PROSPECTS OF MANKIND
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Participants: Adlai Stevenson, Roberto Campos, Theodore Draper, Tad Szulc

[Theme music begins 0:11]

[Title sequence:] [Text overlaid on Prospects of Mankind logo] National Education Television/ Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt/ Prospects of Mankind

[Bob Jones:] From the United Nations in New York, National Educational Television presents the WGBH-TV production Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt Prospects of Mankind. Produced in cooperation with Brandeis University.

[As speaks, film rotates through images related to the announcer’s comments]

[Bob Jones:] Latin America is split today between two counter forces, change through constructive progress and the demand for change through violence. The foreign ministers of the Latin American countries are meeting under the auspices of the Organization of American States to consider whether violent change is being hastened by communist bloc intervention in the Western hemisphere through Cuba. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson is here to discuss with Mrs. Roosevelt some of the implications of this meeting.

[ER:] You’re very kind to be joining us on this program, Mr. Ambassador. We are going to be discussing the meeting of the Organization of American States. And uh we are considering the question of subversion in the hemisphere coming from Cuba and what you hope to achieve. You’ve had the experience of dealing with all those ambassadors who are going to be in this meeting. [ER coughs] We would like to know what you feel can be achieved by this meeting.

[Adlai Stevenson:] Well, maybe -- perhaps I can start by telling you a little bit about the background of this meeting, Mrs. Roosevelt, for what it’s worth. There has been increasing anxiety in Latin America in recent years about the effect of subversion from Cuba--Fidelismo as it is called. As a consequence of this, the president of Colombia, Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo, made a proposal some time ago--last uh spring-- uh that it would be a good idea to convene the um OAS, the Organization of American States under the Rio Pact to consider the threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere created by this new form of intervention in our continental affairs by subversion from um the communist bloc in Cuba. Notably, in the re-export of this uh - of this-- of of uh communism throughout the hemisphere. As a consequence of this, various questions have arisen as to how to proceed, whether it’s under the charter of the Organization of American States or whether it’s under the Rio Pact, which is the defense treaty of the American system. And at last, the American states have met on the fourth of December and have agreed to have a meeting of foreign ministers under the Rio Pact. And at that meeting they will decide what should be done to redefine aggression to include, if need be, this kind of subversion that has taken place in uh Cuba. And then, perhaps, to uh take steps to try to get Cuba to come back into
the family of American states, to rejoin the Western Hemisphere, and to sever its connection with the East. I think this is generally what is contemplated.

[ER:] Well, to some of us who are totally uninformed, of course, Mr. Castro’s declaration that he had been a Marxist-Leninist all along gave us a feeling that this might have been planned by the Soviets, and that his whole -- that everything he has done might have been planned with the Soviets, if not by them, because of that statement of his. So that uh I wonder if there is a danger of bringing this matter to the vote in the OSS -- uh OAS. It may be a very close vote. Will this show a disunity in the hemisphere and thus strengthen Castro?

[Adlai Stevenson:] Well, this is a -this is a consideration, to be sure. Actually, the fact that that Castro has revealed that he has been a Marxist all along is confirmatory of what uh many people have suspected. This has been a communist-inspired kind of maneuver, a takeover. They always usually cloak their adventures under the-under the symbol of democracy, and then when they have achieved their ends, they find it’s not democracy but something else. And this new form of tyranny that’s emerged in Cuba is a good example of it. AS to whether or not the meeting will be useful, I would just like to point out to you and to - to our audience--because the contestants -- uh the uh participants in the panel I am sure will discuss it--it is much less a problem for the United States than it is for the other American republics. Communism is much less of a threat to us than it is to them. And they are the ones who are primarily concerned with steps to isolate Cuba or to reintegrate Cuba in the Western family of nations. Now, to be sure, there will be some states which will uh disagree with this -- the conclusions of this meeting, and perhaps more on juridical grounds, on the ground that we are proceeding under the wrong-under the wrong act -- under the Rio Pact rather under the charter of the OAS, for example. And the concern there will be due to the fact that if you proceed under one you have certain powers of imposing sanctions which you don’t have under the other. And there will be arguments of that kind. And they could reveal a conflict, a division of opinion, within the hemisphere. But basically there isn’t any division of opinion. The leaders of the hemisphere at least realize what the threat of uh Cuba is and the export of communism from Cuba. The people don’t always.

