history of child care in the United States, however, the picture of nursery schools is not necessarily as rosy as that depicted by Wortham, especially for poor children. Not all children were put on the nursery school track; the rise of preschool saw the development of a ñtwo-tier system,ò one with an emphasis on supplementing enrichment in the home, geared toward middle-income children, and a second for lower-income children, for which the purpose was not education, but rather minding children while their mothers worked (Cahan 1989).[1]

[1] See, too, Karchôs assertion that ñThe debate about how best to care for and educate young children dates back óat least to the infant school movement of the early 1800sé [and] continued in the early twentieth century, epitomized by the distinction between day nurseries and nursery schools [poor, care vs. middle-class, education]é . Government

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e Great Depression and World War II, further shaped early education. The Social Security Act of 1935 established a set of social supports for children and families, partly in response to the 1934 Childrenôs Bureau proposal ñto meet the health and social needs of the nationôs children.ò The need to employ teachers displaced as a result of funding decreases also led to their repurposing as nursery school and child care workers. This period thus saw a continuing split, with some programs serving childrenôs developmental needs and others limited to the perceived basic health and care needs of poor children in particular.

With the employment of large numbers of women outside the home during the 1940s, when young fathers were fighting in World War II, the federal Lanham Community Facilities Act continued federal support for public child care. Child care was needed on a large scale, and high-quality programs were developed and quickly implemented. Immediately following the end of the war, however, men returned to factories and women to their homes, and the pre-k centers closed.[2] This period also saw recognition of important early education researchers, including Freud and Piaget. As such, debates about curriculum that are still fought bitterly today ï with self-development and play pitted against more structured curricula and tests ï have their origins in this era.

In the 1950s, relatively few middle- and upper-class American women worked outside of the house, and those who did generally waited until their children were of school age. Of married mothers, just 20 percent were in the workforce (Besharov 2009, 29).[3] Indeed, the return of large numbers of working-age men from the war front prompted a cultural and legal backlash against

---

involvement in the education and care of very young children took on increased political salience during the Great Depression and Second World War. Publicly funded ócemergencyô nursery schools were one component of the New Deal, and the national government created a targeted program, providing grants for day care to those areas most affected by the wartime mobilization effortò (Karch 2010, 219).

[2] The Act terminated the high-quality care in 1945, when women were directed to return to homemaking.

[3] As Besharov notes, however ñ[s]ingle mothers have always had little choice but to work, or go on welfare.ò

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a strong emphasis on homemaking and caring for these children, so for the minority of children who did attend pre-k, most programs were private. For the substantial minority of low-income women and those who had to work, however, daily childcare was a necessity. The continued emphasis on care (versus education) for poor children promoted the development of a system of care that perpetuated the class divide.

> In reality, from the end of World War II to the present decade, the number of mothers working outside the home has risen steadily. Whether the federal government acknowledged the need for child care or not, it had become a necessity in the United States. In the absence of federal support, child care again evolved from private nonprofit and commercial sources (Wortham, 79-80).

The 1960s heralded change in womenôs status in society; they began to challenge their status as ñnaturalò housewives and stay-at-home mothers, and their limited professional opportunities as secretaries, nurses, and teachers, and more began to seek paid work. Still, less than one in four married women with young children (24 percent) worked outside of the home.[5]

That decade also saw a series of federal laws designed to address concerns about social inequities and poverty in the United States, such as Kennedyôs and Johnsonôs Great Society and War on Poverty initiatives. Changes in the Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program required job training for mothers and provided child care. With respect to how those children should be cared for, research increasingly pointed to the need for compensatory education to boost the development of those who were at risk, especially those living in urban slums and isolated rural areas.[6] The 1965 federal Head Start Program responded by providing early education and health services to poor children and their families. Those years also saw the first states enact their own publicly funded pre-k programs. Two large, progressive, and wealthy states, California

[4] ñAt the beginning of the 1950s, the majority of women with children under the age of 6 worked in the home if economic circumstances permitted.ò Ibid., 91.
[5] Ibid., 112.
[6] ñ[Piagetôs] concept that intelligence responded to experience influenced American psychologists, particularly Benjamin Bloom and J. McVicker Hunt who focused on the significance of the early years for cognitive developmenté . [and said] that educational intervention should begin in childrenôs earliest yearsò Wortham, 105.

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first in the nation to do so.[7] This era thus represented the first in which poor children's educational development, as well as their need for basic care, became a serious policy consideration.

It was another 13 years before a third state, Maryland, implemented its pre-k program in 1979, signaling the first real wave of state pre-k programs; twelve more states enacted programs in the following decade. Those states represent a range of sizes, demographic profiles, resource levels, and political leanings ï from Oklahoma (1980) and West Virginia (1983) to Vermont (1987), Louisiana (1988), and Iowa (1989).[8] Pre-k seemed to have gained momentum as a state policy. These two decades also saw major shifts in American economic and cultural factors that shaped pre-k demand: divorce rates shot up, and many more women with young children worked outside the home: 40 percent by 1970, compared to just 20 percent in 1950 (Besharov 2009, 29). In 1979, roughly half of all marriages ended in divorce, and by 1988, 55 percent of women with children under the age of 6 worked outside the home (Hymes 1991). By 1980, over half (52%) of all U.S. children ages 3-5 were enrolled in early childhood programs of some sort (Grant and Eiden 1982).

Starting in the mid-1970s, the combination of unemployment and inflation had put tremendous pressure on working- and middle-class families and driven many of them down into or near poverty. At the same time, the Reagan administration's policies cut expenditures on a range of supports for low-income families ï food stamps, school lunches, AFDC, WIC and others. As a result, the need for child care and pre-k programs increased, but households were less able financially to meet it, providing an incentive for states to enact them.

---

[7] Wisconsin, another historic pioneer of innovative policies, had a program in place in 1873, but it did not fund the program consistently until well into the 20th century and is considered an outlier for the purposes of this research. As discussed above in the section on early pre-k history, Wisconsin's program was part of a very early exploration of such nursery schools.

[8] See Appendix A for a bulleted History of U.S. Pre-k for more detail.

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ven larger number of states (sixteen) adopt programs, as well as a much higher level of investment. Georgiaôs 1993 gubernatorial race was marked by Democrat Zell Millerôs campaign platform of pre-k that would be funded through revenues from a new lottery.[9] 1998 was another landmark year; five states ï Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, New Jersey, and Tennessee ï all started their programs that year. Alabama transitioned to the new decade and millennium with the 2000 enactment of a program. This also marked the end of this wave of new enactments.

2001-2010

After 2000, the trajectory then changed considerably. New enactments ground virtually to a halt. Other than Floridaôs 2002 ballot initiative creating ñuniversalò pre-k, which began to be implemented in 2005, no state enacted a new pre-k program until the end of the decade. Rhode Island and Alaska enacted pilot programs in 2009, but as of 2010, Alaska had not reached the stage of full state policy. At the same time, state investments in pre-k programs have continued to grow. In the past decade, average levels of access and quality have increased substantially among states with programs, although the Great Recession seems to have created a plateau at the end of those ten years.

As a 2003 article by Virginia early childhood scholar Bob Pianta and his colleagues depicts, while many states had programs in place by 2001, most had invested relatively little in more sophisticated considerations around curriculum, balancing cognitive with social and emotional needs, and other issues related to quality (Bryant et al, 2002). The ten years since, then, represent a critical time for those policy debates, and for exploring the forces that spurred them and their resulting investment decisions.

[9] Zeller initially intended a target program for at-risk children, but political feasibility shifted the push to universal.

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more graphic illustration of the state pre-k trajectory. The following pages provide data and maps presenting data on changes in pre-k investments, both access and quality, between 2001 and 2010.

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ne[10]

1873 Wisconsin begins 4-year-old kindergarten (4K)

1965 California enacts its program

1966 New York enacts half-day Experimental PreKindergarten (EPK) for at-risk 4-year-olds

1979 Maryland begins a pilot to help at-risk children in Baltimore City and P.G. County

1983 Maine allows schools to use public school funds for pre-k programs for 4-year-olds

1983 West Virginia establishes Public School Early Education Program for children under 5

1984 South Carolina establishes half-day program for most at-risk 4-year-olds

1984 Texas establishes public school pre-k for at-risk 3- and 4-year-olds

1985 Illinois establishes half-day pre-k for at-risk 3- and 4-year-olds

1985 Wisconsin resumes half-day pre-k for 4-year-olds after 27-year hiatus

1985 Michigan School Readiness Program for at-risk 4-year-olds ineligible for Head Start

1985 Washington establishes program to serve 4-year-olds at risk of school failure

1987 Vermont begins to serve 3- and 4-year-olds who are low-income or otherwise at risk

1987 Oregonôs Head Start Prekindergarten established for disadvantaged 3- and 4-year-olds

1988 Colorado preschool program established

1989 Hawaiiôs program begins serving 3-year-olds with special needs and some 4-year-olds

[10] Adapted from Pre-K Now website, The History of Pre-K, http://www.preknow.org/resource/abc/timeline.cfm. This timeline presents only enactments. Later access and quality enhancements, which often represent the majority of a stateôs investments, are provided in a more detailed pre-k history in Appendix A.

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for all low-income 4-year-olds and with disabilities

am enacted to serve low-income 3- and 4-year-olds

1991 Arkansas Better Chance enacted to serve educationally deprived 3-to-5-year-olds

1991 Minnesota Learning Readiness program implemented to serve at-risk 3- and 4-year-olds

1991 New Mexico's Child Development Program for children from birth to age five begins

1992 Nebraska pilot program enacted[11]

1992 Louisiana funds Starting Points pre-k program

1993 Georgia initiates program for at-risk children funded by state lottery

1994 Delaware establishes ECA Program for children eligible for, but not in, Head Start

1995 Virginia Preschool Initiative started

1996 Arizona forms Early Childhood Block Grant to serve at-risk 4-year-olds

1997 Connecticut establishes School Readiness Initiative for at-risk 3- and 4-year-olds

1998 Oklahomaôs program made available to all of the stateôs 4-year-olds

1998 Tennessee begins funding Early Childhood Education Pilot Project

1998 Kansas creates Preschool Program for at-risk 4-year-olds not eligible for Head Start

1999 Missouri establishes preschool program

2000 Alabama launches Pre-K Pilot Program for at-risk 4-year-olds

2002 FL ballot initiative passed

[11] Nebraskaôs program gained permanent status in 2001.

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Policy in 2010

What is the result of all this increased investment on state pre-k programs as of 2010? A sharply varied patchwork of 39 state programs provides pre-k that ranges in access from just 2% or 3% in some states to over two thirds of all of the stateôs 4-year-olds in Oklahoma. (Eleven states, including Alaska, which recently enacted a pilot but has not yet raised it to the policy level, have no state pre-k programs.)[12] With respect to quality, Floridaôs ballot initiative, put in place as a result of the legislatureôs strong opposition to pre-k, has resulted in a large percentage of children being served in poor-quality settings: large classrooms, high teacher-student ratios, and low per-student funding. At the other end of the quality spectrum, Alabamaôs small but growing programs employ only teachers who have bachelorôs degrees and aides with early childhood experience, classrooms are small and ratios low, and the programs provide snacks, screenings, and opportunities for parental interaction.

Chapter 3 presents data on each stateôs level of access (percentage of 4-year-olds enrolled) and quality, based on a NIEER scale described in the data section. Quality benchmarks include teacher and staff qualifications, class characteristics (maximum class size, staff-student ratio, and curriculum used), and other supports, including snacks/meals, screenings, and home visits. Figure 1.2, below provides a graphic illustration of averages increases across all pre-k states in pre-k access and program quality over the past decade: 2001-02 through 2009-10.

[12] The National Institute for Early Education Research (NIEER) 2009 Yearbook details state pre-k programs through 2008-2009. No new programs have since been enacted, although Rhode Island recently passed legislation formalizing and expanding its 2009 pilot.

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ccess and program quality, 2001-2010



At the start of the decade, average access was thirteen percent, nearly doubling to over 25 percent by 2010, while program quality increased over that period from five of ten to over seven of ten NIEER benchmarks met, on average. It is important to note the difference between the two scales; because of the much narrower NIEER range, the slope appears relatively more flat. Proportionately, quality increased by forty percent from its 2001 level by 2010, so at close to the same pace as access. As the lines indicate, access has increased fairly consistently, continuing to do so during the Great Recession years, while quality increased steadily until 2006-07, at which point that increase flattened out, with quality increasing barely at all. This pattern and the reasons for it are discussed in both the quantitative analysis and the case study results in chapter 5.

Figures 1.3 through 1.6, below, provide similar data from a different angle; these four maps illustrate the state-by-state status of pre-k at two key points in the history of pre-k policymaking. Figures 1.3 and 1.4 depict the percentage of four-year-olds served in pre-k programs in each state and the quality of those programs in 2001, at the end of two decades of new state pre-k adoptions. Figures 1.5 and 1.6 present parallel information from 2008-09 (maps are not available for 2009-2010).

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

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

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

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

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or Pre-K

education and pre-k policy have discussed, a variety of federal policies, combined with changes in U.S. economic and social circumstances, have resulted in increased need for pre-k. Because this research focuses primarily on investment changes between 2001 and 2010, however, those forces are reviewed only briefly here as background for the state decisions.

As state policy-making literature asserts, societal ñshocksò ï new circumstances and facts ï are critical to such large-scale changes. The history set out above suggests that three such shocks have increasingly spurred demand for state pre-k: 1) changes in family structure, in particular womenôs entrance in large numbers into the workforce; 2) federal policies that both served as program models and provided states with new funding sources for pre-k; and 3) research on brain development and on the positive impacts of early childhood programs on childrenôs development and societyôs bottom line. The latter, in particular, is discussed in some detail here because of its direct relevance to the national and state policy network efforts that are explored here.

Changes in Family and Societal Structure

Substantial changes in family structure that have contributed to and interacted with economic and other societal shifts represent one likely factor driving state pre-k investment. The combination of economic downturns starting in the late 1960s, women returning to work for that reason and others, and rising divorce rates all boosted the need for care for young children. The National Womenôs Law Center reports that ñ[a]s women have moved into the labor force in greater numbers, they have increasingly taken jobs that are both full time and year round. In 2006é 72 percent of [all employed women] with children under 6, and 69 percent of those with infants were

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ge of women working is often employed as a variable in explorations of drivers of pre-k and early childhood policies. And as the burden on poor families became particularly challenging, the need for public programs increased. (Poverty rate is another variable often used, as it represents one aspect of the need for subsidized care.)

A 2010 analysis of the ñearly childhood economic sectorò notes that, among low-income families, high-quality care can cost over one fourth of post-tax income per child. That study also points to findings that two-thirds of all children in such households, and higher proportions among minority children, are in poor-quality care; increasing quality to the levels that produce strong positive benefits is estimated to raise that price by 25% or more (Weiss and Brandon 2010). This study builds on substantial research that provides motivation for improved quality for programs serving young children. Indeed, research conducted on the economic benefits of the North Carolina Abecedarian program shows that, among its outcomes, the full-year, high-quality childcare it provided for the child participantsô first five years of life boosted their parentsô labor force participation (Bartik 2007).[14] While most pre-k programs do not provide full-time care, half a day of high-quality care represents a subsidy that parents can then supplement with other care and go to work. As such, support for working families has emerged as one potential motivation for states to invest in pre-k programs.

Federal policy changes

As noted above, a series of federal policy changes has likely also contributed to state investments in pre-k programs. The Great Society Initiatives of the 1960s included two changes that had likely impacts on later state pre-k investments. Head Start, which began as an eight-week

[13] National Womenôs Law Center calculations are based on data from Employment Characteristics of Families in 2006, Tables 5 and 6: ñOf all mothers of children under 6, 43 percent work full time; of all mothers of children under 1, 36 percent work full time.ò

[14] ñThe Abecedarian program [also] seems to have considerable effects on the employment and earnings of the mothers of participants due to the high-quality free child care provided.ò Ibid., 12.

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st over half a million children, had grown by 2007 to serve close to a million children annually. Head Start provides a model that offers states a range of options for implementing their own programs. Indeed, many of todayôs state pre-k programs collaborate with their Head Start programs by providing supplemental state funding and/or channel federal Title I and other funds to Head Start centers.

Withdrawal of federal support for families and young children in the 1970s and 1980s may represent motivations of a different nature for state investments; rather than serving as models of what states could do, they increased both the latent demand for childcare and working familiesô need for public assistance in this area. As set out above, these two decades saw major increases in the divorce rate, and thus in the number of single-parent families, as well as large numbers of women with young children entering the workforce (with the former spurring the latter to some extent). Likely not a coincidence, the 1980s began with the third state to enact a pre-k program ï Maryland, in 1978 ï followed by twelve more states between 1980 and 1989.

Finally, the 1980s ushered in multiple waves of education reform, touched off in large part by the 1983 report *A Nation at Risk*, which documented the drop in educational attainment in the U.S. and asserted decline in global competitiveness. The standards and accountability movement gained momentum, with both public and media attention focused sharply on the importance of schooling. This was accompanied by spikes in urban poverty and crime that also focused attention on problems in schools, especially among poor and minority students. While K-12 schools saw the vast majority of policy attention and change, widespread recognition of the need for better attainment likely spilled into other areas, including the pre-school years.

One area of federal policy that has provided a direct incentive for state-level investment in pre-k is the welfare reforms of the mid-1990s. Specifically, the Personal Responsibility and Work

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6 created the federal Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) block grant from four federal child care assistance programs, increasing total funding by $600 million (Long and Clark 1997). The shift from the entitlement Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program to limited block grants that provided Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) included new streams of funding that states could channel to their pre-k programs. By requiring low-income single women, including those with small children, to work or participate in job training in order to receive public support, the legislation increased by millions the number of young children in need of daily care. As well, its federal-state shared responsibility aspect provided an incentive for states to expend their own money on support for child care, as doing so increased federal contributions. As two Urban Institute policy researchers summed up in a 1997 policy brief:

> The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) fundamentally changes federal child care assistance programs. The legislation eliminates federal child care entitlements and consolidates the major sources of federal child care subsidies for low-income children into a single block grant to states. At the same time, PRWORA transforms the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program into a block grant and expands its work participation requirements, thereby increasing the need for child care among families newly entering the workforce (Long and Clark 1997).[15]

Brain, Early Education, and Economic Research

A third force driving and shaping new investments in pre-k programs is the proliferation of research among scholars in neuroscience, early education, and economics. As David Kirp, a professor of public policy and author of a recent book on the state pre-k ñmovementò suggests, those studies have painted pre-k programs in a new light. While not always fully understood nor accurately interpreted, they have helped to spur state investment. This new research also serves as

[15] Some scholars have suggested that the federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) has influenced pre-k programs. Early childhood development experts, in particular, worry about a ñpush-down effectò from the law, which requires standardized tests and accountability for elementary and secondary schools. However, those impacts are depicted mostly as promoting cognitive curricula over play-based programs, so there is not necessarily reason to think that the level of state investment has been shaped by the law.

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licy network that is hypothesized to play an important part in explaining the differences in states' 2001-2010 levels and types of pre-k investments. It has made neuroscientists like Jack Shonkoff of Harvard University vocal advocates for public investment in quality pre-k programs, and leveraged the resources of his institution, the Harvard Center for the Developing Child, as a key player in that national network. As Shonkoff and others have cautioned, the neuroscience evidence is more nuanced than how it is often portrayed by advocates, and it does not point to the effectiveness of particular early childhood programs. Nonetheless, this line of research has had a major impact on pre-k policymaking, particularly by transforming it into a more bipartisan issue:

> Brain science is widely perceived as "hard" science, with white-coated researchers beavering away in their laborabories, and that gives it special credibility. Neuroscientists don't talk about attachment or maternal bonding, concepts that sound like something lifted straight from the nursery. Instead they speak of neuronal connections, hard wiring, and brain architecture. Their poetry is the language of engineers – babies "wired to learn" and "computers made of neurons." This vocabulary, and the cast of mind that it reflects, has intrigued a powerful new audience. Democrats had long monopolized children's issues – conservatives sneered at the field as the domain of the political ladies bountiful – but the seductiveness of the brain science has attracted lawmakers from both sides of the aisle (Kirp 2007, 103).

Much of this attention, whether for "model" programs like Abecedarian or Perry Preschool, or for larger programs like Head Start or the Chicago Child-Parent Centers, has focused on "at-risk" youngsters. However, some early childhood experts have also presented evidence that supports investment in pre-k for a wider swatch of children, with the ultimate goal of making it universally available (See, for example, Schulman and Barnett, 2005, as well as Gormley's rigorous evaluation of Oklahoma's universal pre-k program, Gormley 2008).

Others, however, have found less solid evidence of lasting positive effects from early childhood programs. Douglas Besharov at the American Enterprise Institute has set out many of the arguments employed by conservative critics. They object, in particular, to universal pre-k on

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libertarian, Besharov is troubled by what he perceives as government intrusion into what ought to be private family choices in children's early years. He is similarly opposed to major public expenditures for "child care" programs that mothers who do not work or work only part time "do not need." For those mothers, he says, "government-funded pre-K might be a welcome financial break, but it would have little or no educational effect" (Besharov 2008, 31).

Conservative skepticism notwithstanding, sufficiently solid evidence of benefits has been produced that many economists have used it to estimate the large societal benefits of pre-k. Building on findings of gains in educational attainment and on reduced crime and other social problems, several newer studies focus on market-type arguments and societal economic gains. Recent cost-benefit analyses compare pre-k with traditional state economic development strategies, asserting that early childhood development programs can boost state economic activity more, and at lower cost, than such strategies as tax abatements or enterprise zones. Among the pioneering research in this area is a 2003 study by Minnesota Federal Reserve Bank economist Arthur Rolnick and his colleague, Robert Grunewald. Timothy Bartik, a senior labor economist at the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research in Kalamazoo, Michigan, also has conducted several studies assessing the economic development potential, specifically, of high-quality early childhood programs, including pre-k. This economic take on brain and early child development research has helped to cultivate business leaders as some of the most enthusiastic proponents of state pre-k programs (and key policy entrepreneurs and members of state pre-k policy networks).

> Economists have been among the most ardent, and effective, supporters of preschool. Not only have they done major scholarly work on the subject; they have also gone on the hustings, writing op-eds in the Wall Street Journal, giving talks to business leaders and public officials. Because decision makers listen to what they have to say, their support has reframed the discussion. Spending money on preschool is no longer regarded simply as something good for the young or as a

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ity. It is also perceived as the best strategy to ive position in the world market ï an ñinvestmentò in ñhuman capitalò that promises to generate ñexceptional returnsò (Kirp 2007, 76).

As Kirp notes, the economic argument has also likely been one factor in the increasing Republican buy-in to pre-k, from governors who have led on the issue from the bully pulpit, to state legislators and business leaders who have supported existing programs and even advocated for their expansion. As discussed in the literature review below, this makes less clear the role of partisanship and ideology in state pre-k investment decisions.

Summing Up

There are numerous reasons for increases in the demand for publicly-subsidized pre-k, and thus for statesô investments in programs. Not only poor and working-class, but middle-class families are increasingly stretched to obtain care for their young children. A series of federal policy changes from the 1950s through the 1990s provided models and incentives, as well as pressures, for states to invest in their own pre-k programs. Research in the neuroscience and early development fields has increasingly emphasized the importance of a childôs earliest years in cognitive and behavioral development, and thus, the need for high-quality care during that time. Inter-state and global competition, as well as increasing dependence on technology to grow economies, has intensified the demand for skilled workers. Finally, recent recognition that budgets at the federal and state levels are unsustainable suggests that evidence must play a larger role in policy making, and the economic benefits of pre-k are among the most clear. These forces promote two distinct types of investment: *access* ï more children are served, and more parents can work ï and *quality*, which speaks to the arguments related to child development.

These factors alone, however, cannot explain state pre-k investment; if they did, the 39 state pre-k programs currently in existence (not to mention other regional and local programs

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and cities) would look much more like one another than they do. As described above, they vary widely in both access and program quality. A review of the literature on how and why states adopt policies generally, and how a new (ñinnovativeò) policy spreads from one state to another, including through policy ñlearning,ò is critical to understanding the reasons for these differences. National and state policy networks, whose origins are alluded to in this history, feature prominently in these findings. The next chapter reviews prior research on how and why states make and diffuse policies, leading to a set of questions specific to statesô motivations for pre-k investment between 2000 and 2010.

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Introduction

In the two decades between 1980 and 2000, the majority of U.S. states adopted pre-k programs. Prior to 1980, only four pioneering states ï California, New York, and Maryland, as well as Wisconsin, which had first funded a pre-kindergarten program in the mid-1800s ï had a program in place. This wave of new enactments indicates the fairly rapid spread of a policy new to most states, or the dissemination of an innovative policy. By 2000, 39 of 50 U.S. states (and the District of Columbia) funded pre-k programs, but the programs were of vastly different types in terms of the percentage of preschoolers served (access), and of program characteristics.

Over the following decade, a very different pattern emerged in the pre-k policymaking arena. While a handful of states piloted or adopted new programs, the overall focus shifted to enhancements to existing programs. Access, which had risen through the 1980s and 1990s, continued to increase. The big difference was in state efforts to improve the quality of their programs. As research increasingly affirmed the importance of quality in attaining the societal benefits that pre-k promised, states updated their programs, such that quality rose alongside access for much of the decade. As described in Figure 1.2, both measures of pre-k investment grew in the order of 50% of the decade, representing an average ñscaling upò of state programs that is a unique policymaking pattern.

In general, policies tend to lose some intensity as they move from privately-funded or pilot stages to large-scale, publicly funded ones. The fact that pre-k programs have managed to do the reverse, maintaining or improving quality as they expanded to serve more children, prompts the question of which factors might have contributed? While the general motivations for state investments in pre-k and other early childhood education programs have been explored in recent research (e.g., Rigby 2005 and 2008, Karch 2010), they have focused largely on the agenda-setting

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the above brief narrative indicates, the more recent, mature policymaking phase of quality enhancements suggests a potentially different set of questions and of answers. Finally, the evolution over this decade of interest of a national pre-k policy network, and the emergence within it of two somewhat conflicting approaches to promoting public investments in young children, point to the need for in-depth investigation of the roles played by both state and national policy networks, and of the policy entrepreneurs who operate within and across them.

Chapter 1 set out some of the societal forces ï new brain development findings, more women with young children working, and several federal policy changes prominent among them ï that have in recent decades increased the demand at the national level and across all states for child care and early education. This chapter thus reviews only briefly prior research on state policymaking in general, as much of it speaks to earlier stages of policymaking, and has been extensively mined by other researchers explaining pre-k investments. It focuses more extensively on studies assessing factors in the dissemination of innovative policies across states, in research that has looked at programs that have and have not gone to scale, and particularly on the influence of individual policy entrepreneurs and on policy networks and state policy ñcommunities.ò It concludes with a set of research questions that are explored through a combination of statistical analyses and case studies.

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ates invest in pre-k programs requires, first, information from studies about how states make policy decisions in general. Dye, who wrote the ñBibleò on state policy-making, used the fifty states as a natural experiment to test ï and confirm ï his theory that policy is driven by the stateôs level of economic development, and that in turn this drives the political factors that also contribute (Dye 1966).[16] Dye hypothesized that the data he collected from all fifty states would reflect the relative importance of the four political variables he employed ï balance between Democratic and Republican control in the state, level of inter-party competition, level of voter participation, and degree of voter mal-apportionment.

Dyeôs findings set the foundation for many subsequent studies, including this one. Indeed, in a recent review of U.S. state policy-making literature, Miller tracks the research trajectory from Dye through recent decades. He depicts the earlier work as minor variations on a theme: ñ[T]he [same] basic theoretical approach [is] taken by most policy content studies. In particular, each model borrows from systems theory to posit that external conditions (e.g., education, urbanization, industrialization, and wealth) influence political system development (e.g., party competition, divided government, political culture, and voter registration), which in turn produces policy outputs that feedback into the external and/or political environmentò (Miller 2004, quoting Blomquist 1999). A given scholar might view the cycle as beginning with political factors prompting economic ones to bear on policy-making, or vice versa (as Dye did), but this was the basic model.

[16] ñIn our model of public policy determination, economic development ï urbanization, industrialization, wealth, and education ï is viewed as the crucial input variable which shapes the character of the political system and the kinds of policy outcomes it produces. There are good theoretical reasons as well as considerable empirical evidence to justify the selection of economic development, rather than any number of other environmental variables, as the principal input variable in our model.ò Dye at p.7.

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Dyeôs identification of economic and political factors as central to policymaking. In their seminal 1971 work, Jacob and Lipsky suggested that the focus on party competition and policy outcomes might be misguided and urged researchers to pay attention, rather, to who wins and who loses from a given policy decision. In particular, given the difficulty of assessing political systems through statistical analysis, they promote the use of case studies to explore those differences among states. While their work is 40 years old, Jacob and Lipskyôs conclusions guide this research in two respects: 1) they emphasize the importance of interactions among state-specific characteristics and 2) they point to including qualitative techniques to better understand the multifaceted nature of variables/factors.

The next generation of scholars continued to see political and economic factors as central to policymaking, but they took Jacob and Lipskyôs lead, emphasizing nuance over clarity and promoting more sophisticated methodologies to better capture those nuances. This new set of researchers viewed state policymaking through a more complex lens. They assumed messy processes that included characteristics changing often and interacting with one another in multiple ways. Gray and Hanson capture this evolution in policymaking research in *Politics in the American States; A Comparative Analysis* (Gray and Hanson 2004). In one chapter, Garand and Baudoin assess fiscal policy-making. While pre-k is not the policy focus, the five key reasons that they identify as driving policy change apply to many issues:

> First, the policy-relevant values of voters and state policy makers may change. é Second, states have demographic, social, and economic characteristics that influence state policy priorities, so it would not be a surprise that changes in those characteristics will result in shifts in policy priorities over time. é Third, changes in the source of funds for specific state programs might result in a shift in priorities. é Fourth, another source of change in state expenditure priorities is tradeoffs among competing policy areas. é Finally, state expenditure priorities can be affected by shocks or events that prompt higher or lower levels of spending (Garand and Baudoin 2004, 303-304).

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ential reasons for investment in pre-k programs: peopleôs ideas about the importance of early education have evolved; state political cultures have shifted in response to both in- and out-migration and populations, as well as to changing economic realities; federal funding has dropped dramatically in some areas and emerged or increased in others, causing changes in the streams that might support pre-k; K-12 policy became stuck in many states, opening the door for a different education policy reform debate; and recent information about the impact of early education on childrenôs later success has produced the sort of ñshockò that causes policy-makers to look at an innovative policy, like pre-k, in a new light.

This line of research provides a fairly broad framework into which a variety of factors can be inserted ï political, economic, demographic, and others, as seen in the examples suggested above ï addressing earlier criticism of the isolation of individual factors. It also moves toward an emphasis on policy adaptation, rather than a sole focus on enactment or adoption. The latter is relevant to this study of levels and types of investments in pre-k programs. The recent generation of scholars has more rigorously explored this division between points in the policymaking process, distinguishing agenda-setting (surfacing an issue in the policy arena and getting it onto policymakersô radar) and the later stages of implementation and changes, or adaptation.

Agenda-setting

Kingdon provides a framework that more flexibly brings together the various strands that he asserts are necessary for real policy change to take place (he calls them ñstreamsò). While Kingdonôs research is geared toward federal policy making, it translates well to the state level. The premise for his work is that ña complex combination of factors is generally responsible for the movement of a given item into agenda prominence (Kingdon 1995, 76). Baumgartner and Jones capture, distinguish, and build on this agenda-setting research in their seminal 1993 book. While their work extends far beyond consideration and adoption of new policies, Baumgartner and Jonesô

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ange as a non-gradual ñpunctuated equilibrium,ò and their assertion that ñstability, not disruption is the rule,ò sets the stage for how those initial decisions are made (Baumgartner and Jones, 78). Moreover, they say, while change is the exception, when it does take place, it is more often substantial than minor or marginal.

Issue definition is central to this theory. How a policy is viewed is critical to whether and how policy change takes place, with a complex set of factors involved in creating, changing, enhancing, and destroying policy images. With equilibrium as the default, those seeking to change policy must overcome apathy among important players, including the media. Strong positive and negative depictions of issues and policies are reinforced by the media, which tend to raise an issue when timely and repeat the images put forth by the forceful advocacy forces at play. This seems relevant to the emergence and enhancement of state pre-k programs. Recent definitions by interest groups (taken up by the media) that combine the message that investments in young children are the ñrightò thing to do with an emphasis on brain development research showing that quality early development programs lead to better societal outcomes has somewhat hindered the capacity of opponents to gather momentum against these policy investments.[17]

In that vein, interest groups play very different roles in setting agendas depending upon the policy issue and, as well, upon the time in which the policy issue arose.

> First, we note that different issue areas are home to different configurations of bias. Some generate the interest of a great variety of competing and conflictual interest groups, but other areas witness the mobilization of only one side of an issue. Second, we note that the mobilization of bias can change over time. A single issue may be altered over the years from a one-sided mobilization of interests to a much more conflictual and multifaceted configuration (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 175).

[17] This contrasts with earlier depictions of pre-k as unnecessary government intervention, which opened the door for opposition on both political and economic grounds.

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ivement in issue definition seems also to apply well to how pre-k policymaking has evolved. Because children are often perceived as a ñdeservingò population, and one in need of representation because they cannot vote or advocate for themselves, pre-k might be seen as a valence issue that initially occupied a relatively one-sided space in the policy arena and would suggest a more private and less hotly contested process of agenda-setting.[18] At the same time, the aspects of family and parental decision-making that are closely tied to pre-k policy are more controversial, generating public attention and more conflicted interest group involvement. As well, Baumgartner and Jonesô tracking of the shift from corporate-dominated interest groups in the 1940s and 1950s to citizen- and consumer-focused advocacy in the 1960s and after helps to explain growth in government generally, as well as in institutional support for pre-k. Increased public attention to pre-k programs has likely led both to increased positive feedback and resulting investment, as well as to more organized opposition among ultra-conservative and other groups (as per Schattschneiderôs model).

Finally, Baumgartner and Jones point to federal influences on policymaking: while the federal system provides multiple venues for promote diverse policies, it also means that those policies will look quite different across states. Pre-k programs are a prime example; grants to states increase investments in this area that the federal government has prioritized. State-to-state differences in responses to that motivation are likely attributable in part to the state-specific factors explored in this chapter.[19]

The literature on state policy making broadly, then, suggests some important guides for exploring state motivations for pre-k investment. State economic and political contexts, which play important roles, should be interpreted in a nuanced way. Other factors, including those that

[18] Indeed, Rigby hypothesizes in her 2005 dissertation that the relative visbility and coerciveness of the four early childhood policies she studies help determine the level of state investments in them.
[19] The four state case studies employed to complement the statistical analysis explore the impact of federal policy.

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ecific, interact with one another and must also be explored. The process of policy-making is iterative, with different forces at play at various points in the process. In particular, individual and organizational advocates that are members of the policy issue community influence policymaking from the agenda-setting stage through implementation and later adaption of policies. As well, federal policy can influence statesô investment choices and provide models for states. Finally, not only employing good data, but applying methods that are appropriate, is critical to understanding how and why states make the choices that they do.

Later-Stage Policymaking

Also important in considering the spread of pre-k investments across states is the stage of the policy process under consideration. While much prior policymaking research focuses on agenda setting and the adoption of initial legislation, pre-k is characterized by the multi-stage nature of its process. Moreover, while those stages may entail tweaks to initial legislation, often they involve rather substantial enhancements, such as doubling the number of children served, adding requirements for teacher qualifications, or placing the control of pre-k programs under the authority of a new agency or commission designed for the purpose. While perhaps not unique, this distinguishes pre-k from many other policies. Regulatory policies, for example, are likely to see small changes as initial expectations for how much a given pollutant can viably be reduced in a single year is found to be unrealistic, with a resulting shift downward. Those are quite different from the major changes to pre-k policy described above, in which the initial legislation often establishes the equivalent of a small pilot program serving few children, and it is assumed that subsequent changes will largely shape the ultimate policy/program.

While the forces at play in agenda setting may apply to much of the later adaptation of pre-k policy, understanding the potentially different forces that might also be at play in later stages of

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This body of literature is less comprehensive, and it falls into a few categories. First is the ñimplementationò literature that is helpfully summed up by Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980). These studies pertain more to the processes involved in putting in place the changes intended by the policy than to subsequent legislative changes. Another set consists of studies describing the ñreinventionò of policies as they diffuse; these studies analyze changes that take place from one state to another as innovative programs spread. The third set, which explores amendments that happen as states emulate others and adapt their models, which may be of particular relevance to pre-k enhancement.

Sabatier and Mazmanian assert that ñmajor legislative failures in the 1960s and 1970sò brought implementation, a previously-neglected part of the public policymaking process, to the attention of researchers (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980, 538). Although their study explores traditional regulatory policies, the authors contend that, properly adapted, the ñbelief frameworkò would apply, as well, to other laws that attempt to change actorsô behavior. The authors also discuss a series of issues related to implementation, including: tractability; the extent to which the statute coherently structures the implementation process; and a set of non-statutory variables, including social, economic, and technological conditions; amount and continuity of media attention; public support; changes in resources and attitudes of constituency group; implementing institutions; commitment and leadership skill of supportive implementing officials; and stages (or dependent variables) in the implementation process. Adapted, some of these also appear relevant to later-stage adaptation of pre-k policy. Indeed, Sabatier and Mazmanian set out two implementation scenarios, the common one characterized by initial zeal and success followed by gradual decline, and the second, rarer scenario seeing continued success over time. The latter could describe success by a state in scaling up its pre-k program.

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y conditions for such success, then, should be considered when assessing statesô capacity to do so: policy objectives in enabling legislation [that] are clear and consistent; sound theory regarding problems linked to behavioral changes; [policy that is] structured to increase likelihood of change in target groups; leaders of implementing agency [with] strong managerial and political skills; program actively supported by organized constituency groups; and relative priority of goals not undermined by societal changes.

A second line of research looks at the differences in a given policy as it is diffused, with a focus on how it evolves through dissemination across states. Scott Haysô 1996 study assesses patterns of ñreinventionò for three policies with different diffusion rates: child abuse reporting, crime victim compensation, and public campaign funding. The early diffusion literature assumes a dichotomous choice ï adoption or non- of an innovative policy, which applies to many taxes, lotteries, and other policies.

> [F]or those policies which lend themselves to reinvention, examining this reinvention adds a critical dimension to the study of state innovativeness. To the extent that later adopters do adapt and improve upon an earlier adopted innovation, these states could be considered innovative in their own right, despite their later adoption of the law. This type of innovative behavior is left unexamined by the large aggregated studies of state innovation diffusion.ò (p.552)

This description seems to apply to pre-k, which, as discussed above, are implemented differently in other states and provide room for state-to-state learning. For example, Hays says, early adopters might enact ñtentative, watered down, or outright ineffective versionsò of the policy in order to break new ground on a politically difficult issue, while later adopters can learn from mistakes othersô experiences (553).[20] Moreover, after some time, convergence is expected as early adopters have time to learn from themselves and others and to amend their earlier laws.

[20] One application of this might be later adoptersô inclusion of key quality requirements in initial legislation, as improving policy post-adoption has proven difficult, with early adopters New York and Californiaôs large but low-quality pre-k programs prime examples.

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on during diffusion, but little support for the hypothesis, based on prior research, that policies become more comprehensive over time, nor for a link between date of adoption and current comprehensiveness. Perhaps relevant to pre-k policy, ñWhile states may follow the leaders in the initial adoption of innovative policies, they do not [do so] in reinvention; state policymakers feel free to reinvent these policies by building on or adapting policies previously adopted by more innovative statesò (Hays 1996, 563). The statistical analysis tests this theoryôs application to pre-k through the use of a ñyear adoptedò variable, and the four case studies explore its relevance through the models adopted and enhancements enacted by later-adopting states.

Other implications include: the possibility that the ñgrandiose plans of early adoptersò may be scaled back by later adopters who have learned of their difficulty; the opportunity provided in the policy implementation stage for policy reinvention, which Hays suggests ñmay be the most crucial aspect of reinvention é and may impact subsequent legislative reinvention through amendmentò; and the roles of interstate communication and cooperation during the diffusion process in helping policies to evolve. Though not equivalent to the multiple stages of changes enhancements seen in state pre-k policymaking, these findings regarding the evolution of innovative policies as they diffuse across states are relevant to how states adapt programs as they adopt them.

Finally, a recent study on how states adapted their state Childrenôs Health Insurance Programs (CHIP) over a four-year period finds that states emulate successful states, with success defined as meeting the goal of insuring more at-risk children. Voldenôs (2006) adapted event history analysis further discovers that successful states are more often emulated when they lower rather than raise costs and among other states that are similar in terms of politics, demographics,

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findings apply especially to policy changes for which the legislature, rather than an administrative agency, is responsible. All of this points to factors to be assessed in the case studies regarding the roles of the policy networks and related entrepreneurs.

Political Ideology and Culture

Given the strong influence of political systems, ideology, and culture on policymaking, extensive research has assessed how to best measure those state political characteristics. A distinct body of research examines these closely interlinked factors and sets out competing, and even contradictory, ways of measuring them. Like policymaking generally, trends in this area inform the study of state pre-k investments.

State policymaking researchers since Dye have employed different measures of political systems and ideologies and debated how they should be measured. As detailed above, Dye used a combination of Republican-Democratic balance, level of inter-party competition, level of voter participation, and degree of mal-apportionment. Some early measures of political ideology employ socioeconomic or geographic data to proxy for political opinion, reflecting the difficulty of accurately capturing this factor.[21] Jack Walker, whose 1969 article pioneered the ñdiffusion of innovationò line of state policymaking research, posited that a stateôs degree of urbanization was a driving force in innovative policy adoption, blurring the line between ideology and state political culture.

One widely-used measure is that constructed by Wright, Erikson, and McIver in xxxx and substantially updated since. While Wright and his co-authors disagree, however, Berry and three of his colleagues find evidence of major changes over time in many states in both governmental

[21] All of this work must acknowledge that there is no ñrealò or ñactualò ideology measure that would be perfect or universally applicable. Like social science research generally, perspective, timing, and other critical factors necessarily frame and define such a term in a particular context.

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largely to shifts in party control (Berry et al year). They thus constructed measures of political ideology for each stateôs public and governmental bodies using data from the statesô federal legislatorsô votes on a specific set of bills. The measures rely on a series of assumptions, including the ideological similarity of the governors and legislators from his or her party and the relative power of the different branches of state government.[22] This method addresses the authorsô perceptions of flaws of prior work on measures of public and government ideology. Helpful to this research, the Berry measure is dynamic, rather than static, and thus up-to-date; the figures used to capture 1999 ideology reflect data from 1998.

One interesting finding is that, while in some states, public and government ideology vary hardly at all, in others they diverge and converge over years, demonstrating that these two measures are indeed different, and thus both important for determining how policy is made. As research on education, and specifically on pre-k, has looked to both institutional ideology and public opinion as factors in policy change, this dual measure is particularly useful for this research.[23]

A related state characteristic employed by researchers to help understand how policy decisions are made is political culture. As per scholarsô definitions, political culture represents a

[22] Assumptions: 1: ñVoters are arrayed on a liberal-conservative ideological continuum, and in two-candidate elections they vote for the candidate whose ideology is closest to their own.ò; 2: ñOn at least some bills legislatorsô votes are guided primarily by ideology. Moreover, ćratersô can identify a set of bills that accurately reflects legislatorsô ideology.ò; 3: ñWhen a seat is open, voters perceive the ideological position of the new candidate from the incumbentôs party to be similar to that of the incumbent.ò; 4: ñVoters perceive the ideological position of a challenger to resemble the typical ideological position of incumbents from the same party in the same state.ò; 5: ñThe proportion of voters who prefer the incumbentôs ideology to that of a ćhypothetical challengerô changes linearly from the proportion of votes received by the incumbent at the start of a term to the proportion of votes received by the incumbent (or the successor candidate from his or her party) in the next election.ò; 6: ñThe mean ideological position of the members of a party in a stateôs legislature is similar to the mean position of the partyôs U.S. Representatives and Senators.ò; 7: ñThe expected ideological position of a governor is equal to the average ideological position of state legislators from the same party.ò; 8: ñThe governor and legislative branch have equal power over the policy decisions of state governments. Within the legislature, chambers have equal power.ò; 9: ñIf parties have the same number of seats in a chamber, their power over policy is equal. Otherwise, the majority party controls at least 60% of the power. This power grows until the majority has 60% of the seats, when it obtains complete policy control.ò (Ibid.)

[23] Another important advantage is the availability of state-specific data through 2010.

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ñattitudesò toward policymaking as a process, including how well it does so, how much it tends to invest in public policy generally, and the efficacy of its public institutions. Ideology, on the other hand, is a measure of the state populationôs and/ leadersô current/contemporary ideologies (time is an important factor in distinguishing the two) and of the *types* of policies they favor or oppose. With respect to assessing how and why states have invested in pre-k, ideology would seem to be a stronger factor than culture, but culture may be a dominant factor in explaining statesôsuccess (or lack of success) in ñscaling up.ò

For the purposes of assessing motivations for state pre-k investment, culture would be important to the extent that it explains a set of public and institutional factors distinct from ideology, which might include strength of religious tendencies, attitudes toward and support for government as an institution. It might also be helpful to understand the different cultures that co-exist within states; upstate New Yorkers appear to have a different political culture and set of attitudes than do residents of Manhattan. The same is true of Atlanta versus rural Georgia and of many, if not most U.S. states. Because urban areas have reason to support pre-k programs differently from other regions, such distinctions could help explain some of the lack of clarity in statesô motivations for investment in pre-k. Similarly, a state with a long and strong history of religious fervor might be less likely to invest in pre-k than a state that is ranked among the most ideologically conservative for different reasons (e.g., fiscal).

Elazar, a pioneer of political culture theory, established a three-type characterization of states: *moralistic* (government is good, bureaucracy is important, social programs are helpful); *individualistic* (government/bureaucracy is usually bad but not if used to my advantage); and *traditionalist* (government is bad, unless it supports the elite and helps to maintain the status quo) that has since been used and adapted by many other researchers (Elazar 1966). These demonstrate

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ience policy ï it reflects attitude toward policymaking and bureaucracy, and thus how well or effectively a program is implemented.

Among the criticisms of Elazarôs measures were their close parallel to the differences between Southern and Northern states. As discussed below, however, Southern states have developed some of the highest quality programs, while expanding access, so assessment of influences on policy enhancement in the past decade should employ one of these two measures.

The state narratives offer an opportunity to further explore nuances of state ideological and cultural characteristics. In addition to their overall ideology, one factor that appears relevant to the stateôs level and type of pre-k investment is the influence of far-right and religious groups on policymaking. Because pre-k programs are perceived by conservative populations and organizations as pro-government and anti-family, the most conservative states (or those with strong right-wing interest group influence) may be less likely to invest. David Kirp, for example, writes of a proposed 1979 Illinois pre-k bill that

> [W]hen Chicago legislator Barbara Flynn Currie first introduced a bill to underwrite preschool for children who seemed destined to fail in school, she confronted virulent opposition. Phyllis Schlafly, the founder of the ultra-conservative Eagle Forum and self-proclaimed leader of the ópro-familyô movement, believed that if the government put four-year-olds in school, family sovereignty over child-rearing would be in jeopardy. óShe came down to Springfield determined to kill it, with her supporters wheeling baby carriers to underscore their point,ô [Currie recalls] óHer position was that children belong on the kitchen floor at their mothersô kneesôô (Kirp, 2007, 20).

More broadly, he asserts that ñAn antigovernment message has been crafted by a nationwide web of organizations that share a libertarian philosophy. Prominent among them are the Washington, DC-based Cato Instituteé the Goldwater Instituteé the Reason Foundationé the Texas Public Policy Foundationé the Oklahoma Council of Public Affairsé and Freedom Worksé They take up the cudgels on a wide array of causes [and] state preschool is on their ñnot-do-doô listsò (Ibid., 167). The influence of such groups could translate in practical terms into lower

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in reduced levels of investment in such programs. Indeed, the Reason Foundation funded research that helped defeat the California pre-k ballot initiative that was sponsored by Hollywood mogul Rob Reiner.

Clearly, there are factors whose variance across states explains much about their policy decision-making. Another sub-strand of studies explores specific policies and their influences; the next portion of this chapter therefore reviews studies relevant in particular to pre-k policy.

The Role of Interest Groups in Early Childhood Education Policy

Within the state policymaking research, scholars have examined specific areas of policy, among them education and others that pertain specifically to children. While many of the studies in this area find state economic and political characteristics to be the major drivers of policy choices, other, more specific factors come into play as well. Among these are the influences of age ï elderly and young residents ï of the educational attainment of state residents, with higher levels seen to correlate with greater investments in education-related policy, and of demographic factors, particularly race. This work, however, looks specifically at the impact of interest groups in early childhood education (distinguished from education policy generally), and their role in policy networks.

