Prospects of Mankind
Season 2, Episode 8, Congo: Challenge to the United Nations
April 9, 1961


Participants: , Adlai Stevenson, G. Mennen Williams, Rajeshwar Dayal, Jaja Wachuku, William Frye

[Introduction music begins 00:05]

[Credit Sequence overlaid on Prospects of Mankind Logo]

[Bob Jones:] Recorded at the United Nations, New York, National Education Television Presents the WGBH TV production, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Prospects of Mankind.

[As announcer speaks, film rotates through images related to the announcer’s comments]

[Bob Jones:] As the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly reconvened, the major focus for the returning delegates was item eleven on the agenda: the situation in the Congo. The new chief American representative, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, escorts Mrs. Roosevelt into the opening meeting. She returns as a United States delegate for the first time since 1952. Stevenson has quickly earned the reputation as a wise and sympathetic leader, sensitive to the complex problems confronting him. Today, at UN headquarters, he is Mrs. Roosevelt’s special guest.

[Introduction music ends 01:10]

[ER:] I am glad that we are able to do this Prospects of Mankind program on the Congo at the United Nations headquarters because the Congo has raised some of the most important and difficult questions at this session of the General Assembly. Ambassador Stevenson, we’re very happy to greet you here today, and the daily events of the Congo and the United Nations have been so complicated and confusing that we are trying to take a long look at the problem to understand what its meaning is for us. Certainly, a key element in the whole picture is the agreement among the Congolese leaders themselves. Would it be possible for you to say how they can possibly come together and compose some of their differences in order that they may build a sovereign state?

[Adlai Stevenson:] [clears throat] The Congo, as we know, is a vast territory--I’ve had the privilege of traveling across it twice now--It comprises not only an enormous variety of soils, of forests, of uh climates, but also of peoples and languages. The concentrations in Leopoldville and Elizabethville of uh, and Stanleyville, of industrial civilization are far, far from one another -- uh measured by thousands of miles. The problem um of governing such a country by a unitary system from one central location has even even uh been impossible for much more advanced states. In our own case, we adopted a federal system, and our centralization of authority has only come very uh gradually. The same has been true even in the Soviet Union for that matter, to a lesser degree; at least, they’ve tried to federate a great
variety of cultures and civilizations and peoples. The same has generally been true of most large
countries. So we have in the Congo a unitary system with a strong central government imposed by the
original constitution that they adopted, inherited from the Belgians last spring. Since then the
country has fallen into disagreement—as we know into separate segments. Shambi and the
Katanga—rich area—are have been quite separate and quite independent from Kasai and from
Leopoldville, and from Orientale Province, where Stanleyville is. So we’ve—And even Kivu, another one
of the principal provinces, has acted separately from time to time. So that we have in effect the
dismemberment of the original unitary plan. Now it seems to me that what the leaders are beginning to
do, are groping for, is some sort of a federal system, and this is what happened at their meeting in
Tannarive when they met and discussed the possibility of finding some common ground to save their
country from the disasters of total disintegration. Um Just how the country will be federated—on
what basis—I think remains to be seen, but it would seem to me that this is the best hope for the Congo-
that the separate large units that comprise these major provinces, now each of them headed by a
leader, Kasavubu in Leopoldville, generally recognized as the constitutional chief of state; the original
president, [Moise] Tshombe, in uh in uh Katanga, a rich mining area; and Kalangi in Kasai and Gizenga in
Stanleyville, and so on. Each of these people must find some way of accommodating their separate
ambitions and their separate—um separatism of their regions in some larger federation, with central
authority over finance, over foreign policy, over the military—that sort of thing. I’m not sure how
and when this is going to come about, but for my part, uh Mrs. Roosevelt, I can see no other solution to
the Congo except a federation. (6:00)

[ER:] I think the real difficulty is for most of us to realize the size of the African continent [Adlai
Stevenson: yes.] and the difference. What do you think can be done to improve the relations between
the different states and the United Nations, now? Have you any hopes for better feeling there?

[Adlai Stevenson:] Well, the United Nations, in the Security Council, adopted a resolution on the twenty-
first of February which had a number of provisions in it. The implementation of these provisions has um-
proceeding, but very very slowly and not by any means on a satisfactory basis. In the first place, there
is the problem of control of the armed forces. The armed forces are now divided among these various
states, fighting with one another—not responsive to discipline, uh dangerous, if you please, elements. I
remember the remark of a very intelligent Nigerian here not long ago who said to me, “In our great
country at the time of independence if each of the political leaders had had a private army we never
would have had a country.” [ER laughs] Well, that’s what we have, in a sense, in the Congo. Until they’re
willing to relinquish their private armies to a central authority, and until they can be brought under
control by the United Nations, until the uh military interventions from outside are stopped, be it by
the Belgians or anyone else, it’s going to be extremely difficult. When these things are done, however,
with any good will and any anxiety, any national sense of national patriotism, on the part of these
leaders, I should think it would be possible to pull the country together. Meanwhile, it depends upon the
United Nations—the extent to which peace and order uh can be preserved in the country and conditions
established in which a viable republic can be uh can come to birth. The relations now with the United
Nations, of course, are not good, because the United Nations constitutes a threat to the
independent sovereignty of each of the independent leaders. The objective of the United Nations is the
Belgian Congo as a whole, not the welfare of any of the individual leaders. Right now, we are not in the
Port of Matadi, and the Port is indispensable to the United Nations military operation. It’s the
commencement of our line of supplies. It’s the port to which ships from Europe and from the United
States and elsewhere arrive and unload the goods that have to go up the railroad to Leopoldville. The
United Nations forces there have been forced out by the Kasavubu government. Until they can be
restored, until the port can be operated properly with security, by the United Nations for the benefit of
our operation there, it’s going to be extremely difficult. I-I-I wish I had the short answer to your question as to how we can bring about a better relationship between the leadership in the Congo and the United Nations. Until we do, uh there’s going to be no solution for this.

