

## THE ELEANOR ROOSEVELT PROGRAM

April 23, 1951

Description: In the opening segment, ER and Elliott Roosevelt respond to a listener's question about the funding for the United Nations and the UN's spending habits. In the interview segment, ER's guest is Cord Meyer, Jr., chairman of the Policy Committee of the United World Federalists.

Participants: Eleanor Roosevelt, Elliott Roosevelt, Cord Meyer, Jr.

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[ER:] This is Eleanor Roosevelt speaking. Elliott and I are very happy to be able to bring you this program each day from my living room here in the Park Sheraton Hotel in New York City. I hope you'll find the program we've planned for today an interesting one. Elliott, will you tell us about it, please?

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Yes, I'd like to. The United World Federalists have a definite recommendation which will improve world conditions, they believe. We're going to have this recommendation outlined for us today by Cord Meyer, Jr., honorary president and chairman of the Policy Committee of the United World Federalists. Mrs. Roosevelt will introduce Mr. Meyer a little later on in the program, but while we're on the subject of recommendations for the UN, there's one in our mail today having to do with how the UN is spending its money. We'll come back to the mail as soon as we've heard from our sponsors, who make this recorded program possible.

(01:05-01:15)

[Elliott Roosevelt:] In today's mail a listener asks that we read excerpts from a recent uh *New York World Telegram* and *Sun* editorial entitled "Spend Thrift UN." Here it is: "When it comes wasting American taxpayers' dollars, the United Nations appears to be doing as thorough a job as the federal government. When the UN was founded, it was generously agreed for the US taxpayers that they pick up uh 40 percent of the tab for operating the big organization. The Russian bloc, with its six votes to our one, was let off with a 10 percent nick. Now, it turns out American taxpayers have been footing the bill for some 57 percent of the total cost. That's because other members, including the Soviet group, have been renegeing and Uncle Sam -- grand Uncle Sap--" it's called in this editorial--"grandly makes up for their shortages. This country is more than half supporting an expensive staff of 9,790 men and women, most of them brought here from other countries. Their upkeep accounts for 65 percent of the UN's big and growing budget. They've got 723 projects underway, many of them academic rather than practical. For instance, such studies as the effect of chewing the coca leaf, the market for Uruguayan wool, translations of great books, and a comparative study of civilizations. My questions are: Should the United States continue footing a major portion of the UN bill indefinitely? While it's still uncertain whether the UN can solve an actual peace or war problem, shouldn't some of the less critical goals be postponed? And uh shouldn't some of--some kind of reprisals be demanded of those who are not meeting the financial responsibilities they agreed to meet?

[ER:] I think every effort is made to get uh nations to pay their share. Russia's share was uh made higher in the last session of the UN. It is true that the United States has carried a very disproportionate share.

(03:55)

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Let me go back a second, though, and interrupt you, if you don't mind. Uh you said that Russia's share was raised in the last session. You mean above 10 percent?

[ER:] Yes.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Uh had she been meeting her 10 percent up to that time?

[ER:] I think she's met her expenses. She does not belong to good many--uh in fact, I don't know whether she belongs to any of the specialized agencies which have separate budgets. But I think Russia has met her-her quota um up to the present time. Of course, I haven't gone over the list because nations--um it is published, you know, at different times um whether they are in arrears or not. Um I did not imagine that she was in arrears but she may be. Um it would not be extraordinary because South American countries, great many of them, are in arrears. Um of course, when you say that she has one vote--she has six votes to our one, you must remember that she always says that we have um all the South American votes, and that, as a matter of uh fact, she claims that um we have uh twenty-one votes as against her six. [Elliott Roosevelt: Does she--just is thinking the Western Hemisphere?] Now, that is not--Yes -- That is not true, um but uh to some extent there is a germ of truth in it because we do have some support--

[ER and Elliott Roosevelt overlap]

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Can you see what would happen though if uh Russia were to succeed in persuading us that we would represent the UN, uh Costa Rica, Cuba , and Mexico, and uh Canada, and that we'd just have one vote for all of those countries? Can't you see what those countries would do?

