Civic Legacies and the Development of Urban Integration Policy in France: Migrant Roma Housing Policy.

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Dedication

For The Amy Hayes, Mom, Dad and Leo.

Acknowledgments

I would like to start with a land acknowledgment. I wish to acknowledge the ancestral lands that this dissertation was written on. It began on George Washington University's campus which is the ancestral homelands of the Piscataway, Anacostan and Nacotchtank people.[1] Most data analysis and final drafts were written on the land of Turrbal and Yuggera people, the traditional owners and custodians of Brisbane/Meanjin, where land was never ceded.[2] I love this dissertation because I identify with the migrant story. I believe the more of us acknowledge our own migration stories, the better off we will all be.

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[1] Student Life, « Land Acknowledgement, » Division of Student Affairs, George Washington University, https://studentlife.gwu.edu/land-acknowledgement#:~:text=The%20Orientation%2C%20Class%20Year%2C%20%26,%2C%20Anacostan%2C%20and%20Nacotchtank%20people.

[2] « The Traditional Owners of Morningside, Brisbane," Yarn, https://www.yarn.com.au/blogs/yarn-in-the-community/the-traditional-owners-of-morningside-brisbane#:~:text=The%20Turrbal%20and%20Yuggera%20peoples%20have%20lived%20in%20this%20area,name%20for%20Brisbane%20is%20Meanjin.

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woman Dr. Schraudenbach in the family and Grandpa Austin, the historian and archivist of the family. To Mommom, who kindly asked Poppop to stay for my defense. To Poppop, for his love of a good problem. From all of you I inherited a great love of social science and the scientific method. It is such a privilege to not only have the freedom to run and explore the world as I see fit, but to have your blessing as well. As Poppop said, we are all very lucky.

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Abstract of Dissertation

Civic Legacies and the Development of Urban Integration Policy in France: Migrant Roma Housing Policy.

In 2014, two French cities that host thousands of migrant Roma—Toulouse and Lille—had similar housing policies for migrant Roma. However, by 2015 Toulouse housing policy shifted dramatically and pre-empted the national-level model for long-term housing policy for migrant Roma. Lille did not pivot toward long-term housing for migrant Roma until a national level policy change in 2017. What explains this divergence? Why did Toulouse emerge as a leader and Lille a follower regarding housing policy for EU migrant Roma?

This dissertation finds evidence that civic legacies—networks (NGOs), ideas (policy frames), and actors (policy entrepreneurs)—developed during previous integration efforts shape housing policy. Using Toulouse and Lille as case studies, this research asks: how do civic legacies influence housing policy for migrant Roma? The evidence demonstrates that policy entrepreneurs engage with the civic legacy of a city and use it to introduce housing policy. Toulouse's civic legacy was developed in the 1990s and activated in 2015 by a policy entrepreneur who advocated for long-term housing. In contrast, Lille lacked the civic legacy development in the 1990s to pivot entirely toward long-term housing in 2015. Instead, even after Lille introduced long-term housing options in 2017, Lille maintained its reliance on short-term housing through 2020. This dissertation explains the role of civic legacies in the integration policy of migrant Roma in Western Europe, by leveraging 36 stakeholder interviews and 1,344

archival items across three local archives, to analyze housing integration policy for EU migrant Roma in France between 1990-2020.

Table of Contents

Dedication ……..... iv

Acknowledgments ……..... v

Abstract of Dissertation ix

List of Figures…….....xii

List of Charts……..... xiii

Chapter 1: Introduction.....1

Chapter 2: Literature Review.....24

Chapter 3: Methodology/Measuring a Civic Legacy.....36

Chapter 4: Establishing A Civic Legacy: Divergent Networks in Toulouse v. Lille..49

Chapter 5: Establishing a Civic Legacy: Policy Frames and Entrepreneurs…….78

Chapter 6: Policy Frames and Entrepreneurs…….....120

Chapter 7: Conclusion…….....139

Bibliography…….....148

List of Figures

Figure 1 : Civic Legacy Represented by Number of Policy Frame References ……...79

List of Charts

Chart (1): Housing Policy Eras in Toulouse and Lille 1990-2020.....11
Chart (2): Presence of Civic Legacies in 1990s *and Outcome*.....18
Chart (3): Policy Frame Analysis.....43

Chapter 1. Introduction

"'Laudato si' means to welcome, protect, promote and integrate."[3]

Why was Toulouse a leader in housing policy for migrant Roma while Lille was a follower? In 2015, the City of Toulouse announced it would pivot from a logic of short-term accommodation to a logic of long-term accommodation.[4] This long-term accommodation policy was comprised of, "autonomous housing units with social support in view of assuming the rights and duties of being a tenant able to cover the cost of rent in the long term."[5] Alternatively, Lille did not adapt their housing policies from short-term accommodation until 2017 when a National Housing First policy was launched.[6] Toulouse was a leader in introducing autonomous housing policy with social support for EU migrant Roma while Lille was a follower and only adapted its policy after national

[3] In 2019, at a council meeting in Toulouse, Dr. Daniel Rougé used this reference to, Laudato Si, to describe the values which underpinned the Toulouse model of housing integration for precarious European nationals and refugees. Toulouse Municipal Council, « Conseil Municipal, Séance du vendredi 10 Juillet 2020 N4, » pg 24, 10 July 2020, Toulouse Municipal Online Archive.

[4] In 2015, Toulouse had around 1,200 EU migrant Roma mainly from Bulgaria and Romania living in 15 camps (Frederic Dessort, "A Toulouse, l'insertion des Roms passe par les toits, » 2019, Libération,https://-l-insertion-des-roms-passe-par-les-toits_1721996/). Toulouse Municipal Council, "Dispositif d'hébergement accompagné pour les personnes en situation de précarité : modification et harmonisation du cadre normatif, » pg 1, 22 October 2021, Délibération n 1.4, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives. Toulouse Municipal Council, « Terrains et sites d'accueil gères par la ville pour les personnes en situation de précarité : modification et harmonisation du cadre normatif, » pg 1,2, 26 October 2015, Déliberation n 4.2, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives. "15 cities learn from Toulouse how to support Roma to access adequate housing," 2019, Eurocities.http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/news/15-cities-learn-from-Toulouse-how-to-support-Roma-to- access- adequate-housing-WSPO-BBDLD3.

[5] "15 cities learn from Toulouse how to support Roma to access adequate housing," 2019, Eurocities. http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/news/15-cities-learn-from-Toulouse-how-to-support-Roma-to- access-adequate-housing-WSPO-BBDLD3.

[6] The 2014 planning document between the Lille metropole and CANAL association continued to recommend reception and temporary emergency accommodation for migrant Roma. Lille Metropole « Plan National 'Logement d'abord'- Mise en œuvre acceleree sur le territoire de la MEL- Actions 2018, » Pg 1, 19 October 2018, Lille Metropole Online Archives. Toulouse Metropole, « Convention Passee entre : La Métropole Européenne de Lille et CANAL : Annee 2017, » pg 2, 1345W6, 2017, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France

level policy changes. Understanding the divergence in these cases explains why some cities lead while others follow in their policy-making concerning stigmatized migrants and how that integration policy changes over time.

Furthermore, Roma are an important group for several reasons (not all discussed here). Roma are the largest minority in Europe and live in *every* country in Western Europe in addition to Canada and the United States. At the same time, non-Roma Europeans harbor some of the highest levels of prejudice and racism toward Roma.[7] So, boiled down, the question of housing integration policy for EU migrant Roma is a question of integration policy and racism broadly. How do urban governments across Europe house people who face such a high level of prejudice?

The literature on civic legacies suggests that policy entrepreneurs draw upon existing networks (NGOs) and ideas (policy frames) developed in previous integration efforts to shape integration policy (Arrington 2016; Chung 2020; Ireland 2004). I suggest that Toulouse developed networks and ideas during the integration of migrant Roma in the 1990s which set a precedent for its city council to shape new housing policy in 2015. Alternatively, Lille lacked a civic legacy in 1990 to set precedent for 2015 and thus did not change their policy until there was a national level change in policy.

This dissertation develops a theory of how civic legacies influence integration policy. The evidence demonstrates that the legacy of local grassroots NGOs, policy entrepreneurs and policy frames results in policy change. By "legacy," this dissertation

[7] Pew Research Center, "Chapter 4: Views of Roma, Muslims, Jews," 2014, Pew Research Center Global Attitudes & Trends, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2014/05/12/chapter-4-views-of-roma-muslims-jews/.

refers to the NGOs, policy entrepreneurs and policy frames that existed historically and set a precedent for the current contemporary housing integration policy.

While civic legacies are a necessary condition, they are not sufficient for policy change. Policy entrepreneurs are required as the agents of policy change. Therefore, while policy entrepreneurs are part of the civic legacy which sets a precedent for policy change, there must also be a policy entrepreneur acting to change policy in the present. The rest of this introductory chapter explains variation in housing policy for EU migrant Roma in Lille and Toulouse, the argument in brief, a short discussion of methods, important context concerning policy on Roma and the cities of interest, empirical expectations, the significance of the inquiry and lastly a roadmap for the rest of the dissertation.

Variation in Housing Policy for EU migrant Roma in France

Housing Policy in France

The French government has a rich history of introducing social policy for socioeconomically disadvantaged populations. Magda Maaoui (2020) describes the housing market in France as, "characterized by an interventionist state-led urban regime where national programs in place since the postwar era guaranteed a consistent production of social housing units for the country" (Maaoui 2021, 1-2). In the early 2000s the French government introduced the Solidarity and Urban Renewal Law (Loi Solidarité Et Renouvellement Urbain (SRU)) in an attempt to "rebalance the geographic location of social housing units in response to growing trends of segregation and concentration of poverty in French cities" (Maauoi 2021, 2). The SRU law was designed to promote "la mixité social," directly translated as "social mixing," or social diversity and thus integration outcomes. France has introduced the SRU law that required selected

municipalities to devote 25% of their local housing stock to social housing. For comparison, most American inclusionary housing programs (e.g., in Illinois, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts) set a fair share of social housing at about 10% (Silver 2019). Social housing stock (social rental housing with capped rents) is relatively large in France. Therefore, while France does not collect data on ethnicity or race, French national law and policy has a disproportionate focus on the integration on social housing stock.

That said, while France has a relatively large stock of social housing and a deliberate focus on the housing integration in France, while the state has the legal duty to integrate or deport EU migrant Roma from its territory, it is up to city governments to introduce housing policies for different groups.[8] Therefore even when the administrative status of a group is clear and the responsibility to provide housing clearly lies with the government, as a stalling tactic city and state representatives will contest whose responsibility (legal and otherwise) it is to accommodate migrant Roma. Therefore, integration policies change depending on how the city frames its sense of responsibility toward a target group—such as a humanitarian responsibility versus a legal responsibility. Thus, housing policy depends partially on the administrative status of the migrants, but it is also influenced by the policy frame articulated by the city regarding the target group.[9]

[8] The DALO law, adopted in March 2007 opened the possibility for an enforceable right to housing in France. France was the second European country to adopt a national right to housing, after Scotland. However, this law can exclude that right to housing to, "people who do not have permanent residence or a valid temporary resident permit." (Levy-Vroelant, 2015, pg 88). That said, the EU Racial Equality Directive (RED) of 2000 prohibits housing discrimination as well as discrimination in access to goods and services. Therefore, while the state has a legal responsibility to provide housing rights, housing access can be denied due to an individual's administrative immigration status.

[9] Scholars such as Dr. Maaoui (2021) consider "land use ideologies" to be the relevant organizing ideology.

In practice, French policy makers refer to integration policies that adopt the national-level legal responsibility to house migrants as "volontariste" policies, or proactive policies.[10] The adoption of housing integration policies for migrant Roma is perceived as the city taking on extra responsibility for these groups and developing political will beyond its legal competencies to introduce policy that legally should be handled at the state-level. Typically, it is the political parties on the left of the ideological spectrum that take on these proactive policies, but in the case of Toulouse, for example, we observe the center-right adopting proactive policies on behalf of the state in order to house their local EU migrant Roma.

Policy for EU Migrant Roma

While the policies analyzed for this dissertation focus on housing for one specific group "EU migrant Roma," the broader ethnic group, "Roma" is comprised of a multifarious people that city bureaucracy and NGOs tend to homogenize into one administrative group for the purpose of service delivery.[11] The name, "Roma," is an umbrella term, first adopted at the World Congress in London in 1971. "Roma" refers to Roma, Sinti, Kale and related groups in Europe, including Travelers and the Eastern groups (Dom and Lom), and covers the wide diversity of the groups concerned, including persons who identify themselves as Gypsies.[12] Some Roma share common geographic and linguistic origins. At the end of the 18th century, linguists found evidence that Roma migrated from the north of India as early as the 9th century and

[10] Zoom interview with Lille Civil Servant in Department for Welcoming Travelers and Roma Migrants, September 19, 2020.
[11] However, undoubtably sometimes this homogenization is due to institutionalized and historical racism.
[12] EU definition of Roma found in the 2012 Glossary of Terms Related to Roma issues. Council of Europe, "Fighting Housing Discrimination in Europe," https://rm.coe.int/1680088eab.

concluded that Roma share a language, Romani, derived from Sanskrit.[13] Historical evidence suggests Roma have been present in Europe since the end of the 14th century (Council of Europe 2012).

Roma have a long history in France specifically. In France, Roma have had many different policy names over the last two centuries: "nomades," (nomads) "gens du voyage," (French travellers) "tsiganes," (gypsies) and finally "Roms" (Roma). These exonyms refer to different groups of Roma over time, some migrants, some French. Today, 10 to 12 million Roma live in the EU, the majority of whom are sedentary. This number is a conjecture due to the "…varying definition and classification systems for race/ethnicity, ethical and legal limitations, and reluctance to identify as Roma for fear of stigmatization" (Warwick-Booth et al. 2017, 670). Nevertheless, Roma are a non-negligeable population as Europe's largest minority. In 2019, policy centers and NGOs estimated there were between 12,000 and 15,000 migrant Roma in France.[14][15] At the High-Level Conference on the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies in March 2019, the French Minister for Housing (DIHAL), Mr. Sylvain Mathieu stated

[13] The 2012 "Glossary of Terms Related to Roma issues" addresses the challenges in defining who counts as Roma, "There are, in addition, other groups, particularly in the Balkans, who are regarded or who regard themselves as Roma, but who do not speak Romani and who do not have the same North Indian origin. These include the Boyash (also known as Beash, Bayash, Banyash, Baieşi or Rudari, depending onthe country) whose language derives from Moeso-Romanian, and some members of the Ashkali, who speak Albanian. Other groups, who resemble the Roma in certain respects, such as the Albanian-speaking "Egyptians" (so-called because they reputedly came from Egypt) and certain Ashkali,insist on their ethnic difference. Both groups are Albanian-speaking In western Europe, a distinction should be made between the Roma/Sinti/Kale and other groups who sometimes share their lifestyle, or their plight (difficulties in integrating, discrimination, etc.) but who do not have the same ethnic origin or the same language. These include the Yenish (found in Switzerland and some neighbouring countries)and the Irish Travelers (see below)." Council of Europe, "Fighting Housing Discrimination in Europe," https://rm.coe.int/1680088eab.

[14] National Human Rights Collective Romeurope Collectif, "Les Elus Locaux: Face a la Résorption des Squats et Bidonvilles," 2019, https://www.romeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/DOSSIER_Les-%C3%A9lus-locaux-face-%C3%A0-la-r%C3%A9sorption-des-squats-et-bidonvilles_FINAL.pdf.

[15] Kristi Severance, "France's Expulsion of Roma Migrants: A Test Case for Europe," 2010, The Online Journal of the Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frances-expulsion-roma-migrants-test-case-europe

that throughout France, "(t)here are around 500 slum areas populated by 16,000 people, mainly Romanian and Bulgarian nationals (Mathieu 2019, 2). The question of housing for EU migrant Roma is a pivotal one for France.

Migrant Roma from Post-Soviet Romania and Bulgaria

For this dissertation specifically, "migrant Roma" refer to Roma migrants from Romania and Bulgaria who began their migration west after 1990. These migrants were fleeing discrimination and seeking economic opportunities. In Romania and Bulgaria, after the fall of communism in 1990, while Roma had their rights formally reinstated, discrimination was still widespread across education, labor, health and housing sectors.[16] For example, in February 1990, the leading political coalition in Romania, the National Salvation Front (with the support of national television stations) used Roma as scapegoats for the violence of Romania's Revolution in December 1989.[17] In response to this heightened discrimination, Roma travelled west to countries such as France for new economic opportunities.[18] French cities struggled to house these new immigrants, but some cities were more successful than others. For example, in Toulouse social workers collected surveys of migrant Roma families and attempted to find them suitable housing. In Lille, there is no archival record that local NGOs conducted systematic surveys or aided migrant Roma families from Romania or Bulgaria during this time.

Between 1990 and 2007, Toulouse continued its efforts to re-house migrant Roma

[16] Arno Tanne, "The Roma of Eastern Europe: Still Searching for Inclusion," 2005, Migration Policy Institute, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/roma-eastern-europe-still-searching-inclusion.
[17] Valeriu Nicolae and Hannah Slavik, "Being a 'Gypsy': The Worst Social Stigma in Romania," 2003, European Roma Rights Centre, http://www.errc.org/roma-rights-journal/being-a-gypsy-the-worst-social-stigma-in-romania.
[18] The number of families is very difficult to track but experts estimate. Between 1997 and 2005, approximately 12,000 to 15,000 Roma left Eastern Europe. Arno Tanne, "The Roma of Eastern Europe: Still Searching for Inclusion," 2005, Migration Policy Institute, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/roma-eastern-europe-still-searching-inclusion.

living in informal camps. Whereas Lille policy focused solely on providing parking sites for nomadic Roma with French citizenship, called "French travelers," or *gens du voyages*, not migrant Roma. Most French cities, included Lille and Toulouse, provided and still provide French travelers with designated parking lots with basic water and sanitation services. Lille did not introduce policy for migrant Roma until 2007 when Romania joined the EU and migrant Roma were legally allowed to work, travel and live in France (with some restrictions). In this way, variation in housing policy depends partially on the administrative status of migrants (whether they are EU citizens, refugees, asylum seekers, etc.). In 2016, for example, migrant Roma with Romanian citizenship had a right to live and work in France while migrant Roma with Albanian citizenship did not. Therefore, variation in housing policy partially depends on citizenship and requisite administrative status of migrants.

In 2007, Lille and Toulouse relied on a patchwork of housing policies regarding emergency accommodation (like hotels), short-term and long-term housing for migrant Roma. However, these policies targeted unhoused and marginalized residents generally, not migrant Roma specifically. Then, in 2007, cities in the north of France developed a new type of short-term accommodation specifically for migrant Roma. The housing consisted of gated parking lots with varying levels of resources and services provided by the city. Some parking lots were equipped with only the basics such as water and sanitation services, while others were further equipped with mobile homes. In any case, the defining feature of these parking lots was that they were gated. These parking lots for migrant Roma were referred to as "integration villages," or *villages d'insertion*. Migrant Roma families applied to reside in these integration villages for a designated amount of

time, usually to avoid being deported from France. By 2007, integration villages were explicitly funded by the EU.[19]

However by 2010, French academics and activists were concerned that integration villages segregated migrant Roma from the city, policed their movements in and out of the sites and did not in fact lead to broader integration outcomes (Bessone et al. 2013; Legros 2010; Picker 2017). Despite this backlash, both Lille and Toulouse considered integration villages a valid policy option for housing until 2015. In 2015, Toulouse publicly pivoted from a logic of short-term housing (integration villages) to autonomous long-term housing with social support. Lille, however, did not make the same pivot away from integration villages. Between 2015-2018 Toulouse worked to eliminate integration villages while Lille maintained a stock of integration villages. In September 2017, France introduced a national Housing First plan similar to Toulouse's 2015 policy that focused on long-term autonomous housing with social support. This 2015 policy divergence had lingering effects years after which can be identified in 2020 policy documents. By 2020 Toulouse no longer considered integration villages a valid housing policy, whereas in 2020 Lille still mentioned integration villages as a valid housing option. This background on housing policy for migrant Roma in Toulouse and Lille—summarized in chart 1 below—provides context for the puzzle of why Toulouse led the way and pivoted from integration village policy in 2015 and Lille did not.

[19] European Regional Development Fund, « Operational program 2007-2013 Co-financed by the European Funds, Attributive Subsidy Agreement (FEDER), 'Competitive and Employment-Nord-Pas-de-Calais operational program for the creation of integration villages for marginalized populations in the territory of Lille Metropole » 1345W7, 2012, pg 2 and 3, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

Anti-Roma Discrimination/Racism in France

In 2014, 66 percent of French had an unfavorable view of Roma (whereas 27 percent of French had an unfavorable view of Muslims, for context).[20] In France, anti-Roma prejudice is stronger than general anti-immigrant prejudice. In France, anti-Roma prejudice is exacerbated by the presence of informal encampments. If migrants cannot get access to housing, some join the informal camps already set up by family or friends. These camps are not serviced by the city; detritus piles up creating a safety hazard and negatively impacts the surrounding areas. Often, these neglected camps are the most visible presence migrant Roma have in cities like Toulouse and Lille. This anti-Roma prejudice presents an additional challenge for city councils. The challenge of anti-Roma racism, sometimes referred to as antigypsyism, is well-documented and well-theorized.[21] However, this research is focused on how city councils introduce new policies that provide enough support for migrant Roma and end up assuaging the resentment that fuels anti-Roma sentiment (racism and prejudice), public opinion and voting preferences.[22]

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[20] Richard Wike, Jacob Poushter, Laura Silver, Kat Devlin, Janell Fetterolf, Alexandra Castillo, and Christine Huang, "European Public Opinion Three Decades After the Fall of Communism," 2019, Pew Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2014/05/12/chapter-4-views-of-roma-muslims-jews/

[21] Alliance Against AntiGypsyism, "Anti-Gypsyism- A Reference Paper," June 2017, European Roma Grassroots Organizations (ERGO). Network and Central Council of German Sinti and Roma. "A persisting concern: anti-Gypsyism as a barrier to Roma inclusion," 2018. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), "Local Engagement for Roma Inclusion," 2014. Ismael Cortés Gómes and Markus End, "Dimensions of Antigypsyism in Europe," 2019, The European Network Against Racism (ENAR) and the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma in Brussels. Jarmila Lajčáková, Marek Hojsík and Mirjam Karoly, "Combatting Antigypsyism: Expert reports building on forward-looking aspects of the evaluation of the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies,"2020. European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers Directorate D — Equality and Union citizenship Unit D.1 Non-discrimination and Roma coordination. Margareta Matache, Jacqueline Bhabha, Ian Alley, Murphy Barney, Samuel Francis Peisch, Veronica Lewin.Voice of Roma: Kristin Day, Carol Silverman, "Romani Realities in the United States: Breaking the Silence, Challenging the Stereotypes," 2020, November 2020, FXB Center for Health and Human Rights, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/2464/2020/11/Romani-realities-report-final-11.30.2020.pdf.

[22] I am not claiming that supportive and proactive housing policies combat anti-Roma racism and anti-gypsyism entirely, to the extent that anti-Roma racism and anti-gypsyism is systemic and/or structural phenomena. To an extent, even the idea of ameliorating or erasing anti-Roma racism is reductive and

Chart (1): Housing Policy Eras in Toulouse and Lille

Policy Eras	**Toulouse Policy**	**Lille Policy**
1990-2007: Policy Development. Rehousing efforts and social support in Toulouse but not Lille.	Some focus on migrant Roma in re-housing efforts. Surveys of migrant Roma conducted by social services network.	No focus on migrant Roma. Focus on parking sites French travelers, "gens du voyage. » No surveys of migrant Roma conducted by social services network.
2007-2015: Policy similarity. Integration villages in both cities.	Integration villages in addition to other types of housing, moratorium on evictions (2010-2012), an increase in integration villages after 2010.	Integration villages in addition to other types of housing, moratorium on evictions (2010-2012), an increase in integration villages after 2010.
2015-2017: Policy Divergence. Toulouse pivots from integration village policy and Lille continues with integration village policy.	City council phases out integration villages, relies primarily on autonomous housing with social support and preempts national-level policy. One integration village remains.	Despite closure of a few integration villages (from 10-7) continued reliance upon them.
2017-2020: Policy Continuity. National Housing First policy is introduced.	Long-term autonomous housing with social support is referred to as a success and the model for future integration of refugees in Toulouse City Council.	Under national Housing First policy, autonomous long-term housing becomes policy while different types of integration villages still used.

The difference between Toulouse and Lille demonstrates why certain cities lead

misunderstands the power structures and incentives that bolster anti-Roma racism. However, I am claiming that certain housing policies as opposed to others can make progress toward a more humane and fair housing process at the local level and can potentially address the anti-Roma attitudes present at the local level that influence housing policy.

while others follow in their policymaking concerning stigmatized migrants. Toulouse led the change from integration villages to long-term autonomous housing with social support. Furthermore, Toulouse's long-term housing policy served as a model for the integration of future refugee populations in Toulouse and was recommended to different cities in France and beyond as a policy solution for migrant Roma integration.[23] Lille implemented long-term autonomous housing with social support after it was mandated by the federal government and then continued to use integration villages years after they were considered dubious housing policy at best by academics and policymakers alike.

Argument in Brief

Broadly, civic legacies are the networks (including NGOs and social workers (chapter 4)) ideas (policy frames (chapter 5)) and actors (policy entrepreneurs (chapter 5 and 6)) developed in previous integration efforts that set a precedent and influence contemporary integration policy. This dissertation focuses specifically on the civic legacies that influence migrant Roma housing policy and distinguish cities as leaders or followers. So, this dissertation is focused on the networks and ideas developed during previous integration efforts that set a precedent for policy entrepreneurs to influence contemporary integration housing policy.

Networks create and solidify connections amongst civil society and government actors. They also generate information-sharing and trust between the target group, civil society actors and city council that is necessary for housing policy. The civic society network can play a role in shaping integration policy by holding national and local political actors accountable, giving a voice to migrant concerns, raising public awareness

[23] 15 cities learn from Toulouse how to support Roma to access adequate housing," 2019, Eurocities. http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/news/15-cities-learn-from-Toulouse-how-to-support-Roma-to- access-adequate-housing-WSPO-BBDLD3.

of policies and advocating for certain policies and reforms (Chung 2020). The civic legacy of a network is developed over time. The civic legacy of the network is established by the vanguard group. This vanguard group has the institutional power to advocate for the new migrants based on its historical experience with integration. The vanguard group develops the network during previous efforts to integrate the same or similarly stigmatized migrant groups that require more support from the government. The role of the network is explored further in chapter 4.

An important actor in the network is the policy entrepreneur (introduced in chapter 5). Policy entrepreneurs draw upon existing networks (NGOs) and ideas (policy frames) developed in previous integration efforts to shape contemporary integration policy. A successful policy entrepreneur convincingly articulates why their policy is the preferable policy. Chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation demonstrate how a policy entrepreneur converses in city council meetings in order to convince opposition parties and mayors of other municipalities that their housing policy is preferred. In order to convince others, the policy entrepreneur can introduce policy frames with a civic legacy.

When a policy entrepreneur introduces a frame, she is introducing or constraining possibilities to change a policy. Successful policy entrepreneurs invoke a policy frame that develops the political will for a particular policy. Policy frames shape how civil-society actors negotiate housing integration policy. Policy frames structure and contextualize debates over integration policy and provide tools for migrant advocates. Policy frames used in previous struggles for integration have a civic legacy. The civic legacy of policy frames provides a repertoire of policy frames that have specific resonance in the community. These policy frames have historical significance and a

different semiotic weight because of that significance. As such, if actors invoke a specific frame with a civic legacy, this frame may have more resonance in the community, which might garner the necessary political will to introduce one policy over another. In this way, the policy frame is part of the city's civic legacy. Sometimes these frames are strategically introduced and sometimes not. In Toulouse, the earlier development of policy frames in reaction to re-housing efforts in the 1990s contributed to the civic legacy which made Toulouse a leader in housing policy for migrant Roma, while the latent development of policy frames in reaction to integration villages in 2008 in Lille contributed to the lack of a civic legacy in Lille and its follower status. The influence of policy frames on housing policy is explained further in chapter 5.

This dissertation finds evidence that civic legacy of policy frames (ideas) and NGOs (networks) is activated by policy entrepreneurs to influence contemporary housing policy. In this way this dissertation describes the transformation of integration policies over time and the distinction of cities as leaders or followers of migrant integration policy.

Research Design

Case Selection

In picking the city case studies, Toulouse and Lille, the research design aims to achieve a similar systems design, or Mill's "method of difference," to clarify the role of civic legacies in each city.[24] This paired case comparison holds country-level explanations (national immigration, integration, welfare and capitalist regimes) constant,

[24] As Arend Lijjphart (1971) explains Mills' paper focuses on research designs for causal inference, which can be difficult to achieve with the comparative method. This dissertation's findings do not identify causal relationships. But the research design and process aimed to keep as many variables constant between the two cases to allow for greater comparison between cities. Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," 1971, The American Political Science Review.

as well as metropolitan area population sizes and the estimated number of migrants in each city. In 2015, at the time of the key policy divergence at the center of this study, Toulouse and Lille had the fourth and sixth largest metropolitan areas by population at 1,360,829 and 1,187,820 people, respectively.[25] While there is no census of migrant Roma in Toulouse and Lille, in 2016 the Interministerial Delegation for Accommodation and Access to Housing (DIHAL) did track the number of EU migrants evicted from slums and enrolled in each city's integration programs. We can assume that most of these migrants were EU migrant Roma from Romania and Bulgaria at this time. So, in 2016 – a year after policy divergence—Toulouse reported 817 EU migrants enrolled in their integration program and Lille reported 1,415 EU migrants enrolled in their integration program, the second and third highest number of EU migrants enrolled after the Paris metropolitan area.[26]

Therefore, while it is true that Toulouse and Lille are often sequential in their population counts, and while a lot of the national level context is the same for Toulouse and Lille, it is important to note how these cities are different. Eurostat reports that in Toulouse migrants comprised 18 percent of the population with 124,066 migrants in 2015, while in Lille migrants comprised 13 percent of the population with 118,651 migrants in 2015.[27] One could claim that Toulouse has a larger share of immigrants and a stronger culture of welcoming immigrants. This strong history and culture of immigration

[25] "Tables of the French Economy," 2019, Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE), https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/3676570?sommaire=3696937.
[26] "Actions de Résorption des Bidonvilles Soutenues par le Dihal : Bilan 2016 et Panorama 2017, » 2017, Interministerial Delegation for Accommodation and Access to Housing (DIHAL).
[27] Eurostat, "Population by citizenship and country of birth-cities and greater cities," 2024, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/urb_cpopcb__custom_10299824/default/table?lang=en.

would not doubt influence Toulouse's ability to lead change in integration policy for migrant Roma.