[ER:] There’ll be no real solution--

[Adlai Stevenson:] No, there’s going to be no real solution.

[ER:] Well now, one of the great difficulties, at least one that looms large in many people’s minds, is the whole financial problem of the carrying of the United Nations situation in the Congo. Do you think that’s going to continue to be precarious for a long time?

[Adlai Stevenson:] Well, it’s certainly going to be precarious. It’s extremely precarious now. The uh cost of the Congo operation has been far in excess of what was anticipated originally. It’s uh more than the budget of the whole United Nations operation for this year. To raise that money means doubling, in effect, the assessment of uh-- on all of the countries, if it was apportioned on the same basis. In the meanwhile, the Soviet Union has refused to make any contribution to the Congo operation, because it disapproves of it. Uh-uh we’ve now had the unhappy news that France is going to withhold any contribution to the Congo operation. This, I think, is a most unfortunate development, and a very shocking one, I’m frank to say. The problem of raising these funds from the other members of the United Nations is not easy. Many of the countries find it extremely hard to meet their assessments to the U.N., especially now if they are doubled. So there’s a feeling--there’s no doubt that some of the countries with a greater capacity to pay, like Britain, the United States, Canada, and so on, will probably have to bear a disproportionate share of this expense. I don’t by any means preclude the possibility that it--that this can be done. I think it can be done. I do hope very much that um that there’s reconsideration on the part of all the members of the United Nations, who will recognize, I am sure, on reflection, that if this Congo operation fails for want of adequate financial support, that it could be a very serious blow to the morale and to the prestige of the United Nations itself.

[ER:] Thank you very much. And now just one quick question. Do you think there’s any way we can prevent another situation like the Congo arising?

[Adlai Stevenson:] Yes. I think if, in anticipation of the independence of new countries, proper precautions are taken to uh--the circumstance will never be identical, they’ll always be somewhat different--but if proper precautions are taken, as the British have tried to do in the case of their colonies in Africa, as indeed the French have tried to do and uh--and both of them quite successfully, I think we can avoid these uh major disasters such as the case of the Belgian Congo.

[ER:] Well, that at least is an encouraging note with which to end your interesting introduction to this program. I hope that we’re going to be able to provide some more information, though i realize we cannot in one program provide a great deal of clarification of what is still a very confusing situation. I want to thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

[Adlai Stevenson:] Well thank you, Mrs. Roosevelt. I’m very happy to have been here with you.

[Scene change from smaller room to large room with all guests around table] (12:47)
[Announcer:] Mrs. Roosevelt and her guests now continue this discussion of the current situation in the Congo and its broader implications for future developments in the UN. Though representing contrasting viewpoints, all are authoritative spokesmen.

G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and former governor of Michigan, has recently returned from a month-long trip to Africa. His visit to sixteen nations stirred considerable controversy, but he has retained the full support and confidence of President Kennedy.

Jaja Wachuku is chairman of the UN Congo Conciliation Commission made up of representatives of eleven African and Asian nations. A distinguished Nigerian, he holds the high government posts of Minister of Economic Development and chairman of his country’s UN delegation.

Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal, as special representative of secretary Dag Hammarskjold in the Congo, has been the center of stormy dispute. He is on leave from his regular post as India’s high commissioner to Pakistan. a veteran in the troubled ways of the world body, he was a member of the UN observation group in Lebanon in 1958 and before that India’s permanent representative to the United Nations.


[ER:] Ambassador Stevenson has given us his view of the Congo situation. Now we are happy to have with us not only Americans, but leaders from other parts of the world who are closely involved in this crisis. The UN mission in the Congo has been assailed with criticism from all sides. What do you think can be done for the relations between the Congo and the United Nations, Ambassador Dayal?

Well, Mrs. Roosevelt, it is important to remember that a UN operation in the Congo is unique in the history of international organization, and the task set before us is an immense one, which is uh to build life and substance into the independence of a young and struggling nation. Naturally, this task has many facets to it and the criticism of which you speak is related to one aspect of this task or the other, and sometimes uh it comes from different quarters which look at one aspect of it or another. Much of this criticism, if I may say so, is contradictory, and uh--which I think, goes to show to what extent the operation has been impartial. Now you ask what could be done to improve the relations between the Congo and the United Nations. Well, uh the relations are not universally bad by any manner of means. When they are bad, it makes good newspaper copy but when there are good, one doesn’t hear about them. The difficulties, of course, have been largely on the political level and there is a basic predicament before the operation which is that uh in maintaining the position of impartiality, it must not intervene in or be influenced--used to influence the outcome of any internal struggle--constitutional or otherwise, and the tendency among the Congolese leaders, of different factions, has
been to try and utilize the United Nations machinery to further their individual or factional political interests. I hope that this difficulty can be resolved by a better understanding of the mandate and by presenting the fact that political settlement must come from the Congolese people themselves, by means of reconciliation, negotiation, discussion; and that the United Nations machinery cannot be used under the terms of its mandate to further any particular political point-of-view.

