Japanese Democracy Assistance:
Weak Involvement of Civil Society Actors

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Dedication

To my parents, Jun and Yumiko Ichihara

Acknowledgments

This project started by getting inspirations from my encounter with a number of civil society actors in Indonesia, who are working to improve their democracy. They are eager to push the government from without, and work with the government from within, for that purpose. They have a number of the best and brightest of Indonesia - and thus possess expertise in their fields, be it law, election, human rights, and so forth.

The only thing that lacks in their hands is money. This issue drove me to the question of where they get funding from. Soon I discovered that they obtain funding from such sources as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the Asia Foundation (TAF), the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the European Union (EU), and the Netherlands Organization for International Development Cooperation (Nederlandse Organisatie Voor Internationale Bijstand: NOVIB). The second question that occurred to me, as a Japanese, was “where is Japan?” It was intriguing given the fact that Japan is the biggest donor for Indonesia.

There are quite a number of people who regard civil society assistance as a kind of conspiracy for the purpose of overthrowing governments. Given the eagerness to improve their democracy among civil society actors in Indonesia, however, I realized that civil society assistance cannot be rejected with regarding it as such. There are people in the society who are committed to the improvement of their democracy. Indeed, many of them are those who held pro-democracy demonstrations during the authoritarian regime under Suharto, risking their lives in the process. While living expense in Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, is ever getting higher, these NGO actors live with tiny amount of

salary, which is far from enough. They are serious to the extent that they risk their daily lives for the better future of Indonesia. It was apparent that the existence of such active pro-democracy actors was indispensable for democratization, improvement of democratic quality, and democracy consolidation of the country.

Thus, I thank my Indonesian friends in the civil society for letting me realize the importance of democracy, democracy assistance, and civil society assistance not only as academic topics but also as what are at stake for our future, for our dignity, and for our lives. Special thanks go to Windu Kisworo. I also thank staff members of the Indonesian Center for Environmental Law (ICEL) who accommodated me for a month in their office in 2008 and had discussions with me about a variety of issues they were tackling. Special thanks go to Mas Achmad Santosa, Wiwiek Awiati, Sukma Violetta, Rino Subagyo, Prayekti Murharjanti, Dyah Paramita, Giorgio Budi Indrarto, Edhis Subhana, Josi Dewi, Erwinanto Darmajuno, Dwi Priyotomo Riyo, Fauzi Mansyur, Feby Ivalerina Kartikasari, Lestari, Irvan, and Indro Sugianto. I also thank former and current staff members of the Asia Foundation in Indonesia office.

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The biggest thanks go to Takayuki Yamasaki. Without his constant encouragements and support, this project would not have been possible.

Abstract of Dissertation

Japanese Democracy Assistance:
Weak Involvement of Civil Society Actors

The third wave of democratization continues and further accelerates in every part of the globe after the end of the Cold War, including in Asia, which Japan considers as its sphere of interest. In addition, civil society has been playing ever greater roles in democratization. That is the case in Asia as well, and not only have civil society actors taken leading roles in democratization processes, but they have also been playing significant roles in the consolidation of democracy afterward.

While scholars such as Amartya Sen (1999) argue that democracy is a universal value, others argue that democracy is a Western idea. Do non-Western developed democracies join democracy assistance activities? Examining Japan, almost the only non-Western developed democracy among major providers of foreign aid, it turned out that Japan has expanded democracy assistance amount as well. However, there are two distinct characteristics. First, the ratio of democracy assistance to Japan's ODA overall is extremely small. Second, most of Japan's democracy assistance is directed to the state institution sector, while little assistance to the civil society sector of recipient countries is provided. Despite the rising importance of democracy assistance, why is Japan a minor player in democracy assistance? Why does Japan concentrate its democracy assistance on the state institution sector?

In order to answer these questions, this dissertation looks into the involvement (and lack thereof) of civil society actors and its impact on the country's democracy assistance. This dissertation argues that the weak involvement of civil society actors in

Japanese democracy assistance affects the share of democracy assistance in Japan's foreign aid and its sector allocation through two different intervening variables: information sources and aid human resources. Civil society actors are rarely involved in Japan's democracy assistance, particularly because Japanese civil society is small in scale, and also because they have a mutual distrust with the Japanese government in the field of democracy assistance. The lack of information from civil society causes the Japanese government to collect information on aid needs almost exclusively from the state actors of recipient countries, which successfully grasp needs on the state level but not on the society level. Weak civil society involvement as an information source fails to convey voice from the civil society of the recipient side. Such skewness about information on aid needs causes Japan to provide democracy assistance to the state institution sector but not to the civil society sector.

The weak involvement of civil society actors as aid human resources also limits Japanese democracy assistance. Democracy assistance in general tends to be provided as technical assistance, because it is not money but knowledge that is transferred from the donor to the recipient sides. The existence of agents who transfer such knowledge is crucial. The amount of human resources among Japanese state actors that can be mobilized for democracy assistance, however, is extremely limited. It is potentially by the mobilization of civil society actors that Japan could increase the number of human resources in the field. However, civil society actors' involvement in Japanese democracy assistance as project implementation partners is rare, which limits the overall size of human resources for Japanese democracy assistance. The paucity of human resources as implementation partners for democracy assistance forces Japan to provide democracy

assistance, which does not require a large number of implementation partners. It limits the size of each democracy assistance program/project and makes it difficult to increase the number of programs/projects.

In sum, the weak involvement of civil society actors in Japanese democracy assistance causes the paucity and skewness of the country's democracy assistance.

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Glossary of Terms

ACILS	:	American Center for International Labor Solidarity
ADB	:	Asian Development Bank
ADP Committee	:	Diet members League to Aid Democracy for Peace Building
ADR	:	alternative dispute resolution
AEC	:	Australian Electoral Commission
ANFREL	:	Asian Network for Free Elections
AOTS	:	Association for Overseas Technical Scholarship
APEC	:	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	:	Association of South-East Asian Nations
AusAID	:	Australian Agency for International Development
BAPPENAS	:	State Ministry of National Development Planning (Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional)
BHN	:	Basic Human Needs
BPS	:	Central Bureau of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik)
BRICs	:	Brazil, Russia, India, and China
CALE	:	Center for Asian Legal Exchange
CDI	:	Centre for Democratic Institutions
CIA	:	Central Intelligence Agency
CIPE	:	Center for International Private Enterprise
CJL	:	Center for Japanese Law

CLAIRE	:	Council of Local Authorities for International Relations
DAC	:	Development Assistance Committee
DAG	:	Development Assistance Group
DDR	:	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DPJ	:	Democratic Party of Japan
EBRD	:	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EKUIN	:	Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs (Ekonomi, Keuangan dan Industri)
ELSAM	:	Institute for Social Advocacy (Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat)
EROA	:	Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Area
EU	:	European Union
FDI	:	foreign direct investment
FILP fund	:	Fiscal Investment and Loan Program fund
FSA	:	Financial Services Agency
GARIOA	:	Government and Relief in Occupied Areas
HRN	:	Human Rights Now
IBA	:	International Bar Association
ICCLC	:	International Civil and Commercial Law Centre Foundation
ICCPR	:	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICD	:	International Cooperation Department
ICESCR	:	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
IFES	:	International Foundation for Election System

IICT	:	Indonesian Institute for Conflict Transformation
IMF	:	International Monetary Fund
INP	:	Indonesian National Police
IRI	:	International Republican Institute
JANIC	:	Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation
JBIC	:	Japan Bank for International Cooperation
JD	:	Juris Doctor
JETRO	:	Japan External Trade Organization
JFBA	:	Japan Federation of Bar Associations
JIAM	:	Japan Intercultural Academy of Municipalities
JICA	:	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JILAF	:	Japan International Labour Foundation
JOCV	:	Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers
KADIN Indonesia	:	Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kamar Dagang dan Industri Indonesia)
KIPP	:	Independent Committee Election Monitoring (Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu)
KPU	:	General Elections Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum)
LAWASIA	:	Law Association for Asia and the Pacific
LDP	:	Liberal Democratic Party
LGOTP	:	Local Government Officials Training Program
MAFF	:	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
Menko Polkam	:	Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security (Menteri

Koordinator Bidang Politik dan Keamanan)

METI	:	Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
MEXT	:	Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
MHLW	:	Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
MIC	:	Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
MITI	:	Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MLIT	:	Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
MOE	:	Ministry of Environment
MOF	:	Ministry of Finance
MOFA	:	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOHA	:	Ministry of Home Affairs
MOJ	:	Ministry of Justice
MOT	:	Ministry of Treasury
NAMFREL	:	National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections
NATO	:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDI	:	National Democratic Institute
NED	:	National Endowment for Democracy
NGO	:	Non-Governmental Organization
NHK	:	Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nippon Hoso Kyokai)
NICC	:	Nippon-Keidanren International Cooperation Center
NIEs	:	Newly Industrialized Economies
NPA	:	National Police Agency
NPM	:	New Public Management

NPO	:	Non-Profit Organization
ODA	:	Official Development Assistance
OECD	:	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONUSAL	:	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
OSCE	:	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PANSUS	:	Special Committee (Panitia Khusus)
PDD	:	Partnership for Democratic Development
PDG	:	Partnership for Democratic Governance
PERADI	:	Indonesian Advocates Association (Perhimpunan Advokat Indonesia)
PGR	:	Partnership for Governance Reform
PKO	:	Peace-Keeping Operation
PMN	:	Indonesian Mediation Center (Pusat Mediasi Nasional)
POLA	:	Presidents of Law Associations in Asia
PPP	:	Public-private partnership
PSHK	:	Indonesian Law and Policy Study Centre (Pusat Studi Hukum Indonesia)
PVO	:	Private Voluntary Organization
RTI	:	Research and Training Institute
RTK	:	Radio Television of Kosovo
SCAP	:	Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
SDF	:	Self-Defense Force
SEKNEG	:	National Secretariat (Sekretariat Negara)

SIAP1	:	Strengthening Integrity and Accountability Program 1
SIDA	:	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
TAF	:	The Asia Foundation
TICAD	:	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
TOEFL	:	Test of English as a Foreign Language
UN	:	United Nations
UNAFEI	:	United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders
UNAVEM II	:	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II
UNDEF	:	United Nations Democracy Endowment Fund
UNDP	:	United Nations Development Program
UNFREL	:	University Network for Free and Fair Elections
UNHCR	:	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK	:	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNTAC	:	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET	:	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
USAID	:	United States Agency for International Development
WANGO	:	World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations
WTO	:	World Trade Organization
WWII	:	World War II
YLBHI	:	Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia)

Chapter 1: Introduction

Why are some countries more active in assisting democratization and democracy consolidation abroad than others? Why do some countries mainly support state actors, while others support civil society actors for these purposes? Although there is nothing intrinsically new about these questions, they are timely. The world in the early 2010s is observing the expansion and continuation of pro-democracy uprisings in the Middle East, one of the world's regions that had not yet experienced such a move. Its impact is substantial not only within the region but outside of it as well. Pro-democracy movements in the Middle East led to liberalization, although partial, in Malaysia. People openly protested injustice in the Russian parliamentary election at the end of 2011 and the presidential election in March 2012. Although interrupted by the government, a number of pro-democracy uprisings have been planned in China. Myanmar, which has been under a military regime since 1989, has been showing signs of liberalization. In almost all of these cases, support provided from external donors for citizens of pro-democracy movements plays an important role. Such assistance empowers citizens in gathering and disseminating information, reaching out to the international community, and appealing to the domestic public.

However, not all developed democracies are active in either assisting democracy and democratization abroad or assisting citizens in particular. That is especially the case with Japan. This dissertation aims to examine why Japan is a minor player in democracy assistance and especially in assisting civil society.

The Puzzle

The third wave of democratization continues and further accelerates in every part of the globe since the end of the Cold War. Long and consistent demonstrations for democratization in such countries as Poland and Hungary seized the opportunity for democratic transition at the time of perestroika in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. This led to the snowballing of citizen demonstrations for democratization in other Eastern European countries such as Czechoslovakia and Romania. The quest for democratization further spread to Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Urban intellectual elites organized civil protests in many African countries such as Cameroon, Kenya, Niger, and Zambia, eventually leading to democratization. Protests of intellectuals and students led to democratization in Asian countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, Mongolia, and Indonesia. The Arab world, which political science has long argued is possibly incompatible with democracy, started seeing citizens calling for democratization. People long for free and fair elections, governmental accountability and transparency, freedom of speech, and the protection of human rights.

Given the spread of uprisings for democratization and the increase in the number of eventual democratization, developed democracies have increased aid for democratic political reform and the improvement in the quality of the democracy in developing countries. There is a widespread sense of moral obligation that they cannot just watch and see oppressed people demonstrating on the street for democracy only to be killed by authorities. Developed democracies share the norm that they should support people in developing countries to create a political system where citizens' voices can be reflected (McFaul 2004).

Such a political system, namely democracy, is deemed necessary not only because it is likely to improve civil liberties and political rights, but also because it is closely linked with governance quality, which is likely to impact developing countries' economic performance as well. Good governance, which naturally comprises democratic institutions, is considered a prerequisite for fair distribution of the benefits from foreign aid. Through the improvement of the quality of governance, democracy assistance is thus considered to prevent the erroneous concentration of foreign aid money, meant to foster economic development, into the hands of corrupt governmental actors.

Given the increased demand for democracy assistance from developing countries in addition to the spread of democracy norms among developed countries, almost every developed democracy provides foreign aid for democratic institution-building to non-democracies and countries in democratic transition (hereafter transitional countries) today. This dissertation calls such aid "democracy assistance." While the aggregate aid amount for democracy assistance from the member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) , a group of developed democracies, was only $933 million in 1990, it increased to $11.6 billion by 2008.[1] This represents more than 12 times increase.

Such an increase was led by the expansion of democracy assistance aid in not a limited number of donor countries but by all the developed democracies, despite some fluctuations year by year. The United States, which has been the largest donor of democracy assistance among all the DAC member countries, has increased its democracy

[1] Currently, DAC member countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.

assistance amount from $454 million in 1990 to $4 billion by 2008. The United Kingdom, which was not one of the largest donors in 1990, providing only $18 million, increased its aid amount to $170 million in 1992, $967 million in 2005, and $2 billion in 2008. The average share of democracy assistance in the Official Development Assistance (ODA) of the DAC member countries increased from 2.9% in 1990 to 9.9% in 2008, which is more than three-fold (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.). Democracy assistance now constitutes one of the most significant types of aid provided by developed democracies.

While scholars such as Amartya Sen (1999) argue that democracy is a universal value, others argue that democracy is a Western idea. Samuel Huntington (1993 and 1997) argues that the idea of democracy in the West may end up getting into conflict with other civilizations that do not support this idea. Former Asian political leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Mahathir bin Mohamad of Malaysia have made strong criticisms toward the West, arguing that Western countries should not seek to enroot the idea of democracy in Asia because that is not of Asian value (Zakaria 1994). If these arguments hold, does this mean that non-Western developed democracies would not join democracy assistance activities?

Almost the only non-Western developed democracy among major providers of foreign aid is Japan. As is speculated from the above arguments, some scholars of democracy assistance point out that Japan is either not a part of democracy assistance activities or just a minor player. Peter Burnell points out that Japan has not "jumped aboard the democracy assistance bandwagon directly" (Burnell, Democracy Assistance: Origins and Organizations 2000, 50). Larry Diamond (1992, 45) states that "the United States must encourage democratic allies – especially Japan, which currently lags far

behind Germany in this regard – to spend more to support democratization and market reforms." While quite a few studies have been conducted about American and European democracy assistance as a part of foreign aid, none has been written about that of Japan at least in English. It seems to indicate that Japan, as a non-Western country, does not have the same view of democracy as Western donor countries.

However, in reality, Japan has provided and even increased its democracy assistance to match the international trend. Since the early 1990s, Japan has launched multiple foreign aid frameworks to support democratization abroad. Two administrations even placed democracy assistance at the center of their foreign policy in the latter half of the 2000s. As a result, Japan's democracy assistance amount has increased. While the country provided only $4 million in 1990 for that purpose, the amount was increased to $140 million in 2003 and to $200-300 million after 2006 (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.). This is 50-70 times increase compared with the amount in 1990.

Despite such increase in democracy assistance aid amount, however, data show a mixed picture about Japanese democracy assistance. Japanese democracy assistance amount is far smaller than those of major donors such as the United States and the United Kingdom, which provided $4 billion and $2 billion in 2008, respectively. The small size of Japan's democracy assistance is even clearer in terms of its ODA allocation to democracy assistance. While countries like Australia, Sweden, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, and Finland have allocated about or more than 10 % of their ODA to democracy assistance on average between 1990 and 2008, and from 10% to 30% in the 2000s in particular, Japan has allocated only 0.7% of its ODA to democracy assistance on average during the period. Japan's share of democracy

assistance in ODA is indeed the smallest among all the DAC member countries, which is followed by 1.8% of France and 1.9% of Austria (Table 9). Although the share of democracy assistance in Japan's ODA has increased from almost nothing in 1990 to 2.4% in 2006, it dropped again to 1.2% in 2008. Even the 2.4% in 2006, which is the highest ever percentage Japan has allocated its ODA for democracy assistance, is tiny compared with those Western donors mentioned above. Despite the rising importance of democracy assistance, why is Japan a minor player in democracy assistance? Does it indicate that Japan does not believe in democracy? Does the country provide democracy assistance just as a formality? What inhibits the country from providing aid for this purpose?

In addition to the small size of Japan's ODA allocation for democracy assistance, what is notable is the fact that its democracy assistance is provided extremely unevenly among different sectors. In general, there are three major target sectors of democracy assistance according to Thomas Carothers (1999) – election, state institution, and civil society sectors. Among these sectors, Japan's democracy assistance for the state institution sector constitutes 98.2% of all its democracy assistance between 1995 and 2008. Although Portugal and France have also allocated more than 90% of their democracy assistance to the sector, Japan's democracy assistance allocation to the state institution sector is the highest among all the DAC member countries. While election assistance always constitutes only a small share of overall democracy assistance for every donor country (below 6% of overall democracy assistance), most donors allocate high percentage of democracy assistance to the civil society sector as well as to the state institution sector. European countries such as Sweden, Norway, Spain, Finland, Ireland,

Denmark, and Germany assist the state institutions and the civil society sectors evenly. Most other developed democracies allocate at least 20% of their democracy assistance for the civil society sector. Japan's democracy assistance allocation to the sector, on the other hand, is only 1.1% on average between 1995 and 2008. Although Portugal and France also allocate less than 10% of their democracy assistance to the civil society sector, Japan's democracy assistance allocation to this sector is the lowest among all the DAC member countries (Table 14 and Table 16).

This is intriguing when taking into account that other developed democracies increased their assistance to civil society in the early 1990s, observing the power of civil society actors in democratization of such countries as Poland and Czechoslovakia. Carothers further argues that the weak will for reform within state institutions led to the increase of assistance for the civil society sector (Carothers 1999, 207-209). A series of studies conducted by Steven Finkel et al. on the effect of democracy assistance activities of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) found that civil society assistance was one of the most effective types of democracy assistance. They found that the impact of assistance for the state institution sector, about which they use the term "governance assistance," was not clear, on the other hand (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, & Seligson 2006 and 2007; Finkel, Perez-Linan, Seligson, & Tate 2008). Although these evaluation reports are written specifically on USAID's democracy assistance activities, these findings are suggestive for all the donors of democracy assistance. Committed donors of democracy assistance would be likely to provide substantial amounts of aid to the civil society sector given such findings. Despite the recognition about relatively high effectiveness of civil society assistance, why does Japan concentrate its democracy

assistance on the state institution sector? Does this indicate that Japan lacks intention to assist democracies abroad when citizens request democracy against the will of their governments?

Democracy is in inseparable relations with citizens and civil society. Whether democracy is defined procedurally to mean a regime that possesses free, fair, and regular elections, or defined substantially to mean a regime that guarantees liberty and freedom to its citizens, the main theme about democracy is that it is a type of government "of the people, by the people, for the people" as stated by Abraham Lincoln in 1863. In addition, such scholars as Keck and Sikkink (1998), Kaldor (2003), and Wapner (1995) argue that civil society organizations of political nature, namely non-governmental organizations (NGOs), play substantial roles, using such functions as advocacy, service delivery, gathering and dissemination of information, and agenda setting. Although these scholars feature the relations between democracy and civil society to a lesser extent than neo-Tocuqevillean literature on civil society by such scholars as Robert Putnam (1992, 2001), their studies indicate that NGOs are in inseparable relations with democracy. NGOs tend to be vibrant in democracies while oppressed or prohibited in authoritarian countries. They tend to reflect democratic norms and seek to help out oppressed people in foreign countries. It is also democracies that are more likely to accept NGOs' influence on governmental policies. In such a way, democracy and NGOs, political civil society actors, influence each other.

Given such relations between democracy and civil society, this dissertation will argue that the involvement of civil society actors in policy process within donor countries shapes its democracy assistance. The involvement of civil society actors determines not

only the volume of democracy assistance but also direct democracy assistance to civil society sector in recipient countries by clarifying assistance needs in the civil society. The maturity of domestic civil society and its relations with the state reflects the level of democracy assistance of the country.

Institutionalist, Gaiatsu, and Mercantilist Explanations

In a limited number of Japanese studies on Japanese democracy assistance, there is no examination on the causes behind the small level and skewed sector allocation of Japanese democracy assistance. Four factors seem to be causing such a state of scholarship. First, most existing works about Japanese democracy assistance are policy papers written by participants of democracy assistance projects. This is especially the case in literature about police assistance. It limits the contents of the studies to descriptions of the projects they took part in, without analysis about either its relations with Japan's democracy assistance overall, or factors shaping today's democracy assistance provided by Japan.

Second, the nature of Japanese scholarship influences academic studies to be descriptive, not analytical. The genealogy of Japanese political science is in diplomatic history studies, where narratives hold the greatest importance. The tendency to emphasize the importance of narratives was further strengthened by Japan's defeat in the World War II (WWII). Although there were some theoretical arguments in Japanese political science field before and during the two World Wars, such as geopolitical arguments, the regret that these arguments led to Japan's invasion into Asian countries caused political science scholars in the post WWII period to be cautious about creating

theories and influencing foreign policies with it. Because of the general absence of theory building, scholars tend not to conduct analysis on causal relations. Although there has been a gradual change in Japanese scholarship in the past 10 years because of the increase in the number of scholars who obtain academic training in the United States, the overall characteristics remain the same.

Third, Japanese studies on democracy assistance, although scarce, have paid attention mostly to economic sanctions (and lack thereof) from the Japanese government at the occurrence of outright human rights violation in recipient countries of Japanese foreign aid. studies on such a negative and indirect method of democracy assistance flourished especially after the Tiananmen Square incident of China and the establishment of the military regime in Myanmar at the end of the 1980s (e.g., Democracy Coalition Project 2002; Miyashita 2000; Ri 2009; Shimomura, Nakagawa, & Saito 1999), because Japanese response to these cases were criticized both domestically and internationally and thus gained attention. On the other hand, there has not happened any event which catches eyes of people on Japanese democracy assistance provided through foreign aid, and thus studies have not been conducted on this topic. Although there are a limited number of exceptions such as Sugawara (2003), Hirono (2004), and Sugiura (2010), they remain descriptions on the state of Japanese democracy assistance of this kind, spending only one chapter or less each.

Because studies on Japanese democracy assistance as a direct and positive method provided through ODA lacks, this section will turn to the existing literature on Japanese foreign aid overall to find implications about causes for the paucity and skewness of Japanese democracy assistance.

The existing literature has provided institutionalist, gaiatsu (foreign pressure), and mercantilist explanations for Japanese foreign aid. According to the institutionalist argument of such scholars as Alan Rix (1980 and 1989-1990) and Robert Orr (1990), while four ministries/agencies – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, current Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry or METI), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) – have been traditionally at the center of foreign aid practice, relatively weak power of MOFA vis-à-vis others makes it difficult for Japan to allocate foreign aid to issues of foreign policy concerns. While the Cabinet Office (CAO) was established in 2001 and took over EPA by absorbing it, these four ministries still remain at the center of foreign aid decision-making. It is MOFA that is in charge of democracy assistance, and thus, according to the institutionalist argument, small level of democracy assistance seems to be explained in terms of the relative weakness of the power of MOFA vis-à-vis three other governmental organizations.

As will be argued in chapter 4, the institutionalist explanation accounts for the paucity of Japanese democracy assistance to some extent. Unlike other ministries, MOFA tends not to have those who lobby for MOFA's sake either in the private sector or among Diet members, because foreign affairs do not constantly impact either industries or voting behaviors of citizens in general. This puts MOFA in a weaker position vis-à-vis other ministries. In addition, ODA budget is allocated not only to MOFA but to more than a dozen ministries/agencies, which naturally limits the ODA allocation for democracy assistance, which is a part of MOFA's ODA. However, the share of MOFA's budget in the ODA general account budget is 50-70% of all from 1995 to 2010, and the

largest among all the ministries/agencies (Table 19). It suggests that the small share of democracy assistance in Japanese ODA is partially caused by MOFA itself – indeed, only 5-6% of MOFA's ODA budget is allocated for democracy assistance. While the institutionalist literature does account for Japanese democracy assistance to some extent, reasons behind the small ODA allocation to democracy assistance within MOFA has to be explained as well.

Because the dependent variable of the institutionalist literature is Japanese foreign aid behavior as a whole, we cannot obtain clues for such a particular move as why Japan allocates most of its democracy assistance to the state institution sector from this literature. Because democracy assistance is basically conducted by MOFA with outsourcing project creation and implementation to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the sector allocation of democracy assistance is not influenced by the political struggle among ministries. Instead, it is determined by MOFA and JICA. This indicates that some other features than the institutional factor affects the sector allocation of Japanese democracy assistance.

The second school of thought on Japanese foreign aid emphasizes gaiatsu. Gaiatsu is a Japanese word meaning pressure from outside, a word that has been used in studies on Japanese foreign policy decision-making. This literature argues that the United States has applied gaiatsu to Japan in order to have the country contribute for what the United States belives Japan should do (Lancaster 2007, 110-142; Orr 1990). While the dependent variables of this literature is Japanese foreign aid behavior as a whole but not particularly democracy assistance, this literature implies that gaiatsu from the United States for Japan to provide democracy assistance, if there is, would lead Japan to do so.

Indeed, Robert Orr (1993, i-iii) states that he himself was in charge in USAID from 1981 of encouraging Japan to expand foreign aid not only for commercial purposes but also for other purposes including democracy promotion.

As chapter 4 will argue, the inclusion of democracy promotion as one of the purposes of Japanese foreign aid provision was partially a result of gaiatsu for that direction. Japanese tepid response toward military crackdown of pro-democracy movements in Burma and China at the end of the 1980s caused media in the United States and some European countries to criticize such a Japanese approach. It was at least partially because of such criticisms that Japan created the ODA Charter of 1992, the first ever guideline on Japanese foreign aid, which stated that Japan would provide foreign aid paying attention to the direction of democratization in recipient countries.

However, if gaiatsu from the United States for Japan to provide democracy assistance were so influential, Japanese democracy assistance wouldnot have been so tiny in its share in ODA. Thus, while the gaiatsu literature explains why Japan incorporated the idea of democracy promotion in its foreign policy in the early 1990s, we have to find different explanations on why Japanese democracy assistance has been small in terms of its share in Japan's overall ODA nevertheless. In addition, when it comes to sector allocation of democracy assistance, there is no indication that the United States has applied gaiatsu to Japan in order to have the country allocate its democracy assistance to any particular sector. Because the lack of gaiatsu on sector allocation makes it impossible to explain it in terms of the gaiatsu literature, it is necessary to find background factors for the sector allocation of Japanese democracy assistance outside this literature.

The third school of thought on Japanese foreign aid policy emphasizes its mercantilist interest. Such scholars as David Arase (1995), Dennis Yasutomo (1986), and Susan Pharr (1994) argue that Japan uses ODA as a tool to promote its own economic interest and does not possess a consistent and normative principle besides it.[2] According to their logic, Japan is not interested in providing such foreign aid, which does not bring direct economic benefit to the country, and is fond of hard infrastructure aid which would expand markets for Japan and facilitate the necessary infrastructure for the operation of Japanese companies. Reinhard Drifte (1996, 124-125) finds this mercantilist interest as the reason for the lack of automatic application of democracy norms described in the ODA Charter of Japan to the country's actual foreign aid practice. Ken Matsui (1983) takes a further step to argue that economic security is the foreign aid principle for Japan. Their argument leads us to assume that Japan might have placed lower priority on democracy assistance because of the centrality of mercantilist interest.

However, the mercantilist literature does not seem to be positioned well to explain Japanese democracy assistance. Most mercantilist arguments appeared from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, when criticisms toward the mercantilism of Japanese foreign aid was harsh. Given strong criticisms, however, Japan has implemented a number of reforms to its foreign aid after then in a way that foreign aid cannot be provided for the benfit of Japanese economy or Japanese companies at least directly. It was mainly after then that the Japanese government participated in democracy assistance. Thus, although the mercantilist literature explains Japanese foreign aid until the late 1980s, it is not well suited to explain it after the 1990s.

[2] Among studies in Japanese language, see, for example, Morikawa 1997; Yamamoto 1988.

In sum, while the institutionalist literature explains the cause of the paucity of Japanese democracy assistance to some extent, the gaiatsu literature explains the existence of democracy assistance in Japanese foreign aid partially. However, the gaiatsu literature does not account for the small share of democracy assistance in Japanese foreign aid, whereas the institutionalist literature does not explain why the allocation of MOFA's ODA budget to democracy assistance itself is small. In addition, none of the existing literature explains why Japan provides most of its democracy assistance to the state institution sector.

In order to answer the questions on the share of democracy assistance in Japanese ODA and its sector allocation, this dissertation will look into the involvement (and lack thereof) of civil society actors and its impact on the country's democracy assistance. This dissertation argues that weak involvement of civil society actors in Japanese democracy assistance affects the share of democracy assistance in Japan's foreign aid and its sector allocation through two different intervening variables – information sources and aid human resources. Civil society actors are rarely involved in Japan's democracy assistance, particularly because Japanese civil society is small in scale, and also because they have mutual distrust with the Japanese government in the field of democracy assistance. Weak involvement of civil society actors inhibits them from playing roles either as information sources about aid needs, or as aid human resources who implement democracy assistance projects. The lack of information from the civil society causes the Japanese government to collect information on aid needs almost exclusively from state actors of recipient countries, which successfully grasp needs on the state level but not on the society level. The weak civil society involvement as an information source fails to

convey voice from the civil society of the recipient side. Such skewness about information on aid needs causes Japan to provide democracy assistance to the state institution sector but not to the civil society sector.

Some might argue that it must be the Japanese government's foreign aid policy, not information on aid needs, which determines democracy assistance aid amount and its sector allocation. Traditionally, however, Japanese foreign aid projects have been created not necessarily based on Japanese governmental policies but rather based on requests for it from the recipient side. Although foreign aid policy was officially created in 1992 as the ODA Charter, it was not created as a binding law but just as a guideline. Although MOFA creates ODA mid-term policies every 3 to 5 years and country-based plans every five years, they only list up priority areas for Japanese foreign aid and remain short of deciding ODA amount or allocation based on such policies or plans. Thus, actual aid project contents are influenced by the information that aid agents receive about aid needs in developing countries.

In addition to the factor of information sources, this dissertation argues that the weak involvement of civil society actors as aid human resources shapes Japanese democracy assistance as well. Democracy assistance in general tends to be provided as technical assistance, because it is not money but knowledge that is transferred from the donor to the recipient sides. Although material such as computers for the purpose of collection of election results are provided as well, material assistance is only supplemental to knowledge transfer. It is the knowledge about democratic management of institutions, functions of democratic institutions, and advocacy/fundraising of civil society groups that is the most crucial for democratic governance. Because it is mainly

about knowledge transfer through technical assistance, the existence of agents who transfer such knowledge is crucial. This dissertation will focus on human resources of such agents, calling them "aid human resources."

The amount of human resources among Japanese state actors that can be mobilized for democracy assistance is extremely limited. It is difficult, and almost impossible, to increase aid human resources among state actors because of the continuing recession and the tide of the new public management. Downsizing of the state has been conducted continuously since the 1990s, and an increasing number of works has been outsourced to non-state actors. Thus, this dissertation holds the amount of aid human resources among state actors constant. It is potentially by the mobilization of civil society actors that Japan could increase the number of human resources in the field. However, civil society actors' involvement in Japanese democracy assistance as project implementation partners is not common, which limits the overall size of human resources for Japanese democracy assistance. The paucity of human resources as implementation partners of democracy assistance forces Japan to provide democracy assistance, which does not require a large number of implementation partners. It limits the size of each democracy assistance program/project, and makes it difficult to increase the number of programs/projects. Thus, weak mobilization of civil society actors as aid human resources limits Japanese democracy assistance overall.

In sum, this dissertation argues that the small ratio of democracy assistance within Japan's ODA and the concentration of the country's democracy assistance to the state institution sector are not resulted from arbitrary policy-decisions toward those directions. While the Japanese government makes optimal choices on its democracy

assistance, choices are made within the limitations of both information and human resources. The weak involvement of civil society actors in Japanese democracy assistance causes the paucity and skewness of the country's democracy assistance. In other words, the weak involvement of civil society actors bound the rationality of the Japanese government on democracy assistance.

Why Civil Society?

In most democratic countries' politics, there are several different kinds of political actors who cast influence over foreign aid – prime minister/president, executive offices of prime ministers/presidents, and parliament/congress. President George W. Bush of the United States took the initiative of "a new compact for development" in 2004, which pledged the increase of US foreign aid amount by 50% in addition to the creation of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). Tony Blair administration of the United Kingdom shifted its foreign aid policy from economic growth-centered approach to poverty-reduction-focused approach in 1997. Despite Australian citizens' will to provide foreign aid for poverty reduction purposes, the Australian foreign aid policy reflects parliamentary members' favor of aid provision in a way to bring economic benefit to Australia, according to a report by AID/WATCH (Bhandari 2007). These indicate that it may be necessary to examine the influence of these types of political actors or institutions on Japanese foreign aid.

However, as Robert Orr (1990, 10-11) argues, the influence of these political actors over Japanese foreign aid is limited. Prime ministers pay attention to the

maintenance of good balance among different political factions within his own party and thus mostly do not launch initiatives which reflect his own political belief. The Prime Minister's Office does not have substantial number of policy analysts. Paucity of supporting staff can be found in each Diet member's office as well, and thus Diet members tend to suffer from the lack of knowledge and information on foreign aid. Although Japanese political system has changed in the last 15 years because of a series of administrative reforms that intended to empower the prime minister, the cabinet, and the Diet vis-à-vis bureaucrats, the impact of political leaders remains weak.

Japanese actors who have been studied up to today as the ones to have influence over Japanese foreign aid have been ministries and private companies. Former type of studies makes institutionalist arguments. The latter type of studies can be seen in the mercantilist literature, which argues that Japanese private companies have exerted influence over foreign aid allocation and project contents by advising recipient governments about foreign aid projects they should request to the Japanese government and also by negotiating with the Japanese side so as for these companies to receive contracts for the implementation of such projects (Kubota & Yamaguchi, 1967; Tsuito kubota yutaka henshu iin, 1987; Sumi, 1989).

While this dissertation will examine how much the institutionalist literature explains Japanese democracy assistance, it will only mention its diminished roles concerning private companies. It was since the beginning of Japanese foreign aid practice in the 1950s until the late 1980s that Japanese private companies possessed substantial influence over foreign aid. Facing criticism on the sticky relations between Japanese government and private companies over foreign aid, Japan untied foreign aid from

private companies between the 1980s and the 1990s. As a result, the Japanese foreign aid after the end of the Cold War does not have substantial influence of private companies. Because it is mainly after the end of the Cold War that Japan started democracy assistance, it is not likely that Japanese democracy assistance has substantial influence of private companies.

Then why does this dissertation focus on the civil society? This is related to the nature of the issue of democratization. While political elites play significant roles in democratization, the mass plays significant roles as well especially when democratization is conducted as a bottom-up process either as reforms or revolutions (e.g., Karl 1990). Civil protests play a role to get attention on their requests, while civil society organizations could function as *de facto* political opposition groups against their government. Then who could convey the voice of such citizens or civil society organization? It is mainly NGOs of developed countries or international NGOs. Because of the distance they maintain from governmental actors, they tend to be trusted in local societies. NGOs tend to possess offices in developing countries and have a long history of operation. They thus tend to possess information on needs in local societies, among people, and of local civil society groups. Because of such a significant function of NGOs or political kind of civil society actors in general, it is worth testing how much and what kind of influence they exert on donor countries' democracy assistance and how they exert it. This is out of such a reason that this dissertation shed light on the roles of civil society actors in democracy assistance.

Geographical proximity to countries in democratic transition might seem to explain donor countries' involvement in democracy assistance. However, it is almost

impossible to find significant difference in geographical proximity between countries in transition and each donor country, given the fact that countries in democratic transition are widespread from Eastern Europe to Africa, Asia and Latin America. In addition, the fact that terrorism occurs every corner of the world due to the recent technological development, along with the fact that most donors are potential targets of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, makes it difficult to consider that the lack of good governance in transitional countries, which serves as the hotbed of terrorism, is a threat only for some donor countries but not for others.

Variables and Hypotheses

This dissertation takes two intervening variables for the involvement of civil society in democracy assistance – information sources and aid human resources. In order to create projects of democracy assistance, it is necessary for a donor country to grasp needs for it. If civil society actors play the role of information sources in addition to state actors, it could help clarify democracy assistance needs not only on the state but also on the civil society levels, which could affect both the overall size and the sector allocation of democracy assistance. If a donor asks about democracy assistance needs to Malaysian governmental officials under the Mahathir administration, for example, they are likely to say that there is no such need. Even if they say there are, the needs are likely to be on institutionalization and strengthening of the government and bureaucracy. If a donor asks the same question to those who are on the street requesting democratic opening to the government, they are likely to request such assistance for such purposes as the empowerment of themselves, while they might point out that governmental reforms are

necessary and need assistance as well. If both the state and civil society actors are used as information sources, comprehensive understanding about democracy assistance aid needs is likely to be obtained. If only one of the two types of actors is used as information sources, understanding about democracy assistance aid needs is likely to be partial. The difference between the comprehensive understanding and partial understanding about aid needs is likely to impact the overall size of democracy assistance as well for Japan, which creates aid projects based on needs. Thus, information source used to grasp democracy assistance needs is likely to have impact on the shape of democracy assistance both in terms of the size of aid amount and in terms of sector allocation of democracy assistance. Thus, this dissertation sets the following two hypotheses using the intervening variable of information source:

Hypothesis 1-a: *If a donor relies on state actors for information about democracy assistance needs, it is likely to grasp needs only on the state level. Because it is likely to prevent one of the potential recipient sectors of democracy assistance, the civil society sector, from receiving democracy assistance, it might limit the overall democracy assistance amount. If a donor relies not only on state but also on civil society actors for information about democracy assistance needs, on the other hand, it is likely to grasp needs both on the state and the civil society levels; and thus, its democracy assistance amount is likely to be bigger.*

Hypothesis 1-b: *If a donor relies on state actors for information about democracy assistance needs, it is likely to grasp needs mostly on the state level, and thus its*

democracy assistance is likely to be directed mostly to the state institution sector. If a donor relies not only on state but also on civil society actors for information about democracy assistance needs, on the other hand, it is likely to grasp needs both on the state and the civil society levels; and thus, its democracy assistance is likely to be provided to both the state institutions and the civil society sectors.

The second intervening variable of this dissertation is aid human resources. Even if a donor is willing to provide democracy assistance, it would be difficult to do so if there is a lack in human resources available for project implementation. The number of aid human resources among state actors is extremely limited in Japan and is hard to expand. Thus, this dissertation holds the amount of aid human resources constant and assumes that the small size of aid human resources among state actors limits the possible size of democracy assistance from Japan overall, and especially so in civil society assistance, which requires knowledge about the function of civil society organizations. It would be the mobilization of civil society actors that could increase the volume of aid human resources. That is especially likely to impact civil society assistance, because the expertise of civil society actors is necessary for such assistance. Thus, having aid human resource as intervening variable, this dissertation sets the following two hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2-a: *If a donor relies heavily on state actors as implementation partners of democracy assistance projects despite the paucity of foreign aid human resources among them, its democracy assistance amount is likely to get limited because of the short supply of implementation partners. If a donor relies not only on state but also on civil society*

actors as implementation partners of democracy assistance projects, on the other hand, its democracy assistance amount is likely to be bigger because a larger number of foreign aid human resources are likely to be available.

Hypothesis 2-b: *If a donor relies on state actors as implementation partners of democracy assistance projects, its democracy assistance is likely to be directed to the state institution sector because of the lack of implementation partners with the expertise of civil society assistance. If a donor relies not only on state but also on civil society actors as implementation partners of democracy assistance projects, on the other hand, its democracy assistance is likely to be provided to the civil society sector as well as the state institution sector because of the existence of implementation partners with the expertise of civil society assistance.*

The path diagram among variables of this dissertation is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 Path Diagram among Variables



Method and Data

This dissertation utilizes three qualitative methods – interview, participant observation, and content analysis. Interviews were conducted with both governmental and non-governmental officers related to Japanese democracy assistance. Among staffers in Japanese bureaucracy, interviews were conducted with officers in MOFA and JICA. Interviews were conducted to staffers of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) as well, taking into account the expanding assistance in the law field in the past decade or two. From the legislature, Diet members from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the two large political parties of Japan, were interviewed. On the non-governmental side, staff members of Japanese non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international NGOs in Japan, Japanese Philanthropies, journalists, and scholars involved in democracy assistance were interviewed. In order to compare the Japanese case with those of other donor countries, interviews, although to a lesser extent, were conducted with staff in the ministries in charge of foreign affairs and foreign aid, in addition to NGO members, in three countries –the United States, Sweden, and France. All the interviews were conducted between 2008 and 2011.

Participant observation targeted conferences of governmental, non-governmental, and academic in nature, in the field of democracy assistance, foreign aid, and foreign policy. There were no foreign panelists in these conferences except for one case where a panelist from Vietnam presented a keynote speech at the beginning of a conference and left the conference thereafter. There was almost no foreign observer in any of these conferences either. Thus, these conferences reflect Japanese discourse on democracy assistance and its adjacent fields.

Content analysis was conducted both on primary and secondary documents in order to understand Japanese discourse on democracy assistance. Concerning primary documents, although this dissertation mainly utilizes publications from MOFA and JICA, publications from MOJ and the National Police Agency (NPA) are analyzed and referred to as well. A limited amount of administrative documents on democracy assistance were obtained from MOFA as well. Annual reports, newsletters, pamphlets, and other publications of NGOs were used as well in order to understand the state of their assistance, their relations with governmental actors, and their discourse. Both governmental and non-governmental primary documents on democracy assistance in other donor countries were also used for the purpose of comparison.

Finally, secondary documents were also used in order to understand the state of Japanese democracy assistance, the discourse on democracy assistance, the state of Japanese civil society, its relations with the government, and its impact on Japanese democracy assistance. Secondary documents studied cover such fields as democracy assistance, foreign aid, developmental studies, humanitarian intervention, foreign policy, sovereignty, state-society relations, and civil society. Target documents include both of establishments and anti-establishments for the purpose of comparing their discourse and analysis. In order to compare the Japanese case with those of other donors, secondary documents on other donors were referred to as well.

Contribution of the Dissertation

Foreign aid has been one of the most important foreign policy tools for Japan. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution prohibits Japan from using military means for

foreign policy issues. This inhibits Japan from playing substantial roles in military-related issue areas such as military intervention for the purposes of humanitarian and democracy assistance. Japan tends not to play important roles politically either, partially because of the fact that the country is not one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. War-time memories further limit Japan from exerting influence politically especially in Asia, and thus foreign aid has been utilized as one of the most important tools for the Japanese foreign policy.

Analyses about the roles of non-governmental actors in Japanese foreign aid were widespread in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. A number of scandals were revealed related to Japanese foreign aid in the late 1980s, which included Filipino President Marcos's peculation of Japanese foreign aid money and JICA staffers' taking bribe from Japanese corporations related to foreign aid projects. In such scandals, it was revealed that Japanese corporations had played significant roles connecting Japanese foreign aid and recipient governments, finding aid needs, and creating and implementing foreign aid projects. Reflecting these facts, a number of studies on Japanese foreign aid examined the roles of Japanese private companies in the country's foreign aid back then. However, on the other hand, the roles of civil society actors are yet to be studied.

Because academic studies tend to focus on what *happened*, it is a matter of course that existing studies have examined the roles of Japanese corporations in foreign aid, which have *played* important roles in it. The above-mentioned scandals on foreign aid revealed the proactive roles of Japanese private companies, which led scholars to study about it. On the other hand, what this study tries to do is to illuminate the consequence of the *lack* of involvement of civil society actors in Japanese foreign aid. It has not been the

target of study because of the weak presence of civil society actors in Japanese foreign aid, while international organizations and NGOs frequently point it out as what lacks from Japanese foreign aid (OECD 1999 and 2010). If the lack of civil society actors' involvement causes some characteristics of Japanese foreign aid, it would be difficult to fully understand Japanese foreign aid without studying it.

While the argument of this dissertation can be located within the civil society literature in a sense, it is also an argument of the bounded rationality. Given the international trend of democratization, Japan has shown its interest and commitment to democracy assistance since the early 1990s. The paucity and skewness of Japanese democracy assistance, however, is caused because of the limitation in information and human resources. The state of Japanese democracy assistance, this dissertation argues, is an unintended consequence of the weak involvement of civil society actors.

In addition, this dissertation makes a contribution for policies of Japanese foreign aid as well. The Japanese government has diminished its ODA budget since 1998 because of the long-lasting economic stagnation in Japan. While Japan expanded its presence in the international aid community because of the amount of its foreign aid into the 1980s and early 1990s, the reduction of aid budget requires change in its foreign aid approach. It especially requires Japan to shift from taking quantity-oriented to quality-oriented foreign aid approach. Democracy assistance plays an important role in this sense. Democracy assistance tends to be provided as technical assistance, which costs much less than economic infrastructure assistance. In this field, Japan possesses a quality to offer – Japan itself is an early and rare successful case of democracy as non-Western country among developed countries. As Japanese democracy assistance experts themselves often

point out, Japanese own experience of incorporating democratic institutions would provide a good example to learn from for transitional countries. Reflecting such a potential of democracy assistance for Japanese foreign aid, there has been an increasing number of mention in governmental documents that Japan should expand its democracy assistance especially in such fields as legal and police assistance. Studying the causes behind the paucity and skewness of Japanese democracy assistance up to today would help illuminate the factors that Japan should tackle when it tries to expand democracy assistance.

Structure of the Dissertation

The aim of this dissertation is to examine why Japan is inconspicuous in the democracy assistance field and why the country focuses its assistance on the state institution sector. The next chapter will define major concepts and the distinctive characteristics of democracy assistance. Chapter 2 will also articulate why it is important to focus on democracy assistance despite Japan's minor roles in the field. Chapter 3 will describe the state of Japan's democracy assistance in comparison with other major donor countries. Because almost nothing is known about Japanese democracy assistance, this dissertation will spend substantial space describing the state of Japanese democracy assistance in Appendix 1.

In order to understand the reason why the pie for democracy assistance has been limited within Japanese foreign aid overall, it is necessary to compare it to Japanese foreign aid allocated for other issue areas. For that purpose, chapter 4 will articulate the

overall trend of Japanese foreign aid since the mid 1950s until now and examine the explanatory power of existing literature.

Chapters 5 and 6 will test the causal relations of civil society involvement in democracy assistance with Japanese democracy assistance and with its sector allocation. Chapter 5 will take information sources as the intervening variable and examine who provide information about the needs for democracy assistance to Japan and whether it affects the country's democracy assistance. Chapter 6 will take aid human resources as the intervening variable and examine who are the agents implementing democracy assistance projects, and whether that affects Japanese democracy assistance.

It is almost impossible to obtain quantitative data on information sources and aid human resources, and thus, statistical testing cannot be conducted. Because qualitative study is the practical method, this dissertation mainly conducts qualitative study on Japan, while examining the cases of other donor countries for comparison as well. But the lack of systematic cross-country study has to be compensated. Thus, chapter 7 examines Japan's democracy assistance to a major recipient country – Indonesia. This case study makes it possible to compare Japan's democracy assistance policy with that of other countries like Australia and the United States. The concluding chapter will summarize findings of this dissertation.

Chapter 2: What is Democracy Assistance

Before getting into the argument, it is necessary to define variables of this dissertation. After defining democracy assistance, this chapter will describe its contents and characteristics. It will then move on to defining independent and intervening variables of this dissertation, and will also articulate the state of civil society and the importance of information sources and implementation partners for democracy assistance. The final section of the chapter will argue that demand for democracy assistance has been in rise in Asia, which increases the need for it to Japan as a donor country in the region.

Definition of Democracy Assistance

Democracy assistance does not occupy a subfield either in comparative politics, international relations, or public policy. This makes it difficult to grasp the picture of democracy assistance overall. There is no consensus as to what is included in democracy assistance, and what is not. Some count diplomatic pressure applied in order to lead a country for the direction of democratization and the improvement of democratic quality as a kind of democracy assistance. Some count foreign aid sanctions applied at the time of governmental crackdown of pro-democracy protests as democracy assistance. Some count setting democratization requirement for the membership of certain international organizations such as European Union (EU) as democracy assistance.

Among such variety of existing literature on democracy assistance, this dissertation focuses on democracy assistance conducted through the provision of foreign aid. For one thing, while other types of democracy assistance have been studied on Japan, there is almost no study on Japanese democracy assistance conducted as direct foreign aid provision for democratic institution-building. Second, this is where Japan shows a clear difference from most European and Anglo-Saxon countries as will be discussed in Chapter 3, and thus is interesting academically.

This dissertation uses Thomas Carothers' (1999, 6) definition on democracy assistance that it is "aid specifically designed to foster a democratic opening in a non-democratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a democratic opening." It is provided not only to authoritarian countries but also to transitional countries, because those countries which have already had democratic opening could have low democratic quality, which are called "illiberal democracies" in the terms of Fareed Zakaria (1997 and 2003) and "hybrid regimes" or "quasi democracies" in the terms of Larry Diamond (2002). Such cases are often seen among those countries that democratized in the third wave of democratization. Carl Gershman and Michael Allen (2006, 37) succinctly point out the political problems seen in transitional countries as follows:

> The third wave has not been followed by a reverse wave of authoritarianism, but it has left behind many stalled or failed transitions. In these cases, autocrats have either replaced reformists after a brief interval of unsuccessful democratization, or have held on to power while accepting superficial liberalization and a modestly more open political space for democratic opposition. Hybrid regimes often retain certain formally democratic procedures, including relatively free (if not fair) elections, and permit civil society organizations to function and receive foreign assistance. But the underlying political realities are manipulated elections, a weak

parliament, an overweening executive branch, state-controlled media, rampant corruption, and no recourse to an independent judiciary.

What are the major sectors which receive democracy assistance in order to improve the quality of democracy and to stimulate democratic openings? According to Carothers (1999), the major target sectors of democracy assistance are the following three: election, state institutions, and civil society sectors. Contents of assistance in each sector are shown in Table 1, which was created based on Carothers's categorization, but with slight revisions.

Table 1 Sectors, Sub-Sectors, and Program Contents of Democracy Assistance

Sectors	Sub-Sectors	Program Contents
Election	Electoral Process	- Electoral system design - Administration of elections - Voter education - Election observation - Election mediation
	Political Party	- Party aid for a particular election campaign - Party aid between campaigns
State Institutions	Rule of Law	- Reforming institutions - Rewriting laws - Upgrading the legal profession - Increasing legal access and advocacy
	Legislature	- Building the capacities of legislators - Building the capacities of legislative staff - Strengthening infrastructure - Bolstering input and scrutiny from NGOs and media
	Local government	- Fostering system-level change - Building the institutional capacities of local governments - Increasing citizen input
	Military	- Civilian-run trainings - Military-run trainings
	Central government administration	- Reforming institutions - Upgrading the capacity of administrative staff
Civil	NGO	- Technical assistance

Sectors	Sub-Sectors	Program Contents
Society		- Direct funding - Organizing coalition of NGOs in recipient countries to tackle particular issues - Strengthening the legal frameworks within which NGOs operate
	Citizens	- Civic education for elections - Civic education on democracy
	Media	- Training and technical assistance for journalists - Stimulating the establishment or strengthening of journalist associations - Supporting new media watchdog groups - Organizational development - Helping modify the legal and regulatory framework in which the media operate - Funding for infrastructure and equipments
	Union	- Training union activists - Underwriting salaries of union officials - Contributing equipment and other materials

Source: Created by the author based on information in (Carothers 1999, 88, 125-244). This table mostly reflects tables and categorizations made by Carothers, but some revisions are made by the author.

Free and fair elections with open contestation are the very basic requirement for democracy, which require not only democratic electoral process itself but also multiple competent political parties. It leads assistance for the election sector to target electoral process and political party. Assistance for the electoral process is typically comprised of five types of programs according to Carothers: 1) design of electoral system; 2) administration of elections; 3) voter education; 4) election observation; and 5) election mediation. Additionally, in order to bring contestation to these elections, assistance is provided for political parties, focusing on campaign method during a particular campaign, and on organizational development between campaigns (Carothers 1999, 125-128, 142-144). Since opposition parties are "extremely poor, lacking in offices, means of communication, and transportation" (Lasota 1999, 128), political party assistance plays a

significant role in providing opposition parties fair chances of winning elections. The election sector typically receives aid when the transition from authoritarianism to democracy has started and free and fair elections are crucial for successful transition to democracy. In post-conflict countries, elections tend to be the turning point to cease civil conflicts and start nation-building as a new democracy. In other authoritarian countries, they mark the end of authoritarian rule and the beginning of democracy (Balian 2001; Carothers 1997; Carothers 2006; Hirschmann 1995; Koenig-Archibugi 1997; Kumar 1998; Reilly 2003).

State institutions in the democracy transition or post transition phase tend to lack necessary resources for consolidating democracy. As Larry Diamond (1992, 26) points out, "Elected executives lack effective control over the military and many need to weigh actions against the threat of a coup. Legislatures are weak, poorly financed, and understaffed. Legal systems lack the training, resources, and authority to protect human rights and due process." In order to overcome such issues, assistance for the state institution sector typically targets the following five sub-sectors: 1) rule of law; 2) legislature; 3) local government; 4) military; and 5) central government administration. While Carothers raises only the first four sub-sectors as those that receive US democracy assistance, this dissertation adds the fifth sub-sector category reflecting the state of democracy assistance in general.

In assistance for the state institution sector, rule of law assistance typically consists of four different types of programs: 1) legal institutional reform; 2) law writing; 3) legal profession upgrading; and 4) the increase of legal access and advocacy. Institutional reform in this sub-sector targets not only judiciary, but also prosecutors,

police, prisons, and public defenders, all of which constitute important elements of creation, implementation, and enforcement of laws. Law writing covers all types of laws from constitution to civil, criminal, and commercial laws. Upgrading the legal profession mostly involves capacity building, which targets judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and the general public. Increasing the access to justice and supporting advocacy not only helps reform public interest laws, but also supports advocacy NGOs in the legal and public interest fields in order to increase people's access to justice (Carothers 1999, 160-170; Carothers 2006; Magen, Risse, & McFaul 2009; Washington Office on Latin America 1998/1999).

