PROSPECTS OF MANKIND
November 15th, 1959

Season 1, Episode 2: “What Hopes for Disarmament”

Description: ER and her guests discuss disarmament.

Participants: Eleanor Roosevelt, Saville Davis, Trevor Gardner, and Jules Moch

(0:20)

[Bob Jones:][voice over] Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, one of the great world respected figures of our time, explores the question: what hopes for disarmament? With Jules Moch, France’s leading disarmament expert and representative to the United Nations General Assembly; Saville Davis, managing editor of the Christian Science Monitor; Trevor Gardner, former assistant secretary of the Air Force, now president of the High Con manufacturing company, producer of guided missile components.

[Theme music starts at 0:51]

[Title Sequence:] National Educational Television

[Bob Jones:] Recorded on the campus of Brandeis University in Waltham, Massachusetts. National Educational Television presents WGBH TV production Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind.

[Title Sequence:] Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt Prospects of Mankind

[Bob Jones:] September 1959: headlining the world’s agenda as the general assembly convenes, disarmament. Khrushchev presents the crux of his proposal. (1:31)

[Cuts to video of Khrushchev speaking]

[Unknown speaker:] What does the Soviet government propose?

[audio interference]

[Khrushchev (with voice-over translation):] The essence of our proposals is that over a period of four years all states should effect complete disarmament and should no longer have any means of waging war. This means that land armies, navies, and air forces shall cease to exist; that general staffs and war ministries shall be abolished, that military educational establishments shall be closed.

[Cuts to diagrams outlining the proposal, then back to Khrushchev.]

[Khrushchev (with voice-over translation):] Dozens of millions of men shall return to peaceful, creative labor. At the disposal of states, there should remain only strictly limited contingents of police or militia agreed upon for each country, armed with small arms, and intended exclusively to maintain internal order and to protect the personal security of the citizens. Military bases in foreign territories shall be abolished. All atomic and hydrogen bombs at the disposal of states shall be destroyed and their further production terminated. The energy of fissionable materials shall be used exclusively for peaceful economic and scientific purposes. Military rockets of all ranges shall be liquidated and rocket facilities shall remain only
as means of transportation and for the harnessing of outer space to the benefit of all mankind. To ensure that no one could violate their obligations, we propose the setting up of an international control body comprising all states— with the participation of all states. There should be initiated a system of control over all disarmament measures, which should be created and should function in conformity with the stages by which the disarmament should be effected. If the disarmament is comprehensive and complete than upon its obtainment control shall likewise be general and complete. (4:35)

[Bob Jones:][as Jones speaks, film rotates through images related to his comments.] In the weeks that followed, reaction to this proposal ranged from bitter skepticism to guarded enthusiasm. Many Americans felt that support should go to the British plan presented the day before Khrushchev’s speech by Selwyn Lloyd, which provided for international controls at every step rather than at the final stage. Recently for the first time in the U.N.’s history all eighty two countries jointly sponsored a resolution to put the Khrushchev plan and the Lloyd plan on the agenda of the ten nation disarmament conference when it meets early next year in Geneva. An agreement on procedure only to be sure, but it may betoken a new change in the climate of negotiations. This raises the question which Mrs. Roosevelt and her guests are about to discuss. Now, here is Mrs. Roosevelt.

[Cut to film of ER and her guests in the studio]

[Audience claps] (5:35)

[ER:] I’m very glad to welcome you here Mr. Moch and Mr. Gardner and Mr. Davis. And we are going to discuss a very controversial question. I hope therefore gentlemen, that you will feel entirely free to differ with each other, to differ with me, to really say what you think, because a discussion which does not bring out what you really think is of very little value. Now, I have a feeling that Mr. Khrushchev has made many of us think that disarmament can be brought about in the short period of four years and be complete and that it’s not such a very difficult thing to do. As far as some of the technical steps, I think we may look and hope for beginnings, but it seems to me one has also to consider the fact that there are problems in the world which will have to be settled—or so it seems to me—before we can really hope to have total disarmament, and those are the sidelights that I think we might explore. And the first place I’d like to hear from Mr. Moch and what he thinks on the subject.

[Jules Moch:] It’s very difficult to differ with you, Madame Roosevelt, because I think also that a total disarmament is possible only with a total political agreement between the nations. And that the things must go on the same level. A beginning of disarmament must bring a beginning of understanding. This beginning of understanding can help the second step of disarmament and so more until we arrive to the goal, but I shouldn’t say that I am sure that we can arrive in four years.

[Saville Davis:] Do you think, Mr. Moch, that, that uh Khrushchev really meant the total disarmament proposal seriously or-or was he more uh seriously proposing the partial steps which were the other part of his speech?

[Jules Moch:] He proposed all together. He proposed all the total disarmament in four years.

[Saville Davis:] Well you’ve heard that before haven’t you?

[Jules Moch:] Oh, five uh partial measures all to come back to the Russian plan of the [unclear word] May 1955 which was not so explicitly a general disarmament and a new plan and we have to choose between all that or else.