[ER:] Do you think there is a feeling that this is interference at all in the internal affairs of Cuba or -- among the states? Do you think that matters to them at all?

[Adlai Stevenson:] Well, I haven’t detected that that’s a major concern because the treaties are very clear that we should-that we should meet and consult in the event of any threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere from an extra-continental power or from a- uh an aggression that is not military in the normal sense of the world--any interference from outside. This has taken place. A member of the family of American states has um has withdrawn, in effect, from the American states and joined the uh-uh joined the Eastern bloc. So that I don’t believe that that’s so likely. I think what could emerge here is some conflict of opinion that would appear to disclose a difference of opinion that might - uh that might be more apparent than real.

[ER:] Oh, well now, but there is no real basic feeling among the leaders of-of desire to have Fidelismo spread.

[Adlai Stevenson:] No, on the contrary, uh the leaders are very aware. [ER coughs] The people in Latin America—

[ER:] It is the people that might have that feeling.

[Adlai Stevenson:] In many cases confuse Fidelismo with a social revolution for their benefit because that’s the way it started. And this was very popular.
[ER:] Well, that is, of course, what he tried at first to make clear. That’s why I thought his statement, if it reaches the people, uh that he had been a Marxist-Leninist all along, might have the effect of clarification for the people. But perhaps it doesn’t reach the people?

[Adlai Stevenson:] No, I think it does. I think this has been very helpful because this has been confirmatory of what many of their leaders have been telling them for a long while. But it still takes time to persuade people that a social revolution for the benefit of the ordinary people is in fact the imposition of a new form of tyranny. And there -- one must remember that in Latin America there are a great many illiterate people. On top of that they have been subject to a great deal of propaganda and there has been also a great deal of anti-Americanism. All of these things combined--poverty, ignorance, anti-Americanism, propaganda have created a sympathy--a sympathetic reception for Fidelismo which far-far exceeds -- which is much more apparent among the people than it is among the leaders. The leaders I think are quite realistic.

[ER:] From my own very slight experience, I would think it natural that they wanted social reforms in South America. I would-I would not think that odd at all. But I would think that it would be difficult to persuade uh--that actually someone who said they were with the communist bloc um would give them the social reforms they wanted. Or do you think that is easier than we think?

[Adlai Stevenson:] Well, I think once they can be persuaded that this is an illusion and that this is the imposition of a new tyranny, they will be much less receptive than they have been in the past. But many of the leaders of Latin America are uh are hesitant because they have these large elements in their countries of extreme—

[ER:] That are unhappy.

[Adlai Stevenson:] That are unhappy and extremely leftist and to whom Fidel Castro has been a hero.

[ER:] Thank you very much. I think you have given us a very wonderful start for this program and for the future discussion.

[Adlai Stevenson:] [Laughs] I have enjoyed it very much, Mrs. Roosevelt.

[ER:] Thank you.

[Cut to ER and guests sitting around a table]

[Bob Jones:] Now to continue the discussion with Mrs. Roosevelt here are three men with an expert knowledge of Latin America. Roberto Campos, Brazilian ambassador to the United States, is Latin America’s foremost economist. He has acted as economic adviser to the Brazilian government at many international conferences, and in 1958 was president of Brazil’s National Bank for Economic Development. A career diplomat, Dr. Campos had previously spent six years in the United States before returning as ambassador last July. Theodore Draper has spent the last twenty-five years as a journalist, historian, and editor, specializing in international affairs, American foreign policy, and the American communist movement. In addition to other publications, he is the author of two important pamphlets on Cuba. Tad Szulc, as correspondent for the New York Times in Buenos Aires for five years, reported on most Latin American countries. Polis by birth, educated in Brazil, he worked there as a newspaper man until coming to the United States in 1947. He now covers Latin American affairs for the Times from Washington. On this program, he will assist Mrs. Roosevelt in directing the discussion.
Ambassador Stevenson and I have been talking about Cuba. Before we go any further perhaps we should talk a bit about the kind of regime Cuba is now and how this came about. Mr. Draper, would you like to begin this discussion?