Legislative assistance mainly consists of four types of programs: 1) capacity-building of legislators; 2) capacity-building of legislative staff; 3) physical infrastructure improvement; and 4) support for watchdog NGOs and media. Capacity building of legislators and legislative staffers involve training on substance about democratic governance and methods for it. Support for infrastructure such as libraries and office equipment is also necessary. Support for NGOs and media aiming to promote their watchdog function to foster transparency and accountability in legislative bodies, again has an overlap with civil society assistance (Carothers 1999, 177-181; Lippman & Emmert 1997; McCannell 1995; Office of Democracy and Governance, USAID 2000).

Assistance is provided to local governments as well. Carothers divides the types of assistance programs for local governments into three: 1) fostering system-level change; 2) institutional capacity building; and 3) increasing inputs from citizens. In order to foster system-level change, donors urge recipient governments on both the national and local levels to reconsider the relationships between them in addition to the roles of

local governments. Capacity building of local governmental institutions covers all the areas related to governance. Supports for physical infrastructure of local governmental institutions are provided as well. In order to increase inputs from the citizens, assistance is provided for public groups which work in relations with local governments, advocacy NGOs, and media (Blair 1998; Carothers 1999, 187-191; Sisk 2001; USAID Office of Democracy and Governance 2000).

State institutions which receive democracy assistance include civil-military relations as well. The nature of assistance for this sub-sector is basically the provision of training on democratic civil-military relations, which is provided by both civilian and military actors (Cope 1995; Forman & Welch 1998; Rhame 1996). Central government administration is also target of assistance. The purpose of assistance here is in the improvement of governance capacity and transparency. Institutional reforms and capacity building of governmental officers are conducted for those purposes. Although state institutions typically receive aid after the transitional process finishes, and when newly democratized countries are in the process of improving democratic quality and consolidating democracy, aid for this sector is occasionally provided to countries in or before the democratic transition phase as well. An example includes legal assistance to authoritarian countries for the purpose of market-oriented economic reform.

Assistance towards the civil society sector has increased over the years, reflecting the increased recognition about the significance of the role of civil society actors in democratic opening and the improvement of democratic quality. Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi (1999, 121-122) states civil society's role in democratization as follows:

> Professionally run NGOs and watchdog groups are indispensable to sustaining democratic change because they are typically more "civic-minded" and are relatively resistant to governmental cooptation and repression. Perhaps the best measure of the effectiveness of such civil-society groups is how governments have been reacting to their growth. Various legislative and regulatory devices and stratagems are being employed or contemplated by governments in order to muzzle or unduly regulate the activities of NGOs and the media.

Assistance for civil society is typically provided in four ways: 1) NGO building; 2) civic education; 3) strengthening media; and 4) union building. NGO building typically targets advocacy NGOs and provides both technical assistance and grants. It also helps organize coalition of NGOs to deal with particular issues, and enhance legal frameworks of the country in a way that allows NGOs to better operate. Civic education is conducted intensively at the time of elections, but it is conducted at other times as well in order to educate the citizens about democracy and citizens' rights. Assistance for media is provided in order to train journalists, help organizational development of media and journalist associations. Support is provided for the modification of legal frameworks as well in a way that media can operate better. Funding for infrastructure and equipment is also provided. The final target within civil society assistance is labor unions. Here, training of union activists, funding for equipment, and some portion of salaries are typically provided (Carothers 1999, 211-244; Hansen 1996; Hadenius & Uggla 1996; Jenkins 2001; Ottaway 2001; Ottaway & Carothers 2000). Although this sector most often receives assistance in the process of improving democratic quality, it receives assistance both before and during the democratic transition phase as well. Assistance toward the civil society sector tends to cost less compared to assistance towards state institutions due to the small scale of each project.

Characteristics of Democracy Assistance

Democracy assistance mainly consists of knowledge transfer on democracy and democratic management of institutions, in addition to capacity building. In building or reforming institutions, donors provide information about the available choices of institutional setting. In legal assistance, for example, donors dispatch experts on specific legal fields such as bankruptcy and civil procedure laws to provide lectures on democratic laws for legal professionals in charge of revising or drafting new laws. In police reform assistance, information is provided, for example, on democratic police administration, civilian control of police organizations, and public safety commission system.

At the same time, newly-built institutions need agents who can operate institutions democratically. For this purpose, capacity building is conducted as well. Capacity building of judges, prosecutors, and police officers are conducted in order to increase the law enforcement capacity of recipient countries in a democratic manner. Various seminars are provided for civil servants on topics from tax practices, custom duties, statistics, aid coordination, macro-economic policy, policy on medium and small enterprises, financial systems, trade, investment, to property rights. Financial and material assistance is provided as well. Examples of material assistance include the provision of TVs, videos, and radios in order for citizens to have good chance of learning about election candidates, or the provision of computers for the purpose of computerization of elections and governmental administration (Table 53). However, because material assistance contributes for democracy only if there are democratic institutions and capacity to handle it, material assistance tends to be conducted only

supplementary. Thus, democracy assistance is mainly provided as technical assistance. In that sense, democracy assistance in the form of foreign aid is distinctive from other measures of democracy promotion such as diplomatic persuasion and economic sanction.

The agents involved in diplomatic persuasion and economic sanction are executives, legislatures, and related governmental agencies both in the decision-making and implementation phases. The number of involved agents is relatively small. On the other hand, since democracy assistance conducted as foreign aid provision for democratic institution-building is mostly provided as technical assistance, it necessitates securing a large number of experts in such fields as politics, law, and economics. Each field of assistance requires highly-skilled professionals with knowledge of a particular field. In addition, the experts are to provide assistance by locating themselves in recipient countries for a substantial amount of time – possibly for years. Assistance is provided either in English, local languages, or with the use of translators specializing in particular fields.

In addition to the distinctiveness of democracy assistance in terms of necessary human resources, democracy assistance through foreign aid and diplomatic measures of democracy promotion differ in the ways these methods are utilized. Diplomatic measures of democracy promotion come with various types of trade-off measures from embargo to military strikes. Economic sanctions suspend foreign aid and/or trade in case of serious violation of democratic/humanitarian norms. In the sense that these measures hold something at stake in exchange of the violation of democratic/humanitarian norms, these measures are negative methods of democracy assistance as Peter Burnell calls it (Burnell, Democracy Assistance: The State of the Discourse 2000, 8-9).

On the other hand, democracy assistance as foreign aid provision for institutional and capacity building is a direct and positive method of democracy assistance (Burnell, Democracy Assistance: The State of the Discourse 2000, 8-9). Conducted based on voluntary acceptance of sovereignty violation on the recipient side, foreign agents provide information on democracy and help design democratic institutions. There is no sanction even in cases of serious violation of democratic/humanitarian norms. Rather, violation of such norms increases the motivation for foreign agents to assist democracy. However, because democracy assistance of this type is provided based on voluntary acceptance of the violation of sovereignty, the more anti-democratic a recipient government is, the more difficult it is for foreign assistance to be accepted for this purpose.

Definition of Civil Society

There are various types of civil society organizations from neighborhood groups, bird watch groups, to NGOs and philanthropies. Among these civil society actors, what this dissertation focuses for its independent variable is those that have direct interest in foreign aid and democracy. This naturally limits the types of such groups into the following three – NGOs, university institutions, and philanthropies. NGO is a broad term which literally only indicates that they are not governmental organizations. This dissertation uses narrower definition of NGO to mean that they are not only organized without having governmental representatives as its member, but also work voluntarily for political purpose not for profit. This excludes such civil society organizations as bowling leagues which do not possess political purposes, and private corporations that work for

profit. NGO's here are equivalent of Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) in the United States.

Citizens are not necessarily active in participating in politics and solving collective action problems in all the democracies. As Alexis de Tocqueville showed, France in the 19th century did not possess a vibrant civil society to function for the solution of collective action problems in the public sphere. The same was argued by Edward Banfield (1958) and Robert Putnam (1993) about Southern Italy of the 20th century. As in such cases, civil society and its political participation in Japan are weak.

Banfield and Putnam find the reason for weak civil society in vertical relations between the authorities and the public. Such vertical relations can be found in Japan as well. Existing literature on Japanese civil society has pointed out its dual nature. They argue that while Tocquevillian type civic associations such as neighborhood groups have flourished, professional civil society organizations such as NGOs are weak in Japan. They have pointed out governmental manipulation as the cause of such a dual nature. The Japanese government utilized civic associations of non-political nature as means for mobilizing the public from the Meiji period. This was how people were mobilized and governmental decisions were handled down to the society. On the other hand, the government has maintained a relatively tight control over NGOs according to Robert Pekkanen (Pekkanen 2006). It was only immediate aftermath of WWII and after the Great Hanshin Earthquake of 1996 that the government loosened control over NGOs. The loosening of governmental control after WWII occurred due to the influence of American-led Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), which tried to broaden the role of civil society organizations. The loosening of control after the Great

Hanshin Earthquake occurred because people realized the high mobility and responsiveness of NGOs at the earthquake when central and local governments were not able to have quick action due to the damage on the communication line. It was only after the earthquake that the criteria for approving legal status to NGOs were loosened, and tax break for NGOs started being allowed. Because Japanese NGOs had been under such a relatively tight control, it has been maintained small in terms of the number of NGOs, the number of NGO staffers, and their financial scale (Pekkanen 2006). It is such NGOs that this dissertation focuses for the independent variable.

Definitions of Intervening Variables

This dissertation utilizes two intervening variables to examine the impact of civil society involvement on Japanese democracy assistance – information sources and aid human resources.

Information source here means the targets of information gathering on democracy assistance needs in recipient countries. The information sources could be state and civil society actors, and Japanese, local, or international actors. Among international actors, there are such potential information sources as international organizations, state actors of other donor countries, international NGOs, and NGOs of other donor countries.

Aid human resources are those actors who implement democracy assistance projects. They are occasionally called "implementation partners" as well. While the type of information sources affects democracy assistance of any donor country, it is especially in Japan that aid human resources matter.

Technical assistance naturally requires aid human resource with highly professional skills and knowledge. There are multiple qualifications required for them. First of all, since creating a one-size-fits-all model and applying it to every recipient country regardless of their history and culture does not work in assisting democracies, aid agents have to possess or obtain knowledge not only about models and functions of democracy and governance, but also about the way to tailor the existing models to fit recipient countries. This is an extremely difficult enterprise. As Robert Dahl (1971, 209-210) points out there is no formula on democracy assistance from outside. It requires donors to create individual aid projects tailored for each case. For this purpose, aid agents have to have knowledge not only about the state of political institutions in recipient side, but also about past efforts of democracy assistance in particular fields both inside and outside of their target countries. On top of that, they have to tailor assistance projects in accordance with the recipient country's socio-cultural characteristics. Without adequate understanding about each recipient country, it is highly difficult to make assistance work (Mendelson and Glenn 2000, 61).

In addition, aid agents need to communicate with their counterparts either in a major language such as English, or in local languages. In fields such as legal assistance, where terminologies and nuance of words are so important, it is necessary not only to precisely understand terminologies but also to convey nuance in a local language or in English. It is this language element which brings the issue of aid human resources to the front stage of Japanese democracy assistance.

Despite the importance of languages, English proficiency of Japanese is not high in general. The average score of the internet-based test (iBT) of the Test of English as a

Foreign Language (TOEFL) of DAC member countries of 2008 (Table 2) shows that Japanese English skill is overwhelmingly lower and the lowest among DAC member countries. While all the European countries have the national average scores of 85 or higher out of 120, Japan's average score is almost 20 points lower than that. There is 36 points difference between Japan and such countries as the Netherlands and Denmark. It shows the potential difficulty for Japan to secure agents who can participate in democracy assistance using English. Various Japanese aid agents do point out the difficulty of securing human resources for democracy assistance in Japan due to language barrier (e.g., Miyakoshi & Toshihiko 2003, 123).

Table 2 DAC Countries' Average Score of TOEFL iBT Test, 2008

Country	Average Scores	Country	Average Scores
Australia	Native	Japan	66
Austria	100	Luxembourg	94
Belgium	98	Netherlands	102
Canada	Native	New Zealand	Native
Denmark	102	Norway	94
Finland	97	Portugal	97
France	88	Spain	89
Germany	97	Sweden	92
Greece	87	Switzerland	97
Ireland	Native	United Kingdom	Native
Italy	85	United States	Native

Source: Table 10. TOEFL iBT Total and Section Score Means: All Examinees Classified by Geographic Region and Native Country, in (ETS 2009, 10-11).

The English skills of developing Asian countries, which are the main beneficiaries of Japan's foreign aid, tend to be low as well, which makes it even more difficult to smoothly share information with Japanese counterparts when assistance is conducted in English. According to Hiroto Yamazaki, a former chief of Japan's police reform assistance to Indonesia, there are few mid- to high-level police officers in

Indonesia who can have discussions in English (H. Yamazaki 2003, 65). Table 3 shows the average TOEFL scores of Asian countries in 2008. This table does not include Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea because they are not potential targets of Japan's foreign aid due to high level of their economic performance. Because those who take TOEFL tests are limited to middle to upper class population in developing countries, this data can be a proxy for measuring the English proficiency of elites in developing Asian countries. The average TOEFL scores of most European donor countries are above 90 as Table 2 shows. On the other hand, many Asian countries have the average scores of below 80. The scores of Indochina countries (Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam), major recipients of Japan's democracy assistance, are even lower (65, 59, and 70 respectively).

Table 3 Asian Countries' Average Score of TOEFL iBT Test, 2008

Country	Average Scores	Country	Average Scores	Country	Average Scores
Afghanistan	69	Kazakhstan	74	Pakistan	87
Azerbaijan	75	DPRK	72	Philippines	88
Bangladesh	82	Kyrgyzstan	79	Sri Lanka	83
Bhutan	85	Laos	59	Tajikistan	67
Brunei	-	Malaysia	88	Thailand	72
Cambodia	65	Maldives	-	Timor-Leste	-
China	76	Mongolia	72	Turkmenistan	79
India	87	Myanmar	68	Uzbekistan	73
Indonesia	79	Nepal	74	Viet Nam	70

Source: Table 10. TOEFL iBT Total and Section Score Means: All Examinees Classified by Geographic Region and Native Country, in (ETS 2009, 10).

While most European and Anglo-Saxon donors do not face such a language proficiency issue, the weak English skills both on the Japanese and the recipient sides makes it necessary to provide democracy assistance either in Japanese or in recipient countries' languages. Some Japanese foreign aid agents master languages of recipient

countries and use it in democracy assistance. Yoji Mano and Hiroto Yamazaki, two of the past project leaders of Japan's police assistance to Indonesia, used Indonesian without needing to rely too much on translators (Yamazaki H. 2009; Yoshimura & Takeuchi 2005, 33). Some country-based seminars are provided in recipient countries' languages such as Indonesian and Khmer (Sugiyama 2005, 71; Tanigawa 2003, 100). However, obtaining language skills is time-consuming, and the necessity of learning languages of recipient countries makes it difficult to expand the volume of aid human resources in Japan.

It makes the existence of translators between Japanese and recipient countries' languages important as well, who not only translate languages precisely but also understand technical terms in specific fields of assistance (Hashimoto K. 2009; Morishima 2002, 47, 50-51; Yamazaki H. 2007, 47-48). It requires highly skilled translators who are well-versed in each technical field such as election, civil law, criminal law and so forth. Securing such translators is a daunting task, not only because the number of translators between Japanese and languages of recipient countries is small, but also because the number of those who are well versed in each technical field is small (Inaba 2009, 40). In the field of legal assistance to Vietnam, for example, there was only one trustable Japanese-Vietnamese translator as of the early 2000s (A. Morishima 2002, 38-39).

In sum, in the cases of democracy assistance from most other DAC member countries, knowledge on given field and recipient countries are the requirements for aid human resources. On the other hand, in addition to these requirements, language barrier

further constrains the volume of aid human resources for Japan, which makes it a sensitive issue that affect the country's democracy assistance.

Rising Demand for Democracy Assistance in Asia

Demand for democracy assistance has expanded over the years due to multiple reasons. The biggest reason of all is in the third wave of democratization. The birth of a number of new democracies increased the necessity for external support. Starting from German party-affiliated foundations' civic education on democracy in Portugal and Spain in the mid-1970s, democracy assistance began being provided.[3] Demand for democracy assistance has expanded constantly since the mid-1980s in Asia as well, where Japan holds interest. While Japan was the only democracy in the region up to the mid-1980s, the third wave of democratization led the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Korea to democratization from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s.

Further spread of democratization after the end of the Cold War increased the demand for democracy assistance. Democratization of Eastern Europe caused a snowball effect, which expanded democratization to sub-Sahara Africa, Latin America and Asia as well. It increased the need for greater support of their nascent and unstable democracies (Carothers 1999, 40-44). Mongolia and Indonesia democratized after the end of the Cold War. The end of civil wars in Cambodia led to the establishment of new Cambodia which sought to facilitate democratic governmental functions, and the independence of East

[3] These German party-affiliated foundations are Friedrich Naumann Foundation of German Liberal Party, Friedrich Ebert Foundation of Social Democratic Party, Konrad Adenauer Foundation of Christian Democratic Union, and Hans Seidel Foundation of Christian Social Union (Lowe n.d.; Magone 2004, 86; Rich 2008, 85).

Timor from Indonesia also gave birth to a new democracy. They needed to upgrade laws and state institutions in accordance with democracy.

The burgeoning of civil society in East Asian countries after democratic opening also required support. In countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand, the number of NGOs increased rapidly after transition to democracy. A number of NGO members are university graduates, Master's degree holders, lawyers, and have experience of studying abroad. Possessing highly professional members, NGOs in these new democracies play significant roles in the improvement of the quality of democracy in their countries. They perform such functions as election monitoring, governmental monitoring, legal education provision for judges and prosecutors in their country. They fight against corruption, advocate, provide civic education, and play the roles of think tanks.[4] These roles are important in ensuring their democratization and democratic improvement processes, giving pressure to governments from without and providing support for them from within. Lacking financial stability, however, these NGOs need support from external forces.

The transition to market economies seen in communist Vietnam and China also require assistance for market-oriented economic reform. Assistance for that purpose can be considered a part of democracy assistance because capitalist economy requires governmental accountability and transparency, which are required by democracy as well. In the era of globalization, it is necessary to equip adequate institutions for market economy in order to develop economies. Participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO), a necessary step for the expansion of exports, requires them to develop domestic

[4] Concerning civil society in Asian countries, see, for example, Alagappa, 2004.

rules and institutions in accordance with international rules adopted in developed countries. Attracting foreign direct investment requires the creation of adequate laws which covers foreign investment, taxation, land use, contracts, labor, and customs.

The Asia Financial Crisis of 1997 further increased the necessity of assistance for market-oriented economic reform. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) required Asian countries, which was hit by the Asian Financial Crisis, to upgrade their economic systems and related laws in accordance with market economy in order to receive IMF loans. IMF, the World Bank, and individual donor countries also requested greater transparency in the institutions of these Asian countries. This expanded demand for knowledge transfer on such reforms, and increased the necessity of democracy assistance.

Democracy assistance enterprise was buttressed intellectually as well, as the academic discussion on democratic peace theory intensified. Established by Bruce Russet's work based on Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace* and following the line of the argument of Michael Doyle's seminal study in 1983, the democratic peace theory argued that democracies do not fight with each other (Brown, Lynn-Jones, & Miller 1996; Doyle 1983; Russett 1993). The theory gave impact to foreign policies especially in the United States, and the Clinton administration formulated its foreign policy on human rights and democracy assistance in order to spread peace in the world (Carothers 2004, 23).

The increased attention on failed states further raised needs for democracy assistance. As the end of the Cold War increased the number of intra-state wars and decreased the governability of those countries, which made those civil conflict-prone countries "failed states." Failed states tend to be the hotbed for terrorism, piracy, and illegal drugs, which cause damages not only within the countries but also outside of their

borders as well. Thus, increasing the governability of failed states became an urgent issue for the national security of donor countries as well (Diamond 1995, 2-6). The September 11 incident in 2001 further gave a strong impression about the importance of governance to the world, and strengthened demands for democracy assistance from a strategic or realists' viewpoint, in addition to normative standpoint.

Democracy assistance has not been free from criticisms, however. Donors often have paternalistic mentalities, and sometimes take a one-size-fits-all approach regardless of local culture and customs in the recipient side. Due to the strong belief in democracy, donors' attitudes are sometimes interpreted as coercive, causing strong reaction and rejection of assistance from recipient side.

Authoritarian governments also criticize the aim of democracy assistance itself, because it threatens their regime stability. This is especially the case when assistance is provided mainly to civil society and opposition groups within authoritarian countries. In addition, international attention and criticisms are occasionally raised as well against supports provided to empower anti-governmental groups. No matter whether the intention to support freedom, liberty, and human rights of the citizens in authoritarian countries is noble, the transition to democracy cannot avoid conflicts along the line of domestic cleavages, which was controlled under oppressive regime (Carothers 1999; Ottaway & Chung 1999; Snyder 2000).

However, although cautious attention on its methods and contents is needed, the demand for democracy assistance has increased in the world for the purposes of peace, security, and economic development. Studying what Japan has been doing and why it has been doing it in the way it does is important especially for human, national, and

international security in Asia, where Japan holds a special interest traditionally due to geographical proximity.

Conclusion

In addition to defining variables of this dissertation, this chapter has described contents and characteristics of democracy assistance. Democracy assistance conducted through foreign aid provision has different characteristics from those conducted as diplomatic measures such as economic sanctions, and the application of diplomatic pressure due to the centrality of the quality and quantity of human agents not of high-ranking governmental officers but of each technical field.

After showing that civil society actors which have political functions such as NGOs tend to be weak in Japan, this chapter also articulated the roles and importance of information provision and aid human resources in democracy assistance. In describing the importance of aid human resources, this chapter showed a particular challenge for Japanese democracy assistance – the language proficiency issue. Due to this issue, the potential population of aid human resources in Japan is more limited than in Anglo-Saxon countries and most European countries.

Although Japan is a minor player in the democracy assistance field as will be shown in the next chapter, it does not mean that Japanese democracy assistance does not deserve a study. Strong democratization tide exists in Asia. Civil society actors in these countries are in need of democracy assistance. The Asia Financial Crisis further necessitated Japanese assistance for democracy and market-oriented economic reform.

Given the rising importance of democracy assistance in Asia, thus, it is worth studying the causes behind the paucity and skewness of Japanese democracy assistance.

Chapter 3: Overview of Japan's Democracy Assistance

Is Japan active in democracy assistance just as the international trend? Or is Japan a minor player in the field? Not much study has been conducted on Japan's democracy assistance through ODA either in English or Japanese. The scantiness of the studies on it might be a reflection of the paucity of such assistance. Indeed, scholars such as Larry Diamond and Peter Burnell mention the lack of Japanese effort in the field, while they stop short of showing picture on the state of Japanese democracy assistance (Diamond, 1992, p. 45; Burnell, Democracy Assistance: The State of the Discourse, 2000, p. 6; Burnell, Democracy Assistance: Origins and Organizations, 2000, p. 50).

This chapter will analyze the state of Japanese democracy assistance, the dependent variable of this dissertation, as bases for the analysis on why Japan does it in the way it does. While this chapter provides an overall and data-driven picture on Japanese democracy assistance, detailed picture about the state of Japanese democracy assistance is provided in Appendix 1.

This chapter will first argue that the increased demand for democracy assistance in the world has caused the emergence of various policy frameworks on democracy assistance in Japan. However, although these policy frameworks declare Japan's commitment to democracy assistance, they remain unclear on the concrete methods and contents. Reflecting such an unclear nature of Japan's commitment, Japan's democracy assistance remains small compared with other donor countries in terms of the share of democracy assistance in overall ODA, although Japan has expanded its democracy

assistance along with these policy frameworks. In addition, Japan tends to provide assistance to the state institution sector, putting aside assistance to the civil society sector.

Policy Frameworks on Democracy Assistance in Japan

Along with the trend of the expanded democracy assistance in the international aid community and the increased necessity for democracy assistance in Asia, Japan has launched various policy frameworks and initiatives since the early 1990s. The Official Development Assistance Charter (ODA Charter), the first ever guideline on Japanese foreign aid, was created in 1992 and stated that "(f)ull attention should be paid to efforts for promoting democratization and introduction of a market-oriented economy, and the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient country" (MOFA 1992) . It was the first policy framework that connected Japan's ODA with democracy promotion, and thus was the first significant step for Japan's participation in democracy assistance. However, the ODA Charter was created merely as a guideline but not as a law and thus did not possess legal power to bind Japanese foreign aid practice. It did not mention any direct foreign aid methods Japan should take for democratic institution-building abroad either.

Commitment specifically on democracy assistance was declared four years later. Japan made a declaration of "Partnership for Democratic Development (PDD)" in the Lyon Summit of 1996 in order to explain Japan's democracy assistance efforts up to then and its intention to further strengthen it (MOFA, Partnership for Democratic Development n.d.). In this declaration, Japan raised law, governance, election, and media as the sectors that Japan has assisted, and will further assist, for democracy assistance

(MOFA, Partnership for Democratic Development n.d.). While it did not mention the history (or lack thereof) of Japan's assistance for human rights protection, it stated that Japan should take measures to help improve human rights protection.

However, it made a hedging that whether human rights protection should be a visible purpose is to be decided case by case. It made a hedging on overall democracy assistance as well and stated that democracy assistance was to be provided upon consent of recipient countries and in partnership with them. It stopped short of clarifying what kinds of actors were assumed as the ones to provide consent on receiving democracy assistance.

Similar tendency of showing commitment to democracy assistance without concrete contents for it was seen in its foreign aid policy to Africa two years later at the Tokyo International Conference on African Development II (TICAD II). TICAD II was a Japan-Africa summit co-hosted by the Japanese government, the United Nations, and the World Bank, and participants adopted "African Development towards the 21st Century: The Tokyo Agenda for Action" on October 21, 1998. In this agenda, they confirmed the importance of democracy assistance for the development of Africa. The following six goals and objectives were stated in this agenda (MOFA, African Development towards the 21st Century n.d.):

i) strengthening constitutional legitimacy and democratic systems based on the principle of separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers;
ii) strengthening institutions that are essential components of good governance and democracy;
iii) promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law;
iv) enhancing accountability, transparency, and efficiency in public administrations;
v) promoting culture of tolerance and broader participation in the decision-

making process (particularly participation by women and civil society);

vi) promoting social justice by encouraging equitable development across different ethnic groups and geographic areas.

However, Japan's foreign aid program for Africa, which was created based on this agenda, did not show any concrete plan for attaining the above-stated aims. The only plan mentioned for the purpose of democracy assistance for Africa in this program was the plan to fund the Africa Governance Forum of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (MOFA, Japan's New Assistance Program for Africa based on TICAD II Action Plan 1998). It did not raise any bilateral democracy assistance plan to Africa.

The ODA Charter was revised in 2003 and further emphasized the importance of democracy assistance and human rights protection more clearly than the ODA Charter of 1992. It also stated the contents of Japan's democracy assistance and raised capacity- and institution-building in such areas as legal sector as contents of Japan's democracy assistance.

Here again, it emphasized the importance of ownership in recipient countries of assistance and stated, "Japan will give priority to assisting developing countries that make active efforts to pursue peace, democratization, and the protection of human rights" (MOFA 2003, 2). In other words, it made clear that Japan prefers not to provide democracy assistance unless the recipient is in action for democratization. It raises the question of whose active effort for democratization is the prerequisite for Japan's assistance. From the ODA Charter alone, we are unable to determine whether the existence of citizens requesting democratization is a sufficient condition for Japan's democracy assistance provision, or whether Japan needs to see active efforts for it from state actors as well.

These policies are intended to show and form the commitment of MOFA as the ministry in charge of democracy assistance. While JICA plays significant roles as the agency in charge of the implementation of technical assistance projects of democracy assistance, JICA does not exert influence over Japanese foreign aid policy. Former high-ranking officers of MOFA have dominated the presidency of JICA traditionally, and former high-ranking officers from other ministries such as MOF and MITI/METI also possess the director positions of each division.

While JICA had been controlled by central ministries traditionally as such just as Orr (1990) points out, the arrival of Sadako Ogata for the presidency of JICA in 2003 strengthened JICA's influence over contents of Japanese foreign aid. Ogata served as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees on the Human Environment for 10 years from 1990 to 2000 and is one of few Japanese who worked as high-ranking officers in international organizations. Her influence on Japanese foreign policy has been substantial both during and after her career at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Ogata is an influential advocate of "human security," which is defined as "freedom from fear and freedom from want," and thus placed pursuit of better human security as one of the core missions of JICA (Kusano 2007, 122-124). While good and democratic governance is necessary for strengthening "freedom from fear," however, JICA's policy on democracy assistance has not changed even after the arrival of Ogata at its top.

While democracy assistance was merely one of the target areas of Japan's foreign aid in these frameworks, the LDP administration under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe brought it to the central stage of Japanese foreign policy overall. Foreign Minister Taro

Aso of the Abe administration launched an initiative in 2006 to increase Japan's democracy assistance efforts to create an "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity" in the regions from "Northeast Asia to Central Asia and the Caucasus, Turkey, Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states" (MOFA, Arc of Freedom and Prosperity 2006). It was the first time that a Japanese administration showed its will to contribute for the creation of world order along the line of democracy norm.

However, the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity initiative merely mentioned some of the methods such as legal assistance as the means for democracy assistance, or Japan's "value diplomacy." In addition, although it was such a new initiative that would need a new mechanism specifically used for this purpose as Derek Mitchell (2007, 8) points out, it merely tried to utilize existing resources. It meant that it was hard to expect substantial and qualitative change in Japanese democracy assistance.

As such, although the Japanese government has launched various frameworks on democracy assistance, concrete plans, methods, and contents have been lacking therein. Given the conflict between consecutive launching of policy frameworks on democracy assistance and their weak contents, how has Japan's effort of democracy assistance been changed over time? Has it increased along these policy frameworks? Or has it been rather constant, and the policy frameworks have been mere lip service to the rest of the international aid community? The next section will examine the trend of Japanese foreign aid for democracy assistance.

Democracy Assistance Amount

It is not easy to capture the aid amount provided for the purpose of democracy assistance for several reasons. For one thing, democracy assistance is sometimes provided not as ODA but out of other funding mechanisms. This makes locating aid projects that can be categorized as democracy assistance a complicated task. Second, it is not an easy task to track the ways aid money is used, which makes it difficult to match the purposes of aid projects with the categorizations given for them. Third, although there are some published data on democracy assistance, nothing provides a comprehensive picture. It is not clear from Japan's *ODA White Paper* how much foreign aid is provided for democracy assistance through multilateral channels. Although data on the amount of democracy assistance through both bilateral and multilateral channels are provided from OECD, data on Japan do not include the amount of technical assistance before 1998. Thus, this chapter will utilize multiple sources to grasp the picture on Japan's foreign aid for democracy assistance. While this section will provide an overall and data-driven picture on the amount of Japanese foreign aid for democracy assistance, concrete assistance contents is described in Appendix 1.

The *ODA White Paper* of Japan provides a rough picture on the country's bilateral democracy assistance. According to it, while Japan's bilateral democracy assistance amount in 1990 was $6.58 million, it was more than doubled to $13.44 million by 1992, when the first ODA Charter was established. The amount was further increased to $131.59 million by 1995, a year before PDD was announced, which was about 10 times larger than the amount in 1992. $100 to 200 million was allocated for democracy assistance every year in the late 1990s. Although the amount decreased once in 2001,

$250-400 million was spent on it every year after then. Although the amount dropped in 2005 to $102 million, it increased again to $378 million in 2006, the year the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity initiative was launched (Table 4). Overall, despite the ups and downs of assistance amount, democracy assistance has increased in the last two decades. The data here show that the amount of Japanese foreign aid allocated for democracy assistance has increased over time generally along with the launching of new frameworks.

Table 4 Japan's Bilateral Democracy Assistance Amount, 1990-2008

(Commitment, Unit: $ million)

1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
6.58	9.83	13.44	12.74	13.60	131.59	113.85	102.83	105.70	128.63
2000	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	
186.91	61.61	376.82	260.43	276.28	102.73	378.16	290.50	277.33	

Note: The amounts are those of "public government" until 1995 and "government and civil society" from 1996.
Source: MOFA, *ODA White Paper*, each year.

If the amount of foreign aid for democracy assistance has been increased along with the increase of ODA budget as a whole, the increased amount of democracy assistance might merely be a reflection of the change of budget size instead of proactive policy initiatives. Table 5 shows the share of Japan's bilateral democracy assistance in its overall bilateral ODA. It shows that the share of democracy assistance in Japanese ODA as a whole has been increased gradually. Japanese ODA budget, as a whole, continued increasing until 1997, and started decreasing in 1998 because of recession. However, democracy assistance continued increasing in its share, while the ODA budget as a whole was in constant increase, and further increased after the ODA budget started decreasing in amount. Such an increase in the share of democracy assistance in Japanese ODA shows that Japan has taken a proactive effort of expanding democracy assistance.

Table 5 Japan's Bilateral ODA Allocation for Democracy Assistance, 1990-2008

(Commitment-based)

1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
0.06%	0.07%	0.11%	0.08%	0.09%	0.72%	0.68%	0.70%	0.76%	0.93%
2000	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**	**2008**	
1.34%	0.50%	3.90%	1.70%	2.11%	0.58%	2.76%	2.25%	1.51%	

Note: The amounts are those of "public government" until 1995 and "government and civil society" from 1996.
Source: MOFA, *ODA White Paper*, each year.

The expansion of Japan's effort of democracy assistance can be seen in the number of JICA's technical assistance projects in the democracy assistance field from 1994 to 2009 (Table 6). JICA is in charge of technical assistance and outsources project implementation to various other actors such as MOJ, NPA, NGOs, and individual experts. According to Table 6, the number of technical assistance projects in the democracy assistance field increased largely in 2003, when 14 new projects were started. More than 10 projects have started every year after then. This is in a contrast with before 2003, when only one to four projects were started every year. The accumulative number of technical assistance projects conducted every year has increased from 11 in 2002 to 68 in 2006.

Table 6 The Number of Japan's Technical Assistance Projects, 1994-2009

Fiscal Year	All Projects (continued and new)	New Projects
2009	55	10
2008	62	15
2007	66	17
2006	68	28
2005	44	17
2004	34	14
2003	22	14
2002	11	4
2001	10	2
2000	9	4
1999	6	3
1998	4	2
1997	3	1
1996	2	0
1995	2	1
1994	1	1
Total	399	133

Note: It counted the number of projects categorized as governance-related aid.
Source: Created by the author based on information in (JICA, JICA Knowledge Site n.d.).

Merely looking at Japan's democracy assistance amount alone does not tell how big it is compared with those of other donor countries. Thus, the next section will compare the size of Japan's democracy assistance with other donor countries. OECD provides useful, although not perfect, data for this purpose – data on the amount of democracy assistance provided by DAC member countries. Because DAC member countries and developed democracies in the world are almost identical, these data provide a picture about the state of democracy assistance in the world. These data are not perfect concerning Japan in a sense that they do not include Japan's technical assistance up to 1997.

Table 7 shows the democracy assistance amount of DAC member countries from 1990 to 2008. While annual democracy assistance amount of DAC countries in total was

about $1 billion in the early 1990s, the amount started rising in the late 1990s reflecting the increased demand for it because of the democratization of Eastern European countries and the further spread of the third wave of democratization. After democracy assistance gained strategic importance for the fight against terrorism after 2001, the democracy assistance aid amount of DAC countries further increased and reached to $7.57 billion in 2004, which was more than eight times greater than the amount in 1990. The amount continued rising since then except for 2006 and reached $11.511 billion in 2008. The rise in the amount suggests the increasing needs and importance of democracy assistance in the world.

Table 7 Democracy Assistance Amount, 1990-2008

(Unit: US$ Million, Commitment-current)

	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	Total
United States	454	590	468	366	408	1,424	416	550	592	504	548	1,263	1,294	1,046	4,159	3,703	1,992	3,581	3,979	27,334
United Kingdom	18	40	170	54	123	120	148	107	263	281	424	456	509	551	704	967	804	583	2,052	8,375
Sweden	290	106	187	134	129	104	148	197	140	129	119	163	162	255	292	529	634	369	460	4,548
Germany	-	6	26	..	..	35	7	..	33	156	148	185	234	295	348	422	566	811	933	4,206
Australia	32	19	73	39	38	11	82	75	78	180	108	107	117	282	456	372	512	482	783	3,847
Canada	31	37	28	41	46	130	147	76	129	142	144	113	160	203	266	388	394	690	554	3,718
Netherlands	26	40	39	41	61	106	184	65	76	80	189	147	283	315	264	228	457	351	494	3,447
Norway	10	16	21	18	54	71	46	48	77	140	116	131	208	192	216	279	285	347	447	2,721
Japan	4	3	41	16	10	312	229	26	16	..	60	..	26	140	130	102	309	250	209	1,882
Denmark	14	3	18	31	41	58	51	72	37	76	47	122	98	128	125	228	111	214	344	1,817
Spain	..	..	4	2	2	29	4	30	56	31	32	42	54	57	95	103	168	326	375	1,412
France	28	48	48	21	41	65	181	20	58	71	90	54	48	77	64	93	72	74	110	1,262
Belgium	..	..	..	..	8	20	15	19	32	26	25	33	61	37	110	136	151	137	173	981
Switzerland	5	6	10	4	21	21	32	17	25	27	79	57	40	60	92	98	86	154	128	962
Finland	14	3	7	8	10	2	10	24	18	29	31	33	40	59	68	82	60	79	81	660
Ireland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	11	18	29	45	60	81	83	110	132	568
Italy	8	8	7	5	11	4	13	12	18	44	6	13	27	28	38	25	39	70	122	498
Austria	..	1	..	..	..	..	10	14	8	7	7	7	12	15	11	19	33	60	40	245
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	9	15	17	45	41	37	52	219
Portugal	..	..	3	2	..	..	0	0	0	11	7	7	9	12	10	9	8	26	11	116
Greece	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	9	6	45	4	8	8	21	100
Luxembourg	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0	3	1	3	5	12	10	34
DAC Countries, total	933	926	1,148	782	1,003	2,515	1,725	1,353	1,656	1,935	2,189	2,952	3,430	3,821	7,570	7,917	6,816	8,771	11,511	68,951

Note 1: This table excludes European Union (EU) because this section intends to compare democracy assistance of Japan with that of other donor countries, not regional/international organizations.

Note 2: It does not include South Korea because the country became a DAC member in 2008 while the data here cover only up to then.

Note 3: The numbers are from the item “government and civil society, general.”

Note 4: The data on Japan do not include technical assistance from 1990 to 1997.

Source: (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.).

All the DAC member countries have increased democracy assistance amount overall. Sweden has been a large donor of democracy assistance since the 1990s, spending $100 to $300 million constantly every year during that decade, and it further raised the amount in the 2000s to reach its peak in 2006 ($634 million). Other donor countries have significantly increased their democracy assistance amount as well. The United States, which has constantly been the largest donor among all the DAC member countries, has increased its democracy assistance amount from $454 million in 1990 to $1.3 billion in 2001, and to $4 billion in 2008. The United Kingdom, whose democracy assistance amount ($18 million) was even smaller than those of Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and France in 1990 ($32 million, $31 million, $26 million, and $ 28 million, respectively), increased its aid amount to $170 million in 1992, $967 million in 2005, and $2 billion in 2008. The United Kingdom is now the second largest donor of democracy assistance followed by Sweden.

Along with the overall trend, Japan's democracy assistance has increased as well. According to the data, while Japan's democracy assistance amount was only $4 million in 1990, it jumped up occasionally in the 1990s (to $41 million in 1993 and $220-320 million in 1995 and 1996) and stabilized at more than $100 million after 2003. Further increase was seen in the late 2000s, when the amount of democracy assistance stabilized between $200 and $300. These data roughly coincide with the numbers provided by the *ODA White Paper*, and thus, we can assume that the technical assistance amount before 1998, which is not taken into account here, is small and ignorable.

Despite such increase, however, the size of Japan's democracy assistance remains only the nineth of all the 22 DAC member countries. Japan's democracy assistance

amount is about the same as that of Denmark, whose total ODA between 1995 and 2008 was less than one tenth of that of Japan (Table 8). Among the top 10 ODA providers, it is only Spain and France that have provided slightly smaller amount of democracy assistance than Japan (Tables 7 and 8).

Table 8 Total ODA Amount of DAC Member Countries, 1995-2008

(Unit: US$ Million)

Ranking	Country	ODA Amount	Ranking	Country	ODA Amount
1	United States	212,764	12	Italy	17,313
2	Japan	170,609	13	Denmark	15,237
3	Germany	80,645	14	Belgium	13,950
4	France	72,210	15	Switzerland	13,436
5	United Kingdom	64,548	16	Austria	8,618
6	Netherlands	49,069	17	Finland	5,463
7	Canada	25,403	18	Portugal	4,554
8	Sweden	23,101	19	Ireland	4,219
9	Spain	22,783	20	New Zealand	1,671
10	Norway	21,324	21	Greece	1,467
11	Australia	18,630	22	Luxembourg	1,412

Note: The data here do not include South Korea because the country became an OECD DAC member country only in 2008.
Source: (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.).

Table 9 shows DAC member countries' ODA allocated for democracy assistance from 1990 to 2008. It shows that Japan's ODA allocation for democracy assistance is the smallest among all the DAC countries. According to it, Japan's ODA allocation for democracy assistance is only 0.7% on average, while the DAC average is 5.8% during that period, which is more than eight times greater than that of Japan. Japan is especially in major contrast with Anglo-Saxon and Northern European countries, which have allocated about or more than 10% of their ODA to democracy assistance on average. While the highest ever percentage Japan has allocated its ODA for democracy assistance

is 2.4% of 2006, such countries as Australia, Sweden, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Denmark have occasionally allocated more than 20% of their ODA to democracy assistance. France is the only donor besides Japan among the top 10 ODA providers, which has allocated as small percentage of ODA to democracy assistance as Japan (1.8%). It is clear that, Japan is a minor player of democracy assistance compared with most other developed democracies.

Overall, there is a clear increase of democracy assistance in terms of aid amount, the share of democracy assistance in ODA, and the number of technical assistance projects of democracy assistance in Japan. However, the share of democracy assistance in Japan's ODA is smaller compared with other developed democracies, and the smallest of all the DAC member countries.

Table 9 Share of Democracy Assistance Amount in Total ODA, 1990-2008

(Unit: Percent)

	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	Average
Australia	8.7	3.6	22.5	5.9	5.3	4.1	5.6	10.4	13.9	22.4	10.5	15.0	17.8	25.6	37.8	26.0	23.6	28.2	16.7	16.0
Sweden	12.2	6.2	8.8	13.3	11.1	9.3	14.8	17.9	13.3	13.2	12.0	17.4	14.9	12.6	14.2	19.7	20.7	15.9	17.3	13.9
United States	6.9	5.0	9.7	7.9	8.8	26.5	10.5	13.6	12.7	4.9	5.5	12.8	10.8	5.0	17.7	13.3	8.2	14.5	12.6	10.9
Canada	1.8	4.0	2.6	4.3	4.3	9.6	11.7	8.0	11.9	15.0	11.9	11.3	10.1	12.9	11.5	15.5	18.0	20.7	14.9	10.5
United Kingdom	1.7	3.5	6.0	6.7	13.2	9.4	7.8	6.6	8.3	9.6	10.0	16.7	14.2	14.0	13.5	9.8	11.6	10.2	25.9	10.5
Norway	2.1	2.8	5.2	3.4	7.6	7.9	5.3	7.1	11.0	12.1	14.6	12.0	18.8	13.4	16.2	14.3	10.0	12.0	11.8	9.9
Denmark	3.3	0.7	3.2	4.8	8.1	6.5	3.6	8.9	9.1	11.9	5.0	13.1	11.3	18.8	7.5	14.8	8.1	14.4	21.9	9.2
Finland	2.8	0.5	1.9	3.7	7.0	0.9	5.2	13.7	8.4	13.5	15.6	11.8	13.3	15.3	15.8	12.1	10.0	12.0	8.8	9.1
Ireland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.7	8.8	10.8	13.9	14.5	16.9	13.0	13.2	14.2	5.9
Greece	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.1	2.5	27.0	1.8	4.1	3.2	6.6	5.9
Netherlands	2.4	3.9	2.6	2.4	4.6	5.0	8.4	3.3	3.8	4.3	7.4	6.1	6.3	12.9	9.4	6.5	4.2	7.3	8.8	5.8
Switzerland	0.9	0.8	1.7	1.0	2.3	2.8	5.7	3.3	5.0	3.1	11.6	7.8	5.1	6.5	7.3	6.9	6.8	10.1	7.5	5.1
New Zealand	-	-	-	-	-	4.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.2	12.9	9.7	14.7	14.2	13.4	14.6	5.1
Belgium	-	-	-	-	2.2	4.4	2.7	4.1	6.1	5.6	4.9	5.9	5.7	2.4	8.5	8.6	9.8	8.6	9.7	4.7
Spain	-	-	0.5	0.5	0.9	9.1	1.0	4.1	5.3	3.0	3.4	3.4	4.7	3.8	6.5	5.8	6.3	8.6	8.2	4.4
Germany	-	0.2	0.6	-	-	0.9	0.1	-	1.4	3.9	4.7	5.5	5.1	5.2	6.2	4.6	6.0	8.8	7.4	3.2
Portugal	-	-	1.3	1.4	-	-	0.4	0.0	0.2	4.6	2.1	3.6	4.7	6.2	1.0	3.3	4.2	4.3	1.2	2.3
Italy	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.9	0.4	1.9	2.3	2.6	7.2	0.8	2.1	2.1	2.0	4.3	-	-	4.9	5.2	2.0
Austria	-	0.2	-	-	-	-	1.9	4.2	1.5	1.1	1.8	1.7	2.6	5.4	2.9	1.5	3.1	4.3	3.0	1.9
France	1.1	1.5	1.8	0.8	1.6	2.7	6.5	0.9	1.7	2.3	3.5	1.9	1.1	1.2	1.0	1.1	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.8
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	2.2	0.5	1.4	2.5	4.7	3.6	0.9
Japan	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.1	2.2	1.7	0.2	0.1	-	0.6	-	0.4	1.0	1.1	0.6	2.4	2.0	1.2	0.7
DAC Average	2.9	2.3	3.3	2.5	3.2	6.8	4.6	4.3	4.9	4.7	5.3	7.6	7.4	5.6	10.5	8.2	6.9	9.8	9.9	5.8

Note: Yearly average is calculated as [(sum of the percentages from 1990 to 2008)/19] concerning those countries that were DAC members since before 1990. Concerning those countries that became DAC members after 1990 (Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain), it divides the sum of the percentages by the number of years of membership since a year after the start of their membership.
Source: (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.).

Sector Allocation of Democracy Assistance

So far, this chapter has examined Japan's democracy assistance overall. In what follows, this section will analyze how Japan's democracy assistance is allocated among different sectors and will argue that most of its assistance is directed to the state institution sector.

Table 10 shows total democracy assistance amount of DAC countries by sectors and sector allocations as percentage of total democracy assistance amount from 1995 to 2008. The aid amount has been the smallest in the election sector. While the total amount of aid in the state institutions and the civil society sectors are $43 billion and $19 billion from 1995 to 2008, respectively, that of the election sector is only $2 billion. Assistance for the election sector has never exceeded 6% of the overall democracy assistance. It reflects the fact that while assistance for the election sector tends to have significance in the transitional phase, its significance dilutes compared to other sectors in the process of democratic quality improvement and democracy consolidation. Thus, election assistance constitutes just a small part of the overall democracy assistance.

Table 10 Democracy Assistance of DAC Countries by Sector, 1995-2008

(Unit: US$ Million, Commitment-current)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
Election															
Raw Amount	35	31	32	34	95	49	59	43	79	224	362	124	295	641	2,104
Percentage in Democracy Assistance	1.4%	1.8%	2.4%	2.1%	4.9%	2.3%	2.0%	1.3%	2.1%	3.0%	4.6%	1.8%	3.4%	5.6%	3.1%
State Institutions															
Raw Amount	1,969	1,254	840	1,001	1,126	1,383	1,707	2,223	2,430	5,797	5,745	4,510	6,111	7,058	43,154
Percentage in Democracy Assistance	78.3%	72.7%	62.1%	60.5%	58.2%	63.2%	57.8%	64.8%	63.6%	76.6%	72.6%	66.2%	69.7%	61.3%	62.6%
Civil Society															
Raw Amount	511	440	481	620	713	757	1,187	1,164	1,311	1,549	1,810	2,182	2,365	3,812	18,901
Percentage in Democracy Assistance	20.3%	25.5%	35.5%	37.4%	36.9%	34.6%	40.2%	33.9%	34.3%	20.5%	22.9%	32.0%	27.0%	33.1%	27.4%

Note 1: The percentages in the section "total" is calculated as (sum of the amount between 1995 and 2008 / sum of democracy assistance amount between 1995 and 2008)×100.

Note 2: Assistance for state institutions was calculated as a sum of economic and development policy/planning, public sector financial management, legal and judicial development, and government administration in OECD data on "government and civil society in general."

Note 3: The amount of civil society assistance is calculated as a sum of the assistance for strengthening civil society, human rights, free flow of information, and women's equality organizations and institutions.

Source: Calculated by the author based on data in (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.).

Compared with election assistance, the state institution sector has received much greater aid. Aid for the state institution sector is more than 20 times that for the election assistance overall. On average, 62.6% of overall democracy assistance of DAC countries went to state institutions between 1995 and 2008. Although the allocation of democracy assistance for the state institution sector was the greatest in the mid-1990s and decreased from then to some extent with the exception of the mid-2000s, the allocation for the state institution sector has never been below 50% of overall democracy assistance. In other words, the largest part of democracy assistance has constantly been provided to the state institution sector. Assistance for state institutions is costly reflecting the existence of numerous types of state institutions such as judiciary, legislature, local government, military, and central government administration that are all targets of democracy assistance. In addition, democracy assistance for the state institution sector tends to be large in amount because assistance to the state institution sector needs to be provided before, during, and after democratic opening in recipient countries; while assistance for the election sector tends to stop when recipient countries complete the democracy transition phase and move to the democracy consolidation phase.

Assistance for the civil society sector has been in constant rise. Except for slight drops in 1996 and 2002, the amount continuously rose from $511 million in 1995 to $3.8 billion in 2008. This constant increase in civil society assistance shows the increased recognition about the importance of civil society in improving democratic quality. Carothers (1999, 207) points out that democratization in Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1989 brought donors' attention on the power of civil society actors, which caused the acceleration of civil society assistance. In addition to the raw amount, the ratio of civil

society assistance to overall democracy assistance rose especially in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. While only 20.3% of overall democracy assistance was allocated for the civil society sector in 1995, 40.2% was allocated for the sector in 2001, which is almost a two-fold increase. Although the share of the civil society sector decreased after then, DAC countries in total have allocated 29.4% on average during the period covered in the data.

Is Japan's democracy assistance in accordance with this trend? How does Japan's democracy assistance differ from that of other DAC member countries? Table 11 shows DAC countries' democracy assistance amount contributed for the election sector from 1995 to 2008. Although there are fluctuations in the amount of election assistance depending on the year, seven countries, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Australia, have provided more than $100 million for election assistance in total during the period. The United States is the largest donor of all and has contributed $770 million for election assistance. On the other hand, Japan has been a marginal actor in the field, contributing only $11.8 million in total during the period.

Table 11 Election Assistance, 1995-2008

(Unit: US$ Million, Commitment-current)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
United States	0.3	7.4	12.2	9.6	40.1	4.9	27.8	3.2	12.1	18.9	114.1	10.4	151.4	361.4	773.8
United Kingdom	4.3	4.9	1.0	3.4	6.5	11.8	2.4	6.5	10.5	32.4	52.4	39.5	41.8	56.7	274.0
Canada	1.8	7.4	2.4	1.8	3.9	6.8	1.9	1.9	10.8	30.9	50.1	16.5	25.9	34.5	196.5
Netherlands	3.8	..	..	3.9	2.6	4.0	4.0	5.8	10.6	21.2	24.8	13.5	12.1	24.7	131.1
Norway	7.5	0.2	1.2	0.3	9.6	4.3	5.1	8.3	6.7	11.5	19.7	9.8	14.7	31.4	130.3
Sweden	6.1	5.6	8.6	2.4	5.8	5.8	5.0	6.1	6.9	12.3	15.3	3.1	8.7	29.0	120.5
Australia	..	0.1	0.4	0.9	16.3	2.3	2.3	1.3	10.6	5.5	28.0	6.0	5.6	30.3	109.7
Denmark	7.9	..	1.5	5.1	4.1	1.7	3.7	2.7	1.7	8.5	1.7	4.0	4.3	10.2	57.0
Germany	..	3.3	..	..	3.0	3.7	2.8	1.5	1.1	2.0	16.1	0.4	4.3	13.6	51.8
Belgium	1.1	0.6	0.1	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.0	1.0	0.9	17.6	13.3	5.5	1.7	4.6	48.0
Greece	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	39.0	0.6	..	0.0	..	39.6
Spain	..	..	0.0	1.1	0.2	0.2	0.8	0.4	0.1	0.5	3.2	3.4	4.3	18.1	32.3
Switzerland	2.1	..	0.8	1.6	1.2	1.9	0.4	0.8	3.3	6.0	1.8	2.1	1.8	1.8	25.5
France	..	..	..	..	..	0.0	..	2.0	0.8	5.8	2.0	3.3	5.0	5.8	24.7
Ireland	..	..	..	..	..	0.4	1.0	0.5	0.6	2.5	3.9	2.0	3.2	7.4	21.4
Italy	0.1	..	1.6	1.1	0.3	0.3	0.8	..	0.1	4.4	3.5	0.5	0.1	8.4	21.0
Finland	0.0	0.3	0.3	2.5	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.3	1.9	1.5	3.3	0.4	0.4	0.7	12.5
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2.7	7.8	1.3	11.8
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.5	0.4	2.8	5.4	0.8	0.9	0.1	10.8
Austria	..	0.7	1.9	..	0.2	0.4	..	0.1	..	0.5	1.9	0.0	0.2	..	6.1
Portugal	..	..	..	..	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.8	0.7	0.2	0.5	0.5	4.1
Luxembourg	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.6	..	..	0.3	0.9

Source: (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.).

Table 12 shows the change in the share of election assistance in each country's overall democracy assistance. Because the demand for election assistance is seen only in countries in the democratic transition process, the percentage of election assistance in each donor country's democracy assistance is small. With the only exception of Greece, which allocated 87% of its democracy assistance to the election sector in 2004, all the countries have allocated less than 6% of democracy assistance to elections on average. Greece's large election assistance in 2004 was provided for neighboring former Yugoslavia during its dissolution process. Although Japan is no exception in a sense that the share of election assistance is not great, the share is overwhelmingly small among DAC member countries and indeed the smallest of all (0.7%), which is followed by the 1.2% of Germany.