[Saville Davis:] Are you hopeful at this point? (8:31)
[Jules Moch:] Yes, oh I worked disarmament since nearly ten years and uh I am hopeful because I think that the men are reasonable beings. But it is impossible not to arrive to the disarmament with the progresses of technology of the manner of killing the humanity, and with the costs of the new machinery of war.

[Saville Davis:] I think someone from this country ought to point out though that we are by no means optimistic here as a country [clears throat] at the present time. As you know, Governor Rockefeller has come out for resuming tests, Mr. Truman has come out for resuming tests and seems to be rather negative on the whole question of arms control.

[Trevor Gardner:] Mr. Davis, I don’t agree that we’re not optimistic. I think that we have every reason to be optimistic. Our president has uh stated very clearly that-he endeavors to do everything possible to achieve some kind of peace. And our hopes for peace at this moment--the breakthroughs that have occurred in technology are permitting us to-to believe that we can arrive at some substitute for trust, some technical mechanisms of inspection which science technology is bringing to us.

[ER:] I think people have rather little knowledge of um what you are hoping for. It’s a monitoring system?

[Trevor Gardner:] Well I believe that that the only real breakthrough in disarmament in the last fourteen years has been the agreement of the technical experts uh on the suspension of testing, the USSR experts and the US experts and the UK experts. It seems to me that the uh possibility that science and technology can deliver us some additional methods of uh inspection, some improvements of our present methods of inspection. It’s clear that we can’t abandon any ideas of inspection because we just can’t trust that much, we don’t dare at this moment. But the same science and technology that has delivered us these tremendously horrible weapons of destruction and uh has assisted us in our present arms race uh is beginning to deliver us some hopes for peace, through uh inspection devices that are beginning to be agreed on by-both sides.

[ER:] Mr. Davis you would agree wouldn’t you that political settlements have to go along almost step by step with disarmament, don’t they? (11:15)

[Saville Davis:] Well certainly some of the major political settlements have to-have to come into account here. For example, we have a very real question with respect to China-- with respect to communist China at the present time, whether that country will be willing to come into an agreement to start down the line step by step towards the various forms of arm control. There’s the question raised of course by the test of France which is forthcoming in the Sahara. I think all of us can understand that that a country such as Mr. Moch’s country, in a world which has been dominated by power up until now--we after all were the ones who started nuclear power--would certainly want to join the club, but we do have this very real question at the present time of uh where we draw the line, where we start to restrict nuclear weapons from spreading all over the globe where they can do an indefinite amount of damage.

[Jules Moch:] Yes, but let me explain the position of France. We can’t accept any discrimination, any monopoly to some nations, and I said two years ago, I repeat it last year and I said some days ago in the United Nations, that the day where the three atomic powers accept a beginning of nuclear disarmament--that means the cessation of production of fissile materials for military purpose, a beginning of reconversion of stocks to peaceful use--the same day France will stop all the tests she prepares now. That must be fully understood and I hope that what France is preparing now, which I should say five years advanced on the other countries, will show to the three atomic powers that it is time now to begin, really and seriously, disarmament.
Oui, I think a great many of us have a real fear of the tests, from the point of view of humanity as a whole, or some people believe that um while it may not show up so quickly, that it may make a real uh change- a real change in the health of human beings and gradually it may bring about decadence in the human race. Now you probably know more than anybody else about that, Mr. Gardner. (14:02)

Mrs. Roosevelt, the thing that- on the question of health risk, I think that in all fairness it’s realized that the French test, if it’s an upper air test, uh will not seriously increase the danger, it will marginally increase the danger.

[Mr. Moch:] Even not.

But- On the theory that any test will increase the danger somewhat, I think that the French test will do this. Uh it is not clear to me why the French test can’t be used for peaceful purposes. We know that we do not have enough information about the underground effects of nuclear tests. And we don’t have enough information and presumably the Russians don’t either, and it is not clear to me why the French test cannot be made underground and mon-monitored by the US and the USSR and the UK with their seismographs and used as a method of beginning to verify a test monitoring system on underground tests only.

It’s not possible now to make the first French test underground. I hope later we can do, but the first test is too difficult to begin with underground. The Americans have made nearly two hundred tests, and much more important than the French one will be. The Russians have made fifty five, the British have made twenty-twenty one if my memory is good? [looks to ER, who nods.] (15:37)

All aerial tests and you began only one of two tests underground after a long experiment aerially we shall not want such a long experiment but the first one we couldn’t do.

Well I’m aware of the legal difficulties but it seems to me that if the Russian test could be turned around so that it served peaceful purposes--

The French test. The French test, excuse me, uh then uh it seems to me that we should be willing--I realize it’s quite a late date to do this--but we should be willing on our side to give the technical assistance so that this might occur and what is the problem there?

I am not mixed in internal American policy [laughter from other participants] but let me say that if we had had this technical assistance that we gave to you during the war when our best scientists were here to fight with you for the common liberty of the people, if you had given after the war the same technical assistance we should not have made our own tests, but we were obliged to prove that our scientists are the same worth as yours and that we can find alone the secrets, the top secrets of the atom.