In a word, Cuba has become an orthodox communist state. Its ideology is orthodox communism, Marxism-Leninism. It is now ruled by a single communist party and in every other way, Cuba is as communist as any state in the Soviet Bloc in Eastern Europe. There are differences, but the difference might best be expressed in the way that Castro himself expressed them in a recent speech. He made a speech, a very interesting one, published in the Cuban press in-on December 22, in which he made the following point: In Russia, the state farms are called sovkhoz, in Cuba the state farms are called “people’s farms,” granjas del pueblo. And he said, if we had called our state farms sovkhozes, why the Cuban people wouldn’t have accepted it. There would have been trouble and rebellion, so we didn’t call them with a Russian name, we decided to use a good Cuban name, and therefore our granjas del pueblo are exactly like Soviet sovkhozes but we call them differently, and uh this was not the only example of word substitution that he gave. This is about what Cuban originality amounts to at the present time.

Well that’s very interesting. And how do you think this came about?

In a most peculiar and complicated way that is still the subject of much controversy. Broadly speaking, I suppose one can distinguish three stages. Before January 1959, when the Batista regime fell and Batista fled, the promise of the Cuban revolution might broadly be described as that of a radical democratic revolution. This was stage one, before January 1959, in the struggle for power. After January 1959, came a revision of the original promise. It might in brief be described as a social revolution that was no longer democratic but was not communist, that was supposedly original and indigenous. An original, indigenous Cuban non-communist, undemocratic social revolution. Now we are in stage three. Namely, a revolution of communist totalitarianism no different in its principle and not very different even in its details, in its details increasingly similar to the Soviet model.

Well, that’s a very interesting account. Now I wonder, Mr. Ambassador, if this really is the way you look at it and the rest of South America and see it, or if you see certain differences from this, uh-- from Mr. Draper’s point of view?

Well, the greatest authority on Castro and his intentions is Castro himself, and his speech of December did indicate that uh he intended to conduct the revolution on Marxist-Leninist lines and that he had that conviction before. We all hoped in Latin America that it would really be an indigenous revolution. We were prepared to accept the fact that uh due to special circumstances the breaking of the social mold in Cuba probably could not be done efficiently through simple reform. That more than that was needed, probably revolution was needed because of a crystallized social mold. The situation there was too late for reform. We hope in other countries it is not too late for the process of reform, which of course we hold to be much more preferable than the surgery of revolution, dramatic and often uncontrollable. Uh this confession therefore of Castro came as a disappointment to many of the, well, the
center, middle of the road groups of Latin America, who had great sympathy for an indigenous revolution but who do not look with the same favor to an imported resolution--uh, revolution.

Now what effect would that be this change of outlook in Cuba on the final position of the inter-American system is a bit early to determine. Uh first, because I don’t think the revolutionary pattern of Cuba has come to a crystallization yet. Uh the intentions of Castro, according to what he himself says is much crystallized, but one does not know whether the underlying forces, as it were, may not usher a process of change that might lead to eventual democratization. We still hope that that may be the case, although this hope has been seriously weakened by the last statement. But what many people in Latin America feel is that the statement of Castro, even though it brings uh new light to the picture, does not really erase this fact that communist threat has not begun with Castro and does not end with Castro. There is a communist movement in the world and the best way, to our mind, of dealing with the problem is perhaps not to concentrate so much on the Castro problem as to talk more about economic development and social progress, to give emphasis to the Alliance for Progress, to positive measures rather than to an obsessive preoccupation with an isolated case of communism, and as the threat of communists did not begin with Castro, it certainly will not end with him.

[ER:] Well, of course, sir, I think the feeling has been, however, that possibly this has brought the whole situation of communism uh infiltration or attraction, let us say, in the whole hemisphere uh clearly before us, because here is here is one small place where it has gained a tremendous foothold. And I think that’s why we are particularly interested in Cuba. It’s very close to the United States, and here is here is a place from which a great deal of various kinds of influence can flow to the whole of Latin America. Is that- is that so?

[Robert Campos:] Well, I think it’s quite clear that uh the Castro experience has given new dramaticity, as it were, and the feeling of nearness to communist infiltration. But if you look at the American reaction as compared to the reaction of some Latin American countries, what you will find is that uh uh United States sees Cuba as an external phenomenon, not particular dangerous to the United States itself because it has a fairly stable social and economic structure and certainly militarily the United States are very strong. But more of a danger to the Latin American countries, and therefore at times some disappointment is expressed at the Latin American countries did not jump, as it were, to uh proposals for dealing with the problem in a rather vigorous way.