Table 12 Ratio of Election Assistance to Overall Democracy Assistance, 1995-2008

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Average
Greece	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	86.5%	17.2%	..	0.4%	..	39.7%
Canada	1.4%	5.0%	3.2%	1.4%	2.7%	4.7%	1.7%	1.2%	5.3%	11.6%	12.9%	4.2%	3.8%	6.2%	5.6%
Norway	10.5%	0.5%	2.5%	0.4%	6.9%	3.7%	3.9%	4.0%	3.5%	5.3%	7.0%	3.4%	4.2%	7.0%	5.0%
Belgium	5.8%	3.7%	0.7%	1.8%	1.9%	2.6%	0.1%	1.6%	2.3%	16.0%	9.8%	3.6%	1.3%	2.6%	4.9%
New Zealand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4.9%	2.5%	16.8%	12.0%	1.9%	2.4%	0.1%	4.9%
Italy	1.8%	..	13.2%	6.2%	0.6%	5.5%	6.1%	..	0.3%	11.4%	13.9%	1.3%	0.1%	6.9%	4.6%
Netherlands	3.6%	..	..	5.1%	3.2%	2.1%	2.7%	2.0%	3.4%	8.0%	10.9%	3.0%	3.5%	5.0%	4.0%
Ireland	..	..	..	..	..	3.4%	5.9%	1.9%	1.3%	4.1%	4.7%	2.4%	2.9%	5.6%	3.8%
Portugal	..	..	..	..	4.8%	2.9%	1.0%	1.0%	3.1%	8.0%	8.0%	3.0%	2.0%	4.5%	3.7%
United Kingdom	3.6%	3.3%	0.9%	1.3%	2.3%	2.8%	0.5%	1.3%	1.9%	4.6%	5.4%	4.9%	7.2%	2.8%	3.4%
Denmark	13.7%	..	2.0%	13.9%	5.4%	3.5%	3.1%	2.7%	1.3%	6.8%	0.7%	3.6%	2.0%	3.0%	3.3%
Sweden	5.9%	3.7%	4.4%	1.7%	4.5%	4.8%	3.0%	3.8%	2.7%	4.2%	2.9%	0.5%	2.4%	6.3%	3.3%
United States	0.0%	1.8%	2.2%	1.6%	8.0%	0.9%	2.2%	0.3%	1.2%	0.5%	3.1%	0.5%	4.2%	9.1%	3.1%
Australia	..	0.2%	0.6%	1.1%	9.1%	2.1%	2.1%	1.1%	3.8%	1.2%	7.5%	1.2%	1.2%	3.9%	3.0%
Switzerland	9.9%	..	4.9%	6.3%	4.4%	2.4%	0.7%	1.9%	5.4%	6.6%	1.9%	2.5%	1.2%	1.4%	2.8%
Luxembourg	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	20.2%	..	..	2.8%	2.7%
Austria	..	7.2%	13.6%	..	3.3%	5.6%	..	1.2%	..	4.8%	9.9%	0.1%	0.3%	..	2.5%
France	..	..	..	..	..	0.0%	..	4.1%	1.0%	9.0%	2.1%	4.5%	6.8%	5.3%	2.3%
Spain	..	..	0.1%	1.9%	0.8%	0.6%	2.0%	0.7%	0.1%	0.6%	3.1%	2.0%	1.3%	4.8%	2.3%
Finland	1.7%	3.0%	1.0%	13.6%	1.2%	0.5%	1.3%	0.9%	3.1%	2.2%	4.0%	0.6%	0.5%	0.8%	2.0%
Germany	..	50.0%	..	..	2.0%	2.5%	1.5%	0.6%	0.4%	0.6%	3.8%	0.1%	0.5%	1.5%	1.2%
Japan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.9%	3.1%	0.6%	0.7%

Note: The percentages in the section "total" is calculated as (sum of election assistance amount between 1995 and 2008 / sum of democracy assistance amount between 1995 and 2008)×100.

Source: (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.).

Table 13 shows the democracy assistance amount of DAC member countries allocated to the state institution sector from 1995 to 2008. It shows quite a different picture from election assistance – Japan ranks as the seventh biggest donor for state institutions, and has provided about $1.8 billion for the sector in total during the period. While Japan's aid amount is much smaller than that of the United States and the United Kingdom ($19.4 billion and $5.6 billion in total during the period, respectively), Japan often contributes more than $100 million a year for state institutions assistance, and contributed more than $300 million in 1995 and 2006. The accumulative amount of Japan's democracy assistance is even greater than those active countries of democracy assistance such as Sweden, Norway, and Denmark.

Table 13 State Institutions Assistance, 1995-2008

(Unit: US$ Million, Commitment-current)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
United States	1,127	226	313	326	181	332	952	938	660	3,745	3,193	1,568	2,835	3,019	19,415
United Kingdom	106	128	98	195	241	346	126	389	381	515	795	677	469	1,100	5,565
Australia	9	78	63	72	143	78	73	105	245	389	320	461	444	659	3,140
Canada	79	103	55	75	86	78	69	99	127	148	221	220	474	277	2,111
Germany	35	3	0	33	91	77	84	100	139	164	201	210	398	441	1,977
Netherlands	66	151	47	42	47	121	62	168	228	142	148	285	242	210	1,960
Japan	312	217	26	16	0	60	0	26	139	130	102	306	239	204	1,777
Sweden	45	64	105	68	68	37	73	70	96	113	148	165	127	133	1,310
Norway	45	20	28	11	45	29	33	64	61	84	127	122	141	177	986
France	62	179	17	49	65	79	47	43	68	55	91	66	69	80	971
Denmark	24	29	30	16	46	9	62	53	90	35	72	37	115	144	762
Switzerland	15	27	12	13	23	76	53	34	49	52	65	58	121	105	702
Belgium	9	7	5	19	13	10	8	27	19	61	91	118	110	127	623
Spain	29	4	23	42	13	19	21	27	25	49	38	62	98	134	584
Italy	1	11	1	16	42	5	11	20	23	26	15	31	20	66	288
Finland	1	6	8	6	8	9	11	10	27	36	35	28	46	36	267
Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	5	11	20	20	23	36	30	48	46	238
Austria	0	3	8	3	4	4	2	7	12	8	11	24	48	34	168
New Zealand	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	10	10	26	27	28	40	150
Portugal	0	0	0	0	11	7	7	8	11	8	8	8	25	10	103
Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	2	4	1	6	7	9	37
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	3	7	7	20

Note: Assistance for state institutions was calculated as a sum of economic and development policy / planning, public sector financial management, legal and judicial development, and government administration in OECD data on "government and civil society in general."

Source: (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.).

Table 14 shows the share of state institutions assistance in overall democracy assistance of each DAC member country from 1995 to 2008. It shows that Japan has allocated the greatest percentage of democracy assistance to the state institution sector among DAC member countries during this period. The average allocation of Japan's democracy assistance to the state institution sector is above 98%. This number is strikingly high compared with other countries. Although the difference among donors is gradual, 18 countries allocate less than 80% of democracy assistance to state institutions, and 8 countries allocate less than 50% to it. The fact that Japan's assistance for state institutions is even greater than those of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, which was shown in Table 13, is because these countries have not allocated large percentages of democracy assistance to the state institution sector. Sweden allocates 35%, Norway allocates 38%, and Denmark allocates 45% of democracy assistance to the state institution sector on average. It is Portugal and France, other than Japan, that have allocated more than 90% of their democracy assistance to this sector.

Table 14 Ratio of State Institutions Assistance to Overall Democracy Assistance, 1995-2008

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Average
Japan	100.0%	94.8%	100.0%	100.0%	..	100.0%	..	100.0%	99.5%	99.7%	99.6%	98.9%	95.5%	98.0%	98.2%
Portugal	..	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	94.8%	96.8%	94.4%	93.8%	94.5%	81.0%	88.0%	94.7%	96.8%	90.8%	93.0%
France	95.7%	98.5%	89.5%	85.5%	92.3%	88.4%	86.6%	89.4%	88.4%	85.7%	97.9%	91.3%	93.2%	72.5%	90.2%
Australia	82.6%	94.8%	84.2%	92.2%	79.3%	72.2%	68.4%	89.7%	87.0%	85.3%	85.9%	90.1%	92.3%	84.2%	86.1%
United States	79.2%	54.3%	56.9%	55.1%	35.9%	60.7%	75.4%	72.5%	63.0%	90.1%	86.2%	78.7%	79.2%	75.9%	77.5%
Switzerland	71.8%	82.6%	70.0%	52.9%	86.1%	96.0%	93.1%	83.5%	81.5%	56.4%	66.5%	67.6%	78.3%	82.4%	76.7%
United Kingdom	88.6%	86.2%	91.0%	74.0%	85.6%	81.6%	27.6%	76.5%	69.1%	73.1%	82.2%	84.2%	80.5%	53.6%	69.8%
Austria	..	32.1%	59.6%	38.4%	54.7%	61.1%	29.7%	56.4%	76.3%	69.2%	58.5%	72.5%	80.0%	85.7%	69.1%
New Zealand	72.0%	..	..	..	..	..	..	80.5%	65.3%	58.5%	57.8%	65.9%	74.0%	77.8%	68.5%
Belgium	44.8%	46.4%	26.8%	59.2%	48.1%	42.3%	25.5%	43.5%	50.5%	55.3%	66.8%	78.3%	80.5%	73.4%	64.0%
Italy	14.6%	81.7%	8.4%	90.1%	94.7%	93.1%	80.9%	75.7%	81.5%	67.4%	60.5%	80.7%	28.7%	54.2%	62.8%
Netherlands	62.0%	82.1%	72.5%	54.6%	58.7%	64.1%	42.4%	59.4%	72.2%	53.9%	65.0%	62.4%	68.9%	42.6%	60.5%
Canada	60.8%	69.7%	73.1%	58.3%	60.4%	54.5%	61.1%	61.9%	62.8%	55.5%	56.9%	55.9%	68.7%	50.0%	59.7%
Luxembourg	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	100.0%	41.6%	9.5%	56.9%	59.4%	58.6%	65.5%	58.1%
Germany	100.0%	50.0%	..	100.0%	58.2%	52.2%	45.2%	42.5%	47.2%	47.2%	47.7%	37.0%	49.1%	47.3%	47.4%
Denmark	42.4%	56.5%	41.6%	43.3%	60.5%	18.8%	51.3%	53.9%	70.1%	28.3%	31.4%	33.3%	53.7%	41.9%	44.6%
Finland	31.3%	58.1%	32.1%	34.8%	28.6%	30.1%	32.1%	24.0%	45.9%	53.7%	42.3%	47.0%	58.0%	44.0%	43.2%
Ireland	..	..	..	..	..	46.9%	64.0%	68.9%	43.6%	37.9%	44.6%	36.0%	43.2%	34.8%	41.9%
Spain	100.0%	100.0%	75.3%	74.0%	42.7%	59.8%	49.6%	50.4%	43.4%	52.2%	36.6%	36.7%	30.2%	35.6%	41.6%
Norway	62.8%	43.2%	58.4%	14.2%	32.4%	25.4%	25.4%	30.9%	31.7%	38.8%	45.3%	42.7%	40.6%	39.6%	37.9%
Greece	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	90.6%	28.8%	8.6%	35.0%	79.4%	89.5%	45.0%	37.5%
Sweden	43.7%	43.0%	53.1%	48.5%	52.4%	30.8%	44.9%	42.9%	37.4%	38.8%	27.9%	25.9%	34.4%	28.8%	35.4%

Note: The percentages in the section "total" is calculated as (sum of election assistance amount between 1995 and 2008 / sum of democracy assistance amount between 1995 and 2008)×100.

Source: Calculated by the author based on data in (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.).

Table 15 shows the amount spent by DAC member countries on civil society assistance from 1995 to 2008. Here, Japan's assistance is significantly small compared to most DAC countries. While seven countries have spent $1 to 5 billion for civil society assistance in total during the period, Japan has spent only $20 million. The total civil society assistance amount of Japan is only 0.4% of that of the United States. Although Japan is one of the biggest donors of ODA, its civil society assistance amount is about the same level as small donors such as Greece and Luxembourg.

Table 15 Civil Society Assistance, 1995-2008

(Unit: US$ Million, Commitment-current)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
United States	296	183	225	256	282	211	283	352	374	395	395	414	594	599	4,859
Sweden	52	79	84	70	55	77	85	87	153	166	366	466	233	298	2,272
Germany	0	0	0	0	62	67	99	133	154	182	205	356	408	478	2,146
United Kingdom	9	15	9	65	34	66	328	113	159	157	120	88	72	896	2,131
Norway	19	26	19	66	85	82	92	135	124	121	133	154	192	239	1,486
Canada	49	37	18	52	52	59	42	59	65	88	117	157	190	243	1,228
Netherlands	37	33	18	31	30	64	81	109	77	100	55	158	97	259	1,149
Denmark	25	22	40	16	26	37	56	43	36	81	155	70	95	190	891
Spain	0	0	7	14	17	13	20	27	32	45	62	103	223	223	787
Australia	2	4	11	5	21	28	32	11	26	61	25	45	32	94	396
Finland	1	4	16	9	20	22	22	30	30	30	44	31	33	45	338
Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	8	25	35	41	51	59	79	309
Belgium	10	8	14	12	13	14	25	34	18	32	32	27	25	41	302
Switzerland	4	6	4	10	3	1	4	6	8	34	31	26	32	21	188
Italy	3	2	10	1	2	0	2	6	5	8	6	7	50	47	150
France	3	3	2	8	5	10	7	3	8	3	0	3	0	24	81
Austria	0	6	4	5	3	2	5	5	4	3	6	9	12	6	69
New Zealand	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	4	14	13	9	11	58
Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	2	2	2	1	11	23
Japan	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	3	3	20
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	2	5	3	13
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	4

Note: The amount of civil society assistance is calculated as the sum of the assistance for strengthening civil society, human rights, free flow of information, and women's equality organizations and institutions.

Source: (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.).

Table 16 shows the share of civil society assistance in each DAC member country's overall democracy assistance between 1995 and 2008. The result here is almost the opposite from that of the state institutions assistance. While most DAC member countries allocate more than 40% of their democracy assistance to the civil society sector, Japan allocates only 1.1% to the sector on average. The share of civil society assistance of Japan is the smallest among all the DAC member countries, followed by 3.3% of Portugal and 7.5% of France. The small amount of Japan's democracy assistance allocation to the civil society sector is striking compared with other donors. Seven out of 22 countries allocate more than 50% of their democracy assistance to the civil society sector on average, 12 countries allocate more than 40% to it, and 17 countries allocate more than 20%. Japan's minor role in assisting civil society is distinct.

Table 16 Share of Civil Society Assistance in Total Democracy Assistance, 1995-2008

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Average
Sweden	50.4%	53.2%	42.5%	49.8%	43.1%	64.4%	52.0%	53.3%	59.9%	57.0%	69.2%	73.6%	63.2%	64.8%	61.4%
Norway	26.7%	56.3%	39.1%	85.4%	60.8%	70.9%	70.7%	65.1%	64.8%	55.9%	47.6%	53.9%	55.2%	53.4%	57.1%
Spain	0.0%	0.0%	24.6%	24.1%	56.6%	39.6%	48.4%	48.9%	56.5%	47.2%	60.3%	61.3%	68.5%	59.6%	56.1%
Finland	67.0%	38.9%	66.9%	51.6%	70.3%	69.4%	66.5%	75.1%	51.0%	44.1%	53.7%	52.4%	41.4%	55.2%	54.8%
Ireland	..	..	..	..	..	49.7%	30.1%	29.2%	55.1%	57.9%	50.7%	61.6%	53.9%	59.6%	54.3%
Denmark	43.9%	43.5%	56.3%	42.8%	34.1%	77.6%	45.6%	43.3%	28.5%	64.9%	67.8%	63.1%	44.3%	55.2%	52.1%
Germany	0.0%	0.0%	..	0.0%	39.9%	45.4%	53.3%	56.9%	52.4%	52.2%	48.5%	62.9%	50.3%	51.3%	51.4%
Luxembourg	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.0%	58.4%	90.5%	22.9%	40.6%	41.4%	31.7%	39.2%
Netherlands	34.5%	17.9%	27.5%	40.3%	38.1%	33.7%	54.9%	38.5%	24.4%	38.0%	24.1%	34.6%	27.7%	52.4%	35.5%
Canada	37.7%	25.2%	23.7%	40.3%	36.9%	40.8%	37.3%	36.9%	31.9%	32.9%	30.2%	39.9%	27.6%	43.8%	34.7%
Italy	83.6%	18.3%	78.5%	3.7%	4.7%	1.4%	13.0%	24.3%	18.2%	21.2%	25.6%	18.0%	71.3%	38.9%	32.7%
Belgium	49.4%	49.9%	72.5%	39.0%	50.0%	55.0%	74.5%	54.9%	47.2%	28.7%	23.4%	18.0%	18.2%	23.9%	31.1%
Austria	..	60.7%	26.7%	61.6%	42.1%	33.3%	70.3%	42.4%	23.7%	26.0%	31.6%	27.4%	19.7%	14.3%	28.4%
United Kingdom	7.8%	10.4%	8.1%	24.7%	12.1%	15.6%	71.8%	22.3%	29.0%	22.3%	12.4%	10.9%	12.3%	43.6%	26.7%
New Zealand	28.0%	..	..	..	..	..	..	14.6%	32.2%	24.7%	30.2%	32.1%	23.6%	22.1%	26.5%
Greece	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	9.4%	71.2%	5.0%	47.8%	20.6%	10.1%	55.0%	22.8%
Switzerland	18.2%	17.4%	25.1%	40.8%	9.5%	1.6%	6.1%	14.6%	13.0%	37.1%	31.6%	30.0%	20.6%	16.2%	20.5%
United States	20.8%	43.9%	40.9%	43.3%	56.1%	38.4%	22.4%	27.2%	35.8%	9.5%	10.7%	20.8%	16.6%	15.1%	19.4%
Australia	17.4%	5.0%	15.3%	6.6%	11.7%	25.6%	29.5%	9.1%	9.3%	13.5%	6.6%	8.7%	6.6%	12.0%	10.9%
France	4.3%	1.5%	10.5%	14.5%	7.7%	11.6%	13.4%	6.5%	10.6%	5.3%	0.0%	4.1%	0.0%	22.2%	7.5%
Portugal	..	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.4%	4.6%	5.2%	2.4%	11.0%	4.1%	2.3%	1.1%	4.8%	3.3%
Japan	0.0%	5.2%	0.0%	0.0%	..	0.0%	..	0.0%	0.5%	0.3%	0.4%	0.2%	1.3%	1.4%	1.1%

Source: Calculated by the author based on the data in (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.).

Figure 2 shows each DAC member countries' democracy assistance allocation to each sector. It shows that while there are countries such as Australia, France, and Portugal that allocate significant portions of their democracy assistance to state institutions, the percentage Japan allocates for the state institution sector is the greatest among all. On the other hand, countries such as Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Spain, and Sweden allocate about or more than half of democracy assistance to the civil society sector; and their aid allocated to both the state institutions and the civil society sectors is balanced.

Figure 2 Democracy Assistance by Aiding Sectors, 1995-2008



Source: Created by the author based on the data in (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.).

Conclusion

This chapter has examined Japan's democracy assistance in terms of its policy frameworks, aid amount, its share in Japanese ODA, and aid allocations among sectors. Concrete contents of Japanese democracy assistance are described in Appendix 1.

Japanese democracy assistance amount has increased along with the launching of various new policy frameworks on democracy assistance since the early 1990s. It has increased in terms of its share in Japanese ODA amount as well. However, what is striking is that the share of democracy assistance in Japanese foreign aid has been constantly small. The share of democracy assistance in Japanese ODA from 1990 to 2008 is only 0.7%, and the smallest among all the DAC member countries. Why has Japan's ODA allocation for democracy assistance been so small? Why has Japan been a minor player in the field? This is the first of the two questions of this dissertation.

When it comes to state institutions assistance, however, Japan's assistance is substantially large, and Japan is the seventh largest donor for this sector among DAC member countries. It is because of the fact that Japan's democracy assistance predominantly goes to the state institution sector – 98.2% of Japanese democracy assistance goes for this sector. While other donors are active in assisting the civil society sector as well, Japan barely assists the sector. Why does Japan allocate most of its democracy assistance to the state institution sector? Why does Japan barely assist the civil society sector? This is the second question of this dissertation.

Examination on the reasons behind the small allocation of Japanese ODA to democracy assistance requires the examination on Japanese ODA to other areas vis-a-vis democracy assistance. Expansion of the share of democracy assistance in ODA requires

the decrease in the share of other types of aid provided from ODA. Why does Japan allocate only a small amount of ODA to democracy assistance vis-à-vis other areas? What are the areas that have enjoyed large allocation of Japanese ODA? The next chapter will articulate the overall trend of Japanese foreign aid in order to grasp the position of democracy assistance within Japanese foreign aid as a whole. In doing so, it will also test three existing literature on Japanese foreign aid to see if they explain the share of democracy assistance in Japanese foreign aid.

Chapter 4: Japanese Foreign Aid and the Explanatory Power of the Existing Literature

In order to understand why ODA allocation for democracy assistance has been small, it is necessary to examine the trend of Japanese foreign aid overall. Because the increase in the share of democracy assistance naturally decreases those of other fields, it is necessary to examine the position given to democracy assistance within overall foreign aid vis-à-vis aid provided for other purposes. By examining the trend of Japanese foreign aid, this chapter will also clarify what can be explained by the existing literature and what remains to be explained.

Reparation and the Era of Mercantilism

Japan was not a foreign aid donor but a recipient in the aftermath of WWII. Devastated from the defeat in WWII, Japan received foreign aid of $1.8 billion from the United States between 1946 and 1951 through the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) and the Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Area (EROA) programs. Two years after Japan finished receiving foreign aid from the United States, the country started receiving loan from the World Bank. From 1953 to 1966, Japan received a total loan of $862.9 million for 34 projects from the World Bank, and it was only in 1990 that Japan finished paying it off to the World Bank. Other donors for Japan included such countries as Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Mexico, and Peru.

It was in 1954 that Japan started providing foreign aid in addition to receiving aid. Participating in the Colombo Plan in 1954, Japan started providing technical assistance through the dispatch of specialists and the receipt of trainees. Technical assistance approach was taken partially due to Japan's weak economy at the time and also due to the Colombo Plan's focus on human resource development. About the same time, Japan entered into agreement on grant aid as sub-reparation with Thailand in 1955, Laos in 1958, Cambodia in 1959, South Korea in 1965, Singapore in 1967, and Malaysia in 1967. These agreements were concluded because these countries relinquished their claim on reparation to Japan even though the Treaty of San Francisco required Japan to pay reparation to countries which were occupied or damaged by Japan before and during the WWII. Japan's foreign aid activities were further propelled by its participation in the Development Assistance Group (DAG, later became DAC) of OECD in 1960.

Foreign aid was a big financial burden for Japan which was still a much weaker economy compared to the United States and other major European countries. Japan in the mid 1950s thus planned to provide foreign aid in a way to promote its own trade and economy. As Kazuo Sumi points out, the fact that Baisho tokuju shitsu (Compensation Special Procurement Office), the office in charge of foreign aid, was created in MITI, the ministry in charge of trade, succinctly indicates such a Japanese policy to connect foreign aid with its own economic expansion (Sumi 1989, 128-129). Japanese products and companies were tied to foreign aid in a way to provide Japanese plants, machines, and products to recipient countries. It led to the expansion of foreign markets for Japanese corporations. Japan took mercantilist approach due to the weakness of its own economy.

Japanese companies took initiatives from project mining, project building, to project implementation in a large number of Japanese foreign aid projects. Prominent person who worked in this field was Yutaka Kubota. Having the experience of a large number of dam constructions in North and South-East Asia before the two world wars, Kubota took the initiative of creating dams in Asian countries with using Japanese foreign aid. He pushed prominent Japanese politicians such as Shigeru Yoshida, Nobusuke Kishi, and Hayato Ikeda, in addition to bringing big Japanese construction companies for foreign aid project implementation (Kubota & Yamaguchi 1967; Sumi 1989, 130-133; Tsuito kubota yutaka henshu iin 1987).

Foreign aid practice from the late 1970s to the early 1990s continued reflecting Japan's economic interest. *Current State and Problems of Economic Cooperation (Keizai kyoryoku no genjo to mondaiten),* published from MITI in 1993, showed the recognition that foreign aid constituted the core of Japan's economic activities. It regarded ODA, investment and import as the trinity of Japanese economic activities (MITI 1993, 144). Japanese companies were tied to ODA projects in order to drop ODA money to them. These companies provided advice to governments of recepient countries on what kind of foreign aid projects they should request to the Japanese government. The companies also maintained intimate relations with Japanese governmental officers in charge of foreign aid, and conducted preliminary research, basic project creation, lobbying, and procurement necessary for the implementation of foreign aid projects recipient governments requested to Japan based on advice from Japanese companies (Ichikawa & Sakurai 1995, 230; Orr 1990, 28-29, 60-64).

The projects they designed were formulated in a way to be beneficial not only for the recepient countries but also for Japanese economy and companies. When faced US embargo of soybean export in 1973 due to its shortfall in the United States, Japan used foreign aid to promote soybean production in developing countries (Lancaster 2007, 117). The Japanese government utilized ODA as a tool to secure natural resources in the Middle East after two oil shocks in the 1970s by distancing itself from US support for Israel and pledging $3 billion of foreign aid for Arab countries. This was a strategy taken in order to maintain good relations with Arab countries so as to stabilize oil import from them (Hashimoto K. , Strategic Aid, 1995; Orr 1990, 55-56). Stable import of oil possessed a vital importance for Japan, which relied 90% of oil on imports, and 80% of imported oil from the Middle Eastern countries. Such foreign aid behavior of Japan is just as the mercantilist literature explains. Although Japanese economy was already much stronger compared to the aftermath of WWII, Japan continued formulating its foreign aid policy based on its economic interest rather than on needs in developing countries.

After DAG was created in 1961 with having European countries and Japan participating in the foreign aid practice, the international aid community overall conducted assistance which was consistent with the neoclassical growth model of Robert Solow (1956) and Trevor Swan (1956). Solow and Swan argued that investment to economic infrastructure pushes up national income. Enhancement of national economy by industrialization and trade was considered to enhance the living standard of citizens overall. Based on the belief, assistance for the economic infrastructure and the promotion of trade activities of corporations in recipient countries was considered a way to improve

citizens' lives. The neoclassical growth model, thus, was compatible with Japan's mercantilist approach of focusing its foreign aid on economic infrastructure.

Japanese government diluted its emphasis on the benefit of foreign aid to Japanese business sectors in the 1970s to some extent due to several reasons, however. First, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's visit to Southeast Asian countries faced huge anti-Japan riots especially in Indonesia and Thailand. Indonesian and Thai students criticized the penetration of Japanese corporations into their markets, calling it Japanese imperialism, and regarded Japanese foreign aid as one of the means to help the penetration. Second, media started reporting some mal consequences of Japanese foreign aid projects such as environmental degradation and forced relocation of local people, which increased criticism against Japan's foreign aid for economic infrastructure domestically. In addition, Japan's trade surplus toward the United States was growing and caused criticism from the United States, which led the US-Japan Summit in 1977 to pick up the issue of strictly tied nature of Japanese foreign aid as one of the causes of the trade imbalance. Given these factors, Japanese government announced that it would untie Japanese companies from ODA in 1978, and increased the rate of untied loans to 85.6% of all its bilateral aid by 1990 (Table 17).

Table 17 Change of the Untied Rate in Japanese Bilateral ODA

(commitment-based)

1972	1977	1982	1987	1990	1991
28.3%	43.8%	63.9%	72.1%	85.6%	83.3%

Source: "Zuhyo-8 wagakuni ODA sogaku no taiingu suteitasu no suii (Figures and Tables 8 Change of Tying Status of Japanese ODA)" in (MOFA 1994, 20).

As the structural adjustment loan programs of the World Bank, which planned national economy building based on trade expansion, came to a dead end at the end of the 1980s, the international aid community started weighing heavily on assistance for Basic Human Needs (BHN) and good governance. Change of focus in Japanese foreign aid from economic infrastructure to BHN occurred in a way that Japan's aid gets consistency with DAC's ODA policy, albeit slowly. The grant element of Japanese ODA increased in the 1980s as well. Discussions on the importance of good governance for economic development started in the late 1990s in Japan, 10 years after the international aid community started such a discussion. However, many in Japan remained skeptical about governance assistance which supports democratization, arguing that it might be "imposition" of a particular institution on developing countries (e.g., Shimomura 1998). Despite the overall change, Japan's ODA remained mainly targeting economic infrastructure.

As such, while the mercantilist characteristics started diluting from the mid 1970s, Japanese foreign aid up to the 1980s was largely provided based on mercantilist interest.

Democracy Norm and the Creation of the ODA Charter

From the latter half of the 1980s to the early 1990s, a number of factors led Japan to consider providing foreign aid for democracy promotion. Domestically, criticism toward the lack of Japanese foreign aid principles was ever getting fierce in the 1980s. Japanese foreign aid had been provided without clear policies up to then. Individual projects were created without having overall visions about foreign aid and policies about target sectors. Targets of foreign aid were determined not in terms of priority sectors or

visions but in terms of overall foreign aid amount set in mid-term policies from 1977 to 1993. Japanese foreign aid was also occasionally used as "souvenirs" at the time of top Japanese officials' visit to foreign countries (Orr 1990, 24). The contents of such souvenirs are created ad-hoc in a way to please the recipient side.

Such scholars as Yoshinori Murai and Kazuo Sumi argued that the lack of principles causes Japanese foreign aid to accept strong influence of Japanese corporations and foreign pressure, which end up damaging culture and environment in recipient countries (Murai 1992; Murai & ODA chosa kenkyu kai 1989; Sumi 1989). These criticisms named Japanese foreign aid as "aid without face *(kao no nai enjo)*", meaning mere monetary aid without the dispatch of people, and required the Japanese government to create foreign aid law in which to specify visions and principles of its foreign aid.

Domestic criticism toward Japanese foreign aid was further strengthened by a broadcasting of corruption case in the Philippines related to foreign aid from Japan in 1986. As the Marcos administration was suspected to have corruptly amassed Japanese foreign aid and peculated it, voice requesting greater transparency in Japanese foreign aid increased domestically. Along with the criticism that Japanese foreign aid lacks principles, they required the specification of the visions and principles of Japanese foreign aid.

While these criticisms only required some set of principles but not necessary democracy principle, the occurrence of democratization in Burma and the Tiananmen Square incident in China increased pressure toward the Japanese government that it should provide foreign aid along with democracy norms. Given governmental

suppression on people's pro-democracy uprising occurred in Burma in 1988, donors including Japan suspended foreign aid to the country. However, while most European donors and the United States have continued the sanction until today, Japan resumed its foreign aid to Burma already in February 1989 despite the hope from opposition leaders within Burma not to do so (Sanger 1989).[5] Japan also acknowledged the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), a military regime created by General Saw Maung out of a coup d'état in Burma, as a legitimate regime before any other developed countries. This caused criticism internationally and domestically toward the Japanese government that Japan was providing foreign aid for military regime and thus was assisting the suppression of pro-democracy movement.

Same kind of criticism occurred concerning Japan's foreign aid to China. Despite the Chinese government's brutal crackdown of pro-democracy uprising in the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989, the Japanese government initially showed intention to continue providing foreign aid to China. Japan tried to distance itself from the incident, while the United States and most European donors were considering the suspension of their foreign aid (Horvat 1989). Criticism that Japan was trying to bring business back to as usual too soon, and that Japan, as the biggest donor for China, was not trying to take sanction measures just as other Western donors amounted domestically and internationally (Hiatt 1989). Such domestic and international criticisms for Japan's reluctance to take actions for the support of pro-democracy movements triggered Japan to consider the necessity to specify visions and principles of Japanese foreign aid along with democracy norms.

[5] Japan suspended non-humanitarian and non-urgent foreign aid to Burma in 2003.

In addition, public opinion in Japan keenly sensed that check-book diplomacy was not enough in obtaining international recognition as a major political power at the time of the Gulf War. Having the tendency to care "how others view us" than "what we do," the lack of recognition for the Japanese monetary contribution of $13 billion for the multilateral force in the Gulf War triggered Japan to reconsider its foreign policy in general including foreign aid provision. In addition to the Japanese public in general, MOFA and the LDP, governing party of the time, also strongly felt a "sense of defeat" in diplomacy, which motivated them to reform Japanese ODA (Shimomura, Nakagawa and Saito 1999, 81). Bringing "human face" to Japanese ODA, which means to locate Japanese agents on the ground in foreign aid projects in order to show Japanese presence, became a task for the Japanese government (Alan 1993; Reimann 2003, 310).

These events strengthened the voice of opposition parties such as the Socialist and the Komeito parties, in addition to civil society, to request the creation of a law on foreign aid which states visions and purposes. The Komeito and the Socialist parties submitted Kokusai kaihatsu kyoryoku kihon ho (International Development Cooperation Fundamental Law) in 1989 and 1993 respectively to the House of Councillors, although these bills were discarded (Shimomura, Nakagawa and Saito 1999, 68-70). Instead of creating binding laws, the LDP, the governing party of the time, in addition to MOFA, moved to create a guideline for ODA. MOFA, MOF, EPA and MITI negotiated its form based on a draft ODA Guideline created by MOFA in March 1991. The Cabinet reached an agreement in June 1992 to accept it as ODA Charter with slight revisions. The resulted ODA Charter stated that Japan would provide aid paying full attention to "efforts for promoting democratization and introduction of a market-oriented economy,

and the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient country" (MOFA 1992).

In sum, the occurrence of pro-democracy movements in Asia, in addition to corruption case concerning Japanese ODA and the lack of recognition for Japan's monetary contribution in the Gulf War, led Japan to incorporate democracy idea in its foreign aid.

Human Security as a New Idea

The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, which devastated a number of Asian countries whose markets were important for Japanese exports, caused another paradigm shift for Japanese foreign aid. Keenly sensing the need for aiding these countries for stability of individual lives and the region as a whole, Japan started positioning the idea of "human security" at the center of its foreign aid.

It was by the publication of *Human Development Report* from UNDP in 1994 that the concept of human security came to the forefront of international assistance. This report pointed out the importance of focusing on individual human beings as the target of security instead of countries, and found threat to human security in terms of military, politics, economy, and society (UNDP 1994, supra note 3, Chapter 2). In a sense, however, the concept of human security has its origin back in the 1940s – in the United Nations Charter (UN Charter). The UN Charter raised the promotion of economic and social development for all human beings as one of the purposes of UN activities. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 1966 also raised these

issues. The focus on human security in the 1990s was, thus, reemergence of an old issue. This reemergence of the human security issue was caused due to emerging threat of civil conflict in the post-Cold War era in addition to the expansion of gaps between rich and poor as a result of globalization. Incorporating this concept, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi manifested in May 1998 that Japan would provide foreign aid for the weak in Asian countries hit by the financial crisis for their human security. By giving a name for Japanese effort, Japan tried to impress the international society and the Asian countries that Japan had been taking massive effort of assisting Asian countries recovering from the financial crisis (Fukushima 2010, 87-90).

Ever since then, human security has been positioned as one of the main purposes of Japanese foreign aid. The Diplomatic Bluebook of 1999 used the term human security for the first time, and continued explaining its importance in subsequent diplomatic bluebooks. The Japanese government mentioned human security in various occasions such as the TICAD Tenth Anniversary Declaration of 2003, ASEAN-Japan Tokyo Declaration of 2003, the G8 Summit of 2008, and TICAD IV of 2008. With having Sadako Ogata, a former UNHCR High Commissioner, as the president of JICA, JICA also started placing human security as the priority issue for its aid activities. Based on Japanese proposals, such institutions as the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS), the Commission on Human Security, and Friends of Human Security Forum were established within the United Nations in 1999, 2001, and 2006 respectively. Among these proposals, Japan pledged 500 million yen (approximately $5 million) for the establishment of UNTFHS. While the Commission on Human Security was dissolved after publishing a final report, "Human Security Now," as a result of five

meetings held in the commission, the Friends of Human Security Forum is still held twice a year, and UNTFHS still exists (Fukushima 2010, 87-94). These Japanese actions show that human security has been a new central idea for Japanese foreign aid policy.

The figures who brought the idea of human security into Japanese foreign policy were Keizo Obuchi and Keizo Takemi. It was then Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi who officially announced the incorporation of human security into Japanese foreign policy in May 1998. He also emphasized the importance of human security in his policy speeches in 1999 and 2000 as a prime minister. Also important was Keizo Takemi, Obuchi's brain who became vice minister of MOFA in July 1998, who regarded the importance of incorporating the idea of human security from early on. Yukio Sato, former Japanese Ambassador to the United Nations, also played an important role in disseminating Japanese emphasis on human security in the United Nations (H. Sato 2011, 342-343). According to Sato (2011, 344) and Akiyama (2005, 263-343), these political leaders found the utility of human security in pursuing a new way of international cooperation for Japan after the Gulf War. Experiencing the lack of recognition on Japan's monetary contribution at the time, Japan was seriously seeking to expand the target areas of Japan's international cooperation. UNDP's proposal of the concept of human security gave a light for those politicians and MOFA members that Japan could contribute to address threat to human security. Sadako Ogata, then High Commissioner of UNHCR, also played a significant role as a co-chair of the Commission of Human Security established in the United Nations in 2001 with Amartya Sen. In addition, Akiyama (2005, 263-264) and Yokota (2002, 360) argue that activating Japan's international contribution with the usage of the concept of human security was considered as a way to improve

Japan's international status in order to obtain a seat in the United Nations Security Council.

Human security is defined as "freedom from fear and freedom from want." Kofi Annan (2000), then Secretary General of the United Nations, stated that human security includes such issues as human rights and good governance. Taking into account that one of the purposes of democracy assistance is the improvement of governance, assistance for human security naturally incorporates democracy assistance. However, while such countries as Canada, Norway and Switzerland do appreciate the linkage between human security assistance and democracy assistance, Japanese understanding of human security differs from theirs. For example, Canada criticized the UNDP's definition of human security that includes protecting individual human beings from military, political, economic, and social threats. For Canadians, such a definition was too broad to develop concrete politics and downplayed human insecurity caused by violence (Canada 1999). Canada therefore emphasized that the prime aim of human security should be the prevention of conflicts and wars (Commission on Global Governance 1995). Canada and European countries understand human security mainly in terms of "freedom from fear," and protection from the threat to human rights in countries under military conflict. Their main method for the protection of human security tends to be humanitarian intervention, although the means are not necessarily military ones. Democracy assistance is a part of such means. In contrast to this rights-based approach, Japanese understanding of human security is more comprehensive, and focuses more on development rather than human rights. Japan took the line of DAC's "New Development Strategy" of 1996, which sets human-centered development, economic welfare, social development, and environmental

sustainability as its aim (DAC, New Development Strategy 1996). The ODA Mid-term Policy of 1999 stated that it bases its policy on DAC's New Development Strategy and emphasized the concept of human-centered development and human security (MOFA, Former ODA mid-term policy 1999). The ODA Mid-term Policy of 2005 raised such factors as threats to human security – conflict, terrorism, crimes, human rights violation, becoming refugees, infectious diseases, environmental degradation, economic crises, natural disaster, poverty, starvation, lack of education, health, and medical services (MOFA, Mid-term Policy on Official Development Assistance 2005, 2). It shows that Japanese understanding of human security is substantially broader than that of Canada and European countries. Among these issues, Japan defines priority issues as 1) poverty reduction, 2) sustainable development, 3) tackling global issues, and 4) peace building. Although human rights issues are not excluded from Japanese understanding of human security, it is not in the priority issues. This is a development-based approach which emphasizes "freedom from want" as opposed to the rights-based approach of Canada and European countries, and excludes democracy assistance from the means for human security (Ichihara 2011, 127-128).

Those who interpret human security in terms of "freedom from fear" and take rights-based approach are not absent in Japan either. Such scholars as Kazuhiko Aiba and Toshiki Mogami (2001) argue that humanitarian intervention should be considered as means for human security of victims in conflict or ethnic cleansing, although it is necessary to obtain authorization for such means from the United Nations Security

Council without requests or consent of domestic actors in countries in issue.[6] However, two factors led Japan to possess development-based approach which focuses on freedom from want. First, the situation in Asia in the late 1990s cast a grave impact. The Asian Financial Crisis posed serious threat to economies of Asian countries, life of people in those countries, the stability of the region, and the health of international finance. Although Japan was not hit by the financial crisis, the sense of threat for Japanese economy was enormous. Created in such a situation, Japanese interpretation of human security naturally focused on those areas that were threatened by the Asian Financial Crisis (Akiyama 2005, 255-259; Fukushima 2010; M. Sato 2009, 99-100).

Secondly, the limitation on the use of military forces defined in the Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution restrained Japanese role in humanitarian intervention. Seeking a practical way that Japan can contribute for human security, Japan could not avoid but to remove humanitarian intervention from the means of achieving human security and instead to have development-based approach which does not require the use of force.

Such a development-based approach to human security was not totally new to Japan. A study group of Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira launched the concept of "comprehensive security (sogo anzen hosho)" in 1980, in order to identify non-military threat to Japan. Being motivated by the economic suffering Japan experienced from two oil shocks, this study group raised the necessary to understand security not only in terms of military but also in terms of energy, food, and natural disaster. Japanese understanding

[6] Concerning the argument of Aiba, see (M. Sato 2009, 104). It was originally appeared in Kazuhiko Aiba, "Ningen no anzenhoshoron to jindo kainyu: Ruwanda no jenosaido kara (Human security and humanitarian intervention: From the case of genocide in Ruwanda)," in Mitsuru Kurosawa, Ningen no anzen hosho to kokusaiteki na seidoka (Human security and international institutionalization), study conducted with the funding from MEXT, 2000-2002.

of human security is in line with the concept of comprehensive security (Fukushima 2010; M. Sato 2009, 97-99).

Although democracy assistance is not excluded from the focus of Japanese foreign aid, the increased presence of human security has taken over the emphasis of aid for democracy assistance. Figure 3 shows the share of aid to human security in comparison with aid to other fields. This figure categorizes foreign aid provided for social infrastructure, humanitarian aid, and refugee support as aid for human security. It shows that economic infrastructure aid has been in a slight decline since the early 1990s. Aid for the production sector, which covers all production related sectors such as agriculture and fishery, has been in an even clearer decline.[7] Instead, what has been in rise is aid for such fields as social infrastructure and humanitarian aid, which is categorized as "human security" in this figure. The share started rising in the early 1970 as international aid community's concern on BHN grew, and continued increasing until today. This is in a contrast compared to democracy assistance, whose share has been extremely small. Although the share of democracy assistance started rising in the early 2000s, it is still far below the level of human security assistance. But we have to note this

[7] "Production sector" is a category name created by OECD. According to OECD, it includes "Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry: crop and livestock development, provision of production requisites such as farm machinery and fertiliser, irrigation, pest control, veterinary services; services to the agricultural sector, fishing and forestry (including tree crops); conservation and extension, land reclamation; land and soil surveys, land and water use; agricultural construction; storage and transport facilities. Agricultural development banks are included under this heading. Industry, Mining and Construction: assistance to extractive and manufacturing industries of all kinds, including prospecting and geological surveys, development and refining of petroleum and ores, processing of food and other agricultural products, manufacture of fertilisers and farm machinery, cottage industry and handicrafts and non-agricultural storage and warehousing. Trade and Tourism: export promotion, trade, commerce and distribution; banking (including industrial development banks) and hotel and other tourist facilities." (OECD, Data Characteristics: Production Sectors n.d.)

tricky issue that Japanese definition of human security is so broad that any kinds of foreign aid could potentially be defined as a part of human security assistance.

Figure 3 Rising Share of Foreign Aid for Human Security



Note 1: "Human Security" includes social infrastructure, humanitarian aid, and refugee support.
Note 2: “democracy assistance” is a sum of "I.5. Government & Civil Society" and "I.5.a. Government & Civil Society-general."
Note 3: This figure excludes Multisector/Cross-Cutting, Action Relating to Debt, Administrative Costs of Donors, Support to NGOs, and Unallocated/Unspecified costs.
Source: (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.).

As such, the core idea in Japanese foreign aid has changed over time. While Japanese foreign aid was provided to economic infrastructure overwhelmingly until the 1980s, the idea of democracy assistance was inserted as one of the purposes of Japanese foreign aid in the early 1990s. While democracy assistance has been in increase reflecting such a policy change, the emphasis on human security, which does not

incorporate democracy assistance within itself due to Japan's development-based approach, has been increasing its presence in Japanese foreign aid.

Explanatory Power of the Mercantilist Literature

Despite such changes of ideas concerning foreign aid over time, the share of economic infrastructure assistance remains higher than either those for democracy assistance or human security. The rising share of aid for human security is more a result of declining share of production sector assistance than the change in the share of economic infrastructure assistance (Figure 3).

In addition, the Japanese government has a tendency to position economic infrastructure assistance as part of both human security and democracy assistance. As has been already pointed out, the first two priority issues for human security are stated as poverty reduction and sustainable development. When it comes to poverty reduction, most European countries take direct methods for it such as by aiding for the improvement of nutrition and providing technical assistance for food processing which utilizes alternative food resources. International aid community has also focused on good governance as a way to improve the effect of aid in a way that citizens of recipient countries can benefit so as to reduce poverty.

On the other hand, Japan has maintained its belief that the investment for economic infrastructure works the best for the reduction of poverty. This belief is shown in the *ODA White Paper* of 2000, which states that Japan has been taking an approach to promote economic growth necessary for poverty reduction, instead of taking an approach to regard poverty reduction itself as the main target of aid (Economic Cooperation

Bureay, MOFA 2000, 16). Foreign Minister Taro Aso called such an Japanese approach "investment for development" and emphasized its effectiveness in OECD Tokyo Policy Forum held in 2006 (Aso 2007, 280-285). Governmental agents and scholars of aid tend to regard that aid policy which overemphasizes BHN would fail to develop the economic environment necessary to attract investment, which would fail to lead to economic growth and thus is not an appropriate aid policy in the long run (Kidera 2008, 36-41). This belief causes the aid allocation for such categories as BHN, which should be considered a part of human security based on Japanese understanding, small. According to data of 2008, Japanese bilateral foreign aid allocation for primary healthcare and population issues were 0.8% and 0.2% respectively.[8] DAC Peer Review of 2003 criticizes such a Japanese approach, and points out that the foreign aid allocation for poverty reduction, primary healthcare and primary education, in addition to aid for least developing countries, are not enough (DAC 2003).

In relations with democracy assistance, Japan again argues that economic infrastructure aid has a utility as the foundation of democratization and the improvement of democratic quality. For example, the *ODA White Paper* of 1995 states that Japan regards important "cooperation for economic development and basic needs…which constitute indispensable bases for democratization and the introduction of market economy" (MOFA 1995, 65). JICA shows a similar view in its report, *Minshuteki na kuni zukuri eno shien ni mukete (Towards Democratic State-Building Assistance),* where it states that Japan has provided economic assistance as a basis for democratization (JICA, Towards Democratic State-Building Assistance 2003, 15). Based on such a belief,

[8] "Table 19. Aid by Major Purposes in 2008" in (DAC, Statistical Annex of the 2010 Development Co-operation Report n.d.).

Japan occasionally chooses to assist economic infrastructure instead of democratic governance even when there are demands for democracy assistance. An example can be found in East Timor. East Timor requested the Japanese government to provide legal assistance beginning in 2001, when its independence from Indonesia was determined. The Japanese side, however, rejected the request, saying that economic infrastructure assistance has a priority over democracy assistance (Shimizu 2002, 58).

Figure 4 shows the share of economic infrastructure assistance in Japanese ODA in comparison with four other large donor countries – France, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The share of economic infrastructure assistance in each donor country's ODA was substantially high in the late 1960s. France and the United States allocated more than 30% of their total ODA to economic infrastructure assistance in 1967, and Germany allocated 52.4% of its ODA to it in 1969. These rates were even higher than that of Japan, which was allocating 20-30% of its ODA to the economic infrastructure sector in the late 1960s. All the five countries including Japan dropped the share of economic infrastructure assistance in the beginning of the 1970s given increased emphasis on assistance for BHN, while the drop was the smallest for Japan. While most of them raised the share of economic infrastructure assistance again from the mid to late 1970s, it was Japan which increased the share of economic infrastructure assistance the most. The share of economic infrastructure assistance of Japanese ODA became the highest among them every year since then with the only exception of 1984, when the share of economic infrastructure assistance in German ODA exceeded the number of Japan. Other donors have allocated mostly less than 25% of their ODA to this sector, while Japan have continued allocating more than 30% of its ODA. While ODA allocation

for the economic infrastructure sector increased again in the mid 1980s for other donor countries, it dropped again after then and has been ever shrinking. On the other hand, while the share of economic infrastructure assistance for Japan occasionally dropped to below 30% in the 2000s, that of 2008 was still 38% (OECD, Aggregate Aid Statistics n.d.).

Figure 4 Share of Economic Infrastructure Assistance in ODA, 1967-2008



Source: (OECD, Aggregate Aid Statistics n.d.).

Why does the aid allocation for the economic infrastructure remain substantial for Japan? Why does Japan not increase the share of democracy assistance instead? If Japanese statement about the utility of economic infrastructure assistance for human security, democracy assistance, and economic growth as a whole is a mere lip service to disguise its interest in foreign aid as a tool for the promotion of its own economy, the

mercantilist literature seems to explain it. However, as has been argued, Japanese corporations have been untied from Japanese ODA since the 1980s, and thus Japanese foreign aid is not provided in a way to directly benefit Japanese economy anymore.

Despite the consistently high share of economic infrastructure aid, its nature changed after the 1980s from a tool for the promotion of Japanese economy to a tool for economic cooperation with developing countries. Japanese policy makers and scholars refer to Japanese own experience in addition to the development of Asian Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) as the rational for believing in the utility of economic infrastructure aid as the main method for economic cooperation. They argue that Japan itself reduced poverty, improved the public health, and expanded the opportunity for education by receiving loans from the World Bank for the economic infrastructure sector, which expanded trade and led to economic growth (Aso 2007; Kidera 2008; Omori 2005, 50-51). The belief in the utility of economic infrastructure assistance was further buttressed by the development of NIEs and member countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). *The ODA White Paper* of 1996 states that, with Japanese ODA for economic infrastructure playing a role, NIEs and ASEAN countries expanded trade activities and improved the living standard of their citizens (MOFA 1996, 32-33).

In Japanese discourse on democracy assistance, in addition, Japanese policy makers, aid agents, and scholars show strong discomfort about assistance that are provided for the benefit of the donor side. For example, Japanese agents of legal assistance criticize EBRD's legal assistance to East European countries after the end of the Cold War, where EBRD sought to improve the basic financial conditions of the East

European countries so as to lend money to the recipient countries. Japanese aid agents criticize American STAR Project in Vietnam as well, where the United States required and assisted Vietnam to create and revise its economy-related laws in order to expand the Vietnamese market which could benefit the US economy (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 3, 9). Japanese aid agents argue that assistance has to be provided solely for the benefit of the recipient side, and not for the donor side.

They also show hesitation about establishing for-profit organizations of democracy assistance such as consulting companies for the same reason. They believe that aid agents should not act for the sake of their profits, but for the sake of benefits of the recipient side. For example, such opinion was widely shown in the Kokusai Shiho Shien Semina (International Legal Assistance Seminar), hosted by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA) held in Tokyo on February 8, 2011. This is quite different compared to the United States, for example, where a number of private companies operate in the democracy assistance field.

Strong belief in the utility of economic infrastructure aid for human security, democracy assistance, and economic growth, in addition to the discomfort toward mercantilism, shows that the mercantilist literature is not appropriate to explain Japanese foreign aid after the late 1980s, although it explains that before then.

It has to be noted, in addition, that the mercantilist argument does not provide a clue to understand why Japanese democracy assistance goes mostly for the state institution sector. If we stretch the mercantilist literature, we may be able to speculate that Japanese government might provide its democracy assistance to the state institution sector instead of the civil society sector because the country uses its democracy

assistance as a tool to promote its economy, and possessing friendly relations with recipient governments makes it easier for Japanese corporations to enter into markets in the recipient side. However, because the mercantilist argument has never attempted to explain the rationale for the sector allocation of Japanese democracy assistance, this literature cannot be used as an alternative explanation for it.

Explanatory Power of the Institutionalist Literature

While the mercantilist literature does not seem to explain the remaining large share of economic infrastructure assistance as opposed to small share of democracy assistance from the late 1980s, the institutionalist literature seems to explain it to some extent. Alan Rix (1980) argues that there are multiple ministries struggling over foreign aid in the Japanese decision-making system, which inhibits the country from providing foreign aid in a consistent manner. Robert Orr (1990) further points out the relative weakness of MOFA compared to such ministries as MOF and MITI/METI when it comes to foreign aid.

Since democracy assistance is mainly political foreign aid in nature and is provided as technical assistance, the agencies in charge are mainly MOFA and JICA. Even when legal assistance projects are created, MOJ does not take initiatives. Under MOFA's authority over legal assistance projects, JICA takes initiative of project creation and implementation. MOJ comes in only after JICA requests the dispatch of experts from MOJ for such projects (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 81).

Not only has MOFA been simply in charge of democracy assistance, it has been an advocate of democracy assistance, although with cautiousness. While MOFA's staff

members such as Akira Yamada, then Assistant Chief of the Division of Research and Programming in the Economic Cooperation Bureau, showed anxiety about applying political conditionality to foreign aid automatically (A. Yamada 1991), it has always been MOFA that takes initiatives on democracy assistance. *The ODA White Paper* of 1990 created a section on democracy assistance for the first time. Stating that it would be necessary to have a national discussion about the pros and cons of taking into consideration regime types of recipient countries as criteria for providing foreign aid, MOFA indicated that it was sensing the need for democracy assistance (MOFA 1990, 26-27). The ODA Charter of 1992, the first ever guideline on Japanese foreign aid which indicated the will to assist democratization abroad, was drafted by MOFA (Shimomura, Nakagawa and Saito 1999, 83). Susan Pharr (1994, 169) points out that MOFA took the initiative of inserting the idea of democracy promotion in the ODA Charter because MOFA regarded it an interest to go along with the trend of international donor community for the direction of democracy promotion. If the institutionalist argument holds, however, it would be not an easy task to secure ODA budget for democracy assistance due to the political struggle over ODA budget among multiple ministries and the relative weakness of MOFA's power, even though MOFA tries to promote democracy abroad.

Because each ministry acts for the sake of its own interest as the organizational theory points out, there is always power game and politics among agencies. Such politics is most prominent over budget. Robert Orr (1990, 10) states as follows:

> Aid policy formulation is intrinsically linked with budgetary decisions and also with determining how funds are to be spent. Bureaucratic politics is said to

> dominate the budgetary decisionmaking process and this is certainly true in Japan. Since the distribution of the budget is directly linked to increase or decrease of power and influence of government organizations, most organizations strive to increase their share of the budget.