It seems to me, Mrs. Roosevelt, that there are some elements in this debate which are perhaps up above the level of the national elements involved, and that perhaps we ought to make sure that we don’t uh lose sight, when we talk about the genetic problem involved in tests and the necessity for underground tests, of the thing that we’re really aim at, which is I think uh best defined perhaps not by the word disarmament so much as by the word arms control, that what we’re trying to do here is to face the fact that in today’s world, instead of getting more security for any country--but let’s start out with the United States--from the present arms race we are actually running into a diminishing return in security.
That’s one reason why this is a golden moment, it seems to me, why it’s extremely important for us to-to plunge ahead. Uh--(17:45)

[Jules Moch:] This is very important, what you say, because if I may interrupt you, uh we made, we all the nations, we made the greatest mistake in forty-six when we remained intransigent on both sides --one side on Baruch Plan and the other side against it, instead of trying to find reconciliation so that we went quickly over the point of no return. Now we are so far in production of fissile material that no control of the production of the past can give to anyone security because it can be hidden, and we shall be, in some time, at the same point with the means of delivery, with the missiles, the satellites, the rockets, and so forth.

[ER:] And plus the more people who have this means, the more dangerous it becomes, doesn’t it?

[Trevor Gardner:] Yes, and this is why it seems to me we have to fight so hard to-to keep the possibilities of- of arms limitation uh out uh in front of us, because the course that you’ve [looks to Mr. Moch] just outlined, with missiles and rockets and satellites and more atomic bombs, uh this-this just suggests further arms race and-and we’ll have more entrants into this race as time goes on, and we-we move towards-- uh with greater expenditures all around, we move in the direction of greater risk-

[Jules Moch:] Yes.

[Trevor Gardner:] And not greater security by the-by that course of action. If I understand what you said correctly, uh you seem to say that we have legislated ourselves into the position of your having to have-France having to have a test. Is this uh--?

[Jules Moch:] Yes but--

[ER:] This is what you seem to have suggested.

[Jules Moch:] I want to have another idea, the idea that we must stop the arm race and that the most dangerous is now the increase of the means of delivery. We can no more control the fissile material, the bombs; they can be hidden anywhere: underwater, in a room, under a bed, so long as they pass along the plutonium, but it is time but it is-- encore, how do you say that--? (20:09)

[ER:] Still time!

[Jules Moch:] Still! Excuse me, I forgot that I was a Frenchman.

[Laughter]

[Jules Moch:] It is still time eh to look after the means of delivery and to arrive to limit first and to uh forbid ah all the vehicles going for military purposes in the stratosphere, and that is most important now. I think it’s more important than the limitation of fissile materials.

[Trevor Gardner:] Well I will agree that your bombs and the Russian bombs and our bombs can’t do any damage as long as they stay where they are. They have to be delivered. I think the technical problems of ins-inspection of delivery systems are-are quite involved, and it’s my belief that we can uh invent our way out of this kind of problem. Uh I think we can invent some inspection systems, and perhaps already have some invented, which can inspect delivery uh-uh possibilities on all sides. To um enter into a limitation of delivery systems without inspection and control is, I think, impossible and it seems quite impossible that
this can occur. As Mrs. Roosevelt said earlier just by saying—just by making a statement that we’re going to disarm doesn’t accomplish it.

[Saville Davis:] To come back to the point I was making a moment ago about the timing, which I think is very important here and the fact that this is a kind of golden moment, isn’t there an argument for coping with the production problem rather than uh-uh- as an earlier step, rather than jumping over to the delivery problem? Uh one of those factors which—which is part of this-this molten moment in history now why we have to do something, because here you have a situation in which uh we are all agreed we can’t build on just trust, we must have more than trust, we also have to build on national interest and it seems to me that there is uh a very real possibility that there is a Soviet national interest in having uh the nuclear club kept very small. You can understand this best, it seems to me, by analyzing what would happen if uh let’s say uh production became reasonably general and uh small vest pocket pea shooter uh versions of nuclear weapons became available uh to people inside the closed uh Soviet society, became available to Poles for example or to Hungarians or even to Ukrainians, or if one were set off in the Red Square on May Day, let alone the question of one being made available to the Communist Chinese and uh since a closed society has to defend itself in many respects more carefully than an open society, I wonder if there isn’t a very strong Soviet national interest which we should explore in-in uh checking production at this point.

[Jules Moch:] Oh I think that national interest of Soviet is much larger than that. The Soviet has a plan of public works of all kinds changing the climate of Siberia by example, making new seas in the desert. So that they want manpower, and wanting manpower they cannot have so many soldiers and they cannot build so many material which cost many manpower, so that they have surely interests to go in the way of disarmament like we, and uh I think that it is the best reason of being optimistic, that the common interest of all the people and not only for the question of atom bomb, for the question more general of work lost for general interest brings the way to disarmament. (24:12)

[Saville Davis:] There’s another—

[ER:] I think this is a wonderful moment to-to be thinking about this. There’s one point that I would like to make, and that is the effect, which we often don’t think about, of this constant thinking and talking of our--of the possibilities of destruction on the younger generation or on a country’s people. Uh I heard a little story the other day and it struck me as very important for us to think about. A little girl in the evening said to her father, “Daddy will you play ‘disaster’ with us?” And her father said, “What do you mean, what is ‘disaster’?” And she said “Oh, we learn it in school. You get your coat and then you go downstairs to the cellar and you put your coat over your head and lie flat on the ground and wait for disaster.” [Laughter from participants and audience] Now that of course uh is one of the effects of this constant concentration. I can’t help believing that uh this is a tremendously good moment, because if the Russians have reason, certainly all the rest of us have reason, and I interrupted you [gestures toward Mr. Davis] so perhaps you have something to--?