[ER:] It has to, in other words, serve the whole of the Congo. That, of course, is always the difficulty because when the areas covered are so very large, it’s the most natural thing in the world for each one to think only of their own particular area. So I can understand perfectly how this situation has come about. But I do think that it’s important. I wonder what your [motions to Jaja Wachuku] reaction would be to this.

[Jaja Wachuku:] Well, Mrs. Roosevelt, my own reaction to this, having visited the Congo and observed the situation during the Commission’s stay there, I was the Chairman of the Reconciliation Commission, um I want to say that I agree in a number of things, which Mr. Dayal has said, but there is an element, which is missing; that is, the Congo situation is not only an abstract problem, military, political, but is a human problem. And if you are going to solve the Congo problem, you must conceive the human aspect of it. The personal relationship of those who go to serve in the Congo must be right, otherwise it can’t make headway. The United Nations has been invited by the Congolese leaders because the Belgians left them with nothing, they just left them as orphans; they were drowning, and they wanted to escape from eh that domination by the Belgians. My own observation, there, was that the Belgians just dropped them like a hotcake, expected that they would come to them on bended knee, begging for them to come and help them and then they would return and exercise power without responsibility. But instead of that, they miscalculated. The Congolese applied to the United Nations as a service organ that could help them out of their difficulty. But then, uh my own observation is that there seemed to be a kind of a slight misconception of the mission of the United Nations there. Did the United Nations go to rule, is the Congo an independent state, or is it a protectorate or a colony or a trust territory of the United Nations? There has been some mishandling on this aspect of it because instead of going to serve, the military side of it uh was beginning to play a role far out of proportion to its true objective. As I see it, the United Nations is an organization for peace, not for war and, therefore, the relationship between the president of the state who is recognized internationally, the Congolese leaders, whether we like it or not, if the Congolese have put a piece of wood, or a cripple, or an imbecile as their leader, we have to accept that. That is the best they can produce--not to judge them or come into our own standard, and cooperate with them on that basis as advisors and friends, not despise them. I personally feel that you cannot treat them as little babies, or treat them as rebels, or treat them as people who do not understand themselves and expect them to cooperate. So if we put the personal relationship right, then we’ll be on the path of reconciliation, and then there’ll be no hostility towards the United Nations. I saw this myself, I observed them and the members of the Conciliation Commission had no difficulty at all in dealing with the various personalities involved. And I think if that attitude is adopted, don’t see the Congo problem as an intellectual exercise, but a human problem that requires a sympathetic understanding of the problem of the Congo. We must put ourselves in their position, put under similar circumstances how would we react to the occasion. The moment we adjust our mind to that situation, then there is the beginning of understanding between the United Nations. (21:20)

[ER:] That’s a very interesting aspect. Now--Mr. Williams, you’ve just come back from a rather long trip, and I suppose you don’t feel that you had the time to really go in depth into any question, but what would be your reaction to the-- this question which--
[Mr. G. Mennen Williams:] Well, I must say that I think this is the toughest job in the world, to try and take an entirely new organization such as the United Nations, toss it into one of the most difficult uh problems that, well, any group of people have ever had to face. I'd like to go back for just a moment, because I think while we've taken a look at the geography, the immense geography of the Congo, I think that one of the other problems is the fact that I hear there are many time gaps. Here is a country where at the time they were granted independence, they had only twelve university graduates. They hadn't had any experience of self-government, except maybe a year or so. As a consequence, to be thrown into the middle of the problem of uh bringing order and freedom together so that they could work out was a tremendous challenge to them, and then when they weren't able to accomplish it themselves, to bring the United Nations, which never really had to face a job like this, into the picture, we have an immense problem. Even the whole world hasn't solved the problem of freedom and order. We have troubles around the world. So when it comes into the Congo, we have a most complicated problem, and it certainly is true that this is a political as well as a military operation. Sometimes, when we read the papers, it looks as though it's just military, but I think the political aspect is the dominant one, because, as Mr. Wachuku said, and as Ambassador Dayal pointed out, what we're trying to do is to promote peace, promote order, to give the people a chance for a good life. And this is a personal problem, and I think we really need as much psychology as we need arms. And I think that this can be done. I remember sitting down with President Kasavubu, talking about this, and certainly, he was first to admit that the United Nations in some of its aspects had made a great contribution and that he felt that it was possible uh to get together and to work together. And I think that uh working out a relationship here, a very difficult one, between the sovereign country and the United Nations, so that they are able both to respect each other in their proper spheres, is a very difficult one indeed, and it is a great test of human relationships, but I am sure the United Nations is going to do this, and this is our real hope.

[ER:] Well I gather, I don't know-- you know more than I do-- but I gather that the human side has been um rather successfully envisioned by the United Nations personnel that has been carrying out some of the civil aspects of work there, in different phases.