Toulouse's geographic location in the southwest of France near the border of Spain and on the Garonne River which connects to the Mediterranean Sea has historically made it a hub for immigrants and refugees. In the 1920s and 30's Toulouse welcomed Spanish and Italian refugees and migrants fleeing their respective fascist regimes.[28] Thousands of Jewish migrants traveled to Toulouse during the Holocaust.[29] French and Algerian immigrants traveled to Toulouse after Algeria's 1962 independence.[30]

However, Lille also has a strong history of migration. In the early 20th century, Lille attracted migrants (mainly from Poland and Italy) through its burgeoning coal mining and textiles industries.[31] Between 1960 and 1970's the first wave of immigrants from North Africa came to the region, specifically from Algeria and Morocco. However, immigration slowed down after the 1974 recession and national immigration policies that restricted the number of permanent workers in France.[32] But in 1994 with the arrival of the TGV and then Eurostar rails, Lille found itself at the crossroads of all major European capitals. While Toulouse sits in the southwest and Lille in the northeast, both cities have a historical reputation as crossroads for the rest of Europe. So, while Toulouse does have a strong history and culture of immigration so does Lille. Since the late 20th century, Lille

[28] Scott Sayare, After Killings in France, Muslims Fear a Culture of Diversity is at Risk," 2012, The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/world/europe/in-toulouse-muslims-fear-diversity-is-at-risk.html.
[29] Scott Sayare, After Killings in France, Muslims Fear a Culture of Diversity is at Risk," 2012, The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/world/europe/in-toulouse-muslims-fear-diversity-is-at-risk.html.
[30] Jean-Marie Pailler, Annie Thomas, Jack Thomas, « Little History of Toulouse," Cairn Catalog, https://www.editions-cairn.fr/collection-petite-histoire/957-petite-histoire-de-toulouse-9782350685618.html.
[31] Laurent Fraisse and Marie-Luce Bia Zafinikamia, "City Report : Lille," 2012, WILCO Publication.
[32] Laurent Fraisse and Marie-Luce Bia Zafinikamia, "City Report : Lille," 2012, WILCO Publication.

has modernized to accommodate the changes in demographics and is clearly up to the challenge of welcoming migrants.

By 2015, both Toulouse and Lille were considered global cities with strong economies, progressive residents, and a history of immigration suggesting either one had the potential to be a leader in housing policies for EU migrant Roma. Keeping these contexts similar helps to identify the influence of civic legacies. While both Toulouse and Lille make big efforts to house migrant Roma and deserve credit for generating the political will to introduce housing policy for the largest minority and most discriminated group in modern-day Europe, the way they introduce policy is different, with Toulouse leading the way and Lille following.

Methods

A quick note on methodology before it is covered in depth in chapter 3. First, to identify relevant networks and policy entrepreneurs, a process-trace was applied to municipal and metropole level archives, online city council meeting minutes and interviews gathered in Lille and Toulouse. All content gathered and analyzed concerned migrant Roma housing policies between the 1990s and 2020.

Next, to identify policy frames, a qualitative analysis was performed in NVIVO. Policy concepts that repeated themselves (sometimes referred to as "themes") were inductively coded across the documents. A pattern was established by tracking which concepts repeated themselves, why, when and by whom. These patterns delineated policy frames. Lastly, the chronology of the frames was described in a timeline. This dissertation does not claim that these are the *only* policy frames that are *always* found in

urban integration policy. But, it is likely that these policy frames are present concerning housing integration policy that require extra social supports.

Empirical Expectations

In Toulouse we should expect to observe mobilized NGOs, policy entrepreneurs and policy frames (a civic legacy) regarding housing for migrant Roma in the 1990s that set precedent for the policy change of interest in 2015. However, in the Lille case, we should expect to observe an absence of mobilized NGOs, policy entrepreneurs and policy frames regarding housing for migrant Roma in the 1990s and thus no change in housing policy for migrant Roma in 2015 (See chart 2).

Chart (2): Presence of Civic Legacies in 1990s and Outcome

	1990s Policy Frames (Ideas)	**1990s Successful Policy Entrepreneur (Actors)**	**1990s NGO Network (Networks)**	**2015 Policy Change (Outcome)**
Toulouse	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lille	No	No	No	No

In Toulouse, the associative network mobilized in the 1990s was a precedent to the housing policy change in 2015. Toulouse also had a policy entrepreneur that was part of the civic legacy in Toulouse. Dr. Jean-Claude Guiraud ran a pivotal organization for nearly 30 years between 1971-1998. Dr. Guiraud established the trust, mediation and expertise for the social support of migrant Roma families. These policy frames and social networks were activated again by a new policy entrepreneur when new leadership took control in 2015. Toulouse had a policy entrepreneur in Mr. Daniel Rougé who worked at

the city council and echoed specific policy frames that were used by Dr. Guiraud in the 1990s in his role as an Associate Director of his NGO.

Lille, in comparison, lacked a mobilized associative network, policy entrepreneurs and policy frames in the 1990s. Lille did not have a historical associative network that supported migrant Roma or a policy entrepreneur who articulated policy frames for migrant Roma housing in the 1990s. In this way, Lille did not have a civic legacy that set precedent for policy change in 2015. Instead, policy change in Lille occurred later in 2017 after a national level policy was introduced.

In 1990 Toulouse, we expect to identify policy entrepreneurs articulating specific policy frames on the topic of housing for migrant Roma. This would further signal the presence of a civic legacy. And then in 2015, we again expect to observe policy frames articulated by particular policy entrepreneurs. For Lille in 1990, we do not expect the presence of policy frames on the topic of housing for migrant Roma articulated by policy entrepreneurs. In 2015, we expect to observe policy frames regarding migrant Roma, but we do not expect to observe a particular policy entrepreneur articulating these policy frames. In this way, the presence of policy frames is necessary but not sufficient for policy change. Policy frames must be articulated by a policy entrepreneur to result in policy change. The substantive messages of the policy frames, not just the presence, are further explored in chapter 5.

Significance

While the European Commission and member states have done important work on EU Roma integration over the past decades, policy development and implementation are left to the cities. In France, this has resulted in some cities leading and others following in policymaking for EU migrant Roma. This dissertation is interested in what

drives that divergence at the city level. However, the international and national levels are not irrelevant.

The EU and member states have set broad priorities and limited funding that encourages housing integration but does not mandate or implement policy change at the national or local levels. There has been some EU policy introduced that has created incentives for cities to introduce housing policies. The "Decade of Roma Inclusion," launched in 2005, was the first international effort in Europe to improve the socioeconomic conditions of EU Roma.[33] As part of this decade of inclusion, in 2008 the European Commission drafted the Framework for Roma Integration and mandated that all EU member countries draft National Strategies for Roma Integration (European Commission 2020). Between 2014 and 2020, the European Commission earmarked around 1.5 billion euros for the "socio-economic integration of marginalized communities such as Roma," with most investment allocated for education and housing (European Court of Auditors 2016 10).[34] By 2018, it became clear that the 2008 standards for inclusion were not sufficiently met (European Commission 2019). There were some improvements to education and health outcomes, but housing and employment outcomes stagnated or worsened. Member states described vague, aspirational integration efforts, leaving the implementation to municipalities. Some cities, like Toulouse, took the opportunity to lead in its housing policy, while others, like Lille, followed national-level policy.

[33] Regional Cooperation Council, "Decade of Roma Inclusion." 2020. https://www.rcc.int/romaintegration2020/romadecade.

[34] European Commission, "An EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020," April 5, 2011, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0173.

To review, a seemingly small and local policy change in Toulouse in 2015 matters because it demonstrates the difference between a city that is willing to lead policy change concerning stigmatized migrants versus a city that follows status quo policy. Toulouse led the change from integration villages to long-term autonomous housing with social support. Toulouse's innovative policy was broadcast to different cities in France and beyond as a policy response for migrant Roma integration.[35] Furthermore, Toulouse's long-term housing policy served as a model for the integration of future refugee populations in Toulouse.[36] In contrast, Lille was a follower in its policymaking. Lille City Council developed autonomous long-term housing policy after it was mandated by the federal government under its Housing First initiative. Lille continued to use integration villages beyond 2020, years after they were considered dubious housing policy at best by academics and policymakers alike.

Most importantly, the question of housing integration policy for EU migrant Roma is a question of integration policy broadly. Non-Roma Europeans harbor some of the highest levels of prejudice toward Roma and this anti-Roma racism is pervasive across EU countries.[37] Furthermore, Roma are the largest minority in Europe and live in

[35] 15 cities learn from Toulouse how to support Roma to access adequate housing," 2019, Eurocities. http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/news/15-cities-learn-from-Toulouse-how-to-support-Roma-to- access-adequate-housing-WSPO-BBDLD3.

[36] Toulouse Municipality, « 2.37 Attribution de subventions à des associations d'insertion sociale et professionnelle-(Solidarités et cohésion sociale) » pg 24, 10 July 2020, Toulouse Municipal Online Archives. 15 cities learn from Toulouse how to support Roma to access adequate housing," 2019, Eurocities.http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/news/15-cities-learn-from-Toulouse-how-to-support-Roma-to- access- adequate-housing-WSPO-BBDLD3.

[37] Richard Wike, Jacob Poushter, Laura Silver, Kat Devlin, Janell Fetterolf, Alexandra Castillo, and Christine Huang, "European Public Opinion Three Decades After the Fall of Communism," 2019, Pew Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2014/05/12/chapter-4-views-of-roma-muslims-jews/. Anti-Roma racism is pervasive in the sense that the level of prejudice stays relatively stable at the country level. In their analysis of the 2008 Eurobarometer survey, Loveland and Popescu (2016) and find that only "10 percent of the variance in Roma attitudes can be attributed to the country level" (Loveland and Popescu 2016, 16).

every country in Western Europe in addition to Canada and the United States. How do urban governments across Europe house people who face such a high level of prejudice? Finally, housing is not only a challenge for EU migrant Roma, but also for other populations that face a similar level of stigma and/or need access to a similar level of social support to integrate successfully. As such, this project explores a puzzle relevant to all urban democratic societies that welcome stigmatized newcomers such as refugees, asylum seekers and migrants with fewer employment and housing options.

Chapter Overview/Road Map

Chapter 1 began with the puzzle, why did Toulouse lead the change in housing policy for migrant Roma in 2015, and why did Lille follow status quo? Toulouse developed its own policy change from integration villages to autonomous housing with social support, while Lille adopted national level policy later. While the policy change in question is focused on 2015, the evidence points to a historical process of over twenty years that set the precedent for policy change. This dissertation finds evidence that policy entrepreneurs (actors) draw on existing NGOs (networks) and policy frames (ideas) developed in previous integration efforts—*civic legacies*—to shape housing policy (Arrington 2016; Chung 2020; Ireland 2004). Toulouse developed a civic legacy in the 1990s that influenced a housing policy shift in 2015, while Lille did not have the aspects of a civic legacy to influence a policy change at the time. In this way, civic legacies impact how much political will cities can generate to change policy, and how much they are led by national level integration policy. Chapter 2 will develop the concept of civic legacies through a review of the literature on civic legacies and integration policy. Chapter 3 will explain how to empirically track evidence of civic legacies using process tracing and content analysis. Chapter 4 will lay out the variation in networks over time.

Specifically, Chapter 4 will establish what institutions and networks were developed in the 1990s and activated again in 2015. Chapter 5 will lay out the variation in policy frames and how policy entrepreneurs leverage them. Chapter 6 will focus on the 2015 housing policy change in Toulouse and the lack of policy change in Lille at this time. This chapter will demonstrate the link between historical policy frames, NGO networks and political entrepreneurs—civic legacies—and contemporary policies. Finally, Chapter 7 will conclude and describe the theoretical and policy significance of the findings. In this way this dissertation demonstrates how civic legacies—policy frames, NGO networks and policy entrepreneurs—influence migrant integration policy over time and make leaders versus followers out of cities.

Chapter 2. Literature Review/Conceptualizing Civic Legacies

The central puzzle of this dissertation asks why Toulouse was a leader in integration policy for migrant Roma while Lille was a follower. This dissertation demonstrates how civic legacies shape integration policy (Chung 2020; de Graauw 2016; Good 2016). Civic legacies are the historical ideas, networks and actors developed during previous integration efforts (sometimes for different groups) that set precedent for contemporary integration efforts (Chung 2020). While there is a rich history of literature on the role of civic society in democracies, the focus on legacies, or the historical influence of civic society is underexplored.

Civic Legacy Concept

First, it is necessary to define civic legacies versus civil society. Erin Chung (2020) defines civil society using Gellner's 1995 definition, "civil society as 'that set of diverse non-governmental institutions, which is strong enough to counterbalance the state, and, whilst not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent the state from dominating and atomizing the rest of society" (Chung, pg 7). Chung defines civil society as non-governmental institutions. Chung (2020) then defines civic legacies as the "interactions…between actors in the state and civil society and between civil-society actors" (Chung, pg 25). For Chung, civic legacies include both non-governmental and governmental actors. Chung does not define civic society, and for the purposes of this dissertation, civil and civic society can be used interchangeably.

Earlier studies on civic legacies include Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work* (1993). Putnam developed the concept of *civic traditions* to explain why political

institutions in North-Central Italy are more democratic than Southern Italy. He claimed that civic traditions formed through "associationalism,"—or spontaneous interactions between private citizens—encourage civic engagement, more involvement in local organizations and ultimately more horizontal governance structures and democracy. Sheri Berman (1997) characterized Putnam's argument as such,

> "Like the mass society theorists, recent neo-Tocquevillean analyses stress the way individuals relate to each other and their society when explaining why individuals relate to each other and their society when explaining why democratic regimes function well. To measure and explain the success of democracy, Putnam, for example, uses the concepts of civic community and social capital; for both of these the key indicator is what might be termed associationism, the propensity of individuals to form and join a wide range of organizations spontaneously."

This dissertation does not touch on why residents join organizations. Furthermore, unlike Putnam (1993) and Chung (2020), this dissertation is focused specifically on housing integration and not democratization broadly. Therefore, while the significance of integration outcomes likely has bearing on democratization this is only surmised in the concluding chapter of the dissertation when considering the significance of the project.

Berman's (1997) main critique of *Making Democracy Work* was that "associationism [which underpins civic society] should be considered a *politically neutral multiplier* – neither inherently good or bad, but rather dependent for its effects on the wider political context." (Berman 427; emphasis added). Chung (2020) agrees with this critique when she argues that for the disaggregation of civic legacies into strategies, networks and ideas; "rather than assume that civil-society actors are unified in their goals, worldviews, or strategies for democratic inclusion, or that civil-society actors necessarily seek to incorporate immigrants in their local societies." Instead, she "introduce(s) the concept of *civic legacies* to refer to the ideas, networks, and strategies applied in previous

struggles for democratic inclusion that shape how civil-society actors make claims to the state, mobilize public opinion, and build networks." In this way,

> civic legacies do not *determine* immigrant incorporation patterns, they inform the discourse on citizenship and democracy within civil society. The language, symbols, and strategies used in past struggles for democratic inclusion, then, provide a blueprint for how civil society actors—including immigrants themselves—negotiate exclusionary policies, understand democratic inclusion and political empowerment, and engage with the state (Chung 2020; 25).

This dissertation supports Chung's civic legacy theory by demonstrating that the legacy of local NGO networks, policy entrepreneurs and specific policy frames provide a precedent (both produce and constrain opportunities) for integration policy change. The main point of difference between Chung's theory and this dissertation is her focus on historical democratization movements as the precedent for immigrant incorporation and political engagement. This dissertation focuses on how previous integration efforts set precedent for local integration policies. Instead of democratization movements concerning other groups, this dissertation focuses on integration efforts for a similar group, 30 years earlier. Therefore, the networks, ideas and actors involved should bear even more similarity to each other and set an even stronger precedent than those than Chung investigated. Those components of the argument are unpacked below.

Networks

While there has not been much focus on civic legacies in the integration literature, there is work on how civil society actors affect a patchwork of integration outcomes (not just housing), typically through activism and advocacy efforts. These studies do identify which actors, networks and ideas matter for integration outcomes and why. However, this literature does not focus on the process of path dependency—they either assume it, include a descriptive historical explanation, or take a snapshot instead of a longitudinal inquiry. For example, De Graauw (2016) finds NGOs act as brokers between migrants

and the city by supporting goods provisioning and mitigating nativist backlash. De Graauw (2016) finds that NGO networks in San Francisco ensure access to integration policies for migrants such as job opportunities and municipal ID cards. Kristin Good (2016) in her study on Canadian cities does not focus on civic legacies but she does find that integration outcomes vary depending on key stakeholders' public/private partnerships which determine how resources are pooled to implement policy (Good 2016, 13; Ireland 2004; Dancygier 2010). However, her argument does not have a strong historical explanation. She mentions other scholars who argue that demographic shifts in the ethnocultural composition of urban and suburban societies shape local governance. For example, Kymlicka (2008) argues that multicultural societies are partially conditioned by the ethnoracial configuration of historical flows of migrants,

> If multiculturalism in Canada had initially been demanded by groups who were perceived as having strong religious/cultural commitments to illiberal practices – say by Somalis or Saudis rather than Ukrainians and Italians – and if their demand for multiculturalism had been perceived as a demand that such practices be tolerated and accommodated, then multiculturalism would probably not have arisen' (ibid., 5).

Good (2016) takes history into consideration by describing the different multicultural periods or stages in Canada based on policies and initiatives associated with multiculturalism. These are useful ways of organizing multicultural regimes but she never argues for path dependence or how a preceding era conditions the next. Good's argument is not a historical one, instead she focuses on resources and argues that cities that have more resources and can better coordinate between private and public relations to use those resources tend to be the leaders of urban regimes; eg Toronto. This dissertation focuses on one type of integration policy, housing for one group, EU migrant Roma so

that the theory of civic legacies can focus on the historical influence that networks play to explain contemporary policies.

Chung (2020) does explain the historical legacies of networks in her book. Networks are comprised of the "'organizations, networks, traditions, and solidarities that include policy networks and informal networks between civil-society and state actors" (Chung, 28). Networks mediate immigrant incorporation patterns in policy and practice. Civil-society actors can play a significant role in shaping immigrant incorporation by interpreting, negotiating, and enforcing policies pertaining to immigrants, holding national and local state actors accountable, giving voice to migrant concerns, raising public awareness and pushing for policy reforms…"(Chung 30). Through their relationships, or network, with city council, civil society actors attempt to hold government actors accountable, give voice to migrant concerns and push for service provisioning.

According to Chung (2020), the civic legacy of the network is established by the vanguard group, which developed the network during "previous struggles for democratic inclusion…" (Chung, 30). This vanguard group has the institutional power to advocate for the new migrants based on its historical experience with integration. In Toulouse, the key organization that worked with Roma migrants in the 90's was still a lead organization in integration for EU migrant Roma through to 2019. Therefore, this organization comprised and developed the vanguard network that influenced outcomes later on. Chung explains the role of vanguard civil-society organizations may be to "provide guidance and logistical support to migrant activists, open or rebrand their campaigns to provide migrant advocacy, help migrant advocates establish new allies, and/or retool themselves as

migrant advocates." (Chung, 30). The main role of the NGOs working in Toulouse and Lille was not focused on activism as much as service provisioning. The role of NGOs was more broadly to generate trust and information sharing between the immigrants, social workers and city council.

But how does the vanguard group within civil society have the greatest effect on integration? Chung finds that first, "The reach of influence of the vanguard group is based on, "its capacity to provide symbolic significance and legitimacy to a new movement" (Chung 30). This is the civic legacy of policy frames. And second, "the vanguard group's established connections with other civil-society actors and state officials at the local, national and international levels (Chung 30)." This is the role of policy entrepreneurs who mediate the vanguard's established connections with state officials. First the civic legacy of policy frames will be explained and then the civic legacy of policy entrepreneurs.

Policy Frames

One way the NGO network provides symbolic significance and legitimacy to housing integration efforts for migrant Roma is through policy frames. In her analysis of integration rights and policies for migrants in San Francisco, De Graauw (2016) finds that policy frames are customized and introduced by NGOs to connect with city officials, voters and the media, in order to successfully navigate "a highly politicized environment in which their objectives remain a difficult political sell" (De Graauw, 17). De Graauw argues that advocates for migrant integration use certain policy frames to downplay how integration policies directly benefited immigrants. Instead, they framed these policies as benefitting all city residents' civil and labor rights,

> They used different advocacy frames to establish this linked fate in each of the campaigns. They framed language access legislation as a civil rights issue and a much-needed local attempt to enforce existing state and federal language access provisions (chapter 3). In contrast, they used the lens of economic justice to frame labor rights legislation (chapter 4), and they framed municipal ID cards legislation as a public safety and civic integration issue (chapter 5). By strategically downplaying that these policies primarily benefited immigrants, immigrant-serving nonprofits successfully navigated a highly politicized environment in which their objectives remained a difficult political sell.

By customizing policy frames, De Graauw argues that NGO advocates were able to create political will for policies that were initially unpopular. This dissertation supports De Graauw's findings that policy framing can help develop the political will for integration policy for stigmatized and discriminated migrant groups. How the housing policy for migrant Roma is framed (e.g. through the lens of humanitarian rights, human rights, feminism, civic integration) influences how the policy is perceived by residents and representatives alike and whether there is enough political will at the city council level to introduce the policy.

Chung (2020) defines policy frames as "the ideational frames through which debates and policies on immigration and citizenship operate" (Chung, 26, 27). She goes on to explain that debates about immigration and citizenship are "closely tied to collective understandings of nationhood," and that some collective understandings of nationhood are "rooted in ideas about race and racial inequality, class domination, patriarchy, caste and colonial classifications, for example" (Chung 26, 27). While it is true that the policy frames at the focus of this inquiry could and often do implicate collective understandings of nationhood (rooted in ideas about race, class, patriarchy, colonialism, etc), at the local level other frames are frequently invoked that concern collective understandings of the city, the urban identity. Policy frames in Toulouse and Lille considered topics such as integration, social support, proactive policy, precarity,

crime and human rights generally. The heterogeneity of the local level policy frames are more eclectic than the hegemonic and homogenized policy frames at the national-level.

According to Chung (2020), policy frames structure debates over integration policy and provide tools for migrant advocates, "while ideational frames may constrain immigration policy debates and reforms, they also provide the tools for making claims legible to the state and the larger public" (Chung, 27). Because of the lessening of the nationalism policy frame and the diversity of the policy frames at the local level, city actors and networks are freer to be creative with how they use which policy frames to further their agenda. Therefore, the most successful policy frames are not necessarily the most obvious, they can be place-based and historically informed, which is where the idea of the civic legacy of a policy frame is useful.

Chung (2020) then defines the civic legacy of policy frames as the frames used in previous struggles for integration which can be used as contemporary housing policy frames and shape how civil-society actors negotiate contemporary challenges to housing integration. "Struggles over citizenship status, identity, and rights…inform later debates and movements for democratic inclusion...ideational frames used in previous struggles for democratic inclusion shape how (1) civil-society actors negotiate exclusionary policies in their attempts to gain rights for migrants" (Chung, pg 27). The civic legacy of policy frames provides a repertoire of policy frames that have precedence in the community. These policy frames have historical significance and a different semiotic weight. As such, if actors invoke a specific frame with a civic legacy, this frame may have more resonance in the community, which might garner the necessary political will to introduce one policy over another.

This dissertation considers policy frames regarding *housing* policy for EU migrant Roma. There is a lot of important work on how policy frames regarding specific migrant communities (such as Roma) inform housing policy, but this is a different research goal. Policy frames regarding migrant Roma securitization, mobility, economic deservingness, morality, ethnicity, culture, lifestyle, citizenship, European-ness, and governmentality—all of these frames inform integration policy (Van Baar 2014, Manca & Vergnano from Magazzini and Piemontese 2019, Kostka 2015, Chapter 3 of Triandafyllidou and Spencer 2020; Chauvin and Garcés-Mascarñas, Foucault 1991, Scott 1998, Vermeersch 2012, Vermeersch 2012, Guy, 2003; Molnar Diop, 2013, Vašečka & Vašečka, 2003, Benedik, 2010, Kóczé & Trehan, 2009, Kocze 2018, 460). However, this project does not ask how ideas regarding migrant Roma influence housing policy, instead this project looks at how policy frames regarding *housing* differentially influence housing policy. The difference is nuanced but important, because it is a major contribution of this dissertation. For this dissertation, the policy frames of interest concern the policies themselves, not the groups who are targets of the policies. Next, the role of the policy entrepreneurs who articulate the policy frames will be explained.

Policy Entrepreneurs

The literature on discursive institutionalism is useful in understanding how policy entrepreneurs articulate policy frames and coordinate actors (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Schmidt 2008).[38] Policy entrepreneurs articulate policy frames and demonstrate a sophisticated awareness of the discursive field in which they are operating (Schmidt 2008; 310). The literature on social movements that uses the term political entrepreneur

[38] Policy frames can also travel along other avenues such as advocacy networks/coalitions, discourse coalitions and epistemic communities (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Schmidt 2008).

suggests that policy entrepreneurs can draw from their own personal experience in government or activist movements. Political entrepreneurs, as opposed to policy entrepreneurs, mobilize resources like information and membership and show a sophisticated awareness of the political opportunity structures in which they are operating. Policy entrepreneurs demonstrate this same savvy and level of coordination across networks and institutions except at the local level instead of the trans-national level studied in Keck and Sikkink's work (2005). Policy entrepreneurs are also specifically focused on policy change as opposed to political change more broadly. Furthermore, this project explores how policy entrepreneurs can draw upon the civic legacies of networks and policy frames coordinated by previous policy entrepreneurs to convince political opposition of particular policies.

Chung (2020) does not include policy entrepreneurs in her conceptualization of civic legacies because she is not interested in "elite-based approaches (that) focus exclusively on policies and policymakers," because "they tend to overlook how policies are implemented, negotiated, and contested on the ground" (Chung, 27). However, policy entrepreneurs do not have to be elites and this explanation does not focus only on policymakers. This explanation includes the role of individuals, yes, however a policy entrepreneur can be positioned in civil society, outside of government, as well as inside government as either bureaucrats or representatives. Furthermore, at the local level as opposed to the national, individuals have a greater effect on political outcomes, so it makes intuitive sense to focus on the agency of individuals to a certain extent.

When a policy entrepreneur introduces a policy frame into the political arena; she is introducing possibilities. Policy entrepreneurs can introduce an idea rooted in a

different time or place and force it into the present; sometimes this creates a rupture or a discontinuation within the predominant policy frame. As suggested above, some policy frames have historical significance and a different semiotic weight. As such, if actors invoke a specific frame with a civic legacy, this frame may have more resonance in the community. [39] Policy entrepreneurs that are aware of which policy frames have more resonance are better able to garner the necessary political will and "provide symbolic significance and legitimacy," to introduce one policy over another (Chung 30). This is the mediating and coordinating effect that a policy entrepreneur can wield in order to convince political opposition of the merits of a specific policy.

Policy entrepreneurs articulate policy frames with a civic legacy, but they can also be part of a civic legacy. Policy entrepreneurs with a civic legacy had a role in perpetuating the policy frames sometimes within the vanguard network that set a precedent for the policy frames, policy entrepreneurs and networks that would support integration policy for migrant groups later. These actors are not necessarily leading national level social movements for democracy, but they are playing a necessary role in developing the political will to introduce integration policy for stigmatized groups in societies with high levels of racism and discrimination.

The contribution of this research is an innovative focus on the historical precedents of integration policy at the urban level. Within integration literature, the focus is on national-level policy, as if the city-level does not have the most effect on policy-

[39] Other sources of discursive resonance in additional to a historical resonance could be a type legitimizing expertise (medical v. activist v. legal expertise) or there could be an emotional valence of the discourse (whether it is fueled by strong emotions such as NIMBY-ism and thus would have strong short-term influence at least) that resonates.

outcomes. The integration literature also overlooks the historical legacies of cities, including NGOs, policies actors and frames. This focus on civic legacies contributes something slightly different than research on policy legacies, policy feedbacks or path dependence provides. An inquiry into civic legacies is an inquiry into the potential for policy *change* and *transformation*, which is different from the process of continuity that path dependency suggests. The theoretical motivation is to understand how civic legacies—including policy frames, networks and entrepreneurs—could shape contemporary integration policies of a city and sets precedent for some cities to lead while others follow in their housing policy for stigmatized groups. The next chapter details the methods and methodology that is used to operationalize and measure civic legacies' influence on integration policy.

Chapter 3. Methodology/Measuring Civic Legacies

How to measure a civic legacy? To measure the influence of networks and policy entrepreneurs this project will use process tracing and map the networks and actors involved in the housing process using metropolitan and municipal level archival documents and interview data between (1990-2022). To measure the influence of policy frames this project will conduct a content analysis of the same data (1990-2022). This project will also create a timeline of housing policy for migrant Roma using the same data to trace how the policies change over time. This project employs an NVIVO content analysis of municipal and metropolitan archives, online municipal and metropolitan meetings and interviews with municipal and metropolitan stakeholders concerning Roma migrant housing policy in Toulouse and Lille between 1990-2022.

Measuring Policy Eras

Chart 1 reflects the four relevant policy eras in Toulouse and Lille. I analyzed municipal and metropolitan archives and online metropolitan and municipal level meetings minutes to demarcate the different policy eras. Each new era represents a shift in housing policy for migrant Roma. The process tracing began in 1990s—when NGOs in Toulouse began to conduct surveys of the migrant Roma population in their city—through to 2022. As I documented potential policy eras, I noted potential critical policy junctures (moments in policymaking when counterfactual policy outcomes could be imagined) such as when surveys and re-housing efforts were conducted, when camp evictions were halted and when new housing policies were introduced. In Toulouse, re-housing efforts of migrant Roma in 1998 was an important juncture during which the social support network was activated. The next critical policy juncture was the

introduction of integration villages in 2007, and Toulouse's pivot to long-term autonomous housing with social support in 2015, followed by the national decision to implement Housing First in 2017. I noted these critical policy junctures on a timeline of policies, actors, networks and events from 1990-2022. At these critical junctures I noted which actors and organizations were involved and the extent of their involvement.

Measuring Networks

The literature review on networks established that networks create and solidify connections amongst civil society and government actors. Therefore, using the comparison described above, I used inductive reasoning to identify important organizations and actors, which comprise the civic legacy of the network. After creating the timeline in NVIVO based relevant policies, events, actors and networks, I noticed which organizations and actors were relevant to these changes. The number of mentions of an organization or individual was the greatest indicator of the relevancy of that actor in the network of actors involved in housing policy for EU migrant Roma. Another metric of relevancy was mentions over time. I identified instances when the same organization or individual kept appearing in the timeline of critical policy junctures even as years passed. For example, if an organization was mentioned in the 1990s and mid 2010s, this was of interest to me because it demonstrated an institutional and historical continuity, and potentially a civic legacy. When certain actors and organizations began to distinguish themselves in these ways, I then kept an eye out for these in the archival and online documents.

I would cross reference my timeline of actors and policies with the archival and online documents and interviews to get a sense of the substantive decisions and roles the actors played in the process of housing for migrant Roma. Through this process I

understood which organizations were mediating between civil society and the local government, advocating on behalf of migrant Roma, holding government accountable, giving voice to migrant concerns and raising public awareness for policy reforms and in turn shaping integration policies; all key aspect of civic legacies of networks found in the literature (Chung pg 30).