Reflecting power struggle over foreign aid budget among ministries, budget requests are made with listing aid budget by ministries and agencies but not by target countries or fields. Although budget items and their amount are already determined to some extent within each ministry before making budget request, the budget allocation within agencies is somewhat relaxed and not binding. Budget process, therefore, is a reflection of politics among ministries about "who secures more," while such a politics is weaker within ministries.

As the institutionalist argument points out, MOFA's power is traditionally weak compared to other ministries. This is largely due to the lack of support from outside MOFA. Each industry possesses industry groups who actively lobby for their interest. There are also Diet members called zoku-giin, who represent these industries to speak and act for their sake in politics. On the other hand, MOFA does not have either industrial groups that lobby for its sake, or zoku-giin. Suzuki Muneo, a zoku-giin of MOFA who exerted influence over such issues as Russo-Japanese relations, is extremely a rare, and might be the only, case.

Politics over foreign aid is complicated. The ministries that have traditionally possessed the greatest amount of ODA budget are the Cabinet Office, MOFA, and MOF. However, MITI/METI exerts influence over it as well. Japanese foreign aid is provided typically based on aid requests from developing countries either to MOFA or to Japanese embassies in their countries. Upon requests, the Cabinet Office, MOFA, MOF, and

MITI/METI discuss whether or not to accept the request. Although other ministries also participate in the decision-making process depending on the subject area, the above-mentioned four ministries are the core members which have the power over decisions. The Economic Planning Agency (EPA) was one of the core members in the foreign aid decision-making process until 2001, when the Cabinet Office was created and incorporated EPA operations (Kusano 2007; Orr 1990).

ODA budget is allocated not only for MOFA but also for other governmental agencies. Table 18 shows the breakdown of ODA Budget by agencies every five years from FY1995 to FY2010. ODA budget is spread to a large number of governmental agencies. Although MOFA's budget has been the biggest in terms of general account budget with possessing 554 billion yen in FY1995, 560 billion yen in FY2000, 488 billion yen in FY2005, and 413 billion yen in FY2010, MOF has had a big budget as well. When comparing MOF's budget to that of MOFA's in terms of ODA project budget overall, that of MOF exceeds the amount of MOFA's in all the four years. This is because MOF utilizes Fiscal Investment and Loan Program fund (zaisei toyushi shikin, FILP fund) and government compensation bond in addition to the ODA general account budget for its foreign aid. MOF's ODA project budget was 1.2 trillion yen in FY1995 and FY2000, dropped to 869 billion yen in FY2005, and again rose back to 1.2 trillion yen in FY2010, while those of MOFA have been almost half of these. While MOFA has increased its budget for democracy assistance over time, the ODA budget of MOF remains significantly large, which limits the share of democracy assistance amount, a part of MOFA's ODA budget, in the total ODA budget. Since the largest share of MOF's ODA goes for overseas investment, it maintains the share of economic infrastructure

assistance high, which tends to be the target of MOF's overseas investment. For example, FY2009 budget for overseas investment from MOF was 820 billion yen. While grant aid conducted by MOFA had the second largest budget only after MOF's overseas investment, the FY2009 budget for it was 161 billion yen, which was one fifth of the MOF's overseas budget of the year (MOFA, ODA White Paper of 2009 2009, 119-125). While METI has third or fourth biggest ODA budget every year, they use their ODA budget in a way to expand overseas market for Japanese companies or to secure natural resources because of its interest in the promotion of Japanese industries, and is not interested in foreign aid for such areas as BHN or democratic governance (Orr 1990, 36-37). As such, the fact that the share of MOFA's budget is smaller than the total ODA budget of MOF and MITI/METI which conduct economic infrastructure assistance, limits the share of democracy assistance, which is a part of MOFA's ODA.

Table 18 ODA Budget Breakdown by Agencies, FY1995-2010

(Unit: million yen)

	FY1995	FY2000	FY2005	FY2010
General Account Budget				
CAO	43,714	1,261	57	-
NPA	135	121	32	27
FSA	-	61	110	119
MIC	2,652	1,064	957	773
MOJ	603	510	391	236
MOFA	553,703	560,260	488,063	413,378
MOF	387,049	362,687	204,101	132,934
MEXT	42,649	48,979	43,809	33,132
MHLW	10,554	12,640	10,006	8,599
MAFF	10,453	8,183	5,246	3,956
METI	52,248	48,727	32,118	23,126
MLIT	1,682	1,465	926	471
MOE	684	637	383	1,994
ODA Project Budget				
CAO	43,714	1,261	57	-
NPA	135	121	32	27

	FY1995	FY2000	FY2005	FY2010
FSA	-	61	110	119
MIC	2,668	1,077	957	773
MOJ	603	510	391	236
MOFA	566,634	577,431	490,340	416,596
MOF	1,243,470	1,152,033	868,978	1,248,551
MEXT	53,905	57,747	43,809	33,132
MHLW	16,267	15,673	11,782	9,242
MAFF	29,666	26,683	15,698	14,757
METI	53,451	51,639	32,318	39,287
MLIT	1,682	1,465	926	471
MOE	684	637	383	3,505

Note1: CAO stands for the Cabinet Office; FSA stands for the Financial Services Agency; MIC stands for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications; MEXT stands for the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; MHLW stands for the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare; MAFF stands for the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan; MLIT stands for the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism; and MOE stands for the Ministry of Environment.
Note 2: Names of the Ministries and Agencies reflect those after the administrative reform of 2001, which abolished and merged some ministries and agencies. Current CAO consists of former General Administrative Agency of the Cabinet and EPA; current MEXT consists of former Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture and the Science and Technology Agency; current MHLW consists of former Ministry of Health & Welfare and the Ministry of Labor; current MLIT consists of former Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Construction, and the National Land Agency; current MIC consists of former Management and Coordination Agency, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, and the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Note 3: ODA Project Budget (ODA jigyo yosan) includes FILP fund, a budgetary source used for loan programs, and government compensation bond, a budgetary source for monetary contribution to international organizations. (MOFA, On Publication of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) Budget within the General Account Budget (Budget Request) of 2009 2008).
Source: MOFA, Japan's ODA White Paper, each year.

MOF's influence over ODA is greater than what its ODA budget amount shows. MOF oversees the foreign aid decision-making of MOFA, and conducts budgetary assessment on both bilateral and multilateral foreign aid (Kusano 2007, 120-122). All the governmental agencies have to negotiate with MOF when they create budget request. The negotiation takes place from September to December every year, and MOFA staff

members who are in charge of each program have to persuade staffers of the Budget Bureau at MOF about the importance of their programs. Negotiations tend not to go straightforward, partially because the Budget Bureau's responsibility is to shrink the size of budget request to the level of budget ceiling set by the Cabinet, and also because the Budget Bureau's staffers tend to focus on short-term cost-benefit calculation of each program (Orr 1990, 32). Because Japanese ODA has been the target of budget cut since the end of the 1990s due to the continuing economic recession, MOF's control over ODA budget is getting ever tighter. Thus MOFA staffers in charge of ODA tend to have multiple negotiation sessions with MOF, squeezing time out of their busy schedule.

Despite such a time-consuming and pains-taking nature of budget negotiations, staffers at Japanese governmental agencies rotate their positions every two to three years. The position rotation causes each ODA program to be explained by staffers who are new to handle the program at a high frequency. Due to the lack of knowledge about specific programs despite having the burden of persuading MOF about their importance, each staff tend to simply try to maintain the programs that were conducted in previous years. Thus, MOF's budget overseeing function, along with the influence of staff rotation, has a tendency to inhibit staffers from changing the contents of ODA programs. This inertia tends to preserve same types of ODA programs/projects every year, making it not an easy task for Japan to change target areas of Japanese ODA.

Some might argue that there should be overarching policies that determine ODA budget size and allocation among target fields, which should be limiting the size of Japanese democracy assistance. Although things have been in change for the last 20 years, priority issues had not been made clear in Japanese ODA policies and plans only

until recently. While ODA Mid-term policies were created every five years from 1977 to 1993, it only set aims quantitatively in terms of overall foreign aid amount, but not in terms of foreign aid contents or priority issues. It was only in 1992 that the ODA Charter was created as the first ever guideline on ODA. The ODA Charter, which stated visions and priority issues for Japanese foreign aid, set such issues as global issues, BHN, and democratization as priority issues. However, the ODA Charter only vaguely set such priorities without any concreteness. MOFA started creating country policies in 1998 in order to articulate concrete projects and emphasis of Japan's foreign aid in each recipient country. Country policies are to take into account the condition of governance in recipient countries along with socio-economic conditions, and to articulate needs to support good governance. However, the creation of country policies itself took many years, and resulted country policies did not grasp foreign aid needs in recipient countries appropriately. It was weak in articulating Japanese foreign aid strategies either.[9] Therefore, the influence of foreign aid policies over the contents of Japanese foreign aid is limited.

However, foreign aid planning and management was streamlined in 2006 in order to bring a greater consistency over foreign aid by giving leadership on foreign aid decision-making to the prime minister. In April 2006, the Prime Minister's Office (Kantei) under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe established Kaigai Keizai Kyoryoku Kaigi (Overseas Economic Cooperation Council: OECC) in order to create consistent strategy on ODA. With having OECC on the top layer, Japan's ODA is now created through four

[9] This issue was pointed out by Kenichi Ono in the second ODA general Strategy Meeting held on July 15, 2002 (MOFA, The 2nd "ODA General Strategic Meeting" Meeting Minutes n.d.).

layers of policy-decision making mechanism (Kusano, 2007, pp. 129-138; MOFA, Summary of the 4th Meeting of the Intellectuals Meeting on International Cooperation, 2007). However, its structure shows that foreign aid decision-making has not diluted the influence of power politics among ministries. The OECC is chaired by the Prime Minister, and consists of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, in addition to ministers of MOFA, MOF, and METI (Prime Minister's Office of Japan 2006). Furthermore, the Council is not as strong as ministries and thus only discusses strategies and directions of Japan's foreign aid. Although OECC is to give leadership for the Prime Minister, the three member ministers have to consult and come to agreement, while Prime Minister's leadership is limited (Kusano 2007, 130-133).

It has been only half a decade since such an ODA reform was conducted, and thus it is difficult to measure its effect on democracy assistance. So far, there is no distinct change in Japan's democracy assistance after 2006. As seen in Figure 5, the growth of democracy assistance amount of the DAC countries in total is much more radical compared to the growth of Japan's democracy assistance amount.

Figure 5 Change of Democracy Assistance Amount, Japan and DAC Total

(Unit: US$ Million, Commitment-current)



Source: (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.)

According to Figure 6, the ratio of democracy assistance in Japanese ODA is rather in decline after 2006. It is the opposite of the overall trend of DAC countries, which has increased the ratio of democracy assistance in ODA. Although the utility of these data in measuring the impact of ODA reform in Japan is limited because it has been only half a decade since the streamlining of ODA administration was conducted, it suggests that politics over ODA among ministries still limit the share of democracy assistance, a type of MOFA's foreign aid. Despite the ODA reform of 2006, the institutionalist literature still seems to account for the weak impact of MOFA over Japanese foreign aid.

Figure 6 Ratio of Democracy Assistance in ODA, Japan and DAC Average



Source: (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.)

However, the utility of the explanation by the institutionalist literature remains limited. Firstly, the share of the ODA general account budget of MOFA has been in increase compared to those of others. ODA general account budget of all the ministries and agencies have decreased over time since 1998 due to recession in Japan. For example, while NPA still conducted 12 ODA projects with the budget of 92.3 million yen (approximately $738.4 thousand) in 2002, it conducted only one ODA project with the budget of 30 million yen (approximately $330 thousand) in 2008 (International Affairs Division, Commissioner General's Secretariat, NPA 2005, 2; Miyakoshi & Kasahara 2003, 105; Mukoyama & Masuda 2009, 134, note 8).[10] However, while the absolute amount of ODA general account budget of MOFA has also been in decline, its share in the total ODA general account budget has risen from 50.1% in FY1995 to 66.8% in FY2010. While MOF remains a big player of ODA possessing several hundred billion

[10] 1 yen was $0.008 at the end of 2002, and $0.011 at the end of 2008. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.

yen of ODA budget a year (363 billion yen in 2000, 204 billion yen in 2005, and 174 billion yen in 2008, Table 18), the share has been in decline from 35.0% in FY1995 to 21.5% in FY2010. METI, who exerts influence in decision-making process over ODA, has also seen its share of ODA general account budget in decline. While its ODA general account budgets was 49 billion yen in 2000, which was 4.7% of the total ODA general account budget of the year, it declined to 23 billion yen in 2010 whose share is only 3.7% of all. The biggest change occurred to the Cabinet Office, which possessed the ODA general account budget of 44 billion yen in FY1995 with the share of 4% of overall Japanese ODA. Its ODA general account budget saw constant cuts over time, and no ODA general account budget was provided to the Cabinet Office in FY2010 (Table 18 and Table 19).

Table 19 Share of ODA General Account Budget, FY1995-2000

	FY1995	FY2000	FY2005	FY2010
CAO	4.0%	0.1%	0.0%	-
NPA	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
FSA	-	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
MIC	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
MOJ	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
MOFA	50.1%	53.5%	62.1%	66.8%
MOF	35.0%	34.7%	26.0%	21.5%
MEXT	3.9%	4.7%	5.6%	5.4%
MHLW	1.0%	1.2%	1.3%	1.4%
MAFF	0.9%	0.8%	0.7%	0.6%
METI	4.7%	4.7%	4.1%	3.7%
MLIT	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
MOE	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%	0.3%

Source: ODA White Paper, each year.

The rise in the share of MOFA's ODA budget of the total ODA budget of Japan should have increased the impact of policies and purposes of MOFA's foreign aid. Given

that democracy assistance is one of the types of assistance conducted by MOFA, the increase in the share of MOFA's ODA budget must lead to the increase in the share of democracy assistance. However, the share of democracy assistance in Japanese ODA has not changed over time largely, despite a slight increase over time. As shown in Figure 6, the share of democracy assistance in ODA was the highest in 1995, and declined gradually throughout the late 1990s. Although the share rose in the 2000s, it started decreasing again in 2006. This indicates that the share of MOFA's ODA budget in Japanese ODA budget as a whole and the share of democracy assistance in Japan's ODA budget do not coincide. There would be some reason other than the institutional factor which contains Japanese democracy assistance.

In addition, explanation is necessary on the rationale for ODA budget allocation within MOFA as well as among ministries. While MOFA's ODA budget for 2008 was 441 billion yen, which was approximately $4.41 billion, Japan's democracy assistance of the year was only $277.33 million according to *the ODA White Paper*, and $209 million according to OECD. It shows that only 6.3-4.7% of MOFA's ODA budget was allocated to democracy assistance. Why is MOFA's ODA allocation to democracy assistance so small? In addition to the argument of the institutionalist literature on the existence of multiple agencies as players of ODA and the relative weakness of MOFA's influence, we have to explain why MOFA allocates only a small percentage of its ODA budget to democracy assistance itself.

In addition, the institutionalist literature cannot be used to explain sector allocation of Japanese democracy assistance, because sector allocation is not determined

by negotiations or power politics among ministries. It is MOFA itself that makes decisions over sector allocation of democracy assistance.

Explanatory Power of the Gaiatsu Literature

The gaiatsu (foreign pressure) literature also accounts for Japanese democracy assistance to some extent. While there could be gaiatsu from any countries, this literature tends to focus on that from the United States. It is due to the fact that Japan tends to be more sensitive to the United States than to other countries, because its security is highly dependent on the United States. Robert Orr (1990) argues that gaiatsu from the United States tends to work well when MOFA shares US concerns and picks up pressure from the United States to support its position vis-à-vis other ministries. Such scholars as T. J. Pempel (1987, 303) and Robert Angel (1988) also argue that MOFA tends to utilize gaiatsu from the United States in order to improve its position vis-à-vis with other governmental agencies not only concerning foreign aid but on foreign policy as a whole. House Committee on Foreign Affairs of the US Congress points out, in its document of 1982 about decision-making in Japan, that MOFA occasionally requests the United States to apply pressure to Japan so that MOFA can utilize it to strengthen its position in relations with other governmental agencies (Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives 1982, 167). Orr (1990, 128) states that US approach to Japan tends to be so effective that he speculates that "the basic rationale for MOFA's policy position appears to have been dictated more by Japan's interest vis-à-vis the United States than by the needs of developing countries."

Indeed, gaiatsu from the United States has played important roles in deciding the directions of Japanese foreign aid. In the 1950s, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles started applying pressure to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida to pay war reparation and foreign aid to the countries that suffered damages from Japan during the two world wars. The United States wanted Japan, along with the West Germany, to play a greater role in foreign aid as burden-sharing with the United States. Although Yoshida's initial response was rejection, this led Japan to provide foreign aid to Asian countries in the mid 1950s (Orr 1990, 53 and 109). Gaiatsu from the United States further increased from the 1970s to the mid 1980s, given the increasing trade imbalance between the United States and Japan, which worsened trade frictions between the two countries. The United States applied gaiatsu to Japan in order to have the country 1) weaken the concentration of Japanese foreign aid to Asia and instead provide more aid to other regions, 2) untie Japanese foreign aid from Japanese corporations, 3) increase the grant element of Japanese ODA loans, and 4) allocate more Japanese foreign aid to BHN rather than to economic sectors. Japan eventually accepted gaiatsu from the United States toward all these directions (Orr 1990, 109-131). The history of Japanese foreign aid shows that gaiatsu from the United States tend to work well in determining the directions of Japanese foreign aid.

Gaiatsu played a role from the late 1980s to the early 1990s when Japan switched its policy from staying away from political matters abroad to playing a role in democracy assistance. As has been discussed, criticism that Japanese responses to the military crackdown of pro-democracy uprisings in Burma and China were tepid, in addition to criticism toward its check-book diplomacy in the Gulf War, led LDP, MOFA, and

opposition parties to change Japanese ODA policy. It was as a consequence of these events that Japan manifested in the ODA Charter of 1992 that it would provide foreign aid in a way to promote democracy abroad. Reinhard Drifte (1996, 123-127) points out that it was the gaiatsu from the United States in particular which led Japan to incorporate the idea of democracy in its ODA Charter. Robert Orr (1993, ii-iii), who served in USAID himself, points out that the principles shown in the ODA Charter of 1992 are what the United States continued encouraging Japan to take into account.

However, while the gaiatsu literature can account for the incorporation of democracy norm in Japanese foreign aid, it does not seek to explain how large a portion of the Japanese foreign aid would be provided in a way that the United States wanted. Thus, the literature does not give a clue in understanding why the allocation of Japanese foreign aid to democracy assistance remains tiny despite the pressure from the United States for Japan to provide democracy assistance. In addition, because there is no record that the United States applied gaiatsu for Japan to make it provide its democracy assistance to specific sectors, either the state or the civil society sectors, the gaiatsu literature cannot be used in explaining sector allocation of Japanese democracy assistance. In sum, while the gaiatsu literature accounts for Japan's inclusion of the democracy norm in its ODA policy, it is not something to provide explanation about either its ODA allocation for democracy assistance or sector allocation of its democracy assistance.

Conclusion

The central idea for Japanese foreign aid has changed over time from mercantilism to democracy and to human security. In addition, the rationale for concentrating foreign aid to economic infrastructure sector has changed over time, from mercantilism to economic cooperation. Due to such change of central ideas, the mercantilist literature seems to explain Japanese foreign aid until the late 1980s, but not after then.

On the other hand, the institutionalist literature and the gaiatsu literature seem to explain Japanese democracy assistance to some extent. While MOFA is the main ministry that provides democracy assistance, MOFA's influence over ODA is limited in a sense that MOF possesses even a greater ODA project budget than MOFA's in addition to the function of budgetary assessment. Limited power of MOFA over ODA budget restrains Japanese democracy assistance, which is just one of the categories MOFA allocates its ODA for.

However, two factors have to be noted. For one thing, MOFA's share in Japanese ODA budget has been in increase. Despite such a change, however, Japanese democracy assistance amount has not increased along with the trend. In addition, MOFA allocates only 5-6% of its ODA budget to democracy assistance. If MOFA were to allocate a greater share of its ODA budget to democracy assistance, the share of democracy assistance in Japanese ODA overall would have been greater despite the big budget of MOF's ODA. The reason why MOFA itself does not allocate larger share of its ODA to democracy assistance has to be explained. In addition, because this literature does not seek to explain sector allocation of democracy assistance, it is necessary to explain it

MOFA's allocation of democracy assistance among sectors without the use of the institutionalist argument.

The gaiatsu literature also explains Japanese democracy assistance to some extent. The fact that Japan incorporated the idea of democracy promotion in its foreign aid policy itself was a result of criticisms and gaiatsu from outside, especially from the United States, toward Japanese tepid reaction to military crackdown of pro-democracy movements in Burma and China. However, despite the existence of such a gaiatsu, Japanese democracy assistance remains small. There must be some other factors working to limit Japanese democracy assistance. In addition, the gaiatsu literature does not help explain sector allocation of Japanese democracy assistance, because there is no fact of gaiatsu on this matter.

Overall, while the institutionalist and gaiatsu literature account for Japanese democracy assistance partially, they do not explain it fully. In the remaining chapters, this dissertation will test if there is an impact of the civil society involvement in democracy assistance on the share of democracy assistance in Japanese ODA and sector allocation of Japanese democracy assistance. Chapter 5 and 6 will test the causal relations between civil society involvement and democracy assistance using two intervening variables – information sources and aid human resources. Chapter 7 will further test the causal relations with using a case study of Japan's democracy assistance to Indonesia.

Chapter 5: Information Sources and Democracy Assistance

Chapters 3 and 4 examined the characteristics seen in Japanese democracy assistance in comparison with other donor countries and within Japanese foreign aid policy as a whole. This and the next chapters will test the hypothesis of this dissertation that weak involvement of civil society actors causes Japanese democracy assistance to be inconspicuous and concentrated on the state institution sector. Among the two intervening variables, this chapter will test the impact of civil society actors through the first intervening variable – information sources. The hypotheses are, here again, as follows:

Hypothesis 1-a: *If a donor relies on state actors for information about democracy assistance needs, it is likely to grasp needs only on the state level. Because it is likely to prevent one of the potential recipient sectors of democracy assistance, the civil society sector, from receiving democracy assistance, it might limit the overall democracy assistance amount. If a donor relies not only on state but also on civil society actors for information about democracy assistance needs, on the other hand, it is likely to grasp needs both on the state and the civil society levels; and thus, its democracy assistance amount is likely to be bigger.*

Hypothesis 1-b: *If a donor relies on state actors for information about democracy assistance needs, it is likely to grasp needs mostly on the state level, and thus its*

democracy assistance is likely to be directed mostly to the state institution sector. If a donor relies not only on state but also on civil society actors for information about democracy assistance needs, on the other hand, it is likely to grasp needs both on the state and the civil society levels; and thus, its democracy assistance is likely to be provided to both the state institutions and the civil society sectors.

The literature of bounded rationality points out the impact of information on consequential policies, arguing that actors' rationality is bounded due to the lack of perfect information (Simon 1978a and 1978b). Assuming that the lack of perfect information would pose impact on democracy assistance as well, this chapter will argue that the choice of information sources determine the information on democracy assistance needs, which eventually shapes Japanese democracy assistance.

Governmental Actors as Information Sources

Japan basically judges the adequacy and necessity of democracy assistance based on the existence or lack thereof of requests for it from recipient countries. It is called request-based policy. This policy has been used from the outset of Japanese ODA provision in the mid 1950s, when Japan started providing foreign aid as war reparation. Because aid was to be provided in order to express Japan's apology to its Asian neighbors, it was the recipient side that was to determine the contents of aid projects to request to Japan. Thus, Japanese foreign aid obtained the characteristics Tetsuya Nishikawa (1993, 654) explains as, "in addition to Japan's understanding that

international cooperation is to assist self efforts of other countries, its basic notion is to avoid coercing aid and instead implement projects of recipient countries' high priority."

It was also a natural consequence of such an outset of Japanese ODA that one of the aims of Japanese foreign aid was set to nurture friendly relations with recipient countries. The ODA Charter of 1992 stated that "Japan's aid is expected to expand friendly relations with other countries, especially with developing countries" (MOFA 1992). The revised ODA Charter of 2003 also expects that Japanese aid "activities would bring benefits to us by expanding friendly relations and the exchange of people with other countries and strengthening our position in international scenes"(MOFA 2003).

As the characteristics of Japanese foreign aid as war reparation diluted over time, the international aid community started criticizing the lack of quality control of Japanese aid contents in the late 1980s and the 1990s. Such criticism heightened when multiple corruption cases were revealed related to Japanese ODA provision. In the mid 1980s, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines was revealed to have peculated Japanese ODA on a daily basis, as has been already referred to in the previous chapter. Media also revealed that Japanese companies often received ODA projects contract by paying kickbacks to prominent politicians of recipient countries and Japan, in addition to staffers of JICA and the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), a governmental lending agency which existed until 1999 (Analysis of the 1989 Report on Political Funding 1990; Mainichi Shimbun 1986; A Partner Company for Japanese Loan Illegally Receives Money from Jamaica 1987). Governmental officers and politicians in recipient countries tended to possess such sticky relations with Japanese companies. Upon such scandals and the increased pressure for Japan to combat corruption in relation with its foreign aid,

request-based policy was officially removed from Japan's foreign aid policy in 1997. However, Japan basically continued and still continues providing foreign aid based on requests from recipient countries. In the case of democracy assistance, it is highly advised to provide aid based on requests from the recipient side in order to secure autonomy of recipient countries (JICA, Towards Democratic State-Building Assistance 2003, 8).

The reason why Japan utilizes the request-based policy in its democracy assistance can be found in various reports and articles. A journal article published from JICA states that JICA places importance on a proactive and spontaneous actions from developing countries. It indicates that the existence of a proactive and spontaneous process for democratization and democracy consolidation is regarded as a sign that the socio-cultural characteristics there are compatible with democracy (JICA's Approach 2007, 18).

Then who are considered to be the actors to take such proactive and spontaneous actions for democratization? The same JICA publication states that it regards important "proactive and spontaneous improvement of governance, democratization, and consolidation of democracy taken by governments of developing countries" (JICA's Approach, 2007, p.18). Here, the proactive and spontaneous action is considered to be taken by recipient *governments*, while it does not mention the necessity or sufficiency of such actions from *citizens*. The same understanding appears in other JICA publications on democracy assistance as well (e.g. JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, iv). It considers that the improvement in the reflection of citizens' voices should be conducted as recipient governments' own choice. Strengthening citizens, it regards, should be

attained as a consequence of assistance toward their governments (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 20).

Because data on past aid requests is not open for the public, it is not easy to grasp actual sources of requests. But secondary sources indicate that aid requests come from state actors of various levels. Some requests are made from the heads of states such as Peruvian President Fujimori and South African President Mandela (Sugiyama 2005, 73, 76), and some are made from current administrations such as Cambodian government (Yoshimura and Takeuchi 2005, 28). Most country-based seminars are provided based on requests from recipient governments (Nishikawa 1993, 627-628), but some seminars are provided according to requests from past seminar participants, who are staffers of public administration in recipient countries (Sugiyama 2005, 73).

Japanese democracy assistance, thus, started given requests from governments of recipient countries. While Japan has been increasing its legal assistance efforts since the mid 1990s, Japan's legal assistance began given requests for it from the Vietnamese government. The Minister of Justice of Vietnam made a request to Japan for assistance on drafting civil law in 1993, which led to the initiation of Japan's legal assistance to the country (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 39, 92-93). Akio Morishima, a law scholar who led the legal assistance mission to Vietnam from then on, states that "To be honest, the Japanese government had not have a proactive policy on legal assistance by the time" (A. Morishima 2003, 5). An officer of the Japanese Embassy in Cambodia, who participated in the Legal Assistance Meeting hosted by the Asia Foundation and held in Cambodia in June 1994, "fully understood demand [for legal assistance] in the three Indochina countries, but had an understanding that legal assistance is to be conducted by legal

technical experts of Europe and the United States, while it would be impossible for Japan, which did not possess experience in the field, to participate in it directly," according to Morishima (A. Morishima 2003, 4) ([ ] was added by the author).

The initiation of Japan's legal assistance based on a request from Vietnam led to the expansion of such requests from other countries, Cambodian government requested Japanese assistance for the revision of Civil Procedure Law which was already drafted by France, in addition to the drafting of Civil Law in 1996, which led to the start of Japan's legal assistance to the country in March 1999 (A. Morishima 2003, 6). The request was made from H.E Chem Sgnoun, then Cambodian Minister of Justice, to the Japanese government through Morishima (A. Morishima, On legal assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia and Cambodia civil law drafting 2003, 28). In any of these cases, it was governmental actors who made democracy assistance requests to Japan.

This is quite different from active donors of democratic governance such as Sweden, which accepts foreign aid requests not only from recipient governments but also from NGOs all over the world. Because democracy assistance policy of Sweden places importance on civic empowerment and human rights protection as central issues (Government Offices of Sweden n.d.; SIDA 2009), Swedish democracy assistance is often provided in the fields of access to information, access to justice, empowerment of NGOs, and improvement of government accountability. Although MOFA introduced a funding scheme in 1989 to fund NGOs not only in Japan but also in developing countries, the amount of funding remains tiny. In addition, it clearly articulates that it does not provide assistance to political projects and recipient organizations' capacity building (MOFA, Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects 2010). It limits

Japan's civil society assistance projects, and NGO capacity building altogether. Although JICA is aware of the increasing importance of the civil society in developing countries and the assistance for them (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 101), JICA does not acknowledge the importance of their watchdog and advocacy functions.

Not all the requests come to Japan out of blue. The Japanese side occasionally conducts preliminary research on foreign aid needs in recipient countries and exchange ideas with actors in the recipient side based on which recipient governments make official requests to Japan (Inaba 2009, 36; JICA staff 2011). Japan's police assistance for Pakistan started as Japan's initiative. In this case, Japan sent a preliminary research unit to Pakistan in 1996, and proposed the establishment of a national public safety commission to the Pakistani government based on the research. Pakistani government accepted this proposal (Yoshimura and Takeuchi 2005, 29). In such cases, ODA Taskforces in Japanese embassies of recipient countries, local JICA offices, and recipient governments, in addition to preliminary research teams dispatched from the JICA headquarter, function as the main information sources about aid needs in recipient countries.

ODA Taskforces were introduced in the 2000s in Japanese embassies in developing countries. ODA programs and projects were mostly created in Tokyo at MOFA and JICA headquarters up to the 1990s. However, it gained criticisms that Japanese aid does not take into account the actual needs and voices in the recipient side. In order to address this issues and create foreign aid programs and projects fully reflecting the voice in the recipient side, the Japanese government established the ODA Taskforces. The ODA Taskforces were intended to take initiatives in foreign aid

program/project creation, with taking into account the actual needs from the recipient countries. Such task forces have been established in all the recipient countries which possess JICA's local offices (MOFA, What is local ODA Taskforce n.d.).

ODA Taskforces consists of staffers from Japanese embassies and local offices of JICA and the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) (Kiya 2007, 1-2). The establishment of ODA Taskforces is a positive move to grasp opinions from, and exchange ideas with, local societal actors. The ODA Taskforce in Bangladesh, for example, holds meetings with staff of NGOs and Japanese companies operating in the country in order to get to know about foreign aid needs. They also include those NGO and corporate staff members in their list serve to share information.

However, compared to the number of governmental staffers the ODA Taskforce meets, the number of NGO staffers is limited. For example, Masahiko Kiya, a former member of the ODA Taskforce in Bangladesh, names 71 staff members as those Japanese governmental agents who had meetings together with the ODA Taskforce in Bangladesh from 2003 to 2006. In the same manner, he lists 34 names of International Organization staff members, 13 names of other donor countries' governmental staff members, and 11 Bangladeshi governmental staff members. Compared to those numbers, only 8 NGO staff members are named as those had meetings with the ODA Taskforce in Bangladesh (Kiya 2007). In addition, publications and conferences on Japan's democracy assistance, in addition to interviews with JICA officers I conducted, show that they use scholars and private companies as information sources more frequently than NGOs. Major information sources in Japan's legal assistance to China in the corporate law field were, for example, local scholars and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in China, in

addition to Chinese governmental officers (Nunoi 2011; JICA staff 2011). Talking about the ODA Taskforce in Ghana, *ODA White Paper* of 2004 states that the Taskforce repeated policy dialogues with local governmental officers, intellectuals, and businessmen in order to grasp developmental needs in the country.[11] Although NGOs are not structurally excluded from such dialogues, they tend to be a minor source of information for Japan.

The ODA White Paper of 2010 shows the Japanese government's intention to switch its foreign aid approach from request-based policy to a so-called "program-approach." This approach is that target issues of foreign aid should be determined through policy dialogues with developing countries. The difference between request-based policy and program-approach is that, while it is difficult to maintain consistency among, and relate each foreign aid project under the request-based policy, program-approach shapes overall framework of foreign aid programs before deciding on individual aid projects within it. However, here again, the programs are to be formed through dialogues with governmental actors of developing countries (MOFA 2010, 24-25). Civil society actors are not considered to be a necessary part of this dialogue. It means that, whether the Japanese government takes the request-based approach or program-approach, voices of recipient governments are likely to be reflected to foreign aid projects, while voices from the civil society is less likely to be heard.

Because Japan respects information and requests from state actors of the recipient side, continuous consultation is held with governmental agencies both and during democracy assistance projects. Regarding justice ministry, prosecutor's office and courts

[11] "Column II-1 Gana ni okeru genchi ODA tasukufo-su no katsudo (Column II-1 activities of local ODA taskforce in Ghana)," in (MOFA 2004).

as counterpart institutions, Japanese agents of legal assistance consults with them on the contents, methods, and time-frame of assistance (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 75). Although private actors are not excluded, the number of them in such consultations is limited. For example, a working group was created in Uzbekistan concerning Japan's legal assistance to the country in the field of bankruptcy law. While there were 10 Uzbekistan members in the working group, only one of them was a private actor. Others were from national agencies, prosecutor's office, and the Ministry of Justice (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 130).

Lack of attention on the voices from the civil society side is somewhat odd, when taking into account that the Japanese government has continuously emphasized the importance of collaboration with NGO actors in various guidelines and publications such as the ODA Charters, the ODA White Papers, and issue-based reports on foreign aid. *ODA White Paper* of 2010 published under the DPJ government even points out the importance of such collaboration not only in aid implementation but also in preliminary research (MOFA 2010, 26-28, 33-34, 46, 114). While such continuous emphasis on the importance of collaboration with NGO actors shows the Japanese government's recognition of its importance, it is also a reaction to continuous foreign pressure. Consecutive OECD DAC peer reviews and other reports of international organizations have criticized the Japanese government for its weak collaboration with NGO actors (OECD, 2010; OECD, 1999; United Nations, 2010). Participants of various meetings and councils on the future of Japanese ODA, such as the Overseas Economic Cooperation Cabinet Council (Taigai keizai kyoryoku kankei kakuryo kaigi), the ODA reform councils and committees, the ODA General Strategic Meeting (ODA sogo senryaku

kaigi), and the ODA Reform Working Team (ODA kaikaku waking gurupu, within LDP), almost always mention collaboration between state and NGO actors as international custom, and the necessity for Japan to adopt this international trend (MOFA, Council on ODA Reform for the 21st Century, 1998; MOFA, Meeting Days of the Second Consultative Committee on ODA Reform and Their Agendas; MOFA, ODA General Strategy Meeting, Second Meeting, Meeting Minutes; MOFA, ODA General Strategic Meeting members; "Table I-10 Stakeholders' Opinion on ODA Charter Reform" in MOFA, ODA White Paper 2003, 2003; Working Team on ODA Reform, 2002). It shows the impact of international pressure on this issue.

However, looking from another perspective, the very fact that the Japanese government has continuously emphasized the importance of collaboration with NGO actors is a reflection of continuous weakness or lack thereof. Despite such emphasis, the *ODA White Paper* of 2010 states that country-based aid projects are created taking into consideration opinions raised from the ODA taskforces, which consists of staffers of Japanese embassies and JICA's local offices. It shows that country-based aid projects do not directly seek comments and information from NGOs, although ODA Taskforces have meetings with NGOs to a limited extent. It shows that despite the existence of gaiatsu, Japan has not institutionalized collaboration between state and civil society actors over foreign aid (MOFA 2010, 46).

The weak information collection on foreign aid needs from civil society actors is a striking difference compared to active donors of democracy assistance that obtain information from various sources including civil society actors. The Rockefeller Brothers Fund created a team of Americans and Hungarians to travel all over Hungary at the

beginning of the country's democratization. They created memos after memos on what is necessary for democratic consolidation of the country, and shared it with other philanthropies and US governmental agencies (Former-Japan-Foundation-staff 2008). Governmental agencies such as USAID also dispatch their officers to recipient countries and have them interview American NGOs operating there about aid needs (Asia Foundation staff 2009). Face-to-face interaction of USAID and State Department staff with NGO actors occur on a daily basis, where they exchange information about the state of democracy (and lack thereof) in developing countries (Asia Foundation staff 2009). In Sweden, staff of the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) makes phone calls to NGOs on a daily basis to obtain information about recipient countries (SIDA staff 2009). There is a high level of trust and interaction between civil society and governmental actors.

Compared to that, the level of institutionalization of communication channels between the government and NGO is much weaker in Japan. Although private companies and scholars both in recipient countries and Japan are occasionally interviewed (JICA staff 2011; Nunoi 2011), the frequency of interviews to NGO actors is lower despite their knowledge in the field. That is not only the case of small and unknown NGOs. Even well-established NGOs are almost never requested to provide information about the state of democracy and governance in developing countries either by MOFA or JICA. InterBand, one of the oldest Japanese NGOs in the field of election assistance, was established in 1992, has participated in more than 15 cases of election monitoring abroad, and has conducted numerous field research in the election field (InterBand; InterBand, History of Activities). Despite InterBand's rich experience in the field, however,

governmental agencies of Japan have almost never requested any information about the state of elections and election monitoring from InterBand, according to a former director of InterBand. While he points out the weakness of the experience and knowledge on the side of InterBand as a possible reason for it, he senses the lack of trust from the government for NGOs as well (Former InterBand staff 2011).

Japanese government's lack of request for information to NGOs is not only the case with Japanese NGOs but also with international NGOs operating in Japan. Despite its long history, active advocacy, and high reputation, even such well-established international NGOs as Amnesty International Japan do not receive requests from Japanese governmental agencies on information about the situation of human rights protections/violations in other countries (Amnesty International Japan Staff, 2011). The lack of requests for information from the governmental side is so common in Japan that some NGO actors even show surprise when asked if governmental actors request information to them. According to research conducted by Yutaka Tsujinaka, et al., while organizations in such issue areas as economic, education, and social welfare tend to have frequent exchanges of opinions with the state, organizations in the international cooperation field have extremely limited chance of dialogue. Among 240 respondents, only one organization answered that they have ever been requested to provide opinions and comments by MOFA. This is in a clear contrast from the number of organizations that are asked opinions and comments by METI, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) (83, 49 and 34 organizations respectively) (Mori and Adachi 2002, 126-127, 134-136).

Prime ministers Shinzo Abe (September 2006 – September 2007) and Taro Aso (September 2008 – September 2009) brought democracy assistance to the central stage of Japanese diplomacy in 2006 by launching an initiative to establish an "arc of freedom and prosperity" to promote democracy from "Northeast Asia to Central Asia and the Caucasus, Turkey, Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states" (MOFA, Arc of Freedom and Prosperity 2006). However, this initiative did not necessarily intend to help reflect voice of citizens in developing countries on their government and governance. Rather, this initiative possessed Cold War-strategy-like characteristics to expand Japanese *de facto* allies in the world. Taro Aso, in his first speech to launch the concept of "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity," clearly mentioned, "Japan must make its ties even firmer with friendly nations that share the common views and interests, namely of course the United States as well as Australia, India, and the member states of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and at the same time work with these friends towards the expansion of this 'arc of freedom and prosperity' " (MOFA, Arc of Freedom and Prosperity 2006).

In addition, this initiative did not expand Japanese democracy assistance due to negative reactions from the Chinese and the Russian governments, who understood this initiative as a containment policy toward them (Yamauchi 2009).[12] Also influenced by the fact that these two administrations were only short-lived, MOFA did not end up embodying the contents of this policy. Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, who served as a prime minister between the two administrations, in addition to administrations after

[12] On Russian reaction, see, for example, Russia warns Japan over "anti-Russian" activity, supports nuclear energy for all, 2007. On Chinese reaction, see, for example, Containment Bid by the Neoconservatives Fails, 2008.

Prime Minister Aso, did not pursue this policy either. The attempt to expand friends among foreign governments was foiled by governments of two major powers. In other words, Japanese governmental actors were sensitive to reactions from other governmental actors here again.

A large number of NGO actors from developmental to election to human rights NGOs point out a subtle change brought by the DPJ government, which came into place in 2009. They mention that the DPJ government holds meeting sessions with NGOs much more frequently than during the long-lasting LDP government, which held office during the entire Cold War era (Former InterBand staff 2011; Free the Children Japan staff 2011; Japan International Volunteer Center staff 2008). However, NGOs' impact on governmental policy-making is still limited. While they are invited to participate in official meetings with governmental actors, it remains rare for governmental actors to request information from NGOs outside such meetings. In addition, time frame provided for each individual to speak is heavily limited in official meetings, and thus opinions raised from NGO actors are only listened to but not necessarily discussed. Because such meetings are organized by the governmental side, they tend to be the ones to provide topics for discussion while the topics NGO participants raise tend not to be discussed in detail (Japan International Volunteer Center staff 2008). In addition, despite the increase in communication between DPJ administrations and NGOs, the DPJ administrations have low trust toward the bureaucracy, which limits information-sharing between the administration and the bureaucracy (DPJ's Diplomatic Weakness All Too Evident 2010). This was especially the case during the Prime Ministers Yukio Hatoyama and Naoto Kan's administrations. Although DPJ administrations have greater chance to hear voices

of NGOs, the system to convey such voices to the ones in charge of aid project-making remains weak.

Assistance for Governments with Intentions of Democratic Governance

One of the consequences of foreign aid provision based on information collected from state actors is that Japan provides democracy assistance to those countries whose governments regard democratization and the improvement of democratic quality a part of their national development plan. In a JICA report published in 1995, JICA clearly states that "whether to promote 'democracy' itself through foreign aid must be determined based on the direction, speed, and process that recipient government and citizens choose concerning their democratization" (JICA, Participatory Development and Good Governance 1995, 42). Although the statement here shows the intention to respect the will of the citizens along with the government, JICA naturally excludes citizens from its eyesight by using the criteria that the improvement of governance has to be in the recipient governments' development plan in order for JICA to provide assistance for it. For example, one of three major JICA publications on democracy assistance, which was published in 2004, states that Japan would actively seek to assist democratic institution-building for those countries where "will for the improvement and strengthening of governance is made clear in its policies" (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 22). They find it important to secure recipient governments' commitment in democracy assistance projects for effective management of such projects.

Table 20 shows the top 10 recipient countries of democracy assistance from Japan between 2003 and 2009. This table covers only from 2003 because that is the year when

Japan started providing democracy assistance to a large number of countries in most of the regions. Japan's democracy assistance provision before then was sporadic.

Table 20 Top 10 Recipients of Japan's Democracy Assistance, 2003-2009

(Unit: Commitments, current USD millions)

1	Indonesia	131.66
2	Afghanistan	126.99
3	Cambodia	52.55
4	Pakistan	49.57
5	Kenya	49.43
6	Viet Nam	44.22
7	Jordan	42.37
8	Laos	39.42
9	Philippines	30.88
10	Ghana	27.96

Source: (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.)

Most of the top 10 recipients are those that have already experienced democratic opening, with the only exception of Vietnam and Laos. Looking at national development plans of the top 10 recipients in the 2000s, they do contain the improvement of democracy or governance among their aims. The national development plans of Indonesia, Kenya, and Ghana contain the promotion of democracy as one of their aims (Kenyan Ministry of State for Planning n.d.; National Development Planning Commission, Republic of Ghana n.d.). The national developmental plans of Cambodia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Ghana contain the improvement of governance as one of the aims (Afghanistan n.d.; Government of Pakistan n.d.; National Development Planning Commission, Republic of Ghana n.d.; Royal Government of Cambodia n.d.). Most of the top 10 recipients of democracy assistance from Japan also contain more specific elements of democracy/governance improvement in their development plans. Rule of law is stated

as one of the aims in plans of Cambodia, Afghanistan, Jordan and Laos (Afghanistan n.d.; Committee for Planning and Investment, Laos n.d.; Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan n.d.; Royal Government of Cambodia n.d.). Combating corruption is stated as such in plans of Cambodia, Kenya and Afghanistan (Afghanistan n.d.; Kenyan Ministry of State for Planning n.d.; Royal Government of Cambodia n.d.). Public administration reform is a part of the plans of Cambodia, Kenya, Laos and Ghana (Committee for Planning and Investment, Laos n.d.; Kenyan Ministry of State for Planning n.d.; National Development Planning Commission, Republic of Ghana n.d.; Royal Government of Cambodia n.d.). Political participation is aimed for in Jordan (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan n.d.). The Philippines sets decentralization as one of its development aims, and Afghanistan sets human rights protection as one of its aims (Afghanistan n.d.; Philippines n.d.). The only exception here is Vietnam. While Vietnam sets industrialization and economic growth as its aims, it does not set the improvement of either democracy or governance as its national plan (Vietnam n.d.).

These development plans of each country roughly determine the areas of Japan's assistance. Reflecting Indonesia's commitment to the consolidation of democracy, Japan's assistance toward the country covers a wide range of areas from election to public administration, law, and local government. One characteristic in the assistance toward Indonesia is that Japan uses the term "democracy assistance" publicly in some of its projects such as police assistance. It is a reflection of the Indonesian government's willingness to accept democracy assistance. In the case of Laos and Cambodia, two countries that raise the rule of law and public administration reform as aims in their

development plans, Japan's assistance to these countries focuses on these two areas. Japan's assistance toward Vietnam, an authoritarian country which does not mention democratization as one of its aims in national development, mostly focuses on market-oriented economy reform in areas such as legal and public administration reforms (JICA, Towards Democratic State-Building Assistance 2003, 107-108).

Because recipient governments' commitment to democratization and the improvement of democratic quality is prerequisite for Japanese democracy assistance, assistance to foster democratic opening in authoritarian countries is not considered an option as far as the recipient governments do not intend to democratize the country. That is the case even where citizens protest against their governments requiring democracy. While Japan's democracy assistance amounts between 2003 and 2009 to such countries as Indonesia and Cambodia are $131.66 million and $52.55 million respectively, that to Myanmar is only $7.09 million (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.). The small amount of aid categorized as democracy assistance according to OECD data is allocated from Japan to most developing countries, and Myanmar is one of them. But this amount is tiny. It shows that recipient governments' commitment to democratization strongly affects Japan's democracy assistance. A JICA publication on democracy assistance published in 2004 repeatedly states that the promotion of democracy itself is not Japan's purpose. It states that Japan assists governance of countries which take proactive moves for democratization (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 4-5, 21, 23, 31). Japan's target selection for democracy assistance is determined by the policies of recipient governments.

That is why Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa asked President Bill Clinton in November 1993 not to impose Western values such as human rights and democracy to other governments at the time of tension between the United States and China over the Chinese government's violation of human rights of its citizens (Premier Gave U.S. Advice on Rights 1994). Prime Minister Hosokawa took efforts to persuade the Chinese government to better protect human rights of its citizens in a meeting held at the time of his visit to China in March 1994 (Prime Minister Hosokawa Urges Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng to Make Improvement on Human Rights Issues 1994). However, he considered that it is ultimately the Chinese government who chooses whether or not to improve its human rights protection, and what external forces can do is only persuasion.

It is not only Prime Minister Hosokawa who considers persuasion as the only means for democratization and human rights protection. When a US-Japan legislative exchange on human rights took place on April 8, 1994, Don Bonker, Chairman of the Congressional Human Rights Foundation, asked Japanese Diet members whether they think economic sanction is a measure for the improvement of human rights protection in China. Answering the question, Shoji Motooka, the leader of the Legislators Organization on Human Rights and a member of the House of Councilors, stated that Japanese citizens would not support economic sanction, while he did not propose any concrete alternative measures for the purpose (Strengthen UN Functions for Human Rights Protection 1994). Although he was an advocate for human rights protection, he did not consider taking enforcement measures to foreign governments as an option.

Even when the national development plan of a recipient country shows commitment to democratization, the contents of aid requests do not necessarily have

direct relations with democratization or democracy consolidation and good governance. Even when technical assistance is requested, it tends to focus on mere technical aspects with little democratic nature. Indeed, many of the requests for Japan's police assistance, for example, are on traffic policing, police communication, crime-prevention (such as community policing system, patrolling, and dispatcher system), and criminal investigation (Nishikawa 1993, 646-649).

Japan's approach to provide democracy assistance to countries whose governments possess the will for democratization and the improvement of democratic quality is a way to secure governments' commitment for aid projects and thus a way to have assurance that the aid is likely not to just be wasted. It is a way to exert aid selectivity for effective aid giving (JICA Research Institute 2003, 122-137). However, it is in a clear contrast with the approach of other donor countries, which allocate a greater portion of democracy assistance to the civil society sector, considering that civil society assistance would be more effective in assisting democratization and the improvement of democratic quality. Japan's approach, at the same time, naturally limits the potential targets of Japan's democracy assistance, and thus limits Japan's assistance amount overall.

Lack of Assistance for Counterbalancing Forces against the Executives

The second consequence of aid provision based on the will of recipient governments is the concentration of democracy assistance to the state institution sector, and lack thereof for constraining forces against the executives. While Japan provides democracy assistance upon requests from recipient governments, even doves in

authoritarian and transitional countries, who regard future democratization unavoidable, tend to hesitate bringing in liberalization due to a high level of uncertainties about who are going to be the actors in politics, and whether they can maintain control over such liberalization. O'Donnell and Schumitter (1986) argue that governmental actors in both authoritarian and transitional countries try to avoid losing their vested interests and thus tend not to possess high motivation for the furthering of democratization. E. Gyimah-Boadi (1992, 120-121) also raises this issue as follows:

> Incumbent regimes, typically reluctant to undertake democratic reforms and faced with severe resource constraints, are generally unable or unwilling to fund programs designed to improve the workings of governmental institutions. At the same time, the private sector in many of the new democracies is weak. By and large, it is civil society, political parties, and the media that are most likely to push governments to reorder their budgetary priorities appropriately and to create a possibility for local funding of agencies that fight for political and fiscal restraint.

As can be seen from these arguments, while governmental actors tend to be reluctant to change the status quo, an impetus for change is more likely to be in non-governmental actors such as civil society organizations, legislature, and political parties. In other words, because empowering such constraining forces for the executives could damage governmental actors' vested interests, governmental actors are reluctant to request assistance for the constraining forces for them.

This leads Japan to tend not to assist such counterbalancing forces. JICA's Public Policy Department, which is in charge of assistance for good governance and democracy, does not have a division for civil society assistance, while it possesses divisions in charge of assistance for governmental agencies, public finance, and the law (JICA, Industrial Development and Public Policy Department n.d.). A JICA report on good governance

assistance of 1995 does not regard civil society assistance as part of its menu for democracy/governance assistance (JICA, Participatory Development and Good Governance 1995, 41). When they mention civil society assistance, it tends to be for the empowerment of the civil society for economic development purposes, nor for the purposes of democratization. JICA report of 1995 only regards such civil society assistance as assistance for the social basis necessary for democratization:

> When implementing aid, it is necessary to have a perspective to improve economic and social capacity of the citizens of developing countries as the actors of development through their extensive participation (in other words, it is the perspective of "participatory development"). Such an aid which aims sustainability, self-reliance, and social justice of development leads to the attainment of democratization in a sense that it creates the basis for developing countries' democratization (JICA 1995, 35).

On the other hand, the same publication places lower priority on citizens' participation in politics than that participation in economy and society by saying, "among citizens' participation in the three phases of politics, economy, and society, we emphasize aid for the promotion of participation in economy and society in the first place" (JICA 1995, 42). While the protection of citizens' political rights and its empowerment are not officially excluded from Japan's democracy assistance menu, assistance for citizens' participation in economy is considered to have priority over their participation in politics. Reflecting that, JICA's assistance for civil society is targeted to socio economic areas such as micro finance, development, and healthcare. Thus, Japan's assistance to combat corruption, for example, is provided only for the state institution sector such as police and legal institutions, and no assistance has ever been provided to

civil society organizations for the purpose of advocacy and watchdog to combat and prevent corruption in government (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 100-101).

Most donors assist the civil society sector aiming to empower citizens so that they can be a dynamo for democratization and the improvement of democratic quality, monitor their governments, and ensures transparency of their government. Civil society assistance expanded in the 1990s, with donor countries being frustrated at the results of state institutions assistance, according to Carothers. Recognizing the difficulty of bringing substantial reform as a top-down approach, donors found the necessity of empowering the citizens for attaining democracy or the improvement of democratic quality on their own (Carothers 1999, 169-170). In that sense, most assistance for the civil society sector is rather intended to be confrontational with their government. It is natural that recipient governments do not request aid for such counterbalancing forces as civil society. On the other hand, since cooperation with the recipient government is assumed in Japan, assistance for anti-governmental advocacy NGOs is not provided. Unlike the United States and European countries which support counter-balancing and watchdog functions of advocacy NGOs, Japanese assistance is naturally unlikely to be provided for such organizations because Japan's aid is provided based on requests from recipient governments. That is the very reason why David Arase (2005, 117-118) points out that request-based aid tends to cause provision of favorable aid for the government of recipient countries. In the fourth meeting of the ODA sogo senryaku kaigi (ODA General Strategy Meeting) held on November 1, 2002 in order to make proposals on the revision of ODA Charter, Michio Ito, Managing Director of the Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC), also pointed out that recipient governments of

Japanese foreign aid have ignored the needs of the poorest people in their countries (MOFA 2002).

Even when Japan provides assistance to such counter-balancing forces, Japan carefully tries to restrain the political impacts of Japan's assistance in a way not to cause political changes such as political power shift. A JICA publication of 2002 indeed states that "careful handling is required for democracy assistance. It has to minimize the impacts to [recipient countries'] citizens by causing such matters as change in political administrations" (JICA, Towards Democratic State-Building Assistance 2003, 20) ([ ] was added by the author). It is contrary to the original aim of democracy assistance, which is to bring political change to recipient countries in a way to foster healthy restraint of, and balance against, powerful executives. Incumbent executives tend to hold strong power compared to its counterbalancing forces such as the legislature or the civil society in authoritarian and transitional countries. It is out of the necessity to help empower such actors for the purpose of balancing their power against the executives that the United States and European countries are active in assisting them. Democracy assistance provided only for the incumbents seem to function to tilt the power balance in favor of the incumbents even more.

