Recruitment Strategies of Rebel Groups: by Force, by Incentive, or by Task?

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D e d i c a t i o n

To Tomoko and Masataka Obayashi

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Abstract of Dissertation

Recruitment Strategies of Rebel Groups: by Force, by Incentive, or by Task?

How do rebel groups choose their recruitment strategies? In this dissertation, I classify recruitment strategies of rebel groups into three types: recruitment by force, recruitment by incentive, and recruitment by task. Building on this typology, I argue that two factors affect a rebel group's choice of its recruitment strategy: its vulnerability to desertion and resultant information leak, and the types of tasks within the group. This is because the three recruitment strategies vary in their selection effects in terms of agents' loyalties and capabilities. In order to test the plausibility of the argument, I analyze changes in organizational characteristics of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda. There, I first conduct a congruence test of the proposed theory against recruitment strategies of the two groups. In addition, to test the validity of the causal mechanism proposed in the theory, I draw its implications to the desertion rate in a rebel group, state counter-insurgency strategy, and the effects of a mass desertion on the course of civil war, and test their empirical validities. Findings in this study provide insights into the role of ethnicity in civil war, studies of duration and termination of civil war, and development of a political theory of organization.

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Glossary of Terms

ADFL: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo

CFA: Agreement on a Ceasefire between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

CRA: Central Republic of Africa

DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo

EPDP: Eelam People's Democratic Party

EPLF: Eelam People's Liberation Front

EPRLF (V): Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (Varathar)

EPRLF: Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front

GOSL: Government of Sri Lanka

HSM: Holy Spirit Movement

IPKF: Indian Peace Keeping Force

LRA: Lord's Resistance Army

LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

NRA: National Resistance Army

NRM: National Resistance Movement

PLOTE: People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam

RAW: Indian Research and Analysis Wing

SLA: Sri Lankan Army

SLMM: Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission

SPLA: Sudanese People's Liberation Army

SPLM: Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement

TELO: Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation

TMVP: Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (Tamil Peoples Liberation Tigers)

TULF: Tamil United Liberation Front

UCDA: Uganda Christian Democratic Army

UNLA: Uganda National Liberation Army

UPDA: Uganda People’s Democratic Army

UPDF: Ugandan People’s Defence Force

UTHR(J): University Teachers for Human Rights, Jaffna

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Research Question

How do rebel groups recruit their members? Why do rebel groups choose one recruitment method over others? The bulk of the literature in political science presumes individuals to participate in rebellion voluntarily. The theories often refer to ethnic identity, class identity, or economic incentives to explain voluntary participation of combatants in rebel groups. However, while some individuals do voluntarily participate, rebel groups also often physically coerce people to participate in their groups. In fact, rebel groups use various methods to recruit and retain soldiers, some voluntary, some coercive. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), for example, does not pay its soldiers, while Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN) pays some urban soldiers but not other grassroots soldiers(Gutierrez Sanin 2004b). The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is notorious for abductions. However, the practice became dominant only around 1994 (Doom and Vlassenroot 1999). The Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Maoist in Nepal, and the Congolese Patriotic Union/Popular Rally (UPC/RP) all developed systems in which villagers are given the responsibility for selecting soldiers to be conscripted at family or village level over time (Singer 2006 on UPC/RP). Hence, far from just promoting propaganda and accepting volunteers, rebel groups often employ coercive means, combine multiple methods, and shifts from one method to another in their recruitment practice. In this research, I start with a simple dichotomy between recruitment by incentive (inducement) and recruitment

by force (coercion). Relying on this typology, I will inquire the conditions under which rebel groups employ one recruitment strategy over another.

The voluntarist bias in the current studies of rebellion apparently has its origin in the nature of the questions scholars asked. Until recently, a large portion of the political scientists' research on rebellion or civil war focused on individuals' motivations to participate in rebellion. As Ted Gurr (1970) most notably put it, scholars asked *Why Men Rebel*. Sometimes, the motivation behind such research was an amazement to observe individuals putting their own lives at the risk of death for an advent to overturn a regime through military means, which had little chance of success in the eyes of scholars. Sometimes, the research was motivated by scholars' concern over the intensity and scale of violence that resulted from civil wars. Scholars also sought conditions for people's uprising in their anticipation for revolution either for democracy or for socialism. These motivations behind scholars' studies had them presume that individuals initiated or joined rebellion voluntarily, and confined the scope of their analysis to the positive motivations or incentives behind their participation.

At least two issues are left out from these studies, however. First, individuals are often coerced to participate in rebel groups. Joining a rebel group has not always been a voluntary act, and rebel groups often forced people to join the groups through abduction or conscription. Second, the existing literature's focus on individuals – and structures behind their behavior – left organizations of rebellion untouched. There have been few studies on the choice of recruitment strategies by rebel groups. This is problematic not only because we know little about the rebel organizations but also because it constitutes a methodological problem for the study of the motivation for individuals to participate in

rebellion. Not only do rebel groups force individuals to join rebellion, they also sometimes reject individuals who seek participation. Hence, if we study only the motives of those who are members of a rebel group, say, through a survey, the study may suffer from a selection bias. In order to rectify this problem, it is necessary for scholars to understand the choice of recruitment strategies by rebel groups. As Stathis Kalyvas pointed out, however, "the puzzle of cross-national variation of these dynamics [of rebel recruitment] remains unresolved: It calls for a sophisticated conceptualization of interactions within rebel organizations, between rebel organizations and civilian populations, and between rebels and the state. We have only begun to scratch the surface of this set of related phenomena" (Kalyvas 2007). Hence, it is in this area, that is, the analysis of the logic behind rebel organization's recruitment practice that this research seeks to fill in the gap in the current literature in political science.

1.2 Theoretical Significance:

Why should we study recruitment practices of rebel groups? I believe this research makes contributions to three areas of study in political science: ethnicity in conflict, duration of civil war, and power and organizations.

First, rebel groups' use of coercive recruitment methods such as abduction and conscription, or even just use of economic incentives, cast significant doubt on the usefulness of the concept of ethnicity widely used in the studies of civil war. The role of ethnicity in conflict started to receive significant attention in political science in 1990s, not least because of civil wars in the former Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda. Many scholars on both sides of the agent-structure debate rely on the concept of ethnicity in their

analysis of conflict and violence.[1] They start their research with a question of "why do ethnic groups (voluntarily) fight each other and when?" While scholars differ on their definitions of ethnicity and its relationship with individuals' behavior, here, they share a common (and often inaccurate) assumption that co-ethnics voluntarily fight against members of other ethnic groups, attributing it to ancient hatred (Kaplan 1994a), fear (Walter and Snyder 1999), social network (Fearon and Laitin 1996), and/or social norm and cascade effect (Hardin 1995; Sandbu 2007).Practice of coercive recruitment, especially among co-ethnics during civil war, however, indicates that the question is formulated in a misleading manner. Ethnic identity, whether internal or external, does not necessarily motivate individuals to voluntarily participate in rebel groups. They are oftentimes coerced into participation. This means that ethnicity is either irrelevant to civil wars or is related to civil wars in a way different from scholars conceive (c.f. Mueller 2000). In order for political scientists to identify the logic behind apparently ethnic wars and properly understand the relationship between ethnicity and political violence, it is necessary to conceptually detach a rebel organization (or, its leaders) both from the ethnic group it is associated with and the individuals in the ethnic group and redress its relationship with them. For this purpose, it is indispensible to study the recruitment activity of rebel groups because it constitutes a primary mode of contact between them and ethnic groups or individuals. Failure to do so leaves a significant part of interaction between rebel groups and ethnic groups and individuals untouched.

[1] For useful reviews of the literature on ethnicity and conflict, see, for example, Lars-Erik Cederman(2002), Fearon and Laitin(2000) and Kanchan Chandra (2006).

Second, research on rebel group recruitment is also indispensable to explain duration and termination of civil war. The number of countries in civil war increased steadily from 1950s up to 1990s, and declined since then. However, we cannot explain the change in the number of civil wars per year by counting the number of civil war onsets each year. During this period, the number of civil war onset remained more or less constant at a low level. Rather, it is the variation in the duration of civil wars that is behind the observed pattern in prevalence of civil wars over years. (Hegre 2004: 243-244). `In order to explain the prevalence of civil wars or the lack thereof, it is indispensible to analyze the causes of duration and termination of civil wars. Termination of civil war requires either military victory by one party or negotiated settlement between the state and rebel groups. In order to explain timing of military victory by one party, political scientist need to explain the changes in the relative military capacity between the state and rebels, while explanation of successful negotiated settlement in addition requires analysis of state and rebel leaders' capacity to make credible commitment by ensuring its members' compliance to peace agreement. Current studies on duration and termination of civil war, however, tend to treat rebel groups as unitary rational actors and presume their capacities to make credible commitment to be constant (Cunningham 2006; Fearon 2004; Walter 2002a; Walter 2002b). In conditions of civil war, however, loyalties of rebel group members to their leaders cannot be taken for granted. As historical research and recent studies on the microfoundation of civil war reveal, rebel members often desert, defect to the enemy groups, fight each other over resources, and split (Andvig and Gates 2006; Atlas and Licklider 1999; Blattman 2007; Figes 1990; Gates 2002; Gutierrez Sanin 2004a; Hovil and Werker 2005; Kalyvas 1999, 2003, 2006; Kocher 2004; Stedman 1997; Straus 2006;

Weinstein 2006). Even the Russian Red Army, which is often portrayed as an extremely cohesive rebel group, suffered from massive desertion throughout civil war (Figes 1990). Moreover, the current civil war in Iraq demonstrates that sometimes the major problem for the state to terminate war is not that the rebels are too strong but that rebels are too weak and fragmentary so that the state has no counterpart to effectively negotiate peace with. Hence, a satisfactory analysis of the duration and termination of civil wars requires analysis of the rebel groups' capacities to recruit and retain its members, which significantly affects both the relative military capacities between the state and rebel groups and their capacities to make credible commitments to negotiated peace agreements. It is a purpose of this study to provide such an analysis by focusing rebel groups' strategies to recruit and retain its members.

Third, the question also provides a valuable opportunity to develop a political theory of organization political scientists should not miss. In the last two decades, there has been a visible progress in the studies of organizations and institutions in economics and sociology.[2] Economists developed so-called new economics of organization (Aoki 2000, 2001; Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Williamson 1995; Williamson and International Center for Economic Growth. 1994; Williamson et al. 1991). Sociologists also developed studies called new institutionalism. In contrast, political scientists are yet to develop its own version of a theory of organization. Terry Moe has been one of the most vocal scholars for the need for political scientists to develop their own theories of organization (1984, 1990a, 1990b, 1991). We need a 'political' theory of organization not only because political

[2] For review of the literature, in addition to works by Moe cited above, see Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol (2003) and Barry Weingast (2003).

organizations such as states, political parties and rebel groups behave differently from non-political organizations like firms but also because even the behavior of non-political organizations cannot be adequately explained without consideration of political factors such as power and coercion (Moe 1990, 2005, 2006). There have been a few studies that explored the political aspects of organizations, especially the role of power in development and design of organizations (Gruber 2000; Knight 1992; Koremenos et al. 2001; Mahoney 2000; McGuire and Olson Jr 1996; Miller 1992, 2005; Olson 1993, 2000).

Rebel groups provide a case of theoretical importance for the development of such a theory of organization because they are distinct both from firms and from states in several significant ways.[3] Rebel groups are different from firms at least in six ways[4]: 1) as illegal entities, rebel groups do 'not have external enforcement mechanisms' unlike firms that enjoy state enforcement of property rights and other legal rights (Gates 2002). There is no formal external constraint on leaders or on subordinates. This means that the commitment problem between them is intense and prevalent. It also means that there is a wider range of actions including the 'use of violence' they can take against each other for coercion, rewarding or punishment (Polo 1997). It also raises the 'cost of members' exit' for the groups since no external sanction will be imposed on those who side with their enemies after their exit; 2) rebel groups often do 'not produce a residual.' In economics, a residual

[3] In addition to Moe's works, the discussion in the following two paragraphs relies heavily on the literature on organized crime and public bureaucracy. Cf. Schelling (1971), Fiorentini and Peltzman (1997), Brehm and Gates (1997, 2008).

[4] Here I discuss the stylized distinction between ideal types among firms, states, and rebel groups. As I will discuss briefly later, in reality, there are some overlaps across types as well as variation within each type.

or residual return refers to "any net income that the firm produces" or "the amount that is left over after everyone else [than the owner of the firm] has been paid" (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 291).[5] Allocation of a residual and authority to control it is the primary means to improve efficiency and motivate individuals in firms (Alchian and Demsetz 1972: 288-324; Milgrom and Roberts 1992). However, rebel groups cannot necessarily use it to solve the information asymmetry and incentive incompatibility problem. Economic incentives often cannot be relied on to ensure the cohesion of the rebel groups; 3) rebel group members have 'diverse properties'. Economic incentives are hardly the only motive for them to stay in and work for the rebel groups. Ideology, security, revenge, solidarity, and other factors can motivate individuals to participate and stay in rebel groups. In absence of external enforcement mechanisms and residuals, such factors play significant parts. Of course, this is partly a function of the recruitment methods the group employs. The diversity of interests, however, is still a general feature of rebel groups when compared with firms; 4) the lack of external enforcement, lack of residuals, and the diversity of interests among its members add up to make the prevalence of 'power and coercion' within the organization another distinctive feature of rebel groups.[6] In familiar portrayals of firms by economists, voluntary exchange is the norm. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) for example

[5] In other words, residual is "whatever remains after all revenues have been collected and all debts, expenses, and other contractual obligations have been paid" (Milgrom and Roberts 1992: 291).

[6] Moe (2005) argues that the rational choice theory has not paid sufficient attention to the concept of *power*, despite a contrary and prevalent image that it has.

adamantly discount the role of power within firms.[7] However, the situation is quite different in rebel groups. Coercion is prevalent to solve the principal-agent problem, and interaction within a rebel group is not always mutually beneficial. It often creates winners and losers. A most obvious example is enforcement on child soldiers. Not only do some rebel groups kidnap children to serve in their groups, they also force those children to assault their own families so that they can no longer return to their own village. The purpose of this practice is to prevent child soldiers from desertion. This is an extreme, but not rare, example of forcible attempt to solve the principal-agent problem by dropping an important outside option of the agent in a violent manner; 5) rebel groups often have 'territorial control'. This means that the relationship with the inhabitants in the territory matters for them. They may repress, protect or provide social welfare to the inhabitants. Either way, how rebel groups interact with them have significant political and military implications. Territorial control also means that geography matters. Not only the size of territory and distance among rebel leaders, soldiers and state, but also the topography of the region has important implications.

When compared with states, rebel groups differ from them in a few aspects, too: 1) rebel groups 'do not enjoy monopoly' as states do. Rebel groups 'seek' monopoly,[8] and

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[7] Read the following quote from Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 777) on firms: "It is common to see the firm characterized by the power to settle issues by fiat, by authority, or by disciplinary action superior to that available in the conventional market. This is delusion. The firm does not own all its inputs. It has no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any different in the slightest degree from ordinary market contracting between any two people. I can "punish" you only by withholding future business or by seeking redress in the courts for any failure to honor our exchange agreement. That is exactly all that any employer can do."

[8] Schelling (1971) considers seek for monopoly the central feature of organized crime.

may even have some de facto monopoly in the use of violence in areas of their control. Still, they are always in competition with states and/or other rebel groups. Hence, there exists some structure that force rebel groups to increase some kind of efficiency, although it may be different from the productive efficiency firms pursue (Cf. Skaperdas and Syropoulos 1997). True, states also are in competition with each other (Waltz 1979). However, the institution of sovereignty developed in international society over time, and this significantly moderates the structural pressure on states for survival (Wendt 1999); 2) there is 'no institutional arrangement' that holds rebel groups accountable to inhabitants, while at least democratic states have such an arrangement.

Hence, rebel groups constitute a distinct category of organization for which an original theory needs be developed. While their organizations are still diverse, they share some common features such as an intense commitment problem, prevalence of power and coercion including use of violence both internally and externally, dependence on resource extraction rather than residual production, and seek for monopoly that allow us to develop a common framework for rebel groups. Neither has economics nor sociology developed a useful theory of rebel group organization, and the study of rebel group recruitment policies provides an entry point to develop a 'political' theory of organization. True, there have been some theoretical studies of recruitment in rebel groups (Beber and Blattman 2009; Gates 2002; Weinstein 2006). The enterprise, however, is still in its beginning and the findings are far from definite. Jeremy Weinstein (2006), for example, points out the impact of resource endowment of a group with specific attention to the recruitment issue: if a rebel group has abundant economic resources, it is likely to attract opportunistic members, develop little institution, and interact with society in violent manners, while if the group has

scarce economic resources, it tends to rely on social endowment, recruit only dedicated members, develop institutions, and interact with society in restricted and stable manners. Although his theory marks a significant step forward, the effects of the resource endowment needs not be so determinate. The tradeoff between social endowment and economic endowment Weinstein proposes does not logically follow from his assumptions. Rebel groups can have economic 'and' social endowments simultaneously as we can see in Hamas and the LTTE. A resource rich organization can restrict the payment to soldiers to attract dedicated participants and not opportunistic ones. Also, a resource poor organization may need to resort to abduction and looting to secure human and economic resources. In fact, Weinstein's theory fails to account for atrocities committed by economic resource scarce groups such as LRA in Uganda. The relationship between resource endowment, recruitment method, and institutional development in rebel groups is less deterministic than his theory suggests. What is missing in his study seems to be the strategic interaction between states and rebel groups. Literature on the state repression, for example, points out that state repression can have positive or negative impact on dissident activities, while the literature has not identified conditions for such effects.[9]

[9] Christian Davenport (2007: 10) writes, "There have never been any analyses of the conditions under which governments effectively eliminate or reduce dissident; there have only been empirical investigations that reveal that occasionally repression increases and/or decreases the activity of state challengers (i.e., that state coercive efforts are respectively ineffective and/or effective). Whether repression is more or less likely to reduce proto-insurgency or any other form of dissident activity, and if so under what conditions, are open empirical questions." Moore (2000) models and tests the impact of dissident activity on state repression and accommodation.

1.3 Policy Implications

The question also has significant policy implications. First, violence associated with forcible recruitment such as abduction and later assault on abductees' own families and villages are attracting significant attention in the media and among policy makers and humanitarian organizations. In order to reduce the number of such instances, however, it is essential to understand the logic behind such violence and identify conditions conducive to these recruitment methods. This study will shed a light on the conditions under which such violence is more likely to occur.

Second, the research will also contribute to improvement in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs. In order to effectively induce rebel groups' members to participate in DDR (i.e. to promote defection from rebel groups), it is necessary to understand the motives behind their participation in and compliance with rebel groups. Analyzing the recruitment methods of rebel groups, this study will contribute to the accumulation of knowledge about the incentives and opportunities for rebel group members to exit their groups so that policymakers can employ appropriate means to solve problems in DDR.

Third, it also has implications to improvement of counterinsurgency policies. Effectiveness of policy instruments states use such as general amnesty and intelligence operations depend partly on the organizational attributes of the rebel groups as well as the kinds of agents they recruit. It is, therefore, important to analyze the conditions under which rebel groups adopt certain recruitment policies and their implications to the types of agents they enlist as well as to the characteristics of their organizations.

1.4 Argument

In this dissertation, I classify recruitment strategies of rebel groups into three types, coercion, inducement by common incentive, and inducement by task incentive. Coercion means recruitment by force. It may take a form of sheer abduction or a more institutionalized form of conscription. Inducement by common incentive refers to recruitment of agents by presenting rewards that are not exclusive to the enlistment in the group. A typical example is the use of pecuniary incentive. Inducement by task incentive refers to recruitment of agents by presenting rewards that are exclusively tied to enlistment in the group. Rebel groups use certain ideologies, group solidarity, and other sorts of rewards that are difficult to obtain in other organizations. The difference between common incentive and task incentive is sometimes a matter of degree. We cannot always clearly differentiate one from another. For example, when a group provides a huge amount of pecuniary incentive to an agent, the group may be practically the only organization that has sufficient amount of economic resource to do so, and thus it may be reasonable to call it a task incentive rather than a common incentive. Still, most of the time, it is possible to differentiate the two. A clear example of task incentive is the opportunity to carry out revenge to the state. In a familiar portrayal of civil war where a military conflict takes place between state and a rebel group, it is only the rebel group that can provide an agent with an opportunity to take revenge against the state.

Theoretically, it is important to differentiate the three types of recruitment methods because they have different selection effects. Coercion practically has no selection effect and thus brings any type of agent into the group. Inducement by common incentive tends to

attract those who are capable, but they are not necessarily loyal to the group. Recruitment by task incentive tends to attract those who are capable and loyal to the group.

The primary argument of this dissertation is that rebel groups choose their recruitment methods in consideration of these selection effects in order to meet their functional demands. Rebel groups vary in two dimensions, vulnerability and task type. Some rebel groups are highly vulnerable to agents' desertion and defection. These groups depend on secrecy and loyalty of their agents for survival. Other groups are less vulnerable to agents' desertion because they have resources such as high military capacity and safe haven, which mitigate negative impacts of agents' desertion on security of the organization. Rebel groups also differ in types of tasks they require their agents to perform. Some groups employ sophisticated military techniques to directly attack the state military infrastructure. These groups, therefore, require high skills in their agents. Other groups rely on much less sophisticated military techniques and its security environment is not very demanding. As a consequent, they are not very demanding to their agents.[10]

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[10] In their study on interdependence, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye distinguish sensitivity from vulnerability (Keohane and Nye 2001: 9-17). According to them, the main difference between the two is the time framework and the need for change in the policy of an actor. Sensitivity refers to the speed and magnitude of the cost an event in one state imposes on another state in a short run. Here, the policy of the latter state is assumed to stay constant. Vulnerability, in contrast, refers to the magnitude of the cost an event in one state imposes on another state in a long run. Here, the latter state is assumed to have sufficient time to change its policy to reduce its dependence on the former state, if the latter does have an alternative resource or policy to do so. In this dissertation, however, I do not clearly distinguish the two concepts and use the term vulnerability to refer to the both. This is partly because it is sometimes difficult to operationalize distinction between the two. That is, it is sometimes difficult to tell how much policy change is required to talk about 'vulnerability.'

The main hypotheses of this dissertation, then, are as follow. First, 'the more vulnerable a rebel group is, the more likely the group relies on task incentives for recruitment,' so that the group enlists only those who are loyal to the group. Second,' the more demanding tasks inside a rebel group are, the less likely the group relies on coercion for recruitment' because the group needs to enlist only those who are capable. A rebel group that has military power or safe haven is invulnerable to agents' desertion and resultant leak of information from the group because it does not pose a significant risk to security of the organization. Such a group can afford to ignore the level of loyalty in its agents. In contrast, rebel groups that lack such resources, however, are highly reliant on information asymmetry with the state and thus on the loyalty of agents for survival. Hence, these groups tend to rely on task incentives to minimize the risk of agents' desertion. In terms of the task types, rebel groups whose tasks are demanding need to enlist only those who are highly capable. These groups, therefore, tend not to use force for recruitment. In contrast, groups whose tasks are not demanding are more likely to rely on coercion because they can be indiscriminate in their effort for recruitment and coercion gives them an instant measure to increase their sizes.

Here, it is important to note that a rebel group may employ more than two recruitment methods simultaneously or change its recruitment method over time. This is because they have different kinds of tasks inside the group and their organizational attributes change over time. A group, for example, obtains a safe haven at a certain point and then loses it later. I expect such a shift in a rebel group's organizational resource to change its recruitment strategy.

1.5 Research Method:

The main purposes of my research are to develop hypotheses and test their plausibility. I believe that this rather modest scope is appropriate because there are few preceding studies of the question and I am developing new hypotheses to answer it. As the quote from Kalyvas above indicates, we just started to scratch the surface of this question. For these purposes, I will conduct qualitative case studies of the LTTE in Sri Lanka and the LRA in Uganda. I chose these two groups because they constitute anomalies to an existing theory of rebel recruitment – the resource curse theory. The LTTE was rich in its economic resource and still relied mostly on task incentive for recruitment. The LRA, in contrast, had little economic resource and still relied mostly on force for recruitment.

A closer examination of these two groups, however, also reveals diversity and changes in their recruitment practices. For this reason, I will also follow changes in recruitment practices of these two rebel groups. This is highly useful to test the plausibility of the theory because this sort of 'before-after' comparison allow researchers to conduct a controlled-comparison of two cases to gain insights on effects of independent variables of theoretical concern on dependent variable (Cf. George and Bennett 2005).

Qualitative research methods allow me not only to compare the recruitment practices of the two groups but also to follow internal variations in respective groups. It also allows me to investigate the process that leads to change or variation in the recruitment practices. This provides me with an opportunity to examine the validity of the causal claim my theory presents.

1.6 Structure of the Dissertation

In the next chapter, I will first review the relevant literature on recruitment and organizations. Then, I will develop a theory of rebel recruitment. In Chapter 3, I will conduct a congruence test of the proposed theory against an overall comparison of the LTTE and the LRA as well as changes in respective rebel groups over time. In Chapter 4, in order to assess the validity of the causal mechanism in the proposed theory, I will assess validities of the observable implications of the theory to desertion rates in the LTTE and the LRA, state counterinsurgency strategies in Sri Lanka and Uganda, and sensitivity of the two rebel groups to massive desertion. I will conclude this study with the final chapter that discusses some implications of findings and directions of future research.

Chapter 2: Theory

2.1 Introduction

Rebel groups use a variety of incentives to recruit their combatants. They are also known to use force sometimes for this purpose. However, political scientists know little about conditions under which rebel groups use one or the other– incentive and force – as a means for recruitment. With the rise of literature on micro-foundations of civil war, there have been an increasing number of studies on the recruitment strategies of rebel groups. However, the literature that addresses this question about the conditions under which rebel groups recruits their soldiers by force (coercion) or by incentives (inducement) is still premature.

The question provides an important opportunity to develop a political theory of organization, incorporating coercive aspects of organization into the existing literature on organizations. As Terry Moe pointed out, current theories of organization, especially the new economics of organization, have not sufficiently taken into account the power dimension of organizations (Moe 1990, 2005). This relative lack of attention to power is understandable, because the new economics of organization developed primarily in studies of economic organizations, where voluntary exchange is expected to be the norm. However, power is a central element of organizations that rebel against the state. The study of rebel groups and their recruitment methods, therefore, provides an invaluable opportunity to incorporate the more coercive dimensions of organizations. I believe that such a study will provide important insights, not only about political organizations but also about economic ones.

The question regarding the choice between the uses of incentive and coercion for recruitment and retention has been addressed in previous studies of slavery farms. However, rebel groups differ from slavery farms on several accounts such as the lack of external enforcement authority, geographical dispersion, and intensity of competition between rival groups. A close examination of these differences may lead to a new variable that affects the choice of recruitment strategies by organizations.

The importance of the question for policymakers is clear. Abduction by rebel groups has attracted considerable attention from policymakers around the world, because it can expose victims to intensive violence and atrocities, and cause them long-lasting physical and/or psychological damage.

The international community has been particularly shocked by the large number of incidents of children kidnapped to turn them into combatants (e.g. International Labour Office. 2005; Singer 2006). However, the reasons for these children being in rebel groups vary substantially. Some children volunteered to join rebel groups, while others were forced to do so. The literature on child soldiers, however, pays relatively little attention to this variation in the reasons behind child soldiering across rebel groups.[11]It is essential to understand different logics behind such practices to develop effective measures to prevent such incidents in the future.

In this research, I focus on the vulnerability of the rebel groups to agents' desertions, and the task types within these groups, to explain their choices of recruitment strategies. A rebel group's vulnerability and task types inside the group affect what sorts of qualities

[11] For a review of the literature, see, for example, Christopher Blattman(2007) and Jens Christopher Andvig and Scott Gates (2007).

rebel groups seek in their agents. A vulnerable group seeks to enlist only those loyal to the group, while invulnerable ones can afford to recruit those of dubious loyalty to the group and still thrive. If a rebel group requires their agents to perform tasks highly demanding of their skills or physical strengths, the group has an incentive to recruit only those sufficiently capable. If tasks in the group are not very demanding, the group is more likely to enlist not only those highly capable but also those of lesser capabilities and increase its numerical strength.

These variations in demands for qualities of agents across rebel groups affect their choice of recruitment strategies, because the latter vary in their selection effects. Vulnerable rebel groups, which prefer only loyal agents, tend to rely on tasks for recruitment. Groups that are relatively invulnerable but whose tasks are highly demanding, care about the capacities of agents, even at the expense of their loyalties. Accordingly, these groups are more likely to rely on common incentives for recruitment. Finally, rebel groups who are invulnerable and whose tasks are not demanding need not care much about the loyalties or capacities of their agents. These groups are more likely to recruit their agents by force to increase the number of their agents, even at the expense of their qualities.

In order to assess the plausibility of this argument, I will assess its explanatory power against those of existing theories on rebel recruitment, that is, resource curse theory and theories of outside option. For this purpose, I will conduct qualitative case studies of LRA in Uganda and LTTE in Sri Lanka. I will not only analyze the overall characteristics of these two groups, but also their changes over time. The method I will use for theory-testing involves a congruence test and an assessment of the more direct implications of the proposed causal mechanism.

Given this plan, the main objectives of this chapter are to present and justify the theoretical framework to explain recruitment practices of rebel groups and to identify research methods to test its plausibility. I will first review existing theoretical works that address relevant questions on rebel groups. However, the literature has some limitations, partly because they borrow insights from studies of non-rebel organizations such as forced economic labor and organized crimes. Following my literature review I will develop a theory that explains the choice of recruitment strategy by rebel groups focusing on their organizational vulnerability and task types. I will conclude the chapter with a discussion of the methodology I will employ to assess the validity of the proposed theory.

2.2 Literature

Traditionally, studies of civil war have focused much more on the motivation for individuals to organize or join a rebellion. These studies pointed to factors such as ancient hatreds(Kaplan 1994b), fear and security concerns (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Walter and Snyder 1999), grievances (Gurr and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Center of International Studies. 1971), economic interests (Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004), ideology, class interests, social networks (Fearon and Laitin 1996), ethnic identities (Sandbu 2007), and psychological mechanisms (Petersen 2002). It is only more recently that important studies have emerged or been published regarding rebel group's choice of recruitment strategies. In the next section I will discuss the studies that specifically address the question of recruitment by force or by incentive, and highlight their limitations.

2.2.1 Resource Curse Theory

Jeremy Weinstein(2006) argues that the resource endowment of a rebel group determines its recruitment strategy. According to him, rebel groups that have abundant economic resources tend to recruit their combatants by economic incentives, while those with poor economic resource tend to rely on social endowments for recruitment. Weinstein further argues that resource-rich groups attract opportunistic members, develop little institutionally, and interact with society in violent manners. Resource-scarce groups, in contrast, tend to rely on social endowment, recruit only dedicated members, develop institutions, and interact with society in a restricted and stable manner. What underlies this difference between the two types of organizations is the adverse selection problem; resource-rich groups tend to attract opportunistic members, who demoralize the discipline inside the organization, and make it difficult for the group to make a credible commitment to establish a stable relationship with local civilians. Also, the presence of opportunistic members have a crowding-out effect, reducing the number of those loyal to the political causes of the group. An implication of this theory, Weinstein argues, is that resource-rich groups tend to be more violent, and abduct locals, once they are in decline, while resource-poor groups would not.[12]

A problem with this argument is that the tradeoff between social endowment and economic endowment which Weinstein proposes does not always hold. Rebel groups can have economic 'and' social endowments simultaneously, as we can see in Hamas and the LTTE. A resource rich organization can install a screening mechanism, restrict its payment

[12]For a general discussion of the relationship between economic resources and rebellion, see, for example, Karen Ballentine, Jake Sherman and International Peace Academy(2003), Michael Ross (2006; 2004) and Beardsley and McQuinn(2009).

to combatants, and develop social endowment. The question, therefore, becomes when resource-rich groups develop these attributes, and when they do not. Similarly, a resource poor organization sometimes needs to carry out abduction and looting to secure necessary human and economic resources. We need to inquire when resource-poor groups carry out abduction and when they cultivate social endowment. Overall, the relationship between resource endowment, recruitment methods, and institutional development in rebel groups is less deterministic than this theory suggests.

A possible source of this limitation in the resource curse theory is its almost exclusive focus on the relationship between rebel leaders and members. As a result, the theory ignores the group's relationship with the state and other rebel groups. The omission is critical, as the impetus for development of social endowment or for abduction largely comes from the group's fight against these other groups. It is possible to examine the level of demand for the group to take certain actions only by incorporating its relationship with adversarial groups. That is how we can identify conditions under which these groups take one recruitment method over another.

2.2.2 Outside Option

Another compelling study of rebel recruitment was developed by Bernd Beber and Christopher Blattman (Beber and Blattman 2010). According tithe study, it is rational for a rebel group to rely on force to recruit and retain combatants when they have little outside option. So, while Weinstein focuses on the characteristics of the rebel organization or principal, Beber and Blattman focus on the characteristics of combatants or agents. Building on Michael Suk-Young Chwe's study on managers' use of violence against child workers at the time of the British industrial revolution (Chwe 1990), they

contend that children are especially susceptible to abduction and violence inside rebel groups because children have little chance of escape in comparison to adults.

Beber and Blattman's study develops a formal model of the theory and makes a compelling argument, utilizing survey data from Northern Uganda. Their argument is a strong one; that it is more efficient for a rebel group to use force, rather than reward, to recruit and retain agents who have little outside option, that is, children.

Their theory, however, remains insufficient to explain rebel groups' choice of recruitment methods, for two reasons. First, they assume that the primary concern of rebel groups is the retention rate. Beber and Blattman's argument is that it is more efficient for a rebel group to use force to recruit and retain children when the group can retain her/him effectively for a lower cost. However, the ultimate goal of a rebel group is not to maintain a high retention rate or to increase the size of its group, but to survive civil war and hopefully achieve military victory. For rebel groups, therefore, it is only a means and not the end to increase the number of its members. The question then becomes whether having more members always increases the chance of survival and victory. I argue that the answer is negative. In order to maximize the chance of survival and victory, rebel groups need to care not only about the size of the group, but also about the quality of the members. The level of loyalty and the capacity of agents matters significantly. Sometimes, rebel groups are better off remaining small to ensure the recruitment of only loyal and/or capable agents. Having disloyal agents, for example, can be fatal to some groups, though not to all of them. In addition - as I argue later in this chapter -the recruitment method used also affects the types of agents of which the group consists. Therefore, when recruiting its members, a rebel

group needs to determine the priority between quantity and quality, this decision affecting their choice of recruitment method.

What variable, then, affects rebel groups' priorities between the quantity and quality of its members? An obvious place to look for an answer is the group's relationship with the state and other rebel groups. Only by assessing its position against other adversarial groups, does it become possible to determine the military demand for quantity and quality. This lack of attention to the power relationship between rebel group and the state, I believe, highlights the second limitation of Beber and Blattman's theory. By ignoring the group's position relative to the state, they fail to take into account possibly the most important factor that affects behavior of the rebel group.

Scott Gates also uses principal-agent model, but incorporates adversarial groups into his analysis (Gates 2002). Though not focusing on the question of inducement and coercion, Gates develops a theory that captures interaction between a rebel group and the state and its effects on rebel group's recruitment strategy. An important contribution of his theory is that it captures the triangular relationship among three actors – rebel leaders, potential members, and the state. He also incorporates the element of power into the theory by introducing the contest-success function developed by Jack Hirshleifer and others (cf. Hirshleifer 2001b).

Gates' theory, however, also suffers from two limitations. First, he assumes that a rebel group seeks to maximize the number of its members while minimizing agency cost, by recruiting only those whom they expect to be able to retain either by force or by incentive. In this theory, power relationship between the rebel group and the state matters, only because it affects the prospect for agents' successful defection. In other words, the

power balance between the two parties affects an agent's outside option, which in turn affects the rebel group's decision about whether or not to recruit the agent. However, it is not only the outside option of the agents that the power balance between the two parties affects; it also affects the level of urgency for the group to recruit more people. Moreover, the choice of military strategy best suited for the group to undertake against the state is effected, which, in turn, influences the type of agent the group requires.

Second, Gates does not sufficiently examine the significance of agents' desertion for rebel groups. He considers the desertion of an agent as a loss of human resource for the group. However, in the context of civil war, an agent's desertion may have more significance. In military competition, for a rebel group, desertion means not only the loss of a human resource but also a potential loss of information about the group. This is especially problematic if the group is militarily weak. For information asymmetry becomes almost the only asset for the group to stand against the state.

2.2.3 Roving and Stationary Bandits

Mancur Olson also focuses on power balance between a rebel group and its adversaries (McGuire and Olson Jr 1996; Olson 1993, 2000). However, he does so in a way different from Gates. According to Olson, power balance between the two parties affects the former's capacity to commit itself to a stable long-term relationship with the locals. If the group is powerful enough to create a good prospect for itself to stay in the community, both the group and the local community become interested in institutionalizing the group's resource extraction in the community. Through institutionalization, the group becomes interested in the long-term prosperity of the community and thus becomes less extractive in the short term. In contrast, if the group is not sufficiently powerful, the

group cannot commit itself to a long-term relationship with the community. Therefore, the group tries to extract as many resources as possible each time they visit the community, and consequently the local community has no incentive to cooperate with the group. Thus, a powerful rebel group or stationary bandit is less exploitative and tends to institutionalize its relationship with locals, while a weak rebel group, or roving bandit, is more exploitative and tends to have only an ad hoc relationship with locals. Although Olson discusses rebel groups' resource extraction in general, the theory is certainly applicable to their recruitment practice. An implication, therefore, is that powerful rebel groups tend to recruit by incentive, while weak rebel groups tend to recruit by force.

For the present purpose, there are two limitations with this argument. First, the distinction between ad hoc and institutionalized resource extraction does not neatly coincide with the distinction between coercion and inducement. It is possible for a rebel group to use force to recruit people in an institutionalized manner. It is also possible for them to use rewards to attract more agents in an ad hoc manner. True, the prospect for a stable future with the group may raise the number of volunteers from the community making it easier for the group to secure the necessary number of agents by incentive. Still, the existence of this effect does not mean that inducement and institutionalization always go together.

Second, while strong rebel groups may be more able to commit themselves to a stable relationship with locals, it is rather the weak groups that have strong incentive or immediate need to maintain a good relationship with their immediate community. As Mao Zedong (1961) famously proclaimed, it is important for the survival of rebel groups to gain support among locals, as rebel groups often fight against more powerful enemies. Strong

rebel groups, by contrast, do not have an immediate need to maintain a good relationship with locals, as they can survive without their support, at least for the time being. This means that weak rebel groups have more incentive to recruit by incentive and avoid antagonizing locals, while strong rebel groups may be more willing to use force for recruitment, even at the expense of local support.

2.2.4 Summary

Recent studies of rebel recruitment draw on literature about the economics of organization and produce many important insights. However, these studies still have a significant limitation; they do not sufficiently appreciate the fact that rebel groups are fighting a military conflict against the state (or other rival groups) in civil war. First, they either underestimate or under-specify potential costs of agent's defection and desertion for rebel groups. Second, these studies do not recognize variation across rebel groups in their means to achieve production, especially their military strategies. As a result, these studies remain relatively silent about differences among rebel groups in their demands for certain qualities in their agents.

Implications of Agents' Defection and Desertion First, existing studies underestimate the probable impacts of agents' defection and desertion for rebel groups.

Existing studies of rebel recruitment often rely on principal-agent models to develop their insights. An advantage of these studies is their explicit focus on the difficulties rebel leaders experience in recruiting and monitoring their agents. Weinstein points out the significance of adverse selection problems in rebel recruitment and the resulting disciplinary problems. Gates' study, alongside Beber and Blattman's study and Stathis Kalyvas' work on ethnic defection (Kalyvas 2008), directs our attention to the

significance of the risk of desertion and defection for rebel groups, as well as to their enforcement capacities. These studies also recognize that rebel groups do not always produce economic residuals for distribution within the group, which leads to resource constraints and existence of multiple motives for the agents to join and stay with the group (Gates 2002; Weinstein 2006).

These studies, however, often focus exclusively on the relationship between rebel leaders and members, ignoring state and other groups adversarial to the rebel group. This absence of 'state' in these theories appears to have constrained their formulations of the costs of agents' desertion and defection. Beber and Blattman's study, for example, fails to specify how desertion and defection affects the military production of the rebel group. Their theory focuses on the question of how rebel leaders meet the participation constraint to ensure that their agents stay in the group, and while recognizing numerical loss as a cost of agents' desertion, it is not clear what other costs they have in their mind. Unlike Beber and Blattman, Gates explicitly include the state in his theory. However, he also appears to focus on the numerical loss as the cost of agents' desertion. Weinstein's resource curse theory departs from the other theories by pointing out the negative impact of agents' defection, on the level of discipline inside the group and its relationship with the local community. In this theory, agents' defection harms the groups' ability to solve the commitment problem with the local community and establish a stable relationship with them.

However, in addition to these two kinds of costs, agents' defection and desertion produces two further costs for the rebel group. First, as Gates recognizes, an agent's desertion does not only reduce the numerical strength of the group, but also transfers the

human resource from the group to the state. Second, agents' desertion also transfers information between these two parties. Together, these two effects of agents' desertion can have significant impact on the fate of the rebel group and the course of civil war.[13]

The magnitude of these two effects of agents' desertion depends partly on the number of deserters and the amount of information they disclose to the state. Importantly, however, their magnitude also depends on the rebel group's position relative to the state, as well as the kinds of assets the group possesses. If the group is relatively powerful and already exposed to the state, the group can remain relatively unaffected. This sort of group may increase the number of agents to meet their immediate needs, even if it entails a higher rate of desertion by its agents. In contrast, if the group is relatively weak and surviving under cover, transference of human resource and information disclosure can have a disastrous effect on the group. Such a group prioritizes minimizing the risk of desertion by their agents, and has an incentive to become more selective in its recruitment strategy than other theories suggest. It is therefore necessary to examine the group's military position against the state and the sorts of assets the group possesses, and analyze how susceptible the group is to negative effects of agents' desertion, in order to explain rebel group's recruitment strategies. In other words, the vulnerabilities of rebel groups are important if we are to explain their choice of recruitment strategies.

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[13]Gates (Gates 2002)Explicitly denies the link between agents' desertion and power balance between the two parties, despite also assuming that agents have no choice but to side with one party of the other. He is correct in pointing out that the military balance between the two parties depends not only on the number of deserters but also on other factors. My argument is that by incorporating the vulnerability of the rebel group and the disclosure of information into the theory, it becomes possible to identify when agents' desertion significantly influences the course of civil war and when it does not.

It is worth emphasizing here that rebel groups are often highly concerned about the leak of information through deserters. Control of information is often a central issue in the interaction between rebel groups and the state. Leites and Wolf (1970: esp. 132-148), discussed the primacy of information in counterinsurgency. According to them, "Information, then, is more important in insurgent and counterinsurgent conflicts than in other forms of conflict. If, for example, one defines a side's capabilities in terms of intelligence information (measured as the probability of observing or locating some activity or target), firepower (tons of ordnance deliverable per unit of time), and mobility (cargo or personnel lift capability per unit of time), improvement in intelligence are likely to be more important (productive) than increases in mobility or firepower" (Leites and Wolf 1970: 137). Stathis Kalyvas(1999) places control of information at the center of his analysis in use of violence by state and rebel groups in civil war. Moreover, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita(2005) argues that the state co-opts moderates in a terrorist group to obtain information about the group, even at the risk of perverse effects on domestic order, i.e. a temporary increase in the use of violence by the terrorist group controlled by the radicals. It is relatively well known that the control of information is vital for rebel groups' survival, and that agents' defection and desertion are important pathways through which information leaks from rebel groups.[14] Still, the existing literature says little about its implications to rebel groups' recruitment and retention practice.

Variation in Tasks The second limitation within the current literature is a lack of explicit discussion regarding the variation across rebel groups in their means to achieve military

[14]The cost of desertion by a member may not be only information outflow. In case of ethnic groups, ethnic defection may prove vital to the credibility of the organization (Kalyvas 2008).

effectiveness, to ensure survival and ultimately a military victory. The best means for rebel groups to pursue these goals is not always the same. For example, rebel groups use different military strategies such as conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, and terrorist attacks. Depending on which strategy a rebel group uses, its demands for agents differs. Some strategies require high skills in rebel members, while others do not. In order for us to explain the recruitment practices of rebel groups, it is indispensible to recognize variation across rebel groups in tasks they expect their agents to perform, and explore how such tasks relate to demands for certain qualities in their agents.

In this section, I discussed two important limitations in the literature on rebel recruitment that utilizes principal-agent models. First, the literature does not sufficiently examine the negative implications of agents' desertion in rebel groups, such as transfer of power and information from these groups to states. Once we consider these elements, it becomes important to take into account variation across rebel groups in terms of how much they are susceptible to these additional costs of agency loss. In other words, in order to explain a rebel group's choice of recruitment strategies, it is necessary to take into account how vulnerable the group is to agents' defection and desertion. Second, the literature fails to recognize variation across these groups in their means to ensure military effectiveness. The choice of military strategies affects the skills and capacities these groups require in their agents. Therefore, in order to explain rebel groups' choice of their recruitment strategies, it is imperative to take into consideration the types of tasks inside the group.

It is also important to note that the above limitations are shared by Mancur Olson's study of roving and stationary bandits. True, Olson incorporates the power relationship

between rebel groups and states, and its implication to the commitment problem between rebel groups and their agents or local population, as well as to the groups' recruitment practice. However, he stops short of exploring the inverse relationship. That is, he does not discuss the implications of a rebel group's commitment failure and resultant desertion by its agents to the relationship between the group and the state. Also, by focusing on the 'capacity' of rebel groups to commit, he fails to recognize variation across rebel groups in their demands for certain qualities in their agents.

The literature on child soldiers is where the question of force and incentive is extensively explored. However, except for a few studies by Gates (2002), Andvig and Gates (2006), and Beber and Blattman (2010), the literature predominantly focuses on the factors that affect the supply of children to rebel groups. Consequently, more research is needed regarding the organizational variables that affect the recruitment of child soldiers, and the groups' choice between force and incentive for enlistment of the children. Furthermore, the existing studies on child soldiers leave much of the variation within or across rebel groups unexplained, because the systematic absence of focus on organizational factors leaves their findings tentative, due to the potential problem of omitted variables.

2.2.5 Control of Information in Civil War

In the above review, I argued that the literature ignores certain costs of agents' desertion to rebel groups such as leaking information to the state. Before moving on to the next section where I develop an alternative theory, I will briefly address two related questions. First, what sorts of information are relevant when we discuss the leak of information from rebel groups through deserters? Second, are deserters really an important source of

information in military competition? Is there an alternative source of information that outweighs the rebel group's concern over the information cost of its agent's desertion?

The first question relates to the content of information. In essence, the sorts of information relevant to our analyses are the ones that affect the security of the rebel group or of its operations. The single most important piece of information is arguably the location of the organization. The site of its facilities, weapons, foods, and human resources are all important and critical to the security of the organization. Another sort of information critical to the survival of the rebel group concerns divisions within the group. Rebel groups often, and probably almost always, have some sort of intra-group conflict, though with varying intensity. Given the centrality of desertion and defection to the course of civil war, as discussed above, a rival group can quickly seize an opportunity and utilize the information to instigate desertion from the group. The third kind of information critical to the security of the rebel group is that regarding its operational plan. Even relatively small rebel groups of 30 to 100 cannot move effectively without an operational plan prepared *a priori*. Such a plan may concern, among others, a future attack on government facilities, an emergency plan in case of a state's military assault, or logistics in a battlefield. The disclosure of such information can jeopardize the routine operations of the rebel group and possibly undermine its security, especially if the group remains unaware of any defection and information leak, so that no remedy is taken.

The second question concerns the existence of alternative sources of information for rival groups. If rival groups, such as the state, have an alternative source of information that is more reliable and decisive, it is ineffectual for a rebel group to be concerned with the risk of information leak through deserters and defectors. I maintain, however, that deserters

are a precious source of information for rival groups fighting against a rebel group. True, rival groups do have alternative sources of information such as the local population, intelligence satellites, foreign government agencies, and so on. In fact, scholars and strategists of rebellion and civil war have repeatedly emphasized the need for rebel groups and rival groups to win the hearts and minds of the local population to control or extract information(Guevara 1998; Mao 1961). Also, recent developments in civil wars highlight that the states and their allies sometimes rely on satellite images to bomb the headquarters of rebel groups.[15]Still, for rival groups, such as the state, information gleaned from deserters is crucial for counterinsurgency. This is the same for rebel groups fighting against rival groups, for at least three reasons. First, information from deserters tends to be timelier than those gained from other sources. Second, deserters tend to have more detailed information about the 'decision making process' of the rebel group, including internal conflicts. Third, deserters often have more information about the 'future' plan of the rebel group. These three features make information from deserters a highly valuable resource for rival parties to effectively fight against the group, and thus a major concern for the rebel group.