From this, I understood how the relevant actors and organization interacted with each other within the network over time and how they established and solidified connections amongst civil society actors and government. Next, I gleaned who were potential policy entrepreneurs, and which policy frames were most relevant over time.

Measuring Policy Entrepreneurs

Policy entrepreneurs articulate policy frames with a civic legacy, but they can also be part of a civic legacy. The policy entrepreneur has the power to change policy. In this analysis, actors with a level of political influence who articulated a specific policy frame consistently over time were identified as a policy entrepreneurs. However, an effective policy entrepreneur can draw upon the civic legacies of networks and policy frames and *convince* the political opposition of particular policies. It is unlikely that the analysis would have missed a relevant effective policy entrepreneur due to the triangulation of meeting minutes, archives and interviews. It is unlikely that a relevant policy entrepreneur was influencing policy at the time but was not mentioned in any of these data sources.

Measuring Policy Frames

The literature on policy frames expects policy frames to structure debate over integration policy and provide tools for migrant advocates to push for policy for migrant Roma (Chung 2020). The literature defines policy frames as the ideational frames

through which debates and policies on integration operate (Chung 2020). These frames should be customized and introduced by actors to connect with city officials, voters and the media to navigate a "highly politized environment," and develop the political will for a policy (De Graauw 2016).

To measure policy frames, this project will use a policy frame analysis to analyze the archival, online and interview data and generate a list of relevant policy frames. Policy frame analysis is useful for analyzing policies beyond the level of factual disputes. Policy frame analysis defines what is a stake in policy debates, the differences in worldviews and policy values (Schmidt from Yanow and Schwartz-Shea pg 323). as "a system of representation that has developed socially in order to make and Through the process of defining what is at stake, the differences in worldviews and values, policy frames generate associated meaning, or ideational frames, attached to a policy. In this way, the policy frame acts circulate a coherent set of meanings" (Weldes from Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2014, 230). The policy frames are articulated by specific actors in specific contexts. Who articulates the policy frame should give us a sense of the relevant network and policy entrepreneurs as well.

The literature also defines the civic legacy of policy frames as frames that have been used in previous struggles for integration that can be used as contemporary housing policy frames and shape how civil-society actors negotiate contemporary challenges to housing integration. The civic legacy of policy frames provides a repertoire policy frames that could have precedence in the community. In this way, a policy frame analysis contextualizes a policy frame within the historical repertoire of policy frames. These policy frames have a historical significance and a different semiotic weight because of

that significance. This semiotic weight helps develop the political will for particular policies. Furthermore, a policy frame analysis method avoids implicitly reifying policy debates and policy beliefs.

The benefits of a policy frame analysis are multifold. Applying a longitudinal and comparative policy frame analysis provides an explanation that is less taken-for-granted and more contextualized. I can use a model that *historically* considers how policy frames define debates and issues at play and, in turn, shape policy. I can also identify the absence of a policy frame – or the presence of marginalized or subjugated policy frames—at the same time as focusing on the hegemonic policy frames articulated by policy entrepreneurs. Therefore, while policy frame analysis is time intensive and the findings are descriptive and not often causally determinative or parsimonious, it is a detailed and historically contextualized analysis, lending a richness of understanding to the subject matter. The next section delves further into the method of policy frame analysis.

Content Analysis in NVivo

To measure the policy frames, I conducted a content analysis in the program NVivo. There were three coding steps to this content analysis: 1) code policy frames 2) describe the context and the actors involved 3) code arguments and core values/themes. The first step was to code basic policy frames that arose inductively from the archival documents and city council meeting minutes. During this first step I asked myself, "What are the categories being used in this policy issue?" During this step it was important to generate as many categories of analysis as possible. So, I coded any concepts that were relevant to "housing for EU migrant Roma," and I took an expansive historically-based definition of "Roma." Therefore, any concepts regarding housing for "tsiganes," "travelers," "gens du voyages," "nomades," "Roma," and "migrant Roma," were all

included (explained further in chapter 4). In the program NVIVO the policy frames in this first step are referred to as "codes." To "code," means I highlighted the relevant group of words that reflected a specific policy frame, such as "humanitarianism." I knew it was better to create "too many," codes at the beginning and then pare down the relevant codes later. I created a new code every time I came across a concept that reflected a policy frame in the corpus. After I highlighted and identified the group of words as one instance of a code, that group of words became a "reference" and was filed automatically under a code such as "humanitarian." After I had gone back into the qualitative data to contextualize the codes and references, I pared down which codes were relevant for which city and when I went back over the data to look for saturation, I paid more attention to these codes and looked for references that I may have overlooked in my first round of coding.

The second step of the content analysis is to identify the actors who articulate policy frames, or policy entrepreneurs, sometimes referred to as protagonists. In order to identify the main policy entrepreneurs, I asked, "What do they want? Why do they care about this issue? What is their view of the social context." It is also important to identify the "backgrounds, motivations, key positions in the debate," of each actor. Then, ask "what is at stake for whom," "what kind of arguments are actors making repeatedly?" This step analyzes the relationship between communities and actors and can also help identify relevant networks.

The third and last step is the identification of policy frame values. During this third step I identified the policy arguments and core value disagreements. In other words, in this step I attached contextualized meaning to the phrases, actors and concepts that

were coded in steps one and two. Instead of "categories," some scholars refer to "threads, patterns, themes, regularities, topics, constructs, actions, events and repeating ideas" (Packer 2010). These arguments are unpacked in chapter 5. Relevant questions for this step are, "what are the central arguments?" and "what are the core values that underlie these arguments?"

Next, I identify the "silences." I ask what arguments are not being used, which policy frames are not referenced, and which actors' voices are not present (JC. Scott 1990; Spivak 2009). I also ask what assumptions are being made by actors when they use a specific argument. This questioning gets at the "taken for grantedness," or logic of appropriateness in the themes (HS Becker 1998) (167), Schutz (1967, 74).

I stop the process of coding when codes, actors, values and policy frames begin to repeat themselves across texts. In her methodology on interpretive social science Milliken states that, "An analysis can be said to be complete (validated) when upon adding new texts and comparing their object spaces, the researcher finds consistently that the theoretical categories she has generated work for those texts (Milliken 1999, 234). Internal validity is achieved when policy frames repeat themselves across interview, archival and council meeting minutes documents.

The content analysis resulted in a ranking of the most common codes; a snapshot of the top 20 policy frames in both cities (Chart 4). After I identify the timeline of housing policies for migrant Roma and completed the policy frame analysis, I place the results of the policy process tracing and the policy frame analysis side by side and produced Figure 1.[40] Using this figure I can check if any changes in the policies coincide

[40] The y-axes of the timeline represents references to housing for Roma were coded per year, and throughout the dissertation I refer to the number of references counted as n=X.

with an uptick or drop in aggregate number of code references per year. If there is an uptick in references, I check the policy timeline to see whether there was a critical policy juncture. For example, in Toulouse in 1990 there was an uptick in code references with 87 references counted. This is reflective of the policy development that was introduced by a specific policy entrepreneur at a specific NGO. In this way, the policy frame analysis triangulates the findings from the process tracing and can further substantiate findings concerning the relevant networks and actors involved in civic legacies.

Chart (3) Policy Frame Analysis

Policy Frame Analysis	
1. **Identify the issue and protagonists**	- "What is the problem or situation being argued about? - How do the competing camps in the policy identify themselves in relation to each other?
2. **Describe the context and the protagonists' policy proposals**	- Make clear what is at stake for whom, this step is essentially articulating the relationship between the policy entrepreneur and the policy frame. - Identify, "backgrounds, motivations, key positions in the debate." - Identify subject-positions, interpretive communities and networks - "What do actors want? Why do they care about this issue? What is their view of the social context." - Acknowledge resources that go toward sponsoring certain frames, the prestige, reputation and networks associate with a specific subject-position.
3. **Describe the Arguments and Core Values**	-Identify relevant concepts or "relevant theoretical abstractions," - "What are the categories being used in this policy issue?" - "Threads, patterns, themes, regularities, topics, constructs, actions, events, repeating ideas" - What are the factual disputes versus value disagreements?

Corpus

The corpus is a representative sample of government documentation on housing policy for migrant Roma in both metropolitan regions, Toulouse and Lille. The corpus used for the content analysis to identify policy frames includes metropolitan-level (inclusive of municipal level as well) government documentation concerning housing policy for EU migrant Roma (and earlier populations categorized as "nomade" or "tzigane), inclusive of the years 1990s-2022. The corpus represents a history of housing policy for migrant Roma in the metropolitan region. The archival documentation included municipal and metropolitan policy announcements, police reports, letters and emails between departments and between citizens and the city, local and national newspaper articles, and surveys and reports produced by local NGOs. The corpus includes supplementary materials from non-governmental organizations (civil society), such as NGOs, housing associations, as well as national-level policy memos and reports. These documents were included in municipal and metropolitan archives and were included in the corpus, as these archives were curated by the city. To be clear, the corpus does not include a representative sample of newspapers or journalism regarding housing policy. The only newspaper articles included in the analysis were ones that were archived by the city.

To construct the corpus, in the archives (online and in-person) I searched the key words: "Roms," (Roma) "gen(s) du voyage," (french traveller(s)) "migrant(s)," "tsiganes," ("gypsy/gypsies") "nomade(s)," "bidonvilles," (slums) and "logement(s) "(housing) and pulled whatever was available. I analyzed a total of 1344 archival items. I collected 340 items from the Lille municipal and metropolitan archives and 293 items from the online archives to bring a total of 633 items analyzed for Lille in

NVIVO. I collected 514 items from the online Toulouse archives and 165 items from the Toulouse municipal and metropolitan archives.

The Role of Interviews

Throughout the dissertation, I mention that interviews informed some of my insights. I conducted 36 stakeholder interviews. These included interviews with a policy analyst at the European Commission, a journalist and lawyer, municipal and metropolitan-level employees in housing and integration sectors, NGO members, and migrant Roma families living in public and private housing. These interviews helped me to scope this project. For example, when I began research on housing for migrant Roma, I began at the level of the EU Commission since at the beginning of my fieldwork it had just evaluated the EU Framework for National Integration Strategies up to 2020. Between 2014 and 2020 alone, the European Commission earmarked around 1.5 billion euros for the "socio-economic integration of marginalized communities such as Roma," with most investment allocated for education and housing (European Court of Auditors 2016 10).[41]

In other words, when I was conducting interviews in 2020, 10 years of political will and funding had just been focused on Roma integration in both Western and Central European countries. When I asked an EU policy analyst who worked on social inclusion for Roma at the European Commission, "to what extent the EU has influenced the housing process for EU migrant Roma in specific cities?"[42] The interviewee suggested that while the EU had clear legal responsibility when it came to policy development, outside of this, housing for Roma is not an EU competence.[i] The most he suggested they

[41] European Commission, "An EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020," April 5, 2011, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0173.

[42] Direct quote of author from interview with respondent one over Zoom in Chicago 2020.

can do is coordinate and help member states if the member states solicit their help, as a mutual exercise between both member states and the EU.[ii] After this interview, I began to scope my attention to the city level. I interviewed metropolitan housing officers and NGO workers who worked on housing for migrant Roma. It became clear I was speaking to the right people as they were able to speak to policy changes that affected housing outcomes in the city and they could identify the actors and timelines directly involved in my outcome of interest, housing policy over time. Therefore, based on these preliminary interviews, I decided to scope the dissertation to the urban (municipal and metropolitan) level.

From the interviews with migrant Roma families I understood that there is a great heterogeneity to the types of housing that migrant Roma families are interested in. It was not the case that the migrant Roma families in Toulouse had systematically different preferences in housing than those in Lille. From some of my interviews, I began to get a sense that the matriarchs of families might have a strong housing preference if there was a personal history of domestic violence, however I did not gather enough data for systematic inferences. Furthermore, when I researched the effects of civic legacies on the housing integration of migrant Roma, I did not find any patterns regarding domestic violence and housing policy for migrant Roma families. Overall, housing preferences were heterogenous depending on the families' life circumstances. Some preferred housing near their families, some preferred housing on their own, others preferred housing in the urban center, others on the periphery or the countryside. Most wanted stable housing and would take what they could get. If anything, this was the commonality that I found in my interviews.

This might be partially due to the selection bias of the group of families who I spoke to. In Toulouse and Lille, I was reliant on NGO members' pre-established contacts with families to get interviews. In other words, the families that I could interview were the ones who were seeking and receiving help from NGOs. Some were grateful for the situation they were in and had lived there for years, others were seeking improved accommodation options. While most families expressed they were grateful, there was a clear power dynamic at play. I always conducted interviews with NGO members in the room with me, so it was unlikely they would express something other than gratitude for their help navigating the housing sector while the NGO member was present.

While I enjoyed conducting interviews immensely, COVID impeded my ability to conduct as many interviews as I would like since my time in the field reduced from a year to three months. Furthermore, translating through a mask was very challenging but I did not want to put either myself or the families at risk. Mostly, I used the interviews to direct me to relevant actors, events and policy-developments at the city level, as explained above.

Conclusion

The process tracing identifies networks, actors and policies, while the content analysis identifies the policy frames and associated actors and networks. From both of these analyses, I am able to infer when, how and which policy frames, networks and actors shaped housing policies over time for migrant Roma at the urban level. Therefore, I can answer the question: why did Toulouse lead housing policy for EU migrant Roma while Lille followed? My research finds the civic legacies developed in Toulouse set the precedent for leadership in housing policy; while the lack of a strong civic legacy in Lille set the precedent for it to be a follower.

The following chapters will lay out what aspects of a civic legacy were developed when and how they influenced contemporary housing policy. Chapter 4 will lay out the variation in the networks, policy entrepreneurs and policies regarding housing integration for migrant Roma in Lille and Toulouse identified through process tracing. Chapter 5 will lay out the variation in policy frames in the civic legacy in Toulouse and Lille using the content analysis. Chapter 6 will investigate the specific policy change (in the case of Toulouse) in 2015 to demonstrate how a legacy of local NGOs, policy entrepreneurs and specific policy frames can result in independent policy change while the absence of this legacy results in delayed policy change through the adoption of national policies (in the case of Lille). Chapter 4, 5, and 6 present the empirical evidence that civic legacies developed in previous integration efforts set the precedent of whether policy entrepreneurs can innovate and lead housing policy change in the future.

Chapter 4. Establishing a Civic Legacy: Divergent Networks in Toulouse v. Lille

Why did Toulouse pivot from integration villages toward long-term housing in 2015 and emerge a leader in housing policy for migrant Roma while Lille was a follower? This chapter compares the role of networks in Toulouse and Lille. The evidence suggests that Toulouse developed networks during the integration of migrant Roma in the 1990s which set a precedent for its city council to shape new housing policy in 2015 and empowered it to emerge as a leader in housing policy for migrant Roma. Alternatively, Lille lacked the development of civic legacy networks in 1990 to set precedent for 2015 and thus did not change their policy until there was a national level change in policy and emerged as a follower.

Using process tracing, this chapter identifies important organizations and actors, which comprise the civic legacy of the network. As a reminder, the literature on networks established that networks create and solidify connections amongst civil society and government actors. The network also generates information-sharing and trust between the target group, social workers and city council that is necessary for successful housing policy. The civic society network can play a role in shaping integration policy by holding national and local political actors accountable, giving a voice to migrant concerns, raising public awareness of policies and advocating for certain policies and reforms (Chung 2020). The civic legacy of a network is developed over time by the vanguard group. This vanguard group has the institutional power to advocate for the new migrants based on its historical experience with integration. The vanguard group develops the network during previous efforts to integrate the same or similarly discriminated migrant groups that can require more support from the government.

This chapter organizes the evidence which demonstrates how the civic legacies of networks influence integration policy in Lille and Toulouse. The evidence demonstrates that through the process of providing housing options for the group, a civic legacy was developed in Toulouse. In Toulouse, the associative network mobilized in the 1990s during an effort to re-house migrant Roma set the precedent for housing policy change in 2015. Dr. Jean-Claude Guiraud ran the pivotal organization, "Association Tsiganes Solidarité*"* (ATS), which was involved in the re-housing process and solidified connections amongst civil society and government actors for nearly 30 years between 1971-1998. Dr. Guiraud established the trust, mediation, and expertise for the social support of migrant Roma families. This vanguard group in Toulouse, ATS, had the institutional power to advocate for the new migrants in 2015 based on its historical experience with integration in 1990. This role of this network was to generate the information and trust between the target group, social workers and city council that was necessary for housing policy. The civic legacy of this network that was established by ATS in 1990 during re-housing efforts was activated again when new leadership took control in 2015. Eurocities, a transnational NGO, reported that in 2015, Toulouse had changed its approach from re-housing migrant Roma in integration villages to re-housing migrant Roma in long-term autonomous housing.[43] Toulouse was a leader in making this policy switch to long-term autonomous housing from integration villages, and continued this policy through 2020.

[43] 15 cities learn from Toulouse how to support Roma to access adequate housing," 2019, Eurocities. http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/news/15-cities-learn-from-Toulouse-how-to-support-Roma-to- access-adequate-housing-WSPO-BBDLD3.

Lille, in comparison, lacked the civic legacy of a network in the 1990s. Instead of a network with a civic legacy and a vanguard group that was interested in the rights of migrant Roma, there is little evidence that Lille had a civic legacy of networks which could have set precedent for policy change in 2015. This does not mean that Lille did not have a civic society interested in housing policy change for migrant Roma in 2015, nor does it mean that Lille did not have *some* evidence of a civic legacy. However, Lille's civic legacy of networks was not developed as early as the one in Toulouse and did not have the same level of institutional continuity over time(the organization ATS lasted nearly 30 years in Toulouse), which makes it more difficult to establish the path dependency necessary to make the historical argument for Lille. By 2007, it appears that Lille introduced integration villages because there was EU funding for integration villages available. Then, later in 2017, Lille changed its policy on integration villages only after a national level policy was introduced. In these ways, Lille emerged as a policy follower and not a policy leader.

This chapter will organize the evidence around the four housing policy eras reflected below in chart 1. The first era is policy development, during which Toulouse develops its civic legacy of networks through its rehousing policy for migrant Roma and Lille does not develop its civic legacy, instead focusing on policy only for French travelers. The second era is a period of policy similarity, during which Toulouse and Lille both introduce integration villages because of EU funding. The third period is the era of policy divergence, when the civic legacy of Toulouse empowers it to switch from the integration village policy to long-term autonomous housing policy while Lille continues its integration village policy without a network with a civic legacy to encourage policy

change. Finally, the last period is the era of policy continuity, when Toulouse continues to rely on its new model of long-term autonomous housing and Lille continues to rely on integration villages in addition to introducing the national level policy on long-term autonomous housing. This chapter will establish the civic legacy of networks in Toulouse which empowered it to lead housing policy for EU migrant Roma, while the lack of a civic legacy of networks in Lille compelled it to follow national-level policy. The next chapter, chapter 5, will focus on the influence of the civic legacy of policy frames.

Chart (1): Housing Policy Eras in Toulouse and Lille

Policy Eras	**Toulouse Policy**	**Lille Policy**
1990-2007: Policy Development. Rehousing efforts and social support in Toulouse but not Lille.	Some focus on migrant Roma in re-housing efforts. Surveys of migrant Roma conducted by social services network.	No focus on migrant Roma. Focus on parking sites French travelers, "gens du voyage. » No surveys of migrant Roma conducted by social services network.
2007-2015: Policy similarity. Integration villages in both cities.	Integration Villages in addition to other types of housing, moratorium on evictions (2010-2012), an increase in integration villages after 2010.	Integration Villages in addition to other types of housing, moratorium on evictions (2010-2012), an increase in integration villages after 2010.
2015-2017: Policy Divergence. Toulouse pivots from integration village policy and Lille continues with integration village policy.	City council phases out integration villages, relies primarily on autonomous housing with social support and preempts national-level policy. One integration village remains.	Despite closure of a few integration villages (from 10-7) continued reliance upon them.
2017-2020: Policy Continuity. National Housing First policy is introduced.	In City Council, long-term autonomous housing with social support is referred to as a	Under national Housing First policy, autonomous long-term housing

	success and the model for future integration of refugees in Toulouse.	becomes policy while different types of integration villages still used.

First Housing Policy Era (1990s): Policy development, Rehousing efforts in Toulouse but not in Lille.

Toulouse

In the 1990's Toulouse began re-housing migrant Roma living in camps with the aid of NGOs such as A.T.S. while Lille did not. CCPS was part of ATS which was founded in 1971 by Dr. Jean-Claude Guiraud, who remained its President until 2001.[44] This NGO support would generate the civic legacy of networks that the city would later draw upon. By 1991 Toulouse, with the help of ATS, had conducted a census of families in stopping sites and camps and described 17 clans of travelers around Toulouse and its metropolitan region.[45] Toulouse managed several camps (Ginestous, Martres and Mounède for example) for migrant Roma, while Lille mainly managed stopping sites for French Roma. Toulouse counted 160 families between Camp de Martres and Camp de Ginestous.[46]

By 1999 Toulouse had recorded the demographics of families in their camps. In 1998 there were around 600 families with a French background and 25 families (around 100-150 people) who were Bosniac, Romanian or Bulgarian.[47] The camp Ginestous was the largest and had the most diversity with 242 Roma people from "French, Spanish,

[44] Comite de Coordination Pour La Promotion et en Solidarite (CCPS), "Historique d'A.T.S., 2001" 1220W3, pg6, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.
[45] SIEANAT and AUAT, « Modes D'Habitat Actuels et Besoins en Habitat des Familles Tsiganes, 1988 », 494W0030, pg 14, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.
[46] Municipal Council deliberations, 27 october 1989, « Acquisition d'un Ensemble de Terrains dans le Secteur Nord Pour la Creation d'Une Aire d'accueil pour les Gens du voyage- Declataion d'utilite publique, pg 1 », 345W17, 919W106, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.
[47] ATS, "Rapport d'Activités 1998, » 857W33, pg 9, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.

German, Bosniac, Romanian" backgrounds.[48] This level of *recorded* diversity within Roma families is one way in which the Toulouse integration effort differed from Lille early on. A.T.S. conducted all of these surveys and reported them to the city council. To be clear, while this is the first instance of recorded diversity within Roma families settling in Toulouse, this is not the first time Roma (migrant or otherwise) were put on a registry in France. It is illegal to collect information on ethnicity and race in the French census because of this history.[49]

In 2001, ATS turned into the « Coordinating Committee for the Promotion and Solidarity of Migrant/Gypsy Communities in Difficulty (CCPS)." The CCPS NGO played a central role in supporting families in their housing efforts and other integration efforts as well as mediating between the city and the families. This is the origin of the evidenced presence of a civic legacy of networks, particularly that of the vanguard group A.T.S.

Lille

In Lille, in 1991, the city was working with the NGO Friends of French Travellers, "Amitie aux Gens du Voyage," to provide parking sites for French Roma.[50] In

[48] Department Ingénerie et Conseil, "Les Gens du Voyage à Toulouse: Etat des Lieux et Preconisations, » June 1999, 857W33, pg 16, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.
[49] In France, leading up to the Holocaust, Roma, referred to as *nomades* at the time, were forced to carry anthropometric identity cards (*cartes d'identité)* documenting their physical characteristics, regardless of their nationality. In both the Vichy and "Free" regions, when it was time to round up families and put them into camps or deport them, France relied on these registries to find families (Fogg 2008). This type of registry and identification occurred across Europe at the time. But also as recently as 2024 in Norway for example there is evidence of a Roma police register. Lauritzen, Solvor Mjøberg. "The Wrongs and Harms of a Roma Register in Norway." *Al Jazeera,* Opinions section, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/5/1/the-wrongs-and-harms-of-a-roma-register-in. All of this to say it is important to be critical of registries and records by cities, police, even NGOs, particularly of previously excluded groups, and to inquire what is included in the registry, whether they are legal, how they will be used and by whom.
[50] Lille Municipal Council, « Rapport D'Activité : 1991. Association Amitie Aux Gens du Voyage, » pg 4, 847W47, 1991, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

2001, Martine Aubry (PS)(center-left) was elected the Mayor of Lille, taking over from a previous center-left Mayor. Philippe Douste-Blazy of the center-right (UMP) was elected Mayor of Toulouse, taking over from a previous UMP Mayor. In 2004, the UMP was led by Jean-Luc Moudenc who was elected Mayor.

Second Housing Policy Era (2007-2015): Period of Policy Similarity, Integration Villages

In 2007, the new policy of integration villages was introduced in both Toulouse and Lille. The EU identified integration villages as effective housing options for EU migrant Roma and funded efforts across France to introduce integration villages. Between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2013, the EU funded integration villages for the "support and housing of marginalized populations," set at 332,862,73 Euros.[51] Unlike other accommodation policies, integration villages was housing for EU migrant Roma exclusively, not French travelers. This made the integration village policy stand out. Furthermore, in 2007 Romania became a member in the EU, this allowed migrant Roma from Romania the right to travel, work and stay in France.[52] However, despite Romania's EU membership, there were still labor market restrictions which made it difficult for migrant Roma to find employment (Sardelik 2021). In 2007, due to the influence of EU funds for integration villages and Romania's EU membership, Lille finally began to recognize migrant Roma as a different population from French Roma, with distinguished rights and needs.

Lille

[51] Programme operationnel 2007-2013 Cofinancé par les Fonds Européens, Convention Attributitive de Subention (FEDER), « A "Programme operationnel Compétititivé et Emploi-Nord-Pas-de-Calais de la création de villages d'insertion pour populations marginalisées sur le territoire de Lille Metropole », 1345W7, 2012, pg 2 and 3, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[52] Tomasz Dąborowski, "Citizens of Bulgaria and Romania Receive Full Rights on the EU Labour Market," 2014, Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-01-08/citizens-bulgaria-and-romania-receive-full-rights-eu-labour-market

By 2008, evidence of a civic legacy of networks in Lille emerged through AFEJI's support of integration villages. By December 2008, on the initiative of Mayor Martine Aubry, Lille Metropole had set up 4 integration villages, housing 87 Roma migrants.[53][54] In Lille, AFEJI supported the families during their transition to integration villages, "this work of integration will be based on voluntary work by the families, which will commit themselves by contract with the AFEJI, since November 1, 2007, the State has entrusted AFEJI with an inter-associative coordination mission within the framework of this integration objective."[55] The President of the Metropolis requested on December 24, 2008 that the towns of the Lille metropolitan area provide land, which would be serviced to accommodate the Roma populations in mobile homes. Particularly, "those families likely to adhere to a social and professional integration program."[56] In 2008, Lille was introducing the support network that Toulouse introduced in the 1990s.

Social support was provided in the integration villages by NGOs that had and still do provide support to French Roma, such as AREAS and AFEJI,

> …access to social cover, schooling, training, employment, housing. This integration work will be carried out through the on-the-ground expertise acquired by the NGOs, at the forefront of which will be the AFEJI and the Regional Association for Study and Social Action (AREAS). This work of integration will

[53] Lille Metropole, "L'accueil des Populations Migrantes: des propositions pour le court, le moyen et le long termes, » pg 4, 847W47, November 11, 2010, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[54] Lille Metropole Deliberation, " Accueil et hébergement provisioire et d'urgence. Propositions de Lille Métropole pour un plan d'actions, » pg 4, 847W47, 2010, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[55] Lille Metropole, « Convention de partenariat relative à une action de prise en charge de la population d'origine ROM sur le territoire de la Ville de Lille ,»Pg 1, 850W584, 2009, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[56] Lille Metropole, « Convention de partenariat relative à une action de prise en charge de la population d'origine ROM sur le territoire de la Ville de Lille ,»Pg 1, 850W584, 2009, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

> be based on voluntary work by the families, which will commit themselves by contract with the AFEJI.[57]

Lille introduced integration villages with their own conditions and duties for the families to respect, and the city provided social support. Lille enthusiastically worked with EU funds to introduce integration villages while Toulouse did not demonstrate as much enthusiasm.

Integration villages encouraged assimilation and rewarded families that adhered best to the conditionalities of the integration villages and were thus deserving of a place in the housing system. "This proactive accommodation action will be aimed primarily at those households likely to adhere to a social and professional integration program."[58] There was a strong conditionality to living in integration villages, families had to either have an income or be actively working toward earning an income. Families' social lives were surveilled, classified, and controlled, usually by NGO members.[59] On the other hand, stakeholders "specified that 'the criteria are neither exhaustive nor scientifically evaluated.' It will above all be a question for the families 'of expressing a real desire to settle permanently in France, to learn French and to look for a job.'"[60] So, while there were conditionalities to receiving and maintaining one's place in an integration village, the families' participation was technically voluntary, the conditions could be interpreted

[57] Lille Metropole, « Convention de partenariat relative à une action de prise en charge de la population d'origine ROM sur le territoire de la Ville de Lille ,»Pg 1, 850W584, 2009, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[58] Lille Municipality, « Convention de partenariat relative à une action de prise en charge de la population d'origine ROM sur le territoire de la Ville de Lille, » pg 1, 850W584, 2 July 2009, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[59] « The families will be chosen in collaboration with associations, such as the Regional Association for Study and Action with Travelers (AREAS)." "Intégration des Roms dans la metropole: le dispositive 'villages de l'insertion' se precise, »11 February 2009, 1115W1, Nord Éclair, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[60] Nord Éclair, "Intégration des Roms dans la metropole: le dispositive 'villages de l'insertion' se precise, »11 February 2009, 1115W1, Nord Éclair, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

as the "bare-minimum" to integration, and the process involved significant support from social workers,

> This integration work will be carried out through the on-the-ground expertise acquired by the NGOs, at the forefront of which will be the AFEJI and the Regional Association for Study and Social Action (AREAS). This work of integration will be based on voluntary work by the families, which will commit themselves by contract with the AFEJI. Since November 1, 2007, the State has entrusted AFEJI with an inter-associative coordination mission within the framework of this integration objective.[61]

While NGOs provided experiential knowledge, acted as a mediator between the families and the city and were a huge source of trust for the families, they were also in charge of "observing" families,

> The main means of intervention remains the regular presence at the various parking places. Going to meet families where they live makes it possible to identify and get to know the people, their needs and to list their requests. It is also a main tool for observing the connections between family groups and their evolution. It is also the only way for families to identify us and identify our mission.[62]

While migrant Roma were considered a "marginal group" – by 2009, only 600-1000 Roma individuals lived in Lille Metropolis—their presence was discussed a disproportionate amount.[63]

> …for the Roma who wish to settle permanently in our territory - and these are marginal - integration villages have been created. In the form of an airlock, they make it possible to verify the continuation of this integration in the best conditions. The results today are both very positive for some families and negative for others."[64]

Toulouse

[61] Nord Éclair, "Intégration des Roms dans la metropole: le dispositive 'villages de l'insertion' se precise, »11 February 2009, 1115W1, Nord Éclair, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[62] AREAS, « Mission d'accompagnement social auprès des familles Roms roumaines. Bilan d'activité 2010,» pg 5, 2010, 1345W7, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[63] Lille Municipality, « Création par ADOMA de structure d'hébergement pour ménages Roms- Accord de principe et modalités de choix de terrain d'assiette, » pg 1, 18 December 2009, 850W601. Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[64] Lille Metropole, " Deliberations et Sujets en Exergue : Point d'actualité sur la situation des populations Roms dans la Metropole Lilloise, » pg 21, 12 April 2013, 850W905, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

In Toulouse, the Socialist Party (PS) was voted into office in 2008, led by Mayor Pierre Cohen. France had just elected President Nicolas Sarkozy on the center-right, and in 2008 Toulouse elected its first center-left Mayor since 1971. Claude Touchefeu was deputy mayor in charge of urban politics, which included Roma integration. However, this new political alignment did not seem to influence policy for EU migrant Roma. In the city council deliberations there is no mention of Roma migrants as separate from French Roma, or related to the topic of housing until 2010. Then, in 2010, the federal government did something that ratcheted up anti-Roma rhetoric in all of France and so "Roma" were finally mentioned in city council meetings.