Table 70 shows the allocation of funding among civil society sector assistance as of 2008. Although the utility of this table is limited because it does not correspond to the categorization shown in Table 1, it shows an interesting phenomenon. The small amount of Japan's assistance for civil society is mainly provided for strengthening civil society (39.57%) and free flow of information (48.92%). However, whether the projects for strengthening civil society can be categorized as democracy assistance is dubious.

Japanese projects for strengthening civil society targets those civil society associations that function in the development sector. And thus although these projects do intend to strengthen civil society organizations, their purpose is not necessarily in democracy assistance.

Table 21 Japan's Civil Society Assistance Allocation by Category, 2008

Assistance Category	
Strengthening civil society	39.57%
Human rights	7.19%
Free flow of information	48.92%
Women's equality organisations and institutions	4.32%

Source: (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.).

Japan carefully tries to avoid giving partisan impression when providing assistance. That is especially the case in its assistance to the legislature. Japan has provided assistance to the legislature since 1992 in the form of seminar provisions. Contents of seminars tend to be on democratic parliamentary system, political and administrative reform, local self-governance, and Japan's modernization and democratization experience. In addition, participating legislators meet and have discussions with Japanese Diet members and citizens, and visit Japanese countryside and mass media (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 39). One of the characteristics of Japan's legislative assistance is that, it tends to invite a larger number of legislative staff than legislators. Table 22 shows the list of Japan's legislative assistance projects between 1992 and 2002. As shown in this table, while 94 legislators were invited to these projects in total, the number of legislative staff invited was 257, which is more than 2.7 times of the number of legislators. Some cases such as the Tajikistan Parliamentary Management Seminar started in 1998 invited executive staff along with legislators and

legislative staffers (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 39-41). When legislators are invited to these seminars, Japan invites legislators from both governing and opposition parties in order to maintain political neutrality. However, the participating members are decided by recipient governments (JICA, Towards Democratic State-Building Assistance 2003, 65), which cannot exclude the possibility that the member choice is not politically neutral. Again, it shows the impact of recipient governments on Japan's democracy assistance.

Table 22 List of Japan's Legislative Assistance, 1992-2002

Fiscal Year	Seminar Names	Number of Participants	
		Legislators	Legislative Staff
1992	Democratization Research Seminar / African Region	0	9
	Democratization Research Seminar / Central and South American Region	0	7
1993	Democratization Research Seminar: Based on Japanese Experience / A Course for the Regions of Africa, Central and South America, and Southwest Asia	0	10
	Seminar on Democratic Political and Administrative Institutions in Japan / A Course for Asia	0	7
1994	Democratization Research Seminar / A Course for South African Republic	1	10
	Democratization Research Seminar / A Course for Southern Africa	1	9
	Democratization Research Seminar / A Course for Central Asia and Caucasus	0	5
1995	Democratization Research Seminar / Central America and Caribbean Region	2	9
	Seminar on Democratic Politics and Administrative Institutions in Japan / Indochina countries	0	4
1996	Democratization Research Seminar / Anglophone Africa	0	10
1997	Seminar for the Promotion of Civil Society and Democratic Governance / El Salvador	3	5
	Democratization Research Seminar / Francophone	1	10

Fiscal Year	Seminar Names	Number of Participants	
		Legislators	Legislative Staff
	Africa		
1998	Democratization Research Seminar / Anglophone Africa	0	9
	El Salvador Democratization Seminar (National Finance)	5	10
	Democratization Research Seminar / Tajikistan	0	10
1999	Africa Democratization Seminar (East Africa)	15	15
	Tajikistan Democratization Seminar	3	10
2000	Africa Democratization Seminar (Kenya, Zambia, South African Republic, and Madagascar)	12	12
	Tajikistan Democratization Seminar	3	9
	Africa Democratization Seminar (Tanzania, Mozambique)	6	6
	Nigeria Democratization Seminar	0	9
2001	Africa Democratization Seminar I (Anglophone countries) (Kenya, Tanzania, South African Republic, Botswana)	11	11
	Peru Democratization Seminar (on the Implementation of Democratic Elections)	0	10
	Tajikistan Democratization Seminar	5	10
	Africa Democratization Seminar II (Francophone countries) (Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Mali)	12	12
2002	Tajikistan Parliamentary Management Seminar	5	10
	Peru Democratization Seminar (on the Implementation of Democratic Elections)	0	10
	Africa Democratization Seminar II (Francophone countries) (Guinea, Togo, Republic of Congo)	9	9
TOTAL		**94**	**257**

Source: (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 137).

When it comes to political parties, Japan does not provide even mere material assistance due to highly partisan nature of such assistance. The request-based approach is a bipartisan approach in theory, because requests are made from the executives in recipient countries, but not from political parties. An exception is the case of requests from governments of one-party dominance. In this case, Japan's assistance naturally favors the governing parties by respecting the will of their governments. On the other

hand, other donor countries tend to provide political party assistance from donor countries' political parties directly to recipient countries' political parties. Especially active in this field are European donors, whose party foundations assist political parties in recipient countries along with ideological ties (Carothers 1999, 141-142). Since greater assistance tends to be provided to opposition parties than to governing parties in order to create a balance in the legislature in these cases, there is likelihood that governments and governing parties of recipient countries consider such assistance unfair. Since Japan highly regards the will of recipient governments, Japan eventually does not show the will to assist political parties, another counterbalancing force against the executives.

Japan hardly provides assistance for constitutions which regulates how the country deals with human rights-related issues in addition to defining the organizations and functions of government institutions. This is in a clear contrast with the United States, where constitution assistance is one of the most popular areas of democracy assistance (Carothers 1999, 160-163). The only examples of Japan's constitutional assistance are information provision on Japan's democratization and constitution conducted by Toshiyuki Munesue, then professor of Seijo University, to constitution drafting committee and Kabul University professors in Afghanistan (Munesue, Constitutional Assistance Diary 1, 2003; Munesue, Constitutional Assistance Diary 2, 2003; Munesue, Constitutional Assistance Diary 3, 2003; Munesue, Constitutional Assistance Diary 4, 2003; Kamiya, Constitutional Assistance Diary 5, 2004; Kamiya, Constitutional Assistance Diary 6, 2004), and by Masanori Aikyo, a professor of Nagoya University, in Vietnam and Uzbekistan (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 208).

Although Japan does not officially exclude assistance for human rights protection, Japan states that it provides assistance for it only under consultation with the government of the recipient country (JICA, Participatory Development and Good Governance 1995, 42). Human rights violations in authoritarian countries tend to be caused by state actors. The Myanmar government and military have captured political opponents, ripped off and abducted citizens, and burned down villages. The Egyptian military kill Christian citizens. The Syrian military torture and kill citizens. In order to maintain political control, authoritarian regimes oppress the political activities of citizens and destroy political sphere among the citizens, according to O'Donnel and Schumitter (1986). For recipient countries, thus, accepting assistance for human rights protection not only damages the legitimacy of the regime, but also could encourage anti-governmental movements which tend to be the very reason the regime violated their citizens' human rights originally. This makes state actors highly reluctant to accept assistance on human rights.

Given this reluctance on the side of recipient governments to take actions for human rights protection, Japan rarely provides democracy assistance for human rights protection either. This is in contrast with Northern European donors, which provide assistance for human rights, the socially vulnerable (women, children), and the poor. There are cases of Japanese individuals and NGOs, not the government, assisting the creation of human rights laws. Yoichi Yamada, a lawyer, assisted the creation of human trafficking law in Cambodia in the early 2000s. Human Rights Now, a Japanese NGO in the human rights field, has provided education on governance in Myanmar, which covers human rights issues. They do possess humanitarian norms, and thus work for the benefit of ordinary people from a humanitarian standpoint. It shows that the lack of Japanese

assistance for constitution and human rights is not due to the lack of humanitarian norms in Japan. Rather, the lack of the Japanese government's assistance is due to the extremely small size of requests from recipient governments. A legal aid agent of the International Cooperation Department (ICD) at MOJ states that there has never been an assistance request concerning human rights in the field of legal assistance (ICD staff members 2008). Because the Japanese government considers the existence of requests from recipient governments as prerequisites of its assistance, Japan eventually does not assist those areas where the recipient governments do not want to be touched.

Even when democratization is in progress and furthering it is positioned as a part of a national development plan, support for the central government comes to the front. Decentralization processes could cause tensions between the central and local governments. Despite the decentralization process in Thailand since the end of the 1990s, the central government retains substantial power over local governments. The local governments in Cambodia are outposts of the central government, and the authority of local governmental actors is limited. Patron-client relations between the central and local governments remain in many other Southeast Asian countries as well (JICA, Effective approach to developmental issues 2007, 51). In such cases, Japan's local government assistance for these countries tends to target central governmental agencies along with local governments.

Most of Japan's civil society assistance targets media. JICA's policy guideline on peace-building assistance regards media-assistance as one of the target categories of Japan's democracy assistance (JICA, Guidance by Issue: Peace-Building 2009). International Peace Cooperation Council (Kokusai Heiwa Kyoryoku Kondankai), which

was established within the Cabinet Office, recommended propelling Japan's media assistance in its report published in December 2002 (Council on International Peace Cooperation 2002, 42). Japan has assisted media through grant, technical assistance, expert dispatch, expert training, and the provision of materials related to broadcasting (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 50).

Table 71 shows examples of Japan's media assistance. Japan has provided media assistance mainly to TV and radio stations. According to Masakazu Sakashita (2006, 122), 127 TV media assistance projects and 56 radio assistance projects have been conducted by September 2005, while Japan has never provided media assistance to print media such as newspapers and magazines. This is because Japan regards telecommunication and broadcasting technology as its comparative advantage, and thus focuses on those projects that require it. Sakashita (2006, 122) also points out that the number of media assistance projects has been in decline since the 1980s. Given the fact that the decrease of Japan's media assistance does not match with the increased demand for democracy assistance after the end of the Cold War, it is clear that Japan's media assistance has intended to assist media, but not necessarily democratic media.

Table 23 Examples of Japan's Media Assistance

Target Countries	Project Contents	Year of Implementation	Assistance Method
Afghanistan	Media assistance	2002	Emergency Assistance Study, Trainee Acceptance
	Emergency Loya Jirga national assembly broadcasting	2002	Emergency Assistance Study
Iraq	TV Broadcasting techniques	2004-2005	In-Japan-Training
Nepal	Seminar on election and democratization (in relations with media)	2008-2009	By-Country-Training
East Timor	Election assistance (Election PR and PR human resource development)	2001	Specialist Dispatch
Bhutan	National broadcasting assistance project	2005-2007	Technical Cooperation Project
	National broadcasting capacity building project	2007-2010	Technical Cooperation Project

Source: (JICA, Guidance by Issue: Peace-Building 2009, 4).

Indeed, the characteristic of Japan's media assistance is that the assistance focuses on facilities such as information and telecommunication networks instead of media contents. Project contents include the improvement of the capacity of program-making and broadcasting skills, repair of ground communication system, and provision of studio equipments. Seminars are provided to teach how to use and maintain the devices provided through such projects as well (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 50). Expert trainings have been conducted for countries such as Indonesia and Sri Lanka in addition to broadcasting infrastructure assistance, which provided trainings for program-production. However, these trainings tend to be mere supplements to broadcasting infrastructure assistance projects (Sakashita 2006, 122). The Information and Telecommunication Technology Division of JICA, not the Public Policy Department that is in charge of democracy assistance, is in charge of media assistance. It shows that

Japan's media assistance is conducted mainly as broadcasting technical assistance, rather than democracy assistance as Sakashita (2006, 122) points out.

Japan's media assistance to Afghanistan in 2002 helped broadcasting the country's *Loya Jirga*, or national assembly, on TVs through satellite system. Its aim was to show the discussion at the national assembly and the process of choosing the interim president of the country to increase the legitimacy of the new administration (JICA, Final Report of the Emergency Reconstruction Assistance Study in Kabul, Afghanistan 2004). Such political characteristic of the assistance was distinct compared to Japan's media assistance before then. However, it assisted only a *state* broadcasting station, and did not intend to increase the capacity of *private* media's watchdog functions. In this sense, the actual contents of this assistance project were state, but not civil society assistance. In addition, contents of this assistance were to upgrade broadcasting infrastructure, provide devices and training on how to use the devices. No assistance was provided in terms of contents of the broadcasting. There was no expert of free and fair broadcasting in its preliminary study group and all the experts were of broadcasting techniques, which shows the weakness of Japan's interest in supporting the role of media for democratic governance (JICA, Preliminary Report of the Emergency Reconstruction Assistance Study in Kabul, Afghanistan 2002). Its project document did not set contribution for democratic governance as an evaluation criterion of the project either (Sakashita 2006, 124).

Japan's assistance for unions is provided by Japan International Labor Foundation (JILAF), utilizing funding from MOFA (through the funding scheme of Grant Aid for Japanese NGO's Projects) and subsidies of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare

(MHLW, Table 72). JILAF is an NGO established in 1998 in order to help nurture democratic labor movements in developing countries by which to contribute for stable employer-employee relations. Mainly conducted are invitations of leaders of labor movements in developing countries to Japan in order to inform them of labor conditions in Japan. In addition, seminars are held in recipient countries, aiming to strengthen the leadership of labor union executives and labor union activities. Informal educational institutions on child labor are operated in such countries as India and Nepal as well. In cooperation with the Institute for Science of Labour, programs for nurturing trainers for the improvement of safety and health are initiated by labor unions. Special emphasis is placed on capacity building rather than material provision (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 229).

However, projects conducted through ODA from MOFA do not seem to empower labor unions, but specialize on assisting technical contents. Labor union assistance conducted in FY2009 through funding from MOFA were two seminars for nurturing HIV/AIDS trainers in Thailand, in addition to a workshop and an meeting for creating textbooks on the improvement of work environments in Vietnam (JILAF n.d.).

In sum, Japan's approach to provide democracy assistance based upon requests from recipient governments causes the weakness of assistance toward constraining forces against the executives, such as civil society sector in general (NGOs, media, and unions), political parties, legislature, in addition to human rights issues.

Comparison between Japan and Other Donors

It is not only the Japanese government which tends to provide democracy assistance based on communications with governmental actors in recipient countries. French government does not basically rely on civil society actors for information necessary for the decision-making on foreign aid (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff 2009). They tend to regard that taking into account the interest of small number of individuals or organizations onto policies can be inconsistent with the pursuit of public interest (Peters 2004; Saurugger 2007, 384-385, 389). USAID, an American governmental aid agency, also has the tendency to communicate with recipient governments as Larry Diamond (1992) points out. This is because, as governmental agencies, they are in charge of government-to-government relations. As a governmental aid agency, USAID cannot provide foreign aid without consent from recipient *governments*. This makes it difficult for USAID to assist the civil society sector of recipient countries. USAID cannot provide assistance for political parties either in order to maintain nonpartisanship. These are the same as in the case of Japanese assistance.

However, many, if not all, Western donors are able to provide democracy assistance not only according to the will of recipient governments but also based on the needs from the citizens in recipient countries. This is because they possess private democracy assistance foundations which receive funding from their governments and conduct democracy assistance autonomously. Being aware of the political characteristics, many Western donors have established democracy assistance foundations in order to pool governmental funding for democracy assistance and to restrain the influence of donor governments' policy preference, or at least to show as such (Masujima 2004, 7-8).

For example, the US Congress established the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 1983 as a non-profit organization to pool congressional budget with which to provide democracy assistance abroad. By giving discretion to NED, the United States tries to give an impression that neither the government nor the congress has influence over NED's democracy assistance (Carothers 1991, 202-205; Otsuru-Kitagawa 1998). Being NGOs, they are not bound by governmental diplomatic concerns. They support civil society actors such as NGOs, labor unions, media, think tanks, in addition to political parties (Diamond 1992). Following NED's case, the Canadian congress established the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development in 1988 and the UK established the Westminster Foundation for Democracy in 1992 (Diamond 1995, 20-21). Such creation of democracy assistance foundations as private organizations makes it possible for other Western donors besides Japan to assist counterbalancing forces against the executives in recipient countries.

In the case of North European countries, both governmental and non-governmental actors provide direct aid to civil society organizations in recipient countries. For example, Sweden, which has a long tradition of involving NGOs in governmental policy decision-making mechanism, provides democracy assistance not only through recipient governments but also through various domestic and international NGOs. This open nature of Swedish assistance attracts NGOs from other developed countries as well, and even American NGOs as Ford Foundation seek funding to SIDA first and foremost (Former staff of the Ford Foundation 2009).

In addition, various European countries possess party foundations which provide democracy assistance autonomously from their government. Four German party-

affiliated foundations – the Friedrich Naumann Foundation of the German Liberal Party, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation of the Social Democratic Party, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of the Christian Democratic Union, and the Hans Seidel Foundation of the Christian Social Union – started assisting democracy in Portugal and Spain in the mid 1970s, which was the birth of democracy assistance by party-affiliated foundations (Lowe n.d.; Magone 2004, 86). In Sweden, each political party possesses party foundation, to which the parliament provides budget based on the number of seats of each party in the parliament (Country Snapshot: Political Structure 2009, 25; van Wersch & de Zeeuw 2005, 56-57).[13]

On the other hand, there is no such foundation in Japan. While non-profit organizations such as the Diet members League to Aid Democracy for Peace Building (ADP Committee) and the Partnership for Democratic Governance (PDG) have tried to establish one, it has not come true (Hirono 2004, 13-14; Sugawara 2003, chapter 8). Although the Japan Foundation once tried to cut off its budget from MOFA to become a private foundation to assist democracies abroad, it did not come true either (Former Japan Foundation staff 2008). Japan Platform, an NGO established in 2000 in order to pool governmental funding for emergency assistance, does not provide democracy assistance and thus does not function as a democracy assistance foundation. These are the reflection of the lack of will in Japan to provide assistance which recipient governments are not willing to accept.

Not only Japan but some Western donors also lack private foundations to provide democracy assistance for the sake of their governments. One of the least inactive

[13] Swedish political party foundations receive small amount of budget from SIDA as well.

countries of democracy assistance, France does not possess one. Although there are some non-governmental organizations that have the name "foundation" such as the Fondation Jean-Jaures and the Fondation Robert Schuman, they do not function as intermediaries between the government and recipients of democracy assistance. Indeed, they do not receive money from the government almost at all (Foundation Robert Schuman staff 2009).

Concentration of Assistance for the State Institution Sector

Because information gathered from governmental actors tends to clarify needs on the state level, Japanese democracy assistance projects, which are formed to tackle these needs, tend to be provided for the state institution sector. This is the case despite the fact that the voice for the improvement of the quality of governance tends to be raised from citizens rather than governmental actors. Religious and student groups tend to be the leading forces for democratization (Huntington, The Third Wave 1991). In recent years, Myanmar and China have seen citizens' protests which demand democratization, combating corruption, greater accountability, and human rights protection. The same is seen in various North African and Middle Eastern countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Oman. In all these cases, it is the citizens that require better governance and democracy, while many of these governments oppressed, detained, and killed protesters.

Adam Przeworski, et al. (1999) argues that regime tends to be stable in countries with high economic performance. Political stability is brought by economic development partially because economic development can function to help divert the eyes of citizens

from the issues of civil liberties and political rights, which helps to justify and maintain authoritarian regime. That is why, as the arguments of authoritarian bureaucracy and developmentalism show, authoritarian countries tend to stress economic development in order to release citizens' resentment toward the government and to justify existing regimes (O'Donnell G. A. 1973; O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986). Economic infrastructure construction tends to be used in order to display the power of the government, and is conducted in a way to bring benefit to state-owned corporations. Adding the high cost of economic infrastructure construction onto it, recipient governments have motivation to rely the economic infrastructure construction on foreign aid while maintaining a political grip by itself. In some rare cases, recipient governments do not even possess the political capability to govern their countries. Such cases can be seen in war-torn failed states. Some of them possess transitional governments which heavily rely on external forces such as United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), for example. However, governments in the developing world tend to possess strong sovereignty norms. They prefer relying on foreign aid as far as it does not cause intervention into domestic affairs. From these reasons, authoritarian governments tend to have high motivation to request foreign aid for economic infrastructure. On the other hand, they tend to regard regime survival as the most important issue, and thus do not possess high motivation to request assistance for democratization.

Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996, 55-56) argue that the characteristics of transitional societies differ depending on their former regime types. They argue that a transitional country tends to be weak in such aspects as civil society, rule of law, and professionalism of bureaucracy if their former regime type is Sultanistic. On the other

hand, a country is weak in "autonomy, authority, power, and legitimacy" of the regime if its former regime type is authoritarian. There tends to be asymmetry of power and influence between governmental actors and opposition parties in transitional countries as well (Lasota 1999, 126-127). Larry Diamond (2002) calls these regimes "pseudo-democracies" and Fareed Zakaria (1997 and 2003) calls them "illiberal democracies." Although they possess regular elections, the executives tend to act beyond constitutional limitations put on them. From Bangladesh to Zambia to Guatemala, rule of law is weak, political rights are somewhat limited, civil liberties are often violated. Although these countries can be assumed to have various areas where they need democracy assistance, they do not have high motivation to proactively request foreign aid for democracy consolidation, because governmental actors try to avoid damaging their vested interests. As such, governments of authoritarian countries and transitional countries do not have high motivation to request democracy assistance overall.

However, there is one area where they have motivation to request such aid – assistance for market-oriented economic reform. Economic development is desirable for the purpose of political stability both in authoritarian and transitional countries, as shown in Przeworski's argument (1999). For authoritarian regimes, it is a way to divert the eyes of their citizens from the justifiability of the regime (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). It is difficult to accomplish economic development without the introduction and the promotion of market economy in this era of globalization. The four tigers which are called Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) developed their economies thanks to a great level of investment and trade. Brazil, Russia, India, and China, which are called BRICs, follow NIEs in the sense that their economic development mainly relies on

investment and trade. In order to invite investment from abroad, these countries need to bring transparency to their economic system so that foreign investors would find confidence in investment in the country. One of the most important ways for it is to arrange market-oriented economic laws and to strengthen the capacity for the enforcement measures for it.

In addition, membership in such organizations as WTO is important in order to strengthen trade relations with other countries. Membership in WTO helps avoid getting unilateral trade restrictions by getting countries to abide by certain rules together with other member countries. The Asian region, which Japan considers as its sphere of interest, have had a number of countries in need of developing domestic economic systems in order to become members of WTO. These countries have requested Japan's assistance in economy-related areas. For example, although authoritarian China did not show interest in Japan's democracy assistance in the 1990s, it made an official request for legal assistance in the economic law area to Japan in the course of exchange with Japanese aid agents, in order to prepare for the country's participation in WTO (Inoue and Kaneko 2002, 59).

Most of Japan's rule of law assistance is for market-oriented economic reform, due to the increased necessity of such reform in East, Southeast, and Central Asia along with the introduction of a market economy system after the end of the Cold War. Most of Japan's rule of law assistance so far has been in the civil and commercial law field, whereas assistance in other legal fields has been limited. The major areas of Japan's assistance include civil, civil procedure, bankruptcy, insolvency, and competition laws. In the competition law field, Japan has provided technical assistance for the drafting of

anti-competition law to China since FY2004, and has held training programs in cooperation with other APEC member countries since 1996 (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 232). Assistance in the areas of corporate and economic laws for China started in 2003 as well (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 245). METI, JICA, JETRO, and the Association for Overseas Technical Scholarship (AOTS) have provided assistance in the field of intellectual property rights, which include computerization in law-implementation organizations, provision of training seminars on intellectual property rights violation for courts and police, and awareness campaign on intellectual property for private organizations (Miura 2008, 24-26). These are assistance for the support of not only market-oriented economic reform, but also the arrangement of trade investment environment.

Although there is no significant structural obstacle for the Japanese government to support the civil society, the aid is used for the sake of such regimes, making the nature of its assistance more of political institutionalization assistance than of democracy assistance. This occurs due to the fact that the Japanese assistance is provided according to the will of recipient governments, setting aside their citizens' opinion. Because the existence of the current governments is considered to be *given*, it leads Japan to separate good governance from democratization. Thus, scholars such as Hirotsune Kimura, for example, clearly state that political development is not about democratization but about institutionalization (Kimura 2010). Because JICA, the main agent of Japanese democracy assistance, has its focus on economic development, good governance, which does not contain democratization in itself, naturally means political institutionalization, rather than democracy.

However, if one seeks to assist governance which reflects the voice of the citizens, liberalization, in addition to political institutionalization, is a prerequisite as Larry Diamond argues (Diamond 1999, 64-65). This argument is embedded in the good governance literature as well. The term "good governance" appeared in the 1990s out of the sense that relying governance on government cannot solve the issue of "government failure." From this point of view, the civil society started being expected to play the role which governments fail to play. The civil society was expected to bring greater accountability and transparency in addition to effectiveness. Thus, good governance was a concept which comprises the governance role of the civil society in mind. In that sense, removing the civil society sector from the actors for "good governance" is a contradiction. In addition, such requisites for good governance as accountability and transparency naturally require involvement and monitoring functions of the citizens. Theoretically speaking, good governance cannot exist in authoritarian countries where certain individuals, parties, or the military controls information flow.

Conclusion

In sum, Japan provides democracy assistance based on requests and information from recipient governments. Because recipient governments' will is respected highly, Japan's democracy assistance is provided only to the countries whose governments have the will to request and accept it. Japanese assistance for democratic governance tends to focus on the state institution sector, without deep-seated contents of "democracy governance." Assistance for counter-balancing forces against the executives is extremely limited. In sum, Japanese democracy assistance is both limited in overall amount and

provided mostly for the state institution sector, because it is provided based on the will of recipient governments.

Chapter 6: Aid Human Resource and Democracy Assistance

Previous chapter argued that the approach to value requests from recipient governments not only limits the amount of Japan's democracy assistance but also leads it to concentrate on the state institution sector. This chapter will test the second set of hypotheses, taking aid human resources as the intervening variable here. The hypotheses are as follows:

Hypothesis 2-a: *If a donor relies heavily on state actors as implementation partners of democracy assistance projects despite the paucity of foreign aid human resources among them, its democracy assistance amount is likely to get limited because of the short supply of implementation partners. If a donor relies not only on state but also on civil society actors as implementation partners of democracy assistance projects, on the other hand, its democracy assistance amount is likely to be bigger because a larger number of foreign aid human resources are likely to be available.*

Hypothesis 2-b: *If a donor relies on state actors as implementation partners of democracy assistance projects, its democracy assistance is likely to be directed to the state institution sector because of the lack of implementation partners with the expertise of civil society assistance. If a donor relies not only on state but also on civil society actors as implementation partners of democracy assistance projects, on the other hand, its democracy assistance is likely to be provided to the civil society sector as well as the*

state institution sector because of the existence of implementation partners with the expertise of civil society assistance.

This chapter will show that human resources for Japan's democracy assistance have been mobilized mainly from the state sector, but not from the civil society sector. It will argue that there are two causes for the weakness of human resource mobilization from the civil society sector – the paucity of NGOs in Japan, and the lack of trust between the government and NGOs

Paucity of Human Resources in the Japanese Government

Most Japanese democracy assistance projects have been implemented by governmental agencies and actors. Japan's legal assistance dispatch officers of the International Cooperation Department (ICD) of the Research and Training Institute (RTI) at MOJ, in addition to judges and prosecutors in active service. Police officers in active service are dispatched for police assistance, and officers of MOFA, JICA, and Self-Defense Force (SDF) are dispatched to election observations. Because most governmental agencies neither train their staff solely for democracy assistance nor possess sections or departments for the purpose of democracy assistance, dispatched personnel's main duties are not in democracy assistance. Since dispatching personnel from these agencies require reduction in the number of staff on other duties, it is difficult to secure a large number of officers for democracy assistance.

In the case of local government assistance, it tends to be local government officers who participate in Japan's assistance. They lecture at seminars held in Japan, and

are dispatched as short-term professionals (JICA, Effective approach to developmental issues 2007, 30). In 1999, Local Authorities International Cooperation Specialist Dispatch Project (Jichitai kokusai kyoryoku senmonka haken jigyo) was established as a way to dispatch registrants of the Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (Jichitai kokusaika kyokai, CLAIRE)'s International Cooperation Human Resources Bank (Jichitai kokusai kyoryoku jinzai banku) as local government assistant professionals for local governments in other countries (K. Yamazaki 2006).

MOJ established ICD within RTI in 2001 for the purpose of legal assistance as Japan's legal assistance expanded as a consequence of increased requests (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 75). Since legal assistance is provided not as MOJ's ODA projects but as those of MOFA's with JICA's project formation initiatives, ICD staff members participate in legal assistance projects upon requests from JICA. Prosecutors, judges, and Civil Affairs Bureau staff of MOJ are internally transferred to ICD to be in charge of legal assistance for two to four years before returning to their original units. Despite the existence of ICD, however, aid human resource mobilization is not an easy task for MOJ either. There is almost no legal professional who have knowledge about recipient countries' history, culture, and judicial system in addition to language and communication skills, which makes it necessary to nurture such professionals from scratch (Inaba 2009, 39-40). They are expected to obtain these knowledge and skills on their own. In addition, MOJ does not either provide or arrange language training sessions, and thus each individual has to learn local languages on their own before and during their dispatch (Legal-expert-dispatched-to-Vietnam 2011). As staff moves back to their original units from ICD in two to four years' cycle, ICD's legal assistance capacity drops

significantly again (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 79-80). There is also a problem that the appointment cycle of judges and prosecutors in ICD and long-term project cycle of legal assistance often do not match (Inaba 2009, 39-40). Because of such limitations, Japan tends to allocate only a tiny number of officers to democracy assistance – only one or several officers are dispatched to each democracy assistance project.

It is not only in the local government and legal assistance fields where only a small number of human resources are mobilized. It is the case in every field. In police assistance field, the number of potential aid human resource itself is limited. The number of police personnel in Japan is 285,100 as of 2005, among which 7,500 are in the National Police Agency, and 277,600 are in local police agencies. Law-enforcement officers are the potential aid human resources for police assistance, whose number is 251,100 in total. Remaining 34,000 officers are general employees, and thus not potential aid human resources of technical assistance in the police field. 900 of the law enforcement officers are specialists of protecting the imperial family, and thus cannot be assigned to other duties (Yoshimura and Takeuchi 2005, 24). However, given that the population in Japan is approximately 128 million as of 2005, the number of Japanese citizens each police personnel is in charge is 500 on average. This ratio is large compared to other donor countries, where each police officer is in charge of 300-400 citizens (Tanaka S. 2003, 30; Japan Statistical Yearbook). Due to the small number of police officers per population in Japan, it is difficult to mobilize a substantial number of police personnel for democracy assistance projects. Table 24 shows the number of police experts dispatched between 1978 and 2003 by target countries. During the 26 year-period, only 416 experts have been dispatched for police assistance, which means 16 personnel

are dispatched a year on average. Most of the dispatch is for short-term, and only 44 experts were dispatched for long-term assignments (more than one year) during the 26 years. It is less than two long-term experts per year.

Table 24 Japan's Police Assistance Expert Dispatch, 1978-2003

Target Country	Long-term	Short-term	Total
China	2	64	66
Singapore	0	64	64
Thailand	14	40	54
Philippines	17	28	45
Indonesia	9	31	40
Cambodia	1	25	26
El Salvador	0	15	15
Myanmar	0	12	12
Mongolia	0	12	12
Brazil	0	12	12
Vietnam	0	11	11
Pakistan	0	10	10
Malaysia	0	8	8
Laos	1	7	8
Sri Lanka	0	6	6
Nepal	0	6	6
Bangladesh	0	5	5
South Africa	0	3	3
Costa Rica	0	2	2
Czech Republic	0	2	2
Uzbekistan	0	2	2
Jamaica	0	2	2
South Korea	0	1	1
Mexico	0	1	1
Panama	0	1	1
Jordan	0	1	1
Poland	0	1	1
Total	44	372	416

Note: Long-term dispatch is of more than a year, and short-term dispatch is of less than a year.
Source: (NPA, Commissioner General's Secretariat, International Affairs Division 2005, 14).

The necessity to supplement the lack of police agents has been pointed out in various occasions. Agents related to democracy assistance in MOJ, JICA, and MOFA, in addition to scholars, often argue that the lack of human resources in the democracy assistance field limits Japan's democracy assistance (ICD staff members 2008; MOFA staff 2009; JICA staff members 2008). The Outline for the Promotion of International Cooperation calls for "the creation of database on experts who have foreign language skills and international work experience including retired personnel, and agile dispatch in cooperation with NGOs and related organizations in order to deal with the transfer of knowledge and technology of various needs."[14] From 2003 to 2004, the Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters of Cabinet Office, MOFA, MEXT, and JICA held "Investigative Meeting on Human Resource Development in International Peace Cooperation Fields," and mentioned the necessity of human resource development in democracy assistance field in its "Action Plan."[15] The mobilization of retired governmental personnel is also often requested in various occasions (e.g., Nishikawa 1993, 657). Tsuyoshi Kono (2005, 48), a scholar of comparative politics, points out the quantitative expansion of Japan's assistance as an assignment for Japan.

Japan's election assistance has been conducted mainly by the Cabinet Office, MOFA, and JICA. The Cabinet Office dispatches election observers based on the Peace-Keeping Operations Law (PKO Law), and MOFA also dispatches its personnel for election observation and management based on the Law for the Establishment of the

[14] "3-1-(1) Chishiki Gijutsu no iten (Transfer of Knowledge and Technology)" in National Police Agency, 2005, p. 6.
[15] "1-1 jinzai ga motomerareru bunya (1-1 Fields where Human Resources Lack)," in Meeting on Human Resources Development in International Peace Cooperation Field, 2004.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. JICA also provides technical assistance to elections as well. However, the number of experts dispatched for election assistance is very small. The number of personnel dispatched for election observation based on laws other than the PKO Law, for example, shows that 211 cases, which constitute 89% of all dispatches, dispatched only single digit number of personnel. In addition, most of the dispatch is for short-term, which spans from several days to a week. Long-term dispatch is limited to cases such as the election in Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Appendix 2).

Japan's aid human resource is extremely limited when it comes to legislative assistance as well (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 41). JICA points out that Parliament Management Seminar for Tajikistan in the early 2000s was a precursor of successful mobilization of aid agents for legislative assistance. It shows that agents for legislative assistance had not been mobilized until only recently. However, even at that time, a small number of staff members of the Secretariat of the House of Representatives were the lecturers mobilized (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 41). The Secretariat of the House of Representatives has only about 1,700 staff members including police officers, stenographers and drivers, and the Secretariat of the House of Councillors has 1,300 staff members in total (House of Councillors n.d.). The number of researchers among them is only about 250 in each secretariat (Secretariat of the House of Representatives staff 2011). Compared to the number of Diet members in each house (480 in the House of Representatives and 242 in the House of Councillors), the number of researchers in the secretariats is even smaller than the number of Diet members.

As such, aid human resource mobilization for democracy assistance from the state sector is not an easy task for Japan. However, aid human resources could be in civil society as well. As the next section will show, active donors of democracy assistance indeed outsource a number of democracy assistance projects to civil society actors. The next section will show how rarely civil society actors have been mobilized for Japan's democracy assistance on the other hand.

Weak Mobilization of Civil Society Actors

Most of the human resources that implement democracy assistance projects are non-governmental actors in the case of active donors of democracy assistance. Most donor countries contract out democracy assistance projects to universities, research institutes and NGOs. Such a trend first appeared along with the New Public Management (NPM) reforms. Facing the necessity of downsizing the government, the United States started contracting out foreign aid projects to non-governmental actors in the 1970s (Ichikawa & Sakurai 1995, 235; Hashimoto K. 1995, 67). Sweden conducted NPM reform from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, and strengthened the system where NGOs implement governmental programs. Swedish government has expanded outsourcing of project implementations to NGOs since then (Wijkström 2004, 27).

At the inception of US democracy assistance, democracy assistance was conducted mainly by the State Department, while USAID was not an actor of such assistance.[16] However, as the Asia Foundation (TAF) and NDI proposed a project to

[16] USAID was under direct control of president until 1998. It came under the control of the State Department after then.

USAID to support the National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) of the Philippines to nurture election observers in the country, USAID participated in democracy assistance by accepting and providing funding to this proposal (Former USAID staff 2008). In other words, the participation of USAID in US democracy assistance enterprise was initiated by NGOs. Since then, USAID has basically contracted out democracy assistance projects to such organizations as NGOs, research institutes at universities, think tanks, and private companies. 580 NGOs are registered for foreign aid work at USAID as of May 31, 2011 (USAID 2011, 6). According to USAID contract released in October 2009, democracy assistance projects, which were going to start after then, were contracted out to 229 private organizations (USAID, A Guide to USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA)/Office of Democracy and Governance (DG) Activities 2009).

As the previous chapter showed, US Congress also established NED as a not-for-profit non-governmental organization in 1983 in order to dilute political tone of democracy assistance. Operating with congressional budget, NED provides democracy assistance through various NGOs such as IRI, NDI, the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), and the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS). Human resources that the United States utilizes for democracy assistance are not limited to that in governmental agencies.

In the case of Sweden, the government creates policies and projects on democracy assistance taking into consideration what Swedish NGOs can do (Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation staff 2009). Swedish government provides high percentage of its democracy assistance through NGOs. SIDA provides about 7-8% of its overall bilateral

ODA through what they call Framework Organizations, which are about 10 domestic NGOs. SIDA provides funding to NGOs that are not categorized as Framework Organizations as well, which makes the rate of Swedish allocation of ODA funding through NGOs quite high among DAC member countries. A great number of Swedish NGOs conduct their aid activities using SIDA funding allocated for them through Framework Organizations. 350 Swedish NGOs received SIDA funding through Framework Organizations in 2005, whose number rose to 450 in 2007 (SIDA 2007, 82).

In addition, Swedish political parties possess their own party foundations which assist democracies abroad on their own. Budget is allocated for these foundations from the parliament based on the number of parliamentary seats of each party. Currently Sweden has six major political parties, all of which possess party foundations (Table 25). They also receive funding from SIDA as well, despite to a lesser extent.

Table 25 Swedish Political Party Foundations

	Affiliated Political Parties	Number of Seats in the Parliament
Olof Palme International Center	Social Democratic Party	130
Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation	Moderate Party	97
Centre Party International Foundation	Centre Party	29
Swedish International Liberal Center	Liberal People's Party	28
Christian Democrats Council for Democracy and Development	Christian Democrats	24
International Forum of the Left Party	Left Party	22
Green Forum Foundation	Green Party	19

Note: Number of seat in the parliament is as of April 2009.
Source: (van Wersch and de Zeeuw 2005, 56-57; Country Snapshot: Political Structure 2009, 25).

Japan shows a clear contrast. It was only in 2002 that MOFA established funding scheme called "Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Projects" in order for aid projects to

be implemented by NGO's initiatives. Since then, between 55 and 125 projects have received the grant each year, and the total grant amount has been in rise. However, the amount itself is still extremely small. Total grant in 2002 was 591 million yen, which was only about $4.7 million. Although the grant amount has risen, the amount in 2008 was only 2,900 million yen, which was about $31.9 million (Table 26 and Table 27).[17]

Table 26 Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Projects

(Unit: million yen)

	Number of Projects	Total Grant Amount
2002	60	591
2003	56	758
2004	72	1,038
2005	67	1,197
2006	88	2039
2007	124	2608
2008	72	2,900

Source: MOFA, ODA White Paper, each year.

These amounts are much smaller compared to those of Sweden. Table 27 shows comparison of Japanese ODA allocation through NGOs to that of Sweden from 2002 to 2008. While Sweden's ODA amount is only 10-24% of Japan's in the 2000s, the ODA amount allocated through NGOs is much greater. When Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Projects amounted $4.7 million in 2002, Swedish ODA allocation through NGOs amounted $76-87 million, calculating that 7-8% of ODA was allocated through NGOs. It means Swedish ODA allocation through NGO was 16-18 times greater than that of Japan. While Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Projects increased to $31.9 million in 2008, Swedish ODA amount allocated through NGOs was $186-213 million. Swedish ODA

[17] 1 yen was $0.008 at the end of 2002, and $0.011 at the end of 2008. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.

allocation through NGOs is still 6-7 times greater than that of Japan. US aid allocation through NGOs is even greater. The aid amount USAID alone allocated through NGOs was $3.1 billion in 2009 (USAID 2011, 6). This is almost 100 times greater than the amount of Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Projects in 2008.

Table 27 Japan's ODA Allocation through NGOs compared to Sweden, 2002-2008

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Japan's ODA amount (US$ million)	6,592.3	14,443.2	12,262.0	16,435.6	12,944.1	12,547.5	16,900.3
Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Projects (million yen)	591.0	758.0	1,038.0	1,197.0	2,039.0	2,608.0	2,900.0
Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Projects (US$ million)	4.7	6.8	10.4	9.6	16.3	23.5	31.9
Sweden's ODA amount (US$ million)	1,088.2	2,024.9	2,056.2	2,693.7	3,060.5	2,323.6	2,658.1
Swedish ODA allocation through NGOs (8%)	87.1	162.0	164.5	215.5	244.8	185.9	212.6
Swedish ODA allocation through NGOs (7%)	76.2	141.7	143.9	188.6	214.2	162.7	186.1
Ratio of Swedish ODA amount to that of Japan	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Ratio of Swedish ODA allocation (8%) through NGOs to that of Japan	18.4	23.7	15.8	22.5	15.0	7.9	6.7
Ratio of Swedish ODA allocation (7%) through NGOs to that of Japan	16.1	20.8	13.9	19.7	13.1	6.9	5.8

Source: OECD, Creditor Reporting System; ODA White Paper, each year; International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.

The case which comes to the closest to Japan is France. French government does not assist democracy abroad through domestic NGOs, but provide funding for it to governmental agencies of recipient countries directly. The only domestic democracy-assistance NGO which receive funding from the government is the Institute for Research and Debate on Governance (IRG). Although there are multiple NGOs that are interested in democracy assistance such as the Jean-Jaures Foundation and the Robert Schuman Foundation, they do not receive any funding from the government. In addition, France does not provide funding to civil society actors of recipient countries either.

Although the Cabinet Office, MOFA, and JICA dispatch experts from the civil society for election observation missions, it remains small in number. Governmental officials such as embassy staff and Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV) are dispatched more frequently. When Japan dispatched election observers to the Lower House election in Nepal in May 1999, only three non-governmental personnel were dispatched out of eight personnel dispatched (Southwest Asia Division, Southeast and Southwest Asian Affairs Department, MOFA 1999, 4). Even when NGOs ask for financial support to participate in election observations, the Japanese governmental agencies do not provide financial assistance packages to them, but remains hiring a small number of individuals from these NGOs for election monitoring missions (Shuto & Matsuura 2000, 30-31; Former InterBand staff 2011). The overall percentage of Japanese ODA provision through NGOs was only 2% as of 2001, whereas that of the United States was 41% (USAID 2002).

We need to grasp the idea what NGOs and how many of them have been mobilized to democracy assistance in Japan. The only examples that utilize agents

constantly from the civil society sector in Japan are the fields of legal and local government assistance. Table 28 shows major actors and their legal assistance projects to date. As it shows, although most of the projects are conducted by governmental actors such as MOJ, JICA and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), Sasakawa Foundation and Nagoya University have provided assistance as their own initiatives. Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA) and the International Civil and Commercial Law Centre Foundation (ICCLC) provide assistance in cooperation with JICA and MOJ as well.

Table 28 Actors of Japan's Legal Assistance

Assisting Actor	Year	Assistance Contents
Vietnam		
MOJ	1996-1999	Phase I: Improvement of Lawmaking Capacity of the Justice Ministry
	1999-2003	Phase II: Lawmaking Assistance / Assistance of the Study for Civil Law Revision / Capacity Building Assistance
	2003-2006	Phase III: Assistance for the Drafting of Civil, Civil Procedural, and Bankruptcy Laws, etc / Capacity Building Assistance
Sasakawa Peace Foundation	2005-2007	NPO Law Preparation Assistance
Cambodia		
MOJ	1999-2003	Phase I: Assistance for the Drafting of Civil and Civil Procedural Laws
	2004-2006	Phase II: Assistance for the Drafting of Civil and Civil Procedural Laws
	2006-	Assistance for Cambodian Royal Training School for Legal Professionals
JFBA, JICA	2002-2005	Cooperation Project with Cambodia Bar Association
Laos		
MOJ	2003-2006	Assistance for the Creation of Legal Search Database, Statute Books, and Casebooks
	2003-2006	Assistance for the Creation of Textbooks and Dictionaries, and the Development of Civil and Commercial Law Lecturers
Indonesia		
JFBA, JICA	2007-2009	Assistance Project for the Empowerment of the ADR

Assisting Actor	Year	Assistance Contents
		System
Uzbekistan		
MOJ, MIC, etc.	2005-	Assistance Project for the Creation of the Commentary for the Bankruptcy Law
	2005-	Revision of the Hypothecation Law and the creation of the Administrative Procedure Law
	2005-	Improvement of Legal Database
Nagoya University	2005	Establishment of the Research and Education Center for Japanese Law
Mongolia		
Japan Federation of Shiho-Shoshi Lawyer's Associations	1996-	Assistance concerning the Registration System
JICA	2004-2005	Opening of Courts to the public / Creation of Casebooks
Nagoya University	2006	Establishment of the Research and Education Center for Japanese Law
South Korea		
MOJ, ICCLC	1999-	Japan-Korea Partnership Training (Comparative Study on the Registration Systems)
China		
MOJ, METI, Fair Trade Commission, etc.	2004-2007	Japan-China Economic Law and Corporate Law Creation Project
MOJ, ICCLC	1999-	Japan-China Civil and Commercial Law Seminar

Source: Created by the author based on the information in (Ochi 2007, 101).

JFBA and ICCLC actively participate in Japan's legal assistance projects among non-governmental actors. JFBA has been playing roles in Japanese government's legal assistance projects since the very beginning as an agent to implement aid projects, and also has provided its own legal assistance through MOFA's grant schemes for NGOs as well. ICCLC was established in 1996 as an agent of logistical support in the legal assistance field, and has provided logistical assistance for trainings and seminars of Japan's legal assistance projects (ICCLC n.d., 1). However, ICCLC is never a player of aid project implementation itself, and never involved in the substance of any assistance project (ICCLC staff 2011).

University professors also play significant roles. It has been mainly law professors who have formed advisory groups for legal reform and drafting and providing comments for drafts (JICA staff 2011). Akio Morishima, Professor Emeritus of Nagoya University, Masanori Aikyo of Nagoya University, and Akira Mikazuki, a Professor Emeritus of the University of Tokyo have especially played central roles in Japan's legal assistance. Some law schools teach courses on legal assistance.[18] In order to share knowledge and information about their experience among actors involved in legal assistance, the Legal Assistance Liaison Network (Hoseibi shien renraku kai) was established in 2000 among more than 30 organizations including non-governmental organizations, and hold meetings once a year to share information about the state of legal assistance (Ochi 2007, 105).

Agents of local government assistance are mobilized not only from the central governmental ministries but also from local authorities, universities and research institutes. Human resources in the recipient countries are utilized as well (JICA, Towards Democratic State-Building Assistance 2003, 16). Table 29 shows examples of major actors involved in the provision of group seminars for local government assistance in the 2000s. In addition to such universities as Ryukoku University and Local Autonomy College (a civil servants training institute under MIC), such private organizations as the Japan Intercultural Academy of Municipalities (JIAM) and Shaplaneer (a developmental NGO) have implemented local government assistance projects.

[18] Matsuo (2006) writes about the course on Law and Development (Legal Assistance) provided at the Keio University Law School in Fall 2005.

Table 29 Example of Local Government Assistance Group Seminars in the 2000s

Course title	Year	Assisting Agents
Administrations of Local Governments	1998-1999 2001-2003	Japan Intercultural Academy of Municipalities
Administrations of Local Governments (Participatory Local Development)	2004	Department of Economics, Ryukoku University
Administrations of Local Governments (Participatory Local Development) II	2005-2007	Department of Economics, Ryukoku University
Local Governance Training	2000-2004	Local Autonomy College
Local Governance Training II	2005-2009	Local Autonomy College
Interaction Seminar with Top Officials of Local Governments	2003-2009	International Division, Administrative Management Bureau, MIC
Promotion of the Activities of Civil Society and Community Development	2004-2008	Shaplaneer
Seminar on Private Industry Revitalization by Local Governments	2005-2009	?
Local Finance	2006-2010	JICA

Source: "Hyo A1-2: 2000 nendai chiho gyosei kanren shudan kenshu anken (Figure A1-2: Group Training Projects related to Local Governments in the 2000s)," (JICA, Effective approach to developmental issues 2007, 43-44).

As such, although some civil society actors are mobilized for Japan's democracy assistance, such a case remains rare to the extent that only several civil society organizations are mobilized in each field. In addition, while the mobilization of university professors can be widely seen, the mobilization of NGO remains rare. The only Japanese NGO which is involved in democracy assistance to a substantial degree is JFBA. As the next section shows, the weak mobilization of civil society actors for Japanese democracy assistance is partially because of the paucity of civil society organizations, especially NGOs, in Japan.

NGOs in Japan

One of the indicators of the activeness of citizens' participation in politics can be measured by the activeness of the civil society. Arthur Bentley points out that those who have interest in politics would organize themselves and act as groups (Bentley 1967). That is exactly why NGOs are formed and exist. Although the issues that NGOs act for tend to be weighted for global and humanitarian issues such as environmental and human rights issues, the third force literature of comparative politics and the non-state-actors literature of international relations shed light on the roles NGOs play in solving various issues, which governments do not have either will or capacity to deal with on their own (e.g., Florini 2000; Keck & Sikkink 1998).

NGOs in Japan are not strong in terms of the number of NGOs, the number of their staff, and their financial capacities, however. According to a research conducted by Yutaka Tsujinaka et al., which asked civil society organizations who they think are influential actors in Japan, the greatest number of organizations answered the bureaucracy. On the other hand, NGOs were one of the actors they thought the least influential (Tsujinaka and Choe 2002, 77). Although this data is about perceptions, it reflects the state of their influence in the Japanese society.

Table 30 shows the number of NGOs in DAC member countries both in absolute numbers and per million populations. The number of NGOs here is that of the NGOs registered in the World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (WANGO) as of October 1, 2009. The United States has the greatest number of NGOs, which counts 22,504. While the number of NGOs in the United States is exceptionally large compared to other DAC member countries, the number in other Anglo-Saxon countries are

relatively high as well. The numbers of NGOs in Canada and the United Kingdom are 1,198 and 1,945 respectively. On the other hand, the number in Japan, 131 NGOs, is relatively small even compared to DAC member countries other than the United States. The small number of NGOs in Japan is even clearer in terms of the number of NGOs per a million populations. The number of NGOs per a million populations in Japan is the smallest among all the DAC member countries, and only 1.0 NGO exists out of a million people in Japan. This is only 0.8% of the number of NGOs in Belgium per a million populations, which is 121.5 NGOs. Other DAC member countries that have small NGO density per population are Portugal and Spain. The numbers of NGOs in a million populations in Portugal and Spain are 5.7 and 4.1 respectively.

Table 30 Number of NGOs and NGOs per Million Populations in DAC Countries

Country	Number of NGOs	In Million Population	Country	Number of NGOs	In Million Population
Belgium	1,282	121.5	Austria	173	20.9
Luxembourg	45	95.2	Finland	84	16.0
US	22,504	75.4	France	919	15.0
Switzerland	336	44.9	Norway	67	14.4
Canada	1,198	36.7	Sweden	128	14.1
UK	1,945	32.1	Italy	499	8.5
Australia	554	26.8	Germany	640	7.8
Netherlands	411	25.1	Greece	80	7.2
Ireland	107	25.1	Portugal	60	5.7
New Zealand	103	24.6	Spain	182	4.1
Denmark	116	21.3	Japan	131	1.0

Source: WANGO 2009; The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators.

Data on NGOs differ quite significantly among sources, and thus it would be necessary to refer to another source for it as well. Table 31 shows *Global Civil Society*'s data on the number of NGO in a million populations in DAC member countries. In this data, it is North European countries that occupy the top ranking instead of Anglo-Saxon

countries. The number of NGO per population is the smallest in Japan among all the DAC member countries again in this data. While the average number of NGO in a million people during the years 1990-1993 and 2000-2003 in Belgium was 161.7, that in Japan was only 1.6, or less than 1% of that in Belgium. Portugal and Spain score low in this data as well, and the numbers of NGOs per a million population are 4.1 and 4.9 respectively.

Table 31 Number of NGO per million populations, 1990-93, 2000-03

average		1990	1991	1992	1993	2000	2001	2002	2003
161.7	**Belgium**	120.7	176.3	141.3	147.7	163.3	182.5	181.5	179.9
120.4	**Luxembourg**	144.0	149.9	120.1	114.6	141.5	104.1	93.6	95.4
92.2	**Switzerland**	96.8	98.6	84.6	84.8	85.1	96.1	94.5	97.4
39.6	**Netherlands**	24.1	34.9	33.1	34.5	38.5	51.0	49.9	50.7
39.2	**Denmark**	47.1	47.0	40.4	42.5	2.1	44.1	44.3	45.8
32.9	**Norway**	29.0	29.3	28.9	30.8	30.0	38.3	38.2	38.8
32.2	**Sweden**	28.9	31.6	29.4	29.2	28.7	36.2	36.2	37.0
25.2	**UK**	16.5	25.3	20.3	22.0	23.1	31.6	30.7	32.1
24.8	**Austria**	18.6	21.3	17.6	18.7	24.6	32.1	32.2	33.4
24.3	**Finland**	24.1	25.2	20.8	19.6	24.6	27.8	24.9	27.2
23.5	**France**	20.1	29.4	23.4	23.3	20.1	24.6	23.7	23.4
13.8	**Ireland**	6.6	15.1	14.1	12.4	11.4	17.7	17.3	16.0
13.1	**Australia**	5.9	12.1	9.6	10.5	11.3	18.5	18.4	18.6
11.8	**Canada**	5.8	14.6	11.3	10.7	8.4	15.2	14.0	14.5
9.8	**New Zealand**	5.8	10.3	7.9	8.1	5.6	13.9	12.3	14.1
9.4	**US**	4.3	14.5	7.6	7.7	5.8	12.1	11.3	11.5
9.2	**Germany**	6.2	9.3	7.8	7.9	7.4	11.4	11.6	12.0
8.0	**Italy**	5.5	8.2	6.9	7.2	7.3	10.4	9.4	9.4
5.6	**Greece**	2.0	3.6	3.4	3.7	4.8	9.0	9.1	8.9
4.9	**Spain**	2.0	4.2	3.2	3.3	4.0	7.5	7.8	7.5
4.1	**Portugal**	1.1	3.4	2.8	3.6	3.5	6.2	6.0	6.5
1.6	**Japan**	0.9	2.0	1.4	1.3	1.1	2.2	2.1	2.1

Note: It does not count the number in South Korea because the country was yet to be a DAC member in 2003.
Source: "Record 15 Numbers of NGOs in Countries and Cities," in (Global Civil Society 2003 2003, 327-332).