As Baumgartner and Jones emphasize, the framing of the issue and the involvement of interest groups are two critical and closely intertwined factors with respect to both agenda- setting and policy change. Child advocacy groups have played a critical role at both the federal and state levels in shaping the publicôs image of pre-k. They have interacted with policymakers and helped turn some of them into advocates, or, in political science language, policy entrepreneurs. This is particularly critical for a constituency that cannot vote on its own behalf. At the same time, interest group involvement has not always favored pre-k; longstanding schisms discussed in Chapter 1

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ol providers and between infant-toddler and preschooler organizations have translated in recent decades into intra-policy community infighting that has contributed to shaping the pre-k policy landscape.

The 1970s marked the emergence of major early childhood advocacy groups, with the Childrenôs Defense Fund (CDF) launch in 1973 an important landmark. Cohen emphasizes the CDFôs leadership at the federal level at three key junctures in policymaking around child care and young children more broadly, pointing to Nixonôs 1971 veto, increased funding for child care in the 1990 welfare reform package, and a transition to block grants and more child care attention in President Clintonôs 1996 welfare reform legislation (Cohen 2001). The CDF also served as an organizing focal point from the start for organizations advocating for women (who, despite their return to work in large numbers since the early 1960s, had not focused on this issue) and for other groups, such as Fight Crime Invest in Kids, who have provided important support for pre-k in the later periods. Finally, the CDFôs efforts to promote federal legislation that led, among other things, to devolution of responsibility to states and the creation of state entities to funnel and manage federal funds, also resulted in the involvement of the National Governorsô Association and the National Council of State Legislators. Some of these governors and state legislators learned about pre-k through their organizations and became vocal proponents, demonstrating a pathway from policy network to cultivation of policy entrepreneurs. In other words, the growth of a community that works on behalf of a potentially ally-less constituency ï one with no money and no vote ï can and did grow, in this case, through the early advocacy of a logical leader that brought on board less likely partners.

Cohen also points to the conflicts that emerged between those who viewed child care as a support for working parents, and largely an issue for lower-income children and their families, and

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ent issue, focused more broadly on children themselves. Child care providers and the unions representing them thus emerged at some critical junctures as opponents of reforms that sought to strengthen licensing standards, creating a critical rift within the early childhood community.[24] Finally she points to the importance of emerging brain research developments as key to bringing on board a range of new allies, focusing the attention of policymakers on the issue, and helping move policies that promoted quality care, countering the child-care-as-parental-support voices.

A recent study in this area, one that directly relates to statesô motivations for pre-k investments, is Rigbyôs 2005 Columbia University PhD dissertation. Rigby studies the influence of state political context on the choice of four policy tools available to states to deal with issues related to early childhood education (ñECEò). She hypothesizes that differences in ñvisibilityò and ñcoercivenessò among the four tools ï preschool programs, subsidy generosity, child care tax provisions, and regulatory stringency ï will help to predict statesô investment in them. Using 1990s data, she measures the level of investment in each, including dollars per child spent on pre-k programs (Rigby 2005). Confirming her hypothesis that pre-k is distinct from the three other tools, she finds that a few states seem to be non-investors, engaging in what she terms a ñlimited policy approach,ò while the other end of the spectrum represents a ñpreschool-focused approach,ò with ñeight states [that have made] a great deal of preschool investmentò (Rigby 2005, 91). These include Kentucky, New Jersey, Illinois, Oklahoma, and four others.

[24] Karch emphasizes yet another conflict within the early childhood policy community, that between Head Start and other early education programs: ñ[The] political mobilization and empowerment of Head Start supporters, ironically, contributed to the further fragmentation of the early education policy community during the late twentieth centuryé [battling teacher unions/public schools in 1970s federal debate, which] helped derail such proposals as the Comprehensive Child Development Act of 1971 and the Child and Family Services Act of 1975ò (Karch 2010, pp.220-221). He notes, too, that the Head Start community also strongly opposed Senator Kennedyôs 1988 Smart Start initiative to provide health care, nutrition, social, education services to all U.S. 4-year-olds.

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e-k, Rigby finds that Southern and Northern states behave differently with respect to the interaction between political context and pre-k investment; in the conservative South, having a Democratic governor in charge is more likely to lead to increased pre-k investment, whereas elsewhere in the country, it does not matter.[25] However, she fails to find evidence that having more female legislators in office leads to more investment in early childhood policies.[26] Her analysis also suggests a lack of influence by advocacy groups in state pre-k investment decisions. Rigbyôs research prompts several of the questions explored in this work. In particular, her suggestions that some factors, such as policy networks or Democratic governors, have played an important role but are too difficult to capture using her data, prompt a search for richer data in those areas as well as for case studies, which can add nuance.

In his book on the politics of the ñpreschool movement,ò Kirp illuminates a second angle of the early childhood advocacy community: the foundation world. He describes the Pew Charitable Trustsô entrance into the early childhood field in the late 1990s and then its focus on pre-k specifically starting in 2000 (Kirp 2007). His description of Pewôs melding of research ï through funding of the National Institute for Early Education Research (NIEER) ï and policy advocacy ï including directing NIEER resources toward topics of interest to advocates and relevance to key state policymakers ï points to the importance of Pew specifically, and this strategy more broadly, in moving states to invest not only in increased access, but in program quality. Kirpôs discussion of the Packard Foundationôs parallel efforts in California illuminate some of the explanations for

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] This finding diverges from those of two scholars in this area who have extensively explored women legislatorsô influence on policy. Swers writes in her 2002 book that electing more women at the national level can have an impact across a range of policy making areas, from bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship to the more public roll call voting: ñThe careful analysis of legislative activity at five different stages of the policy process demonstrates that Democratic and moderate Republican congresswomen are more committed to the pursuit of womenôs interests than are their male partisan colleagues.ò (Ibid., 127). And Thomas extends this finding to the state level, asserting that in both the 1970s and 1980s (which she compares and contrasts,ò women officeholders.. reported liberal ideological stances in greater propotions than men, a gender gap on specific issues continued, and their voting records reflected greater support for issues related to women, to families, and to general social welfare concernsò (Thomas 1994, 63).

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state than in some other likely pre-k heavy investors (Kirp 2007, 165-66). And his description of the conflict between those two foundations and several others with broader agendas, in particular, Gates and Buffett, suggest a potential difference in efficacy between the two strategies and, again, a key point of contention within the early childhood policy community.

Karch looks specifically at how states have funded their pre-k programs and introduces a new variable ï Head Start ï into political considerations (Karch 2010). Karch focuses on the schisms within the early childhood policy community that are discussed above; in this case, he asserts that state investment in Head Start, and the accompanying political constituency that it builds, leads states to invest less in pre-k and also to be less likely to dedicate their preschool dollars to a standalone pre-k program.[27] These results support his theory:

> As expected, interest group politics, specifically the division within the early childhood policy community, is influential. é All else equal, moving from a state with a relatively small Head Start community (12.95 percent) to a state with a relatively large one (35.30 percent) increases the likelihood that a state will not fund preschool by 12.72 percentage points. This result suggests that the Head Start community perceives other publicly funded preschool programs as a threat and that state officials are responsive to the preferences of this constituency when it represents a fairly large proportion of those with an existing stake in preschool educationò (Ibid., 226).

Karch also points to the significance of regional influences on the dissemination of this type of policy, noting that starting in the 1980s, ñregional groups [such] as the Commission on the Future of the South and the Southern Regional Education Board called for increased investment in public schools, including preschool programs, as part of a long-term economic growth strategy and a way to make the South more attractive to the business community and to professional workers

[27] ñThis article attempts to explain why states have taken divergent approaches to the funding or preschool education by isolating the political determinants of this policy decision. é [It] examines the impact of several factors, some of which are especially relevant to preschool education and some of which reflect the general state political environment. It focuses on the role of the interest group community. *A long-standing attribute of the []advocacy community is its internal division*ò (Ibid., 217-19).

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work, this one points to the potential for a different set of motivations for pre-k investments among different regions, particular among Southern states.

Finally, Karch suggests that ñCase studies that compare successful and unsuccessful attempts at major policy change in preschool education will add greater depth to the results presented in this article. Another potential avenue for future research is to extend the present study to other dimensions of preschool education policy, such as curricular standards, personnel credentials, and classroom regulationsò (Ibid., 229-230). This is the thrust of the current research and demonstrates its direct contribution to the existing body of literature.

This brief tour through the history of early childhood interest groups serves to spotlight the importance of the community as a whole in framing the issues around pre-k, including emerging quality considerations, as well as to point to specific interest groups and types of individuals that merit attention in state-specific exploration of motivations for enactment and investment.

Scaling Up

Another specific policy-making area of relevance to this research is that on the impact of shifting a program from small-scale, or pilot, to larger-scale. This may entail a change in who runs the program ï e.g., from a private non-profit entity to public, in the form of local or state government ï and often means different rules. Many state pre-k programs began as pilots (though they were run from their inception by the state or local government) and have grown to serve large numbers of children. As Kirp writes, in many states these increases are implemented with the ultimate goal of a pre-k program that is universal, rather than serving a target population only, while many seek to expand to serve all ñat-riskò children. Reviewing the literature in this area can thus shed light on the impact of that change. In particular, it can help explain how and why

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ct so often results in its dilution in quality, and perhaps suggest why, on average, that has not been true of pre-k program expansions.[28]

One widely-known such instance of a program ñgoing to scaleò is that of the so-called Moving to Opportunity, or MTO, project. This federal program, which began in 1994 in four cities, was modeled after the Chicago Gautreaux Assisted Housing program, which, due to its unique characteristics, happened to make for a natural policy experiment. The Gautreaux program came about as part of a judgment in a 1966 series of class-action lawsuits filed against the Chicago Housing Authority and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which charged that HUD policies promoted the segregation of African-American families, among other things.[29] One remedy ordered by the court was a program that would offer African-American residents of public housing units the chance to move to desegregated neighborhoods in the area. By the programôs end in 1998, 7,100 families had been served, many moving to majority-white suburbs with low rates of poverty and substantially better school systems. Gautreaux also provided support services to help with the moves, such as counseling to find a new home. The results were impressive: children who moved were significantly more likely than those who remained in inner-city schools to complete high school, take college-track courses, attend college, be employed, and secure well-paying jobs (Kaufman and Rosenbaum 1992).

With the success of Gautreaux, and an increasing belief among policy makers that it was so difficult to improve bad neighborhoods that helping people move out of them would be more effective, the federal government instituted the ñMoving to Opportunityò (MTO) program. Over four years, 4,248 families in Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York received

[28] A related and also important question is why pilot programs that are successful are rarely brought to scale. While this research looks mainly at the first question, this second one is touched upon as well, below.
[29] The program was named after Dorothy Gautreaux, who filed the original lawsuit and became title plaintiff.

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g. Unlike Gautreaux, however, they did not move to truly low-poverty neighborhoods. While MTO offered restricted vouchers that allowed families to go to very low-poverty areas, the average family moved from a neighborhood with 46% poverty to one with 33%. Moreover, fewer than half the families that were offered restricted vouchers actually used them, and of those who did, some later moved back.

This seems to have reduced the impacts of the MTO program. Indeed, most researchers found that none of the educational effects described by Gautreaux researchers were replicated among MTO participants (Orr *et al*. 2003). Some studies found limited impacts for certain subgroups; e.g., one study saw impacts among young children but none for those who moved after age 12 (Ludwig, Ladd and Duncan 2001), but the larger studies found no overall impacts (Sanbonmatsu et al. 2006).[30] A second factor may have been the failure to incorporate support services; moving out of not just a home, but an entire neighborhood ï where the culture and people are familiar ï can put strain on a family even if the new circumstances are objectively better in some ways. The Gautreaux program offered a range of ways for families to cope with this, which MTO did not. One specific study suggests that this was a factor in the different outcomes; an assessment of households affected by closures and demolitions of Chicago high-rise public housing found that families offered vouchers but no help to move to better neighborhoods or schools when they were forced to relocate did not improve their childrenôs educational outcomes (Jacob 2004).

While a single set of studies of one project cannot provide broad findings, one inference is that pilot or small-scale programs may tend to lose critical elements along the way as they are enlarged, especially when a new public entity does the scaling up. A second factor that is less

[30] As with much social science, there is no way to reach a definitive conclusion. However, the failure to replicate the strong findings from the Gautreaux Program is clear, enabling inferences based on the differences with MTO.

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esearch is that of program ownership ï individuals have tremendous impact on programs, especially when they were founders, and going to scale may mean losing that leadership or shifting from a single, central leader to a system in which no single person takes such ownership. This, too, can dilute effects substantially.[31] This is true both within the policy field generally and, more narrowly, within the realm of early childhood policies. For example, Lipsey estimates that, on average, ñR&D programs,ò which would include pilots, have roughly twice the effect size of their ñroutine practiceò counterparts (Lipsey 2009, slide 13).

This issue can also be assessed through a comparison of the private and public sectors. Private enterprise is quite adept at scaling up innovative programs and products; indeed, that is what companies must do in order to remain in business and profitable. Within the public sector, however, the record is considerably more mixed, with many successful pilots never making it past that stage. In their recent work for the ñDoing What Worksò initiative jointly sponsored by the Center for American Progress and Great Britainôs Young Foundation, Mulgan and Kohli make this point in their call for the public sector to step up on innovation:

> *The question of scaling is a great issue for any progressive government – how to find and foster small pockets of brilliance. It's particularly an issue in the fields of social policy, education and healthé* . Government can learn important lessons in this endeavor from commercial markets, where scaling is natural. é There are strong incentives to innovate in the private sector, with enormous financial returns for those who can take innovations from small ideas to large-scale markets. é But the United Statesô social sector has been largely unable to match the success at achieving scale in industry and services. Growth and scale in the social field are very different from growth and scale in for-profit commercial markets (Mulgan and Kohli 2010, 2, emphasis added).

The authors cite several reasons for this failure of government to successfully bring smart pilot programs to the public policy scale: lack of an ñautomatic sorting mechanism for the most promising innovations;ò a lack of support for ñsuccessful small-scale innovationsé to scale and

[31] Indeed, this is at the core of many who argue that Harlem Childrenôs Zone cannot be replicated because Geoffrey Canadaôs individual leadership, and his vision, has been so central to the programsôsuccesses.

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for social innovations.[32] Added evidence that successful social innovations are rarely brought to scale can be seen in Harvard Universityôs Kennedy School Innovation Awards program. For the past 20 years, it has recognized some of the most effective U.S. innovations, issuing over 400 awards as of 2010. Yet ñfew of the innovations are taken up elsewhere, and even fewer become universal practiceò (Ibid., 6). Among those not taken up is an Oklahoma project to train and inform public safety officials in extreme weather situations. In 1999, the National Weather Service pointed to the 1996 program as a practice to emulate, and Oklahoma even hosted an event in 2005 to teach other states how to do so. Yet, as of 2010, only four states have taken it up. Within the realm of childrenôs policy, the Harlem Childrenôs Zone project, which has expanded to serve children within a 100 block radius and has been fairly extensively studied, is only now beginning to see funding for replicas, through the federal Department of Educationôs Promise Neighborhood program. Moreover, that program provides just $10 million for up to 20 communities, and it has taken nearly 20 years to begin.

Finally, the authors note that, in order to take pilot innovations to scale, it is often necessary to simplify them. This will certainly be true of Harlem Childrenôs Zone, and Mulgan and Kohli point to a Bangladeshi micro-finance project as another. It could be argued that pre-k programs do not fall into the same category as other pilots, since they are more widely known and exist in multiple states. As an initiative, moreover, they have existed for many years; it is the state funding that is newer. However, they have much in common with these other examples: most do indeed begin as pilots, and increasing access is a major challenge; while they now exist in most states, that was not true 20 years ago, and they vary tremendously from state to state, making each program

[32] In order to overcome these barriers, they make four recommendations: develop markets for social outcomes, design funding models that encourage scaling, ñ[shape] the knowledge field to support what works,ò and invest in ñsocial innovation mentorsò (Ibid., 2-3). While not relevant for this research, it would be interesting to explore the extent to which individuals, organizations, and forces that did help pre-k programs successfully scale up employed one or more of these strategies.

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and they may need simplification, and likely adaptation, to enable their success among different states, communities, and cultural groups.

Moreover, other researchers do treat pre-k programs as pilots. Indeed, early childhood experts at RAND have assessed the potential for scaling up pre-k programs, reaching conclusions that are more skeptical than optimistic. Specifically, Karoly and her colleagues explore the challenges faced by states as they try to emulate a handful of ñhothouseò programs that have become models within the pre-k field:[33]

> One of the key unknowns regarding widespread government administration of early intervention programs is what is referred to as the ñscale-up issue. With the exception of Heat Start and the Chicago Child-Parent Centers, the programs [that have been studied] are small-scale model programs, implemented in a specific community by researchers with expertise in child development. The concern here is that early childhood programs administered by public agencies in a diverse array of communities will not replicate the model programsé for several reasons (Karoly et al 1998, 113).

Those reasons include (as noted by Mulgan and Kohli), the potential for lack of sufficient resources being devoted, as well as difficulties around attracting skilled staff, ensuring consistency across program sites, and ñscreen[ing] large numbers of childrenò (Ibid., 114). Indeed, Head Start is sometimes cited by both critics and supporters as an example of the governmentôs attempt to bring to scale a program more akin to Perry Preschool and ending up with a much-diluted version. As the authors conclude, it is unclear what may happen as programs are scaled up: ñIn the end, the expansion or replication of a given early intervention model may dilute some program benefits, while others may remain equally strong.ò

[33] They note, too, that because the existing research fails to fully clarify which aspects of these model programs have produced the outcomes that policy makers and others seek to achieve, those implementing state policies still must experiment, leaving them with a fair amount of risk (Karoly et al 1998, 109).

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ers offer one hopeful example, with both program characteristics and outcomes for participants that are like those of Perry.[34] Oklahomaôs universal pre-k program, which serves nearly three out of four of the stateôs 4-year-olds, is another that has maintained very high quality (Gormley 2008). This could suggest that state or local programs have advantages over those administered at the federal level. And the Obama administrationôs recent allocation of $1.5 million for state implementation of David Oldsô Nurse Home Visitation Program suggests that programs for young children may have particular promise and also that state-level implementation is preferred. Both would help explain the relative success of pre-k.

The RAND Corporation also explored the issue more specifically with respect to state pre-k programs in a 2005 study, *Going to Scale with High-Quality Early Education*, which involved case studies of eight state pre-k programs in various stages of ñscaling upò: Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Washington (Christina and Nicholson-Goodman 2005). With the goal of identifying factors and practices that could help states design and implement high-quality ñUPKò programs, RAND used a combination of data, history of state programs, and interviews to determine: 1) major challenges to implementation of UPK; 2) how states have addressed these challenges; and 3) lessons for other states could use.

Among the major challenges they identified were combined funding streams that had different and often contradictory reporting and assessment requirements; tension between funding and other resources for infants and toddlers versus preschoolers; ñsiloedò state agencies that played different roles; particular challenges for rural and minority populations; balancing cognitive and other developmental needs; and persuading a variety of public and private providers to collaborate to provide quality services. At the same time, they identified a common set of motivating societal forces, essentially those described in the first chapter of this work ï brain research, evidence of

[34] Though Kirp notes that, after many years of quality programs, Chicago has been drastically cut and altered.

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emand for child care as women returned to work earlier in children's lives and worked longer hours.

The RAND report concludes with a decidedly mixed prediction of states' abilities to scale up their pre-k programs without losing quality: "A body of high-quality research is beginning to take shape… [t]he field has not, however, yet reached the stage where the particular components of programs that most contribute to quality *at scale* have been clearly identified" (Christina and Nicholson-Goodman 2005, 67). As the data in the next chapter illustrate, however, the pre-k trajectory among states bucks the trend seen in many other programs that have gone to scale: on average, both access and quality have increased in the past decade. Moreover, these increases have taken place during a period in which many states that never fully recovered from the recession of 2000 faced lingering budget constraints.

This does not mean that all state pre-k programs have successfully scaled up; as noted, many have not. It does signify, however, that some forces not present in those other policy areas (or perhaps not as successfully employed) have supported state efforts. It is theorized in this case that policy entrepreneurs seeking to maintain and/or enhance quality have been bolstered by effective policy networks. The latter includes a set of foundations that have as their mission the adoption and adaptation of high-quality state pre-k programs. Among these are The Pew Charitable Trusts, and the Packard, Kellogg, Gates, and Buffet Foundations. As noted above, it also includes inter-governmental organizations such as the NGA and NCSL. Rarely, if ever, has a public policy issue that favors low-income recipients seen such a lineup of well-resourced and heavy hitters in its corner. Combined with its relatively small price-tag, this factor may explain how state pre-k programs have, on average, successfully scaled up.

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state policymaking suggests several important factors to consider in assessing explanations for the scaling up of pre-k programs between 2001 and 2010. Political and economic contexts are important, although their influence may shift in the agenda-setting, enactment, and subsequent stages. Factors that influence education policy generally may differ with respect to pre-k. Inter-state connections, including policy networks, seem particularly relevant to pre-k policy, as does regional status, and while there are clear challenges for states in enhancing programs, the normal ñscaling upò rules may not apply.

Diffusion of Policy Innovations

One offshoot of state policy-making literature is that of diffusion of policy innovations, which tracks the speed and means by which policies that are new to a state spread from one to another. This literature is particularly relevant to assessing statesô reasons for pre-k investment. As set out above, pre-k programs have been enacted by most states over the past few decades, and they seem to have spread partly through some combination of policy learning and emulation. This body of research also includes studies on some specific types of policies that are similar, and thus relevant, to pre-k. Much of the work on policy diffusion parallels the trajectory of the broader policy-making research, but with a narrower focus.

In 1969, Walker conducted a study that examined the speed at which an innovative policy, defined as a program that was new to the state adopting it, spread across the United States. His primary questions included why certain states ñconsistently adopt new programs more rapidly than other states;ò whether there are ñmore or less stable patterns of diffusion of innovations among the American statesò; and if so, what those patterns are (Walker 1969, 888). Based on earlier systems theory research, he used the results to develop a general theory of diffusion and an ñinnovation scoreò for each state. He posited a system in which ñleaderò states, generally the largest,

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e regional teachers whose policies spread to surrounding states until the last stragglers ï laggardsò ï get the message. At that time, states ñwith the most developed industrial economies and the largest cities would [likely] have the highest innovation scores [since those factors point to] the places where most of the societyôs creative resources are concentrated [and] would be the most adaptive and sympathetic to changeò (Walker 1969, 884).

Walker, like Kingdon, took into account the inability of policy makers to base their decisions on a rational comparison of all possible options; the overabundance of data and limitations of individual capacity make that impossible. Rather, a standard, restricted set of alternatives must be used to create a heuristic. He suggested that it could be described as ñ*look[ing] for an analogy between the situation you are dealing with and some other situation, perhaps in some other state, where the problem has been successfully resolved.*ò (Walker 1969, 889) While Walkerôs research was conducted long before todayôs rapid information transfer among actors and states, he also saw evidence of a

> specialized set of communication channels through which flow new ideas, information and policy cuesé . [and that t]his system links together the centers of research and generation of new ideas, national associations of professional administrators, interest groups, and voluntary associations of all kinds into an increasingly complex network which connects the pioneering states with the more parochial onesò (Walker 1969, 899).

Citing the Council of State Governments as one such communications channel, Walker suggested an explanation neither regional nor proximal for the spread of information, with the transfer of both information and professionalism of personnel promoting this dissemination. Finally, in a nod to subsequent research, he found that, in the latter of the two eras that he studied, federal grants-in-aid increasingly pushed laggard states to adopt, and that rising state professionalism likewise reached the ñmore parochial states,ò making region less of an issue.

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e two concepts in state policymaking work: an emphasis on adoption of new policies, versus a more general focus on policymaking and level of investment; and the importance of external, rather than only internal, factors in that process. He also introduced idea of inter-state networks as boosters of diffusion. This early theoretical frame laid the foundation for what would be termed policy issue networks.

Focusing on characteristics internal to states, Gray expanded on and critiqued Walkerôs work through a study of three different types of policies: education, welfare, and civil rights (Gray 1973). Gray disagreed with Walker on three points. First, she found that states tend not to be more or less innovative across the board, as Walker had suggested but, rather, that they adopt new policies at different rates, depending upon the policy area and on the stateôs internal political and economic circumstances. Moreover, she asserted, the more politically sensitive an issue ï *e.g.*, civil rights versus education ï the greater the role of stateôs internal culture plays in the speed of adoption of the policy. For example, her findings pointed to Southern statesô virtual immunity to inter-state pressure to adopt civil rights laws, while education policy tended to diffuse more normally. Like early policymaking work broadly, Walker and Grayôs research set the stage for the next generations of scholars to build on and enhance their theories through the use of more sophisticated methodologies and different types of data.

The use of ñEvent History Analysisò to study state lottery adoptions using a combination of internal and external factors represented a critical breakthrough to address the problem of point-in-time limitations (Berry and Berry 1990). The authors note that ñ[t]wo types of explanations of state government innovation have been proposed: internal determinants modelsé and regional diffusion modelsé We show that the two are conceptually compatible.ò (Berry and Berry 1990, 397) Building on Grayôs work, Berry and Berry include such variables as the influence of

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eries, which is parallel to that groupôs potentially negative impact on state pre-k adoption and investments. Similarly, their use of the number of neighboring states that enacted lotteries has been applied to statistical analyses of reasons for state pre-k investment.

The specific factors tested in studies of welfare reform are relevant to assessing statesô motivations for pre-k investments, since most pre-k programs are, like welfare programs, targeted at children of low-income parents. Meadôs study of state welfare reform decisions employs Elazarôs theory of three types of state governance, traditional, individualistic, and moralistic, to predict state policy-making in this area. Mead finds that moralistic states, which are theoretically the most willing to use public policy to influence individual outcomes, had more ñsuccessò in enacting policies that were intended to move welfare recipients into jobs, and that traditional states, which are generally ñanti-government,ò performed worst, with individualistic states in the middle (Mead, 2004).[35] These findings speak more to the successful implementation by states of policies than to their reasons for spending on them, which is relevant to the assessment of why some states have successfully scaled up while others have not.

Policy Issue Networks and Diffusion Mechanisms

Recent work incorporates another variable, policy issue networks, in the state decision-making and diffusion area. Along the lines of Kingdonôs ñpolicy communities,ò policy issue networks play a major role in many diffusion studies. This is based on the premise that the actions of state policy-makers are not based solely on their personal beliefs, but are heavily influenced by

[35] One of Meadôs key assumptions, which might significantly influence the implications for policy-makers, is that ñsuccessfulò adoption ï with an emphasis on *how*, or process, rather than the substance of the policy adopted ï will be good for the state in general, while not adopting a new policy will have negative consequences.

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information that is available regarding the specific policy.[36] Policy issue networks have been the subject of research for many scholars studying the spread of policies, but their exact definition and precise role varies. Heclo described them as

> compris[ing] a large number of participants with quite variable degrees of mutual commitment or of dependence on others in their environment; *in fact is is almost impossible to say where a network leaves off and its environment begins*. Iron triangles and subgovernments suggest a stable set of participants coalesced to control fairly narrow programs which are in the direct economic interest of each party to the alliance. Issue networks are almost the reverse image in each respect. Participants move in and out of the networks constantly. *Rather than groups united in dominance over a program, no one, as far as one can tell, is in control of the policies and issues.* Any direct or material interest is often secondary to intellectual or emotional commitment. Network members reinforce each otherôs sense of issues as their interests, rather than (as standard political or economic models would have it), interests defining positions on issues.ò (Heclo 1978, emphasis added)

Walker points to both their vertical and horizontal components: ñA policy network is a part of the large policy system and is comprised of both those from the larger community outside government and those within it who have official decisionmaking powerò (Walker 1982). As Kirst, Meiser, and Rowley sum up the existing set of descriptions, ñ[t]he state policy issue network has many of the attributes of an interest group, but does not fit into any of the conventional definitionsò (Kirst, Meiser, and Rowley 2002, 247).

Notwithstanding their loose definition and shifting membership, policy issue networks are seen as particularly critical in the agenda-setting stage of state policymaking. Spurring and capitalizing on media attention and navigating the state political environment, networks help bring their issue to policymakersô attention (Ibid.). Their ability to use windows of opportunity to their advantage depends upon a key set of skills; Nelson ñfinds that state issue networks are led by

[36] I am lucky to have one of the experts on policy networks, Steven Balla, chairing my dissertation committee. His 2001 article on the influence of inter-state professional organizations in the area of health policy innovations sets the stage for other research illustrating the impact of such networks, and their leaders, in shaping policy diffusions.

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e in translating technical and academic data into óplain Englishoófor other bureaucrats and politiciansò (Nelson 1982).

One exploration of the impact of policy networks on education policies builds on early research by Rogers on the dissemination of policies across states, and on more recent work by Heclo that emphasizes the ñhowò of policy diffusion, rather than just the ñwhat.ò Mintrom and Vergari (1998) emphasize the critical nature of personal interactions in spreading new policies: ñ[t]his dependence on the communicated experience of near peers suggests that the heart of the diffusion process consists of the modeling and imitation by potential adopters of their network partners who have adopted previouslyò (Rogers 1995, 18). The gradual buildup developed through interactions permits actors to judge the reliability of both the others and of substantive information that they transmit: ñNetwork communications thereby serve to screen proposed innovations based on meritò (Mintrom and Vergari 1998, 128).

The researchers assert, too, that ideas are an important but often neglected part of the policymaking process. By ñfocus[ing] on the important role that policy networks, and the policy entrepreneurs embedded in them, can play in the diffusion of policy innovations,ò they say, studies can help overcome this and incorporate ideas into process.[37] Prior work in this area has relied heavily on case studies, failing to provide empirical support for their agenda-setting role. Mintrom and Vergari thus used survey data from multiple members of 48 statesô policy issue networks around school choice to assess policy entrepreneursô access to and use of internal and external policy networks. Based on results from event history analysis, the authors find that policy

[37] In a companion article based on the same data, too, Mintrom points to the importance of ideas and evidence: ñThis study shows how policy entrepreneurs have helped stimulate the diffusion of state school-choice plans by collecting and generating evidence of the workability of this innovation.ò (Mintrom 1997, 41)

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in diffusing education reforms.[38] They also discover that ñinternaló and ñexternaló networks perform different functions at the agenda-setting, enactment, and implementation stages.

> In a federal system like the United States, we argue that two broad types of policy networks can be found. First, policy entrepreneurs operating at the state level will most often develop their ideas for policy innovation through their conversations and interactions with members of interstate or *external policy networks*. [as well as] Intrastate or internal policy networks [which] comprise the second [network] type é . These networks are generally issue specific and are comprised of individuals with established connections to the local policymaking community and who, perhaps, have some connections to the broader external policy network relevant to the issue domain on which they focus. Policy entrepreneurs can make good use of internal networks by capitalizing on the contacts of the network participantsò (pp.130-131, emphasis in the original).

Based on these findings, they urge that future diffusion studies take into consideration interactions between policy entrepreneurs and networks and ñpay careful attention to the role that policy networks play in this processò (Mintrom and Vergari 1998, 126).

Other researchers find that, controlling for socioeconomic and political factors, policy issue networks are a major driver of state adoption of different types of education-related policies. Michael Kirst, Gail Meister, and Stephen Rowley assessed the spread of school finance reform, collective bargaining, minimum competency tests, and creation science during the 1970s. The policies had disseminated widely and quickly, without regard to state wealth or history, and none was stimulated by federal legislation. ñTheé variation among state economic, social, and political characteristics generated a pattern of different contexts in which to explore why the same issue did or did not reach state agendas. *If an issue sweeps across very different state political cultures and socio-economic contexts, the idea that issue networks help determine agenda setting regardless of*

[38] This statistical analysis addresses the problem they see with Walkerôs (1981) ñ[argument] that interaction among members of policy communities are vital for ensuring the diffusion of innovationsò ï the lack of any empirical backing for that assertion (Mintrom and Vergari, 128).

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*s a possibility*ò (*Ibid*., 250, emphasis added). Employing four case studies to explore the influence of policy issue networks on dissemination, they found a different type of policy entrepreneur in each policy area. Network membership varied from one policy area to the other, as did the level of conceptual agreement, basis for advocacy, legislative focus, and mechanisms of information flow. Legislative focus, for example, ranged in their four policy areas from ñcomplete and inflexibleò (e.g., model legislation replicated precisely in each case) to ñmotivated but highly variableò programs. Pre-k would likely fall closer to the latter, with a fairly defined focus but substantial variation in hours, teacher qualifications, etc., and with differences among states in how narrowly they focus on pre-k versus more broader related early childhood supports.

Another important factor mediating the success of the network in setting the agenda, and thus diffusing the policy, was the interaction of state political culture with the network. Factors in political culture include social, economic, historic, and political characteristics, with different combinations relevant, depending on the policy situation. The six deemed most important in their research were: 1) historical receptivity to new policy ideas that circulate among the states; 2) impact of state political culture in changing national concept; 3) sophistication of state administration and legislative staff; 4) cohesiveness of interest groups leading to coalition or conflict; 5) linkage of state or local officials to interstate policy issue networks; and 6) linkage of relevant intrastate interest groups to interstate networks.[39] The authors note that policy issue networks are often treated as an omitted variable or a topic for future research to explore and suggest that case studies might help determine the influences of entrepreneurs and/or networks at different points in the policymaking process.

[39] The latter three seem particularly relevant to the impact of policy networks on pre-k investment and are explored through the case studies.

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influence of policy networks, Shipan and Voldenôs recent study of four different mechanisms of policy diffusion points to the potential for effective pre-k policy issue networks to promote learning. It also illustrates how weaker networks might prompt states to engage in (counterproductive) competition. Their event history analysis of three types of local antismoking policies in 675 U.S. cities between 1975 and 2000 assesses the factors that drive learning, economic competition, imitation, and coercion (Volden and Shipan 2008). They find multiple mechanisms at work in each scenario; i.e., the mechanisms are not isolated from one another. They also find that there are temporal diffusion patterns; consistent with their hypotheses, imitation is more immediate, while learning takes longer and has longer-lasting impacts. City characteristics drive the contingent nature of diffusion, again, supporting their hypotheses: learning is enhanced in larger cities, which rely less on imitation, while smaller cities are more concerned with economic competition.

Applying the findings to pre-k investment, then, learning and competition would seem the most likely mechanisms for diffusion. Imitation is the shortest-lived, suggesting that policies whose diffusion has take place over many years and in more than one stage, such as pre-k, are less likely to be adopted and adapted based merely on imitation.[40] No federal policy exists that would force states to adopt through coercion, so that is not a likely mechanism. The authors define learning in a way that takes into account the evidence base of a policy like pre-k: ñwhen confronted with a problem, decision makers simplify the task of finding a solution by choosing an alternative that has proven successful elsewhereò (Shipan and Volden, 841, citing Berry and Baybeck). Economic competition, which the authors describe as closely related to learning, may be at play in some states as well. Competition likely takes place after initial adoption, since at that point the state has

[40] Some limited imitation, or emulation, however, could be part of the policy dissemination process among a few smaller or less policy savvy states whose larger, more powerful neighbors had adopted it.

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o take place mostly among next-door neighbors, for whom the consequences of lack of competitiveness are strongest. A classic example is welfare policy; states limit benefits in order to avoid becoming welfare magnets.

If competition has played a role in pre-k, it is fair to suggest that the diffusion process may more closely resemble learning. Assuming that states are competing to attract new skilled workers who may have children, support the ability of parents to work productively, improve their studentsô school readiness and school attainment, and generate a future pool of talented employees, or some combination of those objectives, the logical way to do so would be to increase both the number of children served and the quality of the programs serving them. The potential for mobility is one counter to that argument, but given that pre-k policy is implemented at the state level, and that the rate of inter-state mobility is relatively low, that is unlikely to motivate many states to limit their pre-k investments.[41]

Policy learning, which entails the assessment of other statesô policies nuances and their practical implications, rather than just copying the actions of political actors ï competition ï appears to suggest an important role for policy issue networks. Together, the prior research on policy issue networks suggests that states with committed policy entrepreneurs who are able to capitalize both on the ideas, research, and connections to other states provided by external networks and on the understanding of state culture and policymaking dynamics from internal issue networks will more successfully set agendas and enact and implement innovative policies.

Recent research expands on all of the above progress in diffusion of innovations work, employing more nuanced data and mixed methods to more fully understand the particular role of various actors at different times and to explore in detail policymaking around specific issues. In his assessment of whether or not states do, as widely believed, race to the bottom with respect to

[41] A state with an unusually high level of out-migration could be an exception.

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es data on state enforcement of three federal pollution control programs ï the Clear Air , Clean Water, and Resource Conversation Recovery Acts ï to construct a model to test that theory (Konisky 2007). He finds that, while states do respond strongly to economic competitor states, there is evidence of both the predicted race to the bottom (in response to a regulation that puts the state at a disadvantage) and a race to the top (in response to advantageous difference). Konisky suggests that, due to their different economic circumstances and corresponding economic development agendas, states approach environmental regulation quite differently, often in diametrically opposite ways. For example, poorer states might want to attract even those businesses that demand the freedom to pollute cheaply ï while other, more prosperous states shun that type of economic development. The latter tend to enact regulations that discourage pollution in order to attract businesses in the technology field that demand quality infrastructure and clean air.

Koniskyôs work can be seen as building on Grayôs findings that differences among states lead them to adopt policies differently and to respond in different ways to competitor states. This suggests an important sub- or counter-theory regarding state pre-k investment. While the majority of states likely invest based on economic capacity to do so and a politically progressive ideology that spurs such investment, a minority may be responding to different forces, such as the need to reduce the high costs of running a failing school system and/or the desire to develop a more business-friendly workforce. Among the latter group, economic and political factors likely would point in the other direction, as those types of needs tend to be associated with low levels of state resources to expend on policies and with more conservative politics.

Within the education field of study of diffusion of innovations, specific studies further guide this work. In their 2008 exploration of the reasons behind limited dissemination of merit-

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r colleagues use case studies to delve into why states have imitated their neighbors and how competition and policy issue networks have influenced the spread of this particular policy (Cohen-Vogel et al 2008). Specifically, they test the theory that proximity (as per Walker) rather than other forces (Gray, others) guides inter-state emulation. The researchers assess the roles played by various actors ï politicians, aides, advocates, etc. Because eight of the thirteen states with such programs are clustered in the Southeast, they look particularly at the history of policymaking in these states, policy leaders within the group, and forces that influence this region especially. Georgia emerges as an early and powerful leader, with the Southern Regional Education Board (SREB) also appearing to have exerted strong influence. Broadly, they conclude that state competition for students, revenue, and ideas, rather than geographic proximity, most strongly promotes inter-state policy emulation and enactment.

This research builds on earlier findings on the dissemination of educational innovations, including: the suggestion that regional influences may be associated with postsecondary assessment policy, but not with general state innovation around higher education (Hearn and Griswold 1994); Mintrom and Vergariôs 1998 finding that the likelihood a state would consider school choice is affected by election year, number of state private schools, and neighbor state policies; and a lack of evidence that internal economic/political factors explain state adoption of charter school or district takeover reform (Wong and Shen 2002). Relevant to this work, these earlier studies point to the complexity of how education-related policies tend to disseminate and to the need to view them as distinct, nuanced, and complex. Finally, like several others referenced above, Cohen-Vogel and her fellow researchers set out a strong rationale for including qualitative analysis in such studies:[42]

[42] Their methodology is also similar to that employed here, as detailed in Chapter 3: they begin with data on the level and number of awards, parallel to the NIEER data employed to map out the current state of pre-k policy. They

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tandard quantitative approaches to test these three
nfluenced by the policy choices of other states. é
[W]ell-planned qualitative approaches have the potential to consider at once multiple reasons for observed geographic diffusion patterns where they existé .[and can ask] what mechanisms are at work? Convenience? Competition? Communities? What are the roles of state agency officials, interest group representatives, and elected officials in the interstate spread of policy ideas? Does the work of national and regional associations encourage policy diffusion?ò (Cohen-Vogel et al 2008, 344)

As noted above, the authors conclude that competition for the best students was a strong driver of policy change. As is likely true of the similar cluster of Southeastern states that are leaders in pre-k investment:

> According to Gray (1994), states compete to lower their tax rates, to deter welfare clients, and to attract business. We speculated that states, especially bordering states, may compete for students, particularly the best and brightest, and that such competition may be motivating the regional adoption of state merit scholarship programs. *After all, public officials are concerned with attracting high-paying industries to their states. Because high-paying businesses often employ highly skilled labor, part of the strategy for attracting them is to guarantee an educated workforce"* (Ibid., 350-351, emphasis added).

State adopters of merit-based college aid feared brain drain ï in the case of pre-k, that may translate to losing educated parents of young children. Finally, policymakers who were interviewed cited pressure from constituents who read positive news accounts of neighbor statesô programs ï evidence of success next door made it easy to adapt and adopt. This, too, is very likely true of the spread of pre-k investments and is explored in interviews with state actors.

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then conduct primary data collection, including news sources, use that information to identify interview targets, and code the answers to assess the influences of various actors and to amend theories and data collection methods.

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rch Questions

zes a cluster of factors as central to understanding how, when, and why states adopt and adapt specific policies: state political and economic contexts; demographic and educational characteristics that may be specific to the policy being studied; state political ñcultureò; and the influence of external forces, including policy issue networks and individual entrepreneurs. The internal and external factors interact with one another and operate within a framework in which resources spur new policy adoptions, obstacles limit such change, and motivations to overcome obstacles respond to overcome those obstacles.

The diffusion of innovation literature adds much to this study. It affirms the importance of state wealth (capacity) and measures of progressiveness, including urbanization of the population, in adoption of new policies, and it suggests the exploration of leaders versus laggards in such adoptions, as well as the impact of external factors. Several of the seminal studies, starting with Gray, emphasize the importance of the particular policy type in predicting which states will lead (and which may never adopt). Their exploration of specific policy issues provides guidance for factors likely to influence pre-k policy decision-making.

Like the state policy-making research, these studies contrast the initial policy adoption and later adaptation processes. This is particularly important for research on pre-k policy, as it has involved at least two stages ï a twenty-year period comprised largely of new adoptions by states of programs, and a more recent period characterized almost entirely by amendments to those policies and major changes in investments. More recent research on diffusion explores the various mechanisms by which policies diffuse, both at the initial adoption stage and later, as states ñreinventò those policies, and the researchers discuss the potential implications of those different mechanisms. Finally, both the broader state policymaking literature and studies of the diffusion of innovative policies note the roles played by both external and internal/state policy issue networks

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ze the benefits of qualitative work in addition to statistical analysis. All of these factors intersect with broader societal forces relevant to pre-k. As set out in Chapter 1, those forces include changes in family structure and capacity, brain and education research, and the influence of federal policies. Based on the above reviews of the history of pre-kindergarten as a U.S. policy and of state policymaking, these research questions are posed:

Q1: How did influences on state pre-k policymaking differ between the 1980-to-2000 and post-2000 periods?

Q2: How did the national pre-k policy network influence pre-k policymaking between 2001 and 2010?

Q3: How do the different early childhood advocacy strategies that emerged within the larger network explain statesô differential levels of success in ñscaling upò during this decade?

Q4: How did state early childhood communities interact with national networks?

Chapter 3 develops three hypotheses to explore these questions. It then describes the data employed to operationalize the hypotheses and the various methods that are used to test them.

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3: Data and Methodology

Introduction

Having set out the main research questions to be answered, this chapter begins by translating those questions into hypotheses. These are then operationalized to determine the data needed to answer them. The data and their sources are described, as are the limitations to and caveats associated with them. The second half of the chapter sets out both the quantitative and qualitative analyses employed to test the hypotheses.

It is theorized that the nature of pre-k policymaking changed between the 1990s, when the last wave of states enacted new programs, and the decade starting in 2000, when virtually all new investment in state pre-k programs consisted of enhancements to existing programs. The emerging national pre-k policy network is theorized to have engaged with and influenced states differently, contributing to their different levels of success in scaling up pre-k programs ï increasing access while maintaining or enhancing levels of quality. This leads to hypothesis 1:

H1: *The differential influence of the national pre-k policy among states helps explain why some were more successful than others in "scaling up" their programs between 2001 and 2010.*

In particular, as the policymaking process moved in most states from agenda-setting, enactment, and initial implementation to the more mature adaptation phase, state pre-k programs generally sorted themselves into one of two competing ñcamps.ò The first group has a pre-k focus and is intent first and foremost on establishing quality early education programs for preschoolers. The other, a broader, birth-to-five strategy, sees a need to address from the outset the needs of the whole child and was concerned about the potential for a more narrowly targeted strategy to drain attention and resources from infants and toddlers to preschoolers. The former strategy is led within the national pre-k policy network by the Pew Charitable Trustsô Pre-K Now campaign. The latter

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BUILD systems-building initiative, and the Birth-to-Five Policy Alliance. These two groups illustrate the divide within the national network between pre-k and early childhood education more broadly.[43] This leads to hypothesis 2:

H2: *Two camps within the national pre-k policy network that represent different strategies for pre-k advocacy interacted differently with different states, leading to different outcomes in terms of type and level of pre-k investment by 2010.*

A third strategy, which can be seen as a compromise between the two, combines some systems-building with a narrower approach than the BUILD-Birth-to-Five association. This middle road is represented by both the School Readiness Indicators Initiative and the SPARK initiative. It should be noted that, while the two main competing camps both originated near the start of this decade and have growth throughout it, along with the state programs that they have promoted, both SRII and SPARK were time-limited initiatives. Kellogg funded spark from 2003 to 2008, and SRII was in existence from 2001 to 2004. Also, while many states fall solidly into one camp or another, others have received funding and support from two, or even all, of the three.

Indeed, these hypotheses speak, as well, to the cohesiveness of the stateôs early childhood policy community. Prior studies of the dissemination of innovative policies across states have found the degree of cohesion of the state policy network to be an important factor in the speed and success of such dissemination. In this case, cohesion could be represented by a stateôs strong affiliation with one of the three strategies of the policy network, while weak affiliation with more than one might be interpreted as lack of clear intent with respect to pre-k investment. (E.g., one group within the state policy community might lean toward a more targeted approach, indicated by support from Pre-K Now, while another might seek a broader, birth-to-five policy strategy and

[43] As discussed in chapter 5, each has its own philanthropic sponsors, and each has worked at different points and in different ways with other members of the policy network, including intergovernmental associations such as the National Governorsô Association and the National Council of State Legislators.

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o-Five Policy Alliance.) Again, these divisions also speak to the distinction between pre-k and a broader view of early childhood programs and investments. The influence of the state early childhood policy community on pre-k outcomes is reflected in hypothesis 3:

H3: *The strength and cohesiveness of state early childhood policy communities interacted with the national network and components of it to influence success in scaling up programs.*

Hypotheses

H1: The differential influence of the national pre-k policy among states helps explain why some were more successful than others in ñscaling upò their programs between 2001 and 2010.

H2: Two camps within the national pre-k policy network that represent different strategies for pre-k advocacy interacted differently with different states, leading to different outcomes in terms of type and level of pre-k investment by 2010.

H3: The strength and cohesiveness of state early childhood policy communities interacted with the national network and components of it to influence success in scaling up programs.

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It is hypothesized that membership in/level of involvement in one, two, or all three of the advocacy strategies influenced the stateôs level and type of investment in pre-k. I.e., each of these associations had as its goal the dissemination of high-quality pre-k programs across states. The question, then, is whether a more targeted approach, exemplified by Pre-K Now, or a more holistic one, as anchored by the BUILD and Birth-to-Five strategies, better delivered those results (or whether a middle-of-the-road strategy was most effective). Because the hypotheses posit specific impacts during the 2001-2010 period, only those 37 states with pre-k programs in existence at both the start and end of the decade are included in the statistical analysis.[44]

Dependent Variables[45]

Assessing state motivations for policy investment requires that appropriate data be available to measure the type and level of investment. Policy investment can be captured in many different ways, since states can invest in different aspects of a policy. In the case of pre-k, the most common is a version of that employed by Rigby (2005 and 2008): how many dollars did states spend on pre-k? Until recently, this was the only measure available. Starting in the 2001-02 school year, however, the National Institute for Early Education Research (NIEER), housed at Rutgers University, has collected annual data from each state regarding its pre-k program along two key measures, described below. These allow researchers to compare states along different dimensions.[46]

[44] The exception is Nevada, which formally adopted its pre-k program in 2002. Excluded, however, are Hawaii, which funded a program in 2001 but which NIEER stopped including two years later, and Alaska and Rhode Island, both of which adopted pilot programs in 2009. No other states changed pre-k status during this decade.
[45] See Appendix B, Codebook, for a more detailed descriptions of all twelve dependent and independent variables.
[46] The richness of the NIEER data have prompted a number of recent studies on pre-k policy to employ them; indeed, Bryant *et al* note in their 2002 study of pre-k that there is a need for more comprehensive state-level data collection, and they use survey data from the prior decade to begin that process.

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001-2002 school year (2001), the NIEER data that are compiled into *The State of Preschool; the State Preschool Yearbook* capture three key aspects of state pre-k investment: per-pupil spending by the state, the percentage of state 3- and 4-year-olds served, and program quality.[47] The latter two are of particular interest to both policymakers and researchers, as they represent two distinct and often conflicting characteristics of state pre-k programs.