From the viewpoint of Latin America, many of the countries feel that uh uh communism in Cuba is an external danger. But there is a permanent continuous danger of social unrest and fermentation brought by the cultural broth represented by poverty, by income inequalities, by the existence of regional depressed areas, so that uh many of them feel that uh uh the important thing is -- really, the most important thing is really to eliminate conditions that would facilitate, that would increase really the vulnerability to communism, rather than to single out a case of external communism, no matter how dramatic it is, no matter how near it is to us, single out this case instead of recognize it for many of those countries the big, real difficult problem is an internal one.

[ER:] Well, and is an economic one then? I mean, actually, what you are saying is uh that the conditions of the economies of these countries, which have brought about inequalities that are very um evident, uh have to be corrected. Well now, this is of great interest, I think, to us in the United States because, in many ways, the economy of the United States and the economy of South American Countries is closely bound together. We have had uh relationships for a very long time. Uh isn’t it a little peculiar uh that with this relationship there has gone no sense from the United States, apparently, that you did not export or undertake a purely economic relationship with a country? That you also had to undertake a demonstration of how economics and an understanding of um what democracy offered more or less went together.

MR. CAMPOS: Well, I was not really referring merely to the problem of economic conditions, but also to questions of uh social structure, which invariably affect political attitudes. Uh the relationship of Latin
America and the United States has traversed several cycles, as you know, in the relatively short period of time from the thirties to the sixties. There has been several changes in policy. The Good Neighbor policy, for instance, was not really based very much on material aid. If anything, it was really political concept, and the relationship between Latin America and the United States was rather good at that time. And Roosevelt, your husband, was credit with having reversed certain policies which were a [ER: Well, they were political policies.] political policies such as the policy of intervention, for instance. He was really the announcer of the principle of non-intervention, the principle which represents a long hard won conquest of the Latin American states, which they are not willing to abandon. That renders us peculiarly sensitive on this question of intervention, even though the definition of intervention, of course, is not an easy one, and there are various shades and degrees.

He reversed certain policies which were not liked in Latin America, and uh he gave a new political concept, which is the treatment of Latin Americans as equal and as really a political priority area from the viewpoint of the United States. After the war, the policy has varied in other directions, and Latin America was relegated, as it were, to residual treatment. And again, the unfavorable aspect was not merely the uh unsatisfactory character of the economic aid as compared to the Marshall Plan given to Europe and so on. But again the feeling of psychological and political dissatisfaction because there was a residual treatment on all fields, not only economic, but political. Uh later on the emphasis was given to Asia--from Europe the emphasis shift a little bit to Asia and to a small extent to Africa. And again the residual -- policy of residual treatment, as it were, continued in a somewhat abated form. Now we have again a new revolution in the U.S. policy, which is bound to produce good results. The Alliance for Progress, the psychological climate has improved already. Whether there will be later on, dissatisfaction and disappointment I don’t know. I hope not. But certainly it’s an idea which again is not based merely on economic help, but also on uh demonstration of the revolutionary character of the American experience. And the idea of promoting social reform, of demonstrating that the United States is not interested in mere permanence of the status quo, but wants to promote change, preferably orderly change. Uh this has improved considerably the US uh image in Latin America.

The quarrel, if I might call that a quarrel between the US position and the position of the Southern countries, is to a large extent a methodological one. They say what’s really important is to give a demonstration that you can achieve a rapid rate of economic development and promote orderly social change through democratic planning, as against the ideological totalitarian planning. This is to me the crux of the question. Regardless of what is done with Cuba, even if the Cuban problem disappears, this other problem will still remain: how to promote orderly change, how to accelerate economic development for masses which feel disgruntled. So we do feel that the Cuban problem has to be seen in this proper focus. The solution of the Cuban case does not solve the problem of communist non-infiltration and does not really tackle this very basic and fundamental point, which is that the system--the Inter-American System--can only survive democratically if we demonstrate that there is the possibility, there is the alternative of democratic planning as compared to socialist planning, with its apparent display of efficiency, but with its tremendous cost in human dignity, freedom, and even great sacrifice to the consumer because socialism has this particular quality of promising the betterment of the consumer’s lot but postponing it in time.