[William Frye:] Mrs Roosevelt--

[Jaja Wachuku:] Well, I--

[William Frye:] Excuse me, there is a fascinating story, which we might tell at this stage, which would illustrate perhaps, the difficulty the United Nations has had. Not long ago, last month, in fact, in March, the—a corporal of the Congolese army approached two United Nations officials, one from the World Meteorological Organization, who was there to study the weather, and said that they must report the following morning to the police and that they would be beaten. They were under arrest. Well, the UN people went to the— to their UN authorities, and they were whisked out of there in a hurry and then the UN inquired as to what the charge was against them. And in utter seriousness, the UN—the Congolese army explained that the charge against the World Meteorological Organization expert was that he was planning to steal the climate of the Congo and sell it to the enemies of the Congo. [Laughter] (26:04)

[ER:] No--

[G. Mennen Williams:] That sounds like a California story if I ever heard one.

[William Frye:] WELL--this is a literal fact.
[Jaja Wachuku:] Well, I think I read that story somewhere in the newspaper-- But um, well in a serious situation, there must be a sense of humor. And Newspaper supporters--

[ER:] Well, that’s part of the human element.

[Jaja Wachuku:] The human element, and, therefore, newspaper reporters.

[William Frye:] Mr. Wachuku said that you folks have treated the Congolese as if they were, I believe he used the word rabble, [ER: Babies.] and babies--have you?

[Rajeshwar Dayal:] No, no. I was rather-- didn’t think that that criticism was meant seriously because--

[Jaja Wachuku:] Well, I mean seriously in respect to the Army, you regard them as rabbles. It is true we agreed that the Army had been broken up into various parties, but they have not been accepted as the leaders of the army--but in the terms of rabbles, they consider them as leaders of a rabble army. You don’t-- you don’t if a person is a rabble and you call him a rabble, he will react adversely in that particular respect. It may well have something to say-- That is my observation. I was in the Congo for nearly two years.

[Rajeshwar Dayal:] One shouldn’t go by word, one picks up here and there. One should go to the substance of the problem; and the problem, of course, so far as the army is concerned, the Congolese army, is that it has been a considerable source of embarrassment to the country, which has been pointed out by Mr. Wachuku and his colleagues in their report itself. And whether you call them rabble or whether you call them a glorious army, it makes very little difference, the question really is one of substance.

[ER:] It matters a lot to them though, probably.

[Rajeshwar Dayal:] Yes, of course. No, no, absolutely.

[Jaja Wachuku:] They would like to be considered [Rajeshwar Dayal: Yes.] leaders eh-- for instance when a corporal is promoted-promoted to a colonel--well under normal circumstances, in my own country, such a person would never dream of such a thing, but that is the circumstances under which the Belgians left them. And what is that? Congolese situation, he is a colonel, and treat him as a Congolese colonel, not as a Nigerian, or American, or English colonel. But he is a colonel, as far as the situation has made him so, now just give him that respect. For instance, there is an aspect quite correctly, must I mention here, the newspapers have paid more attention to the military and the political side. Naturally, these are more sensational, but the civilian operation, I must give them the credit there, they have done excellent work. [ER: that’s what I heard, too.] Excellent work, without their effort, the whole situation in the Congo state would have collapsed completely. We said that in our report and that is an element that must be emphasized. And that is because we find the United Nations went first of all to assist the Congolese to establish an administration, the uh Belgians left them none. Then unfortunately, when the Belgians were leaving, being the officers of the army, they engineered the army to rebel. That again fell on top of the head of the United Nations, they were not prepared for that type of situation that collapsed on them. And then the next stage came when the President and the Prime Minister clashed, and the President dismissed the Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister refused to accept his dismissal
and, therefore, the whole political blowup came and so that you had three stages of development, and that is why that complicated the whole situation, as observing it as we saw it.

[ER:] Well now, you’ve brought up the point, which I think, is in many people’s minds. Um, What are the problems of insulating the Congo from outside intervention. How effective--what can we do about those, because it is of this fear of outside intervention, which does uh add to the difficulties a good deal.

[William Frye:] Don’t we need to speak out rather plainly in this context? Whose intervention do we mean? Many of the Africans seem to concentrate wholly on Belgian intervention and no doubt this is one of the sources of difficulty, but surely, there is also the very great danger of Soviet intervention, and this, too, surely the Congo must be insulated also against this. Now one of the principle things--

[G. Mennen Williams:] I think maybe you better have in mind that some of the Africans think there’s United States intervention.

[some crosstalk]

[Jaja Wachuku:] Well I may be in a better position to say what you mean. I remember I had a press conference in Leopoldville, where I used the expression that there are too many fingers in the Congolese pie, and you have to remove all of them and reform. There is intervention by the Western powers through the companies in which they have investments. For instance, in the Katanga Province. The big companies that have interests in the mines there, naturally uh Belgian is interested in that. From South Africa, from Tanganityka, and indirectly the United Kingdom, and the United States citizens and holding companies have interests there and one of the reasons for encouraging Tshombe to succeed is to have a safe place so that their capital investment will not uh be lost. Now, we have to face that fact, the companies are not cooperating with the central government economically, that’s one of the problems which the United Nations has there. The Belgian problem is not only political, it is economic and is also social and, finally, uh military, of course. Then you have intervention by Afro-Asian states. I think that I can say this, because I am an African and a member of the Afro-Asian group. When you can have some African states getting together somewhere and pronouncing that--we want X to be Prime Minister, and Y to be this, we don’t like this man’s face, we like this man’s face [ER laughs]--from my own point of view that is direct intervention. If they have not sided A or B, and have used their good offices to bring these together to see the problem as Congolese--the United Nations won’t have the problem of trying to reconcile one person and the other. All forces would be--it would be a kind of pincer movement trying to pull them together. Then, another thing, naturally, finally the Soviet Union wants to come in. the Soviet Union is in difficulty in this sense in that she can’t come into the Congo unless she goes through the African States. There you have UAR, it’s far away from the Congo, there is no contiguous territory, no boundary, you can’t get there unless you go through Sudan, which has a common boundary. There is Ghana far away on the other side, you can’t come there unless you pass through--