[ER:] I can well see what those countries would do, and what the USSR says is utterly silly, because if she would just analyze the vote, she would see how often they disagree and that what she has claimed is nonsense. But um that is uh her claim. And also one of the very most amusing things I know is to watch her face when New Zealand, for instance, votes against the United Kingdom. Um her [Elliott Roosevelt: Uh-huh.] delegates just can't understand how the United Kingdom permits a wretched little mite like New Zealand to be voting [Elliott Roosevelt laughs] against it. But um not only do they vote against, but they usually have very forthright spokesmen. Sir Carl Berendsen is some gentleman for stating his mind and [Elliott Roosevelt: Uh-huh.] and um--but that, of course, is something the USSR doesn't understand.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] All right, well now, then we-we take this edit-- [ER: But now on the 40 percent--] wait, no, wait a minute now, let me get back to this. [ER laughs: All right.] Uh then this editorial, uh while you're not exactly sure, uh is in-in fact in error that the Soviet Union itself uh is not uh behind on its payments.

[ER:] I wouldn't say it wasn't behind, but I would say that it always paid when it was uh-uh -- it wasn't more behind than some of the others.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] You mean it wasn't as far behind as some of our friends [ER: Yes.] in our so-called bloc of votes. [ER: Yes.] [Elliott Roosevelt laughs] All right, well then that-that uh explains why, uh to a certain extent, we're not pressing for an immediate payment by the--some of the [ER: Oh, every--] Soviet bloc.

[ER:] Oh goodness, we press all the time. They're published each time, [Elliott Roosevelt: Uh-huh.] and demands are made on them. Now, as a matter of fact, uh in the Secretariat, among the people employed, there are more Americans um than there are all the other nations combined. [Elliott Roosevelt: There are.] Employees.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Uh I think that point should be brought out and clarified in answering this editorial. Now, in the--to go on to what you have wanted to talk to us about the 40 percent, which turned out be to

57 percent, according to this editorial, uh and uh has now grown to be even greater because we are making up the shortages of the unpaid bills to the other nations.

[ER:] Well, as a matter of fact, we really don't. Um [ER coughs] I-[ER coughs] I think what he must be talking about is loans um that-that we've made perhaps on the new building or something of that sort, because I don't think any nation is assessed for other nations. Now, it may be that we have agreed in certain individual cases to give more. That I don't know.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Well, I think he-he-now--y-you're now getting down to the specialized agencies like UNESCO [ER: Hm.] where probably we do contribute [ER: I think very likely.] disproportionately there to the operations of UNESCO.

[ER:] I think very likely we do. But we do contribute. There's no question. We contribute more than any other nation. The reason has always been uh that the assessment uh is on the basis of your national income. [Elliott Roosevelt coughs] And our national income is so much higher uh that um that naturally puts us in a- in a high--[Elliott Roosevelt: That raises--] We talk and talk and talk about the fact that it was very bad within the United Nations. I'm not on the budget committee, nor am I on the finance committee, so that's why I'm not uh able to give you concrete facts [Elliott Roosevelt: Mhm.], but I remember the long arguments about the inadvisability of any one nation providing [Elliott Roosevelt: More.] so much more and trying to get down to--I think it's 33 and a half percent or some such thing and which is considered a more just proportion um as regards uh other nations, but--

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Well, I-I see we've got just a very few uh minutes left, so I'd like to ask you to-to answer this other question: "While it's still uncertain whether the UN can solve an actual peace or war problem, shouldn't some of the less critical goals be postponed?" as quoted in this--

[ER:] Well, he named things that he felt were useless. Now, that book proposition, the translating of the great books [Elliott Roosevelt: Translation of great books.] is being done in UNESCO and not in the United Nations proper, and is one of the things that is considered the most important in the world today, a [Elliott Roosevelt: 'Cause that leads to greater understanding between the nations of the different--] understanding between the nations. And one of the other things I've thou--