2010-2012: National and International Influence

Between 2010 and 2012, national and supranational level politics heavily influenced integration policy for migrant Roma families in France. As a result, in 2010 both Toulouse and Lille city councils distinguished French travelers from migrant Roma, and Lille introduced six more integration villages. The impetus was the 2010 evictions of slums and camps in the northern city of Grenoble, France. On July 30, 2010, in the wake of violence in Grenoble, President Sarkozy made a speech that "lumped together 'gens de voyage' (travelers), Roma immigrants and French citizens 'of foreign origin' and linked, at the same time, crime and migration" (McGarry 2017, 238). Then, in September 2010, a secret memo from the French Ministry of Interior signed by Interior Minister Brice Hortefeux, dated August 2010, was released to the public. The memo asked local police authorities to evict 300 Roma encampments within the following three months. In response, an estimated 50,000 protestors took to the streets in early September 2010 in Paris, Bordeaux, Marseilles and Toulouse, as well as French embassies in London, Brussels, Madrid, Barcelona, Serbia and Hungary. Protestors held placards that read, "Je

suis Européen," (I am European) and "Ne nous expulsez pas," (Do not deport us) (McGarry 2017, 239).

The deportations themselves were legal (most Roma that were subsequently deported from France had been residents for at least three months and had not secured employment), but the targeting of a specific group for evictions was against the EU's Racial Equality Directive (2000). Viviane Reding, the VP of the EU Commission at the time, publicly denounced the French government and threatened legal proceedings as "discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin or race has no place in Europe" (Reding 2010).[65] EU justice chief Viviane Reding dropped the threat of legal action against France and "expressed regret" for the "wartime comparison," by October 2010, however "that summer period was synonymous with exclusion, precariousness and moral and physical violence."[66]

Toulouse and Lille both denounced these evictions along with the rest of the international community.[67] Lille responded to President Sarkozy's Grenoble speech by introducing a moratorium on evictions, building six more integration villages and conducting social surveys of the families living in the camps to get a better sense of what families in the informal encampments needed, "In this sense, our establishment voted on November 5, 2010 an action plan relating to 'provisional and emergency reception and accommodation, in particular calling for the creation of additional integration villages for

[65] These particular deportations rose to the level of international condemnation, but in fact, evictions and deportations are a frequent occurrence for the Roma in France.
[66] News Wires, "EU to Drop Legal Threat against France over Roma Expulsions," 2010, France 24, https://www.france24.com/en/20101019-eu-drops-legal-threat-against-france-over-roma-expulsions-reding.
[67] « Anticipation et accompagnement des évacuations de campements illicites : Application de la circulaire du 26 août 2012, en 4 cas et 6 questions. » pg 32, November 2016, Interministerial Delegation for Accommodation and Access to Housing, https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/contenu/piece-jointe/2017/01/etude_cerema-application_de_la_circulaire_du_26_aout_2012.pdf

a global reception of 200 people, in the long term."[68] The metropolitan government had a goal of 10 integration villages by the end of 2011.

Toulouse

In Toulouse, 2010 is the first year the subject of "Roma" appeared in the Toulouse City Council deliberations by name.[69] The Toulouse City Council condemned the leaked memo and also called for an eviction moratorium "on the free movement and settlement of European citizens who do not represent an 'unreasonable burden' for society."[70] Lastly, Toulouse asked that the state respected the "one month period which must be granted to any person subject to an eviction order on the principle of 'proportionality.'"[71] However, the center-right accused the incumbent government of leveraging the "discriminatory policy of the Sarkozy government" to avoid "clearing 'dangerous' spaces."[72] In other words, the center right accused the center left of using national-level events as cover to avoid accountability at the local level, this is a similar accusation that the center-right wields against the center-left in Lille at the time.[73]

[68]Lille Métropole, FEDER, « Création de Villages d'lnsertion pour populations marginalisées sur le territoire de Lille Metropole (phase 2), » pg 2, 1345W7, 2013, Lille Metropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
Lille Métropole, "Accueil et hébergement provisoire et d'urgence. Propositions de Lille Métropole pour un plan d'actions, » pg 6, November 12, 2010, 847W47, Lille Metropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[69] Délibération, « Vœu du Conseil Municipal relatif à la politique du gouvernement à l'égard des Roms, « Séance de vendredi 24 Septembre 2010, » Toulouse Online Municipal Archives, 24 September 2010, Toulouse Online Municipal archives. https://deliberations.toulouse.fr/data/archive/10-725.pdf.
[70] Toulouse City Council Meeting Minutes, « Vœu du Conseil Municipal Relatif de la Politique du Gouvernment a l'egard des Roms, » pg 2, Conseil Municipal N° 6 du 24 septembre 2010 Délibération n° 84, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[71] Toulouse City Council Meeting Minutes, « Vœu du Conseil Municipal Relatif de la Politique du Gouvernment a l'egard des Roms, » pg 2, Conseil Municipal N° 6 du 24 septembre 2010 Délibération n° 84, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[72] Toulouse City Council Meeting Minutes, « Séance du vendredi 24 September 2010, » pg 9, Conseil Municipal N° 6 du 24 septembre 2010 Délibération n° 84, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[73] Toulouse City Council Meeting Minutes, « « Séance du vendredi 24 September 2010 » pg 9, Conseil Municipal N° 6 du 24 septembre 2010 Délibération n° 84, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.

At the same time, in 2010, EU cities were incentivized by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) to provide more integrated accommodation generally, "Opportunities for Lille Metropolis: rehabilitation of existing integrated housing, demolition of precarious housing, construction of new housing or shared housing, integration villages, short-term housing,"[74] Lille described integration villages as a success, while some scholars and policymakers condemned them.

Then, 2 years after the Sarkozy scandal, in August 26, 2012, Interior Minister Manuel Valls of the new center-left national government issued a memo on, "anticipating and supporting eviction operations of unauthorized settlements," signed by seven ministries.[75] This ended the moratorium on evictions and between June 2013 and November 2014, nine camps and around 2,000 people were evicted from their homes (including a camp of 550 people in Lille).[76]

As such, 2013 was a period of evictions for Romani migrants throughout France, "French authorities forcibly evicted more than 21,537 Romani migrants in 2013, more than double the total for 2012. Law enforcement officers carried out 165 evictions

[74] Lille Metropole, « Eligibilité des logements pour les commuautés marginalisées au financement FEDER," pg 2 April 14, 2011, 1345W7, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
"Following the modification in May 2010 of the European regulation relating to the support by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) of integrated housing operations in favor of marginalized populations and the creation of the Roma task force by the European Commission in September 2010, DATAR published in March 2011 a circular aiming at the transcription at regional level of this ERDF measure. In July 2011, the Nord-Pas de Calais regional program monitoring committee approved the creation of a priority 7 in axis 4 entitled "support for access to housing for marginalized communities. Lille Metropole, « Eligibilité des logements pour les commuautés marginalisées au financement FEDER," pg 2 April 14, 2011, 1345W7, Lille Metropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[75] Ministry of the Interior, « circulaire interministerielle du 26 Août 2012 relative à l'anticipation et à l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites, » 2012, https://juridique.defenseurdesdroits.fr/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=6988.
[76] DIHAL, « Anticipation et accompagnement des évacuations de campements illicites : Application de la circulaire du 26 août 2012, en 4 cas et 6 questions. » pg 32, November 2016, https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/contenu/piece-jointe/2017/01/etude_cerema-application_de_la_circulaire_du_26_aout_2012.pdf

affecting almost 19,380 people. There were 22 evictions due to fire, affecting 2,157 Roma."[77] Toulouse reported 139 people evicted and Lille reported 1878 people evicted.[78]

In light of these evictions, by 2013, the center-left government in Toulouse explained how difficult it was for migrant Roma families from Romania and Bulgaria to secure housing, and identified integration villages as an appropriate policy response,

> Indeed, since the entry of Romania and Bulgaria into the European Union in 2007, nationals are subject to a restrictive transitional legal regime. This status and the material precariousness they experience both in their country of origin and in France creates a particular context which represents a challenge both for social work and for the logic of public order.[79]

In 2013, the center-left government began a last-ditch effort to provide housing for migrant Roma. The center-left identified integration villages as an appropriate housing option due to France's restrictive transitional legal regime regarding migrant Roma from Romania and Bulgaria.[80] "Roma families who are in a regular situation on the territory…nevertheless cannot claim social housing today, in particular because the conditions of access to work are quite restrictive."[81] At this point, French cities were anticipating Romania's full accession to the EU in 2014, and the requisite lifting of transitional measures such as work and residence permits. So, by the end of 2013, the center-left in Toulouse acknowledged that, "Despite this initial work undertaken by the

[77] « Census : Forced Evictions of Migrant Roma in France," 2014, European Roma Rights Centre and Ligues des droits de l'Homme, http://www.errc.org/uploads/upload_en/file/france-detailed-report-14-january-2014.pdf.
[78]« Census : Forced Evictions of Migrant Roma in France," 2014, European Roma Rights Centre and Ligues des droits de l'Homme, http://www.errc.org/uploads/upload_en/file/france-detailed-report-14-january-2014.pdf.
[79] Toulouse Municipal Council, "Lancement de la Maitrise d'œuvre Urbaine et Sociale (MOUS) sur la Population des ressortissants europeens de nationalite Roumaine et Bulgare sur la Ville de Toulouse-Demade de Subention a l'etat, » Conseil Municipal N6 du 29 novembre 2013, Deliberation n22, 2013, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[80] Toulouse Municipal Council, "Séance du vendredi 20 septembre 2013," N5, 2013, pg 30, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[81] Toulouse Municipal Council, "Séance du vendredi 20 septembre 2013," N5, 2013, pg 30, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.

City, illegal occupations and the phenomenon of over-occupation in certain degraded condominiums continue to exist," and proceeded to ask the federal government for 100,000 euros to support an Urban and Social Project Management program (MOUS) that is focused on providing, "stable" autonomous housing, as opposed to integration villages.[82] This was a last-ditch effort of the center-left leadership to successfully introduce housing options for migrant Roma; nevertheless, a new city council was elected in 2014.

Toulouse

In 2014 the Toulouse City Council changed hands from the PS (center-left) to the UMP (center-right) and Mr. Moundenc was elected Mayor (for a second time) under the premise that he would decrease the number of people living in informal camps and effectively offer housing options.[83] In an interview with a pivotal NGO member in Toulouse, they reported that they predicted that the center-left would lose power because they were no longer responsive to what the NGO network wanted in regards to housing policy for migrant Roma, while the center-right party was responsive.[iii]

In 2014, Mr. Daniel Rougé was elected as the new deputy mayor in charge of social housing, solidarity policies and social affairs. He is credited by many respondents as being one of the reasons that Toulouse has had such success with housing efforts.[84] In Toulouse in 2015, once the center-right was re-elected, it was revealed in the city council

[82] Toulouse Municipal Council, "Lancement de la Maitrise d'œuvre Urbaine et Sociale (MOUS) sur la Population des ressortissants europeens de nationalite Roumaine et Bulgare sur la Ville de Toulouse-Demade de Subention a l'etat, » pg 2, Conseil Municipal N6 du 29 novembre 2013, Deliberation n22, 2013, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[83] Toulouse Municipal Council, "Lancement de la Maitrise d'œuvre Urbaine et Sociale (MOUS) sur la Population des ressortissants europeens de nationalite Roumaine et Bulgare sur la Ville de Toulouse-Demande de Subvention a l'etat, » pg 2, Conseil Municipal N6 du 29 novembre 2013, Deliberation n22, 2013, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[84] Zoom interview with Toulouse Metropole/Municipal Representative, March 10, 2021.

meeting minutes why the center-right leadership thought the center-left was not successful in housing policy for migrant Roma,

> … the debates that are agitating French society and the French Left at the moment clearly show the immense problem of the Socialist Party and the gap that exists between what it says and what it does. What it says when it is in opposition, like here, and what it does when it is in charge.[85]

Mr. Moundenc called the center-left cynical, performative, and callously strategic in the face of complex social questions. A new administration with a new agenda for integration was part of the pivot away from integration villages as a primary policy option for housing integration.

Lille

In Lille on the other hand, in 2013 Lille implemented EU-funded policy (EDRF and ESF funds) that focused on integrated housing options for Roma,

> This operation allows Lille Metropolitan area to continue its work with marginalized communities, including the Roma community, from a new perspective through integrated housing and social support operations. Indeed, for the first time, to support the development of the experimentation of integration villages carried out by Lille Metropolitan area, the action of the ERDF funds will be accompanied by the action of the European social fund.[86]

The integration villages were a cooperation between local, metropolitan, state and international bodies, the highest level of cooperation for integration policy thus far,

> Following the modification in May 2010 of the European regulation relating to the support by the ERDF of integrated housing operations in favor of marginalized populations and the creation of the Roma task force by the European Commission in September 2010…In July 2011, the Nord-Pas de Calais regional program monitoring committee approved the creation of a priority…support for access to housing for marginalized communities.[87]

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[85] Toulouse Metropole, « Approbation du Proces-Verbal du Conseil de 25 Juin 2015,» pg 29, 29 September 2015, Toulouse Online Metropole Archives.

[86] Lille Métropole et FEDER, « Création de Villages d'Insertion pour populations marginalisées sur le territoire de Lille Métropole (phase 2), » pg 16, 15 March 2012, 1345W7, FEDER, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

[87] Lille Métropole et FEDER, « Création de Villages d'Insertion pour populations marginalisées sur le territoire de Lille Métropole (phase 2) », pg 4, 15 March 2012, 1345W7, FEDER, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

Throughout 2014, NGOs continued to support families in integration villages and other housing. NGOs reported a lot of success and increased their focus on trust-building and mediating between the families, their neighbors and the city, "in fact, taking problems into account soothes households, which feel less alone and more supported. Of course, building trust is a daily job. But despite occasional tensions, the accompaniments are carried out serenely."[88] Between 2012 and 2014, in an effort to provide integration villages, there was an enhanced level of stakeholder cooperation between NGOs, city council and the state in regards to integration villages and EU migrant Roma integration more generally.

Third Housing Policy Era: Policy Divergence between Toulouse and Lille

2015: Toulouse Pivots from Integration Village Policy and Leads Integration Policy

Toulouse

In 2015, instead of introducing more integration villages, on the advice of the "Collectif d'Entraide et d'Innovation Sociale" (CEDIS), a mutual aid NGO with ties to CCPS, the city pivoted from a logic of short-term accommodation to a logic of long-term housing.[89][iv] The city coordinated with the prefect and 13 social housing landlords and found 150 accommodations that comprised low-cost social housing.[v] Eurocities, a transnational NGO, reported that in 2015, Toulouse shifted from a logic of providing

[88] Association Sauvegarde Nord, « Bilan 2014, Mission d'accompagnement social auprés des Roms migrants sur les terrains communautaires de LMCU (Sites Aménagés Gérés (SAG) et Stationnements spontanés),» pg 14, 2014, 1357W7, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

[89] Toulouse Municipal Council, "Dispositif d'hébergement accompagné pour les personnes en situation de précarité : modification et harmonisation du cadre normatif, » pg 1, 22 October 2021, Délibération n 1.4, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives. Toulouse Municipal Council, « Terrains et sites d'accueil gères par la ville pour les personnes en situation de précarité : modification et harmonisation du cadre normatif, » pg 1,2, 26 October 2015, Déliberation n 4.2, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives. "15 cities learn from Toulouse how to support Roma to access adequate housing," 2019, Eurocities. http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/news/15-cities-learn-from-Toulouse-how-to-support-Roma-to- access-adequate-housing-WSPO-BBDLD3.

"short-term housing," to a focus on long-term housing— "autonomous housing units with social support in view of assuming the rights and duties of being a tenant able to cover the cost of rent in the long term."[90] Other policies included subsidizing rent costs for families interested in long-term housing, rather than re-housing these families in integration villages or short-term accommodation.[91] This shift in policy in Toulouse was at least one year after Lille declared their integration village policy a success and decided to increase the number of integration villages. It appeared that this policy change was the outcome of the change in administration which was advised by a network of NGOs and other civil society organizations to move in the direction of long-term autonomous housing for migrant Roma. This network included the vanguard group with prior experience integrating migrant Roma in the 1990s.

The network that had established itself back in the 1990s, led by CCPS, was still involved in housing for migrant Roma in 2015 when the government switched from center-left to center-right. The NGO networks established in Toulouse in the1990s that had continuously developed through to 2015 helped empower the center-right to introduce new policy for migrant Roma that focused on long-term housing. Organizations such as CCPS and CEDIS31 created the networks and solidified connections, trust, mediation and expertise between civil society organizations and migrant Roma families through housing provisioning support efforts. The development of these networks culminated in a new government in 2014 that was more responsive to the will of civic society and subsequent

[90] "15 cities learn from Toulouse how to support Roma to access adequate housing," 2019, Eurocities. http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/news/15-cities-learn-from-Toulouse-how-to-support-Roma-to- access-adequate-housing-WSPO-BBDLD3.
[91] Toulouse Metropole, «6. Cohésion sociale » pg 73, 9 November 2017, Toulouse Online Metropole Archives.

policy change in favor of long-term autonomous housing in 2015. As such, the evidence suggests that Toulouse developed networks during the integration of migrant Roma in the 1990s which set a precedent for its city council to shape new housing policy in 2015 and empowered it to emerge as a leader in housing policy for migrant Roma.

2015: Lille continues reliance on integration village policy

In Lille instead of policy influenced by a vanguard group within a network that was interested in the rights of migrant Roma, Lille introduced policies that had the most funding available. In Lille there is no evidence of a local civic legacy of an NGO network with a vanguard group advocating for housing for migrant Roma similar to the one Toulouse has which empowers its government to be responsive to the rights of migrant Roma.

Instead in Lille, policy change for long-term housing occurred later in 2017 after a national-level policy was introduced. As stated above, this does not mean that Lille did not have a civic society interested in housing policy change for migrant Roma in 2015, nor does it mean that Lille did not have *some* evidence of a civic legacy. In fact, the NGO network in Lille advocated for policies including integration villages and international cooperation programs with Romania.[vi] However, Lille's civic legacy of networks was not developed as early as the one in Toulouse and did not have the same level of institutional continuity (the organization ATS lasted nearly 30 years in Toulouse) over time. Evidence suggests that Lille was more influenced by international and EU funding than local advocacy interests which were developed through civic legacy networks.

Fourth Housing Policy Era (2017-2020): Policy Continuity, National Housing Policy Introduced

Lille

In September 2017, the National government launched a 'Housing First' Plan on "the observation that direct access to housing, or staying in housing, with support, are generally better suited to people and less costly for the community, than emergency accommodation."[92] In 2020, Housing First was considered a success in Lille, and an important process in moving people out of slums and into housing.

> Housing First Update: 'The territory of the MEL (Metropolitan Region) is confronted with the phenomena of poverty and exclusion which particularly affects people confronted with poor housing and homelessness. The MEL is resolutely committed alongside the State as part of the "housing first" plan, of which it became in 2019 one of the 23 territories for accelerated implementation. The first results of this partnership have been positive in several areas, including the number of people living in emergency accommodation accommodated in social housing or the strengthening of systems aimed at comprehensive support (housing, health, integration, etc.) key to success of the "Housing First" policy. Similarly, the mobilization of the MEL alongside the State has made it possible to evacuate several slums by relocating their inhabitants and providing them with appropriate social care.[93]

The support from the EU for integration villages came to an end in 2019 because the EU had only agreed to fund the integration villages between 2014-2019,

> The commissioning of the integration village in Toucoing having been financed as an investment by European funds for a period of 5 years: from the final payment of the operation made on 02/12/2014, it is advisable to extend the availability of the building at the MEL until 03/12/2019 in order to be in line with the financing methods, in particular European, that can be mobilized for the operation.[94]

By 2020, the city mentioned integration villages alongside other "mechanisms for access to housing,"

> …mobilizing its sovereign functions alongside social policies of integration and access to housing. It will involve both the activation of mechanisms for access to

[92] Lille Metropole, « Plan National 'Logement D'abord'- Mise en Œuvre Acceleree sur le Territoire de la MEL-Actions 2018. » pg 1-2, 19 October 2018, Lille Online Metropole Archives.
[93] Lille Metropole, « Strategie Nationale de Prevention et de Lutte Contre la Pauvrete- Demarche de contractualisation entre l'Etat et la MEL et Prefiguration pour 2020, » pg 2-3, 16 October 2020, Lille Online Archives.
[94] Tourcoing Municipality"Convention de Location de L'immeuble Communal SIS 28 Rue de la Bienfaisance a Tourcoing Appartenant a la Ville de Tourcoing au Profit de la Metropole Europeenne de Lille (MEL), pg 2, 13 June 2018, 1345W2, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

> housing (e.g. housing first) but also the construction of temporary reception structures such as SAS or integration villages.[95]

The Metropolis recognized that the Covid-19 crisis increased the urgency for adequate housing and offered housing first and integration villages as policy options,

> The contract should also make it possible to intensify efforts to clear slums. The covid crisis and the period of confinement that followed have only increased the urgent need to remedy an undignified situation for the occupants of the camps, …It will involve both the activation of mechanisms for access to housing (e.g. housing first) but also the construction of temporary reception structures such as SAS or integration villages.[96]

In 2021, the center-right coalition outlined the Metropolis' current strategy. In the Metropolitan online archives, VP and Mayor of Loos, Madame Anne Voituriez described instances of inter-municipal cooperation, the use of different types of integration villages, work with Housing first, and NGOs such as Sauvegarde de Nord, CANAL, SOLIHA, AFEJI, and with the Prefect of the Nord Department.[97] While the Lille Metropolitan area committed to providing autonomous housing options, still in 2021 integration villages were mentioned as a valid option in city council meetings. Lille's previous reliance on integration villages made it difficult to entirely transition from the integration village policy toward autonomous long-term housing, but the fact that the city council and metropolitan representatives weren't more critical of the integration village policy is evidence that the civic legacy of the NGO network wasn't as strong in Lille.

Toulouse

In contrast, in the Toulouse City Council meeting minutes there is evidence that representatives did critique previous housing policy. During a city council meeting in

[95] Lille Metropole, « Strategie National de Prevention et de Lutte Contre la Pauvrete- Demarche de Contractualisation entre L'etat et la MEL et Prefiguration pour 2020, » pg 3, 16 October 2020, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[96] Lille Metropole, « Strategie Nationale de Prevention et de Lutte Contre la Pauvrete- Demarche de contractualisation entre l'Etat et la MEL et Prefiguration pour 2020, » pg 3-5, 16 October 2020, Lille Online Archives.
[97] Lille Metropole, « Question Orale,» pg 104-106, 19 February 2021, Lille Online Archives.

2017, Deputy Mayor Daniel Rougé reflected on the policy change in 2015.[98] Rougé pointed out the continuities and discontinuities with the previous administration. Deputy Mayor Daniel Rougé acknowledges that integration villages can be helpful but that it was necessary to move on from this policy if the city was going to provide the level of support that the families needed. Rougé argued that if the center-left government had remained in power, the city would have continued with the integration village policy. Rougé acknowledged that the city will continue with the Urban and Social Project Management (MOUS) contract with the State decided on January 1, 2014 under the previous administration and then he acknowledged the great strides taken with the integration village Grynfogel but then announces that due to the number of families that needed support have decided not to continue with the integration village method.[99] And then Rougé talks about the discontinuities,

> There is, in my opinion, great progress and I can provide you with the facts: since we took on this issue, we have evicted 105 squats in the city of Toulouse. That doesn't mean there aren't any left, of course. On the other question of the method, where it is different, it is that, concerning precarious European nationals, we have used methods of temporary emergency accommodation, with social support to bring about the integration of people who go to social housing. But this accommodation being integrated, we did not use camps or an integration village, like that of Grynfogel, even if the results of Grynfogel are very interesting. The great methodology is the mobilization of the assets of the City and of EPFL, but also, the efforts of the City also for this purpose, and also the great mobilization of social landlords in this question. Very great mobilization of social landlords on this issue, who have, by the method, been secured in the use of their property, for which neighborhood issues do not cause major problems.[100]

He mentions that the new administration has evicted 105 squats, this is their main talking point. However, he goes a step further to mention the *social support* and *integrated*

[98] Toulouse City Council, "Proces Verbal, » pg 49-50, 10 March 2017, Toulouse Online Archives.
[99] Toulouse City Council, "Proces Verbal, » pg 49-50, 10 March 2017, Toulouse Online Archives.
[100] Toulouse City Council, "Proces Verbal, » pg 49-50, 10 March 2017, Toulouse Online Archives.

housing that the city is advocating for and supplying, instead of the segregated Grynfogel integration village. Here, Rougé establishes that the pivot from the 2015 policy of integration villages to more integrated housing with increased social support was in fact the right move, even a few years in retrospect.

By 2018, Toulouse still maintained one integration village, but when asked about the topic of integration and housing, policymakers spoke of their efforts for long-term housing accommodation and no longer mentioned integration villages as a policy option.[101] Toulouse focused more on the "Five-year plan for Housing First (2018-2022) and the fight against homelessness."[102] This plan was the result of cooperation between Toulouse Metropolis and the Haute-Garonne Prefect.[103] In 2018 during a city council deliberation, Mayor Moudenc announced that in 2015, there were 1500 people in informal camps and that by 2018 they had around 750 people in informal camps.[104] Additionally, they had offered short-term (hébergement) accommodation to 1090 people in 2018.[105] The Mayor also reported that the reduction of slums in 2017 was praised by CEDIS13, a mutual-aid NGO.[106] A policymaker in Toulouse municipality urged that

[101] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Conseil Municipal N° 4 du 07 décembre 2018 Délibération n° 10.4, » 7 December 2018, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[102] presented on September 11, 2017 in Toulouse and proposed a structural reform of access to housing for homeless people. moving from a response mainly based on emergency accommodation to one based on direct access to housing along with social support adapted to people's needs.
[103] Toulouse Metropole, "Mise en œuvre accélérée du Plan Logement d'abord - Année 2021 : adoption de la convention de partenariat avec l'Etat October 2021. » 14 October 2021, Toulouse Online Metropole Archives.
[104] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Séance de vendredi 19 October 2018, » pg 3, 19 October 2018, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives, 2018,
[105] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Séance de vendredi 19 October 2018, » pg 3, 19 October 2018, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives, 2018,
https://deliberations.toulouse.fr/data/archive/20181214_PV_20181019.pdf.
[106] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Séance de vendredi 19 October 2018, » pg 3, 19 October 2018, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives, 2018,
https://deliberations.toulouse.fr/data/archive/20181214_PV_20181019.pdf.
This praise was confirmed in an anonymous interview.

while Toulouse is understood as a model of housing through integration villages, in practice, they have surpassed this policy and believed that it is long-term housing that leads to integration.[107]

In October 2018, the Mayor of Toulouse announced that the work on Housing First is a direct result of Mr. Daniel Rougé's work with "precarious populations," particularly "migrants,"

> It is the recognition of the work that has been done under the impetus of Daniel ROUGÉ with the intervention of Franck BIASOTTO and other elected officials, in connection with the associative world concerned, in connection with the prefecture. So all the work we are doing on this difficult issue of housing the most precarious and so I salute this good decision.[108]

The Mayor attributed Toulouse's "success" to the work done by Mr. Rougé, other elected officials, *in connection with* the "associative world," as well as the relationship with the prefect. The "associative world" is the network of NGOs and other civil society organizations that work with the city council governments to advocate for long-term housing.

By 2018 Toulouse had a specific interest in integrated housing, "what is interesting in these questions is that for social inclusion, it is still much better to achieve social diversity in integrated housing than to do so with a much more closed (or segregated) design of the system…"[109] The closed design system is a reference to integration villages which were enclosed, gated spaces with curfews for its inhabitants. This move away from integration villages and toward integrated housing is reflected in the city budget under the fight against exclusion policy, "1 integration village, 2 reception

[107] Zoom interview with Toulouse Municipal Representative, March 10, 2021.
[108] Toulouse Municipal Council, «Conseil Municipal Séance du vendredi 30 mars 2018, Procès Verbal, »N1, pg 11, 2018, Online Municipal Archives.
[109] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Conseil Municipal Séance du vendredi 15 juin 2018, » pg 7,15 June 2018, Toulouse Municipal Online Archives.

sites, 144 housing units spread over the whole of Toulouse to meet the accommodation needs of precarious migrant populations.»[110] By 2018, Toulouse is explicitly referring to integration villages as a policy of the past, and that integrated housing options are preferable and a result of the work of Mr. Daniel Rougé, with his associative network that allows for this model to be understood as a success. The municipality has great hopes that this model of integration could be applied to the integration process for other groups as well.

By 2018, Toulouse welcomed more non-EU migrant populations, and distinguished this state-led effort to the city council's "proactive approach" of housing EU migrants, "This action falls within a field of competence quite distinct from that of the Town Hall, whose proactive approach consists of offering precarious European people living in slums accommodation for the purpose of integration."[111] By 2018, the city council articulated the integration of EU migrants as a template for the integration of refugees. They have gone so far as to develop the "Toulouse method," which is "a model for the reduction of camps, with social inclusion through integrated accommodation."[112] Whilst articulating their successful policy, they explained how they "pushed" the state to work in concert with them, acknowledged the "fluidity" of the policies, the importance of

[110] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Budget Primitif 2019. Toulouse Ville Solidaire : Renforcement du Lien Social, » pg 49, 7 December 2018, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[111] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Vœu du groupe Toulouse Ensemble demandant à l'Etat de mettre en œuvre une méthode de résorption des campements illicites sur l'espace public» pg 1, 19 October 2018, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives, 2018, https://deliberations.toulouse.fr/data/archive/20181214_PV_20181019.pdf.
[112] Toulouse Municipality, « 2.37 Attribution de subventions à des associations d'insertion sociale et professionnelle-(Solidarités et cohésion sociale) » pg 24, 10 July 2020, Toulouse Municipal Online Archives.

remaining humble and also critiqued the previous center-left leadership for its "militant cynicism" toward integration issues.[113]

In Toulouse City Council meeting minutes from 2017-2020 there is a lot more discussion about the success of Toulouse City Council housing policy. The policies are referred to as a model for other groups' integration and other cities in France looking for successful integration policy. There is a lot more discussion about housing options for migrant Roma as a whole, compared to the city council meeting minutes in Lille. In Lille between 2017-2020 there is mainly discussion about the patchwork of policy options available to migrant Roma, the national level policy focused on autonomous long-term housing and then the emergency efforts related to COVID-19 housing policies.