The number of staff at Japanese NGOs is small as well. The average number of staff per NGO was only 6.3 as of 2001 (Katayama 2004, 194-197). It is only a fraction of the number of major European and American NGOs. For example, CARE USA had 695 employees in 2009, and Oxfam Great Britain had more than 2,800 as employees and full-time equivalent in the same year (Care USA n.d.; Oxfam GB n.d., 56). According to Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (Kokusai Kyoryoku NGO Senta, JANIC), only 94 out of 146 NGOs, or 43.8% of all the NGOs responded to JANIC's research, had at least one full-time staff as of 2006. Among them, there was only one NGO that constantly hires paid full-time staff (JANIC, NGO databook 2006: Japanese NGOs by numbers 2007, 105).

In addition, the revenue of Japanese NGOs is much smaller compared to that of NGOs in other DAC member countries. Table 32 shows revenue of Japanese NGOs as of 2006. According to this data, there were only six NGOs whose revenue was greater than 1 billion yen, which is about $8.6 million.[19] It is much smaller than the revenue of American NGOs, for example. The total revenue of World Vision USA in 2010 was $1 billion, almost 116 times greater than those biggest Japanese NGOs, and the revenue of Amnesty International USA in 2009 was $37 million (World Vision 2010; Amnesty International USA n.d., 21). According to DAC data, Japanese NGOs' total self budget was $315 million in 2006, which was only 3.5% of US NGOs' self budget of the year ($9.04 billion), 23.4% of Germany ($1.35 billion), and 28.6% of Canada ($1.1 billion).[20]

[19] The yearly average of the exchange rate between the $US and Japanese yen was $1=116.31 in 2006. Bank of Japan, "Tokyo gaitame shijo niokeru torihiki jokyo: 2006 nenchu (State of Transaction in Tokyo Foreign Exchange Market: 2006)."
[20] Report by DAC Chair, (2007).

Table 32 Revenue of Japanese NGOs, 2006

Less than 5 million yen	5-10 million yen	10-30 million yen	30-50 million yen	50-100 million yen	100-500 million yen	500 million to 1 billion yen	More than 1 billion yen
88	38	57	22	28	30	6	6

Source: (JANIC, NGO databook 2006: Japanese NGOs by numbers 2007, 84).

The small size of Japanese NGOs' revenues is due to several factors. For one thing, the amount of donations is small in Japan. Susan Pharr finds its reason in the weakness of the concept of charity in Japan (Pharr 1988). In addition, the introduction of preferential tax treatment for NGOs was quite new – it was introduced only in 2001. The applicability of this preferential treatment is strictly defined as well, and only 15 NGOs were certified as *Tokutei Koeki Zoshin Hojin* (special public interest promotion corporation) as of 2003, which are qualified for preferential treatment (Atoda, Hotta and Shitani 2003, 57, 59).

Carole Lancaster points out that the United States had put pressure on Japan to expand its support to NGOs, which caused the expansion of Japanese NGOs in the 1990s (Lancaster 2007, 252, fn.20). It seems to support gaiatsu argument. However, as shown in Table 30 and Table 31, the number of Japanese NGOs remains much smaller compared to other DAC member countries. It shows that just as in the case of incorporation of democracy norm in Japanese ODA, although initial move is taken to the direction of gaiatsu from the United States, continuous effort to further expand Japanese policy toward the direction is weak.

Civil Society in Japan

As such, Japanese civil society is weak. Not only is the number of NGOs itself small, but the number of NGOs per population, the number of NGO staff members, and their financial resources are all small as well. As shown in Table 31, the number of NGOs per million populations in 2003 in Belgium was 179.9 and the highest among DAC member countries. While that in different countries differ quite significantly, it was about 100 in such countries as Luxembourg and Switzerland and two digits in almost all the DAC member countries. On the other hand, that in Japan was only 2.1, and the lowest among all the DAC member countries.

Given such a small size of Japanese civil society itself, the number of NGOs in the democracy assistance field is tiny. There are only 13 NGOs in the field of democracy assistance as of 2006 according to JANIC (JANIC, NGO databook 2006: Japanese NGOs by numbers 2007, 81). It is a huge difference compared to other active donors such as the United States. Compared to the fact that USAID contracted out its democracy assistance projects to 229 private organizations as of 2009, the number of NGOs in the democracy assistance field in Japan could be 20 times or more small than that of the United States (USAID 2009). Although the first boom of NGO establishment was seen in the 1970s in Japan, the number of NGOs in 1980 was only 59.[21] Among the 13 NGOs in the field of democracy and governance as of 2006, only 8 NGOs make policy proposals to the Japanese government (JANIC, NGO databook 2006: Japanese NGOs by numbers 2007, 88).

[21] "Zuhyo-23 NGO dantaisu no suii (Figure 23 Trend of the Number of NGOs)" Economic Cooperation Bureau of MOFA, Wagakuni no seifu kaihatsu enjo, jokan (Japan's Official Developmental Assistance, Vol.1), (1994), p.49.

Table 33 shows the list of NGOs operating in the field of democracy as of 2011. The data here does not include JFBA, probably because JFBA is regarded more as a professional association than as an NGO. While the number of NGOs in the field has increased from 13 in 2006 to 15 in 2011, the number is still tiny. Most of them operate primarily in the field of development, while having some operations in the field of human rights as well. Other than human rights field, only two NGOs have operations in the election field and only one NGO has operation in the legal assistance field. No NGO exists in any other fields whether in the legislature, local government, police, or military.

Table 33 Japanese NGOs in Democracy-Related Field, 2011

	Field of Operation (primary field)	Number of Paid Full-time Staff in Japan	Number of Paid Full-time Staff outside Japan	Number of Offices outside Japan	Revenue (million yen)	Revenue ($US million)
Network Earth Village	Human rights (environment)	11	-	0	472.2	5.19
Earth Tree	Human rights (environment)	1	-	0	12.0	0.13
People's Forum on Cambodia, Japan	Human rights, election	1	-	0	2.0	0.02
21st Century Association	Human rights (development)	1	9	1	13.3	0.15
Korea NGO Center	Human rights	5	-	0	56.9	0.63
Red de Cooperaciõn Mutua entre Japõn y América Latina (Japan Latin America Cooperation Network)	Human rights (development)	0	0	1	4.2	0.05
The Institute of Cultural Affairs: Japan Global Partnership Center	Human rights (development and environment)	6	-	26	195.4	2.15
Nagasaki Peace Museum	Human rights (development)	3	-	0	24.8	0.27
InterBand	Election	0	0	1	6.5	0.07
Ayus	Human rights (development)	4	-	0	46.5	0.51
Asian Health Institute	Human rights (development)	7	-	0	491.1	5.40

	Field of Operation (primary field)	Number of Paid Full-time Staff in Japan	Number of Paid Full-time Staff outside Japan	Number of Offices outside Japan	Revenue (million yen)	Revenue ($US million)
World Vision Japan	Human rights (development)	48		100	4,358.2	47.94
Japan Center for Conflict Prevention	Election (peace-building)	5	4	3	118.5	1.30
Human Rights Now (HRN)	Human rights (law)	1	0	1	11.5	0.13
The International Movement against All forms of Discrimination and Racism (IMADR)	Human rights	3	1	2	39.8	0.44

Note 1: Fiscal period of each NGO is as follows: January 2009 - December 2009 (Network Earth Village); April 2009 - March 2010 (People's Forum on Cambodia Japan, 21st Century Association, Japan Latin America Cooperation Network, Ayus, Japan Center for Conflict Prevention, and Human Rights Now); April 2004 - March 2005 (Korea NGO Center and InterBand); July 2007 - June 2008 (Institute of Cultural Affairs); July 2009 - June 2010 (Nagasaki Peace Museum); October 2009 - September 2010 (World Vision Japan); October 2008 - March 2009 (IMADR); and N/A (Earth Tree and Asian Health Institute)
Note 2: 1 yen is calculated as $0.011, taking the exchange rate at the end of 2009.
Source: JANIC, NGO directory n.d.; “Nominal End of Year Exchange Rates” in IMF n.d.

Reflecting the small size of the number of NGO staff members in Japanese NGOs overall, the number of paid full-time staff of these NGOs in democracy field is small as well. There are only two NGOs that possess more than 10 paid full-time staff members. Especially distinctive is the fact that Japanese domestic NGOs possess only a tiny number of paid full-time staff members. Among the 15 NGOs, World Vision Japan and the Institute of Cultural Affairs are international NGOs that have branches in Japan. The number of paid staff members in these two NGOs is relatively large compared to other NGOs. World Vision Japan alone possesses 48 staff members. Excluding these two NGOs, the average number of paid full-time staff members is only 4.3. This is incomparably smaller than the number of staff of American non-governmental organizations for democracy assistance – NDI has 1,300 staff members and IRI has 400 staff members worldwide (NDI n.d.; IRI n.d.). Japanese NGOs do not possess enough number of staff members to be able to participate in democracy assistance projects in a substantial scale.

Reflecting the tendency of Japanese NGOs overall, these NGOs' annual revenue is tiny as well. Most of the NGOs operate with the annual revenue of less than $1 million. Compared to TAF's revenue of $142.9 million in FY2009, for example, InterBand's revenue of $0.07 million and the Human Rights Now (HRN)'s revenue of $0.13 million are only 0.0005 and 0.0009 of that of TAF respectively (TAF, Annual Report 2010 n.d., 36). Robert Pekkanen (2006, 18-20, 27-29 in Japanese ver.) argues that Japanese NGOs do not have a large number of full-time staff members because of weak financial resources. The financial limitation makes it difficult for them to provide their full-time staff chances to acquire highly-professional knowledge and skill, and also makes it

difficult to hire professional personnel. Indeed, there is almost no NGO except JFBA who can provide assistance in highly technical fields. Even such NGOs as Human Rights Now in legal assistance field and InterBand in election assistance field are tiny. InterBand is almost not functioning anymore (Former InterBand staff 2011). Even the number of NGOs that can provide capacity-building assistance to developing countries' NGOs is small. On the other hand, American NGOs hire a large number of highly-professional personnel both from the United States and from recipient countries and station them in recipient countries, by which to satisfy both highly professional knowledge and local language requirements. For example, TAF, which implements democracy assistance projects in Asian countries, have 18 offices in Asian countries and station American and local staff members with PhDs and Juris Doctors (JDs). Due to such a high professional level of NGO staffers, the United States managed to station some thousands of Americans as full-time staff for the implementation of democracy assistance projects already at the end of the 1990s (Carothers 1999, 7).

Furthermore, Japanese NGOs rarely possess offices in recipient countries. Only half of the 15 Japanese NGOs listed in Table 33 possess offices outside Japan. But some of the offices are in developed countries such as in the United States and Switzerland, which makes the number of offices in recipient countries even smaller. Japan does not possess a private organization specifically focused on democracy assistance either, while most DAC member countries possess those (Table 34).

Table 34 Democracy Assistance-Focused Organizations of DAC Countries

Country	Organization Name
Australia	Centre for Democratic Institutions
Austria	Karl Renner Institut / Politische Akademie der ÖVP
Canada	Rights & Democracy
France	Robert Schuman Foundation / Fondation Jean-Jaures
Germany	The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung / Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung / Friedrich Naumann Foundation / The Hanns Seidel Foundation / Heinrich Böll-Stiftung / The Rosa Luxemburg Foundation
Greece	Institute For Democracy Constantinos Karamanlis / ISTAME - Andreas Papandreou / Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy
Italy	Fondazione Alcide de Gasperi / Fondazione Nova ResPublica / Instituto Luigi Sturzo
Netherlands	Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy / MATRA – Programme Central and Eastern Europe / Alfred Mozer Stichting
Norway	Norwegian Human Rights Fund / Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support
Portugal	Cooperaçã e Desenvolvimento OIKOS / Centro de Intervençã Para O Desenvolvimento Amílcar Cabral CIDAC
Spain	Fundacion Pablo Iglesias / Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales
Sweden	Swedish International Liberal Center / Centre Party International Foundation / Jarl Hjalmarson Foundation / Olof Palme Internationella Centrum
United Kingdom	Westminster Foundation for Democracy / Center for Democracy & Development / Electoral Reform International Services
United States	National Endowment for Democracy / The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs / International Republican Institute / The American Center for International Labor Solidarity / The Center for International Private Enterprise

Note: This list does not include domestically focused foundations.
Source: Democracy n.d.; Jaures and Schum 2003.

Because of the small size of Japanese NGOs in terms of the number of organizations, the number of staff members, and their financial scale, they do not actively participate even when there are chances for them to be involved in democracy assistance. No Japanese NGO applied when the United Nations Democracy Endowment Fund (UNDEF) solicited democracy assistance projects to NGOs in 2006 (Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Division staff 2008). No Japanese NGO responded to the call from

the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) when ANFREL asked for participation in election monitoring in Cambodia in 1997 either.[22]

The only area which has active NGOs is the legal assistance field. Table 35 shows examples of non-governmental actors which have played roles in the legal assistance field. None of these organizations except Human Rights Now are included in the data on Japanese NGOs in democracy field shown above. It is probably because these organizations do not register as NGOs at JANIC's database.

Table 35 Example of Non-Governmental Actors in the Legal Assistance Field

Organization Type	Agent of Assistance
Legal Associations	Japan Federation of Bar Associations
	Japan Federation of Shiho-Shoshi Lawyer's Associations
	Japan National Notaries Association
	Japan Bar Association
	Law Association for Asia and the Pacific (LAWASIA)
	Nicchu Horitsuka Koryu Kyokai (Japan-China Lawyers Interaction Association)
NPO/NGO	ICCLC
	Nihon Kanbojia Horitsukano Kai (Japan Cambodia Lawyers League)
	Peace Boat
	Sasakawa Peace Foundation
	Human Rights Now
	Kansai Asia Civil and Commercial Law Group
	Ishikawa International Civil and Commercial Law Center
Educational Institutions	Nagoya University
	Yokohama National University
	Osaka University
	Kobe University

Source: (Matsuo 2006, 339).

[22] InterBand participated in the election monitoring in the end, but the decision was made after all the participating NGOs departed for Cambodia (Shuto and Matsuura 2000, 13-14).

While there seem to be relatively a substantial amount of NGOs in the legal assistance field, however, it is almost only JFBA which plays a substantial role in Japan's legal assistance. ICCLC, Kansai Asia Civil and Commercial Law Group (Kansai Ajia Minshojiho Kenkyukai) and Ishikawa International Civil and Commercial Law Center (Ishikawa Kokusai minshojiho Senta) were established in order to arrange logistics for legal assistance, but not to play a role in its substance (Okamura 2001, 39). A number of legal associations have dispatched lecturers for seminars as a part of assistance package, but they have not done more than that. While NGOs as Human Rights Now conduct small-scale legal assistance on their own, they do not collaborate with the Japanese government on this issue (Human Rights Now staff 2011).

The only NGO which plays a significant role in Japanese legal assistance is again JFBA. JFBA has International Legal Assistance Center of International Exchange Committee (Kokusai koryu iinkai kokusai shiho shien senta) within itself, which functions not only as an administrative office for JFBA's legal assistance activities, but also conduct research, seminars, and archive activity records. JFBA has a registration system where lawyers who are interested in participating in legal assistance register, and approximately 250 lawyers have registered to this system as of 2009 (Yabuki 2009, 42). JFBA also has established International Cooperation Activity Fund (Kokusai kyoryoku katsudo kikin) within itself and utilizes this fund for its own legal assistance activities. It also holds a number of seminars and research meetings on legal assistance (The 9th Legal Assistance Liaison Meeting, Meeting Materials, 2008, p. 174). It actively interacts with overseas counterparts, co-hosts symposiums on rule of law with the International Bar Association (IBA), and cooperates with Canada and France in legal training in

Cambodia (The 9th Legal Assistance Liaison Meeting, Meeting Materials, 2008, p. 174-175).

However, the number of actors JFBA dispatches is tiny in reality. While JFBA has been providing legal assistance to Cambodia since 2001, only several lawyers have been involved in it each year. On the other hand, American Bar Association's Rule of Law Initiative has more than 400 lawyers participating in it with implementing projects in more than 40 countries (American Bar Association n.d.).

Educational institutions have played roles as well. Nagoya University established the Center for Asian Legal Exchange (CALE) within the university as a center specializing legal assistance, developed sister university relations with law schools in recipient countries, and has dispatched a number of professors for legal assistance (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 132). In order to increase the number of lawyers who can use Japanese language in recipient countries as potential translators in legal assistance, CALE established the Nagoya University Research and Education Center for Japanese Law (CJL, Nagoya daigaku nihon ho kyoiku kenkyu senta) in the Tashkent State Institute of Law of Uzbekistan, the National University of Mongolia, the Hanoi University of Law of Vietnam, and the Royal University of Law and Economics of Cambodia to teach Japanese and Japanese laws (Research and Education Center for Japanese Law, Nagoya University n.d.). Some Japanese universities also provide courses for nurturing legal translators, and some of them have ICD staff as lecturers (Inaba 2009, 40). These are activities conducted for Japanese legal assistance in the future, but these are not legal assistance themselves.

In sum, even in the legal assistance field which is the only exception where non-state actors play some role in aid implementations, JFBA is almost the only NGO actor playing a substantial role.

Weak Collaboration between the State and NGOs

Peter Evans argues that civil society expands where state-civil society partnership exists (Evans 1997). In the case of Japan, such partnership is weak. While the state-society relations in the economic sphere have been relatively collaborative in the country, the state and the civil society have possessed mutual distrust in the spheres related to politics (Garon 2003; Inoguchi 1993; Muramatsu 1994).

According to a research conducted by Yutaka Tsujinaka, et al., civil society organizations have general distrust toward the state (Tsujinaka, Mori and Hirai 2002, 97-100). While organizations in relatively value-free domestic issues such as economic, education, and social welfare tend to rely their information on the state, organizations related to politics and international cooperation rely information more on the media, academics, and related organizations than on the state. While organizations in the former categories tend to have frequent exchange of opinions with the state, organizations in the latter field have extremely limited chance of dialogue (Mori and Adachi 2002, 126-127, 132-134). As has already been pointed out, among 240 respondents, only one organization answered that they have ever been requested to provide opinions and comments by MOFA. It is in a clear contrast from the number of organizations that are asked opinions and comments by METI, MAFF, and MEXT (83, 49 and 34 organizations respectively) (Mori and Adachi 2002, 134-136).

As Takatoshi Imada (2002, 124) points out, the Japanese NGOs were first formed in the 1960s, although small in number, as civic or class movements against controlling Japanese state over such issues as the US-Japan security alliance. These NGOs did not take a cooperative approach toward the state, but possessed anti-governmental attitude as a natural consequence of the lack of Japanese government's respect for, and trust in, its citizens as actors for public issues. Civil activists such as Osamu Kuno express their feeling that public servants in Japan tend to regard citizens as ignorant beings who need guidance from public servants (Kuno 1996, 46). Even scholars as Yoshiko Terao (1997, 140) argues that "the government in Japan has a tendency to regard requests from residential or civic participations as the presentation of private interests and individual opinions. There is still a strong tendency that the government considers that their raison d'être is in judging public benefit from neutral standpoint." NGOs did not find it likely to be able to change state behavior by collaborating with it.

The anti-governmental nature of NGOs further strengthened the state's distrust toward them, causing a negative cycle of distrust. Until the end of the 1990s, the Japanese government required NGOs to obtain authorization from related governmental agencies in order to obtain non-profit organization status. Even after they got authorizations, NGOs were to be overseen, evaluated, and guided by the governmental agencies if necessary (Pekkanen 2006, 37-40 in Japanese ver.; Sugimoto 1997; Wolferen 1989). The state felt the necessity of monitoring NGOs due to the lack of trust toward them.

This is somewhat similar to France. The French government tends to be cautious about civil society, considering that civil society might disturb socio-political societal

order if civil society gains strength. Governmental approval is necessary for the establishment of civil society organizations, whose criterion is whether an organization is a "good" organization which reflects general interest. The government also tends to approve organizations that do not have a history of social mobilization or demonstrations but supportive of governmental policies. It causes French NGOs to be either being heavily influenced by and supportive of the government or being anti-governmental (Saurugger 2007, 389-391).

The weak trust between the state and NGOs, and consequent weakness of collaboration between them, are partially due to the shortness of Japan's history of contracting out projects to NGOs. Although some developmental aid projects for BHN were contracted out to NGOs and individuals from the 1970s and 1990s, these contracts remained ad hoc. It was only in 1999 that JICA started soliciting the participation of NGOs in ODA projects on a regular basis (Hirata 2002, 139-140). However, project contracts for democracy assistance remain to be made on personal-basis, and JICA officials in charge of projects request the participation of people such as university professors individually (e.g., Munesue 2003, 16-18).

It was only in the early 1990s that cooperation between the state and NGOs in ODA started getting attention in Japan. MOFA introduced Grant Assistance for Grassroots Project (*Kusanone Musho Shikin Kyoryoku*, initially called Small Scale Grant Assistance (*Shokibo Musho Shikin Kyoryoku*)) and NGO Project Subsidies (*NGO Jigyo Hojokin*) as funding schemes for NGOs, recognizing the importance of collaboration with NGOs. Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Project (*Nihon NGO Renkei Musho Kyoryoku*) and Grant Assistance for Cultural Grassroots Projects (*Kusanone Munka*

Musho Shikin Kyoryoku) were added to NGO funding scheme later on.[23] Such action was taken mainly due to the increasing pressure from the international community to Japan toward that direction. DAC pointed out the need for the Japanese government to expand its cooperation with NGOs in many of its reports (e.g., DAC 1991; DAC 1993; DAC 1996; DAC 1999). The United States also took efforts to expand the roles of Japanese NGOs (Reimann 2003, 310-311). Given such international pressure, the ODA Charter of 1992 stated the importance of cooperation with NGOs, and budget for MOFA's Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Projects and JICA's Grassroots Technical Cooperation increased largely in the 2000s.

However, cooperation between the state and NGOs remains weaker compared to other DAC member countries to date. Among MOFA's funding schemes for NGOs, NGO Project Subsidies and Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Project target Japanese NGOs. MOFA provided 278 million yen as NGO Project Subsidies in 1992, which was equivalent to $2.2 million.[24] The funding increased toward the late 1990s, and reached its peak in 1997 to 919 million yen (about $7.4 million).[25] Year 2002 saw the introduction of Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Project, whose total in combination with the NGO Project Subsidies in 2008 was 2,928 million yen, which was equivalent to $32.2

[23] "Zuhyo III-10 Kaku Shocho no Jigyo Yosan (2009 Nendo) to Jigyo Naiyo (Figures and Tables III-10, Operational Budget of Each Agency (Fiscal Year 2009) and Operational Contents)," in MOFA, *ODA Hakusho 2009 (ODA White Paper 2009)*. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/hakusyo/09_hakusho/index_shiryo.html; (MOFA, Nihon NGO Renkei Musho Kyoryoku [Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Project] n.d.); (MOFA, Kusanone Bunka Musho Shikin Kyoryoku [Grant Assistance for Cultural Grassroots Projects] n.d.)

[24] One yen was $0.008 at the end of 1992 (market rate). "Nominal End of Year Exchange Rates" in International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.

[25] One yen was $0.008 at the end of 1997 (market rate). "Nominal End of Year Exchange Rates" in International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.

million.[26] This is 10.5 times bigger than the MOFA funding for NGOs in 1992 (Figure 7). However, the amount still remains smaller compared to other aid donors. For example, the amount SIDA allocated ODA through Swedish NGOs called "framework organizations" was $167.62 million in 2007, which was about 7 times greater than MOFA's funding for Japanese NGOs (Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation n.d.). Given that Swedish ODA totaled only $4.34 billion that year, which is about 60% of that of Japan, Swedish ODA allocation for NGOs is much greater compared to Japan (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.).

Figure 7 MOFA's funding to Japanese NGOs, 1990-2008

(Unit: million yen)



Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *ODA White Paper*.

[26] One yen was $0.011 at the end of 2008 (market rate). "Nominal End of Year Exchange Rates" in International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.

Another problem with MOFA's funding for NGOs is that it tends to fall short of covering the whole project cost. For example, when JFBA provided legal assistance to Cambodia receiving funding through the scheme of Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Projects, the funding did not cover travel costs necessary to decide the details of the project and did not cover staff salaries. Participating lawyers had to pay for these costs from their own pocket (M. Tanaka 2002). When looking at MOFA's grant application solicitation, however, it does not exclude any substantial cost from grant application. Instead of the grant structure itself, the problem seems to be in the mere size of such grants. While USAID's Development Grants Program provides up to $2 million to each program of NGOs, PVOs in US terms, which do not have much experience of cooperation with USAID, MOFA's Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Project provides only up to 20 million yen, which is about $0.24 million, to NGOs which do not have a cooperation record with MOFA (USAID n.d.; MOFA, FY2011 Guid for the Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Project n.d., 21-30). Development Grant Program of the United States provides more than eight times greater amount of grant than MOFA's Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Project does.

This issue is serious for most Japanese NGOs due to the small size of their budget. Even relatively large and stable organizations as the Nippon-Keidanren International Cooperation Center (NICC), which had conducted capacity building in developing countries, needed to dissolve itself in 2010 because fund matching started being required for securing funding from MHLW (Former NICC staff 2011). For even smaller Japanese NGOs, bearing some cost on their own is a serious burden. As Shu Sugawara (2003, 185-187) points out, even though MOFA possesses schemes to support NGOs through ODA,

it is difficult for many Japanese NGOs to apply for MOFA funding because they cannot cover the costs that MOFA funding does not cover.

NGOs in this field also dislike becoming contractors of governmental projects, and thus they try to be away from governmental funding (Ohashi 2010; Japan International Volunteer Center staff 2008; Human Rights Now staff 2011). Many Japanese NGOs hesitate to work with Japanese governmental agencies receiving funding from them, arguing that NGOs might get co-opted by the state. The representative of JANIC, a Japanese network NGO where 90 Japanese NGOs are members, shows discomfort about aid policy under LDP administrations, stating that the policy seems to regard NGOs as implementers of governmental aid (Ohashi 2010). The Secretary General of HRN states that HRN does not have intention to receive any funding from the Japanese government because HRN is independent from the Japanese government (Human Rights Now staff 2011). It is an interesting comment in a sense that while independent NGOs in other donor countries provide democracy assistance with governmental funding, this Japanese NGO shows hesitation on it. Due to the small amount of donations from the general public, governmental funding occupies a significant portion of Japanese NGOs' revenue. If NGOs are to increase such financial reliance on the state by accepting a greater number of contracts from them, the independence of NGOs would be in danger. This is not a problem if the state and the civil society possess such relations that civil society actors are able to take their own positions regardless of their funding sources. However, due to the clientelism and citizens' dependence on the state, the state has a tendency to set various limitations on

the usage of their money while the civil society side tends to refrain from making objections and complaints to the state side (Atoda, Hotta and Shitani 2003, 54-47).

It is not only for Japanese NGOs but also for NGOs in other donor countries that neutral image is important for their operation. However, while NGOs in North European and North American countries balance between maintaining neutral stance and receiving governmental funding, the attitude of the Japanese NGOs is more extreme and anti-governmental. In the case of the Asia Foundation, for example, grants from the U.S. Government (USAID and the US Congress) constituted 42% of its revenue in 2010 (TAF n.d., 7). In the case of Japanese NGOs, on the other hand, only 9.8% and 11.2% of their revenue were from contracts and grants respectively as of 2006 (Table 36), and grants from local or national government constitutes only 14.4% of all grant revenue (Table 37).[27] It makes the share of governmental grant in total revenue of Japanese NGOs only 1.6%. Assuming that all contracts are made with the government, only 11.4% of Japanese NGOs' revenue relies on governmental source. It is almost a quarter of the share of governmental funding for TAF. It shows that it is distrust toward the government, rather than high share of existing funding from governmental sources, which makes Japanese NGO actors cautious about receiving funding from the government.

[27] This percentage is sum of the percentages of Japan Post, Local governments, MOFA, and Japan Fund for Global Environment in Table 37.

Table 36 Japanese NGOs' Revenue Breakdown, 2006

(Unit: US$ Million)

	amount	%
Membership fee	2,700	7.8%
Donations	14,364	41.8%
Investment profit	120	0.4%
Business operational revenue	2,136	6.2%
Contract revenue	3,348	9.8%
Grants	3,852	11.2%
Other revenues	2,052	6.0%
Carried from previous year	5,760	16.8%
Total Revenue	34,332	100.0%

Note: Amount was originally expressed in Japanese yen. The author converted it into US dollar, using the exchange rate of 1 yen = $0.12.
Source: (JANIC, NGO databook 2006: Japanese NGOs by numbers 2007, 93)

Table 37 Breakdown of Japanese NGOs' Grant Revenues, 2006

(Unit: Million US$)

	amount in Million USD	% in total grant	number of receiving NGOs	% of the number NGOs in all grant-receiving NGOs
Private grant	2,712	70.40%	123	44.70%
Japan Post	60	1.60%	28	10.20%
Local governments	48	1.20%	48	17.50%
MOFA	372	9.70%	30	10.90%
Japan Fund for Global Environment	72	1.90%	14	5.10%
Other grants	588	15.30%	33	12.00%
Total Grants	3,852	100%	275	100%

Note: Amount was originally expressed in Japanese yen. The author converted it into US dollar, using the exchange rate of 1 yen = $0.12.
Source: (JANIC, NGO databook 2006: Japanese NGOs by numbers 2007, 95-96)

The necessity of collaborating with civil society actors for democracy assistance has been pointed out in various occassions and by various state actors. A report of a study group established by JICA proposes JICA to strengthen its collaboration with civil

society actors (JICA, Towards Democratic State-Building Assistance 2003, 95-97). A former head of the International Cooperation Bureau of MOFA points out that the creation of NGOs and nurturing of aid human resources is necessary in democracy assistance field (MOFA staff 2009). Referring to the aid field in the United States where agents of the state and civil society have dense network, a former Japan Foundation staff (2008) states that, "Japan should nurture such organizations as the Japan Platform more. There are a lot to learn from the United States on how to incorporate state actors and make decisions by non-state actors. Aid money becomes neutral and flexible by incorporating non-state actors." A staff of the Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Division of the Foreign Policy Bureau at MOFA (2008) states that, "we would like to learn from the approach of TAF, a quasi-governmental and quasi-private organization which takes hands-on approach."

At the same time, however, they hesitate in collaborating with civil society actors (especially NGOs). MOFA staff members state that they prefer working with NGOs to providing grant packages and letting them handle projects (MOFA staff members 2008). Legal aid agents point out that many NGOs have Marxist ideology (ICD staff members 2008). Civil society actors are also aware that they tend to be regarded as such by state actors. Explaining the lack of collaboration between state and civil society actors, a staff of the ADP Committee (2008) says, "because Japanese NGOs initially started as labor unions, have taken socialistic and communistic stance, and have conflicted with LDP, NGOs' moves tend to be suspected as leftist movements."

The lack of trust between state and civil society actors is an serious issue. NGO actors point out only those actors who have close relations with the state tend to be

invited to meetings with state actors, and thus those who are invited are those NGOs to which state actors are involved or has influence. An exaple is the Japan Platform (ADP Committee staff 2008; Japan International Volunteer Center staff 2008). However, in reality, even such NGOs as Japan Platform has hard time getting fair treatment by state actors. Muneo Suzuki, former House of Representatives member from LDP and a zoku giin (policy tribe) in the field of foreign affairs who had strong connection with, and influence over MOFA, rejected the participation of Peace Winds Japan and Japan Platform in NGO Conference on Afghanistan Reconstruction Assistance held in Tokyo on January 20, 2002 for the reason that the NGOs are critical toward the government (Damage to the Government on NGO-Exclusion Issue, MOFA's deputy minister dinies the existence of pressure from a politician 2002; NGO-Exclusion issue, Mr. Onishi of PWJ Reveals talks with Mr. Muneo Suzuki 2002). An Oxfam Japan staff (2008) points out that, while interaction between the state and civil society actors are dense and frequent in Europe, the Japanese government looks at NGOs cynically and even does not listen to them. There was a strong distrust against NGOs.

Impact of the Lack of Aid Human Resources on Democracy Assistance

Because it is difficult to secure governmental officers as implementation partners of democracy assistance projects for a long term, many democracy assistance projects of Japan tend to be seminar-provision conducted in Japan, in addition to material and financial support. Appendix 4 shows examples of the resources input from the Japanese side in technical assistance projects for local government assistance. It shows that many projects have material and financial inputs in addition to acceptance of trainees.

Although professionals have been dispatched for local government assistance from Japan, most of such dispatch is for short-term. In addition, except for the assistance provided for Sulawesi, Indonesia for poverty alleviation, not only long-term dispatch of professionals is rare, but also the number of professional dispatched remains several per project (JICA, Effective approach to developmental issues 2007, 30-31).

Due to the lack of agents of democracy assistance, JICA recommends Japan to focus its aid on fields and themes which are small in scale and can be implemented with a small number of agents (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 84). Training seminars held in Japan is considered to be suitable for this reason. Dispatch of experts to recipient countries for seminar lecturing has the same function, and experts are only required to have relatively shallow but wide knowledge about Japan's democratization and democracy. JICA regards that assistance in such forms can be conducted relatively easily (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 90).

Because the number of agents for legal assistance does not expand over night, the current assistance is provided targeting specific sectors which could be assisted with a limited number of agents. Teleconference-style seminars are often used utilizing JICA's teleconference device called JICANET. Utilization of teleconference method makes it possible to have distinguished legal professionals for legal assistance without sacrificing too much of their domestic duties (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 159). Only one to four legal professionals are dispatched for long- and short-term assignments. And due to the

lack of agents, aid agents support the idea of limiting the target countries of Japan's legal assistance only to Asian countries for the time being.[28]

Given the lack of agents in police assistance, the Outline for the Promotion of International Cooperation states that "it is desirable to set such duties as planning on police system, advising, mentoring, and controlling of educational training as civil police duties because these can be conducted with the dispatch of a small number of staff."[29]

On the other hand, technical assistance and development research projects require setting purposes before the initiation of the projects based on particular needs. Development research projects provide assistance to developing countries about the policy-making on development, and provide technical assistance concerning planning, research and analysis methods.[30] Because of such characteristics of supply-drivenness, it requires agents who are well versed in recipient countries. Because the number of governmental agencies, private consultants, and university professionals, who can participate in such type of assistance is limited in Japan, records of technical assistance and development research are limited (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 90). Even when development research is conducted, the contents tend to remain only the

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[28] Remark of Kyoko Kuwajima, Vice Leader of the Public Policy Division and Leader of Governance Group at JICA at the 10th Legal Assistance Liaison Meeting of January 16, 2009. (Questions and discussions 2009, 82); Remark of Kazuo Inaba, Departmental Chair of the ICD at RTI of MOJ. (Questions and discussions 2009, 83).

[29] "2-2-(2) Bunmin keisatsu katsudo," National Police Agency, *Outline for the Promotion of International Cooperation* (September 2005), p.5. http://www.npa.go.jp/kokusaikyoryoku/suisinyoukou/kokusai.pdf (accessed on September 1, 2010)

[30] "Kaihatsu chosa no mokuteki to yakuwari (Purpose and Roles of Development Research)" in MOFA, *Sukimu betsu hyoka: Kaihatsu chosa (Evaluation by Schemes: Development Research)* (March 2007), p. 2-1. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/hyouka/kunibetu/gai/kaihatsu/pdfs/sk06_02.pdf

provision of information. There seems only one case where Japan's development research indeed contributed for program formation in the recipient countries – development research conducted in Tanzania for local development sector program formation (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 90-91).

As such, because information provision about Japan's democratization and democracy in seminars do not require dense knowledge about given field, various issues can be picked up as themes. On the other hand, because technical assistance and development research require dense knowledge about given fields, most Japanese technical assistance and development research focused on the areas of tax service, customs administration, and statistics (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 91).

Conclusion

Democracy assistance requires highly skilled human resources who can also handle English or local languages, because democracy assistance is mainly conducted as technical assistance in general. Securing such human resources is inherently difficult for Japan, because of the low proficiency in English. Despite such difficulty, however, Japan mobilizes aid human resources mostly from governmental agencies, while not mobilizing civil society actors to any similar extent. This severely limits aid human resource, because Japanese governmental agencies do not possess agents specializing in democracy assistance. Small number of governmental agents is dispatched for democracy assistance assignments while taking care of their original duties at the same time. Examining the reasons for the weakness of civil society mobilization for democracy assistance, this chapter found out two causes. One is the paucity of civil

society actors in democracy assistance field itself, and another is the lack of trust between the state and the civil society.

The paucity of aid human resources does limit Japanese democracy assistance. Japan creates small scale assistance projects intentionally such as seminar provision for capacity building projects conducted in Japan, being restricted by the lack of aid human resources. On the other hand, there was no evidence which suggests that the lack of aid human resources due to the weak utilization of civil society actors causes Japan to focus its assistance to the state institution sector. In sum, the hypotheses-testing using aid human resources as the intervening variable showed that, heavy reliance on state actors as aid human resources has a tendency to limit Japanese democracy assistance, while it does not affect its sector allocation.

Chapter 7: Case Study: Japanese Democracy Assistance towards Indonesia

From chapter 1 to 6, this dissertation posed a hypothesis on what limits Japan's democracy assistance and leads it to the state institution sector, and tested four hypotheses using qualitative method. This chapter will conduct a case study to further test the hypotheses. It takes Indonesia for the case study because documents are relatively abundant on Japan's democracy assistance to Indonesia. Indonesia has already experienced democratic transition and thus has greater tendency to request democracy assistance to Japan than countries with governments which lack intention of democratization. The existence of documents makes it possible to examine whether the involvement (and lack thereof) of Japanese civil society actors affects the country's democracy assistance. By controlling for the recipient country, this case study permits a detailed comparison between Japan's democracy assistance policies and those of other major donor countries like Australia and the United States.

In what follows, it will first show the trend of democratization and the current state of democracy in Indonesia. Secondly, it will examine the state of Japan's democracy assistance to Indonesia in comparison with other DAC member countries. It will show that Japan's democracy assistance is smaller in terms of the ratio of democracy assistance to its overall ODA to Indonesia. It will also show that Japan's democracy assistance concentrates on the state institution sector in the case of Japan as well just as the overall characteristics of Japan's democracy assistance. The case study will then test

four hypotheses to examine the impact of Japanese civil society on the country's democracy assistance.

Indonesia's Democratization and the Current State of Democracy

Indonesia' democratic transition started in 1998, given the social and political crisis caused by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. While economic development had been the source of legitimacy for the Suharto's authoritarian regime which lasted from 1965 up to then, the economic crisis led to citizens' protests calling for democratization. Students of Trisakti University and the University of Indonesia protested for democratization, which led political elites to apply pressure to Suharto. In the end, the civil protest led to the collapse of the Suharto regime in May 1998. The interim administration under President Habibie took various liberalization efforts for the sake of Habibie administration's justification. The first democratic election was held in 1999, and the country began democratization process.

Ever since the democratic transition has started, domestic actors, both on the state and the society levels, have been active in consolidating democracy. Successive administrations have regarded that democratization is a way to justify their administrations, and thus have been positioning democracy consolidation as one of the objectives of Indonesia's national developmental plans. Two of the three objectives of Indonesia's National Long-term Development Plan 2005-2025 are related to the consolidation of democracy - strengthening democracy and justice. Based on these objectives, it sets 1) enhancement of good governance, 2) strengthening of the pillars of democracy, and 3) law enforcement and eradication of corruption, as three of the five

agendas for the National Mid-term Development Plan of 2010-2014 (President, Republic of Indonesia 2010; APEC 2011, 4-6). Reflecting Indonesia's national development plans, Japan's country-based aid plan toward Indonesia regards the assistance for the creation of democratic and just society as one of the major aims. It states that Japan will assist governance reform especially in the areas of justice, police, and decentralization (MOFA, Country-based Aid Plan toward Indonesia 2004, 7-8).

A decade since the country's transition to democracy, Indonesia has been taking various concrete steps to consolidate democracy. Constitution was revised in 1999 to strengthen the power of the legislature in relation to the executives (Dalpino 2002, 86-87). While any political parties but Golkar Party (Partai Golongan Karya), Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia), and United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) were not allowed during the Suharto era, the establishment of political parties was liberalized. As a result, 48 political parties contested in the 1999 election, 24 contested in the 2004 election, and 44 contested in the 2009 election. Direct ballot system was applied to presidential and local chief executive elections starting in 2004 and 2005 respectively.

While censorship was tight under the Suharto regime to the extent that liberal journals such as Tempo were banned, these media activities resumed due to liberalization policies on journalism taken under Habibie and Wahid administrations. Freedom of speech was restored to the extent that political debates are conducted freely and publicly now. Tempo magazine even covered a police corruption story in June 2010, although there was a consequential incidents involving injury of a prominent anti-corruption

activist seemingly conducted by Indonesian police members (Anti-Graft Activist bashed in Jakarta 2010).

Figure 8 shows the change of Indonesia's political rights and civil liberty scores. While civil liberties and political rights scored from five to seven during the Suharto era, both of them were improved significantly in the 2000s. Political rights and civil liberty scores dropped to 2 and 3 respectively in 2006, leading Freedomhouse to rate Indonesia a free country.

Figure 8 The Change of Political Rights and Civil Liberties in Indonesia, 1972-2010



Note: The score ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the most free and 7 representing the least free.
Source: Freedomhouse, Freedom in the World 2011.

While the Indonesian military possessed "dual function" of military as well as socio-political actor during the Suharto era, its socio-political function was abolished.

The national police organization, which had been a part of the military, was separated from the military. Decentralization of public finance, personnel, and facilities started in 2001, and has been deepened to date.

In the democratization process, Indonesia has seen the number of NGOs growing, and this number is said to have increased to around 70,000 by 2000. This is 7 times as big as the number of NGOs in 1996, several years before the beginning of democratization in Indonesia (Biro Pusat Statistik 2000, 34). Indonesian NGOs not only apply pressure to the government from outside. They apply pressure from within as well, by collaborating with the government in drafting laws, providing civic education, and encouraging citizens' participation in politics (e.g., Blair 2004, 91-97).

However, a variety of issues remains in the Indonesian democracy. One of the most serious issues among all is corruption (e.g., Butt 2009; Henderson & Kuncoro 2011; Kuncoro 2006; Mietzner 2007; Palmier 2006). Corruption in Indonesia has been always ranked as one of the worst in the world, and Transparency International has scored it between 1.7 and 2.8 from 1999 to 2010 (0 is the most corrupt and 10 is the least corrupt. Table 38). Although the score has been getting better steadily over time, low scores indicate the seriousness of corruption issue in Indonesia.

Table 38 Corruption Perception Index Score of Indonesia in the Post-Suharto Era

1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
1.7	1.7	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.4	2.3	2.6	2.8	2.8

Note: 0 is the most corrupt and 10 is the least corrupt.
Source: Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index.

In addition, political authorities are increasingly challenging the tide of democracy consolidation. Lack of transparency and accountability is widespread both at

the national and regional levels. The space for citizens' political participation is diminished compared to the immediate aftermath of the country's transition to democracy. Government officials show strong interest in not only maintaining but also further expanding their vested interests. Although various new and democratic laws and regulations have come into effect, the implementation against government officials remains weak (Civil Society Capacity Building for Democratic Reform, 2010, 420). Court decisions on political cases are yet to be impartial, and provide the verdict of not guilty to a large number of corruption-suspected governmental officials. Judges' and prosecutors' legal capacity is still weak, and yet to fully internalize and act based upon newly-established democratic laws. Military still exerts influence over politics behind the scene (Case 2009, 256-257).

As such, while Indonesia has worked to consolidate democracy in the last decade, a number of issues still remain. Due to both the eagerness of various Indonesian actors for democracy consolidation and the existence of remaining issues, developed democracies have been actively assisting democracy in Indonesia. The next section will examine the state of democracy assistance to Indonesia.

Dependent Variable: State of Democracy Assistance to Indonesia

Given Indonesia's will for democracy consolidation as well as the need for it, the international society has been active in providing democracy assistance to Indonesia. Table 39 shows DAC member countries' democracy assistance amount to Indonesia from 1995 to 2009. The United States and Australia have been the biggest donors for Indonesia, which is followed by Japan, the Netherlands, Canada and the United Kingdom.

Japan's total democracy assistance amount to Indonesia during this period is $333.89 million, which is almost 1.9 times greater than the amount of the Netherland, the fourth biggest donor. Overall bilateral democracy assistance amount from DAC member countries to Indonesia started rising in 1999 given Indonesia's democratic opening. While the increase of the amount was steady in the early 2000s, it jumped up largely in the latter half of the 2000s influenced by the global war against terrorism. Having the greatest Muslim population in the world, Indonesia was considered to have a possibility of becoming democracy as a Muslim country. Overall, the data shows that the major donors for Indonesian democracy are either Anglo-Saxon countries, former colonial masters, or neighboring countries.

Table 39 DAC Member Countries' Democracy Assistance Amount to Indonesia, 1995-2009

(Unit: US$ Million)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
US	23.4	6.2	4.9	16.4	23.4	25.5	64.4	44.4	30.4	34.6	44.2	41.4	47.9	34.9	44.6	486.5
Australia	..	1.6	6.0	3.6	18.2	13.0	8.0	2.4	49.9	26.1	51.3	49.2	27.3	165.4	61.7	483.6
Japan	90.3	4.3	..	..	..	106.7	..	0.9	13.5	19.7	6.4	84.5	1.6	3.4	2.7	333.9
Netherlands	..	..	..	0.0	0.6	35.2	4.5	9.5	19.8	23.8	13.9	18.5	10.4	29.9	16.0	182.0
Canada	9.3	..	3.6	1.1	8.9	4.9	0.1	22.9	6.4	0.5	8.2	27.2	20.3	4.1	27.1	144.3
UK	..	1.1	..	..	3.1	3.2	2.2	26.1	9.3	8.4	11.1	60.3	0.6	1.2	17.4	143.8
Germany	..	..	..	..	3.9	4.2	9.6	4.5	1.7	12.2	12.3	21.6	12.7	11.7	18.7	113.1
Norway	13.8	0.0	..	..	2.1	1.7	0.9	0.3	2.3	0.8	2.2	2.7	4.6	3.2	5.3	39.8
Denmark	..	..	..	..	0.1	2.2	0.9	0.5	1.3	4.7	4.4	..	5.8	..	18.7	38.6
Spain	..	..	8.0	..	0.0	..	..	..	0.0	22.8	0.0	0.1	..	7.2	..	38.0
Sweden	1.0	0.6	0.1	1.3	1.2	0.2	2.1	..	4.5	2.7	0.5	0.8	15.2	0.0	4.4	34.6
New Zealand	0.1	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.0	2.9	1.6	0.2	1.0	4.7	1.8	0.1	12.5
Switzerland	..	..	..	0.2	..	1.9	..	1.1	..	..	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.0	4.5	8.0
France	0.2	3.7	..	..	..	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	5.2
Finland	..	0.0	..	1.0	0.1	0.3	0.0	1.2	0.1	..	1.0	..	0.6	0.3	0.1	4.6
Belgium	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	2.6
Ireland	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.0	..	0.0	..	0.0	0.3	..	..	0.3
Italy	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.1	0.2	0.3
Austria	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.0	..	..	0.0
Luxembourg	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.0	0.0	0.0
Greece	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.0
Portugal	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.0
Yearly total	138.1	17.6	22.8	23.7	62.0	199.3	92.8	114.3	142.3	158.1	156.4	307.5	152.2	263.2	221.5	2,071.7

Note: All the amount except for Japan's amount in 2000 is ODA. Japan's democracy assistance amount in 2000 is expended from non export credit.

Source: (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.).

While it seems that Japan is an active donor of democracy assistance when it comes to that for Indonesia, it is not really the case. Table 40 shows the percentage of democracy assistance amount in overall ODA. It shows that North European and Anglo-Saxon countries allocate high percentage of their ODA to democracy assistance in aiding Indonesia. Denmark has allocated almost half of its ODA to democracy assistance. Sweden, Canada, Norway, and Finland allocate 20-30% of their ODA to democracy assistance. On the other hand, the percentage of democracy assistance in Japan's ODA for Indonesia is only 1.3% on average. It shows that while the absolute amount of Japan's democracy assistance is significant, it is due to the large size of Japan's ODA to Indonesia overall.

Other donors that allocate as small percentage of their ODA to democracy assistance as Japan include Luxembourg, France, Austria, Greece and Portugal. But they are all small donors for Indonesia. While Japan's total ODA to Indonesia between 1995 and 2009 is $25,857 million, those of France, Austria, Luxembourg, Greece, and Portugal are $1,142 million, $73 million, $5 million, $1 million, and $5 million respectively. Although these countries' ODA allocation for democracy assistance is as small as that of Japan, the small size of Japan's ODA allocation for democracy assistance stands out due to the big size of the country's overall ODA to Indonesia (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.).

Table 40 Percentage of Democracy Assistance in Total Aid to Indonesia, 1995-2009

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Ave.
Denmark	-	0%	0%	-	100%	86%	81%	37%	100%	27%	16%	0%	12%	-	83%	45%
Sweden	94%	76%	21%	64%	22%	40%	57%	0%	78%	71%	1%	7%	63%	1%	43%	32%
Canada	22%	0%	36%	6%	48%	28%	1%	77%	22%	10%	10%	25%	52%	18%	61%	29%
Norway	61%	0%	0%	0%	23%	35%	14%	4%	47%	18%	5%	25%	26%	50%	39%	23%
Finland	-	26%	0%	59%	1%	33%	3%	93%	9%	0%	5%	0%	23%	17%	1%	19%
Australia	0%	3%	10%	5%	21%	18%	9%	3%	31%	29%	26%	14%	31%	20%	21%	19%
UK	0%	2%	0%	0%	6%	3%	17%	100%	97%	75%	10%	62%	4%	3%	31%	19%
New Zealand	2%	-	-	-	-	-	-	0%	45%	24%	1%	10%	24%	28%	1%	15%
US	43%	19%	14%	18%	10%	11%	20%	14%	16%	22%	7%	11%	20%	19%	22%	15%
Spain	0%	-	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	67%	0%	1%	0%	18%	0%	13%
Netherlands	0%	-	-	0%	5%	20%	4%	4%	23%	33%	4%	4%	4%	23%	13%	10%
Switzerland	0%	0%	0%	6%	0%	37%	0%	20%	0%	0%	1%	2%	13%	3%	28%	10%
Ireland	-	-	-	-	-	0%	-	6%	-	5%	0%	0%	60%	0%	0%	9%
Germany	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	5%	8%	3%	2%	7%	4%	10%	8%	10%	10%	4%
Italy	0%	0%	-	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	29%	17%	4%
Belgium	2%	1%	11%	18%	26%	0%	30%	3%	18%	15%	1%	0%	2%	1%	2%	2%
Japan	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	13%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	8%	0%	0%	0%	1%
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	1%	1%
France	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%
Austria	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	6%	0%	0%	0%
Greece	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Portugal	-	-	-	-	-	-	0%	0%	-	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Note: Aid includes ODA and OOF.
Source: (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.).

Table 41 shows sector allocations of democracy assistance provided from DAC member countries to Indonesia. It shows that while significant portion of democracy assistance was provided for the election sector in 1999 and 2003 for national elections, democracy assistance has been provided mainly to the other two sectors in other years. On average between 1995 and 2009, 73.9% of DAC member countries' democracy assistance toward Indonesia went for the state institution sector, while 22.3% went for the civil society sector. It shows that while the largest portion of democracy assistance goes for the state institution sector, a significant amount of assistance is provided to the civil society sector as well.

Table 41 DAC Countries' Democracy Assistance to Indonesia: Sector Allocations

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
Elections	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	21.6	2.4	0.0	0.4	15.1	8.5	0.1	1.1	2.2	15.1	8.0	75.4
% of Elections of all	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.9%	34.9%	2.6%	0.0%	0.4%	10.6%	5.4%	0.1%	0.3%	1.4%	5.7%	3.6%	3.8%
State Institutions	134.2	10.6	14.0	3.5	20.8	52.9	40.2	101.1	108.0	133.3	128.4	266.5	116.7	178.7	160.3	1,469.3
% of State Institutions of all	97.2%	60.5%	61.4%	14.8%	33.6%	57.2%	43.3%	88.4%	75.9%	84.3%	82.1%	82.2%	75.2%	67.8%	71.6%	73.9%
Civil Society	3.9	6.9	8.8	19.3	19.5	37.3	52.6	12.8	19.3	16.2	27.9	56.4	36.4	69.8	55.5	442.6
% of Civil Society of all	2.8%	39.5%	38.6%	81.3%	31.5%	40.3%	56.7%	11.2%	13.5%	10.3%	17.8%	17.4%	23.4%	26.5%	24.8%	22.3%
Total	138.1	17.6	22.8	23.7	62.0	92.6	92.8	114.3	142.3	158.1	156.4	324.1	155.2	263.6	223.8	1,987.2

Note: Assistance toward the election sector is calculated as a total of assistance toward elections, legislatures and political parties. Assistance toward the state institution sector is calculated as a total of assistance for public sector policy and administrative management, public finance management, decentralisation and support to sub-national government, anti-corruption organisations and institutions, and legal and judicial development. Assistance toward the civil society sector is calculated as a total of assistance for democratic participation and civil society, media and free flow of information, human rights, women's equality organisations and institutions.
Source: (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.).

Comparison of it with Japan's democracy assistance for Indonesia presents a significant difference. Table 42 shows sector allocations of Japan's democracy assistance to Indonesia. While it is common between Japan and DAC member countries overall that the largest portion of democracy assistance for Indonesia goes to the state institution sector, almost all the Japanese democracy assistance is provided to this sector. On average, 99.9% of Japan's democracy assistance to Indonesia goes for the state institution sector, while only 0.1% of it goes for the civil society sector. Since Japan is one of the biggest donors for Indonesia in terms of absolute amount, Japan's score might largely impact the overall picture of DAC assistance toward Indonesia. Table 43 shows democracy assistance of DAC member countries excluding Japan. The results here do make difference compared to Table 41. The allocation for the state institution sector drops from 73.9% when including Japan to 70.6% when excluding Japan, while that for the civil society sector rises from 22.3% when including Japan to 25.1% when excluding Japan. It shows that while DAC member countries excluding Japan allocate 70.6% of their democracy assistance for Indonesia to the state institution sector, Japan allocates 99.9% of its democracy assistance for Indonesia to the sector. On the other hand, while other DAC member countries allocate 25.1% of their democracy assistance for Indonesia to the civil society sector, Japan allocates only 0.1% of its democracy assistance to the sector. It shows Japan's strong tendency to provide democracy assistance to the state institution sector in the case of assistance for Indonesia as well.