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Well, he said the effect of chewing the coca leaf. (10:57)

[ER:] Well, that's very important. [Elliott Roosevelt: Why?] It's one of the very important things because there are parts of this world where the chewing of the coca leaf is one of the most detrimental things to the people's health, and um it's--[Elliott Roosevelt: To th--uh a great many millions of people.] Yes. And it's extremely difficult uh to control it because the people are hungry, and they do it to deaden the hunger, and it makes them unable to work [Elliott Roosevelt: All right.] and to do things. So it's one of the very important things [Elliott Roosevelt: Well, you certainly are--] because it spread to great many people.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] You certainly are blowing up this gentleman who wrote this editorial. Uh what about the uh the market for Uruguayan wool?

[ER:] Well now, that I don't happen to know, but I imagine Uruguay requires a market for her wool. I imagine that the study is being made of the types of the wool in different parts of the world and that that is a general economic uh study, uh which is valuable, um and maybe helpful. I don't know about that.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] Well, I think that all economic uh problems must be studied if the UN is to succeed at all. Now I-[ER: Well, it would seem so to me.] I uh am afraid that our time has run out, so we'll have to

bring this discussion to a close. I feel that it has been very clarifying, though, uh and uh as against the uh quite evident use by the editorial of uh s-subjects which they had not looked into themselves.

[ER:] Oh, I think they probably had looked into them, but you can always use things to prove the point you wish to make.

[Elliott Roosevelt:] You're right. [Elliott Roosevelt laughs]

(Break 12:36-12:45)

[ER:] On one of my programs during February, Elliott and I discussed a letter from a listener involving the United World Federalists. I think it's only fair to say that I apparently um, either in that interview or in a column, [ER coughs] gave the impression and uh which I had not intended to give, that the United World Federalists believed in certain things they don't believe in. So uh as a result, I've had a great many letters, and um uh several people have come to see me to explain to me what was evidently uh the ignorance that I displayed. So I'm very happy that Mr. Cord Meyer, Jr., the honorary president and chairman of the Policy Committee of the United World Federalists, has consented to be my guest today to further discuss this plan. It gives me great pleasure to introduce to you Mr. Meyer.

[Cord Meyer:] Mrs. Roosevelt, I'm very glad to have this chance.

[ER:] Well now, please, Mr. Meyer. Would you explain to our listeners what the basic principles of the United World Federalists are?

[Cord Meyer:] Well, Mrs. Roosevelt, we support, as a defensive necessity in the world as it is today, the rebuilding of America's military strength. We also support, and will continue to do so, the constructive work done by the United Nations in many fields. And we do believe that the US, at the same time that it rearms, should take the lead in proposing a fundamental strengthening and reconstruction of the UN. We believe that the present arms race will wreck living standards everywhere in the world and finally explode in a third world war unless competitive national armaments can be replaced with the UN having a preponderantly powerful international police force and the authority under established yor--laws to use that force to enforce disarmament and prevent aggression. We feel that once that kind of enforced disarmament has been achieved, the resources that are now wasted in the arms race can be devoted to raising living standards and improving the economic welfare of the peoples throughout the world. (14:58)

[ER:] Well now, what sort of additional powers and authority do you think the United Nations uh should have in order to be able to end present-present armament competition?

[Cord Meyer:] Well, I think that President Truman, uh on October 24 before the UN General Assembly, spelled out, uh in general terms, the line that we think we should move in. He called for general disarmament on the part of all nations down to the level of their internal policing requirements. He said this was an essential condition for peace and that short of all nations agreeing to that kind of disarmament, every nation would have to continue on to arm competitively against the others.

[ER:] You can call for that, but how do you bring it about?

[Cord Meyer:] Well, he went one--two steps further, actually. He said there would have to be inspection, and I would agree, in other words, that this country should never disarm without an effective and continuously working system of international inspection. And, beyond inspection, President Truman called for enforcement. Full-proof enforcement, he said. And I would agree with him on that. And that, it

seems to me, means an international police force and the authority vested in the UN under law to use that force under certain defined conditions.