[William Frye:] Are you suggesting that Ghana would--wishes to intervene in the Congo and has, in fact? Would you acknowledge this? (33:04)

[Jaja Wachuku:] By word and pronouncement that the African states that have intervened--when you say we have Casablanca powers in Africa, you have the Brazzaville powers--one side say we support the Kasavubu group and the other say we support the Lumumba-Gizenga group. [William Frye: Right.] If uh--if anything that is an intervention. Personally, I consider that an intervention.
[G. Mennen Williams:] Well I think-- Mr. Wachuku, I think the thing you’re pointing out indicates why we have to work through the United Nations.

[ER:] yes, I do too.

[G. Mennen Williams:] Because this is the only way that we’re going to avoid intervention. Channeling all of our efforts through the United Nations.

[William Frye:] Well as a matter of fact, is it possible, Mr. Dayal, to impose a decision that there should be no outside intervention? Is it practical?

[Rajeshwar Dayal:] Well, the Security Council has been itself very much aware of the problem.

[William Frye:] But can you carry it out?

[Rajeshwar Dayal:] It is essentially a diplomatic and political problem. Member states have sponsored and have voted for certain resolutions. [William Frye: Yes.] They are in honor-bound to respect them.

[William Frye: To respect them.] I was just going to say that intervention takes many forms. There are, of course, the more flagrant forms, but there are also subtle forms of intervention, and one of the difficulties which the Congolese people will encounter in finding the solution to their conflicts is the fact that many countries have adopted uh favorite sons in the Congo.

[William Frye:] Including the United States, perhaps?

[Rajeshwar Dayal:] Well, I cannot mention any countries by name, but some have been built up, you see, all out of proportion to their worth of their support in the country. Others have been denigrated or shown as through a uh distorted mirror. Uh--

[G. Mennen Williams:] I think, again, this comes back to the importance of the fact that the United Nations has to act and it did act to recognize the chief of government, Mr. Kasavubu. (35:00)

[William Frye:]Well has the United States--?

[Jaja Wachuku:] Well the main reason for that is that nobody challenges his authority. [G. Mennen Williams: no.] The position-- all sides have agreed--Gizenga, Tshombe, everybody agrees that the chief of state is the chief of state, as the one well recognized. [Rajeshwar Dayal: and we will respect and honor-- [unclear].] Then we say, well that being the case, if you want an institution, take this and respect its law. That’s why we say the Loi Fondamentale, which is the basic constitution that has brought a state into being, must be respected. Anybody who does not satisfy his claim, politically or otherwise, in the Congo, under that law, should be ignored by the United Nations. But that is one point which, according to our recommendation, will insist that the United Nations must make a definite pronouncement on this matter. It is because of that vacillation, due to uh uh various forces in the United Nations, playing against the other, that the position--

[William Frye:] Should there be a pronouncement in favor of Prime Minister Ileo, you mean?
[Jaja Wachuku:] No, I’m talking of the Loi Fondamentale, the constitution. [ER: Law Fundamental.] For instance, Tshombe says, oh the Loi Fundamental is of no use any more, it was Belgian constitution, it was never ratified. Well, I spoke to him--I said, “Well if that is true then you have no right to be president of Katanga because if the constitution was not ratified and you, as according to the election one night, became president of the provincial government and now you say it is no good then the whole existence of your government is a lie, and which means then that Congo is not independent because if the constitution is no good, then it means that Belgium has a right to come back and rule the place as a colony. So you can’t blow hot and cold.” And then, President Kasavubu, if you say you want to be president under a constitution you recognize, you have no right to suspend parliament for more than one month.

[ER:] Well then in other words--In other words, the Loi Fondamentale is a very important subject.

[Jaja Wachuku:] It is very fundamental to the whole existence or solution of the problem; otherwise, there will be complete chaos.

[William Frye:] There are many who feel--there are many who feel, Mr. Ambassador, including Ambassador Stevenson, who just spoke on this program, that the constitution of the Congo is totally inappropriate to the nature of the country with its diverse tribes, and so on. That only a federation, if not a confederation, to--to make it more specific, would be more appropriate.

[Jaja Wachuku:] Yes, Yes. In fact that is part of our recommendation.

[G. Mennen Williams:] You have to start where you are--or--

[Jaja Wachuku:] Well, you must begin with something, from the known to the unknown.

[G. Mennen Williams:] I think you start with this Loi Fundamental, but I think the thing that you were pointing out is the necessity of getting together of trying to get a consensus, getting the people together to work out something better. I know that uh--

[ER:] This doesn’t preclude having a federation though.

[G. Mennen Williams:] No, not at all.

[ER:] But they have to decide it.

[Rajeshwar Dayal:] Yes.