2.3 Theory – Inducement and Coercion

In the previous section, I have shown there exists sufficient ground for developing a new theory of rebel recruitment. In this section, I develop a theory that explains rebel groups' use of incentives and force for recruitment.

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[15] In the Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, the Ugandan military carried out an air attack on the headquarter of the LRA after the government identified its location using a satellite image provided by the United States. The leader of the LRA, Joseph Kony, narrowly escaped the offensive.

I start with two assumptions. First, rebel groups are in military competition with adversarial groups such as the state. This means that the rebels care not only about reducing the agency cost inside the organization, but also about the effectiveness of their military operations, to ensure security and hopefully a military victory. For this purpose, it is important that they secure a sufficient number of agents, with required qualities, to carry out certain military strategies. Second, rebel groups usually have little capacity to monitor and sanction their agents. Accordingly, it is vital for rebel groups to install a proper selection mechanism to recruit their agents, if they are to secure particular types. Third, rebel groups have limited information about the qualities of agents – their capacities and levels of loyalty to the rebel groups – at the time of recruitment. This information asymmetry creates a problem for rebel leaders in deciding how to select the right kinds of agents.

The types of agents which/that rebel groups require depend on two factors: vulnerability of the organization agents' desertion, and the types of the tasks inside the group. If an organization is vulnerable to agents' desertion, it is crucial for the group to recruit only those who are loyal to the group. If the organization is secure, the group can afford to recruit those who are of dubious loyalty. The types of tasks within the group also matters. If the task is highly demanding, the group needs highly capable agents. If the task is not very demanding, the group can afford to recruit those who are less capable.

How do the recruitment strategies of rebel groups affect the types of agents recruited? I distinguish three kinds of recruitment strategies. First, coercion means recruitment by force; it has no selection effect and thus brings any type of agent into the group. Second, inducement by common incentive refers to the recruitment of agents by

presenting rewards that are not exclusive to the enlistment in the group. A typical example is the use of pecuniary incentive. Inducement by common incentive tends to attract those who are capable. However, they are not necessarily loyal to the group because they can expect to gain similar rewards from other sources. Third, inducement by task incentive refers to the recruitment of agents by presenting rewards that are tied exclusively to enlistment to the group. Rebel groups use certain ideologies, group solidarity, and other sorts of rewards that are difficult to obtain in other organizations. Recruitment by task incentive tends to attract those who are capable and loyal to the group. The methods employed also create variance in the number of agents recruited. The more selective the recruitment strategies, the smaller the number of agents the group can enlist.

Building on these premises, I make the following arguments in this research. First, groups that are invulnerable, and their tasks less demanding, tend to rely on force for recruitment. Second, groups that are invulnerable and their tasks demanding, tend to rely on common incentive for recruitment. Third, groups that are vulnerable tend to rely on task incentive for recruitment, regardless of the types of tasks inside the organization.

The primary purpose of this research is to develop the above argument and assess its plausibility, testing the validities of the main argument and the three observable implications. For this purpose, I will conduct qualitative analyses of the LRA in Uganda and the LTTE in Sri Lanka. The two groups were initially selected because they constitute deviations from the predictions of the resource curse theory, setting a low bar to test the plausibility of the proposed theory. However, these two groups have substantially changed their characteristics and recruitment practices over time. Hence, by studying their changes over time, I can conduct a controlled comparison.

I will first discuss the selection effects of various recruitment methods; the premise on which the entire theory is built on. Next, I will analyze rebel groups' demands for certain types of agents, and how those demands lead them to rely on one recruitment method or another. Here, I will present the main hypotheses of this project. Then, I will discuss the three observable implications of the argument. Finally, I will present the research method to assess the plausibility of the argument.

2.3.1 Selection Effects of Recruitment Strategies

In this section, I discuss the selection effects of various recruitment strategies. I assume that there is a rebel group (principal) that attempts to recruit its members (agents) to carry out certain tasks by force (coercion), by common incentive (inducement by incentive), or by task incentive (inducement by task). Those who are potential or actual members of the group are referred to as agents. A rebel leadership is assumed to be unitary and rational, while agents are likewise rational in their individual capacities. Agents vary in two aspects: in their capacities and in their loyalties to the group. It is assumed that rebel groups have no information about the type of the agents at the time of recruitment. Once a rebel group presents a task and an incentive, or a threat, an agent chooses whether to join the group. If the agent joins, the rebel group decides on the extent of its monitoring system over its members. Observing the monitoring system's effectiveness, an agent decides between staying with the organization and deserting. If the agent deserts, it is likely they will report to the state or other rebel groups (rival groups).

A potentially problematic feature of this analytical framework is the assumption of a unitary and rational rebel leadership. Obayashi (2011) takes an intra-group politics approach, to analyze the conflict within a rebel leadership, and its implications for the

group's behavior. However, in the present study, I maintain the assumption of the unitary and rational rebel leadership, and attempt to develop and test a theory of rebel recruitment, that focuses on the groups' vulnerabilities to information outflow. I believe this scope of research is appropriate, given the absence of any previous study on rebel recruitment from a similar theoretical perspective. Incorporating an assessment of intra-leadership politics can complicate the analysis, and thus be counterproductive to the present purposes. Future research can capitalize on the achievement of this project and assess the need for incorporating an intra-group politics perspective.

2.3.1.1 Coercion– Recruitment by Force

Process Recruiting by force can, by implication, take the form of an actual use of force to abduct the agent, or it can simply threaten the use of force to coerce him to join the group. However, for the sake of discussion, these two forms of coercion are equivalent. I will therefore focus on the use of threat. When coercing an agent to join, the rebel group first presents the assigned task within the group, additionally, the punishment for refusing to join. At this point, as in the case of inducement, the rebel group does not know the type of the agent. Therefore, in threatening the agent, the group presents its capacity to set a new reservation point that is low enough to force most agents to join the group. Observing the threat, the agent chooses between joining and refusing to join the group. If he refuses to join, the group carries out the promised punishment and moves on to the next agent. Because the group sets the reservation point sufficiently low, through threat of immediate execution, the agent chooses to join the group. Once the agent has joined the group, a certain amount of resource is invested in developing a monitoring system, and setting the code of punishment for agents' failure to fulfill their tasks. Even at this

point, the group has no knowledge about the type of agent recruited. Observing the group's decision, the agent decides whether to stay with the group or desert.

Figure 1 Coercion and Types of Recruited



Non-selection, Code of Punishment, Desertion While inducement allows a rebel group to learn the type of agent, through their self-selection to join or not to join, coercion does not have this selection effect. By setting the reservation point for the agent sufficiently low, through threat of execution or the killing of relatives, the rebel group leaves little choice for the agent to stay out of the group. In other words, coercion has a fishing-net effect. Regardless of whether an agent has the capacity to perform the task, she joins the group to avoid punishment by the group. On the one hand, this allows the group to recruit all those who are capable of performing the task. On the other hand, the group also

recruits those who are incapable or unwilling to perform the task. Thus, while coercion ensures the group recruits all those capable, recruitment through coercion prevents the group ascertaining the type of agent.

This fishing-net effect of recruitment by force has two consequences. First, it increases the desertion rate in the group, by enlisting those who are incapable or unwilling to perform the assigned tasks within the group. One assumption here is that the group cannot maintain the threat-level set against an agent - at the time of the recruitment - following the agent's enlistment.[16] Indeed, this future shift in threat-level is anticipated by the disloyal agent - who is either incapable or unwilling to perform the task – and motivates them to temporarily join the group, when facing a threat from the rebel group.

Second, the fishing-net effect of recruitment by force keeps the commitment problem between the rebel group and its agents high, leading to a high-level of monitoring within the group and severe punishments for agents' failure to fulfill their tasks. Due to the fishing-net effect of coercion, the rebel leader does not know the agents' type, even after their enlistment. Moreover, the agents themselves lack an effective means of signaling their 'type' to the group. This forces the rebel leader to invest a substantial amount of the group's resources towards an intensive monitoring system. Moreover, when an agent fails to fulfill his task, the rebel leader cannot tell whether this failure was the intent of the agent -by his incapacity- or by circumstances beyond anyone's control. This enforces the leader to set a severe code of punishment, for even a minor failure may be an indication of an agent's incapacity or dissatisfaction with the group. The rebel group sets a severe code of

[16] There are cases when this assumption does not hold, such as when the rebel group sets up a conscription system, or when the agenthas a safe haven abroad. These cases shall be discussed in due course.

punishment to deter desertion by dissatisfied agents, and execute incapable ones. Such a code, however, reduces the utility of all the enlisted agents, including those who were capable and willing to stay with the group, because a single mistake or accident beyond his control, may lead to his execution. Accordingly, assuming the monitoring system of the group is imperfect, the code results in the desertion of both loyal and disloyal agents, in anticipation of severe punishment, should they fail to fulfill their tasks for reasons beyond their control.[17]

Consequently, the group experiences a high desertion rate, due to the enlistment of disloyal agents, and the resultant severe punishment code within the rebel group. Assuming these deserters report to one or more rival groups, including the state, a constant and high volume of information is leaked from the group to its rivals. This potentially causes a fatal damage to the group.[18]

2.3.1.2 Inducement – Recruitment by Common Incentive

Process When recruiting with common incentive, a rebel group presents the task and the incentive to an agent. At this point, the rebel group does not know the type of the agent i.e. whether he prefers to join and stay with the group, given the task and the incentive presented to him, and whether he has sufficient capacity to perform the task. Observing the task and the incentive, the agent decides whether or not to join the group. If he chooses not to join the group, nothing happens, and the rebel group moves on to recruit another agent. If he chooses to join the group, the rebel group assigns them their task and

[17] This last effect is not captured in Figure 2.3.

[18] In the discussion over adoption of a conscription system in the United States, another problem with the inclusion of disloyal agents – contamination effect - is discussed (Folsom 1981).

provides an incentive for him, while investing some resources in monitoring the agent and setting up a code of punishment, should he fail to fulfill his task. On the one hand, the agent chooses between staying with the group, and one the other hand, between deserting it and reporting to the state or other groups.

Figure 2 Inducement and Types of Recruited



Self-selection, Desertion, Information Leak If a rebel group recruits its agents through inducement with a common incentive it results in an agent's self-selection to reveal his capacity. The agent joins the group only when he is confident of performing the task presented by the group, initially finding the incentive sufficiently attractive. However, his participation in the group does not reveal the level of his loyalty to the group. If a rival group presents a similar incentive of a larger amount, or present task incentive of some kind, the agent might desert from the rebel group and join the rival group.

Moreover, it is difficult for the rebel group to gain information regarding an agent's potentially defection, until the agent actually attempts defection to a rival group.

This partial selection effect has two consequences. First, it moderates the group's desertion rate by selecting out those who are incapable; capable agents are less likely to leave the organization, although, as pointed out above, they may still leave the organization in response to greater incentives from one of the rival groups.[19] Second, the group invests a moderate amount of its resources in monitoring systems (that is, less than the case of coercion) and sets a rather severe punishment code (but still more moderate than the case of coercion). Meanwhile, the rival group, knowing the existence of ordinary agents in the original group, is aware that the use of slightly higher common incentives than that offered by the rebel group is sufficient to instigate the desertion or defection of agents from the original group.

Consequently, the rebel group that relies on inducement with common incentive for recruitment experiences a lower desertion rate than those relying on force, for three reasons: first, the group attracts only those who are capable.; second, the group sets a less severe punishment code, which makes the agents more tempted to stay than they would be otherwise; third, the rival group invests more resources into instigating agents to desert.

2.3.1.3 Inducement – Recruitment by Task Incentive

Process When recruiting with task incentive, a rebel group presents the task and the incentive to an agent. At this point, the rebel group does not know the type of the

[19] Here, I am excluding the possibility that some agents may be spies, that is, those who join the group to obtain information about the group and desert later to provide it to the rival groups. This is because I do not see a reason to believe that the choice between the two recruitment strategies – inducement and coercion – significantly affects the probability that a spy joins the group.

individual agent i.e. whether he prefers to join and stay with the group, given the task and the incentive presented him. Observing the task and the incentive, the agent chooses between joining the rebel group and not joining it. If she chooses not to join the group, nothing happens and the rebel group moves on to another agent for recruitment. If she chooses to join the group, the rebel group assigns the task and provides the incentive to her, while investing some resources in monitoring the agent and setting up a code of punishment for her failure to fulfill her task. Observing her decision, then, the agent chooses between staying with the group on the one hand and deserting it and reporting to the state or other groups on the other hand.

Figure 3 Inducement with Task and Types of Recruited



Self-selection, Desertion, Information Leak Inducement by task brings about self-selection by an agent to reveal not only his capacity, but also the level of his loyalty to the group. An agent joins the group only when he prefers to stay with the group, that is,

when he is confident he has the capacity to perform the task and is satisfied with the promised incentive.[20] If the agent prefers to stay out of the group, either because he lacks confidence in his own capacity to perform the task or because he is confident but does not find the incentive satisfactory relative to other alternatives, he chooses to stay out of the group and there is no negative consequence to him. Accordingly, the rebel group recruits only those who are capable and satisfied with the incentive, but omits not only those who are incapable, but also those who are capable but unsatisfied with the incentive. Assuming that the rebel group keeps its promise about the task incentive, we therefore expect no desertion from the group. This remains the case regardless of whether a rival group presents some incentive to the agent, as by definition, task incentive is unique to the rebel group and rival groups cannot provide it to the agent.

The selection effect of recruitment by incentive has two consequences. First, it keeps the group's desertion rate low by selecting out those who are incapable or dissatisfied with the incentive in advance. If we allow no random chance factor to operate, we would expect no desertion from the group, although this is unrealistic.[21] Second, it reduces the

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[20]When the incentive a rebel group presents is high, this selection process may not work, because agents may join the group,hoping that they acquire only the incentive, and can then escape. Also, such an incentive may attract those who would easily defect if a rival group offers a higher incentive. I do not discuss this issue for three reasons. First, the issue of those who defect to rival groups or the state, upon counter-inducement, is discussed laterin this thesis. Second, this sort of adverse selection problem has been discussed to some extent by Weinstein (2006), although he examines the issue in relation to the disciplinary problem and violence against civilians, rather than to desertion and defection. Third, it is not clear if this problem is unique to inducement because coercion, as discussed later, has a fishing-net effect and thus also results in a recruitment of these types of agents.

[21] Here, I am excluding the possibility that some agents may be spies, that is, those who join the group to obtain information about the group and desert later to provide information to rival groups. This is because I do not believe that the choice between the

commitment problem between the rebel group and its agents, keeping both the level of monitoring and the intensity of punishment low within the group. By joining the group, the agent has successfully signaled the rebel leader that he is capable and satisfied with the incentive and the assigned task. The rebel group, therefore, needs not invest as much in the development of an expensive monitoring system to watch its agents. If an agent fails to fulfill a task, the rebel group knows that he did so only by error or by circumstances beyond his control and not by intention or by his incapacity. Thus, the group punishes the agent severely enough to caution them/him not to make the same mistake again, but moderately enough so as not to scare them/him away from the group. This allows the agents to stay with the group without fear of execution by mistake or by other sorts of happenings beyond their control.

Since there would be no desertion (or only a small number of deserters if we allow a chance factor to operate here), the group does not need to fear the disclosure of security-related information to rival groups.

2.3.2 Main Hypotheses – Vulnerability and Task Type

Now that the selection effects of the three recruitment methods have been identified, I will examine the question of when rebel groups choose one method over another. As previously mentioned, I assume that rebel groups share three important organizational characteristics. First, rebel groups are in military competition with the state and other groups. Second, rebel groups usually lack an effective monitoring and sanction system.

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two recruitment strategies – inducement and coercion – significantly affects the probability that a spy joins the group.

The first characteristic – military competition with the state –compels rebel groups to care about the qualities of their agents. Rebel groups need to have the right kinds of agents who satisfy their military requirements. Rebel groups require their agents to be loyal and have sufficient capacities to perform tasks assigned to them. Otherwise, these groups would simply lose out and disappear. In fact, in many cases, rebel leaders would be better off not starting a rebellion, if they cannot control the quality of their agents.

The second characteristic of rebel groups – lack of effective monitoring and sanction system – is also important. Rebel groups are illegal entities and thus lack an external enforcement mechanism. Also, they are often geographically dispersed. These features make it extremely difficult for rebel groups to develop an effective monitoring and sanction mechanism. Consequently, rebel leaders need to rely on selection at the time of recruitment, rather than monitoring inside the group, to ensure their agents follow orders.

Finally, rebel groups lack information about qualities of agents at the time of recruitment.

Together, these three characteristics of rebel groups make it crucial for them to utilize the right kinds of recruitment strategy, and enlist only those agents who satisfy their demands.

It is important here, to note that different rebel groups vary in their priorities in recruitment. Some groups require their agents to be highly loyal to the group. Other groups prioritize the skills and capacities of their agents, over their loyalties. Still others focus on increasing their numerical strength, over and above agents' loyalty and skills. Consequently, in order to explain rebel groups' choice of recruitment strategies, it is necessary to identify variables that determine their priorities in recruitment.

I argue that the vulnerability of a rebel group and the task types inside the group, strongly influence the group's choice of recruitment strategies. I will explain these two variables in turn.

Vulnerability of Rebel Group The most important factor – and the primary interest of this research project – is the vulnerability of the group to members' desertion. The term 'vulnerability' here refers to the potential cost of rebel group's dependence on agents' allegiance to the group. More precisely, it concerns the liability to costly effects imposed from the desertion and defection of their agents.[22] In general, members' desertion has negative consequences to rebel groups for two reasons: first, it shifts the numerical power from the group to the state; second, it transfers information from the group to the state.[23] This second point is particularly important because rebel groups often, though not always, rely on secrecy or information asymmetry to ensure their own survival and defeat the state.

[22]Here, it is useful to compare this definition with that of Keohane and Nye(2001). They differentiate two kinds of costs of dependence, sensitivity and vulnerability. The difference between the two concepts lies in their temporal frameworks. According to them, "In terms of the costs of dependence, sensitivity means liability to costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered to try to change the situation. Vulnerability can be defined as an actor's liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered. Since it is usually difficult to change policies quickly, immediate effects of external changes generally reflect sensitivity dependence. Vulnerability dependence can be measured only by the costliness of making effective adjustments to a changed environment over a period of time"(Keohane and Nye 2001, 11-12). In this project, however, I use a different definition and use the term 'vulnerability' to refer to both of these two kinds of costs as it is often difficult to operationalize the difference between sensitivity and vulnerability. I believe that the difference is quantitative rather than qualitative. Moreover, I anticipate that those in civil war studies will be more familiar with the term 'vulnerability' than the term 'sensitivity'. So, I considered resonance of the term, too.

[23]In the international relations literature, defensive realist and rationalist theories of war often refer to the importance of information asymmetries and incentives for states to exploit them. (cf. Fearon 1995; Glaser 1997).

However, what determines rebel groups' level of vulnerability to agents' desertion? The answer depends on whether the group has resources that substitute secrecy. For example, a group that has a significant military power can afford to stay visible to the state and suffer little from agents' desertion. Moreover, a group that enjoys a safe haven abroad need not rely on secrecy for its survival. Conversely, if the group lacks such resources, it is critical that they implement an effective control over information as this is the only way for the group to survive.

The more vulnerable the rebel group, the more important it is for the group to recruit those agents who are loyal. By contrast, those groups less vulnerable to desertion can afford to risk enlisting those of questionable loyalty to increase the group's size. If they are not vulnerable, groups tend to rely on common incentive or force to increase the number of agents. Therefore, the first main hypothesis is as follows:

H1: Rebel groups that are highly vulnerable to desertion are more likely to recruit their agents by task.

Task Types and Required Capacity Levels The second factor that affects a rebel group's choice of recruitment strategy is the types of tasks inside the organization. Rebel groups vary in the kinds of tasks they need their agents to perform, as they each operate in different kinds of climates and terrains, enjoy different degrees of support from domestic and international actors, and conduct different kinds of military strategies. If the tasks inside the group are demanding, the group recruits only those who are highly capable of performing those tasks. In contrast, if the tasks are undemanding, the group can afford to

recruit not only those with high capabilities, but also those who are less skilled. As recruitment strategies vary in their selection effects, in terms of the capacity of agents, the types of tasks inside rebel groups affect their choices of recruitment strategies. If the group is seeking only capable agents, the group uses task or common incentives for recruitment. Conversely, if the group is not very concerned about their agents' capabilities, the group relies on force to increase the number of its agents. Resultantly, the second main hypothesis is as follows:

H2: The more demanding the tasks within a rebel group, the less likely the group are to rely on force for recruitment.

Combining the two hypotheses above, I propose a two-by-two diagram that predicts recruitment strategies of rebel groups (See Figure 4).

H1 and H2 combined: Rebel groups that are highly vulnerable to desertion tend to rely on task incentives for recruitment, regardless of the task types inside these groups. Groups that are relatively invulnerable to desertion, and whose tasks are demanding, tend to rely on common incentives for recruitment. Finally, rebel groups that are relatively invulnerable to desertion, and whose task types are not very demanding, tend to rely on force for recruitment.

Figure 4 Main Hypotheses



Shifting an Assumption I began this section with the assumption that a rebel group has little capacity to monitor and sanction their members. Shifting this assumption reduces the likelihood of a rebel group relying on task incentives for recruitment.

An effective monitoring and sanction mechanism mitigates the principal-agent problem for rebel leaders, making it less important for rebel leaders to select only those loyal to the group. The mechanism, therefore, reduces the need for rebel groups to rely on task incentives to attract loyal agents. However, an effective monitoring and sanction mechanism does not automatically solve the problem of agents' incapacity. Even under a

strict sanction system, incapable agents remain incapable. The distinction between the use of common incentives and the use of force, therefore, remains the same.[24]

The discussion above leads us to the following three hypotheses:

H3: Vulnerable rebel groups that have an effective monitoring and sanction mechanism tend to rely less on task incentive than vulnerable rebel groups lacking such a mechanism.

This proposition suggests that the vertical line in the middle of Figure 4 shifts rightward if the group has an effective monitoring and sanction mechanism (See Figure 5).

[24] Another assumption made previously was that a rebel group cannot maintain its levels of monitoring and sanction over an agent, at the time of coercion. Once the agent is enlisted, the group inevitably reduces its level of surveillance, or is unable to enact the punishment it initially presented to the agent. However, if a rebel group consistently maintains itscapacity to carry out threatstowards its agents, it is possible forthe group to coercively recruit agents unwilling to perform the assigned tasks, and still enforce those tasks, without risk of desertion.

Figure 5 Recruitment Strategies of Groups with an Effective Monitoring and Sanction System



Qualification - Organizational Exit The theory I have developed has an implication to the likelihood of rebel groups' organizational exit from civil war.[25] While the organizational exit is not the main dependent variable, I discuss it at this point, because it concerns the scope conditions for the proposed theory.

An important premise of the proposed theory is that a rebel group has sufficient prospects for survival in the future. In other words, the group has sufficiently long time horizon. It is only because of this premise that the group can afford to spend time to consider the qualities of its agents – their levels of loyalty to the group and capacities to

[25]I will discuss this issue more later in the section on sensitivity of rebel groups to massive desertion.

perform certain tasks – and decide whether to be selective in their recruitment methods. When this premise does not hold, the group is required to deal with imminent threats to its survival. The group may find itself in a position where only high-risk measures will ensure its survival in war. Conversely, the group may rate its survival as improbable, so that it abandons survival and starts seeking a means to exit the war. These conditions also affect rebel groups' recruitment strategies. The group may resort to a massive abduction so as to secure human power - irrespective of the agents' qualities -, discontinue recruitment,\ and desperately seek a peace agreement with the state, or else they behave irrationally in confusion. In either circumstance, I do not expect the group to follow the prediction of the theory. Should the group follow this prediction, it does so not for the reasons proposed in the theory.

What the proposed theory does do, however, is to identify conditions under which rebel groups' time horizon becomes extremely short. According to the theory, rebel groups lose their prospect for survival under one of the following two conditions. The first case is when a vulnerable group (with selective recruitment strategy) suddenly experiences a large number of deserters from the group. In this case, the group not only loses its numerical strength but also suffers from a significant level of information leak. This increases the possibility that the state carries out an 'effective' military offensive against the group, based on the acquired information. Second, a group further loses its future survival prospects when an invulnerable group (with a constant outflow of deserters from the group) suddenly loses its substitutive assets and becomes invulnerable. Such is the case, where a rebel group lacks the advantage of information asymmetry against the state, and suddenly loses this resource which constituted the source of its invulnerability. For example, a group

may suddenly lose its safe haven abroad due to a policy change in the host state. Also, a rebel group may also a significant part of its military advantage against the state due to a foreign government's decision to support the latter and carry out a massive offensive against the state.[26] Under these conditions, it is no longer feasible to assume that the group has sufficient survival prospects. Consequently, the proposed theory no longer provides a clear prediction about the group's recruitment strategy.

This limitation of the proposed theory, however, does not mean the theory fails to explain at all the behavior of rebel groups in such conditions. The theory still clarifies part of the causal mechanism that leads to certain behavior by the group, for instance, that which rebel groups take under imminent threat to their existence. Nevertheless, the theory fails to capture the entirety of the causal mechanism evident in such conditions, and consequently does not help us make a specific prediction which identifies a single recruitment strategy. I will discuss this point in further detail, in the section on research methods.

Now that I have presented the main hypotheses for this research, and its qualification, I will now move on to a discussion surrounding the measurements of these independent variables.[27]

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[26]Weinstein (2006) predicts that a group with poor economic endowment exits quietly from a conflict, while a group with rich economic endowment exits only after extensive use of violence. This is because Weinstein's theory focuses on the types of members within rebel groups. Members of a rebel group do not change instantly. In contrast, the theory proposed in this research focuses more on factors that are susceptible to change given shifts in the environment.

[27] There are two other variables that potentially affect the recruitment strategy of rebel groups, although they are not central to my analysis. First, the number of agents a rebel group requires also affects its choice of recruitment strategy. Coercion allows a group to recruit a relatively large number of agents in comparison to inducement. If the group

2.3.3 Measurements of Independent Variables

Vulnerability In this research, I measure the vulnerability of a rebel group by four measures: its military strategy; its (non-) possession of save haven, geographical environment, and institutional environment.

The 'military strategy' of the rebel group matters, because their vulnerabilities to loss of human resources and information leaks vary. Rebel groups' military strategies fall into three categories: terrorism, guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare. As Butler and Gates (2007) point out, the primary factor that affects the rebel group's choice of military strategy is the power balance between the group and its rival groups, including the state. If the group is very weak, the group resorts to terrorism. If the group is of a similar power to its rivals, the group adopts conventional warfare. It is those parties in-between which carry out guerrilla warfare. Those groups resorting to terrorism require a relatively small number of agents. However, in order to make their strategy most effective, the group needs to send its agents into the heart of urban areas, where the state has the highest control. It is in these

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requires a relatively small number of agents, the group is more likely to use incentives so as to recruit only small numbers of capable agents. Force is more likely to be used if the group requires a large number of agents. Second, the resource constraints arguably matter. Inducement and coercion often, though not always, require different kinds of resources, and thus the sorts of resources the group possesses matters for its choice of recruitment strategy. Note here that the availability of resources for inducement does not have a dominant effect on the group's choice of recruitment method. Kenneth Arrow(1985), for example, noted that the lack of financial resources creates room for the use of force or other non-pecuniary incentives by the principal. Weinstein argued that a rebel group's possession of financial resources in itself automatically leads to its reliance on pecuniary incentives in recruitment. In both cases, the use of pecuniary incentives is seen to be the dominant strategy for the principal. In contrast, I argue that the availability of financial resources (or of any other kind of resources) does not dictate the use of those resources for recruitment by a rebel group. It only creates a possibility for the group to use those resources, and it is the other variables listed in this section and the next that determines the adopted recruitment method.

areas where the psychological effects of violence would be at a maximum. Such operations require a high degree of secrecy, not only making the operation and the organization exempt from interference by the state, but resulting in less investment by the state towards fighting the group (Hirshleifer 2001c). However, the group and its operation are highly vulnerable to information leaks, because the capture or a betrayal of a single operative can destroy a long-planned operation (cf. Berman and Laitin 2006).

A group that carries out conventional warfare against rival groups is highly visible from the outside. The group therefore relies, not so much on information asymmetries with the state, as to its sheer military capacity for protection. This type of group requires a large number of soldiers to maintain its military power. Their strategy is also tailored to protect group-controlled territory, which results in an enduring threat toward the groups' agents.[28]Therefore, conventional warfare is less vulnerable to transfer of human resource and or otherwise the leak of information to the state.

Guerrilla warfare is situated somewhere between terrorism and conventional warfare. A group that relies primarily on guerrilla warfare is usually in a militarily disadvantaged position to other groups, and consequently tries to conceal its operations. However, unlike terrorist organizations -that endeavor to hide their locations - guerrilla groups can, to an extent, afford to be visible. Hence, groups carrying out guerrilla warfare are moderately vulnerable.

'Safe haven' is another measure of a rebel group's vulnerability. If the group has a safe haven abroad, it makes the group less vulnerable to the transfer of human resource and

[28] Paul Collier (2000: 842-843)maintains that 500 to 5,000 agents would be needed for a rebellion which intends the exploitation of natural resources.

information from the group to the state. These groups can enjoy some level of assistance from the foreign governments, in curtailing offensives by the state. In contrast, a safe haven inside the country has little impact in preventing state offensives against the rebel group. An example of an internal safe haven is a camp in mountainous terrain. While the terrain may help the group to defend itself from the state military offensives, it is relatively vulnerable to information leak through deserters. Deserters can, for example, covertly guide the state military through complicated pathways to reach the rebel camps. What makes the difference, therefore, is a rebel group's possession of an external safe haven.

'Geography' is another measurement of the group's vulnerability. In this instance, I do not refer to the mountainous terrain. Rather, I focus on the size of the terrain in which the group is located. If the group is situated within a vast terrain, the group is relatively invulnerable; the group can keep mobile and evade detection or state offensives, even if numbers decrease and information is lost through desertion. In contrast, groups located in a small island, or a peninsula, are much more vulnerable, as they have little space to escape from the state military offensives.

'Institutional environment' also matters. By this term, I refer to the institutional strength of the neighboring states. If the group is located close to a state border and the neighboring state is relatively weak, the group is relatively invulnerable, as they can escape from any state military offensives into the neighboring state. However, if the neighboring state is strong (and do not support the rebel group), the group is relatively vulnerable because lack space to retreat beyond the national border. When the neighboring state is supportive of the rebel group, and the group is fleeing from the state military, the group will probably obtain a safe haven across the border. This effect is captured by the 'safe

haven' variable above. I argue that the institutional environment reduces the vulnerability of a group, if there exists at least one weak state – disallowing a safe haven to the group – which borders the area of conflict between the state and the rebel group.

Task Types How do we measure the task types inside rebel groups? As far as variation across rebel groups is concerned, a main source of variation is their 'military strategy.'

The military strategy of the group is the factor most relevant to the types of the tasks and the associated skill levels required within the group.[29][30] Terrorism requires the group to use a relatively small number of agents. However, in order to make the strategy most effective, the group needs to send its agents into the heart of urban areas, where the state has the highest control. Accordingly, such operations require such an operation requires highly capable agents.

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[29] Another factor that deserves consideration is the development of military technology. However, there has been limited evidence for the relevance of this variable. Singer (2006), for example, argues that the development and spread of light-weight weapons led to increases in the number of child soldiers. It is not clear, however, whether this or other similar developments affect rebel groups' choice between inducement and coercion, for three reasons. First, there has not been a substantial change in the kinds of weapons rebel groups use for each military strategy for at least the last few decades. Change in military technology over time, in the sphere of rebellion, has not been considerable, as in the sphere of national defense in developed countries. Therefore, I anticipate that any variation across military strategies effectively overshadows the effect of the technological change, over time, in the respective fields of the military strategies of rebellion. Second, regarding the weight of the weapon, the physical strength or age difference of potential recruits is relatively visible to the recruiters from rebel groups. Third, again regarding the spread of technological innovations in light-weight weapons, Vera Achvarina and Simon Reich(2006) find its effect on child soldier recruitment to be negligible. Availability of AK-47s is fairly ubiquitous, while considerable variation exists across rebel groups in their levels of use of child soldiers.

[30] If the group has several kinds of tasks, requiring varying degrees of capacities from agents, it is possible for the group to assign jobs that exploit the comparative advantages of respective agents. This is what large slavery farms did in the United States to increase productive efficiency (Field 1988).

A group that carries out conventional warfare against rival groups generally does not require high capabilities or skills in its agents. Instead, it necessitates a large number of combatants to maintain its military power.

Guerrilla warfare stands somewhere in the middle between terrorism and conventional warfare. The group does not require the same level of skill from its agents, as terrorist groups, but agents are still required to possess a certain level of capacity since its members often endure rough terrain for many months at a time. Additionally, the number of members in each operation is usually smaller than that of their opponents.

Monitoring and Sanction System I use 'territorial control' by a rebel group as a measure of the group's monitoring and sanction capacity. Territorial control makes the monitoring and sanctions system of a rebel group more effective in three ways. First, the group can take hostage those who are close to an agent, such as their family members or friends, enabling an agent's punishment, should they fail to fulfill the assigned tasks. Second, territorial control makes it more difficult for agents to desert and return home because the community would refuse to harbor them, in fear of retaliation from the rebel group. Third, the rebel group gains a higher capacity to fend off attempts by rival groups to induce or coerce its members. Together, these effects make it much easier for rebel groups to monitor and sanction their agents.

I will discuss the measurements of independent variables in alternative theories in Chapter Three.

Table 1 Measurements of Independent Variables

Theory	Independent variable	Measurement
Proposed theory	vulnerability	military strategy
		safe haven
		geography
		institutional environment
	task type	military strategy
	monitoring and sanction system	territorial control
Resource curse theory	economic resource	highly appropriable commodities (drag, diamonds, etc.)
		financial support from foreign government
		income from diaspora
Theories of outside option	utility of outside option for agent	geography
		territorial control
		state policy toward deserters
		economic opportunity (GDP per capita)

2.4 Method

The main argument of this study is that rebel groups' vulnerability and the types of tasks within the group affect their choice of recruitment methods. The purpose of this research is to assess the plausibility of this argument and, if necessary, refine the theory. For this reason, I will conduct qualitative case studies. An obvious alternative is to carry out a large N quantitative analysis. However, it is more useful to conduct case studies at this stage for two reasons. First, case studies help me to assess not only the validity of the theory's predictions but also that of its causal mechanism. It is important to gain insights on the validity of the causal mechanism to assess the plausibility of the theory and to refine it. Second, case studies allow me to assess the validity of concepts, such as the vulnerability of rebel groups against observed facts, and provide an opportunity for refinement if necessary. Third, the quality of the large N data on rebel groups is still limited. The available datasets do not contain, for example, information about temporal variation in rebel groups' recruitment strategies and other attributes. As compiling refined data is time consuming, I believe it is more useful at this point to conduct case studies and remain sensitive to variations in rebel groups of limited number.

I will discuss the research design of this project below.

2.4.1 Case Selection

I will conduct case studies on two rebel groups, Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. There are a few reasons for selecting these two groups. First, they are of theoretical importance because they deviate from predictions of Weinstein's resource curse theory. The LRA had little economic resources throughout its history, and still carried out massive abduction for

recruitment. The LTTE was one of the richest rebel organizations in the world and still relied mostly on social endowment for recruitment. These two cases, therefore, raise certain questions, such as why the LRA did not invest more in developing social endowment and why the LTTE invested so much on social endowment with apparent success. If the theory proposed in this thesis explains these deviations, it demonstrates the theory's usefulness and provides the necessary grounding on which to conduct a more systematic test.

Second, a closer examination of the two groups reveals them to have changed their characteristics substantially over time. These changes allow me to conduct 'before-after' research on these two cases. An advantage of 'before-after' case study is that it allows the researcher to control the many independent variables, both known and unknown, except for a single independent variable of main theoretical concern. Admittedly, this 'ideal' condition does not hold in the cases of the LTTE and LRA. As in many other 'before-after' case studies, the values of a few variables changed more or less simultaneously. Still, it is useful to conduct 'before-after' case studies of the two groups, because it allows me to reduce the risk of bias due to the influence of a hidden unknown variable. It is also because the problem can be ameliorated, to some extent, by multiplying the number of observable implications from the proposed theory, as well as from its alternatives. I will discuss this point later in this chapter. Third, the two groups are relatively well-researched and thus it is possible to capitalize on existing studies to assess explanatory power of the theory, not only through cross-sectional comparison, but also against intra-group variation in their recruitment practices.

These particular cases raise a few concerns about the feasibility of the case selection, however. Let me discuss three potential concerns here.

First, a potential problem here is the so-called indeterminacy problem.[31] It is arguably difficult to test three hypotheses with only two rebel groups. I believe that this issue does not pose a significant problem, for the following reasons. First, I will compare not only the LRA and the LTTE in general but also examine internal variation within each group. The main focus of this research is the explanation of temporal variation in these groups' recruitment practices. Second, I will also conduct analysis of other sorts of internal variation, where the data is available. Third, I will conduct process tracing to follow the recruitment policy-making method within these groups, where evidence is available. Admittedly, this exercise remains only indicative. Due to the nature of this process, it is highly difficult to obtain reliable data. Fourth, I identify the observable implications of the proposed theory's causal mechanism and assess their validities. I believe that these practices provide sufficient remedies to the indeterminacy problem, and allow me to achieve the primary goal of this research project as set above.

The second potential problem with this case selection is that there is an issue with the external validity of the findings from the two cases. A drawback of a small-N case study is that it is difficult to know to what extent the findings from the study hold in other cases. A solution is to conduct a large N quantitative study. Another is to choose cases in a

[31] Indeterminacy problem in case studies are similar to the degree of freedom problem in statistics. Both concepts refer to the insufficiency of evidence to draw a conclusion about the causal significance of multiple independent variables. The two concepts, however, identify different sources of the problem. The degree of freedom refers to an insufficient number of cases or observations. Indeterminacy problem in case studies refer not only to insufficient number of cases but also to insufficient evidence from each case.

way that allow the researcher to make some inferences about the applicability of findings to other cases. Examples are studies on 'most-likely' cases or 'least-likely' cases. One or more such exercises are certainly needed to assess the proposed theory's explanatory power. In this study, however, I focus on the development of the theory and an assessment of its initial plausibility, relegating the assessment of its external validity to future studies.

The third potential problem with this case selection is that it is possible that this researcher's prior knowledge of the rebel groups may have biased their selection for this thesis. As is often pointed out, the researchers' knowledge about the value of the dependent variable often biases their analysis. For instance, in the case of the LRA and the LTTE, it is widely known that the former enacts quite brutal recruitment practices, while the latter was relatively restrained (e.g. Allen 2006; Swamy 2006). I mitigate this problem by conducting an analysis of the observable implications of the proposed theory. It also helps to conduct a 'within-case' comparison for each group. As mentioned above, I will predominantly analyze their temporal dimensions. In addition, I also ascertained whether the proposed theory explains variation within each case, on geographical and functional dimensions. Due to limitations in the availability of data, however, this analysis will remain an ad hoc and exploratory exercise rather than a systematic examination.

Overall, the research design necessarily involves tradeoffs among different values. Therefore, in this dissertation, I have maximized values for theory-generation and assessment of the theory's plausibility.

2.4.2 Congruence Test

In Chapter 3, I will conduct a congruence test of the proposed theory against the cases of the LTTE and LRA. By examining the organizational features and recruitment practices

of these rebel groups, I assess whether the proposed theory explains their recruitment practices better than the other two theories, the resource curse theory and the theories of outside option.

If the recruitment strategies of the LTTE and the LRA followed predictions of the proposed theory - presented in H1 through H3 - better than those of the alternative theories, it indicates that the evidence from these two cases supports the proposed theory over the alternative theories. If either of the alternative theories performs better than the proposed theory, I conclude that the proposed theory was implausible.

The hypotheses of the alternative theories I will test are as follows:

Resource Curse Theory:

HR1: The more economic resource the group has, the more likely the group employs economic incentives or force for recruitment rather than social endowment.

Figure 6 shows prediction of the resource curse theory.

Figure 6 Prediction of the Resource Curse Theory



Theories of Outside Option:

HT1: The lower the utility of the outside option for agents, the more likely the group is to use force for recruitment.

Figure 7 shows prediction of the theories of outside option.

Figure 7 Prediction of the Theories of Outside Option



Hypotheses of the proposed theory and its alternatives are listed in Table 2. The proposed theory's predictions about their recruitment strategies of the LTTE and LRA are presented in Figures8 and 9.

Table 2 Hypotheses about Recruitment Strategies of Rebel Groups

	Proposed Theory	Resource Curse Theory	Theories of Outside Option
	H1: Rebel groups that are highly vulnerable to desertion are more likely to recruit their agents by task.	HR1: The more economic resource the group has, the more likely the group employs economic incentives or force for recruitment instead of task incentives.	HT1: The lower the utility of the outside option for agents, the more likely the group is to use force for recruitment.
Recruitment Strategy	H2: Rebel groups whose tasks are more demanding tend to rely on incentive for recruitment, regardless of whether it is common incentive or task incentive.		
	H3: Vulnerable rebel groups that have effective monitoring and sanction mechanisms tend to rely less on task incentives than those vulnerable rebel groups without effective monitoring and sanction mechanisms.		

Figure 8 Prediction of the LTTE's Recruitment Strategy



Figure 9 Prediction of the LRA's Recruitment Strategy



2.4.3 Assessment of the Causal Mechanism

The congruence test in Chapter 3 provides a preliminary test of the validity of the proposed theory. However, this exercise is insufficient to assess the plausibility of the theory; it does not allow for the effective examination of the causal mechanism's validity, as proposed in the theory. One way to rectify this problem is to conduct process tracing to examine the validity of the causal path in each case (Cf. George and Bennett 2005). In Chapter 3, where possible, I incorporate evidence to identify the causal paths through which LRA and LTTE changed their recruitment strategies. However, this exercise does not solve the problem. Given the nature of the research question, it is difficult to locate evidence necessary to identify each step in the proposed causal mechanism. The findings from the process tracing, therefore, remain indicative rather than confirmative.

For this reason, in Chapter 4, I will examine the validity of the proposed causal mechanism by examining three observable implications of the theory regarding desertion rates in rebel groups, state counterinsurgency strategies, and the sensitivities of rebel groups to massive desertion. Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba argue that it is useful to increase the number of observable implications in case studies to test a theory (King et al. 1994). However, as Alexander George and Andrew Bennett point out, it matters/much depends on which observable implication we use for theory testing (George and Bennett 2005). Observable implications vary in their significance for theory testing, and their significance is determined by the strengths of their associations to the proposed causal mechanism. For the analysis in Chapter 4, I selected observable implications that directly or closely speak to the proposed causal mechanism. These implications either constitute a part of causal mechanism - though not its entirety - or directly follow from it.

Therefore, by assessing the validity of these implications in case studies, I can assess the validity of the proposed causal mechanism with the theory.

More specifically, in Chapter 4, I intend to meet three objectives through analysis of these observable implications. First, by assessing desertion rates in rebel groups, I will examine the validity of the assumption of the proposed theory that three types of recruitment strategies vary in their selection effects. As my argument is built on this assumption, it is very important to assess its validity by examining variation in desertion rates, over time, and across rebel groups. Second, an assessment of the state counterinsurgency strategy serves an objective, to examine whether the coding of respective rebel groups in this research - in terms of their vulnerabilities to desertion - remains consistent with the belief and behavior of the states in civil war. Finally, by examining the cost of agents' desertions from rebel groups, I will assess the validity of the coding of vulnerabilities in this research in an objective and controlled manner. Moreover I can identify a scope condition for the proposed theory out of the variables internal to the theory. Therefore, overall, an assessment of the observable implications of the proposed theory is a constitutive part of the attempt to verify the causal mechanism proposed in the theory. Below, I will further expound on why this is the case.

2.4.4 Desertion rate

As discussed above, the proposed theory assumes three types of recruitment strategies of varying selection effects. Task incentives tend to attract only those loyal and capable to the group. Common incentives attract only those capable, although recruited agents may or may not be loyal to the group. Coercion results in recruitment of any type of agent regardless of their levels of loyalty to the group or their capacities to perform tasks in the

group. These assumptions constitute a basis of the proposed theory, and also have immediate implications for desertion rates in rebel groups. This is so because the level of agents' loyalty to the group and their capacities to perform tasks inside the group affect their likelihood to desert from the group. Agents who have high loyalty to the group are less likely to desert from the group than those not loyal. Also, capable agents are less likely to desert from the group than those incapable. Consequently, I anticipate that, *ceteris paribus*, rebel groups that rely on more selective recruitment strategies tend to experience low desertion rates, while those using less selective recruitment strategies are likely to experience high desertion rates.

Given the centrality of this assumption in the proposed theory, significant doubt will be cast on its validity should I find evidence directly against this proposition.[32]It is also important to note that this proposition is related to the two other observable implications, as discussed below. First, the association between selective recruitment strategy and low desertion rate is further reinforced by the states' counterinsurgency strategies. Second, the proposed association does not mean that rebel groups, with selective recruitment methods, never experience massive desertion. The claim is therefore more 'probabilistic' than 'deterministic.' Once it happens, however, groups with selective recruitment strategies are more likely to suffer for this fact, due to their sensitivity to desertion, possibly leading to their exit from civil war. I will discuss these two points in the next section.

[32]This does not preclude the possibility that an exogenous change increases the number of deserters from a group with selective recruitment strategy. As discussed later, such a group is likely to suffer significant military damage – possibly defeat – because these groups tend to be those most vulnerable to desertion.

2.4.5 State Counterinsurgency Strategy

The second way to assess the validity of the proposed causal mechanism is to examine the counter-insurgency strategies of the state. The proposed theory has implications to a state's investment of resources in different counter-insurgency strategies, especially in its intelligence capacity. Here, intelligence capacity refers to the state's capability to collect information about rebel groups. States' intelligence strategies vary in their degrees of selectivity. Selectivity here refers to specificity of the information the state intends to collect about the rebel group, as well as that of the means through which the state collects information. The state increases its selective intelligence capacity when it invests in its own surveillance system, such as high-tech machines or highly-trained deep penetration units, or when it invests resources in inducing defection of a limited number of individuals from the rebel group. The state intelligence activity is less selective if it invests more in inducing defection by a large number of individuals in an indiscriminate manner. An example of this sort of strategy is a universal amnesty law for deserters from a rebel group.

I believe that it is possible to assess whether the coding of vulnerabilities of rebel groups – used in this thesis - was consistent with the belief and behavior of states that fought these rebel groups, by examining their counter-insurgency strategies. Let us here assume that the state is unitary and rational, and that it seeks to defeat a rebel group. If a rebel group adopts a selective recruitment strategy, the state tends to invest more in selective intelligence capacity, for two reasons. First, the state knows that the chance of successfully inducing defection from the group is minimal, due to the selection effect of the group's recruitment strategy. The state, therefore, seeks to maximize the chance of

successful information-gathering, by concentrating a large amount of its resource in building its own surveillance mechanism, or in inducing defection by a small number of individuals. Second, the state is also aware that a relatively small amount of information from the group can significantly affects the stability and security of the group. This fact is a direct implication of the primary hypothesis of this research; that groups vulnerable to desertion tend to employ more selective recruitment strategies. In contrast, if the state is fighting a rebel group with less selective recruitment methods, the state should find it less costly to induce a large number of agents to defect or desert from the group. Also, the state should be aware that the rebel group is invulnerable and that they, the state, need substantial amounts of information about the group, to ensure the success of military operations against the group.

Through examining the state counter-insurgency strategy, I can verify whether the state's assessment of the rebel groups' vulnerability and the propensity of the agents to desert match my own analysis. This examination further enables me to check whether the state behaves in a way consistent with the proposed theory. The prediction is that the more selective recruitment strategy a rebel group adopts, the more resources the state tends to invest in selective intelligence methods. If I find evidence supporting this claim, it increases our confidence in the validity of the causal mechanism within the proposed theory. If I find evidence against this claim, it reduces our confidence in the proposed causal mechanism.

The counter-insurgency strategies that states employ, reinforces the pattern of desertions within the respective rebel groups. The states opposing rebel groups with selective recruitment strategies tend to rely on selective intelligence policies. Therefore, the groups' desertion rates tend to remain low. The states confronting groups with non-

selective recruitment methods tend to rely on non-selective intelligence strategies. Thus, the desertion rates in these groups tend to become high.

2.4.6 Rebel Group's Sensitivity to Mass Desertion

The third way to assess the validity of the proposed theory is to assess the impact of mass desertion to a rebel group. By examining how much damage a rebel group suffered from a mass desertion by its agents, I can assess whether I have properly coded the vulnerability of the rebel group –the independent variable being the primary focus in this study – in an objective and controlled manner. Vulnerability, by definition, refers to the cost of agents' desertions to a rebel group. Agent desertion incurs significant costs to vulnerable rebel groups, because they have little assets that mitigate the negative effects of such desertions. By contrast, invulnerable groups suffer little from their agents' desertions because they have substitutive assets that they can rely on in such a case. From another viewpoint, this analysis is also an exercise that assesses consistency between measurements of vulnerability, of rebel groups, and the actual damages from which rebel groups suffer from agents' desertions.