The NIEER data have been fairly widely used by other researchers because these unique characteristics, along with their reliability, provide a new tool for policy scholars in this area. Data are compiled from survey responses by the state agencies responsible for pre-k programs, and the NIEER researchers who author the Yearbook are early childhood experts with extensive expertise in the field.[48] Moreover, because the data are collected through surveys of states by a single organization, a consistent definition of what constitutes a state pre-k program is used and helps to ensure an apples-to-apples comparison.[49]

The NIEER ***pre-k quality*** measure employs ten benchmarks that are divided into three key categories: teacher qualifications, classroom characteristics, and services offered.[50] Among teacher qualifications, benchmarks include whether the lead teacher has a bachelor's degree, has specialized in early childhood, and has met his or her in-service requirement, and whether the assistant teacher has at least a degree or certificate in early childhood. Classroom factors include curriculum standards, maximum class size of 20, and maximum staff-student ratio of 10:1, and

[47] Throughout the paper, when referring to data for a given year, that year reflects the start of a school year; i.e., 2001 data are for the 2001-2002 school year, 2002 data for the 2002-2003 school year, and so on.
[48] Steven Barnett, NIEERôs director, is one of the nation's foremost Head Start and early education researchers.
[49] See Appendix B, Codebook, for NIEERôs definition of a state preschool program and discussion below regarding limitations as a result of that definition.
[50] See Codebook, for more detailed description of how quality is measured and state compliance with each item.

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gs and referrals, family support services, and provision of meals.

Pre-k access is measured by the percentage of the stateôs four-year-olds enrolled in the program. This does not include children enrolled in federally funded Head Start or other pre-k like programs that others might consider to be state pre-k. As is true of pre-k quality, programs considered by NIEER to be state pre-k programs must meet certain criteria, including the use of state dollars to fund them, not having as their main purpose care for working parents, and those that serve only or primarily children with disabilities.[51]

With respect to both measures, the use of 2001 indicates data from the 2001-02 school year, 2006 indicates 2006-07, and 2009 captures data from 2009-10. As such, variables are coded access01 to indicate percentage of 4-year-olds enrolled in the 2001-02 school year, and quality06 indicates the number of the ten NIEER quality benchmarks met by the stateôs program in 2006-07.

Independent Variables

In order to isolate the hypothesized differential impact of the components of the policy network on state pre-k policy decisions, it was necessary to produce variables for those influences, as well as to identify key other factors seen in prior studies of pre-k and general state policymaking to influence this area. Each of the three network strategies is represented by a variable that codes each state with either a zero, one, or two, with zero representing no influence or support, one minimal support/influence, and two maximal influence and/or support.

Pre-K Now: As the only national organization to promote this specific strategy to increase access to high-quality pre-k programs, this variable is operationalized to measure the level of support a given state had with the campaign. As described in more detail in chapter 5, Pre-K Now

[51] These criteria and the resulting weaknesses in the measures are discussed in more detail below.

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es, including funding for one or more state early childhood advocacy groups to conduct research, host events, and otherwise promote pre-k; technical assistance, such as guidance in crafting proposed pre-k legislation; and chances to learn from peersô experiences. More broadly, it provided access to both supported and unsupported states to its national networking and other events, research and advocacy materials, and other resources generally available on its website. A zero meant that the state received no funding or technical assistance from Pre-K Now (Pew) at any point between 2001 and 2010. However, this does not mean that the state early childhood community failed to take advantage of national conferences or of the many electronic and print resources that the campaign made available to all. (These include research studies and reports produced by the National Institutes for Early Education Research at Rutgers University, a major research actor in the national network that has been supported by Pew throughout Pre-K Nowôs existence.) A measure of one indicates a minimal to moderate level of support by Pre-K Now for the stateôs pre-k policymaking effort. This might mean one-time technical assistance or occasional guidance on testimony. A two indicates strong to maximal support, indicating that the state received substantial funding over an extended period of time and/or extensive technical assistance from Pre-K Now staff.

Broad Early Childhood Network: Because membership in either the BUILD or Birth-to-Five Policy Alliance networks is either yes or no for a given state, this variable is operationalized less qualitatively. A zero for the ***BUILD/Birth-to-Five*** variable represents lack of membership in either of the state networks, and thus no influence from this approach, one represents membership in one but not both, or moderate influence, and a two represents dual membership, or maximal influence from this strategy.

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he in-between strategy is operationalized in the same way; both the SRII and SPARK initiatives included as their members specific states only (although SPARK had two ñlevelsò ï general membership and a gubernatorial summit, both of which are counted here as involvement). As such, zero for the ***SRII/SPARK*** variable means that the state received funding from neither initiative, one indicates that it was linked to one but not the other, and two means involvement in both initiatives.

In theory, a state can have been supported at three levels by any or all three campaigns, and thus can score a collective zero to six in terms of national pre-k policy network support. In practice, all but one (Delaware) of the 37 states tested worked with at least one of the initiatives, and ends at 5, since no state received more than Ohioôs level of support across the networks.

State investment, of course, is influenced by myriad factors, including both decisions at the time of enactment and all policy changes prior to 2001. As such, several variables are added to control for these factors. First, a dummy variable is included to indicate the year the stateôs pre-k program was first enacted. This is important, because states that have had 30 years to enhance their programs would be expected to have invested more, and perhaps differently, from those that first adopted pre-k programs closer to the adaptation decade studied here. ***Program Year*** indicates the first year that NIEER counts the stateôs pre-k program as having been in existence.[52] As discussed below, this is one instance in which use of NIEER data may pose a challenge, since its definition of pre-k differs in some cases from that of other organizations.

As Andrew Karch finds in his research on state pre-k policymaking, Head Start is also a potentially conflicting and conflating factor. While this research looks specifically at stand-alone state pre-k programs, many states also use early childhood funds to supplement federal Head Start

[52] Wisconsinôs pre-k program was actually first enacted in the late 1800s and continued for many years, but this analysis employs 1984, the year from which it has been consistently funded through the present.

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of their state pre-k funding to Head Start sites. In order to isolate the influence of the three pre-k network strategies on policymaking in this decade, a variable was produced to control for the stateôs support for the Head Start model at the start of the decade. ***Head Start supplement*** thus represents the percentage of the stateôs pre-k dollars (as calculated by NIEER) that were devoted to state Head Start programs in 2001-02.

In addition to the year in which they first adopted programs, states also made different levels of progress in investments leading up to 2001. In order to determine which portion of those investments can be attributed to the particular network influence(s), it is necessary to control for each stateôs type and level of investment in 2001-02. Parallel to the two dependent variables, ***Access01*** captures the percentage of four-year-olds served by the state, and ***Quality01*** represents the number of benchmarks met.[53]

Finally, a set of control variables is employed to assess more generally the role played by other state characteristics in level and type of pre-k investment. The state policymaking and diffusion of innovation literatures point to state economic capacity, or wealth, and political factors, as the two key drivers of policy investments. ***Per capita income***, which is frequently employed by other scholars of pre-k policymaking, is used here as the measure of state wealth. Other possible options include measures of state fiscal capacity, which tend to take into account tax structure. That type of measure is not used here, however, both because there is substantial debate as to which particular measure to employ, and because it incorporates state policy decisions around tax effort that are presumed to be partially captured in measures of institutional liberalism, which are employed separately.

[53] Many pre-k programs also serve 3-year-olds, but because they are still a minority, this research focuses on four-year-olds only.

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ly divided into two main camps: ideology and partisan control. Berry *et al*ôs two measures of political ideology are thus employed to represent this set of state characteristics. ***Public ideology*** uses interest group ratings of federal legislators to impute the level of liberalism at the state level, weighting votes for winning and losing candidates in order to capture the full spectrum of state residentsô ideological leanings. ***Institutional ideology*** adds additional measures to capture both the liberalism of the governor and of state legislators as well as partisan control. Because state economic and political conditions fluctuate from year to year, and this research assesses influences and outcomes over the entire decade, all three measures are averaged over the period being studied.[54]

Finally, it is hypothesized that state political culture, independent of political ideology, played a role both independently and in interaction with state policy networks to influence level and type of pre-k investment in 2010. In particular, the review of state policymaking literature suggests that political culture may be strongly associated with how and how successfully a state implements a policy once it has been adopted. Because the focus of this study is on later stages of policymaking, culture is likely an important factor. Elazarôs classification of states as either moralistic, traditional, or individualistic would fit this need well; they speak to the stateôs attitude toward policy generally, and thus likely to its capacity to carry out the legislatureôs intent and make enhancements easier. One criticism of these measures is that they are closely correlated with the region in which the state resides, with moralistic a decent proxy for Southern states. In this case, however, that correlation is useful, since it is also theorized that three sets of states ï Southern, Northern Plains, and the rest ï have three distinct investment patterns. The use of a ***Southern*** dummy thus includes both a good proxy for political culture and a test of the degree to which

[54] Because data for the later two years were not available for all three, per capita income and both ideology measures are in practice averaged over the 2001-2007 period, in order to maintain consistency.

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te pre-k investment. In this case, ***Southern*** states include the pre-k states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia.

Several other factors hypothesized to impact state policymaking and/or the dissemination of innovative policies, including early childhood programs, are not included in this analysis. These include age of state residents; the percentage of residents who are older is found in some literature to be associated with limiting investments in young children, while the percentage of preschool-aged children may tend to increase them. The degree to which the state population lives in cities or urbanized areas has been found by Walker and others to increase the speed with which a new policy spreads across states, and it might limit pre-k investment in very rural areas due to the difficulty of transporting very young children to sites. As well, higher educational attainment among state residents has been found by many researchers to be associated with higher levels of investment in education-related policies. Karch, among others, uses this factor in his analysis of state investments in pre-k. Because of the small N of 37 employed in these statistical analyses, however, limits on the degrees of freedom dictate a parsimonious model. Moreover, the use of a change model, which controls for the stateôs level and type of investment at the start of the decade being studied, should incorporate these factors to the degree that they have driven and/or limited stateôs investments through 2000. The control variables that are employed here represent the few that might change sufficiently from one decade to the next and that are too central to motivations for state investment in pre-k programs to be omitted.

Limitations to the NIEER Data

A primary concern regarding the NIEER data is that they capture only those programs that NIIER defines as state programs, which presents analytical challenges. In particular, city, county, or federally-funded programs that serve children may act as substitutes, driving down the measured

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data are not included in the NIEER figures.[55] There is no existing measure that captures this; Rigbyôs investment figure, for example, excludes local funds. Local and private matching funds are discussed, as relevant, in the four case studies.

While each of the three measures could be challenged on the grounds that there are many different ways to calculate it, quality is the most likely to draw criticism. Each of the ten benchmarks is included based on findings from research on early education as to which factors contribute most to children's gains from pre-k participation. As with all social science research, however, there is room for disagreement. For example, there is a fairly contentious debate on the importance of a pre-k teacher having a bachelorôs degree, with opposing research finding that the key is an understanding of and specialization in early childhood development. NIEER (and Pre-K Now) have taken the position that, on balance, having a teacher with a bachelorôs degree benefits the teacherôs class, so this is among the benchmarks included. As well, in order to avoid conflict over the relative importance of any specific one of the ten factors, NIEER does not weight them, which resulted in a ranking system that renders equivalent whether the lead teacher specializes in early childhood and whether participating children receive a snack.[56]

Perhaps most relevant to this work, the benchmarks are intentionally geared toward scoring the quality of a targeted pre-k program serving three- and four-year-olds. This necessarily means that the assessment does not pertain as well to younger children, and that it weighs heavily factors that contribute to childrenôs cognitive development and kindergarten readiness, rather than the broader set of factors that a Head Start or holistic, birth-to-five approach would see as important.

[55] Karchôs study on the influence of Head Start enrollment on state pre-k illustrates this challenge; Karch posits, and finds support for the theory, that higher Head Start participation reduces state adoption of and investment in freestanding pre-k programs. As Head Start represents a different strategy than the targeted pre-k approach, the degree to which the state diverts funds to Head Start programs is one variable employed to assess state intent.
[56] The Yearbook does explicitly address this, noting that meals do not compensate for weak teacher credentials. While the nature of the statistical analysis does not lend itself to the use of specific quality benchmarks, they are explored to a limited extent in the four state case studies.

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success in scaling up programs to serve higher percentages of children in high-quality pre-k programs, it works well. At the same time, it is instructive to see how each of the different approaches to early childhood advocacy that are explored here influences this specific type of investment. It is also worth noting that some state interviewees for the case studies saw quality very differently from how NIEER ranks state programs.

The integrity of the data may also raise concerns among some. NIEER is a hybrid research and advocacy organization ï its leading researcher and director is a long-time pre-k advocate, and NIEERôs mission is largely to encourage states to adopt pre-k programs and to improve those they have.[57] As such, the data must be treated as potentially biased or at least collected with the intent of use for advocacy by the Pre-K Now campaign. However, there is reason to believe neither that they are biased in a particular direction, nor that any bias would harm the state-to-state comparisons conducted here. With respect to the direction of the bias, the numbers might be inflated if NIEER wishes to paint a rosier picture, but they might also be deflated to support the contention that more investment is needed. Even assuming a general upward bias, the main challenge to conducting a multi-state comparison study would be the disproportionate gap between states with pre-k programs and those with none. Given the important investment represented by enacting a program in itself, such an inflated gap might actually be appropriate.[58]

A final issue is that state self-reporting of children served is likely not entirely accurate. Each stateôs pre-k program is run through its own distinct system, with different agencies in charge in different states, and often multiple agencies involved, including private care providers who are contracted by the state. Consistent and reliable reporting may be a challenge in the context of such

[57] It has also been funded for much of the past decade by The Pew Charitable Trusts as part of its pre-k for all work and as a means of supporting and supplementing the advocacy work of the Pre-K Now campaign.
[58] Also, as set out above, both 39- and 50-state comparisons are conducted, so any difference would be noted.

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ver, children move in the course of the year, and some are registered but do not attend or attend only sporadically. Self-reported data are common in state policymaking research, however, as are differences across state agencies that collect them; this problem is thus somewhat endemic to much social science research and certainly does not disqualify the NIEER measures.[59] (As some of the case study interviewees report, there is substantial variation in quality across states and sites, with average quality often lower than the NIEER data would indicate.)

Notwithstanding these caveats, the NIEER data are employed because of their unique capacity to illustrate state pre-k investment decisions. They are the only numbers available that assess all 50 states with measures that extend beyond total dollars spent (capturing measures of program quality and access and average spending per child). While, like all data, they are imperfect, they are by far the best option for this quantitative analysis and provide a good foundation for case studies. As with other data-related limitations, the researcher must acknowledge them and keep them in mind when interpreting results.

As discussed in chapter 6, the use of data on state economic capacity and political ideology and partisan control that is averaged across the decade can also present limitations. (In a period of a major recession, like that included in the decade studied here, differential impacts across states may be especially prevalent.) The case studies provide several examples of state- and context-specific influences of economic and political factors that might be obscured by these measures.

Table 3.1, below, sets out the data employed and the expected sign, mean, maximum, minimum, and standard deviation for each.

[59] Bryant and his colleagues employ similar methods in their 2002 study of state pre-k investments, as do scholars in other fields. The degree to which such inaccuracies vary by field is unclear but could be correlated in the case of pre-k with program quality and/or level of state investment, if they indicated sophistication of agencies in charge.

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ndent and Independent Variables

Variable	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	S.D.
Dependent variables					
Pre-K Access, 2009-10	37	1	71	25	18
Pre-K Quality, 2009-10	37	2	10	7	2
Network Variables					
Pre-K Now	37	0	2	1.5	0.76
BUILD/Birth-to-Five	37	0	2	0.54	0.65
SRII/SPARK	37	0	2	0.59	0.64
Context Variables					
Year enacted	37	1965	2002	1989	9
Head Start Supplement 2001	37	0	561	40	112
Pre-K Access 2001-02	37	1	56	13	13
Pre-K Quality 2001-02	37	2	9	5	2
Control Variables					
Average per-capita income, 2001-2007	37	$25,894	$46,879	$32,898	$4,974
Average Institutional progressiveness, 2001-07	37	34	69	51	10
Average Public progressiveness, 2001-07	37	29	87	54	14
Southern	37	0	1	0.19	0.40

As these summary statistics demonstrate, pre-k programs expanded over the decade studied, nearly doubling average enrollment from thirteen to twenty five percent, while increasing average quality by two of ten possible points, from meeting five NIEER benchmarks in 2001 to seven by 2010. At the same time, investments in pre-k programs continued to vary greatly from state to state. The lowest-ranked state with respect to access enrolled just one percent of its four-year-olds in 2001, which was also true at the end of the decade (although the number of states enrolling only one percent was four in 2001; in 2010, only Minnesota had such a low number).

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y increase; New Mexico, Kansas, and Texas met only two NIEER benchmarks in 2001, and Ohioôs loss of investment brought it down to two by 2010.

With respect to network participation, 31 of the 37 pre-k states received at least minimal support from Pre-K Now, with 25 of them supported at the ñintensiveò level, as defined by funding as well as technical assistance and consistent, rather than one-time, support. The BUILD-Birth-to-Five comprehensive strategy, in contrast, engaged a much smaller set of states. Fewer than half were supported by either of the network initiatives, and only three states ï Illinois, New York, and Washington ï received funding from both, putting them in the ñintensiveò category. The middle-ground networkôs reach was very similar ï nineteen states participated, with three ñintensiveò participant states.[60]

Pre-2000 pre-k investment elements also vary broadly. California, the first state to fund a pre-k program, adopted in 1965, with New York just one year later. The vast majority of states that fund pre-k chose not to also supplement Head Start with state funds, supporting Andrew Karchôs findings regarding the conflict between advocates for those two programs, but of the twelve that did set aside some funds, five allocated equal or larger amounts to Head Start, two of them over three times as much (as compared to pre-k funding). As state policymaking research has consistently found, state economic and political contexts also vary widely, allowing them to have a substantial influence on some policy decisions. Among pre-k states, average per capita income pre-recession ranged from nearly $26,000 to almost $47,000, with a mean of $33,000. Public progressiveness ranged from just 29 on Berry *et al*ôs scale in Oklahoma to 87 in Vermont, with institutional ideology having a narrower range, from a minimum among pre-k states of 34 in South Carolina to 69 in Vermont.

[60] As discussed in chapter 5, all three ï Ohio, Arizona, and Connecticut ï are case study subjects.

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Quantitative Analysis

Chapter 4 describes and analyzes the results of the bivariate and multivariate analyses employed to test hypotheses 1 and 2. As described here, these include correlations and a series of regressions that seek to determine both the absolute and relative influences of the state characteristics theorized to explain the variation in access and quality among state pre-k programs between 2001 and 2010. Maps illustrating pre-k access and quality at both the start and end of the decade are also used, along with scatterplots, to graphically depict changes in those two program characteristics over the period studied and to identify changes in the patterns of investment. (While limited data exist to explore the cohesiveness of state early childhood policy communities that hypothesis 3 theorizes influence pre-k investment, the case studies are a stronger tool for that, with data noted to supplement those qualitative findings.)

Bivariate Analysis

Before assessing the cumulative ability of the data to test the hypotheses, correlations were run to determine the influence of each individual variable, when not controlled by any other factor, on state investment as captured by each of the three measures. Data from 2009 outcome variables ï pre-k program access and quality ï are related to measures of state characteristics theorized to influence those outcomes. These initial tests of relationship strength point to likely stronger and weaker influences when all variables are taken into account, and the correlations among the independent variables indicate any threats to regression results from multicollinearity.

In particular, the correlations are needed to ensure that there is sufficient independence among the three pre-k policy network strategies tested to render the model valid. As well, correlations of program access and quality in both 2001 and 2009 are one means of assessing the degree to which those two factors might compete with one another, as some literature suggests, or

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tandem, which indicates average state success in ñscaling upó pre-k programs.

Multivariate analysis

The first set of OLS regressions measure the impact of the three early childhood investment strategies on pre-k access and quality from 2001-02 through 2009-10, controlling for early state pre-k policy decisions, state economic capacity, and public and institutional ideology, as well as for whether or not the state is Southern. These also allow for correlations between the two measures of pre-k investment in both 2001-02 and 2009-10 to test for the theory that the watering down of policies often seen when they are taken to scale has not happened here. (The Excel charts provide a second support for this theory.)

A second set of OLS regressions tests the robustness of the findings across time periods (before and during the recession), across specific pre-k advocacy strategy networks, and across regions (with non-Southern states tested separately).

The results of these quantitative analyses are then supplemented with qualitative work that includes both an illustration of the larger national pre-k policy network, including the three network strategies tested here, and four state case studies.

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The qualitative research presented in chapter 5 explores influences relevant to all three hypotheses. It assesses the influences of the policy network strategies and of the broader national pre-k policy network in which they are embedded, in order to flesh out the results of the statistical analyses that test hypotheses 1 and 2. It also assesses the strength and cohesion of statesô internal pre-k policy networks, or early childhood policy communities, and how their interactions with the national networks lead to specific policy change. While some data exist to test this third hypothesis, they are far too thin to provide much insight into the third hypothesis. As well, the case studies provide more nuanced explanations for the influence of other factors that are tested in the quantitative work ï earlier state pre-k policy decisions and their influence on policy change between 2001 and 2010, and economic and political circumstances, in particular the impact of the Great Recession and state budget cuts.

This research consists of two parts: a depiction of the national policy network that has worked across all state to promote investments in pre-k, including the three distinct policy approaches that coexist within it, and studies of four states. The national pre-k policy network that has emerged increasingly figures in studies of public pre-k but has not yet been compiled in one place, so this depiction represents an important contribution to the pre-k policymaking literature. It also helps explain the emergence of the different strategies for promoting pre-k that have both increased pre-k investment across states and divided the early childhood community. And while only those three strategy networks are represented in the statistical analysis, there are other influential players whose influence is evident in the case study findings. Their omission from this research would therefore substantially our understanding of how policy has been shaped over this critical decade. Finally, the studies shed additional light on the relevance for policymakers of the

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oyed ï access and quality ï and on why given states seem to focus on one over the other, or why the focus may have shifted toward quality measures over the past decade or periods within in.

The four states studied ï Arizona, Ohio, Connecticut, and Virginia ï were chosen based on their movement among four cells in the quality-access investment grid that illustrates the general trend in state pre-k investment between 2001 and 2009 (see Figure 3.1, below).

Figure 3.1: Changes in State Investment in Pre-K Access and Quality, 2001-2009

2001-2002

	Quality: Low	**Quality: High**
Access: Low	***AZ***, CA, ***CT***, HI, IA, KS, MO, NE, NM, NV, ***OH***, OR, PA, WA	AL, AR, DE, MN, NC, TN, ***VA***, VT
Access: High	CO, LA, MA, ME, NY, TX, WI	GA, IL, KY, MD, MI, NJ, OK, SC, WV

2008-2009

	Quality: Low	**Quality: High**
Access: Low	***AZ***	AL, DE, MN, MO, NE, NV, OR, WA,
Access: High	CA, FL, ***OH,*** TX,	AR, ***CT***, CO, GA, IA, IL, KS, KY, LA, MA, MD, ME, MI, NC, NJ, NM, NY, OK, PA, SC, TN, WI, ***VA,*** VT, WV

With respect to both access and quality, high is defined as above the 2001 median and low defined as at or below it, among states with pre-k programs. These medians are 9% for access and 4 out of 10 NIEER points for quality. This seems low from a 2010 perspective, but it is a fair measure given where states began the decade.

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re was a substantial trend across states toward both greater access to pre-k and higher program quality over the decade. Among the 38 states that had pre-k programs for which NIEER measured quality and access in both 2001 and 2008,[61] of fourteen that began the decade with low levels of both quality and access, only one, Arizona, maintained that status. Among the others, one (Texas) maintained its low-quality, high-access status; five increased from low quality to high quality without increasing access; two (Ohio and California) went from low access to high access without increasing quality; and five, including Connecticut, increased both quality and access. Five states with high quality in 2000 increased access, including Virginia, and nine began the decade with high levels of both quality and access and maintained that status.

Based on this analysis of trends, four states were chosen for the purpose of assessing the influence of network strategies and those networksô interaction with state early childhood policy communities. The four states represent two that entered the decade (2001) with a pre-k program that ranked low in both quality and access and maintained low quality through 2008, and two others that either maintained high quality while increasing access or saw increases in both measures over the decade. States that increased quality but not access were not considered, as this does not represent a move from pilot to large-scale, just enhancement of that one aspect of the program. Another option would be to assess a state that began and ended the decade with no program at all, but only Florida occupies this cell. It has already been extensively studied, and it has not established a high-quality program.

[61] Note: There is one switch over the 9 year-period, as Hawaii eliminated its program and Florida enacted one. Hawaii had enacted a limited pre-k program in the early 1980s that served children of working parents only who also met other qualifications; because its primary purpose was supporting parentsô ability to work, rather than educating children, NIEER did not consider it a true pre-k program, and the state ceased funding it in 2005.

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r considerations include the nature of the state and the year it enacted its program. Outlier states ï New York, California, Texas ï that are very large and have a disproportionate influence on others ï may not make for good case studies. They tend to have too many characteristics that distinguish them from other states to enable viable comparison, limiting their external validity. Moreover, their sheer size makes major influence by policy networks less likely and also more difficult to identify and to contact for an interview. The research also suggests choosing for study states that enacted their programs around the same time, so that at least timing of adoption can be eliminated as an influence on policy adaptation. Given this studyôs focus on the wave of enactments in the 1990s, the four states chosen all first implemented their pre-k programs during that decade.

Arizona is the first state chosen; it is the only one that saw an increase in neither access nor quality between 2001 and 2008. While Ohio increased access, it maintained low program quality and is the second state to be studied. Virginia and Connecticut represent the increases in quality that are described above; the former shifted from high-quality, low-access to high-access, while the latter increased from low-low to high-high.[62]

While Virginia was chosen over several states that started the decade with low-low status, representation of the South was another criterion, and none of the low-low states is Southern. (Virginiaôs 2001 ñhighò quality is also at the lower end of the high spectrum.) Recession-driven cuts meant that both Arizona and Ohio actually saw small declines in access over that decade (six percent down to five percent, and nine percent down to eight percent, respectively), so the apparent

[62] As discussed in detail in chapter 5, however, differences are evident between the two low-quality states that did not successfully scale up and the two that did. In particular, while Virginia increased both access and quality quite substantially in a relatively short period of time, Connecticut enhanced quality and increased the number of children it served in small increments and saw losses in the recent recession. Similarly, Arizona has simply failed to scale up over the past decade, while Ohio saw major increases in access, followed by massive cuts in the past two years.

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was erased the subsequent year. In Connecticut, cuts in 2009-2010 reduced enrollment among 4-year-olds from 16% the prior two years to 11%. So while it still meets the cut-off for access, it is rightly perceived as less than fully successful (as is discussed in chapter 5).

The final portion of this chapter sets out the important aspects of case study planning and implementation.

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ign, and Implementation

Before deciding to conduct a case study, the researcher must establish that the type of question being asked is the appropriate one. Fundamentally, is the issue being addressed one of ñwhatò ñwhenò or ñhow many,ò or rather, is it a ñhowò or ñwhyò?[63] The second criterion sees a case study as appropriate ñwhen the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context.ò[64] Because the focus of this study is assessing why and how states invested in pre-k programs between 2001 and 2010, a recent/ongoing phenomenon over which the research clearly lacks control, case studies are an appropriate part, but not the only part, of this work.[65]

The first, and perhaps most critical piece of case study design, is the development of a robust theory that supplies the rationale for conducting the case study. As is true of statistical analysis, without such a basis grounded in literature and clear research questions, a researcher cannot determine the need for a case study nor decide which type will satisfy her needs. The theory for this study emerges from the literature review (Chapter 2) in two related strands: the importance of policy networks in disseminating new policies and enabling state-to-state learning, and of the strength and cohesiveness of the statesô internal policy issue networks, or policy communities, that interact with those external actors.

[63] This is the question asked by Robert K. Yin in his seminal text, ñCase Study Research: Design and Methods.ò Because the field of case study design and conduct is relatively thin, and Yin is considered to be an authority, his is the main source employed in structuring this research. However, his book references and builds on that of dozens of prior case study researchers and academics, making it akin to a literature review of the field.

[64] If the researcher had more control, an experiment would likely be the appropriate strategy, while an event that took place long ago might merit a history rather than case study.

[65] The literature review also includes several suggestions by researchers that case studies are useful, and even critical, in exploring statesô motivations for policy-making.

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ce of a national pre-k policy network that emerged over the past decade around the time that mature stage of pre-k policymaking being studied took place.[66] It includes several large foundations that have provided funding, technical assistance, and networking opportunities across the states; national (and regional) inter-governmental organizations; and a handful of early childhood advocacy organizations that have operated at the national level. (It also might include other organizations not principally devoted to promoting early childhood investments but who have mounted campaigns around the issue. Policy networksô fluid nature precludes precise definition and means that their ñbordersò are in flux.) If this network exerted a roughly equal impact on each state, its existence would not help to explain the different investment levels and types among them. However, two related factors suggest otherwise. First, distinct strategies funded by foundations have provided more funding and other supports for some states over others. Second, the degree to which state policy issue networks have connected to and leveraged the national networkôs other resources, potentially reflecting their own level of capacity, would also, if they vary, explain some of those differences.

Prior research reviewed in chapter 2 suggests that both of those are the case, and thus that differences among state policy issue networks may also explain some of the variation in pre-k investments. Moreover, while some studies (e.g., Kirst, Meister, and Rowley 1984) focus on the role of policy issue networks in agenda setting; these entities appear to have played important roles, as well, in the implementation and adaptation/amendment of pre-k policies. Kirst and others who have studied policy issue networks also suggest that the nature of the interaction between state political culture and those networks likely differs across states. Finally, the degree to which the

[66] The nucleus for this network was established at least a decade earlier, when early childhood scholars including Barnett, Schweinhardt, and Zigler began to speak about their findings around the benefits of early childhood education and to spur additional studies.

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ity is divided may vary, with opposition from child care providers in particular a more powerful obstacle to network cohesion in some states than others.

With respect to policy entrepreneurs, Mintrom and Vergari (1997) point to the impact of two factors: having the committed individual advocate connected to the national network for the purpose of obtaining new ideas and formulating initial policy options; and also being embedded within the state network in order to understand state-specific dynamics and be close to key power brokers. To the extent that new research emerges on the benefits of pre-k, and that other states scale up successfully, the network is a continuing source of information and resources for those entrepreneurs and their state networks. Indeed, existing case studies point to the influence of policy entrepreneurs from outside of the government in several states.[67]

Prior research on pre-k and existing case studies demonstrate that governors have also played an important role. At the same time, they do not act in isolation, nor are they always successful in getting their policy priorities implemented. Indeed, Rigbyôs recent work sets out four different types of roles for governors on this issue: influential leaders, constrained leaders, influential followers, and constrained followers (Rigby 2008).

Another factor making pre-k relatively unusual within state policy issues is the large amount of scientific and economic evidence that has been developed to support it. Indeed, one reason for the lack of rationality in policymaking in general is that evidence of effectiveness of the program proposed (or lack of effectiveness) rarely exists and, when it does, tends not to assume a significant role in the policymaking process. The connections between emergence of the evidence of pre-kôs benefits and dissemination of the policy make it clear that results of research have played a more important part in the spread of this particular policy than of most. While such a

[67] See, for example, the influence of Rob Reiner in California, Dave Lawrence in Florida, James Carville as Zell Millerôs aide in Georgia, and George Kaiser and fellow business and philanthropic leaders in Oklahoma.

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rely available for a given policy issue, prior research on policy issue networks has noted the importance of information in their spread. Mintrom and Vergari focus on the importance of information in their emphasis on the often-neglected role of ideas in the policymaking process and find policy networks to be important conduits of those ideas. Kirst, Meister, and Rowley find that policy entrepreneurs spread information differently in each policy area, and Volden points to the centrality of information and evidence both in his (2006) exploration of how policy success has driven CHIP amendments across states and his (2008) study of the different policy diffusion mechanisms shaping smoking bans across U.S. cities. This might also help to explain statesô differential success in ñscaling upò pre-k; i.e., to the extent that some states were better connected to networks that spread the information, they may have invested more than or differently from other states.

In sum, increases in pre-k investment between 2001 and 2010 look very different from those of the preceding decade. States spent substantial new money on pre-k programs, with increases, on average, in both quality and access, but they did not enact new pre-k programs. This signals a more mature phase of largely policy adaptation, in contrast to agenda-setting and new adoptions in the 1990s. The brief review here suggests a strong role for policy networks in spreading pre-k through state-to-state learning (*see, e.g.,* Kirpôs *Sandbox Investment*), leading to the same research questions posed for the quantitative analysis: 1) *How did national policy networks influence states efforts to scale up pre-k programs?; and* 2) *How did state early childhood policy communities' interactions with networks differ in ways that help explain variation among states in 2001-2010 policy change?*

Having defined the questions, the next step is to design the study. Yin establishes several criteria for putting in place a solid design that will appropriately address the questions that have

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sures of study strength: construct, internal, and external validity, and reliability. Note that internal validity concerns are relevant only for case studies for explanatory studies, and not for other types, such as exploratory or descriptive. The case studies conducted for this work are mainly explanatory in nature but also involve some exploratory work as well as some description. This is in keeping with Yinôs caveat that the lines between the three kinds of studies will not always be bright ones, and it suggests that internal validity concerns should be addressed to the extent possible in all research.

Explanatory case studies have five critical components: 1) questions; 2) propositions; 3) units of analysis; 4) logic linking data and propositions; and 5) criteria for interpreting findings. A well-designed study employs all five in a coherent manner to connect the research questions to the findings. For example, the questions should point clearly to a particular unit of analysis.[68]

Given the above questions, the first decision to be made before using them to establish propositions is that of single versus multiple case studies. Yin believes strongly that, while single case studies can provide very valuable, and even rigorous analysis, they are difficult to defend and most subject to criticism.[69] The theoretical base, data, and results of the statistical analysis all point to different roles for policy entrepreneurs and policy issue networks across states, and thus for the need to employ multiple case studies to explore those contrasts. Indeed, the above review of the literature and research questions posed lead to the following summary and resulting propositions for testing/exploration:

It is theorized that policy issue networks have functioned differently in each state with respect to both agenda-setting and later policy implementation and adaptation. These differences

[68] If they do not, Yin says, they are too vague. Either the theory is not fully fleshed out or the questions too broad.
[69] There are five instances in which single case studies make sense: critical, extreme/unique, representative/ typical, revelatory, or longitudinal cases. Because this research entails multiple cases, however, these definitions are not set out or further explored here.

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t choices made by the 37 states that had pre-k programs at both the start and end of the decade.[70] Cohesive, well-connected policy networks were critical to successfully scaling up statesô pre-k programs. This is because they conveyed and were able to persuade elected officials of their constituentsô united preferences; to have access to key power brokers; to communicate pre-k program priorities to policymakers; and to present evidence in support of those priorities. The three propositions below, parallel to the hypotheses set out above, provide a framework for exploring pre-k policymaking in four states from 1990 to 2010. They are not intended to be tested as rigorously as are the hypotheses in chapter 4, but rather to allow for a structured comparison across these four states of the influences of individual entrepreneur and policy issue networks, including their interaction with other factors.

Propositions[71]

P1: The differential influence of the national pre-k policy among states helps explain why some were more successful than others in ñscaling upò their programs between 2001 and 2010.

- States were more likely to emulate other states that were successful and that are like them politically and economically.

P2: Three camps within the national pre-k policy network that represent different strategies for pre-k advocacy interacted differently with different states, leading to different outcomes in terms of type and level of pre-k investment by 2010.

P3: The strength and cohesiveness of state early childhood policy communities interacted with the national network and components of it to influence success in scaling up programs.

- State early childhood communities that more successfully engaged both pre-k and child care advocates faced fewer internal obstacles to scaling up.

[70] They are also likely relevant in explaining why some states invest in programs while a minority has not, but only states with pre-k programs are explored in the case studies.
[71] The propositions incorporate points from the prior literature that lend themselves to qualitative exploration.

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Assessing these propositions requires the production of two closely related bodies of qualitative research. First, it is important to understand in greater detail the nature and reach of the national policy network. In particular, how did each component ï foundations, inter-governmental entities, and advocacy groups ï and its collective impact, affect statesô decisions regarding pre-k resources devoted to access, quality, and per-student spending? How was that impact similar across states, and what differential impact did it have on particular states that might explain some of the variations among them in type and levels of investment? How do the three camps fit into and interact with the larger network? Second, a set of state case studies explore the roles played in each state by policy entrepreneurs and state policy issue networks. This includes both the ability of those actors to connect to the national policy network and take advantage of its resources and their characteristics and level of cohesion. While agenda setting is explored as well, the main focus is on policy adaptation between 2001 and 2010.

Yin emphasizes that, in contrast to statistical analysis, one cannot use more cases to attain validity, but a minimum of two cases enables at least some exploration of how contrasting characteristics or actions in the different cases/units of analysis may have led to the differing outcomes. Ideally, multiple cases in each ñcellò would help to validate those findings, but limitations to research capacity limit this work to only a 2-by-2 set of cases, rather than a larger number that might replicate the results of each cell. The two states that saw the quality-access increase over the time period in question (Connecticut and Virginia), combined with two that did not (Arizona and Ohio), allow for the investigation of the role of entrepreneurs and the policy issue networks in two different ñgoodò contexts and two ñbadò contexts, or outcomes. A fuller study would likely employ three or more in each context in order to try to assess or control for the

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hat are inevitable when investigating an entity as large and complex as a state.

A second decision is the unit of analysis, and, within that decision, whether the case study will be ñholisticò or ñembedded.ò The research questions and propositions above point to the state as the unit of analysis; the state is the level at which decisions are made, and, thus, at which the influence of policy entrepreneurs and issue networks are relevant. At the same time, distinct sets of actors ï policy entrepreneurs; staff of the advocacy groups, foundations, and government agencies that form the state policy community with which they interact; and the national network members, emerge as relevant.[73] The state narratives can therefore be characterized as embedded: questions are posed to three sets of actors in each state that is the subject of study, as well as to organizational members of national-level actors, with the collective responses representing both sector-specific evidence and parts of the larger study.

The process for conducting these case studies entails several steps, each driving the next:[74] 1) using prior literature to identify key policy changes and the actors and organizations related to them; 2) developing questions and terms to guide both general and targeted searches; 3) producing initial descriptions of the national network and of each stateôs pre-k trajectory from enactment to 2010; 4) identifying individuals to interview; 5) using the first round of interviews to identify additional questions to pose and individuals to interview; and 6) using the information from

[72] A different option would be to select states in which particular entities were known to have been strong actors and to contrast the results of those influences, but, again, this research is limited as to how much it can explore. Also, as discussed, the chosen strategy can be seen as exploratory as well as explanatory. I.e., it may be that, among the four states chosen, the influence of the networks explored was not particularly different.

[73] These three categories often overlap, e.g. directors of state Voices affiliates who are members of both the state and national policy networks, or the policy entrepreneur who founds or leads the state advocacy organization.

[74] While the construction of the national network can be seen as an extension of the literature review, it began with several of the same steps: use of the literature review to identify key players and points in time, a general internet search that confirmed and clarified the role of organizations identified and added new ones, and surfacing individuals to interview. Only one person from three core organizations was interviewed, however, with information from individual case studies supplementing the understanding of the networkôs role in each.

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state narratives, check facts, and reduce risks of bias. In addition to incorporation of the information into analyses of major influences on pre-k investment in each state, the final section of chapter 5 addresses themes that run across states.

Having reviewed the literature, established research questions and propositions, and determined the unit of analysis, the next stage of case study design is preparation for data collection.

Searches

Construction of the national policy network information began with foundations and other organizations whose resources and assistance were identified in the literature review as likely contributors to state pre-k investments. Websites were explored for each foundation, inter-governmental organization, and early childhood advocacy group in order to determine the years and nature of the groupôs involvement, including broad versus state-specific influences, and to identify potential interviewees. Google searches using the terms ñpre-kò and ñprekindergartenò were conducted as well to identify relevant groups not previously discovered.

At the state level, NIEER and Pre-K Now information on each stateôs pre-k policy trajectory was used to construct a bullet-point timeline.[75] Google searches that employ the state name and key terms such as ñpre-k,ò ñprekindergarten,ò and/or ñearly educationò were then conducted for each state to begin to flesh out the timelines to construct narratives.[76] Websites of state foundations and other non-profit organizations that may have promoted pre-k investments in the specific state were explored. These searches produced information on the circumstances around enactment of pre-k in each state, as well as on the prior agenda-setting period and major

[75] Like the statistical analysis, this introduces the potential for bias, since both organizations are funded by Pew and have a specific perspective. Given the goal of establishing a rudimentary trajectory of major pre-k policy changes, however, with the exception of Arizona, which has no Pre-K Now profile, they provide equivalent cross-state information, which is then checked against news articles and interviews.

[76] See Appendix C, Data Protocol Shell, for lists of searches conducted, search terms used, documents filed, etc.

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onnecting those events to the funders and networks that influenced them. They also produce names of individuals who were involved at those various points and may connect them to one or more of the policy issue networks being investigated. Finally, a search was conducted of each stateôs newspaper of record, using the same types of search terms as the general search.[77] This was particularly important, since websites often had only more recent information, while most newspapers covered the entire period since adoption.

These searches begin to reinforce one another, as newspaper articles mention an event that was sponsored by a national or state foundation or legislative action referenced on a groupôs website. This signals that the documents available online have covered or described many, if not all, of the key events and individuals involved in the stateôs pre-k policy development. Based on the findings from the initial searches, additional targeted searches are conducted to look for:

- Foundation work on particular events or advocacy materials
- Information about specific individuals or groups, such as a policy advocateôs role in a ballot initiative process
- Information about the proposal, debate, and passage of specific legislation
- Documents, such as letters from an organization to a policy maker, a pamphlet or other campaign material, or a governorôs speech

With respect to Arizona, for example, initial searches repeatedly produced two names ï Janet Napolitano and Nadine (and Eddie) Basha. These led, in turn, to searches that included those names, and to a Wikipedia description of Governor Napolitano that suggested that her involvement with the National Governorsô Association did not focus on pre-k. As newspaper searches fleshed out the involvement of these key players, they began to focus on a few events, in particular a 2006

[77] For each state, the newspaper of record was that with the largest circulation, with the exception of Ohio. In Ohio, the newspaper of record, the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, has a search engine that is difficult to use and only goes back to 2005. The stateôs second-largest newspaper, the *Columbus Dispatch*, was thus searched to supplement the first search, and interviewees were asked about both papers with respect to the impact of media coverage. In all four cases, the paper used also was from one of the stateôs largest cities and had the most extensive online archive available. In Virginia, the *Richmond Times Dispatch* was also searched because it covers the state capitol, but articles are only available as far back as 2007.

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as that established First Things First, and the governorôs involvement in a Town Hall meeting that promoted quality pre-k.

First-stage analysis

Based on the above information, a preliminary timeline was created for each state that included key events from initial adoption of pre-k to the present. This timeline provides an initial review of each stateôs pre-k history, allowing for the following decisions:

1) *Should any of the four states be swapped for others?* (This would happen only if initial stages of the narrative work reveal the state to be an unanticipated outlier, so not representative, or because information on the state is so difficult to find that it is likely to be hard to conduct interviews (key actors are dead, interest groups defunct/out of business, etc.) None of the states posed these types of serious obstacles, and the original set of four has been retained.[78]
2) *What is the evidence around (a) policy entrepreneur*(s) *with respect pre-k policymaking?* Who should be interviewed? (the actor him/herself, an aide? Co-worker?)
3) *Which state early childhood advocacy group(s) have been the most influential?* Is the key player from the relevant period still available? If not, who should be interviewed?
4) *Which foundation(s)-funded networks most influenced pre-k adoption and/or adaptation in the state?*[79] Who at that organization most closely interacted with relevant state actor(s)? What was the nature of that interaction? (Timing and amount of grants? Visits to state? Networking events and other opportunities? Other technical assistance?) Is there a need for addition interviews with national foundation staff based on this information?
5) *Which inter-state policymaker organization(s)* (i.e., NGA, NCSL, or SREB), if any, *has most closely interacted with relevant state actor(s)*? What was the nature of that interaction? (Or, was the interaction similar across states, unlike that of foundations?)[80]
6) *Do the reviews point to a "neutral" expert/observer?* If so, the reporter or academic is to be interviewed for two purposes: to fill in holes in the stateôs pre-k history that emerge or remain after the above interviews, and to explain contradictions that arise among interviewees or between the first exploration and subsequent interviews.[81]

[78] Notwithstanding recession-era changes to their pre-k trajectories, Arizona, Connecticut, and Ohio remained relevant and appropriate for study.
[79] This question is relevant both to the case studies and to the national policy network narrative. State foundation leaders were interviewed in states in which their leadership on pre-k was influential, as was staff from Pre-K Now.
[80] Staff members from NGA and NCSL were also interviewed about their involvement at both levels.
[81] While at least one reporter was identified for each state, I was unable to obtain permission to interview any of them. The main threat this posed was the potential for advocates to overstate their personal or organizational influence on policymaking, which was largely alleviated by interviews with government officials in each state.

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ed from the above searches regarding their influence at key points in the pre-k policy process, a first set of interviewees was selected for each state, with at least one from each membership category of state policy issue network ï government aide, advocacy organization, and foundation ï as well as at least one individual policy entrepreneur. In Connecticut, for example, the majority of newspaper articles that covered pre-k policy referenced either the William Caspar Graustein Memorial Fund or its president, David Nee, suggesting his potential status as a policy entrepreneur (and his organization as a key member of the state network).

Based on the protocol suggested by Yin, the researcher first establishes a set of questions for which she requires answers to the questions posed by the propositions. These then form the basis for the more detailed and tailored questions developed for the state interviewees. In addition to the state-specific targets, several members of the national policy network who worked across multiple states were interviewed. These included staff at Pre-K Now and at both the National Governors Association and the National Conference of State Legislatures.[82] Figure 3.2, below, sets out the broad research questions on which questions for specific interviewees were based.

[82] At the time these interviews were conducted, interviews with BUILD and Birth-to-Five staff were not considered critical to the questions. Although it would have been helpful to have been able to add those individuals to the list of interviewees, state policy community members provided ample information regarding those networksô support in the state and their interactions with members of the state networks.

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rame for Questions for Interviewees

ces from the national pre-k policy network played a role in promoting pre-k in STATE?

a. National-level foundation strategies ï Pre-K Now, BUILD, Birth-to-Five, SPARK, SRII?
b. Interstate policymaker organizations ï NGA, NCSL, SREB, others?
c. National-level early childhood advocacy group(s) ï Voices, NAEYC, CDF, others?
d. Nature of influence ï research, advocacy materials, other?
e. Part of the policy process ï agenda-setting, enactment, later?

2) *How have policy entrepreneurs and issue networks played a role in promoting pre-k?*

a. Influential individuals
b. Characteristics of policy issue network
c. Connections to national policy network
d. Impacts at different parts of the policy process ï agenda-setting, enactment, later?

Based on the above broad research questions, more detailed questions were developed for interviewees, tailored both to the type of individual ï e.g., governorôs aide, director of early childhood advocacy group, foundation head, staffer of inter-state policymaker organization ï and to the stateôs circumstances and history.[83] Interviews included requests for individuals to talk to who might not have surfaced in the above search for state information; these formed a second round of interviews and allowed for follow-up to questions raised in the first round.[84]

Interview Analysis and Case Study Compilation

Notes from each interview were reviewed and typed up following the phone call, in order to categorize responses into relevant clusters: key policy changes between enactment and 2010; influence of individuals, national networks, and internal/state policy issue network at each point; basis for and nature of opposition; influences from research and media; and other people to talk to or organizations to research. This allowed for consistent assessment of information across

[83] These are available in Appendix C as part of the Case Studies Protocol.
[84] Appendix C also lists individuals interviewed and notes how they were identified and the category they represent.

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clarification.[85] As new information was incorporated into the state narrative, points of conflict among interviewees or between news articles and a personôs opinion, were noted so that they could be explored further. Additional individuals identified as critical to the pre-k policymaking process were interviewed in a second round, helping to answer questions and resolve conflicts. For example, a few Connecticut interviewees criticized state education commissioner Ted Sergiôs request for a smaller-than-anticipated increase for pre-k funding, painting it as a missed opportunity to expand the program; a discussion with Sergi helped clarify his perspective on and reasons for the decision, and both viewpoints are presented.

All of the information gathered from the literature review, internet and newspaper searches, interviews, and from materials provided by interviewees and others was synthesized to produce individual case studies as well as an analysis of trends cutting across two or more of the states. These are written up in chapter 5, with chapter 6 assessing the intersection between these factors and those explored in the statistical analysis and setting out policy implications and suggestions for future research.

[85] As per research protocol, each interviewee was provided a copy of the notes and asked to correct any inaccuracies, provide any additional relevant information, and confirm that the material could be used for the case studies. In a few cases, interviewees asked that some of what they said be used anonymously. Two researchers failed to respond to repeated requests for confirmation, so their responses are incorporated anonymously.