[ER:] Well, Mr. Szulc, you’ve had experience both in Brazil and in Latin America generally and here. Would you agree with this feeling that the problem will exist not matter what happens in Cuba?

[Tad Szulc:] Yes, of course, because the Cuban revolution in a way opened sort of a Pandora’s box of anxieties, ambitions, and desires, and cravings. And I think Ambassador Campos is quite right in saying that even if Cuba were to vanish we would still have the problem. Ah it’s been three years now since the Cuban revolution; and I think that perhaps we are approaching a new-new point of crossroads in the whole set of relationships in the hemisphere. One the one hand, of course, the Cuban revolution has inflamed imaginations of people who had the material to which Mr. Draper referred, of a social revolution
which captured imaginations of people, which created its own mystique; there’s great sense of excitement and promise.

Now we have entered the Cuban third stage and the last stage of a communist totalitarian system. Uh the question would arise, presumably, would be this: If the admission by Castro that he is a Marxist-Leninist, or communist, if it has indeed disappointed a great many people in Latin America, if it has erased to a lesser or greater extent the sympathy, the deep feeling which existed for the Cuban revolution in Latin America. The question now arises, is there anything we, the West, or the United States can provide to fill this new gap? In other words, can we, through the Alliance for Progress, through the whole fabric of our new policies, to what we now call the American revolutionary approach to it, if we-if we can satisfy this ideological and human hunger which the Cuban revolution first awoke and then disappointed, or we think disappointed. If not of course, if we cannot do it, if we cannot fill this gap, there is going to be tremendous vacuum, I think be unpredictable. So perhaps this is the point of crossroads again. I think the question that arises is this: Can the Western approach, the United States approach, through the Alliance for Progress, offer or provide for the Latin American masses the kind of mystique, the kind of religion, excitement, even pageantry that the Cuban revolution provided in its -- at least in its first stage? I think that Ambassador Campos is quite right in pointing out as he did, that the great need right now is to develop the economic structures, uh find an answer to the great social problems. The basic problem of how to cope with a population that’s growing, I think, at the rate of almost two million, in your country, in Brazil every year. I think there’s a set of statistics that points out that every year the Latin American need for housing increases by one million dwellings. I think this is all this is terribly important.

Of course, we have to go ahead with those programs, but I think I would like to come back to the initial point that unless -- in our planning for Latin America we can provide with the money, with the technical advancement and the know how -- this feeling of excitement, make people feel they’re participating in building - in building their continent or countries, in the way that Castro I think was successful in doing in Cuba in the early days of the revolution, then I think that perhaps the whole Alliance for Progress stands in danger of, I won’t say “going down the drain,” but perhaps becoming a static thing only based on-on infrastructure economic programs, which I think is not even remotely enough. I think we are past the stage where money alone can be the answer to those things.

[ER:] What is your feeling?

[Theodore Draper:] With much of what the ambassador said and what Mr. Szulc has just said I’m thoroughly in agreement. With some part of it, I perhaps would like to put it differently, slightly differently. I wonder whether it’s possible to put the Cuban problem in one box and the problem of orderly democratic change in another box, as if they were separate problems and did not, each on the other, uh have tremendous repercussions. It’s my impression that these two problems are intimately connected. And that it’s uh not quite possible to separate them so neatly. For example, if we look forward to the phrase that the Ambassador used, “orderly democratic change,” the role that the Castro regime plays, is to make such change as difficult as possible, if not impossible. In most, if not all of Latin America, I dare say, there are two enemies, two prime enemies of orderly democratic change. On the one hand, the privileged classes, who don’t want any change because it would reduce their privileges and their power. They want what they have and they want to keep what they have. On the other hand, the pro-Castro forces, which are against orderly democratic change because such change would make their role impossible or else unnecessary. In a country like Venezuela, where there is admittedly, I think, it’s acknowledged by all, a leadership which is dedicated to orderly democratic change, what enemies does that leadership face? On the one hand, one on the right, one dedicated solely to the status quo. On the other hand, the Castro forces, making life miserable for the democratic government and leadership of Venezuela. Uh you can’t ignore Castro and his followers in Latin America if you’re seeking democratic change.
Robert Campos: The point is probably that there is a communist movement in Latin America which finds it expedient and inspirational, as it were, to look to a leader who is nearby. But if the situation were different, if this immediate revolutionary leader with some inspirational value was not nearly at hand, they would no doubt use some other symbol. The problem which you point out does exist, communism is a disintegrating force opposing orderly reform and promoting continuously revolutionary change. But my point still subsists, even though the dramatic neighborhood of Castro underlines the problem of communist infiltration, it's basically a different problem. The threat does not begin with Castro does not end with him. The basic threat is the presence of communism, and therefore it can only be dealt with by a combination of measures. Of which one of them is the most important is really demonstration of the possibility of an alternative to ideological totalitarian planning.