The proposed theory predicts a positive association between vulnerability of rebel groups and selectivity of their recruitment strategies. The more vulnerable a rebel group, the more selective recruitment method the group is likely to use. An observable implication of the proposed theory, therefore, is that 'rebel groups with more selective recruitment strategies tend to suffer more from their agents' desertions than those with less selective recruitment strategies.' This implication is an immediate corollary of the proposed theory.

I anticipate that this positive association between selectivity in rebel group's recruitment strategy, and the costs of its agents' desertions for the group, is further

reinforced by state response to those desertions. If the proposed theory is correct, mass desertion from a vulnerable group with selective recruitment strategy significantly raises the expected efficiency of the state military operations against the group. The state, therefore, increases its investment in the military sector. This move further increases the cost of agents' desertion to the group. In contrast, mass desertion from an invulnerable group (with less selective recruitment strategies), only moderately improves the expected efficiency of a state offensive against the group. Consequently, the state has little incentive to increase its investment in the military sector. The state response, therefore, hardly affects the cost of agents' desertion upon the group.

To summarize, I anticipate that rebel groups with more selective recruitment strategies, tend to suffer more from a massive desertion of their agents due to their vulnerability. In contrast, rebel groups with less selective recruitment strategies suffer little if mass desertion occurs, given their invulnerability. If the available evidence supports this implication, it increases our confidence in the proposed theory. If not, it reduces our confidence, casting doubt either on the validity of the degree of rebel groups' vulnerability, or the validity of the coding of rebel groups within this research.

2.4.7 Implications of Alternative Theories

What are the implications of the alternative theories to the desertion rate, state counter-insurgency strategy, and rebel group's sensitivity to massive desertion? If alternative theories make predictions different to those of the proposed theory, it allows the assessment of the relative explanatory power of these theories. However, the alternative theories do not always have clear implications to these issues. When clear implications are present, I will test the prediction of the proposed theory against those of alternative

theories. When alternative theories lack clear predictions, however, I will simply rely on empirical evidence to assess the validity of the prediction of the proposed theory. If I find evidence supporting the proposed theory, it increases our confidence in its plausibility.

The resource curse theory makes clear predictions about desertion rates in rebel groups, and somewhat less clear predictions about the state counter-insurgency strategy, and the rebel groups' sensitivities to mass desertion. According to the resource curse theory, rebel groups with rich economic endowment tend to attract those agents with short-time horizons. These groups, therefore, tend to suffer from high desertion rates. This means that the state is inclined to invest more in non-selective intelligence strategies. These groups also tend to be more sensitive to mass desertion, because mass desertion and the resultant shift in the balance of power between rebel groups and the state arguably demoralizes their members. Rebel groups with poor economic resource, in contrast, tend to experience low desertion rates. The state tends to invest more in highly selective intelligence strategies in aware of the group members' high discipline. These groups also tend to be less sensitive to massive desertion because their members are more likely to remain with them even in face of massive desertion. Admittedly, scholars of resource curse theory hardly discuss its implications to state counter-insurgency strategies and rebel groups' sensitivities to mass desertion. However, the predictions discussed here appear logical extensions of the theory.

The theories of outside option make some predictions about desertion rates in rebel groups, but lack predictions about state counter-insurgency strategies or rebel groups' sensitivities to mass desertions. The implications of the theories of outside option, to rebel members' desertion rate, are not so straightforward. One implication is that the members have more incentive to desert when they have better options outside the group. However,

these theories also predict that the rebel groups would adjust the amount or types of incentives, so that the groups have an equal chance to retain all the members, thus canceling out the differences in their outside options. The theories also predict that the rebel groups would not recruit those who have a high chance of desertion. It is for this reason that Scott Gates (2002) predicts an existence of a zone of non-recruitment between rebel groups and the states. One implication of the theories of outside option is, therefore, that desertion rates across rebel groups are constant and low. When we consider temporal changes in rebel groups, however, there is another implication of these theories. Desertion rate in a rebel group rises when the relative utility of the life for agents outside the group increases in comparison to the life inside the group. This occurs when the total amount of its resources or incentives – ideological, economic, functional, and military –declines. Desertion also transpires when the groups' resources remains constant, but the relative value of life, outside the group, rises.

The implications of the theories of outside option differ from those of the proposed theory, however. The most important distinction remains whether the theories expect rebel leaders to recruit their agents, even in anticipation of their desertion. The theories of outside option do not expect rebel leaders to recruit them in such cases. The theories of outside option assumes that the rebel leaders maximize the efficiency of the organization by providing a sufficient amount of incentives (positive or negative), to retain its members, not wasting important outflow in recruiting those with high chances of desertion. In contrast, the proposed theory argues that rebel groups may or may not recruit those with high risks of desertion, depending on their types – whether the agents are or are not loyal and capable– and subject to the numerical needs of the group. If the group is vulnerable to

information leak, they would not recruit agents whose loyalty remain questionable to minimize the risk of information leak. If the group is not vulnerable to information leak, however, they are more likely to recruit even agents with high risks of desertion because they want to increase the number of members and also because they know that some of those members, though not all of them, would have high qualities – loyal and/or capable – and remain in the group. In other words, while vulnerable groups rely on *ex ante* selection to recruit only loyal agents, invulnerable groups can afford to first recruit anyone and then rely on *ex post* selection to identify those loyal and/or capable.

Table 3 Observable Implications of the Proposed Theory and Alternative Theories

	Proposed Theory	Resource Curse Theory	Theories of Outside Option
Desertion Rate	The more selective rebel group's recruitment strategy is, the lower the desertion rate in the group is.	The more economic resource the rebel group has, the higher the desertion rate in the group is.	Desertion rate is constant across rebel groups.
State Counter-insurgency Strategy	The more selective a rebel group's recruitment strategy is, the more resource the state invests in selective intelligence strategies.	The more economic resource the rebel group has, the less selective the state counterinsurgency strategy is.	
Cost of Massive Desertion	Rebel groups with more selective recruitment strategies tend to suffer more from massive desertion than those with less selective recruitment strategies do.	The more economic resource the rebel group has, the more sensitive the group is to massive desertion.	

2.4.8 Summary

In this section, I have discussed the research strategy to test the plausibility of the proposed theory. I selected two rebel groups for case study: the LTTE in Sri Lanka and LRA in Uganda. I will conduct a congruence test assessing whether these groups' recruitment strategies fit the predictions of the theory. As these groups employed different recruitment methods, I will examine not only the overall characteristics of these groups, but also the internal variations in their recruitment strategies over time. However, this exercise is insufficient to establish the plausibility of the theory. While a congruence test is useful as a first-cut test of the proposed theory, it does not allow me to assess the validity of the causal mechanism behind its predictions. To mitigate this problem, I will examine validities of the proposed causal mechanism by assessing observable implications of the theory to desertion rates in the groups, state counter-insurgency strategies, and rebel groups' sensitivities to mass desertion.

2.5 Conclusion

The main argument of this study is that a rebel group's recruitment strategy is a function of two variables~~,~~ its vulnerability and task types inside the group. Recruitment strategies vary in their selection effects, not only in the agents' levels of loyalty to the group, but also in their capacities to perform military tasks. As rebel groups fluctuate in their levels of tolerance to desertion, and the kinds of military strategies they perform, they choose recruitment strategies that best fit their organizational characteristics. Highly vulnerable groups – those likely to suffer significant damage from agents' desertion–try to select only loyal agents by relying on task incentives for recruitment. Less vulnerable groups, who have resources that mitigate the negative effects of agents' desertion, tend to rely

less on task incentive in recruitment. If these groups require high capacity in their agents, they tend to recruit them by common incentives. Groups that are less vulnerable, and their tasks undemanding, tend to rely on force for recruitment. Existing studies have not taken into account the organizational characteristics of rebel groups to explain their recruitment strategies.

In Chapter Three, I will conduct a congruence test of the proposed theory against the cases of the LRA and the LTTE. I examine not only the overall difference between the two groups in their recruitment strategies, but also their internal variations. The explanatory power of the proposed theory will be tested against those of the alternative theories. In Chapter Four, I will examine the validity of the causal mechanism in the proposed theory, by assessing its observable implications to desertion rates, state counter-insurgency strategies, and rebel groups' sensitivities to mass desertion. Although alternative theories do not always make clear predictions about these issues, it is useful to conduct the analyses to assess the plausibility of the proposed theory.

Chapter 3: Recruitment

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I developed a theory of rebel recruitment that places a rebel group's vulnerability and task types at its center. The purpose of this chapter is to carry out a congruence test of this theory against two rebel groups – the LRA in Uganda and the LTTE in Sri Lanka. I will first examine whether the proposed theory explains the overall differences in the recruitment strategies of the two rebel groups. Then, I will test if the proposed theory explains changes in their recruitment methods over time. Through these exercises, I will compare the explanatory power of the theory with those of the two alternative theories, resource curse theory and theories of outside option.

The findings in this section support the proposed theory over the alternative theories. As demonstrated below, the predictions of the proposed theory coincide with the observed patterns of recruitment in the LTTE and the LRA. The resource curse theory, in contrast, makes predictions contrary to the observations, especially when it comes to a comparison of the LTTE and the LRA. The theories of outside option perform better in predicting recruitment practices of the two groups. This fact is partly because I used several measurements to assess the utility of the outside options for agents – the main independent variable for these theories. At least one of the measurements signified a correct prediction in each case, while other measurements produced different predictions. However, a main problem for the theories of outside option is that there is no measurement that consistently makes precise predictions across all the cases.

The following sections will be split into four parts: first, I will briefly discuss the method used to conduct the congruence test. Second, I will test the alternative theories against a comparison of the LRA and the LTTE. In this instance, I will ignore the detailed variation within each rebel group, simply examining whether the proposed theory explains the general characteristics of the two groups' recruitment practices, improving on the explanations of the alternative theories. As discussed in Chapter Two, I did not select the two cases in order to facilitate a neat comparison. Rather, these two cases were chosen for their deviations from the resource curse theory. Nevertheless, it is useful to see whether the proposed theory explains the differences between the two groups, as they were extremely different in their recruitment practices. A comparison of the two groups, therefore, sets a relatively easy test that the proposed theory must pass if it is to be of beneficial to further research. In the third and fourth sections, I will discuss the variations within the LTTE and LRA respectively; examining variation in recruitment strategies of the LTTE first, and then that of the LRA. In both cases, the primary focus will be to explain changes in the recruitment methods of each rebel group over time. However, in addition, I will conduct additional analyses of further variations in the recruitment strategies of the two groups, along functional lines. This exercise provides me with an opportunity to further test the validity of the proposed theory. I will conclude the chapter with a brief summary of the findings from the analyses.

3.2 Method

Imre Lakatos (1978) highlights the difficulties in setting an objective standard to evaluate the validity of a theory merely against the empirical evidence. It is for this reason that I will test the explanatory power of the proposed theory against those of the two alternative

theories. The resource curse theory argues that the initial resource endowment of the rebel group determines its recruitment method (Weinstein 2006). A group with poor economic resource, therefore, depends on social endowment (ideology and social ties) to recruit its members, while a group with abundant economic resource relies on economic incentives. The theory of outside option argues that a rebel group facing an agent with poor alternative options uses force to recruit him, while it uses incentives when approaching an agent with alternative options of high value (Beber and Blattman 2009; Gates 2002).

The challenge in testing these theories is deciding what measures best represent independent variables in these theories. I have already discussed measurements for independent variables in the proposed theory, and will, in this section, discuss the choice of measurements for the resource curse theory and the theories of outside option. The task is relatively straightforward in the case of the resource curse theory. It is possible to classify a group as 'resource-rich', if the group produces abundant economic profits through their control of natural resources or other means, or if they receive abundant economic support from external financiers such as diasporas.

However, it is a little more complicated to operationalize the main independent variable in the theory of outside option. No single indicator represents the utility of outside options for agents. Therefore, I will use four measures of geography, territorial control, government protection, and economic opportunity to assess utility of the outside options for agents. Geography concerns whether the terrain makes it easy for agents to escape from the group. If the terrain is isolated by sea, river, deep mountains, for example, it is difficult for agents to escape from the group. If the terrain is rather open, it is easier for them to desert.

Second, territorial control by the group is related to its opportunities for successful punishment against deserters and defectors. If an agent's family resides in the area under the group's control, it is relatively easy for the group to punish the agent either by finding him with his family or by simply harming his family. It becomes more difficult to enact punishment if they do not control the area. Government protection concerns not only the rebel group's chance of successful punishment, but also the agent's chance of survival and the quality of their life outside the group. If the government gives amnesty to deserters from the group, and provides economic assistance for rehabilitation and reintegration, the agent has a good chance of survival after their desertion from the group. If the government's policy is not to offer amnesty but to punish deserters as former rebels, then agents' chance of survival is reduced because they now require a means of escape both from the rebel group and from the government. Even if the agent successfully evades the government, they need to remain concealed a fact which significantly affects their quality of life. The level of economic development in the country affects the financial opportunities available to potential deserters from the group. Of course, more detailed micro-level data is required to precisely assess the economic opportunities for respective agents once outside a rebel group. However, such data is very difficult to obtain. Nevertheless, the level of economic development in the country provides a rough measure of the economic opportunities available to potential deserters.

Table 4 Explanatory Power of Alternative Theories –

Difference between the LTTE and the LRA

		LTTE	LRA
Dependent Variable	recruitment method (observation)	Task	force
Proposed theory	military strategy	diverse	guerrilla
	safe haven	vulnerable	invulnerable
	geography	vulnerable	invulnerable
	economic resource	rich*	poor*
Resource Curse	economic resource	rich	poor
Outside Option	geography	yes	(no)
	territorial control	yes*	no*
	government protection	no*	yes*
	economic opportunity	Yes	no

*A value that indicates a prediction contradictory to the observed recruitment practice by the group.

3.3 Comparing the Recruitment Strategies of the LTTE and the LRA

The purpose of this section is to assess the plausibility of the proposed theory against a comparison of the LTTE and the LRA. As discussed in Chapter Two, I chose the LTTE and the LRA for case study because of their apparent deviations from the resource curse theory. The LTTE had a relatively abundant economic resource, and yet was still known to rely primarily on task incentives for recruitment. In contrast, the LRA had little

economic resources and extensively used force to recruit its soldiers. While this arguably gross simplification could distract us from the subtleties and complexities of the two rebel groups, I will turn to such details later in this chapter. Moreover, the two cases were not selected in a way that facilitates a neat comparison to test the proposed theory. Still, I believe that it is necessary to ascertain whether the proposed theory properly explains the differences between the two groups in their recruitment strategies. Given the way these cases were selected, a minimum criterion has been set for the proposed theory to pass, if it is to be of benefit in explaining the recruitment strategies of other rebel groups. Accordingly, in the next section, I will initially compare the values of the measurements of the independent variables in the two cases; the power asymmetry between the group and the state authorities, their military strategies, surrounding geographies, and the possession of safe haven. Then, I will see whether the values of these variables properly point to the ways the LTTE and the LRA differ in their recruitment strategies.

The proposed theory explains the LTTE's effort for inducing volunteers and the LRA's heavy reliance on abduction by referring to the differences between their military strategies, their (non-) possession of safe havens, and vulnerabilities to information leak. The LTTE was without a consistent safe haven, and primarily conducted terrorist and guerrilla warfare against the government from the coastal area. This fact is the reason why the group relied primarily on volunteers for recruitment, to mitigate the risk of desertion and defection by its agents, and also to ensure the capabilities of the recruited. In contrast, the LRA covered a vast terrain, had a safe haven in Sudanese territory, and waged guerrilla warfare. The group, therefore, was much less vulnerable to information disclosure and did

not require such high aptitudes among its recruits. Accordingly, the LRA relied primarily on abduction.

3.3.1 Recruitment Strategy

How did the LTTE and LRA recruit their agents? As these groups employed multiple recruitment methods, we cannot avoid a gross simplification at this stage, if we are to successfully summarize their recruitment strategies. Still, it is possible to identify general tendencies in the two groups. The LTTE was mostly reliant on the use of task incentives to recruit its agents. That is, the group made little use of force or pecuniary incentives to recruit their agents most of the time, and primarily relied on social networks and propaganda for recruitment (c.f. Hellmann-Rajanayagam 1994; Hopgood 2005; Samaranayake 1999; Swamy 2006). However, when it required a large number of agents, the group resorted to conscription, which allowed them to enlist a large number of agents without losing their command over them (e.g. Human Rights Watch 2004). Still, exceptions were made to members of the Black Tiger, who carried out missions that required extreme loyalty and capacities. I will discuss the details of these recruitment practices later in this chapter, where I test the proposed theory against the variation in the LTTE's recruitment strategy over time. The overall recruitment strategy of the LTTE, however, was a combination of the recruitment by task incentives and conscription.

In contrast, the LRA predominantly relied on force for the recruitment of its members. The group initially made some attempts to enlist its members by task incentives. Kony organized Mass every day, involving not only his combatants but also local civilians. The LRA also advocated Acholi nationalism. However, such efforts dissipated after several years, and the group did not allocate as much of its resource towards political propaganda.

A few organizations conducted surveys among local civilians and ex-LRA members, and found more than 90 percent of the LRA members were recruited by force (Annan et al. 2006; Bean 2008; Pham et al. 2007). Even among 62 members who occupied high ranks within the LRA between 1987 and 2008, 33 individuals, or more than 50 per cent entered the LRA by abduction (See Table 8).

3.3.2 Explanatory Power of Alternative Theories

How do the existing theories – resource curse theory and theories of outside option – explain this general difference between the recruitment practices of the LTTE and the LRA? It is apparent that the resource curse theory cannot explain the difference, as its predictions directly contradict the actual practices of the two groups. The explanatory power of the theories of outside option is mixed, depending on which indicators were used to measure the utility of the outside options for the agents.

3.3.2.1 Resource Curse Theory

The resource curse theory fails to explain the difference between the two groups. The LTTE was a rich organization due to its extensive diaspora network and often illegal economic activities abroad. Jane's Report highlights that in 2008 the LTTE was the second richest rebel group in the world. In contrast, the LRA was notably resource-poor. The latter did not control any natural resources of high economic value. Moreover, their diaspora network failed to provide financial support to the group. While the LRA received support from the Sudanese government, most of the assistance came in kind. Accordingly, even senior leaders of the LRA lived financially modest lives, lacking any sort of luxurious commodity, at least until the United Nations provided some at the time of the peace talk around 2005-2006. The resource curse theory, then, predicts the LTTE to rely on economic incentives for recruitment and the LRA on social endowment. As

shown in Figure 10, however, these predictions go directly against the observed patterns of recruitment in the two groups.

Figure 10 Resource Curse Theory and Comparison of the LTTE and LRA



3.3.2.2 Theories of Outside Option

The results of a test for the theories of outside option is mixed, dependent upon which measurements are used to assess the utility of outside options for agents in the group. In terms of terrain, it was arguably easier to escape from the LTTE, due to the relatively mountainous terrain and proximity to a government-controlled area. However, it was more difficult to escape from the LRA, as the group was primarily located in Sudanese

territory and was consequently far from the homes of the agents. The above theory predicts the LTTE relies on incentive for recruitment and the LRA on force, which fits the actual practices of the two groups. We would reach a same conclusion if we focus on the level of economic development in the two countries. Sri Lanka was more highly developed than Uganda most of the time throughout the conflicts. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that agents in the LTTE observed better economic opportunities outside the group in comparison to those in the LRA. This reflection also leads to a prediction that the LTTE would recruit by incentive and the LRA by force.

However, the remaining two measurements imply a different conclusion. The LTTE controlled a substantial amount of territory, while the LRA practically had none. This fact should have made the LTTE more capable in punishing agents' attempts at desertion than the LRA. Also, the Ugandan government took a rather benevolent policy toward deserters from the LRA, granting amnesties through executive decisions in the late 1990s, and then through parliamentary legislation from 2000 onwards. The Sri Lankan government, in contrast, did not present a credible commitment giving amnesty to deserters.[33] Consequently, these measurements indicate that the agents in the LTTE had more outside options than those in the LRA. The theory of outside option then predicts the LTTE to rely more on force and the LRA on incentives for recruitment, which goes against their actual practices.

Overall, the results of the theories of outside option are mixed. Two of its measurements explain differences between the LTTE and the LRA, whereas the other two measurements indicate predictions contradictory to the observed practices of these groups.

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[33] See Chapter 4 for more detailed discussion of the amnesty policies of the two states.

Figure 11 Theories of Outside Option and Comparison of LTTE and LRA

*Predictions are in square brackets.



3.3.3 Organizational Vulnerability and Task Type

I will now assess whether the predictions of the proposed theory coincide with the observed differences between the two groups in their recruitment practices, demonstrating that the proposed theory makes predictions in line with the observed pattern. The LTTE was vulnerable to desertion and therefore required relatively high skills in its agents, which meant that they typically relied on task incentives for recruitment. The LRA, in contrast, was much less vulnerable and tasks inside the group were not very demanding. As a result, the group mostly depended on force for recruitment.

I will first measure and compare the vulnerabilities of the LTTE and LRA. I will use four measurements to assess the vulnerabilities of the two groups: their power relations with the state; the terrains surrounding these groups; their (non-) possession of safe havens; and their military strategies. The assessment of their military strategies will also involve an assessment of the task types in these groups.

Figure 12 Proposed Theory and Comparison of LTTE and LRA



3.3.3.1 Power Asymmetry

In terms of the military power, the LTTE was, for the most part, more vulnerable than the LRA. This conclusion – that the LTTE was more vulnerable than the LRA - may sound

contradictory. At its height, the LTTE is estimated to have had approximately 15,000 soldiers, while the highest estimates for the size of the LRA are around 6,000 agents, with the actual number remaining much smaller most of time (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2009). The LTTE is also known to have had a large amount of economic assets, by and large thanks to its extensive diaspora network. However, the strengths of the states these groups faced were quite different.

The Sri Lankan state was much stronger than the Ugandan state, throughout the civil wars in these two countries. The GDP per capita of Sri Lanka was $400 in 1978 (constant 2000 US dollars) , and steadily developed to $1,199 in 2008. Conversely, the GDP of Uganda was $172 in 1988 and $348 in 2008 (The World Bank 2009). The military expenditure of the Sri Lankan government increased from $198 million in 1989 (constant 2005 US dollar), to $795 million in 2007, while that of Uganda shifted from $88.6 million to $237 million during the same period (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2009). The size of the Sri Lankan military was 22,000 in 1988 and 150,900 in 2007, while that of Uganda was 70,000 in 1988 and 40,000 in 2007 (International Institute for Strategic Studies. various years; Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2009). In the meantime, the land sizes of these countries remained 64,630 sq. km and 197,100 sq. km, respectively, throughout these years (The World Bank 2009). When these figures are converted into military persons per square kilometer, the Sri Lankan military had 0.34 persons per sq. km in 1989 and 2.33 in 2007. However, the Ugandan military had 0.36 in 1989, decreasing to 0.20 in 2007. The military expenditures per sq. km in these two states illustrate their differences more clearly. The Sri Lankan government's military expenditures per sq. km were $2,792 in 1988 and $10,589 in 2007, while those of the Ugandan government were

$576 in 1991 and $1,021 in 2007. The density of the road network provides another measure of the strengths of these states. In Sri Lanka, the total lengths of the road network was 90,000 to 100,000 km, making the road density approximately 1.50 km per sq. km (The World Bank 2009). In Uganda, the total length of the road network was approximately 70,746 km in 2003, with a density of approximately 0.36km per sq. km (The World Bank 2009).

Hence, while the LTTE possessed all the military strengths the LRA did not enjoy, the LTTE was in a position far inferior to the LRA; the former group stood against a far stronger Sri Lankan state, than the Ugandan state which the LRA fought against.

Table 5Comparison of the LTTE and the LRA

category	variable	LTTE	LRA
Rebel Power	rebel size (person)	5,764	1,784
	number of the rebel group member per sq. km (person) (A)	0.31	0.02
State Power	number of the miliatry personnel per sq. km (person) (B)	1.55	0.26
	amount of the military expenditure per sq. km (constant 2000 US$)	7,861	637
	length of the road network per sq. km (km)	1.50	0.36
Power Balance	Power Difference (A-B)	-1.24	-0.23
Rebel Military Strategy	military strategy	terrorism/ guerrilla warfare/ conventional warfare	guerrilla
Geography	terrain	.	.
	safe haven	0.15	0.57
	weak state neighbor	0.94	1.43

*The table shows mean values for each variable for all the years when relevant rebel groups existed and the data was available.

3.3.3.2 Terrain and Safe Haven

Similarly, in terms of geography and safe haven, the LTTE was in a far inferior position than the LRA. Sri Lanka is an island country and the LTTE was based in its coastal areas, in the Jaffna peninsula and the coastal areas of the northeastern part of the country. True, Tamil Nadu, an Indian province with Tamil majority, was just 64 km away from the northern end of Sri Lanka ("Palk Strait" 2010). However, the Sri Lankan Navy's control of the Palk Straight made it a high-risk venture for the LTTE to transport personnel from

Sri Lanka to Tamil Nadu. Therefore, even when the LTTE suffered a military setback from the state military forces, it was impossible for the group to massively retreat into Indian Territory. Moreover, the political relationship between the group and the Indian government was not stable. While the Indian government hosted some leaders of the LTTE, and other Tamil nationalist groups in the early 1980s, the government's relationship with the LTTE turned sour in 1987. It was in this year that the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) entered into combats with the LTTE. Relations between the two were virtually severed in May 1991, when the LTTE assassinated the former Indian President, Rajiv Gandhi.

These conditions contrast significantly with those of the LRA, who found safe havens first in southern Sudan and then in the Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The vast terrains and the weak states in these areas made it possible for the LRA to move around and evade the government's attempted offensives. Because, in contrast, the LTTE had no such safe haven, it was highly dependent on its knowledge of the terrain under its control, and the secrecy of its whereabouts in its defense against state incursions. The LRA was much less dependent on these factors for its survival.

3.3.3.3 Military Strategy

The LTTE adopted a variety of military strategies: terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and conventional warfare (Höglund 2005; Hopgood 2005; Samaranayake 1997, 1999; Swamy 2006). Importantly, terror attacks remained the most important part of the group's military strategy throughout its existence. True, the group trained guerrilla fighters, and later organized a conventional army that consisted of an army, navy, and air force. These strategies played an important role in the LTTE's political and military tactics. Still, the power asymmetry between the LTTE and its enemies made the LTTE reliant on this

approach, even when the group carried out guerrilla or conventional warfare against the Sri Lankan army or the IPKF. The LTTE never abandoned terror attacks as its military strategy, an important reason why the group survived for as long as it did.

Following the discussed in Chapter Two, terrorism, as a strategy of war, is highly vulnerable to the leak of information, and also requires a certain level of skills on the part of agents. Therefore, the LTTE needed a guaranteed number of agents who were loyal and capable.

These two features of the LTTE's military strategy contrasts strongly with that of the LRA. The LRA conducted neither terrorist attacks – for instance urban terrorism - nor conventional warfare. The group carried out guerrilla warfare, which was not as demanding as terrorism in terms of the skills and loyalty required of their agents. This decision was especially important, because the LRA operated across vast terrains, enjoyed safe havens outside Uganda, and fought against the Ugandan state, which was much weaker than the Sri Lankan state.

Consequently, the LRA relied heavily on abduction as a means of recruitment, as they did not need agents with high skills or ability. Also, the LRA could afford to have deserters from the group, because its military strategies were not as sensitive to information leak as the LTTE's terrorism.

3.3.4 Summary

The analysis in this section demonstrates that the proposed theory explains the difference between the LTTE and the LRA in their recruitment strategies, better than the resource curse theory and theories of outside option. Generally speaking, the LTTE primarily relied on task incentives for recruitment, advocating Tamil nationalism and refraining

from paying pecuniary incentives to its agents. The LRA, by contrast, relied predominantly on force for recruitment, often carrying out mass abduction to recruit its agents.

The proposed theory explains this difference between the two groups, by focusing on their vulnerabilities to information leak and the task types within these groups. The LTTE was fighting a relatively strong Sri Lankan state, although the group itself was located on the edge of an island country. While the group had a safe haven in India for a limited time period, the Palk Straight between the two countries made it highly problematic to conduct a massive withdrawal of its members to Indian Territory. Also, the LTTE relied heavily on terrorism as its military strategy, and consequently the group and its operations were vulnerable to information leak. Because the LTTE required relatively high skills among its members, it relied mostly on task incentives, in order to ensure the recruitment of agents with a high loyalty and capabilities. In contrast, the LRA faced an arguably weak Ugandan state. Because the group was based across a vast terrain, and was surrounded by weak states, they fought mainly guerrilla warfare, and could afford to rely on abduction for its recruitment strategy.

Predictions of the resource curse theory do not coincide with the observed pattern of recruitment in the two groups. The LTTE had far more economic resources than the LRA. Therefore, the resource curse theory predicts the former to rely heavily on both pecuniary incentives and the use of force for recruitment, or one or the other, than the latter group. This prediction effectively contradicts the observation that the LTTE shied away from the use of pecuniary incentive for recruitment, moreover that the LRA was far more

violent than the LTTE, both in recruitment strategies and on other occasions, for instance their interaction with the local population.

The relative explanatory power of the theories of outside option remains uncertain. I identified four measurements of the utility of outside options for agents: geography, territorial control, government protection, and economic opportunity. Two of these four measurements – geography and economic opportunity outside the group – lead us to a correct prediction that the LRA relies more on the use of force than the LTTE. The other two measurements – territorial control and government protection – however, lead us to a contradictory prediction that the LTTE relies more on the use of force than the LRA, which was not the case.

At this point, I will not attempt to make a final judgment on the explanatory powers of the proposed theory and the theories of outside option. It is more reasonable to assess the explanatory powers of the four measurements of outside option, against the temporal changes in the recruitment practices of the LTTE and the LRA respectively. This way, it becomes possible to examine whether at least one of the four measures performs better than the proposed theory, in explaining the recruitment practices of the two rebel groups.

3.4 Changes in the Organizational Characteristics of the LTTE

In the previous section, I tested the proposed theory by comparing the general organizational characteristics of the LTTE and the LRA. However, the findings in the analysis provide inadequate support for the proposed theory. The organizational practices of the two rebel groups went through various changes during the courses of their existence. Thus, in order to assess the explanatory power of the two theories, it is

important to examine whether the theory properly explains any variations in the recruitment strategies of the two groups over time. In this section and the next, I will conduct a congruence test to assess whether the proposed theory explains these temporal variations in the LTTE and the LRA respectively in comparison to the resource curse theory and the theories of outside option. For this purpose, I divide the lifespan of the LTTE into three phases: the first phase lasted from May 5, 1976 to around 1997. In this phase, the LTTE primarily relied on task incentives – ideology and social networks – to recruit its members. The second phase started in the late 1990s and ended in 2004. In this phase, the group recruited its agents predominantly using force. However, the LTTE's use of force was institutionalized, and consequently, it is more precise to label the group's recruitment strategy in this phase 'conscription'. Finally, from 2004 until May 2009, the LTTE used force more intensively and not always in an institutionalized manner. While the group continued to use conscription, it also resorted to abduction as a means of recruitment.

After identifying the recruitment strategies of the LTTE in each phase, I will assess the explanatory power of the two alternative theories – the resource curse theory and the theories of outside option. Moreover, I will demonstrate that the two theories' predictions sometimes contradict the observed patterns of recruitment in the LTTE.

I will then proceed to assess how well the proposed theory explains changes in the recruitment strategies of the LTTE. The proposed theory explains the LTTE's shift from the use of task incentives in the first phase to the use of force in the second phase, as a function of two factors: the diversification of its military strategy from terrorism and guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare, and its territorial control. These factors affected

the vulnerability of the group's military operations, the types of tasks inside the group, and its capacity to monitor and sanction agents.

As to the group's intensified use of force for recruitment in the third phase, the proposed theory explains this as a consequence of Karuna's defection. The state obtained a significant amount of information about the LTTE through Karuna. This leak of information, coupled with the vulnerable position of the LTTE, increased the possibility of demise for the LTTE. As a result, the LTTE resorted to mass abduction as a last resort, itself one of the 'crisis actions' discussed in Chapter Two. As this third phase is particularly important in testing the validity of the proposed theory, I will discuss it briefly in this chapter, and analyze it more extensively in Chapter Four.

Before concluding this section, I will make an additional analysis of Black Tiger unit. In analyzing changes in general recruitment strategy of the LTTE, I will not discuss the group's policy toward Black Tigers. As Black Tigers conducted unique operations, the proposed theory predicts that they were recruited in ways different from other members of the group. Therefore, I will examine whether the ways the LTTE recruited Black Tigers conform to prediction of the proposed theory.

3.4.1 Recruitment Strategy

The recruitment practice of the LTTE went through a few changes across the phases under examination. In the first phase, from the late 1970s to late 1990s, the LTTE mostly recruited its members by task incentives. In the second period, from the late 1990s to 2004, however, the group installed a conscription system and recruited its agents by force. In the third period, from 2004 to its demise in 2009, the group aggressively recruited its agents by force, both through and outside its conscription system.

3.4.1.1 Phase I – Task Incentive

From the latter half of the 1970s to the mid-1990s, the LTTE primarily relied on task incentives for recruitment. In this phase, the group relied heavily on Tamil nationalist ideologies and social networks to recruitits members. Except for the provision of food and uniforms, the LTTE provided few material incentives. Neither did it use force for recruitment. As the number of applicants increased, the group used a screening mechanism to tighten its recruitment process and keep out those less qualified. When the group required more combatants, it rarely resorted to force. In fact, although observers noted some incidents of abduction by the LTTE in this phase, especially in the early 1990s, these cases appear as marginal aberrations rather than a reflection of the LTTE's general recruitment strategy.

Also in this phase, the LTTE was primarily reliant on volunteers for recruitment. The principal task incentives the group offered included the personal security of its members, opportunities for revenge, and Tamil nationalism. The group initially relied on social networks to promote the cause and recruit their members, with most of its leaders originating from a same village and elementary school in Jaffna peninsula. Moreover, most members of the group belonged to the same caste. As the group grew in number, the LTTE organized propaganda and printed newspapers and journals to reach out to more people. The LTTE issued newspapers and journals in Tamil and in English, and called for more volunteers and financial contributions (Hellmann-Rajanayagam 1994: 49-50). The LTTE's publications included *Viravenkai* (Brave Tiger, Tamil paper defunct by 1994), *Tamil Voice International* (English magazine), *Tamil Ilam* (Tamil magazine), *Velliyakka* (Revelation), *Erimalai* and video tapes. While the EPRLF also published a journal 'Ilapporali: Iniye Tamil Makkal' (Hence, Tamil People), the LTTE excelled in issuing these publications,

indicative of its commitment to recruiting volunteers. The LTTE also organized ceremonies to glorify its members who had died during their missions, the most famous of which was Heroes Day on November 27, at which Prabhakaran gave a speech to commemorate the dead.

When the number of applicants increased, however, the LTTE found the system of recruitment through task incentives unsatisfactory in keeping out unqualified members, and subsequently introduced a screening mechanism. Two events increased the number of applicants, not only for the LTTE but also for Tamil militant groups in general. First, in the early 1980s, the Indian government started to provide material support for Tamil militant groups and harbor them on its soil. In 1971, as the Indian government assisted Eastern Pakistan in gaining independence from Pakistan - as Bangladesh - Tamils in Sri Lanka expected India to do the same for them in the northern of the island. The expectation for India's continuous support in the coming years reduced peoples' perception about the personal risks involved in joining militant groups. Some of them even expected to receive financial benefits through joining. The second event which increased the number of applicants to the LTTE was the Black July of 1983, when many young Tamils sought security and revenge by joining militant groups. The dramatic increase in the number of applicants resulted in greater diversity among its members, which consequently undermined the discipline within the militant groups. To fend off this problem, the LTTE introduce a screening mechanism, rejecting all applicants in their first and second visits to the group, and recruiting only those who persevered and visited a third time. This practice discouraged those insincere and uncommitted, from joining the group. These particular applicants either gave up joining any militant group, or chose to participate in other Tamil

militant groups. Finally, the IPKF operations in the late 1980s also encouraged Tamils to join the LTTE, for security or for revenge. The IPKF reportedly committed indiscriminate violence against Tamil civilians and angered the local population. The most notable example is a female suicide bomber who assassinated Indian Premier Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991. IPKF soldiers previously gang-raped her and killed all four of her brothers. Revenge was thus the primary motivation for her to commit herself to this assassination operation.[34]

The LTTE's commitment to recruitment by task is observable through its reactions to a shortage of manpower. Instead of providing common incentives, or resorting to the use of force, the group intensified its propaganda and targeted a new pool of population for recruitment. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, for example, the group intensified its guerrilla activities, fighting battles not only with the state military forces, but also with other Tamil militant groups, and the IPKF. As a result, the LTTE found itself in need of more combatants. To meet this demand, they could have used force or pecuniary incentive to recruit more agents. However, the group did not use force or incentive and instead resorted to two other measures. First, the group intensified its propaganda activities. According to Narayan Swamy, in the first half of the 1990s, the group "had been issuing appeals all over the Sri Lanka's northeast urging Tamils to join its ranks. Many did join. Still, *Kalathil* repeatedly underlined the shortage of fighters, and even moaned that the young did not seem to realize the gravity of the situation. LTTE literature said although its strength was massive, it was spread all over the sprawling northeast and the numbers

[34] Robert Pape (2005: 226-230) provides a brief description of Dhanu's background and her operation.

present in Jaffna peninsula were not enough to prevent a large scale offensive by the Sri Lankan army" (Swamy 2006: 344).

The second measure taken, in order to recruit more members to the LTTE, was its targeting of a new category of population, such as Muslims and children. (Hellmann-Rajanayagam 1994: 31 n90).In the beginning, the LTTE tried to attract the Muslim community, who comprised 17 per cent of the population in the north and east. However, these attempts were not met with any success. The majority of Muslims are extremely wary of the concept of an independent Eelam, and unhappy with the merger of the north and eastern provinces. Moreover, in terms of religion, the majority of the members of the guerrilla groups are Hindus(Samaranayake 1997).

Another group of population the LTTE tried to recruit was children (University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) 1995). According to the University Teachers for Human Rights, Jaffna (UTHR (J)), children were reportedly working as sentries for Tamil militant groups as early as the mid-1980s. However, the LTTE started to use children for combat around November 1987, as the group entered battles against the IPKF. The LTTE is reported to have used children as young as ten-years-old to carry out assassinations in Jaffna. The following excepts are from a report of the UTHR (J) (1995).

> "From 1990, the LTTE's methods of enlisting children were initially relatively subtle. The methods of employed included displaying cut outs and poster pictures of dead cadre all over, patriotic songs, exhibits of representations of Sri Lankan Army atrocities, meetings in schools, LTTE versions of history in school curricula with compulsory tests and a general exhibition of military glamour. Even children's playgrounds and parks were designed with mock

weapons to give children a feeling that they were playing in a battle ground. A common picture seen everywhere in Jaffna in 1990 was of an LTTE soldier holding children either side and walking towards a hill top where a gun was planted upside down. This symbolically portrayed the vision of the LTTE."

"From early March 1995 even as the recent peace talks were supposed to be going on, LTTE propaganda wing leader Thamil Chelvan [Tamilselvan] addressed school children in the Rural North announcing preparations for the next round of war and calling for volunteers. Recruitment took an aggressive turn, particularly when the war became a physical fact from 19th April. There was a sharp increase in the invasion of schools and tutories in Jaffna by the LTTE to have recruitment sessions. A Student's Revival Week was announced beginning 6th June targeting students in the mid-teens who were to be subjected to intense propaganda and the screening of action videos."

While the LTTE intensified its recruitment drive for volunteers, the group still refrained from acts of forcible recruitment during this period. Dagmar Hellmann-Rajanayagam (1994) denied allegations of forcible recruitment by the LTTE. Stephen Hopgood (2005: 60-61) endorsed her view. However, it seems implausible to deny any act of forcible recruitment, as the reports byUTHR (J) as quoted above, suggest instances of forcible recruitment by the LTTE. Still, the number of such instances appears limited. For example, Chris Hobbs, Helga Hanks and Harendra de Silva interviewed nineteen former LTTE child soldiers in prison in 1994, and found that one of them was forcibly enlisted in the group, while the other members were volunteers (Hobbs et al. 2001). However, it seems

that these were rather marginal cases, and the group did not make it a part of its recruitment strategy to use force.

Over all, the LTTE strictly followed the use of task incentives for recruitment. Even when the group fell short of human resources, the LTTE tried to solve the problem without resorting to other forms of recruitment.

3.4.1.2 Phase II - Conscription

In the latter half of 1990s, the LTTE started to use force for recruitment. The group's method, however, was not that of sheer abduction. Instead, the LTTE began a system of conscription around 1997. The LTTE first formed what they called a 'volunteer force' around 1997. This 'volunteer force' consisted of forcibly-recruited part time combatants. The LTTE ordered that each family offer one person to serve in the group, for one week per month. The size of this volunteer force reached a significant number by early 2000s. However, this system did not solve the shortage of manpower. Around 2002 or 2003, the LTTE started conscription ('one family, one person' policy) to recruit a full-time combatant from each family.[35] The following quotation from an interview with Harendra de Silva on August 4, 2004, then chair of the National Child Protection Authority of Sri Lanka, signifies the change in the LTTE's recruitment practice: "In 1994, I found that one in nineteen child recruits was abducted. Now in 2004, the reverse is true and only one in nineteen is a volunteer." (Harendra de Silva, quoted in Human Rights Watch 2004: 16)

It would require further investigation to ascertain the exact scale of this conscription system and how well it functioned. For example, Human Rights Watch reported that the

[35]The LTTE started conscription around 2002 or 2003. According to the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) (1995), The LTTE used to conduct forcible recruitment as early as in 1995. Nevertheless, forcible recruitment does not appear to have taken place in a large scale at this point.

LTTE members visited villages and ordered residents to offer one child from each family at village meetings and through intermediary priests (Human Rights Watch 2003: 16-21, 23). However, most of the reported cases took place in Eastern Province, especially in Batticaloa. As to the control of agents recruited through conscription, existing reports indicate that the system was successful. The LTTE conducted a type of census to ascertain the number of residents in each village, recruited one person or sometimes more from each family, and found them back at their homes if they deserted. Also, since Tamil women usually keep their hair long, the LTTE had their female combatants cut their hair short, so that it would be easier for the group to identify deserters in villages.[36] However, there are also reports of attempts by deserters to avoid capture by the LTTE, sometimes escaping to cities without returning home, or moving their families to other villages. For example, a LTTE cadre escaped from the group and reported to the military after a one-year stay in a secret location, changing his name and religion (*The Statesman* 2003).

The LTTE did not suspend its forcible recruitment drive even after the 2002 CFA.[37] According to Höglund, the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) received 1,955 complaints against the LTTE between 2002 and 2005, of which 670 concerned the forcible recruitment of children and 348 of adults(Höglund 2005: 160-161). UNICEF documented

[36]It was reported on June 27, 2003 that the LTTE's female cadres took a 22-year old girl captive and demanded her brother to rejoin the group. The brother became a member of the LTTE two years prior to this incident and received training in the Tharavani camp in Batticaloa. The abducted girl was reported to have been kept in the same camp (*The Statesman* 2003).

[37] It should be also noted that the 2002 CFA prohibited abduction, but not recruitment in itself. In fact, the government also carried out a military build-up during the period (Höglund 2005: 16).

4,600 cases of child recruitment by the LTTE.[38] Although the figure includes those who volunteered, it is safe to assume that most of the recruited were forced to join the group. Human Rights Watch also reported the LTTE to have resorted to force to recruit a significant number of children during the ceasefire (Human Rights Watch 2004).[39] Human Rights Watch quotes a UNICEF representative, saying that "An enormous recruitment drive began with the cease-fire. Reporting increased, and we received SOS calls from schools. The LTTE had access to government controlled area like never before" (Human Rights Watch 2004: 15). In 2003, the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government signed the Action Plan for Children Affected by War. However, the plan turned out to be ineffective.[40]While the LTTE released 831 children, from June 2003 through October 2004, UNICEF registered 1,424 cases of recruitment and 323 cases of re-recruitment by the group in this period (Human Rights Watch 2004: 50 n153).

The initiation of recruitment by force did not make the LTTE discontinue its efforts to recruit volunteers using task incentives. The group persisted in its propaganda campaigns to enlist more volunteers than from the previous phase (Human Rights Watch 2004: 21-24). Their cadres visited schools to give speeches and show films about the LTTE, and assigned schools set examinations on the history of the LTTE to their students. In August 2004,

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[38] The LTTE released 1,208 children during the same period (Human Rights Watch 2004: 49)

[39] According to the report, UNICEF documented 3,516 cases of child recruitment between the signing of the 2002 CFA and November 2004, with the largest number taking place in Batticaloa. Human Rights Watch, however, estimates that the UNICEF database reflects only about 25% of the abducted children, due to the difficulties in communication between UNICEF and parents (Human Rights Watch 2004: 15 n14). However, it is important to note that the figure includes children recruited both by force and by incentives.

[40] For a summary of the facts relating to the action plan, see UNICEF (2010)

when the LTTE cadres made house-to-house visits in villages in Trincomalee district, they also performed street plays motivating people to cooperate with the LTTE.

3.4.1.3 Phase III – Conscription and Abduction

In the third phase, the LTTE intensified its recruitment drive by force. In addition to the conscription system, the LTTE started to use abduction to recruit more personnel. An analysis of the survey conducted by the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence (MOD) among ex-combatants indicates the following trend: from the signing of the CFA in 2002 until 2004, the number of members recruited remained more or less constant. However, in 2005 the LTTE intensified its drive for recruitment, doubling the number of new recruits from the previous year. The figure further increased in 2006, when the Eelam War IV started.[41] Nevertheless, the analysis at this point is only indicative, as it is based on an analysis of a survey among ex-LTTE combatants captured by the Sri Lankan state.

3.4.1.4 Summary

The recruitment practice of the LTTE went through three phases: the first phase started in the late 1970s and ended in the late 1990s. The LTTE mostly recruited its members by task incentives and tried to avoid using other recruitment methods, even when the group fell short of manpower; the second phase started in the late 1990s and ended in 2004. In this phase, the group installed a conscription system and recruited its agents by force; the third phase commenced in 2004 and ended with the surrender of the LTTE to the state military forces in 2009. In this phase, the group aggressively recruited its agents by force, both through conscription and also through abductions.

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[41] For details, see Table 4.3 and its explanation in Chapter Four.

3.4.2 Explanatory power of the resource curse theory and the theories of outside option

How well do the resource curse theory and the theories of outside option explain these changes in the LTTE's recruitment strategy? Below I assess the explanatory powers of the two theories in order:

Table 6 Explanatory Power of Alternative Theories – Changes in Recruitment Practice of the LTTE

		Period 1	Period 2	Period 3
Dependent Variable	recruitment practice	incentive	coercion	coercion
Vulnerability	military strategy	terrorism/guerrilla	terrorism/ guerrilla/ conventional	terrorism/ guerrilla/ conventional
Resource Curse	economic resource	poor	rich	moderate*
Outside Option	geography	easy	easy*	easy*
	territorial control	small	medium	large
	government protection	no*	no	(no)
	economic opportunity	low*	middle*	high*

*A value that indicates a prediction contradictory to the observed recruitment practice by the group.

3.4.2.1 The Resource Curse Theory

The resource curse theory can explain the change in the recruitment practice of the LTTE so long as we focus on the 'relative' change in its economic resource. In the beginning, the LTTE's economic resource was relatively limited. However, it increased in the early 1980s as the group started to receive support from the Indian government. The 1983 riots against Tamils intensified the trend for emigration, which in turn developed the LTTE's

diaspora network. Kyle Beardsley and Brian McQuinn (2009), for example, argue that these newly-acquired economic resources made the LTTE more violent and less disciplined.

A problem with this argument is that the LTTE continued to be violent and kept recruiting its agents even after its assets abroad - in India, Britain, and USA - were frozen. However, the LRA became more violent in its recruitment practice. Beardsley and McQuinn explain this by referring to path dependence.[42]

[42] "Human Rights Watch (2006) estimates that about one-quarter of the entire Sri Lankan Tamil population, some 600,000 to 800,000 people , are part of the diaspora. The diaspora in Canada is the largest, followed by India, various EU countries, and Australia. With the wealth acquired by the Sri Lankan Tamils in their diaspora homes, the voluntary and "enforced" contributions funded a substantial amount of the LTTE war effort. As an upper limit, Byman et al. (2001) estimate that a staggering 90 to 95 percent of the LTTE war budget comes from either remittances or international investments and businesses. From Sri Lankan Tamils in Canada alone, about $12 million (CDN) flows to the LTTE (Human Right Watch 2006), and about $50 million (USD) each year comes from international sources." (Beardsley and McQuinn 2009, 633)

Figure 13 Resource Curse Theory and LTTE

*Predictions are in square brackets.