While the change in government from the center-left to the center-right in 2014 is an important change that resulted in a change of housing policy, the role of the NGO network with a civic legacy in Toulouse is also important. The network solidifies the connections amongst civil society and government institutions and actors that allow the experience, information and trust to influence policy decisions. This network was developed during prior attempts at integration in the 1990s and early 2000's, by decades of social support already provided to migrants generally and migrant Roma specifically, which developed the trust, expertise and institutional channels necessary for good governance and leadership in policymaking.

Conclusion

The evidence suggests that Toulouse developed networks during the integration of migrant Roma in the 1990s which set a precedent for its city council to shape new

[113] Toulouse Municipality, « 2.37 Attribution de subventions à des associations d'insertion sociale et professionnelle-(Solidarités et cohésion sociale) » pg 27, 10 July 2020, Toulouse Municipal Online Archives.

housing policy in 2015 and empowered it to emerge as a leader in housing policy for migrant Roma. Alternatively, Lille lacked the development of civic legacy networks in 1990 to set precedent for 2015 and thus did not change their policy until there was a national level change in policy and emerged as a follower.

The civic legacy of networks in Toulouse had established itself back in the 1990s, led by CCPS, continually developed and was still involved in housing for migrant Roma in 2015 when the government switched from center-left to center-right. Organizations such as CCPS and CEDIS31 created the networks and solidified connections, trust, mediation and expertise between civil society organizations and migrant Roma families through housing provisioning support efforts. The development of this civic legacy culminated in 2015 when this network helped empower the newly elected center-right—which appeared more responsive to the will of civic society—to introduce new policy for migrant Roma that focused on long-term housing. As such, the evidence suggests that Toulouse developed networks during the integration of migrant Roma in the 1990s which set a precedent for its city council to shape new housing policy in 2015 and empowered it to emerge as a leader in housing policy for migrant Roma.

This chapter set up the argument that the vanguard group in Toulouse, ATS, had the institutional power to advocate for migrant Roma in 2015 based on its historical experience with integration in 1990. This role of this network was to generate the information and trust between the target group, social workers and city council that is necessary for housing policy. The civic legacy of this network that was established by ATS in 1990 during re-housing efforts was activated again when new leadership took control in 2015. This network was able to hold local political actors accountable, give

voice to migrant concerns and advocate for certain policies over others. Toulouse was a leader in making this policy switch and continues with this policy through 2020.

Lille on the other hand, did not introduce long-term housing until 2017 with a change in national policy. Lille lacked a strong vanguard group like CCPS in Toulouse with an institutional legacy developed over decades that could solidify the necessary connections, trust, mediation and expertise between civil society organizations, migrant Roma families and city council. A network was developed later in 2007 when the civil society network supported migrant Roma families in their move from encampments to integration villages. However, this network did not have the historical legacy like the one developed in Toulouse. Without a robust civic legacy, Lille did not change its policy from integration villages until there was a national level change in policy in 2017. Instead, policy change in Lille was lead by national policy and EU funding opportunities.

In this way, the evidence suggests that the development of a civic legacy of a city can influence contemporary integration policy. This chapter described the relevant networks that influence integration policy, however this is not the full picture of the role of a civic legacy. Civic legacies include networks, ideas and actors. The next chapter will focus on the role of an actor, the policy entrepreneur, and how they engage with policy frames to influence policy. Specifically, chapter 5 will focus on the role of an actor introduced in this chapter, the role of Daniel Rougé and how he used policy frames to lead Toulouse in housing policy. Alternatively, Chapter 5 will also describe how Lille's lack of a successful policy entrepreneur impeded its ability to lead policy change for EU migrant Roma.

Chapter 5. Establishing a Civic Legacy: Policy Frames and Entrepreneurs (1990-2007)

Chapter 4 established how the civic legacy in Toulouse shaped integration policy for migrant Roma in 2015 when the city switched to long-term autonomous housing and why Lille did not develop a civic legacy and did not switch its housing policy until 2017 when a national policy was introduced. The integration efforts in the 1990s developed a network of civil society actors who established the trust, information-sharing between civil society and government to influence housing policy later in 2015. This network was able to hold local political actors accountable, give a voice to migrant concerns and advocate for certain policies over others. Since Lille did not have that historical network development, the information-sharing and trust between civil society actors and government was lacking and the vanguard group was not able to encourage policy change like Toulouse and instead it followed national level policy.

But the network is not the only aspect of a civic legacy potentially at work influencing integration policy. Why else did Toulouse pivot from short-term housing to long-term housing in 2015 and emerge a leader in housing policy for migrant Roma while Lille was a follower? Using a content analysis, this chapter presents the evidence from the content analysis and identifies which resonant policy frames comprise the potential civic legacy of each city. As a reminder, the literature stipulates that when a policy entrepreneur introduces a frame, she is introducing or constraining possibilities to change a policy. Policy frames shape how civil-society actors negotiate housing integration policy. Policy frames structure and contextualize debates over integration policy and provide tools for migrant advocates. Policy frames used in previous struggles for

integration have a civic legacy. The civic legacy of policy frames provides a repertoire of policy frames that have specific resonance in the community. These policy frames have historical significance and a different semiotic weight because of that significance. As such, if actors invoke a specific frame with a civic legacy, this frame may have more resonance in the community, which might garner the necessary political will to introduce one policy over another. In this way, the policy frame is part of the city's civic legacy. Sometimes these frames are strategically introduced and sometimes not.

This chapter presents the evidence from the content analysis to compare the role of policy frames in the civic legacies of Toulouse and Lille (see Chart (4)). Between 1990 through to 2020, the "humanitarianism" and "hospitality" frames distinguish Toulouse from Lille, as do the "balancing act" and "policy critique" frames. However, the humanitarianism policy frame was used both historically and in 2015 in Toulouse and not in Lille to the same extent. This specific "humanitarianism" frame had a resonance in Toulouse that appeared to reflect a civic legacy and helped through the network and wielded by the policy entrepreneur to develop the political will for the policy switch from short term to long-term housing for migrant Roma.

In Lille, there is not one policy frame that has resonance and appears both in the 1990s and later on during the period of policy change in 2015. Lille's frames focus a lot on "history" of "French travelers," not migrant Roma. Like in Toulouse there is a focus on "stakeholder coordination," "social support" "dialogue and mediation" and "dignity." All policy frames which develop the political will for housing policy for migrant Roma. However, these are also found in the top 20 frames in Toulouse and do not distinguish Lille from Toulouse. Lille has a focus on "pedagogy" that Toulouse does not. The

development of this policy frame appears prominently after 2012, three years before the policy switch in 2015, but it is not reflected earlier in Lille's history. So there does not appear to be a civic legacy of the frame "pedagogy" to the same extent that there is to the humanitarianism frame. The meaning of these frames will be explored more throughout the chapter.

Chart (4): Top 20 Policy Frames in Toulouse and Lille (1990-2020)

Toulouse	*Lille*
~~Stakeholder Coordination~~	History
Humanitarianism	French Travelers
~~Residency Status~~	~~Stakeholder Coordination~~
~~Social Support~~	~~Social Support~~
Hospitality	Neighbors
~~Precarity~~	~~Dialogue/Mediation~~
~~Dignity~~	Hygiene
~~Security~~	~~Precarity~~
Social Relations	Pedagogy
Way of Life/Against the Grain	~~Security~~
~~Dialogue/Mediation~~	Proactive Policy
Human Rights	Evictions
Identity	~~Dignity~~
Balancing Act	~~Residency Status~~
Crime/Delinquency	Coordination with Other Countries
Policy Critique	Surveillance
Housing Needs	State Responsibility
Health	Emergency Conditions
History	Shared public intervention
Diversity	Re-housing

Blue policy frames develop political will for housing.
Red policy frames block political will for housing.
~~Crossed out~~ policy frames indicate that the frame was present in *both* Toulouse and Lille. The remaining policy frames that are not crossed out were identified in one city but not the other, emphasizing the variation of frames in each city.
Themes without highlight are ambivalent policy frames

However, from the evidence it appears that in addition to the question of *which* policy frames were developed, is also the question of *when* were policy frames developed? The evidence suggests that Toulouse developed a civic legacy of policy frames concerning migrant Roma in the 1990s (during the re-housing efforts explained in the last chapter) which set a repertoire of frames to influence a policy change in 2015. Alternatively, Lille lacked the development of a civic legacy of policy frames in 1990. Instead, most of Lille's policy frame development occurred later in 2008 in response to the integration

village policy. This development set a different repertoire of policy frames and thus Lille did not change its policy until there was a national level change in policy and emerged as a follower. In these ways, the earlier development of policy frames in reaction to re-housing efforts in Toulouse contributed to the civic legacy which made Toulouse a leader in housing policy for migrant Roma, while the latent development of policy frames in reaction to integration villages in Lille contributed to the lack of a civic legacy in Lille and its follower status.

Figure 1: Civic Legacy Represented by Number of Policy Frame References (1990-2021)



Integration Policy Frames in France

Conventional understanding from the literature is that policy actors invoke, "collective understandings of nationhood," or nationalist policy frames to develop the political will for or against housing policies for migrant Roma (Chung 26, 27). "Nationalism" is a dominant policy frame in ideological debates concerning immigration and integration policy.[114] Furthermore, French Civic and Republican ideals are deeply interwoven with French nationalism and are constitutive of French identity (Brubaker 1992). So, it is perplexing that "Nationalism" is not a prominent policy frame in the content analysis regarding migrant Roma integration. The next section unpacks different

[114] Before "nationalism," "religion," for example, was a dominant ordering discourse for governance and may still have effects on identity-formation, policy and nation-states today (Grzymala-Busse 2015, 2021).

types of conventional "Nationalist" policy frames and concludes by previewing and comparing which policy frames were identified in Toulouse and Lille.

In his work on *Nationalism in France Compared to Germany*, Brubaker (1992) argues that France's modern-day nationalism is state-centric, assimilationist and values Republicanism and civic integration. He posits that France's nationalism evokes the dominance of political citizenship over ethnocultural conceptions of nationhood. France's nationalism was born in the 18th century and reified by the French Revolution and its aftermath including the "mission civilisatrice" carried out by the Third Republic's schoolteachers whose mission was to "institute" the nation (Brubaker 1992, 6). In addition to the imperialist and colonial mission to "liberalize and civilize," overseas populations and create "la plus grande France," French republicans pursued an assimilationist, civilizing and nationalizing mission inside France as well. "In the 1880s this assimilationist internal nationalism, linked to reforms of primary education and military conscription, formed the backdrop of an expansive, assimilationist reform of citizenship law whose central provisions have endured to this day" (Brubaker 1992, 11). Later, the Dreyfus affair (1894-1906) "challenged" the state-centric and assimilationist French nationalism in favor of an ethnoculturalism, as represented by the party that Jean-Marie Le Pen's founded, The National Front. This is the understanding of French nationalism as articulated by Brubaker (1992). Brubaker's analysis gives us a good understanding of a traditional French nationalism, while Beaman (2017) provides a more contemporary analysis of French nationalism that takes racist discourses into consideration.

France has a contemporary history of wielding its dominant Republican values

(egalité, fraternité, and laicité) like a discursive cudgel, forcing groups on one side or the other of a discursive debate (e.g. liberal v. illiberal; Christian v. non-christian). This is partially because France's nationalist ideology is a Republican and "colorblind ideology."[115] Since France is a liberal republican country, "per French Republican ideology, (one) is as culturally French as any other French person, so long as they adhere to the values of the Republic" (Beaman 2017, 41). A perverse implication of this is that in national-level debate, France has a rich history of putting its "Republicanisme," value which includes, "Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité," in contestation with the presumed "values" of groups trying to integrate into French society.

The modern national debate concerning immigration in France began in the late 1980s with the rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front Party and through the 1990s (Morgan 2017, 892). At the time, the policy focus was on the first generation of North African/Maghrebin migrants that had migrated first in the post-war years and through the 1970s. "Anxiety over the integration of these immigrants reflected the sense that non-European populations would have difficulty fitting into French society, and many of these fears concerned Muslims and the place of Islam in French society" (Morgan 2017, 892). This modern policy frame regarding "Muslim integration" claims to be predicated upon liberal v. illiberal democratic French values. Within this policy frame, immigrants are responsible for their ability to integrate or assimilate and if they are unable to then it is due to a values clash. Given enough time and pressure, this innocuous clash of *values* soon morphs into an amalgamation of cultural, religious, post-colonial and finally racial

[115] A 1978 law prohibits the collection or processing of data that reveals a person's racial or ethnic origins Erik Bleich, "Race Policy in France," Brookings, (May 1, 2001): https://www.brookings.edu/articles/race-policy-in-france/.

(racist) differences (Beaman 2017, 18, 19). This pervasive racist frame sometimes motivates and culminates in violence such as the Charlie Hebdo massacre in 2015 and the Bayonne mosque shooting in 2019. While this liberalism frame is popular at the national level, it was not a common policy frame in Toulouse and Lille.

Another policy frame that is popular at the national level and has racist undertones is the "welfare-chauvinist" argument. Welfare-chauvinism is the ideology that immigrants unjustly benefit from a welfare system meant to support citizens and that this support is a drag on the country's economy and citizen's pocketbooks. Dancygier (2011) finds that "welfare-chauvinism" was a 90's a popular policy frame of the far-right as a means to garner votes in municipal elections,

> According to a survey of fifty-eight of the party's manifestos during the 1995 municipal contests, the FN's rhetoric focused predominantly on the costs that immigrants imposed on France's welfare state and the party's proposed solution – Preference Nationale – which envisioned a system whereby French nationals would receive preferential treatment in the allocation of all state-provided services. Preference Nationale was mentioned fifty-four times, compared to "Identité et immigrés" or "Déliquance immigrée," themes that appeared only seven and two times, respectively. (Dancygier 2011, 11)

However, welfare-chauvinism was not a common policy frame in the content analysis of Toulouse and Lille.

Then in 2005, as the FN party platform was gaining influence in local and national elections, the "merit-based" or "deservingness" policy frames against Muslim and North African second-generation migrants were also gaining traction. Beaman (2017) describes the "merit" or "deserving-ness" policy frames introduced in 2005 in reaction to the riots (in reaction to the deaths of two young people from migrant communities that lasted for three weeks in the suburbs of Paris, and other cities, including Toulouse and Lille) which discriminated against immigrants and specifically children of immigrants,

> It was they (second generation migrants) who were the problem, not France. They cultivated an oppositional identity and did not see themselves as French. Marginalization in France was based on class or socioeconomic status, not race and ethnicity. The issue was that this population (second generation migrants predominately from North Africa) did not work hard enough to make it in French society. (Beaman 2017, 46)

This "merit-based" policy frame was not as common in Toulouse and Lille as predicted by conventional understandings of anti-immigrant policy frames.

In 2010, Marine Le Pen took over her father's party and attempted to pull the party further toward the center by invoking "feminist" policy frames to bolster an anti-immigrant discourse, "she and others in the party have linked immigration to delinquency and violence against women…the party line on violence against women is that it is largely a consequence of 'the massive and continuous arrival of non-European foreigners who do not share the culture, mores, or customs of most French people'" (Morgan 2017, 900). In 2012 she placed third in the presidential election with 17.9% of the vote, in 2017 she placed second with 33% of the vote, and in 2022 she placed second again with 41.45% of the vote.[116] However, in 2022 turn-out was lowest since 1969, signaling that these two parties' political discourses were not the most appealing to voters. During the 2022 election Le Pen had to contend with competition such as Eric Zemmour. Zemmour replaced "welfare-chauvinist" arguments with blatant conspiracy theories underpinned by a threat discourse such as the "great replacement" rhetoric. As Le Pen moved further towards the center with her discourse, a gap was filled by other discourse entrepreneurs,

[116] Constitutional Council, "2012 French presidential election: first round results in the departments after the official proclamation by the Constitutional Council," May 2012, https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/sites/default/files/as/root/bank_mm/decisions/2012premiertourPDR/resultats-departements.pdf. Le Monde, "Results of the second round of the 2017 Presidential election," May 8, 2017, https://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle-2017/live/2017/05/07/suivez-la-soiree-electorale-en-direct_5123713_4854003.html. Le Monde, "The results of the 2022 legislative elections," 2022, https://www.lemonde.fr/resultats-elections/.

like Zemmour, who were more than willing to provide extremist anti-immigrant discourse.

There is an empirical difference between the national policy frames regarding integration and local policy frames regarding integration. In order to weaken political will, I expected some actors to invoke French ideals such as, “republicanism” “nationalism,” “color-blindness,” “meritocracy,” or to scape-goat others with claims of “welfare-chauvinism,” “illiberalism” and “anti-feminism.” Sometimes local representatives and NGOs did invoke the Republican ideal, or the French identity, but they did not do this as often as expected. While these policy frames have a strong history in French national politics, these policy frames were not commonly used in Toulouse and Lille between 1990-2020.

However, three national-level policy frames, “crime and “delinquency,” “security” and “values-clash” (but not necessarily illiberalism) policy frames did appear in local level policy debates. In 2010, national level events regarding migrant Roma explicitly influenced these policy frames. As mentioned in the chapter on networks, in July 30, 2010, President at the time, Nicolas Sarkozy made a speech in the wake of violence in Grenoble that associated French travelers and migrant Roma with crime and security threats. The interior ministry then introduced a policy targeting Roma informal encampments. The “crime and delinquency” and “security” frame was identified in both Toulouse and Lille and was one of the most common policy frames. These frames were articulated in order to weaken political will for integration policies.

In this way, this project explores the independence of local policy frames from national-level policy frames. While the notion of French identity and its Republican ideal

appears in the cities' integration policy frames, this project finds that a city can develop its own policy frames regarding housing policy (frames such as "humanitarianism," "human dignity," "mediation," and "social support") based on its civic legacy—the NGOs, policy entrepreneurs and frames—established during previous periods of integration, such as the 1990 re-housing of migrant Roma in Toulouse.

Toulouse and Lille Top 20 Policy Frames

Table 3 lists the policy frames present in Toulouse and Lille. Table 3 is a comparison of the top 20 most common policy frames in Toulouse and Lille (1990-2020), by aggregate counts of policy frame references from the corpus.[117] The policy frames that are crossed out appear in the top 20 policy frames in both cities. The policy frames that are left are unique to each city's top 20 policy frames. The most common policy frame unique to Toulouse is the "humanitarian" frame, followed by "hospitality." The most common policy frame unique to Lille is "history" and "French travelers," which emphasizes that most policy in Lille was focused on travelers. "Neighbors," and "hygiene" are unique policy frames to Lille that weaken political will. While "pedagogy" and "proactive policy" are unique to Lille.

Chart (4): Top 20 Policy Frames in Toulouse and Lille (1990-2020)

Toulouse	*Lille*

[117] The policy frames in blue were used to develop the political will for housing policy while the policy frames in red were used to weaken political will for housing policy. From table 3 we observe that Lille has more policy frames that block housing policy than Toulouse does. The policy frames that weaken housing policy in Lille are: evictions, hygiene, security, neighborhood nuisance, surveillance, state competence/responsibility. The policy frames that develop the political will for housing policy are, pedagogy, social support, stakeholder coordination, coordination with other countries, dignity, dialogue/mediation, political will. Lastly there are also ambivalent policy frames such as shared public intervention, French travelers, state competence, history, re-housing. Toulouse has more policy frames that develop the political will for housing such as, balance/balancing act, policy-critique, health, diversity, human rights, dialogue/mediation, hospitality, dignity, stakeholder coordination, humanitarianism. But there is also a presence of policy frames that block housing policy, way of life, security, crime/delinquency. As well as ambivalent policy frames, social life/relations, precarity, housing law, history, living conditions/needs, identity. Ambivalent policy frames are themes that were used in both ways, to block and to develop political will for housing policy.

1. ~~Stakeholder Coordination~~	History
2. Humanitarianism	French Travelers
3. ~~Residency Status~~	~~Stakeholder Coordination~~
4. ~~Social Support~~	~~Social Support~~
5. Hospitality	Neighbors
6. ~~Precarity~~	~~Dialogue/Mediation~~
7. ~~Dignity~~	Hygiene
8. ~~Security~~	~~Precarity~~
9. Social Relations	Pedagogy
10. Way of Life/Against the Grain	~~Security~~
11. ~~Dialogue/Mediation~~	Proactive Policy
12. Human Rights	Evictions
13. Identity	~~Dignity~~
14. Balancing Act	~~Residency Status~~
15. Crime/Delinquency	Coordination with Other Countries
16. Policy Critique	Surveillance
17. Housing Needs	State Responsibility
18. Health	Emergency Conditions
19. History	Shared public intervention
20. Diversity	Re-housing

Blue policy frames develop political will for housing
Red policy frames weaken political will for housing
~~Crossed out~~ policy frames indicate that the frame was present in *both* Toulouse and Lille. The remaining policy frames that are not crossed out were identified in one city but not the other, emphasizing the variation of frames in each city.
Themes without highlight are ambivalent policy frames

Policy Frames Timeline

Figure 1 is the result of the qualitative content analysis of policy frames. Every time a policy frame was identified in the corpus of archival material, city council meeting minutes and interviews, it was noted as a "reference." The number of "references," coded per year were visualized in the Figure 1 timeline. The x-axis is by year and the y-axis is the number of references (coded in NVIVO). The chart is a visual representation of the number of policy frame references to migrant Roma housing per year in the corpus.[118] Higher peaks reflect more references. So, for example, taking a zoomed-out view of the timeline we can observe more policy frame references in the 1990s, with the highest peak in 1998, in Toulouse. This indicates a period of civic legacy development. In Lille, the highest peak in policy frames is observed in 2010. This figure supports the claim that Toulouse's civic legacy was developed earlier than Lille's. Throughout the analysis,

[118] The process of coding references was explained further in chapter 2 under "NVIVO discourse analysis."

Figure 1 is used to broadly indicate the development of a civic legacy through the number of policy references over time.

Figure 1: Civic Legacy Represented by Number of Policy Frame References (1990-2021)



First Policy Era (1990s): Policy development, Rehousing efforts in Toulouse but not in Lille.

Toulouse

In Toulouse, this first policy era was a period of policy development. There was some focus on migrant Roma due to the city's re-housing efforts which included surveys that were conducted by NGOs. These efforts resulted in most of policy frames in Toulouse between 1990-2007. In 1988, ATS and the city council identified that the Ginestous camp was a safety risk for its inhabitants. The Mayor proclaimed, "it is my duty to call and draw attention to the urgency of the work, because the 40 families of Ginestous representing some 300 people live in a veritable 'ghetto' whose law could be that of the 'jungle.'"[119] At the same time the AUAT agency conducted another social survey on "nomades" in Toulouse in 1988. The AUAT presented the study as an open-ended question as opposed to a list of solutions or recommendations, which reflected a critical perspective,

> The purpose of this present file is not to find an answer or a logic to these different situations, but rather, based on the observation of the current way of living of the

[119] Ville de Toulouse Letter to the Mayor, « Camp de Ginestous : Conditions Sanitaires, »pg 1, 24 May 1988, Folder: Camp de Ginestous, Box, 345W17. The discourse here referring to "ghettos" and law of the "jungle," is very strong and problematic but this is not the focus of this section.

> Gypsy families in Toulouse and its Metropolitan area, to determine the problems and the housing needs of these families according to their ethnic groups, their customs and their professional activities.[120]

There was robust discussion regarding housing for migrant Roma in Toulouse in the 1990s.[121] Toulouse developed the civic legacy of networks and policy frames during the administration of diagnostic surveys. The policy frames generated from these surveys were "dialogue/mediation," "policy critique," "balance," "hospitality" and "diversity."

By the 1990's, Toulouse NGOs used a "responsibility" frame for migrant Roma policy. NGOs and city council portrayed integration as a "balancing act," as opposed to a unilateral process with all the onus on the migrant's ability to integrate. For example, the housing commission in 1990 admitted that an eviction was a result of a failure of intervening actors, *not* the result of intrinsic characteristics of the evicted individuals.[122] At one of the meetings for the intercommunal syndicate of Toulouse, the group acknowledged a moral commitment to "nomades" during the development of the Metropolitan area.[123] The AUAT held a meeting and demonstrated that it was aware of the importance of educating non-Roma; it emphasized the "sensitization" of "elected officials, union members, residents, administrators and institutions," to the "lifestyles, the different ethnic groups, professional activities, parking problems, experiences of

[120] SIEANAT, « Modes d'Habitat Actuels et Besoins en Habitat des Familles Tsiganes : du Nomadisme a la Sedentarisation, » Décembre 1988, Pg 4, box 345W17, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.
[121] This is reflected in the timeline of references. There were 87 references in 1990, 72 in 1993, 65 in 1994 and in 1998 there were 254 thematic references counted. 254 references is the highest number of references counted in Toulouse in this corpus.
[122] Bagatelle City Council, "Commission Logement du Bagatelle 26 Septembre 1990, » pg 2, 1990, box 800W80, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.
[123] SIEANAT, « Compte rendu la réunion du 12 Juillet 1990, » pg 2, 1990, 919W106, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.

reception sites, citizenship, the rights of communities etc."[124] The AUAT and the intercommunal syndicate were aware of the importance of educating non-Roma about their fellow residents and the integration process more generally. This was a cutting-edge policy frame regarding integration policy for 1990. In Toulouse, 1990s housing policy frames were articulated by local NGOs, social workers and city council with references to "diversity", "hospitality," "cultural mediation" and "humanitarianism."

By the 1990s, due to the work of ATS, Toulouse had conducted enough social surveys that they framed housing integration for migrant Roma around concepts such as "cultural sensitization" of election officials, the "responsibility" that Toulouse had to provide housing options, and integration as a "balancing act." The city, with the help of NGOs, distributed short, accessible public service announcements and cartoon strips that addressed common challenges for migrant Roma families trying to integrate.

By 1998, Toulouse understood the importance of representation and of civic engagement in the integration process, "the improvement of the participation of the inhabitants could also be a support to revitalize and regenerate the associative life on the districts.[125] Like previous social surveys, the one on contemporary populations of "Bosniacs and Romanians," was detailed to the point that ATS and the city knew how many families lived in which areas, their ethnicities and their immigration statuses. [126][127]

[124] SIEANAT, "Group de Reflexion 'Communication:' Copte-Rendu des Reunions du 11/01/90-1/02/90, » Pg2, March 1990, 919W106, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.
[125]Toulouse Municipality, "Mission d'appui a la preparation du prochain Contrat de Ville : Attentes et éléments de réflexion, »pg 2, 1998, 857W33, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.
[126] ATS and Toulouse Municipal Council, "Consultation Medicale en Faveur des gens du voyage ayant des difficultes d'access aux soins, » 1998, 857W33, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.
[127] ATS and Toulouse Municipal Council, "Domiciliation des Roumains & Presentation du Groupe » pg 6, 7, 1998, 857W33, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.

By 1999, ATS had a description of the history of "Tsiganes" in Toulouse from 1613 through the 1990s.[128] In this way, the local NGOs were fully engaged in policy framing regarding migrant Roma by 1999.

In 2000 the "issues" with Ginestous camp worsened and the city had to figure out how to resolve them. ATS reminded the city that the problem of "delinquency," was not developed inside the camp and that the city was responsible for the conditions that made the camp possible,

> …it should above all be remembered that, according to the NGOs themselves, the residents of Ginestous want to live in Ginestous and that the current problems do not come from the occupation but from the fact that delinquency has been able to develop there with complete impunity and that its origin is partly outside the camp itself.[129]
>
> This is a more holistic view of responsibility and what it means to host migrants.

This interpretation of violence in the camp re-framed the issue. It emphasized Ginestous as a place that residents value and where they feel like they belong. ATS suggested that in this case it might not be in the city's interest to take that security away from the residents. In 2000, NGOs did a lot of work to mediate and develop the will to act on behalf of the families did a lot of work in making sure families felt acknowledged, "this allowed us to intervene in several municipalities this year. Dialogue and goodwill made it possible to resolve the problems thanks to good mediation by each party. We intervene at the request of families, town halls and the state."[130] The policy frame remained localized,

[128] Comite de Coordination Pour La Promotion et en Solidarite (CCPS), "Historique d'A.T.S., 2001," 1220W3, pg 6, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.
[129] SIEANAT « Compte-Rendu de la Commission Communication Intercommunale, » Pg 4, Folder "2000 Les Gens du voyage, aire d'accueil," 857W94, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.
[130] Goutte d'Eau, "Bilan de la Situation des gens du voyage en juin 2000," pg 7, 857W94, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.

the city did not reference international or national rights, norms or laws to rationalize its integration efforts.

It was at this time that the Toulouse metropolitan government acknowledged the influence of policy framing on the integration process. In 2001 the intermunicipal communication committee was focused on four objectives, "establish(ing) 'a discourse' of intermunicipal cooperation, promot(ing) the experience of S.I.E.A.N.A.T., shar(ing) know-how; learn(ing) from the experiences of other French cities or departments."[131] The articulation of these values is very nuanced for the time; particularly its outright acknowledgment of the importance of discourse. Specifically, the committee was focused on establishing a cohesive discourse that centered on the importance of intermunicipal cooperation, promoted the "experience" of the intermunicipal institution, as well as the expertise and knowledge generated by the city and other organizations and lastly, to generate knowledge from the experience of other cities and departments. At this point, Toulouse city government had already developed a self-awareness of the policy frames it used and the influence of its networks. In 2001, the UMP was elected and the city—with the help of NGOs A.T.S. and Goutte d'Eau—undertook rehousing of the residents of Ginestous.[132] While they conducted a needs assessment, they simultaneously collected the demographic information of the residents of Ginestous, as well as their living conditions and their wishes for their re-housing (which they categorized as "difficult," "conceivable," and "desirable" options).[133]

[131] SIEANAT/AUAT, "Toulouse Aire Urbaine- Document provisoire prepare pour le Bureau du 03/05/01 »pg 11, 3 May 2001, 886W51, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.
[132] This policy change is represented in Figure 1 as the second highest spike of references to migrant Roma housing in Toulouse at 149 references.
[133] Goutte d'Eau, "Bilan de la Situation des gens du voyage en juin 2000," pg 7, 857W94, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.

By 2006, CCPS (previously ATS) was also rehousing families at a stopping site in La Mounède and reported that they were still "searching for housing solutions," speaking with families and that "demands are emerging in terms of rehousing (and social support) but remain to be expounded upon."[134] Simultaneously, Toulouse articulated integration as cultural and social integration, "Globally, our working method consists of intercultural mediation. This mediation is always done with respect for the cultures of individuals but by placing them in our social context and our environment. We also take into account the person received as a whole."[135] Each aspect of integration—employment, housing, education, etc.— had a cultural component to it, but CCPS also framed the broader process of integration through a sociological lens that focused on "culture," "hospitality," "societal context" and notions of "belonging," instead of a process that was only measured through technocratic metrics such as job attainment, educational achievement, etc. CCPS also emphasized the importance of mediation between several actors across several sectors; they enumerated the importance of mediation with public representatives, mediation between French travelers and their neighbors, mediation with common law rights access, such as housing and domiciliation processes.[136] All of these re-frame the responsibility of integration away from the migrant, to the responsibility of the city as a whole.