ER: This puts a great deal of responsibility, I think, on the United States because we have succeed in making changes in our country and making them peacefully, without revolution. And now the question is whether we can uh find a way of um understanding the needs and helping without um offending, I think, our neighbors. And that I think is largely a question of uh how we approach the whole intellectual um discussion with our neighbors, of how they meet their difficulties. It’s not purely the economic side, it’s also an intellectual exchange of ideas, isn’t it? And the-the understanding that comes with that same exchange. And I think possibly, uh being a woman I must mention this, that perhaps the women in South America who have been very conscious of the needs of poverty, I mean the surrounding poverty, and what should -- could be done um to help will be rather an important factor, if-if they can come in on the intellectual exchange between countries in South America and in our own.

Tad Szulc: Well may I - may I expand a little beyond what you said Mrs. Roosevelt? I think you are quite right, but I would like to come back to the point that maybe there are two levels or more. Of course, intellectual one that you mentioned. I think there is also the emotional level. I think it’s a question, perhaps, if I may put it this way, of touching the souls of people, of getting them interested in our system. I think that communism as such, more specifically the Castro regime, has been making quite an effort to convince Latin America that the Western approach through the Alliance of Progress, through the preaching of democracy cannot succeed, that their system is better, both in terms of economic structure, of economic planning, that they can fulfill the promise much better than ours. And I think that relates to Mr. Draper’s observation that you cannot disassociate Latin America from Castro, that you cannot put in separate compartments. I think that Castro has -- because he’s committed to it, to defend his own system -- he has and is engaging in every conceivable effort to demonstrate that our--what we propose, that our solution cannot work. I think this is where subversion will come in. This is where propaganda will come in. This is where the use of the Communist Parties will come in.

But furthermore, I’m not sure I agree with Ambassador Campos, in saying that it is only the communist parties that will perform this work. I think that you have large-larger or smaller groups of people who are going to call themselves Marxists in this very special way in which leftist tendencies are subdivided in Latin America -- left wing socialists--I think the--that people in Brazil are called with the very good name of “the useful innocents.” The people who go along with things. I think they will--they have and they will cooperate directly or indirectly with the Castro or the communist onslaught on that which we try to preach. So I think that so long as Castro and the communist system remain in Cuba our effort in Latin America to develop it in a democratic system, I think will be under continuous attack, through propaganda, through the radio stations that Cuba has, the short wave transmitters, through the student delegations that come and go between Latin American countries and Cuba. I think that’s a very important point. The fact that Castro has established a system of scholarships for Latin American students is, perhaps, one of the most important current aspects of the Latin American problem; in the sense that the Cuban revolution is busily establishing cadres in Latin America. A small nuclei of highly indoctrinated students who come to Cuba, spend anywhere between six weeks and six months on such apparently harmless things as agrarian reform. Perhaps training a little bit in guerrilla warfare, then they get a very heavy Marxist-Leninist indoctrination, and they return to their universities, to their countries, to preach
and practice the credo. And I think we all are familiar with the tremendous effect that the dedicated and
the well-trained minority can accomplish. So I will go along with Mr. Draper in saying that you cannot, in
any way, forget the Castro phenomenon, even in trying to concentrate-trying to concentrate on the orderly
democratic development.

[ER:] Well let me ask you, Mr. Ambassador, in South America, I think in many countries, the students
have always had a keen political interest, and a good deal of political action has come from student
groups. Are you noticing much of the Castro influence through the students today?