[Saville Davis:] Well I just wanted to interrupt you with another story if I might. [Clears his throat] Please excuse my voice, it’s very—it’s on cracking side today. Sometimes I think a story like that can say a great deal more than several volumes of uh-of serious discussion of the subject and I would like to add my sub-my story on the subject of arms control if I may. It’s one of the great stories that comes from the Paul Bunyan country, which is just up north here in uh- in the state of Maine, [ER: I know. I--] and he uh was having a great plague of mosquitoes on one occasion and the boys just weren’t getting out the logs, and someone said to Paul, if you’ll send down to Louisiana there’s a race of the fightenest bees known to modern civilization down there, get them up here and they’ll destroy the mosquitoes. Well he did and there was wild chaos for about two weeks in the country of the blue snow, and when it was all over Paul admitted that the idea hadn’t been quite so good, because the bees and the mosquitoes had intermarried and the children had stingers on both ends.
[Laughter]

[ER:] That also has possibilities.

[Saville Davis:] I think as an example of arms control uh that does as well as anything I know.

[Trevor Gardner:] Now Mrs. Roosevelt, uh I’m-I’m tremendously worried about the nth power problem or the fifth power problem or the fourth power problem of additional countries uh having these tests. And uh Sir Moch tells us there’s nothing we can do, the French are going to have their tests in any case. It seems to me we need to look uh here in America at our organization for peace and ask ourselves, are we organized to-to get enough technical development in the peace area accomplished, so that we won’t have the nth plus one power or the fifth or the sixth power. Uh if the French test is inevitable, we can’t legislate our way out of it, uh I-I’d like to raise the question uh whether or not we are properly organized. Uh the president has-has a staff working at the White House, working diligently on disarmament. Uh there is a staff in the State Department to work on this, and uh in the Pentagon, there also. It’s uh it’s very difficult however to find very many experts who will spend their full time on the subject. As a matter of fact, most of our notions on the subject of disarmament have been developed by uh essentially part time people who are so busy with defense or state or some other interest that they really don’t have time uh to think uh full time on the subject. Now what I was hoping might eventuate is uh since this is a basic national need, a search for peace, since we have a forty, forty-five billion dollar defense program, since we can afford a billion too for the exploration of space in our NASA program, um I was hoping that we might be able to define in our American bureaucratic way the need for a new agency, which would be the peace agency, and which would have a large budget between five hundred million and a billion dollars a year and which would be able to explore the technical possibilities--.

[Jules Moch:] I want such a budget in France, for the peace agency of France, every part of it.

[Trevor Gardner:] Well I’m sure we don’t have such a budget here, it’s much smaller than that and it’s hidden amongst the bits and pieces of our other budgets. I believe that if we had such an agency, uh we might begin over the next few years to be organized to properly explore all of the arms limitation ideas, to peace game them as we now war game other ideas in our various uh study agencies, such as the RAND Corporation. (29:17)

[ER:] I think that’s a very important idea because it would include, um it seems to me, eh finding the answers which uh you meet everywhere in the world. I have always asked in other countries, you really in America don’t want uh to stop preparations for war because you cannot afford- [clears throat] you cannot afford to have peace. Now that’s a horrible thing to me, and I’ve always said of course we can afford it, the needs of the world are so great that uh we could uh manage to employ everybody, but of course it means organization. It means um helping- the government helping, and-and having a plan and having it discussed with all the different firms involved and industrial areas--um how this is to be done and where the help will be needed and so that we really know what we do if peace comes, and the people know and are not afraid. I find for instance in this country that uh I will be asked in a press conference uh ‘would it mean greater unemployment,’ and our people want peace tremendously but they’re also worried about their daily bread, and I think this is part of what an agency such as you suggest could explore and could have before the people. I think it would be of great value.

[Trevor Gardner:] Well, it’s clear that we-we can’t ask- we can’t believe that we can invent our way out of the trouble that we’re in by simply inventing new weapons systems. Uh I-I don’t believe that we-we can see ahead of us a new weapons system that can deliver a decisive advantage uh- weapons advantage to either side.
Jules Moch: That is the most important of the progress of technology, during the last years.

Saville Davis: We really have two proposals that we’re discussing here, haven’t we, which are uh allied but not quite the same. Mr. Gardner’s proposition which deals with technical competence uh which is poured into the problem of developing ways and means for carrying out arms control and Mrs. Roosevelt’s, which is on the civilian side.

ER: Yet I think they go together.