At the same time, this focus on the holistic process of integration made social surveys susceptible to paternalistic discourses such as the following, "Gypsies have

[134] CCPS, "Rapport d'Activités 2006," pg 37, 3 May 2007, 1220W3, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.
[135] CCPS, "Rapport d'activités 2006, » pg 8, 2006, 1220W3, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.
[136] CCPS, "Rapport d'activités 2006, » pg 10, 2006, 1220W3, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.

certainly 'advanced' in forty years, but we must affirm that they are not yet completely settled... It is on a daily basis in the actions with them that our NGO continues this work...There is a lot to be done to bridge the chasms of exclusion from which the Gypsies still suffer."[137] While Toulouse treated the integration process with relative nuance it is not devoid of biased (and outright discriminatory) policy frames.

Lille

Lille's period of civic legacy development occurred in 2007, in response to the integration villages policy (reflected in Figure 1). Between 1990-2008 in Lille there was a strong focus on parking sites for French travelers, but no surveys conducted for migrant Roma and no re-housing efforts. The few policy frames identified in this early period concerned "flexibility," "social support," "right to housing" and "humanitarianism," and were used in talking about parking sites for French travelers. By 2007, Lille emerged from this first policy era prepared to provide integration villages for migrant Roma and little else.

In 1990, Lille published best practices for welcoming French travelers. These best practices referenced "flexibility" and "dialogue and mediation" themes,

> … Furthermore, planners must always bear in mind the heterogeneity of populations. Varied and diversified parking projects are essential to meet the needs of travelers and the requirements of municipalities. However, there is no 'miracle and unique' solution, so actions must be considered and considered on a case-by-case basis, in conjunction with the populations concerned in order to work towards an effective and coordinated reception.[138]

This quote encapsulates an early understanding that the policy for French travelers had to be flexible to respect the diversity of the people the department was serving.

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[137] CCPS, "Rapport d'activités 2004," pg 3, 2004, 1220W3 Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.

[138] Departement du Nord, « Schéma Départemental d'accueil des gens du voyage : Loi 90.449 du 31 Mai 1990- art.28, » pg 7, 147W20-27L, 31 May 1990, Lille Metropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

By 1992, the Urban Community of Lille began to acknowledge that some French travelers wanted to settle in Lille, a process that was referred to as "sedentarization;" this provided the impetus for the city to consider an adaptation of the services that they offered, "…the growing phenomenon of sedentarization has been accompanied by various secondary effects: heterogeneity and plurality of needs, evolution in demand."[139] This also presented an opportunity for the city to get to know these populations better. By the 1990s Lille attempted to employ social surveys to get a better understanding of who was arriving. This accounts for the steady uptick in references between 1992 and 1998, with the peak in 1994 with 157 references. In addition to short-term stopping sites, the city offered an increase in social support linked to housing, "sensitization work with partners" and financial aid.[140] The North Department and the Urban Community of Lille conducted a study on welcoming French travelers in Lille, "Study prior to the development of the Departmental Scheme of reception areas for Travelers: Welcoming Travelers in the Lille District." In the introduction of the report they acknowledged the relevant stakeholders: residents, travelers, elected officials and police. The Urban Community then acknowledged that all actors had duties as well as rights, and that to deny a group their rights was to marginalize them. But the Urban Community did not take as much responsibility as it could have,

> Over time, the arrival of caravans in a municipality is unraveling in an increasingly pronounced climate of suspicion, where everyone protects themselves against the other and thus causes conflictual situations for all (residents, travelers, elected

[139] Communauté Urbaine de Lille, Prefecture du Department du Nord, Direction Départementale de l'Equipement du Nord, « Etude préalable à l'élaboration du Schéma Départmental d'aires d'accueil pour les gens du voyage : L'accueil des gens du voyage sur l'arrondissement de Lille, » pg 31, 147W20-27L, November 1992, Lille Metropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[140] Communauté Urbaine de Lille, Prefecture du Department du Nord, Direction Départementale de l'Equipement du Nord, « Etude préalable à l'élaboration du Schéma Départmental d'aires d'accueil pour les gens du voyage : L'accueil des gens du voyage sur l'arrondissement de Lille, » pg 36, 147W20-27L, November 1992, Lille Metropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

> officials, police...). Today, our region must face a deficit of parking sites to foster harmony between the Tsiganes and the local communities, where everyone would have the time to assume their duties and obligations while respecting their rights. To deny Tsiganes and Travelers their independence through their way of life would be to…marginalize them.[141]

The Urban Community acknowledged how the attitude of "flexibility" and respect for differences was necessary for stopping-site policy-making,

> The stopping place for travelers, whether temporary or not, precarious or organized, obliged or decided, must be considered as a privileged meeting place (between nomads, residents, elected officials and local officials...). On the other hand, it should in no case be solely a parking lot for caravans but a set of dwellings adapted to a way of life.[142]
> Lastly, the working group uncovered a need for "reflection," greater "intermunicipal coordination," and "flexibility" in allowing certain caravans to stay for longer. These were advanced observations for the time and provide evidence that this first era of stopping-site policy for French travelers may have laid the groundwork for housing policy for EU migrant Roma later on,

> The reception of travelers raises many comments and questions on the part of local authorities, local services, as well as the population, on the district of Lille. The objective of this study was therefore, to observe the situation and to introduce a different reflection. From the synthesis of these observations results the need for intermunicipal groupings, and the need for impact studies, to better understand the difficulties of designing parking lots in municipalities. In addition, it seems important to take the regulatory provisions …to allow certain caravans to park for a longer period.[143]

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[141] Communauté Urbaine de Lille, Prefecture du Department du Nord, Direction Départementale de l'Equipement du Nord, « Etude préalable à l'élaboration du Schéma Départmental d'aires d'accueil pour les gens du voyage : L'accueil des gens du voyage sur l'arrondissement de Lille, » pg 1, 147W20-27L, November 1992, Lille Metropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[142] Communauté Urbaine de Lille, Prefecture du Department du Nord, Direction Départementale de l'Equipement du Nord, « Etude préalable à l'élaboration du Schéma Départmental d'aires d'accueil pour les gens du voyage : L'accueil des gens du voyage sur l'arrondissement de Lille, » pg 6, 147W20-27L, November 1992, Lille Metropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France
[143] Communauté Urbaine de Lille, Prefecture du Department du Nord, Direction Départementale de l'Equipement du Nord, « Etude préalable à l'élaboration du Schéma Départmental d'aires d'accueil pour les gens du voyage : L'accueil des gens du voyage sur l'arrondissement de Lille, » pg 6, 147W20-27L, November 1992, Lille Metropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France

Second Housing Policy Era (2007): Period of Policy similarity, integration villages in both cities.

Lille

In Lille, the second housing policy era (2007-2010) concerned accommodation for EU migrant Roma and was the beginning of Lille's civic legacy development. Lille residents started to mobilize against the installment of integration villages, this is reflected in newspapers clippings from the archives. However, in response, some NGOs used policy frames to refer to their own role building "experiential knowledge" and "trust," referred to social workers as "mediators," and referred to the "European Cosmopolitanism" of Roma migrants to build political will for integration villages for migrant Roma. These policy frames were localized in their specific focus on integration villages in Lille, and were supported by NGOs such as AREAS and AFEJI, and Mayors like Martine Aubry.

In Lille, the policy frame timeline depicts a big spike in references to housing for migrant Roma in 2008. Between 2008 and 2010, references spiked from 10 references in 2008 to 370 references in 2010. During this initial period of integration villages between 2008 and 2010, the most common policy frames referenced were "European cosmopolitanism," "experiential knowledge," "trust" and "stakeholder coordination."

Integration villages were described as an "airlock," which evoked exclusionary policy frames.[144] By 2009, migrant Roma individuals who had citizenship in Romania were EU citizens and so "European Cosmopolitan" policy frames were introduced. The Mayor of Villaneuve d'Ascq, Gerard Caudron, "recalled that the Roma were citizens of

[144] Lille Metropole, " Deliberations et Sujets en Exergue : Point d'actualité sur la situation des populations Roms dans la Metropole Lilloise, » pg 21, 12 April 2013, 850W905, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

the European Union and expressed his refusal to 'evict the slums.' The European Comsopolitian frame had a few interpretations. For example, a Lille resident described being proud to have migrant Roma as neighbors, "I am proud to live in this neighborhood and the arrival of these Europeans near my home."[145] At the same time, EU citizenship could be an opportunity for cities to eschew their responsibilities toward migrant Roma families. For example, a Lille Metropolis mayor Gerard Caudron declared, 'it is up to the state and Europe to face up to their responsibilities.' In these cases, EU migrant Roma's EU identity only served as further evidence that the responsibility to accommodate families was with the France or the EU, not Lille.

The mayor of Lille at the time, Martine Aubry, was a strong advocate for integration villages. In May 2009, Mayor Martine Aubry blamed state budgets for the city's inability to welcome new families and asked for more funds for integration villages.[146] Then, on 19 December 2009, while Mayor Martine Aubry called on mayors to welcome Roma families in the metropolitan region, but there was push back from some Mayors, "this Roma village will add misery to misery and pull the neighborhood from below."[147]

The municipal and metropolitan governments realized that during private discussions there was more opportunity for dialogue about accommodation options for migrant Roma families. This reflected an awareness that public policy frames and discussions were not helpful for policy development. Lille established a working group to

[145] Nord Éclair, « C'est Vous qui le Dites, Roms : fier de les accueillir, » 11 February 2009, 1115W1, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[146] La Voix du Nord « Martine Aubry :'Un bilan dans les six mois' » 17 Mai 2009,1115W1, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[147] Letter from the Council of the North Department to the Mayor of Roubaix, 2 October 2009, 1115W14, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

"make it possible to reflect together and ask about available land."[148] Closed to the public and the press, this working group could make it possible to envisage local solutions, at the very least to open a dialogue between the main actors concerned.[149]

By 2010, Lille Metropolis considered the integration villages policy a success.[150] "The experiment is a success. Six programs of the same type will see the light of day by the end of next year."[151] Once the city could count the new integration villages as a successful policy, the city of Lille took more responsibility for Roma integration, "there are others [integration villages] in Seine Saint- Denis, in Nantes, but it's in the North that is doing it well. In the department, these are small integration villages, which accommodate between two and five families at most. It blends more easily into the local fabric."[152] Some recognized the implementation of the integration village policy as an opportunity for the city to prove itself, to take responsibility. During the meetings of the North district council, in particular, there was a lot of talk about one migrant Roma integration village. "But the mobile homes are now there, and they will soon be inhabited. It will therefore be necessary for everyone to do their part: after all, isn't this

[148] Nord Eclair, « Villeneuve D'ascq : Un groupe de travail se réunit mercredi autour des Roms, » October 15, 2009, 1115W14, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[149] Nord Eclair, « Villeneuve D'ascq : Un groupe de travail se réunit mercredi autour des Roms, » October 15, 2009, 1115W14, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[150] "The integration villages of Lille Métropole are a success and constitute an innovation in France? in particular by the mobilized partners (State, municipalities, National Education, Department, Family allowance funds, CCAS, CPAM, AFEJI and AREAS associations)" Lille Metropole, "L'accueil des Populations Migrantes: des propositions pour le court, le moyen et le long termes, » pg 4, Accueil et hébergement provisoire et d'urgence. Propositions de Lille Métropole pour un plan d'actions. November 11, 2010, 847W47, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[151] Lille Métropole Info, "Accueil et Hébergement: Lille Métropole se mobilise," 3 November 2010, 1115W1, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[152] La Voix du Nord, « Les expulsions, ça ne résout pas le problème, » 3 November 2010, 1115W1, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

the opportunity to show that the famous 'living together,' so pronounced on paper, can find a happy concretization here?"[153]

This is evidence that before Sarkozy's Grenoble speech, integration villages were a politicized phenomenon in Lille. Four months before the Sarkozy speech, the Socialist leadership in Lille was defending its introduction of more integration villages despite backlash from some residents and the political opposition represented by the center right. There was evidence of the left exerting its ideological commitment to the policy of integration villages, "I am the left, elected on a municipal program of the left, I am not elected to apply the politics of the right."[154] Even before Sarkozy's Grenoble speech, there was the politics of the left and politics of the right in Lille and these political themes had strong organizing policy frames in regard to migrant Roma accommodation. By 2010, both political parties were "using" the Roma integration issue to garner electoral support.

Toulouse

In Toulouse, 2007 is the first year "Roma" were mentioned in a city council meeting. "Roma" were mentioned for the first time because the metropolitan area of Toulouse was participating in a meeting at the EU. "Indeed, the President of [the metropolitan area], member of the steering committee of the European program 'Development of local initiatives for the inclusion of Roma and Travelers,' took part in the first meetings of this committee in December 2006."[155] However, there was not much

[153] La voix du Nord, « Bungalows » pour Roms, rue d'Alger : les familles emménageront le 6 janvier, » 1115W1, December 2009, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[154] Nord Éclair, « Le 'village' des Roms, un an après, » 11 March 2010, 1115W1, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[155]Municipal Council, « SIEANAT- Presentation du Rapport D'activite pour l'Annee 2006, » pg 2, Conseil Municipal N° 6 du 23 octobre 2007 Délibération n° 178, Toulouse Municipal Online Archives.

talk about integration villages at the time. There was much more discussion in Lille in 2007 regarding the introduction of integration villages and it was not until 2010 that policy frames proliferated once again.

In 2010 national level events influenced Toulouse's policy frames. Sarkozy's speech at Grenoble in July 2010, followed by the leaked memo by the Minister of the Interior Brice Hortefeux, dated August 2010, incited an ordering moment across France in regard to policy for migrant Roma, as city representatives wanted to be on what they deemed to be the "correct" side of the issue. [156][157] Previously, policy frames that referenced migrant Roma were Toulouse-specific, based on scenarios and actors at the local level. After 2010, these same frames concerned international and supranational-level policies and actors. Toulouse City Council meetings demonstrated that the city's representatives had an enhanced awareness of the power of policy frames to instrumentalize a political issue in the wake of Sarkozy's comments. Toulouse City Council released a statement that the speech given by the President Sarkozy in Grenoble introduced an "openly discriminatory policy," and that instead of "easing social tensions, exacerbate(d) them, [and] it also exempt[ed] itself from any duty of mutual aid and solidarity."[158]

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[156] It is important to clarify that the young Romani who was killed and whose death sparked protest was a French citizen, not a migrant. Ethel Brooks, "Stop this state persecution of Roma," The Guardian, August 19, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/aug/19/state-persecution- Kristi Severance, "France's Expulsion of Roma Migrants: A Test Case for Europe," 2010, The Online Journal of the Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frances-expulsion-roma-migrants-test-case-europehttps://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frances-expulsion-roma-migrants-test-case-europe.

[157] While there were only 69 references observed in this spike, these references more often directly addressed "Roma migrants," while previous references implicitly addressed "tsiganes," and "migrants" more generally.

[158] Toulouse City Council, "Vœu du Conseil Municipal Relatif a la Politique du gouvernment a égard des Roms, » pg 1, 24 September 2010, Conseil Municipal N° 6 du 24 septembre 2010 Délibération n° 84, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.

Toulouse City Council went so far as to criticize Sarkozy's efforts at electoral instrumentalization with his speech, "this policy, dictated by electoral motivations, stigmatizes a population in the eyes of public opinion and in fact fuels prejudice."[159] A city council Green Party representative pointed out the instrumentalization of the Sarkozy speech at Grenoble, "This political crisis is also due, more broadly, to a political practice implemented by Nicolas Sarkozy and his colleagues, that of the instrumentalization of the event."[160] Even more than the stigmatization of an ethnic group, it was the political instrumentalization—the effort to manipulate policy frames—that was condemned, "It is this political practice that we must denounce and it is another political practice that we must embody in order to live up to the political moment…"[161]

And finally, the city council criticized the discursive move that Sarkozy made by conflating "delinquency" and "immigration" policy frames, "the political class should claim, on the contrary, not to deal with the issue of delinquency at the same time as that of immigration."[162] This move can be referred to as discursive amalgamation; when an actor conflates two different concepts—either intentionally or unintentionally. This engineered association between the two concepts then gives each policy frame a new (in this case, discriminatory) meaning when mentioned in certain contexts. Toulouse City Council members went a step further and warned against the ills of discursive

[159] Toulouse City Council, "Vœu du Conseil Municipal Relatif a la Politique du gouvernment a égard des Roms, » pg 1, 24 September 2010, Conseil Municipal N° 6 du 24 septembre 2010 Délibération n° 84, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[160] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Séance du vendredi 24 septembre 2010, » pg 9, 24 September 2010, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[161] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Séance du vendredi 24 septembre 2010, » pg 9, 24 September 2010, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[162] Toulouse City Council, "Vœu du Conseil Municipal Relatif a la Politique du gouvernment a égard des Roms, » pg 1, 24 September 2010, Conseil Municipal N° 6 du 24 septembre 2010 Délibération n° 84, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.

amalgamation. For a municipal meeting, this was a nuanced discussion concerning discourse, led by the opposition, Jean-Luc Moudenc of the center-left,

> …so that means that you are in line with what Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy does, that is to say talking about insecurity, immigration, and the Roma and that is exactly what we accuse the Government of. It is not the fact that every once and a while we have a Republican reminder of the occupations of places that are illegal, that is normal. We do referrals. But the debate as it was launched is that it started on security with Grenoble and bandits in a city; then it was discussed with immigration. And finally it has been harped on by all European countries, it has been stigmatized around a type of population called the Roma… It's true that when we talk about Travelers, which has nothing to do with the Roma and even less with insecurity, well, there are also rights and duties, and the municipalities are not meeting their responsibilities vis-à-vis the areas. So all this is a debate that must be conducted calmly and the Left is not angelic, but it is certainly more Republican than the current (national) Government![163]

Here, the opposition is pointing out not only the danger of discriminatory policy, but also the danger of conflating or associating policy frames, particularly stigmatizing policy frames, with a specific ethnic group, in this case Roma. This demonstrates that by 2010, Toulouse's political representatives were well aware of the influence of policy frames.

This city council meeting concluded the announcement with policy prescriptions for the national and local level, "Instead of deporting people who, as targets of discrimination in their country of origin, will keep coming back, it would be appropriate to prepare for their integration..."[164] They recommended reception areas, schooling for children and literacy and professional training for adults.[165] They mentioned the importance of "will" to support Roma populations for "more dignified living conditions," and then cited themselves as an example of a city that has implemented "support and

[163] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Séance du vendredi 24 septembre 2010, » pg 9, 24 September 2010, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[164] Toulouse City Council, "Vœu du Conseil Municipal Relatif a la Politique du gouvernment a égard des Roms, » pg 1, 24 September 2010, Conseil Municipal N° 6 du 24 septembre 2010 Délibération n° 84, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[165] Toulouse City Council, "Vœu du Conseil Municipal Relatif a la Politique du gouvernment a égard des Roms, » pg 1, 24 September 2010, Conseil Municipal N° 6 du 24 septembre 2010 Délibération n° 84, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.

integration schemes," to achieve better living conditions.[166] Finally, they asked European member states to respect Roma as European citizens who have the right to enjoy the freedom of movement throughout Europe and they named and shamed the Sarkozy administration by declaring that, "the designation of a scapegoat dishonors the homeland of human rights."[167]

In October 2010, the city council held another meeting and Roma integration policy was heavily discussed. Not only was integration policy discussed but the nature of the debate regarding the policy was discussed. A Socialist Party representative analyzed the debate between the right and left as "Manichean;" as an unnecessarily binary debate.[168] In response, once again, the Mayor stressed the danger of amalgamations, not just between ethnic groups, or "evictions" and "deportations," but even broader concepts, themes, and discourses such as "social situations" and "personal statuses,"

> And this is where the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister moreover overflowed this summer: it is that we must always be careful of amalgams between social situations, or personal statuses, which are not necessarily or even often security issues. That is to say, you have to be very careful not to mix things up - so obviously I won't talk about Roma - I could talk about the homeless, for example. There are enough sufficiently strong concerns about the problem of the homeless, without falling into the amalgam of insecurity, because insecurity is different, it is really a problem that is totally different.[169]

The latter half of 2010 was an inflammatory year for political rhetoric concerning Roma due to Sarkozy's speech in Grenoble. However, in Toulouse, policy regarding

[166] Toulouse City Council, "Vœu du Conseil Municipal Relatif a la Politique du gouvernment a égard des Roms, » pg 1, 24 September 2010, Conseil Municipal N° 6 du 24 septembre 2010 Délibération n° 84, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[167] Nicole Dedebat, « Affaires Juridiques et Assemblées- Administration du Conseil Minicipal : Vœu du Conseil Municipal Relatif a la politque du government a l'égard des Roms, » 24 September 2010, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[168] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Séance du vendredi 22 octobre 2010 N7,» pg 19, 22 October 2010, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[169] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Séance du vendredi 22 octobre 2010 N7,» pg 20, 22 October 2010, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.

Roma remained in city council meetings beyond 2010. By 2012, the center-left criticized the national policy introduced in 2012 by Manuel Valls, Minster of the Interior for Sarkozy, to dismantle illegal settlements,

> …we repeat it to Manuel VALLS: beware, the eviction of Roma in a systematic way reproduces occupations of land. Toulouse is not Marseille, fortunately, since in Marseille, in view of an experience of the summer, citizens declared themselves police officers which the jurisdiction to go and evict Roma.[170]

However, the Mayor also admitted that the city was struggling with the governance of "violence," in Toulouse, and the opposition did not hesitate to point this out.

Manual Valls, Minister of the Interior in the Hollande government, closed out the second housing policy era by claiming that, "Roma 'do not want to integrate' and that their lifestyles are 'clearly in confrontation' with the French way of life. He added: 'the majority [of Roma] should be delivered back to the borders. We are not here to welcome these people'" (van Baar 2014, 31). So between 2010 and 2013 at the national level migrant Roma were depicted as "moral outcasts," "unwilling to integrate and contribute to society," which left local level governments to undo that policy frame and introduce alternative policy frames that encouraged integration policy instead of eviction and deportation (Kostka from Magazzini and Piemontese 2019; 157).

Lille

In Lille in 2010, in the aftermath of the international condemnation of Sarkozy's speech and the leaked interior minister's memo, the accommodation of EU migrant Roma became an issue of "French values," of "European values," of "identity," of "human dignity" and "rights." Whether Lille decide to dismantle camps and evict migrants, or not, became a much more politicized choice. Suddenly, accommodating Roma was an

[170] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Séance du vendredi 28 septembre 2012 N5, » pg 12, 28 September 2012, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.

issue of identity and "nationalism," that made cities respond with policy changes, "refusing the policy led by the government with regard to migrant populations, judged by many in France and abroad to be 'contrary to the values of France', the urban community has decided to accelerate its action intended to welcome these populations with dignity and more generally Travelers and homeless people."[171]

In the aftermath of the 2010 Sarkozy speech, the policy frame "proactive policy," was emphasized. This policy frame is unique to French discourse and is a major policy frame in Lille that distinguishes the extra responsibility the city takes on to introduce policy that legally should be managed by the department or federal government. Proactive policy refers to policies that the city implements that are outside of its official legal mandate and are typically state-level responsibilities. In Lille, integration policy intended for migrant Roma as well as other groups was referred to as "proactive policy," "the city of Lille, faithful to its social tradition, introduces a proactive policy to fight against exclusion" (CCAS Report 2010). Through this proactive policy, Mayor Martine Aubry claimed to promote dignity, health, security and tranquility,

> at the heart of the roles of the State, this reception cannot be done without the involvement of the municipalities and the responsibility of the mayors must be supported. It is this intervention shared between the State, Lille Metropolis and the municipalities that contributes to ensuring public dignity, health, security and tranquility.[172]

[171] Lille Métropole Info, "Accueil et Hébergement: Lille Métropole se mobilise," 3 November 2010, 1115W1, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
Newspapers reported that associations were genuinely shocked by Sarkozy's words, "Nicolas Sarkozy has fixed a meeting for July 28 to study the problems posed by the behavior of some of the Travelers and the Roma'" the local associations say they are shocked." Nord Éclair, "Roms : L'heure est aux expulsions," 22 July 2010, 1115W1, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[172] Lille Métropole « Accueil et hébergement provisoire et d'urgence. Propositions de Lille Métropole pour un plan d'actions : L'échange de pratiques de solidarité et le travail inter-institutions » pg 8, 5 November 2010, 1115W1, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

The municipalities that demonstrated the political will to house migrant Roma implemented "proactive policy," which supplemented the state's legal jurisdiction in housing integration.

> As you know, Lille Metropolis has embarked on a proactive policy in matters of welcoming Roma populations on its territory, even though this policy is not part of the competences of the urban community, in order to guarantee these families decent living conditions, and to facilitate good acceptance by local residents. This policy is reflected in the development and management of several parking sites, the creation of integration villages and the search for housing solutions in diverse areas.[173]

By 2012, proactive policy included the establishment of the parking sites, integration villages and housing opportunities in diverse areas. In Lille's report to the national French strategy for the integration of Roma until 2020, Lille described that a proactive policy required that local actors were dedicated to the objectives which in turn required mayoral support and ultimately the political will to welcome migrant Roma at the level of each municipality, "a proactive policy in this area will only have an effect if the local actors, already at work on the ground, are dedicated to their objectives."[174] The fact that proactive policy is such a common policy frame in Lille indicates that actors are consistently debating whose responsibility it is to introduce policy for migrant Roma. In the aftermath of the 2010 and 2012 federal-level controversies, the "proactive policy," "European identity," "NGOs as mediator and source of trust," and "stakeholder cooperation between the state and city," policy frames were strengthened along with the integration villages policy.

[173] Letter from Madame Martine Aubry to the Mayor of Loos, 13 December 2012, 1345W4, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[174] European Commission. 2019. "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Report on the Implementation of National Roma Integration Strategies – 2019." In . Brussels. https://doi.org/5.9.2019, COM / 2019/406 final

By 2012, Interior Minister Manuel Valls called for public order and the reduction of slums. There was a rhetorical focus on "flows of people" and "migrant flows." Both sides compared EU migrant Roma integration policies to the French republic's values and standards and to the French identity, however these frames were used to make nationalist/nativist claims. By 2013, integration villages were promoted by Lille NGOs. Lille NGOs mentioned their "expertise," the "trust" they fostered between families and the city, as well as the "flexibility" they provided in housing options, and sometimes they articulated policy critiques and critiques of their own practices.

In response to the July 2010 deportations the political left, represented by the Greens, critiqued the state representatives who did not actively support the Roma. Malik Ifri, (Green party) in charge of the issue of travelers and Roma in the metropolitan region, articulated the lack of political will on behalf of the State with regard to integration policy for Roma, "I have never seen the prefect requisition land for the reception of these populations. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the Roma are European citizens with specific status. France imposes very strong constraints on them which do not favor their integration and their employability."[175]

However, some center-left mayors were unhappy with the moratorium on evictions. During a city council meeting Mayor Gerard Caudron of the center-left called again on the authorities responsible for Roma policy,

> While the moratorium on evictions decided by the president of the urban community inevitably suggests new encampments, Gérard Caudron believes for his part that "the Roma file has resumed its spiral of failures..." Gérard Caudron already draws the line not to cross, "I do not accept that this results in new encampments…

[175] Nord Éclair, "Roms : L'heure est aux expulsions," 22 July 2010, 1115W1, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

> almost everywhere, the day before winter, in Villeneuve d'Ascq. Encampments that will put us back in serious trouble." The alarm signal is sounded, will it be heard?[176]

However, there is also evidence that Mayors also showed solidarity for one another by acknowledging when the migrant Roma issue was exploited by political opponents, "I know that as Mayor you share this concern of welcoming these families in good conditions. I salute this commitment and I can only imagine the anger you feel in witnessing this complex issue exploited by an opposition that calls for hatred and rejection of others."[177]

In response to the international backlash to Sarkozy's request to dismantle Roma camps, Mr. Marc-Philippe Daubresse and Mayor Martine Aubry introduced six more integration villages, and the newspapers portrayed integration villages as the "nordiste" (Northern) example of Roma integration.[178] Lille's moratorium on camp evictions was introduced because of Sarkozy's comments, "In summary: Martine Aubry has frozen the procedures for evacuating Roma since the expulsion measures taken by the (national) government. If land has to be freed up for operational reasons, the city must find other land in compensation to accommodate the Roma."[179] However, by the end of the year, social workers were conducting social surveys with the families to get a sense of who they were and what they wanted when they were evicted,

> the summer period was synonymous with exclusion, precariousness and moral and physical violence. Following [the metropolitan area's] positioning to stop the evictions of [Romania] Roma families on its land, things calmed down and the stabilization of parking places facilitated the work of social support. Thus, at the end of the year, work was carried out with [the metropolitan government] in terms

[176] La Voix du Nord, "Insertion des Roms : l'exemple nordiste ? » 3 November 2010, 1115W1, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[177] Letter from Madame Martine Aubry to the Mayor of Loos, 13 December 2012, 1345W4, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France
[178] La Voix du Nord, "Insertion des Roms : l'exemple nordiste ? » 3 November 2010, 1115W1, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[179] Email exchange with the Mayor's office "Occupation de terrain par les Roms- Eurasanté," 27, June 2011, 1356W28, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

> of expertise and social survey in the field in order to find answers adapted to the lifestyles and functioning of families.[180]

While the EU had already agreed to fund new integration villages in 2009, in the wake of the Sarkozy scandal in July 2010, the policy of integration villages was at the forefront of the EU and Lille's toolkit concerning housing integration of EU migrant Roma. After 2010, Lille wanted 10 integration villages set up by the end of 2011.

However, the integration villages had a specific policy frame on the center-right. The center right was focused on the families' identities as Romanian or Bulgarian, as well as their specific immigration status that allowed them to travel but not stay in the EU without a job for over three months,

> The Roma of Romania or Bulgaria concerned must demonstrate a real willingness to learn the language of Voltaire, educate their children and look for jobs," says Marc-Philippe Daubresse…We are ready to finance integration projects for people in a regular situation who demonstrate a true willingness to integrate. But we will not finance the structures for welcoming people in an irregular situation.[181]

Mr. Marc-Phillippe Daubresse of the UMP (center-right) who was responsible for the opposition group at the metropolitan level, reportedly justified the evictions the Sarkozy government conducted.[182] At the national level he served as the secretary for housing from March to November 2004 and from November 2004 to 2005 he was the deputy minister for housing and cities. At different times Mr. Marc-Philippe Daubresse was the Vice-President of the Urban Community of Lille Metropolis (2001-2008) as well as the mayor of Lambersart between 1988 and 2017. In Lille, Mr. Daubresse supported a mix of policies that reportedly confused the majority government in Lille. While he supported

[180]AREAS, Mission d'accompagnement social auprès des familles Roms roumaines, "Accompagnement social global: A- Types d'accompagnement et objectifs, » pg 5, 2010 1345W7, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[181] La Voix du Nord, "Insertion des Roms : l'exemple nordiste ? » 3 November 2010, 1115W1, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[182] Nord Éclair, "Les villages d'insertion ont un budget," 3 November 2010, 1115W1, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

the evictions that Sarkozy called for and did not support the policy to pay for hotel rooms (emergency housing) for migrant Roma, Mr. Daubresse also supported the integration village policy.[183] Mr. Daubresse called for the closure of hotel rooms for EU migrant Roma, referencing a welfare magnet policy frame,

> The urban community's plan to find solutions for the Roma has found its funding. But behind the State-[metropolitan] agreement, the communication war is raging…Marc-Philippe Daubresse used the welfare magnet argument to justify the closure of hotel rooms. The state did not intend to continue funding these schemes indefinitely…we cannot welcome all the misery in the world.[184]

The implicit logic of the welfare magnet frame is that of welfare chauvinism. The idea is that if the city introduces welfare policies to support marginalized migrant families that policy would attract more people that the city was not equipped to welcome, so therefore cities should not introduce welfare policies. Mr. Daubresse has a lot of institutional power over time and across institutions and so his opinion held sway.