Table 42 Japan's Democracy Assistance to Indonesia: Sector Allocations

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
Elections	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Elections	0.0%	0.0%	-	-	-	-	-	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
State Institutions	90.3	4.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	13.4	19.7	6.4	84.5	1.5	3.2	2.7	227.0
State Institutions	100%	100%	-	-	-	-	-	100%	99.8%	100%	99.9%	100%	94.9%	95.9%	100%	99.9%
Civil Society	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.3
Civil Society	0.0%	0.0%	-	-	-	-	-	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	5.1%	4.1%	0.0%	0.1%
Total	90.3	4.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	13.4	19.7	6.4	84.5	1.6	3.4	2.7	227.2

Note: Assistance toward the election sector is calculated as a total of assistance toward elections, legislatures and political parties. Assistance toward the state institution sector is calculated as a total of assistance for public sector policy and administrative management, public finance management, decentralisation and support to sub-national government, anti-corruption organisations and institutions, and legal and judicial development. Assistance toward the civil society sector is calculated as a total of assistance for democratic participation and civil society, media and free flow of information, human rights, women's equality organisations and institutions

Source: (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.).

Table 43 DAC Countries' Democracy Assistance toward Indonesia, Excluding Japan: Sector Allocations

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
Elections	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	21.6	2.4	0.0	0.4	15.1	8.5	0.1	1.1	2.2	15.1	8.0	75.4
% of Elections of all	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	3.8%	34.9%	2.6%	0.0%	0.4%	11.7%	6.1%	0.1%	0.5%	1.4%	5.8%	3.6%	4.3%
State Institutions	43.9	6.3	14.0	3.5	20.8	52.9	40.2	100.2	94.6	113.6	122.0	182.0	115.2	175.5	157.6	1,242.3
% of State Institutions of all	91.8%	47.7%	61.4%	14.8%	33.6%	57.1%	43.3%	88.4%	73.3%	82.1%	81.3%	76.0%	75.0%	67.4%	71.3%	70.6%
Civil Society	3.9	6.9	8.8	19.3	19.5	37.3	52.6	12.8	19.3	16.2	27.9	56.4	36.3	69.7	55.5	442.3
% of Civil Society of all	8.2%	52.3%	38.6%	81.4%	31.5%	40.3%	56.7%	11.3%	15.0%	11.7%	18.6%	23.5%	23.6%	26.8%	25.1%	25.1%
Total	47.8	13.2	22.8	23.7	61.9	92.6	92.8	113.4	129.0	138.3	150.0	239.5	153.7	260.3	221.1	1,760.0

Source: (OECD, Creditor Reporting System n.d.).

In sum, Japan's democracy assistance for Indonesia holds the same characteristics as its democracy assistance overall – tiny allocation of its ODA to democracy assistance, and its concentration on the state institution sector. The following sections will test whether the involvement (and lack thereof) of civil society actors causes these two characteristics.

Hypotheses 1: Information Sources and Democracy Assistance

The previous sections showed that the characteristics of Japan's democracy assistance overall are seen in the country's democracy assistance to Indonesia as well. In order to examine whether the characteristics are caused by the lack of civil society's involvement in Japanese democracy assistance, this and the next section will test two sets of hypotheses against the Indonesian case.

JICA has provided democracy assistance to Indonesia in three areas so far – election, local government, and justice. JICA publishes preliminary study reports. Concerning those projects that are already finalized, JICA published evaluation reports as well. This section will utilize these documents to examine information sources and aid human resources in these projects. It will also make comparison of Japanese assistance with that of two other donors – the United States and Australia. These two donors are appropriate for comparison because they are the top two donors of democracy assistance to Indonesia.

Being the second biggest donor of democracy assistance for Indonesia, Australia has been conducting justice sector assistance to Indonesia as a five-year project from 2010 to 2015. Information sources relied on for the creation of this project was various.

While the bodies consulted in Australia were mostly governmental actors such as Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Attorney-General's Department, and Federal Police, the bodies consulted with AusAID in Indonesia included a number of civil society actors in addition to governmental actors. They include major Indonesian NGOs in the law field such as the Institute for Social Advocacy (ELSAM), the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI), the Indonesian Law and Policy Study Centre (PSHK), the Indonesian Human Rights Working Group, and the Partnership for Governance Reform (PGR) in addition to other Indonesian NGOs and experts (AusAID, Australia Indonesia Partnership for Justice design document n.d., 51-52). It shows that Australia does obtain information about the aid needs not only from state actors but also from civil society actors. With assistance needs not only from state but also from civil society actors taken into account, Australia includes "grants to civil society for dissemination, monitoring and other activities" and "one-off and/or ongoing technical assistance to state and non-state institutions" among six types of assistance (AusAID, Australia Indonesia Partnership for Justice design document n.d., 34).

Australia's democracy assistance has been provided to almost all the sectors. The Centre for Democratic Institutions (CDI), which was established by the Australian government in 1998 and funded by AusAID, provides assistance mainly to political parties and parliaments (Centre for Democratic Institutions n.d.). AusAID's own democracy assistance to Indonesia has been provided mainly in law and human rights fields, in addition to the election sector. The assistance goes not only for the state institution sector but also to the civil society sector. In its assistance in the law field, while Australia provides assistance for the Indonesian Supreme Court for the

improvement of transparency of court decisions, it provides assistance to civil society organizations as well in order to empower their capacity for supporting legal reform in Indonesia (AusAID, Democratic Governance n.d.).

Given aid needs raised from the civil society, Australia assists the civil society sector in various fields. For example, in AusAID's assistance to empower ADR system, it assists an Indonesian NGO, the Indonesian Institute for Conflict Transformation (IICT), which nurtures mediators (Social Development Department, JICA 2007, 4).

The composition of information sources and the contents of information about aid needs obtained are quite similar in the case of the United States as well. Indonesia is one of the major recipients of US democracy assistance, and the United States is the biggest donor of democracy assistance for Indonesia. USAID/Indonesia's Program Strategy for 2009-2014 places strengthening of democracy as one of the major aims of US assistance to the country. The creation of this Strategy was facilitated by non-state actors (USAID, USAID Indonesia Strategy 2009-2014 2009, 36). Democracy International, a US consulting firm, assessed democracy and governance in Indonesia and created a report titled "Indonesia Democracy and Governance Assessment" in June 2008 for USAID. The team members who conducted assessment in Indonesia were the president of Democracy International, a professor at the Ohio State University, and a professor at Gadjah Mada University of Indonesia, in addition to an USAID staff (Democracy International n.d.). It shows that the assessment of Indonesian democracy itself was conducted by actors including those from the civil society both in the United States and Indonesia.

For the creation of this assessment report, the authors consulted with various governmental and non-governmental actors both in the United States and Indonesia. The

actors they consulted were eight Indonesian governmental actors, 12 Indonesian politicians, 10 legal professionals both of the state and the civil society, 24 civil society actors, five local governmental actors, 23 USAID non-governmental partners, five officials of international organizations, 16 US governmental officials, and 61 local governmental and civil society actors (USAID, Indonesia – Democracy and Governance Assessment 2008, 59-64). Not only was the number of information sources big in this case, but also the information sources were widely distributed from the state to the civil society side, both of the United States and Indonesia. This assessment grasps the existence of voice among citizens which demand better governance and their participation in it (USAID, Indonesia – Democracy and Governance Assessment 2008, 45). This assessment makes various recommendations for US democracy assistance to Indonesia in the civil society sector, which includes the establishment of legal think-tanks in major Indonesian universities and the empowerment of NGOs (USAID, Indonesia – Democracy and Governance Assessment 2008, 51, 55-56).

While the information sources for the creation of democracy assistance projects are both state and civil society actors in the case of Australia and the United States, information sources for Japan, the third biggest donor for Indonesia, is almost solely state actors. One of the biggest democracy assistance projects of Japan to Indonesia is police reform assistance. Started as a five-year project in August 2002, it got into the second phase in August 2007. It is one of the rare cases that Japan calls this program democracy assistance officially. While this program is named "Project for the Promotion of Community Policing Activities in Indonesia," it is also called "Indonesian National Police Democratization Assistance Program."

Japan had received assistance request from the Indonesian government through various channels since the separation of police from the military in 1999, and also at the time of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to Indonesia in January 2002 (Social Development Department, JICA 2002, 97; Sakurai 2003, 75-76). The fact that Indonesia's National Development Program raised the improvement of public safety as one of the aims of Indonesian development functioned as a supplemental factor, and Japan examined the possibility and methods of democratic police assistance given the Indonesian government's will for democratization of its military and police (Social Development Department, JICA 2002, 1).

Several preparatory study teams were dispatched to Indonesia for the assessment of the needs for assistance, one from January 20 to 30, 2002, one from June 19 to July 3, 2002, and one from July 14 to 17, 2002. These study teams conducted hearings only to major state actors. These teams created a working group in Indonesia, whose member list is shown in Table 44. All the members are personnel of the Indonesian National Police (INP), and it does not include any civil society members despite the existence of Indonesian NGOs in the police field such as PGR. A number of meetings with the working group were held, which was the major source of information for project formation. Other actors interviewed were a Brigadier General of INP and a Deputy for Politics, Defense and Security of the State Ministry of National Development Planning (Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional: BAPPENAS). No interview was conducted to civil society actors (Social Development Department, JICA 2002, 2-3, 26-27).

Table 44 List of Indonesian Members in the Working Group

January 2002
Secretary General, INP
Deputy Secretary General, INP
Head Bureau of Management for Security Strategy, INP
Head of Division for Development Strategy, INP
Head of Division for Strength Capability Research, INP
Head of Planning Division of Deputy Operation, INP
Head of Planning Division of Deputy for Education and Training, INP
Head of Planning Division of Intelligence and Security, INP
Head of Planning Division of Deputy for human Resources, INP
Assistant for Planning and Budgeting of mobile Brigade Corp, INP
Head of Planning Division for Deputy Logistics, INP
Head of Planning Division of Criminal Investigation Corps, INP
Head of Management Division of NCB-Interpol Indonesia Secretariat
Assistant for Planning and Budgeting for the Jakarta Metropolitan Police
Chief of Bekasi Police Resort
Assistant Office for Development Strategy Division

Source: (Social Development Department, JICA 2002, 27 and 113)

The second study team's interview targets were quite similar as well. Having the tight schedule of two-days of stay in Indonesia, the Japanese side had a meeting with the working group, conducted hearing to the Chief of INP, a departmental chair of the National Secretariat (Sekretariat Negara: SEKNEG), and a Deputy for Politics, Defense and Security of the State Ministry of BAPPENAS, in addition to visiting a local police office in Bekasi, Indonesia. No hearing to civil society actor was conducted this time either (Social Development Department, JICA 2002, 3-4). According to the record, Yun Mulyana, the Secretary General of INP, said to the Japanese study team that INP does not know how to reform itself (Social Development Department, JICA 2002, 97). It is striking that although the Indonesian state actors stopped short of clarifying concrete needs for assistance, the Japanese side did not conduct further hearings to civil society actors.

The only case where citizens' opinion was referred to was when the final evaluation team was dispatched to Indonesia in January 2007 after the end of the first phase of its police reform assistance project. In addition to conducting hearings to state actors, the team contracted with AC Nielsen, an US consulting firm having a local office in Indonesia, to conduct opinion polls about citizens' perception of INP. The opinion polls were used to measure the effect of Japan's police assistance, but not to grasp concrete needs from the Indonesian citizens yet to be addressed (Social Development Department, JICA 2007, 45-46, 194).

The hearings targeting state actors limited Japan's assistance in terms of possible assistance target areas. The issues raised from the Indonesian side were mostly technical matters such as the inadequateness of the command structure, the lack of crime lab activities and techniques necessary for it, and inadequateness of equipments and facilities. Tons of requests for material and financial assistance were made as well. None of these assistance requests were intended to strengthen the civil society sector for the purpose of monitoring INP. All these requests were for the better equipment of INP, and for the improvement of INP's technical skills. Yamazaki points out that such phenomenon of the recipient side's requesting material and financial assistance for the sake of governmental agency as the target of reform is seen very often not only in Indonesia but in every country.[31] Creating projects based on such information, the purpose of Japan's assistance was set to stabilize INP. Japan's police assistance program to Indonesia provided advisers to the Secretary General of INP, invited Indonesian police personnel to Japan for training, and provided equipments such as those necessary for criminal identification

[31] Hiroto Yamazaki's remark in the Q&A session, in (Police Policy Forum, 2007, pp. 211-212).

(Social Development Department, JICA 2002, 115-116). Police stations were constructed and wireless communication network was updated as well (Mukoyama and Masuda 2009, 112-114). Technical assistance for criminal investigation and dispatcher was provided as well. No assistance was provided to the civil society.

Secondary documents on Japan's police reform assistance to Indonesia do not seem to regard the lack of inputs from the civil society as a problem. It does not doubt the impartiality of information about aid needs obtained solely from state actors. Instead, they show confidence in the fact that their assistance projects are created according to the will of Indonesian state actors. Kenichi Sakurai, who was involved in the initiation of Japan's police reform assistance as a Japanese diplomat at the Japanese Embassy in Indonesia, states that this project gained political back up from the Indonesian governments, which was a factor to contribute for its implementation (Sakurai 2003, 82). In other words, they highly regard Japan's police assistance which was conducted based on the will of Indonesian state actors.

Instead of finding problems in the narrow target areas of Japan's assistance, which does not assist the civil society for police assistance, Japan criticizes those donors that try to inflict what they believe to be right outside of the areas of recipient governments' interest. Mentioning that the United Kingdom failed in its police assistance to Indonesia, Hiroto Yamazaki, a former Japanese adviser to the INP Secretary General, stated that British police assistance did not get along with the Indonesian side because it tried to address issues such as suppression of citizens and separatist movements, corruption, and collusion, which could not inspire Indonesian cooperation (H. Yamazaki, Trajectory of 10-Years of National Police Reform Assistance to Indonesia 2009, 33-34).

Those comments show a belief that state actors of the recipient country should define the contents of democracy assistance.

Somewhat a smaller scale compared to $4 million and five years of Japan's police reform assistance project, Japan has provided Indonesia justice sector assistance in the field of ADR as well. The origin of the assistance was also in the Indonesian government's request for legal reform assistance to Japan. A study team was dispatched to Indonesia in 2002 to grasp the current state of the justice sector in Indonesia and the possible ways for Japanese assistance. Table 45 shows the list of interviewees for the study team during two weeks of stay from January 6 to January 18. The team mainly interviewed state actors in the justice sector such as leaders of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, the Supreme Court, the Attorney General's Office, INP, BAPPENAS, and the National Law Commission. 23 officials of these governmental agencies are listed as interviewees. Civil society actors interviewed in Indonesia were only small in number – one each from PGR and the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kamar Dagang dan Industri Indonesia: KADIN Indonesia), in addition to a lawyer and a law professor. Among those Japanese agents who conducted interviews, one specialist was hired from the civil society by JICA as JICA specialists. Overall, it shows that most of the information sources for this study team were state actors of Indonesia and Japan.

Table 45 List of Interviewees for Justice Sector Assistance Preliminary Study

Indonesian Side
1) Ministry of Justice and Human Rights
Minister of Justice and Human Rights
Director General of Human Rights
Director General of General Court and Administrative Court
Director General of General Law Administration
Director General of National Law Reform Agency
Director General of Legislation
Director General of Intellectual Property Rights
Director General of Corrections
Director General of Immigration
2) Supreme Court
The Chief of the Supreme Court
Deputy Justice
Deputy Chief Justice
Head of Research & Development Center
3) Attorney General's Office
Junior Attorney General for Development Affairs
Head of Legal Bureau
Head of Management Section, Planning Bureau
4) INP
Police Brigadier General, National Central Bureau of the ICPO-Interpol
5) BAPPENAS
Deputy Chairman for Human Resources and Governmental Institutions
Director of Law and State Apparatus
Director of Bilateral Foreign Financing
6) National Law Commission
Secretary
Government Relations Coordinator
Financial Supervisor
7) Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia
staff
8) legal community
President of the KADIN Indonesia
Lawyer of Lubis, Santosa & Maulana-Law Office
Professor of Law, University of Indonesia

International Organizations
9) World Bank
Senior Counsel
10) Asian Development Bank
Director of Indonesia Resident Mission
Senior Governance Advisor
11) United Nation Development Plan
Senior Governance Advisor
Japanese Side
12) Japanese Embassy
Minister
Second Secretary
Researcher
13) JICA office in Indonesia
Director
Deputy Director
Staff
Staff
14) Jakarta Japan Club (JJC)
Deputy Director of JETRO
15) Other experts hired by JICA
NPA staff
University professor
Kazuhiko Sakai, a professional on central banking administration (affiliation unknown)
Shinichi Tominaga, a professional on central banking administration (affiliation unknown)

Source: (Asia Group I, JICA 2002, 3-5).

With holding training seminars both in Japan and Indonesia for the purpose of information exchange between the Indonesian and Japanese side, five years of communication led to the formation of Japan's ADR assistance to Indonesia, with Vice Chief Justice of the Indonesian Supreme Court taking initiative (Social Development Department, JICA 2007, 11). Preparatory study team for Japan's ADR assistance was

dispatched in September 2006 and conducted further interviews. Interviewees this time included three civil society organizations – IICT, the Indonesian Mediation Center (Pusat Mediasi Nasional: PMN), and the Indonesian Advocates Association (Perhimpunan Advokat Indonesia: PERADI). The inclusion of civil society actors in a working group for ADR assistance project was requested from Indonesian state actors (Social Development Department, JICA 2007, 19). ADR assistance project's working group was created, which consisted of five members of the Indonesian Supreme Court, one member of the Judicial Training Center, four local court judges, one Supreme Court Reform Team member, two officials of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, the head of PMN, and three lawyers (Social Development Department, JICA 2007, 20). The civil society actors might not have been included in the working group if Indonesian state actors did not request their involvement.

Reflecting the fact that most of the information sources were state actors, the aid needs raised from the Indonesian side was mostly on the necessity of revising the Supreme Court rule and the creation of ADR law (Social Development Department, JICA 2007, 22). While such issues as collusion between judges and lawyers which prevent fostering motivations for them from choosing ADR method, in addition to the issue of weakness of citizens' access to justice were raised from civil society actors, the focus of the project was set to the assistance for the revision of Supreme Court rule and mediator training (JICA, Project Basic Information: Assistance Project for the Empowernment of the Reconciliation and Arbitration System n.d.).

The preliminary study for election assistance in 2004 was somewhat different from justice sector assistance in a sense that Japan's assistance was provided in

collaboration with other donors. UNDP played the coordination role to orchestrate assistance from different donors. Reflecting such characteristics, major interviewees of the preliminary study were UNDP and other donor organizations. Table 46 shows major interviewees for the preliminary study. It shows that while major donor organizations (state aid agencies, international organizations, and non-governmental foundations) are interviewed mainly, interviewees also include a number of Indonesian governmental officials – six officers of the General Elections Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum: KPU), two officers of BAPPENAS, three officers of the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security (Menteri Koordinator Bidang Politik dan Keamanan: Menko Polkam), three officers of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), one officer of the Central Bureau of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik: BPS), two officers of the Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs (Ekonomi, Keuangan dan Industri: EKUIN), and one officer of a Special Committee (Panitia Khusus: PANSUS). No member of the Indonesian civil society was interviewed, despite the existence of prominent Indonesian NGOs in the election monitoring field such as University Network for Free and Fair Elections (UNFREL), the Rectors Forum, and KIPP (Virgianita 2010).

Table 46 List of Interviewees for the Preliminary Study for Election Assistance

Organization	Position
UNDP	Deputy Resident Representative Programme
UNDP	Programme Adviser
KPU	Vice Chairman
KPU	Secretary General
KPU	Deputy Head of Bureau
KPU	staff
KPU	Head of Division for Technical Cooperation
KPU	Deputy General Secretary
AusAID	Second Secretary
AusAID	Program Manager
BAPPENAS	Director of Politic, Communication and Information
BAPPENAS	Deputy Director, Directorate of Politic, Communication and Information
IFES	Project Manager
IFES	Election Administration Specialist
IFES	Assistant to Election, Administration Specialist
Menko Polkam	Deputy for Foreign Policy Affairs
Menko Polkam	Assistant Deputy for Foreign Policy Affairs
Menko Polkam	Assistant deputy, Assistant deputy Asia and Pacific
World Bank	Governance Advisor
USAID	Democracy and Governance Senior Advisor
USAID	Deputy Director
EU	Counselor, Political and Economic
EU	Political and Economic Section
TAF	Assistant Representative
TAF	Media and Election Program Officer
AEC	Team Leader, Election Assistance Project
AEC	Project Officer, Election Assistance Project
AEC	Specialist DRIDGE Trainer Election Assistance Project
MOHA	Secretary General
MOHA	staff
MOHA	Head Center for Management of Cooperation
BPS	Director of Statistical Information System
EKUIN	Deputy for Macro Economics and Finance
EKUIN	Deputy Assistant for Budget
PANSUS	Ketua Komisi II DPR-RI

Note: IFES stands for the International Foundation for Election System, and AEC stands for Australian Electoral Commission.
Source: (Asia Group 1, JICA 2002, 41).

Reflecting the heavy concentration on state actors as information sources, the assistance needs grasped in the preliminary study was of the Indonesian government's. In a meeting, KPU raised some primary and supporting needs which they expected for Japan to satisfy. Among three primary needs KPU raised (capacity building of KPU, voter education, and material assistance), KPU listed material assistance as what they expect on Japan (Asia Group 1, JICA 2002, 22-25).

The resulting assistance contents are shown in Table 47. Reflecting the fact that the Indonesian government raised voter education as one of the areas of primary needs, Japan provided assistance to five Indonesian NGOs for the purpose. However, the material assistance to the Indonesian government shared most of the portion of Japan's assistance. While $22 million of material assistance was provided to the Indonesian government, the grant amount to Indonesian NGOs for voter education was only $0.27 million. The share of civil society assistance of Japan's election assistance in 2004 was only 1.2%. The contents of Japan's assistance heavily reflect the requests raised from the interviewees in the preliminary study.

Table 47 Contents of Japan's Election Assistance in 2004

Assistance Schemes	Contents of Assistance	Details
Material Assistance	Ballot boxes	623,000 boxes ($11 million)
	Voting booth	1,220,000 sets ($11 million)
Technical Assistance	Specialist dispatch to KPU	1 person for a long-term and 24 persons for a short-term ($0.6 million)
Civil Society Assistance	Assistance to NGOs in voter education field	5 NGOs ($270,000)
Dispatch of Election Observers	General Election: 23 persons	9 persons from the civil society and 14 from the state
	Presidential Election (first round): 44 persons	5 intellectuals and 39 embassy or consulate staff

Source: (Southeast Asia Team I, Asia Group I, JICA 2004, 4, 10).

In sum, Japan relies on state actors as information sources for figuring out aid needs in Indonesia. This is quite different from other donors such as Australia and the United States, which obtain information on aid needs not only from state actors but also from civil society actors. In addition, secondary documents show that actors involved in Japan's democracy assistance believe the choice of information sources is right, and they do not mention the necessity of obtaining information from the civil society at all. They do not doubt the impartiality of information about aid needs raised from state actors.

The reliance on state actors for information about aid needs naturally leads Japan to acquire needs on the state level, while needs from the civil society tend not to be clarified. This leads Japan's democracy assistance to be focused on the state sector. Even when Japan provides assistance to the civil society, the amount tends to be much smaller compared to the assistance to the state sector, as seen in the case of Japan's election assistance to Indonesia.

While the hypothesis on the impact of the choice of information sources on the sector allocation of democracy assistance was found positive, the case study here did not find substantial information to support the hypothesis on the impact of information sources on the democracy assistance amount overall. This section, however, found out that the United States and Australia, which gather information on assistance needs from civil society actors as well, tend to provide assistance to the civil society sector as well as the state institution sector. Thus there remains a possibility that there is a correlation between information sources and democracy assistance amount. But this possibility is not substantial enough to claim causality between the two variables.

Hypotheses 2: Aid Human Resources and Democracy Assistance

The previous section showed that those donors that obtain information about aid needs not only from state actors but also civil society actors have tendency to provide democracy assistance not only to the state but also to the civil society sector. It also showed that Japan collects information necessary for project formation mostly from state actors, which leads the country to provide assistance mostly to the state sector.

This section will examine aid human resources and its impact on democracy assistance. In doing so, it will compare the Japanese case with that of the United States, the top donor of democracy assistance to Indonesia. Not all the Japanese aid projects provide information about concrete human resources they utilized for project implementation. This section will thus examine those projects about which actors who implemented project are clear – justice sector and election assistance. Before examining the aid human resources and its impact on Japanese democracy assistance projects, this section will describe the types of aid human resources for US democracy assistance and the way they secure such human resources.

The United States, which is the largest donor of democracy assistance to Indonesia, implements democracy assistance projects in collaboration with non-governmental organizations, along with governmental actors. USAID states that it is "partnering with Indonesian communities, government, and civil-society organizations" to meet challenges, and positions the empowerment of civil society along with the improvement of the capacity of governmental personnel, as objects in each assistance field (USAID Indonesia n.d.). Table 48 shows USAID's democracy assistance projects in Indonesia and their implementing partners as of September 2011. It shows that non-

governmental organizations (NPO/NGOs and consulting companies) both of the United States and Indonesia are the implementing partners here.

Table 48 USAID's Democracy Assistance in Indonesia and Implementing Partners, 2011

Project	Implementing Partner(s)	Type of Implementing Partners
Cross Cutting Program: Strengthened Capacity for Sustainable Peace-building		
Inisiatif Kemitraan Asia Tenggara – United States, or Southeast Asia – U.S. Partnership: Civil Societies Innovating Together (IKAT-US)		
SERASI	International Relief & Development	American NGO
Effective Governance Promoted		
KINERJA	Research Triangle Institute	consulting company
Program Representasi (PROREP)	Chemonics International	consulting company
Representative Parties Program (RPP)	IFES, IRI, and NDI	American NGO
Strengthened Rule of Law		
Changes for Justice (C4J)	Chemonics International	consulting company
Educating and Equipping Tomorrow's Justice Reformers (E2J)	The Asia Foundation	American NGO
Strengthening Integrity and Accountability Program 1 (SIAP1)	Management Systems International (MSI)	consulting company
Strengthening Integrity and Accountability Program 2 - Kemitraan (SIAP2 - Kemitraan)	PGR	Indonesian NGO
Strengthening Integrity and Accountability Program 2 - PATTIRO (SIAP2 - PATTIRO)	Pusat Telaah & Informasi Regional (PATTIRO)	Indonesian NGO

Source: Created by the author based on (USAID Indonesia n.d.).

Taking "Strengthening Integrity and Accountability Program 1 (SIAP1)" project as an example, USAID solicited applicants for this grant opportunity in November 2009. The overall contents of the project were already fixed, and USAID solely looked for a project implementing partner. The solicitation did not limit aid human resources to US actors, but was open to US NGOs, international NGOs, and US state universities as well

(USAID Indonesia 2009, 1). The only selection criteria stated was, "International and U.S. non-governmental organizations (NGOs) actively engaged in activities consistent with the program objectives"(USAID Indonesia 2009, 50). The grant amount was not to exceed $13 million over three years of basic period and two years of optional period. This shows that the United States created the project without having in mind exactly who to implement the project. The human resource for the implementation of this project was determined after the formation of the project (USAID Indonesia 2009, 1).

Such selection process of aid human resources was not the case only in the SIAP1 project. Other projects also solicited aid human resources widely both from international and US non-state organizations in the forms of contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements. Grants are open to any organizations that meet project criteria, and resulting implementing partners are not only US organizations but local or international NGOs and commercial organizations. Table 49 shows the list of implementing partners for USAID Indonesia as of September 2011. Although not all the organizations listed here have activities in the democracy assistance field, it shows that USAID possesses implementing partners not only from the United States or Indonesia. It includes various international organizations, and some organizations of third countries. In addition, they include not only NGOs but also consulting firms and university research institutions. It shows that potential aid human resources for US democracy assistance projects are open and diverse.

Table 49 List of Implementing Partners for USAID Indonesia

International Organization for Migration
AIDS Projects Management Group (APMG)
Andalas University
Bank Andara
Bank Danamon
Chemonics International
Cipta Cara Padu – Indonesia (CCP-I)
Columbia University
Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening
Development Alternatives Inc.
Education Development Center, Inc.
Family Health International
Farmers' Initiatives for Ecological Livelihoods and Democracy (FIELD)
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nation
Georgia State University
Harvard University's School of Public Health
Helen Keller International
Indonesian International education Foundation (IIEF)
International Relief & Development
IPB (Institut Pertanian Bogor)
JHPIEGO
Kemitraan (or Partnership for Governance Reform)
KNCV Tuberculosis Foundation
Komisi Penanggulangan AIDS Nasional /National AIDS Commission
Lutheran World Relief
Management Systems International (MSI)
Mercy Corps
Nathan Associates, Inc
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA)
Pacific Institute
Parsons Global Service, Inc
PEM GmbH
Pusat Telaah & Informasi Regional (PATTIRO)
Research Triangle Institute
Sajogyo Institute
Save the Children
Sesame Workshop
Standard Chartered Indonesia
Swisscontact
Tetra Tech ARD
Tetra Tech ES Inc.
Texas A&M's (Borlaug Institute)
The Asia Foundation
The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID)

Tokyu Construction Co., LTD.
Training Resources Group, Inc.
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
U.S. Department of Justice
U.S. Forest Service
UCLA (University of California)
UNICEF
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Universitas Indonesia
Universitas Mataram
Universitas Sam Ratulangi
Universitas Udayana
University of Indonesia's SEAMEO Regional Center for Community Nutrition
US Pharmacopeia
Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance
World Health Organization
World Neighbors
WWF-US

Source: (USAID Indonesia n.d.).

This is a significant difference compared to Japanese assistance projects, whose implementing partners are mostly limited to Japanese state actors. Taking Japan's police reform assistance to Indonesia as an example, there is no non-governmental actor playing a role in project implementation. According to an interim evaluation report which was published in October 2005, during the three years from mid 2002 up to then, eight personnel were dispatched as long-term experts and nine were dispatched as short-term experts. All of them are NPA officials. Counterpart-trainings were conducted in Japan and Indonesia as well, whose lecturers were again officers of NPA. As can be speculated from the numbers of Japanese personnel implemented the project, the project was small in scale. While $1.1 million was spent on the project, 70% of it or $0.8 million was used for material assistance (Social Development Department, JICA 2005, 86-87). Compared to the fact that USAID's grant for just one of the projects in the law field, SIAP I project,

was $13 million, the Japanese aid amount spent on this project was only 8% of the USAID grant. The police reform assistance project to Indonesia shows that the project secured extremely limited number of aid human resources only among state actors, and the project was small in scale.

When preliminary study team conducted interviews in Indonesia for the ADR assistance project, the Japanese side told the Indonesian Supreme Court judges that JFBA and RTI were going to support the project. It shows that although assistance project contents were not decided up to then, the preliminary study team members already discussed with officials of JFBA and RTI about the implementation of future ADR project. The process to determine the implementation partners for the project was not open unlike the case of the United States, but rather was closed and pre-determined to some extent.

Only one expert was going to be dispatched to Indonesia for the ADR assistance project as an expert to assist for more than a year, and the person was mentioned to be a lawyer. While the Japanese side said that they were going to solicit a lawyer for the position, their remarks implied that they were going to solicit 1) not any law expert but a lawyer, and 2) a Japanese lawyer but not a lawyer of other nationalities (Social Development Department, JICA 2007, 22, 28). While an aid human resource for the implementation of the projects was solicited, the solicitation was conducted within a small Japanese circle. With already having the number of human resources to be involved as implementation partners in mind, it was clear that the Japanese side could not agree on any contents that require a large number of project implementation partners.

The contents of the assistance project had to be what can be implemented by the dispatch of just one lawyer.

It was actually a rare case that aid human resource was solicited for a democracy assistance projects. JICA chooses aid human resources from people they know in most cases, with taking into account advice from various sources. In the case of Japan's police reform assistance to Indonesia, Hiroto Yamazaki, the adviser to the INP Secretary General, was chosen given recommendation from former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto. Former Prime Minister Hashimoto visited Indonesia immediate aftermath of the country's democratic transition, and mentioned the name of Yamazaki as an appropriate human resource for the adviser position. Hashimoto considered him an appropriate person for the position because he knew that Yamazaki had an experience of working at the Japanese Embassy in Indonesia and thus was knowledgeable about the country (H. Yamazaki 2009, 28).

The reason for the small number of project implementers and the fact that they tend to be state actors is in the lack of aid human resources in Japanese civil society. While there is such an NGO as PGR in Indonesia that can implement various types of democracy assistance projects including police assistance, such an NGO does not exist in Japan. There is no NGO, consulting firm, or university institution which can implement police assistance project. It naturally leads Japanese police assistance projects to obtain aid human resources from a limited number of state actors.

The law field has somewhat a larger number of aid human resources, and JFBA has been an implementation partner of legal assistance projects. However, the number of lawyers who are interested in legal assistance abroad is not great. Other NGOs in the

field of justice sector assistance such as Human Rights Now does not possess intention to collaborate with the Japanese government for assistance abroad (Human Rights Now staff 2011). The potential aid human resources for democracy assistance projects for Japan is limited both due to the lack of such resources in Japanese civil society, and the lack of trust between civil society actors and the government of Japan.

When taking into account the US case however, it is clear that the implementation partner of any democracy assistance projects do not need to be Japanese actors. They can be actors from Indonesia, third countries, or international organizations. Relying on state actors as implementation partners limits the contents of assistance projects and aid amount necessary for such assistance, because the amount of aid human resources is limited among state actors. However, open solicitation would make it possible to expand the contents and aid amount of Japanese democracy assistance, because there is no known limitation in terms of the number of potential implementation partners in this case. There are a limited number of cases Japan solicits project implementers widely among non-governmental actors. But such cases can be seen almost only in the election assistance field. Table 50 shows NGO recipients of Japan's democracy assistance to Indonesia, grant amounts, and their project contents. Five Indonesian NGOs received grants in 2003 and 2004, but the number is in decline. Only one NGO received grant in 2005 and none received a grant in the following two years.

Table 50 Democracy Assistance Projects in Japan's Grassroots Human Security Grant Aid to Indonesia, 2004-2009

	Grant Amount ($US)	Recipient Organization
2003		
Project for Supporting Voter Education for General Election in West Java, Central Jawa, East Jawa and Banten Province	$73,972	Muhammadiyah Youth Group (Pemuda Muhammadiyah)
Project for Supporting Voter Education for General Election in Yogyakarta	$12,662	Parwi Foundation (Yayasan Parwi)
Project for Supporting Voter Registration for General Election	$39,501	Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information (Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Economi dan Sosial: LP3ES)
Project for Supporting Voter Education for General Election in North Sulawesi	$69,620	LP3ES
Project for Supporting Voter Education for General Election in Jakarta, Bandung, Makassar, Manado and Medan through Radio	$75,134	Indonesia Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia: LSI)
2004		
Project for Supporting Voter Education Program for Presidential Election in West Nusa Tunggara	$67,883	LP3ES
Project for Supporting Voter Education for Presidential Election in Yogyakarta	$30,661	Yayasan Parwi
Project for Supporting Voter Registration Audit for Presidential Election	$40,846	Indonesian People's Network of Election Observers (Jaringan Masyaraka Pemantau Pemilu Indonesia: JAMPPI)
Project for Supporting Voter Education for Direct Election in Palu City and Poso District, Central Sulawesi	$75,224	LP3ES
Project for Supporting Voter Education for the Second Round of the Presidential Election in Yogyakarta	$12,891	Yayasan Parwi
2005		
Project for Supporting Voter Education of Regional Election in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province	$68,923	Independent Election Commission of Aceh (Aceh Komisi Independen Pemilihan: KIP)
2008		
Project for Supporting Voter Education for General Election in Banda Aceh	$41,568	Islamic Students Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam)

	Grant Amount ($US)	Recipient Organization
City and Lokshumawe City, Aceh Province		
Project for Supporting Voter Education for General Election in Makassar City, South Sulawesi Province and Mataram City, West Nusa Tenggara Province	$86,310	LP3ES
Project for Post-Conflict Journalists' Training for Peacebuilding in Aceh Province	$85,568	Ache Conscience Foundation (Aceh Yayasan Kata Hati)

Source: (Embassy of Japan in Indonesia n.d.); Embassy of Japan in Indonesia's press release on each project.

Despite the exception that open solicitation would push up the ceiling of grant amount due to the availability of implementation partners in a large scale, the grant amounts for the NGOs are small. The yearly total grant amount in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2008 provided for these NGOs were $271 thousand, $228 thousand, $69 thousand, and $213 thousand respectively. These amounts are much smaller than the assistance Japan provides for election through Indonesian government. For example, Japan's assistance provided to the Indonesian government for 2004 election was $22.87 million (Table 47). It means only 1% of the overall Japanese election assistance in 2004 was allocated through these NGOs.

The lack of funding through NGOs is distinctive in the area of democracy assistance compared to other areas of assistance. Table 51 shows the percentage of NGOs in the democracy assistance field which received Grassroots Human Security Grant Aid from MOFA among the NGOs operating in Indonesia which received this grant. The percentage of NGOs in the democracy assistance field has never exceeded 23% of all the NGOs which have received grant from the Japanese government, and its share was 0% in

2006, 2007, and 2009. Other NGOs that have received grant are mostly in health and education fields. It shows that while the Japanese government has a greater tendency to provide assistance through NGOs in the field of BHN, it is less likely to do so in the democracy assistance field.

Table 51 Democracy Projects in Japan's Grassroots Human Security Grant Aid to Indonesia, 2004-2009

Year	Number of Democracy Projects	Number of Projects received Grassroots Human Security Grant	Percentage of Democracy Projects
2003	5	33	15.15%
2004	5	22	22.73%
2005	1	14	7.14%
2006	0	17	0.00%
2007	0	20	0.00%
2008	3	25	12.00%
2009	0	14	0.00%

Source: (Embassy of Japan in Indonesia n.d.).

A discussion between two prominent figures of justice sector assistance, Morio Takeshita and Akio Morishima, shows the reason behind the reliance on the implementation of democracy assistance projects on state actors, and the small size of funding provided through NGO actors. The discussion took place in the Legal Assistance Liaison Committee of 2003 on principles behind justice sector assistance. Takeshita stated as follows:

> We think that Japan should conduct justice sector assistance as a country. When one provides assistance for hard infrastructure construction, private actors can implement projects given funding from the state. On the other hand, justice sector assistance is an assistance provided in the process of democratization for the consolidation of the rule of law in recipient countries. Therefore, state support would be necessary. Talking in terms of public and private differentiation, I think this is what we cannot rely on private actors. State actors should be responsible

> for it. While a governmental agency should be in charge on the Japanese side, the reality is that the responsibility is casted on JICA. While JICA can be called a state agency, it is only a government-affiliated organization. Then does JICA implement projects? In reality, JICA only establishes assistance committees, and the committees are in charge of project implementation. I have an impression that the responsibility of the management and operation of justice sector assistance projects are transferred from governmental agencies to JICA, and from JICA to assistance committees. It is important to ask for opinions to experts. But they should remain being in advisory groups, while the state should be in charge of planning, implementation, and management of these projects (Special Topic: Summary of the Results from the 4th Legal Assistance Liaison Meeting, p. 31).

Takeshita's statement shows a strong belief that justice sector assistance, as a part of democracy assistance, is what should be implemented by state actors. There is shown a strong belief that the actors in charge of democratization are state actors, and thus assistance should be conducted by state actors as counterparts. He considers that it is irresponsible to hire non-governmental actors to implement justice sector assistance.

Akio Morishima counter-argued against the above statement of Takeshita. But his point was not about the appropriateness of project implementation partners. His point is that JICA is a governmental organization and thus can be responsible for justice sector reform. Morishima states as follows:

> When the Japanese state provides assistance through ODA, the implementation actor is JICA. It is not that the state gives up its responsibility and pushes it to JICA. Indeed, MOFA comes participate when JICA creates projects. You misunderstand that JICA throws projects to assistance committees within Japan. That is not true. Assistance committees are in charge of concrete implementation of JICA projects, where responsible officials of JICA attend. All governmental agencies related to justice sector assistances, such as MOJ, dispatch their representatives to the committee as well (Special Topic: Summary of the Results from the 4th Legal Assistance Liaison Meeting, p. 33).

It shows that both of these central figures of Japan's justice sector assistance share the idea that state actors should be in charge of the implementation of democracy assistance projects. The natural consequences of belief in state actors as implementation partners of democracy assistance are two-fold. First, it leads Japanese democracy assistance to utilize mostly state actors for project implementation. However, because of the limitation in the number of aid human resources among state actors, aid projects get limited both in terms of contents and aid amount. Second, distrust in the utility of civil society actors as implementation partners of democracy assistance projects limits both the number of projects and amount of funding provided through NGOs. These two factors together limit the amount of democracy assistance from Japan.

Overall, the examination here showed that aid human resources tend to lack for Japanese democracy assistance projects. There are two reasons for it: 1) the paucity of aid human resources in the civil society of Japan, and 2) mutual distrust between government and civil society actors. While the United States openly solicit implementing partners of their democracy assistance projects widely among civil society organizations internationally, Japan hires small number of state actors for the implementation of their projects. There is a strong belief that human resources should be secured from the state sector for democracy assistance projects. However, the limitation in the amount of human resources among state actors limits the contents and aid amount provided through democracy assistance projects. At the same time, distrust in civil society actors causes Japan to provide only a tiny amount of democracy assistance through civil society actors. With having these two factors binding Japanese democracy assistance, substantial relation between aid human resources and the amount of democracy assistance projects

was recognized. However, the lack of civil society actors among aid human resources does not necessarily leads Japanese democracy assistance to the state sector at the cost of not providing assistance to the civil society. The target sectors of assistance are already determined when they hire implementation partners for democracy assistance projects, and thus the consideration about aid human resources comes after the selection of target sectors of democracy assistance.

Conclusion

This chapter has tested the relations between the involvement (and lack thereof) of civil society actors and the country's democracy assistance. Two intervening variables were used in order to measure the involvement of civil society actors in Japan's democracy assistance – information sources and aid human resources. In the case of Japanese democracy assistance to Indonesia, both information sources and aid human resources are mostly limited to state actors.

Using four hypotheses, the relationship between the involvement of civil society actors and Japanese democracy assistance was tested. The result of the test in this case study was that, while two of the hypotheses were found positive, the other two were not. The fact that Japan relies information about aid needs on state actors does have impact on the selection of target sectors of assistance. State actors on the Indonesian side tend to clarify needs on the state level, and thus Japanese assistance based on which tends to be provided to the state sector more than to the civil society sector. On the other hand, however, it was not clear if the selection of information sources have impact on Japan's democracy assistance amount overall.

Only one of the two hypotheses was valid in the case of relation between aid human resources and Japan's democracy assistance as well. While the lack of aid human resources tends to limit the overall assistance from Japan, it does not necessarily direct the assistance to the state institution sector. Rather, the target sectors of democracy assistance were determined before or without soliciting implementation partners. Overall, while the overall assistance amount tends to be influenced by the lack of aid human resources, the sector allocation is influenced by the selection of information sources. The results of hypotheses-testing here revise path diagram among variables as shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9 Revised Path Diagram after Hypotheses Testing



Chapter 8: Conclusion

The third wave of democratization continues and further accelerates in every part of the globe after the end of the Cold War including in Asia, which Japan considers as its sphere of interest. In addition, civil society has been playing ever greater roles in democratization. That is the case in Asia as well, and not only have civil society actors taken leading roles in democratization processes, but they have also been playing significant roles in the consolidation of democracy afterwards.

Given the spread of democratization, developed democracies including Japan have expanded democracy assistance amount. However, the ratio of democracy assistance to Japan's ODA overall is extremely small - only 0.7% of ODA was allocated to democracy assistance on average between 1990 and 2008. In addition, most of Japan's democracy assistance is directed to the state institution sector, while assistance to the civil society sector of recipient countries is provided scarcely. While 98.2% of Japan's democracy assistance is directed to the state sector, only 1.1% of it is directed to the civil society sector.

This dissertation hypothesized that the involvement of civil society actors impact democracy assistance. In order to measure the involvement of civil society actors, this dissertation used two intervening variables – information sources and aid human resources. Because there are two dependent variables (democracy assistance amount and sector allocation of democracy assistance) and two intervening variables, this dissertation tested four hypotheses. The hypotheses are, here again, as follows:

Hypothesis 1-a: *If a donor relies on state actors for information about democracy assistance needs, it is likely to grasp needs only on the state level. Because it is likely to prevent one of the potential recipient sectors of democracy assistance, the civil society sector, from receiving democracy assistance, it might limit the overall democracy assistance amount. If a donor relies not only on state but also on civil society actors for information about democracy assistance needs, on the other hand, it is likely to grasp needs both on the state and the civil society levels; and thus, its democracy assistance amount is likely to be bigger.*

Hypothesis 1-b: *If a donor relies on state actors for information about democracy assistance needs, it is likely to grasp needs mostly on the state level, and thus its democracy assistance is likely to be directed mostly to the state institution sector. If a donor relies not only on state but also on civil society actors for information about democracy assistance needs, on the other hand, it is likely to grasp needs both on the state and the civil society levels; and thus, its democracy assistance is likely to be provided to both the state institutions and the civil society sectors.*

Hypothesis 2-a: *If a donor relies heavily on state actors as implementation partners of democracy assistance projects despite the paucity of foreign aid human resources among them, its democracy assistance amount is likely to get limited because of the short supply of implementation partners. If a donor relies not only on state but also on civil society actors as implementation partners of democracy assistance projects, on the other hand,*

its democracy assistance amount is likely to be bigger because a larger number of foreign aid human resources are likely to be available.

Hypothesis 2-b: *If a donor relies on state actors as implementation partners of democracy assistance projects, its democracy assistance is likely to be directed to the state institution sector because of the lack of implementation partners with the expertise of civil society assistance. If a donor relies not only on state but also on civil society actors as implementation partners of democracy assistance projects, on the other hand, its democracy assistance is likely to be provided to the civil society sector as well as the state institution sector because of the existence of implementation partners with the expertise of civil society assistance.*

Given the lack of studies on Japanese democracy assistance either in English or Japanese, chapter 3 analyzed the state of Japanese democracy assistance in order to articulate the nature of dependent variables of the dissertation. Several tendencies became clear from the examination. First, while the Japanese government has launched a number of democracy assistance-related policy frameworks such as the ODA Charter of 1992, PDD, TICAD II declaration, the ODA Charter of 2003, and the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, none of them provide concrete pictures on the methods and contents of the country's democracy assistance.

Second, reflecting such policy frameworks, Japan's democracy assistance amount turned out to be small. While the country has expanded democracy assistance in terms of the absolute amount and the ratio of democracy assistance to overall ODA, it remains

small on both counts. It is only France and Spain, which are as inconspicuous as Japan in the democracy assistance field among the top 10 ODA providers. While the gaiatsu literature argues that the existence of foreign pressure, especially from the United States, leads Japan to provide democracy assistance, lack of change in Japanese democracy assistance over time cannot be explained from this argument.

Chapter 3 also found that Japan allocates most of its democracy assistance to the state institution sector. While Japanese democracy assistance amount overall is relatively small compared with most other donor countries, the country's aid amount for the state institution sector is quite substantial. This is because Japan allocates 98.2% of its democracy assistance to the state institution sector, while most other donors allocate it both to the state institutions and the civil society sectors more evenly.

Chapter 4 examined the overall trend of Japanese foreign aid in order to understand priority issues in Japanese ODA. First, it showed that central ideas in Japanese foreign aid have changed over time. Japanese foreign aid possessed commercial characteristics from the mid 1950s to the late 1980s, and Japan provided foreign aid in a way to promote its own economy and benefit Japanese companies. It led Japanese foreign aid to be targeted to economic infrastructures.

However, given the increased pressure from domestic and international public, the Japanese government changed its foreign aid policy in a way to provide it along with democracy norm. There were several causes behind it. Consecutive scandals on Japanese ODA led the Japanese public to criticize Japanese foreign aid that it lacks principles and visions. In addition, the fact that the Japanese government had tepid response toward the Burmese and Chinese government at the time of their military crackdown of pro-

democracy movements at the end of the 1980s caused criticism domestically and internationally that Japan lacks democracy norms. Furthermore, the lack of recognition for Japan's large monetary contribution for the multilateral force at the time of the Gulf War caused the feeling of *defeat* among members of the LDP and MOFA. These factors led to the creation of the ODA Charter, which stated that Japan would provide foreign aid, paying attention to the direction of democratization in recipient countries. This was incorporation of the idea of democracy in Japanese foreign policy.

As the Asian Financial Crisis occurs in the late 1990s, Japanese attention moves toward human security, however. With having comprehensive and development-centered understanding about human security, the country has launched various frameworks on human security in the United Nations, as well as increasing foreign aid amount for this category. Although Canada and European countries take rights-based approach to human security and utilize democracy assistance as one of the methods for human security assistance, Japan's development-centered approach excludes democracy assistance from the methods of human security assistance.

However, the sector that receives the greatest share of Japanese foreign aid remains to be the economic infrastructure sector. Examining whether the mercantilist literature is well positioned to explain the remaining focus on the economic infrastructure aid within Japanese foreign aid, this dissertation argued that the mercantilist literature cannot account for Japanese foreign aid after the 1990s. While the mercantilist literature appeared from the end of the 1980s to the early 1990s and explains Japanese foreign aid before then, consecutive changes were brought to Japanese foreign aid after then in order to get rid of the mercantile characteristics, which changed the nature of Japanese foreign

aid. Although Japanese foreign aid is still mainly provided for economic infrastructures, it is not for the benefit of Japanese economy but for economic cooperation with developing countries. Japan possesses strong belief in the utility of economic infrastructure-led and economic growth-centered aid approach not only for development but also for poverty alleviation, human security, and democracy.

However, the institutionalist and the gaiatsu literature do seem to explain Japanese democracy assistance to some extent in different ways. As the institutionalist literature points out, MOFA's power is relatively weak especially as opposed to MOF. This limits MOFA's ODA budget, which naturally limits democracy assistance amount as well. However, the allocation of MOFA's ODA budget to democracy assistance itself is quite limited. This factor shows that the institutionalist argument is not enough in explaining the small share of democracy assistance in Japanese foreign aid.

Chapter 4 also pointed out that the gaiatsu literature accounts for the incorporation of democracy idea into Japanese foreign aid at the beginning of the 1990s. However, on the other hand, if the gaiatsu were to be successful in changing Japanese foreign aid to be provided more for democracy assistance rather than for commercial purposes, Japanese democracy assistance amount would have been greater. The gaiatsu literature cannot account for the remaining small percentage of democracy assistance within Japanese ODA.

In addition, there is no existing literature that explains the sector allocation of Japanese democracy assistance. The lack of studies on Japanese democracy assistance as such necessitates this dissertation to seek causes for the paucity and skewness of Japanese democracy assistance.

Given that existing literature is not well suited to explain causes for the paucity and skewness of Japanese democracy assistance, this dissertation tested the impact of civil society involvement on Japanese democracy assistance practice, taking two intervening variables. Chapter 5 tested the causation using information sources as the intervening variable.

Chapter 5 first examined information sources for Japanese democracy assistance and argued that Japan tends to use governmental sources in order to figure out democracy assistance needs. Japan possesses request-based aid policy concerning democracy assistance and takes into account requests which come from governmental actors of recipient countries, but not from civil society actors. Even when Japan consults about the possibility of democracy assistance with recipient side without having requests in the first place, Japan consults with governmental actors. This is quite different from active donors of democracy assistance such as the United States and Sweden. These countries collect information about democracy assistance needs not only from state actors but also from NGOs operating in recipient countries. On the other hand, the Japanese government does not request information about democracy assistance needs to NGOs, be it domestic, foreign, or international NGOs.

Because Japan's democracy assistance is provided based on requests from recipient *governments*, it turned out that Japan provides democracy assistance only to the countries whose government possess intention of democratization or the improvement of democratic quality. Indeed, the top 10 recipient countries of Japanese democracy assistance all contain such policies in their national development plans. This leads Japan to have a tendency not to provide democracy assistance to authoritarian countries

because of the lack of will for democratization in their governments. This naturally limits Japanese democracy assistance amount.

In addition, while force for democratization tends to come from anti-governmental side such as civil society actors and opposition political parties, Japan tends not to assist these actors because of the prerequisite of the existence of assistance request from recipient governments. When recipient governmental actors request democracy assistance to Japan, they tend not to request such assistance that empowers opposition forces for them. As a consequence, Japanese democracy assistance tends to be provided to streamline and empower state institutions, which causes Japanese assistance to be focused on the state institution sector. Overall, information collection from state actors has the effect of both limiting democracy assistance amount and concentrating it on the state institution sector.

Chapter 6 tested the impact of civil society on democracy assistance taking aid human resources as the intervening variable. First, this chapter argued that aid human resources for democracy assistance are scarce among state actors. Despite the paucity of aid human resources among state actors, it turned out that civil society actors are hardly mobilized for democracy assistance. It is almost only the legal assistance field which continuously mobilizes civil society actors.

The lack of mobilization of aid human resources from the civil society is in contrast compared with active donor countries of democracy assistance. They tend to mobilize a large number of such actors as NGOs and university research institutions. In addition, they tend to possess non-governmental democracy assistance foundations that receive governmental funding and provide democracy assistance based on it. Active

donors also possess political party foundations, which mainly provide political party assistance. On the other hand, Japan does not have those.

Chapter 6 found two reasons behind the weak mobilization of civil society actors for democracy assistance in Japan – paucity of NGOs in Japan and the lack of trust between state and civil society actors. The paucity of NGOs in the country limits the potential partners for democracy assistance. In addition, because of the lack of trust between state and civil society actors, they tend to choose not to cooperate between them but rather to provide democracy assistance separately from each other.

Weak mobilization of civil society actors for democracy assistance further limits the aid human resources in the field in Japan. This leads Japan to conduct democracy assistance projects that do not require a large number of implementation partners. This naturally limits the scale of projects, which eventually limits the overall size of Japan's democracy assistance. On the other hand, the impact of aid human resources on sector allocation of democracy assistance was not found in the test.

In order to buttress the above hypotheses-testing, chapter 7 conducted a case study, using Japan's democracy assistance to Indonesia. It first described the current state of democratization in Indonesia and showed that while there have been a number of efforts taken for democratization, significant issues remain in the country's democracy such as corruption, the lack of transparency and accountability among the national and regional state institutions and actors, in addition to citizens' weak participation in politics.

In order to help improve the quality of democracy in Indonesia, Japan has been providing democracy assistance to the country constantly. Indeed, Japan is the third biggest donor of democracy assistance for Indonesia only after the United States and

Australia. However, Japan's tendency to allocate most of its democracy assistance to the state institution sector can be seen here as well. Indeed, while other DAC member countries allocate 70.6% of their democracy assistance to the state institution sector of Indonesia, Japan allocates 99.9% of its assistance to the state institution sector. Japan's assistance to the civil society sector is extremely weak.

This chapter tested whether civil society involvement (and lack thereof) impacts Japan's democracy assistance through two intervening variables in the case of Japanese democracy assistance to Indonesia as well. In the analysis on information sources, this chapter found that Japan collects information about democracy assistance needs exclusively from state actors of Indonesia. That was the case in legal, local government, and election assistance, which have been provided from Japan to Indonesia. Civil society actors were included from information-sharing circles only when Indonesian state actors request their involvement.