[Robert Campos:] Yes, I would say it’s-it’s is rather strong. Of course, youth has a propensity for drastic
change and revolutionary experiments. I think the French philosopher, [Auguste] Comte, would say that
the law, the universal law of human development is to be revolutionary in the early age, conservative in
the middle age, and reactionary in the old age. You have been consistently disproving this law because
you have maintained throughout the years a remarkable flair for-for-for change and worked actively to
promote constructive social change regardless of age, but this seems to be human law. And uh
unfortunately one point on which Mr. Szulc touched is important and his observations are correct.
Namely, that part of the student movement, student groups, are obsessed with the idea that to accelerate
economic development you must have an ideology and you must have revolution. Revolution to break
the social mold, because they believe that otherwise change will be too slow -- it’s the normal impatience of
the youth -- and ideology to great regimentation of the producer and the patience--a patience of the
consumer. Well, this idea to my mind has to be disproved, to my mind it is incorrect.
Actually the greatest and most successful experience of development in the Western World were not
particularly affected by ideologies.
The U.S. development, the Canadian development, Australian development, Western European
development. Admittedly, there were mystiques, and this is the distinction I’d like to make, that uh to be
useful and important perhaps, to create a mystique of economic development, of social change and of
collective interest of the system, but not necessary an ideology because the ideology carries with it a
connotation of regimentation and intolerance, which is only superficially effective.
In fact, one very debatable subject is to determine to what extent ideology and regimentation was really
the factor in Soviet development. Soviet economy was already advancing at a fairly fast pace despite
political disintegration even before the preceding years of the communist regime. And being a country
with such vast resources, it’s not at all proven that it couldn’t have developed very fast under some other
regime. At least I wouldn’t like to take it for granted, and I’m enthusiastic about the possibilities of
democratic development on the basis of actual experience. You must have mystiques, of course. The
United States had the mystique of the march to the West and opening up of the frontier. There are several
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successful mystiques which never however, amounted to an ideology. Brazil, for instance, we are now
creating some mystiques. For instance, the mystique of the rehabilitation of the northeast--the idea that we
should help this depressed area and bring up bring it up quickly to the-to the standards of the south, as uh
some sort of national social duty. Uh our President [Juscelino] Kubitschek, before the Alliance of
Progress, through the idea of Operation Pan America, and tried internally to create the mystique of the so-
called Program of Goals, Programa de Metas.
Which -- there is a mystique of five year plans, such as that of the Indian experiment which is democratic.
So it’s important to dispel this idea that you need a totalitarian ideology to have the sufficient discipline --
an amount of discipline sufficient for quick economic development. Uh and the students are as a group,
which you mentioned, are particularly affected by this skepticism concerning the speed of democratic
change. Creation then of a mystique in the Alliance for Progress is an attempt to create a mystique, is in
itself a counter ideology at it were. Its ideals are basically sound--which--the three ideals are economic
development--acceleration of economic development, promotion of social change, and recognition of a
collective responsibility of the entire system, including particularly the United States, which is the
wealthiest and the economically most advanced member of the system. Lets then try to promote this
mystique and render it effective, and let’s clearly indicate that we need discipline for development, not ideological discipline with its twin components of intolerance and regimentation.

[Theodore Draper:] Well, the relationship of economics and ideology, on which you have just touched on, is one of those infernally complicated subjects that uh Cuba throws some light on. Let me come back to Cuba. Batista came into power for the second time in 1952 by a coup. He lasted until the end of 1958. His regime became increasingly brutal and decadent. Politically it was a monstrosity, but in this very period, the economic growth of Cuba developed faster than in any previous period. The per capita income in Cuba increased more than in any previous period. It was a period of great economic growth. Now uh this is what the facts and the figures show, not what the propaganda likes to uh pretend. Here you have one of those tremendously complicated affairs, uh which we must face without, of course, in any sense making this a justification of the Batista dictatorship. But facts, as some people like to say, are facts.