Trevor Gardner: Of course they do.

Saville Davis: Indeed they do.

Trevor Gardner: We have to find ways of making peace profitable, we have to capitalize peace.

ER: Well I also think that it--

Jules Moch: Well, that is a good capitalist formula.

ER: Actually--

[Laughter]

ER: Yes, actually an agency such as this could explore what I think is vital namely uh - in combination with the United Nations - all the various things that the United Nations does to promote peace in the world. One of the other things I meet wherever I go practically in the world is, “How can you justify, morally and economically, the fact that you pay to keep your land out of production when two thirds of our people go to bed hungry every night.” Now that’s a hard thing to answer. It seems to me that that’s one of the elements of peace, how you reconsider how you use the things you have to the maximum advantage for the world.

Saville Davis: Would you also include technical assistance in that Mrs. Roosevelt?

ER: I certainly would, it is technical assistance.

Jules Moch: Well the questions abound surely.

ER: Yes.

Jules Moch: But how to use best the things, that is all the question of planning, of national planning, and of international planning, the question of the money and the forces lost in publicity like here. That is an enormous problem which brings us very far from this puzzle, great problem of disarmament.

ER: Well, I don’t think so sir. I think it’s a part of it. Now Paul Hoffman is finding uh through that agency of his in the United Nations that people have not used their manpower in different areas of the world or their own natural resources to a point where they could help themselves. Now I think all these are a part of a future peace.
[Saville Davis:] There’s also a very important industrial side to this, isn’t there Mrs. Roosevelt? In other words, a great many people are concerned about the armament’s lobby in Washington and the pressures it brings to bear on politics in Washington. We won’t bring you into this Mr. Moch, but uh obviously--

[Trevor Gardner:] I suggest, I--

[Jules Moch:] I won’t get mixed in internal American policy.

[Trevor Gardner:] I suggest Mr. Moch has a similar lobby in his country.

[Saville Davis:] It’s not impossible, and I think we--

[Jules Moch:] I should confess that. But we have nationalized the most important publications so that we have not the same problems as you.

[Saville Davis:] I think with-- we also have Mr. Moch a reasonable amount of evidence, Mr. Moch, that there is a similar group, a war party so to speak, and lobby and pressures of this sort in the Soviet Union as well. In any event in this country I was talking to a group of newspapermen just a short-- newspaper editor a short while ago. And they were discussing the question of whether adequate plans of the sort that you’re speaking about, Mrs. Roosevelt, had been made and they came to the conclusion that they hadn’t, and each one was going to go his own way and see if he could develop a series of articles on finding out what this would mean to Detroit, and to Pittsburgh, and to Lille, and to uh Liverpool and uh places all over the world, uh with the objective of seeing whether we could get some kind of plans on the books today, which as I understand-- if I understand your position, is what you’re supporting [ER: That is what I think.] so that it would be tangible plans where that businessmen would understand them? (34:50)

[ER:] An agreement with businessmen: how it should be done and what aid they would need to do it, from the government.

[Jules Moch:] I beg your pardon. Uh don’t uh confuse this idea so that a Soviet Russian who heard us can think that you imagine a means of non-disarmament because you want ten years to study how to begin the disarmament. That is a danger.

[speakers overlap: 35:18]

[Trevor Gardner:] I think-I think we can begin right away. I think that we need to know more of the technical answers to go very far.

[Jules Moch:] I am ready to begin disarmament even not knowing these answers.

[Trevor Gardner:] I think that-that is correct.

[Saville Davis:] Could I illustrate your point--excuse me.

[Jules Moch:] Yes we have [unclear word] so many times that we have no the right to go slower than it is possible to.

[Saville Davis:] Could I illustrate your point, Mr. Gardner, with a small uh incident? Uh I was talking with a group of people who are uh weapons experts and physicists and so forth who understand the arms control problem very well, a short while ago. We were discussing the large expenditures that you referred
to [nods toward Trevor Gardner] that are being made by the government in order to uh-uh show why it is difficult to carry out an arms control agreement. And uh one of the group came over to another who was a man of uh international reputation -- one of the top team, so to speak, in the field -- and wagged his finger under his nose and made a statement which is burned in my mind since that time. He said in spite of all the money which is being spent in this country today -- uh we’ll call this man Johnson for example -- in spite of all the country that is being made- uh spent in this country today to show why arms control cannot be carried out, we have not yet expended one Johnson in the effort to show how it can be done. Now he meant of course that the first team of American scientists had to be brought into the effort and I gather that’s what you’re talking about.

[Jules Moch:] Well, he flustered it, he flustered it a little bit. But the difficulty is not there, the difficulty is in the idea that the Russians and we, we have all the control which is not the same and that is the first thing where we must unite.

[ER:] You mean we must agree on the type of control?

[Jules Moch:] We must agree with the Russians--

[ER:] Yes. (37:10)

[Jules Moch:] –because there are three-three ways: uh the American way asks to control sooner than disarmament if I can so speak, [ER: Yes.] the Russians ask disarmament before-- or asked disarmament before control, and we Frenchmen, we said always no disarmament without control, no control without disarmament [uncertain phrase] so but all the disarmament progressively, all the disarmament which can now be controlled.