[ER:] Yes, but how do you get agreement?

[Cord Meyer:] Well, I think the-the first step, the-the practical step, that we can take to begin with is for the United States government to define in specific terms where it wants to go in this respect and to lay such a plan down before the peoples of the world saying in effect, "We are rearming now defensively, because we fear attack. But we also realize that this kind of a competitive arms race, if it's allowed to run its course, will wreck us and the rest of the world, and, therefore, we are willing and ready to agree to these specific changes in the UN, even if it does mean some limitation on our traditional independence of action."

[ER:] But uh I have sat and listened to proposals made by the United States, um but you can propose things--uh how do you get agreement?

[Cord Meyer:] Well, I think that--as I said the first step is the proposal, and the second step, it seems to me, is to continue through every means of propaganda and source of information we've got to make it clear to the world that this is our fundamental and basic objective. Then, it seems to me, if we can succeed in this containment policy over time in setting effective limits to the expansion of the Soviet imperial drive, then there is a chance, it seems to me, over a period of time, for either a change in their policy in view of a situation that they can't change or a change in their leadership.

[ER:] But you have from the USSR uh a proposal, um made over and over again, that every nation shall um disarm a third of its military strength uh in a year uh but a-an absolute refusal to agree on the type of inspection and um-um enforcement of uh what the other nations, most of them, would consider would be the only way to safeguard it. So um having that, uh I-I'm just curious to see where--how your agreement would come about, you see. (18:18)

[Cord Meyer:] Well, I--Mrs. Roosevelt, really I think I see two stages of this process. The first stage I see is-is the-the actual uh decision by this country to take this step and its specific proposal to others. Then I see a period in which we use this proposal for all it's worth in the ideological struggle. In other words, I'm very much afraid that the Russians have succeeded in a Machiavellian way in misrepresenting our motives and purposes to a large part of the world and that the war-mongering uh propaganda that they've been getting out has been more effective than sometimes we're willing to admit.

[ER:] Oh, I'm quite sure it's extremely effective.

[Cord Meyer:] And I think the only way to meet that sort of propaganda is to come out in specific terms and say, "Well, you -- the Russians say you're for peace, and you say you're for disarmament. Well, we are too, but these are the minimum conditions for any nation reasonably to agree to disarmament, and we're prepared to pay them. Are you?" And I think that's where we've fallen down.

[ER and Cord Meyer overlap]

[ER:] I'm going to say that we had done that, except to the extent uh that you are now proposing, as I understand it, that there should be a um-um some kind of a delegation of uh powers, uh which would give um certain legal uh rights to the United Nations that it does not at present have. Does--as I understand it, from what I've been told, you do not approve of the recent attempt to set up a people's convention in Geneva.

[Cord Meyer:] No, that seemed to me a very naive affair, and-and we've never been associated with it in any way.

[ER:] Well, um now do the World Federalists believe that national representatives in the United Nations should be elected by popular vote before giving to the United Nations any more power than it now has?

[Cord Meyer:] Well, I certainly don't feel that. Uh I think that's an ultimate objective we've got to work towards. But I think, with the world as it is, that the--initially, the representatives in the UN will have to be selected by their national legislatures or parliaments and that uh this is what was proposed, for example, in the Council of Europe, and I think this is probably as far as we can go at the moment or should try to go.

[ER:] Um well now, your-your--as I understand it, your idea is that every nation should um cede a certain amount of its sovereignty to set up a-a super-court, practically, within the United Nations which would have only the power to decide on questions of war and peace. Is that correct?