At the very least, Mr. Daubresse's support of the integration villages reveals that the integration village policy was attractive to those who aligned themselves with a specific policy frame. Particularly, representatives like Mr. Daubresse were sympathetic to the policy that if a Roma family wanted to live in an integration village, they had to demonstrate a "willingness to integrate," under this policy.[185] Taken to its logical conclusion, this "deservingness" or "meritocracy" policy frame was underpinned by the same policy frame as the welfare magnet policy frame. Therefore, while it is already difficult for migrant families to meet the standards for integration, some political actors

[183] La Voix du Nord, "Insertion des Roms : l'exemple nordiste ? » 3 November 2010, 1115W1, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[184] Nord Éclair, "Les villages d'insertion ont un budget," 3 November 2010, 1115W1, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France
[185] Nord Éclair, "Les villages d'insertion ont un budget," 3 November 2010, 1115W1, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France

reference the "deservingness" or "meritocracy" frame to rationalize why some families are not "fit" to remain in France.

Then, in August 26, 2012, Interior Minister Manuel Valls of the new Socialist French government issued a circular on anticipating and supporting operations of evictions of unauthorized settlements," signed by seven ministries. [186] This ended the moratorium on evictions and between June 2013 and November 2014, nine camps and around 2,000 people were evacuated (including a camp of 550 people in Lille).[187] Lille conducted social surveys in an attempt to give Romanian and Bulgarian migrant Roma housing options before they were evicted, "in accordance with the ministry circular of August 26, 2012 relating to the anticipation and support of operations to evict illegal camps, this decision was taken on the basis of an in-depth health and social survey and a proposal to stay given to each family."[188]

The integration village projects were emphasized as a policy for nationals of the EU (not "simply" Roma families) and representatives emphasized the inclusion of migrant Roma from Romania at the time, not only the welfare magnet policy frame. In

[186] Education Ministry, Ministry of Social affairs and Health, Ministry of equality and housing, Ministry of the interior, Ministry of work, employment, professional development and social dialogue, « CIRCULAIRE INTERMINISTERIELLE NOR INTK1233053C du 26/08/2012 relative à l'anticipation et à l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites, » August 26, 2012, https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/contenu/piece-jointe/2017/01/etude_cerema-application_de_la_circulaire_du_26_aout_2012.pdf.

[187] Education Ministry, Ministry of Social affairs and Health, Ministry of equality and housing, Ministry of the interior, Ministry of work, employment, professional development and social dialogue, « CIRCULAIRE INTERMINISTERIELLE NOR INTK1233053C du 26/08/2012 relative à l'anticipation et à l'accompagnement des opérations d'évacuation des campements illicites, » August 26, 2012, https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/contenu/piece-jointe/2017/01/etude_cerema-application_de_la_circulaire_du_26_aout_2012.pdf.

[188] Prefet du Nord, Communique de presse, « Reinstallation de campements de Familles Rom Implantes sur le Campus Universitaire de Villeneauve D'Ascq, » January 31 2013, 1345W6, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

this way the "EU cosmopolitanism" theme was further referenced in the wake of the Sarkozy speeches,

> The exceptional character lies in the nature of the project, namely the hosting of a few Roma families, which is part of a metropolitan plan to provide temporary prefabricated accommodation to respond urgently to the situation of great distress and great fragility of Roma families who are nationals of the European Union and homeless.[189]

This effort to provide integration villages was recognized and funded by the EU through their ESF and EDRF programs, and was portrayed as a model integration program with an emphasis on the work of NGOs,

> European credits will be requested for all initiatives. In particular, Europe has opened up the possibility of funding housing projects for marginalized communities…The ESF could also be mobilized for the actions carried out in favor of the economic and social integration of the Roma, in particular through the NGOs working in favor of these populations.[190]
> Political leaders discovered that neighbors and neighborhood problems were

reportedly the source of electoral backlash, so with the integration villages policy, the metropolis kept the numbers of residents low, "These experiences take place without neighborhood problems, because of their limited size, the willingness of families, and the support they receive."[191] The city relied a lot on the "expertise" and "trust" that NGO members built with the families to mediate the relationship between families in the integration villages and their neighbors. NGOs such as CANAL offered social support that "ensured good neighborly relations with local residents…CANAL offered information and explanation upstream of an installation because for local residents, it is a

[189]Letter from the Metropole to the Mayor of Roubaix, 16 June 2010, 1115W14, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[190] Réunion du Conseil du 03/12/2010 , "Accueil et hébergement provisoire et d'urgence. Propositions de Lille Métropole pour un plan d'actions. » pg 8, 1092W102, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[191] Tribunal administrative de Lille, « Memoire en Defense, » pg 3, 9 July 2012, 1092W68, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

subject of concern."[192] NGOs such as CANAL would speak to the neighborhood even before an integration village was installed in order to dialogue with the families and help them understand what was going on in their area. Municipal councils had a good understanding of the pivotal role NGOs played in establishing trust between Roma and their neighbors. By this point, Lille has finally understood the role that policy frames and networks play in influencing integration policy.

By 2012, the NGOs CANAL, AREAS and AFEJI were working closely to provide social support for migrant Roma which strengthened political will for integration policies

> CANAL is in regular, even constant, contact with the other associative structures officially assigned to the field: the AREAS which is in charge of social support, schooling and the health of Residents. The AFEJI which supports us in the possibility of hiring residents of the integration village.[193]

CANAL touted a level of "policy critique" that supposedly allowed them to support Roma migrant families better, "without judgement or interpretation."[194] The CANAL NGO endeavored to listen to all relevant stakeholders and to educate its members in order to communicate their own understanding of Roma "culture" and "way of life,"

> CANAL is listening, CANAL is constantly listening to elected officials and the general public. The goal being to make available our knowledge of the culture and the way of life of the residents without judgment or interpretation, in a completely transparent way in the desire to silence certain prejudices, certain stigmatizing or hateful ideas, but without obscuring the difficulties and nuisances caused by

[192] Canal, « Compte-rendu de l'activite de coordination et de mediation de l'activite de I' Association CANAL sur les campements des Migrants en provenance de l'Europe de l'Est : Annee 2012 » pg 5, 2012, 1345W6, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[193] Canal, « Compte-rendu de l'activite de coordination et de mediation de l'activite de I' Association CANAL sur les campements des Migrants en provenance de l'Europe de l'Est : Annee 2012 » pg 5, 2012, 1345W6, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[194] Canal, « Compte-rendu de l'activite de coordination et de mediation de l'activite de I' Association CANAL sur les campements des Migrants en provenance de l'Europe de l'Est : Annee 2012 » pg 5, 2012, 1345W6, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

> informal camps. Thus, the CANAL teams regularly attend meetings, debates and conferences on the subject of "Roma."[195]

Some of this language such as the "way of life" of the residents, can be alienating and exclusionary, but in the context of educating social workers, listening to all stakeholders and encouraging critical thought for the people providing the service and not the migrant families is unique for the context.

It is around 2012 that CANAL realized its role as a mediator and communicator between Roma residents and the city, "the NGO is committed to the establishment of coordination, the establishment of mediation and communication, to bring a better life to the Roma public…"[196] The city put a lot of emphasis on pedagogy between municipalities regarding best practices, "the urban community and the departmental union of the CCAS will jointly bring together all the municipalities, in order to know and promote the exchange of practices of solidarity with regard to the populations received."[197] This emphasis on pedagogy continued into 2012 when the NGO CANAL joined the stakeholder network.

As the March 2014 municipal elections grew closer, the center left searched for a policy equilibrium which would "enable a certain number of Roma to meet the conditions for integration within the Metropolis, but also prevent[ed] the development of informal settlements which have consequences in terms of health, hygiene, security and

[195] Canal, « Compte-rendu de l'activite de coordination et de mediation de l'activite de I' Association CANAL sur les campements des Migrants en provenance de l'Europe de l'Est : Annee 2012 » pg 5, 2012, 1345W6, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[196] Lille Métropole, « Convention Passe entre Lille metropole et Canal annee 2012 : Annexe 1 : détail du projet ou des actions subventionné(es). Cahier des charges. » Annex 1, 21 October 2011, 1345W6, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[197] Lille Métropole « Accueil et hébergement provisoire et d'urgence. Propositions de Lille Métropole pour un plan d'actions : L'échange de pratiques de solidarité et le travail inter-institutions » pg 8, 5 November 2010, 1115W1, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

neighborhood."[198] Outside of the context of the elections there was still anti-Roma vitriol, "a lifting of anti-Roma outcry...counterbalanced by the position taken by a collective of humanist NGOs and left-wing political parties."[199] The left continued to call out discriminatory comments made by the political opposition, "deploring a mountain of irresponsibility in the remarks made about Roma families by the political opposition and by all those who express themselves in this debate..."[200]

At this time, it was reported that the topics of migrant Roma and encampments were hot button issues, "in municipal elections, candidates are campaigning in particular on the issue of the reception of migrant Roma and encampments. The subject becomes very controversial and dividing. Communities then adopt a cautious attitude on this subject"[201] In Lille, the policy era of integration villages (during 2010-2014), was the most incendiary period of time for the topic of housing for migrant Roma.[202]

Conclusion

The evidence supports De Graauw's findings that policy framing can help develop the political will for integration policy for stigmatized and discriminated migrant groups. How housing policy for migrant Roma is framed (e.g. through the lens of humanitarianism, human rights, proactive policy, mediation) influences whether there is

[198] Lille Metropole, " Deliberations et Sujets en Exergue : Point d'actualité sur la situation des populations Roms dans la Metropole Lilloise, » pg 22, 12 April 2013, 850W905, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[199] « Loos-Haubourdin, La Voix du Nord ,» 25 January 2013, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[200] « La voix du nord, » 13 Mars 2013, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.
[201] DIHAL « Anticipation et accompagnement des évacuations de campements illicites: Application de la circulaire du 26 août 2012, en 4 cas et 6 questions, » pg 33, November 2016, https://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/contenu/piece-jointe/2017/01/etude_cerema-application_de_la_circulaire_du_26_aout_2012.pdf.
[202] There was a proliferation of discursive development surrounding the 2014 elections, however 2012 already had a high number of references (N=273) and 2013 (N=335) had over double the count of references as 2014 (N=156).

enough political will at the city council level to introduce the policy.

In Toulouse, the civic legacy of housing policy frames included “mediation,” “pedagogy,” “diversity,” “humanitarianism,” “critical policymaking” and “stakeholder coordination.” These policy frames were initially articulated by local NGOs in their efforts to re-house migrants in the 1990s. Later on, these policy frames were adopted by city council members. However, policy frames were articulated most vocally by policy entrepreneur Mr. Daniel Rougé. His role is theorized more broadly and contrasted to Lille’s discourse entrepreneurs in chapter 7.

Lille’s policy frames included themes such as “pedagogy,” “social support,” “dignity,” “mediation,” “flexibility,” and “proactive policy.” Lille did not have a similar first housing era like in Toulouse in the 1990s that was triggered by NGOs’ management of camps, instead it was the introduction of integration villages in 2008 that shaped policy frames regarding migrant Roma housing to a greater extent in Lille. While Toulouse main policy frame was “humanitarianism,” Lille’s main policy frame was “proactive policy.” According to Chung (2020), policy frames structure debates over integration policy and provide tools for migrant advocates, “while ideational frames may constrain immigration policy debates and reforms, they also provide the tools for making claims legible to the state and the larger public” (Chung, 27).This suggests that Toulouse’s understanding of its responsibility was to the humanitarian needs of migrant Roma, while Lille’s understanding of its responsibility was in relation to the state’s legal responsibility to migrant Roma.

This next chapter will answer the question, how do policy entrepreneurs use civic legacies to shape contemporary housing policy for EU migrant Roma? This chapter will

demonstrate the link between civic legacies of policy frames, networks and policy entrepreneurs by looking at a specific critical juncture when a policy entrepreneur changed policy through the use of a specific historical policy frame. This chapter will describe how the policy entrepreneur convinces political opposition to follow his lead by introducing specific policy frames and drawing on the civic legacy of the town regarding housing integration.

Chapter 6. Policy Frames and Entrepreneurs (2007-2020)

Chapters 4 and 5 set out the policy frames and networks that comprise the civic legacy in Toulouse and Lille. This next chapter will demonstrate how the civic legacy in Toulouse was re-activated in 2015 when a policy entrepreneur (Mr. Daniel Rougé) used historical policy frames to redefine the issue of housing and generated the political will to introduce new housing policy. Meanwhile, while Lille may have had evidence of an NGO network and policy frames by 2007, Lille did not have necessary contemporary policy entrepreneur to make the pivot in 2014, instead financial incentives drove policy change in Lille in 2017.

This chapter explores how policy entrepreneurs can draw upon the civic legacies of networks and policy frames coordinated during groups' previous attempts to integrate to change contemporary policy. One way the NGO network provides symbolic significance and legitimacy to housing integration efforts for migrant Roma is through policy frames. In her analysis of integration rights and policies for migrants in San Francisco, De Graauw (2016) finds that policy frames are customized and introduced by NGOs to connect with city officials, voters and the media, in order to successfully navigate "a highly politicized environment in which their objectives remain a difficult political sell" (De Graauw, 17).

In Toulouse there is a history of individuals who directed the NGOs which established the trust, mediation and expertise that provided accommodation options. One individual, Dr. Guiraud ran a pivotal organization for nearly 30 years between 1971-1998. This long-term commitment spearheaded by one person established a cohesive policy frame around accommodation for "tsiganes" in Toulouse, which included migrant

Roma.[203] The policy frames established in the 1990s were activated when new leadership took control in 2015. The 2015 policy pivot from short to long-term housing policy was spearheaded by a policy entrepreneur, Mr. Daniel Rougé. Lille, on the other hand, did not have a historical policy entrepreneur with similar institutional longevity, or a policy entrepreneur to change policy in 2015. This process of successfully leveraging policy frames to convince multiple stakeholders (predominately municipal mayors, prefects and political opposition) of a specific policy delimits the housing policy options available for EU migrant Roma.

In Lille, while NGOs developed policy frames and networks through their mediation and social support of migrant Roma, this development occurred later, in 2007 as opposed to 1990 in Toulouse. This could explain why Lille was slow to pivot from integration villages to long-term housing. While the Mayors Pierre Mauroy and Martine Aubry were vocal Mayors who acted as policy entrepreneurs, they could not convince the center right parties, other mayors and NGOs that long-term housing policy was preferable. Furthermore, policy entrepreneur, Mr. Marc-Philippe Daubresse, was heavily involved in multiple Lille political institutions as well as national institutions and was not interested in developing political will for EU migrant Roma housing. This evidence supports the argument that in Lille, with a delayed civic legacy and without a policy entrepreneur to develop the political will for housing, there was no independent policy change from integration villages.

[203] The use of the term "Tsiganes" or "Gypsy" can be a slur depending on the context and power-dynamics of relevant interlocutors. These terms are only used in this dissertation when quoting or referring to archival documents.

The Role of Policy Entrepreneurs

Civic legacies, historical policy frames, networks and policy entrepreneurs influence housing policy. However, the evidence supports that the role of one contemporary policy entrepreneur in Toulouse was necessary for policy change. Without the political influence of one policy actor, Mr. Daniel Rougé, it is unclear whether the presence of a civic legacy would be enough to result in policy change in Toulouse 2015.

One source of authority for the policy entrepreneur is how she persuades her political opposition by articulating specific policy frames over time.[204] This actor has the power to convince political actors such as the center left and right party leadership as well as national level representation such as prefects and NGO advocates. Anyone with that level of persuasive power *while* articulating a specific policy frame *over time* (around ten years or more) was identified as a policy entrepreneur. If they did not have that level of influence, they probably would not have ended up in the archives.

In Toulouse, Dr. Jean-Claude Guiraud served as a policy entrepreneur for over 30 years during his service as the director of A.T.S./C.C.P.S. from 1971-2005. In total, Dr. Guiraud was involved with Roma in Toulouse for 40 years (1965-2005). This long-term commitment spearheaded by one person established the trust and expertise necessary to communicate policy frames concerning migrant Roma integration.

In the Toulouse archive, most documents published between 1970-2000 mention Dr. Guiraud as the president of A.T.S. and then C.C.P.S. Dr. Guiraud ran A.T.S. for 30 years, beginning with his involvement in the Ginestous camp in 1966, “Jean-Claude

[204] Other sources of discursive authority could be the epistemological source of the discourse (medical v. activist v. legal) and the historical valence of the discourse (whether it harkens back to the city’s passed and has ideological longevity or whether it is fueled by short-term emotions such as NIMBY-ism and thus only holds short-term sway).

Guiraud, a 5th year medical student, introduces a reception clinic, in the camp of Ginestous...because the 'official' teams did not dare to go to the camps. The reception clinic was a converted freight car."[205] In his interview with C.C.P.S., Guiraud reported that he was motivated to visit the camp of his own volition, with nothing but an understanding of "how much more this community was rejected," and a concern for the infant mortality rates of the Ginestous camp,

> since I was in the 5th year of medicine when I went, voluntarily, no one sent me there, I went to the Ginestous camp since I had already realized much more how much this community was rejected, the Gypsy population in general. And from the outset there was also a very high infant mortality compared to the national average of the time…very quickly I thought that for these questions concerning the exclusion of the Gypsies it was necessary to mobilize disciplines other than mine, medicine, and that it was necessary to mobilize other wills than mine, hence the idea of creating the NGO which called Foyer d'éducation populaire de Ginestous, then called Amitié Tsigane de Toulouse, then called A.T.S. and then C.C.P.S.[206]

Dr. Guiraud continued to lead this group until 2005, so as not to "lose" his "sense of reality," in other words, it seems his work with migrants grounded his medical career and sense of self.[207]

Dr. Guiraud oversaw and supported an extended moment of hospitality toward migrant Roma on the Toulouse University Rangueil Campus. After the fall of the Ceausescu regime in 1989 Romania, Toulouse received migrant Roma from Romania and Dr. Guiraud was part of that integration process, "at the time, the 1st major problem for them (migrant Roma) was that of their regularization, we worked a lot with the social service for aid to migrants, we worked with lawyers, we worked with Secours Catholique

[205] CCPS, "Le C.C.P.S. » pg 6, 2005, 1220W3, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.
[206] CCPS, "Mille ans d'exode, Chemin de la Plage à la Cite," pg 1, 2005, 857W93, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.
[207] CCPS, "Mille ans d'exode, Chemin de la Plage à la Cite," pg 1-2, 2005, 857W93, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.

to help their application file as asylum seekers."[208] On Rangueil campus there was a surge of hospitality toward migrant Roma from Romania, what Dr. Guiraud referred to as "benevolence," to the extent that access to housing and social support was provided by the University community,

> on the Rangeuil campus, it was surreal. They (Roma migrants) arrived just before the end of the Ceausescu era, so at a time when there was a great "optimism" of citizens for all that was aid to Romania… So great benevolence, great benevolence, to such an extent once again that we had put in place actions, relating to protection and access to care, and some actions relating to housing, they (Roma migrants) were very surrounded by the community of teachers and students on campus.[209]

This hospitality lasted two years. Even though Toulouse had a policy entrepreneur in Dr. Guiraud and a surge of hospitality in their civil society, the Metropolis failed to provide public housing options for the first wave of Romanian Roma. Dr. Guiraud described his attempt to involve state level stakeholders to re-house migrant Roma before they were evicted,

> We tried to put in place rehousing solutions, they did not arrive. I brought successive sub-prefects, at least two to the site. We had considered a somewhat lengthy relocation assistance procedure, which did not take place, and in fact it was they themselves (migrant Roma) who relocated, in the private housing sector. They had no help with social rehousing."[210]

Dr. Guiraud was an important policy entrepreneur for Toulouse beginning in the late 1960s. He established trust between prefects, local NGOs and the city, mediated between Roma families and the city and had the medical and social expertise that was necessary to provide opportunities for integration. This long-term commitment spearheaded by one person established cohesive policy frames around accommodation

[208] CCPS, "Mille ans d'exode, Chemin de la Plage à la Cite," pg 4, 2005, 857W93, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.
[209] CCPS, "Mille ans d'exode, Chemin de la Plage à la Cite," pg 11, 2005, 857W93, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.
[210] CCPS, "Mille ans d'exode, Chemin de la Plage à la Cite," pg 6, 2005, 857W93, Toulouse Municipal Archives, 2 Rue des Archives, 31500 Toulouse, France.

for “nomades” in Toulouse.[211] These older policy frames were used again when new leadership took control in 2015. Toulouse had a policy entrepreneur in Mr. Daniel Rougé who worked at the city council and echoed specific policy frames that were used by Dr. Guiraud in the 1990s in his role as NGO director.

Third Housing Policy Era (2015): Policy Divergence between Toulouse and Lille, Toulouse Pivots from Integration Village Policy and Leads Integration Policy

Toulouse

The Toulouse City Council minutes revealed that Mr. Rougé was central to the change in Roma integration policy in 2015. In the minutes, the Mayor often called upon to Mr. Rougé whenever there was a question regarding migrant Roma. Stakeholders who had worked in Toulouse on the topic of housing for migrant Roma prior to Mr. Rougé’s appointment said that with Mr. Rougé’s involvement, the integration effort was “progressed further” under his leadership[vii] They described Mr. Rougé as sincere, “Mr. Rougé, pushes for inclusion and solidarity. Inclusion—it is not a vain word for him. It's really means something.”[viii] Also his specific medical authority resonates with Toulouse’s civic legacy of “humanitarianism” policy frames. Mr. Rougé’s comfort with the “humanitarianism” policy frame could also be attributed to his medical profession. As a former hand surgeon and Dean of the University of Toulouse medical school[ix] he approaches the topic from a humanitarian and medical perspective,

> Mr. Rougé was a doctor, he did research at the university, and he was very active in humanitarianism…So he's very open minded. According to him, no one should be excluded for any reason. So you have to find a way to support the dignity of the person, to have a house, to have a job, to be able to raise a family. So he's very, very attentive to all that.[x]

[211] The use of the term “Tsiganes” or “Gypsy” can be a slur depending on the context and power-dynamics of relevant interlocutors. These terms are only used in this dissertation when quoting or referring to archival documents.

He is also interpreted as "apolitical," he is placed outside politics but has a legitimate and credible concern for integration policy. He is "'apolitical…Daniel Rougé is someone who is not a politician at all… and he is someone who is there because he is a humanist…He does not have a card in a political party. He was taken for doing good things and things that made social and health sense."[xi] While some say he is "apolitical," Mr. Rougé is heavily involved in politics as the deputy mayor in charge of social housing, solidarity policies and social affairs since 2014. Mr. Rougé has developed ties with the NGO network of Toulouse. A member of a mutual aid organization and NGO commented, "he and I are very complementary and I am really in the field, in contact with people. He is also much more in contact with institutions. But we understand each other very well. We have the same priorities."[xii] Mr. Rougé also works well with national institutions such as DIHAL, "Daniel Rougé, works very well with certain ministries. For example, the Interministerial Delegation for Accommodation, DIHAL, Sylvain Matthieu, worked with Toulouse for a long time."[xiii] While Mr. Rougé never explicitly invoked Dr. Guiraud's legacy, they both articulated a medical/humanitarian aid policy frame as the rationale for their policies. Through these policy frames they were able to advocate for specific policies at the municipal/metropolitan level while remaining "apolitical."

This evidence does not mean that in order to introduce housing policy, a doctor with a medical humanitarian perspective is necessary. I interpret this to mean that a city is more effective in introducing housing integration policy when there is an authoritative and institutionally established actor working to provide a convincing policy frame (usually with historical roots relevant to the city) to develop the political will for housing policy.

By 2015, Toulouse looked beyond the issue of migrant Roma to non-EU migrants which suggests that Toulouse policy actors began to coalesce around its housing policy for migrant Roma. A logic of appropriateness became the rationality for housing for migrant Roma and other "precarious European people living in slums," signaling that policy frames for housing for migrant Roma had become normalized.[212] By 2020, Toulouse City Council had a model of housing for migrant Roma that it wanted to apply to accommodation for non-EU migrants as well.

The citizens of Romania received full EU labor market access in January 2014, however there was not a discussion of a marked change in "flows of migrants," or how a change in administrative status and access to the labor market might affect city policy, or at least the experience of migrants. Perhaps this was because 2014 also happened to be the year that municipal elections occurred across France. At the end of 2013, Mayor Cohen described Toulouse's legal responsibility to integrate migrant Roma as, "a situation where republican law has motivated us and where we have considered that our social responsibility is to provide solutions."[213] Drawing on policy frames (which he refers to as logics) of "responsibility," "reciprocity" "respect," "humanitarianism," and "health concerns," he requested financial support for the Urban and Social Project Management (MOUS), which introduced long-term housing in comparison to the short-term integration village.

> The reception on these grounds is contractualized in a logic of responsibility, reciprocity, and respect for a certain number of principles such as the schooling of children. Support for families has been set up in a humanitarian and health framework. Despite this initial work undertaken by the City, illegal occupations

[212] Toulouse Municipal Council « Conseil Municipal Séance de vendredi 19 Octobre 2018, N3, Proces Verbal, » pg 97, 19 October 2018, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[213] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Séance du vendredi 20 september 2013 N5, » pg 33, 20 September 2013, Conseil Municipal N° 6 du 29 novembre 2013 Délibération n° 2, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.

> and the phenomenon of over-occupation in certain degraded condominiums continue to exist. In order to optimize the possibilities of integrating these families, the City must seek the means of the State within the framework of an Urban and Social Project Management (MOUS).[214]

These policy changes were too little too late for the Toulouse public and they ended up electing the center right option, Mr. Jean-Luc Moudenc in the 2014 municipal elections. This new leadership included policy entrepreneur Mr. Daniel Rougé as the third deputy mayor of Toulouse in charge of solidarity and inclusion policies in October 2013 (more on the role of policy entrepreneurs in chapter 6). Mayor Moundenc framed his position on integration relative to the center-left early on in 2015,

> …hosting for me is something other than adopting a political posture and making it an instrument of combat in the pre-election period. Welcoming has another meaning; welcoming is what we did a few weeks ago, by opening 500 rooms for the most precarious in Toulouse.[215]

Mayor Moudenc took it a step further and accused the previous administration of being "cynical," and "conducting petitions of principle, political performances and electoral postures."[216]

In 2015, on the advice of the NGO "Collectif d'Entraide et d'Innovation Sociale" (CEDIS), the city pivoted from a logic of short-term accommodation to a logic of long-term housing.[217] The city coordinated with the prefect and 13 social housing landlords

[214] Toulouse Municipal Council, »Lancement de la Maitrise D'œuvre Urbaine et Sociale (MOUS) sur la Population des ressortissants Europeens de Nationalité Roumaine et Bulgare sur la Ville de Toulouse-Demande de Subvention a L'etat, » pg 1-2, 29 November 2013, Conseil Municipal N° 6 du 29 novembre 2013 Délibération n° 22, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[215] Toulouse Métropole Council, « Proces Verbal, Conseil de la Métropole, Mardi 29 Septembre 2015, » pg 29, 29 September 2015, Toulouse Online Métropole Archives.
[216] Toulouse Métropole Council, « Proces Verbal, Conseil de la Métropole, Mardi 29 Septembre 2015, » pg 29, 29 September 2015, Toulouse Online Métropole Archives.
[217] Toulouse Municipal Council, "Dispositif d'hébergement accompagné pour les personnes en situation de précarité : modification et harmonisation du cadre normatif, » pg 1, 22 October 2021, Délibération n 1.4, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives. Toulouse Municipal Council, « Terrains et sites d'accueil gères par la ville pour les personnes en situation de précarité : modification et harmonisation du cadre normatif, » pg 1,2, 26 October 2015, Déliberation n 4.2, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.

and found 150 low-cost social housing units.[218] Eurocities, a transnational NGO, reported that in 2015, Toulouse had changed its approach from re-housing migrant Roma in integration villages to re-housing migrant Roma in housing through either the public or private market.[219] Toulouse provisioners shifted from a logic of providing "short-term housing," to a focus on long-term housing— "autonomous housing units with social support in view of assuming the rights and duties of being a tenant able to cover the cost of rent in the long term."[220]

Lille

After the 2014 municipal elections the policy rhetoric regarding housing for migrant Roma cooled down. There is a sharp decrease in policy frame references after the peak in 2014.[221] In the Lille archives, the figures with the requisite institutional longevity and coordinative influence to be a policy entrepreneur for housing policy are Mayor Pierre Mauroy and Mayor Martine Aubry. The evidence in chapter 5 demonstrates that these Mayors articulated various policy frames, but they were not successful at advocating for a policy change. Why? Because the network is an important aspect of advocacy for housing policy and there is not evidence that the Mayors in Lille had the same advocacy network that Toulouse had. Without a civil society network, it is difficult

[218] 15 cities learn from Toulouse how to support Roma to access adequate housing," 2019, Eurocities, http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/news/15-cities-learn-from-Toulouse-how-to-support-Roma-to- access-adequate-housing-WSPO-BBDLD3.
[219] 15 cities learn from Toulouse how to support Roma to access adequate housing," 2019, Eurocities, http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/news/15-cities-learn-from-Toulouse-how-to-support-Roma-to- access-adequate-housing-WSPO-BBDLD3.
[220] Toulouse Municipal Council, "Dispositif d'hébergement accompagné pour les personnes en situation de précarité : modification et harmonisation du cadre normatif, » pg 1, 22 October 2021, Délibération n 1.4, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives. Toulouse Municipal Council, « Terrains et sites d'accueil gères par la ville pour les personnes en situation de précarité : modification et harmonisation du cadre normatif, » pg 1,2, 26 October 2015, Déliberation n 4.2, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[221] From the height of 156 references in 2014 to 34 references in 2015, the next peak was 166 references in 2018.

to generate information-sharing and trust between migrants, NGO workers and city council that is necessary for housing policy.