[ER:] Well--

[Saville Davis:] I wonder if this… excuse me.

[ER:] That seems to be a rather good slogan.

[Saville Davis:] I think we could all adopt it without much difficulty.

[ER:] Yes.

[Saville Davis:] I wonder if this doesn’t illustrate the point that Mr. Gardner is making, however, because as I understand it, one of the great obstacles that has existed on the technical level is the fact that we and the Russians have been unable to agree on how many inspection stations we need in the Soviet Union, uh that being a key uh to the first step. This was eased to a certain extent uh when McMillan came out with a proposal that the inspections be random, which means that nobody ever knows when the inspector is going to knock on the door and that multiplies the effect of-of each inspection, but even in spite of that both-both sides are far from agreeing.

[Jules Moch:] Well it was not a little part of the control it was that from what you speak is the control of nuclear tests. [Mr. Davis: Yes.] But you have the control of manpower, you have the control of fissile materials, you have the control of the armament-- the conventional armaments, you have the control of budget and so more many types of control are necessary in a large international organization, and we--

[Saville Davis:] Oh, yes of course. (38:55)
[Jules Moch:] We must agree with the Russians on the principle of such a control: what has it to do—has it to do in the first step, in the second step, in the last step, and so more. That is the real problem.

[Saville Davis:] Yes of course. I was just trying to take the first of those steps, which is the one we’re all working on now, and to show how there is a great need at the moment for more scientific information on how inspection at this level of the first step can be uh- can be carried out.

[Trevor Gardner:] I have a great sense of urgency about this business of getting more technical information uh that can be uh described as a substitute for trust—

[Jules Moch:] Yes!

[Trevor Gardner:] Technical information that permits us to do uh very sophisticated inspections of the progress that—that the various countries are making.

[ER:] Well this you will make available to the United Nations so that the control would be in the United Nations.

[Trevor Gardner:] I don’t think that we in this country need to wait for a United Nations agreement or for a treaty to begin doing some of the necessary things. For example, we could, through this peace agency immediately build a monitoring system similar to the one we’re advocating for the suspension of detection of tests and uh this monitoring system needs to be tested. We can test a great deal of it with just blowing high explosives up, we don’t have to use nuclear devices, and we can invite other nations to witness this the way this monitoring system works. It doesn’t have to be just theory, we can reduce it to practice, and we can prove the weaknesses of a monitoring system.

[ER:] Now you’ve we’ve reached a point I think where we have to consider um that along with everything we do, we will have to be, as we work towards disarmament, developing a system of law under which nations must live, and at the same time, a system of enforcement of law. Now this must be under the aegis of the United Nations, and uh I should think that it would have to go straight along with everything that you develop for this, because human beings are going to have differences, they’re going to have difficulties, and they disagree, and there must be a place where they go to—to arrange those difficulties or discuss them, that’s the United Nations. But eventually there must be a court [Mr. Moch: An international court.] which decides and a way for that court to enforce it. Now this brings us of course to a possible police force, which is a very technical thing which will take a long while to work out, but I think these things all have to be worked together. And we ought all to be thinking about them as part of disarmament.

[Jules Moch:] You say that you know that we have proposed the international police force at the League of Nations with Tardieu as prime minister of France and Paul-Boncour who had the post that I have now uh thirty and some years ago and it has not progressed, so. (42:21)

[Saville Davis:] Well if I understand what you’re proposing Mrs. Roosevelt, you’re—you’re suggesting that we should have a phased step by step uh program to develop the-the-the basis and the-the means of international law or international police, going-- we almost need a blackboard for this don’t we -- having these steps [gestures to make step motion with hands] going along toward the ultimate objective. Exactly at the same time as we carry on these steps that we’ve been discussing--

[ER:] Technical steps--
[Saville Davis:] For working on tests, and production, and delivery of missiles, and-and so forth.
[ER:] And the psychological acceptance by people of the fact that this is what disarmament means, and it has to be universal.

[Mr. Davis] Don’t you think we’re beginning to get some of the ingredients of that even now? I’ve been very much impressed with uh the tangibility of that thing which people normally call uh world opinion and dismiss as if it were a very casual kind of thing, but it seems to me you can almost feel that in these days when force of both large and moderate sorts is pricing itself out of the market—the large force is priced out of the market, the moderate force is too dangerous—that we’ve begun to see approaches to war uh almost stopped by the recognition of common humanity and—and world opinion that this thing shouldn’t be allowed to go too far. We advanced and pulled back in the Middle East, we advanced and pulled back in the Formosa Straits, there was difficulty in Laos and uh we pulled back as soon as the spotlight of world opinion was turned on it.

[ER:] Well, I think this means uh the great importance of the United Nations as uh a meeting point, as an agreement point, but I also think that you can’t trust um that we will always pull back. Somebody might make a mistake sometime. I think you have to get busy getting everybody to see that you begin and are doing something, and then the force of the longing for peace will, I think, move. (44:21)

[Jules Moch:] But you know I make a great difference between the United Nations and an international court. I am ready to accept any judgement of an international court. I am not ready to accept a vote of United Nations, because the difference between the nations in the United Nations are too great. [ER: Ah, but-but the international--] There are factions, [uncertain word, might be “patience”].