[Cord Meyer:] That's right. In ess--in essence, we're asking uh the--we're-we're calling for the uh surrender, if you want to call it that, of two rights, sovereign rights: one, the right to go to war whenever you want to, which we now reserve and other nations have. And two, the right to continuously prepare for war to the limit. In other words, we would like to limit the right to prepare for war and we would like to limit the right to go to war. The part of national governments through us enforceable world legal structure backed up by an international police force. (21:29)

[ER:] Well, now, let me ask you um to get an international police force, you have to get agreement as to what shall constitute [Cord Meyer, Jr.: Yes.], and that must come percentage-wise, I imagine, from every nation, otherwise it would not really be representative of the United Nations. Um now, you have to get that. That's number one agreement, isn't it, that has to be agreed to by everybody.

[Cord Meyer:] I think it would have to be a package agreement. In other words, I think the whole thing is interdependent, and-and without the-the legal structure and without the uh police force, uh the other things wouldn't follow.

[ER:] Well now, get a legal structure, to get a legal thing set up, um you have to have a certain degree of understanding of what the legal structure is and of how it functions and of just what has been delegated to it. Uh do you feel that the countries of the world have as yet reached that amount of understanding that it is possible to get. Um the understanding that makes people live up to laws? Because, you see, uh we have proved in this country that where the people actually don't understand and care about a law, they will not live up to it. Now, you are facing that, I imagine, in an international effort, aren't you?

[Cord Meyer:] Yes, I think. And I would agree with-with-with what you feel that-that if this kind of a legal structure went very far in infringing upon uh national freedom and sovereignty, it wouldn't be accepted. But we're asking for something that-that-that deals with the immediate threat of atomic, biological, and all the rest of the weapons of modern war. And we feel that the people of the world, insofar as have expressed their opinion, are very definitely on record in favor of surviving, in favor of continuing to live in a world that hasn't been blown to pieces. And we feel if we can appeal to that basic survival motive, uh that we will have enough support to push through such a uh enforcement uh structure for uh effective disarmament. We feel [ER: There are--] that's the motive we've got to appeal to.

[ER:] Uh that, I think, is-is true, but on the other hand, there are a great many people who don't in the least understand what the threat is, and um there is that question, it seems to me, of the willingness to live

under uh the law that is set up, because if there is not that willingness on the part of the majority at least, it's going to be difficult to enforce.

[Cord Meyer:] Well, I-I would like to ask you, Mrs. Roosevelt, a question myself, if I may, and that is: Do you think, for example, that if such a structure was set up, and there was in effect a working system of inspection and behind it an international police force and rules, regulations, laws, if you will, defining the arms that nations were not allowed to construct, and if, for example, in the United States a secret attempt was made, say in uh Mississippi, to-to build a uh-uh a--weapons that had been prohibited. This attempt was discovered by the international inspectors, and the people who instigated were brought individually to trial before any of the national court for that violation. What do you think the feeling uh of the American people would be? Uh would they support the enforcement of the law in that case or not?

[ER:] I'm sure they wou--the American people would support it, [Cord Meyer: I-I hope so. I think so.] but I think there are other--I don't know that that is a question um that I think is very pertinent in this particular um decision. But unfortunately, we have to stop for a minute. We'll come right back to go on with our discussion. Uh we must let our announcer have a few words.

[Break 25:17-25:35]

[ER:] We're resuming the discussion now with Mr. Cord Meyer, Jr. uh on the subject of the World Federalists and um their proposals. I have been working in the United Nations since '45 --'46 rather, and um I have seen great strides made in um mutual understanding, but I am still doubtful whether we have made sufficient strides um to come to an agreement such as you suggest. Um I think you would have great difficulty, for instance, inducing uh the USSR um or little countries, a number of them, um to-to agree to the setting up of this extent of law and enforcement. Now, um and I'm-I'm-I'm sure if it was once set up, and agreed to turn into this United Nations the force and-and to reduce their own sufficiently, that that would be an excellent thing. I think it would be wonderful. But I-I just question whether you have as yet the understanding and the um the ability to actually put it through [Cord Meyer, JR.: Well--] in the nations.