3.4.2.2 Theories of Outside Option

The explanatory power of the theories of outside option is similarly mixed in its successes. If we focus on geography, the level of difficulty to desertion from the group hardly changed over time. As the value of the variable remained more or less constant over time, it does not explain any changes in the LTTE's recruitment practice.

The level of government protection fails to explain changes in the recruitment practices of the LTTE. In the first instance, the level of government protection for deserters changed little from the first phase to the second phase. While the government occasionally mentioned amnesty to deserters from the LTTE, not one government made a strong commitment to the policy, introducing amnesty legislation or investing resources in the Demobilization, Demilitarization, and Rehabilitation (DDR). Therefore, this variable cannot account for the change in the LTTE's recruitment strategy, from the first phase to

the second phase. If anything, after Karuna's defection in 2004, the government's tacit alliance with him might have raised expectations among the LTTE members, about the possibility of the government protecting LTTE deserters. Karuna's defection also increased skepticism among the Sri Lankan people regarding the LTTE's capacity to execute its promise to find and punish deserters, as Karuna had managed to evade capture and execution after desertion. However, this perceived change in the government's policy toward deserters, and in the LTTE's capacity to punish them, predicts the LTTE to use incentive rather than force as a means of recruitment in phase three, and consequently goes against the observed pattern.

The change in the economic opportunity in Sri Lanka also fails to explain the observed changes in the LTTE's recruitment practice. Sri Lanka's economy grew steadily from the late 1970s to the 2000s. This means that the economic opportunities for agents outside the LTTE kept growing. According to the theory of outside option, this growth should entail a shift in the LTTE's recruitment policy, from coercion to inducement. However, as the group's actual practice shifted from inducement to coercion, the economic opportunities in civilian life fails to explain the changes.

Finally, territorial control appears to explain the changes in the LTTE's recruitment practice better than other proxies of the theory. The size of LTTE's controlled area expanded gradually from the 1980s through to the 2000s, meaning that the LTTE increased its capacity to punish deserters, reducing the expected utility of desertion for its agents. Accordingly, to the theory, the LTTE shifted its recruitment policy from inducement to coercion. At the first sight, this explanation fits the observed shift in the LTTE's recruitment policy.

A closer examination, however, reveals that this explanation is problematic for two reasons: first, the LTTE installed a conscription system in 1997. This occurred when the LTTE lost a substantive part of its control-area. In 1995, the LTTE lost the Jaffna peninsula to state military forces, consequently shifting from inducement to coercion as a recruitment strategy, not because the group enlarged the size of territory under its control, but because the group lost a significant part of it. Second, the same problem exists regarding the start of the LTTE's mass abduction drive in 2004. It was Karuna's defection and the resultant loss of a significant part of the Eastern Province that marked the beginning of the mass abduction program. Hence, territorial control is unlikely to explain the changes in the LTTE's recruitment practice over the examined phases.

Figure 14 Theories of Outside Option and LTTE

*Predictions are in square brackets.



The above discussion demonstrated that both the resource curse theory and the theory of outside option have difficulties explaining changes in the recruitment policy of the LTTE over time.

3.4.3 Organizational Vulnerability and Task Types

How well does the proposed theory explain changes in the LTTE's recruitment practice? Below, I will measure organizational vulnerability and task types within the LTTE in each phase, and demonstrate that the proposed theory make predictions according to the observed pattern.

The proposed theory explains the shift from reliance on task incentives in phase one, to the use of force in phase two as a function of change in the group's military strategy. In the first phase, the LTTE relied on terrorism and guerrilla warfare to fight the Sri Lankan state. The group's operations, therefore, were highly vulnerable to desertions, especially to information leaks. Moreover, tasks in the group were highly demanding. This meant that the LTTE needed to enlist only loyal and capable agents, and consequently is why the group used a highly selective recruitment strategy – the recruitment of volunteers using task incentives and social networks.

The LTTE changed its military strategy in its second phase, diversifying its military strategy and commencing conventional warfare. The set-up of a conventional army meant that the group's military operations became less vulnerable to information disclosure, also a result of its numerical strength. Furthermore, most of the agents in a conventional army were expected to perform tasks far less sophisticated than those performed by agents in terrorist or guerrilla operations. Consequently, the LTTE required a relatively large number

of agents regardless of their qualities. It was for these reasons that the LTTE decided to use force to recruit new agents in late 1990s.

It is important to note that the LTTE, as an organization, did not greatly reduce its own vulnerability. True, the group's initiation of conventional warfare meant that military operations were fairly invulnerable to desertions. In the meantime, however, the group was still located in a coastal area, with its numerical strength much inferior to the state's military forces, and lacking a safe haven abroad. These factors remained unchanged even in the second and third phases under analysis. Consequently, the group remained fairly vulnerable to desertions, which is why they resorted to conscription instead of relying on abductions for recruitment. In addition, as the group controlled a substantial amount of territory, it was possible to install a conscription system and monitor and sanction their agents with some effectiveness. This factor made it possible for the group to keep desertion rates relatively low, in spite of the use of force for recruitment.

The LTTE's shift in recruitment strategies, from the second to the third phase, is only partially explicable by the proposed theory. In the third phase, the LTTE moved beyond the scope of the proposed theory due to the defection of the Karuna faction. The LTTE's vulnerability to desertions, and the types of tasks inside the group, did not change much from the second phase to the third phase. The group remained fairly vulnerable and required a large number of agents regardless of their qualities. However, Karuna's defection made it possible for the Sri Lankan state to exploit the vulnerability of the LTTE. The group's vulnerability, combined with the leak of information through Karuna, greatly increased the risk of organizational defeat for the LTTE, which explains why, in its third

phase, the LTTE started to use force for recruitment, both through abductions and its conscription system.

Figure 15 Proposed Theory and LTTE

*Predictions are in square brackets.



Table 7 Changes in Organizational Characteristics of the LTTE

	Rebel Power		State Power			Power Balance	Rebel M-ST	Geography		
year	rebel size (person)	number of the rebel group member per sq. km (person) (A)	number of the military personnel per sq. km (person) (B)	amount of the military expenditure per sq. km (constant 2000 US$)	length of the road network per sq. km (km)	Power Difference (A-B)	military strategy	terrain	safe haven	weak state neighbor
1976	.	.	.	.	.	.	terrorism	.	0	0
1977	.	.	.	.	.	.	terr/guerr	.	0	0
1978	.	.	.	.	.	.	terr/guerr	.	0	1
1979	.	.	.	.	.	.	terr/guerr	.	0	1
1980	.	.	.	.	.	.	terr/guerr	.	0	1
1981	.	.	.	.	.	.	terr/guerr	.	0	1
1982	.	.	.	.	.	.	terr/guerr	.	0	1
1983	600	0.03	.	.	.	.	terr/guerr	.	0.5	1
1984	2,500	0.13	.	.	.	.	terr/guerr	.	0.5	1
1985	3,950	0.21	.	.	.	.	terr/guerr	.	0.5	1
1986	.	.	.	.	.	.	terr/guerr	.	0.5	1
1987	3,250	0.17	.	.	.	.	terr/guerr	.	0.5	1
1988	.	.	0.76	2,792	.	.	terr/guerr	.	0	1
1989	2,000	0.11	0.34	2,857	.	-0.23	terr/guerr	.	0	1
1990	2,500	0.13	0.34	3,039	1.44	-0.21	terr/guerr	.	0	1
1991	5,000	0.26	0.34	4,769	1.50	-0.08	terr/guerr	.	0	1
1992	7,000	0.37	1.93	4,979	1.51	-1.56	terr/guerr	.	0	1
1993	7,000	0.37	1.16	5,322	1.53	-0.79	terr/guerr	.	0	1
1994	4,000	0.21	1.94	5,620	1.53	-1.73	terr/guerr	.	0	1
1995	7,000	0.37	1.95	9,882	1.52	-1.58	terr/guerr	.	0	1

1996	8,000	0.42	1.86	10,258	1.53	-1.43	terr/guerr	.	0	1
1997	6,500	0.34	1.73	8,732	.	-1.39	terr/guerr	.	0	1
1998	7,000	0.37	1.70	9,142	.	-1.33	terr/conv	.	0	1
1999	6,500	0.34	1.70	9,535	.	-1.36	terr/conv	.	0	1
2000	6,500	0.34	1.55	12,634	.	-1.20	terr/conv	.	0	1
2001	6,500	0.34	1.55	9,951	.	-1.20	terr/conv	.	0	1
2002	6,000	0.32	2.32	7,759	1.42	-2.00	terr/conv	.	0	1
2003	7,000	0.37	2.36	8,220	1.51	-1.99	terr/conv	.	0	1
2004	.	.	1.68	8,668	.	.	terr/conv	.	0	1
2005	11,000	0.58	1.72	9,209	.	-1.13	terr/conv	.	0	1
2006	9,500	0.50	1.72	9,915	.	-1.21	terr/conv	.	0	1
2007	7,500	0.40	2.33	10,589	.	-1.94	terr/conv	.	0	1
2008	.	.	.	11,219	.	.	terr/conv	.	0	1
2009	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0	1
Mean	5,764	0.31	1.55	7,861	1.50	-1.24		.	0.07	0.94

*The data was compiled from the following sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies (various years), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2009), Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2009), and The World Bank 2009.

3.4.4 Constant Characteristics of the LTTE

In this section, I clarify what factors remained constant with the LTTE. In Chapter Two, I identified four indicators to measure the vulnerability and task types of a rebel group: its power asymmetry with the state; the surrounding terrain; the (non-) possession of a safe haven; and strengths of neighboring states. I also pointed out that territorial control increases the capacity of the group to monitor and sanction its agents.

Among these five indicators, four indicators remained constant (see Table 7 in page 106-107). Three of these indicators affected the vulnerability of the LTTE. As discussed in the previous section, the LTTE's military power remained much weaker than that of the Sri Lankan state. If anything, the power gap between the two groups only widened. Moreover, while the LTTE had been based in a coastal area of the country, this condition did not alter significantly, even when the group expanded the area under its control. Also, the LTTE did not have a safe haven abroad. True, while the group had a safe haven in Tamil Nadu in India, especially in the 1980s, it was located across a strait in the control of the Sri Lankan military, and thus could not be used for an effective retreat from its bases inside Sri Lanka. These features thus rendered the LTTE quite vulnerable throughout its existence.

Another indicator whose value remained constant was territorial control. While the size of its territory changed over time, the LTTE retained particular territories almost throughout its existence, greatly contributing to the monitoring and sanction capacity of the LTTE over its agents .As discussed below, this fact played a role in the LTTE's use of force for recruitment in the third phase.

Consequently, the LTTE had two features that continuously marked its organization; first, the group was generally quite vulnerable as an organization, due in part to its military inferiority to the Sri Lankan state, its coastal location, and its lack of safe haven abroad; second, the LTTE enjoyed a relatively high monitoring and sanction capacity thanks to its territorial control. Having identified these constant features of the LTTE's organization, I will now turn to a discussion on the changes in organizational characteristics of the LTTE that explains temporal variation in its recruitment practice.

3.4.5 Phase I (May 1976 – 1997) – Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare

The proposed theory explains the LTTE's reliance on task incentives for recruitment, in this phase, as a result of the group's vulnerability to desertions and demanding tasks inside the group. As discussed above, the LTTE was quite vulnerable throughout its existence, due to its military inferiority to the Sri Lankan state, its coastal location, and its lack of safe haven abroad. In addition to these characteristics, in its first phase, the LTTE's military strategy – terrorism and guerrilla warfare – also contributed to its vulnerability. As a result, the LTTE needed to ensure recruitment of only loyal and capable agents, which is why the group relied primarily on task incentive for recruitment.

Military Strategy – vulnerability + task types The dominant military strategy of the LTTE, in the first phase, was terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Because these strategies required the group to carry out mostly covert operations, it was important for the group to be able to keep information under control. Also, the daily-existence for LTTE members was tough, and the tasks to be performed demanding. Therefore, the group needed to recruit only those who would be loyal and capable, which was why the LTTE heavily relied on task incentives for the recruitment of its agents.

In the very early stages of the LTTE, terror attacks were a prevalent strategy, that is, the use of violence against civilians or other targets of symbolic significance to affect the policy of the political authority.[43] The following passage by Samaranayake captures this preference for violent tactics, by the LTTE, in the 1980s:

> "[The LTTE violence] first concentrated on assassinating Tamil politicians and executing police informers. The violence was organized by the 'Tamil Tigers', prior to the factionalization, with the specific objective of strengthening the cause of Tamil guerrilla warfare. From 1977 the armed attacks focused on the police and the armed forces. The initial attacks on the police forces were confined to Tamil policemen who were conducting inquiries into guerrilla violence. The targets were later expanded to include Sinhala and Muslim members of the Police and servicemen. From 1977 to July 1983, 50 police officers and servicemen, 11 Tamil politicians, 13 police informants and 16 civilians were killed. Between 1981 and 1984, 34 police stations were attacked by the Tamil guerrillas. From 1984 Sinhala civilians residing in settlements and villages within the northern and eastern provinces became targets of terrorism" (Samaranayake 1997: 115)

Notable examples of the LTTE's terror attacks include the massacre of more than 200 civilians in Anuradhapura, May 1985; the killing of 65 civilians in the Mullaitivu district on the Kent and Dollar farms in November 1985; the destruction of an Air Lanka

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[43]Prabhakaran is known to have committed his first murder on July 27, 1975, when he assassinated Alfred Duriappah, then Jaffna mayor, as a member of the Tamil New Tigers (TNT) (Swamy 2006: 56-57).

Tristar, killing 16 passengers in 1986; the raids of several Sinhala villages in Ampara, Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts during the Buddhist festival Vesak in May 1986 that killed at least 32 civilians; and the shooting of 175 bus passengers in Trincomalee in April 1987 (de Silva 2009; Samaranayake 1997: 115). The primary targets of the LTTE violence were mostly civilians, and not the state military forces.

The group continued its terror attack campaign throughout the first half of the 1990s, when the group was fighting the Eelam War II. Some notable victims of the LTTE assassinations during the Second Eelam War are: EPRLF MP Sam Thambimuttu and his wife Kala, shot dead in Colombo in 1990; EPRLF chief Pathmanabha and 12 of his party members, including an MP and a former minister in the North Eastern Provincial Government (NEPG), shot dead in Madras in June 1990; Ranjan Wijeratne, the deputy Defence Minister of Sri Lanka, assassinated in March 1991; the Commander of the Sri Lankan Navy, Admiral Clancy Fernando, killed by a suicide bomber in Colombo on November 16, 2009; [44] Rajiv Ghandi, former prime minister of India, killed by a suicide bomber near Madras in May 21, 1991; Lalith Athulathmudali, the former deputy Minister of Defence in April 1993; Ranasinghe Premadasa, former President of Sri Lanka, on 1 May 1993; and Gamini Dissanayake, a candidate of the presidential election, in November 1994 (Samaranayake 1997: 116; Swamy 2006: 318-319).

While these acts of terrorism persisted, the LTTE shifted its emphasis to guerrilla operations around the mid-1980s for three reasons. First, the riot in July 1983 by the Sinhalese against Tamil people, made Tamils concerned about their personal securities.[45]

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[44] He introduced the Sinhala communication system into the Navy as its commander.

[45]For a discussion of this riot, see, for example, Tambiah(1986, 1996).

Between July 24 and August 1, the riot caused, "471 deaths, 8077 cases of arson, and 3,835 cases of looting" (Tambiah 1996: 98).[46] As a result, the number of applicants to the LTTE increased. Prior to the riot, the group had approximately 500 members. After the riot, however, the number of its combatants increased to around approximately 3,000, making it possible for the group to organize itself for guerrilla warfare. Second, the relationship between the LTTE and other Tamil groups worsened and the LTTE started to fight not only against the Sri Lankan military, but also against other Tamil militant groups. Approximately 30 Tamil militant groups existed, with major groups including the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO). The LTTE started military confrontation with these groups around the mid-1980s, and practically defeated the TELO in May 1986, followed by the EPRLF in late 1986, and then PLOTE in July 1989.

Third, the LTTE entered a fight against the IPKF in October 1987, which lasted until IPKF's withdrawal in March 1990. The IPKF entered the Northern and Eastern Provinces in Sri Lanka, following the India-Sri Lanka accord signed in Colombo on July 29. However, the peace between the two nations did not last for long. Prabhakaran was reportedly dissatisfied with the terms of the accord, and the LTTE failed to surrender most of their weapons, in spite of the requirement in the accord, only handing over old weapons

[46] The details of the riot were as follows: "Colombo district topped the list with 227 deaths, 2,720 cases of arson, and 1,712 of looting; Kandy district suffered 31 deaths, 1,065 arson, and 132 of looting. Other districts where much violence occurred were Badulla (52 deaths, 838 cases of arson, and 630 lootings), Matale (3 deaths, 1,131 acts of arson, and 838 lootings), Kegalle (24 deaths, 390 cases of arson, and 195 lootings)" (Tambiah 1996: 98). The actual number of casualties from the riot should be higher, since the riot continued until August 5.

to the IPKF. In October, the deaths of seven LTTE members in a Sri Lankan military base in Jaffna triggered a full-scale fight between the LTTE and the IPKF, with the IPKF initiating "Operation Pawan" against the LTTE (Swamy 2006: 269-317, esp. 269, 286). During the conflict, the number of IPKF soldiers increased from 5,000 to around 75,000 (Swamy 2006: 343). Also, the IPKF fought alongside other Tamil militant groups such as ERPLF, ENDOLF and TELO. Given the numerical supremacy of the opposition and their direct military tactics, guerrilla warfare was the only viable option for the LTTE. According to Samaranayake, the LTTE "operated in densely populated areas from behind the cover of human shields of civilians. […] Although Indian army managed to capture Jaffna […] Eventually the LTTE retreated to the north-central jungles and eastern provinces, where they continued their guerrilla warfare until India withdrew at the end of the March 1990. India's intervention cost the lives of over 1,155 Indian soldiers and officers and had 2,987 injured. Nearly 1,400 LTTE guerrillas were also killed" (Samaranayake 1997: 116).

Upon the withdrawal of the IPKF, the LTTE continued its guerrilla strategy throughout the Eelam War II, until the first a few years of the Eelam War III.

The LTTE's reliance on terrorism and guerrilla warfare meant its operations remained vulnerable to defection and information disclosure throughout this phase. For example, during the Eelam War II, on July 28, 1995, the LTTE launched an assault against the SLA's Weli Oya military facility. However, the operation ended in a complete failure, with the LTTE losing 300 of its combatants, while the SLA lost only two. This failure was allegedly due to an advanced tip-off from elements in the LTTE about the planned assault (*Agence France Presse* 1995). Arguably, the LTTE leadership could have alleged the

existence of ‘spies’ within the group to avoid taking responsibility for the failure of the mission. However, in either case, it is very difficult to ascertain the truth, as allegations of tip-offs carry some credibility, indicating the vulnerability of guerrilla operations to defection from within.

Consequently enlisting only those loyal and capable to the group became crucial to its survival, which further explains why the LTTE invested considerable resources on developing task incentives, relying on them for the recruitment of new agents in this period. Moreover, to ensure the recruitment of loyal and capable agents, the group invested a substantial amount in propaganda. For this reason, the LTTE avoided the use of pecuniary incentive or force, even when the group fell short of manpower. Rather, they sought the enlistment of new categories of people such as children (and Muslims, though an arguably futile endeavor) using task incentives.

Additional evidence for LTTE’s concerns about quality of its agents is the group’s commitment to enlisting high quality agents is also evident in its introduction of additional selection mechanisms in the 1980s.

In the 1980s, as discussed above, the number of applicants for the LTTE increased due to the following factors: Indian support for the group; the 1983 riot against Tamils; and battles with the IPKF. The LTTE responded to this increase in applicants by introducing new screening mechanisms, because the high-influx of aspirants meant that recruitment through task incentives was insufficient to keep out unqualified individuals. Consequently, the LTTE enlisted only those highly motivated for its political cause.

It is noteworthy that the theories of outside option do not explain the LTTE’s reaction, especially to the 1983 riot. According to the theories of outside option, the LTTE

should have shifted its recruitment practice from the use of task incentives to the use of force in reaction to the riot. At the very least, the group should have reduced the amount of its resources to recruit new agents. The riot was significant as it signaled the Sri Lankan's the lack of commitment to protect Tamil civilians, by failing to protect them from the Sinhalese riot. This event, therefore, greatly reduced the utility of outside option for agents. In fact, the group invested more resources for recruitment of its agents, by setting up a new selection mechanism. It is possible to explain this move by the LTTE only by the group's concern over the qualities of agents to be enlisted.

Summary To summarize, in its first phase, the LTTE relied primarily on task incentives for recruitment, because the group adopted terrorism and guerrilla warfare as its military strategies. In addition to other organizational features of the group, these strategies rendered the group's operations highly vulnerable to an information leak. Tasks in these operations were also highly demanding in terms of the skills and physical strengths of agents. It was for this reason that the LTTE used task incentives for recruitment, so that the group enlisted only those loyal and capable. As explored below, these conditions changed in the second phase.

3.4.6 Phase II (late 1995 – March 2004) – Conventional Warfare (and Territorial Control)

In the second phase, the LTTE's main characteristics remained same; the group remained quite vulnerable to desertions due to its power asymmetry with the state, its geographical locations, and its lack of safe haven abroad. However, the group changed its recruitment strategy, from the use of task incentives in the first phase, to the use of force.

The proposed theory identifies two factors which were behind this change. First, the LTTE diversified its military strategy to conduct conventional warfare. Operations in

conventional warfare are relatively invulnerable to information leak and the majority of tasks inside the group did not require much skill. Therefore, the introduction of conventional warfare as a military strategy raised the group's demand for agents who do not necessarily have high level of loyalty or skills.

Second, the LTTE's control over territory made it possible for them to monitor and sanction its agents more effectively. The LTTE's capacity for monitoring and sanction is discernable in its introduction of a conscription system. Under this system, the group explicitly linked the issue of desertion by its agent with the punishment of their family and community. Therefore, in spite of the use of force for recruitment, the group kept desertion rate relatively low. In other words, the LTTE's control over territory enabled the group to rely less on the use of task incentive and recruitment of only loyal agents, to ensure compliance of its members.

Constant Characteristics And yet, at the same time it is important to note that other conditions remained unfavorable for the LTTE. The group continued to be based in coastal areas of the Northeastern Province and did not enjoy safe haven abroad. The LTTE's relative military power continued to decline due to the increase in the power of the Sri Lankan state, which benefited greatly from the country's economic development. These unfavorable conditions continued from Phase I through into Phase II.

An indication of the LTTE's military disadvantage is that the group continued terrorism and guerrilla strategies even after its set-up of a conventional army. In fact, as I will discuss at the end of this section, the use of terror attacks remained a crucial part of the LTTE's military strategy in the second phase. Given the significant power asymmetry

between the two parties, the LTTE continued relying on such attacks and their political effects, to curb the military offensives of the Sri Lankan state.

Set-up of a Conventional Army The LTTE diversified its military strategy to conduct conventional warfare, while continuing to carry out terror attacks and guerrilla warfare. This change partly explains the group's use of force for recruitment in this phase.

It was the LTTE's loss of Jaffna to the state military forces that initiated the group's formation of a conventional army. On April 19, 1995, the Sea Tiger boats sank the Navy gun boats, Sooraya and Ranasuru, marking the start of the Eelam War III. In response, President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga started off a so-called "War for Peace" policy, the aim of which was to forcibly undermine the military capacity of the LTTE, and bring about peace negotiations. Under this policy, the state military forces advanced to take over Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE. By December 1995, the LTTE lost Jaffna and was forced to withdraw into the jungles of the Vanni area. This loss of Jaffna peninsula was a shock for the LTTE leadership including Prabhakaran, forcing the LTTE leadership to seriously reconsider their guerrilla strategy, culminating in their decision to adopt a conventional war strategy.

The decision to carry out conventional warfare involved a few changes in the LTTE's organization. On the military side, the LTTE decided to form defense lines on its territory. Prior to the 1995 military offensives, the LTTE had no defense line and instead utilized guerrilla tactics to target the advancing military forces from behind. Prabhakaran decided that this strategy would not allow the group to defend its territories in the North and East. On the side of procurement, Prabhakaran authorized Shanmugam Kumaran Tharmalingam, alias KP, to take charge of overseas procurement to purchase artillery and

mortars on the international market. Other military hardware the LTTE acquired, after 1995, included tanks and planes. With regards to military training and organization, Prabhakaran ordered one of his commanders, Bhanu, to form an artillery and an armory unit by 2000 (Jeyaraj 2000). The former was named Kittu and the latter Victor after notable commanders of the LTTE. While the LTTE first seized hardware for these units from the state military after battles, they later secured them from overseas through their procurement units. The LTTE also set up an air wing called Air Tiger around 1998, under the leadership of 'Colonel' Shanka.[47] While the Air Tiger only made its first attack only in 2006, its presence was known before this time. Some of its members were sent abroad for training, and equipment was purchased abroad, in countries such as France, the United Kingdom and Malaysia (*Asian Tribune* 2007; *Daily Monitor* 2007).

As the LTTE started to prepare itself for conventional warfare, it also faced a shortage of manpower. The problem was further aggravated by the government's Operation Jayasikurui from 1997 to 1999, which reduced the number of LTTE cadres to less than 4,000. If the group were to carry out only guerrilla warfare and terror attacks to harass the state military forces, the number might have been enough. In fact, in the late 1980s, when the group had only 3,000 combatants and had to fight against the IPKF with approximately 75,000 soldiers, the LTTE still continued to depend mostly on the recruitment of volunteers using task incentives, due to the critical importance of keeping only reliable members in guerrilla warfare. However, by 1997, the LTTE had a territory with approximately 100 km of defense line, and it decided to defend it by forming a conventional army and fighting

[47] Colonel Shanka was the first senior leader of the LTTE to be killed by the Long Range Reconnaissance Program (LRRP) of the Sri Lankan military. He was assassinated by claymore attack on September 26, 2001 (*TamilNet* 2001).

positional warfare. This strategy required a large number of combatants. And yet, the shortage of manpower, in itself does not explain the LTTE's resort to the use of force as a means of recruitment. As discussed earlier in this Chapter, in its first phase, the LTTE did not opt to such recruitment strategies, even when they fell short of manpower. More significantly, their military strategy did not rely so much on secrecy and surprise attacks. Also, the kinds of tasks agents perform in conventional warfare were generally less sophisticated than those performed in terrorist or guerrilla warfare.

The conventional warfare strategy played an important role in the LTTE's comeback from the initial losses during the Eelam War III. Jeyaraj (2000) points out that Bhanu's artillery and armored units played crucial roles in defending the Vanni area, and the LTTE's capture of Elephant Pass for the first time in April 2000. Moreover, the artillery and armored units made it possible for the group to halt the advance of the state military forces from a relatively long range. At the beginning of the Eelam War III in 1995, the LTTE controlled 67 percent of the Northeastern Province. Kumaratunga's War for Peace offensives reduced it to 53 percent by 1999. From there, however, the LTTE initiated counteroffensives and increased the size of the area under its control to 76 percent in 2000 (Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence 2009).

The end of Eelam War III did not change these characteristics of the LTTE's military strategies. On February 22, 2002, the LTTE and the government, led by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe, entered a ceasefire agreement (2002 CFA).[48] The Norwegian government facilitated the negotiation for this agreement and the subsequent

[48] The president of Sri Lanka was then Chandrika Kumaratunga of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP).

peace process between the two parties. The agreement set up the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM), which consisted of five Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Admittedly, the observed patterns in the use of violence by the two parties changed after the signing of the 2002 CFA (Höglund 2005: 162-163).[49] While the two parties went through a few incidents of violence against each other, overall they showed restraint, and none of these incidents led to a major military confrontation. In July 2002, for example, a Sri Lankan Army soldier was killed in a buffer zone between the government-held area and the LTTE controlled area in Jaffna peninsula. In October 2002, the LTTE held six government soldiers hostage after the police had arrested two rebels carrying arms in a government-controlled area. In March 2003, the Sri Lankan navy sunk a LTTE merchant ship. LTTE is believed to have attacked a Chinese trawler and a troop transport ship off Trincomalee in the same month. None of these incidents led to a major confrontation between the two parties. However, the lack of major confrontation does not mean that the LTTE dropped conventional warfare from the repertoire of its military strategies.

Despite the 2002 CFA, the LTTE continued to prepare for the resumption of military offensives. The group's leadership used the time during the ceasefire to reorganize the group and prepare for another military confrontation. According to Karuna,

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[49] Article 1.2 of the CFA states: 'Neither party shall engage in any offensive military operation. This requires the total cessation of all military action and includes, but is not limited to, such acts as: a) The firing of direct and indirect weapons, armed raids, ambushes, assassinations, abductions, destruction of civilian or military property, sabotage, suicide missions and activities by deep penetration units; b) Aerial bombardment; c) Offensive naval operations.'

Prabhakaran "wanted the talks dragged for at least five years till the LTTE obtained enough arms to strengthen itself further" (Sriram 2008).[50]

Therefore, from the late 1990s to early 2000s, the LTTE set up its conventional army and started to carry out conventional warfare against the state military forces. This fact greatly reduced the vulnerability of its military operations to desertion. As a result, the group's military strategy now required a large number of agents. Moreover, so long as the majority of the group's military operations were concerned, the LTTE no longer needed its agents to be highly loyal or capable.

The proposed theory explains the LTTE's use of force for recruitment in the second phase partly by referring to the commencement of conventional warfare by the group. This change in the military strategy reduced its operations' vulnerability to desertions. The strategy was also less demanding in terms of the capacities of the agents. It was for this reason that the LTTE started to use force to recruit its agents in late 1990s.

Territorial Control It also helped with the group's shift from the use of task incentives to the use of force that the LTTE had a substantive area under its control. As discussed in Chapter Two, territorial control allows a group to set up a relatively effective monitoring and sanction system. The group can pursue deserters to their homes, and even if deserters flee elsewhere, the group can still take hostage the deserters' families, living in the area under their control.

[50] The Sri Lankan state also increased the size of the military in this period. Though, it should be also noted that the ceasefire, in conjunction with the repetitive order of amnesty for army deserters, reduced the overall number of army deserters and led some of the deserters to report back to the SLA, contributing to its expansion.

The importance of territorial control and the monitoring and sanction capacity in LTTE's shift from task incentives to force is evident in the LTTE's reliance not simply on abductions but on a conscription system.

When the LTTE formed what they called 'volunteer force' around 1997, it consisted of forcibly-recruited part time combatants. Importantly, the LTTE ordered each family to offer one person to serve in the group for one week in every month. The size of this volunteer force reached a significant number by early 2000s. However, this system did not solve the shortage of manpower.

Around 2002 or 2003, the LTTE started conscription ('one family, one person' policy) to recruit a full-time combatant from each family. It appears that the LTTE copied this policy from India. In the northern part of India, the government adopted this policy to secure soldiers to fight against Pakistan. The LTTE followed this example to solve the manpower problem.

These practices effectively held the families of LTTE members in hostage. If an agent deserted from the group, the LTTE could pursue them to their homes. Or, if the agent escaped away to the government-controlled zone, still, the group could punish their family and those in the same community. This system, therefore, contributed to the retention of agents inside the LTTE.

*Predictions are in sqaure brackets.



Summary These two factors – the LTTE's adoption of conventional warfare and its territorial control – fostered the LTTE's use of force for recruitment in the second phase. The adoption of conventional warfare increased the group's demand for agents. Importantly, as a conventional army is relatively invulnerable to information leak, and the tasks within it not very demanding, the group did not automatically require its agents to be highly loyal or capable. At the same time, while the group remained fairly vulnerable, due to its inferior military power and geographical location, its territorial control allowed the LTTE to effectively monitor and sanction its agents. Consequently, the group could afford to recruit those who were less loyal or capable, and still keep its retention rate relatively high. Together, these factors propelled the LTTE from its reliance on task incentives to the use of force for recruitment in its second phase.

3.4.7 Phase III (April 2004 – 2009) – Karuna's Defection

In March 2004, the LTTE's Eastern commander Karuna Amman defected from the group.[51] The event was extremely significant for the LTTE, as it seriously undermined the security of the group by removing about 5,000 cadres from its ranks and, more importantly, disclosing confidential information about the group to the Sri Lankan state. This information leak increased the efficiency of the military option for the state, relative to the peace negotiations with the LTTE. Accordingly, while Karuna's defection did not change either the LTTE's military strategy or the nature of its recruitment strategy, it led to the intensification of the group's recruitment practices in anticipation of a fully-fledged war against the state. That is, the LTTE increased its forcible recruitment practices, mostly through conscription but also through abductions.

This event and the subsequent responses by the state and the LTTE are of critical importance to the testing of the proposed theory. However, I will defer an in-depth discussion on the desertion and its impacts on rebel groups to Chapter Four. Here, I briefly summarize the impact of Karuna's defection on the recruitment practice of the LTTE, emphasizing two points: first, Karuna's defection brought the LTTE beyond the scope of explanation by the proposed theory set in Chapter Two. Therefore, the proposed theory does not fully explain the LTTE's new recruitment strategy. Second, this does not mean that the LTTE's recruitment practice is inconsistent with the proposed theory. Rather, it

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[51] It is not clear why Karuna decided to defect from the LTTE. Existing literature cites the longstanding conflict between Tamils from the northern and eastern regions and Karuna's personal rivalry with Pottu Amman (the head of the intelligence wing), for the position of second-in-command within the group's hierarchy. It is also possible that his decision was affected by his experience at peace talks, where he had experienced the comforts of life outside the bush.

remains consistent with the proposed theory. In fact, the proposed theory provides at least a partial explanation of the LTTE's behavior in this phase.

After Karuna's defection in March 2004, the LTTE (also called Vanni LTTE in this phase, to differentiate it from Karuna's splinter group, which was based in the Eastern Province) initiated a guerrilla offensive against Karuna group in April 2004 (e.g. Höglund 2005: 163-164; International Crisis Group 2006: 8-9). The LTTE swiftly defeated the splinter group. Karuna withdrew, disbanded his soldiers, and went into hiding. Karuna's faction, however, regained its strength and the fighting resumed in July 2004.

A more important development, however, was that Karuna's departure increased the prospect for an outright war between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan military, which eventually materialized two years later. Karuna not only left the LTTE but also aligned itself with the government military forces. While the Sri Lankan government officially distanced itself from the conflict between Karuna and the Vanni LTTE, it started to provide some support to Karuna's faction as early as in 2005: "In March 2005, it was revealed by journalist Amanatha Perera that there was some truth to these allegations [that the government forces implicated in some of these killings of the LTTE members by Karuna faction]" (Höglund 2005: 164). According to an ICG report, "By 2006 Karuna's forces had become allies of the government and a key source of intelligence for its forces. His defection was an immense loss to the LTTE and boosted support among some Sinhalese leaders for a resumed military option" (International Crisis Group 2006: 9). Karuna faction's members also served as a medium between the state and potential defectors within the LTTE, facilitating the flow of information from inside the group to the state throughout the rest of the war. Given the LTTE's reliance on information asymmetry for its survival,

Karuna's cooperation with the government meant that the Sri Lankan state military had vital information necessary to deal a severe blow to the LTTE.

While the 2002 CFA and the presence of the SLMM exerted some pressure against the outright use of violence, the LTTE anticipated and prepared for a direct military confrontation with the state military forces. This anticipation was the reason why the LTTE started to recruit members more aggressively in the third phase. Right after Karuna's defection, the LTTE tried to re-recruit cadres released by Karuna in the Eastern Province (Human Rights Watch 2004). As the Eelam War IV erupted in Mavil Aru and Mutur in Eastern Province in July 2006, the LTTE further intensified its forcible recruitment practices, not only through the conscription system but also through abductions. While the LTTE conducted terrorism in Colombo and other parts of the country, and also carried out air attacks, the group needed to rely on its conventional army to defend itself and thus recruited as many agents as possible to slow down state military offensives , though ultimately these actions were futile. During the Eelam War IV, from July 2006 to the LTTE's surrender in May 2009, the LTTE is reported to have recruited a large number of people, mostly by force.

It is important to note that the proposed theory does not fully explain the behavior of the LTTE, that is, its resort to mass abduction in the third phase. Given the critical situation the LTTE found itself in after 2004, it should have been possible for the LTTE to renounce civil war by sticking to the peace process with the government. The proposed theory does not explain why the LTTE decided to continue fighting instead of concluding a peace agreement with the state. Still, the proposed theory does explain why, once the LTTE

had decided to continue the fight, they then chose to recruit their agents by force rather than by other means.

3.4.8 Summary

In this section, I have discussed the changes in the recruitment practices of the LTTE, from its inception in 1977 to its demise in 2009. I focused on the roles of vulnerability of the LTTE, the types of tasks within the group, and the leak of information from the group.

The LTTE was initially reliant on terrorism and guerrilla warfare, and thus required a relatively small number of agents with high loyalty and capacity. When the LTTE lost Jaffna peninsula to the state military in December 1995, the group's leadership realized the need to form a conventional army to defend the area under its control. Consequently, the group initiated the use of force for recruitment to meet the high numerical demand for combatants, to form long defense lines, and effectively carry out positional warfare. An important point, however, is that the LTTE's inferior position kept the group reliant on retaining its information advantage. Accordingly, the group had to ensure a high discipline among its cadres. What facilitated the LTTE's shift to the use of force recruitment, then, was its control of territory, a allowing the group to set up a conscription system rather than relying on sheer abduction. As a result, the group had a relatively high capacity to monitor and sanction its agents, and thus did not need to select out those with low levels of loyalty to the group.

Karuna's defection in April 2004 was a significant blow to the LTTE, however, undermining its security by leaking confidential information to the state and heightening the risk of full-fledged warfare, which eventually materialized in July 2006. The LTTE,

under risk of annihilation, initiated a full-scale forcible recruitment strategy so as to withstand the state military offensive. Nevertheless their attempts were only in vain.

3.4.9 An Additional Analysis: Internal Variation across Tasks – Black Tiger

Before moving on to a discussion of the LRA, let me briefly discuss the recruitment of the Black Tigers. In this section, so far, I focused on explaining changes in the recruitment practice of the LTTE over time. It is, however, important to note that the LTTE used an additional procedure to select those to be assigned in a unit called Black Tiger. Therefore, this internal variation along the functional line provides another opportunity to test the relative explanatory power of the proposed theory, against those of the resource curse theory and theories of outside option.

The LTTE had a suicide unit popularly known as the Black Tigers. While it is not clear exactly when the unit was formed, it is generally thought to be around the late 1980s. The unit received orders directly from Prabhakaran and performed not only suicide missions, but also missions that demanded an extraordinary capacity and involved high risks of death (Hopgood 2005).

The LTTE had an internal mechanism – through voluntary application - to select members of Black Tiger unit. The LTTE commanders usually kept the names of applicants for the Black Tigers in their own units. When the unit needed more agents, Prabhakaran informed the commanders of the number and qualifications of agents needed. The commanders then recommended eligible applicants from their lists. Applicants then went through a series of tests to join the Black Tiger unit. The identities of all the Black Tigers were kept secret, with even their colleagues in their original remaining unaware of their assignments in the Black Tiger.

The LTTE made extensive use of task incentives to recruit members to the Black Tigers. The group used pictures of Black Tigers who died in operations in posters. They also ordered local Tamils to treat families of deceased Black Tigers with respect. It is reported, for example, that these families were given priorities in receiving food and other commodities from the LTTE.

The LTTE's reliance on task incentives to recruit Black Tigers fits the prediction of the proposed theory. Black Tigers are known to have committed suicide attacks. They also joined other operations, such as commanding dangerous attacks on the state military forces in guerrilla warfare. These types of operations are highly vulnerable to information leak. Also, these tasks demand agents' extraordinary strengths both physically and mentally.

A possible deviation from the proposed theory is the reported use of common incentive – pecuniary incentive – by the LTTE. The LTTE provided a significant amount of money to the families of Black Tigers who committed to suicide attacks.

The LTTE's provision of pecuniary incentive, however, does not go against the proposed theory for two reasons: first, the payment was made not to Black Tigers themselves but to their families; second, more importantly, payment was made to the families of Black Tigers only after they completed operations. These conditions reduced the incentives for Black Tigers to defect in their operations. If they failed to complete the mission, their families would not receive the reward. More importantly, the LTTE knew the whereabouts of their families and could punish them if the agents ever defected to the state.

3.5 Changes in the Organizational Characteristics of the LRA

In the case of the LTTE, the group remained constant in its power relationship with the state, its geographical location, and the lack of a safe haven. Therefore, it was the

changes in its military strategy that drove the alteration in its recruitment strategy from the first phase to the second phase. In the example of the LRA, however, the group's military strategy mostly remained at a constant, carrying out guerrilla warfare against the Ugandan state. While the LRA was weaker than the state military forces, the state's presence was also weak. Also, the region in which the group operated was surrounded by weak states. What did change, in contrast to the LTTE, was the group's possession of a safe haven. As the group acquires or loses a safe haven, the vulnerability of the group to information leak and the level of capacity required of its agents, is altered. Consequently, the group changed its recruitment strategies to meet the changing demands for human resource.

In this section, in order to assess the validity of the proposed theory, I will first divide the life span of the LRA into three phases, and identify its recruitment strategies in each phase. The first phase started with the birth of the group in 1988 and ended in early 1994. The group predominantly used task incentives for recruitment in this phase. The second phase began in 1994 and ended in the early 2000s; a period when the group started to conduct large-scale abduction. The third phase commenced in the early 2000s and ended in the mid-2000s, when the group moved to the Garamba National Park in the DRC. In this phase, the LRA further intensified its abduction drive.

Next, I will assess the explanatory power of the resource curse theory and the theories of outside option, pointing out that these theories sometimes lead us to predictions that are contrary to the observed pattern of recruitment. Thus, they cannot fully explain changes in LRA's recruitment strategy.

Then, I will proceed to discuss how well the proposed theory explains changes in the recruitment strategies of the LRA. I will highlight the importance of two factors: the gain and loss of a safe haven in Sudan, and the mass desertion of its members for state amnesty. it's the LRA's shift from the use of task incentives in the first phase to reliance on force for recruitment in the second phase, can be explained by the group's acquisition of safe haven in Southern Sudan, which significantly reduced the organizational vulnerability of the LRA. The LRA's loss of a safe haven and mass desertion from the group together explain the group's intensified abduction drive in the early to mid-2000s. These two factors significantly undermined the prospect for survival of the organization. From this viewpoint, the LRA's abduction drive was a part of its 'crisis action'. As in the case of the LTTE in its third phase, the LRA's last phase of is critical in which to test the validity of the proposed theory. I will discuss this point in more detail in the next chapter.

Finally, before concluding this section, I will briefly discuss the LRA's recruitment of collaborators to demonstrate the validity of the proposed theory, explaining the variation in its recruitment strategy by the tasks agents perform, though this attempt is exploratory rather than conclusive in its endeavor.

3.5.1 Recruitment Strategy

The LRA's recruitment strategies went through three phases: in the first phase, from the late 1980s to 1994, the group relied on task incentives for recruitment; in the second phase, from 1994 to early 2000s, however, the group started to use force for recruitment, carrying out mass abductions. In the third phase, from the early 2000s through to the mid-2000s, the LRA further intensified its practice of abduction.

3.5.1.1 Phase I – Task Incentive

In the first phase, the LRA primarily relied on task incentives to recruits volunteers, although the group also carried out abduction. The group further exploited Acholi nationalism, personal security concerns, members' desires for revenge, and Alice Auma's religion of Lakwena.

The group drew its members primarily from the remnants of Alice's Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) and the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA). Alice Auma herself claimed to be a medium of the Holy Spirit Lakwena and organized a rebel group called the HSM in December 1986 (Behrend 1998, 1999; *The Associated Press* 1987). The group carried out conventional warfare - that is, positional warfare forming a frontline - and marched from Kitgum District, where they originated from, through Gulu District toward Kampala, defeating the National Resistance Army (NRA) contingents. It was only in Jinja, just 80 km away from Kampala, that the NRA finally defeated the HSM in November 1988. Alice Auma escaped to Kenya with seven of her followers, where she died in 2007. Some of the remnants from the group joined Kony in setting up the LRA.

The UPDA was a secular rebel group fighting against the NRM government in northern Uganda.[52] It mainly consisted of remnants of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). Under the leadership of Walter Ochola, UPDA signed a peace agreement with the government on June 3, 1989. However, a large number of its members splintered away from the UPDA and continued guerrilla warfare against the government. According

[52]The LRA was apparently less popular than the UPDA among northern Ugandans. A local civilian leader attributed this difference to the following three factors: i) the LRA committed more atrocities against civilians; ii) its military method had – according to popular perception - proved a failure at the time of Alice Auma's rebellion; and iii) the LRA rarely engaged in political propaganda to mobilize the population. Interview, Gulu, April 4, 2009.

to a report, one breakaway member of the UPDA, Brigadier Odong Latek, joined the LRA with over 600 former UPDA soldiers and an estimated 500 militias (*The Xinhua General Overseas News Service* 1988).[53]

There were different sorts of task incentives exploited by the LRA attract people into the group. First, the LRA provided protection and opportunities for revenge for the Acholis and other northerners in the country. The NRM/A took power in Uganda after six years of civil war in 1986. While the NRA was relatively well-disciplined (e.g. Weinstein 2006), still, the group committed atrocities against civilians during and after the civil war. Although there exists no systematic record of the NRA's violence against civilians in this period, a series of interviews carried out by Chris Dolan in 1999 revealed that the people in Northern Uganda still remembered instances of NRA violence against themselves or their immediate acquaintances from this period (Dolan 2000).

Second, Kony effectively utilized the symbolism of the HSM to attract and retain people in the LRA. Despite her ultimate failure, Alice's march made a strong impression on the northerners, partly because of its mystical characteristics.[54] Alice told its combatants that the arrows of the NRA would never kill them and that they could march whilst singing hymns, without the use of shields, so long as they were loyal to the Holy Spirit. Auma also armed the HSM with sticks and stones, claimed that the former would turn into grenades thanks to Lakwena's power. However, what amazed the Acholi people was the near-success of the HSM's rebellion to take over Kampala. As a cousin of Alice Auma, Kony

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[53] Latek and his associates are also believed to have moved the LRA away from the use of traditional methods such as stones and magical oils, to the use of more conventional weapons (*The Xinhua General Overseas News Service* 1988).

[54] For details on the HSM, see Behrend (1998, 1999)

was in a good position to cultivate the people's memory of the HSM, and himself claim to be another medium of the Holy Spirit to attract agents.[55] Kony alleged he was a medium of Lakwena and other three spirits, who gave him orders regarding how to carry out the rebellion. Kony attempted to utilize this cult to recruit the local population by engaging himself with them and their beliefs, introducing various rituals of the HSM into the LRA. Once in a while, he performed 'miracles' in front of the local population.[56]He also organized Mass every day, bringing both his combatants and local villagers to the same site, although preventing communication between the two parties.

Admittedly, in this phase, the LRA also used force for recruitment. However, the main bulk of the group members remained volunteers. Also, they selected for abduction, those individuals aged between high-teens and mid-twenties and who looked strong. The group, therefore, was relatively selective in identifying abductees.[57]

The LRA was popular among civilians and received support from them, especially from the late 1989 to 1990 or 1991. As the UPDA signed a peace agreement with the Ugandan state, the LRA served as the only vehicle for Acholis to continue armed rebellion,

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[55] A former Ugandan Minster of Education, Professor Isaac Newton Ojok, joined the LRA in serious belief of Alice's message. He later surrendered to the government forces and denounced Alice (Unston 1988).

[56] An example of such a 'miracle' Kony performed: Women in a village used to climb a hill to reach a river and obtain water in containers. As the slope of the hill was steep and the containers heavy, the women could easily fall down and receive serious injuries . One day, Kony met them at the river and told them to walk down the hill leaving all the containers behind. The women followed his instruction and walked down the hill to find their containers full of water at the foot of the hill. Interview, Kampala, Uganda, February 4, 2009.

[57] Interview, Gulu, Uganda, April 16 (H, I), 2009

to protect civilians, and possibly revenge the NRA.[58] However, popular support for the LRA started to wane around 1990-1991, due to the near-defeat of the LRA by the government and the increases in abductions by the LRA.[59]

The LRA reliance on the use of task incentive is conceivable in the ways their high ranking officials joined the group. Among the 18 high-rank officers of the LRA identified, only three or 17% joined the LRA through abduction. This figure may sound high. However, we should keep in mind two things: first, as discussed below, more than 50% of those who occupied high-ranks in the LRA between 1988 and 2008 were former abductees. By comparison, 17% is quite low; second, all of the three officers who were abducted used to be members of the UPDA. Since the splinter group of the UPDA voluntarily joined the LRA, it is reasonable to expect that the LRA used their local knowledge to identify for recruitment those potentially loyal and competent among the former UPDA members. In other words, the LRA could utilize a screening mechanism to identify targets for recruitment.

[58] Interview, Gulu, Uganda, April 4, 2009.

[59] Interview, Gulu, Uganda, April 4, 2009.