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Introduction

State investment in pre-k programs grew substantially as the policy disseminated across most states between 1980 and 2000 (only 3 states funded programs in 1980, 37 had adopted one by 2000). Investment in pre-k programs has continued after 2000, but in ways that suggest a more mature stage of policymaking. While pre-2000 investments consisted largely of the adoption of new programs and their expansion to serve more children, this recent decade has seen states consider quality and various aspects of it in serious ways. At the start of that decade, a national pre-k policy network began to emerge, with a range of early childhood advocacy groups and philanthropic foundations building upon the brain development, early childhood, and economic literature highlighting the effectiveness of state investment in pre-k. All network member organizations advanced state efforts to provide quality programs for children. However, two camps evolved that can be seen as representing different strategies for enhancing state pre-k services. One, led by Pre-K Now, has promoted a more limited version, targeted heavily at three- and four-year-olds and focused largely on childrenôs cognitive development through classroom-based programs. The second, a more comprehensive strategy, is represented by both the Birth-to-Five Policy Alliance and the BUILD initiative.

The statistical analyses discussed below were designed to test the hypothesis that influence and resources of these network efforts led states to pursue different patterns of investment, in terms of access to and quality of pre-k programs during this decade. None of the statistical analyses shed much light on the influences of either of the two major pre-k strategy approaches, though they do suggest a negative association between a middle-ground strategy and pre-k investments, the explanations for which are discussed below.

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ic illustration of the trajectory of pre-k levels of access and quality from the start of the decade being studied (2001-02) to its end (2009-10). It frames the statistical analysis with a brief summary of the results of the bivariate analysis, including assessment of the potential overlap among the three pre-k advocacy ñstrategies.ò It then presents and discusses the results of multivariate analyses, as well as a set of sensitivity analyses examining the robustness of these findings.

Figure 4.1: Average increases in pre-k access and program quality, 2001-2010



As noted in chapter 1 and discussed in the description of the summary statistics, both average access and program quality increased substantially between the 2001-02 and 2009-10 school years. Indeed, this graphic presents a clear illustration of the overall pattern of ñscaling upò that prompts the questions about influences explored in this research. From baseline levels of thirteen percent enrollment of 4-year-olds (access measure) in 2001 and five out of ten NIEER benchmarks met (quality measure) in 2001, both measures of pre-k investment grew by roughly 50% over the decade. Access nearly doubled, to 25 percent, while quality increased by forty percent to just over seven of ten benchmarks met by 2010.

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s also helpful to look at the potential impact of the Great Recession that hit states between 2007-08 and 2009-10. The two slopes above illustrate an interesting difference between the two measures of pre-k investment before and during this period; while access continued to increase increased fairly consistently through the years of the recession, quality appears to hit a plateau after the 2006-07 school year. Indeed, the data show that average quality reached 6.9 of ten points by that year, so it increased only 0.3 points, or one tenth of a point per year, the following three years of the recession. This pattern and potential explanations for it are explored in both the quantitative analysis below and as part of the chapter 5 discussion of the case study results.

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he full set of factors, and particularly the three ñnetworkò variables, on the two pre-k outcome measures in 2009-2010, bivariate analyses were run of the entire set of variables. This analysis was helpful in illustrating the independent relationships between the two outcome measures and each of the theorized drivers, not controlling for the others. Table 4.1 presents the results of these analyses.

Table 4.1: Correlations between Independent and Dependent Variables, 2009-10

	Access0910	**Quality0910**
Access (4-year-olds enrolled), 2009-10	1	0.062
Pre-K Now strategy	0.179	0.061
BUILD/Birth-to-Five strategy	-0.046	-0.059
SRII/SPARK strategy	-0.273	-0.497***
Year program was enacted	-0.441***	0.324**
Program Quality 2001-02	0.172	0.603***
Access (4-year-olds enrolled), 2001-02	0.724***	0.089
% Head Start Supplement 2001-02	-0.18	-0.038
Average Per Capita Income 2001-07	-0.238	-0.137
Average Public Ideology 2001-07	-0.08	-0.24
Average Institutional Ideology 2001-07	0.046	0.279*
South (dummy)	0.143	0.163

Note: N=36 for quality and 37 for access. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

These correlations reveal that few of the hypothesized factors were significantly associated with either the measure of pre-k access or with program quality. Indeed, the two major networks, as represented by Pre-K Now and the BUILD/Birth-to-Five policy alliance, had no discernible relationship to either quality or percentage of children served in pre-k programs. Interestingly, the

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e that has had much less prominence in the early child community, is strongly and negatively related to pre-k quality (r=-.497, p<.01). (It is also negatively associated with program access in both of those years, but not significantly so.)

One measure of initial state pre-k policy, the year of program adoption/enactment, is also strongly correlated with state policy in 2010, although, interestingly, the direction of this correlation varies for access versus quality. The negative correlation between year of enactment and access (r=.441, p<.01) indicates that the earlier the program was put in place, the higher the level of access. In contrast, year of enactment is positively correlated with program quality in 2010 (r=.324, p<.10) suggesting that it is states that adopted pre-k later who have programs with higher standards of quality. This might reflect more ñlearningò among later adopters, such that they enacted programs with higher or more stringent quality requirements already in place, and/or that, due to the relative newness of their programs, they were more adaptable in the post-2000 era of adaptation and enhancement. It could also represent the related reality that several of the early adopters, in particular New York, California, and Texas, had programs so large that persuading policymakers to invest the substantial sums that would be required to improve quality (without serving more children) was politically very difficult.[86]

The strongest predictors of state pre-k program quality and access are, as was expected, a second measure that controls for prior decisions, their earlier status and pre-k policies. Levels of access and quality at the start of the decade are strongly positively related to their levels at the end (r=.724, p<.01 for access; r=.603, p<.01 for quality). State supplements to Head Start, the third variable used to control for earlier pre-k policy decisions, had no apparent impact on pre-k investments during the decade studied. As discussed more fully in the analysis of the regression

[86] Indeed, in 2009, the Texas advocacy and business communities worked together to channel $25 million that had been appropriated for the stateôs pre-k program to improving quality, but Governor Rick Perry vetoed that provision.

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ily contradict Karchôs findings regarding the influence of the Head Start community on state pre-k investment decisions.

Neither of the usual suspects ï state economic capacity, as captured by per capita income, nor political ideology, represented by both public and institutional liberalism ï has any real influence. The exception is a marginally significant positive association between institutional liberalism and the quality measure. The same is generally true regarding the South dummy, which also serves as a proxy for political culture; regional status seems not to have influenced pre-k policy decisions. The one exception is the significant positive relationship between Southern states and program quality in 2006-07, the year before the recession, but not in 2009-10, after many of the cuts to pre-k programs had taken place. This might support the premise that Southern states have been leaders in quality, but that, given their more precarious economic conditions, they are among the first to reduce that quality/level of investment in periods of fiscal stress.

Correlations were also run to detect potential threats to the modelôs validity posed by multicollinearity among the independent variables. None appears to pose threats, so they are not listed in the table. Of the stronger associations, the only one that stands out is that between average per capita income and average ideology (both public and institutional), with positive links, as expected, in the range of 0.5. There is also an interesting negative South-BUILD relationship, which is statistically significant at -0.4. The most problematic finding would be a strong correlation between two or more of the three networks, as this might confound the results. This did not happen, however; the correlation results show none of the three relationships even approaching significance, with the middle-ground strategy very slightly negatively associated with both of the other two. In addition to testing the relationships between the two outcome measures and the independent variables, correlations indicate relationships between the two outcome measures.

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ationships between quality and access in both 2001-02 (r=0.293, p <.10) and 2009-10 (r=0.062), though the latter association is not significant. This result, along with the graphic illustration of average increase in both measures depicted in Figure 4.1, suggest that the ñtrade offò seen in most public policies that normally prevents their successful ñscaling upò appears not to be true of pre-k programs.

Only when the various factors of interest are considered together, however, can a fuller picture be understood. The next section of the chapter thus presents and discusses the results of the regressions testing the relative influence of these factors.

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ments of the factors associated with state policy efforts to expand access and/or quality between 2001 and 2010. Table 4.2 presents the results of the equation regressing the percentage of four-year-olds enrolled in 2010 (measure of access) and number of the ten NIEER benchmarks met (quality) on the independent variables.

Table 4.2: OLS Regression, Change in Pre-K Access and Quality 2001-02 to 2009-10

Independent Variable	Access 2009-10	Standard Error	Quality 2009-10	Standard Error
Pre-K Now	0.919	2.865	0.185	0.307
SRII/SPARK	-3.358	3.362	-1.201**	0.380
BUILD/Birth-to-5	-2.153	3.998	-0.016	0.428
Year enacted	-0.204	0.308	0.080**	0.029
Access 01-02	0.919***	0.185	N/A	N/A
Quality 01-02	N/A	N/A	0.286**	0.127
% HS Supp01	-0.025	0.021	0.002	0.002
Avg income 2001-07	-1.15*	0.001	0.077	0.059
Avg pub ideol 01-07	0.201	0.262	-0.071**	0.028
Avg inst ideol 01-07	0.224	0.269	0.095***	0.031
South	-2.552	6.225	-0.012	0.655
Constant	436.106	614.865	-156.535***	57.687
N	37		36	
R2	0.671		0.708	
Error (Residual PV)	25.22		7.19	

NOTE: Per capita income measured in thousands of dollars. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

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of the OLS regression model assessing the relationship between state policy change and participation in each of the three national pre-k networks. As discussed earlier, Pre-K Now represents the most limited or targeted of the three approaches, with a focus on increasing access to quality pre-k, defined as meeting specific benchmarks and serving four-year-olds. At the other end of the advocacy strategy spectrum, the BUILD/Birth-to-5 strategy has engaged in a broader campaign to implement a range of education, health and developmental services for children from birth to kindergarten. The third strategy, represented by the SRII and SPARK initiatives, can be seen as falling in between.

Since these models control for state policy in 2001, the coefficients represent the expected change in access (percentage of state four-year-olds enrolled in state pre-k program) and quality (number of ten NIEER benchmarks reported to have been met) associated with each of the variables of interest. As the results demonstrate, none of the three advocacy strategy networks appears to have influenced the percentage of young children served in the state's pre-k program, and only the less substantial network is associated with program quality. None of the three coefficients even came close to statistical significance as associated with access (with an N of only 37, a marginally significant coefficient might have been considered important). Moreover, two of the three strategies have a negative sign attached to the coefficient in the equations testing both access and quality. In other words, states that participated in the Pre-K Now or BUILD initiatives were no more likely than non-participants to increase either access to or the quality of their state's pre-k program during this decade.

The exception is the middle ground approach, which is associated with a negative change in program quality during this decade. Specifically, a state that participated in one of the two initiatives (SRII and SPARK), could be expected to see the quality of its pre-k program drop by

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ECR scale, while membership in both is associated with a reduction of over two points.

The analysis also takes into account statesô earlier decisions around pre-k, as represented by the variables capturing the levels of pre-k access and program quality in 2001-02 (which also capture other state-level factors that are not separately measured in the regression). It is not surprising that this is the strongest predictor of the 2009-2010 level of access; each additional percentage of four-year-olds enrolled in the stateôs program at the start of the decade translates into almost an added percentage at the end of it (b=.92, p<.001). While quality status at the start of the decade is also positively associated with change in quality over that period, however, it is neither as strongly significant nor as robust. Each additional quality point at the start of the decade translates to one third of a point higher at the end of it. This differential impact on access versus quality suggests support for the premise that decade studied represents a particularly important period for enhancement of state pre-k with respect to quality, more so than for access.

As the regression results show, however, earlier program enactment is no longer significantly associated with increased access.[88] Perhaps the level of access at the start of the decade suppressed this factor, rendering it insignificant in the multivariate model. In contrast, earlier adoption remains negatively associated with change in program quality. (Again, note that the construction of the variable makes necessary some interpretation; a ñsmallerò adoption year means that the program has been in existence for more years.) Each additional year the state has had a program in place, then, is associated with a decrease in quality between 2001 and 2010 of

[87] Only three states, Arizona, Connecticut, and Ohio, participated in both initiatives, and all three were case study subjects, so those influences are discussed in chapter 5. This also suggests a possible outlier effect, as Arizona and Ohio had the most substantial reductions in quality over that decade of any states in the country.

[88] Note that the variable is year of program enactment, and not number of years program has been in existence, which can lead to an impression of inverted results. The negative correlation between an earlier year of adoption and access is the equivalent of a positive correlation between more years in existence and program access.

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at, all other factors held constant, a state that enacted its program in 1980 would have a program that was lower in quality by nearly one point compared to a pre-k program that was enacted in 1990. Given that the vast majority of programs were enacted between 1980 and 2000, this indicates a maximum impact of roughly two out of ten possible quality points, a substantial difference.[89]

This analysis also tests the degree to which a stateôs decision to devote a portion of its early childhood spending to expand Head Start (rather than invest it in the state pre-K program) affects changes that pre-k programôs levels of access and quality during this decade. No such relationship is found, which could be seen as a contrast to Karchôs finding of a strong impact of state Head Start communities on pre-k investment. However, this finding likely reflects the different questions posed regarding Head Start. Karch explored the influence of a stateôs Head Start community on that stateôs decision to enact a freestanding pre-k program, while this research looks only at states that already fund programs. Given that difference, we would expect to see a different outcome. Based on these results, it seems that while, as Karch found, Head Start impedes the adoption of free-standing pre-k programs, once a state has decided to fund a program, Head Start may have little influence on subsequent investment decisions. With respect to which states are and are not included in this analysis, Karchôs findings may shed light on why Mississippi stands out among Southern states for its lack of a pre-k program; the state has invested substantially in Head Start.

State economic capacity also appears to affect pre-k investment, but not in the direction theorized. The negative association between state wealth and change in program access suggests that it was poorer states that were more likely to increase the percentage of children served in pre-k programs during this decade. In fact, for every $1,000 difference in state wealth, a poorer state is

[89] Moreover, in 2009-10, the lowest recorded quality rankings were 2 in Ohio and 3 in Arizona, making the real range even smaller and the relative potential impact greater.

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ntage-point greater access to four-year years. A $10,000 increase, then, which is the difference between the state with the lowest average income between 2001 and 2007 and the median-income state, would reduce the percentage of children served in pre-k from one third to close to one fifth. This finding is in conflict with much prior research, which finds state wealth or related measures to promote increased policy investments, including in state pre-k programs. One possibility is that, while economic capacity generally does have a positive relationship with pre-k investment, once controlled for through the level of access at the start of the decade, it was no longer a positive factor. In other words, this model captures change rather than level of investment. While this could explain a neutral relationship, however, it does not explain the negative association seen here. Another potential explanation is that a group of states with less wealth yet substantial increases in investment during these ten years have skewed the results; this is explored below in the regression that tests only non-Southern states. Note, too, that economic capacity has no discernible influence on change in program quality.

Finally, the level of state ideology has no discernable influence on change in access, whether measured by public opinion or institutional ideology (the latter also incorporates state partisan control). This runs counter to substantial prior research and is not true when only the pre-recession years of 2001-2007 are tested (see Table 4.3, below). However, both public and institutional ideology measures are associated with changes in pre-k program quality over the past decade, each in a different direction. A one-point increase in the Berry *et al* measure of public opinion liberalism is linked to a decrease in pre-k program quality of nearly one tenth of a point, so that an increase of about 25 points, from the least liberal pre-k state (Oklahoma, which has a score of 29) to the median state (Wisconsin, 56), translates to a decrease of 1.75, or nearly two points. When controlling for public opinion liberalism, ideology and partisan control of the stateôs

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ndent and almost exactly opposite relationship with change in program quality, each one-point increase in government liberalism is associated with an increase of one-tenth of a point between 2001 and 2010 in quality. This is an interesting finding, given the lack of significance of these relationships in the bivariate analysis; they suggest that perhaps the influence of politics and/or ideology is mediated by other factors. Rigbyôs findings regarding the impact of party control on more visible, less coercive tools, such as pre-k grants-in-aid, suggest ñless sensitiv[ity] to the political context of a stateò (Rigby 2007), however, so they explain neither the significant results found here nor the differential directions of the two measures.

The results presented in Table 4.2 suggest that the three hypothesized pre-k advocacy network strategies have had little influence on changes in either access or quality levels over the decade between 2001 and 2010, during which time state pre-k programs saw substantial average increases in both of those measures. It was theorized that a more targeted approach focused narrowly on that type of increase might have the greatest impact but, as captured by the intensity of Pre-K Now engagement with a state, that appears not to be the case. Nor was the alternative BUILD approach, which focused on the ñwhole childò and emphasized the importance of infants and toddlers as well as preschoolers, associated with a smaller change in pre-k quality or access as compared either the more targeted strategy or a different one. Also unexpected and difficult to interpret is the finding that support from the two less intensive and middle-ground approaches, the School Readiness Indicators Initiative and the SPARK initiative, was associated with a decrease in pre-k program quality, though not access, during the decade studied.

In all three cases, it is important to keep in mind the interaction between existing state pre-k programs and networksô perceptions regarding capacity for investment and those networksô decisions to engage in and support state efforts. For example, Pre-K Now could have perceived

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ccessful campaign, and then seen economic, political, or other obstacles to success and left the state. The variable would remain a 2, or intensive, but the perceived influence on quality would then be negative. Alternatively, BUILD or SRII could be drawn to work in a state due to perceived higher need, which could mean greater obstacles to success in that state, despite the network support. This type of nuance in the engagement of networks with states is better explored and understood through case studies, so findings on this are discussed in chapter 5 below.

The impact of earlier state pre-k policy choices on changes in pre-k programs between 2001 and 2010 also varies by specific decision and investment type. The year of enactment, for example, is negatively associated with change over the decade in program quality, but not with change in the level of access. In general, this means that the early adopter states were no more likely to increase access during the 2000s (possibly because they already did so in the previous decade), but they were less likely to expand quality during this decade. In contrast, more recent adopters were those most likely to take policy action to expand quality during this time period. State pre-k quality and access at the start of the decade were both strongly associated with the level of change during the subsequent ten years. This likely reflects statesô generally consistent priorities for pre-k, as well as the consistency of other state characteristics that contributed to the earlier policy choices.

A stateôs decision at the start of the decade to devote a portion of its early childhood resources to Head Start did not turn out to affect either access or quality. As noted above, however, this could be a factor of the exclusion from this analysis of states with no pre-k program; to the extent that, as Karch found, the Head Start constituency has succeeded in either delaying or

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-alone pre-k program, these data do not address that phenomenon.

Additional analyses conducted to flesh out some of these question and to confirm the robustness of the above findings are presented here.

Sensitivity Analysis

Differences across the time studied

The above results present questions as to other potential explanations for the outcomes. For example, the Great Recession that began to affect state budgets in fiscal year 2007-08 led several states to make cuts to their pre-k programs. It is possible, then, that factors driving and/or limiting changes in level of access or in program quality differed in the last few years of the decade, compared to the first seven. In particular, it network advocacy efforts may have been more important during that period, when they were most mature and when state advocates most needed the financial and technical support they provided.

In order to assess this question, separate regressions were run for the years from 2001 to 2006 and from 2007 through 2010. As the results in Table 4.3 show, however, there seems to have been little difference between the two periods in the impact of the factors tested.

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Pre-K Access and Quality, 2001-2002 to 2006-07

Independent Variable	Access 2006-07	Standard Error	Quality 2006-07	Standard Error
Pre-K Now	1.347	1.842	-0.095	0.266
SRII/SPARK	-1.063	2.162	-0.785**	0.330
BUILD/Birth-to-5	-1.751	2.571	0.207	0.371
Year enacted	0.031	0.198	0.052*	0.025
Access01	1.125***	0.119	N/A	N/A
Quality01	N/A	N/A	0.537***	0.110
% HS Supp01	-0.019	0.014	-0.000	0.002
Average income 01-07	-0.793**		-0.036	0.052
Avg pub ideol 01-07	0.303*	0.168	-0.004	0.024
Avg inst ideol 01-07	0.126	0.173	0.034	0.027
South	0.979	4.003	0.928	0.569
Constant	-54.304	395.378	-.98.916	
N	37		36	
R2	0.846		0.751	
Error (Residual PV)	19.81		6.86	

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

The theorized potential for policy networks to be particularly helpful in that context appears not to be the case. None of the three pre-k advocacy strategy networks has a particular influence in one or the other of the eras that differs from its influence in the full-decade equation. In the earlier years of the decade as is true over all of it, only the middle-ground approach is negatively associated with a change in quality.

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le difference between the first part of the decade and the later recession years in the influence of early pre-k policy decisions on subsequent change. Earlier program adoption is significantly associated with a negative change in quality through 2006-07, but not with access. And status at the start of the decade remains the variable most strongly related to program access pre-recession. It is perhaps worth noting that the associations are even stronger between 2001-02 and pre-k outcomes in the year prior to the Great Recession, 2006-07 (1.125, $p<.001$ for access and 0.537, $p<.001$ for quality), than those for the full decade, (0.919, $p<.001$ and 0.289, $p<.05$, respectively). This could be seen as a sign that the cuts to pre-k programs that rolled out differently across states hit quality harder than access, on average.

One state characteristic that might logically have differed in its impact on pre-k policy decisions between the earlier part of the decade and the recession years was economic capacity. As was true when the entire decade was tested, however, average per capita income is associated positively with change in access and negatively with change in program quality, though the significance of the relationships flipped. In the pre-recession period, the association with access became significant, while the link to quality lost its significance. Only in this period, however, does public ideology have an impact on the change percentage of four-year-olds served in the stateôs pre-k program. In neither the latter years of the decade, during the recession, nor in the first regression above that encompasses the entire decade, does public progressiveness have an impact on change in level of pre-k access.[90] Conversely, during this period, ideology is not significantly associated with change in program quality. Over the decade as a whole, public opinion liberalism is significantly negatively linked, which these results suggest is due to its negative influence during the last few years of the decade, during the recession. Institutional liberalism during this earlier

[90] Institutional ideology ï the measured progressiveness of the state legislature and governor ï has no affect on program access at any point in the decade.

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uence on the quality of pre-k programs at the end of the decade, while it was significantly positive associated with increased program quality over the entire decade. This pattern suggests the influence of ideology during the recession but not earlier, which is explored in four of the pre-k states through the case studies.

Finally, while the relationship between being a Southern state and change in quality is negative and insignificant over the decade as a whole, the opposite is true for all years but the recession. As these results indicate, the South dummy is positively associated with change in quality from 2006 to 2007, and though not quite significant, the confidence level is 89%.

In general, then, there is relatively little difference between the two parts of the decade in the influence of the various factors tested on change in level of pre-k investment, although these results do suggest some impacts of the recession on pre-k policymaking that are also visible in the line graphs illustrating trajectories of access and quality increases through the decade.

Perhaps most important, the two pre-k advocacy strategy networks that were operating at their height during the great recession show no evidence of having helped states maintain or increase childrenôs access to pre-k programs nor the quality of those programs during the budgetary downturn between 2007 and 2010. There also seems to be some change in enhancements to quality versus access between the two periods in this decade. The other noteworthy result is the seemingly different influence on pre-k change pre-recession and during it of ideology, as captured both by Berry *et al* measures of public and institutional opinion liberalism and by the South dummy, which also proxies fairly well for state political culture.

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A second issue to explore is that of the potential interaction between the middle-of-the-road strategy and that of the other two network approaches. The results of the correlations do not suggest any concerns regarding multicollinearity; Pre-K Now is very slightly negatively associated with the SRII variable at -0.073, versus a slightly positive correlation of 0.208 with the BUILD/Birth-to-Five network, with which it is contrasted theoretically. The latter strategic network is also very slightly and negatively associated with the middle-of-the-road strategy, at -0.059. None of the relationships is even close to statistically significant.

Regressions that test the association of the two main advocacy strategies with change in pre-k access and change, omitting SRII, confirm that the seeming lack of impact of those strategies that is depicted in the full regression findings in Table 4.3 is not due to any relationship among the three networks. Whether access or quality is employed as the outcome variable, the results of the regression that omits the SRII variable are nearly identical to the regressions that include it.

Omitting all of the network variables has much the same impact; two of the variables that are associated with change in access level are slightly strengthened, while one factor linked with quality becomes slightly weaker, but overall, there are no substantial differences (see Table 4.4.). These collective results affirm the overall lack of any impact of the network strategies, as captured quantitatively, on changes in pre-k investments between 2001 and 2007.

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Pre-K Access and Quality, 2001-2002 to 2006-07, Network

Independent Variable	Access 2006--7	Standard Error	Quality 2006-07	Standard Error
Year enacted	0.028	0.174	0.036	0.024
% HS Supp01	-0.022*	0.012	0.000	0.002
Access01	1.120***	0.115	N/A	N/A
Quality01	N/A	N/A	0.626***	0.110
Avg income 01-07	-0.903***	0.327	-0.042	0.052
Avg pub ideol 01-07	0.315**	0.155	-0.010	0.025
Avg inst ideol 01-07	0.153	0.162	0.035	0.028
South	2.501	3.497	0.843	0.541
Constant	-46.009	347.596	-67.088	46.894
N	37		36	
R2	0.838		0.690	
Error (Residual PV)	19.81		6.86	

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Differential Impacts by Region

A final test is whether results of the multivariate analysis might vary when only non-Southern states are tested. As the results presented below in Table 4.5 show, the results are nearly identical to those in Table 4.2, which presents parallel results for all states.

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Pre-K Access and Quality, non-Southern states only, 2001-

Independent Variable	Access 2006-07	Standard Error	Quality 2006-07	Standard Error
Pre-K Now	1.007	1.842	-0.011	0.300
SRII/SPARK	-0.773	2.162	-0.955**	0.394
BUILD/Birth-to-5	-1.370	2.571	0.093	0.404
Year enacted	0.135	0.198	0.044	0.029
Access01	1.241***	0.119	N/A	N/A
Quality01	N/A	N/A	0.481***	0.138
% HS Supp01	-0.018	0.014	0.000	0.002
Average income 01-07	-0.875**		-0.017	0.058
Avg pub ideol 01-07	0.327*	0.168	-0.001	0.024
Avg inst ideol 01-07	0.113	0.173	0.018	0.039
South	0.979	4.003	0.928	0.569
Constant	-260.163	395.378	-.83.172	
N	30		30	
R2	0.829		0.700	
Error (Residual PV)	18.07		6.60	

* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

With access as the dependent variable, the outcomes are quite similar to those for all pre-k states. Aside from the foundational levels of access and quality in 2001-02, which are highly statistically associated with change in access level and program quality, respectively, at the end of the decade, only two variables are significantly associated with access level: average per capita income is significant, and, as is true across all states, it has a negative coefficient, and public ideology is positively related. All variables have the same signs as in the larger equation, and there

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n only non-Southern states are included, year of enactment no longer is associated with program quality.

Discussion

In general, the statistical analyses fail to support the main hypothesis that connection to one or the other of the main national pre-k strategy networks helped promote state increases in access and quality during the years between 2000 and 2010. The regression results depict a lack of any association between either of the main two network approaches and change in either pre-k access or quality, whether prior to or during the recession. The only significant relationship with a network is that between the ñmiddle groundò network, comprised of the SRII and SPARK initiatives, and change in program quality, and it is negative. While this negative association could be interpreted as mild support for the hypothesized positive network influence if middle-ground engagement were at the exclusion of support from main networks, the data demonstrate that states did not choose among the three strategic alternatives. A few states engaged with all three, others with just one or the other of the two main approaches or with the middle ground, but no state with a pre-k program failed to receive support from at least one. Moreover, as the case studies illustrate, statesô participation in the two shorter-lived programs, SPARK and SRII, had little apparent influence on their pre-k policy decision-making.

What explains this result? It could be that the efforts of Pre-K Now, BUILD, and Birth-to-Five served more to elevate the national visibility of pre-k than to prompt change in the particular states in which they worked intensively, as was suggested by a few interviewees from national organizations. While there is no question that advocacy organizations consistently claim more credit for their role in policy change than they may deserve, it seems unlikely that their decade-long intensive efforts and tens, perhaps hundreds, of millions of dollars of support for state groups

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More plausible is the difficulty of creating a quantitative measure that captures the important aspects of networksô engagement. In addition, other state factors may have interacted with the efforts of the national networks to produce results that varied greatly from state to state, even with similar inputs from the network end, obscuring patterns in the regression results.

It might also be that the national pre-k policy network was more of an interconnected entity than is represented here, or that key players are missing. For example, like the foundation-based efforts captured here, the National Governorsô Association and National Council of State Legislatures both worked at the state-specific as well as national levels. State gubernatorial summits that likely spurred state action and may have worked in tandem with foundation efforts are also not included in the quantitative analysis. For all of these reasons, case studies can much better capture the nuances of the interactions between state early childhood policy communities and the national pre-k networks that worked with them to promote scaled-up programs. Other regression results also shed some light on how various factors seemed to have played out over this decade.

The influence of diffusion mechanisms, including state-to-state learning, on quality in particular, is potentially apparent in the significant relationship between year of enactment and change in quality over the decade studied. While earlier adoption had no visible impact on change in access between 2001 and 2010, once other variables were controlled for, early adoption was associated with substantially reduced change in quality, both in isolation and when other factors are taken into account. These results suggest that perhaps the investments in quality associated with the post-2000 stage of pre-k policy enhancements were more difficult for states with long-standing programs, possibly because of their larger programs. It could also reflect higher initial

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rs, thanks to the more sophisticated evidence available regarding the importance of quality, including from other states, at the time they structured their pre-k legislation.

Other patterns also emerge from these results. Even when controlling for level of access at the start of the decade, higher state wealth is associated with a smaller increase in this decade in the percentage of four-year-olds enrolled in the stateôs pre-k program. Poorer states were those more likely to increase access, with each $1,000 less in income translated into a percentage point increase in access. This unexpected result suggests that, while higher economic capacity is generally a strong driver of state policy investment, that relationship may be less true for pre-k, perhaps because necessary state investment is much less substantial than it is in other childrenôs programs, such as K-12 public education or health care. This explanation would not explain the significant negative relationship, however.

It may also be that, while even pre-k is generally subject to some economic capacity limitations, this decade was qualitatively different. Perhaps state-to-state learning about the importance of pre-k overcame obstacles posed by low economic capacity in some states. Heavy investment among Southern states during this decade, despite their low average per capita levels and relatively high rates of poverty, provides support for this explanation, though the lack of a coefficient for the South variable suggests that income level, and not the other cultural characteristics particular to Southern states, drive this relationship. The apparent lack of influence of any of the national pre-k networks fails to indicate how the state-to-state learning might have occurred, but, as discussed, this may reflect difficulty in capturing network influence quantitatively. Finally, the lack of a parallel positive relationship between state wealth and change

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d to indicate that, given fiscal restraints, states are more likely to invest in serving more children than in increasing the quality of their programs.

The results of the sensitivity analysis provide another possible explanation. They show that, in the years prior to the recession, access was not negatively, but positively associated with state wealth. This means that the associations of three recession years counter this result with a strong negative association (driving the overall negative association found in the full regression). In other words, in normal fiscal situations, greater economic capacity has the expected positive relationship with pre-k investment. When budgets are strained, however, states tend to pull back substantially.

Economic factors seem to have in turn mediated the influence of political factors on changes in pre-k investment over the decade. The full-decade regression results indicate that ideology was related to changes in quality, but not in access: A higher degree of public opinion liberalism is linked to less change in quality, while more institutional liberalism is associated at roughly the same level with a larger increase in quality. This could be interpreted to mean that access increases more or less automatically ï once the pre-k program is in place, it can be expected to expand at some rate, irrespective of a stateôs characteristics. Stories from individual states about their hard work to expand access, however, run counter to this explanation. A slightly different but related explanation is that the focus in this decade on program enhancement as represented by the quality measure made access less of a target than it had been in prior years. If states, and the policy advocacy networks working with them, were aiming for increases in teacher qualifications, curriculum, staff ratios, services, and parent engagement, then the analyses would reflect less the influence of state factors on access. The correlation results shed relatively little light on this question; while positive correlations between measures of access and quality in both years indicate

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, as political theory often finds to be the case when policies move to scale, the associations are weak enough that no link in approaches is evident.

However, the results of the sensitivity analysis suggest that it was the Great Recession that actually explains these results (and paints a quite different story). When only the early years of the decade, 2001-2007, are tested, liberalism has no relationship with change in quality, so it must be the recession period that accounts for this association. Conversely, change in access is significantly positively related to public opinion liberalism in this period, whereas no such link is seen over the decade as a whole. One logical interpretation of these findings the recession spurred residents with progressive leanings to increase access in ways that they had not in the years prior, while it shut down the positive influence of liberalism on increases in quality. Perhaps severe fiscal restraint led states to decide that their very limited dollars had to be spent subsidizing the enrollment of more children, while higher quality was seen as a luxury. This explanation is strongly supported by the graphic illustrations of the trajectories of average pre-k access and program quality over the decade; as noted above, access continues to grow at a steady pace through the recession years, while program quality, which had been increasing consistently and substantially, slows virtually to a halt and does not pick up.

Differential associations among Southern states between the two time periods also suggest the recessionôs influence through political factors. While overall results suggest a negative and non-significant relationship between regional status and change in pre-k investment, the sensitivity analysis reveals that relationship to be positively and nearly significant until 2006-07. In other words, in the years in which their fiscal circumstances were more stable, Southern states were more likely to enhance program quality, other factors being equal. This also accords with the

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ght invest more in access in general, but not necessarily during periods of fiscal constraint.

Overall, the different ways in which both economic and political variables play out across time periods and groups of states suggest that they may be mediated by other factors. These potential interactions are explored in the case studies and discussed in depth in chapter 6. The most surprising finding among the regression results is the lack of any association between the policy advocacy networks and program enhancement, other than the negative link between the limited middle-of-the-road strategy network and program quality. Chapter 5 depicts the range of experiences with these networks across the four states studied and draws out patterns among them. The discussion in chapter 6 then builds on possible explanations suggested here for the difference in apparent influence of the pre-k network between the quantitative and qualitative analyses. It also fleshes out potential influences of some of the other factors tested in the quantitative analyses, concluding with implications for future research and policymaking.

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As discussed in chapter 4, the statistical analysis yields only limited explanation for the major differences among states in enhancing levels of pre-k access and program quality, or scaling up, through the 2001-2010 decade. Most critical, it fails to support the hypothesized influence of the national pre-k policy network and its two major embedded strategies, represented by Pre-K Now and the broader BUILD-Birth-to-Five coalition. As the regression results suggest, however, both state economic capacity and political ideology may have interacted with one another and/or with other factors, including the networks. Moreover, the Great Recession seems to have had a different influence on increased quality than it did on changes in access. Critical aspects of network influences cannot be explored statistically. These include the strength and cohesion of state policy communities and their interaction with the national networks, as well as the roles played by policy entrepreneurs embedded within them.

These holes in the explanation of factors in differences across states lead, again, to these propositions:

P1: The differential influence of the national pre-k policy among states helps explain why some were more successful than others in ñscaling upò their programs between 2001 and 2010.

- States were more likely to emulate other states that were successful and that are like them politically and economically.

P2: Three camps within the national pre-k policy network that represent different strategies for pre-k advocacy interacted differently with different states, leading to different outcomes in terms of type and level of pre-k investment by 2010.

P3: The strength and cohesiveness of state early childhood policy communities interacted with the national network and components of it to influence success in scaling up programs.

- State early childhood communities that more successfully engaged both pre-k and child care advocates faced fewer internal obstacles to scaling up.

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ed through case studies of the pre-k policymaking process in Arizona, Connecticut, Ohio, and Virginia that cover changes from each stateôs adoption of pre-k through 2010. The case studies also help illustrate the roles played by policy entrepreneurs, both those internal to the state and those who worked from outside to influence policymaking. Finally, as well as assessing the specific impact of the two main pre-k advocacy strategies of interest and of the more limited middle-of-the-road strategy, the case studies incorporate influences of the national pre-k policy network as a whole, including national advocacy organizations and intergovernmental entities, the National Governorsô Association and National Council of State Legislators.

The chapter begins with a detailed account of the individual and collective role played by the foundations, inter-governmental organizations, and early childhood advocacy groups that comprise the national policy network, including network membersô work in particular states.[91] The second half of the chapter is comprised of case studies of the four states that were selected to contrast network and other influences in states that were relatively more and less successful in scaling up programs. Each provides a bulleted timeline setting out key policy shifts in the stateôs pre-k history, a brief narrative of the stateôs trajectory from the agenda-setting period through 2010, and an analysis of the events of the past decade, in particular, and their implications for the above propositions regarding the impacts of state early childhood communities and policy networks. A concluding discussion brings together the findings from all four states to assess the across-the-board impact of the national policy network and to examine cross-state policy issue network, policy entrepreneur, and other patterns relevant to this research.

Chapter 6 relates these qualitative findings to the statistical analysis, helps fill remaining holes in the quantitative results, and suggests research and policy implications.

[91] The network also includes individual entrepreneurs, many of them early childhood researchers.

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ns and policies has been promoted in recent years by a growing national network comprised of several types of organizations. These include: private foundations; inter-governmental organizations; and national early childhood advocacy groups, some of which also have state affiliates or chapters. Several individuals have also played a part in national-level advocacy on this issue, including both policy- and research-oriented leaders. With its foundations in a growing body of solid evidence of the benefits of pre-k for at-risk children, in particular, and for society more broadly that emerged over the past few decades, the bulk of the network emerged and evolved between 2000 and 2010.[92]

In order to illustrate the scope of the network and its influence on various aspects of pre-k policymaking, each of these network members is described here and the connections among them explained. It is hypothesized that the network may have exerted more of an influence on pre-k policy in some states than in others, that particular strategies advocated by network initiatives played strong roles in particular states, and that statesô differing capacities to take advantage of the networkôs various resources influeced the varied levels and types of pre-k investment seen across states.

There is limited prior research illustrating the nature, scope, or membership of the national pre-k policy network, but its growth and influence in shaping pre-k policy make such an exploration important. Several sources were thus drawn on to develop an approximate picture of that network in order to understand the influences among members and their roles within the network as a whole. First, recent literature on pre-k and its politics, most prominently David Kirpôs *Sandbox Investment*, was reviewed to identify key members, including foundations, inter-

[92] The network has grown and shifted over that time, with individual researchers providing the earliest pieces, the NGA Center and NCSL joining in the mid-to-late 1990s, advocacy groups at various points, and foundations latest.

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cacy groups as well as individual policy entrepreneurs. Second, I conducted general internet searches for both foundations and advocacy organizations and used information from their websites to further draw lines connecting them with one another. Third, I ran *New York Times* searches back to 1990 for ñpre-k and foundationò and ñpre-k and advocacyò in order to ensure that the main organizations promoting pre-k had been captured, and to see if I could detect any change over the twenty years. I also drew on personal experience from three years working within the early childhood community at Pew, including national and state conferences and other events on pre-k, and research and advocacy materials collected, to determine which organizations seemed to be the most influential members. These materials also helped develop a short list of researchers whose work helped lay the foundation for this network. Finally, the interviews themselves helped to further flesh out the picture of the network; this could be seen as circular, since one question is the degree to which states have connected with and leveraged the resources of the network, but my assumption is that state pre-k advocates had similar information about and understanding of the networkôs membership and resources, but still used them at different points and to differing degrees.

Clearly, this is neither a scientific nor a comprehensive construction of the network, but rather an estimate of its size and scope with the goal of better understanding how differential state access to and use of resources might have led to their differential investments in pre-k.

Foundations

Central to the national pre-k policy network are a set of private foundations that have operated both across states and within specific states in a variety of capacities. As noted in chapter 2, they appear to have substantially spurred the dissemination of pre-k across the states and possibly to have shaped the types of pre-k policies promoted and enacted. This section provides a

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e to promote pre-k policy as well as how they interact with one another.

The Pew Charitable Trusts is frequently cited as a leader in early childhood advocacy. Since 2000, Pew has funded a multi-faceted campaign to promote state universal pre-k through research, advocacy, lobbying, and grants to partner organizations. With respect to research, Pew funds the National Institute for Early Education Research (NIEER), which is housed at Rutgers University and directed by Steve Barnett. NIEER produces research reports on a range of pre-k-related topics of policy interest, such as economic benefits to states. Since the 2001-2002 school year, it has also produced an annual state-by-state Yearbook that provides short histories of each stateôs pre-k program rates and ranks states based on the access, quality, and per-child spending of their pre-k programs.[94] Pew also funds other pre-k related research on occasion, including work by Clive Belfield and Robert Lynch on the economic benefits to states of pre-k programs.

Pewôs pre-k advocacy work is conducted chiefly through its Pre-K Now campaign. Pre-K Now, which began as a Pew grantee in 2002 as the Trust for Early Education and became part of the Pew Center on the States in 2009, is led by Libby Doggett, wife of Congressman Lloyd Doggett (D-TX). Pre-K Now provides grants to select states through those statesô early child advocacy organizations. Pew spent $10 million per year on the campaign, or $100 million total through 2011 in a combination of grants, staff support through Pre-K Now, and other outlays.[95] Since its inception, it has worked in 39 states, either with an official campaign that includes

[93] As noted above, these foundations were identified through the above literature review and internet searches. Because only four states were studied, most of the foundations were not referenced during the interviews, though they have also worked in individual states, as presented in Table 5.1. Foundations that worked exclusively or mostly in the state in which they are based, such as the Graustein Memorial Fund in Connecticut, are discussed in that state case study only.
[94] These data were used in the statistical analysis for this research and are widely used by other researchers.
[95] A Q&A with Pre-K Nowôs Marci Young, http://earlyed.newamerica.net/blogposts/2010/a_q_and_a_with_pre_k_now_s_marci_young-41160.

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rough less intensive/occasional technical assistance. The latter might include support for one-time state-specific research materials (for example, Pre-K Now gave small grants to Wisconsin and Maine to conduct such work), coaching programs, and other efforts targeted at specific states.[96] Pre-K Now also sponsors annual networking conferences and other events that are open to all states, produces research and advocacy materials based on NIEER and other sources, and hosts an extensive website that provides research, advocacy, and networking tools for pre-k advocates.

Pew has also provided funding for the National Governorsô Association and the National Council of State Legislatures to produce publications and events, and for several organizations it views as ñnon-traditional alliesò: Fight Crime Invest in Kids (police officers who advocate for high-quality early childhood programs); Americaôs Edge (business leaders); Mission Readiness (military leadership); and Generations United (retirees). Finally, it funds Every Child Matters to engage in advocacy and lobbying at the federal level.

The David and Lucille Packard Foundation has worked since 1964 on issues related to child well-being. David Kirp writes that the burst of the high tech bubble in 2001 and resulting loss of substantial portion of its endowment prompted Packard to more narrowly target its policy objectives: ñJust as Pew launched Pre-K Now to spread the preschool gospel, the Packard Foundation started Preschool California to move the topic to the front burner there.ò[97]

While Packard has a national reach and funds some initiatives that span all states, its primary focus is California: ñThe Children, Families, and Communities (CFC) Program works to ensure opportunities for all children to reach their potential. Our central goal is to achieve access

[96] Interview with Albert Wat, Nov. 10, 2010.
[97] It hired Lois Salisbury, who had been the lead lobbyist for a major state childrenôs group, to lead its new push for pre-k for all children in the state. Kirp, p.165.

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all three- and four-year-olds in the state, starting with those who need it most, through our Preschool for Californiaôs Children subprogram.ò[98] Through this program it funds advocacy, research, and best practices through grants. It also supports Birth-to-3 initiatives in several counties as part of its local grant-making efforts.

At the national level, Packard co-funded the National Governors Association 2002-03 School Readiness Task Force, which produced a 2005 report promoting investments in young children. It also co-funded, along with the Kaufmann and Ford Foundations, the School Readiness Indicators Initiative (SRII). This 2001-04 effort is described as ña multi-state initiative that used child and well-being indicators to build a change agenda in states and local communities in order to improve school readiness and ensure early school success.ò[99] For the purposes of this research, the SRII is seen as sitting midway between the more targeted approach to pre-k that is represented by Pre-K Now and the broader, more holistic strategy represented by the BUILD and Birth-to-Five Policy Alliances. Partner organizations supporting SRII included, as well, NGA, NCSL, the National Association for the Education of Young Children (NAEYC), the Education Commission of the States (ECS), the Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO), and the State Early Childhood Policy Technical Assistance Network.[100]

Another prominent national player is the ***W.K. Kellogg Foundation***, ñamong the worldôs largest private foundations,ò which provides funding for a range of child- and family-related initiatives.[101] Eighty percent of its funding goes to domestic programs, with half invested in three states, Michigan, Mississippi, and New Mexico, but it also funds programs that reach across the

[98] The foundation also funds Childrenôs Health Iinsurance and After-School and Summer Enrichment programs. Packard Foundation website, accessed December 2010 at www.packard.org/categoryList.aspx?RootCatID=3&CategoryID=63.
[99] www.Gettingready.org: What We Do ï Intro, accessed December 2010.
[100] All four of the case study states were members of the SSRI, so its influence is further explored in the case studies.
[101] Kellogg Foundation website, accessed December 2010 at www.wkkf.org/who-we-are/who-we-are.aspx.

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Birth-to-Five Policy Alliance, which has provided support to both the NGA and NCSL. Birth-to-Five, which is also funded by the Buffett Early Childhood Fund and the Bill and Melinda Gates, Irving Harris, George Kaiser Family, and J.B. Pritzker Family Foundations , is considered to be the broader, more comprehensive approach that counters Pre-K Nowôs more limited approach.

From 2003 to 2008, Kellogg also funded the $4 million SPARK initiative ï Supporting Partnerships to Assure Ready Kids. SPARK ñworked to create a seamless transition into school for vulnerable children, ages 3-6ò in seven states and Washington, D.C. As part of the initiative, Kellogg also co-sponsored, with the Education Commission of the States, governorsô forums in five states to explore the importance of transition and alignment policy.[102] SPARK, along with the SRII, represents a middle space between the targeted (Pre-K Now) and holistic (Birth-to-Five) approaches to pre-k advocacy strategy and is represented as such in the statistical analysis.

In *The Sandbox Investment*, David Kirp describes the ***Buffett Early Childhood Foundation*** as ña force to be reckoned withï a multibillion dollar presence committed to helping the very youngò[103] Led by Susan Buffett, daughter of billionaire Warren Buffet, the foundation was established in 2005 with the goal of ñestablishing a more level playing field for all children as they enter kindergarten. é The [] Fund invests in young children and their families living in Omaha, the state of Nebraska, and across America. We seek to redefine óeducationô to encompass the first five years of life and learning through an integrated strategy [of practice, policy, and

[102] Table 5.1, below, sets out each foundationôs and national organizationôs support to individual states.
[103] Sandbox Investment, 175.

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ed funding of $10,000 each, through the NGAôs Center on Best Practices, for seven state gubernatorial summits on early childhood.

Buffett funds Educare Centers ï high-quality early care and education facilities modeled on the Abecedarian program ï in a number of states across the country. It supports state policy advocacy through the Birth to Five Policy Alliance, with eleven ñfocalò states and grantees in 26 states and the District of Columbia, and, at the national level, through the First Five Years Fund, ña companion effort to better educate federal decision makers.ò Buffett also provides research funding for the Harvard Center on the Developing Child, which, along with NIEER, provides some of the most influential evidence-based advocacy materials, and for James Heckmanôs work on the economic impacts of early interventions.

The ***Annie E. Casey Foundation*** has devoted hundreds of millions of dollars in recent decades to a broad array of child and youth initiatives.[105] In addition to its substantial initiatives to reduce foster care placements and support for a range of family services, Casey has produced annual data since 2003 on childhood investments and child well-being at both the national and state levels. KIDS COUNT data are widely cited by advocates, and Casey has Kids Count affiliates in several states, some of which act as advocates as well as collectors of information.[106] The Casey Foundation was also a co-funder of the NGA School Readiness Task Force.

Several other foundations that focus mostly on state early childhood work have also provided some support for broader, national efforts. Among these are the ***J.B. Pritzker Family***

[104] The Buffett Early Childhood Fund: Investing in the Early Years, accessed December 2010 at www.buffettearlychildhoodfund.org/index.html.
[105] In 2004, the foundation awarded $171 million in grants, with KIDS COUNT among its major projects. http://aecf.org/MajorInitiatives/KIDSCOUNT.aspx.
[106] Rhode Island Kids Count, for example, is the Pre-K Now early childhood advocacy grantee, helped lead the Packard School Readiness Indicators Initiative, and was chosen as team leader for a new six-state NGA early childhood policy initiative. ñRhode Island Selected for National Governors Association Early Childhood Policy Initiative,ò Press Release, April 12, 2010, www.ri.gov/press/view.php?id=11195.

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y hub of pre-k activity). In addition to its many Chicago-based projects, the organization also supports the Birth-to-Five Policy Alliance. The ***Irving Harris Foundation***, established by Chicago native Irving Harris, which has assets of about $150 million, funds a variety of programs, including the ***Ounce of Prevention Fund*** and Educare centers. Based in Oklahoma and endowed by oil tycoon George Kaiser, the ***George Kaiser Family Foundation*** also supports the Birth-to-Five Policy Alliance.