[Cord Meyer:] Well, Mrs. Roosevelt, I'd agree with you. I have no illusions about the immediate uh results of such a proposal by this country. I-I do feel that we've got to define where we want to get to before we have any chance of getting there, and before agreement comes a definition of what you want to agree on. And if we could put this on the table in terms of specifics and say to the people of the world: "This is, at least, what we believe to be the minimum price of an escape from this kind of a-of a terrible situation we're in." Then I would agree with you that the Russians would turn it down on the record. I mean, th-they've made it clear that they're opposed to World Federation. They've attacked me and the rest of us personally. And I think that the very strength and vigor of their attack is an indication of their realization that, here for the first time, we'd be moving effectively in the ideological struggle to challenge them. And uh it seems to me if we could use this decision, once we've made it, throughout the world to demonstrate to people what our real purposes were, to demonstrate the defensive nature of our rearmament, we would have gained a great deal even if we didn't get agreement to begin with.

[ER:] Well now, one of the questions that will be asked you, of course, is whether the creation of the kind of world federation that you're proposing would lead to the destruction of national loyalties and of national cultures. What do you think about that?

[Cord Meyer:] Well, I-I-I-I-I feel very strongly that the kind of limited federation that we're proposing would actually release, for the first time in many years, people within nations to realize their own ideals and objective in their i-in their best terms. For example, under the present conditions with a necessity for a continued competitive arms race, every country is being forced, slowly or rapidly, into the mold of a

garrison military state with increasing uh appropriations for arms, the regimentation and disciplining its entire citizenry, and the rise of propaganda, and the deliberate distortion of motives that go with it. It seems to me that the chance of living out a decent national life today in terms of our best ideals in America is severely restricted by the kind of arms race we have to engage in, and the only [ER: I would agree with you there.] and the only chance of recovering our-our best kind of possibility is to-is to end this arms race for the sort of structure we're trying to get.

[ER:] Um I-I think our only real basic difference --I've-I've always said that I thought it was a good thing to have these discussions and to go on discussing. Um I think my only basic difference is that I don't practically see um how these things are going to be done. I see the-the desirable um ends that might be achieved, but I um have great difficulty in seeing how um we are effectively going to do them, and I have a very strong belief that you must not try to do things which uh will drive people out of the um uh United Nations, um because I do see that we have come quite a distance. I-I wouldn't say uh that I felt we've made much dent on the USSR representatives, but um on the whole, I would say that there was a growing uh slow understanding uh that-that made uh talking mean more than it used to mean. There was a time when I felt that talking uh by many people uh was just useless because um they were-they were both talking in terms that the other person had no understanding of [Cord Meyer, Jr.: Mhm.], and, therefore, each one was talking to his own audience but it had nothing to do with getting across to the other people. [Cord Meyer: Yeah.] Now, I think that is changing slowly so that now, more or less, the terms mean the same thing as they are used by different people, but [ER coughs] I have a feeling it goes very slowly. [ER laughs] (31:22)

[Cord Meyer:] Well, I-I'm-I'm sure it does, Mrs. Roosevelt, but I simply feel that-that quite aside from the chances of immediate acceptance of this proposal, if we made it, there is this point that we are engaged in this ideological struggle for men's minds and hearts, and that we--atom bombs and dollars are not enough to win that struggle, and we've got to come up with far-reaching and-and really promising ideas. This seems to me to be one of them. And it seems, if we could advocate it intelligently and imaginatively throughout the world, we would really draw the teeth of this very effective communist propaganda.

[ER:] Well, what would you say were the basic defects of the present United Nations, and what chance do you see of the gradual evolution of a peaceful world through the uh work, for instance, which is constructive um and has made strides, of the social and economic agencies?