Table 8 Abducted Experience and Former Affiliation of the High-Ranking LRA Officers

Period	Abducted	ULA	UNLA	UPDA	HSM	NRA	Total
1988 - 1994	3 17%	0 0%	8 44%	17 94%	6 33%	2 11%	18
1994 - 2001	11 42%	1 4%	10 38%	19 73%	8 31%	3 12%	26
2002 - 2005	13 62%	0 0%	3 14%	12 57%	5 24%	1 5%	21
2006 - 2008	17 77%	0 0%	2 9%	6 27%	2 9%	1 5%	22

3.5.1.2 Phase II - Abduction

Since 1994, the LRA began to rely mostly on force than on incentives to recruit its members. In carrying out abduction, the group not only increased the number of locals they recruit but also became less selective in choosing abductees than previously.

In 1994, the High Command of the LRA ordered its commanders to strengthen the group's power through a sharp increase in the number of abductions.[60]The order was given under the leadership of Omona Komakech Field, then the Field Commander. Prior to 1994, the LRA abducted about 50 individuals per operation. However, since 1994 the LRA increased this amount, abducting between 100 to 200 people per operation, and sometimes even 800 persons. Also, the commanders were allowed to be less selective in choosing abductees. Before, the LRA abducted only those physically fit and around a certain age,

[60]Interview, Gulu, Uganda, April 16 (H, I), 2009.

that is, high teens and those in their early 20s. Now, the group recruited both those much younger and those much older, even individuals over 30.[61]

As the LRA intensified its abduction and grew in size, it introduced a military ranking system in 1995.[62] Prior to 1995 the LRA had only two ranks within the group – commanders and privates. Commanders used to be called '*lapwony* (teacher)'. From 1995, the LRA started to assign military ranks to its commanders, and they were referred to by their ranks.[63]

Even among the LRA leadership, the number of abductees increased from 3 out of 18 (17%) in the previous phase, to 11 out of 26 (42 %) in this phase (See Table 8in page 137).

The group recruited few volunteers during this period. Apparently, around 2000, an individual joined the LRA with all of his family members. However, he was suspected by the UPDF for collaborating with the LRA, and thus had no choice but to join the group for the safety of his family.

3.5.1.3 Phase III – Massive Abduction

In the third phase, from the early to mid-2000s, the LRA violently abducted civilians in northern Uganda. A survey conducted by Toulane and Berkeley show that the

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[61] The LRA became more active in abduction throughout rainy seasons than in dry seasons. In dry seasons, more villagers sleep outside in the bush to avoid capture by the LRA. In rainy seasons, they tend to sleep at home to escape from the rain.

[62] Interview, Gulu, April 17, 2009.

[63] The LRA set out twelve rules for its members, ten of which were: 1) do not drink alcohol; 2) do not smoke; 3) do not seduce women; 4) do not rape civilians; 5) do not point guns at your fellow men; 6) do not wrestle with your friends; 7) do not escape. The penalty for escape is execution; 8) observe fast; 9) do not use cash; 10) do no hold private communication with your family or friends unless permitted. The level of observance, however, is not clear.

LRA seized more than 4,000 people in 2002 and over 6,000 in 2003 (See Figure 20 in Chapter 4). The magnitude of this abduction drive was unprecedented, even within the LRA's rather violent history. According to this survey, in the second phase, the group abducted less than 2,000 individuals every year. In fact, the number of abductees decreased around 1999 through to 2001, to somewhere less than 1,000. Hence this sudden increase in the number of abductees in early to mid 2000s was remarkable.

To summarize, the LRA's recruitment strategy went through two changes. In the first period, from the late 1980s to 1994, the group was relatively benevolent and tried to induce volunteers by task incentive. In the second period, from 1994 to around 2000, the group used coercive means to recruit its agents. In the third period, from around 2000 onwards, the group further intensified its practice of abduction.

3.5.2 Explanatory Power of the Resource Curse Theory and the Theories of Outside Option

How well do the resource curse theory and the theories of outside option explain these changes? In this section, I will explain the explanatory power of these two theories and demonstrate their difficulties in explaining these changes in the recruitment practice of the LRA.

Table 9Explanatory Power of Alternative Theories – Changes in Recruitment Practice of the LRA

		Period 1	Period 2	Period 3
Dependent Variable	recruitment practice	task incentive	force (abduction)	force (massive abduction)
Vulnerability		yes	yes	yes (partially)
Resource Curse	economic resource	poor	moderate	poor*
Outside Option	geography	easy	difficult	easy*
	territorial control	no	no*	(no)
	government protection	no*	somewhat*	yes*
	economic opportunity	low*	middle*	high*

*A value that indicates a prediction contradictory to the observed recruitment practice by the group.

3.5.2.1 Resource Curse Theory

While the resource curse theory has difficulty explaining the differences between the LTTE and the LRA, its prediction roughly fits with the temporal changes in recruitment by the LRA. When started, the LRA hardly had any financial resources. When the group moved to Sudan in 1994, it gained a little financial support from Sudan, and started abduction. However, closer examination of the theory reveals at least two problems. In the first instance, the LRA almost immediately started an abduction drive after its move to Sudan. This rapid shift in the recruitment practice of the LRA poses a problem for the resource curse theory. In Weinstein's discussion, a resource-rich rebel group uses extensive violence towards civilians, and recruits them by force, because the group's resource attracts criminals to the organization. In the case of the LRA, however, leaders

of the group in the late 1990s mostly joined the LRA in its first phase, that is, in late 1980s and early 1990s, when the group was still resource poor. Hence, the same leaders used voluntary recruitment methods in the first phase, and then relied on abduction in the second phase. As Weinstein's theory explains variation in recruitment practice of rebel groups by 'types' of the group members, his theory does not hold in the case of the LRA.

Second, whatever financial resources the group received from Sudan, the LRA did not distribute pecuniary incentives to its members. Most of the assistance came in kind, and the financial resources predominantly appear to have been used to recruit collaborators, and not combatants. Even LRA leaders rarely enjoyed comfort of any sort. The LRA leaders obtained some luxurious commodities such as satellite TVs only after 2005, when the United Nations started to facilitate peace negotiations between the LRA and the Ugandan government, and gave LRA leaders these commodities. Hence, for a long time after 1994, the LRA leaders – let alone the low rank cadres - were attracted by pecuniary incentives.

Figure 16 Resource Curse Theory and LRA



3.5.2.2 Theories of Outside Option

The theory of outside option also has difficulty explaining observed pattern of recruitment by the LRA. In terms of geography, it was relatively easy for LRA agents to escape from the group when it was based in Uganda before 1994. Its relocation to southern Sudan that same year increased the difficulties for combatants trying to escape the group and return home, due to the distance and terrain in between themselves and their families. In the third phase, however, the group carried out a massive recruitment drive in Uganda, and many of the abductees escaped before they were taken to camps in southern Sudan. Given the number of deserters, it should, in theory, have been very easy for the LRA leaders to anticipate high risk of desertion among the new recruits. Still, the

group continued abduction. The group's practice in this third phase, therefore, poses an empirical problem for the theory.

Second, the LRA lacked control over a set territory, never having installed a stable camp in Uganda. Moreover, its camps in southern Sudan only contained group members. As the group recruited most of its agents in Uganda, it means that the group was not very effective in punishing deserters. True, there are occasional anecdotal evidences that the LRA punished deserters or their families. Still, this punishment was not systematic or comprehensive, and, more importantly, the constant lack of territorial control indicates that the capacity of the group to punish deserters did not vary much over time. Thus, it does not explain changes in the recruitment practice of the LRA.

In the case of government protection, the Ugandan state gradually intensified its effort and commitment to protect deserters from the LRA, although at first it did not have any protective policy towards them. However, since 1994, the government gave amnesty to nearly all deserters and those captured from the LRA. In 1999, the Ugandan parliament legislated the Amnesty Law for deserters, which further signaled the state's commitment to granting amnesty to deserters and those captured from the group. Therefore, as long as government protection is concerned, the utility of the outside option for LRA members increased over time. According to the theory of outside option, this shift in the environment for agents should entail a change in the LRA's recruitment policy from coercion to inducement. However, the record shows a trend in the opposite direction, with the group moving from inducement to coercion.

Finally, the theory encounters a problem if we measure the utility of the outside option for agents by economic opportunity outside the group. The economy in Uganda

made slow but steady growth over time, increasing the utility of the outside option for agents. The LRA, however, became more coercive in its recruitment practice over time. This fact goes against the theory's prediction.

Hence, an assessment of the four measures of outside option for the LRA's agents shows that the theory of outside option does not explain changes in the recruitment practice of the LRA over time.

Figure 17 Theories of Outside Option and Changes in the LRA

*Predictions are in square brackets.



In this section, I examined the explanatory power of alternative theories – the resource curse theory and the theory of outside option – against that of the proposed theory, using the case of the LRA. The analysis demonstrates that the proposed theory is more

useful in explaining the temporal changes in the group's recruitment strategies than the alternative theories.

3.5.3 Organizational Vulnerability and Task Type

I will now proceed to assess how well the proposed theory explains changes in the recruitment strategy of the LRA. The LRA's recruitment strategy went through three phases; in the first period, from the late 1980s to 1994, the group was relatively benevolent and tried to induce volunteers by task incentive; in the second period, from 1994 to around 2000, the group used coercive means to recruit its agents; in the third period, from around 2000 onwards, the group further intensified its practice of abduction.

The proposed theory explains these changes with reference to the group's (non-) possession of a safe haven and increases in the number of deserters from the group. These two factors affected the vulnerability levels of the LRA and the amount of information leaked from the group to the state. The group's acquisition of a safe haven in Southern Sudan explains its shift from the use of task incentives in the first phase, to a reliance on force for recruitment in the second phase. It significantly reduced the organizational vulnerability of the LRA. The LRA's loss of this safe haven and the mass desertion from the group together explains why the group intensified its abduction drive, in the early to mid 2000s. These two factors significantly undermined the prospects for the survival of the organization. As a result, in desperation, the LRA resorted to mass abduction.

Figure 18 The Proposed Theory and the LRA

*Predictions are in square brackets.



3.5.4 Constant Characteristics of the LRA

Before moving on to discuss what changed in the LRA, let me first identify the organizational characteristics of the LRA that remained mostly constant throughout the phases. There are four indicators to measure the vulnerability and task type in a rebel group: its power asymmetry with the state; the surrounding terrain; (non-) possession of a safe haven; and the strengths of neighboring states. Also, a territorial control increases the capacity of the group to monitor and sanction its agents.

Among these five indicators, four indicators remained by and large constant (See Table 10 in page 150). Three of these affected the vulnerability of the LRA; first, regarding the power asymmetry between the LRA and the Ugandan state, it is fair to say that both organizations were fairly weak. Still, the LRA was in a more advantageous military

position when compared to the LTTE, which was fighting a strong Sri Lankan state. The Ugandan state was much weaker than its Sri Lankan counterpart. Second, the LRA was located in across an area of vast terrain covered with bush. Third, it was also the area where Uganda shared its border with two weak states – Sudan and the DRC. Both states were fighting multiple rebel groups inside their territories. Consequently, it was relatively easy for the LRA to cross the border to escape from the Ugandan state military forces. Therefore, especially when compared to the LTTE, the LRA was in a relatively invulnerable position.

Another indicator whose value remained constant was territorial control. The LRA effectively never controlled a set territory except for a few bases. This fact made it difficult for the LRA to monitor and sanction its agents effectively.

The LRA had two features that continuously marked its organization. First, the group, as an organization, was fairly invulnerable, at least until around 2000. Its invulnerability was due to the weak Ugandan state, its geographical location, and the weak neighboring states. Second, the LRA had a fairly low capacity to monitor and sanction its agents due to lack of any territorial control. Having identified these constant features of the LRA, I now turn to a discussion of the changes in organizational characteristics of the LRA that explain temporal variation in its recruitment practice.

Table 10 Changes in Organizational Characteristics of the LRA

	Rebel power		State power				Power balance	Rebel military strategy	Geography		
year	rebel size (person)	number of the rebel group member per sq. km (person) (A)	total number of military personnel (person)	number of the military personnel per sq. km (person) (B)	amount of the military expenditure per sq. km (constant 2000 US$)	length of the road network per sq. km (km)	power difference (A-B)	military strategy	terrain	safe haven	weak neighboring state
1988	.	.		.	576	.	.	guerrilla	.	0	1
1989	500	0.01		0.36	460	.	-0.35	guerrilla	.	0	1
1990	500	0.01		0.36	489	.	-0.35	guerrilla	.	0	1
1991	500	0.01		0.36	517	.	-0.35	guerrilla	.	0	1
1992	.	.		0.33	356	.	.	guerrilla	.	0	1
1993	.	.		0.30	386	.	.	guerrilla	.	0	1
1994	600	0.01		0.25	411	.	-0.25	guerrilla	.	1	1
1995	1000	0.01		0.25	458	.	-0.24	guerrilla	.	1	1
1996	2000	0.02		0.25	499	.	-0.23	guerrilla	.	1	2
1997	3000	0.04		0.20	525	.	-0.17	guerrilla	.	1	2
1998	3500	0.04		0.15	826	.	-0.11	guerrilla	.	1	2
1999	4000	0.05		0.15	892	.	-0.10	guerrilla	.	1	2
2000	1500	0.02		0.25	628	.	-0.24	guerrilla	.	1	2
2001	950	0.01		0.25	660	.	-0.24	guerrilla	.	1	2
2002	1500	0.02		0.25	702	.	-0.24	guerrilla	.	0	1

2003	1500	0.02		0.30	747	0.36	-0.29	guerrilla	.	0	1
2004	2250	0.03		0.20	798	.	-0.18	guerrilla	.	0	1
2005	3000	0.04		0.20	849	.	-0.17	guerrilla	.	1	1
2006	2250	0.03		0.20	940	.	-0.18	guerrilla	.	1	2
2007	.	.		0.20	1021	.	.	guerrilla	.	1	2
2008	.	.		.	.	.	.	guerrilla	.	1	2
Mean	1784.38	0.02		0.26	607	0.36	-0.23	guerrilla		0.57	1.43

*The data was compiled from the following sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies (various years), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2009), Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2009), and The World Bank 2009.

3.5.5 Phase I (1988-1994) – Lack of Safe Haven

Kony created the LRA around the end of 1987 or early 1988. The names of the LRA changed from Lakwena 2 to the Holy Spirit Movement to the Ugandan Christian Democratic Army (UCDA) during this period. In this phase, the group lacked any safe haven and had to rely to a significant extent on the secrecy and capabilities of its agents for survival. The group, therefore, recruited its agents primarily using task incentives.

In this phase, the LRA had about 2,000 to 3,000 combatants. The group was fighting against the NRA. The LRA was in a vulnerable position and thus needed loyal and competent members, a further reason why they relied on task incentives for recruitment.

As the LRA did not have sufficient military capability to directly confront the NRA, the group had to be on move constantly often hiding itself in bush, and was thus unable to install a permanent camp. It was also reliant on local people for food, clothes, and other daily necessities.

While the vast terrain and the weak states surrounding them mitigated these vulnerabilities for the LRA, the living conditions were tough for its members and the group was under constant threat of NRA attacks. The LRA's vulnerability in this phase was apparent in 1992, when the LRA suffered a near fatal blow, at which point Kony was left in a bush with only 52 others.[64]

In this condition, it was necessary for the group to select only those who are loyal and capable. The demand for such agents was not so acute for the LRA as for the LTTE in its first phase; the Ugandan state was much weaker than the Sri Lankan state, and the LRA

[64]Interview, Gulu, Uganda, March 27 (A), 2009.

was operating in a relatively vast terrain with weak neighboring states. The LTTE, in contrast, was operating in a coastal area of an island country. Still, it was important for the LRA to pay attention to the qualities of their agents in order to survive.

3.5.6 Phase II (1994-1999/early 2000s) – Acquisition of Safe Haven

In April 1994, the LRA moved from northern Uganda to Sudan. The Sudanese government offered safe haven for the group in southern Sudan and provided material support. Therefore, the LRA were much less vulnerable to information leak and the tasks of its combatants were less demanding. This change in its environment led the LRA to rely more on force than incentives in recruiting members.

What marked this phase was the support given by the Sudanese government to the LRA, especially its provision of the safe haven in southern Sudan. In 1993, after Operation North gave a significant blow to the LRA, the Ugandan government and the LRA initiated peace talks, at which the government representative was Betty Bigombe. However, this process collapsed in early 1994. The LRA was reportedly communicating with the Sudanese government during this peace process, and moved to southern Sudan as soon as the peace talks collapsed, setting up camp in Palutaga. [65] The camp was located near Juba, then the only stronghold of the Northern Sudanese government against the SPLA. Observers analyzed that the Sudanese government supported the LRA in retaliation for the Ugandan government's assistance to the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The LRA maintained camps in southern Sudan from 1994 until mid-2000, although the

[65] Museveni issued an ultimatum to the LRA to make an unconditional surrender in two weeks. Some analysts see this ultimatum as a sign that Museveni had never been sincere in this peace negotiation, while others point out that he considered the LRA's secret communication with the Sudanese government to be an evidence for the lack of its commitment to the peace talk and thus decided to end the negotiation.

rapprochement between the Sudanese and the Ugandan governments gradually undermined the security of the group in the area from around 1999, which I will discuss later.[66]

The primary effect of the setup of the LRA camps in southern Sudan was that the group became much less vulnerable to information leak or to the UPDF attacks. However, two factors compromised the LRA's security in the Sudanese terrain. First, the UPDF occasionally pursued the LRA into the Sudanese territory. Second, the SPLA was actively fighting against the Sudanese government in the area, resulting in sporadic skirmishes with the LRA. Still, the latter could count on the military support of the Sudanese government forces in Juba, could obtain weapons, training, and food from the Sudanese government, and were able to fight against the UPDF in a terrain unfamiliar to the latter. The UPDF is reported to have made at least two major attacks against the LRA camps during this period. In 1996, the UPDF attacked the LRA camp in Paltaga with the SPLA and the Ethiopian forces. In 1997, the UPDF and the SPLA attacked the LRA camp in Aruu Junction. Each time, however, the LRA fought with the support from the Sudanese military forces and escaped to set up a new camp.

The LRA's relatively secure presence in southern Sudan also made the tasks less demanding for its members than previously. In southern Sudan, the LRA soldiers encountered the SPLA and the UPDF much less frequently in Sudanese terrain than on the other side of the border. So long as the SPLA was concerned, the LRA fought them only when the two groups encountered each other by chance. When members of the LRA were

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[66] In 1994, after the LRA moved to southern Sudan, local leaders such as Anenda Okoto Ogonie and Lanan Olanya Langony started to communicate with the LRA to persuade them to cease violence and come back to their villages. However, the attempts at peace failed. Interview, Gulu, April 4, 2009.

in Sudan, they fought a battle roughly once every few weeks or even once a month. By contrast, in Uganda, they often fought battles with the UPDF a few times a day.[67] Also, the Sudanese government provided the LRA with uniforms, shoes, medicines, foods, and guns and ammunitions.[68]

3.5.7 Phase III (1999/early 2000s - 2010) – Loss of Safe Haven and Amnesty Law

The proposed theory explains the LRA's use of mass abduction in early 2000s as a result of three factors. Firstly, the LRA had lost its safe haven in southern Sudan. The Ugandan state made significant efforts to reach an agreement with the Sudanese government. As a result, the UPDF gained approval from the Sudanese authority to enter its territory to hunt down the LRA. Second, the UPDF constructed military roads in northern Uganda. This increased mobility of the UPDF to pursue the LRA in this area. Together these two factors increased the vulnerability of the LRA to desertions, both in southern Sudan and in northern Uganda. The third factor was the increase in the number of deserters from the group. Importantly, due to the amnesty law of 2000, many of these deserters started to report to the Ugandan state. Consequently, the group suffered from a near-constant leak of information to the UPDF. These three factors significantly endangered the LRA's existence, which is why the LRA started to carry out mass abductions. The group quickly

[67] Interview, Gulu, Uganda, March 21 (B) and March 31 (A), 2009.

[68] The Sudanese government provided the following materials to the LRA: lorries, one Landcruiser for Kony, one pickup, foods, uniforms, medicines, Walkie-Talkie, solar panels, shoes, civilian attire, mosquito nets, and soaps. The Sudanese government also provided weapons such as, bullets, anti-personnel mines (AP mines), anti-tank mine (AT mines), grenades, rocket propelled grenades, rifles, shotguns, machine guns, and mortars. The Sudanese government also sent its soldiers to reinforce the LRA in five battles, the ones in Magwi in August 1994, in Obo in August 1994, in Pajok in December 1994, in Pogeo in January 1995 and in Owinykibu in February 1995. Interviews, Gulu, Uganda, March 31 (A), April 10 (A, B, C), 2009.

tried to secure reinforcements to ensure its own survival, therefore, could no longer afford to be selective in its recruitment.

From 1999, the Sudanese and Ugandan governments started to move for rapprochement. This change threatened the security of the LRA as the Sudanese government officially permitted the UPDF to enter southern Sudan to track down the LRA. Consequently, the group's security was gravely undermined. This new development did not alter the LRA's method of recruitment, however, but affected its magnitude, as it sharply intensified abduction.

The incursion into the LRA's safe haven in southern Sudan proceeded incrementally. First, on December 9, 1999, the Ugandan and Sudanese governments reached the Nairobi Agreement, in which the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir agreed to disarm and disband the LRA.[69] However, the relationship between the two countries remained fragile for another a few years, primarily due to continued LRA violence in Northern Uganda, launched from the group's camps in southern Sudan.[70]

Second, in March 2002, after negotiations, the Sudanese government gave official permission to the Ugandan government to pursue the LRA in Sudanese territory. Accordingly, the UPDF made a large-scale attack against the LRA camps in southern Sudan. The effect of the campaign, however, did not exactly follow the expectations of the Ugandan military leaders. The agreement allowed the UPDF to operate only within 100 km of their border. The Sudanese government was not in a position to exercise tight control

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[69] Otto (2002) details the developing relationship between Uganda and Sudan right after the signing of the Nairobi Agreement.

[70] Sudanese material support for the LRA appears to have stopped around this time. However, the group maintained its presence in southern Sudan.

over its territory, already facing several rebel groups, most notably the SPLA. Consequently, as the UPDF carried out Operation Iron Fist in 2002, the LRA discarded its camps near Juba and simply fled further into the Sudanese territory. The group also sent its troops into northern Uganda to divert the UPDF's resources from southern Uganda, and to procure human and other resources. Hence, the Ugandan agreement with the Sudanese government failed to put the LRA in a position vulnerable to the UPDF attacks. Rather, it simply pushed the LRA further into the Sudanese territory, where the UPDF had greater difficulties reaching the group.

Third, in January 2005, the Sudanese government achieved a peace agreement with the SPLA, ending the civil war in the region. A primary motive for the Sudanese government to harbor the LRA in its territory was to retaliate against the Ugandan government, which supported the SPLA. The peace agreement, therefore, significantly reduced the incentive for Sudan to support the LRA. Fourth, in November 2005, the Ugandan and Sudanese governments reached yet another agreement, which allowed the UPDF to further penetrate southern Sudan to exterminate the LRA (Royo 2008: 14).

Therefore, the Ugandan government's continuous effort to negotiate with the Sudanese government, from 1999 to 2005, culminated in the de facto removal of the LRA's safe haven in southern Sudan. Thus, the UPDF, with its superior forces, could carry out direct attacks against the LRA, leaving the group in a more vulnerable position than before, as the locations of its camps were known to the UPDF. For the LRA members, this also meant that life in bush became much more demanding and dangerous; as they constantly needed to move from one place to another to escape from the UPDF, while procuring food and other resources.

The UPDF's efforts also undermined the security of the LRA. Since the beginning of Operation Iron Fist, the UPDF had been paving military roads across northern Uganda.[71] As noted above, the LRA were invulnerable and used the villages in northern Uganda to recruit through abduction, partly because the Ugandan state's presence was very weak in this area. The previous lack of any extensive road network was a clear indication of the state's weakness. The development of the military road network, however, gave the UPDF unprecedented mobility, making it possible to pursue the LRA. Given the numerical advantage and the better equipment the UPDF enjoyed, they gained supremacy over the LRA in its territory by 2004.

In this phase, the LRA became highly vulnerable for two reasons: first, the Ugandan state's diplomatic efforts deprived the LRA of a safe haven in southern Sudan; second, the state's construction of military roads also undermined the position of the LRA within northern Uganda. Consequently, the LRA avoided actively seeking the UPDF to engage in conflict. According to a source, the LRA made no single direct attack on the UPDF between 2002 and 2006. In 2002, the LRA was estimated to have approximately 2000 soldiers, but were spread widely, operating in bands of 20 to 50 members, to avoid a major encounter with the UPDF. In each band, roughly half of the members were believed to be carrying weapons, while the rest were without.[72]

This new vulnerability of the LRA was coupled with another new development. The number of those who defected from the LRA and reported to the state increased. Most of the LRA members joined the group through abduction, and consequently there were

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[71] Interview, Gulu, Uganda, April 1, 2009.

[72] Interview, Gulu, Uganda, April 1, 2009.

frequent acts of desertion, such individuals leaking information to the UPDF. The 2000 Amnesty Act increased the number of deserters from the group. The act promised security and rehabilitation programs for deserters. While the number of those who defected from the LRA to report to the state was not initially very large, their number increased over time. The installation of Mega FM in 2002 fostered this process. The radio station broadcast a program, in which ex-LRA members talked of their experiences after reporting to the state, referring to current members of the group by their nick-names, and encouraging them to surrender to the state. Ex-LRA members also communicated directly with those in bush through usage of mobile phones. The state military interviewed these deserters at Child Protection Units (CPUs). Consequently, by the mid-2000s, the LRA experienced a constant leak of information to the state military forces.

By the mid 2000s, the LRA was in a highly vulnerable position, with information frequently/regularly leaking through deserters from the group. The LRA found itself on the verge of defeat by the UPDF, and it was for this reason that the LRA urgently needed large-scale reinforcements and were unable to be selective in recruiting new members.[73] Therefore, the group resorted to mass abductions to avoid military defeat, with the number of abductees increasing sharply in 2002. The group also expanded the area of its activity

[73] The LRA also lacked resources for task incentives or the means to promote them due to its past dependence on abductees. The group's loss of a safe haven meant they could no longer ensure the security of its members, if any every existed. The LRA had not invested hugely in ideology and propaganda to attract local people. Moreover, due to his stay in Sudan, Kony no longer performed Mass in front of civilians. The group issued no journals or newspapers, and could not cultivate social networks between its members and local civilians. To ensure the retention of abducted members, the LRA actively cut off relationships between its members and their relatives and friends in villages. As mentioned previously, the group even forced some abductees to assault their own villages or families to sever ties with them.

from northern Uganda to its eastern regions such as Kaberamaido, Katakwi, Kumi and Soroti, where Teso people reside. This expansion was because the civilians in northern Uganda were kept in government- protected camps and were thus less accessible. For that reason, the LRA's mass abductions in this period were a sort of crisis action.

Further evidence for the LRA's motives behind mass abduction, in the third phase, was its discontinuation of abduction after relocating to Garamba. In late 2005, the LRA began to move its troops to Garamba National Park in the DRC to take refuge from the UPDF attacks. The first group of LRA soldiers moved from Sudan to Garamba around October 2005. Vincent Otti, then second-in-command of the LRA, led a group of approximately 100 soldiers, and negotiated with the DRC government for their stay in Garamba. This new safe haven gave the LRA some respite. Moreover, the group no longer needed to hurriedly secure new recruits in preparation for attacks from the UPDF.[74]

3.5.8 Summary

In this section, I assessed the explanatory power of the proposed theory and its alternatives against changes over time in the recruitment practice of the LRA. Both the resource curse theory and the theories of outside option fail to explain its changes fully, especially so with the third phase, when the group carried out mass abductions.

The proposed theory explains changes in the LRA's recruitment practice as functions of two factors, that is, the gain and loss of a safe haven in Sudan, and mass desertions by its members due to the state amnesty. The group initially did not possess a safe haven and was thus quite vulnerable to desertions. However, as the group was fighting

[74] The group's lack of recruitment drive as this stage is also probably because they reached an agreement with the DRC government about not interfering with the local civilians.

a guerrilla war against a relatively weak Ugandan military, the types of tasks inside the group were not very demanding. Therefore, the LRA mainly relied on task incentives for recruitment. From 1994 until the early 2000s, the group acquired a safe haven in southern Sudan. This significantly reduced the vulnerability of the LRA, which is why the group started to recruit agents through abduction. In the early 2000s, however, a few changes took place. First, the Ugandan state's diplomatic efforts led to the Sudanese government refusing to support the LRA. Consequently, the group lost its safe haven. Second, the Ugandan state military built roads in the northern part of the country, improving its mobility to pursue LRA units. Together, these two factors greatly increased the LRA's vulnerability. Third, the Ugandan state's amnesty law in 2000 steadily increased the number of LRA members who surrendered themselves to the state. The disclosure of information, from the LRA to the state through these agents, coupled with the group's new vulnerability, significantly undermined the prospects for the group's survival. This threat against its survival, in the early to mid 2000s, is why the LRA resorted to mass abduction, one of the crisis actions. Overall, therefore, the findings in this section support the proposed theory over its alternatives.

3.5.9 An Additional Analysis: Internal Variation across Tasks – Collaborators

Although the limited amount of the financial resource the LRA had precluded the group from providing economic incentives to its members, there was an exception. So-called collaborators often received pecuniary incentives from the LRA. The kinds of tasks they perform varies from working as a sort of spy – obtaining information about the location or plan of the UPDF and providing it to the LRA – to purchasing some foods or other commodities in the market in town. The total number of the collaborators is unknown.

Some estimated that there were approximately 200 intelligence officers in Gulu District.[75] When talking to the local people in Gulu town, they often say that this or that building was built by a former collaborator of the LRA, although it is often difficult to verify the credibility of such claims.

Given that most of the LRA members virtually receive no pecuniary incentive, the case of these collaborators constitutes a puzzle. If the group is invulnerable to the information leak, the assigned tasks undemanding, and the number of the required agents limited, why do they provide pecuniary incentive to attract and maintain these collaborators?

The theory proposed in this research suggests that it is due to the skills required in performing such tasks. If the tasks to be performed require a high level of skill or competence on the part of an agent, a rebel group uses an incentive to induce the agent.

The tasks performed by collaborators fit this characteristic. The tasks of collaborators share a few common traits. The tasks are performed often, though not always, in urban areas where the Ugandan state has a relatively strong presence. The LRA often need collaborators to bring some commodities or information. The commodities include foods or medicines, and the information often concerned locations or strategic plans of the UPDF. As some of the agents are engaged in such tasks for a long time, they need be confident and capable to perform such tasks for the LRA. They cannot appear suspicious in the eyes of their neighbors or the government officials.

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[75] The frequency of their communication with the LRA varies considerably over time, and across collaborators, depending on whether the officer in charge of her/him operates in a geographical proximity and the nature of the tasks s/he carries out for them. Interview, Gulu, Uganda, April 10 (B), 2009.

Of course, the kinds of tasks collaborators perform still vary, and most importantly so in the magnitudes of the damages information leaks to the government may bring about to the LRA. It was a real risk for the LRA that a collaborator cooperates with the UPDF and informed them of locations of LRA units, for example. The UPDF also approaches local civilians to gain information about the LRA and its operations in exchange for pecuniary and other incentives.[76] Some of such civilians work for both sides. When the LRA finds potential damage of information leak through the agent very high, therefore, the LRA need the collaborator to be not only capable but also loyal to the group. For this purpose, when approaching a would-be collaborator for the first time, the LRA officers first talked to him and saw if the person showed any sympathy to the group before asking her/him to work as a collaborator for the group. When the potential damage of defection, however, this screening process sometimes prove insufficient in securing only loyal agents, and the group prefers to rely on task incentives. The proposed theory, therefore, predicts that if a task a collaborator performs puts the group in a highly invulnerable position, the group presents task incentives to induce an agent.

This is what used to happen with some collaborators. Some collaborators played critical roles in occasions such as peace talks. These collaborators were recruited specifically for such purpose several years in advance to the actual start of the peace talks. Their tasks involved communication with supporters of the LRA in and outside Uganda, being present in discussion with the Ugandan or foreign government representatives, and meeting – actually serving as a personal security guard for him once in a while – top leaders of the LRA. The LRA agents never offered them pecuniary or other material

[76] The UPDF often relies on Local Councils (LCs). Interview, Gulu, April 1, 2009.

incentive except for payment for expenses directly related to the tasks the collaborator performed. Instead, the LRA carried out an extensive screening process of several years to assess their loyalties and competence to perform above-mentioned tasks. To give a few examples of the screening process, LRA checked their background information such as the locations of their origin, clan backgrounds, and the occupations of their families and relatives. The LRA visited them intermittently, always in a sudden manner, sometimes after several months of no communication. The group also asked them to carry some information from one supporter to another, and then called the latter later to confirm that the collaborator transmitted correct information in a timely manner.[77]

[77] As is the case in other parts of the world, once the peace talk starts, collaborators may receive material benefits, such as fine clothes, accommodation in comfortable hotels, and good foods. However, it is not the LRA but the Ugandan government and foreign governments/ international organizations that provide these luxuries. Moreover, the LRA do not mention such benefits when they first approach would-be collaborators for this sort of purpose. In fact, it is most likely that the LRA members who first contact the collaborators are unaware what role those collaborators would play in the proceedings. Therefore, it is unlikely that the prospects for these benefits lured them into a position of collaboration with erstwhile enemies. If anything, the LRA disguised the prospects for such potential benefits, so as to make the screening process more effective.

Figure 19 Proposed Theory and LRA with Revision

*Predictions are in square brackets.



In this section, I examined the validity of the proposed theory against the internal variation of the LRA's recruitment strategies by assigned tasks. Admittedly, the evidence presented in this section is neither comprehensive nor conclusive. In order to test the validity of the proposed theory against the internal variation of the recruitment strategy by the agents' tasks, it is necessary to develop a typology of the tasks performed in the LRA, and assess whether the proposed theory correctly predicts the recruitment strategies the LRA adopted for each task or position. Given the lack of information, however, it is highly problematic, to conduct such a comprehensive test. Still, the available evidence provides an additional, though tentative, support for the proposed theory presented in this thesis.

3.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I assessed the relative explanatory power of the proposed theory against those of the resource curse theory and the theories of outside option, conducting a congruence test and, where possible, process tracing. For this purpose, I initially compared the general recruitment strategies of the LTTE and LRA. Then, I examined changes in the recruitment strategies of the respective rebel groups.

The findings in this chapter provide support for the proposed theory. The resource curse theory has difficulties explaining all three tests. The theories of outside option also had difficulty explaining those cases. While some measurements - of the utility of outside option for agents - explained the difference between the LTTE and the LRA and changes in the LTTE, none of the measurements fully explained the changes in recruitment practices of the LRA.

However, the proposed theory explained the overall difference between the two groups. It also clarified the changes in recruitment practices of the LTTE and the LRA, especially their respective shifts from the first to the second phases. Admittedly, the proposed theory does not fully explain the two groups' choice of mass abduction as a recruitment strategy in their respective third phases. While the proposed theory explains why these groups resorted to mass abduction and not other recruitment strategies in these phases, it does not make clear why these groups did not conclude a peace agreement with the states, or voluntarily surrender, at an earlier point in time. In this sense, the explanation of the proposed theory remains partial. Yet, the observed behaviors of the LTTE and the LRA in those stages were consistent with the predictions of the proposed theory, in that both groups took one of the 'crisis actions' specified in Chapter Two. Overall, I believe that

the proposed theory better explained the recruitment practices of the LTTE and the LRA than the alternative theories. Table 11 summarizes the explanatory performance of the alternative theories of rebel recruitment.

Table 11Explanatory Power of Alternative Theories

		Difference between the LTTE and the LRA	Changes in the LTTE	Changes in the LRA
Security		yes	yes	yes
Resource Curse	economic resource	no	no	no
Outside Option	Geography	yes	no	no
	territorial control	no	yes	no
	government protection	no	no	no
	economic opportunity	no	no	no

*Each cell tells whether the variable (measurement) correctly predicted the observed pattern of the rebel recruitment.

Chapter 4: Desertion, State Response, and Survival of Rebel Groups

4.1 Introduction

In previous chapters, I proposed a theory of rebel recruitment and assessed its plausibility against the recruitment practices of the LTTE and the LRA. The theory, however, also has implications to other aspects of rebel groups, such as the desertion rates within these groups and their interactions with the states. The recruitment methods of the rebel groups affect the types of agents – their loyalties and capacities – which join those groups. In turn the types of the agents in the group affect the risks of their desertion. Moreover, the expectation for surrounding agents' desertion affects the state's counter-insurgency policy. However, this result is not unidirectional, as the state's counter-insurgency policy also affects the risks of the agents' desertion. Additionally, as the recruitment methods of rebel groups are partly determined by their vulnerabilities to information leak, once desertions happen, its impacts upon rebel groups, and the subsequent courses of civil war varies across rebel groups with different recruitment methods.

The main purpose of this chapter is to assess the empirical validity of the causal mechanism in the proposed theory, by addressing three questions. First, do different types of recruitment strategies have varying selection effects? A starting assumption of the proposed theory is that recruitment by task is most selective, recruitment by force the least selective, and recruitment by incentive somewhere in between. . Therefore, it is important to test the empirical validity of this assumption, so as to examine whether the proposed causal mechanism is in operation behind the observed congruence, between the theoretical

predictions and empirical observations, as outlined in Chapter Three. A straightforward way to test the validity of this assumption is to assess desertion rates in rebel groups with different recruitment methods. For this reason, I will examine desertion rates in each period of the LTTE and LRA. The second question is whether the belief and behavior of states in the two civil wars were consistent with the causal mechanism in the proposed theory? The state is a primary participant of civil war and has a huge interest in closely observing the organization and behavior of rebel groups. For this reason, I expect the state to have extensive knowledge about the organizational characteristics of rebel groups, including their vulnerabilities and recruitment practices. It is therefore useful to examine the belief and behavior of the state and see whether the state responded in a way consistent with the proposed theory. If it does, it provides additional evidence that supports the proposed theory. In this chapter, I will also discuss - whether a state's response reinforces the relationship between vulnerability of rebel groups and their recruitment strategies. Therefore, in this chapter, I will examine what sort of state behavior is consistent with the proposed theory, and then assess whether the Sri Lankan and Ugandan states demonstrated such behavior. Finally, I will assess the validity of my coding of the vulnerability of LTTE and LRA in each period by conducting a controlled comparison. I will take instances where LTTE and LRA experienced mass desertions, within certain periods, and examine the extent to which they suffered as a result of those desertions. In Chapter Two, I defined vulnerability of rebel groups in terms of the impact of agents' desertion on those groups. Consequently, I anticipate that the cost of agents' desertions will correlate with the vulnerabilities of rebel groups within respective phases and thus with their recruitment strategies.

It is essential for me to examine the implications of the proposed theory, partly because this allows me to test the validity of the causal mechanism within the proposed theory of rebel recruitment. The congruence test and process tracing in Chapter Three constitutes a preliminary test of the proposed theory. While the result of the test supports the proposed theory, it is insufficient to create a deep-seated confidence in the validity of the proposed theory. It is necessary to establish not only the empirical strength of the theory's predictions but also the validity of the proposed causal mechanism, thereby confirming the initial plausibility of the theory.

Of course, apart from the theory of rebel recruitment, these questions, regarding desertion, state response, and the survival of rebel groups, are in themselves of theoretical importance, especially given the recent scholarly interest in duration of civil war (Collier et al. 2004; Cunningham 2006; Fearon 2004). There are numerous anecdotes, which indicate the significance of desertion and defection to the course of civil war, especially its conclusion. However, as discussed in the literature review in Chapter Two, few theoretical studies place rebel members' desertion at the center of their analyses, let alone its relationship with civil war termination.[78] Without such analysis, however, the validity of the existing studies on the duration and termination of civil wars remain dubious, since they potentially suffer from a missing variable bias. Therefore, this chapter's analysis intends to fill in the gap; to delineate the theoretical link between rebel members' desertion and the termination of civil wars, or the lack thereof, so that political scientists can improve upon the existing studies on civil war termination.

[78] An exception is Leites and Wolf (1970).

These questions are also important for studies on political organization. There have been very few studies on agents' desertion from political organizations. Some scholars, in economics and sociology, conducted studies on desertion from organizations. In *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*, Albert Hirschman studied the choice made by members of an organization when the organization is in decline (Hirschman 2004). Peter Bearman (1991) and Roger Gould (1991) studied the effects of local social networks on the probabilities of paramilitary organization members to desert. Some political scientists also conducted analysis on this issue (Beber and Blattman 2009; Gates 2002). Still, the number of these studies is limited, and many questions remain unanswered regarding the effects of desertion on the organizations, and their interaction with other entities over desertion.

The policy concerns should also drive political scientists to examine the above questions on desertion and survival of rebel groups. In order for policymakers to formulate effective and efficient counter-insurgency strategies, it is vital to understand the proper methods to induce desertion and defection from rebel groups, and the chances of their success. It is only once equipped with this sort of knowledge that policymakers can allocate their resources properly. Of course, state victory is not always the most desirable outcome in civil wars. Both participants and observers of civil war, whether inside or outside the country, often seek other outcomes such as rebel victory or negotiated peace for geopolitical, economic, humanitarian and other reasons. Still, it remains the case that states, international organizations and foreign powers often search for effective counter-insurgency strategies. In the international society, the institution of sovereignty encourages these organizations to adopt such policies through its constitutive and causal effects (cf. Wendt 2000). Such policies are also justified to some extent by an empirical observation

that one-sided victory tends to bring a more stable peace than end to conflict through. Nevertheless, the literature is still devoid of insights regarding such questions as the relationship between desertion by rebel members and a groups' survival.

The same applies to other strategies to bring an end to conflict, such as peacemaking or peace keeping operations. Desertion is a relatively observable phenomenon in the environment of civil war, where uncertainty frequently prevails. Therefore, patterns of desertion should be a highly useful source of information for policymakers. However, in order for them to utilize such information effectively, scholars need to develop a theory that identifies the causes and consequences of desertion from rebel groups.

My working hypothesis in this chapter links the recruitment strategies of rebel groups with patterns of desertion and, additionally with the probabilities of civil war termination. First, the more selective a rebel group is in its recruitment strategy, the lower the desertion rate in the group. This hypothesis examines the validity of the proposed theory about selection effects of recruitment strategies. Second, the more selective a rebel group is in its recruitment strategy, the more selective the state investment in its intelligence strategy against the group. The hypothesis tests the consistence of the state behavior with the proposed theory. Third, the more selective the rebel group's recruitment strategy, the more decisive and harmful the impact of a major desertion is upon the group. This hypothesis assesses the validity of the coding of vulnerability of the LTTE and LRA in each period as discussed in Chapter Three.

Below, I will first identify the observable implications of the proposed theory to desertion rates in rebel groups, state counter-insurgency strategies, and the effects of major

desertions on rebel groups and states. I will then assess the validity of these implications in turn, conducting case studies on the LTTE and the LRA.

4.2 Desertion, State Response and Survival of Rebel Groups

But first, a summary of the argument I made in the previous chapters: Three recruitment strategies vary in their degrees of selectivity. Recruitment by task incentives is the most selective strategy, attracting only loyal and capable agents. Recruitment by common incentives is less selective. It attracts loyal and capable agents as well as non-loyal and capable agents. Recruitment by force is the least selective method, enlisting all types of agents including those un-loyal and incapable. Three factors affect the recruitment strategies of rebel groups: their vulnerabilities to information leak; task types in these groups; and the number of agents they require. If a rebel group is vulnerable to information disclosure, it requires a relatively small number of agents with high levels of capacity, and consequently the group relies on more selective recruitment methods. If the group is invulnerable to an information-leak, it requires a large number of members, even at the expense of their capacities; the group tends to rely on less selective recruitment methods.

Starting from these premises, I will analyze the observable implications of desertion rates in rebel groups, counter-insurgency strategies of states facing different types of rebel groups, and state and rebel responses to desertion and its outcomes.

Table 12 Implications of the Proposed Theory

Recruitment method of the rebel group	More selective	Less selective
Implication 1. Desertion rate	Low	High
Implication 2. State investment in non-selective intelligence strategies	Low	High
Implication 3. Cost of a major desertion on the group's survival rate	Low	High

4.2.1 Selection Effects of Recruitment Strategies and Desertion Rates

A starting assumption of the proposed theory is that recruitment strategies vary in their selection effects. Recruitment by task leads to the enlistment of loyal and capable agents. Recruitment by incentive results in the mobilization of capable agents, whether or not they are loyal. Recruitment by force brings all sorts of agents into the group: loyal and non-loyal, capable and incapable. One way to test the validity of this assumption is to assess desertion rates in rebel groups with respective recruitment strategies.

The implication of the proposed theory, to the desertion rates in rebel groups, is relatively straightforward. As task-incentives attract only loyal and capable agents, task-based groups tend to experience a low rate of desertion. However recruitment-by-force groups tend to experience a high rate of desertion. Common incentives attract those capable, but their loyalty levels are varied. Therefore, desertion rates in common incentive-based groups depend on the relative amount of resources the group possesses. As long as the group has sufficient resources, to offer competitive common incentives to its members,

desertion rates remain low. If the state offers more incentives than the rebel group, for example, desertion rates rise. In other words, the hypothesis is that the more selective a rebel group's recruitment strategy, the lower the desertion rate is in the group. This tendency is further reinforced by the states' counter-insurgency strategies, which shall be discussed in due course.

What are the implications of the alternative theories to desertion rates in rebel groups? Scholars of the resource curse theory do not directly discuss the risks of desertion by rebel members. The theory posits that a resource-rich group is likely to attract those with short time horizons, while a resource-poor group tends to recruit those dedicated to the cause of the group. The former is more likely to experience a higher rate of desertion, while the latter is less likely to do so. This likelihood should be observable when a resource-rich group loses a significant portion of its economic resource, and their members can no longer expect the same level of pecuniary rewards. Moreover, the difference should be discernable when the two types of rebel groups face a military decline, and their members become pessimistic about their future prospects. The members of the resource-rich groups are eager to leave, accelerating the decline of the group – a self-fulfilling prophecy. The members of resource-poor groups are more likely to remain in the group.

The implications of the theories of outside option to rebel members' desertion rate are not so straightforward. One repercussion is that the members have more incentive to desert when they have better options outside the group. However, they also predict that the rebel groups are likely to adjust the amount or types of incentives, so that they have an equal chance to retain all the members. The theories also predict that the rebel groups tend not to recruit those who have a high chance of desertion. For this reason, Scott Gates

(2002) predicts the existence of a zone of non-recruitment between rebel groups and the states. Therefore, an implication of the theories of outside option is that desertion rates across rebel groups are constant and low. However, on considering temporal changes in rebel groups, there is another implication of these theories. Desertion rates in rebel groups rise when the relative utility of the life for agents outside the group increases, in comparison to the life inside the group. This occurs when the total amount of its resources – ideological, economic, functional, and military – as incentives declines. It also occurs when its resources remain constant, but the quality of life rises, outside the group's sphere. Importantly, the implications of the theories of outside option differ from those of the proposed theory. The most significant difference is the question of whether the theories expect rebel leaders to recruit their agents, even in anticipation for their desertions. The former theory does not, assuming that the rebel leaders maximize efficiency of the organization by providing just the sufficient amount of incentives (positive or negative) to retain its members and not wasting finances recruiting those with a high chance of desertion. In contrast, the proposed theory suggests that rebel groups may or may not recruit those with a high risk of desertion, dependent on their types. If the group is vulnerable to an information leak, it would not recruit agents who are unloyal to minimize the risk of information leak. However, if the group is not vulnerable to information leak, they are more likely to recruit those with high risks of desertion because they want to increase the group's size, and also because they know that some of its members, though not all of them, would have high qualities and are loyal to the group.

4.2.2 State Counter-insurgency Strategy

The second way to test the validity of the causal mechanism in the proposed theory is to examine whether the state agreed with the organizational characteristics of the rebel groups, identified by the theory, and behaved in a manner consistent with the theory.

What sort of state behavior should be focused on for this purpose? The proposed theory has implications for the state's allocation of resources in different counter-insurgency strategies. The state allocates certain proportions of its military and intelligence resources. Intelligence capacity refers to the states' ability to collect information about the rebel group. States' intelligence strategies vary in their degrees of selectivity. From its allocated funds for intelligence, the state assigns certain portions to selective intelligence methods and the rest to non-selective methods. In reality, the difference between selective and non-selective methods is not discrete but continuous. For the sake of simplicity, however, I divide them into two types.

A state facing a group with a selective recruitment strategy knows that the group is vulnerable to information leak, and is reliant on secrecy for its survival. Therefore, it is more efficient for the state to invest a large proportion of its resources in its intelligence capacity rather than its military capacity. At the same time, however, the state knows that the members of the group are mostly loyal and would not easily defect to the state. Therefore, it is more efficient for the state to be selective in investing its resources to instigate defection from the group, or to collect the needed information by itself. Of course, in order for the state to identify potential defectors from the group, the state also needs be able to collect information independently. If the state randomly invests resources to induce defection from the group, it is likely to waste those resources because most rebel agents are

loyal to the group. A state facing a task-based group, therefore, invests a higher proportion of its resources in selective intelligence strategies. Such strategies include building its own capacity to collect information through the use of spies, or high-tech equipment such as Unmanned Vehicles (UMVs), as well as selective investment to induce defections from the group.