Several of these, along with other, largely state-based foundations support a second broad early childhood initiative, BUILD, which operates in seven states to promote its ñvision of comprehensive early childhood development systemsé help[ing] states construct a coordinated system of programs, policies and services that respond to the needs of young children and their families.ò[107] Along with Birth-to-Five, BUILD represents the counter to Pre-K Nowôs targeted pre-k advocacy. Created in 2002 by the Early Childhood Funders Collaborative, it is supported by a large number of foundations that each pledge a minimum of $50,000 to the effort: Casey, Gates, Birth-to-Five, Foundation for Early Learning, George Fund, Irving Harris, the Heinz Endowments, the Kresge, A.L. Mailman Family, McCormick, McKnight, JB Pritzker Family, Rauch, and William Penn Foundations, and the Schumann Fund for New Jersey.[108]

[107] BUILD, About Us, accessed June 2011 at www.buildinitiative.org/content/about-us.
[108] www.buildinitiative.org/content/funding-partners.html, accessed June 2011.

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olvement in the National Pre-K Policy Network [109]

		Pre-K Now	*SRII*	*SPARK*	*BUILD*
Alabama		X			
Alaska			X		
Arkansas		X			
Arizona			X	gov forum	
California	X	X	X		
Colorado	X	x	X		
Connecticut			X	gov forum	
Delaware					
Florida	X	X		X	
Georgia		x		X	
Hawaii		X		X	
Idaho					
Illinois	X	X			X
Indiana		x			
Iowa		x			
Kansas	X	X	X		
Kentucky		X	X		
Louisiana		X			
Maine	X	X	X		
Maryland		X			
Massachusetts		X	X		
Michigan	X	x			X
Minnesota					X
Mississippi	X	x		X & forum	
Missouri		X	X		
Montana		x			

[109] An X indicates state membership at any point in the initiativeôs existence in Birth-to-Five, SRII, SPARK, and BUILD. Participation in Pre-K Now includes both intensive, funded work in the state (indicated by a large X) and occasional technical assistance (a small x). Other foundation-funded efforts, including Educare Centers and NGA summits, are omitted here. Casey supported a KIDSCOUNT affiliate in nearly every state, so not indicated here. Yellow highlight indicates case study state. Gray highlight indicates that the state has no pre-k program.

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		Pre-K Now	*SRII*	*SPARK*	*BUILD*
Nevada		x			
New Hampshire					
New Jersey		X	X		X
New Mexico	X	X		X	
New York	X	X			X
North Carolina		x		X & forum	
North Dakota					
Ohio		X	X	X	X
Oklahoma	X	X			
Oregon	X	X			
Pennsylvania		X		forum	X
Rhode Island		X	X		
South Carolina		X			
South Dakota		x			
Tennessee		X			
Texas		X			
Utah		x			
Vermont		X	X		
Virginia		X	X		
Washington	X	X			X
West Virginia					
Wisconsin	X	X	X		
Wyoming					

This review of the roles of major foundation-backed initiatives in the pre-k policy network demonstrates their potential influence on pre-k policy both overall and in specific states, including the highlighted case study states. Few if any were seriously engaged on this issue during the earlier investment stage studied, the 1990s, and were thus unlikely to have affected agenda-setting or policy adoption. Rather, they have likely been more influential in shaping 2001-2010 changes.

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foundations is a set of national ñtradeò organizations for various state and local government officials. These entities represent the mechanisms of inter-state dissemination of information, advocacy, and professionalism cited by Walker (1969) as key to the diffusion of innovative policies. Most referenced are the National Governors Association (NGA) and the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), though the influence of the National School Boards Association (NSBA), the Southern Regional Education Board (SREB), and others also are mentioned. The NGA and NCSL, in particular, have devoted substantial energy and resources over the past decade to producing and disseminating information about the benefits to states of supporting childrenôs early development, including pre-k, and they have put an emphasis on quality, frequently using the term óquality pre-kò in their materials.

The ***National Governors Association's*** Center on Best Practices (NGA Center) has made early childhood programs, including pre-k, a policy priority since the late 1990s, engaging in and leading a range of activities to promote state-level leadership and investment:[110]

- In *2002-03*, under the chairmanship of former Governor Paul E. Patton of Kentucky, the NGA established a gubernatorial task force on School Readiness ñto identify actions that governors and states can take to support families, schools, and communities in their efforts to ensure all children begin school ready to reach their full potential.ò[111]
- In *2003*, the NGA hosted a summit for governors and their staff in Florida on messaging and strategies to promote pre-k. Four governors and teams from over half the states attended.[112]
- In *2005*, the Task Force issued its final report, ñBuilding the Foundation for Bright Futures,ò which included sections and recommendations on state support for pre-k programs.[113]

[110] In describing its involvement, starting in the late 1990s, Anna Lovejoy distinguishes the NGA Center from the NGA broadly. Interview with Anna Lovejoy, Jan. 31, 2011.
[111] ñParticipating governors were Governor Mike Huckabee of Arkansas, Governor Jennifer Granholm of Michigan, former Governor Bob Holden of Missouri, Governor Bob Taft of Ohio, Governor Edward G. Rendell of Pennsylvania, and Governor Mark Sanford of South Carolina.ò Building the Foundation for Bright Futures,ò NGA Task Force on School Readiness final report, 2005.
[112] Interview with Anna Lovejoy, January 31, 2011.
[113] Anna Lovejoy notes that the report built off the national education goals report that had been issued.

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mitted to establishing ñP-16 councilsò so as to increase ducation. This $23.6 million effort was part of the NGA Honor States Grant Program, a governor-led initiative.[114]

- In the fall of *2007*, the NGA Center for Best Practices ñsurveyed states regarding the presence and nature of state early childhood coordinating councilsò ñThe survey data will inform the NGA Centerôs support activities for governorôs policy advisors and ECAC leaders, including policy briefs, quarterly conference calls, and a policy retreat in 2008.ò[115]
- In *2007-08*, the NGA used funding from several foundations to provide money for several states to host business summits on early childhood investments.
- In *2010*, the organization announced the launch of Ready States: A Project to Develop Key Components of State Early Childhood Infrastructure, a six-state initiative.

The NGA Center became involved in the issue as a result of ñresearch from a few chairmanôs initiatives [such as the North Carolina Abecedarian project] and due to the critical importance of the early years to childrenôs development, ñwith the hook that pre-k could help states close the achievement gap that was a common policy issue.ò[116] Its website offers a variety of research and other tools.[117]

The NGA Center has worked closely with several foundations, including events funded by Pew and more recent work supported by the Birth-to-Five Policy Alliance. Anna Lovejoy notes that, as funding for NGA Center work on early childhood shifted from Pew to Birth-to-Five, its policy focus shifted from pre-k to a broader, birth-to-five focus. It has also collaborated with the Harvard Center for the Developing Child and drawn on work by experts from the educational, neuroscience, and economics fields to inform its research and advocacy materials and to present at events and in testimony before state legislatures.[118]

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[114] Olson, Lynn, ñStates Push to Align Policies from Pre-K to Postsecondary,ò June 21, 2006, *Education Week*. This broader focus on systems-building represents a shift from the narrower, pre-k early childhood strategy to a broader approach to early childhood that accompanied a change in funding from Pew/Pre-K Now to Birth-to-Five.
[115] NGA Center for Best Practices Backgrounder; Survey on Early Childhood Advisory Councils, December 2007.
[116] Interview with Anna Lovejoy.
[117] NGA Center for Best Practices Early Care and Education, accessed January 2011 at http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.4096192acba1c8899cdcbeeb501010a0/?vgnextoid=abbb8cc156de1010VgnVCM1000001a01010aRCRD.
[118] Interview with Anna Lovejoy.

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ute Legislators (NCSL) has engaged in work around pre-k targeted at members of state legislatures that parallels that of the NGA. Like the NGA, NCSL has worked with Pew and other foundations to sponsor events for state policymakers and to produce materials that promote state investments in young children. In particular, funding from Pew allowed NCSL to host 2005 legislative institutes, which provided members from states across the country with intensive two-to three day sessions on early childhood policies, in particular pre-k, as well as education finance meetings that provided guidance on how to fund both new and expanding state pre-k programs. NCSL has devoted sessions at its national conferences to pre-k and early childhood, and it publishes articles in the newsletter it sends to thousands of members across the country. It also provides technical assistance, including state-level testimony and other supports. Ten states, including Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Colorado, and Alabama, have received such support in recent years, and NCSL has also targeted resources to non pre-k states, including Idaho, South Dakota, and New Hampshire.[119]

Under the Human Services section of its website, the NCSL has an Early Childhood page, which provides an overview on state engagement on a range of issues, including preschool/early learning.[120] ñGet Involvedò invites visitors to the site to join NCSLôs Early Childhood Ideas Caucus to hear about ECE bills being filed next legislative session, learn about NCSLôs ECE network and how it can assist, share ideas and strategies. Its ñEarly Childhood 101,ò materials assert that ñstates are at the forefront of recent advances in early childhood issues. Armed with compelling brain research and economic and evaluation findings, lawmakers are improving

[119] NCSL has not received funding from other organizations to work specifically on pre-k, but, like NGA, it works on child care, mental health, and broader birth-to-five issues with support from other foundations. Interview with Steffanie Clothier, February 3, 2011.
[120] Clothier notes the relevance of this portal through which NCSL views pre-k; it became an organizational priority as a human services rather than an education issue. She sees this as important to the broad birth-to-five policy perspective NCSL has adopted, with pre-k one aspect of its early childhood work.

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expanding investments to support childrenôs development and early learning and to support working families.ò[121] It refers visitors to the NIEER State of Preschool yearbook, and a Child Care and Education Database allows visitors to search for all legislation pertaining to early childhood between 2008 and 2010.[122]

The ***Southern Regional Education Board*** is active only among its 16 member states ï Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia, where it has a long history of promoting specific education-related policies (see, for example, Cohen-Vogel 2008 and Karch 2010 regarding the influence of Head Start on state pre-k funding and merit-based college aid). Among these is pre-k; throughout the past decade, SREB has produced research and advocacy materials that encourage its member states to invest pre-k. It has strongly emphasized the importance of quality, suggesting one avenue for the dissemination of this message among Southern states, including a 2001 report, ñImproving Childrenôs Readiness for School: Preschool Programs Make a Difference, But Quality Counts!ò[123] A follow-up 2002 report ranked ñall state prekindergarten programs in the SREB regioné in terms of three critical measures of program quality,ò[124] and a 2007 paper is titled ñReady to Start: Ensuring High-Quality Kindergarten in SREB States.ò[125]

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[121] NCSL Early Childhood 101, accessed Dec.28, 2010 at http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=21599#prek.
[122] The current section on early learning links to the Birth to Five Policy Alliance, NCSLôs research partnership with the Harvard Center on the Developing Child, Pre-K Now and the Pew Center on the States, and using economic recovery funds to support early childhood programs.
[123] Denton, David R. *Improving Children's Readiness for School*, 2001, Southern Regional Education Board, Atlanta, Georgia.
[124] Denton, David R., *Focus on Quality: Prekindergarten Programs in SREB States*, January 2002, Southern Regional Education Board, Atlanta, Georgia.
[125] Accessed at http://publications.sreb.org/2007/07E09_Ready_to-Start.pdf. Of the states studied, only Virginia is an SREB member, and none of those interviewed in that state mentioned SREBôs influence.

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nal pre-k policy network is comprised of early childhood advocacy groups that work across all states or at the federal level. While each has a different early childhood agenda that extends beyond pre-k, the organizations considered for the purposes of this study to be members of the national pre-k policy network have promoted pre-k as well. In many cases, their work on pre-k is supported by one or more of the foundations listed above

Voices for America's Children. Established in 1985, Voices, which is headquartered in Washington, DC and headed by Bill Bentley, engages in ñnonpartisan advocacy in Washington, DC and across the nationò on a range of issues related to child policy. It lists as its policy goals for children: Equity and Diversity; Health; School Readiness; School Success; Safety; and Economic Stability. Funded by the Casey Foundation, Birth to Five Policy Alliance, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation, and a number of others, Voices has state affiliates in all but five states and more than one in a few states. The affiliates tend to be relatively loosely associated with the national body; each has its own set of early childhood policy priorities and advocacy strategies, which may or may not correspond with DC office national priorities.[126]

The National Association for the Education of Young Children (NAEYC). Founded in 1926, NAEYC describes itself and its hundreds of state and local affiliates as ña leading voice for early childhood educationò to key federal, state, and local policymakers that ñhelps [those policymakers] understand the benefits of high-quality programs and services and advocate[s] for investments in high-quality systems of affordable early childhood education for all children birth through age 8.ò[127] NAEYCôs influence is particularly strong with respect to program quality; in

[126] Interviewees for the four case study states all mentioned those affiliates as influential in their work, though not necessarily through a national network. Several of these chapters have collaborated on early childhood beyond pre-k through the BUILD network.
[127] www.naeyc.org/content/about-naeyc.

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rds for early care and education, NAEYC accreditation is the metric used by many states. The association sponsors two journals, the more scholarly *Early Childhood Research Quarterly*, and a professional journal, *Young Children*, and it provides information on a range of federal and state policy issues relevant to early education. The latter, in particular, provides state advocates with up-to-date summaries of current policy movements and with suggestions on how to best manage and take advantage of them.

The ***Birth to Five Policy Alliance*** mentioned above, which is funded by the Kellogg, Buffett, Kaiser, Harris, and Pritzker Family Foundations, as well as by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, has worked closely with both the NGA and NCSL to influence state-level early childhood policies, including pre-k.[128] This coalition has led the broader early childhood camp within the national network, sometimes in conflict with the more targeted, pre-k specific approach anchored by Pew. A parallel organization, the ***First Five Years Fund***, works at the federal level to promote the same broad birth-to-five agenda. It receives funding from the same foundations, but not from Kaiser.[129] ***Every Child Matters*** promotes federal funding for a range of early childhood programs, including early learning and pre-k, at the federal level and has also led targeted campaigns in select states.[130]

A number of other organizations have been involved in the national pre-k policy network, including The ***Children's Defense Fund***, a founder of the childrenôs advocacy movement in the 1970s, with close connections to Hillary Clinton and the 1997 White House conference on Early Childhood Development and Learning, it has been only a minor player on pre-k at the national

[128] http://www.birthtofivepolicy.org/AboutUs/tabid/59/Default.aspx.
[129] http://www.ffyf.org/content/philanthropic-partners.
[130] ñSince our inception in 2002, we have held campaigns in 14 states - AR, CO, IA, LA, ME, MN, MS, NH,NM, NV, OH, SC, WA, and WV.òAccessed Jan. 6, 2011 at http://everychildmatters.org/state-campaigns.

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en more engaged.[131] ñA non-profit, non-partisan business led public policy organization, the ***Committee on Economic Development*** conducts research and advocates on major economic and social issues.[132] Pre-kindergarten and early child development have been a focus since 2002, when it released the report *Preschool for All* to promote public provision of quality preschool education for all U.S. 3- and 4-year-olds, and a follow-up report, ñThe Economic Promise of Investing in High-Quality Preschool.ò Its website spotlights papers pre-k by well-known early childhood researchers James Heckman, Timothy Bartik, and Clive Belfield. It collaborated with Pew to produce a series of working papers as part of Pewôs ñAdvancing Quality Pre-K for Allò initiative.[133]

As discussed in the cross-state analysis of the case studies, below, other organizations have also influenced pre-k policy in various states. These are not listed here as members of the national network because they have not focused in particular on its promotion, but, as scholars of policy networks note, such involvement is fluid and may not be clearly defined.[134]

Researchers and Individual Policy Entrepreneurs[135]

In addition to the leaders of several of the national early childhood advocacy groups described above, many of whom have acted as policy entrepreneurs on an individual basis, a substantial number of researchers and other prominent figures have worked with network member organizations or with the national network as a whole to disseminate information about the societal benefits of pre-k investments and to promote it, often with impacts in individual states. Rob

[131] The case study of Ohio below highlights one example of a CDF state affiliateôs role.
[132] About CED, accessed January 5, 2011 at www.ced.org/about/about-ced.
[133] www.ced.org/issues/education/early-care-and-education/early-education.
[134] For example, the Brookings Institution and Urban Institute publish research studies on benefits of pre-k. In particular, the United Wayôs Success by Six initiative has influenced pre-k policymaking in multiple states.
[135] This represents only a partial list; as noted, membership is not always clear and shifts over time.

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ornia that gained national attention in the 1990s is among the early entrepreneurs and a pioneer of this network.

> Reiner is no more than one degree of separation from any opinion shaper in the country. Beginning in the mid-1990s, when the needs of young children became his consuming passion, he used his Rolodex to great advantage. Over the course of the next two years, he enlisted Hollywood stars, White House staffers, foundation officials, early childhood researchers, and public relations experts ï to considerable effectò (Kirp, 98).

Reinerôs connections put him and pre-k on the cover of both *Newsweek* and *Time* on the issue of early childhood brain development, and sparked Good Morning American and Today Show series on the issue. Reiner and others drew on the emerging research being produced by scholars across the country, including two whose research institutions feed network advocates, among them: Steven Barnett, who produced the first cost-benefit analysis of an early childhood program and whose National Institute for Early Education Research (NIEER) is the primary source of research on various aspects and benefits of pre-k, including the state Yearbook; Arthur Reynolds, who conducted longitudinal studies of participants in the Chicago Child-Parent Centers; Lawrence Schweinhardt, who spearheaded similar research of the High Scope/Perry Preschool Program; Jack Shonkoff, whose neuroscience work helped establish the Harvard Center for the Developing Child; and Edward Zigler, Head Start founder and prominent early childhood scholar at Yale University.

The collective body of research created by these and other researchers has served as the foundation for the national pre-k policy network that has emerged. It is the basis for research and advocacy materials used by foundations, intergovernmental, and advocacy groups, and the individual researchers are often called on to make the expert case to policymakers, business leaders, and other state- and local-level decision makers. As state pre-k ñstoriesò have spread, a few of those leaders, too, have become national-level entrepreneurs, with Governor Jim Hunt of

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about the Smart Start early childhood model, and former Miami Herald publisher Dave Lawrence presenting on the Florida ballot initiative that he successfully spearheaded and got passed. And findings from these and other early childhood scholars enabled economists like Art Rolnick at the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank and James Heckman at the University of Chicago to calculate the societal benefits of early childhood and produce studies of those benefits that have also become central to pre-k advocacy efforts.

Building on the national network that has worked across and within states to promote pre-k policy investment, the next section provides in-depth assessments of the forces and factors that have influenced pre-k policy in four states: Arizona, Ohio, Connecticut, and Virginia. As set out in chapter 3, the first two were selected to study because they failed, relative to the average trajectory among states, to successfully ñscale upò their pre-k programs over the past ten years, while the latter two enjoyed more success. It is hypothesized that aspects of their state policy issue networks and the entrepreneurs embedded within them, and the connections of those policy communities to the national networks have played significant roles in these different trajectories. Case study findings regarding the influence of economic, political, and other factors assessed in the statistical analysis are discussed in greater depth in chapter six, which brings together quantitative and qualitative analyses to provide a comprehensive assessment of each state, as well as cross-state research and policy implications.

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Arizona: Arizona is among the minority of states whose pre-k program did not scale up between 2001 and 2010; it began that decade serving six percent of its 4-year-olds and meeting four out of ten NIEER benchmarks, and by 2009 it served only 5%. It is one of two states selected to assess the proposition that lack of connection to the national pre-k policy network and/or a weak or fragmented internal state policy issue network have limited investments in pre-k access and quality. The case study also explores the impacts of factors assessed in the above quantitative analysis and of others believed to influence policy implementation and adaptation.

Timeline

1991: Arizona began funding prekindergarten programs.

1996: The state began using the Arizona Early Childhood Block Grant as a source of funding.

2002: Arizona served 6% of its 4-year-olds in pre-k at $3,115 per student (2009 dollars).

2006: Arizona established First Things First to support programs providing high-quality early childhood services throughout the state.

2008: A three-year formal evaluation of Early Childhood Block Grant programs was completed. The state served 6% of its 4-year-olds at $2,385/child (2009 dollars).

2009: First Things First and the State DoE allocated $90 million for state and regional early childhood education initiatives. 5% of 4-year-olds were served at $2,247/child (2009 dollars).

2010: A Ballot initiative to repeal First Things First was introduced and defeated.

Narrative history

In 1975, fifteen years before Arizona allocated its first state money for pre-k, Carol Kamin led a committee charged by then-Governor Jack Williams with evaluating the state of child care in Arizona. The committee discovered a severe lack of resources, and Kamin went on to advise two subsequent governors on early childhood policy. ñShe was so adamant about childrenôs issues that, in 1983, then-Gov. Bruce Babbitt created the first-ever Governorôs Office for Children and appointed Kamin as its director.ò When Babbitt devoted his entire 1985 State-of-the-State speech to child care regulations and Child Protective Services funding, however, many failed to see it as a legitimate state policy concern; some legislators accused him of tackling ñsoft issues,ò and the *Arizona Republic* called the speech ñBabbittôs dish of quiche.ò[136]

[136] Bland, Karina, ñCarol Kamin: Battles won and lost in 30year crusade for stateôs children,ò Sep.3, 2006, *Arizona Republic*. Kamin wrote most of the speech, interview with Carol Kamin, Jan. 7, 2011.

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Children's Action Alliance (CAA), a private statewide nonprofit, to promote child care and early education. Nadine Basha, the wife of supermarket chain owner Eddie Basha, who was a CAA board member, recalls that Kamin worked to recruit business leaders as board members and potential funders, since they had access to conservative members of the state government.[137]

Republican Fife Symington, who was elected in 1990, had pledged at the CAA-sponsored debate on children's issues "to ensure that children get whatever they need to grow physically, emotionally and mentally into healthy and happy adults."[138] Research presented by CAA on the positive outcomes for Perry and Chicago participants helped prompt Symington's support for quality pre-k for low-income children.[139] In 1991, the legislature appropriated $600,000 to the Department of Education (DoE) in a line item designated "preschool programs for at-risk children,"[140] through a private-public partnership with major building company Shea Homes.[141] With that initial success as a foundation, the Honeywell Foundation collaborated with CAA on legislation to expand pre-k. The Success by Six initiatives focused on increased funding for at-risk preschool as well as Health Start (prenatal outreach) and Healthy Families. The latter, a home visiting initiative, was very contentious among the more conservative members of the legislature; Democratic support was solicited to counter it.[142] The $12 million allocated for pre-k created a new funding stream through DoE and established a committee to review proposals from school districts, private child care centers and others that wanted to provide services. Patty Briggs at

[137] Telephone interview with Nadine Basha, September 7, 2010.
[138] The debate was moderated by Marion Wright Edelman, President of the Children's Defense Fund. Ibid, Bland.
[139] Interview with Carol Kamin, Jan. 7, 2011.
[140] Building our Foundation: Assessing Early Care and Education in Arizona, February 2008, Arizona Community Foundation.
[141] Interview with Irene Jacobs, Feb. 4, 2011. Note that, among its construction projects, Shea Homes has built retirement communities in the Phoenix area, such as Trilogy: http://www.trilogylife.com/.
[142] Although they were a small group at the time, their opposition promoted Symington to call a special session after the initiative failed to pass the first time. Interview with Carol Kamin.

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o develop standards for reviewing those proposals and making funding decisions.

As in many states, early childhood discussions were influenced by 1996 federal welfare reform laws, which brought both public attention to the issue of needs around child care and a stable source of funding for it. Arizonaôs legislature incorporated funding for Success by Six into an Early Childhood Block Grant, under which districts could choose to use the money to improve K-3 academic achievement instead of pre-k. Because of provisions that made it easier to channel the money to K-3 than to pre-k, however, many districts chose the former, resulting in fewer slots for pre-k programs. The right-wing advocacy group Concerned Women for America helped shape language that one interviewee called ñdifficult to interpret.ò The legislation was also influenced by legislator Bob Burns, who had owned a set of child care centers. Burns saw pre-k as competing with that business, and he supported a provision that required half of ECBG pre-k funds to be allocated to child care centers (versus public schools).[143]

When Symington was forced to resign due to a felony conviction, then-Secretary of State Jane Dee Hull became governor in 1997 and was elected in 1998. Her administration marked the first time in U.S. history that all five of the top state elected executive offices were held by women, but it did not lead to increased support for pre-k. Ten years after its inception, Arizonaôs pre-k program served just six percent of the stateôs 4-year-olds, or 3,600 children, and met only four of ten benchmarks in the first (2001-02) NIEER rankings.[144] At the CAAôs prompting, Hull established the Arizona State School Readiness Board, a diverse group of stakeholders, most from outside the early childhood community. However, the Board made little headway toward its goal of improved system integration, and Hull left office without taking action.

[143] Interview with Carol Kamin.
[144] NIEER Yearbook, 2003.

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had been state Attorney General under Hull, was elected governor, which the small early childhood community saw as a unique opportunity for progress. Both Eddie and Nadine Basha had worked for her, Nadine as a campaign staffer.[145] Lisa Glow, who learned about the scientific and economic benefits of early childhood programs from a CAA report, became Napolitanoôs Director of the Office of Children, Youth, and Families.[146] The governor also adopted the School Readiness Board that had been put in place by her predecessor and, at the advice of Nadine Basha, appointed Irene Jacobs, from the CAA, to run it.[147] When asked how the state could best improve the skill level of its future workforce, Napolitano stated that ñIf I could make a bumper sticker it would say From Pre-K to BA.ò[148] The stateôs 2003 budget further bolstered early childhood advocates; in addition to other new funding for social programs, it used part of $200,000 in federal bailout money for preschool programs.[149]

Libby Doggett, executive director of Pewôs emerging Pre-K Now campaign, who also saw potential, visited Arizona that year to meet with members of the early childhood policy community. Kamin supported a pre-k campaign, but Basha envisioned a broader, birth-to-five model like that of North Carolinaôs Smart Start, and Pew did not fund a campaign in the state.[150]

Napolitano publicly touted her 2004 School Readiness Action Plan, which promoted pre-k as part of a set of policy changes, but she made full-day kindergarten her first early education

[145] Interview with Nadine Basha.
[146] Glow found both brain development and economic research compelling. Interview with Lisa Glow, August 20, 2010.
[147] Glow, who calls Jacobs ñphenomenal,ò notes that the Board met regularly, presented Napolitano with a set of recommendations, hosted summits and workshops, and obtained private fudning for Emergent Leaders Program.
[148] Beard Rau, Alia, ñEarly Governor Gets the Query,ò *Arizona Republic*, April 24, 2003.
[149] ñBudget to Strengthen State but Critics of $6.4 Bil Deal Predict Tax Increase,ò *Arizona Republic Phoenix*, June 13, 2003, p.A1.
[150] Interviews with Carol Kamin and Nadine Basha, responses to questions for Libby Doggett.

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established the stateôs first cabinet-level early childhood specialist, to direct the newly-created Early Childhood unit within the Department of Education. A state official, who had worked in the early childhood field for over a decade and had recently joined the DoE as deputy superintendent, sees this as a critical turning point for the state, ñEverything got moving under Governor Napolitano.ò[152] As of 2005, however, Arizona still served just six percent of its 4-year-olds at the same low quality level.[153] Intent on bolstering pre-k, Basha and Rhian Allvin worked to draft a ballot initiative to create a comprehensive, locally-driven early childhood support system modeled on Smart Start. Warned that an increase in the income tax for the stateôs wealthiest residents might scuttle the measure, they hired a prominent Arizona Republican firm to direct public relations and settled on a tobacco tax as the dedicated revenue stream. They also, says Basha, got ñevery living past governor to endorse itò to ensure Napolitanoôs buy-in.[154] The *Arizona Republic* endorsed the initiative, which passed by a large margin on November 7, 2006.[155] Proposition 203 established and funded First Things First (FTF), an agency designed to support state and local-level programs to provide high-quality 0-5 early childhood education.[156]

In December 2006, Napolitano announced her appointments to the newly created Arizona Early Childhood Development and Health Board, with Basha and Allvin continuing to be central

[151] Accessed at www.ade.state.az.us/earlychildhood/newinfo/ActionPlanState.doc. That summer, the Arizona Town Hall issued produced a 16 page report, ñPre-K-12 Education: Choices for Arizonaôs Future,ò that incorporates early education into stateôs broader education needs and plan.
[152] Interview with state official, Jan. 27, 2011. As discussed below, interviewees disagree regarding Napolitanoôs evel of commitment to pre-k and the reasons for her various early childhood policy choices.
[153] NIEER Yearbook 2006. A NIEER report from 2005 compares the 34% of Arizona children ages 3-4 who attended any preschool with the national average of 45%, another perspective on Arizonaôs low rate of pre-k service.
[154] Interview with Nadine Basha, Sep.7, 2010.
[155] The Bashas were joined by ña Who's Who of high-dollar Republican donors and businessmen [who] have dipped into their pockets to back an initiative that would raise taxes on tobacco products to fund an array of early-childhood education programs.ò Scutari, Chip, ñGOP Donors Seek Higher Tobacco Tax; Money Envisioned for Child Education,ò *Arizona Republic*, April 1, 2006, p.A1.
[156] Originally the Arizona Early Childhood Development & Health Board, it was later renamed First Things First ñas an uplifting reference to the voter-enacted initiative, and to exemplify the importance of early childhood.ò http://www.azftf.gov/WhoWeAre/History/Pages/default.aspx.

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private donors to establish the early education funds that served as ñdownpaymentsò on the regional councils that FTFôs requirements charged it with establishing.[157] As this structural foundation was laid, local communities saw improvements that gradually spurred systemic change. For example, FTF grants enabled DoE to ñmentorò weaker pre-k programs and improve their quality.[158] As full-day kindergarten expanded, it freed up district CDBG money for pre-k programs, enabling FTF to work with districts to structure those. The state official says that, for the first, time, early childhood professional development activities were available. Irene Jacobs sees such changes as evidence that the administrationôs plan to use FTF to enhance quality and to protect the legislative changes put in place by Napolitano to improve a range of early childhood supports was working.[159]

One month after his election, Barack Obama announced the appointment of Napolitano as secretary of Homeland Security, ending her governorship. The *Arizona Republic* reported in March 2009 that ñFirst Things First é collected [$6.3 million for early childhood programs] through a voter-approved 80-cent tax on tobacco products.ò[160] Among its accomplishments were stronger requirements for pre-k teacher qualifications; all new pre-k teachers had to have both bachelorsô degrees and early childhood subject knowledge. FTF also established plans for quality improvement, a state quality ratings system, and other enhancements to early childhood programs. As Arizonaôs fiscal crisis worsened, though, the agency saw a rapid decline in support and funding that exposed and exacerbated existing tensions.

[157] Interview with Lisa Glow.
[158] Interview with state official.
[159] Interview with Irene Jacobs, Feb. 4, 2011.
[160] Javier, Jeffrey, ñEarly childhood programs get $6.3 million,ò *Arizona Republic*, March 13, 2009. The overall percentage of children served did not increase, however, nor did the number of NIIER benchmarks met.

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ptò FTF interest earnings in February 2009, the board sued to reverse the decision and won. The legislature then halved licensing fees for child care centers as part of budget cuts, and FTF turned down a DHS request for help because, Allvin asserts, ñWhat they were asking us to do with the child care licensing money was illegal.ò Yet, says a reporter who covered the ongoing turmoil, ñwhat some lawmakers heard was a flat out óno.ôò[162] Bob Burns, who had become Senate President, led a public battle against FTF in the context of alleviating the state fiscal crisis. Burns demanded that the FTF board return to the state some of the surplus that it was using to create and staff regional councils. Allvin and her board agreed, on the grounds that the money would be considered a loan and would be paid back, but ñ[the legislature] eventually refused a generous $300-million interest-free loan offer from the board.ò[163]

At a January 2010 hearing on FTF finances, however, some members again pointed to this ñmountain of abundanceò as evidence of unnecessary bureaucracy and as a potential source of funds to help the state, which was mortgaging Capitol buildings, balance its budget. Over the vocal protests of FTF board and supporters, the legislature approved a ballot proposal to repeal FTF and put its $324 million into the general fund, to be used ñfor health and human services for children.ò[164] Senator Ron Gould (R, Lake Havasu) defended the initiative on the grounds that ñ[FTF used] the demonization of cigarette smokers and the publicôs love of children to tax people that had nothing to do with the issue of early childhood development,ò and Burns described it as ña correction issue, if you will, on the flaw[ed use] of the taxpayersô money.ò

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[161] Stanton, Billie, ñStanton: Legislature blows smoke,ò Feb. 11, 2009, *Tucson Citizen Morgue*.
[162] Del Puerto, Luige, ñArizonaôs First Things First users caught in political, economic,ñ August 26, 2010, *Arizona Capitol Times.*
[163] Burns asserted that this constituted new state debt, Ibid.
[164] Arizona First Things First Repeal, Proposition 302 (2010) ï Ballotpedia,, accessed January 2010 at http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Arizona_First_Things_First_Program_Repeal.cfm.

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l measure was defeated in November 2010.[165] Arizonaôs fiscal woes remain among the most severe in the nation, however, and early childhood programs hang by a thread. One interviewee notes that most districts have lost their pre-k programs, except those using Title I special education money to fund them. Had FTF funding not been cut, some of those could have been brought back online. Further cuts to FTF would reverse a successful pilot program that matches newer or weaker private programs with stronger partners in order to address the quality problems brought about by the requirement for private providers. As it stands, the future of FTF, and of the stateôs pre-k program, are unclear.

Analysis

Arizonaôs early childhood community has largely been cohesive, but very challenging political circumstances have substantially limited pre-k investment. It seems likely that, over time, the persistent obstacles, coupled with the lack of progress, have opened rifts among groups as to which strategy might present some promise.

Arizonaôs relatively early adoption of pre-k meant a limited national network and set of models on which to draw at that time, though it has had many more since. Support from foundations has been moderate. Kellogg and Packard included Arizona in their early 2000s 16-state School Readiness Indicator Initiative, and Arizona was also among the states to host a SPARK gubernatorial summit, placing it among the middle-of-the-road states with respect to pre-k investment strategy. This perception of its place on the pre-k advocacy spectrum is bolstered by the fact that, although Kamin and others sought and hoped for a Pre-K Now campaign, Pew never

[165] The *Arizona Daily Sun*, *Daily Star*, and *Republic* published statements in opposition, with the Arizona chapter of the National Association of Social Workers, the League of Women Voters and a number of Native American tribal organizations working to defeat the measure. It was supported by two small papers, Inside Tucson Business and The Desert Lamp, and by several right-wing organizations, including the Goldwater Institute, the Arizona Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Arizona Tax Research Association.

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izona a member of the BUILD initiative. In the past few years, this has changed somewhat, the state recently received funding from the Buffett Foundation to build its first Educare Center, which can be seen as a more comprehensive approach (though not necessarily a policy strategy), and it also received its first funding from the Birth-to-Five Policy Alliance.[166]

With respect to national-level advocacy organizations, Kamin cites several as helpful, though it is unclear the degree to which even their collective support increased pre-k investment. Kamin sat on Voicesô board of trustees as head of state member CAA, which made it ñless lonelyò to be an advocate in Arizona, and which helped her to discover and use practices of similar states, such as Utah and Colorado. Voices also helped unpack the potential impact of federal legislation such as Head Start, but more substantive information came from NAEYC and others, such as the National Womenôs Law Center (regarding legislation), and university and research resources, such as NIEER. State-level tax and budget work by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities was critical to letting CAA ñsit at the table and understand the state budget.ò

Interviewees are divided as to whether the problem was inability to leverage outside support into policy change or simply insufficient help. One notes that the CAA sponsored ñconference after conferenceò with Art Rolnick, NIEER scholars, and other expert speakers for business leaders, but it ñdidnôt make much of a dent.ò In an effort to convince Napolitano to prioritize pre-k, CAA also brought Governor Hunt to the state as part of his national campaign. Basha, conversely, cites a lack of outside support as one factor that has limited pre-k success. With the exception of a small grant from Kellogg, however, Basha notes little external funding, including Pewôs decision not to fund a campaign in Arizona, saying that ñIt feels like a wilderness

[166] Casey also supports the Childrenôs Action Alliance as Arizonaôs state KIDS COUNT affiliate.

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pport or influence from organizations external to the state: ñAll have been state and local nonprofits, community-based organizations and the Arizona Dept of Education.ò[168]

Arizonaôs small internal policy community appears to have been cohesive through most of the past twenty years. The CAA serves as the central research and advocacy shop, and early childhood advocates including Allvin, Jacobs, Glow, and others have worked in and with it to promote investments in pre-k through Success by Six and to limit the channeling of funds away from pre-k under the CDBG. As discussed below, however, views on how to most effectively promote pre-k under Napolitano diverged sharply, with the two camps still in disagreement over First Things First.

Arizonaôs history confirms the importance of policy entrepreneurs in opening and acting on windows of opportunity, but its decent connections to the national policy network and fairly cohesive internal early childhood community offer little explanation for its failure to make any real progress on pre-k over twenty years. As discussed in detail in Chapter Six below, the stateôs pre-k story seems to be explained in large part by the interaction of political ideology and culture with the nature of the legislation itself. The first substantial chunk of funding, as part of the 1993-94 effort around Success by Six, was opposed by the most conservative members of the legislature from its inception, leading to what Jacobs describes as ñconvolutedò language drafted by Concerned Women for America.[169] Led by House Appropriations Chair Bob Burns, who ñmounted tremendous opposition to the legislation and [whose] antics were criticized by the ... *Arizona Republic*,ò these members worked to include in the 1996 transition to the Early Childhood

[167] Pew staff note that, although Pre-K Now did not fund a campaign, Arizona early childhood advocates interacted with Pew through participation in networking events and conference calls.
[168] Interview with Rhian Allvin.
[169] Interview with Irene Jacobs, Feb. 4, 2011.

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blematic for pre-k.[170] They give districts a choice between pre-k and K-3 funding (and making the latter much easier to do), and require that at least half of pre-k services be provided through private providers.[171] This hampered efforts to improve program quality, as private providers were less likely to provide high quality services.

The ballot initiative process that created First Things First can be seen as a second key turning point, with the sharply diverging views of those interviewed mirroring the continuing conflict around the law. As Basha emphasizes, conservative opposition to funding for pre-k led her and fellow advocates to ñgo to the people.ò Some within government portray Napolitano as supportive of the measure as a key part of her strategic plan to bolster early childhood supports, which began with child care entitlements and full-day kindergarten. These interviewees also note Napolitanoôs intent to gradually shift ECBG funding toward pre-k. Others believe that her initial privately-expressed concerns about FTF reflect her lack of support for a broader approach and that her other policy decisions, in particular prioritizing full-day kindergarten, represent her lack of commitment to pre-k. Irrespective, antagonism among legislators for FTF remained and grew, with the complex structure exacerbating it.

Articles tracking the recent battle to eliminate the agency point to aspects of the measure itself and how it has been implemented that enabled opponents to paint it as overly bureaucratic, ineffective, even corrupt. One member who had initially opposed the repeal measure explained his vote for it as an attempt to ñaddress the bureaucracy issues [such as the fact that] the board created more layers, rather than having tobacco tax money go directly to services for children.ò[172] John Kavanagh, a supporter of the measure, stated regarding agency operations that, ñMost people have

[170] *Ibid.*
[171] Kamin and others noted the difficulty, particularly, for low-income districts to use the money for pre-k.
[172] Del Puerto, Luige, ñFirst Things First takes hit in final act of special session,ò March 16, 2010, *Arizona Capitol Times*.

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g it up, one reporter pulls together all the factors that led to the ultimately unsuccessful repeal attempt: ñThe proposal to dissolve First Things First appears to be a culmination of the interplay among a turf battle, lack of communication, long-held antagonistic sentiments, political miscues, and a gigantic budget deficit.ò (del Puerto, AZ Capitol Times).

First Things First has also been described as an ñadd-onò to existing pre-k legislation, and it clearly was intended to supplement basic access: by improving quality through provider-district connections; bumping a program from half-to full-day; helping a center attain accreditation status, etc. As discussed in the cross-state analysis below, there is some support among the case studies for the premise that built-in quality measures, rather than those promoted in separate legislation, may be more successful.

Finally, Arizona has also been among the states hardest hit by the great recession. In 2010, it had the highest foreclosure rate in the country, with one home in 175 foreclosed upon,[174] though its FY 2011 budget shortfall was around the median.[175] Like political factors, economic circumstances have interacted with the legislative factors above to stifle momentum for pre-k. Both of these interactions are discussed in chapter 6.

Bottom line: Political conservatism that has evolved over the past twenty years to produce one of the countryôs most ideologically-driven legislatures tracks the trajectory of pre-k in Arizona. Strong support from a moderate Republican governor made the state an early leader on early childhood policy. Pre-k expansion a few years later saw emerging conservative opposition, however, and by 1996, when federal welfare reform prompted funding shifts, opponents helped

[173] ñArizona First Things First Program Repeal, Proposition 302 (2010),ò Ballotpedia, Accessed Jan. 2011 at http://ballotpedia,.org/wiki/index.php.
[174] http://www.cnbc.com/id/29655038/States_with_the_Highest_Foreclosure_Rates?slide=10.
[175] http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=711

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for pre-k expansion. When a potential gubernatorial ally emerged, outright hostility to pre-k prompted the stateôs small early childhood community to avoid the legislature altogether. The result was an initiative that, though widely popular, was viewed with skepticism by many lawmakers and never well understood. Napolitanoôs exit just as the fiscal crisis hit the state hard brought matters to a head; legislators who had long opposed pre-k and FTF faced no gubernatorial barrier to trying to kill it. Communities that embraced the agencyôs support at the local level were able to work with state advocates and FTF leadership to stave off total elimination, but the obstacles limiting pre-k investment in Arizona remain strong.

At the same time, recent events provide some promise. Engagement by Buffett, Birth-to-Five, and Fight Crime suggest that a new national presence may provide the external support and guidance as to strategy that help Arizona reposition itself when the effects of the recession begin to recede. Basha sees a big difference between 2006, when the stateôs early childhood community was weaker and less united, and the 2010 defeat of the repeal measure: ñWe really have grown the early childhood communityôs ability to support a political effort.ò

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t failed to scale up between 2001 and 2010. It began that ear-olds and met six out of ten NIEER benchmarks. By 2009, it was still serving just eight percent, but average quality had dropped to four.[176] It is one of two states selected to assess the proposition that failure to leverage the national policy network and/or a weak or fragmented state policy issue network limited increases in quality and access. The case study also explores the impacts of factors assessed in the above quantitative analysis and of others believed to influence policy implementation and adaptation.

Timeline

1990: Ohio Public School Preschool Program was established after four years as a pilot.

2002: Ohio served 9% of its 4-year-olds at $6,846/child (2009 dollars).

2006: Ohio eliminated supplemental state funding for federal Head Start and created a new program, the Early Learning Initiative (ELI) using TANF funding. Ohio served 4% of its 4-year-olds at $2,662/child (2009 dollars).

2006-07: Increased per-child funding for ECE led to fewer children being served.

2008: Ohio served 10% of its children at $7,478/child (2009 dollars)

2008-09: Increased ECE funding provided funding to nearly 100 new districts and served more children.

2009: Ohio served 8% of its 4-year-olds at $6,904/child (2009 dollars)

2010: Funding for ELI eliminated in budget cuts

Narrative history

In 1985, the Ohio Department of Education (ODE) established an Early Childhood Section, and in 1987, interested school districts could compete for grants to adopt preschool models developed by the Early Childhood Section. These pilot programs had been in place for four years when George Voinovich was elected governor in 1990. Former mayor of Cleveland, Voinovich came to the office with a strong commitment to the federal Head Start program and an understanding of its potential to serve the needs of the stateôs growing numbers of poor families and their children.[177]

Interviewees describe a confluence of forces coming together to translate Voinovichôs support for Head Start into a statewide expansion of pre-k programs. Amy Swanson, Executive

[176] The stateôs Early Childhood Education program met just three of ten NIEER benchmarks, while its Early Learning Initiative met five; each served 4% of the stateôs 4-year-olds.
[177] Interview with Jane Wiechel, Jan. 10, 2011.

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en, cites: his ñabsolute and public commitmentò to the program, state superintendent Susan Zellman, a strong early childhood education supporter; and the existence at that time of some funds.[178] Jane Wiechel, who had been asked by Voinovichôs staff to return to ODE, notes the release around that time of national education goals, including having all children ready to learn by 2010 and, also, Ohioôs participation in a four-state NGA policy academy on families and children. Voinovichôs vision for the stateôs pre-k program was also supported by a unified state Head Start Association led by Barbara Haxton.

Intent on not reinventing the wheel, Voinovichôs staff promoted the adaptation of the federally-funded, locally-based Head Start affiliates to a state-driven model.[179] By 1991, Ohio had two separate preschool programs in place: the Public School Preschool Program (PSPP, which later became the Early Childhood Education Program, or ECE), and a state-funded Head Start model.[180] In 1992, Chris Stoneburner, former director of a county Head Start program and Voinovichôs first director of the state Head Start Collaboration Project, spurred the creation of the Family and Children First Council, whose local councils had authority for early education services and coordinated programs. Various constituencies began to coalesce to create a joint vision. For example, early statutory language that prohibited placing Head Start programs in public schools was rescinded ñover time and as trust and relationships with ODE matured.ò[181]

Two state cultural factors in particular appear to have influenced the manner in which the pre-k programs first developed: a local perspective, and the early childhood communityôs broad, rather than pre-k specific focus. ñOhio is a very parochial state, with 88 counties, and we do

[178] Interview with Amy Swanson, August 30, 2010.
[179] Interview with Jane Wiechel.
[180] In 1990, the state ñprovided Head Start with the opportunity to provide services to 2300 children through state expansion grant fundsò and also ñprovided grant funding to 125 school districts for the purpose of establishing or expansing comprehensive public school preschool programs.ò Ohio Department of Education Office of Early Learning and School Readiness Chronology of Major Legislative and Policy Initiatives.
[181] Interview with Jane Wiechel, Jan.10, 2011.

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Start affiliates across the state were among the early pre-k leaders, and private foundations such as the George Gund and Ohio Childrenôs Foundations, which had promoted a range of local early childhood supports, were also early and influential supporters of state pre-k. United Way chapters and business leaders, too, supported initiatives, including public-private partnerships, in local communities across the state.

Swanson also attributes to the influence of the stateôs many and influential foundations the breadth of early childhood policy agenda, including health and mental health.[183] Community health conversation foundations, which were established as hospitals closed down, directed funding to support the health components of early childhood programs. Governor Voinovichôs strong commitment to Head Start helped create a Republican base of support for state-funded pre-k, as a 1994 *Columbus Dispatch* editorial depicts: ñHead Start is one of the few government social programs that give a warm and fuzzy feeling to both liberals and conservatives. Who could be against taking children from low-income homes and giving them a quality preschool experience and planting the seeds of skills and habits that everyone needs to navigate successfully through the adult years?ò[184] As a result, by 1997, the state was serving nearly 21,000 children through Head Start and 7,655 in its PSPP program, and by 1999, when Bob Taft was elected governor, it served over 22,000 children through Head Start.[185] Between state and federal funds, these numbers mean that Ohio served over 85% of its income-eligible 3- and 4-year-olds in Head Start programs.

As is often the case in gubernatorial transitions, however, the momentum that had grown over the prior eight years soon saw a downward shift. Taft arrived in office facing a major budget

[182] Follow-up interview with Amy Swanson, January 5, 2011.
[183] Swanson notes that the Zero-to-Three Policy Alliance has also helped focus attention on infants and toddlers.
[184] ñHead Start,ò May 3, 1994, *Columbus Dispatch*. Indeed, not one interviewee recalls opposition in that period to Head Start or to the stateôs provision of pre-k for at-risk children.
[185] There was no real increase in PSPP. ODE Chronology.

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ervices advisor recruited Jessie Cannon, who had been a state HHS budget analyst, to work on performance-based budgeting for children's issues. Cannon says that the choice presented was cuts to either pre-k or child care, and that Taft's desire to "serve the most children possible, but make sure we're giving them quality," created a requirement that was harder for child care providers to meet. Zellman, who remained state superintendent, directed the OFCFC during the Taft years, and she was similarly focused on accountability for early childhood programs: "What is Ohio getting out of this?"[186] At the same time, federal welfare reform funds being funneled to all states presented new opportunities.

The result was the development of the Head Start Plus program, which would serve both at-risk children and their working parents by building a full-day, year-round program with a quality early childhood curriculum.[187] Outside of government, the Ohio branch of the Children's Defense Fund had been producing state-level research on pre-k for several years, including reports on the needs of low-income working mothers and the disadvantages faced in school by low-income children.[188] When the Taft administration began its work on Head Start Plus, director Mark Real was one of the first from whom policymakers solicited suggestions; he was seen as the "go to person on the outside," "the first stop on early childhood issues."[189]

The launch of the program was challenged, however, due to budget problems and their consequences. The fiscal crisis that prompted the state to replace Head Start money with federal TANF dollars led to more stringent eligibility requirements and a major drop in enrollment from 2002 to 2004.[190] (In 2001 and 2002, the state had served eight percent of its 4-year-olds at quality

[186] Interview with Jessie Cannon, Dec.23, 2010.
[187] Head Start Plus later evolved into the Early Learning Initiative (ELI).
[188] E.g., Candisky, Catherine, "Report: Poor Need Child-Care Support," Feb. 25, 1997 *Columbus Dispatch*..
[189] Wiechel notes that the state TANF administrator successfully promoted the re-direction of TANF funds beyond work support, to prevention of teen pregnancy through pre-k.
[190] Pre-K Now website/Resource Center, www.preknow.org/resource/profiles/ohio.cfm. Accessed 6/9/10.