[ER:] But the international court is what you have to have eventually.

[Jules Moch:] Yes, and compulsory.

[ER:] And compulsory.

[Jules Moch:] I fully agree on that point. (44:55)

[Trevor Gardner:] Let me come back again to my-my sense of urgency. Mr. Moch mentioned earlier that after the French tests, it appears to him that there may be no other nation who can mount a test for perhaps five years. Um if that is so -- and-and I suspect it may be a shorter time than that -- uh than a series of other nations can soon mount nuclear tests, and it seems to me the time for agreement has to be fairly soon [Mr. Moch: Yes!] The beginnings of agreement, we’ve got to get at it and we’ve got to get to work on the research end of it also, the technical end. But this has to be done immediately and we must make some progress this coming year. The years are running away from us. We don’t need a hundred percent full proof system--

[Jules Moch:] We never shall have it.

[Trevor Gardner:] --because what we have today is infinitely less than a hundred percent and we’re spending forty billion dollars a year to get what we have today and it’s certainly less than-than full proof.

[ER:] You know—you know sir, I don’t know whether this happens in France but here I’m constantly told that our young people uh want nothing except security and sometimes I think that’s been some of the trouble with our older people because we never have had security. We don’t have security about life and we cannot have security about anything we do, as human beings. Uh--
[Saville Davis:] And certainly the last place in the world where we’re going to find security is in the arms race the way it’s now going, because the deterrence has vanished out of it. We’ve uh-- it has proved a blind alley.

[Jules Moch:] I am of the same opinion.

[ER:] There is no security and what we are now trying to do is to make partial security more secure and [ER clears throat] it seems to me that we had much better say to our people generally uh, “You never have had security, never; uh you never knew that you wouldn’t-- something wouldn’t happen to you, every time you get in an automobile, something may happen to you.” And so it seems to me it’s a ridiculous attitude; what you are trying to do is to make it possible uh to try to help humanity to have a better life.

[Jules Moch:] You know what we must uh underline is that the security becomes always smaller when the time becomes slower. Uh twenty years ago it wanted uh twenty day to make the mobilization of a great country, now it’s a question of minutes. And you must say every way that there is a danger of a war beginning without anyone wishing it, only by a mistake, because a radar has found a-- a rocket anywhere in the air; one or the both sides thought it was with a nuclear warhead, then he sent others. And so it can begin and the world can be destroyed only by a false appreciation, by a mistake. That is one of the biggest danger now. And therefore we must underline that the security is becoming always little-- uh not so big. (48:17)

[Saville Davis:] You're filling out the other side of this picture of risk really aren’t you? [Mr. Moch: Yes.] Because uh it would become foolhardy in the extreme if we were unwilling to take a small risk [Moch: Yes.] which would make an inspection system uh have a chance, a good chance of becoming workable. Uh if on the other hand we are uh-- we would be living with an enormous risk of nuclear war uh if we turn our backs on arms control. In other words, the risk is much greater from doing nothing than- - [Mr. Moch: Yes!] than from adventuring as intelligently as we can uh-uh ahead.

[Jules Moch:] Yes.

[ER:] But you’re living with that right now. And that is why our leaders, I think both the Soviet leader and our own president, because they know the complete risk, are actually able when they meet to come to some kind of agreement. It’s because both of them know what is at stake. Most people don’t want to think, they don’t want to face what this might possibly mean, and I think it’s time we did face it. It’s time we told our children that this is no time for weaklings. This is a time for the people who want to develop the best they have in them.

[Saville Davis:] Mrs. Roosevelt-- excuse me--

[ER:] That’s part of it. Yes.

[Saville Davis:] Along-along with that point, there’s something which I think uh to me is one of the most significant aspects of this whole arms control problem, and it touches in a way the obverse of what you were just saying. We have some people at the top--at the heads of government who seem ready to go ahead with this problem. It’s also true that we have a great many people, and especially here in the United States and as well as in the Soviet Union, we are not without our fault in this respect at least from my point of view, we have a great many people who do not wish to go ahead with arms control and the resistance to it is formidable. And I think one of the aspects of the whole arms control problem which has deceived the American public almost more than anything else is the fact that this was uh bottled up
behind the scenes. Two years ago when the-- Harold Stassen went over to London for the disarmament negotiations there--

[Jules Moch:] Oh it was in fifty-five, four years ago. We are older than we think.[Saville Davis:] It was fifty-fi--oh it was earlier than that. Good gracious, I can’t even-- realize it was that long ago.

[ER:] Please talk quickly!

[Saville Davis:] Uh in other-- in any event, when Mr. Stassen went to the slaughter uh it was literally not the intention of our government at that time to go ahead with disarmament or arms control. We merely went through the motions because it seemed from the standpoint of world opinion that we-that we should, but actually, as Mr. Dulles later admitted, the policy which controlled was the policy of Admiral Strauss at the head of the Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Teller who worked with him, people in the Pentagon, and some people in the State Department and this was a policy that Mr. Dulles by and large accepted. (51:21)

[Mr. Moch] Let me have no opinion, that is an internal American affair.