[Tad Szulc:] Well, I think all this points to a very interesting sample of what may be occurring. And I’m referring to the case of the Dominican Republic which is almost a neighbor of Cuba in the Caribbean. Just the other day the Organization of American States lifted the inter-American sanction against the Dominican Republic, which related to all kinds of mischief perpetrated by [Rafael] Trujillo who is the dictator. When a democratic temporary -- a democratic system was set up on the first of this year in the Dominican Republic, two things happened. First, the OAS lifted the sanction, and two, at this point the United States, under OAS, are rushing madly into the Dominican Republic with economic aid, with technical assistance, and all sorts of things. And I think the object there is to demonstrate that the Dominican Republic should become, or can become a showcase of precisely what we are discussing. In other words that advanced economic and social planning, good development, can prosper in a democratic system. Now the Dominican Republic is a small island -- it’s perhaps a microcosm of the problems of Latin America. But the way in which the political and economic situation, tied as they are, does develop in the Dominican Republic, this year and next, perhaps this can offer some terribly valuable lessons on the larger-on the larger problem of can Latin America develop economically and socially in the democratic system? And this I-I imagine is the sort of the key question of our time. Uh this is the-this is the main point of dispute between our two systems, East and West. So I think we should watch the Dominican Republic with fascination and interest because I think the way that goes may have very important implications on everything else we do.

[ER:] You think it will have an implication on the whole of the South American thinking then. And do you feel that way, Ambassador Campos?

[Robert Campos:] Yes, it might have, I would believe it might have an important bearing precisely on this point of destroying the convictions that in some quarters which uh this middle ground of an intelligentsia and bourgeoisie, which in Brazil we call the “useful innocent,” who actually support revolutionary ideas, not because of any overt or concealed sympathy for communism, but because of a technical conviction that unless you resort to ideology and revolution you can’t achieve social change and economic progress with sufficient speed. Now if after the re-democratization, and we manage to uh -- the system as a whole manages to make the Dominion Republic maintain a faster rate of growth, and as Mr. Draper pointed out, the problem is not only economic development. Economic development alone is no protection or is little protection against communism. Economic development plus social change. Those two things are achieved, then I think it will be a very positive contribution to the operation and success of the Alliance of Progress and the thesis of orderly democratic change.

[Tad Szulc:] Well, uh all this of course relates to the basic trends of the future, or perhaps of the present. There’s one question I would like to have Mr. Draper to go into, which is this: to what extent this which has happened in Cuba has been inevitable because I think the -- on the answer to this question there may hinge a great many answers for the future. I wonder if Mr. Draper would like to make a comment on this:
When the Cuban revolution began would the United States reaction to it, if our policies had been different in one way or another, would they have affected the deterioration and the gathering of momentum of a totalitarian state? In other words, should we have a tremendous sense of guilt, or a sense of historical detachment?

[Theodore Draper:] To my mind the answer to that question depends upon where you start. If you start with the past sixty years of Cuban history in which we have been intimately involved, I think our responsibilities have been very great, and I for one, am not an admiral of our policies in Cuba over the past sixty years. If you start with, let us say, 1953, with the beginning of the July Twenty-Sixth Movement, and the attack on the Moncada Barracks, here again I think our responsibilities were very great.

[ER:] I'm sorry, but our time is running out, and you have given us something to really think about, I think. Because out of this discussion, I get a feeling that we could do a number of things that we have not done, but we must have imagination enough to see that it is not all an economic problem. That it is a problem of the spirit and the intellect and of uh an identification with the interests of other people. Now I have to say thank you to all of you, and to our audience, au revoir. Next month joining me in the discussion on Soviet foreign policy will be Reinhold Niebuhr, Lord Michael Lindsay, Seymore Freidan, and Professor Marshall Schulman. Au revoir.

[Theme music begins 57:54]

[Credit sequence overlaid on Prospects of Mankind logo]

[Bob Jones:] Roberto Campos is the Brazilian ambassador to the United States. Theodore Draper is a specialist in international communism. Tad Szulc is the New York Times correspondent for Latin America. Adlai Stevenson, US ambassador to the United Nations, appeared in a special introduction to this program. Next month, Mrs. Roosevelt and her guests will discuss current Soviet foreign policy. This program was recorded through the facilities of United Nations Television and WNEW-TV, Metropolitan Broadcasting, New York.

[Theme music ends 58:59]

[National Educational Television logo]

[Unknown Announcer:] This is NET. National Educational Television.

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