[Jaja Wachuku:] In the Loi Fundamental itself, it is recognized that that is a temporary constitution because it is stated there that the present constitution will last not less than three years and certainly not more than four, within which the people will have the opportunity to amend it. What we say is, accept the law as it is--[G. Mennen Williams: Well I think--] then once we have established the thing, have time to amend it.

[G. Mennen Williams:] I think this is what Ambassador Stevenson was getting at the other day when he talked about the Tananarive conference. As far as he was concerned, and as far as the United States is concerned, what they decide there is their own personal internal problem but the thing that, I think, he
saw with approval was the fact that the leaders were getting together, [ER: yes.] and we hope they will get together again and again until they finally come up with some new satisfactory solution. (38:55)

[ER:] But in the meantime, isn’t it necessary to have the UN presence um in a way to keep a peaceful— we certainly don’t want, and I gather from what you’ve all said that outside intervention must be, under the resolution which the UN passed, um eliminated as much as is humanly possible, [ER nods to Rajeshwar Dayal] You’ve got me now-- but then-- but the UN presence to try and keep as peaceful an atmosphere in which to carry out their negotiations, is probably very important for a time; and so perhaps what one should do is to um urge that this conference go on, and that they do go on in getting together themselves and deciding how they want changes and how they want their setup. And that the UN should go on with its civilian work as far as it possibly can in helping people; and its military should be, as strictly as possible, purely to keep a peaceful atmosphere.

[G. Mennen Williams:] I think Mrs. Roosevelt, that’s very important. Because in this next step of the conference, they are talking about trying to get Gizenga in. now Gizenga pointed out that he wanted to have the conference shifted to a place near the UN presence so he would have his own personal security, so that you can see that the UN is really very very important in— even in accomplishing this consensus.

[ER:] Actually--

[William Frye:] Is the United States prepared to have Antoine Gizenga in a position of prominence in a uh Congolese government, Mr. Williams?

[G. Mennen Williams:] Well, I think the United States is committed to the principle of self-determination. That the Congolese are going to have to work out their own decisions. [William Frye: Because Gizenga is generally--] I must admit that he wouldn’t be our number one candidate, this goes without saying, but I do think uh that he has to be in there, either personally, that is in these original conferences, or through representation.

[William Frye:] Isn’t he, he’s very generally assumed to be, of course, a communist. Perhaps Mr. Wachuku knows him personally, can you tell us whether he is or not?

[Jaja Wachuku:] Well, I take that with a grain of salt because we all, when we are fighting for independence, when it suited anybody, to call you a communist. I cannot call him a communist, and I will not call him a non-communist. As far as this confusion, [William Frye: What does that mean, then?] I am not prepared to label anybody as anything--one thing I know is this, that as a politician, naturally, if he finds that he has no backing from one side, he will be quite prepared to get backing from somebody else. That does not necessarily make him a communist. I’m not prepared now to agree with anybody that he is necessarily a communist, he may well be. Some say he is a communist because he visited Moscow for one or two weeks.

[William Frye:] No, because he studied in a Czechoslovak training school for communists.

[Jaja Wachuku:] Well, we have in Nigeria some who studied in Czechoslovakia, who have even their degree of doctorate there, but they are not communists in Nigeria.
[G. Mennen Williams:] Mr. Wachuku, I just want to make one observation. You know, if you don't get help from one side, you don't have to take it from the other side and maybe--maybe Mr. Gizenga is finding that taking help from one side or the other is going to hurt him with his people, because I think the African people, what I've seen of them, like to see their leaders stand on their own feet. They don't want to have him beholden to anybody and, of course, we see reports now that Mr. Gizenga isn't as strong in his own area as he used to be. Maybe he made a bad choice.

[Jaja Wachuku:] Well-well, with respect to your--you're quite right in that any political leader, that's why I say I'm not prepared to label him communist or non-communist, because Communism to an African, we say it is irrelevant to the African situation.

[William Frye:] It could be very relevant, could it not Mr. Ambassador?

[Jaja Wachuku:] Well, it could be relevant to those who understand it.

[G. Mennen Williams:] It could be relevant if you lived as Hungary or Poland does. Communism is very important there.

[Jaja Wachuku:] Well, I don't know about that, but the African situation--where a peasant has his land, and all the things he requires, he has them. It is only the intellectuals or those who have gone abroad and who have got acquainted with the Marxist doctrine--and the rest of that--but the majority of the people do not look upon their leaders as such. As you say, any political leader in the African scene who wants to survive must have a following in a country. If he doesn't have that following, the next person who has a following is bound to throw him out. And so, until the situation, actually, cools down, and you are able to evaluate people fairly, I think it is too early to call anybody a communist. After all, you have African states, Ghana, and Guinea, and Mali and and UAR and Morocco that have said--we support--recognize Gizenga's government. Surely--he has the recognition from the other side and Moscow says--well we ought to give him recognition. But you notice one thing, there's not one of them that has sent any embassy to stand with him. So from my point of view, I see a game of politics. You have support for one side or the other. You know the United States doesn't give them any support and there is another African state who [unclear] gives them support, they have that as a bargaining power. (45:02)

[G. Mennen Williams:] Don't you think this is one of the kinds of intervention--this pseudo-diplomatic recognition of one of these provincial factions that is unfortunate in the Congo situation?