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ix for state-funded Head Start; by 2004, it was serving just five percent, though the Head Start Plus program now met seven of ten NIEER benchmarks.) ñIt was a very painful process, a very frustrating and difficult time,ò Cannon says, referring to problems with parental awareness, enrollment, and having children move in and out of programs because of the federal work requirements. Several of the stateôs newspapers published pieces critical of the new program ñwhen pickup was poorer than expected,ò but Cannon feels that a lot of the negative press was fair and that it helped to tweak the program.[191]

The subsequent few years saw the emergence of several early childhood advocacy voices, both national- and state-level. Although none of those interviewed noted it, Ohio was one of the states funded by Kellogg for its SPARK initiative. It also participated during this time in the School Readiness Indicators Initiative, which one interviewee said had little if any influence on state pre-k policymaking. Other advocacy campaigns, however, were more substantial. In 2002, BUILD was launched in Ohio, one of the first states to become a member of that broad early childhood initiative. BUILDôs holistic, birth-to-five vision reflects the approach presented by many of those interviewed to that stateôs investments in young children. Chris Stoneburner, one of Voinovichôs inner circle who helped shape the stateôs Head Start program, was the first state BUILD director. Though BUILD served, among other things, as the inter-state network for Voices affiliates like that led by Swanson, its avoidance of political advocacy necessitated the creation of other entities to fulfill that role.[192]

[191] Indeed, Cannon cites this negative coverage as one force pushing the program toward ELI standards.
[192] Interview with Amy Swanson.

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tes launched the Ohio Early Care and Education Campaign (ECEC) to serve as a statewide advocacy entity.[193] In 2006, Cleveland-based Voices for Children expanded statewide to Voices for Ohioôs Children, and the ECEC became groundWork, creating two parallel statewide advocacy voices. That same year, the stateôs Quality Rating Information System, Step Up to Quality, was piloted,[194] and the Ohio Board of Education commissioned the School Readiness Solutions Group. The 50-member task force would work outside Taftôs administration to suggest early education policy changes, with goals of increasing cross-agency collaboration and coherent community-level advocacy.[195]

Democrat Ted Stricklandôs November 2006 excited some pre-k advocates. Pre-K Now, which lists Strickland as a ñpre-k championò on its website, funded advocacy work in Ohio. With state finances tightening, however, many in the early childhood community expected that Strickland would prioritize support for child care over a more education-focused approach. Pre-k was narrower than Stricklandôs ñwhole childò view, and it had attained Republican affiliation. Soon after becoming governor, Strickland signed an executive order to increase reimbursements for child care providers. This shift in support made more open what had previously been a quiet rift within the stateôs small early childhood community. It created problems with both leadership and messaging, says Swanson, with ñtwo powerful camps [that both] had the ears of foundations, business leaders, and elected officials, and who didnôt get along.ò[196]

Strickland did also initially promote funding increases for other programs, creating more slots for ELI and making eligibility easier, as well as creating an Early Childhood Cabinet and

[193] Pre-K Now describes the ECEC as ñestablish[ing] a strategic advocacy plan to address the educational, physical, and emotional needs of children ages birth through six,ò www.preknow.org/resources/profiles/ohio.cfm.
[194] It expanded statewide the following year, but lack of funding to substantially improve program quality rendered the voluntary standards fairly toothless.
[195] Like Arizonaôs School Readiness Board, this group was comprised largely of the ñnon-usual suspects.ò Interview with Jane Wiechel.
[196] Follow-up interview with Amy Swanson.

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ch Pre-K Now described as a ñlandmark,ò increased total early childhood education funding by $270 million, including $29.5 million more for ECE over two years for a total of $31 million in FY08 and $36.5 million in FY09. As a result, by the 2008-09 school year, the state was again serving eight percent of its 4-year-olds, but it still met just three of ten NIEER benchmarks for ECE and was down from six to only five for ELI. [197] Later that year, however, the budget included huge cuts, with ELI funding eliminated entirely and ECE cut by about a third. ñOhio led states in preschool cutbacksé . [It] slashed preschool programs more than any other state in the nation, according to a new report. The state-by-state analysis found that Ohio cut the largest percentage of funding from preschool education and, as a result, will deny services to the largest number of children.ò[198]

In 2010, the Ohio Business Roundtable, with support from Pew, announced its entry into the early childhood policy arena. Its goals included reviewing the current state system of pre-k and other early childhood supports and developing a comprehensive plan to enhance levels of both access and quality of those programs that it chose to support.[199] Cannon is staffing the effort, and others interviewed are hopeful that this might help unite the stateôs fractured early childhood community and present a coherent message with weight behind it to policymakers.

Analysis

Ohioôs story can be seen as the intersection between a fragmented policy community that promoted multiple visions for early childhood community and a fragile and weakening economy.

Connections to the national pre-k policy network are hypothesized to promote greater pre-k investment, and this part of Ohioôs story may also be relevant to lack of pre-k progress. As a

[197] NIEER Yearbook, 2009.
[198] Candisky, Catherine, ñOhio led states in preschool cutbacks,ò Oct. 23, 2009, *Columbus Dispatch*.
[199] *The Talent Challenge2; Ensuring Kindergarten Readiness by 2020*, December 2010, Ohio Business Roundtable.

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hio, like Arizona, had few peers to provide guidance as it expanded between 1990 and 2000, and no foundations from outside the state on which to draw as resources for advocacy and/or funding.[200] For example, while Jane Wiechel suggests that the NGA policy academy on families and children may have helped to focus Governor Voinovichôs attention on young children, that entity was not yet as robust a source of research or advocacy materials as it later became, nor were as many national-level speakers widely available to talk to other policymakers.

Perhaps more important, when those opportunities did arise after 2000, Ohioôs early childhood community largely declined to leverage them. Several of those interviewed emphasized the ñwe know it all/donôt need outside adviceò culture of the stateôs early childhood community. Amy Swanson, in particular, attributes many of the challenges that pre-k advocates have encountered to this attitude. Comparing the early education and mental health communities, Swanson sees the latter as having greatly benefitted from other statesô experiences and guidance, while pre-k advocates have resisted similar assistance. This stands in contrast, she says, to policymakers themselves, who have been receptive to and have benefitted from outside counsel. Indeed, the NGA forum cited, as well as an NSBA report that influenced Zellmanôs two assistants, testify to the direct influence of national-level information that influenced decisions around agenda-setting and implementation but perhaps was less helpful later in the pre-k policymaking process, when advocates who were critical to sustaining that original support failed to draw on it. As Table 5.1 indicates, Ohio received foundation support similar to that of Virginia, but it appears

[200] Cannon sees little evidence of impact on pre-k from national foundations or other nation-level groups, ñalthough I will acknowledge that there could be some policymakers who were energized by an NGA or NCSL.ò

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ed pre-k access and quality, due to interaction with these factors.

The study also suggests a lack of cohesion within the stateôs policy issue network that may be related to its failure to fully leverage outside resources and may have limited investments in pre-k.[201] Swansonôs depictions of fighting between child care and pre-k camps and between the K-12/public school community and the ñcommunity services worldò is backed by Wiechelôs description of a ñtoughò policy community that is ñits own worst enemy [and lacks] collective will.ò The establishment of the ECEC the same year that Voices became a statewide advocacy entity illustrates this lack of cohesion and may have exacerbated divisions within the community; two statewide early childhood organization with largely overlapping but, inevitably, slightly different goals and tactics, made for a zero-sum game with respect to funding and credit-taking. This was also on the heels of the stateôs entry into the BUILD network, which served as another voice for young children but, due to internal reluctance to engage in advocacy, made it necessary to establish yet another entity to fulfill that purpose. Even within state government, Weichel notes that the same agency heads were involved in both the FCFC and the EC council, which could create more confusion.

As is true in Arizona, legislative structure has interacted with other factors to limit pre-k success. The Head Start model championed by Voinovich, while initially helpful in galvanizing local support from affiliates, might also have alienated others who had different visions for community programs or sought flexibility. (There was also a level of distrust from the start between ODE and Head Start.) As research results from studies of Head Start have emerged, ELI may also have been disadvantaged by its association with an early education program model that is

[201] Interview with Jane Wiechel.

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s in promoting school readiness.[202] Ohioôs support for two distinct models of pre-k, one of which emphasized education and the other child care, spurred competition each year between the two camps for policymaker attention and funding and making it harder for them to resolve those differences. With multiple funding streams at play, constituencies saw the need preserve funding levels, rather than collaborating to improve overall access or quality. Michelle Katona, who worked as Family and Children First program officer in Ohio, cites parental confusion and turf battles as consequences of the multiple programs and funding streams.[203] Swanson notes the association of pre-k with ODE and of the perception of ñsnobberyò on the part of private child care providers, prompting them to infiltrate each sideò in their battle to raise the visibility and importance of care for younger children.

Through the years studied and leading up to them, Ohioôs precarious economic situation has interacted with legislative decisions as well. When 1996 welfare reform legislation offered states choices as to how to spend federal dollars, Ohio elected to use them to substitute, rather than supplement, state funds. Several of those interviewed feel that this weakened state support for pre-k, ñallowing federal requirements to dictate policy accordinglyò without any serious consideration of the policy implications (Cannon) and ña critical point at which things started to unravelò (Wiechel). Katona notes that, when TANF funding later dried up, it created additional problems for Ohio. It may also be the case that, because the funding stream reimbursed providers as is done for child care (rather than pre-k), it was harder to build in quality.

Political and governance considerations interacted with all of the above as well, with gubernatorial transitions a bigger factor in Ohio than in other states, as discussed below in the

[202] One interviewee noted problems when Head Start programs failed to ñlive upò to their promise. As a sympathetic paper wrote, ñBut debate over Head Start's effectiveness has been ongoing, almost since it began in 1965,ò Sternberg, Ruth, ñHead Start Program Has Champions, Foes, ñ Jan. 26, 1997, *Columbus Dispatch*.
[203] Interview with Michelle Katona, February 14, 2011.

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Under Voinovich, the governorôs office and ODE were able to work together closely and to form a strong relationship with the stateôs Head Start community. Chris Stoneburner, the first director of the Head Start Collaboration Office, used the creation of the FCFC to get those in the ODE, ñto pay attention to [pre-k].ò[204] But subsequent administrations saw that collaboration weaken. Cannon and her colleagues worked around Taft more than with him, with the creation of the School Readiness Board an illustration of that shift, and Governor Stricklandôs creation of an early childhood cabinet may have exacerbated problems by cutting off members from the agency staff with whom they worked.

Bottom line: Ohio has suffered from a combination of factors that, together, stifled progress for some time and eventually led to the demise of ELI. Unclear vision for pre-k seems central to the stateôs limited success. Rapid early expansion meant few state pre-k models to choose from, and while the Head Start model helped secure affiliatesô support, it allowed little flexibility and resulted in multiple funding streams that fed divisions within the early childhood community. Those divisions sustained a rift that grew over time and also led to a rejection of outside support and insights that might have strengthened pre-k programs. Competing pre-k programs exacerbated the conflict between pre-k and child care that exists in virtually every state, and multiple early childhood advocacy entities overlapped in purpose rather than presenting a united voice or a coherent vision. Two sequential gubernatorial transitions, the second exacerbated by a partisan shift, left pre-k without the champion who had brought it to be. Incoherent policy vision that arose from those problems resulted in a shift from state to federal funding that weakened the stateôs commitment to pre-k and created barriers to take-up, let alone expansion. As a result, when the

[204] Interview with Amy Swanson.

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losses to its manufacturing core, ELI was on the chopping block. And the early childhood community was not strong enough to save it.

As is true in Arizona, however, the entry of a new stakeholder with a strategic vision may signal some promise. The Business Roundtable is close to and has leverage with the stateôs new governor and its legislature. It has also made clear its intent to invest in an in-depth investigation of the stateôs early childhood needs, to develop a strategic plan to put in place the foundations for policies to meet those needs, and to stay the course to ensure that a solid foundation is laid. The current economic crisis may render some of that too difficult even for the stateôs leading CEOs, but it represents the potential for a rallying point for the stateôs disparate early childhood voices and a plan that the new fiscally conservative governor might find palatable.

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pre-k program modestly between 2001 and 2009. It began 4-year-olds at a quality ranking of four out of ten, but by 2007-08, it served sixteen percent (which fell to eleven percent the following year) and met six of NIEERôs ten quality benchmarks. It is one of two states selected to assess the proposition that effective leveraging of national policy network resources and a strong, cohesive internal state policy issue network have played a role in these increases in program access and quality. It should be noted, however, that following Connecticutôs selection as a state that had successfully scaled up, it lost a substantial portion of its pre-k investment, making its ñsuccessò somewhat unclear. The case study also explores the impacts of factors assessed in the above quantitative analysis and of others believed to influence policy implementation and adaptation.

Timeline

1985: The Connecticut Commission on Children is formed by the legislature.

1997: Connecticut created the School Readiness Program for 3- and 4-year-olds.

2002: Connecticut served 9% of its 4-year-olds at $9,151/child (2009 dollars).

2004: Lieutenant Governor Jodi Rell called for economic development and early childhood leaders to come together to find common ground. In July, as governor, she announced early childhood investment and pre-k expansion as two of her three top policy priorities.

2005: At Rellôs request, the general assembly established the Connecticut Early Childhood Education Cabinet (ECEC).

2006: Connecticut served 14% of its 4-year-olds at $8,060/child (2009 dollars). The ECEC released *Ready by 5 and Fine by 9: Connecticut's Early childhood investment Framework*, and Rell formed the Early Childhood Research and Policy Council through executive order.

2008: Connecticut served 16% of its 4-year-olds at $7,396/child (2009 dollars)

2008-09: Connecticut dedicated $5.2 million in state funds to supplement federal Head Start for the program year to improve both access and quality.

2009: Connecticut served 11% of its 4-year-olds at $8,144/child (2009 dollars)

Narrative history

As is true in both Arizona and Ohio, policy attention to young childrenôs education began in Connecticut long before the state allocated its first dollars to pre-k. In the early 1980s, a handful of business leaders, led by then- Senior Vice President of the Hartford Group David Carson, began to consider quality pre-k as a foundation for school readiness (and success).[205] In 1985, the state legislature established the Connecticut Commission on Children (Commission) ñto promote public

[205] Interview with John Rathgeber, August 5, 2010. Rathgeber notes that Carsonôs position made him well known in that region of the state, positioning him to take a leadership role on the issue.

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evelopment.ò[206] And in the late 1980s, with funding from the Education Foundation of America, the state requested the creation of a coherent, birth-to-five integrated system of early childhood supports. Elaine Zimmerman, who had done similar work for Californiaôs legislature, was recruited by Yale Child Study Center research scientist Sharon Lynne Kagan. Zimmerman called the program ñ1, 2, 3, 4, 5, Kids Countò[207] and worked to organize important stakeholders ï parents, business ï and sectors.

A major state foundation, the William Caspar Graustein Memorial Fund, added early childhood to its policy agenda in 1993. The idea ñcrystallized in 1994,ò with Fund program officer Maria Mojica suggesting a birth-to-8 policy frame, including the allocation of $7 million to cities as a Children First Agenda to fund community groups that worked to make collaborative decisions around early childhood.[208] These included creating school readiness plans that incorporated early childhood education. David Nee, Executive Director of the Fund, says that this funding not only planted some of the first seeds for community-level work, it provided standing for the Fund to subsequently work on the issue at the state policy level.

Nee and Graustein began to work with the Commission on Children, then led by Elaine Zimmerman, to build community-level support for pre-k, including data on local needs. A 1996 report co-sponsored by the Commission found that, while ñ[c]hildren who have attended preschool programs in Hartford, Bridgeport and New Haven perform much better in school than those who have not,ò only half of the children in each of those cities, the stateôs three largest, attend pre-k, and that the number was declining.[209] Advocacy by Zimmerman and Nee and by State Superintendent

[206] The Commission has 25 members from all three branches of government as well as the private sector. Pre-K Now State Profiles, accessed Dec. 2010 at www.preknow.org/resources/profiles/connecticut.cfm.
[207] With the permission of Lynn Kagan and Elaine Zimmerman, this later became Casey Foundationôs KidsCount.
[208] Interview with David Nee, Sep. 2, 2010.
[209] Frahm, Robert A. ñPreschool benefits outlined children in program perform better later, recent study says,ò *Hartford Courant*, Feb. 24, 1996.

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ker of the state House Tom Ritter, who ñgot the feverò and quietly helped to pass skeleton legislation authorizing pre-k in 1996.[210] Sergi points also to a state Supreme Court decision that found Hartford to be racially and economically segregated and ordered the governor to come up with a policy remedy.[211]

All of those interviewed view this period as uniquely receptive to advances in pre-k, with ñan interesting coalition ï providers, a grassroots parental group, and the non-profit and business communitiesò ï coming together on the issue.[212] Research on early childhood outcomes, brain development, and results from the Abecedarian and Perry Preschool programs were critical to Speaker Ritterôs ñself-educationò on pre-k.[213] Ed Zigler, a Yale University professor and Head Start founder, provided a local expert voice and worked with Zimmerman to draft the legislation. The following year, the state allocated its first $20 million for pre-k through the 1997 School Readiness Act, due to Ritterôs support, the testimony of key state leaders, including Zigler and Nee; and community-level data collected through Grausteinôs efforts.[214] Graustein also

> brought in experts from North Carolina and Georgia for an information session at the Legislative Office Building. We were told by the Connecticut Commission on Children that the session was influential with those who influence legislatorsô legislative staff, executive branch people and advocates. The Commission felt the session was very helpful to passage of the School Readiness Act.

[210] Interviews with Elaine Zimmerman (Jan. 28, 2011), Nee, Theodore Anonymous II (Feb. 2, 2011), and Janice Gruendel (Dec. 14, 2010).
[211] Anonymous II says that that the decision in Sheff vs. OôNeil led to a focus on early childhood education as one solution.
[212] Interview with John Rathgeber, August 5, 2010. Gruendel paints much the same picture, with governmental (CCC), business (Carson/Peopleôs United Bank) and advocacy (CT Voices, Ct Associtaion for Human Services) perspectives. Interview with Janice Gruendel, Dec.14, 2010. Zimmerman says ñall the stars aligned.ò
[213] Interview with David Nee.
[214] Nee says that the data were rapidly assembled and pulled together in a ñboiler roomò that Graustein created in response to the legislatureôs demands for the information. Nee interview.

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re reform legislation, which included money for child care for women going off the rolls, ñicing on the cakeò for the transition from shell to funding.[215] Zimmerman assigns it even more importance: ñWhen President Clinton moved welfare reform that allowed me to move policy here. Who would take of all these children when their mothers went to work? How would we make sure that their children really thrived?ò She asked the department in charge of welfare funding to ñco-locate dollars.ò The result was a combination of quality enhancement resources from the Department of Social Services (DSS) and school readiness resources from the Department of Education (DoE). This ñcreated a bridge between a department that needed care so parents could work and another that needed school readiness [and] shifted it from a care-giving debate (about the role of women, which wasnôt going to win), to school readiness.ò The School Readiness and Child Care Initiative (SRCCI) also resulted in broad early supports beyond pre-k.

After the passage of the law, the early childhood policy community worked together to reinforce the messages that had been conveyed and to ñkick-startò legislative implementation. Zimmerman describes ña small and start state with a lot of pride in this, coherence, and people who were really committed.ò They had the backing of strong leaders, including Kagan, Zigler, and Ritter, and executive departments that ñgot it.ò ñAnd because they wrote the law during a recession, they knew that could happen,ò which built confidence.[216] Voices for Connecticutôs Children, which had been formed in 1995, became a force in pre-k policy when Nee asked Janice Gruendel, Voicesô Executive Director, ñto focus on moving to a much larger increase in school readiness programs.ò[217] In 1997, they began to build the Early Childhood Alliance, a consortium

[215] Gruendel also cites the concurrent interest in other early childhood supports, with the stateôs ñHuskyò child health care that matched SCHIP passed around the same time.
[216] Interview with Elaine Zimmerman.
[217] Interview with Janice Gruendel,

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-to-8 goal. Zimmerman, now Executive Director of the Commission, used its newsletter to establish expectations of an additional $20 million annually up to $100 million, which would serve all of the stateôs children living at or below 185% FPL.

The biggest obstacle was building local capacity; the local councils co-chaired by mayor and superintendents worked with the state to identify available public school, Head Start, and private provider slots. With $10 million in additional funding each year, however, Anonymous II says that even after ñdragging school districts to make more school classroom available,ò there were no more seats to be had. In 1999, he thus did not request funding that would have expanded the program as some had hoped, but asked for a smaller sum.[218] In 2000, 13,000 families were served through the Connecticut SRCCI, which provided blended pre-k and child care for 3- and 4-year-olds in high-poverty school districts. NIEER reports that the state served ten percent of its 4-year-olds in the 2001-02 school year, meeting four of ten quality benchmarks.

Pre-k advocates also enjoyed support from the administration; though he was not vocal, Governor Rowland ñwas a very strong partner,ò backing Ritter and ensuring that pre-k was ñprotected at all costs.ò[219] In 2004, the Early Childhood Alliance organized a series of summits on early childhood to solidify Lieutenant Governor Jodi Rellôs support for pre-k.[220] Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank economist Arthur Rolnick spoke at a January event about the economic benefits of pre-k.

When Rowland resigned in July, 2004, after being indicted on corruption charges, Rell seemed primed to take his place as a pre-k champion. As governor, she made early childhood investment and pre-k expansion two of her three top public policy priorities and announced

[218] Some interviewees disagree with Anonymous IIôs assessment, contending that he missed a key opportunity for expansion.
[219] Interview with Elaine Zimmerman.
[220] Interview with David Nee.

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early policy advisory on early childhood.[221] At Rellôs request, the General Assembly established the Early Childhood Education Cabinet in 2006, comprised of state agency and legislative leaders and community representatives, to advise the governor and legislature on school readiness, pre-k effectiveness, and funding for early childhood programs.[222] Nee, John Rathgeber, and Valerie Lewis, Commissioner of Higher Education, co-chaired it. Rell then created the companion Early Childhood Research and Policy Council, a ñhigh-level neutral public policymaking force,ò by executive order in February 2006. In November 2006, the 22-member Council released its first five-year strategic budget, which included plans to develop a QRIS proposal and state early childhood education workforce. The Cabinet released its own 2006 report, *Ready by 5 and Fine by 9: Connecticut's Early childhood investment Framework*, complementing the Councilôs budget.

During the Councilôs three years, the Cabinet received roughly $3.5 million annually for its work on quality, strategic planning, public-private partnerships that matched state and philanthropic funds, and implementing the stateôs first results-based accountability study.[223] In the 2005-06 school year, the state served fourteen percent of its 4-year-olds in programs that met six of NIEERôs ten quality benchmarks, having added site monitoring, and the ECEC adopted a plan to make pre-k available to all children at or below 185% of the federal poverty threshold. The Cabinet conducted extensive work in 2006 to assess quality in 400 classrooms in existing pre-k centers, finding many to be lower than expected. It then provided small incentive grants together with strategic improvement plans to help many classrooms to increase their quality.[224]

[221] Pre-K Now website, Resources.
[222] Interview with Janice Gruendel.
[223] The Cabinetôs Community Co-Investment Public Private Partnership was noted by the NGA as a Best Practice.
[224] Interview with Janice Gruendel.

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ard of Education adopted a five-year plan that included substantial early childhood improvements, and Rell continued to prioritize early childhood programs. The governorôs budget would add 4,000 slots for low-income 3- and 4-year-olds in high-quality programs. In the 2007-08 school year Connecticut thus served sixteen percent of its 4-year-olds, though it still met just six of ten NIEER benchmarks. (It required neither lead nor assistant teachers to have degrees, it did not meet the in-service requirement, and it did not require programs to serve meals.) In its 2008-09 budget, the state dedicated $5.5 million to supplement federal Head Start, creating 450 new slots, providing additional services, extending the days, and supporting quality enhancements.[225] However, an overall reduction in pre-k spending led to a substantial reduction in children served ï just eleven percent of four-year-olds participated in the School Readiness Program in the 2008-09 school year. In addition, between late 2008 and the end of the 2009 legislative session, the Cabinetôs funds were reduced by more than 95%, to just $200,000, and in 2009-2010, funding was eliminated entirely.

While the cuts are seen by most as a direct result of the economic downturn, several interviewees felt that the reduction in access may not be attributable entirely to budget decisions.[226] Across the board, members of the policy community were optimistic that incoming Governor Malloyôs support for early childhood supports will translate into increased investments in pre-k and a renewed push to serve all of the stateôs at-risk children.

Analysis

Connecticut has benefitted from a committed and savvy policy entrepreneur who laid the foundation for pre-k and has continued to lead advocacy efforts and who has strong connections

[225] NIEER Yearbook, 2008.
[226] Rathgeber suggests that perhaps funding for support has been stable, but capital has dried up, or that parents who lost jobs have ñdropped out,ò or that scholarships that were part of the program may no longer be fully paid, and parents paying on a sliding scale may be unable to. A second interviewee was surprised at the scale of the reduction.

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ıment. Says Gruendel, ñElaine [Zimmerman] may be the best tactician I know in terms of moving legislators to understand why investing is a good thing. She really was the constant architect in terms of knowing who to move on which issues.ò Zimmerman was supported from the start by strong advocates within government (Ritter, Sergi, and a number of legislators) and among the business (Carson), philanthropic (Nee), and early childhood advocacy communities (Gruendel and others), with consistent access to policymakers. At the same time, strong individual leadership may mask differences of opinion regarding strategy, and it can also limit the emergence of others with different strengths.

Connecticut has a mixed record with respect to drawing on the national pre-k policy network. There was a clear and important role for external resources and guidance in the early years. Zimmerman came to Connecticut from a much larger, leader state with ideas about how to create a cohesive system of early supports. Evidence from Perry, Abecedarian, and other national-level studies of pre-k programs helped persuade Ritter and fellow policy leaders, and the testimony of experts from pre-k leader states influenced the general assembly. Other than participating in the Packard-Kellogg School Readiness Indicators Initiative, however, Connecticut has not received funding from any national foundations. Nee and other state advocates have interacted with Pew through conference calls and other networking events, and Gruendel cites research and advocacy materials from Pre-K Now and NIEER as central to the efforts of the stateôs advocates. Connecticut gubernatorial staff has also attended at least one national Pre-K Now networking meeting. There is some sense from Pre-K Now staff that they perceived a lack of desire in Connecticut for their involvement. Connecticut has not hosted any NGA governorsô summits, and although it has a state Voices organization that is a member of the national network, there was no mention of its use in Connecticut as a resource in that respect. Connecticut is not a member of the

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me up when Nee noted a lack of support in the early childhood community to consider its application in Connecticut, despite his enthusiasm and that of Janice Gruendel.

Overall, it is difficult to determine the role played by the state pre-k communityôs connections to the national network, but the lack of references to it versus multiple notes in Virginia, which adopted its program around the same time, may be one indication of relatively less use of that resource. It is also noteworthy that, in a state that has consistently taken a holistic approach to investments in early childhood programs and that stands out in terms of both political progressiveness and economic capacity to invest, neither BUILD nor Birth-to-Five has engaged with the state.

The groups comprising Connecticutôs extensive pre-k community seem interconnected to form a cohesive network. Nee describes their mutually supportive roles as: the Alliance is the umbrella, hammering out agendas; Voices provides research and analysis; Parent Power organizes parents; and the Connecticut Association of Human Services organizes members and other provider organizations. They receive peer support through Pre-K Now, and the Casey Foundationôs ñsteady data drumbeatò from KidsCount data has helped establish state-specific circumstances and unmet needs. The Commission on Children produces research and, through its newsletter, establishes policy priorities for pre-k, working closely with the community, and many of the stateôs other community foundations have also made pre-k a priority.

In the past few years, however, some of that cohesion seems to have dissipated, with various explanations. Shifting leadership on pre-k from Ritter and the legislature, where it had long enjoyed support, to the Cabinet and Council under Rell may have weakened the stateôs commitment. Sergi suggests, too, that fifteen years into the School Readiness Act, it may simply

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usiness leaders and other key constituencies. Indeed, the early business support that helped translate shell legislation into the first state appropriation and supported the expansion of pre-k in its earlier years has not grown into robust support from that community. On the contrary, advocates are scrambling to bring former business champions back on board and to recruit new blood.

As in Arizona and Ohio, looking to the legislation itself may provide some insight; the cross-agency collaboration that Zimmerman successfully negotiated in 1996 requires a strong ongoing commitment. Blending funding from different agencies has strong benefits, including allowing for high-quality programs that address a range of early childhood needs, but it means the division of tasks within the legislation across agencies, which seems to have become more difficult over time. Gruendel described the process as ñworse than herding cats. é It was harder to work with the mixed model early childhood sector in Connecticut than to work in the prisons [from which she came.]ò It has complicated the stateôs ability to drill down on quality because of concerns from the child care community, to deal with licensing, which is in the Public Health agency, to ensure accurate enrollment counts, and other management tasks that require cross-agency collaboration. Similarly, the local focus that has tailored programs to community needs and engaged local leaders as champions has not necessarily been as successful in reality as the legislation suggests.[227] Two interviewees referenced a ñlack of governance,ò excessive silos, poor organization and weak alignment, which John Rathgeber cited as reasons that the state is now looking to others as alternative, better models. Gruendel asserts, too, that the stateôs ñbipolarò tendency has caused it to ignore local school readiness councils in recent years, and that the community sector now needs to become the ñdemand sideò of the early childhood equation.

[227] Interviewees in Virginia also pointed to substantial differences in implementation and quality across cities.

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fifteen years since enactment, Connecticut has enjoyed progress toward a broad, scaled-up pre-k program, but it suffered moderate losses during the recent recession. It is also the case that, even at the programôs zenith, at least that much progress would be expected in such a wealthy, educated, and progressive state. The above history hints that both the early childhood policy community and the legislation it has promoted may be in need of some restructuring if advocates are to leverage their new governorôs commitment to pre-k as the stateôs fiscal situation improves.

As discussed below in the cross-state analysis, the comparison with Virginia is instructive. Virginia adopted its pre-k program the same year and, while less wealthy and progressive than Connecticut, it has become more so over the past decades. It has been better able to take advantage of national network resources, which may be one reason for its favorable status as it emerges from the Great Recession.

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p its pre-k program between 2001 and 2009. It began that olds at a quality ranking of five out of ten, and by 2008-09, it was serving fourteen percent and missing only two of NIEERôs quality benchmarks ï meals and assistant teacher qualifications. It is one of two states selected to assess the proposition that effective leveraging of national policy network resources and tools and a strong, cohesive internal state policy issue network have played a role in these increases in both program access and quality. The case study also explores the impacts of factors assessed in the above quantitative analysis and of others believed to influence policy implementation and adaptation.

Timeline

1995: Virginia Preschool Initiative (VPI) began serving at-risk 4-year-olds not enrolled in other programs.

2002: The state served 6% of its 4-year-olds at $4,359/child (2009 dollars).

2004-05: Funding allocations were increased to serve 90 percent of at-risk children not already enrolled in other programs.

2006: Virginia served 11% of its 4-year-olds at $3,854/child (2009 dollars)

2006-07: The state increased per-pupil funding to offer access to all at-risk 4-year-olds.

2007-08: New requirements take effect to include history, personal and social development, physical and motor development, science, and social science standards.

2008-09: The per-pupil rate increased further due to $22 million allocation to support VPI going forward.

2009: Virginia served 14% of its 4-year-olds at $4,023/child (2009 dollars), VECF preserved

Narrative history

In 1995, under Republican Governor George Allen, the legislature enacted the Virginia Preschool Initiative (VPI) to serve at-risk 4-year-olds not enrolled in other pre-k programs in order to improve school readiness and increase the stateôs competitiveness.[228] The law required districts that wanted to provide pre-k services to match state funds based on their level of resources, and it mandated qualified staff, with the definition of ñqualifiedò varied based on the funding stream (e.g., Head Start center vs. public school setting). From the start, VPI was intentionally designed to be locally tailored so as to meet the particular needs and capacities of the region.

Business leaders were among those advocating for pre-k; one such leader, former Dominion Resources CFO Tom Chewning, notes both personal and societal factors in Warnerôs

[228] This fit Warnerôs broader competitiveness platform, which also included increased broadband access.

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experience with searching for a preschool for his children in Northern Virginia opened his eyes to the great disparity in pre-k and the impacts that this had on Virginiaôs children.ò[229] VPI adoption also coincided with the debate that preceded passage of the federal Childrenôs Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), which was enacted in August 1997. The need for states to set up structures to match federal funds may have helped to focus attention on the importance of early health in getting at-risk children off to a good start.[230] Voices for Virginiaôs Children, the state member of the national advocacy group, also ñtried early to make the case for early childhood investments, around the time that VPI was established.ò

Neither Allen nor his successor, Republican Jim Gilmore, prioritized pre-k, but VPI did grow slowly and incrementally during their administrations, and state funding ñhelped trigger some additional local diversions of Title I money into pre-k.ò[231] By the first year of NIEER ratings in 2001-2002, six years after adoption, VPI was serving six percent of the stateôs 4-year-olds at a quality ranking of five out of ten (notwithstanding the ñqualified staffò requirement, NIEER did not credit the program with meeting its teacher qualifications benchmark).

This began to change when Democrat Mark Warner was elected governor in November 2001. Warner had campaigned with a commitment to early childhood development broadly, and Voices assembled an early childhood coalition to lobby key members of the new administration and to make policy suggestions. According to Morgan, ñIt wasnôt a hard sell ï they were receptive.ò[232] Warner unveiled his Education for a Lifetime initiative, which included ñnew standards for child day care centers and grants for comprehensive early childhood care and

[229] Interview with Tom Chewning, September 27, 2010.
[230] John Morgan suggests that the SCHIP debate may have played a role in VPIôs early years. Interview with John Morgan, September 21, 2010.
[231] Interview with Bob Pianta, Jan 6, 2011.
[232] Interview with John Morgan.

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who have not yet started school have an almost unlimited potential, and with the right start, they can enjoy enormous opportunities for a prosperous and happy life,ôô[233] Warnerôs broad focus on early childhood, however, did not enhance VPI.[234]

In spring 2004, with the end of his four-year term approaching (Virginia limits governors to one term), Warnerôs administration approached Kathy Glazer, who had worked for six years for Voices for Virginiaôs Children ñto try to help fulfill his early childhood campaign promises,ò including a public education campaign to build awareness around the issue.[235] Her office was in the state Department of Social Services (DSS), through which the Child Care and Development Funding (CCDF) quality money that paid for most of the early childhood programs flowed, and where Maurice Jones, deputy Chief of Staff to the governor, was the commissioner. Around the same time, Paul Hirschbiel, a long-time regional business leader with connections to the Warner administration, joined the board of the Hampton Roads Foundation. Hirschbiel led a four-month effort bringing together a group of area civic, business, and philanthropic leaders to determine how to collaborate with community groups to improve early childhood development in the region.[236] He called Jones, with whom he had previously worked on other commissions and asked him to join the working group, and Jones brought Glazer.

Hirschbiel and the Norfolk Foundation established statewide advocacy as a priority, since the foundationôs size allowed it to put substantial resources behind this. Glazer and Hirschbiel promoted this to Warner, who pulled together a Governorôs Working Group on Early Childhood in the summer of 2005, shortly before the end of his term. The Early Learning Council, which was co-chaired by Robert Dugger, a Northern Virginia hedge fund manager, convened a series of

[233] ñWarnerôs Education for a Lifetime Focuses on prekindergarten students,ò Oct. 23, 2003, *Virginian Pilot.*
[234] VPI was still serving just six percent of 4-year-olds and meeting only five of ten NIEER benchmarks.
[235] Interview with Kathy Glazer, January 4, 2011.
[236] Interview with Paul Hirschbiel, Jan. 14, 2011.

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nt came to talk in Virginia, meeting both with Warner and with his Lieutenant Governor, Tim Kaine. Staff from both gubernatorial campaigns was also invited to sit in on meetings, so Brian Shepherd, who became Kaineôs chief of staff as governor, was included, as were leaders from the health and higher education agencies.

All of the Councilôs recommendations were informed by the North Carolina Smart Start model of strong local initiatives, intended to build on both grassroots and ñgrasstopsò support. They included: 1) a system organized on a statewide basis that would increase early childhood information, resources, and incentives; 2) establishment of statewide standards and a quality ratings system; 3) universal access to early childhood health care , mental health, and nutrition services; 4) ñan effective public engagement campaignò to help ensure ñ engage[ment] and commit[ment to] a culture of educationò across all segments of the state; and 5) private-public partnerships that leverage state resources across all sectors.[237]

Glazer had suggested the creation of community grants, which was included as part of the Councilôs fifth recommendation. These later evolved into the Smart Beginnings Initiative, which allowed Glazerôs office to provide community-level grants to build up capacity at that level. The Council also recommended that Warner create both the Virginia Early Childhood Foundation, a private-public partnership charged with setting and executing an aggressive agenda to improve the lives of young children, including early education initiatives; and a cabinet-level office of early childhood. The VECF was created in December 2005, for which Warner allocated $8.6 million in

[237] *Recommendations to Ensure Optimal Development for Virginia's Youngest Citizens*, The Virginia Early Learning Council report to Governor Mark Warner, October, 2005, presented by co-chairs Paul Hirschbiel and Rob Dugger.

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get package. In 2004-05, state funding was increased to serve 90% of at-risk children not served in other programs, with a goal of serving all of them.[238]

In his 2005 gubernatorial campaign against Republican Jerry Kilgore, Kaine promoted universal access to pre-k for four-year-olds as a way to improve Virginiaôs public schools.[239] Kaine was elected in 2006, and, following the Early Learning Councilôs recommendation of a cabinet-level early childhood office, he created the Smart Strong Council to identify best practices for access and quality for 4-year-olds.[240] VPIôs restriction of pre-k programs to public schools had created challenges in particular for lower-resourced districts in both physical and financial capacity.[241] Kaine requested $4.6 million for a pilot program to provide more diverse delivery of pre-k services and make the system more flexible, and the legislature appropriated $3.5 million in 2007. A 2007 state commissionôs finding that VPI substantially improved at-risk childrenôs level of kindergarten readiness bolstered Kaineôs efforts to expand the program.[242]

However, his plan to expand VPI to allow for universal access for all four-year-olds soon ran into problems. The research base was seen as much thinner, and the price was substantially higher. The staunchly pro pre-k *Virginian Pilot* initially supported universal pre-k, but counter arguments resonated with conservatives, especially in the face of a looming 2007-08 budget

[238] Pre-K Now state profile states that in 2005, ñGovernor Warner spearhead[ed] funding increases to provide public schools with enough money to fund pre-k for 100 percent of at-risk four year olds not enrolled in Head Start [up from 60% previously].ò It also reports that, in 2004, providers were given the option of providing either half- or full-day programs, with half-day programs funded at 50% of full-day ones. Accessed December 2010 at www.preknow.org/resource/profiles/virginia.cfm.

[239] Kilgore advocated instead a merit pay system for teachers. Walzer, Philip, ñElection Issues: Education Divide,ò Nov. 2, 2005, *Virginian Pilot.*

[240] The Pre-K Now profile characterizes the Council as ñcharged with developing goals and best practices for expanding programs for four year olds.ò Among its first recommendations was developing a quality ratings system, which was being used by many states to inform parents and policymakers about the quality of state early care and education available, and also to provide programs, particularly private ones, with incentives to improve quality.

[241] Glazer notes that this provision also engendered opposition from child care providers. Interview with Kathy Glazer, January 4, 2011.

[242] Virginia Preschool Initiative: Current Implementation and Potential Changes, Jan. 4, 2008, Report of the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission To the Governor and The General Assembly of Virginia.

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s have been steadfast in wanting it to be a program for only at-risk children,ó for both fiscal and philosophical reasons.[244] Strong pressure to drop that aspect of his platform prompted Kaine to shift to a targeted goal of doubling the number of at-risk children served by the program. In summer 2007, Kaine released a plan to add 17,500 children to the existing pre-k rolls over five years, bringing the total to 30,000, and costing the state roughly $125,000 per year ($75,000 over the existing $50,000 for pre-k), much less than the $300,000 or more estimated for a universal program:

> Kaine will release details of his proposal at an education summit today in Richmond. He will be joined by Nobel Prize-winning economist Jim Heckman and former North Carolina Gov. Jim Hunt. . Kaineôs plan does not offer free or subsidized services for middle- and upper-income families. Instead, Kaine wants to broaden eligibility for the Virginia Preschool Initiative, which offers free pre-K for families eligible for free school lunches. The governor is proposing to make the program available to new families [up to $38,200 income for a family of four, versus the existing cutoff of $26,800] who qualify for reduced-price lunches.[245]

The resulting legislation also put in place comprehensive curricular standards, requiring all providers to follow new early learning standards that include science, history, social science, personal and social development, and physical and motor standards. The compromise was seen as a victory by more conservative elements of the stateôs media: ñKaineôs decision [to revise revenues downward] validates criticisms that Republican legislators leveled in December against his previously announced spending plans, such as a $1.6 billion bond issue for higher education and an expansion of pre-K funding. The governorôs revenue forecasts were too aggressive, they said, especially for fiscal 2010. ñ[246]

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[243] Both Morgan and Chewning suggested in interviews that Kaineôs goals in this area were overly ambitious and felt that he could not have possibly obtained approval for universal access to pre-k.
[244] Interview with Kathy Glazer, Jan.4, 2011.
[245] Nuckols, Christina, ñGovernorôs pre-k plan boils down to money,ò August 16, 2007, *Virginian Pilot*.
[246] ñKaine Backs Off,ò Jan. 25, 2008,baconsrebellion.blogspot.com.

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term to gradually increase pre-k funding. The General Assembly voted in 2008 to increase the VPI budget by $8 million for FY09, and in the 2008-09 school year, the state served 14% of its 4-year-olds, meeting all quality benchmarks other than assistant teacher qualifications and meals.[247] His proposed 2009-10 budget requested substantial additional increases for VPI, ñwith a 20 percent funding increase during the first year of the biennium.ò[248] The increases were meant to improve the quality of the program by increasing per-student funding from $5,700 to $6,790, as well as adding 4,800 new slots over those two years. Notwithstanding severe fiscal concerns, the legislature added another $6 million for FY10.[249]

The election of Republican Bob McDonnell, a conservative Republican, in November 2009, was met with concern across the early childhood community. McDonnell had campaigned on promises to cut taxes and spending, and advocates were unable to persuade him to protect pre-k. However, intensive lobbying by grassroots individuals and advocacy groups organized through Voices and by high-level members of the stateôs business community (funded in part by a second Pew campaign) combined with work by a lobbyist who had strong connections to McDonnell, resulted in preservation of VPI funding in 2010 as well as last-minute retention of the VECF, which had been slated for elimination.[250] VECF has little of the influence or capacity it enjoyed under Kaine, but as the state recovers fiscally, advocates are cautiously optimistic that the strong foundation they have laid will allow pre-k to grow again.

[247] All preschool teachers were now required to have a bachelorôs degree and early childhood training.
[248] Pre-K Now state profile.
[249] ñAlthough a small, mid-year cut was made to the FY10 appropriation for pre-k, the General Assembly restored most of that cut in its FY11 budget, bringing pre-k funding to $67.6 million.ò *Ibid*.
[250] The [Virginia] General Assembly restored most of [the small mid-year 2010] cut in its FY11 budget, bringing pre-k funding to $67.6 million. Pre-K Now, www.preknow.org/resource/profiles/virginia.cfm.

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Two Virginians ï Paul Hirschbiel from the philanthropic and business sectors, and Kathy Glazer from state government ï stand out as post-enactment policy entrepreneurs who together have helped build an increasingly cohesive state early childhood policy community that is well-connected both to key policymakers and to external networks. Working in parallel from inside of and outside of state government, they have effectively used research on the benefits of pre-k to spur gubernatorial leadership first by Mark Warner and then under Tim Kaine. They also engaged new advocacy and business leaders to increase buy-in from various regions of the state.

Of the four states studied, Virginia is the most connected to the national policy network. During Glazerôs time in the governorôs office, summits sponsored by the National Governors Association brought prominent national experts Art Rolnick, Jim Heckman, Dave Lawrence, and Lynn Kagan, as well as Bob Pianta, a nationally-known state scholar. ñSuch experts are always well received [by governorôs staff and legislative leaders],ô says Glazer, ñYou always hear things better from outside sources.ò The NGA also paid for prominent individuals, such as the governorôs policy advisor, to attend a respected Harvard symposium that Glazer says ñhelped build understanding of the importance of early childhood development.ò Virginia was also the only state to emphasize the influence of the National Conference of State Legislators:

> At one point a handful of legislators who didnôt like Kaine and would try to get even by [bringing down pre-k] had a House retreat leading to big budget session, and they invited Steffanie Clothier from NCSL to provide pre-k info ï thinking it would build opposition among Republicans. Instead, it showed how other Republicans in other states were supporting it, and led to major turnaround. (or at least definitely foiled that legislatorôs plan to use the info to oppose pre K expansion).ò[251]

[251] Interview with Kathy Glazer.

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vidence transmitted to policymakers, and ñit seems very important to governorsô staff and legislators that Virginia received attention from [NGA and NCSL].ò

Virginia also had other connections to the national network and to other individual states. United Wayôs Success by Six campaign was influential in Virginia, especially in the Richmond area, where former Dominion Power CEO Tom Chewning got involved in pre-k through his 2005 chairmanship of the Greater Richmond United Way. The fact that Virginia both neighbors North Carolina and is similar to it geographically, demographically, and politically has also had a clear influence. As noted above, Governor Hunt visited the state several times, including private meetings with both Governor Warner and with gubernatorial candidate Tim Kaine. Smart Startôs funding of technical advice to other states was also instrumental in assembling the task force that was responsible for engaging key business leaders. Virginiaôs state Voices affiliate has worked closely with those inside government, leading grassroots advocacy efforts to complement them, as well as accessing inter-state connections and other resources through its national network.

In addition to these resources, Virginia has received funding from Pew in recent years to support momentum around pre-k. Early efforts were clumsy ï some interviewees felt that Pre-K Nowôs promotion of a move toward universal pre-k under Kaine was ill-considered, and that it caused more harm than good, as the legislature has consistently endorsed public support for at-risk children only. However, later assistance helped pay for a key lobbyist, which protected VPI from planned cuts and prevent the elimination of support for the Virginia Early Childhood Foundation. Bob Pianta says that foundations, including Pew and Casey, have helped by ñeither moving dialogue along or keeping it alive under tough circumstances.ò More directly influential are two

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rfolk (now Hampton Roads Community) Foundations.[252] Both are major supporters of early childhood supports including and beyond pre-k and, as discussed above, the Norfolk Foundation has been instrumental in much of the pre-k progress over the past decade.

That said, it is not clear that all of the stateôs pre-k sites provide the high level of quality service that NIEER reports; the local nature of control in Virginia means quality measures likely vary from site to site and region to region. Indeed, one of those interviewed asserts that Allenôs ñguttingò of state-level DoE infrastructure left Gilmore facing both budgetary and structural deficits and also solidified local control of VPI services. ñAs a result, pre-k is a collection of a lot of local programs that are fostered and supplemented by the state, but [there is] little state role beyond that.ò As well, quality measures that have been added incrementally, including stricter teacher qualifications and comprehensive curriculum standards, do engender opposition from for-profit child care centers, as is true in most states.

Kaineôs decision not to push for a universal program represents a key point; all of those interviewed agreed with media and other assessments that there was little support for such a shift and that the stateôs political culture inherently rejected it. If Kaine had decided to propose it nonetheless, perhaps through supportive Northern Virginia members of the legislature, he might have lost ground rather than gaining as much as he did through increases to the targeted program. Finally, the solid foundation that was laid by Allen and enhanced under Warner allowed Kaine to make changes, such as piloting mixed-delivery to enhanced flexibility for local communities and establishing a comprehensive curriculum focused on social and emotional development.

[252] Interview with Kathy Glazer.

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lso a positive, rather than a negative, force in Virginia. A Republican governor first enacted the program, helping create initial support among Republican legislators and paving the way for later progress. Senate staff well-versed on VPI legislation, in particular a key staffer who later staffed the Senate Finance Committee, also helped smooth the shifts. The two Democratic governors who, together, were responsible for the bulk of VPI enhancements had worked closely together, the first mentoring the second. Finally, Kaineôs creation of the VECF was a critical factor in helping to preserve pre-k across the most difficult and partisan transition, at the height of the Great Recession. This turned out to be a prescient decision, given the one-term gubernatorial limit.

Virginiaôs public and state representatives run a wide spectrum of political perspectives, from progressive Northern Virginia to very conservative rural and Southern regions. The latter has generated opposition to pre-k on both social and fiscal grounds and, as discussed in chapter six, also influenced VPIôs trajectory at several points. Economic factors also played a role at several points, including fiscal limitations under both Gilmore and Kaine.