In contrast, a state facing a group with non-selective recruitment strategy knows that the group is invulnerable and thus not highly dependent on secrecy. Rather, the group is more reliant on factors that reduce its vulnerability, such as its military capacity, safe havens, or favorable geography. Therefore, it is more efficient for the state to invest a large proportion of its resources in its military capacity or other methods that curtail the invulnerability of the group. Examples of such strategies are diplomatic efforts to curtail the foreign provision of safe havens, and building military roads to pursue the group in difficult terrains. At the same time, the state is aware that the force-based group has a large number of disloyal and/or incapable members in its ranks. Consequently, it is relatively cheap for the state to induce defection from the group to gather information (and subsequently reduce the number of its members). A small number of defectors would not make much of an impact militarily given the group's invulnerability. But, if the state can secure a large number of defectors, obtaining large amounts of important information about the rebel group, it makes the state's military operations more effective and efficient. Therefore, from its allocated resources for intelligence, the state invests a substantial proportion to non-selective strategies, to induce a greater number of defectors from the group. An example of non-selective intelligence strategies is that of offering a general amnesty to rebel members. Rather than concentrating an extensive amount of resources to

obtaining a few critical personnel within the group, general amnesty offers a small amount of incentive per member, to induce a large number of defectors.

Therefore, the hypothesis is that the less selective a rebel group's recruitment strategy, the larger the share of state resources likely to be invested in non-selective intelligence strategies.

Here, note that these counter-insurgency policies states employ tend to reinforce the existing patterns of desertions in respective rebel groups. The states facing rebel groups with selective recruitment strategies tend to rely on selective intelligence strategies. Therefore, the groups' desertion rates tend to remain low. The states facing groups with non-selective recruitment methods tend to rely on non-selective intelligence strategies. Thus, the desertion rates in these groups tend to become high.

What do alternative theories have to say about the selectivity of the state counter-insurgency strategy? While some literature talks about the relative effectiveness and efficiency of certain counter-insurgency strategies, they do not provide a theory that explains the state's choice between the two.[79] Still, in case of the resource curse theory, it is possible to deduce an implication. The state facing a resource-poor group is more likely to be selective in its counter-insurgency strategy than those states facing a resource-rich group; the members of a resource-poor group are more likely to remain loyal to the group, while those of a resource-rich group are more susceptible to inducement for defection.

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[79] Stathis Kalyvas (Kalyvas 2004, 2006) discusses the state's choice between selective and non-selective counter-insurgency strategies. While relevant, his theory differs from my focus on two accounts. First, Kalyvas focuses on selectivity in the use of force – negative incentive –while my focus is more on the use of negative 'and' positive incentive. Second, in Kalyvas's work, the immediate target of the state counter-insurgency strategy is the local population, whereas I discuss state strategies directly targeting rebel members.

Therefore, it is difficult to identify the clear implications of the theories of outside option to the state counter-insurgency strategy.

While an analysis of the state counter-insurgency strategy serves as evidence to assess the relative explanatory powers of the proposed theory and the resource curse theory, it does not achieve the same purpose for the proposed theory and the theories of outside option. Still, to the extent that the proposed theory explains the selectivity of the state counter-insurgency strategies, it provides a support for the proposed theory.

4.2.3 State and rebel responses to desertion and its outcome

The third way to test the empirical validity of the proposed causal mechanism is to objectively assess the validity of my coding of vulnerability of the LTTE and LRA in each period. One way to do this is to conduct a controlled comparison and assess the impacts of agents' mass desertions on rebel groups, as well as their impacts on state behavior. I will assume the state changes its allocation of resources, between production (economic sector) and force (military sector), depending on the sectors' relative efficiencies.[80]

Generally speaking, when members of a rebel group desert and disclose information to the state, the additional information raises the decisiveness of the conflict in favor of the latter. That is, information leak from the rebel group to the state increases the efficiency of the state's military operation against the rebel group, and raises the prospect for the state to defeat the rebels. Given this expectation, the state increases the proportion of the resources it allocates to the military sector over the production sector. How much the

[80] This discussion is built on Jack Hirshleifer's analysis of the contest success function (Hirshleifer 2001a, 2001c).

state increases its military investment, depends on their assessment on the worthiness of the obtained information, and the ensuing prospects for efficiency of its military operations against the rebel group.

The degree of impact that desertion has on the survival of the rebel group depends on two factors. First, the amount of new information deserters bring to the state matters significantly. The more intelligence they contribute to the state's knowledge of the rebel group, the more costly the desertion is for the rebel group. Second, the cost of agents' desertion for the rebel group also depends on the vulnerability of the rebel group. The more vulnerable the rebel group is to desertion, the more costly agents' desertion is for the group. It is important here to note that a rebel group's vulnerability correlates with its recruitment strategy, according to the proposed theory.

In case of groups with selective recruitment strategies, the state knows that the group is vulnerable to information leaks. A small number of deserters (or a small amount of information) increases the efficiency of the state military operations and the prospect for its victory. The state allocation of resources between military and productive sectors, therefore, is highly responsive to desertion from the group. The rebel group, aware of the impact of desertion to the group and the anticipated response of the state, reacts swiftly and corresponding to the amount of information leaked. If the amount of the disclosed information is large, the cost is considerable for the rebel group; they are likely to suffer significant military damage from the state, and potentially be defeated. Or, anticipating this response, the rebel group may move swiftly to take one of the following four actions: voluntarily surrendering to the state; seeking a peace agreement; prepare for a retaliatory and larger-scale offensive; or seek a way to reduce the vulnerability of the group. I describe

these four actions as ‘crisis actions.’ It would take a further research project to identify the conditions under which rebel groups take one ‘crisis action’ or another. In all probability, most rebel groups go through a trial and error process with the various ‘crisis actions’. However, for the present purposes of this thesis, it does not matter exactly which action is chosen by the rebel groups. Instead, the question remains: if a group with a selective recruitment strategy suffers from mass desertion, whether the proposed theory predicts the group to take one or more of these crisis actions and/or exit from civil war.

In the case of groups with non-selective recruitment strategies, the state knows that the group is invulnerable to information leak. Consequently, the state is less responsive to desertion from the group. Therefore, it requires a relatively large number of deserters (or a significant information leak) for the state to shift its allocation of resources from its production sectors to military sectors. Expecting this, the rebel group’s response to desertion is likewise relatively slow or weak. Accordingly, the status quo tends to prevail.

The hypothesis, then, is as follows: “the more selective a rebel group’s recruitment strategy, the more likely the group takes a crisis action or exits from civil war in response to mass desertion of its members.” This conclusion is because it is vulnerable groups that adopt selective recruitment strategies, according to the proposed theory. Desertion by a certain number of members is more costly for a vulnerable group than for an invulnerable group.

What are the implications of the alternative theories to the effect of a major desertion on a rebel group’s chance of survival? While the scholars of the resource curse theory do not discuss this issue, an implication of their theory is that a resource-rich group is more vulnerable to a major desertion than a resource-poor group. When a major

desertion occurs - that is, when the military balance suddenly changes to favor the state - members of a resource-rich group attempt to increase their short-term gains by deserting or defecting from the group. Accordingly, a major desertion is likely to trigger a massive outflow of members from the group, leading to its dissolution. A resource-poor group, in contrast, is more likely to withstand a major desertion; members of these groups have long-term horizons and are thus are more likely to remain loyal to the group. Such groups also have better relations with the local population, which may help with the survival of the group from state offensives.

The theories of outside option do not have clear predictions on this point. Bernd Beber and Christopher Blattman's study exclusively focuses on the interaction between rebel leaders and members (2009). Scott Gates (2002) explicitly models the interaction between a rebel group and its rival groups, and discusses the role of a power relationship between the two. However, he intentionally omits the link between desertions from the two sides and the power balance between the groups and the state. An implication of the proposed theory is that Gates correctly points out the non-monolithic relationship between the number of deserters and the shift in the balance of power between the rebel group and the state. However, the theory also suggests that Gates prematurely abandoned the entire causal relationship between the two variables. Instead, his theory propounds that the type of rebel group – whether vulnerable or invulnerable to information leak – directly affects whether desertion impacts upon the power balance between rebel groups and the state, in the course of civil war. Therefore, if desertions turn out to have no direct effect on the power balance between the two parties and the course of civil war, the evidence supports Gates' argument. However, if we observe desertions to have some effect on the course of

civil war, in line with the prediction of the proposed theory, the findings support the latter theory.

The primary purpose of this chapter is to assess the empirical validity of the proposed causal mechanism. I will specifically assess the validity of the basic assumption in the proposed theory; the consistency of the state's behavior with the proposed theory, and the validity of my coding of the vulnerability of rebel groups in each period. For this purpose, I identified three implications of the proposed theory to desertion rates in rebel groups, state counter-insurgency strategy, and the impact of desertion on the survival of the groups and the course of civil war. The proposed theory's implication to the desertion rates in rebel groups compare with those of the alternative theories, which therefore makes it feasible to assess the explanatory power of these theories. The proposed theories' two other implications - to the state counter-insurgency strategy and the effect of a major desertion of rebel group's survival - is a novel inference/suggestion. While it is possible to deduce some implications from the resource curse theory, it is not possible to do so from the theories of outside option. Still, novel predictions do provide support for a theory. Therefore, it is, possible to assess the value of the proposed theory, by examining whether these predictions are supported by empirical observations. In the section below, I assess the value of the proposed theory against those of the two alternative theories: the resource curse theory and the theories of outside option. As in Chapter Three, I will use the cases of the LTTE and the LRA for this purpose.

4.3 Desertion Rate

A starting assumption of the proposed theory is that the recruitment strategies of rebel groups vary in their selection effects. This means that desertion rates from rebel groups are

partly a function of their recruitment strategies. While those who joined the rebel group through selective recruitment methods tend to remain a long time within the group, those who joined the group through non-selective methods, tend to desert earlier and at a higher rate. This means that task-based groups such as the LTTE and the LRA, in their first phases, tend to exhibit a low desertion rate. However as they transformed themselves into force-based groups, the desertion rates in these groups should have increased. By assessing desertion rates in these particular rebel groups, I can test the validity of the starting assumption for the proposed theory.

A problem in testing this implication is the availability of the data. Ideally, data should have been acquired on all the members of the LRA and the LTTE, and the numbers and timings of desertions from these groups. However, it was unfeasible to compile or find comprehensive data on deserters or all the members of the LTTE or LRA. In case of the LRA, a few organizations have conducted surveys among deserters or the local population. While these surveys lack information regarding those who still remain in the LRA, or those who died in the group, they are still invaluable sources of data. The problem is much harder to solve in the case of the LTTE. After the LTTE surrendered to the government in 2009, a few agencies conducted a survey among the ex-LTTE members, most notably the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). However, due to concerns over security for these ex-rebels, these organizations continue to deny access to the data by third parties. To conduct the analysis on the LTTE, therefore, I rely on the data on desertion compiled from news reports in *LexisNexis Academic* ("*Lexisnexis Academic*" 2010), and qualitative accounts. Although a reliance on these data

sources constitute a problem, it is still possible to observe some desertion patterns from these groups.

I will first assess whether the actual changes in the number of deserters from the group conformed to the predictions of the proposed theory, after which I will discuss how alternative theories fare in explaining any variation.

4.3.1 LTTE

The observed changes in the LTTE's rate of desertion supports the proposed theory. While the alternative theories' predictions also conform to large trends in desertion from the LTTE, a closer examination reveals problems with these theories.

4.3.1.1 Proposed Theory's Prediction of Desertion Rate in the LTTE

The proposed theory predicts an increase in desertion rates from the LTTE over time. As discussed in Chapter Three, the LTTE diversified its military strategy from terrorism and guerrilla warfare to include conventional warfare. This diversification was a response to the loss of the Jaffna peninsula to the state military forces, which shocked the LTTE leadership. The latter felt the need to form a conventional army to fight a positional warfare against the state military forces, to defend the group's territory. This shift reduced the vulnerability of the LTTE responses to information leak, and increased the number of positions that did not necessarily require a high-level of capacity or training. Accordingly, the LTTE shifted its recruitment strategy from a highly selective one – recruitment by task with additional screening processes – to a less selective one; conscription. The proposed theory predicts that this shift from the first phase to the second phase (around the late 1990s) increased the desertion rate. The shift in the

recruitment strategy should have increased the number of those unloyal to the LTTE or incapable of surviving with the group.

The proposed theory also predicts desertion rate in the LTTE to have further increased as the group shifted from the second phase to the third phase. The major event that marked the transition was Karuna's defection. His defection was important for the LTTE, not only because the group lost some 5,000 members but also because Karuna and his followers had vital information about the LTTE's organization and strategies. The group expected this disclosure of information to the state military forces, to have a disastrous effect on the group's security. The LTTE, therefore, further intensified its recruitment drive, even abducting children to augment its numbers. The proposed theory predicts that this shift in the LTTE's recruitment strategy, further increased the number of disloyal or incapable members, and additionally increased the desertion rate in the group.

4.3.1.2 Observed Pattern of Desertion in the LTTE

In the first phase of the LTTE, from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, the group experienced only a small number of deserters. In the second and third phases, from late 1990s to 2009, the most significant desertion was the one led by Karuna. However, there were reports of other desertions throughout this period. The number of deserters increased dramatically as the 2002 CFA was abrogated and the group neared its end.

There were only a few reports of desertion from the LTTE in the 1980s and in the early 1990s. The first notable incident of desertion was led by Uma Maheswaran. Once a leader of the LTTE, Maheswaran broke away from the group with his followers. Some LTTE members were reported to have deserted the group around October and November 1988, in face of the deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). Otherwise, no LTTE member was reported to have left the group and sided with the IPKF until its

withdrawal in early 1991. Possibly the largest case of defection from the LTTE in this period was the case of Mahattaya (e.g. Rajasingham 2002). The LTTE took custody of the former deputy leader of the LTTE and executed him on December 28, 1994, for an alleged plot to assassinate Prabhakaran, in cooperation with the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of India. However, except for these cases, there was almost no report of deserters from the group, except for a few cases mentioned during the fight between the LTTE and the IPKF from 1987 to 1990, and the Eelam War II from 1990 to 1994.

In the second phase, the number of deserters increased at first, but then decreased around the middle of the period. The first signs of change in the LTTE were reported in mid 1990s as the Eelam War III started. Earlier, most LTTE members used to take a cyanide capsule, or at least tried to commit suicide, whenever they were arrested by the government. However, according to a comment by a police officer in the Special Investigation Unit in December 1995, newly arrested members of the LTTE tended not to try and take cyanides and, instead, easily confessed information during government interrogations (SLBC Radio External Service 1995). This was the first of such reports on demoralization of the LTTE cadres.

The number of deserters increased in the late 1990s. From 1996 to 1998, as the state military forces made advancement under the War for Peace program, there were several reports of LTTE members voluntarily surrendering to the government or attempting to do so. The scale of desertion was still small, however, ranging from one or two individuals to about 20 or 30 at any one time. Relatively large scale desertion occurred in late 1998 and early 1999. In October 1998, over 20 senior officers of the LTTE resigned their posts, claiming that the organization had little chance of military victory over the government

forces (Xinhua News Agency 1999). In March 29, 1999, the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) announced a surrender of more than 189 LTTE members, upon the governments takeover of Madhu in northern Vavuniya, the first incident of mass desertion in its history (Agence France Presse 1999).

Conversely, in the early 2000s, there were practically no reports of desertion from the LTTE, until the end of the second phase in March 2004.

In the third phase, the number of deserters increased dramatically. . The largest case of desertion occurred in March 2004, when Karuna split from the LTTE and released approximately 4,000 to 6,000 cadres, including 1,800 children under his control (e.g. Human Rights Watch 2004: esp. 58; International Crisis Group 2006: 8-9).[81] The event itself marked the start of the third phase.

Karuna's defection was followed by an increase in the number of deserters from the group. From 2006, a number of LTTE cadres deserted, following the renewal of state military offensives against the group. Upon the government takeover of all areas formerly under the LTTE control in Eastern Province, more than 500 cadres surrendered to the government forces. By the time of the official surrender in May 2009, more than 10,000 LTTE cadres had surrendered to the government forces.

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[81]Though not a clear case of desertion, the LTTE was forced to release some of its child soldiers. The UNICEF reports that the LTTE released 1,702 child soldiers in the three years between January 2002 and October 2004, under pressures from UNICEF and the parents of the local children, while newly recruiting 3,755 of them. The figures are cited in Human Rights Watch (2004: 59). As UNICEF recorded only those for whom the LTTE issued official letters of release, the actual number of children who left the LRA should be larger than this figure. The incident shows that the LTTE could afford to leak the information associated with the release of these combatants. This is partly a reflection of the 2002 CFA and the presence of the SLMM, and partly a result of it adopting conventional warfare as its military strategy, which, to some extent, reduced the group vulnerability.

4.3.1.3 Assessing Alternative Theories' Explanatory Power against the Desertion Rate in the LTTE

While the changes in the number of deserters from the LTTE roughly follow the prediction of the proposed theory, they do not neatly conform to it. On the one hand, the number of deserters increased over time. The proposed theory explains this phenomena as a result of the changes in the group's vulnerability to information disclosure and the associated shift in its recruitment strategy, from highly selective methods to a less selective one (conscription). The theory also explains a sharp rise in the number of deserters in the latter half of the 2000s after Karuna's defection. As will be discussed in section 4.5 of this chapter, his defection was important for the group not only because the group lost a number of members, but also because it leaked information vital for the group's survival. This perception resulted in crisis among the LTTE members and led them to desert or defect. However, on the other hand, the proposed theory does not explain the temporary surges in the numbers of deserters in the late 1980s and mid-1990s. As discussed below, the theories of outside option explain these changes more thoroughly/comprehensively and also the decrease in the number of reports of deserters, in the early 2000s.

In the next section, I will assess how other theories perform in explaining the phenomena. At first sight, it appears that both of the alternative theories – the resource curse theory and the theories of outside option – explain them satisfactorily. However, a closer investigation reveals problems in these explanations and show that the proposed theory performs better than its alternatives.

Resource curse theory Because the resource curse theory implies that resource-rich groups experience a higher-rate of desertion (than resource-poor groups) – because they

attract members with short-term horizons – the theory goes some way towards explaining the changes in desertion rates of the LTTE. The group obtained more economic resources as it moved from the first to the second phase, and the desertion rate increased accordingly. True, the change in the amount of resource does not explain the further increase in the number of deserters in the third phase, after Karuna's defection, because the LTTE's economic resource decreased before then due to western countries' illegalization of the LTTE's affiliates abroad. Still, it is possible to attribute the rise of the desertion rate in the third phase to two factors consistent with the resource curse theory: these are path dependence, and decline in the LTTE's military might. Many of the deserters may have been those who joined the group early in the second phase, before the United States and the United Kingdom banned the LTTE branches in those countries. Also, Karuna's defection might have made these members pessimistic about the future of the organization and triggered their desertion and defection.

Nevertheless, there are two problems with the resource curse theory. First (as discussed in Chapter Three) in its second phase, the LTTE recruited its members primarily not by economic incentives, but by force. Therefore, even though it is likely that a sizable number of the LTTE, in the second and the third phases, were in fact not as loyal as those who had entered the group earlier, it was not because of pecuniary incentives that they joined the group, but because they were forced to do so under the LTTE's conscription system. Second, the resource curse theory does not explain the successful defection by the Karuna faction. A possible explanation, propounded by the resource curse theory, is that Karuna and other members in the Eastern Province joined the group more so for economic incentives, than those in the north of the country. However, Karuna himself joined the

LTTE voluntarily in 1983, after the infamous riot in July against the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Therefore, it is unlikely that pecuniary incentive was the primary reason for him to join the group. Also, the area under his control – the LTTE branch in the Eastern Province – was not any richer than their counterparts in the north. Indeed, it was the LTTE leaders in the Northern Province, and those abroad, who had a control over the group's extensive economic resources. Hence, it is unlikely that the LTTE members in the East joined the group any more for economic incentives, than it is for those members in the North.

Regarding this point, the proposed theory better explains Karuna's defection. While it does not clarify why Karuna decided to defect to the state, it does explain why it was easier for him to do so. Karuna faction is known to have been more reliant on conscription and abduction for recruitment than the LTTE in the North. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the LTTE members in the East were less loyal to the group's leadership than those in the North. Accordingly, Karuna anticipated little opposition to his defection from the members under his control. This is evident, for example, in the report of the Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch 2004), which reports that many former members of the LTTE in the East were surprised and confused by the news that Karuna had defected. However, none of them is reported to have felt anger towards him or thought it necessary to punish him for his defection.

Theories of Outside OptionTo some extent, the theories of outside option also explain the changes in the LTTE desertion rates. It predict desertion rates in a group to rise, as the utility of the agents' outside options rise relative to that of staying inside the group.

An advantage of the theories of outside option is that they can explain some of the temporal increases in the number of deserters in the late 1980s and late 1990s. In both cases,

many observers thought the LTTE's relative military power was in decline, and some of the group members most likely shared such perceptions. In 1987, the IPKF intervened, and soon started fighting with the LTTE. While the LTTE eventually drove the IPKF off the island, it was to be expected that some of the group's members became pessimistic about the future of the group, given the IPKF's significant numerical advantage, and found it safer to stay outside the group. The situation was similar in the late 1990s. The president of Sri Lanka, Chandrika Kumarasinghe, initiated a so-called 'War for Peace' to exterminate the LTTE, investing a large amount in the state's military assets. Consequently, the LTTE reduced the size of its operations from about 65 percent of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, to around 50 percent, if only temporarily (Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence 2009). Therefore, it is not surprising that some of the LTTE members saw better opportunities for existence outside the group.

Another advantage of the theories of outside option is that it can explain something of the logic behind the defection by Karuna's faction. Compared with the LTTE members in the North, Karuna and his followers in the East were located closer to the state military forces. Also, the ethnic composition of the Eastern Province was more mixed than in the north, which was predominantly Tamil. In the Eastern Province, Tamils constituted only about a third of the population and the rest were Sinhala and Muslims. Accordingly, the LTTE leadership had less capacity to monitor and punish its members in the Eastern Province than those leaders in the North had with their groups. On this point, the proposed theory and the theories of outside option provide equally persuasive explanation. I argue that both the geographical distance between the LTTE leadership and Karuna's faction, and

its forcible recruitment practice constituted parts of the causal mechanism that explain Karuna's defection.

A problem with this explanation, however, is that it cannot explain continued desertion from 1999 until 2002. During this period, the LTTE made a significant military come back and enlarged the area of its control to more than 70% of the entire Northern and Eastern Provinces, the largest ever in its history (Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence 2009). Perceived shifts in the military balance between the LTTE and the state, then, cannot account for continued desertion by LTTE members, though small in number, in this period. It is true that some foreign governments proscribed the LTTE and its affiliate organizations abroad, affecting the group's financial resource. The US department of state banned the LTTE in 1997, and the UK government proscribed it in 2000. The theories of outside option, therefore, may explain the continued desertion by LTTE members by referring to the financial constraint the LTTE faced. However, de facto foreign branches of the LTTE continued to operate abroad, especially in European countries and in Canada. Even in 2008, after the European Union and the Canadian government banned the LTTE in 2006, Jane's Report listed the LTTE as the second wealthiest rebel group in the world. In contrast, the proposed theory explains the continued desertion by LTTE members by referring to the LTTE's recruitment practice. As the group adopted conscription system in 1997, the group started to continuously recruit not only those who were loyal and capable but also those disloyal and/or incapable. Therefore, coupled with the intrinsic weakness of monitoring and punishment systems in rebel groups, the conscription system necessarily produced deserters from the LTTE from this year on.

In this section, I assessed the relative explanatory powers of the proposed theory and its alternatives against desertion rates in the LTTE. The evidence shows that both the proposed theory, and the theories of outside option, explains variation in the desertions from the LTTE.

4.3.2 Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

I will now turn to the case of the LRA. The observed pattern of desertion from the LRA conforms to the prediction of the proposed theory. Admittedly, the evidence also, upon first glance, conforms to the predictions of the resource curse theory and the theories of outside option. However, upon closer examination, the proposed theory better explains changes in desertions from the LRA than the other two theories.

4.3.2.1 Proposed Theory's Prediction of Desertion in the LRA

The proposed theory predicts the desertion rate in the LRA to have increased over time. The LRA was relatively selective in recruitment in the first phase. In Chapter Three, I argued that, due to the group's location inside Uganda the LRA was quite vulnerable to information leak. As the group was militarily inferior to the state military forces, it was constantly on the move. Secrecy and mobility were indispensible assets to ensure the group's survival. However, in 1994, the Sudanese government offered the LRA a safe haven in Southern Sudan, making it more difficult for the Ugandan military forces to pursue the group to its bases. This relocation to Sudan greatly reduced the LRA's vulnerability to information leak. Consequently, the group became less concerned about the qualities of its combatants, and intensified its recruitment drive by force. As a result, the size of the LRA increased, while the proportion of those either disloyal or incapable also rose. Therefore, the proposed theory predicts that due to the types of its members,

desertion rate in the LRA was relatively low in the first phase, and then increased in the second phase.

Moreover, the proposed theory predicts that the LRA - in the third phase - should have had an even higher desertion rate. The conditions for the LRA changed in late 1990s and early 2000s. The Ugandan and Sudanese governments reached a few agreements; authorizing the Ugandan military forces to hunt down the LRA in southern Sudan. In 2005, the LRA eventually lost its safe haven in southern Sudan. Throughout this period, until the group found its next safe haven in the Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the LRA's survival was at serious risk. In desperation, the group responded by intensifying its assaults on civilians – in the hope of making the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) reluctant to chase the group – furthermore, carrying out massive abduction. Accordingly, the share of the disloyal and/or incapable members in the group dramatically increased in this third phase. Importantly, as I will discuss later in this chapter, this shift in the LRA's recruitment practice coincided with the Ugandan state's legislation of the Amnesty Act in 1999. This shift also helped to increase the number of deserters from the group. For this reason, the proposed theory expects the group to have experienced a large number of deserters.

4.3.2.2 Observed Pattern of Desertion in the LRA

The number of deserters from the LRA was not particularly large in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This is shown in Figure 20. However, after the group moved to Sudan in 1994, and initiated a large-scale abduction, the number of deserters rapidly increased. Approximately 5,000 abductees escaped from the group between 1995 and 1999. It is also apparent that the number of abductees further increased in early 2000s.

Figure 20 Abduction, Escape and Return over Time in the LRA



Source: Pham et al. (2007: 14)

4.3.2.3 Assessing Alternative Theories' Explanatory Power against the Desertion Rate in the LRA

The observed variation in the desertion rate in the LRA conforms to the prediction of the proposed theory. The theory explains it by changes in the recruitment practice of the LTTE. I will now assess the explanatory power of the alternative theories to explain the same phenomena.

Resource Curse Theory The resource curse theory predicts that a resource-rich group tends to experience a larger number of deserters due to its members' short time horizons. The theory apparently explains the changes in the desertion rate in the LRA. The group was very poor at the beginning, and then, in 1994, started to receive support from the Sudanese government. It was also around this time that the number of deserters increased in the LRA.

However, a closer look reveals that the observed events significantly deviate from the causal mechanism specified in the resource curse theory. As discussed in Chapter Three, from 1994 onwards, the LRA recruited most of its members not by economic incentives but by force. Furthermore, most of the support from the Sudanese government to the LRA came not in money but in kind, mostly foods and weapons. Unsurprisingly, most of the LRA members did not receive any pecuniary incentive. Therefore, it was not the use of economic incentives but the use of force for recruitment that brought disloyal members into the LRA in its second phase.

Theories of Outside Option The theories of outside option also appear, at first sight, to explain variation in LRA desertion rates. In the first instance, the number of deserters increased as the group moved to southern Sudan, the geographical distance making it more difficult for LRA members to desert. Then, deserter numbers increased further as the government introduced the Amnesty Act in 2000.

An important problem with the theories of outside option, however, is its failure to explain why the LRA continued to recruit so many people in its second and third phases, in spite of such a large number of deserters, especially after the 2000 Amnesty Law. Why did the LRA continue abduction? The theories of outside option do not have an answer to this question, because these theories – both those propounded by Beber and Blattman and also by Scott Gates – assume the group would maximize its efficiency. If the group is trying to maximize efficiency, they should refrain from recruiting those with high risks of desertion. Hence, if mass desertion occurs, it should be merely a temporary phenomenon that resulted from a sudden decrease in the group's resources, or a significant military loss. At that point, the group should adjust the number of new recruits to keep it under the group's retention

capacity. However, in the case of the LRA, the group continued to experience a high desertion rate, yet continued to recruited new agents by force.

The proposed theory explains this paradox by referring to the invulnerability of the group to information disclosure and *post hoc* selection. First, the LRA's operation required a certain number of members because the group carried out guerrilla warfare. Second, the group could not attract a sufficient number of members by inducement in its second phase, because of its resource constraints and geographical location. Third, the group did not possess sufficient local knowledge about the population to identify those who could be sufficiently loyal and capable, to stay within the group. Fourth, as a result, the group carried out mass abduction to recruit a large number of people. For the LRA, their agents subsequently service within the LRA functioned as a natural post hoc selection mechanism, to identify those who were capable and would remain loyal to the group. Those agents who did not have such qualities would either die or desert the group. The LRA could take this strategy in its second period, because the group had a safe haven in southern Sudan, and thus remained invulnerable to information leak through deserters. Therefore, the LRA kept recruiting new members and losing significant portion of them. By contrast, in the third phase, the gradual loss of their safe haven made the LRA desperate to secure a number of members to fight against the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF).

In this part, I assessed the relative explanatory powers of the proposed theory and its alternatives, against variation in the desertion rates of the LRA. The available evidence indicates that the proposed theory explains its variation more comprehensively than the resource curse theory and the theories of outside option.

4.3.3 Comparison of the LTTE and the LRA

In this section, I briefly compare the desertion trends of the LTTE and the LRA.

The proposed theory predicts desertion rate in the LRA to be higher than that of the LTTE. On the one hand, both of these groups changed their recruitment strategies, from more selective ones to the less selective. However, on the other hand, the LTTE's recruitment practices had been consistently more selective than those of the LRA. Therefore, the prediction of the proposed theory is that the LRA suffered from a higher rate of desertion, due to its less selective recruitment strategy.

While, I have already discussed desertion rates between the LTTE and the LRA, the data I used for the analysis of the two cases are very different. Yet, the variation in the number of deserters from the two groups is very clear. The largest ever desertion from the LTTE was that of Karuna with about 5,000 members. It took place only about 25 years after the group was created. In contrast, the LRA experienced a large number of deserters, especially from the mid-1990s. In the latter half of the 1990s, about 5,000 deserters left the group. The number of deserters went up further in the next five years, exceeding 10,000 in all.

The proposed theory explains the difference between the LTTE and the LRA in their desertion rates, attributing this divergence to two factors: the variation in their recruitment methods, and the difference in the states' counter-insurgency strategies. These two factors are closely related to each other, and I will discuss this comparison in the next section. But, how well do the other theories explain these changes?

The prediction of the resource curse theory goes against the observed patterns of desertion in the groups. As the LTTE had many more economic resources than the LRA,

the theory expects the desertion rate in the former to be much higher than that of the latter. The theory, therefore, contradicts the observation.

The theories of the outside option do not explain the difference between the two groups,; it assume that rebel groups maximize their internal efficiencies, and consequently it predicts groups to experience equally low desertion rates, except when sudden changes occur to their resources or relative military capacities. Therefore, these theories cannot explain the significant and continuous gap between the two groups in their desertion rates. Instead, it argues that if a group's desertion rate becomes high, the group should adjust the number of agents it recruits, to reduce the cost of excessive recruitment beyond its own retention capacity.

4.3.4 Summary

In this section, I assessed the explanatory power of the proposed theory against two alternatives – the resource curse theory and the theories of outside option, using desertion rates in the LTTE and the LRA. More particularly, I assessed whether the proposed theory explains changes in the respective group's desertion rates, as well as the general difference between the two groups. The analysis demonstrates that only the proposed theory explains all three variations. The two alternatives fail to clarify the differences between the LTTE and the LRA in their desertion rates. Also, while these theories' predictions coincide with observed changes in the desertion rates of the two groups, closer scrutiny found important deviations from these theories, which the proposed theory can explain.

4.4 State Counter-insurgency Strategy – Offer of General Amnesty

The second way to assess the validity of the causal mechanism in the proposed theory is to assess whether the state behaved in a way consistent with the proposed theory. In this section, I examine the state counter-insurgency strategies in Sri Lanka and Uganda. The proposed theory suggests that the state facing a group with selective recruitment strategy tends to adopt selective intelligence policies to induce defection from the rebel group. Conversely, the state facing a group with a non-selective recruitment strategy is predisposed to invest more in less selective intelligence policies. These implications are a result of two factors; the composition of rebel group members, in terms of their susceptibility to state induced defection; and the quantity of defectors from the rebel group, improving the state's chances of military victory against them. Members in a task-based group tend to be less susceptible to state inducement, and thus the state needs to invest a large amount of resource per targeted rebel member, to increase the agent's chance defection. At the same time, since the group is dependent on secrecy for its survival, the state requires a relatively small number of defectors from the group, to increase the chance of its military victory. In contrast, members of a force-based group tend to be more inclined to defection. Consequently, the state needs to invest a relatively small amount of resources, per targeted rebel member, to effectively induce their defection. Moreover, the state does not need be as selective in identifying the intended target for defection. At the same time, since a force-based group tends to be less vulnerable to information leak, the state requires a larger number of defectors to be sufficiently increase the chance of state victory. Therefore, the state facing a group with selective recruitment strategy tends to invest in selective intelligence methods to induce

defection from the group, while the state facing a group with indiscriminate recruitment strategy tends to invest more in inclusive or indiscriminate methods.

To assess the validity of this proposition, I will now focus on how many resources the state invests in a single type of strategy, to induce defection – for instance, the offer of general amnesty to rebel group members. For the state, the offer of general amnesty is a relatively low cost way - per person - to induce a large number of deserters from a rebel group, although the total cost for such a program can be quite expensive. This method starkly contrasts with more selective and often covert intelligence operations, that identify a limited number of potential defectors in the group, and presents them with multiple incentives or forces them to defect – methods often used by intelligence agencies. The state may also improve its own capacity to collect information, by training intelligence officers and introducing high-tech equipment such as intelligence satellites and Unmanned Vehicles (UMVs). The proposed theory predicts that a state facing a group with less selective recruitment strategies offers general amnesty in a way more attractive and credible for the rebel members, in comparison to a state facing a group with more selective recruitment strategies.

Admittedly, there are a few problems with this prediction. First, an offer of general amnesty is just one of many methods the state can use to induce defection from a rebel group; it is methodologically problematic to omit assessment of how much the state invests in other strategies to induce defection. Ideally, I should identify all the strategies available to a state, locate them on a continuum of selectivity, and examine the state's allocation of resources on each strategy. However, it is not practical to conduct such an analysis, because many of the 'selective' strategies which states employ to induce defection are covert

operations, making data collection highly complicated/complex. Therefore, at this point I assume that the state investment in covert and selective strategies - to induce defection - to be constant or inversely related to the offer of general amnesty. Moreover, I will only assess variation within the state investment, in a relatively non-selective and visible strategy for inducing defection, namely the offer of general amnesty. Though not ideal, I believe that this approach is a practical and defensible way to solve the problem in data collection. The proposed theory, therefore, is that the state facing a group with more selective recruitment methods tends to invest less in the public offer of amnesty, than a state facing a group with less selective recruitment methods.

A further problem with the prediction of the proposed theory is the following: the inducement of defection is not always the sole or even a primary purpose of the state. During civil wars, states sometime offer general amnesty for rebel group members, as a part of the incentives to cease their use of violence and join a peace process. While such an offer may bring about the desertion of some rebel group members, this result is not necessarily the outcome the state intended. One way to examine the intention of the state, in offering general amnesty, is to see whether there exists any political conditionality attached to the offer of general amnesty. By 'political conditionality', I refer to the demands a state makes to the rebel leaders regarding the action of the group, such as a ceasefire or the acceptance of a particular political regime. If the state attaches a political conditionality to amnesty, they offer it more as a source of bargaining power, with the rebel leaders, rather than as an incentive to induce defection from the group. If the state sets no political condition to amnesty, it is more likely that the state is using it to induce defection. Another way to assess the state's main purpose is to see the intended targets of the amnesty

offers. If the offer covers only rank-and–file members, it is more likely that the state is seeking to instigate defection from the group. If the offer covers rebel leaders, too, the purpose is less clear.

With these issues in mind, I will examine the offers of general amnesty to members of the LTTE and the LRA, by the Sri Lankan and the Ugandan states respectively. In order for a state amnesty offer to be effective - in inducing the defection of rebel members - the offer should firstly, target individual members, rather than the group as a whole; secondly, appear credible to rebel members; and thirdly, be attractive to them in its conditions.

As stated previously, in order for an amnesty offer to target individual members, the offer first needs be free of 'political conditionality,' which requires an action or promise on the part of rebel leaders, on behalf of the group as a whole. Moreover, the offer is more likely to apply to only rank-and-file, although inclusion of rebel leaders, in itself, does not make the offer ineffective in inducing defection.

Secondly, as per above, the credibility of the offer depends on four factors: the 'timing' of the offer – whether it was made ex ante to desertion or defection from the group or ex post to it – matters; ex ante offers carry more credibility than *ex post* offers. Also, the 'authority of the interlocutor' also matters; if the interlocutor holds a high position in the state, his words carry more credibility. The publicity of the offer also affects its credibility; if the offer was made in public, it appears more credible to rebel members, than those made in secrecy. Moreover, if the offer was made through 'legislation' in the parliament, or through the signing of a treaty or a peace agreement, it becomes particularly credible; then the amnesty offer is guaranteed in public by an entity with a high authority independent of the executive power.

Third, the content of the offer is more attractive to rebel members if it is free of 'personal conditionality', such as weapon submission or voluntary surrender; whether it sets an extensive 'grace period' for them to accept the offer; and if it specifies 'personal incentives', such as physical security or economic gain, including the provision of vocational training.

Table 13 Aspects of General Amnesty Offer and Its Effectiveness in Inducing Defection

effectiveness in inducing defection		low ---------- high
purporting defection	political conditionality	yes ---------- no
	coverage	rebel leadership ---------- rank and file
decision making process	timing	ex post ---------- ex ante
	authority	low ---------- high
	publicity	private ---------- public
	legislation	no ---------- yes
content of the offer	personal conditionality	many ---------- few
	personal incentive	no ---------- yes
	grace period	short ---------- long

To conduct an analysis on the amnesty offer, I compiled data on amnesty offers, by the two states, to the LTTE and the LRA respectively (See Appendices). A useful source of data on amnesty offers is that compiled by Louise Mallinder. Her dataset on amnesty laws around the world is being updated by the "Beyond Legalism" project at the Queen's University Belfast (Beyond Legalism Project 2010; Mallinder 2008). While the project's database is very useful, because of its focus on amnesty laws, the database lacks information about other less formal forms of amnesty offered by the states. For example, states often make announcements, or drop leaflets about offers of amnesty, from the air to

the battlefield, to communicate their intentions to rebels. For this reason, and in addition to Mallinder's dataset, I reviewed news reports in LexisNexis Academic (2010) and other sources, to compile data on amnesty offers made by the two states to the LTTE and the LRA.

The proposed theory makes three predictions: first, the Sri Lankan state made more effective offers of general amnesty in the second phase of the LTTE, than in the first phase; second, the Ugandan state made more effective offers of general amnesty in the second phase of the LRA than in its first phase; third, on average, the Ugandan state made more successful offers of amnesty, than similar offers by the Sri Lankan state.

Below, I will briefly discuss the criterion I set to examine the value of the proposed theory. On the issue of the state counter-insurgency strategy, I will not assess the 'relative' explanatory power of the proposed theory against those of the resource curse theory and the theories of outside option. As discussed previously, the theories of outside option do not have a clear implication on the selectivity of the state's intelligence strategy. The literature on the resource curse theory also does not discuss it. Further to my analysis in Chapter Three, I will now assess whether the proposed theory explains variations in the selectivity of the Sri Lankan and Ugandan state counter-insurgency strategies, against the LTTE and the LRA respectively. If the proposed theory does explain any variations, it is indicative of a novel prediction within the proposed theory that cannot be explained by the alternative theories. I believe that this criterion suffices, for the present purpose, in establishing the plausibility of the proposed theory in as far as the selectivity of the state counter-insurgency strategy is concerned.

4.4.1 Sri Lankan State's Amnesty Offers to the LTTE

An implication of the proposed theory is that the Sri Lankan state increased its investment in general amnesty in the second and third phases of the LTTE's operations, in comparison to the first phase. The Sri Lankan state's policies, in the first and third phases of the LTTE, support this proposition. In the second phase, however, the state did not make any offer of amnesty. This observation defies the prediction of the proposed theory. I explain this deviation with reference to exceptional circumstances in this period.

4.4.1.1 Prediction of the Proposed Theory

The proposed theory predicts the Sri Lankan state to have made its amnesty offers more effective and credible over time, because the relative efficiency of amnesty offers – using a non-selective intelligence method in comparison to more selective intelligence methods - increased over time. On the one hand, the LTTE's diversification of its military strategy, from terrorism and guerrilla warfare to include conventional warfare, made the groups' operations less vulnerable to information leak. This meant that the Sri Lankan state required a significant amount of information from deserters to increase the efficiency of the state's counter-insurgency operations. On the other hand, this change in the military policy, prompted shifts in the LTTE's recruitment strategy, from highly-selective methods to less selective ones. As discussed above, this shift meant that the proportion of disloyal or incapable agents in the group increased, raising the chance of desertion and defection from the group. Consequently, for the Sri Lankan state, it became easier to induce defection from the group at a lower cost per person. Therefore, in comparison to more selective and costly intelligence methods (per defector), amnesty offers became more effective and efficient over time. This fact is why the proposed theory predicts that the Sri Lankan state made more investment in amnesty offers over time, to make them

more attractive and credible. Below, I will review the changes in the Sri Lankan state's amnesty policies.

4.4.1.2 Observed Pattern of Amnesty Offer

LTTE Phase I (May 1976 – 1997) From 1976 to 1997, Sri Lankan state hardly made a serious effort to induce defection from the LTTE through offer of general amnesty. True, in July 1987, the state offered general amnesty to LTTE members. However, this offer was part of the Indo-Lanka Accord, between the Indian and Sri Lankan governments. The Accord set an important political condition for amnesty, demanding the LTTE renounce the use of violence. However, the LTTE was not a part of the Accord and refused to accept the demand from the state. Resultantly, the Sri Lankan state withdrew the offer after a few months, by October 1987. Therefore, it appears that the Sri Lankan state offered the amnesty, not to induce defection from the LTTE, but to use the group as a component of the political bargaining with its leaders. Since 1987, the Sri Lankan state offered general amnesty to LTTE cadres on several occasions. However, these offers of amnesty were tactical and short-lived, carrying little credibility overall.

The Sri Lankan state first expressed its intention to grant general amnesty to the LTTE in the Indo-Lanka Accord, signed in May 1987, between Sri Lanka and India.[82] On August 6, the state officials ordered the release of about 800 political prisoners. By early October, the state claimed to have released about 3,500 Tamil political prisoners (Athas

[82] Article 2.11 of the accord said, "The President of Sri Lanka will grant a general amnesty to political and other prisoners now held in custody under The Prevention of Terrorism Act and other emergency laws, and to combatants, as well as to those persons accused, charged and/or convicted under these laws. The Government of Sri Lanka will make special efforts to rehabilitate militant youth with a view to bringing them back into the mainstream of national life. India will cooperate in the process" ("Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement to Establish Peace and Normalcy in Sri Lanka" 1987: 110)

1987). However, there was a political conditionality attached to this offer; the two governments demanded the LTTE, alongside other Tamil militant groups, to surrender their weapons and participate in the democratic political process. As the LTTE initiated guerrilla warfare against the IPKF, President Junius Jayewardene, and the Indian Defense Minister, K.C. Pant, revoked their amnesty offer to the LTTE on October 9. The Sri Lankan government also announced that it rescinded amnesty to the remaining 800 Tamils in prison. Both the Indian and the Sri Lankan government announced amnesty to LTTE cadres – but not necessarily to the LTTE leaders – until the IPKF's withdrawal in April 1990. However, as part of these offers, LTTE members were required to voluntarily surrender to the government with their weapons. Moreover, following the government dismissal of the Indo-Lanka Accord, the legal basis for these offers became unclear, damaging the credibility of the offers.

After IPKF's withdrawal during the Eelam War II and III, the Sri Lankan state offered amnesty to LTTE members approximately seven times. However, their offers did not carry much credibility, and lacked attraction to the potential deserters. Also, there was no legislation to verify these offers of amnesty, and no guarantee by a third party. The amnesty offer by President Ranasinghe Premadasa in May 1991, for example, demanded that the rebels surrender during a unilateral three-day ceasefire. However, this was too short a time to convince the rebels of the government's sincerity. The offer in November 1991 targeted only civilians who supported the LTTE. Subsequently, three communications of general amnesty were made through military airdropping leaflets in Jaffna or in Vavuniya. Thus, the Sri Lankan state apparently made minimal effort to increase the credibility or attractiveness of amnesty to the LTTE members. Defence Secretary General Cyril

Ranatunga's remark, at the beginning of the Eelam II, illustrates this point well. In May 1991, after the three-day grace period for Premadasa's amnesty offer ended -with no surrender from the LTTE - the defence secretary admitted that he had not anticipated desertion from the group (*Agence France Presse* 1991c, 1991d).

During this period, high authority government officials mentioned general amnesty only on two occasions. In December 1995, President Chandrika Kumaratunga announced that the government would offer amnesty to those who surrendered. In May 1996, Army Chief and Lieutenant General Rohan Daluwatte made a similar statement, mentioning the prospect of vocational training for LTTE members who surrendered. However, since that time until 2002 CFA, there were no reports of offers of amnesty and vocational training, to deserters from the LTTE.

LTTE: Phase II (mid-1990s – March 2004) and III (April 2004 – May 2009) In the second phase of the LTTE, between 1997 and March 2004, the Sri Lankan state did not offer any amnesty except in peace negotiations. In the third phase, as the war resumed, the Sri Lankan state suggested amnesty and called for the surrender of the LTTE cadres. Announced by high-ranking government officials, these offers carried more credibility than before, although legislation had to wait until the LTTE's surrender and the end of war in May 2009.

During the second phase of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan state did not publicly offer amnesty to its members. This omission goes against the prediction of the proposed theory, as it calculates that the state will have intensified its attempt to attract deserters from the LTTE, through offers of amnesty. This anomaly can be explained by two factors: first, the government's advance into the LTTE-controlled area during the Eelam War III ran into a

trouble by 1999. While the Sri Lankan military narrowed the size of the LTTE-controlled area from 67 percent of the Northeastern Province in 1994 to 54 percent by 1999, the LTTE made a surprising counter-offensive and enlarged its control-area to 76 percent by 2001 – the largest ever since the war started in northern Sri Lanka. It is reasonable to assume that the government did not expect a significant number of deserters from the group during the LTTE's comeback. In other words, the state did not expect the amnesty offers to produce sufficient benefits to exceed its high political cost. Second, the signing of the 2002 CFA, and the start of peace negotiations between the two parties, made it difficult for the Sri Lankan state to publicly encourage desertion from the rebel group. Such a move would have undermined the basis of the negotiations. In fact, when Karuna defected from the LTTE, both the government and the SLMM initially avoided openly involving themselves in this matter, claiming that the split was a matter internal to the LTTE. In June 2004, in frustration, Human Rights Watch (HRW) urged the government of Sri Lanka to declare an amnesty to all child soldiers under 18 years who had returned home (*Agence France Presse* 2004). Still, the Sri Lankan state did not follow the demands of the HRW,

After Karuna defected from the LTTE, and the war resumed in the country, the Sri Lankan state made several offers of amnesty. First, the government granted de facto amnesty to Karuna and his followers, although it is unclear exactly when this was granted. However, Karuna's faction adopted the name Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) and registered itself at the parliament in 2007, marking the first official recognition of Karuna and his followers' status. Second, in August 2007, after the SLA took over the entire Eastern Province from the LTTE, President Rajapaksa called for the remnants of the LTTE in the area to surrender for amnesty. Finally, from the beginning of 2009, important

government officials, such as President Rajapaksa and Army Chief Sarath Fonseka, called for their surrender. Importantly, during this period, Rajapaksa clearly denied amnesty to Prabhakaran and his close associates. It is evident, therefore, that the state predominantly sought to encourage desertion from the LTTE with these offers of amnesty. However, bargaining with the LTTE leaders was not a part of the state's tactic.