[Laughter]

[Saville Davis:] And I think at the same time probably one of the most important ones because, as I say, the people know very little about it. So that all through that period actually, we did not want arms control.

[ER:] In other words, we gave lip service [Mr. Davis: Yes.] but we had absolutely no intention of living up to er what the people were led to believe we thought we wanted.

[Saville Davis:] On the contrary Mrs. Roosevelt, we made proposals which were so exaggerated that we knew they would be turned down by the Russians because we wanted to have them turned down. And-and this was all changed in a very dramatic way when Sputnik went up, and then the scientists were called into the White House by uh President Eisenhower, and then in a very remarkable change of direction which took place in-in a comparatively short time and is one of the most important untold pages in American history, the policy was literally turned over by-- through-- one hundred and eighty degrees in the opposite direction. And the scientists argued uh very-- from a number of points of view, but from the standpoint of the Soviet national interest that we have been discussing, they didn’t say that the Russians were necessarily going to be able to sign an agreement but that they might, and that we couldn’t face history if uh we didn’t do the very best that we could. So at that point things switched over from the political level to the scientific level and we had this series of conferences with the scientists of both sides which began to be very promising. And the point that I want to make in all of this is that uh we’ve slid back since then. Because we are back on the political level again now. The arms control negotiations have gotten all caught up in the summit negotiations and have been put on one side until the summit negotiations work themselves out. And it becomes very important now because many people are working behind the scenes arguing against getting arms control back on the track, that we just keep up all the pressure we can in all the directions we can.

[Trevor Gardner:] Seems to me that you’ve just made the perfect argument for the peace agency. In defense of my friends in the-in the military establishment, it’s very difficult to ask a group of people to uh manage the spending of billion-billions of dollars of national wealth to develop ICBMs, and at the same time ask them to agree to a suspension of nuclear tests which they believe are necessary to progress in their field. Uh it’s just impossible for them to-to uh do one thing wholeheartedly and agree at the same time to the other. So that you need to have a group of people in a separate agency whose business it is to think clearly and do the research on the subject of peace. (53:59)
[Jules Moch:] But it must be under direction of a political man. I fear all the experts, the financial, the military, and the scientific, when they are alone. You must have a political direction of your agencies.

[Saville Davis:] I would still like to point out, Mr. Moch, as a non-scientist myself and someone whose work is on the political side of things, that it was however-- it took the scientists to change the direction of American policy from not wanting arms control to thinking that it might be possible and therefore we have an obligation to explore it. And I would be willing, I think, to trust the kind-- I think one of the reasons that we’ve got into this trouble is because in politics, people are accustomed to thinking that the citizen knows everything and doesn’t have to work at it. Whereas the scientists who solve very hard problems of thinking have to commit a labor of thinking to work out a problem. What we need now in this country is to have people commit the same labor of thinking as the scientists do, on our political problems.

[Jules Moch:] To arrive at the disarmament, I am ready to make an alliance even with the devil.

[ER:] That is a good note. I’m sorry but our time is coming to an end. I hope this has been as useful uh to others as it has been to me, and I want to thank all of you: Mr. Moch, Mr. Gardner, Mr. Davis, for coming as you have and giving of your time to this discussion. I hope very much that it has done something towards awakening the people of our country. So I express the gratitude of all of us to you, for what you have given of your time today. And now I want to bring out in the few seconds that really remain to us the things which to me have been meaningful. We’ve had suggested to us today something in the United States which might be done and actually to work for peace. Now there isn’t a single citizen of the United States who does not want peace -- that I’m perfectly sure of -- but there are many who differ as to the methods. Now we have had suggested that we put part of our defense effort and money into ways of working for peace. They’re manifold, they are very varied; I think that is one of the important things which has come out of the conversation today. And I think that um we’ve heard from Mr. Moch that France, quite naturally, wants to be on an equality with the other great powers or allies. This is natural. But that also they will do anything to move towards peace, and disarmament, which is the one real promise of peace that we have in the long run. And I think that it’s more complicated and I think our discussion has shown that, and I’m glad that we’ve brought out many different things that have to happen. And I hope you will think about them. Now I have to say goodbye, and really it’s not goodbye it’s just au revoir, because I hope that our audience will be with us for our next discussion. I think that people are giving their time and their thought and I hope that through these television series we can help thinking in the United States.

[Applause]

[58:21 Theme Music begins]

[Credit Sequence:] (Overlaid on show logo) Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt Prospects of Mankind with Jules Moch, Trevor Gardner, Saville Davis from Slosberg Music Center Brandeis University

[Credits Roll]

[59:11 Theme Music ends]

[Bob Jones:] Topical discussion on Mrs. Roosevelt’s next recorded program, Prospects of Mankind, is foreign aid and economic policy.

[Unknown Narrator:] (overlaid with NET logo) This is National Education Television