[Jaja Wachuku:] Well, I have said so already. I mean intervention, as Mr. Dayal said correctly, there are various ways, subtle ones. We have intervention by word, intervention militarily, to get up on the radio and make a pronouncement that--I want X to be the Prime Minister--I don't recognize anybody--well he begins to feel real and somebody even if there is nothing and he can make things very very difficult for others, you see?

[G. Mennen Williams:] Mr. Wachuku, you said something about African politics, that I think is true the world over. You said if there's one leader who has power, he stays in but if he doesn't, there's another leader who has power who comes in. I think that's just the same way here in the United States. (45:55)

[Jaja Wachuku:] Even in Stanleyville. We saw some people who likely, any day if the situation changes, to overthrow Gizenga for the simple reason that Gizenga is the head of PSA. He is not even a member of Lumumba's party. MNC, Lumumba, he is the president of PSA, which is a coalition. There are other
members of Lumumba’s party—which has thirty-five out of one hundred and thirty seven—and those leaders themselves—although for the moment, we don’t hear much about them, surely they must be aiming at succeeding the head of their own party. And even within Gizenga’s party, you have a man like Kamitatu who is the head of the provincial government of Leopoldville. He has real power. He has real executive power. He is ruling a province. Well, uh there must be reconcile-reconciliation between two of them-- or they’re going to be jockeying of position that is the reason why in a situation like this it is too free for anybody to have a [unclear term].

[ER:] These political situations are the same in every country but very difficult for other countries to understand. And I think here at the moment probably the people are more interested in what can be done for the rapid economic and social development in the Congo than in almost any other question. I think the people are really very anxious about it. Mr. Dayal, what do you think about that?

[Rajeshwar Dayal:] That’s quite true, you see this operation, in normal circumstances, should have been very largely a technical assistance operation. And but for the fact that these political difficulties intervened and that there has been-there has been no effective central government ever since the beginning of September, has been one of the factors which has slowed down the application of technical assistance. Yet, uh the situation is there, Mrs. Roosevelt, that the United Nations technical assistance operation which also, I, as the Secretary General’s special representative, am responsible, has managed to keep the country afloat. We have managed to man the hospitals, we’ve prevented any outbreaks of epidemics, we’ve kept the communications going, we’ve-we’ve cleared the entrance to the Congo River, and so on. A great deal of silent and dedicated work has gone into keeping the Congo going. You must have heard of this uh terrible famine which took place in uh Rwanda, where three hundred thousand persons, the victims of a tribal war-- genocidal war, found themselves without their homes and their occupations. I went to that place myself and we organized in a very rapid space of time a massive relief operation and that has worked out extremely well. Well, this is what we are there to do and what we would like to do. We are not there to impose anything upon the Congolese, we are there to help the Congolese people to help themselves. And I’m convinced that as soon as some kind of law and order is established, and we are performing a sort of a holding operation, we do not wish to intervene militarily, there have been very few instances where the United Nations troops have had to fire a single shot or that one hear of United Nations troops being beaten up, and arrested and so on. It is amazing for a soldier to have to give up his arms without putting up a fight for it, but it is very much a peace army, and proud of this force drawn from so many countries. for the moment are able to establish or to help the Congolese to establish, with our assistance, uh a central government, I am confident that this task of uh giving technical assistance, breathing life-life into the-the into this young country can be speeded up tremendously. (49:51)

[ER:] Do you think it has to be done entirely from a central government or do you think you could do a good deal of it from the different provincial capitals? (50:00)

[Rajeshwar Dayal:] You see we are-we are restricted to some extent by the mandate because we have to operate for the assistance of the central government, and our difficulties arise about the authority with whom contracts, for instance, can be concluded. On a de facto basis, we’ve kept the operation going in different parts of the country. That is not a very satisfactory procedure.

[G. Mennen Williams:] Mr. Dayal--
[William Frye:] Mr. Dayal, you speak of United Nations force as being a peace army and, of course, it is, but under the February twenty-first resolution, it was authorized to use force if necessary to prevent the Congolese from going—uh engaging in civil war. This, surely, uh expanded the horizons of the force very significantly and it also expanded the horizons of the United Nations in a constitutional sense also, in that it helped the UN to develop what could be called a set of teeth. The UN for Peace Force in-in um Egypt could perhaps be likened to a child’s first set of teeth. Surely, the Congo army is the child’s second set of teeth, a much more permanent set, which is able to do a good deal of very important biting if necessary. That is, I suppose that it uh will be able to do a good deal of important biting, if necessary, if we can pay for it. But we haven’t said anything.

[G. Mennen Williams:] Mr. Frye, I hope you remember that between these teeth is a tongue, and we hope the tongue is going to do most of the work in the Congo.

[Laughter]

[William Frye:] That’s a beautiful way to put it. But the teeth are there!

[ER:] Well now.

[G. Mennen Williams:] That’s right, and it’s important that it be there. I-I suppose many of our sounds we couldn’t formulate if we didn’t have teeth in the mouth, but the tongue, I hope, is going to be our principal instrument.

[William Frye:] Plus the United States—The United States urged and supported the resolution, which put those teeth there.

[G. Mennen Williams:] Absolutely. Without it we wouldn’t have been in the shape we should be.

[William Frye:] And urged the UN forces to use them, if necessary.