The proposed theory explains this shift in the state's counter-insurgency strategy with reference to changes in the LTTE's position and recruitment strategies. The LTTE diversified its military strategy in the late 1990s and started to organize a conventional army. As a result, the group installed a conscription system to recruit many of its agents.

4.4.1.3 Assessment

The state's policies toward the LTTE, in the first and the third phases of the group, coincide with the prediction of the proposed theory. In the first phase, the group was vulnerable to information leak and thus relied on highly selective recruitment methods. This discouraged the state from using general amnesties to induce defection from the LTTE. It is politically costly to offer general amnesty, and the state did not anticipate that offers of amnesty would produce a large number of deserters from the group. In the third phase, as the LTTE was reliant on conscription for recruitment, the state did expect offers of general amnesties to produce some deserters. More importantly, Karuna's defection and resultant leak of information significantly undermined the security of the LTTE, making many of its members pessimistic about the future of the group. These factors made the state intensify its efforts to induce more defections, by offering general amnesties to deserters.

A problem with the theory is that it does not explain the lack of state's effort to induce defection from the group by amnesty offers in the second phase of the LTTE. In this period, the LTTE started using conscription to secure a sufficient number of combatants to

fight conventional warfare. The proposed theory predicts the state to have invigorated its offers of amnesty, as the chance of the group members' desertion should have risen from the first phase. And yet, the Sri Lankan state never offered general amnesty during this period, at least in the public domain. I believe that this aberration can be explained by factors external to the theory. First, the shift in the LTTE's strategy led to its military come-back, and thus preempted the prospect for general amnesty offers to be effective. Second, the start of peace negotiations between the two parties made it difficult for the state to initiate general amnesty, as the issue was highly salient to the peace negotiations and thus politically sensitive.

Overall, the state's offers of amnesty were consistent with the predictions of the proposed theory.

4.4.2 Ugandan State's Amnesty Offers to the LRA

Similar to the case of the Sri Lankan state, the proposed theory predicts the Ugandan state to have intensified its offers of amnesty to the LRA over time, because the LRA reduced its vulnerability and shifted its recruitment strategy to ones which were less selective. The observed pattern of the LRA conforms to this prediction.

4.4.2.1 Prediction of the Proposed Theory

The proposed theory predicts the Ugandan state to have made its amnesty offers more effective and credible over time. This calculation is because the relative efficiency of the state in using amnesty offers – non-selective intelligence method – in comparison to more selective intelligence methods, increased over time. On the one hand, the LRA's acquisition of safe haven in southern Sudan made the group less vulnerable to information disclosure. If the state wanted to acquire information that effectively favored their military strategy, it needed a large number of deserters to secure a significant

amount of information, or, indeed it needed important members of the group. On the other hand, however, the LRA's possession of the safe haven shifted the group's recruitment strategy from relatively selective methods to almost indiscriminate ones, for example mass abduction. This shift in recruitment strategy meant that the proportion of disloyal or incapable agents in the group increased, raising the chance of desertion and defection from the group. It became easier for the Ugandan state to induce defection from the group at a lower cost per individual. Therefore, in comparison to more selective and costly intelligence methods (per defector), amnesty offers became more effective and efficient over time. Therefore, the proposed theory predicts the LRA to have invested more in amnesty offers, making it more attractive and credible over time. In the next section, I will review the changes in the Ugandan state's amnesty policies.[83]

4.4.2.2 LRA: Phase I (1987 – 1994)

In this period, the Ugandan state effectively did not offer general amnesty. The proposed theory explains this phenomenon as a result of the group's relatively selective recruitment strategy.[84] The group consisted of loyal and capable members recruited by task incentive. The Ugandan state, therefore, did not consider as feasible the inducement of defection from the group through the use of general amnesty.

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[83] See Appendix for a list of the Ugandan state's amnesty offers to the LRA.

[84] There are reports that the Ugandan government promised amnesty to members of the UDCA, who give up fighting *ex ante* to their surrender. According to the report, 3,000 rebels accepted the offer and surrendered to the government, leaving only a few hundred in the group (Minorities at Risk Project 2004; Peterson 1992). However, I could not obtain detailed information about this case, which appears to be an isolated incident, if it did actually happen, and consequently requires further information.

4.4.2.3 LRA: Phase II (1994–1999) and Phase III (1999-)

From 1994, as the LRA commenced mass abduction, the Ugandan government started to offer near-constant amnesty for rebels. In fact, amnesty was granted to almost all the former LRA members, regardless of whether they voluntarily surrendered or were captured by the army. Also, while the state set deadlines to its amnesties, they state kept extending it. These offers lacked credibility at first, although later, especially after the involvement of World Vision (an international NGO), and the introduction of the Amnesty Law in 1999, the state's offers became both credible and attractive to rebels. This credibility was more the case in Uganda than similar offers by the Sri Lankan state.

Initially, the Ugandan state pardoned LRA members by presidential amnesties. Whereas the Sri Lankan government offered amnesty only to those who surrendered voluntarily, and often made weapons surrender a condition, from the beginning, the Ugandan state granted amnesty not only to those who surrendered but also to those captured. President Museveni announced this policy in December 1995 (Borzello 1995). While the UPDF's high command ordered an exclusion of the captured from the amnesty in May 1997, the government apparently revoked this new order and continued to offer amnesty to the captured (Agence France Presse 1997a, 1997b). While presidential amnesties were granted *ex post* to capture or surrender of the rebels, the offers carried some credibility, as nearly all of the deserters and captives were granted amnesty. It also helped that the UPDF cooperated with World Vision and other NGOs in rehabilitating former child soldiers (Borzello 1997). Still, despite all the efforts of the Ugandan state, the effectiveness of its offers of amnesty, through ex-post presidential orders, appears to have been limited. In Figure 20, we can see that, despite a large number of deserters between 1995 and 1999, less than a third of them reported to the Ugandan state for amnesty.

The Ugandan state's offer of amnesty increased in credibility as the parliament passed the Amnesty Act in December 1999. While the Act set a six-month deadline for rebels to accept the amnesty, it also allowed for an extension by the government. Accordingly, since 2000, amnesty has been readily available both to deserters and captives from the LRA. The act had two effects. First, it encouraged deserters from the group to report to government agencies, such as the UPDF and the Amnesty Commission. We can see this effect clearly in Figure 20. The percentage of deserters who reported to the state drastically increased from 1999. From January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2006, 12,119 ex-LRA members reported to the Amnesty Commission (Ugandan Ministry of Internal Affairs 2010). Second, the act encouraged desertion by middle- to high-ranking commanders of the LRA. In 1999, a LRA commander left the group and reported to the UPDF with twelve other members. This incident was the first case of LRA commanders making a collective desertion with their commanders. It is also reported that Kony executed Alex Otti Lagony, then second-in-command of the LRA, because Lagony was considering deserting the LRA and reporting to the government. According to a report by a female deserter, "two of his [Kony's] commanders, Okello Director and Otti Lagony, told some rebels to come back to Uganda and report [to the government]." The plan, however, failed. "Kony got to know of the plan. He arrested them and put them in a deep pit. They killed them to instill fear among those who were planning to escape and come back home" (FEMRITE and IRIN 2008: 26).

Admittedly, the state's investment in general amnesty was not the only factor that made the offer effective. There were at least two other factors that contributed to the credibility of the offer to potential deserters within the LRA. First, in 2002, the British

government subsidized the establishment of Mega FM, a radio station in Gulu. Mega FM broadcasted programs in which ex-members of the LRA talked about their experiences after their desertion from the group, and called for combatants still in the group to report to the government. An important feature of this program is the ex-rebel's use of nicknames for their former combatants, allowing those still in the bush to confirm the identity of the speakers on the radio, thus adding credibility to their words. A significant number of rebels deserted the group because they heard the voices of their friends on the radio.

A further factor which contributed to the credibility of the offers to desert was through the introduction of mobile and satellite phones into the LRA. While the group most likely introduced this new technology to improve its internal communication, it inadvertently made it possible for its members to maintain communication with deserters and others outside the group. It was James Opoka who brought mobile phones and satellite phones to the LRA in 2002. In addition to the high-ranking commanders, unit commanders and intelligence officers also received mobile and satellite phones, greatly improving communication within the group, as previously they had only backpack radios. However, it also allowed deserters from the group to inform those still within its ranks, of their experience with the Ugandan state and NGOs after desertion. Moreover, it allowed members – individually or collectively - to coordinate their desertion plans with the UPDF, aid workers, and those who had already deserted.

Therefore, the installation of the radio station by foreign aid, and the improvement in the communication systems within the LRA, significantly benefitted the Ugandan state's endeavors to encourage desertion from the group. However, it remains the case that the

legislation of the Amnesty Act by the Ugandan state acted as the main force behind the increase in deserters and informers from the LRA.

4.4.2.4 Assessment

Unlike the case within the Sri Lankan state, the Ugandan state made clear shifts in its policy on amnesties to the LRA members. In the beginning, the group did not rate highly the offers to individual members and relied mostly on its own intelligence capacity and selective cooperators. As the group moved to Sudan, the state started to offer amnesties to deserters and those who surrendered under the government policy. As no political condition was attached to these offers, it is clear that the primary target was not the LRA leaders but its members. The credibility of the state policy was further increased once the state introduced the 2000 Amnesty Act.

The changes in the state's policy conform to the prediction by the proposed theory. As the LRA's recruitment strategy shifted, from voluntary and selective methods to less selective and forcible ones, the state strengthened its amnesty offers, making them more comprehensive and credible. The theory explains these changes, as resulting from the increase in the proportion of disloyal or incapable agents within the group, as well as the group's reduced vulnerability to information disclosure. These changes made it necessary for the state to attract a large number of defectors, so as to acquire sufficient amounts of information to make a military difference.

4.4.3 Comparison of the Amnesty Offers by the Sri Lankan and Ugandan States

By this point, I believe that the general differences between the two states' amnesty offers, to the LTTE and LRA respectively, are evident. In general, the Ugandan state made considerable efforts to ensure its amnesty offers were both comprehensive and credible; the state offered amnesties to all the deserters and defectors in an unconstrained

manner directly after the LRA moved to southern Sudan. Its policy gained more credibility, once the state introduced legislation and received supports from international organizations and NGOs. Conversely, the Sri Lankan state's offers of amnesty were much more limited both in time and scope, and consequently lacked credibility. The Sri Lankan state's amnesty offers were mostly associated with political demands against the group's leadership. Also, the offers frequently set deadlines for LTTE members to surrender, additionally targeting only those members who voluntarily surrendered. Those captured by the state military forces were not eligible for amnesty. This condition left high-levels of uncertainty for potential deserters, as one of the few opportunities they encountered for desertion and defection were battlegrounds, in where it is difficult to distinguish those who volunteered to desert from those who were forced to surrender by the state.

The proposed theory explains this difference as a function of the difference between the two group's vulnerabilities to information disclosure and their recruitment strategies. The LTTE, despite its military strength, was far more vulnerable to an information leak than the LRA. Therefore, for the most part, the LTTE adopted relatively selective recruitment strategies. This decision meant that the Sri Lankan state anticipated little opportunity for defection by LTTE members, and had to focus its resources on more selective intelligence methods to obtain information. In contrast, the LRA was much less vulnerable to information disclosure, especially after its move to Sudan in 1994. As a result, the Ugandan state foresaw an opportunity to induce defection by the LRA members. Furthermore, the group's vulnerability to information leak meant that if any leaked information were to make a substantial military difference, its quality and amount needed

be considerable. Consequently, the state, tended to introduce highly credible amnesty policies with broad coverage, to attract the defection of highly capable agents with important information about the group.

4.4.4 Summary

The primary purpose of this section was to assess whether the state, in a situation of civil war, behaved in a way consistent with the proposed theory. As the state closely observes rebel groups, its behavior is likely to reflect the organizational characteristics of rebel groups they are fighting. To this purpose, I discussed the selectivity of the Sri Lankan and Ugandan states' counter-insurgency strategies, to the LTTE and the LRA respectively. To examine their selectivity, I particularly focused on their offers of amnesty to group members, their coverage and credibility. The proposed theory explains variations in their amnesty offers, across both states and throughout the time examined. Between Sri Lanka and Uganda, the latter state made more serious attempts to induce defection, by keeping the opportunity for amnesty open for deserters and captives from the rebel group. The Ugandan government also made its offer of amnesty credible and attractive, introducing the Amnesty Act - involving third parties - and offering personal economic incentives.[85] The Sri Lankan government was less enthusiastic in its offer of general amnesty, presenting it within limited timeframes and setting personal conditionality. Regarding the changes over time in the two countries, both the Sri Lankan and Ugandan states intensified their efforts to offer credible and attractive amnesty to rebels, as the LTTE and the LRA in turn shifted their recruitment methods to less selective ones. In the first phase, the Sri Lankan state initially offered amnesty as a part of political negotiations with the

[85] Foreign donors, including the World Bank, provided financial aid to finance the program.

rebel leaders, and then as a tactical purpose, to marginally increase the efficiency of its military operations. Although the state did not offer amnesty for desertion in the first several years of peace negotiations, after 2002 CFA, as the war resumed, it made considerable efforts to induce desertion from the group through general amnesty. The Ugandan state offered amnesty in an ad hoc manner prior to 1994. However, as the LRA initiated forcible recruitment on a larger scale in 1995, the Ugandan state started to continually offered amnesty, both to deserters and to captured rebels. The 2000 Amnesty Act and its subsequent extension made the offer of amnesty credible and attractive, contributing to an increase in desertion from the LRA. The findings therefore provide a support for the theory.

Nevertheless, it is important to point out two limitations in this exercise: firstly, I have not analyzed the entire counter-insurgency strategies of the two states, but only their amnesty offers. This omission arguably constitutes a selection bias because there may exist a correlation between the state's investment in amnesty offers, and its investment in more selective counter-insurgency strategies. If the correlation is positive, it undermines the reliability of my analysis in this section. In this sense, it is still necessary to conduct a more comprehensive analysis of the states' counter-insurgency strategies. However, given the difficulties in obtaining information about the intelligence strategies of states, I believe a concentrated analysis of amnesty offers is justifiable. Moreover, a cursory review of the counter-insurgency strategies of the Sri Lankan and Ugandan states shows that the former invested much more in selective counter-insurgency strategies - that is, intelligence operations - than the latter. The Sri Lankan state devoted a significant proportion of resources to developing its own intelligence capacities, in the form of Unmanned Vehicles

(UMVs) and a long-range reconnaissance program (LRRP). In contrast, the bulk of the Ugandan state's efforts focused on diplomatic efforts to curtail the Sudanese support for the LRA, and to build military roads in the north, where the bush used to inhibit the state's counter-insurgency efforts. Therefore, concerning the comparison between the two states, I anticipate that a more comprehensive analysis would confirm, rather than challenge the findings in this section. Secondly, as the alternative theories do not have clear implications on the selectivity of the states' counter-insurgency strategies, I did not test the explanatory power of the proposed theory against those of other theories. Still, by assessing the relative selectivity of the two states' counter-insurgency strategies in the respective phases, I successfully conducted a partial test of the proposed theory.

4.5 Major Desertion and Its Impact on Rebel Group

So far, I have assessed the validity of the causal mechanism in the proposed theory, by examining desertion rates in rebel groups and state counter-insurgency strategies. The third way to test the validity of the proposed causal mechanism is to assess the validity of my coding of vulnerability of rebel groups. I will do this by examining the effects of mass desertions on rebel groups and states, through a controlled comparison. Although this discussion has been left to the last section of this chapter, this issue is arguably the most important part, as it directly addresses a major part of the causal mechanism of the proposed theory; the impact of information disclosure on the survival of rebel groups.

Regardless of whether it is a task-based group, an incentive-based group or a force-based group, major desertion is a possibility. Of course, as discussed previously, the chances of its occurrence varies from one type of rebel group to another. Force-based groups are more likely to experience desertion than incentive-based groups, and incentive-

based groups are more likely encounter desertion than task-based groups. And yet, even a task-based group may experience mass desertion due to the operation of some random factors. However, the effects of such desertions, on the state and rebel groups vary depending on the rebel groups' type. Because a task-based group is vulnerable to information leak, major desertion from such a group leaves it highly vulnerable to the state military offensive. As this increases the expected efficiency of the state counter-insurgency operations, the state has an incentive to dramatically increase the level of its investment in military operations, in response to such desertions. The rebel group, anticipating such a response by the state, may either hurriedly build up its military capacity, initiate a peace process to reduce the chance of military confrontation, or simply dissolve or surrender. In any circumstance, even more so if the rebel group fails to make a move swiftly, it is likely that the rebel group will exit the civil war. The rebel group either endures severe military damage or engenders a peace process to avoid military defeat. A force-based group, in contrast, tends to remain invulnerable to the state military operations, even if they experience mass desertion. Accordingly, the state lacks an incentive to increase the level of its investment in military operations, even if faced with major desertion from the group. Therefore, the force-based group is unlikely to change its behavior as a result of mass desertion from the group.

I will assess the validity of the implications of the proposed theory by examining the case of the LTTE and the LRA. As discussed previously, the LTTE was initially a strictly task-based group. However, the group commenced recruitment by force in the second phase - albeit in the form of conscription - which moderates the chances of desertion and defection by the recruited members. The LRA, in its first phase, was also a

task-based group, although it was less strict than the LTTE was in the corresponding phase. However, the LRA subsequently shifted to the use of force – abduction – to recruit its members.

Similar to the circumstances of the state's selectivity in counter-insurgency strategies, the predicted association between desertion, information leak, and the chance of survival of the rebel group, is a novel one. By contrast, the alternative theories do not have clear implications on these subjects. Regarding the theories of outside option, it is worthwhile mentioning that Scott Gates consciously dropped the causal link between agents' desertion and any shifts in the balance of power between the rebel group and state (Gates 2002). However, he is correct in that there is no simple correlation between the two variables. Conversely, the proposed theory suggests that there exists a causal link between the two variables – the number of deserters from a rebel group and the power balance between the group and the state – and it becomes observable once we control for the effect of an intervening variable – the vulnerability of the rebel group to information leak. If the following analysis finds such a link, it supports the proposed theory.

I should also point out that the limited availability of the data and methodological problem of selection bias, prevents me from assessing temporal variation in the effects of an information leak on the survival of the rebel groups, if the proposed theory is correct, I do not expect to observe the occurrence of mass desertion in the first phases of the two rebel groups. This lack of observance of mass desertion makes it impossible to assess the impact of mass desertion on the groups across the assessed phases. Earlier in this chapter, I discussed desertion rates in the two groups, and I found this prediction to be correct. Still, it is possible to assess those instances where rebel groups experienced some desertion, or

where the state arrested a significant number of group members – a functional equivalent of mass desertion. By examining the effects of these events on rebel groups, I can test an implication of the proposed theory; that rebel groups with different recruitment strategies vary in their degrees of vulnerabilities to deserters.

4.5.1 Impact of Desertions on the LTTE

In Chapter 3, I showed that the LTTE was highly vulnerable to desertion in its first phase, and was therefore highly reliant on selective recruitment strategies for its survival. The group reduced the level of its vulnerability in the second phase, when they adopted conventional warfare as its military strategy. However, this alteration in the group's organizational characteristics was limited. It did not fundamentally transform the LTTE from a vulnerable group, to an invulnerable one. True, the group started to use force for recruitment in its second phase. However, the LTTE was, to an extent, still vulnerable to desertion, and thus installed a conscription system instead of solely carrying out abductions.

The prediction of the proposed theory, then, is that if the LTTE experienced mass desertion in the first phase, it should have severely damaged the group; either forcing it to take a 'crisis behavior' or have ceased operations. In contrast, if the group experienced mass desertion in the second phase, they should have incurred some damage. However, the effects of this damage would have been limited. The next section's analysis demonstrates that the LTTE suffered some deserters in its first phase. In apparent contradiction to the proposed theory, however, these deserters did not cause significant damage to the group. There, I will point out that one of the assumptions of the proposed theory did not hold in these cases. Consequently, these events act as deviations which confirm the logic of the

proposed theory. In the second phase, the LTTE suffered a major desertion, namely the defection by Karuna and his followers. The event turned out to be a significant blow to the LTTE, and slowly brought about military defeat for the group; this finding providing support for the proposed theory.

4.5.1.1 Prediction of the Proposed Theory

The proposed theory predicts that mass desertion would incur varying effects on the LTTE, in the first and the second phases. In the first phase, the group was highly vulnerable to information leak and thus relied on task incentives for recruitment. In this phase, mass desertion would have immediately undermined the security of the organization. In the second phase, the group was somewhat less vulnerable; diversifying its military strategy to conduct conventional warfare, and installing a conscription system. Accordingly, the effects of mass desertion would have had a slower and more moderate impact. .

A problem with testing the above prediction is that the proposed theory envisages that the number of deserters from the group, in its first phase, will be small. This prediction was in fact confirmed earlier in this chapter. However, it does not mean that there were no deserters from the group in this period. In the section below, I will examine the effects of these deserters on the LTTE throughout its first phase. While this analysis is not a perfect solution for the problem, it provides an opportunity to assess the validity of the prediction of the proposed theory.

4.5.1.2 LTTE: Phase I (May 1976 – 1997)

It is difficult to test the implications of the proposed theory on the first phase of the LTTE. From 1976 to the mid 1990s, there is no record of a major defection from the LTTE to the state. This observation, in itself, fits the prediction of the proposed theory, that the

LTTE in its first phase, as a task-based group, experienced a low rate of desertion. However, this fact also makes it difficult to test the impact of a major defection, on the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state.

However, there were incidents when some members left or betrayed the LTTE. The first such occurrence was led by Uma Maheswaran. Maheswaran and his followers split from the LTTE in 1980 and formed a new militant group called the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE). Maheswaran is known to have had a personal rivalry with Prabhakaran, in seeking the leadership of the LTTE. Since Maheswaran's defection, the Sri Lankan state neither carried out a military assault against the LTTE, nor initiated peace talks with the group, thus ensuring its survival. Therefore, it is possible to assume that this case goes against the proposed theory.

However, this incident does not constitute an anomaly for the proposed theory, for two reasons: first, instead of cooperating with the Sri Lankan state, Maheswaran formed a new independent militant group for Tamil secessionism, indicating that Maheswaran and his followers did not leak security information to the Sri Lankan state. Second, the number of deserters who joined Maheswaran in forming PLOTE was small, meaning that in terms of military and human resources, PLOTE was not in a position to defeat the LTTE, even with the information they possessed about the group. If PLOTE was larger than the LTTE at some points in time, it was always weaker than the Sri Lankan military. In fact, while PLOTE had several military confrontations with the LTTE from 1980 onwards, the group never gained ascendancy over the LTTE.

The second instance of betrayal from the LTTE was the one by Mahattaya. Mahattaya was the second-in-command of the LTTE after Prabhakaran. Although he did

not physically leave the LTTE, Prabhakaran had him arrested and executed him in 1994, with 200 others, reportedly because Mahattaya betrayed the LTTE and leaked information to its enemy. However, it is not clear if Mahattaya's alleged betrayal had any negative effect on the group. It did not directly result in Sri Lankan state military offensive, nor did it endanger the LTTE's survival.

This incident, however, does not effectively constitute a case against the proposed theory. Mahattaya had reportedly been cooperating, not with the Sri Lankan government, but with the Indian government, especially its intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). It is not clear, therefore, how much information the Sri Lankan state received from Mahattaya through RAW. Still, it is an important question why the Indian state did not carry out a military offensive against the LTTE upon cooperation with Mahattaya in the early 1990s. However, this fact in itself does not go against the proposed theory. Even if the Indian government had gained sufficient amounts of information from Mahattaya to defeat the LTTE, it would have been extremely difficult for the government to carry out such a military operation, as the Indian government would need to secure consent from the Sri Lankan government for a military operation on its soil. Moreover, difficulties would have arisen over gaining consent because the Sri Lankan people had previously had bitter experiences with the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in the late 1980s. Indeed, the Sri Lankan government even cooperated with the LTTE upon this point, to pursue the IPKF out of country. More importantly, Indian domestic politics would have prevented its government from such an undertaking, due to their own negative experience with the IPKF.

The LTTE's experience in its first phase does not contradict the proposed theory. True, they suffered some significant desertions in this phrase, but they were still mostly unaffected from these instances, because the deserters did not directly cooperate with the Sri Lankan state following their defections.

4.5.1.3 LTTE: Phase II (Middle of 1995 – March 2004) and III (March 2004 – 2009)

In the second and third phases of the LTTE, the group was less vulnerable to desertion than in its first phase. While the LTTE was located towards the edge of the island country, it lacked an effective safe haven nearby, and the Sri Lankan state was developing itself economically and militarily. Therefore, the group remained fairly vulnerable to attach throughout this period. In the meantime, the group experienced a large number of deserters, the most important being the defection of Karuna defected and his followers, who subsequently cooperated with the Sri Lankan state. Consistent with the proposed theory, this event slowly undermined the security of the LTTE, culminating in Prabhakaran's death and the group's surrender in May 2009.

In the latter half of 1990s, the LTTE started to recruit new agents by conscription. , Initially, the agents worked on a part time basis, and later full time. This change in the group's recruitment practice was accompanied by an increase in the desertion rate among its members. However, in terms of information-leak, the most important case of desertion was that of Karuna, who left the LTTE in March 2004, releasing approximately 5,000 of his cadres, of whom 2,000 were women.

After leaving the LTTE, Karuna and his followers cooperated with the Sri Lankan state. The most important part of their assistance was the provision of information about the LTTE to the government. A significant part of this information, of course, concerned the LTTE's presence in the Eastern Province, such as the location of secret camps, and the

identification of collaborators in towns and villages. However, the government also obtained information about the LTTE's organization and its activities in other parts of Sri Lanka, such as the LTTE's strategy to defend Mullaitivu in case of a state military's offensive.

State Response The Sri Lankan state reacted to Karuna's defection by increasing its military expenditure and commencing overt military operations against the LTTE. This action was not only because Karuna's defection reduced the numerical strength of the LTTE, rather it was that the information Karuna and his followers brought to the state, was expected to increase the efficiency of the military option against the LTTE vis-à-vis peace negations. The obtained information did so in three ways: first, the state came to identify so-called 'sleepers' or LTTE operatives undercover in Colombo and other parts of the country.[86] This discovery reduced the risk of terror attacks in Colombo and allowed the state to concentrate on the war in the north and east. Second, the state learnt the whereabouts of Prabhakaran and other LTTE leaders, making it possible to target those leaders in its military offensives. The accuracy of the state operations also created confusion and mistrust within the LTTE leadership. Finally, the state learnt the LTTE's plans regarding their response to state's large-scale offensives. The information helped the state to develop plans to deal with the LTTE's counter-offensives and attempts for escape.

Karuna defected from the LTTE in 2004. In that year, the government's military expenditure increased for the first time since 2001. In 2000, during President Chandrika

[86]Many of the 'sleepers' came from the East, because it was difficult for Tamils from the north to cross the frontline between the LTTE and the government forces, and enter the government-controlled area, without attracting the government's attention.

Kumaratunga's "War for Peace" operations against the LTTE, the government military expenditure hit 56.9 billion rupee, the highest ever since 1991 (The World Bank 2009). Since 1991, partly thanks to the 2002 CFA, the military expenditure continued to decline, reaching 47.0 billion rupee in 2003. However, in 2004 the year Karuna defected from the LTTE, the military expenditure rose again to the pre-CFA level of 56.3 billion, continuing to increase dramatically until 2008, when it reached 133 billion (see Figure 21). True, the increase in military expenditure is partly a reflection of the growth in the country's economy. However, it was not just military expenditure which increased, but also its shares in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and in the central government expenditure that started to increase in 2004 (see Figure 22 and 23).[87] This shows that the state started to allocate a higher proportion of government resources to the military sector, due to the improving prospects for defeating the LTTE.

[87] The temporary drop in these figures, in 2005, most likely reflects the government's allocation of resources for recovery after the Tsunami that followed the Sumatra-Andaman earthquake on December 26, 2004.

Figure 21 Military Expenditure of the Sri Lankan Government (1995-2008)

Source: Created by the author using the data retrieved from the World Bank (2009). The unit of currency is the Sri Lankan rupee, in its current value.

Figure 22 Percentage of Military Expenditure in the GDP in Sri Lanka (1995-2008)



Source: Created by the author using the data in the World Bank (2009).

Figure 23 Percentage of Military Expenditure in the Central Government Expenditure in Sri Lanka (1995-2007)



Source: Created by the author using the data in the World Bank (2009).

The Sri Lankan state's attitude towards the 2002 CFA and the use of military force against the LTTE also changed over time. Until Karuna's defection, the state essentially observed the terms of the CFA and denounced direct military operations against the LTTE. After Karuna's defection, however, the state gradually shifted its position on this issue. In November 2005, Mahinda Rajapaksa of the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) won the presidential election against a dove candidate Ranil Wickmersinghe. During the campaign for this election, Rajapaksa rejected federalism and called for the renegotiation of the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE, allying with two Sinhala nationalist parties, the

JanathaVimukthi Peramuna (JVP, People's Liberation Front) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU).

Also, the state military forces' aerial bombing of Mavil Aru marked the resumption of a direct military confrontation with the LTTE called the Eelam War IV. Since the signing of the CFA, the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE refrained from overt military operations against each other except for a few small incidents (Höglund 2005). However, in July 2006, the state military forces carried out a direct military offensive against the LTTE in Mavil Aru. The immediate trigger of the operation was that the LTTE halted water supply from Mavil Aru reservoir to the surrounding area, which affected the lives of 6,000 Sinhala farmers residing in the area under government control. Before, the government used to solve such altercations with the LTTE through negotiation, due to the 2002 ceasefire agreement and the presence of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) to oversee the agreement. This time, arguably to the surprise of the LTTE, President Rajapaksa initiated a military attack not only to force the LTTE to reopen the gate of the reservoir, but also to assume control of the gate (Hariharan 2006). From this time onwards, the government took any opportunity to initiate a military offensive and take over the control of areas from the LTTE. By July 2007, the government force captured Thoppigala, which was the last remaining base of the LTTE in the east, effectively liberating the entire Eastern Province.

Therefore, Karuna's defection from the LTTE in 2004 increased the prospect for military victory by the state. This fact made a military offensive a more attractive policy for the state than the observance of the CFA and the continuation of peace negotiations. As a

result, the Sri Lankan state started to invest more in the military sector, and then resumed a direct military confrontation with the LTTE, that is, the Eelam War IV.

Impact on the LTTE Karuna's defection had two effects on the LTTE. First, the LTTE intensified its recruitment drive through conscription, because the LTTE lost a significant portion of its human resources under Karuna's authority. Because Karuna possessed information about the organization and military strategy of the LTTE, his defection and the ensuring information-leak sharply increased the efficacy of the state military operations against the group. Moreover, members of Karuna faction had strong networks with core members of the LTTE, from whom they could continuously receive information about the group. A second effect of Karuna's defection, as anticipated by the LTTE, was the state's increase in military investment and intensification of military operations, resulting in severe damage to the LTTE. The group lost the entire Eastern Province and then surrendered to the government in May 2009.

The first and immediate effect of Karuna's defection was the LTTE's intensification of its recruitment drive. Table 14 in page 246 indicates that there was an increase in the number of new recruits per year around 2005. From the signing of the CFA in 2002 until 2004, there was a gradual increase in the number of recruits, with a rate of increase between 9% and 34% each year. However, from around 2005, the rate increased to more than 100%. The trend was intensified further by the start of the Eelam War IV in 2006. Of course, the figures in Table 14 in page 246 are only indicative and do not reflect the precise changes in the number of new recruits in the LTTE over the years. The data for this table is based on a survey conducted by the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence (MOD) among the ex-LTTE members detained by the government in 2009. Therefore, the data

leaves out all the members of the LTTE who either died during the conflict or who are still alive and escaped the government's search operations. Hence, by using this data to analyze the trends in the recruitment practice of the LTTE, I assume that the proportion of the number of those detained by the government for each year remained mostly constant. Because I will confine my analysis to the years after the conclusion of the CFA in 2002, I do not anticipate this assumption to be highly problematic. Second, I have also made a supposition that all the detainees left the LTTE sometime in the first half of 2009, and computed the approximate years of recruitment. It was necessary to make this assumption since there was no data on the year of recruitment, or of detention, in the published data. While the assumption may not be precise, I believe it is acceptable and does not severely bias the analysis, since there were few reports into the detention of ex-LTTE members prior to 2009. Therefore, overall it appears that the LTTE resorted to a mass recruitment drive after Karuna's defection, to compensate for the loss of its human resources, and in expectation of a major military offensive from the state military forces.

Table 14 Duration of Service among the Ex-LTTE Combatants Detained by the Sri Lankan Government*

Duration of service	Year of recruitment**	Number of ex-combatants	Rate of increase from the previous period***
less than 01 year	2008-2009	3,518	2.45
01 to 02 yrs	2007-2008	1,435	0.75
02 to 03 yrs	2006-2007	1,921	2.04
03 to 04 yrs	2005-2006	940	2.28
04 to 05 yrs	2004-2005	413	1.09
05 to 06 yrs	2003-2004	378	1.34
06 to 07 yrs	2002-2003	282	1.18
07 to 08 yrs	2001-2002	240	1.26
08 to 09 yrs	2000-2001	190	1.25
09 to 10 yrs	1999-2000	152	1.22
10 to 11 yrs	1998-1999	125	1.49
11 to 12 yrs	1997-1998	84	1.35
12 to 13 yrs	1996-1997	62	0.77
13 to 14 yrs	1995-1996	81	0.95
14 to 15 yrs	1994-1995	85	1.60
15 to 16 yrs	1993-1994	53	1.39
16 to 17 yrs	1992-1993	38	0.63
17 to 18 yrs	1991-1992	60	1.05
18 to 19 yrs	1990-1991	57	1.24
19 to 20 yrs	1989-1990	46	3.07
20 to 21 yrs	1988-1989	15	1.15
21 to 22 yrs	1987-1988	13	0.00
Total	-	10,188	1.34

*The table was created by the author using the data on the number of detained ex-combatants and their duration of service, in Ferdinando (2010).

**The year of recruitment was calculated on the assumption that all the ex-combatants were detained some time in the first half of 2009. Although this assumption is questionable, it is not wholly inaccurate, since there were few reports on deserters or surrenderers from the LTTE prior to 2009.

***The figure was calculated by dividing the total number of detainees for each period by the number for the previous period.

The second and an indirect effect of Karuna's defection upon the LTTE, was its huge military defeat to the state forces. As discussed above, Karuna's defection made the state increase its military expenditure and initiate military offensives against the LTTE. During the Eelam War IV, the LTTE lost all of its territories in the Eastern Province (by

July 2007), and then surrendered to the state military forces in May 2009. The LTTE was vulnerable to an information leak due to its location in the periphery of an island country, and given that it was fighting the relatively strong state of Sri Lanka, which is why the group relied primarily on task incentives for recruitment. The information leak that ensued from Karuna's defection successfully undermined the LTTE's security.

It was not only that Karuna faction members possessed important information about the group, however, although their knowledge about the LTTE's wing in the Eastern Province was of great significance. It was also important that the members had social networks with senior cadres in the LTTE in the North, making it possible for him to obtain up-to-date information about the organization, strategies, and locations of the LTTE, including the location of Prabhakaran and other senior members of the group. Until the war ended in 2009, Karuna publicly disclosed information from such sources. Why did those senior cadres cooperate with Karuna? The answer is quite simple. After Karuna's defection, they foresaw the possibility of the LTTE's defeat to government military forces, and consequently wanted to demonstrate their acquiescence to the potential winning side. By cooperating with Karuna, they endeavored to secure their individual survival, even after the government victory. Their fear for a defeat may have been a self-fulfilling prophecy. However, Karuna's desertion and the subsequent military build-up by the government, was sufficient enough to make even the LTTE's senior cadres pessimistic about the future of their group. Also, a collective action problem might have been operating within the group. Given Karuna's defection and the pessimistic prospects for the group's survival, the senior cadres might have become suspicious of each other, and thus began to defect to the state, so as not to be left behind when the group collapsed. In any case, Karuna faction members

kept receiving information from the senior members of the LTTE. It not only secured continuous flow of information from the LTTE to the state, but also destabilized cohesion of the group by generating suspicions within the LTTE leadership.

Overall, Karuna's defection in 2004 had a measured but significant effect on the security of the LTTE. His cooperation with the state improved the prospects for a successful defeat of the LTTE. Consequently, the state intensified its military operations against the LTTE, in response to which, the LTTE intensified its recruitment drive by force. In the end, however, the LTTE lost the war to the state. Their defeat was a result two combining factors: the group's innate vulnerability, and Karuna's defection and the resultant leak of information from the group to the state.

Possible Criticisms In this section, I address three possible criticisms of my previous analysis. The first criticism concerns the timing of the state response to Karuna's defection. One may argue that the time lag from Karuna's defection in 2004, to the start of Eelam War IV in 2006, indicates a weak causal link between the two events. The second potential criticism concerns the accidental nature of the 2005 election outcome, and the LTTE's role within it. Some analysts argue that were it not for the LTTE's disturbance of the election in the northeastern area, Rajapaksa would have lost the election to Wickmersinghe, who would have pursued peace negotiations instead of a military solution. This analysis implies that it was not Karuna's defection but the election of Rajapaksa that was critical to the state's resorting to a military solution. Third, some may argue that it was not the information from Karuna's faction but the state's military build-up that brought the military victory. Below, I will address these three possible criticisms in order.

First, it is reasonable to question the claim of the causal relationship between Karuna's defection in March 2004 and the state initiation of the military offensive in July 2006, given the two year difference between these two events. It is necessary to fill in the temporal gap between the two events with a sequence of micro-events if one is to claim a causal relationship between them. However, I believe that the following five factors explain the seemingly slow response by the state to Karuna's defection. Three of these factors are internal to the proposed theory, while the remaining two are external to it.

The first three factors internal to the proposed theory concern the following: the timing of the inflow of information from Karuna and his followers to the state; the LTTE's relative invulnerability after its adoption of the conventional warfare strategy; and the state's expectation of a large military gain given the information from Karuna. First, it appears that the flow of information from Karuna's faction to the state was not very rapid. As the formation of PLOTE demonstrates, deserters from a rebel group do not necessarily cooperate with the state. They may go AWOL or form a new rebel organization. Therefore, for the state to receive information from the deserters, it needs to provide a sufficient amount of incentives, whether they are personal security, a political position or economic wealth.[88] In Karuna's case, it is not clear exactly when he communicated with the government, that is, whether it was before or after his defection. In any case, however, his communication with the government did not immediately bring full cooperation between them. For example, ICG reports that "[b]y 2006 Karuna's forces had become allies of the government and a key source of intelligence from its forces. His defection was an immense

[88] See Bueno de Mesquita (2005) for a discussion on the commitment problem between the state and ex-rebels (terrorists) to cooperate in counterterrorism/counter-insurgency.

loss to the LTTE and boosted support among some Sinhalese leaders for a resumed military option" (International Crisis Group 2006: 9). Second, the LTTE adopted conventional warfare as a part of its military strategy in the late 1990s, and to some extent reducing its vulnerability to information leak. This meant that the Sri Lankan government needed to mobilize more resources to carry out an effective military operation and damage the LTTE. Third, the scale of military operation that the state planned to carry out was considerable, requiring the government to spend time preparing for it. By the time the Sri Lankan state military forces initiated the Mavil Aru offensive, Rajapaksa is reported to have sought a military victory over the LTTE. This contrasts with his predecessors, who, in principle, sought a negotiated peace. Former President Chandrika Kumaratunga, for example, called for a "War for Peace" and insisted on a negotiated peace with the LTTE, even at the height of her military operation against the group in the late 1990s. Therefore, with the LTTE controlling more than 70 per cent of the Northern and Eastern provinces in 2004, Rajapaksa's ambitious plan required extensive preparations to mobilize resources.[89] Hence, the three factors internal to the proposed theory – timing of Karuna's full cooperation with the state, the LTTE's shift to a force-based group, and the state expectation of causing significant damage to the LTTE – delayed the timing of the state offensive against the LTTE in response to Karuna's defection.

The fourth and fifth factors that delayed the state response are external to the proposed theory. In the fourth instance, the political institution of the Sri Lankan state further slowed down its decision-making process. After Karuna's defection in March 2004,

[89] The data on the changes in the size of the area of control by the LTTE was retrieved from the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence website (Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence 2009).

two important elections took place. The first was the parliamentary election on April 2, 2004, and the second, the presidential election of November 19, 2005. These two elections delayed the government's response to Karuna's defection, by distracting political leaders from the conflict with the LTTE during campaigns, and starting the time-consuming processes of setting-up the new governments.

Finally, the 2002 ceasefire agreement (CFA) also prevented the state from initiating a military confrontation on a purely military consideration. Under the CFA, the Sri Lankan government was expected to negotiate a peace deal with the LTTE, under the auspices of foreign governments - called 'co-chairs' - including the European Union, the United States, and Japan. Also, the Norwegian-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was to monitor the ceasefire between the two parties. Therefore, in order to legitimate its military offensive and avoid sanctions from these foreign powers, the Sri Lankan state could not unilaterally initiate a military offensive; instead it had to wait for the LTTE to take provocative action.

I will now turn to the second criticism regarding the impact of the 2005 presidential election on the state's decision to carry out the military offensive, from 2006 onwards. The criticism consists of two parts. The first part is that Rajapaksa would almost certainly have lost the election to Wickmersinghe if the LTTE had not disturbed the implementation of the election in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The LTTE called for a boycott of the election, and used violence to prevent electoral campaigns and voters from casting their votes. If Wickmersinghe had become the president, he may have continued peace negotiations given his rather accommodationist approach to the LTTE. Therefore, despite Karuna's defection, the general public preferred peace negotiations to a military campaign

in dealing with the LTTE. Consequently, it was not Karuna's defection but the LTTE's disturbance of this election - and the resultant appointment of Rajapaksa - that meant the state resorted to military offensive. The second criticism is that the LTTE's disruption of the election in the northeastern area was a strategic action to have Rajapaksa elected instead of Wickmersinghe. In this standpoint, the LTTE made a strategic move to have Rajapaksa elected, anticipating his use of a military offensive, because the group wanted to resume he war, but at the same time wished for the blame to be on the state (*Economist* 2007).

The third possible criticism is that it was not Karuna's defection but the state's military build-up and the foreign military assistance that brought the Eastern Province back to the hands of the state, resulting in the demise of the LTTE. There is no doubt that other factors also contributed to this outcome; the Sri Lankan state had been investing in its military might even during the ceasefire period. It also gained assistance from foreign governments in outlawing those LTTE-affiliated organizations abroad, and in obtaining weapons and intelligence of the utmost value. However, the argument of the proposed theory is that these efforts in themselves were fostered, to a significant extent by Karuna's defection and the subsequent leak of information, which significantly raised the prospect for the state victory.

4.5.1.4 Assessment

The analysis of the LTTE revealed that the effects of mass desertions on the LTTE, in its first and second and third phases, were consistent with the proposed theory.

In the first phase, the LTTE experienced some desertions and defections. As the LTTE was vulnerable and reliant on selective recruitment by task, the proposed theory predicts the group to have suffered severe damage or to have taken 'crisis actions'. However, these desertions did not result in to the demise of the LTTE, and consequently,

these cases may be considered anomalies to the theory. The analysis above demonstrates that the defectors did not turn to the Sri Lankan state for collaboration. Rather, they either created an independent rebel group against the state, or cooperated with the Indian government, which at that time had little incentive or capacity to intervene in the civil war. Therefore, these defections did not lead to a significant information leak from the group to the Sri Lankan state, and did not force the group to exit the war. To an extent, these events turned out to be deviations that confirm the proposed theory, delineating the importance of the information leak.

In the second (and third) phases of the LTTE, the group experienced the desertion of Karuna and his followers. The effect of his defection was considerable. Again, it is possible to see this effect as a deviation from the proposed theory. From the late 1990s, the LTTE adopted conventional warfare as its military strategy and became less vulnerable to information leak. The group also started to use force for recruitment. Therefore, a major desertion should not have had a significant impact on the LTTE. However, it is my argument that the LTTE to some extent remained vulnerable to information leak even into its second phase. The group was still positioned towards the edge of an island country and lacked a safe haven abroad. The LTTE continued to rely on terrorism - operations highly vulnerable to information leak - and faced the strong state of Sri Lanka. Because of this fact, the group built a conscription system instead of resorting to abductions as a means of recruitment. It is also for this reason I argue that Karuna's desertion had such a significant impact (though measured of pace) on the LTTE. Karuna brought information to the Sri Lankan state, which greatly increased the efficiency of state military operations against the

LTTE. It was for this reason that the LTTE resorted to mass abduction after Karuna's defection, and ultimately lost the conflict with the state.

4.5.2 Impact of Desertions on the LRA

As I discussed in Chapter Three, the LRA was highly vulnerable in its first phase of operations. In the second phase, however, the group acquired a safe haven in southern Sudan, and thus became much less vulnerable. Consequently, the group shifted its recruitment strategy from the use of task incentives to mass abduction. My argument implies that if mass desertion happened in the first phase, it should have caused a significant damage to the LRA. If it happened in the second phase, however, mass desertion should not have as much impact on the LRA.

The available evidence shows that mass desertion, or its equivalents, occurred both in the first and the second phases of the LRA. At first sight, these two events appear to have had equally severe effects upon the LRA, which, if true, defies the prediction of the proposed theory. However, closer observation reveals that the two events varied in their effects on the LRA. In the first phase, an equivalent of mass desertion – the government's mass arrest of LRA members and collaborators – caused a severe blow to the LRA. In the second phase, however, mass desertion from the LRA did not significantly damage the group. Rather, it was the Ugandan state's efforts to undermine the invulnerable position of the LRA that caused such damage. The state intensified its diplomatic efforts to stop Sudan from offering a safe haven to the LRA. The Ugandan state also built new military roads in the north to increase mobility and pursue the LRA within that region. These findings are so far consistent with the proposed theory.

Below, I will first identify he predictions of the proposed theory for the effects of mass desertions on the LRA.I will then discuss the available evidence, which provides a support for the proposed theory

4.5.2.1 LRA: Predictions

The LRA was vulnerable in its first phase. Therefore, the group relied primarily on task incentives for recruitment, implying that the group should have suffered greatly if a major desertion took place within this phase. If the group had suffered mass desertion in this phase, it would either have taken a 'crisis action' or demised. However, the problem of endogeneity presents a challenge to test this implication. The group experienced a low desertion rate in this period, because it relied on task incentives for recruitment. One way to mitigate this problem is to focus on an event qualitatively similar to a major desertion and assessing its impact on the LRA. Such an event was the state's arrest of LRA members and collaborators in 1991, which should have resulted in a disclosure of important information from the LRA to the Ugandan state. The proposed theory, therefore predicts that the LRA took a 'crisis action' or demised as a result of this event.

In the second phase, the LRA commenced mass abduction, because the group acquired a safe haven in southern Sudan and consequently became far less vulnerable to desertion. Therefore, the proposed theory expects the group to have suffered little from mass desertion and any resultant information leaks. Earlier in this chapter, I pointed out that the LRA, in its second phase, experienced a large number of desertions. The case, therefore, allows me to examine whether these desertions had significant negative effects on the survival of the group. If these desertions resulted in major setbacks for the group, they provide evidence against the proposed theory. However, if they did not, the evidence supports the proposed theory.

4.5.2.2 LRA: Phase I (1988 – 1994)

As the LRA was a task-based organization in its first phase, the proposed theory predicts that a major desertion from the group would increase the military investment and operation by the state, and that the rebel group neared exit from the war. However, as in the case of the LTTE in its first phase, the LRA did not experience mass desertion during this period. While this fact supports the main argument of this research - that a task-based group is likely to experience a low desertion rate - it poses a problem in assessing the validity of the hypothesis on the relationship between mass desertion from a rebel group, and the ensuing impact on the state's behavior and the rebel group.

To mitigate this problem, I will focus on the 1991incident of mass arrest, of rebel members and their collaborators by the state. Of course, those arrested by the state may be different from deserters, both in their incentives and the state's perceptions of them. However, so long as the leak of information from the group is concerned, it is reasonable to assume that the state arrest of rebel members would have a similar impact, as their desertion from the group by their own initiative. Therefore, a study of the case provides me with an opportunity to examine what sort of effects a major desertion from the LRA would have had on the Ugandan state and on the LRA, in this period.[90]

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[90] Of course, the question remains why the state conducted mass arrests. I consider the operation to be indicative of the state's attempt to selectively induce information disclosure from the group by use of force. The strategy differs from the conventional use of the military force to directly target the rebel group, as well as from the strategy to induce defection in a non-selective manner, namely, a public offer of amnesty. As mentioned in the section on amnesty offers earlier in this chapter, the proposed theory posits that for the state facing a task-based group, a selective attempt to induce an information leak from the group is more efficient than the other two strategies. Hence, it supports the argument of the proposed theory that the Ugandan state conducted mass arrests of the LRA members and collaborators.