Bottom line: Virginiaôs connections to the national network and proximity to North Carolina helped lay a strong foundation that is bolstered by increasingly broad support from the business community and grassroots across the state. Adoption under a Republican governor has been key to reducing what might otherwise be stronger opposition from conservative legislators, while two successive Democratic governors, the latter a vocal supporter of pre-k, helped to greatly enhance investments in both access and quality. While its local focus is similar in some ways to that of Ohio, the degree to which local preferences watered down state standards seemed more limited. Although several interviewees noted variations in quality across the state, which seemed to be the case in all four that were studied, state exploration that discovered that variation and holes in

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ve quality, rather than to a rally by child care providers to squelch the quality provisions.

Kaineôs policy choices, in particular, allowed for some needed increases in flexibility, such as a mixed delivery system, and established structures that helped VPI survive a difficult partisan gubernatorial transition and will continue to benefit it. State and neighboring experts can help as the state works to make quality more consistent and otherwise enhance VPI, with supportive and knowledgeable media outlets an additional resource to tap to highlight needs and successes.

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ayer of understanding to chapter fourôs statistical analyses, illustrating the influence on each stateôs pre-k investment of its connections to the national policy network and its various components, of those components with the stateôs early childhood policy community and its characteristics, and of the policy entrepreneurs embedded within them. They also add nuance to the other factors explored in the regressions, including political and economic factors and earlier pre-k policymaking decisions. Bringing together findings from the four studies illuminates trends that may be relevant to other states as well. These include: the influence of state early childhood policy communitiesô characteristics on their effective use of national network resources; the potential for those national pre-k policy networkôs contributions to be both positive and negative; the benefits and limitations of gubernatorial leadership; the increasing importance of business leaders as advocates; the influence of early legislative choices, and the balance between state and local control. These, in turn, point to several policy suggestions, such as the benefits of establishing quality standards early and/or of embedding them within existing legislation; potential ways to reduce the negative impact of the rift common among states between pre-k and child care groups; and creating bipartisan bridges across gubernatorial transitions.

National Policy Network

The four states studied can be seen as situated at different points along a spectrum of interaction with and benefit from the national pre-k policy network and its various components. At the same time, statesô internal dynamics influenced those interactions and degree to which they benefited from the connections.

Arizona never had support from either of the major foundation-based strategy networks, and indeed, though a key policy advocate tried to persuade Pew to fund a campaign there, Pre-K Now decided against it. Like all other three states studied, it was a member of the middle-of-the-

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tes, none of those interviewed saw it as having any real impact. With respect to other components of the network, Arizona had decent connections to national-level early childhood advocates in its early pre-k years, but because those were pre-2000, they were not positioned to take advantage of the more robust research and advocacy tools available later. Perhaps, by the time those other resources were available, Arizona was too far along a path of decline to be attractive, as Pewôs decision not to engage might signify.

At the other end of the spectrum, Ohio had support from both Pew and from being a member of the BUILD network, as well as support from both middle-of-the-road initiatives. If overall level of engagement with and support from the national network were predicted to lead to more success in scaling up the state pre-k program, Ohio should have scaled up the most of any of the four states studied, and among most states overall. As the hypothesis asserts, however, the cohesiveness of the stateôs early childhood community, as reflected in the nature of its links to the national policy network, is critical. In Ohioôs case, support from advocacy strategies at both ends of the narrow-broad spectrum, as well as both in between, suggests a lack of cohesiveness and clarity of vision that is borne out by the case study. Of the four states studied, interviews in Ohio made reference to the largest number of early childhood advocacy groups, several with overlapping missions. This also may point to the impact of the state policy communityôs internal characteristics on its capacity to draw on the resources of the national network. For example, Amy Swanson noted that Voices had repeatedly attempted to bring NGA and/or NCSL summits to Ohio, with no success.

Connecticut and Virginia can be seen as falling between the two; both had less contact with the national network than Ohio, at least as reflected in Table 5.1ôs foundation support list, but, unlike Arizona, interviewees did not describe any of the sense of isolation that those in Arizona

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ed programs later, providing more opportunity to look at early stages in their policymaking processes to other states for guidance. In Connecticutôs case, its primary policy entrepreneur, Elaine Zimmerman, had direct influence from her work in California, and her promotion of a comprehensive, multi-agency program. Aside from the employment of experts from other states, however, there was little evidence from the interviews of outside influence or external support after the agenda-setting and adoption stages. Like Ohio, there may have been some sense that such support was not needed. Indeed, David Nee and Janice Gruendel had no support from their fellow early childhood advocates when they wanted to pursue membership in the BUILD network. And interviews with Pre-K Now staff suggest that they had the impression that the stateôs early childhood leaders did not feel a need for their support, either.

Virginia seems to have succeeded the most in taking advantage of the national network. It solicited support from the NGA and from Governor Hunt and his Smart Start network when it was most needed to translate Governor Warnerôs broad support into Kaineôs enhancement of VPI. At the same time, it managed to adapt that stateôs model appropriately; VPI can be seen as a hybrid of Smart Start and the Pre-K Now model, in that it is more targeted to pre-k, but has some other initiatives tailored to local needs. The state policy community also rejected external support when it saw it as unhelpful (as per Kathy Glazerôs response to Pew), yet re-engaged with that partner at a critical point (Pew/PKN and PAES). The strength and cohesiveness of the early childhood policy community seems to have enabled those to happen.

As this illustrates, the timing of the national network may also be a factor. Connecticut and Virginia, which both adopted pre-k programs in the mid-1990s, have enjoyed much more success than Arizona and Ohio, earlier innovators. One potential interpretation, discussed in the case studies, is that earlier adoption provides fewer state examples to emulate or adapt and national

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however, that this factor explains as much of the variation in success among states as is theorized. Nor are earlier pioneers, such as Maryland or New York, compared here, making it hard to tease out the impact of this factor. This question does suggest a path for future research however, and points back to the results of the statistical analysis regarding the influence of the number of years a stateôs program has been in place.

State Early Childhood Policy Communities

The case studies also serve as mirrors reflecting the conflicts playing out in the national policy network. Just as foundations and advocacy groups struggled to balance child care and early education needs and to determine the benefits of broad early childhood programs versus pre-k specific legislation, states had those debates internally, with the degree to which they were able to unite behind one or both a factor in their ultimate pre-k progress.

All four of the states studied reflected cultural and/or philosophical differences between the pre-k/education-oriented and child care/service provider communities. However, the degree to which interviewees perceived this divide to have affected or limited pre-k expansion varied greatly and also reflects some of the larger cultural differences across states. The conflict seems to be more pronounced in Ohio, where, as discussed above, parallel programs emphasize one or the other. This division seems pretty clearly to have negatively affected the efficacy of early childhood advocacy efforts; Wiechel says that divisions within the early childhood community, which Swanson agrees were very visible to legislators, compounded advocatesô legitimacy with legislators in conveying the increasingly complex research findings on early childhood programs.

At the other end of the spectrum, interviewees in Virginia described the conflict as extant but not very influential. This could be a result of stronger quality standards in enacting legislation laid an early foundation, but, as also noted there is substantial variation across sites that creates a

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reality in many places. In Arizona, this issue, like others related to pre-k, was subsumed by ideology, with right-wing representatives and groups crafting legislative language around quality that made investments in pre-k more difficult; for example, requirements that a percentage of providers be private meant the need for grants to pair those providers with higher-quality, public sites to improve quality. In Connecticut, Governor Rellôs investments allowed for investigations that uncovered low quality among many providers and began to improve them, but that funding was cut during the recession, and some interviewees suggested that recent loss of cohesion might be exacerbating some of the tensions between child care and pre-k camps. The four statesô Quality Ratings and Improvement Systems (QRIS) also seem to reflect their pre-k investments; In Virginia, Kathy Glazer describing service providersô satisfaction with the system, which has been used to engage a broad base of business leadership, while Connecticut is still developing one, and Ohio and Arizona have struggled to provide the funding needed to provide even basic quality.[253]

Finally, the role of the business community in each state seems to be a microcosm of the respective trajectories. In Arizona, business leadership was key to the establishment of the CAA and to initial legislative success with the passage of Success by Six, and also to the passage of the First Things First ballot initiative. As the state has grown increasingly conservative, however, even business support has not been sufficient to counter legislative opposition. In Ohio, scattered support has come from individual business leaders in cities across the state, rather than from a unified community until the Business Roundtableôs recent decision to tackle the issue. Early business support that helped to spur the adoption of Connecticutôs School Readiness program has

[253] This has a secondary benefit of making the program more attractive to the business leaders who have been key supporters in all four states and many others. Several members of the business community who were interviewed referred to programs like Ohioôs PSPP and Connecticutôs non-NIEER ranked program as ñbabysittingò and wished to eliminate them and bring the children they currently serve into the ELI and CSRRII programs they perceive to be of higher quality.

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rebuild and expand that critical base.[254] In Virginia, conversely, business support that had been scattered has gradually come together, with support from Pew and under the leadership of entrepreneurs like Paul Hirschbiel, to form a successful bulwark against recent attempts to cut VPI.

Business leadership in the states also intersects with, and suggests a cross-state role for the United Way. Information gleaned from case studies points to the influence of United Wayôs Success by Six campaign and its addition to the national pre-k policy network. In Virginia, several business leaders, including Tom Chewning and Paul Hirschbiel, came to pre-k through their involvement in United Way Success by Six campaigns, which helped to build up pre-k programs in particular regions.[255] In Ohio, too, interviewees cited United Way efforts in several of the cities linked to local initiatives. (In Arizona, CAA became the mechanism for the Success by Six campaign that was promoted through United Way in other states.) This is another example of an organization that, though its overarching mission is not thematically tied to pre-k or early childhood, provided key inter-state links and ties to other network members.

As the above assessment demonstrates, the strength, cohesion, and unity of vision of each stateôs early childhood policy community directly influenced the stateôs progress on scaling up its pre-k program both directly through its ability to persuade policymakers to make particular investments, as well as indirectly through its ability to draw and connect to state and national policy network resources.

[254] At the November 2010 business leader summits co-sponsored by the Connecticut Business and Industry Association, one speaker noted that the state was not far ahead of where it had been at a recent event years prior.
[255] Richmondôs Success by Six campaign was key to the stateôs recruitment of other business leaders and produced some of the most influential advocacy materials used to promote pre-k, including through adaption by Pew.

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olicy entrepreneurs who continued to serve leadership roles from prior to pre-k adoption through adaptation stages and who had access to key leaders. (Were those two facts not true, the states would likely not have been the subjects of studies, as they would have had no programs.) The level of access, however, and influence of entrepreneurs seems to vary across states. In Virginia, the two prominent entrepreneurs were closely tied to the governors during the key years of pre-k expansion, one from inside government, the other on the outside but playing a role through his appointment to a key government-established foundation. In Arizona, on the other hand, while both Kamin and Basha had some access to Napolitano, both felt unsure of her personal commitment to the issue and were less privy to decisions around pre-k than were Hirschbiel or Glazer.

Interestingly, both Virginia and Connecticut, the more successful of the four states studied, also had another advantage that their less successful counterparts lacked: scholarly experts on pre-k who were native to the state and widely known (to the point of being prominent speakers on the issue at the national level as well). Every person interviewed in Connecticut pointed to Yale professor Ed Zigler's influence in a number of ways: as a researcher, who added weight to advocates' case, helping to craft legislation, testifying, speaking at state events, etc. Bob Pianta assumed much the same role in Virginia; as an early childhood scholar at the time VPI was enacted and enhanced, he provided support for specific quality enhancements. He is now Dean of the Curry School of Education at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville. No state expert of comparable stature has supported efforts in either Ohio or Arizona.

Across the board, the leadership of governors was critical; in both Ohio and Arizona, the governor's initial support was the impetus behind enactment, while in Connecticut and Virginia,

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ave driven major new waves of investment and of quality enhancements. At the same time, governorsô roles varied. In Ohio, Governor Voinovich was the most important entrepreneur, while in the three other states gubernatorial leadership was created and driven by entrepreneurs who came from outside of government. The case studies confirm Rigbyôs demonstration of multiple potential roles for governors, both leading and supportive, in both liberal and conservative states (Rigby 2008).

They also, however, illustrate the potential danger of having a governor lead state support for pre-k, with gubernatorial transitions playing out differently across states in conjunction with such leadership. In Ohio, Voinovichôs strong early leadership helped establish state support for pre-k in a state that continued to suffer from fiscal challenges. However, his central role meant 1) that pre-k was closely associated with him (and later with Republicans) and 2) a program modeled on Head Start, to which he was very committed. Both have subsequently limited pre-k progress. Support for pre-k weakened in the transition to his Republican successor and dropped off dramatically after the following election and the election of a Democrat. Challenges arising from Head Startôs complex funding structure and eligibility requirements have been compounded by the alienation of some service providers who support other models.

In Virginia, Governors Warner and Kaineôs leadership have been critical to increasing pre-k investments, but, in contrast to Ohio, both were persuaded by policy entrepreneurs whose advocacy began before and continued after their terms. As a result, advocates were able to help translate Warnerôs more modest support for pre-k into vocal and ambitious promotion by Kaine and to establish a body to ensure continuity in more difficult transitions. The latter turned out to be particularly critical when Kaine was succeeded by conservative Republican Bob McDonnell. Pre-k advocates were very concerned, but in the face of the most serious state fiscal problems in

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rt from the business community and strategic lobbying has so far preserved most of the stateôs substantial investment in pre-k. Although McDonnell has recently backed off from apparent support, interviewees are optimistic that progress toward serving all at-risk children will continue after minor current ñblips.ò

Arizona is more complicated. Governor Babbittôs personal strong support for pre-k, and Symingtonôs more strategic support were key to the passage of initial pre-k legislation, but, as in Virginia, a small group of policy entrepreneurs external to the government promoted that support and maintained it. With increasing conservative opposition, however, lack of support under Hull limited progress. Napolitanoôs leadership on pre-k is unclear, with perspectives on pre-k support in this critical period varying from one person to another. Irrespective, the immediate rescinding of early childhood legislation she spearheaded ï in particular, full funding for child care and full-day kindergarten ï highlights the near impossibility of lasting support for pre-k, regardless of the governorôs support, if the legislature is hostile.

The influence of the governor in Connecticut is similarly less clear. Through the first eight years of the School Readiness program, the governorôs role was secondary to that of the legislature; Rowland was supportive, helping ensure that the program was ñprotected at all costs,ò but a quiet backer of [House Speaker Tom] Ritterôs public leadership.[256] Rellôs election signaled the first time that a governor took the lead on pre-k in Connecticut, and she achieved increases in access (though, as in Virginia, the consistency of quality across sites was found to be more uneven than believed). At the same time, state advocates are divided as to her impact; some view the Cabinet and Council that she created as central to pre-k progress, while others believe that they weakened the legislative commitment that was critical to sustained investment.

[256] Interview with Elaine Zimmerman, January 28, 2011.

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All four states studied demonstrate the influence of the characteristics of legislation on subsequent level of success in implementation and adaptation. In Arizona, provisions that allowed districts to choose non pre-k use of funds and made that choice easier resulted in that outcome, as expected. As described by one interviewee, the provision watered down funding so much that it made little substantial difference in any single district, yet it could still prompt turf battles if threatened, making transition to pre-k funding very difficult. And in Ohio, two parallel pre-k models seem to have contributed to a higher degree of fighting over resources and attention than might be true in other states. As Michelle Katona describes, ñFunding for Head Start comes out of the [federal] Department of Education, ELI came out of the [state) Education deparment, in concert with Jobs and Family Services. And the Child Development Block Grant comes out of welfare, [and is therefore] about letting parents go to work, keeping kids safe, not about education. This can lead to both turf and leadership issues.ò

While two of the states saw substantial increases in quality over the decade of interest, all four illustrate the challenges to embedding serious quality standards in pre-k legislation, and in making those standards a practical reality. As Cannon noted of opposition to Head Start Plus, quality improvements can threaten lower-quality service providers. Arizonaôs challenges in retaining FTF funds to work with private providers also signal problems with ñadd-ons.ò Beginning at a higher level of quality, as Virginia did, likely improves subsequent quality, but of course it is not possible for the majority of states that have longstanding programs. Comparing Virginia and Connecticut to Ohio and Arizona, one takeaway may be the relative efficacy of embedding such standards within existing legislation, rather than creating separate legislation to address issues of quality.

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ment of Quality Ratings Improvement Systems, or QRIS, which provide uniform expectations and, optimally, support and incentives to gradually reach quality levels. These apply to existing legislation, so they are neither ñadd-onsò nor replacements for existing pre-k measures. Louisiana and Pennsylvania, among others, base state reimbursement levels on a programôs level of quality and provide help to enable them to move up. The market-like aspect of QRIS systems makes them popular among business leaders, and they are a way for states to take steps toward higher quality during a recession without necessarily investing many more dollars. (For example, the state could focus on bringing more programs into the QRIS system before pushing to increase quality among those already in it.) The Ohio BRT report points to the stateôs QRIS, Step Up to Quality, as one of ñA Few Bright Spotò in an otherwise bleak early childhood policy landscape.[257]

All four pre-k programs were also influenced by 1996 federal welfare reform legislation, but in very different ways. While Virginia and Connecticut, which were just enacting their laws, were able to use the money to build momentum for and attract state support for their programs, Ohio and Arizona both experienced funding shifts that many interviewees depicted as weakening state commitment to pre-k. It is not clear that Ohio could have made a very different choice ï it has faced serious economic problems, making federal dollars a critical ingredient ï but at least one interviewee felt that, had more consideration been taken in how the money was spent and, thus, the requirements attached to it for state programs, the consequences would have been much less severe. Again, state political culture interacts with other forces to provide different outcomes in different states.

[257] *The Talent Challenge 2: Ensuring Kindergarten Readiness by 2020,* December 2010, Ohio Business Roundtable.

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ips played important roles. In Arizona, the first funding for pre-k was private but contingent on matched public funds. Public-private partnerships at the local level across Ohio supported numerous community initiatives. The Connecticut Cabinetôs Community Co-Investment Public Private Partnership was noted by the NGA as a Best Practice, and the Virginia Early Childhood Foundation has served as an important bridge across partisan and gubernatorial transitions and to the stateôs business community.

State vs. Local Control

All four states also illustrated the challenges of balancing local needs and capacities with a coherent, state-driven framework. In Arizona, Governor Napolitano saw embedding pre-k and other early childhood supports in local, community-based councils as key to ensuring their survival in the face of legislative opposition. Jacobs and other see this as prescient; strong grassroots support has been a key factor in preserving FTF in the past year, as all of Napolitanoôs other early childhood policies were wiped out. Some have expressed concern, however, that the result of such a heavily local focus has been the creation of disparate constituencies with divergent goals and views of the agency and a lack of coherent policy supports. In Ohio, the stateôs county-based governance system and resulting emphasis on local culture led to the ñ88 different waysò of pre-k implementation. One consequence was the vast variation in quality, which was a stated reason for Stricklandôs decision not to protect ELI in 2009.

In Connecticut and Virginia, a similar focus on local needs and capacity is touted by many as a smart way to tailor programs, and it seems to have allowed local communities to work within the framework of the SRP and VPI to meet local needs. However, it seems to also hamper the state-wide data collection that legislators increasingly demand and the evaluation of quality, leading to substantial disparities across cities and regions. One interviewee in Connecticut notes

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fused to acknowledge kindergarten readiness data required by law that showed many children not fully ready and 20-40% not at all ready.

The issue of local control also sheds light on how community-based contributions and/or programs might influence the level of state investment and/or substitute for state funding. In Virginia, for example, the requirement for state matching funds, based on localitiesô capacity, has been seen as limiting pre-k investment in under-resourced communities and was the reason for Kaineôs pilot to alleviate that problem. In Ohio, ña county-administered state,ò Michelle Katona notes that ñseveral of the counties [have] very significant early childhood initiatives because of public-private partnerships [and that] the state does need to provide a leadership role in order to bring all children equal access and quality services.ò

Media Influence

The early childhood community in all four states has benefitted from supportive media coverage of and even active advocacy on behalf of state funding for pre-k programs. While this is not surprising in a state as progressive as Connecticut, more moderate Virginia and Ohio saw similarly positive articles in several papers, and even in conservative Arizona, the stateôs paper of record backed the FTF ballot initiative and publicly denounced the legislatureôs recent attempt to repeal it.[258] In Virginia, one the most progressive state newspapers, the *Virginian Pilot*, has been a consistent champion of pre-k, with one interviewee noting its beat reportersô in-depth understanding of early childhood education issues. Indeed, the *Pilot* went so far as to continue to promote universal pre-k after it became clear that the concept could not gain enough support to be implemented.

[258] One interviewee in Ohio did assert that ñmedia hasnôt played a large enough role,ò and that ñit takes quite an effort to get the media focused on early childhood,ò but, overall, interviewees expressed appreciation for state newspapersô positive coverage of pre-k.

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r not) of the media continues to be hotly debated at the national level, these case studies suggest that state newspapers remain an important resource for pre-k advocates, even, and perhaps especially, in more conservative states. Educating reporters and maintaining strong relationships is thus likely a worthwhile use of the resources of state early childhood communities. As such, the sharp decline in the number of state and local papers, and in reporters who know about and cover issues specific to the state capital is likely an issue to be considered by pre-k advocates, who rely on ñearned mediaò to make their case.

In all, the qualitative analysis confirms the role of the national policy network as a whole, and of its various members, in promoting pre-k across all states over the past decade and of its influence in particular states. The four state narratives illustrate the interactions of state early childhood communities with the network at various points in the policymaking process, suggesting that it has served as both a source of initial inspiration and evidence to help open and take advantage of windows of opportunity and, in later stages, to inform more targeted issues such as quality improvements. Stronger links to and better leveraging of those resources seem to have helped drive greater investments in Virginia, while weaker links and missed opportunities to employ resources may have contributed to lack of progress in Ohio. Arizona and Connecticutôs records are less clear, and four studies are not sufficient to draw definite judgments on this point.

The impact of cohesive versus fragmented policy networks is demonstrated much more clearly in these four examples, though, as is true of relationships to the national network, causal direction is not always clear. (I.e., states that have less success in moving policy are more likely to see their internal networks weaken or lose momentum.) All of the states confronted divisions between the child care and education groups that have long divided the early childhood community, but to different degrees and at different points in their policy processes.

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nd demographic forces have interacted with the policy communities in each state to limit and promote pre-k investment. These factors are discussed in the final chapter, which also presents suggestions for policy implications and future research.

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Introduction

Literature on the history of state pre-k programs in the United States and data on those programs show the ten years following the year 2000 to be qualitatively different from the two decades prior. Pre-k disseminated widely between 1980 and 2000, increasing from a handful of states to most, and some programs grew to serve a large percentage of their stateôs preschoolers, but enhancements to program quality in those years were limited. As outcomes of various models began to become clearer, however, a national pre-k policy network emerged starting around 2000. The multi-faceted network incorporated philanthropic foundations, inter-governmental entities, and advocacy organizations that interacted in various ways to promote investments in preschool-aged children. Among these efforts, funded by various foundations, were approaches to promote specific aspects of pre-k programs. The Pew Charitable Trustsô Pre-K Now campaign advocated for a fairly targeted set of high-quality pre-k programs serving 3- and 4-year-olds, while the BUILD and Birth-to-Five Policy Alliance initiatives, each supported by multiple foundations, set forth a broader, birth-to-five early childhood advocacy strategy. More time-limited initiatives that sat between the two can be seen in the School Readiness Indicators Initiative and Kelloggôs SPARK effort.

The emergence and growth of the network as a whole and of these components of it in tandem with statesô investments in pre-k program enhancements present the question of how the two have worked together. In particular, how has the national pre-k policy network influenced individual states? To what extent do those impacts account for the different ways in which states have invested, and in their success or lack of success in scaling up their programs ï of increasing enrollment while holding steady or improving quality at the same time? With respect to the

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aking, is one or the other more effective in promoting successful scaling up? And how have statesô own childhood policy networks, or communities, characteristics and interactions with the national network moderated those impacts? These questions were tested quantitatively through bivariate and multivariate analyses, controlling for earlier state pre-k policy decisions and for state economic capacity and political characteristics. They were then explored qualitatively through case studies of four states. Connecticut and Virginia were studied as examples of states that have relative success in scaling up over the past ten years, while Arizona and Ohio lost ground between 2000 and 2010.

As the discussion in chapter 4 sets out, the statistical analyses provided relatively little explanation for the factors driving differences across states in pre-k policy, including no apparent influence by either of the major policy network strategies, nor from the middle ground approach. Whether the outcome assessed was level of access or program quality, the most consistent influence was program status at the start of the decade. Earlier adoption of a pre-k program, so that the program had been in existence for more years by 2010, led to higher levels of access, as might be expected, while increased state economic capacity led to smaller increases in access during the decade studied. With respect to quality, the reverse was found: earlier adopters increased quality less, and economic capacity had no apparent impact at all. The statistical analyses did, however, make a strong case for adding a qualitative approach as well; the influence of policy networks, in particular, is likely hard to gauge through quantitative measures.

Indeed, the case studies do provide a very different and nuanced illustration of each stateôs early childhood policy community, and of the interaction of that network with the national network as a whole as well as the component entities that supported state efforts. They suggest that support from external policy network efforts increase success in scaling up pre-k programs.

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luding state and policy network culture, in particular the cohesiveness of the stateôs advocacy community, and specifics of the legislation itself have interacted with the national network to mediate that impact. They also point to evidence that state economic and political characteristics also promote and limit network influences. While each state has very different circumstances and outcomes, and the findings cannot necessarily be applied to others, patterns emerge across the four that are explored here. (It should be noted that in the Great Recession, Ohio and Arizona suffered some of the largest losses of any states to their pre-k programs. In some ways, this may make them outliers. At the same time, as the case study suggests, their weaknesses going into the 2007-2010 years likely led to much of those losses, suggesting lessons for other states as well.) This chapter discusses the various findings that bring together this quantitative and qualitative research, concluding with suggestions for both future research and policy.

Economic Capacity

As noted above, the regression results indicate that greater state economic capacity, measured by average per capita income over the decade studied, was associated with less increase in pre-k access, as measured by the percentage of the stateôs four-year-olds enrolled in the program. While economic capacity would not be expected to influence pre-k policymaking as much as does policies that require more investment, the negative relationship is still unexpected. One possibility is that change in capacity, rather than average capacity, may be a more important factor. In Arizona, for example, one interviewee noted that, because the state is so heavily dependent on tourist dollars but has no stabilization tax or other major revenue source to smooth the bumps that inevitably come from a source that fluctuates so much, year-to-year differences in available funding may be much greater than in other states. In Ohio, where per capita income was

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ng the decade studied, the continued loss of manufacturing jobs and, thus, loss of revenue relative to years prior (rather than to other states) seems to have been a factor in the 1996 decision to substitute state Head Start dollars for federal TANF funds. This was a choice that several interviewees described as the beginning of the end for the stateôs ELI program.

Virginia may present the other end of the spectrum. While none of those interviewed in Virginia pointed to it, the stateôs per capita income rose steadily over the time period studied, so that it ranked twelfth among all states at the start of the decade and rose to fourth, only three less than top-ranked Connecticut, by 2010. It is likely that this increase in revenue contributed to the legislatureôs willingness to allocate increased funds requested by Governor Kaine for the VPI program.

Economic factors also interacted with political circumstances. In Arizona, which, like Ohio, had roughly median per capita income over this period, also has a conservative political culture that opposes spending on social programs and government generally. One of those interviewed asserts that, as the state has increased dramatically in population over the past few decades, there has been a failure to grow government to meet the resulting increased demand. Rather, the stateôs institutions have become more socially and fiscally conservative over that time, widening the gap between demand and supply of such programs (including pre-k).

In Ohio, interviewees described a different interaction between the two factors. Because state and urban poverty was a newer and more visible issue in 1990, Voinovich was elected to office on a platform to fight poverty. Head Start was depicted as an anti-poverty program that would be part of this effort, and, in that contect, its its perceived ñanti-povertyò capacity was recognized and appreciated. As the focus shifted to societal benefits and school readiness,

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nd thus a poorer fit for the stateôs needs. By the time Taft was elected, he was one of a wave of ñeducation governors,ò and Head Startôs broader, service-oriented focus seemed out of kilter to some. As a result, early childhood staff within his administration worked to restructure Head Start and create the Early Learning Initiative. They were challenged, however, by administrative and funding structures that made the shift difficult and, due to its weak launch, may have helped ultimately to kill it.

Finally, while the Great Recession that marked the last three years of the decade studied required virtually all states to make painful budget cuts, it had a very different impact across the four states. In general, the impact on states of recessions tends to lag that of the national impact and also to affect states at slightly different times and to last longer in some states than others. The impact is also obscured in these analyses by the use of an average income measure. With respect to the four case study states, Arizona was among the states hit the earliest and hardest by the recession; heavily dependent on housing, as well as tourist dollars, the massive building boom that had propelled the stateôs per capita income during the start of the decade put the state among those top-ranked for percentages of homes in or facing foreclosure by the decadeôs end. Because the economic capacity measure employed is per capita income, the severity of the impact of this contraction on the stateôs available resources to invest would not be fully evident. The interviews and review of newspaper articles covering the attempt to repeal First Things First, however, made starkly clear the extent of the devastation; several lawmakers cited the need for the return of the FTF dollars to the stateôs general fund to avoid having to sell off major government properties in Phoenix. While Ohio was not hit as hard, its already-high unemployment rate meant that job losses caused by the recession raised it far above the national average, rendering it also an outlier among states.

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states hit hardest in terms of size or percentage of budget deficits, Connecticut also seemed to perceive a disproportionate hit due to the heavy influence of the financial sector on the stateôs Southern region. Several interviewees referred to this fact, affirming again the importance of change in economic capacity versus/in addition to absolute wealth or capacity (which, in Connecticut, remained the nationôs highest). Virginia, on the other hand, was relatively well off compared to the other three states. Northern communities were spared from major increases in unemployment by their connections to the federal government, and although its wealthier suburbs saw some loss of housing value, the same proximity to Washington, DC sustained most of the value, and the state had not engaged in the kind of real estate speculation that heavily damaged Florida, Nevada, and Arizona in particular.

Political Ideology and Partisan Control

Over the decade studied, neither public nor institutional ideology, as captured by Berry *et al* measures of liberalism, influenced levels of access, once the status at the start of the decade was controlled for. Ideology and partisan control did have strong impacts on quality in those years, however, but the findings are hard to interpret: public liberalism was associated with a loss of quality to roughly the same extent that institutional liberalism, which also indicates partisan control, was linked to quality improvements. As is true of economic capacity, the state case studies provide some nuance and illustrate the interaction of political ideology with other factors.

In Arizona, increasing conservatism over the twenty years since the state adopted its pre-k program, and particularly over the decade studied, was cited by every single interviewee as the dominant factor limiting progress in pre-k, whether increasing access or improving quality. The state is home to both strong social and fiscal conservatives, and their influence was depicted in multiple ways. Dana Naimark suggested that the ñOzzie and Harrietò myth that mothers are still

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ere little need for publicly supported child care, is fairly widespread, but that Arizona is so conservative that, unlike in other states, it is voiced publicly.

One interviewee asserted that the two major struggles/issues that have been ñparamount in the debate on preschool are: 1) the role of private providers in the preschool debate; and 2) the ideological debate on parents staying home with their kids.ò The former is an issue of fiscal conservatives, while the latter is a concern among social conservatives, and both have factored into state pre-k policy decision-making. While not related to pre-k, the State Child Health Insurance Program, which also serves low-income children, was the subject of major debate under Governor Hull. Another interviewee pointed out that Arizona was the last state in the country to vote to allocate state funds to match federal SCHIP funds ï the legislature initially rejected the law, and Hull had to call it back into a special session to get it through.

As evidence that conservative ideology gained substantial ground over this time period, several of those who spoke about pre-k pointed to increased opposition to First Things First. In 2006, when the First Things First ballot initiative was presented and passed, the only organized opposition came from anti-tax robo calls led by Grover Norquist and a handful of very conservative Republicans. By 2010, when the repeal measure was introduced, a number of right-wing organizations assembled to back it, including the Goldwater Institute, a long-time critic of state pre-k, and the Arizona Tax Association. The rise of legislator Bob Burns over that period from member to Senate President also illustrates what one interviewee described as the result of state provisions that made it increasingly likely that conservative candidates would win primary contests and that the winners of such contests would win the election. She contended that the legislature had become so ideological that even the stateôs business community had much less leverage than in prior years, rendering its support for pre-k relatively ineffective.

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to interact with the recession. As noted above, Arizonaôs dire fiscal situation provided a rationale for conservative legislators who had long opposed pre-k funding to try to get rid of it. In Ohio, the partisan shift that put ELI on shady ground coincided with the recessionôs impact on the state budget, providing Strickland with a financial basis for eliminating funding of ELI. And in Connecticut, Rellôs apparently sudden loss of commitment to the School Readiness Program was suggested by some to represent a return to her partisan fiscally conservative roots in response to the recession. (McDonnell initially proposed similar cuts in Virginia, but, as discussed in chapter 5, they were staved off.)

One way to explore the influence of ideological conservatism is through a comparison of Southern and non-Southern states. Unfortunately, the only Southern state included in the case studies is Virginia, which has grown increasingly non-Southern over the period studied, as the Northern Virginia communities surrounding Washington, DC have seen an influx of wealthy, progressive residents. It does provide a helpful contrast to Arizona, however, in that the sizeable conservative base is divided among fiscal and social conservatives, and they have not organized to oppose pre-k. Indeed, while the stateôs social conservatives oppose pre-k on much same ground as those in Arizona ï the ñOzzie and Harrietò vision of family life ï they are relatively few in number. Fiscal conservatives have successfully opposed expansion of the Virginia Preschool Initiative from targeted to universal, as demonstrated by Kaineôs inability to expand VPI more broadly, but, as one interviewee acknowledged, ñeven a very conservative [local] foundation was not opposed to public funding for at-risk kids only.ò

These case study findings suggest several possible explanations for the statistical results regarding the influence of political ideology. First, it may be that political conservatism has a much stronger impact than the regressions suggest because they only included states with pre-k

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ng those states. Similarly conservative states such as Utah, Idaho, Montana and Wyoming have no pre-k programs largely because their legislators refuse to provide public funding for them. In Montana, for example, Democratic Governor Mark Schweitzer has made pre-k a priority without success, despite the backing of one of the small stateôs philanthropic foundations. Advocates from Voices for Utahôs Children are currently in negotiations with the legislature to establish a market-based pilot that would channel savings from averted special education dollars into a small pre-k program. If successful, that would be the first state funding for pre-k. Arizona established its program at a time when, as noted, the institutions were much more moderate, but increasing ideological opposition has stifled progress and even erased the small progress it temporarily enjoyed under a Democratic governor.

Another possibility is that, as Rigbyôs results indicate, governorsô party affiliations have influenced pre-k investment decisions, but that those may be independent of the stateôs recent level of liberalism or conservatism. For example, the fact that Republican governors in both Ohio and Virginia championed the enactment of programs led to increased investments in pre-k in both states. In Ohio, however, that association eventually helped prompt the elimination of ELI, while in Virginia, it has continued to bolster VPI and perhaps helped sustain funding following the recent election of another Republican governor. These influences may not reflect the overall measures of state institutional ideology, however. Because Democratic legislators tended to be more sympathetic to pre-k, it was the governorôs party affiliation that commanded the most attention, according to interviewees; i.e., a Democratically-controlled legislature would support pre-k anyway, and Republican connections to the stateôs pre-k program would help bolster the case when Republicans controlled the legislature.

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ative association between the middle-of-the-road strategy represented by the SRII and SPARK initiatives, the quantitative analysis found no influence on pre-k access or quality from either of the two major pre-k national advocacy strategy networks. As discussed in chapter 5, while this finding could be interpreted as lack of support for the hypothesis, it more likely reflects the difficulty of capturing network influence well in quantitative measures and the complex nature of the interactions between state early childhood policy communities and the national networks. These realities are borne out by the case studies and discussed in chapter 5.

However, there may also be interactions between other factors tested in the quantitative analysis and the networks that help to explain the findings regarding both sets of variables. In particular, the economic and political ideology factors discussed above in turn interacted with national and state pre-k policy networks in ways that help explain differences in state outcomes. In Arizona, conservative opposition to pre-k appears to have contributed to the limited effectiveness of the state policy network. The business community that led initial agenda-setting and adoption of pre-k has waned in influence, and the challenges to success that have frustrated advocates have also made it harder to sustain the support of business leader and to recruit new ones. Perhaps more fundamental, the forced end-run around the state legislature drove the First Things First ballot initiative that divided Arizonaôs early childhood community into two camps that remain somewhat at odds to this day as to the wisdom of that approach. And although Governor Napolitanoôs election, and her stated commitment to pre-k, provided sufficient promise for Pre-K Now to consider funding a campaign in the state, a site visit persuaded the campaignôs staff that Arizonaôs political obstacles were likely still too difficult to surmount to make the investment worthwhile. (The other factor was the inability of the two main leaders of the early childhood community to agree on a common strategy.)

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ry conservative history of the state may have been one contributor to the cohesiveness and success of its early childhood policy community. Perhaps as much as any other state, Virginia is really two distinct ones: the progressive Northern Virginia region that surrounds Washington, DC and abuts Montgomery and Prince Georgeôs Counties in Maryland, and the Southern and Western parts of the state, which are also much more rural and less wealthy. From VPIôs adoption by a conservative Republican to Governors Warner and Kaineôs need to negotiate with conservative legislators to reach agreement on enhancements to pre-k, the early childhood policy community grew to know and work with more conservative elements from the start and to understand their concerns. Every interviewee pointed to those factions, yet none saw them as a serious obstacle to the improvements in quality and increases in access to serve more at-risk children. Rather, it was accepted that universal pre-k was not an option; in order to sustain the needed conservative support advocates had to work within certain limits. Indeed, when Pre-K Now pushed Kaine to continue to promote universal pre-k, Kathy Glazer and others pushed back against Pre-K Now, acknowledging the political realities and working toward a more viable way to expand VPI. This consistent collaboration has also led to one of the strongest business coalitions supporting pre-k of any state in the country, one that can take much credit for the programôs largely intact preservation through the Great Recession and a partisan shift in gubernatorial leadership.

At the other end of the spectrum, it is possible that Connecticutôs very progressive culture failed to spur the same kind of coalition-building and contributed to the smaller progress on access and progress, relative to Virginia. Several of those interviewed pointed to Connecticutôs strongly progressive legislature and culture; indeed, it is one of the countryôs most progressive states. And there are hints that this, combined with the wealth of the state, may have led over time to some

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t for the School Readiness Program. When Pre-K Now explored the possibility of mounting a campaign in the state, some staff felt that the state was so well off that there was no need and decided not to invest there. David Neeôs description of the lack of enthusiasm for developing a BUILD campaign in Connecticut suggests perhaps a similar feeling that in such a wealthy, progressive state there was no need for support from the national advocacy network. Among the four states studied, Connecticut was unique in that several of those interviewed responded to the question of what the main opposition to pre-k was by saying ñnone,ò again, noting the very progressive nature of the state. While it seems a strange obstacle to encounter, lack of an ñenemyò around which to unite to defeat may actually be one factor that weakens a coalition.

In Ohio, both economic and political factors interfered with the stateôs early childhood policy community. The budgetary problems that posed repeated obstacles to investments in the stateôs pre-k program forced changes to the program that disrupted coalition-building ï as programs changed, constituencies changed with them, and priorities shifted. And as was true of political obstacles to promoting pre-k in Arizona, economic challenges inevitably frustrated some in Ohioôs policy community, resulting both in attrition and, potentially more problematic, the emergence of new advocacy groups to try to address the problem slightly differently. The political changes noted in Chapter five, from a progressive Republican governor committed to Head Start to a more fiscally-minded Republican successor and eventually a Democrat, also interacted with the stateôs early childhood network. As Karch documented, Head Start has a powerful constituency, and in Ohio, that constituency saw its influence wane as successors to Voinovich favored other models. Political priorities that favored education exacerbated the rift between school-based pre-k and private child care providers, a rift that opened wider when Democrat Ted Strickland reversed

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l program while protecting child care. Faced with major budget challenges, Strickland saw child care as a necessity that working families could not live without, and the roughly five thousand dollar per child price tag compared favorably to the Early Learning Initiativeôs eight thousand. Note, too, that school-based pre-k programs may pay unionized workers/wages, exacerbating the rift with the largely non-unionized, much lower-paid child care community.

Omitted Factors

Race is one factor that has been found in prior research, such as that of Andrew Karch, to influence pre-k policymaking but that was not tested in the statistical analysis. While it was not raised by interviewees in other states, a few of those in Arizona felt that race and ethnicity, both immigration and Native Americans, were a potential factor in opposition to publicly funded pre-k. For example, one noted, ñwhen SCHIP was debated, even though it used funding from a tobacco tax, not from the general fund, one legislator who voted against it said ôI donôt want to support the health care needs of *those* children,ô and I interpreted óthoseô as óbrown.ôò She felt that this was not an uncommon belief among some legislators. Another interviewee noted that, while First Things First worked intensively with Native American communities, and that they were among the strongest opponents to the 2010 repeal effort, there was antipathy among some conservative legislators to funding programs that supported Native American families.

Government structure and/or governance is another factor that was raised repeatedly in the case studies but not represented in the quantitative analysis. Collaboration across offices and agencies that was established under an administration particularly committed to pre-k often did not translate into the same level of collaboration in subsequent periods. In Ohio, the distance between the Department of Education and the Governorôs office became an issue during the Taft

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peration that had been the norm under Voinovich was no longer the case. In Connecticut, the same ambitious inter-agency collaboration that enabled funds to flow both to access/care and to quality appeared to weaken over time. In both states, the lack of inter-agency collaboration was cited as the reason why statewide data collection was unavailable, which, in turn, was cited as a limiting factor in persuading the legislature of the societal benefits of the pre-k program. (In Virginia, a statewide study was referenced by several interviewees as key to persuading skeptical legislators of VPIôs statewide benefits.)

Finally, urbanization or some variation might be a useful addition to future research in this area. While the existence of extensive rural communities was not raised explicitly among case study interviewees as a limitation to transporting young children to pre-k cites, concentrated urban poverty in Ohio and Connecticut in particular was clearly a concern driving pre-k investment that was distinct from poverty overall. As well, interviewees in Arizona referred to the particular need to tailor programs to the needs of rural communities, especially Native American reservations. It should also be noted that because non pre-k states were not among those studied, the degree to which the scattered populations of the Dakotas, Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming have contributed to those statesô failure to fund pre-k programs was not explored.

Research and Policy Implications

The above analysis points to both avenues for both future research and to policymaking ñlessons.ò With respect to selection of variables for use in quantitative research, change in the level of a factor, rather than its level at any particular time, may be decisive. For example, two states that are at roughly the national median with respect to per capita income may in reality be in quite different situations if one is seeing an increase and other a decline. The former would mean likely public perception of greater capacity, while the latter might signal the need to cut back on

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case studies point to changes in political leadership as substantial influences and except for Arizona, shift in governor and/or party seemed to have a larger impact than that of ideology in general. Virginiaôs ability to protect its substantial pre-k program from virtually all cuts during a major partisan shift, also at the height of the Great Recession, suggests a very solid foundation for VPI and a strong early childhood policy community. With data available on cuts to pre-k across the states over the past few years of fiscal difficulty, an examination of how partisan and gubernatorial shifts affected cuts would be a useful contribution to the pre-k policymaking literature.

There are indications in both the quantitative and qualitative analyses that earlier adopters have both advantages over and disadvantages relative to later enactors of innovative policies. With respect to pre-k, earlier adopters have larger programs in place and thus serve more children, but they have had a more difficult time enhancing policy, relative to states with younger programs. It would be helpful to build on Haysô research in this area to try to determine how policy learning mechanisms could better serve more established programs. This might also be related to research that further delves into the interactions between state policy communities and national policy networks, an issue that is surfaced here and suggests the need for further exploration.

As prior studies demonstrate and this work confirms, case studies are clearly a valuable contribution to policymaking research. In this instance, the interactions between policy networks and state actors and circumstances helped to illuminate aspects of the policymaking process that were obscured in the quantitative analysis. They also brought out nuances of the state economic and political characteristics that are hard to capture statistically. At the same time, case studies are time-consuming and labor intensive, and not all work is amenable to conducting them. In such cases, careful construction of variables to represent such factors as policy network influence can

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of findings. For example, Pre-K Now supported pre-k campaigns in a range of states, while promising context was a prerequisite for engagement, it was balanced with other considerations, such as cost of supporting the state group, which was in turn correlated with size of the state, etc. Employing measures that take into account network staffôs perceptions of the relative promise and risk of states with which they engaged might be one way to control for the reverse causation seen in the case studies. In Ohio, for example, the potential big win that would be achieved was likely one reason that the investment was seen as worth the risk in a state that had seen challenges in scaling up. In Vermont, on the other hand, both the risk and the investment level was low, as the state is extremely progressive, had made consistent progress on pre-k, and was small enough that a relatively small dollar investment could potentially make a substantial difference. Of course, this is not necessarily an easy thing to capture and requires a mini-case study of sorts. At the same time, it allows for a better proxy for this particular variable than a simple ñyes-noò approach provides. An alternative option is to distinguish between single-year and continuing funding, or to otherwise further differentiate levels of campaign support.

One of the more surprising pre-k policymaking patterns is the strong investment in the policy among Southern states, which historically under-invest relative to their non-Southern counterparts in both K-12 education and in other social programs serving low-income families. One of the theorized explanation for the overall weak regression results is the split in economic and political characteristics between Southern and other states; this can results in a cancelling-out effect when the two sets are tested together. Because this research sought to explore, in particular, the influence of policy networks, differences between Southern and non-Southern states were not assessed, nor was any Southern state included in the qualitative work, other than Virginia. As other researchers have demonstrated, however, the Southern Regional Education Board (SREB)

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to promote early childhood investments. An in-depth assessment of the SREBGs impact on scaling up, along the lines of this research, would thus constitute another important contribution to the pre-k policymaking literature.

This could also provide important insights for the Rocky Mountains and Northern Plains states that form the bulk of the remaining non-pre-k states. Like their Southern counterparts, these states are fiscally and socially conservative, yet their pre-k investment pattern is the mirror opposite. If researchers were able to identify the mechanisms and strategies that were most successful among Southern states, perhaps some of these could be translated to create the same kind of regional network among the Plains states to disseminate pre-k policies there.

As the recessionôs impacts begin to recede, it would be useful, as well, to assess overall cuts to state pre-k programs, and to explore both those that suffered the largest losses and those that most successfully sustained their programs (or even grew them a bit). Pre-k advocates may be able to point to relatively small losses, on average, as a reflection of the policyôs acceptance and political viability compared to ten years ago. Among those states that did lose ground, as the contrast between Arizona and Ohio on one hand and Virginia on the other illustrates, the recession may be seen as a test of the underlying foundational strength of the program, the degree to which support for it is embedded within the public and policymakers, and the cohesiveness of the state early childhood policy community. Like Virginia, business leaders in Pennsylvania and Alabama were critical to protection of pre-k programs during the recession and through loss of strong pre-k champions in gubernatorial transitions. These examples suggest that one of the strongest protections for programs states can put in place is advocates ñwithout skin in the gameò who are respected by both parties and whose support for pre-k is viewed as legitimate, particularly in difficult budget contexts.

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s some reason to think that embedding quality standards within legislation, rather than adding them on separately, may make them more viable. As well, combining incentives and supports to enhance quality appears to reduce the resistance to higher standards that is engendered among private providers, who often work with fewer resources. Both of these speak to the wisdom of developing Quality Ratings and Improvement Systems (QRISs) with ñteethò that are legislatively or otherwise linked to technical assistance, teacher education and training programs, and financial supports. Louisiana has developed a comprehensive system and is working with several other states to pilot aspects of it.

Within state government, inter-agency collaboration was one of the major challenges to sustaining existing levels of support for pre-k and for enhancing programs. Across all four states interviewees signaled that mechanisms to solidify cross-agency cooperation were among the most helpful policy changes to support pre-k. It was suggested that single-agency responsibility for licensing, data collection, quality evaluation, and support to improve quality would be a very useful improvement. Situating the agency within education, rather than social services, child care, or welfare, was also seen as preferable, as it was likely to support quality enhancements and to make clear the programôs priority for education over parental/workforce support.

Finally, the intersection of state economic and political circumstances with both national and internal state pre-k policy networks offers some potentially useful lessons for states. While national networks can offer useful assistance in terms of advocacy materials, expert speakers, and especially funding, knowing when to say no, or to push back, is critical. To the extent that state advocates can work with external organizations to adapt national-level campaigns to approaches that are culturally and fiscally appropriate within the state context, the outcome is likely to be more successful.

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Detailed History of U.S. Pre-K[259]

led to include a commitment to free education for all children ages four to twenty

1853: New York City has 58 infant schools. The New York Public School Society endorses the schools as a way to counteract some of the damaging effects of poverty.