[Cord Meyer:] Well, Mrs. Roosevelt, uh I think that the Korean War has in some respects demonstrated uh some of the weaknesses of the UN that weren't before too apparent. Uh the veto did not hinder action because of Soviet absence. Therefore, that wasn't at stake in-in the Korean situation. But what is at stake is that it-it--the UN had to wait, lacking an inspection of force, lacking the power to control national armament, it had to sit by and wait while a huge aggressive army was secretly built up north of the 38th parallel, so that when aggression actually did occur, its only recourse was really to launch into a major war uh in Korea. And secondly, it had to depend on voluntary contributions by its forces--by its member nations, instead-instead of having an organized and really effective international force in being. And finally, and most seriously, it was forced by the nature of collective security to take collective action against the entire people in Korea so that we have the destruction of the towns, the villages, and the people in that country to such an extent that if you ask the ordinary Korean today what he thought of collective security as a beneficiary of it, he would say he was a victim of it. We've got to get a legal structure that bears directly on the individual and get away from this concept of mass guilt and collective responsibility. That's the only hope of order and peace, it seems to me. (33:31)

[ER:] That--I-I would say uh, quite truthfully, that um naturally any Korean would feel that collective security at the moment had meant uh-uh collective destruction, but um I-I would say that that was because um we had never succeeded in setting up um a real uh force within the United Nations, but I don't quite

see how through your plan of setting of um setting up uh some legal uh system which-to which the powers dele-delegate a deal with war, will then make it possible to set up uh that force, because uh our trouble has always been that we couldn't agree within the United Nations as to how to set it up. We'd have set it up long ago. It's in the original plan of the United Nations. [Cord Meyer: Uh--] It's always been there, um and we've never been able to g-to agree as to how atomic energy should be controlled. Uh we were the ones who suggested that it should be internationally controlled. We-we can't agree uh over that uh proposition and the proposition of inspection and-and um uh enforcement, and-and I don't see how having been able--having made the suggestion that we have a court and put it in the um United Nations is going to change that basic disagreement.

[Cord Meyer:] Well, I--a-a-again, let me say that I'm uh not all sure that we can get immediate acceptance of this proposal. I'm simply saying that it-it-it always strengthens your side in the world to-to recognize the truth when the truth is quite apparent. And by making this kind of proposal, we, it would seem to me, would-would for the first time really being a-be appealing effectively to the vast majority of the peoples in the world in terms of one of their basic interests. And-and on the Baruch Plan, I-I would point out that President Truman, on October 24, in effect rejected our own Baruch Plan, because he said that we could not agree to any system of disarmament that d-did-did not include within it all weapons, while previously we'd been taking the line that we could control atomic weapons as a separate problem while competition continued for the others. I was very glad to see this shift in our policy. I think it was long overdue, because I do feel in many ways the Baruch Plan was a dead end street. That it was never possible to expect [ER: Well, I don't think--] agreement on a single weapon.

[ER:] I don't think the Baruch Plan was meant um to be the only one. I think what they meant was uh that that should be the first and that after that the others would follow. Or at least that was always my understanding of the Baruch uh Plan and of what would happen. But um I-I-I think that what um mis-- what the president stated was what some of us had always thought existed, uh I mean, was the plan. And-and um I would be surprised if even Mr. Baruch had not felt that was the plan. And, however, uh you may be-you may be right about that, and I may have been wrong. However, I'm very sorry that we have to come to an end in this discussion, but I think it has clarified um what you hoped for, and I think it's very valuable to have it uh clearly discussed. Our time has run out, and so I must thank you for being with me today.

[Cord Meyer:] Many thanks.

[Break 37:01-37:10]

[ER:] There is hope where cancer is concerned. Thousands of cancer patients are saved every single month, but we cannot rest until the disease is finally and completely controlled. Guard your family by joining the 1951 Cancer Crusade of the American Cancer Society. Strike back at cancer by supporting generously the ACS's vital research, education, and service programs. Mail your contribution today to "Cancer," C-A-N-C-E-R, care of your local post office. (37:52)

[Elliott Roosevelt:] And now, it's time to close the program and to remind you that you've been listening to the Eleanor Roosevelt Program, which comes to you each Monday through Friday at this same time, and this is Elliott Roosevelt speaking and wishing you all good day.

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