The Ugandan state military and the police commenced a four-month operation to arrest members and collaborators of the LRA, on March 31, 1991. The Minister of State for Defense, Maj. Gen. David Tinyefuza, initiated this operation, which was later called Operation North. The immediate purpose of the operation was to capture rebel collaborators. The state used arbitrary arrests and blanket cordon and scorch operations to arrest the rebels (O'Kadameri 2002: 35). While the scale of the entire operation is unclear, in the initial one and a half months of the operation, the Ugandan state is reported to have arrested at least 1,600 people, of which 150 were "confirmed rebels" (*Agence France Presse* 1991a). The list of the arrested included prominent politicians: such as Foreign Affairs Minister Daniel Omara Atubo; a former Ugandan high commissioner to London and a rehabilitation minister in the post-Idi Amin government, Andrew Adimola; and National Resistance Council members Zachary Olum and Irene ApiuJulu (*Agence France Presse* 1991b).

State Response and Impact on the LRA The mass arrests of LRA collaborators and the subsequent NRA offensive against the LRA had two effects on the group. First, the LRA suffered a severe military loss due to the state military offensives. While there is no reliable data on the exact number of LRA members in this period, the NRA announced that the number of the LRA members declined from thousands to hundreds by 1992 (O'Kadameri 2002: 35-36). News reports from the late 1980s estimated the size of the LRA to be around 1,000 or 2,000. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program estimates the size of the LRA declined from 500, in 1991, to 200 in 1994 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2009). In 1992, due to NRA offensives, Kony was left in the Pararoch bush with only 52

others, and survived without food for approximately a week.[91] As the LRA continued to harass civilians throughout the early 1990s, it is obvious that the LRA survived the UPDF offensive, and either maintained or regained its numerical strength. Still, it is unquestionably the case that the NRA's offensives during this period severely impacted the LRA.

Second, as a consequence of this military loss, the LRA participated in peace negotiations, for the first time, with the Ugandan government, the two parties signing a ceasefire agreement. Admittedly, it was not the LRA but the government – Betty Bigombe, the Minister of State in Office of the Prime Minister, Resident in Northern Uganda – who initiated the process. However, it should be noted that the LRA did not present any political demands on postwar Northern Uganda. Rather, their demands mostly concerned the guarantee of LRA members' personal security, and recognition of the legitimacy of the group and its members. For example, in the first formal meeting between the LRA and the state on November 25, 1993, the LRA delegates said that they set no condition for the peace talk. The LRA requested that the government take the following steps: issue general amnesty to all the members of the LRA; recognize the LRA as a partner for peace and not a surrendering force; to exclude ex-UPDA officials from the talk; to formalize the ceasefire with the LRA; to give the LRA time to reorganize itself for demobilization; and to treat sick and wounded members of the LRA in government hospitals (O'Kadameri 2002: 37-38). These requests from the LRA indicate that the group was desperate to halt the offensive of

[91] Interview in Gulu on March 27 (A), 2009.

the NRA, although it is hard to ascertain whether they sincerely sought a peace agreement or just a temporary relief from the offensive to reorganize itself for yet another conflict.[92]

The peace talk between the two parties brought a tentative peace in Gulu and Kitgum, especially after Kony and Bigombe met at the second meeting held in Pagik on January 11. At the fourth meeting on February 2, 1994, at Tegot-Atto, LRA's Field Commander George Omona and the NRA's Fourth Division Commander Colonel Wasswa signed a ceasefire agreement.

To summarize, the mass arrest of the LRA members and their collaborators by the state appears to have caused a significant information leak from the group to the Ugandan state. As a result, the NRA intensified its military operations, causing severe military casualties for the LRA, which, as a task-based group, was highly reliant on secrecy for its survival. Consequently, the LRA positively sought a peace agreement with the government, entering a ceasefire agreement with them.

However, the peace process between the two parties broke down in February 1994. On February 6, Museveni visited Gulu and announced a seven-day ultimatum to the LRA to surrender their arms and personnel. Two weeks later, the LRA fighters moved into southern Sudan to install camps. The Sudanese government had earlier decided to harbor

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[92] In contrast, the Ugandan government's stance toward the peace negotiation was more ambiguous (O'Kadameri 2002). While Bigombe was fully committed to the success of the peace talk, she had never gained public support from President Museveni, although he is said to have been supportive of her effort. Prime Minister George Cosmas Adyebo - Bigombe's immediate boss- even refused logistical support for her progress within the peace process. Although only some took part in the peace process, the NRA commanders were reluctant to fully endorse the process, and their behavior at the negotiation table reportedly caused tensions with the LRA delegates. While their negative attitudes toward the peace process may be a reflection of their personal stakes in the war, it also supports the analysis that the NRA's offensives caused significant damage to the LRA and thus they had a fewer reasons to seek a peace agreement than the LRA.

the LRA in its territory, for two reasons: first, it wanted to have the LRA fight against the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM); second, the Sudanese government sought to counteract the Ugandan government's support for the SPLM. This decision on the part of the Sudanese suddenly changed the situation for the LRA; significantly reducing the vulnerability of the group so they could afford to quit the ceasefire agreement or the ultimatum from Museveni. The two parties, consequently, returned to war. This change in the LRA's policy confirms, rather than contradicts the logic of the proposed theory. The LRA had little choice but to seek a peace agreement with the Ugandan government before they secured support from the Sudanese government. However, once they received assurance from Khartoum for the security of their safe-haven, it significantly reduced the vulnerability of the group, making it possible for them to ignore the government's ultimatum.

4.5.2.3 LRA: Phase II (1994 – 1999/early 2000s)

When the LRA crossed the border, from Uganda to Southern Sudan, and installed camps in that locale, the group became much less vulnerable to information leak than before their relocation. Consequently, the LRA started to rely almost exclusively on abduction for the recruitment of its new members. As discussed earlier in this chapter, this shift in the LRA - from a task-based group to a force-based group - resulted in an increase in the number of deserters. However, the desertions in themselves did not cause significant damage to the LRA.

As we can see in Figure 20, the number of deserters (Escaped) increased from 1994 onwards, and basically paralleled changes in the number of the abducted. In 1996, the number of deserters per year for the first time exceeded 1,000. After a decrease 1999 and

2001, the number suddenly increased to more than 2,500, in 2002, and rose again to approximately 6,000 in 2003.

However, as the analytical focus of this research is on the leak of information from the rebel group to the state, it is more useful at this point to focus on the changes in the amount of deserters received by the state. Here, we can see that the number of those received by the government exceeded 500 every year between 1998 and 2005. The figure shows its first increase in 1997-1998, followed by much sharper rises from 2002 to 2005.

State Response The increase in the numbers of deserters and reporters in themselves, however, did not significantly affect the state's military operations against the LRA. Admittedly, a cursory review of the data regarding the Ugandan government's military expenses, and its battles with the LRA, gives a different impression. The increase in the number of deserters from the LRA in the early 2000s was accompanied by the government's efforts to mobilize more resources in the military sector. However, a closer look at the data and the history reveals that this correlation is spurious. It was not the variation in the number of deserters or defectors from the LRA that affected the government's military expenditure and military operations against the group. Rather, it was changes in the level of the group's vulnerability that was behind the state's intensified offensives. Moreover, it was the Ugandan state's own diplomatic and military efforts that effectively undermined the LRA's position and raised its vulnerability. Moreover, the success by the state appears, to some extent, to have increased the number of deserters from the LRA, which is why there is some correlation between the number of deserters from the LRA and the state's mobilization of its resources to fight the group.

In the second and third phases of the LRA, between 1995 and 2006, the state's military expenditure and its share in the country's GDP increased simultaneously on several occasions. This increase occurred in 1996, 1998-1999, 2002-2003, and 2005. In some of these years, the UPDF carried out major offensives against the LRA. In 2002, the UPDF conducted Operation Iron Fist and in 2005, they carried out Operation Iron Fist II. At the same time as the increases in state military expenditure - in the years 1997-1998 and 2002-2003 – there occurred an increase in the number of information leaks from the group. The associations between these two occurrences, indicates that an increase in the number of reporters from the LRA caused an increase the state's military expenditure.

Figure 24 Military Expenditure of the Ugandan Government

(1995-2008)



Source: Calculated from the data in the World Bank (2009)

Figure 25 Percentage of the Military Expenditure in GDP in Uganda (2005-2008)



Source: The World Bank (2009)

It is, however, also reasonable to assume that the increase in the state's military expenditures and its intensified military operations against the LRA, augmented the number of deserters from the group. A qualitative analysis of each period supports this conjecture. First, the UPDF carried out major operations against Allied Democratic Force (ADF) in the western part of Uganda from 1997 to 1999. The increase in the military expenditures in 1998-1999, therefore, reflects these operations.

Second, it was due to the sudden rise in the vulnerability of the LRA that the increases in state military expenditure occurred in 2002-2003. In March 2002, the Ugandan

government reached an agreement with the Sudanese government in Nairobi. The agreement allowed the UPDF to conduct military operations against the LRA in Sudanese territory, within 100 km of the border between the two countries. This agreement increased the optimism of the Ugandan government regarding the prospect of a military victory over the LRA. In the same month, the UPDF commenced Operation Iron Fist, a massive offensive against the LRA camps in southern Sudan, such as those in Bin rwot and Lalaa. Two things should be noted here: first, a sudden increase in the number of defectors from the LRA followed, not precipitated, the March 2002 agreement and the initiation of Operation Iron Fist. Therefore, it was not the inflow of information from deserters that motivated the government to conduct the Operation Iron Fist, but the opposite occurrence; second, the operation failed to achieve its objective – to finish off the LRA – and the LRA consequently initiated large-scale retaliatory attacks on civilians inside Uganda, from August 2002 through 2003. The UPDF was forced to respond to these attacks, resulting in large military expenditures throughout the same period.

A third assumption is that the increase in the government military expense in 2005 was as a result of the undermined security of the LRA and the UPDF's expectation the group's demise. While attempts for peace negotiations continued throughout 2005, the Ugandan's government's inclination for a military solution over peace negotiations soon became apparent. Mayo writes: "In the second half of the year [2005], various donor countries including Ireland, the United Kingdom, Holland, Denmark and Sweden, decided to cut their aid to the Ugandan government because Yoweri Museveni was prioritizing the military campaign over the peace negotiations" (Royo 2008: 14). However, behind these actions was not an increase in the flow of information from deserters, but the changing

situation in Sudan itself, ultimately undermining the security of the LRA. First, in January 2005, the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A signed a peace agreement, thus increasing the chances of a UPDF victory. This meant that the Sudanese government now had much less of an incentive to support the LRA than previously. As early as 1999, in the Nairobi Agreement, the Sudanese government promised the Ugandan government that they would not support the LRA. While the Khartoum government had arguably ceased its support for the LRA since 1999, local units of the military were reported to have continued their assistance to the LRA. Therefore, the peace agreement in Sudan raised expectations that the Sudanese government would ultimately curtail its support for the group. Another event that destabilized the position of the LRA was yet another agreement between the Ugandan and Sudanese governments, allowing the UPDF to operate in Sudanese territory. The two governments signed the agreement in November 2005, obtaining permission for the UPDF, to go further into Sudanese territory to find the LRA.

Therefore, in 2005, with the changes in the Sudanese government's policy on southern Sudan, coupled with the UPDF's Operation Iron Fist II launched in March 2004, there occurred a serious undermining of the LRA's position, which was reliant on the safe haven in southern Sudan and material support from the Sudanese government. The ensuing damage is evident in the LRA's attempt to escape from Uganda and Sudan, to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The first section of the LRA, led by Vincent Otti, moved to the Garamba National Park in September 2005, to set up a base.[93] The group's incurred damage is also evident in the reduced number of cases of abduction (see Figure

[93] Interview, Gulu, March 31, 2009.

20). Given these developments, the Ugandan government saw an increase in the relative efficiency of military offensives against the group, and invested more in its military sector.

To summarize, during the second and third phases of the LRA, the large number of deserters from the LRA, and their reports to the Ugandan government, did not significantly affect the Ugandan investment in military actions. While mass desertion from the group, and a high military expenditure by the government coincided in some years, the concurrence is more likely the result of a third factor: the Sudanese government's cooperation with the Ugandan government or a potential for such collaboration, effectively undermining the invulnerable position of the LRA. As a result, the Ugandan government's military operation against the LRA improved in their efficiency, which is why the government was more inclined to pursue military campaigns against the LRA. As a result of the government's military action, the number of deserters from the LRA increased.

Impact on the LRA Mass desertion from the LRA, in itself, had little impact on the behavior of the group. If the group was task-based - in the case of a major desertion - the proposed theory would predict the group to initiate a peace process, carry out mass abduction and launch a preemptive attack, or suffer significant damage at the hands of the state military forces. As the LRA was force-based, however, the theory predicts that desertion had little effect on its behavior, a prediction supported by the available evidence. True, the LRA did take 'crisis actions', such as initiating peace processes and carrying out preemptive attacks. Moreover, the group suffered significant military setbacks. Yet, mass desertion from the group was not the primary cause for these events. In the next section, I will demonstrate the other causes behind these events. Important factors include: the Sudanese government's cooperation with its Ugandan counterpart

mentioned above. A further factor was the state's construction of military roads in the north of Uganda, which greatly increased the mobility of the UPDF. Below, I will discuss the LRA's participation in the peace processes, its military losses to the UPDF, and relocation to Garamba.

Firstly, however, it was not the desertions but the increase in its vulnerability that made the LRA join the peace processes. Also, the LRA, or at least Kony appears to have lacked serious intent within these processes, using such occasions to reorganize the group for future battles. While there were a few attempts by third parties to initiate peace processes in the 1990s, none of them included peace talks between the two parties. Since the mass desertions from the LRA in 1998, the group participated in formal or informal communication with the government at four points in time, beginning in July 2002, November 2004, February 2005, and in May 2006.[94] Three of these processes started after the LRA's vulnerability was severely increased. The July 2002 process started after the Uganda-Sudan agreement to allow the former to enter the latter's territory in pursuit of the LRA as part of the UPDF's Operation Iron Fist. The February 2005 process commenced after the signing of the peace agreement between the Sudanese government and the SPLA. The May 2006 process was initially called for by the Ugandan government and the LRA in November 2005, after the Uganda-Sudan agreement, allowing for the UPDF's deep penetration into the latter's territory, forced the LRA across the border to the Garamba National Park in the DRC. The LRA's, or more specifically Kony's insincerity in the peace process, was signified by the surrender of Sam Kolo, LRA's principal delegate to the 2005

[94] As such communications typically started in secrecy, with communications through third parties, (mostly local NGOs), it is difficult to ascertain exactly which side initiated these communications.

peace process. Kolo was reportedly disappointed by Kony's lack of commitment to the peace process, and defected from the LRA. Also, in the Juba Peace Process, despite the lengthy communications between the two parties from May 2006 to March 2008 - to prepare the Final Peace Agreement - Kony failed to appear for the signing of the agreement, on April 10, 2008.[9596]

Therefore, mass desertion in itself did not bring about the demise of the LRA. If it did, it was only when coupled with the state's diplomatic efforts to curtail the Sudanese support for the LRA, and the state's creation of military roads in the north of Uganda. These initiatives by the state increased the vulnerability of the LRA and resulted in the demise of the group.

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[95] The agreement was originally set to be signed in March 2008. As Kony did not show up on this date, the signing of the agreement was postponed twice, first to April 5 and then to April 10. Kony failed to appear on any of these dates.

[96] It is possible that the 2000 Amnesty Act in fact discouraged the LRA from fully committing to the peace process, because the Act allowed some of the LRA leaders, those more inclined to reach a peace agreement with the government, to desert the LRA. In the 2000s, some LRA leaders sincerely sought a peace agreement with the government. However, their voice was never dominant within the LRA leadership, partly because these doves decided to leave the group and enjoy the benefits of the Amnesty Act, rather than staying inside the LRA and trying to change the course of its policy. If the Amnesty Act did not exist, it is likely that these doves would have taken one of the following two ways: first, they could have united themselves and made the LRA commit itself to the peace process; or second, they might have organized themselves as well as their soldiers, and negotiated a peace with the government. This second case differs from what actually happened because, without the Amnesty Act, they would have seen the need for bargaining with the government for the conditions for their defection, and thus organized more of their soldiers to increase their bargaining power (as Karunainthe LTTE did). Hence, the 2002 Amnesty Act not only created an option for doves to desert the LRA, but also prevented negotiation between themselves and the government on the terms of their surrender, by legally tying the government's hands on this issue. Consequently, the Act not only prevented the LRA from reforming and committing itself to the peace process, but also discouraged a major split of the group on this matter.

4.5.2.4 Assessment

In this part, I examined whether LRA members' desertions significantly damaged the group in its first and second phases. The purpose of this exercise was to assess whether the effects of mass desertion on the LRA were consistent with the proposed theory. From the first phase to the second phase, the group's recruitment strategy changed from recruitment by task to mass abduction. The proposed theory explains this change as a result of the dramatic decrease in the group's vulnerability in 1994, when the group moved to southern Sudan. An implication of the theory, therefore, is that the group became less vulnerable to information leak through deserters than previously. Mass desertions, therefore, should have significantly damaged the LRA in its first phase, but not in its second phase.

Because the LRA did not experience mass desertion in its first phase, I examined the impact of the state intelligence activities on the LRA throughout this period, and then the effects of mass desertion on the group in its second phase. As both incidents involved the flow of information from the LRA to the state, it is methodologically acceptable to compare their effects. The findings from the analyses showed that the state intelligence activity did significantly affect the LRA and almost force it out of the civil war, as the size of the group was significantly reduced by 1992, and the group was seriously considering a compromise with the state. If not for the Sudanese government's offer of safe haven, the LRA might have concluded a peace agreement or been defeated by the UPDF.

In the second phase, in contrast, the group experienced a huge number of deserters. However, these incidences had little effect on the position of the LRA. True, the group was forced to move to the Garamba National Park in 2005, and then fled the park to drift around the region in late 2008. However, this change in the group's military power was a

result of the Ugandan state's diplomatic efforts and military build-up. These policies were aimed at increasing the vulnerability of the LRA, and had little to do with deserters from the group.

It is my conclusion, therefore, that the observed effects of mass desertion on the Ugandan state and the LRA, in phases one and two, were consistent with the proposed theory, which explains the changes in the variation in the effects of major desertions on the LRA over time.

4.5.3 Comparison of the LTTE and the LRA

It is useful at this point to compare the two groups in their second phases as such analysis constitutes an important evidence for the proposed theory. While both groups carried out forcible recruitment in their second phases, their practices differed to a significant extent. The LRA simply carried out mass abduction, whereas the LTTE, by contrast, adopted a more systematic means of recruiting its members through conscription. The latter strategy reduces the risk of members' desertion, due to the capacity of the group to go after the deserters and punish their families. In Chapter Three, I argued that the difference between the two groups in their recruitment practices originated in the variation in their levels of vulnerability to information leak. The LTTE was much more vulnerable to leaks of information than the LRA. As a result, the LTTE relied on a recruitment strategy that ensured desertion rates remained low. Therefore, an implication of the theory is that once a major desertion occurs, it should have more seriously undermined the security of the LTTE than that of the LRA.

The discussion above conforms to this prediction. Karuna's defection in 2004 had fatal consequences for the LTTE, although its effects took several years to materialize. The

LTTE surrendered to the state military forces in May 2009, with as yet little possibility of its return. The LRA also experienced a large numbers of deserters from 1994 onwards, the total number of deserters being far larger than that of the LTTE. Still, the group continued operations unaffected throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s. Only after the two governments in Uganda and Sudan initiated rapprochement, and gradually removed the safe haven for the LRA, did the group find itself in trouble.

Therefore, the proposed theory explains the differential effects of mass desertion on the two groups in their second phases, by referring to the difference in their vulnerabilities to information leak, which were associated with their chosen recruitment strategies.

4.5.4 Summary

The primary purpose of this section was to examine the validity of my coding of the vulnerability of the LRA and the LTTE in each of its phases, and see whether their members' desertions had the type of effects predicted by the proposed theory. For this purpose, I analyzed the effects of major desertions from the LTTE and the LRA on the courses of civil war in Sri Lanka and Uganda respectively. While it was not possible to conduct a proper analysis on the LTTE in its first phase, due to the lack of mass desertion in this period, the analysis of the other cases – Karuna's defection from the LTTE, the NRA's arrest of LRA collaborators in 1991, and the mass desertions from the LRA in early 2000s – provide support to the proposed theory.

As the alternative theories do not have clear implications as to the impact of desertions on the survival of the rebel groups, the criteria I set to test is whether the available evidence from the cases of the LTTE and the LRA, conforms to the predictions of the theory.

The clearest evidence comes from a comparison of the two groups in their second and third phases. Both groups experienced major desertions. However, as predicted by the proposed theory, their effects on the two groups differed. The Karuna faction's desertion was a fatal blow for the LTTE. The group suffered not only a loss of human resources, but also the leak of information from Karuna. The latter led the Sri Lankan state to intensify its investment in military operations including intensive intelligence operations, while a pessimism about the future of the group led some of the remaining members to covertly cooperate with Karuna, providing a continuous outflow of information from the group. The LTTE finally surrendered to the state military forces in May 2009. In contrast, desertions from the LRA in its second phase, had relatively limited effects on the fate of the group. While the LRA was gradually weakened militarily, and was forced to move from southern Sudan to Garamba in the DRC, it was not the mass desertion which caused these problems, in spite of their frequency and size. Rather, it was due to the diplomatic efforts of the Ugandan state and the changes in the political environment within Sudan. Also, the LRA continued to survive in the DRC and its neighbors. This difference conforms to the prediction of the theory, that a major desertion has a more serious effect on a group with a more selective recruitment strategy, than on those with a less selective strategy.

The findings in this section confirm Gates' argument that desertions from rebel groups do not have a straightforward effect on the power balance between the group and the state (Gates 2002). However, the findings also further the argument by highlighting that their effects on the power balance or the fate of the rebel group depends on another variable – the vulnerability of the rebel group to an information leak. While it is necessary to conduct a more comprehensive cross-sectional and time series analyses on desertions and

rebel groups, to see if the finding has external validity, the conclusions in this section provide a sufficient reason to carry on such an analysis.

4.6 Conclusion

The primary purpose of this chapter was to assess the validity of the causal mechanism in the proposed theory. For this purpose, I conducted three tests: first, I assessed the validity of the assumption that recruitment strategies vary in their selection effects. To test this assumption, I examined desertion rates in the LTTE and the LRA in each period; second, I assessed the consistency of the state behavior with the proposed theory, specifically examining the state offers of amnesty in each period to identify the levels of selectivity in state counter-insurgency strategies; third, I assessed the validity of my coding of vulnerability of rebel groups in each period, by examining the effects of mass desertion on rebel groups and the state in each period. The findings in this chapter support the proposed theory.

The LTTE, as a strictly task-based group, experienced a low desertion rate in its first phase. The state hardly offered amnesty to the LTTE members to induce their desertions, except in the Indo-Lanka Accord, whose target was the leadership of the group and not its ranks. In its second phase, the LTTE became a moderately force-based group. The desertion rate rose, and the Sri Lankan state invested more in offers of amnesty. Karuna's desertion from the LTTE had a significant impact on the fate of the civil war. The Sri Lankan state gradually shifted from compliance with the 2002 CFA, to military campaigns in order to defeat the LTTE, which the state accomplished in 2009.

The history of the war in northern Uganda also provides support for the argument. The LRA was primarily task-based in its first phase, and had a low desertion rate. The

Ugandan state offered amnesty to its members during the peace negotiations in 1993-4, but not otherwise. Although there was no case of mass desertion from the group, after the NRA conducted extensive cordon and search operations and arrested a number of LRA collaborators, the NRA inflicted severe military damage on the LRA. While the NRA's actions forced the LRA to commence peace negotiations in 1993, the group also sought Sudanese assistance – safe haven and material support - to reduce its vulnerability, obtaining such assistance in 1994. Consequently, Sudan's assistance to the LRA not only ended the peace talks with the Ugandan authorities, but also made the LRA a force-based organization. Therefore, from 1994, the desertion rate from the group increased over time. In response, the Ugandan state unilaterally offered an unconditional amnesty to deserters from the group. However, the impact of such desertion on the conflict was not as significant as the NRA's cordon and search operation in 1991, or of Karuna's defection from the LTTE. It was not the variations in the number of deserters, but the changes in the vulnerability of the LRA – affected primarily by domestic politics in Sudan – that changed the course of the conflict, such as state initiation of military campaigns and the LRA's moves to initiate peace talks.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

5.1 Summary of Findings

In Chapter Two, I developed a theory of rebel recruitment that places rebel group's vulnerability to information leak and the types of tasks within the group at the center. I started with the selection effects of different recruitment strategies: Recruitment by task incentives attracts only loyal and capable agents; Recruitment by common incentives attracts not only those but also disloyal and capable ones; Recruitment by force enlists all types of agents including disloyal and incapable ones. Starting with this classification, I argued that rebel groups choose their recruitment strategies based on their functional needs, specifically the vulnerability of the group to information leak and the types of tasks to be performed in the group. The analyses pointed to the importance of several factors, such as the military strategy of the rebel group, and the geography surrounding the group for the group's choice of its recruitment strategies.

The purpose of this dissertation was to develop a theory of rebel recruitment and assess its plausibility. In order to do so, I conducted case studies of the LTTE and the LRA. The validity of the proposed theory was tested against the comparison of the two group's recruitment strategies as well as their changes over time. I also drew three implications from the proposed theory to the desertion rates in the rebel groups, counter-insurgency strategies of the states in conflict against the rebel groups, and the impacts of desertion from rebel groups on the courses of civil wars. The findings from the cases of the LTTE and the LRA mostly supported the proposed theory.

Now that I have reviewed the findings of this research, I will return to the issues raised in the introduction and discuss the implications of this research to these concerns.

5.2 Theoretical Implications

In Chapter One, I mentioned that this study has important implications for three areas of research in political science, that is, ethnicity, duration of civil wars, and the political theory of organization. In this section, I discuss the implications of this study to the literature on each of these issues in turn. However, it is important to acknowledge that the study raises further questions for scholars in this area than can be addressed in this thesis.

5.2.1 The Role of Ethnicity in Rebel Recruitment

The findings in this research question the relationship between ethnicity and the recruitment practice of 'ethnic' rebel groups. While the studies on ethnicity and use of violence are voluminous, relatively few works addressed questions about ethnicity and rebel recruitment, such as 'do ethnic groups use recruitment strategies different from other sorts of rebel groups?' or 'when and why do ethnic rebel groups recruit those who are not co-ethnics?' Admittedly, this research does not directly take on the issue of ethnicity in civil wars. Still, it is useful to reflect upon the concept and its relevance to the organization of rebel groups, given the theoretical and empirical findings in this study. This is partly because of the growth in the number of studies on ethnicity and conflict.[97] It is also because the two groups analyzed in this research were both ethnic rebel groups. In the literature, there are two criteria to decide whether a rebel group is ethnic or not. One is to examine the discourse of the rebel group. If the group defines its goal or the

[97] For useful reviews of the literature on ethnicity and conflict, see, for example, Lars-Erik Cederman (2002), Fearon and Laitin (2000) and Kanchan Chandra (2006).

potential beneficiaries of its military struggle in terms of certain ethnic groups, the group is coded as ethnic (e.g. Sambanis 2001). The other way is to assess the ethnic composition of the rebel group and code it as ethnic if the proportion of its members -of the majority ethnic group within the rebel group - exceeds a certain threshold (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The LTTE and the LRA qualify as ethnic rebel groups in both of these criteria.

One implication of the research is that there appears to be no necessary connection between ethnonationalist claims of the rebel group and its recruitment practice. The existing literature tends to associate ethnic rebel groups with voluntary participation of its members. However, the LTTE and the LRA used both voluntary and coercive recruitment methods. Admittedly, the point in question is not novel to this research. John Mueller (2000; 2004)addressed how economic incentives and force were used for recruitment in supposedly 'ethnic' wars. Moreover, David Laitin (1999)examined the use of violence by the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA, Basque Homeland and Freedom) for recruitment. Also, in order to properly assess the relationship between ethnonationalist claims of the rebel groups and their recruitment practices, it is necessary to conduct further research designed to address this issue. Still, a cursory observation of these two ethnic rebel groups and other rebel groups in the world suggests that there may not be a significant relationship between ethnic (or certain other political) claims of the rebel group and its recruitment strategy, at least regarding the choice between voluntary and coercive strategies.

The second and related implication of this study is that strategic consideration for the survival of the group may prevail over the ethnic consideration in rebel recruitment. Although the LTTE and the LRA advocate ethnic agendas and have dominant ethnic

groups in their ranks, both groups recruited or at least tried to recruit their members from other ethnic groups. The LTTE attempted to recruit Muslims and the LRA abducted those who were Teso. While both groups were not blind to the ethnicity of the potential recruits, they were certainly not ethnically exclusive in their recruitment strategy. When they had insufficient number of volunteers or targets for abduction, these groups intentionally targeted members of other ethnic groups.

The question then becomes what role ethnicity plays in ethnic rebel groups' recruitment strategies. A possible answer is social network. As co-ethnics tend to share common social networks, an ethnic group has more local knowledge about co-ethnics than about those from other ethnic groups. The group, therefore, can utilize its local knowledge about co-ethnic individuals as a screening mechanism and select targets for recruitment, mitigating the adverse selection problem. Those in the same network may also have something akin to a personal bondage, which strengthens the relationship between the rebel leaders and the combatants. Either way, these logics imply that recruitment of co-ethnics is more efficient for leaders of ethnic rebel groups because it reduces the risk of desertion and defection by its members. This situation may be the case so long as the group relies on voluntary recruitment methods. Lucian Pye, for example, shows how the communist movement in Malaysia relied on an ethnic network among those with Chinese descent (Pye 1956). However, when the group uses coercive recruitment methods, the issue is not so simple. On the one hand, a rebel group can use its local knowledge about co-ethnics or personal ties between its members and civilians to select targets for recruitment. Groups can also use such knowledge to enforce an effective monitoring and punishment mechanism. On the other hand, however, the group also has an incentive to cut off the

existing ties between its members and civilians or among its members. The former is necessary to reduce the risks of desertion and defection by the forcibly recruited, while the latter is aimed at preventing collective dissent against the rebel leadership. In such cases, therefore, it may turn out costly for the rebel group to rely on social network among co-ethnics for recruitment.

The evidence from Sierra Leone's civil wars is consistent with the discussion in this section. While social ties with members of a rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), increased the likelihood of the non-member joining the group voluntarily, those ties also decreased the possibility of the group abducting the individual (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008).

The second way to understand the role of ethnicity in rebel recruitment is to focus on its function as an information cue.[98] When the local information is scarce about the preference and the capacity of the local population, leaders of ethnic rebel groups might expect the preferences of co-ethnics to be similar to those of the leaders. Also, co-ethnicity may suggest that they share the same cultural codes (c.f. Wedeen 2002) and thus can be more easily assimilated to the group than others. While the social network perspective assumes that the rebel group has some knowledge about individual co-ethnics, this second perspective assumes the group has little knowledge about individuals, whether they are co-ethnics or those from other ethnic groups. Facing uncertainty about the traits of individuals, the group uses ethnicity as a clue to build expectation about their traits.

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[98] On the use of ethnicity as an information cue, see, for example, Chandra (2004). In this study, voters use the ethnic standpoints of the political parties as information cues to decide which party to vote for.

The third way to conceptualize the relationship between ethnicity and rebel recruitment is to see it as an epiphenomenon of their accessibility. As co-ethnics tend to live in close geographical proximity, especially in Africa, a rebel group that forms in a region might simply find the members of the ethnic group majority in the area more accessible than other ethnic groups, and thus recruits more of them.

The evidence from the case of the RUF provides a support for the second and third views on ethnicity. Mende was an ethnic group over-represented in the RUF. Humphreys and Weinstein's (2008) analysis shows that controlling for the social ties, being a Mende is still associated with higher likelihood of membership in the group. However, this result is driven by the fact that a Mende is more likely to be abducted by the RUF. Being a Mende, in the meantime, did not guarantee a higher likelihood of joining the group voluntarily. Consequently, the RUF preferred to abduct Mendes over members of other ethnic groups, either because Mendes were more accessible or because the RUF thought that Mendes would make better fighters for the group. However, accessibility, in this instance, is not a function of geographic isolation. Humphreys and Weinstein control for the effects of geographical isolation by a variable called 'villages accessible by foot or boat only.' Therefore, it is more likely that accessibility is a function of the RUF's power relationship with the state and other rebel groups.

Therefore, it matters which concept best captures the role of ethnicity in rebel recruitment, For it has implications not only for the group's recruitment practices but also for the state's counterinsurgency policy, and for postwar Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation (DDR) programs.

5.2.2 Duration and Termination of Civil War

An obvious implication of this research to the literature on duration and termination of civil war is that it is necessary to pay attention to the characteristics of rebel organizations. Many existing studies in the literature conduct statistical analyses on the duration of civil war, using country-specific variables (e.g. Collier et al. 2004). While these studies incorporate environmental factors and state-side variables, they mostly ignore variation across rebel groups especially in their organizations. At this point, there exist few studies that take a dyadic approach to analysis of duration and termination of civil wars (Cunningham et al. 2009). Among these, Cunningham et al. conceptually differentiates the offensive capacity of the rebel groups (rebel strengths) from the ability of rebel groups to withstand or evade state offensives, which is similar to the concept of (in-)vulnerability in this study.

This study argues the need to further develop such studies, especially on the following three aspects first, while Cunningham et al. uses territorial control as a measure of the group's ability to defend itself, it is necessary to compile data on other factors that affect the groups' vulnerabilities, such as safe havens abroad. Admittedly, in the case of Cunningham et al., the authors highlighted their plan to incorporate this variable into their analysis. Second, this study suggests that the number and quality of deserters or defectors from the group affects the duration of civil war when the rebel group is vulnerable to information leak. It is therefore necessary to compile data on deserters and defectors from rebel groups, although the compilation of comprehensive data on deserters from a single rebel group is often impractical, as such incidents frequently occur under cover. Still, it is possible to utilize survey data to approximate the number of deserters and its changes over

time, or to identify 'major' cases of desertion in which a large number of combatants deserted together, or high-ranking members of the group deserted. Third, foreign aid may have different effects on a civil war's duration, depending on the content of the aid and the type of the rebel group. Some scholars found third-party intervention to have no effect on the duration of civil war. Elbadawi and Sambanis endogenize intervention by external actors into their model and find that expected intervention has a positive relationship with war duration (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002). Others found that only third-party intervention for rebels have the effect of shortening the duration of civil war, while intervention in support of the state has no significant effect. However, the sort of support third parties provide to the government may matter. This research suggests that a third party intervention could prove effective in shortening civil wars if it involves the build-up of state intelligence capability and the rebel group in the conflict is vulnerable to information leak. If the group is invulnerable to information leak, however, foreign aid in the build-up of intelligence capacity may not effectively shorten the duration of the war. Rather, third party intervention may be more effective if it involves measures that undermine the security of the group, such as making diplomatic efforts to curtail external support for the rebel group, or sending troops to increase the size of the state military. Fortunately, Patrick M. Regan (2002) compiled a dataset on foreign intervention in civil wars, which differentiates the different types of military intervention including provision of intelligence.[99]

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[99] Regan, Richard W. Frank, and Aysegul Aydin (2009) compiled a dataset on diplomatic interventions by foreign actors in civil conflicts. Their analysis demonstrated that diplomatic interventions contribute to the termination of civil war and postwar stability. It appears important to incorporate this form of intervention into the analysis on the effects

What factor would not be effective for war termination, in contrast, is general amnesty law during civil war. General amnesty is important for humanitarian reasons such as encouraging those who seek an escape from abuse within the rebel groups and to facilitate their smooth transition to civilian life. However, the proposed theory suggests that the state only seriously offers general amnesty when it is fighting against rebel groups that are invulnerable to information leak. Hence, general amnesty in itself is unlikely to contribute to the termination of the war, at least not through leak of information. Moreover, general amnesty potentially has two perverse effects: first, if the rebel group loses a large number of combatants due to the state's general amnesty, the group may seek to replace them by intensifying its forcible recruitment practices; second, it may hamper the process of organizational reform within the group or its shift toward peace. The state's offer of general amnesty tends to encourage moderates within the group to desert from the group, meaning that those who may otherwise have made an effort to reform the organization - to improve its relationship with civilians or to seek a peaceful solution to the war - tend to move out of the group, leaving it to the hands of extremists.[100] Bueno de Mesquita (2005) makes a similar point in his work, showing that the state's conciliatory policy toward terrorists may result in a temporary intensification of the terrorist violence due to the defection of the moderates to the state side. The proposed theory suggests that such policy may still prove effective to end the war if the rebel group is vulnerable to information leak. However, if the group is not vulnerable to information leak the negative effect of a

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of military and economic interventions on war duration in order to avoid missing variable biases. Of course, the relationship between these three modes of interventions seems complicated, and requires the development of theoretical and empirical studies for scholars to adequately model these variables simultaneously.

[100] The insight comes from Hirshman's study of organization in decline (Hirschman 2004).

conciliatory policy, such as an offer of general amnesty, may prove greater than predicted by Bueno de Mesquita; the state is likely to fail to terminate the war and the consequent intensification of the rebel violence may not be a temporary result.

5.2.3 Political Theory of Organization

In this study, I assumed a rebel group to seek security, and emphasized the importance of the level of vulnerability of rebel groups and their operations to information leak, in order to analyze the rebel leaders' choice of recruitment strategies. Also, a logical extension of this focus on the vulnerability of the rebel groups leads us beyond the principal-agent model (PA model) to a bargaining model. In the PA model, principal is assumed to design the organization singlehandedly to maximize the group's own interests. In the case of rebel groups, however, rebel leaders (principal) are sometimes vulnerable to information leak, which rebel members (agents) can bring about. This occurrence indicates that rebel members sometimes have bargaining power against the rebel leaders in designing the organization of the rebel group. However, this point is not entirely novel. Hirschman (2004), for example, pointed out that agents chose between two options, raising a voice for the reform of the organization, or exiting the group. However, in his analysis the decision-making process of the organization (and thus the chance for an agent to materialize the reform) was a given. Indeed, the decision-making process itself may be a subject for potential reform. Currently, there are some studies that take a bargaining approach to the development of institutions (Knight 1992). Fearon (1996) and Robert Powell (2004) respectively developed models that incorporate the dynamic aspects in interaction between two players over forms of an organization. These studies provide a starting point for political scientists to develop a theory that explains the

interaction between rebel leaders and rebel members over organizational reform and defection.

A difficulty in applying these theories to rebel organizations is to determine who have has the agency in the political process to determine the forms of organizations. In order to analyze the bargaining process between rebel leaders and other members, and its impact on the organization of the group, scholars need to know who deserve agency in the group. However, it is complicated to know, a priori, who has the power and interest to do so within the group as not all members of the group are able or willing to affect the course of organizational reform. There are three ways to address this problem: first, scholars can conceptualize the dependent variable, as the probability of a rebel group to experience an organizational reform or a split, without specifying the nature of the issue of contention or the direction of reform. Second, scholars can first observe the group and inductively decide who counts as an agent. It would be tautological if the scholar identifies agents, looking at only the outcomes such as desertion and organizational reform. However, if the scholar can measure the bargaining power and interest of the rebel members independent of such outcomes, this practice is a methodologically defensible and practical solution. Third, scholars can develop a theory that predicts the bargaining power and interest of members in rebel groups.

5.3 Policy Implications

The proposed theory has a number of policy implications for those who seek the termination of civil war, some of which are obvious from the discussion so far.

First, if an external actor is to provide assistance to the government to end the war swiftly, the actor needs be attentive to the type of the rebel group and support the

government in the area where it can directly assist the government in ending the war. If the group is vulnerable to information leak, for example, the external actor should support the government in providing intelligence and improving the government's and its own intelligence capacity. In contrast, if the group is invulnerable to information leak owing to the size of its military force or its safe haven abroad, the actor should either provide military personnel, or make diplomatic attempts to curtail the neighboring countries' accommodation of the group inside its territory.

Second, an external actor needs be aware of the limitation and the potential negative effects of the general amnesty law for peace and stability, if the actor is to support the action financially. General amnesty law could prove vital to address some humanitarian issues. However, it may not be effective in ending the use of violence by the rebel group. In fact, general amnesty law may intensify coercive recruitment practices by the group or its use of violence against civilians. Not only the government but also the external actors need to recognize the issues involved in the use of general amnesty, and weigh them against each other before deciding to support such action.

Overall, the findings in this research highlight several directions for further research; in the fields of studies of ethnicity in civil war, the duration of civil war, and the political theory of organization.

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A p p e n d i c e s

Appendix 1 Sri Lankan State's Offer of Amnesties to the LTTE*

yyyy.mm.dd	main purpose		communication and credibility				content		
	target**	political condition	timing	speaker/authority	publicity	legis-lation	personal incentive	personal condition	grace period
1987.2.19	.	.	ex ante	President Jayewarnede	yes	no	.		.
1987.5.28	rank and file	.	ex ante	Government	yes	no	.		.
1987.07	all	yes	ex ante	The National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali	yes	no	yes		.
1987.07.29	all	yes	ex ante	President Jayewarnede and Premier Rajiv Gandhi (Indo-Lanka Accord)	yes	yes	yes		revoked on Oct 9
1987.10.28	.	yes	ex ante	Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi	yes	no	.		.
1987.10.30	all	yes	ex ante	President Jayewardene	yes	no	.		.
1987.12.09	rank and file	.	ex ante	Indian Ambassador to Sri Lanka, JyotindraNath Dixit	yes	.	.		.
1988.06.30	.	yes	ex ante	Presidential secretariat	yes	.	.		.
1988.09.20	.	no	ex ante	Government communique	yes	no	.		.
1989.04.01	.	no	ex ante	President Premadasa	yes	no	.		.
1989.04.	.	no	ex ante	President Premadasa	yes	no	.		.

1989.04.06	prisoners	no	ex post	Presidential pardon	yes	no	.		.
1989.04.11	.	no	ex ante	Government	yes	no	.		1 week
1989.10.12	.	yes	ex ante	President Premadasa	yes	.	.		.
1991.05.27	.	no	ex ante	Government	yes	no	.		3 days
1991.11.22	civilians	no	ex ante	Cabinet Spokesman Ranil Wickremsinghe	yes	no	.		.
1991.12.02	rank and file in Vavuniya	no	ex ante	Government leaflet air-dropped	yes	no	.	surrender	.
1992.07.	rank and file in Jaffna peninsula	no	ex ante	Government leaflet air-dropped	yes	no	.	surrender	.
1995.11.17	rank and file in Jaffna	no	ex ante	Government leaflet air-dropped	yes	no	.	surrender	.
1995.12.06	.	no	ex ante	President Kumaratunga	yes	no	.	.	.
1996.05.26	.	no	ex ante	Army Chief and Lieutenant General Rohan Daluwatte	yes	no	vocational training	.	.
2004-2006	Karuna faction	.	.	Government	no	no	.		N/A
2007	rank and file in east								
2009.02.05	.	no	ex ante	Government	yes	no	.		.
2009.04.21	.	no	ex ante	Army Chief Sarath Fonseka	yes	no	reprieve		.
2009.04.22	rank and file	no	ex ante	President Rajapaksa	yes	no	.		.
2009.05.03	rank and file	no	ex ante	Minister of Human Rights Mahinda Samarasinghe	yes	no	.		.

2009.05.05	rank and file	no	ex ante	Director of the Peace Secretariat Rajiv Wijesinghe	yes	no	.		.
2009.05.28	rank and file	no	ex ante	Government	yes	no	.		.

*The table was created by the author.

**Amnesty offer is not meant to cover Prabhakaran and possibly other top leaders of the LTTE when it says "rank and file". The section is left blank when the offer covers rank and file but it is not clear if it covers the top leaders.

***Except for a few cases where the offer covers detainees, all the amnesty offer requires voluntary surrender by LTTE members.

Appendix 2 Ugandan State's Offer of Amnesties to the LRA*

yyyy.mm.dd	main purpose		communication and credibility				content		
	Target	political condition	timing	speaker/authority	publicity	legis-lation	personal condition	grace period	personal incentive
1988.06.03	all**	yes	ex ante	Government (Gulu Peace Accord)	yes	.	none	.	.
1992.03.	.	no	ex ante	Government	yes	.	none	.	.
1995.	captured LRA-abductees in Sudanese government forces.	no	ex post	(Presidential amnesty)	yes	no	none	n/a	.
1995.	all returnees	no	ex post	Presidential amnesty	yes	no	none	n/a	.
1996.04.	rank and file	no	ex ante	Presidential amnesty	yes	no	none	.	.
1997.05.	rank and file voluntarily surrendering (captured excluded)	no	ex ante	UPDF 4th Division Commander Colonel James Kazini (order from the UPDF's High Command)	yes	no	surrender	.	.
1997.05.23	rank and file	no	ex ante	Minister of state resident in the North OwinyDollo	yes	no			.

1997.09.	captured LRA members	.	ex post	Colonel James Kazinin (Presidential amnesty)	yes	no		n/a	.
1997.10.29	All	.	ex ante	President Museveni - expression of support	yes	no		.	.
1999.03.20	All	no	ex ante	Minister in charge of Northern Reconstruction Alphonse Owiny-Dollo (Cabinet resolution)	yes	no	.	.	.
1999.05.13	All	yes	ex ante	President Museveni	yes	no		.	cabinet post to Kony
1999.06.02	all**	no	ex ante	President Museveni		no		.	.
1999.06.09	all**	.	ex ante	President Museveni - expression of support	yes	no		.	.
1999.12.07	all**	no	ex ante	Parliament	yes	yes		6 months	rehab package
2000.	all**	no	ex ante	Statutory instruments 2000 No. 50 The Amnesty Act (Extension of Expiry Period) Instrument, 2000	yes	yes^			rehab package

2001.	all**	no	ex ante	Statutory instrument 2001 No. 6 The Amnesty Act (Extension of Expiry Period) Instrument, 2001	yes	yes^			rehab package
2001.	all**	no	ex ante	Statutory instrument 2001 No. 44 The Amnesty Act (Extension of Expiry Period) Instrument, 2001	yes	yes^			rehab package
2002.	all**	no	ex ante	Amnesty (Amendment) Act, 2002	yes	yes			rehab package
2002	all**	no	ex ante	Statutory instrument 2002 No. 48 The Amnesty Act (Extension of Expiry Period) (No. 2) Instrument 2002	yes	yes^			rehab package
2003.	all**	no	ex ante	Statutory instrument 2003 No. 34 The Amnesty Act (Extension of Expiry Period) (No. 2) Instrument 2003	yes	yes^			rehab package

2004.01.12	all**	no	ex ante	Minister of Internal Affairs Ruhakana Rugunda (3 months ultimatum to Kony)	yes	yes^		3 months	rehab package
2004.01.26	Kony and other four top leaders	yes	ex ante	President Museveni	yes	yes^		3 months	rehab package
2004.02.	all**	.	ex ante	Government	yes	yes^		6 months	rehab package
2004.08.16	all**	.	ex ante	Miniter of Internal Affairs Dr. RuhakanaRugunda, Amnesty Commission Chairman Justice Peter Onega	yes	yes^		3 months	rehab package
2004.11.	not LRA leaders	.	ex ante	President Museveni (denial of amnesty for LRA leaders)	yes	no		.	.
2004.11.15	all**	.	ex ante	Government	yes	no		3 months	rehab package
2004.11.25	All	yes	ex ante	President Museveni (according to Presidential aide Moses Byaruhanga)	yes	no		7 days	.
2005.04.	rank and file**	no	ex ante	Parliament	yes	yes		6 months	
2005.06.07	Kony	yes	ex ante	President Museveni	yes	no		.	.
2006.07.04	Kony	yes	ex ante	President Museveni	yes	no		.	.

2006.07.05	All	yes	ex ante	Government's Media Centre	yes	no		till Jul. 31	rehab package
2006.07.09	All	yes	ex ante	President Museveni	yes	no		till Sep.12	.
2006.08.	All	yes	ex ante	Government (Truce with LRA)	yes	yes		3 weeks	.
2006.08.28	(ICC denies the possibility of amnesty to Kony and his four top commanders.)								
2006.09.07	Kony	yes	ex ante	Third Deputy Premier KirundaKivejinja	yes	no		till Sep. 12	.
2006.09.	Kony	yes	ex ante	Government (extended deadline for peace agreement)	yes	no		.	.
2006.12.07	Kony	yes	ex ante	Interior Minister Ruhakana Rugunda (extended ceasefire)	yes	no		till Feb. 28	.
2008.08.05	rank and file**	no	ex ante	Parliament	yes	yes		2 years	rehab package
2010.04.13	(State Minister of Internal Affairs Maktia Kasaija withdrew a motion (authorized by the High Command) to the parliament to exclude LRA's four top commanders from amnesty)								

*The table was created by the author.

**Applicable not only to LRA but also other rebel groups in the country.

^Original legislation by the parliament, but extension by government discretion.

^^It is reported that nearly all of the LRA deserters and the captured were granted presidential amnesty between 1995 and 1997 (Borzello 1997).