On the other hand, in the aftermath of Sarkozy's speech, Lille had a strong policy entrepreneur who was against housing policy. Mr. Marc-Philippe Daubresse served as the Mayor of Lambersart from 1988 to 2017. He also served as the Vice-President of the Urban Community of Lille Metropole between 2001 and 2008. At the national level he had served as the Deputy Minister for Housing and Cities and the Secretary of State for Housing under Jacques Chirac between 2004 and 2005.[222] He has been a Senator since 2017.[223] He was responsible for articulating policy frames that diminished the political will for housing integration for migrant Roma.

Alternatively, one expert in Lille, located in civil society, has worked at the Sauvegarde de Nord (an NGO) for 16 years, but he is nowhere in the archive or in the newspapers. He provides necessary support and expertise but there is no evidence that he articulates convincing public policy frames to persuade political actors to adopt his policies. He would not be considered a policy entrepreneur by this study's standards.

It is unlikely that the corpus would overlook a relevant policy entrepreneur. The corpus consists of municipal and metropolitan archives (which include municipal and metropolitan policy announcements, police reports, letters and emails between departments and between citizens and the city, local and national newspaper articles, and surveys and reports produced by local NGOs), coupled with the online municipal and metropolitan archives as well as the interviews conducted with relevant NGOs and

[222] Marc Philippe Daubresse, "Biographie," National Assembly of France, accessed April 23, 2024, https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/tribun/fiches_id/1001.asp.
[223] Marc Philippe Daubresse, "Biographie," Senate of France, accessed April 23, 2024, https://www.senat.fr/senateur/daubresse_marc_philippe04008a.html.

housing and solidarity deputy mayors. Part of the qualification of being a policy entrepreneur is the ability to articulate a policy frame over time, across institutions; if this influence is not picked up by the archives, meeting minutes and interviews, then it is unlikely this overlooked actor is a policy entrepreneur.

Fourth Housing Policy Era (2017-2020): Policy Continuity, National Housing First Policy is introduced.

Toulouse

By 2018, Toulouse was moving on from integration villages and toward providing housing for other precarious groups such as non-EU migrants and refugees. By 2018, when the NGO SOLIHA asked for Toulouse City Council to provide a subsidy for them, the city council did not mention integration villages as a service that they supported.[224] In one city council meeting, Mr. Rougé commented that integrated accommodation is preferred to closed design systems, alluding to integration villages, "What is interesting in these questions is that for social inclusion, it is still much better to achieve social diversity in integrated accommodation than to do so with a much more closed design of the system..."[225] By 2018 there was only 1 integration village left in Toulouse.[226]

Furthermore, by 2018, the city council discussed the issue of EU migrant Roma less and moved on to extra-Communautaire (non-EU citizens) populations. This signaled

[224] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Presentation du vilan d'activité de l'instance Toulouse diversités-Conseil des résidents étrangers, » Conseil Municipal N° 4 du 07 décembre 2018 Délibération n° 10.4, 7 December 2018, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[225] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Conseil Municipal, Séance du vendredi 15 juin 2018, N2» pg 29, 15 June 2018, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[226] "1 integration village, 2 reception sites, 144 housing units spread over the whole of Toulouse to meet the accommodation needs of precarious migrant populations, 25 night accommodation places for the reception of women with children in the street during the winter period 2017-2018, opening of 20 night accommodation places for isolated women on the street or victims of violence for the winter period 2018-2019 (gradual start from November 2018)." Toulouse Municipal Council, « Budget Primitif 2019. Toulouse Ville Solidaire : Renforcement du Lien Social, » pg 49, 7 December 2018, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.

a normalization of integration policy for EU migrant Roma. In addition, the city acknowledged that while they could offer "precarious European people living in slums," housing options, they were not legally allowed to offer extra-Communautaire peoples the same integration options, "(t)his action falls within a field of competence quite distinct from that of the Town Hall, whose proactive approach consists of offering precarious European people living in slums accommodation for the purpose of integration."[227] However, Mr. Rougé goes on to explain how despite their status, the city will attempt to apply the "great methodology" they used to house migrant Roma to other groups.

Mr. Rougé mentions the "great methodology,"—the Toulouse model that Mr. Rougé refers to here—which resurfaces in 2019. The policy frames "mediation," "pedagogy," "diversity," "humanitarianism," "critical policymaking" and "social support," are all laid out here in this one paragraph articulated by Mr. Rougé. This is a response to the center-left asking how Mr. Rougé's administration's policies differed from theirs in the past,

> Here are the change points. Regarding the measures you had taken, we have modified the monitoring of squats, which we started as you had done, and evolved with the prefecture…This is, in my opinion, great progress and I can provide you with the facts: since we took on this issue, we have evicted 105 squats in the city of Toulouse. That doesn't mean there aren't any left, of course. On the other question of the method, where it is different, it is that, concerning precarious European nationals, we have used methods of temporary emergency accommodation, with social support to bring about the integration of people who go to social housing. But this accommodation is integrated, it is not a camp or an integration village, like that of Grynfogel, even if the results of Grynfogel are very interesting. The great methodology is the mobilization of assets of the City and of the Metropolis, but also, and the efforts of the City also for this purpose, and also the great mobilization of social landlords in this question. An enormous amount of mobilization of social landlords on this issue, who have, by the method, been

[227] Toulouse Municipal Council « Conseil Municipal Séance de vendredi 19 Octobre 2018, N3, Proces Verbal, » pg 97, 19 October 2018, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.

> secured in the use of their property, for which neighborhood issues do not cause major problems.[228]

Mr. Rougé is a policy entrepreneur because he effectively uses policy frames to provide context and build support for his policy decisions. The integration policies for migrant Roma are referred to as a "model," for the integration of other groups. Mr. Rougé explained to a local newspaper that "after four years of experimentation, I am convinced that we cannot lift someone out of great poverty if we do not give them a real home and basic security, without which an integration project is doomed to failure or will be difficult."[229]

In 2019, the center-right government still referenced its "accommodation project" for "precarious European nationals," that was founded by the "principle of inclusion when people have the right to stay."[230] Mr. Daniel Rougé identified that one of the most valuable aspects of the accommodation project was the "interlayer culture," the NGO network, civil society, or the group of organizations that mediate the relationship between residents and their local government.[231]And finally, he re-emphasized Toulouse's reliance on the integration model which was developed through the accommodation of precarious European nationals, which includes EU migrant Roma, "We are also going to do the same thing, in the same proportions, for refugees, according to the model of social inclusion through work as we have done for precarious European nationals."[232]

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[228] Toulouse Municipal Council « Conseil Municipal Séance de vendredi 10 Mars 2017, N1, Procès Verbal, » pg 49, 10 March 2017, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[229] Frederic Dessort, "A Toulouse, l'insertion des Roms passe par les toits, » 2019, Libération.
[230] Toulouse Municipal Council « Conseil Municipal, Séance du vendredi 14 juin 2019 Procès Verbal N3,» pg 33, 14 June 2019, Toulouse Online Municipal Archives.
[231] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Conseil Municipal, Séance du vendredi 14 Juin 2019 Proces Verbal, N3» pg 33, 14 June 2019, Toulouse Municipal Online Archive.
[232] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Conseil Municipal, Séance du vendredi 14 Juin 2019 Proces Verbal, N3» pg 33, 14 June 2019, Toulouse Municipal Online Archive.

In a 2019 city council meeting Mr. Rougé explicitly referred to Toulouse's efforts to house migrant Roma and other European nationals as the "Toulouse method," "a model for the reduction of camps, with social inclusion through integrated accommodation, known as the 'Toulouse method.'"[233] Toulouse paired up with DIHAL and "imposed it largely in France for about half of the territory for precarious European nationals and refugees."[234] Lastly, Mr. Rougé described the values that drive the model for housing efforts for precarious European nationals that they had been proposing since 2014: "'laudato si' means to welcome, protect, promote and integrate."[235] Here Mr. Rougé refers to a defining ethos of the Catholic Laudato Si' Movement. Pope Francis defined Laudato Si in May 2015 as "care for the natural environment and all people, as well as broader questions of the relationship between God, humans and the Earth."[236] Cecilia Dall'Oglio, associate director of European programs of the Laudato si'Movement, summarized it's meaning as "hospitality expressed through a mission of dialogue, a commitment to build a shelter for others."[237] Mr. Rougé had the skill to introduce a new policy frame into the debate, one with historical foundations and religious significance for the city.[238]

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[233] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Conseil Municipal, Séance du vendredi 10 Juillet 2020 N4, » pg 24, 10 July 2020, Toulouse Municipal Online Archive.
[234] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Conseil Municipal, Séance du vendredi 10 Juillet 2020 N4, » pg 24, 10 July 2020, Toulouse Municipal Online Archive.
[235] Toulouse Municipal Council, « Conseil Municipal, Séance du vendredi 10 Juillet 2020 N4, » pg 24-25, 10 July 2020, Toulouse Municipal Online Archive.
[236] Giada Aquilino, "Season of Creation 2021 : A focus on Dialogue through Hospitality, » 31 August 2021, Vatican News, https://www.vaticannews.va/en/church/news/2021-08/season-of-creation-2021-a-focus-on-dialogue-through-hospitality.html
[237] Giada Aquilino, "Season of Creation 2021 : A focus on Dialogue through Hospitality, » 31 August 2021, Vatican News, https://www.vaticannews.va/en/church/news/2021-08/season-of-creation-2021-a-focus-on-dialogue-through-hospitality.html
[238] But Laudato Si' has deeper meaning beyond Pope Francis' use of it in the Laudato Si' Movement in 2015. Laudato Si' is the opening phrase of the thirteenth century canticle of St. Francis of Assisi, The Canticle of the Creatures.

Lille

By 2017, Lille and the rest of France, appeared to move on from a strategy of integration villages to long-term housing through the national housing first strategy, "in September 2017, the government launched a National 'Housing First' Plan on the observation that direct access to housing, or staying in housing, with support, are generally better suited to people and less costly for the community, as emergency accommodation."[239]

By 2017, Lille had moved on from the integration policy to the Housing First policy. However, in Lille the more radical left and right wing parties—such as the Greens and National Rally party—were more vocal in city council meeting minutes than in Toulouse, suggesting this policy debate was not as settled. Beginning in 2017 and continuing through 2020, Lille's two centrist parties were in policy alignment, while the more extreme right and left parties took this opportunity to ramp up their ideological discourse. In 2017, the vitriol of the far-right was still reaching new heights. Opponents of a long-term housing policy claimed that the "proactive policy" that the Metropolis implemented in 2008 was a threat to non-Roma residents. They claimed the structure of the Metropolis itself was to blame because it introduced an unfair power dynamic between the Metropolis and individual municipalities and that in response the Mayors needed their own "lever[s] for action."[240] The National Rally representative argued the

[239] Lille Metropole « Plan National 'Logement d'abord'- Mise en œuvre acceleree sur le territoire de la MEL- Actions 2018, » Pg 1, 19 October 2018, Lille Metropole Online Archives.
[240] Lille Metropole, « Conseil de la Métropole Européenne de Lille, » pg 80, 19 October 2017, Lille Metropole Online Archives.

Metropolis threatens the "rights" of its residents and "go[es] against the will of the metropolitans who suffer" from the "pro-immigration policy of its leaders."[241]

> The municipality is still a scale that allowed citizens to have control over their direct environment, over their daily life, but what will it be tomorrow? Their interlocutor, namely the mayor of the town, will no longer be anything more than the legal representative of a community but without any lever for action. What better example than the dilemma of rest areas for travelers, and particularly the care of the Roma population, to demonstrate that this PLU can be set up without Metropolitan residents? The policy that you conduct in the metropolis for the reception of Roma populations goes against the will of the metropolitans who suffer in all its forms from the pro-immigration policy of its leaders.[242]

At this point housing policies had been distilled into pro versus anti-immigration policies. This representative went on to articulate policy frames such as "meritocracy," or "duty," and to question whether the EU citizenship of migrants even matters,

> They are European, so they have rights on our territory? Have we ever spoken once of the duties that this kind of privilege should automatically oppose? Never! On the other hand, we oblige the French vis-à-vis them and impose these populations while the vast majority of the French would like us to take care of the distress of our own people above all.[243]

In 2020, there was a "green wave," across France as the Greens (Ecologiste) party won more representation. The ecologists asked the center-left party to take more action to find housing for migrant Roma before they were evicted from informal camps,

> Allow me to come back to the eviction of the Roma camp last week on Napoleon road in Hellemmes at the request of the Metropolitan government. Let's start perhaps by no longer reproducing this kind of episode in which the housing pathways were not prepared in advance with the people concerned. Let us respect the dignity of these people as much as possible.[244]

[241] Lille Metropole, « Conseil de la Métropole Européenne de Lille, » pg 80, 19 October 2017, Lille Metropole Online Archives.
[242] Lille Metropole, « Conseil de la Métropole Européenne de Lille, » pg 80, 19 October 2017, Lille Metropole Online Archives.
[243] Lille Metropole, « Conseil de la Métropole Européenne de Lille, » pg 80, 19 October 2017, Lille Metropole Online Archives.
[244] Lille Metropole, « Strategie National de Prevention et de Lutte Contre la Pauvrete- Demarche de Contractualisation entre L'etat et la MEL et Prefiguration pour 2020, » pg 69, 16 October 2020, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

By 2020, the city mentioned integration villages only alongside other "mechanisms for access to housing,"

> …mobilizing its sovereign functions alongside social policies of integration and access to housing. It will involve both the activation of mechanisms for access to housing (e.g. housing first) but also the construction of temporary reception structures such as SAS or integration villages.[245]

The emergence of more ideologically extreme parties such as the Greens and the National Rally started to introduce more polarizing policy frames and debates regarding integration, such as the issue of "municipal autonomy" discussed above by the National Rally representative. Unlike in Toulouse, the debate over housing for migrant Roma was never normalized. Instead in Lille the debate became further polarized.

Conclusion

The policy entrepreneur, Dr. Guiraud was heavily involved in Toulouse in the 1990s and articulated specific policy frames for Roma which developed Toulouse's civic legacy for housing policy. In Lille, 2007 was the beginning of policy frame development for migrant Roma with the introduction of integration village. By 2014, Toulouse had a prominent policy entrepreneur in Mr. Rougé who articulated policy frames which helped develop political will for long-term housing policy. Lille did not have a similar policy entrepreneur in support of long-term housing policy for migrant Roma in 2014. Toulouse's civic legacy was re-activated in 2015 when a policy entrepreneur (Mr. Daniel Rougé) used historical policy frames (such as a humanitarian frame) to redefine the issue of housing and generated the political will to introduce new housing policy. Meanwhile, while Lille had developed an important network and policy frames by 2015, they were newer than Toulouse's, and Lille did not have necessary contemporary policy

[245] Lille Metropole, « Strategie National de Prevention et de Lutte Contre la Pauvrete- Demarche de Contractualisation entre L'etat et la MEL et Prefiguration pour 2020, » pg 3, 16 October 2020, Lille Métropole Archives, 2 Rue de l'Europe, 59320 Sequedin, France.

entrepreneur to make the pivot in 2014, instead national policy drove policy change in Lille in 2017.

In Toulouse there was a history of individuals who directed the NGOs which established the trust, mediation and expertise that provided accommodation options. One individual, Dr. Guiraud ran a pivotal organization for nearly 30 years between 1971-1998. The 2015 policy pivot from short to long-term housing policy was spearheaded by a policy entrepreneur, Mr. Daniel Rougé. Lille, on the other hand, did not have a historical policy entrepreneur with similar institutional longevity, or a policy entrepreneur to change policy in 2015.

In Lille, while the Mayors Pierre Mauroy and Martine Aubry were vocal mayors who could be considered policy entrepreneurs, neither launched persuasive policy arguments to convince political opposition, other mayors and NGOs. Furthermore, policy entrepreneur, Mr. Marc-Philippe Daubresse, was heavily involved in multiple Lille political institutions as well as national institutions and was not interested in developing political will for EU migrant Roma housing. This evidence supports the argument that in Lille, with a delayed civic legacy and without a policy entrepreneur to develop the political will for housing, there was no independent policy change away from integration villages toward integrated long-term housing with social support. Therefore, Toulouse was able to independently lead policy change toward long-term housing while Lille followed national policy later on. In this way, the strong civic legacy of NGOs, policy entrepreneurs and policy frames influenced housing policy for migrant Roma in 2015 in Toulouse.

Chapter 7. Conclusion

With this dissertation, I make several contributions. Firstly, a contribution to knowledge regarding the importance and influence of civic legacies. An inquiry into civic legacies captures more than a focus on policy feedback loops or path dependence provides. An inquiry into civic legacies is an inquiry into the potential for policy *change* and *transformation*, which is different from the process of continuity that path dependency suggests. The theoretical motivation is to understand how civic legacies—including policy frames, networks and entrepreneurs—could shape contemporary integration policies of a city and sets precedent for some cities to lead while others follow in their housing policy for stigmatized groups. This dissertation suggests that the whole of a civic legacy is greater than the sum of its parts, in this case policies, policy frames and NGO mobilization. Furthermore, the civic legacy of a city can influence policy in a way that a national-level legacy might not.

With this dissertation, I also demonstrate how to collect evidence and devise theory when evidence is not readily available online or otherwise. My first step was to immerse myself in interpretivist methodologies and explore other ways of collecting evidence. I searched for cases where evidence on this group was successfully collected and analyzed. After this, I was able to find evidence for civic legacies in multiple cities regarding policies for a group that societies have historically undercounted, overlooked and actively excluded. When I first approached this research topic, the most common response I received from non-Roma academics was that this would be a difficult topic to study for myriad reasons. First, the historical racism against this group results in inaccurate data collection. For example, I knew that most social science scholars would

want statistics on the number of migrant Roma in a city in order to do a direct comparison. However, comparable numbers are not available. When they are available, they are tracked only recently, say, within the last 10 years. And finally, the definition of the group changes so much that often the numbers are not direct apples to apples comparisons, so to provide numbers would be more of a slight of hand than useful information. But instead of giving up and changing topic, I used teachings from interpretivism and tried to find unconventional types of evidence to address my question: what are the various ways in which cities have provided housing for migrant Roma over time? So, I put myself on the ground and found the evidence in the archives. What this evidence consisted of was not statistics on the numbers of families year by year, city by city, but instead a fractured record of policy-makers and NGOs mentioning the Roma over time. This dissertation models how to create a cohesive historical narrative of integration policy for a group, particularly when the historical record of a people seems sparse. This is one of the greatest contributions of this dissertation; to provide a model of how to collect and present evidence that others say is not easily collected, analyzed and conveyed.

Third, my dissertation uses civic legacy theory to emphasize how history bears on and presents opportunities for housing at the urban level. This topic is not merely a theoretical inquiry. In recent history, cities have tried to provide adequate housing for migrant Roma families for at least the past 30 years, in earnest since the COVID-19 pandemic. Beginning with the 2014 “refugee crisis,” the integration of stigmatized groups has flummoxed city governments and was only exacerbated with the COVID-19 pandemic. But also, since racism is such a strong and obviously present explanation for

policies concerning migrant Roma, it is often the only explanation explored in policy analysis. This dissertation on the other hand is focused on real *opportunities* for integration policy, not only theoretical challenges and "problems."

Lastly, I only know of one other (very well done) dissertation manuscript in Political Science that was focused on the Roma and still the case of the Roma serves as one case of three cases (Buzas 2014). With my focus on service provisioning for this one group, I have demonstrated that focusing solely on one group does not have to be a methodological problem but an opportunity to explore how governments represent and interact with in-group diversity and how multiple city-governments differently engage with the "same" group. These are the myriad contributions of the work.

An important question that one may be asking is: where are the Roma in this story? Where is Roma voice? I conducted 11 interviews with migrant Roma families.[246] However, from a methodological perspective I was not comfortable including my interviews because I did not conduct enough interviews to achieve generalizability. On the other hand, I did end up with enough archival evidence for generalizability, so I followed the evidence, as I explained above. Additionally, there is *already* a lot of important work on housing for Roma that has been authored or published by people with Roma backgrounds.[247] But in none of these will you find an analysis of urban housing

[246] While I conducted 11 interviews there were often several family/friend members present at each interview.

[247] Here are some papers published in Roma academic journals that consider preferable or desirable housing and housing policies for Roma (Cittadini, Critical Romani Studies, 2019) Here are some publications written by Roma considering integration policy for Roma (Rostas, 2019). The journal Critical Romani Studies has been publishing important work on Roma-related topics including integration since 2018. Here are some publications written by Roma considering racism toward Roma in Europe and the U.S. (Kocze 2018; McGarry 2017, Picker 2018, Acton 2016, End 2012, Sergio et al 2017; Matache 2020). There are also very good publications written by non-Roma that consider Roma integration in France and Roma Racism in France and the EU (Buzas 2017; Sardelic 2019; Sigona and Vermeersch 2012; Van Baar; Kostka 2015, Silver 2019, Van Baar 2014, Manca & Vergnano from Magazzini and Piemontese 2019,

policies for migrant Roma over the last 30 years in France. So, while political science as a discipline may find the subject matter of this dissertation myopic, this dissertation contains novel insights that concerns the largest minority in Europe.

I would like to suggest that asking the question, "well what type of accommodation styles do migrant Roma want?" is not as useful as one would hope. Even though it is well intended, asking about housing preferences for migrant Roma would unfortunately, not change the reality of housing for migrant Roma. Firstly, because what migrant Roma *wanted/want* is heterogenous and would require another dissertation to adequately explore. Even within cities, families want different things, and within families individuals prefer different types of housing. In my interviews, I did not get a sense that the migrants in Lille v. Toulouse were different on average in their preferences. I *did* get the sense that no matter the preferences of the families and individuals, the realistic options for most of these families is to accept whatever help from the NGOs or leave/get evicted from their encampments by the state. Secondly, the more I spoke with families, the more I understood that—very simply—migrant Roma families want what all families want: a stable housing situation, an income, healthcare and oftentimes nearby education options for their children. Some families want to make money and send it back to their homes abroad. This is their prerogative. It informs some decision-making of course, but to focus too much on this question "well, what do migrant Roma want," risks essentializing and "othering" migrant Roma preferences and gets in the way of investigating what cities *can do* to welcome this group. So, for readers interested in

Kostka 2015, Chapter 3 of Triandafyllidou and Spencer 2020; Chauvin and Garcés-Mascarñas, Vermeersch 2012, Vermeersch 2012, Guy, 2003; Molnar Diop, 2013, Vašečka & Vašečka, 2003, Benedik, 2010, Kóczé & Trehan, 2009, Kocze 2018, 460).

furthering their understanding of housing integration process and policy for migrant Roma, written by people with Roma and non-Roma backgrounds, I encourage you to do the research into the large literature on integration policies for the heterogenous Roma people.[248] Below, I restate the specific arguments and findings laid out by chapters 1-6.

The role of civic legacies is not the only explanation for housing policy for migrant Roma. The roles of racist attitudes and institutions, educational attainment, political representation, political culture, and economics do matter for housing policy for migrant Roma. But the role of civic legacies must be considered because it emphasizes the historical role that civic society, including NGOs, policy entrepreneurs and their public policy ideologies, plays in shaping integration policies. The role of civic legacies contributes more than a historical illustrative account, it is a theory regarding how the history of civic engagement in a place, in this case a city, shapes the potential for future integration policies.

Therefore, why did Toulouse emerge as a leader and Lille a follower regarding housing policy for EU migrant Roma? The evidence suggests that Toulouse developed a civic legacy in the 1990s which allowed its city council to autonomously pivot away from one housing policy to another in 2015, while Lille's civic legacy was developed in 2007 and lacked a policy entrepreneur, thus Lille did not change its policy until there was a

[248] Cittadini (2019) published a paper specifically on housing policy and human rights for Roma in the *Critical Romani Studies* journal. For work that considers integration policy for Roma please refer to Rostas (2019). The following are publications written by Roma considering racism toward Roma in Europe and the U.S. (Kocze 2018; McGarry 2017, Picker 2018, Acton 2016, End 2012, Sergio et al 2017; Matache 2020). There are also very good publications written by non-Roma that consider Roma integration in France and Roma Racism in France and the EU (Buzas 2017; Sardelic 2019; Sigona and Vermeersch 2012; Van Baar; Kostka 2015, Silver 2019, Van Baar 2014, Manca & Vergnano from Magazzini and Piemontese 2019, Kostka 2015, Chapter 3 of Triandafyllidou and Spencer 2020; Chauvin and Garcés-Mascarñas, Vermeersch 2012, Vermeersch 2012, Guy, 2003; Molnar Diop, 2013, Vašečka & Vašečka, 2003, Benedik, 2010, Kóczé & Trehan, 2009, Kocze 2018, 460).

national level change in policy. Therefore, to return to the research question, how do civic legacies shape contemporary housing policy for EU migrant Roma? This dissertation finds evidence that civic legacies—networks, policy frames and policy entrepreneurs—developed in previous integration efforts shape housing policy. Thus, the legacy of local NGO networks, and specific policy frames used by policy entrepreneurs can result in independent policy change (in the case of Toulouse) while the absence of a developed NGO network, policy frames and a policy entrepreneur that can activate this legacy results in delayed policy change through other avenues such as national level policy (in the case of Lille). However, civic legacies are a necessary condition, they are not sufficient for policy change. I find that the role of one policy entrepreneur in Toulouse was indispensable. Without the influence of the policy entrepreneur, Mr. Daniel Rougé, it is unclear whether the presence of a civic legacy would be enough to result in policy change.

This dissertation presents evidence that Toulouse developed networks during the integration of migrant Roma in the 1990s which set a precedent for its city council to shape new housing policy in 2015 and empowered it to emerge as a leader in housing policy for migrant Roma. Chapter four described how the vanguard group in Toulouse, ATS, had the institutional power to advocate for migrant Roma in 2015 based on its historical experience with integration in 1990. This role of this network was to generate the information and trust between the target group, social workers and city council that is necessary for housing policy. The civic legacy of this network that was established by ATS in 1990 during re-housing efforts was activated again when new leadership took control in 2015. This network was able to hold local political actors accountable, give

voice to migrant concerns and advocate for certain policies over others. Whereas Lille lacked a strong vanguard group like CCPS in Toulouse with an institutional legacy developed over decades that could solidify the necessary connections, trust, mediation and expertise between civil society organizations, migrant Roma families and city council. A network was developed later in 2007 when the civil society network supported migrant Roma families in their move from encampments to integration villages. However, this network did not have the historical legacy like the one developed in Toulouse. Without a robust civic legacy, Lille did not change its policy from integration villages until there was a national level change in policy in 2017. Instead, policy change in Lille was lead by national policy and EU funding opportunities.

Then chapter 5 and 6 described the roles of policy frames and policy entrepreneurs. The historic policy frames developed by NGOs and policy entrepreneurs during previous integration attempts establishes a repertoire of policy frames which potentially resonate with a city in future. In Toulouse, policy entrepreneurs emphasized the humanitarian policy frame which had historical roots, while in Lille the present policy frames did not persuade multiple stakeholders (predominately municipal mayors, prefects and political opposition) to change policy. In Toulouse, the policy entrepreneur was able to coordinate policy change across the metropolis. In this way, the history of cities' experience with integration—the policy frames, NGO networks and policy entrepreneurs—does matter in current integration processes.

Practical and Theoretical Implications

The practical policy significance of these findings provides incentives for city councils to research their own civic legacies regarding integration to achieve a better understanding of how their past integration policies may influence present and future

integration policies. The theoretical significance of this project demonstrates how historical civic legacies influence integration policy. In this way this dissertation will contribute to migrant integration studies most directly; however, this project has implications for integration policies introduced by cities for marginalized groups more broadly, in addition to migrant groups, such as formerly incarcerated, autochthonous, and unhoused individuals.

The policy frames that contextualize and categorize marginalized migrant groups (which include stereotypes, biases etc.) are well understood within the literature. However, policy frames (both historic and contemporary) regarding service provisioning such as housing, healthcare, education and employment opportunities are equally important for academics to focus on. Without an understanding of how cities frame housing policy, policy analysts are missing half of the picture when it comes to welfare policy. This could lead to the incorrect assumption that cities introduce objective policy options that are not influenced by policy frames. Or that policy frames are generated out of thin air, instead of through the development of civic legacies. Ultimately, this new consideration provides city leadership with more agency and responsibility regarding policy development and implementation, and a greater appreciation for its own civic legacy.

While this dissertation analyzes housing for EU migrant Roma in specific cities in democratic societies, this project has portability to other cases. This dissertation interrogated housing integration policy for EU migrant Roma in select cities in France. However, non-Roma Europeans harbor some of the highest levels of prejudice and

racism toward Roma.[249] Furthermore, Roma are the largest minority in Europe and live in *every* country in Western Europe in addition to Canada and the United States. Therefore, this is a policy question regarding a group in diaspora across the world who have been historically discriminated and persecuted. In this way, this specific policy question applies to many contemporary societies. Migrants are not the only group subject to a government-supported integration process. Formerly incarcerated, unhoused and autochthonous individuals are also subject to governance policies that are heavily influenced by civic legacies.[250] In this way, this project has theoretical implications even beyond the field of migrant integration and housing and applies to service provisioning during (re)integration processes of marginalized groups generally.

[249] https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2014/05/12/chapter-4-views-of-roma-muslims-jews/

[250] While there are comparisons between the types of social exclusion and prejudice that Roma and formerly incarcerated, indigenous and unhoused people face, it is still important to make distinctions between what a government's responsibility is to each group. For example, governments may owe an apology, acknowledgment, reconciliation, and/or reparation, in addition to integration processes to the formerly incarcerated, indigenous and unhoused people in certain conditions. Acknowledgement and reconciliation processes may not be necessary for all migrant groups, it depends on the history of the group in that country and/or city. In some cases though, scholars such as Dr. Margareta Matache and Dr. Jacqueline Bhabha recommend programs for reparatory justice that go beyond truth-telling and apology to include offender accountability, restitution, reparative compensation and new and stronger legal protection for Roma populations that have endured historical and/or enduring injustices. Lauritzen, Solvor Mjøberg. "The Wrongs and Harms of a Roma Register in Norway." *Al Jazeera*, Opinions section, 2024

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[i] Respondent #1. 2020. Interview by Author over Zoom. Chicago.
[ii] Respondent #1. 2020. Interview by Author over Zoom. Chicago.
[iii] Respondent #2. 2020. Interviewed by Author over Zoom. Louisville.
[iv] Respondent #2. 2020. Interviewed by Author over Zoom. Louisville.
[v] Respondent #2. 2020. Interviewed by Author over Zoom. Louisville.
[vi] Respondent #3. 2021. Interviewed by Author in person. Lille.
[vii] Respondent #4. 2021. Interviewed by Author over Zoom. Louisville.
[viii] Respondent #4. 2021. Interviewed by Author over Zoom. Louisville.
[ix] Respondent #2. 2020. Interviewed by Author over Zoom. Louisville.
[x] Respondent #4. 2021. Interviewed by Author over Zoom. Louisville.
[xi] Respondent #2. 2020. Interviewed by Author over Zoom. Louisville.
[xii] Respondent #2. 2020. Interviewed by Author over Zoom. Louisville.

[xiii] Respondent #2. 2020. Interviewed by Author over Zoom. Louisville.