1873: Wisconsin beings Four-Year-Old Kindergarten (4K). A few school districts maintain 4K service for more than a century despite a suspension of state aid between 1957 and 1984.

1899: The *New York Times* publishes an article about a Day Nurseries Conference, providing a window into public awareness of early care and education.

1903: New Jersey establishes its first pre-k program.

1909: By the early twentieth century, free public prekindergarten for five year olds gains popularity throughout Wisconsin.

1910: Across the country, private nursery schools are established for children birth to five whose mothers are widowed or impoverished. The focus is on hygiene and safety. Tuition is paid by private charities.

1912: The U.S. Childrenôs Bureau is created to investigate and report ñupon all matters pertaining to the welfare of children and child life among all classes of our people.ò The first federal agency for children, it is now located in the Administration for Children and Families at the Department of Health and Human Services.

1913: Dr. Maria Montessori, Italyôs first female physician, visits the United States for a lecture tour on her unique educational methods. Her visit sparks an intense debate in newspapers and communities nationwide around child care and early education.

1915: Parent cooperative preschools being in the United States as educational experiences for young children and their parents. The first is the Northside Cooperative Nursery School in Pasadena, California.

1922: The Womenôs Education Association of Boston funds one of the nationôs first nursery schools in Boston, Massachusetts. In 1952, the school becomes affiliated with Tufts University.

1930: In response to the Great Depression, federal funds are allocated for public nursery schools as part of President Franklin Rooseveltôs New Deal. The Works Progress Administration oversees the program, viewing it primarily as a way to create jobs for unemployed teachers and other school staff. Enrollment eligibility is restricted to children of parents who are on relief. During this time, some of the educational components of a modern day pre-k classroom begin to emerge, such as

[259] Source: Pre-K Now website, www.preknow.org/resource/abc/timeline.cfm, unless otherwise noted.

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ns, and unit blocks. Funding for these schools is terminated strength in 1939-40.

1940: During WWII, the Lanham Act provides federal funds for the operation of hospitals, schools, and pre-kindergarten centers to support those working in the defense industry. The dual purpose of the pre-kindergarten is to create educational experiences for young children and to support working parents. The centers are immediately closed after the war, but California and Washington, D.C. choose to continue funding centers for low-income children and single, working mothers.

1950: Federal government funding for childcare centers rapidly declines as American women leave the workforce to return home, and public support shifts away from separating young children from their mothers for long hours.

1954: More than one million children are enrolled in free, public kindergarten, a 300 percent increase from 1910.

1965: Head Start is established by President Lyndon Johnson as part of the ñWar on Poverty.ò Edward Zigler, a Yale researcher, helps create the program, which assists communities in meeting the needs of disadvanged three and four year olds.

- Washington, D.C. begins to offer pre-k to ñat-riskò children.

1966: New York enacts the Experimental Pre-Kindergarten (EPK), a half-day program for ñat-risk four year olds.

1971: President Nixon vetoes a measure that would have provided day care at no cost to families on welfare and a fee-paying basis to working and middle-class families.

1977: Alaska beings appropriating funds to expand access to Head Start and improve quality.

1978: Florida appropriates funds to offer pre-k to children of migrant workers.

1979: MarylandsôExtended Elementary Education Program (EEEP) begins as a pilot program to help ñat-riskò children in Baltimore City and Prince Georgeôs County.

1980: The federal Department of Education is created, helping to spur the creation of several state-funded, targeted pre-k programs over the following 25 years. Many states also begin supplementing Head Start with state funds to increase access.

1983: A blue-ribbon commission appointed by the Reagan Administration releases ñA Nation at Risk.ò Published by the U.S. Department of Educationôs National Commission on Excellence in Education, it is considered the catalyst for current education reform efforts, but early education and school-readiness issues are not addressed.

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chools to offer pre-k classes for four year olds through the

- West Virginia establishes the Public School Early Childhood Education program for children under five.

1984: South Carolina establishes the Half-Day Child Development Program for those four year olds considered to be most at risk for school failure.

- As part of the education reform package passed by the legislature, Texas establishes the Public School Pre-Kindergarten Program to serve three and four year olds from low-income families. School districts must provide the pre-k program if at least 15 eligible children are identified in the district.

1985: The National Association for the Education of Young Children (NAEYC) creates the first comprehensive system to measure the quality of early childhood programs. NAEYC Accreditation is a voluntary national system that measures the quality of child care and pre-k centers and kindergartens using more than 400 criteria.

- As a result of education reform legislation, Illinois funds half-day pre-k for ñat-riskò three and four year olds.
- Wisconsin resumes funding half-day pre-k programs for four year olds after a 27-year suspension of state funding. The new funds are distributed through the school-aid formula.
- Maine beings supplementing Head Start programs with state funds.
- Louisiana begins funding the Model Early Childhood Program for ñat-riskò four year olds through annual state appropriations.

1986: Massachusetts establishes the Community Partnership for Children as part of the stateôs School Improvement Acts of 1985.

- Rhode Island begins supplementing Head Start programs with state funds.

1987: Florida funds pre-k for ñat-riskò four year olds through the state lottery. Funding for this program and existing pre-k programs for migrant families are repealed in 2002 and placed under the authority of local School Readiness Councils.

- Vermont establishes its Early Education Initiative, a competitive grant program to serve three and four year olds who come from low-income families or have other risk factors.
- Oregonôs Head Start Pre-kindergarten is established for disadvantaged three and four year olds.
- Hawaii appropriates funds to extend Head Start programs.

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is established with the goal of preventing school failure

1989: Hawaiiôs pre-k program, Open Doors, begins serving three year olds with special needs and some four year olds from low-income families.

1990: Research concludes that brain development in the first five years of life is critical for learning and developing nurturing relationships.

- The federal Child Care and Development Block Grant is passed.
- Kentucky establishes the Kentucky Preschool Program as part of systematic education reform. The state provides pre-k funding for all four year olds who qualify for reduced-price lunch programs and for all three and four year olds with disabilities.
- The Ohio Public Preschool Program is established for three and four year olds. It is a targeted program serving low-income families.

1991: The Arkansas Better Chance begins as part of a larger education reform initiative with a dedicated sales tax for the Educational Excellence Trust Fund. The programôs goal is school readiness for three to five year olds who are deemed educationally deprived.

- Learning Readiness, one of several Minnesota pre-k initiatives, is established. The pre-k component is a half-day program for three and four year olds. Children considered ñat riskò as determined by Minnesotaôs health and development screening receive priority.
- New Mexicoôs Child Development Program for children from birth to age five begins.
- ñThe National Commission on Children emerged from fifteen months of site visits and town meetingsé with a bill of particulars covering everything from health and family-support initiatives to early education and family values.ò[260]

1992: The Nebraska Early Childhood Education Grant Program begins as a pilot program and is eventually made permanent in 2001. The program serves three and four year olds as well as some infants and toddler from low-income communities identified by the state.

- Louisiana funds the Starting Points pre-kindergarten program.

1993: Georgia initiates the Georgia Pre-Kindergarten Program for ñat-riskò four year olds using funds generated by a state lottery. It is the nationôs first pre-k program open to all four year olds.

1994: Delaware establishes the Early Childhood Assistance Program. It is a part-day program for four year olds who meet Head Start income eligibility requirements but are not served by Head Start.

[260] Kirp, David, Sandbox Investment, 155.

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is established to serve disadvantaged four year olds who programs.

- The Carnegie Corporation issues its report, ñStarting Points,ò which refers to a ñsilent crisisò facing young children and their parents, and references new research on the importance of early years for brain development.[261]
- The Pew Charitable Trusts ñembarked on an ambitious 10-year effort to reinventò the nationôs child care and early education system, but ñpulled the plugò after 18 months.[262]

1996: Arizona forms the Early Childhood Block Grant to fund a pre-k program targeted at four year olds eligible for free or reduced-priced lunch programs as well as full-day kindergarten and supplements for grades K-3.

1997: The New York State Legislature passes legislation with the purpose of making pre-k available to all four year olds by 2002. However, in subsequent years the Universal Pre-Kindergarten program receives flat funding, leaving close to three-quarters of the stateôs foru year olds without access to the program. Most children served by the program are from low-income families.

- Rhode Island establishes the Early Childhood Investment Fund to encourage schools to offer early childhood programs.
- Connecticut establishes the School Readiness Initiative for eligible three and four year olds in predetermined low-income or ñhigh-riskò school districts.
- The Clinton White House conference entitled ñWhat New Research on the Brain Tells us About our Youngest Childrenò marked the culmination of a well-orchestrated publicity campaign by Rob Reiner and his wide circle of friendsò to promote pre-k programs.[263]

1998: Illinoisô pre-k program is added to the Early Childhood Block Grant.

- Oklahomaôs half-day pre-k program, the Early Childhood Four-Year Old program, is made available to all four year olds in the state.
- Tennessee begins funding the Early Childhood Education Pilot Project for three and four year olds from low-income families.
- Kansas creates the At-Risk Four-Year-Old Children Preschool Program, a part-day public-school-only program for children who are considered at risk but not eligible for Head Start.

1999: California voters approve Proposition 10, a ballot initiative that institutes a tobacco tax to establish the First 5 California Children and Families Program and Commission and authorizes the establishment of county First 5 commissions. The mission of these commissions is to provide

[261] http://carnegie.org.
[262] Kirp, Sandbox Investment
[263] Kirp, Sandbox Investment, 97-98.

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rated system of early childhood development services from

- Missouri establishes its pre-k program through the Early Childhood Development, Education, and Care Fund, which pools riverboat gaming fee revenues. The fund supports programs for children birth through age five, including pre-k programs in school and community agencies. The Fund also supplements Early Head Start and increases subsidy rates for accredited childcare centers.
- South Carolina creates a new initiative, First Steps to School Readiness, for children ages birth to six. It is a comprehensive program modeled after North Carolinaôs Smart Start.

2000: Massachusettsô advocates launch the Early Education for All campaign with the goal of establishing pre-kindergarten for all three and four year olds.

- Idaho, New Mexico, and North Dakota begin using federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families funds to supplement Head Start and Early Head Start.
- Alabama launches the Pre-Kindergarten Pilot Program for four year olds. Although there are no set income or eligibility requirements, most participating children are eligible for free or reduced-price lunch programs.

2001: Illinois Governor George Ryan appoints a Task Force on Universal Access to Pre-kindergarten charged with devising a plan to implement pre-k for all three and four year olds.

- Louisiana uses federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families funds to establish the LA4 pre-k program for low-income four year olds. In addition, the Non-Public Early Childhood Development Program is created with the purpose of reimbursing approved non-public pre-k programs for the children they serve.
- Pennsylvania appropriates federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families funds to enable Head Start programs to extend their hours and/or days of operation.
- North Carolinaôs More at Four program is established to expand pre-k opportunities for ñat-riskò children. Beginning in 2004-2005, at least 80 percent of participants must come from families with incomes at or below 250 percent of the federal poverty level.
- After cuts in its early childhood budget from $30 million to $18 million, the David and Lucille Packard Foundationôs longstanding focus on children narrows on universal pre-k and hires Lois Salisbury, former executive director of the state childrenôs lobbying group. ñJust as Pew launched Pre-K Now to spread the preschool gospel, the Packard Foundation started Preschool California to move the topic to the front burner there.ò[264]
- The Packard Foundation, with support from Kellogg and Ford, launches its School Readiness Indicators Initiative in 17 states. The first national meeting is held, the final one is in 2004.

[264] Kirp, Sandbox Investment, 165.

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untryôs seventh largest foundation, awards a grant of cy center for pre-kindergarten.[265] The new Washington-based nonprofit organization is to work at the federal level to expand support for more effective early education for all three and four year olds and to enhance existing state-level campaigns for voluntary pre-kindergarten.

- The Maryland state legislature passes the Bridge to Excellence in Public Schools Act requiring local school systems to provide pre-k services to all eligible four year olds from disadvantaged families or who are homeless.
- On January 8, the federal No Child Left Behind education reform law is signed by President George W. Bush.
- The Nevada Early Childhood Comprehensive Plan begins serving children birth to five, though most participants are three and four year olds. The program is operated on a competitive grant system through both public schools and private centers. Although there are no official eligibility requirements, preference is given to low-income and ñat-riskò children.
- Florida voters approve a ballot initiative that amends the state constitution to require the state to provide voluntary, high-quality pre-k to all four year olds.

2003: The process of implementing Floridaôs 1998 pre-k ballot initiative begins with the convening of the Florida Universal Pre-Kindergarten Council. The Council creates a high-quality curriculum and program standards, which are presented to the Florida State Board of Education in October.

- A $30 million funding increase for the Illinois Early Childhood Block Grant is passed. The Illinois Early Learning Council is created to make recommendations for a comprehensive early learning system for all families in the state.
- The Kellogg Foundation launches its SPARK (xxxxx) initiative in seven states and Washington, D.C. The initiative runs through 2008 and includes governorsô forums in five states.

2004: The Massachusetts legislature authorizes the restructuring and consolidation of existing state early childhood programs into the Department of Early Education and Care. The Department will be governed by an independent board of experts and key administrative leaders and run by a new commissioner of early education and care. Its goal is to create a plan to establish pre-k for all the stateôs three and four year olds.

- A bill intended to satisfy Floridaôs voter-approved constitutional amendment on pre-k is vetoed by Governor Jeb Bush because it does not include adequate quality standards. The

[265] David Kirp writes in Sandbox Investment that the result of a 2000 ñpitchò from early childhood researcher Steven Barnett to Pew was a ten-year commitment to advocate for universal pre-k, including funding for the NIEER.

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a second pre-k measure which Governor Bush signs the program standards are still too low.

- Los Angeles Universal Preschool (LAUP) is created with funds from First 5 Los Angeles. LAUPôs goal is to offer high-quality pre-k to every four year old by 2014. First 5 LA commits $600 million over five years to begin pre-k-for-all implementation. First 5 county commissions in California work toward similar pre-k for all plans, including San Mateo, Santa Clara, San Francisco, and San Diego counties.
- ***2003,*** NGA given Pew funds to hold a Florida governorsô summit on pre-k.

2005: Pre-K Now is established by the Pew Charitable Trusts to support advocacy throughout the states for high-quality, voluntary pre-k programs that serve all three and four year olds. A national conference in Marina del Rey, California discusses strategy and messages for states.

- New Mexico creates a pilot pre-k program for four year olds.
- Tennessee Governor Phil Bredesen makes early childhood education a top priority and, in May, the legislature passes a bill allocating $25 million to expand the stateôs pre-k program.
- Floridaôs legislature passes a pre-k funding bill allocating $2500 per-child, a figure that many parents and private and public pre-k providers is insufficient to create a high-quality program.
- For the third consecutive year, a $30 million increase for the Illinois Early Childhood Block Grant passes through the legislature, fulfilling Governor Rod Blagojevichôs 2002 campaign pledge to secure a $90 million increase. The legislature also avoids proposed budget cuts in home-visiting programs for ñat-riskò infants and toddlers.
- The Arkansas legislature appropriates an additional $20 million per year for the Arkansas Better Chance pre-k program. The legislature also re-approves the three percent excise tax on beer, which was set to sunset in 2005 and is expected to generate about $9 million annually for the program.
- The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation launches Thrive by Five in Washington state.
- The National GovernorsôAssociation (NGA) Task Force on School Readiness releases its final report on Building a Brighter Future.

2006, NCSL hosts ñwildernessò states pre-k conference in Montana, sponsored by Pew

2007, NGA announces $10,000 grants to states to hold governorsôsummits on early childhood

2009, January SPARK networking meeting in Battle Creek, Michigan

2010 NGA launches ñnew national policy and planning initiative to develop the infrastructure needed to improve childrenôs access to high-quality early learning programs, including child care, Head Start, and Pre-K.ò

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Dependent Variables

NIEER definition of state preschool program includes/requires a:

- State-funded initiative (which excludes state-run programs funded by federal dollars);
- Focus on serving children ages 3-4 (which excludes programs that include such children but focus on toddlers and/or infants as well);
- Program focus on group learning two or more days per week (which excludes programs that serve children on an occasional basis);
- Program that is distinct from the state's child care subsidy program, although it may be "closely coordinated with it; and, while substantial expansion of Head Start or related programs using state dollars does qualify as state pre-k, state enhancements of existing programs do not.ò

Together, these guidelines provide a picture of state pre-k that capture many, but definitely not all programs that exist within states ï in particular, those funded by cities or counties, programs that serve younger children, and programs funded largely by federal sources.

Dependent Variables

- ***Pre-k Access09*****:** Percentage of the stateôs four-year-old residents who were enrolled in its NIEER-defined pre-k program during the 2009-10 school year.* (Note that P***re-k Access01*** is among the independent variables, in order to construct the change model.)
- ***Pre-k Quality09*****:** NIEER ranking of stateôs pre-k program on a ten-point quality scale in the 2009-10 school year.* The 10 factors include: *teacher quality* (teacher has B.A., specialization in early childhood, has met annual in-service hours, and assistant has at least an early childhood certificate); *classroom* (curriculum standards, maximum class size of 20, maximum child-teacher ratio of 10:1); and *services* (screenings and referrals, family supports, and provision of meals). See table, below, for details on number of states meeting each benchmark in 2001-02 and 2009-10. (Note that ***Pre-K Quality09*** is among the independent variables, in order to construct the change model.)

*with respect to all three measures, for states that had more than one pre-k program, the value reflects a weighted average of the programs

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capita income of stateôs residents, data from the 2010 censuses.

- ***Public ideology:*** Berry *et al* measure of state populationôs level of political ideology, with more liberal populations scoring higher and conservative ones lower. The scale runs from 1 to 100, but actual state minimum is 22 and maximum 88, 2001-2007 figures.
- ***Institutional ideology:*** Berry *et al* measure of state legislature and governorsô level of political ideology, combined with weighted measure of partisan control. States that are more conservative score lower and more liberal states score higher. The scale runs from 1 to 100, but, as with public ideology, actual values range slightly less, from 13 to 91.[266]
- ***Pre-K Now***: This variable represents the more targeted approach to early childhood advocacy, with efforts focused on preschoolers aged 3-4 in center-based settings. It measures a stateôs level of engagement with and support from the Pew Charitable Trustsô Pre-K Now campaign, including the years prior to 2005 when it was officially a separate grantee. A measure of 2 indicates intensive support, meaning funding of at least one state early childhood advocacy group and periodic calls to provide technical assistance and discuss needs, plus other potential support. A 1 indicates less support, with little or no funding and only one-time or sporadic technical assistance. A 0 indicates that Pre-K Now has not supported a campaign in the state. This information was obtained from Pre-K Now staff.
- ***BUILD:*** This variable represents the broader strategic approach to early childhood investments, with a focus on children birth to age 5 in a variety of settings, and including non-cognitive supports such as health care. It measures a stateôs level of engagement with and support from two coalitions that exemplify this approach: the BUILD and Birth-to-Five Policy Alliances. A measure of 2 indicates that members of the stateôs early childhood community have received support from both initiatives. A 1 indicates that either BUILD or Birth-to-Five, but not both, has funded work in the state. A 0 indicates that no state group has received support from either initiative. This information was obtained from the websites of the respective campaigns.
- ***SRII:*** This variable represents an approach that falls between the two main camps, and that has been more limited than either of them in both time and resources. It measures a stateôs level of engagement with and support from two initiatives that exemplify this middle-of-the-road perspective: The School Readiness Indicators Initiative (SRII) and Supporting Partnerships to Assure Ready Kids (SPARK). A measure of 2 indicates support from both initiatives, a 1 signifies support from one or the other but not both, and a 0 indicates that no state group has received funding from or been a participant in either.

[266] As discussed above, this slight difference partially illustrates the difference between the two measures; in several states, institutional ideology is more extreme than public opinion, bringing the minimum score down.

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ariable was constructed using NIEER data for each state t represents the percentage of state early childhood funds devoted to a Head Start program as a percentage of pre-k funding; the numerator is total state dollars spent on Head Start, and the denominator is total state dollars spent on pre-k programs. NOTE that federal dollars devoted to Head Start are not included in the calculation.

- ***Southern:*** A dummy variable indicates that a state is Southern. Southern pre-k states are Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. (Mississippi has no pre-k program, so it is not coded as such.)

NIEER Quality Measure Benchmarks: Number of State Pre-K Programs that Comply[267]

Broad quality category (#)	Specific quality factor	# of states that meet benchmark, 2001	# of states that meet benchmark, 2009-10
Teacher quality			
1	***Teacher has B.A.***	20	27
2	***Teacher specialized in early childhood education***	31	45
3	***Teacher met in-service requirement for hours***	27	44
4	***Teacher's aid has at least early childhood certificate***	11	16
Class quality			
5	***Early Learning Standards***	15	49
6	***Maximum class size (20)***	31	46
7	***Staff-student ratio (10:1)***	30	45
Services			
8	***Screenings and support***	23*	36
9	***Site visits***	33	40
10	***At least one meal***	21	24

*In an earlier yearbook, the definition was different, and 18 states were considered to be in compliance: ñEighteen of the state-financed initiatives mandated screening and referral for vision, hearing, and health. Twenty additional initiatives mandated at least one type of screening or referral, or allowed programs to determine screening and referral requirements at the local level. Five state initiatives had no specific requirements for screening and referral services.ò[268] Several of the definitions have changed, these represent 2010 definitions.

[267] Note that, because the number represents the programs that comply, rather than states, the total exceeds the states that NIIER counts as having pre-k programs (several of them have more than one)
[268] NIEER Yearbook 2003 at p.34.

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e must have comprehensive curriculum standards that are exclusive to prekindergarten and cover the domains of language/literacy, mathematics, science, social/emotional skills, cognitive development, health and physical development, and social studies. ***2009-10: Early learning standards:*** National Education Goals Panel content areas covered by state learning standards for preschool-aged children must be comprehensive.

- ***Teacher degree requirement:*** Lead teachers are required to hold at least a BA in both public and private program settings.
- ***Teacher specialized training requirement***: Pre-service requirements for lead teachers must include specialized training in early education. Such training might involve licensure/endorsement in the prekindergarten area or a degree or credential in early childhood, such as a CDA. Elementary teaching certificates and kindergarten endorsements were not considered to qualify as specialized training in early childhood.
- ***Assistant teacher degree requirement:*** Assistant teachers are required to hold at least a CDA or equivalent (24 hours in early childhood), in both public and private settings.
- ***Teacher in-service requirement:*** Teachers must be required to receive an average of at least 15 clock hours of professional development annually.
- ***Maximum class size:*** Class sizes must be limited to no more than 20 children, for both 3- and 4-year-olds
- ***Staff-child ratio:*** Classrooms are required to have at least one staff member present per 10 children attending, for both 3- and 4-year-olds
- ***Screening/referral requirements:*** Programs are required to provide both screening and referral services that cover at least vision, hearing and health.
- ***Family support services:*** Programs must offer at least one type of support service for families of participants. Services may include parentsô conferences or adult education, referral to social services for families, or information relating to nutrition.
- ***NOTE:*** In later versions, screening/referral and support services are combined, with ***monitoring***/site visits of centers added as the tenth benchmark.
- ***Meal requirements:*** Programs are required to provide participants with at least one meal daily. Snacks were not counted as meals.

[269] Note that several of these changed between 2001-02 and 2009-10. For benchmarks for which there has been a change, both are noted.

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R Quality Standards Checklist[270]

been found by research to contribute to the quality of prekingarten programs.ò However, ñ[t]hese benchmarks do not represent a high standard of excellence, but are viewed as important minimums for an educationally effective preschool program, particularly programs that serve educationally disadvantaged children. (This checklist should *not* be interpreted as implying that these are the only aspects of a program that are important for quality.)

- ***Scale:*** Each prekindergarten initiative received a summary score based on the total number of benchmarks that were met, ranging from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 10. ***This scoring system is merely a couple of the items and is not meant to imply that all of the items are of equal value of interchangeable***. For example, providing a meal does not offset the effects of failing to require that teachers have a college degree and vice versa.
- ***Implementation/Policy vs. Practice:*** ñBenchmarks were developed for each item, and for each prekindergarten program we determined whether or not state policy met the relevant benchmark.ò It should be noted that this means that NIEER did not/is not able to investigate actual compliance by pre-k programs with their stateôs policy.

[270] NIEER Yearbook, 2002-2003.

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Protocol

I. Preliminary timeline created using NIEER information on each state
II. Basic (internet) searches
III. Targeted (internet) searches
IV. Information review and assessment, creation of state histories
V. Interviews
VI. Interview Data review

II. Basic Searches

- State name, pre-k/prekindergarten (and/or early education, if appropriate): may generate news articles, assembly bills, names of key actors (both individuals and groups) arguments for and against policy changes, etc.
- Pre-K Now state profile
- State newspaper of record searched using same terms found relevant in Google search
    - Key pieces of information are incorporated into a preliminary state pre-k history
    - Documents and websites are captured in the data shell and saved in the stateôs file
- Information gleaned from this search is recorded in the spreadsheet, and the timeline is expanded/ fleshed out. Specifically:
    - Names of key actors are incorporated as potential interviewees
    - Relevant legislation, both proposed and enacted, is added to the timeline by date and also recorded for further exploration
    - Early childhood advocacy and other relevant interest groups, both internal and external to the state, are entered as potential sources for further information, documents, and interviews
    - News articles that highlight key decisions, actors, and sources of information (the reporters themselves and/or academics quoted) are documented, saved, and used as next-stage guidance
- These lead to more targeted searches

III. Targeted searches

- State government websites ï key dates, documents, individuals etc. (very limited because most information is kept only a short time)
- Websites of relevant/influential individuals and organizations, including Wikipedia entries
- Documents and other materials suggested in above search
- Biographies of people named in searches above

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Data Collection Shell

National/state	*Source*	*Data/Doc*	*Notes*	*Status/eval*
All states	NIEER yearbooks	State pages for Arizona, Ohio, Connecticut, and Virginia: 2001, 2005, and 2008	Notes on each are incorporated into draft write-up. No need to photocopy ï have copy of each yearbook.	
National	Basic internet search ï pre-k/ prekindergarten	Googled ñpre-kò and ñprekindergartenò Pew Charitable Trusts Packard Foundation Kellogg Foundation Buffett Early Childhood Foundation National Governors Association, NCSL Voices, NAEYC, CDF	Pre-K Now, lots of private programs, some foundations, a lot of different results Pre-K Now page, Pew Center on the States, specific materials and links to NIEER School Readiness Indicators Initiative (involved all four of my target states, funded by Packard, Kaufmann, and Ford Foundations, run by RI KIDS Count). Relevant pages printed and filed, information incorporated into national network. Recently pledged $16.5 mil to Buffettôs EC efforts. Building network of Educare centers, supports Birth to 5 Policy Alliance (state EC charities/policies) and First Five Year Fund (federal spending on early learning). (Also support from Kaiser, Gates, Irving Harris, Pritzker.) Pages on early childhood for each org, links to Pew, Harvard Center on the Developing Child, other Pre-k and many other early childhood pieces (little relevant on CDF site)	
Arizona	Basic internet search -	Governor Napolitanoôs School	First result is AZ.GOV (see below), also ECS profile, several news articles, Goldwater Institute opposition page, Town	

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		liness Action , 01/04	Hall report.	
	pre-k for preschool and prekindergarten which brought some of same results, also individual programs).	AZ.GOV, Arizona govôt website, has pre-k page	Broad input from across state, items include health screenings, doubling funding for Healthy Families, QRIS, EC quality improvements, incentives to improve EC teacher quality, better child care.	
		Arizona 84th Town Hall report on Pre-K-12 ed	Page includes information on child care, ECE-preschool, EC Special Ed ï preschool, birth-3, and Head Start. ECE in ADE Focus on pp. 4-6 (pre-k references), 9-11 (community role), 17-23 (list of members, participants etc.)	
		Fight Crime AZ report, see Appendix C FNs.	Promotes NFP, quality pre-k, drug abuse counsel for pregnant women, mental health support	
	Newspaper of record	Searched stateôs major newspaper, Arizona Republic ï www.azcentral.com.	Searches conducted: pre-k, Napolitano and pre-k, ñNapolitano early childhood aide,ò ñBasha pre-kò (none), ñBasha early childhood,ò ñpre-k advocateò (none), ñearly childhood advocate,ò ñFirst Things Firstò (too broad, got irrelevant hits). Abstracts saved in internet searches doc, notes incorporated into state history/timeline.	
	Targeted searches	www.azaeyc.net	Came up in general pre-k search, site focused on training of EC teachers and caregivers, promotes advocacy for high-quality EC programs but no links to advocacy tools/resources.	
		First Things First	First things First (created in 2006), Arizona EC Development and Health Board History, About us etc. printed and filed, reviewed Leadership and Staff for potential interview targets	

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		t Napolitano, ipedia	Born 1957, New York City. 1991, Anita Hillôs attorney. Spoke at 2000 and 2004 Dem Natôl Conventions. Awards for good governance, was a member of Dem Governors Association, *chaired NGA 2006-07*, Western Governors Association. As NGA chair, pre-k was NOT her priority, focus on workforce innovation w/ 3 big issues STEM, post-secondary ed, business innovation. (PKN has NOT seen her as a leader on pre-k, notes in 2007, 2009 Leadership Matters flat funding of ECSBG.)	
Connecticut	Basic search		ñConnecticut pre-k,ò pulled up a lot of individual pre-k program sites, first hit was Pre-K Now state profile (Jodi Rell important figure). ñPrekindergartenò the same, plus ECS state profile, CT Preschool Curriculum and Assessment Frameworks, docs that help programs design curricula and evaluate outcomes.	
		Government contacts	Bureau of Early Childhood and Social Services, CT State Dept. of Education.	
		ECS Connecticut page	www.ecs.org/dbsearches/.../PreK_ProgramProfile.asp?state.	
	Newspaper of record	Hartford Courant	http://www.courant.com/. Did archive searches: pre-k (1994 first article), Graustein Fund mentioned in many of articles as spurring local planning, action, advocacy; Jodi Rell, mayor of Hartford pre-k supporters; reports issued on benefits of pre-k; 2010 article notes issues with funding, access; achievement gap, economic issues prominent drivers/arguments Carolyn Moreau authored several articles, should interview her	
	Targeted internet	Jodi Rell	Gives her political history, notes priority for ECI. She was	

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		graphy, got her cial site, www.connecticut.gov Nothing re pre-k or ECI on her Wikipedia bio/site.	LG for nine years before becoming governor, and she was active in the NCLG and served as president of National Order of Women Legislators.	
		State dept. of Educ., www.sde.ct.gov	Comprehensive state education plan for 2006-2010 has high quality pre-k as the first step, look for potential interviewees?	
		Connecticut Business and Industry Association	CBIA promotes education through Public Policy Advocacy and through its Education Foundation, http://www.cbia.com/edf/. ñCBIA makes important policy recommendations to government, foundations, and corporations. é We advocate for policies ranging from expansion of early childhood education to high-school reform, pathway programs from two-year colleges to four-year universities, and increased assessment and accountability at every level. ñ With respect to Education and Training Policies, ñCBIA works to advance a number of public policy goals related to education and workforce training. Our agenda addresses two major achievement gaps: (1) the gap between Connecticut's poor and minority youth and its white, middle- and upper-class students, and (2) the gap between American students and those studying in foreign countries.ò http://www.cbia.com/edf/Policies.htm. (page printed and filed)	
		Connecticut ECEC	http://www.ctearlychildhood.org/. Relevant pages printed and filed, two individuals identified for interviews	
		William Caspar		

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		ustein Memorial ndation	Printed pages from this site: http://www.wcgmf.org/. It has been supporting education work since a 1993 gift. Notes taken and incorporated into state pre-k history. Reviewed: Strategies, Discovery Initiative, Partnerships. Site mentions as well the Early Childhood Funders Affinity Group, Child Care Cost Model. See Publications re relevant advocacy and research actions	
Ohio	Basic search: ñOhio pre-kò Also did ñOhio prekindergartenò		Pulled up Pre-K Now Ohio page (information incorporated); Ohio Early Learning Program Guidelines (saved in Ohio file); OH Dept. of Ed (has Early Learning and School Readiness page); Center for Early Childhood Development; Ohio AEYC; state foundations that support EC work (OCF, Gund, etc.) Pre-K Now State Profile (saved in Ohio file) cites Groundwork, Build Ohio, School Readiness Solutions Group, Voices for Ohioôs Children, Ohio United Way, and Fight Crime Invest in Kids Ohio Prekindergarten pulled up much of the same, plus private/indiv programs, Groundwork, and ECS page (latter saved in file). ñNursery schoolò produced only individual/private programs.	
	Newspaper of record	Cleveland Plain Dealer Columbus Dispatch (2nd largest, better archive)	Not much ï search engine only goes back to 2005, hard to use ñPre-kò as search starting in 1994 turned up handful of articles, only from 2002, saved relevant clips in Ohio file. ñpreschoolò instead brought 1600 articles, most not at all relevant, but I saved the useful ones in the same file with the	

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			others.	
		o Childrenôs Foundation	Funds service and advocacy, works w/ Pew, Voice for Ohioôs Children, GroundWork, and Voices for Americaôs Children	
		GroundWork	Printed main pages, including staff, Advisory, and donor lists.	
		Voices for Ohioôs Children	Have basic history, mission, and Amy Swansonôs bio	
		Voinovich, pre-k	US Senate page, 2011 Appropriation bill requests for labor, health and human services, and education, including $1 million for a universal pre-k program in Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), citing economic returns, potential as model for national UPK	
		Strickland, pre-k	Office of Governor webpage has ECE page, with a school readiness focus. Full cite on search page	
			PKN press releases, pages, etc., not much on Wikipedia.	
Virginia		Basic search ï pre-k and Virginia	PKN State page ï printed and reviewed; news articles on key pre-k decision points (reviewed/saved); references to Voices for Virginiaôs Children, Fight Crime	
		Virginia and prekindergarten	Virginia ECS page (short, only through FY 2002, so most missing, but saved in VA state file Also Kaplan page for Virginia, VAEYC push for UPK in Virginia, otherwise much the same as pre-k (which Google suggested)	
		Follow-up searches	*Voices* website (John Morgan) ï established 1994 , expanded to NoVa in 2006, priorities: pre-k, foster care, quality child	

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			care, immigrant support, data and research to stakeholders. Lead multiple ECE coalitions, expansion and maintenance of pre-k among their policy successes. (printed pages on history, successes, policy priorities for file) *Fight Crime Virginia* page shows 2006 report release on pre-k investments reducing crime; July 2009 law enforcement event; Fight Crime has no VA office, but Mission Readiness is big there. *Virginia Early Childhood Foundation*: public-private partnership founded in 2005 (under Kaine) to advance Smart Beginnings in VA. Works w/ VA Office of Early Child Development and with VA Smart Beginnings. (key pages from website printed for file) *Smart Beginnings* ï sponsored by the VECF, ñSmart Beginnings brings people together in support of Virginia's youngest citizens, those under the age of five.ò SB supports 27 local or regional initiatives working to build networks for early care and education services. Tom Chewning chairs SB Leadership Council.	
	Newspapers of record	Richmond Times Dispatch Virginian Pilot	#2 paper in state, might be most influential for policymakers. Search: Pre-k (tons of good articles, but only goes back to mid 2007, saved in VA state file) #1 circulation, based in Northern Virginia. Search: Pre-k (search only from 2002, requires daily subscription) 800 clips came up, many classifieds and careers, but told story of pre-k rise from 2002 to 2010, especially through Kaine (paper has been strong pre-k supporter, including UPK), saved some good pre-k articles.	

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t, creation of state histories

basic and targeted searches, state pre-k histories are fleshed out, with key decision points identified and, where possible, individual actors and/or groups attached to them.

  - This includes identifying individuals and groups involved in enactment vs. adaptation phases
  - Within state government, aides or others close to key actors at key points in time are identified where possible (governors themselves unlikely to be available to talk)

- Individuals and organizations are identified as interview targets. (see above re proxies in cases in which the actor ï government, advocacy group etc. ï is not available or unwilling to be called
- Table set up for each state to compare interviewesôresponses re key entrepreneurs, national network connections, influence of various early childhood groups/networks, etc.

V. Interviews

Using the template self-oriented questions set out in Figure 5.1, this section provides examples of interview questions for different types of interviewees: policymaker aides; leaders of early childhood advocacy organizations; foundation staff; and members/staff of inter-governmental organizations. Names are not included, but the sets of questions below demonstrate both the detail level of the questions asked (though not all pertain to all interviews), as well as customized questions that relate to state-specific events or information (in red text).

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<u>s – e.g., governor's senior education policy advisor</u>

1. ***How and when did you become engaged in early childhood development/pre-k?***

2. ***What are the major factors that drove STATE's initial decision to enact a pre-k program?*** (1995, under Governor Allen)
   a. *How strong was the influence of a specific individual/leader?* Who? How?
   b. *How strong was the influence of interest/advocacy groups?*
      i. If so, inter-state or intra-state or both?
      ii. Which ones? In what ways? (Voices? Who was there then?)
   c. *How strong was the influence of evidence or anecdotal information from other states?* How was that conveyed? (NGA? NCSL? Was SREB influential in VA?)
   d. *How strong was the influence of research/evidence?*
      i. Which line of evidence ï School readiness? Brain? Economic? State-specific?
      ii. How was this research conveyed/disseminated?
      iii. How did the concurrent CHIP enactment play a role ï EC health focus?
   e. *What role was played by the media*, and how did it interact with the above factors?
   f. If one or more of these was a substantial factor in policy-making/enactment:
      i. Provide an example of how the individual/group/resource was successful
      ii. Try to rank the relative influence of the factors that had the most impact

3. ***What were the main sources of opposition to enactment of a pre-k program?***
   a. Groups/populations?
   b. Institutional/within the government?
   c. Reasons the state did not adopt earlier: Political? Economic? Other?
   d. Was Republican Governorôs leadership unusual/unexpected?

4. ***Basic trajectory of state's program since enactment (factors in scaling up/not)?***
   a. *Describe major policy changes* ï access? Quality? Investments? Other? (There does not appear to have been much post-enactment change through Wilder? True?)
      i. *Describe the formation of the Early Learning Council (Warner)*
      ii. *Describe the enactment of the Virginia Early Childhood Foundation/Smart Beginnings (Warner)*
      iii. *Describe the establishment of the Smart Strong Council (Kaine)*
      iv. *Virginia has put in place several quality enhancements – teacher quality and curriculum requirements etc. What prompted/encouraged those?*
   b. *Has there been strong influence from a specific individual/leader?* Who? How? (Within government or outside of it?) Warner came to office favoring pre-k. Was this his own belief? Did he have an aide or other influence?
   c. *How strong is the influence of interest/advocacy groups?* (Voices? Others?)
      i. If so, inter-state or intra-state or both? Which ones?
      ii. Warner was fairly involved with the NGA. Do you think the NGAôs pre-k message/events had an influence on him?
      iii. Has the advocacy message been more specific/unified or broad/scattered?
   d. *How strong is the influence of research/evidence?*
      i. Which line of evidence ï brain? Economic? State-specific?
      ii. How has this research been conveyed/disseminated?

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position to proposed policy changes?
ervative message of parental control/kids at home
resonated especially in more rural/Southern parts of the state?

ii. Is the opposition scattered, organized, unified, etc.?

f. What role was played by the media, and how did it interact with the above factors? (Virginian Pilot has pretty consistently written favorably, how about other papers?)

g. If one or more of these was a substantial factor in policy-making/enactment:
   i. Provide an example of how the individual/group/resource was successful
   ii. Try to rank the relative influence of the factors that had the most impact

5. Other influential individuals we should talk to or organizations we should look at?

Leader of Early Childhood Advocacy Organization – e.g., director of state Voices chapter

1. How and when did you become engaged in early childhood development/pre-k?

2. ***What are the major factors that drove STATE's initial decision to enact a pre-k program?*** (1990, under Governor Voinovich. How did former role as mayor influence his position?)
   a. *How strong was the influence of a specific individual/leader?* Who? How?
   b. How strong was the influence of interest/advocacy groups?
      i. If so, inter-state or intra-state or both?
      ii. Which ones? In what ways? (Voices? CDF? Who was there then?)
      iii. This was prior to NGA involvement. Other groups?
   c. How strong was the influence of research/evidence?
      i. Which line of evidence ï School readiness? Brain? Economic? State-specific?
      ii. How was this research conveyed/disseminated?
      iii. How was evidence about Head Start conveyed/influential?
   d. *What role was played by the media*, and how did it interact with the above factors?

3. Basic trajectory of state's program since enactment (factors in scaling up/not)?
   a. *Describe major policy changes* ï access? Quality? Investments? Other? (Ohio made changes early, under Voinovich)
      i. *Describe the formation of the Ohio ECEC*
      ii. *Describe who and how was served by Head Start in early days, when/how that changed*
   b. *Has there been strong influence from a specific individual/leader?* Who? How? (Within government or outside of it?) Voinovich came to office favoring pre-k. Was this his own belief? How did his personal/political history impact this/subsequent?
   c. *How strong is the influence of interest/advocacy groups?* (Voices? Foundations?)
      i. If so, inter-state or intra-state or both? Which ones?
      ii. Has the advocacy message been more specific/unified or broad/scattered?
   d. How strong is the influence of research/evidence?
      i. Which line of evidence ï brain? Economic? State-specific?
      ii. How did emerging Head Start findings influence policy decisions?
      iii. How has this research been conveyed/disseminated?

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position to proposed policy changes?
ssage of parental control/kids at home resonated especially in more rural parts of the state? Other opposition?

ii. Is the opposition scattered, organized, unified, etc.?
iii. How influential is the opposition, and with whom?

f. *What role was played by the media, and how did it interact with the above factors?* (Columbus Dispatch covered under Voinovich a lot, also reports by Pre-K Now, CDF. How has this influenced decision-making?)
g. If one or more of these was a substantial factor in policy-making/enactment:
   i. Provide an example of how the individual/group/resource was successful
   ii. Try to rank the relative influence of the factors that had the most impact

4. ***Other influential individuals we should talk to or organizations we should look at?***

Inter-state/national network Interviewee (Pew/Inter-governmental entity)

1. ***How and when did you become engaged in early childhood development/pre-k?***

2. ***How did ORG work across states?***
   a. *Research*
   b. *Advocacy*
   c. *Partnerships with other organizations*
   d. *Federal policy*

3. ***How did ORG work in individual states? (in particular AZ, OH, CT, VA)***
   a. *Funding*
   b. *Research*
   c. *Advocacy*
   d. *Partnerships with other organizations*
   e. *Inter-state networking/events*
   f. *Technical Assistance/other?*

4. ***Trends in pre-k investments over the 1990-2010 period in terms of access, quality, other factors?***
5. ***Other influential individuals we should talk to or organizations we should look at?***

* Note that I was not able to conduct interviews with ñneutralò observers in any state, nor with legislators, so these sets of questions, which would pull from several of the above, are not here.

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	(e.g. advocacy group, government aide/policymaker, etc.)	**Date Interviewed**	**Source/Identified by**
AZ	**Nadine Basha –** policy entrepreneur, advocate (CAA board member), policy maker aide (Napolitanoôs early ed board, First Things First)	09/07/2010	Albert Wat and Libby Doggett both mentioned her. Her name and her husbandôs came up in many news articles about the ballot initiative, others
CT	**Janice Gruendel** ï policy entrepreneur, advocate (Voices), policymaker aide (Rellôs senior policy advisor on EC)	12/14/2010	News articles re her appointment, Albert Wat and David Nee both noted her influence
CT	**John Rathgeber** ï advocate (CBIA), served on Rellôs Early Childhood Research Policy Council	08/05/2010	Name came up in articles that referenced CBIA and pre-k, ECRPC, worked with David Nee
CT	**David Nee** ï policy entrepreneur, advocate, foundation (Executive Director of William Caspar Graustein Memorial Foundation)	09/02/2010	Graustein reference in general search, multiple newspaper articles
AZ	**Rhian Allvin** ï advocate (CAA), policymaker (First Things First)	09/27/2010 (email)	Nadine Basha referenced her, her name was in news articles regarding First Things First
OH	**Jessie Canon** ï policy aide (Taft budget advisor on early childhood), advocate (BRT pre-k work), former head, Family & Children First Council	12/23/2010	Amy Swanson identified her as ñmust interview.ò
OH	**Amy Swanson** -- advocate (Executive Director, Voices for Ohioôs Children)	08/30/2010	Voices for Ohioôs Children came up in search for pre-k, Ohio and in several news articles
VA	**Tom Chewning** ï advocate, business (Virginia Early Childhood Foundation), former chair of United Way	09/27/2010 (email)	Name in news article re United Way, VECF
VA	**John Morgan** ï advocate, (Executive Director, Voices for Virginiaôs Children)	09/21/2010	Identified by Pre-K Now staff, Voices came up in search for pre-k, Virginia
Pew	**Albert Wat** ï national network (Research manager for Pre-K Now)	11/10/2010	Research manager for Pre-K Now, author of multiple research and advocacy pieces
Pew	**Libby Doggett –** director of Pre-K Now, **Stephanie Rubin**, state campaigns manager, Pre-K Now	01/ 2011 (email, off-the-record)	Suggested by Albert Wat to follow up on questions regarding PKN history, NGA etc.
AZ	**Lisa Glow** ï policy aide (policy advisor to Napolitano)	08/20/2010	Identified by Nadine Basha as key policy advisor

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	entrepreneur, policy aide er and executive director of the Childrenôs Action Alliance)	01/07/2011	Identified in newspaper articles as key advisor to Babbitt, subsequent advocate
VA	**Bob Pianta** ï policy aide (Smart Start Council), neutral (researcher, University of Virginia), national network expert	01/06/2011	Recommended by John Morgan, authored 2003 article on status of state pre-k policy
VA	**Kathy Glazer** ï policy entrepreneur, policy aide (first director of Office of Early Childhood Development under Governor Kaine), advocate (now works for Build initiative)	01/04/2011	Identified by John Morgan and Bob Pianta, others
OH	**Mark Real** ï advocate (former director of Ohio Childrenôs Defense Fund)	01/04/2011	Identified in news articles citing research from CDF, Jessie Cannon pointed to his influence
NCSL	**Steffanie Clothier** ï national network (led NCSL early childhood work)	02/03/2011	Identified through NCSL website, interview with Albert Wat, and interview with Kathy Glazer
OH	**Jane Wiechel** ï policy entrepreneur, policymaker/agency (Department of Education during Taft)	01/10/2011	Name surfaced in news articles on pre-k during Taft administration, Jessie Cannon recommended as major influence on her involvement in pre-k
NGA	**Anna Lovejoy** ï national network (directed early childhood policy for NGA Center for Best Practices)	01/31/2011	Identified by Pre-K Now staff, others
CT	**Elaine Zimmerman –** policy entrepreneur, advocate **(**Executive Director of Commission on Children)	01/30/2011	Identified through newspaper articles, interviews with David Nee and Janice Gruendel as key policy entrepreneur
AZ	**Dana Naimark,** -- advocate (executive director of CAA)	01/31/2011	Suggested by Carol Kamin as follow-up on CAA activities, state contact for SRII
CT	**Theodore Sergi** ï government/policymaker (former state commissioner of education under Rowland, Rell)	02/02/2011	Identified in news articles as pre-k advocate as state commissioner of education, and for requesting less money than hoped by advocacy community.
AZ	**Michelle Katona** ï advocate, government (worked in Ohio DoE)	02/14/2011	Identified/suggested by Amy Swanson (now lives and works on early childhood policy in Arizona)

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	y entrepreneur, foundation ndation), government aide (VECF)	01/04/2011	Recommended by Tom Chewning, Bob Pianta, business leader from Allen days.
AZ	**Amy Corriveau** ï government (formerly at DoE, now at FTF)	01/30/2011	Recommended by Nadine Basha. Permission not granted, notes not attributed
AZ	**Irene Jacobs** ï government (senior policy aide to Governor Napolitano) , advocacy (Educare Arizona)	02/04/2011	Recommended by Dana Naimark
	Additional – suggested but not interviewed		
OH	**Marcia Egbert, Gund Foundation**	Not able to schedule	Identified through news articles, Gund site, several interviewees
CT	**Carolyn Moreau, reporter, Hartford Courant who covered pre-k news for many years,** cmoreau@courant.com	No contact	Reporter who covered pre-k for several years, but unable to get her agreement to talk
OH	**Susan Zellman, was OH superintendent under Voinovich**	No contact	Jessie, Amy referenced her, asked JC for her email, unable to get contact information
OH	**Catherine Candisky, Columbus Dispatch reporter, covered issue from Taft years (or before),** ccandisk@dispatch.com**.**	Not willing to talk	Reporter who covered pre-k in Ohio for many years, recommended by interviewees
AZ	**Mary Kay Rhinehart, now at Arizona Guardian (online), used to be at Tribune, knows history/story well**	Multiple tries to contact	Covered pre-k in Arizona, including ballot initiative, Nadine Basha suggested her as ñneutralò interview
CT	**Representative Andrew Fleischmann, chair of Education Committee**	Could not get permission for interview	PKN champ, òkey proponent of pre-k expansion,ò
CT	**Senator (formerly representative) Beth Bye**	No response to email	Recommended by Elaine Zimmerman, she did not respond to email request for interview