[G. Mennen Williams:] That’s right—

[Jaja Wachuku:] Well that’s uh—as a last resort—[William Frye: If necessary, yes.] but not uh initially.

[Rajeshwar Dayal:] Of course, as you yourself so correctly quoted, the function is to prevent uh civil war, which is very much of a- a peaceful function.

[William Frye:] Could you also use the force, the army, in a forceful fashion to protect your supply lines, Mr. Dayal? Would you be willing to do that?

[Rajeshwar Dayal:] Well you see, under the basic agreement with the Congolese government, we are, I believe, legally authorized to do it, but it’s a-a step we do not wish to take. We’re not there to fight the Congolese. We are there to build cooperation--

[William Frye:] Well they threw you out in the Port of Matadi back early in March?
[Rajeshwar Dayal:] Yes, well, as you know, negotiations are going on, and uh it’s very important to make sure that the supply lines are in our hands. We don’t want to occupy the city of Matadi, but we do want to make sure that our supplies are in safe hands.

[G. Mennen Williams:] Mrs. Roosevelt, I’d like to go back to this famine because I think here is an interesting uh demonstration of the fact that the United States insists on going through the United Nations because with our open-heartedness the first thing we would want to do is to fill our planes or our boats and fly the food in, but we didn’t take a single step until we’d had the word from the United Nations and cooperated with it, so this matter of nonintervention takes a lot of very different and sometimes difficult forms.

[William Frye:] I wonder if we can claim to have been quite so angelic in the Congo as that, Governor?

[G. Mennen Williams:] Well, I claim that in this instance we were.

[laughter]

[William Frye:] Perhaps with reference to famine, but haven’t we, how much money do you suppose the Central Intelligence Agency has poured into the Congo?

[G. Mennen Williams:] I don’t know, are you prepared to say?

[William Frye:] I certainly, of course, don’t know but uh uh your question implies an acknowledgment that we have done so.

[G. Mennen Williams:] No, it doesn’t at all. I am just pointing out that the United States has seized every occasion that it could in all of its action, and you were going to make a contrary statement, but you didn’t have anything to say. (54:16)

[William Frye:] I-I would not, of course, want to indict our policy. On the contrary, I think we’ve intervened less than most other countries, but I [G. Mennen Williams: Well I--] wonder if it’s quite honest to-to-to represent our policy as completely angelic and completely in support of the United Nations. Mr. Dayal, do you feel that the United States has always given you complete and unequivocal support?

[Rajeshwar Dayal:] Well, the operation would not have got off the ground but for United States support. [William Frye: Its diplomatic-- yeah.] The Governor mentioned the [G. Mennen Williams: Well I--] famine situation, well we’ve had extremely generous support. We’ve had planes and foodstuffs flown in, one day we had more than twenty-two planes flying in with supplies--

[ER:] Well, I’m delighted to feel that we did wait to cooperate with the United Nations and that we have done our cooperation [G. Mennen Williams: yes.] through the United Nations. I think this is a habit, which one should form on all these occasions. (55:21)

[G. Mennen Williams:] Well I-- listen to me, Mrs. Roosevelt.

[ER:] Yes.
[G. Mennen Williams:] I was just going to say that while I agree with Mr. Frye that Uncle Sam still wears a top hat, not a halo, but I think we’ve been doing the best we could. [Laughter]

[ER:] Well, I think that’s a very good thing to say, but I would like just to ask um how you feel, and I don’t know who can answer this, about the refusal of some of the nations to carry the financial burden--what-what can we do to-to get more people to feel that this is a part of the peace burden of the world?

[Rajeshwar Dayal:] I think it’s a question for Mr. Wachuku--

[Jaja Wachuku:] Well, I think it is a matter of recognizing the obligation every member has as a member of the United Nations. There is no way which you can force them to do it but constant reminder that once you’re a member of a club or organization you always have the responsibility or obligation to that club; and if others are playing their part, it is only fair that you should play your own part; otherwise, then you don’t participate in anything else. I think a gentle pressure, continual pressure, will make members do something in favor of the Congo operation.

[ER:] Well now I’m sorry to say, I’m sorry[laughter] but the time has come when we have to thank all of you very much for your participation today. You’ve been most kind in coming and we are deeply appreciative. And I would like to say that next month, we hope that the audience will join us again, as we will be looking at the problem of economic development, and our guests will be Chester Bowles, Paul Hoffman, and others. ‘Til then, au revoir.

[Theme music begins 57:25]

[End credits sequence overlaid motion picture Images of the United Nations building and delegates meeting]

[Unknown Announcer 1:] [Speaking while names appear on credit sequence.] Ambassador Adlai Stevenson is the chief American representative to the United Nations. G. Mennen Williams is Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs. Jaja Wachuku of Nigeria is the Chairman of the UN appointed Congo Conciliation Commission. Rajeshwar Dayal is Dag Hammarskjold’s special representative in the Congo. William Frye is the United Nations correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor. (58:12)

[Unknown Announcer 1:] On next month’s program, Mrs. Roosevelt will discuss the new US foreign aid program with Chester Bowles and other special guests. This program was produced at the United Nations. (58:43)

[Theme music ends 59:05]

[Unknown Announcer 2:] This is National Education Television.

Transcribed from documents in the Henry Morgenthau, III papers, then corrected against audio files at the Library of Congress.

Transcription: Kellie Menzies