This was quite different from information gathering activities of the United States and Australia, the top two donors of democracy assistance to Indonesia. Both of them collect information about aid needs not only from state actors but also from civil society actors widely. As a consequence, Japan tends to figure out aid needs on the state level while the United States and Australia tend to figure out aid needs not only on the state but also on the civil society levels. Thus, this chapter found that the lack of civil society involvement in democracy assistance as information sources causes Japan to concentrate its assistance on the state institution sector. However, no substantial correlation was found between civil society actors' involvement in democracy assistance as information sources and Japan's overall democracy assistance amount.

This chapter also tested the impact of civil society actors' involvement as aid human resources on democracy assistance. The examination here showed that Japan rarely uses civil society actors as aid human resources, while the United States heavily relies on them. The way these countries secure aid human resources was different. While the United States tends to solicit project implementation partners openly among domestic and international non-governmental actors, Japan secures partners from a closed circle, mostly among state actors, without openly soliciting. In addition to the paucity of civil society in the field, it was also because of the belief that implementation partners of democracy assistance should be state actors. However, because of the limitation in the amount of available aid human resources among state actors, contents and aid amount of democracy assistance were limited to what can be implemented by extremely small number of agents.

Although there are limited cases where Japan openly solicits implementation partners, the resulted assistance provided to these NGOs were extremely limited in terms of aid amount. The democracy assistance amount provided through NGOs in the election field was only 1% of what was provided to state actors in the field. As such, the paucity of civil society actors and the lack of trust in them leads Japan to provide democracy assistance to Indonesia mostly utilizing state actors as implementation partners. However, the limitation in the amount of aid human resources among state actors causes Japan to provide democracy assistance only to the scale that can be provided only with a small number of implementation actors. However, this chapter did not find impact of the lack of civil society aid human resources on the sector allocation of democracy assistance.

Given the hypotheses-testing from chapters 5 to 7, two of the hypotheses were found valid among the four. While this dissertation hypothesized that weak information collection from the civil society limits democracy assistance amount and causes its concentration on the state institution sector, only the latter link was found valid. While weak information collection from civil society actors tends to have impact on sector allocation of democracy assistance, its impact on the overall size of democracy assistance was not found.

While the dissertation hypothesized that weak mobilization of civil society actors as aid human resources limits democracy assistance amount and causes aid concentration on the state institution sector, the latter link was not found. Weak mobilization of civil society actors as aid human resources tends to have impact on the size of democracy assistance, but not on its sector allocation.

While the institutionalist and the gaiatsu literature account for Japan's democracy assistance to some extent, both of them are weak in explaining the small size of Japanese democracy assistance. In addition, there is no existing study that explains why Japan allocates most of its democracy assistance to the state institution sector. On the other hand, civil society involvement possesses impact on the democracy assistance allocation among sectors through the intervening variable of information sources, in addition to the impact on the size of democracy assistance overall through the intervening variable of aid human resources.

Future Research

There arose two future research agenda from this dissertation. First, in order to further verify the impact of civil society involvement on democracy assistance, it would be ideal to conduct cross-country study on democracy assistance, taking as many donors as possible for comparison. This dissertation did not manage to do so because of the lack of usable data for such a purpose. A future assignment for this study will be to build such a cross-country data on civil society and democracy assistance by which to test their relations. Such a cross-country analysis will help examine whether the impact of civil society on democracy assistance can be found among donor countries in the same manner. Especially interesting would be the comparison of active donors of democracy assistance such as Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries, with those less active donors such as continental European countries and Japan.

Second, finding causes behind the weakness of civil society actors' involvement in democracy assistance will be a future research topic. This dissertation set the weak involvement of civil society actors as the independent variable, and did not conduct thorough examination on factors that cause it. While it argued that such a weak involvement of civil society actors is caused by the paucity of civil society actors and the lack of trust between the state and the civil society actors, why is the number of civil society actors small in Japan in the first place? Why do the state and the civil society have a mutual distrust? Focus of the future research might be the ideational factor – how these actors regard democracy and governance.

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Appendices

Appendix 1 Detailed Examination on Japan's Assistance in Each Sector

Almost none is know about Japanese assistance for democratic governance to date due to the minor role Japan has played in this field. Although Chapter 2 presented overview on the state of Japanese assistance for democratic governance, those who are interested in democratic governance assistance itself would want to know more about the state of Japan's democratic governance assistance. This appendix will present more details about the state of assistance in each sector.

Election Assistance

Electoral Assistance

As shown in Table 1, electoral assistance typically covers electoral system design, administration of elections, voter education, electoral observation, and election mediation. What has Japan done among these is mostly electoral observation.

Japan's election assistance has been conducted mainly by the Cabinet Office, MOFA, and JICA. The Cabinet Office dispatched election observers to United Nations peacekeeping operations (UN PKOs) based on PKO Law between 1992 and 1994. However, the number of election observers dispatched is very small. Only three election observers were sent to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) of 1992, and although 41 observers were sent to UNTAC, the number declined again

after then (Table 52). No election observer has been dispatched to UN peacekeeping operations after the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) mainly due to the trauma of the personnel loss in UNTAC.

Table 52 Japan's Dispatch of Election Observers to UN Peacekeeping Operations under PKO Law

UN Mission Names	Duration	Number of Observers
United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)	Sep.-Oct. 1992	3
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	May-Jun. 1993	41
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Oct.-Nov. 1994	15
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)	Mar. and Apr. 1994	15 (twice)

Source: Created by the author based on the information in (MOFA, Japan's cooperation based on International peace cooperation law 2010).

Under the PKO Law, the Cabinet Office has sent election-related materials to UN peacekeeping operations as well. Such items as TV, video, radio and generators have been sent to UN missions in Cambodia, Mozambique and East Timor for election PR purpose (Table 53).

Table 53 Election-Related Material Provisions based on PKO Law

UN PKO Mission	Decision Date	Items	Number of items sent	Purposes
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Sep. 11, 1992	TVs, videos, and small generators	200 sets	Improvement of the PR and educational effect for Cambodian citizens concerning free and fair elections.
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Jul. 26, 1994	TVs, video decks	200 sets	Improvement of the PR and educational effect for Mozambique citizens concerning free and fair elections.
United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)	Jun. 22, 1999	Radio	2000	PR activities concerning UNAMET's direct ballot concerning expanded autonomy.

Source: Created by the author based on the information in (MOFA, Japan's cooperation based on International peace cooperation law 2010).

The Cabinet Office has sent personnel for national and local election observers and administration apart from UN peacekeeping missions from 1998 to 2007 under the PKO Law as well. Here again, most of the personnel were dispatched for election observation purposes. The only exceptions were the two dispatches to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1998 and 2000, when personnel were dispatched for election administration as well. As in the cases of UN PKO missions, the number of personnel dispatched is small. While a substantial number of personnel was dispatched to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1998 and to Timor-Leste in 2007, only single digit personnel were sent to the election of Kosovo in 2001 and the one of East Timor in 2001 (Table 54).

Table 54 Other Election Assistance under PKO Law

Country	Election Type	Mission Type	Duration	Number Dispatched
Bosnia and Herzegovina	General and local elections	Election administration and observation	Sep. 1998	30
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Municipal election	Voting control	Mar.-Apr. 2000	11
East Timor	Parliamentary election	Election observation	Aug.-Sep. 2001	19
Kosovo	General election	Election observation	Nov. 2001	6
East Timor	Presidential election	Election observation	Apr. 2002	8
Democratic Republic of Congo	Presidential and parliamentary elections	Election observation	Jul.-Nov. 2006	13
Timor-Leste	Presidential and parliamentary elections	Election observation	Apr.-Jul. 2007	36
Nepal	Constituent assembly election	Election observation	Mar.-Apr. 2008	24

Source: Created by the author based on the information in (MOFA, Japan's cooperation based on International peace cooperation law 2010).

MOFA also has dispatched personnel for election observation and management based on the Law for the Establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1989. 238 personnel have been dispatched in total as of August 2009. Here again, the smallness of the number of personnel dispatched for election monitoring is a distinctive characteristics. 211 activities, which constitute 89% of all dispatches, dispatched only single digit number of personnel (Appendix 2). It shows that Japan's participation in election observation has been conducted mostly perfunctory. In addition, most of the dispatch is for short-term, which spans from several days to a week, and long-term dispatch is limited to cases such as the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted by OSCE.

MOFA's election assistance also includes financial assistance and the provision of election-related materials. Material or financial assistance has been provided to Liberia (1997), Nigeria (1998), Lesotho (1998), Central Africa (1998), Djibouti (1999), South Africa (1999), Guinea-Bissau (1999), and Zimbabwe (2000) (JICA, Towards Democratic State-Building Assistance 2003, 63). The cooperation for South Africa was a material provision within the framework of Grant Aid for Grass-Roots Groups (JICA, Participatory Development and Good Governance 1995, 22). MOFA also provides financial assistance to Central American countries through international organizations and Organization of American States as well.

Unlike the election assistance conducted by the Cabinet Office and MOFA, JICA's election assistance covers wide range of contents, because JICA's assistance is technical assistance. There are cases of the dispatch of election observers such as in the Presidential election in Afghanistan of 2004 (K. Hashimoto, Changing Nature of International Society's Democracy Assistance 2006, 38). JICA provided seminars on democratic election for Cambodia in 1997, and for Peru and Pakistan afterwards. JICA also sent experts (or an expert) to the national election administration committee of Cambodia in 1998 for technical assistance. In election assistance to Indonesia in 1999, a relatively large number of short-term experts were dispatched to the election administration committee for election observation and logistics support. A graphic designer was sent to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in 2001 for the purpose of civic education and election PR (JICA, Towards Democratic State-Building Assistance 2003, 18). JICA dispatched a scholar of democratic elections to the Presidential election of Afghanistan in September 2004 in

order to conduct capacity-building of the election management committee and local NGOs that observed female candidates. JICA conducted capacity-building of election management committees in Iraq and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 as well(K. Hashimoto, Changing Nature of International Society's Democracy Assistance 2006, 38). In JICA's election assistance to Indonesian in 2004, in addition to material assistance and election observation, capacity building of election staff and voter education were conducted through Indonesian NGOs using Grant Aid for Grass-Roots Groups. This was the largest ever election assistance project Japan conducted in its history (Election in Indonesia and Democracy Assistance, 2004, p. 7).

Table 55 Examples of JICA's Election Assistance

Country	Year	Contents	Assistance Types
Indonesia	1999	Election assistance	Dispatch of individual specialists (22 short-term specialists)
East Timor	2001	Election PR (Election PR activities and PR human resource development)	Dispatch of an individual specialist
Cambodia	1997	Election assistance	Special individual country training (10 trainees)
	1998	Advising for the National Election Administration Committee	Dispatch of individual specialists
	2003	Election monitoring assistance	Study for project formation
Pakistan	2002	Pakistan election assistance	Dispatch of individual specialists
Peru	2001-	Peru democratization seminar	Special individual country training
	2005	Implementation of democratic election	
Afghanistan	2002	Media assistance	Study for emergency assistance,

Country	Year	Contents	Assistance Types
			acceptance of trainees
	2002	Emergency Loya Jirga national assembly broadcasting	Study for emergency assistance
Iraq	2004-2005	Election assistance	In-Japan-training
	2004-2005	TV broadcasting technology assistance	In-Japan-training
Democratic Republic of Congo	2005	Seminar on voter registration	Study for project formation
	2005	Election assistance project	Technical cooperation project
Nepal	2008-2009	Seminar on elections and democratization (election system, election administration, voter registration, voter education, media relations, etc.)	Individual country training

Source: JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 137; JICA, Guidance by Issue: Peace-Building 2009, 4.

In sum, Japan's election assistance tends to lean toward election observation, and dispatch of small number of personnel. As scholars such as Keiichi Hashimoto points out, such small number of election observers seem to be dispatched only ostensibly in order to maintain records that Japan assist elections abroad (K. Hashimoto 2006, 38). Although JICA's election assistance activities show much more diverse types of assistance than those conducted by the Cabinet Office and MOFA, JICA's activity records are much fewer compared to that of MOFA. Not only the number of assistance projects, but also the number of experts involved tends to be small. In addition, cooperation tends to concentrate on Asian countries.

Political Party Assistance

Japan has never provided political party assistance at all, whether during particular elections or between elections.

Summary of Election Assistance

Table 56 shows the record of Japan's election assistance. Although the dispatch of election observers has been conducted, not much cooperation has been conducted other than that. Participation in election administration was conducted only few times, and there is only one occasion Japan conducted voter education so far. No cooperation in electoral system design and election mediation has been conducted. When it comes to political party assistance, no cooperation has been conducted at all.

In general, Japan's election assistance has been low-key. It does not take initiatives but remain a reactive participant – which is shown in the fact that the number of election observers dispatched is extremely small, for example. It has never cooperated in areas where the political foundation of the recipient country is decided, such as electoral system design and party aid. Highly political assistance such as election mediation is avoided as well.

Table 56 Record of Japan's Election Assistance

Sectors	Assistance Types	Program Contents	Record of Japan's Assistance
Election	Electoral Assistance	Electoral system design	No
		Administration of elections	Some
		Voter education	Few
		Election observation	Yes
		Election mediation	No
	Political Party Assistance	Party aid relating to a particular election campaign	No
		Party aid between campaigns	No

Source: Created by the author.

State Institution Assistance

Table 57 shows the distribution of JICA's state institutions assistance from 1994 to 2009 by category. The biggest share within JICA's state institutions assistance is that of governmental agencies assistance. This is quite different from American and European donors who put a lot of efforts on increasing political party and non-governmental actors' capacity to counterbalance against central governments, instead of assisting the governmental side. Rule of law assistance has the second biggest share among JICA's state institutions assistance. This is a category where the number of projects has been increasing over years since the mid 1990s. Local government assistance has been conducted to somewhat a smaller extent, while only one legislative assistance project has been conducted, and no assistance is conducted on civil military relations.

Table 57 Distribution of JICA's State Institutions Assistance, 1994-2009

Category	Number of Projects	Share
Governmental agencies assistance	61	48.03%
Rule of law assistance	42	33.07%
Local government assistance	23	18.11%
Legislative assistance	1	0.79%
Civil-military relations	0	0.00%
Total	127	100.00%

Source: Created by the author based on information in (JICA, JICA Knowledge Site n.d.).

The following sections will describe Japan's state institutions assistance.

Governmental Agencies Assistance

Japan considers the role of governmental agencies in improving governance capability as central, and thus provides large democracy assistance for governmental agencies. Considering that the quality of administrative body affects the efficiency and quality of both governance and development, Japan is intended to further expand assistance for governmental agencies (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 83).

Most of Japan's assistance for governmental agencies focuses on economy-related areas. Assistance covers such issues as tax practices, custom duties, statistics, aid coordination, macro-economic policy, policy on medium and small enterprises, financial systems, trade, investment, and property rights (JICA, Participatory Development and Good Governance 1995, 21). On the other hand, Japan is not active in assisting combating corruption. The only assistance Japan has provided in this area is a project to improve the capacity of audit agencies that have obligation to report power abuse and violation of rights seen in the administrative body (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 100-101).

Assistance is provided for the improvement of the certainty and efficiency of administrative works. The actors that implement assistance projects in these areas include officers of National Tax Agency and Japan Customs. JICA regards that Japan's assistance for governmental agencies in economy-related areas, which utilize the practical experience of these Japanese governmental agencies, is in better quality in terms of practicality compared to those assistance provided by other countries' consultants (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA, 2004, pp. 91-92; JICA, Participatory Development and Good Governance, 1995, p. 21). In addition, from the fact that Japan developed its economy as a late comer, Japan considers that it has comparative advantage in governmental agencies assistance in economy-related areas in a way to assist recipient countries' economic development. Target countries are mainly Asia and Central and South American countries (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 91).

Most of Japan's assistance for governmental agencies provides choices concerning various mechanism-building and fosters changes in governmental agencies' and agents' attitudes. Some assistance for the measures and methods of institutional and mechanical operations, capacity-building, and organizational improvement are provided as well, but to a smaller extent. On the other hand, Japan rarely provides assistance for administrative reform and the creation of new institutions and mechanisms when it comes to administrative underpinnings such as public servant system and decentralization (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 84). The only case of Japan's assistance for administrative reform is a project conducted for five years from 1995 to Vietnam, targeting assistance for policy-coordination and administrative-oversight concerning mechanisms related to market-economy. Other projects on

administrative underpinnings remain only dispatches of policy advisers and provisions of seminars (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 76-77).

In sum, Japan is active in governmental agencies assistance, especially in economy-related areas. However, the assistance concentrates on capacity-building of governmental staff and information provision about institutional reform, while direct assistance for institutional reform is rarely conducted.

Rule of Law Assistance

Rule of law field is where Japan has been increasing its assistance. The main areas of Japan's assistance are legal assistance and police assistance. The sections below will describe Japan's assistance in these areas into detail.

Legal Assistance

Legal assistance is one of the areas where Japan's democracy assistance has placed importance on. In 2001, the Justice System Reform Council in the Prime Minister's Office pointed out the importance of legal assistance, and International Cooperation Department was established within the Research and Training Institute of the Ministry of Justice in order to strengthen the institutional structure for legal assistance (Justice System Reform Council 2001).

The current ODA Charter, which was revised in 2003, lists rule of law assistance as one of the principal areas of Japan's ODA provision (MOFA 2003). The Liberal Democratic Party, the governing party at the time of the ODA Charter revision, made policy recommendations in "Strategic Vision of Japan's World-Class Rule of Law

Assistance (Sekai ni hokoru, wagakuni hoseido seibi shien no senryaku bijon)" of 2007, which regards rule of law assistance as one of the most important areas of foreign aid (Subcommittee on Law to Cope with Internationalized Society, Legal System Research Council, Policy Research Council, LDP 2007). Given this LDP recommendation, Overseas Economic Cooperation Council (Kaigai keizai kyoryoku kaigi) concluded in January 2008 that Japan should provide rule of law assistance as one of the most important areas of overseas economic cooperation (Office of Prime Minister 2008).

The first instance of Japan's rule of law assistance goes back to 1897-1913, when Tokichi Masao assisted Siam's (current Thailand) creation of law, being employed by the Siam government (Kagawa, Biography of Masao Tokichi 2002). More recent interaction of Japanese legal professionals with overseas include interactions and contacts among Asian lawyers through the Law Association for Asia and the Pacific (LAWASIA), an NGO of Asian lawyers,[32] and information collection and exchanges of the Conference of the Presidents of Law Associations in Asia (POLA) where JFBA participated (Ochi 2007, 100).

Japan provided legal assistance during the Cold War period as well, although it remained small during the time. The United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) was established by Japan and the United Nations in 1962, and ran with Japan's ODA to provide technical assistance in the criminal law field.

[32] Its full name is the Law Association for Asia and the Pacific. It is a voluntary organization of Asian lawyers who aims to establish the rule of law in the Asia Pacific region.

With having such a base, Japan's rule of law assistance started in 1994. Japan provided seminars to governmental officials and legal professionals of Vietnam that year, which was followed by the initiation of JICA's rule of law assistance project to Vietnam in 1996. Table 58 shows examples of JICA's rule of law assistance. The rule of law assistance, which started in 1994 targeting Vietnam, expanded the target countries after then to include Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Mongolia, Uzbekistan, and China. While assistance to most countries started as seminar provisions, today's rule of law assistance projects include the long-term dispatch of legal professionals and advisory activities from Japanese domestic legal professionals.

Table 58 Examples of JICA's Rule of Law Assistance

Country	Duration	Scheme
Vietnam	1994	Short-term specialist dispatch (1 person), In-Japan-training (1 time)
	1995	Short-term specialist dispatch (8 persons), In-Japan-training (1 time)
	1996	Short-term specialist dispatch (2 persons), In-Japan-training (2 time)
	Dec. 1996 – Nov. 1999	Legal Assistance Project Phase I
	Dec. 1999 – Mar. 2003	Legal Assistance Project Phase II
	Jul. 2003 – Mar. 2007	Legal Assistance Project Phase III
	Apr. 2007 – Mar. 2011	Assistance Project for Law and Legal System Reform
Cambodia	1997	Short-term specialist dispatch (1 person)
	1998	Long-term specialist dispatch (1 person), Short-term specialist dispatch (8 persons), In-Japan-training (1 time)
	Mar. 1999 – Mar. 2003	Legal Assistance Project Phase I
	Apr. 2004 – Apr. 2008	Legal Assistance Project Phase II
	Apr. 2008 – Mar. 2012	Legal Assistance Project Phase III
	Jun. 2007 – Jun. 2010	Bar Association Legal Assistance Project

Country	Duration	Scheme
	Nov. 2005 – Mar. 2008	Educational Improvement Project for the Training School of Judges and Prosecutors, Phase I
	Apr. 2008 – Mar. 2012	Educational Improvement Project for the Training School of Judges and Prosecutors, Phase II
Laos	1998	Short-term specialist dispatch (3 persons), In-Japan-training (1 time)
	1999	Short-term specialist dispatch (2 persons), In-Japan-training (1 time)
	2000	Short-term specialist dispatch (7 persons), In-Japan-training (1 time)
	2001	Planning and Research Personal Dispatch (1 person), Short-term specialist dispatch (6 persons), In-Japan-training (2 times)
	2002	Long-term specialist dispatch (1 person), Short-term specialist dispatch (7 persons), In-Japan-training (2 times)
	May 2003 – May 2007	Legal Assistance Project
Indonesia	2002	Short-term specialist dispatch (6 persons), In-Japan-training (2 times)
	2003	Planning and Research Personal Dispatch (1 person), In-Japan-training (2 times)
	Mar. 2007 – Mar. 2009	ADR system empowerment assistance project
Mongolia	2001	Short-term specialist dispatch (1 person)
	2002	Short-term specialist dispatch (2 persons), In-Japan-training (1 time)
	Sep. 2006 – Nov. 2008	Bar Association empowerment project
Uzbekistan	2001	Short-term specialist dispatch (3 persons)
	2002	Short-term specialist dispatch (6 persons), In-Japan-training (1 time)
	2003	Short-term specialist dispatch (6 persons), In-Japan-training (1 time)
	Nov. 2005 – Sep. 2008	Civil and Administrative Laws Improvement Project for the Promotion of Corporate Activities
	Aug. 2005 – Sep. 2007	Bankruptcy Law Commentary Creation Project
China	Nov. 2004 – Nov. 2009	Economic and Corporate Laws Creation Project
	Nov. 2007 – Oct. 2010	Civil procedural and Arbitration Laws Improvement Project

Source: Created by the Author based on information in JICA, JICA Knowledge Site n.d.; "Dai 9 kai hoseibi shien renrakukai shiryo (The 9th Legal Assistance Liaison Meeting Materials)," ICD News, vol. 35 (June 2008), pp.222-226; (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 138-140).

Most of Japan's rule of law assistance was law-drafting assistance at first (Ozaki, 2001, p. 23; Kagawa & Kaneko, 2007, pp. 46, 74; Aikyo, 2007, p. 25). The rule of law assistance to Vietnam of 1996 was assistance for amending civil law and bankruptcy law in addition to drafting civil procedure code. Assistance to Cambodia in 1999 was drafting of civil procedure code and civil law. Assistance took the forms of drafting or commenting on draft laws created by recipient side so as to make revisions based on comments from Japanese experts. In Japan's civil law and civil procedure code assistance to Cambodia, Japan drafted laws based on consultations with Cambodian working group. In assistance to Vietnam, which covered civil law, civil procedure code, and bankruptcy law, Vietnam side drafted laws, on which the Japanese side provided comments, which process was repeated until the completion of drafts. However, Vietnam did not accept some of the comments from Japanese experts into the drafts (Ochi 2007, 100, 102).

Table 59 Examples of Japan's Rule of Law Assistance

Country	Project Name	Duration	Contents of Assistance
Vietnam	Legal assistance project (Phase 1-3), Legal system reform assistance project	12/1996-3/2007 (4-2007-3/2011)	(1) Law drafting assistance Civil law revision assistance Civil procedure law drafting assistance Bankruptcy law revision assistance (2) Legal system assistance For the Office of the Public Prosecutor General: Advising for the creation of Prosecutor's manual For the People's Supreme Court: 1) assistance for the creation of the decision document manual; 2) assistance for research on the case law system (3) Capacity building assistance Advising for the creation of

			textbooks for the National Judicial Academy
Cambodia	Legal assistance project (Phase 1-2)	3/1999-4/2008	(1) Law drafting assistance 1. Civil Procedural Law drafting assistance a. Civil Procedural Law drafting assistance b. Bylaw drafting assistance (2) Civil Law drafting assistance
	Educational Improvement Project of the Royal School of. Judges and Prosecutors (Phase 1)	11/2005-3/2008	Curriculum creation assistance Text creation assistance Teacher nurturing assistance
Laos	Legal assistance project	5/2003-5/2007	(1) Ministry of Justice 1. Law database creation assistance 2. Civil Law textbook creation assistance 3. Corporate law commentary creation assistance 4. Legal glossary creation assistance (2) People's Supreme Court 1. Statute Book creation assistance 2. Civil trial decision document manual creation assistance (3) Office of the Public Prosecutor General Prosecutor’s manual creation assistance
Uzbekistan	Bankruptcy Law Commentary creation assistance project	8/2005-9/2007	Bankruptcy Law Commentary creation assistance
Indonesia	Reconciliation and Arbitration System Empowerment assistance project	3/2007-3/2009	(1) Supreme Court Rule (PERMA2/2003) revision assistance (2) Arbitrator training improvement assistance (3) PR assistance for the new arbitration system
China	Civil Procedural and Arbitration laws improvement project	11/2007-11/2010	Improvement assistance for the Civil Procedural and Arbitration Laws

Note: The examples here are those that the Ministry of Justice cooperated.

Source: "Dai 9 kai hoseibi shien renrakukai shiryo (The 9th Legal Assistance Liaison Meeting materials)," ICD News, vol. 35 (June 2008), pp. 222-226.

As Japan accumulates the experiences of rule of law assistance, the country started regarding important the capacity of law-implementing organizations and personnel, which led to assistance for related justice and administrative systems. Mainly conducted are the provisions of seminars on trial, prosecution, and legal practice, upgrading of fundamental materials such as digests, statute books, and various manuals and guidelines, and provision of related devices.

Third area of assistance is the nurturing of legal professionals. The targets are from judges, prosecutors, lawyers, to law-school instructors. Along with capacity-building assistance, creation of texts and curriculum has been assisted as well. In such assistance, Japan focused on those human resources which apply and implement laws. In Cambodia, Japan established a training institution of judges and prosecutors in November 2003, and have dispatched instructors and created textbooks for civil trial training (Ochi 2007, 102-103). Assistance is provided for law-drafting preparation as well, which include the creation of textbooks of civil and commercial laws, law dictionaries, legal database, digests, and training of legal instructors conducted in Laos (Ochi 2007, 102). Japan has provided assistance for university law departments and accepted international students in the legal field to Japanese universities (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 121-122, 125).

On the other hand, the Japanese government hardly provides assistance for the expansion of access to justice for recipient countries' public as a whole (Inaba 2009, 34, 39). Although JFBA provides assistance for access to justice, in the case of Japanese

government's assistance, alternative dispute resolution assistance for Indonesia would be the only one which could be considered to aim the expansion of public access to justice. Although assistance for legal aid center in Mongolia and legal clinic in lawyer training school in Cambodia might be considered as of such examples, the expansion of access to justice was not regarded as goals of these projects (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 46).

Interestingly, similarly to assistance for governmental agencies, legal assistance also tends to focus on economy-related areas. A number of assistance projects have been conducted for upgrading laws and legal systems necessary for the recipient countries' integration into the market economy in the world.

Most of Japan's rule of law assistance is for market-oriented economic reform, due to the increased necessity of such reform in East, Southeast, and Central Asia along with the introduction of market economy system after the end of the Cold War. Most of Japan's rule of law assistance so far has been in the civil and commercial law field, whereas assistance in other legal fields has been limited. The major areas of Japan's assistance include civil, civil procedure, bankruptcy, insolvency, and competition laws. In the competition law field, Japan has provided technical assistance for the drafting of anti-competition law to China since FY2004, and has held training programs in cooperation with other member countries of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) since 1996(Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 232). Assistance in the areas of corporate and economic laws for China started in 2003 as well (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 245). METI, JICA, JETRO, and AOTS have provided assistance in the field of intellectual property rights, which include computerization in law-implementation organizations, provision of training seminars on intellectual property rights violation for courts and

police, and awareness campaign on intellectual property for private organizations (Miura 2008, 24-26). These are assistance for the support of not only market-oriented economic reform, but also the arrangement of trade investment environment.

In the criminal law field, main assistance from Japan is provided for police as a law enforcer. Details about Japan's police assistance will be described in a separate section. Outside of police assistance, Japan provided seminars in Jordan for Palestinian Authority judges about basics of the criminal law field from 2003 to 2006 (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 41).

On the other hand, Japan has hardly provided assistance in areas related to human rights. Japan generally avoids constitutional assistance which is an area where rules on human rights are defined (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 203-204). The only examples of Japan's constitutional assistance are information provision on Japan's democratization and constitution conducted by Toshiyuki Munesue, then professor of Seijo University, to constitution drafting committee and Kabul University professors in Afghanistan (Munesue, Constitutional Assistance Diary 1, 2003; Munesue, Constitutional Assistance Diary 2, 2003; Munesue, Constitutional Assistance Diary 3, 2003; Munesue, Constitutional Assistance Diary 4, 2003), and by Masanori Aikyo, a professor of Nagoya University, in Vietnam and Uzbekistan (Aikyo 2006). Yoichi Yamada, a lawyer and a former adviser to the United Nations Center for Human Rights and a project member of Japan's rule of law assistance in Cambodia, drafted trafficking law in Cambodia in 2003, personally offering the assistance to the Cambodian Ministry of Justice. However, it was not assistance from the Japanese government (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 211). There is no history of Japan's assistance in labor law field either (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 224,

228). Promotion of democracy and improvement of human rights protection remain indirect or additional purposes of legal assistance, and not the main or direct purposes. Assistance in the election law area is not conducted either (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 38, 125).

Target countries of Japan's rule of law assistance are chosen referring to the priority country list for Japan's rule of law assistance decided in the Overseas Economic Cooperation Council based on its "Legal Assistance Basic Plan." JICA also has its own aid guideline which is in accordance with the government's country-based aid plan. Attention is paid to the national development plan of recipient countries as well. Based on these guidelines and choices, assistance requests from recipient countries influence the final choice of assistance targets (Kuwajima 2009, 69-70).

Most of Japan's rule of law assistance has governmental agencies as its counterparts such as justice ministries, supreme courts, and prosecutor's offices. This reflects the fact that Japan hardly provides assistance for access to justice (Table 60).

Table 60 Examples of Materials Created in Japan's Legal Assistance, Assistance Target Countries and Counterparts

Types of assistance	Materials created in assistance	Target countries	Counterparts
Law drafting assistance	<Procedural laws> Civil Procedural Law, Personal Status Litigation, etc.	Cambodia	Justice ministry
	Civil Procedural Law, Bankruptcy Law	Vietnam	Supreme court
	<Substantive laws> Civil Laws	Cambodia, Vietnam	Justice ministry
Law-related	Statute book	Laos	Supreme court
	Law database	Laos	Justice ministry
Case-related	Study on the Case-law system	Vietnam	Supreme court
Manuals	Prosecutors' manuals	Laos, Vietnam	Prosecutor's office
	Decision document manuals	Laos, Vietnam	Supreme court
	Lawyers' handbook	Cambodia	Lawyer's training school
Textbook materials	Curriculum, mock record	Cambodia	Supreme court training school
	Textbook materials for legal apprentice	Cambodia, Vietnam	National school for justice
Textbooks	Briefs on the Civil Procedural and the Compulsory Execution Laws	Cambodia	Justice ministry
	Textbook on the Civil Law		
Commentaries	Clause-by-clause explanations on the Civil Procedural and the Civil Laws	Cambodia	Justice ministry
	Corporate Law commentary	Laos	Justice ministry
	Bankruptcy Law commentary	Uzbekistan	Supreme Economic Court
PR tools	Pamphlets, DVDs for PR-purpose	Indonesia	Supreme court

Source: Material distributed by Kazuo Inaba, Director of ICD at RTI of MOJ at the occasion of the 9th Legal Assistance Liaison Meeting held on January 18, 2008. In "The 9th Legal Assistance Liaison Meeting, Meeting Materials," *ICD News* (June 2008), p.106.

The Aim of Japan's Assistance

The aim of Japan's legal assistance is often explained as in the promotion of market-oriented economic reform. At the same time, however, both JICA and the Ministry of Justice point out the importance of the establishment of the rule of law and

state it as another aim of Japan's legal assistance. Aid agents from these organizations state the aim of Japan's legal assistance as the attainment of the situation where trustable judicial system is arranged so that all the authorities follow laws (Inaba 2009, 37-38; Kuwajima 2009, 64). Kagawa and Kaneko, two scholars of legal assistance state the aim of Japan's legal assistance as the attainment of good governance in recipient countries, the establishment of democratic rule of law, and strengthening of peace, security, and friendship between Japan and recipient countries in the long run (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 79-80). Legal assistance was regarded as a part of democracy assistance especially under Abe and Aso administrations when "value diplomacy (kachi no gaiko)" was set as the core of Japanese diplomacy. "Value diplomacy" was launched being influenced by the neo-conservatism in the United States, and aims to promote "universal values" such as democracy, liberty and human rights. This policy was reflected on the international cooperation priority issues of the FY2007, which emphasizes the importance of universal values and regards legal assistance as one of the methods to support the consolidation of democracy and market-oriented economic reform (MOFA, Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, 2006; Sakai, 2008, p. 14).

Some, although not all, of the legal assistance projects clearly states the support of democratic governance as the aim of legal assistance. An instance includes Japan's civil procedure code assistance to Cambodia. At the initiation of the project, representatives from the Cambodian government and core participants from the Japanese side discussed the basic policy about this project, and agreed that the creation of civil procedure code of "democratic law-abiding country" as the basic policy(Takeshita 2003, 26).

Compared to Japanese governmental organizations, private organizations more clearly state democratic and human rights values as the aim of their legal assistance. Identifying itself as human rights NGO, JFBA cooperates with the Japanese government as far as its legal assistance is in accordance with JFBA's assistance aims of the promotion of the rule of law, basic human rights, and lasting peace (Yabuki 2009, 42-43). ICCLC also aims to solve unreason, assist social reform and economic development in recipient countries (Kosugi 2009, 60).

The Characteristics of Japan's Legal Assistance

The Japanese government clearly places emphasis on legal assistance among all the areas of democracy assistance due to several reasons. First, Japan regards itself as the only donor country which has the experience of receiving laws from other countries on its own. This self awareness creates a pride that Japan knows the way to align domestic legal orders and that of Europe and the U.S. and thus is possible to analyze appropriate ways to establish institutions from recipient countries' point of view. Japan's experience of receiving both continental and common laws eclectically adds up the confidence that it knows the characteristics of these two different legal systems fairly (Mikazuki 2005, 42). Having such confidence, Japanese legal assistance agents regard that Japan's experience would be a good example for Asian countries, where Japan provides legal assistance to and which has cultural affinity with Japan (Institute For International Cooperation, JICA 1998, 131-132).

Secondly, Japan has a pride that first-class scholars of positive law and incumbent judges are the core of Japan's legal assistance unlike European and American donor

countries which dispatch young lawyers for legal assistance. Resources for Japan's legal assistance have been procured mainly from public organizations such as governmental agencies and national research institutions. Japanese aid agents regards the merit here as that Japanese public organizations assist their counterpart in recipient countries which makes it possible to transfer necessary know-how for capacity development as a package (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 44). In addition, some point out that recipient governmental agencies tend to be pleased to receive assistance from their counterparts (such as ministry of justice, prosecutor's office, and courts) rather than non-counterparts out of their pride (Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 84).

Methods of Japan's Democratic Governance Assistance

Reflecting the discomfort about inflicting a particular institution to recipient countries, Japan's democracy assistance tends to focus on provision of information and capacity building instead of designing new institutions. This is in clear contrast with donors such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and EBRD, which establish their own model laws and urge recipient countries of loan to create or reform domestic laws based on these model laws, for example. These international organizations set legal reform as conditionality for loans, set up indicators to analyze the progress of legal reform, and report analysis results. These methods give direct and indirect pressure to recipient countries for legal reform. In the case of bilateral donors, France tries to implant French-type legal model to other countries. However, such one-size-fits-all approach has pros and cons. While it brings a strong force for democratic opening in recipient countries, this approach tends to disregard cultural and historical difference of

recipient countries. Since institutional design defines various key elements necessary for democratic governance such as accountability, responsiveness, and transparency, one-size-fits-all approach exerts substantial negative impact to the governance of the recipient countries as well. The institutional assistance needs to respect the culture and history in each recipient country. TAF, for example, does well on this point. Having local offices and hiring local staff, it creates projects that local staff regards as suitable in light of the culture there.

In case of Japan, however, it almost totally avoids assisting institutional design and focuses on capacity building and information provision instead. Japan's legal assistance to Cambodia, which created a brand new civil law, is a rare case where Japan took initiative in institutional design. This was the case because the Cambodian government strongly requested the Japanese side to take initiative due to the lack of legal experts in Cambodia. Indeed, Cambodia had only less than 10 law experts at the new start of the country in the early 1990s due to the massacre of intellectuals during the Por Pot regime in the 1970s. Information provision and capacity building aim to increase the efficiency of existing institutions and provide food for thought for institutional design without directly initiating reform. Even when fundamental institutional reform, rebuilding, or creation is necessary, Japan tries to avoid taking initiatives in the process due to the possibility of political conflict as shown in a JICA report published in November 2004 (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 84, 93). The political conflicts they try to avoid are ones with recipient governments. In addition, they value the importance of ownership for successful governance assistance, and thus consider that Japan should not implant or impose specific laws, clauses, and lawmaking policies

(Kagawa and Kaneko 2007, 98). Indeed, recipient countries have to have the sense of ownership so that they can be responsible for what they do in order for assistance from outside to be successful as has been discussed in the international aid community. However, requiring ownership to the recipient governments and respecting the governments' will could end up disregarding its citizens, and thus could end up being another type of one-size-fits-all approach. Even when Japan assists the establishment of new institutions for good governance purposes, it does not necessarily regard democratization as the ultimate goal, and regards it is up to the recipient government whether to choose democratic regime type. In addition, JICA report suggests that Japan does not necessarily regard democracy as a universal value, but merely as a good system for reconciling interests (JICA, Towards Democratic State-Building Assistance 2003, 16).

In the argument of Japan as a reactive state, Kent Calder speculates that it would be only in technical fields that Japan would be able to take leadership (Calder 1988). It is indeed the case in Japan's democratic governance assistance. A good example can be found in Japan's media assistance. The content of Japan's media assistance is mainly to transfer broadcasting technology, and Japan hardly assists contents in a way to improve the quality of democracy in recipient countries. Thus, the impact of Japanese assistance for the improvement of democratic governance is often limited.

Police Assistance

Japan's assistance for police in developing countries has relatively a long history compared to other areas, although governmental organizational structure for police assistance has been consolidated only recently in the country. The International

Investigation Training Institute (Kokusai sosa kenshu jo) was established under the National Police Academy in 1985 and has provided trainings for police officers from overseas. Police assistance was managed by the General Affairs Division of Commissioner General's Secretariat from 1989 to 1993, and by International Affairs Division of Commissioner General's Secretariat after then (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 44). International Cooperation Committee was established in 2004 in order to examine future direction of Japan's police assistance, and published Outline for the Promotion of International Cooperation (Kokusai kyoryoku suishin yoko) in 2005, where five principles for international cooperation were stated and the importance of police assistance was pointed out (Hirohata & Eguchi, 2005, pp. 2-3, 5; Metropolitan Police Department, 2005).

Assistance through ODA

The number of Japan's police assistance through ODA has been in rise. Table 61 shows the trends of the number of JICA's technical assistance projects in the political assistance field. While only zero to two projects was launched yearly in the early 2000s, larger numbers of projects started being launched in the late 2000s. Most projects are three to five years projects, and thus quite a number of projects are conducted simultaneously recently.

Table 61 Number of JICA's New Police Assistance Projects, 2002-2009

2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Total
1	0	2	2	6	3	7	2	23

Note: The number here is of projects started in the given years.
Source: Created by the author based on information in JICA Knowledge Site.

Police assistance as an ODA project has a long history, and the oldest police assistance was provided in 1962. What was started that year was an anti-drug seminar, and was not a JICA's project but was technical assistance project of NPA. NPA held meetings and seminars on drug crackdown and traffic police administration in 1988, from when the number of NPA's ODA projects increased (NPA, Commissioner General's Secretariat, International Affairs Division 2005, 2). However, the number of NPA's own ODA projects has been in decrease because launching NPA's own ODA projects was a burden for the agency, and also because the Japanese government established a policy to unify ODA projects to JICA. While 12 projects were conducted by NPA in 2002 spending $731,812, only one project was conducted in 2008 spending $287,136 (Miyakoshi & Kasahara, 2003, p. 105; Mukoyama & Masuda, 2009, pp. 134, note 8).[33]

The first JICA projects of police technical assistance were started in 1974, and were seminar provisions on drug crackdown and traffic police administration (NPA, Commissioner General's Secretariat, International Affairs Division 2005, 2). More than 400 Japanese experts have been dispatched to 27 countries between 1978 and 2003 for police assistance. The recipient countries and the number of experts dispatched are shown in Table 62. It shows that most dispatch is for short-term. While 44 experts were dispatched for long term (more than one year) between 1978 and 2003, 372 experts were dispatched for short term (less than one year), which is eight times greater than that of long-term dispatch. Experts are mainly dispatched to Asian countries. According to

[33] Yearly average of exchange rates in these years was $1=126.18 yen in 2002 and $1=104.48 in 2008. Data from Mitsubishi UFJ Research $ Consulting.

Table 62, eight out of top ten target countries of Japan's police expert dispatch are Asian countries.

Table 62 Japan's Police Assistance Expert Dispatch, 1978-2003

Target Country	Long-term	Short-term	Total
China	2	64	66
Singapore	0	64	64
Thailand	14	40	54
Philippines	17	28	45
Indonesia	9	31	40
Cambodia	1	25	26
El Salvador	0	15	15
Myanmar	0	12	12
Mongolia	0	12	12
Brazil	0	12	12
Vietnam	0	11	11
Pakistan	0	10	10
Malaysia	0	8	8
Laos	1	7	8
Sri Lanka	0	6	6
Nepal	0	6	6
Bangladesh	0	5	5
South Africa	0	3	3
Costa Rica	0	2	2
Czech Republic	0	2	2
Uzbekistan	0	2	2
Jamaica	0	2	2
South Korea	0	1	1
Mexico	0	1	1
Panama	0	1	1
Jordan	0	1	1
Poland	0	1	1
Total	44	372	416

Note: Long-term dispatch is of more than a year, and short-term dispatch is of less than a year.
Source: International Affairs Division, Commissioner General's Secretariat, National Police Agency, "Heisei 15 nen madeno kokusai kyoryoku no ayumi (Record of International Cooperation until 2003)," (July 2005), p.14.
http://www.npa.go.jp/kokusaikyoryoku/kyoryokujokyo/kokusaiayumi1.pdf

The number of dispatched experts has been in rise over the years. While the data in Table 62 covers only up to 2003, the number of dispatched experts grew recently, and 583 people have been dispatched in 30 years between 1979 and 2008. Approximately 40 experts are dispatched yearly in recent years as shown in Table 63.

Table 63 Dispatch of Japan's Police Experts, 1979-2008

(Unit: person)

Duration	Continuing dispatches from previous years	New dispatches		Up to 2003	Number dispatched each year*
		Experts	Study team		
1/1979-12/2003	-	408		416	
1/2004-3/2004	7	8	0		26
4/2004-12/2004		11	6		
1/2005-12/2005	10	28	9		38
1/2006-12/2006	11	30	10		41
1/2007-12/2007	13	34	9		47
1/2008-12/2008	12	21	9		33
1/1979-12/2008		583			

*: "Number dispatched each year" is a sum of "continuing dispatches from previous years" and "new dispatches: experts."
Source: Yoshihiro Mukoyama and Kimiko Masuda, "Capacity Building Assistance of the Japanese Police and G8 Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial Declaration," Keisatsugaku ronshu, 62-4 (April 2009), p.134, note. 11.

The areas of Japan's expert dispatch from 1978 to 2003 are shown in Table 64. The biggest number of experts are dispatched in the area of traffic policing, being followed by crime lab, community policing, IT, and drugs. These areas of cooperation reflect the requests made from recipient countries.

Table 64 Police Assistance Expert Dispatch by Area of Cooperation, 1978-2003

Area	Long-Term	Short-Term	Total
Traffic	8	127	135
Criminal (Crime Lab)	24	67	91
Community policing	1	58	59
Information telecommunication	3	51	54
Drugs	6	42	48
Others	2	26	28
Total	44	371	415

Note: Long-term dispatch is of more than a year, and short-term dispatch is of less than a year.
Source: International Affairs Division, Commissioner General's Secretariat, National Police Agency, "Heisei 15 nen madeno kokusai kyoryoku no ayumi (Record of International Cooperation until 2003)," (July 2005), p.14.
http://www.npa.go.jp/kokusaikyoryoku/kyoryokujokyo/kokusaiayumi1.pdf

The lack of coordination among agencies related to police assistance such as MOFA, JICA, NPA, and Cabinet Office further inhibits the accumulation of knowledge and experience. While the Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters of the Cabinet Office is in charge of dispatching civil police, its weak coordination with NPA has failed to establish a system to jointly train police officers for police assistance. It is also almost impossible that NPA secures budget for police training for civil police, which is dispatched by the Cabinet Office.[34]

In addition to expert dispatch, training of police experts from developing countries has been conducted as well. International Investigation Training Center of the National Police Academy is the main actor here, and provides training in cooperation with JICA. 801 personnel from 94 countries received training in 20 years from 1985 to 2005. The number of trainees further increased in these years, and approximately 200 personnel receive training from Japan every year recently (Sugiyama, 2005, p. 69; Mukoyama & Masuda, 2009, p. 107). Group trainings which target trainee from multiple

[34] Takeuchi's remark in the Q&A session, in (Police Policy Forum, 2007, p. 207).

countries, and country trainings which target trainees from a single country have been provided, but the number of group trainings has been in decrease due to MOFA's policy change (Miyakoshi and Kasahara 2003, 105). Most seminars target young executives of police agencies, and the largest number of trainees are from Asian countries (NPA, Commissioner General's Secretariat, International Affairs Division 2005, 2-3).

In technical cooperation projects, not only assistance based on people such as expert dispatch and training provision, but also material cooperation is conducted as well. Examples include assistance to the Central Police of the Philippines in 1985, when devices for crime lab were provided. However, material cooperation is to be conducted along with technical cooperation projects, and the maximum amount that Japan may provide is set to be approximately $600,000 to $700,000 a year (Nishikawa 1993, 639-640).

While expert dispatch, training seminars, and material provisions were conducted as separate projects for a long time, large projects which span multiple years and cover two or all of the above types of assistance have been conducted since 1989. List of large police assistance projects is shown in Table 65. The number of large technical assistance projects increased in the 2000s, and 12 projects were conducted in 2008.

Table 65 List of Large Technical Assistance Projects in Police Assistance

Duration	Target Country	Project Names
11/1989-11/1993	China	Road Traffic Control Executive Training Center Project
6/2002-6/2005	Thailand	Regional Cooperation Project on Capacity Building of Drug Analysis for Improvement of Drug Law Enforcement
8/2002-7/2007	Indonesia	Project on Enhancement of Civilian Police Activities
1/2005-3/2008	Brazil	Community Police of Public Security
1/2005-1/2007	Indonesia	Project on Drug Enforcement
1/2005-1/2007	Philippines	Project on Capability Enhancement for Drug Law Enforcement
7/2005-7/2007	Indonesia	Enhancement of Civilian Police Activities for Bali Regional Project
7/2006-7/2009	Philippines	Project to Build up the Operation of Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS)
9/2006-3/2009	Thailand	Regional Cooperation Project on Capacity Building of Drug Analysis for Improvement of Drug Law Enforcement Phase 2
1/2007-1/2010	Cambodia	Drug Control Project
7/2007-7/2012	Indonesia	Project on "Building a Society with a Sense of Safety in Bali"
8/2007-7/2012	Indonesia	Support Program for Reform of Indonesian National Police (Phase 2)
10/2008-3/2011	Philippines	Project for PNP's Capacity Enhancement for Firearms Control in the Philippines
11/2008-11/2011	Brazil	Project on Implementation of Community Policing Using the Koban System
1/2009-12/2011	Honduras	Training for the National Police on the Community Police Philosophy by Japanese Model
2/2009-2/2010	Malaysia	Forensic Science and Investigations - Procedures and Techniques at Crime Scenes
2/2010-2/2011	Malaysia	Forensic Science and Investigations - Procedures and Techniques at Crime Scenes

Note 1: Projects listed here are those that have already started as of August 2010.
Note 2: This table does not include project related to public safety whose main recipients of assistance are not the police.
Note 3: “Regional Cooperation Project on Capacity Building of Drug Analysis for Improvement of Drug Law Enforcement” and “Regional Cooperation Project on Capacity Building of Drug Analysis for Improvement of Drug Law Enforcement Phase 2” were projects targeting not only the target countries listed above but also neighboring Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam.
Source: Yoshihiro Mukoyama and Kimiko Masuda, "Capacity Building Assistance of the Japanese Police and G8 Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial Declaration," Keisatsugaku ronshu, 62-4 (April 2009), pp.108-109; JICA, JICA Knowledge Site.

http://gwweb.jica.go.jp/km/ProjectView.nsf/VW02040106?OpenView&Start=1&Count=1000&Expand=4.5#4.5 (accessed on August 31, 2010)

Japan's police assistance tends to have only indirect relations with democratization and democracy consolidation. Technical assistance for the improvement of criminal investigation and trainings on traffic management lead to the improvement of police capability which is necessary for good governance required for the consolidation of democracy. In some seminars, the concept of community police and public safety commission system are introduced as assistance of police organizational reform which is required in democratization processes. However, not many police assistance has been conducted directly aiming to assist democracy. There are only two cases where Japan provided police assistance for the purpose of democracy assistance – police reform assistance to Pakistan since 1996 and police reform assistance to Indonesia since 2002 to present.

Japan has provided grants in the police assistance field as well. For example, grants were provided to Thailand in 1988 and 1989 in order to upgrade report receiving, command, communication systems and criminal investigation devices. Japan also provided grant to Peru for the purchase of vocational training devices in jails (Nishikawa, 1993, pp. 625-626; JICA, Roads to Democracy and Governance, 2002, p. 46). Because grant aid projects tend to be more costly than technical assistance, the overall cost spent on grant aid tends to be substantial.

Civil Police

Although civil police has been dispatched under PKO Law to peacekeeping operations in addition to assistance through ODA, the past record is small. Table 66 shows the record of Japan's civil police dispatch to peacekeeping operations. Civil police was first dispatched to UNTAC, and has dispatched to three peacekeeping operations in total so far. While 75 civil police were dispatched to UNTAC, only three and two civil police officers were dispatched to the two UN missions in East Timor/Timor-Leste.

Table 66 Japan's Dispatch of Civil Police to Peacekeeping Operations

Country	Name of Peacekeeping Operations	Duration	Number of Civil Police Dispatched	Assistance Contents
Cambodia	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Oct. 1992 to July 1993	75	Research and monitoring on the fair activities of local police, advising on investigation methods, and guidance on traffic regulation
Indonesia (East Timor)	United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)	Jul. to Sep. 1999	3	Information gathering on incidents occurred in East Timor, advising to INP which is responsible for the security in East Timor
Timor-Leste	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)	Jan. 2007 to Feb. 2008	2 (twice)	Advising to the chief of the police division of UNMIT, which is responsible for the security in East Timor

Source: MOFA, Japan's Cooperation based on International Peace Cooperation Law (August 2010). http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pko/kyoryokuhou.html (accessed on August 30, 2010); Yoshihiro Mukoyama and Kimiko Masuda, "Capacity Building Assistance of the Japanese Police and G8 Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial Declaration," *Keisatsugaku ronshu*, 62-4 (April 2009), pp.107-108.

75 civil police was dispatched to UNTAC, reflecting the importance of Cambodia for Japan's diplomacy toward Asia. Cambodia can be said as the first country toward

which Japan conducted its original diplomacy apart from American policy after the end of the World War II. MOFA had been spending considerable resources for the settlement of civil war in the country, held a Tokyo Conference on Cambodia in June 1990, and successfully had a Japanese UN officer, Yasushi Akashi, as the head of UNTAC before the civil police dispatch was decided. Civil police was to provide advice and training to Cambodian police, in addition to monitor them. However, due to the lack of capacity of Cambodian police, UNTAC requested civil police personnel to conduct policing in addition to the above missions. However, the PKO Law of Japan does not allow policing in the countries of peacekeeping operations, and thus conducting policing as requested by UNTAC was a violation of the PKO Law.[35] Since policing mission became one of the main missions in later UN peacekeeping operations as well, Japan started being hesitant in sending civil police. In addition, the loss of Japanese civil police personnel in Cambodia, which was caused due to the lack of Japan's authorization of carrying and using of weapons for self defense, further increased Japan's hesitation in dispatching civil police.

Police Assistance as Democracy Assistance

Japan highly regards the importance of police capability for the achievement of good governance. Shiro Hirohata and Yurin Eguchi state that "international cooperation of police increased its importance due to the substantial significance police shares for the maintenance and security of social order, which is a prerequisite for good governance"

[35] The Clause 3 of the Article 3 of the International Peace Cooperation Law defines operations concerning civilian police as "advising or guidance concerning police administration or monitoring of police administration."

(Hirohata and Eguchi 2005, 3-4). The Outline for the Promotion of International Cooperation, published in 2005, also regards police assistance as a necessary part for the attainment of good governance, and recommends the expansion of Japan's police assistance which directly aims to serve the purpose of the achievement of good governance, such as the one being provided to Indonesia.[36] The outline regards the dispatch of civil police as also important for the achievement of good governance.[37]

While the Outline does not show a direct link between Japan's police assistance and democracy assistance, it implies the connection between the two. The Outline states that "the idea has been in spread in recent years that the effects of financial and material aid cannot be exerted unless there is efficient and democratic political administration (good governance) which is a basis for development." Here, democratic political administration and good governance are shown as equivalent. Since the outline recommends further expansion of Japan's police assistance for good governance purpose, it also means to recommend police assistance for the improvement of democratic governance.[38] From these recognitions, police assistance can be said to be regarded as a part of Japan's democracy assistance efforts.

The International Peace Cooperation Meeting (Kokusai heiwa kyoryoku kondankai), held under the leadership of the Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda in 2002, published a report which recognized the importance of the dispatch of civil police as a part of nation-building assistance in post-conflict countries (Hirohata and Eguchi 2005,

[36] "Dai 2 no 2(1) i: hokatsuteki na shien (2-2 (1) i: Comprehensive Assistance)," in (NPA, Outline for the Promotion of International Cooperation 2005, 4)
[37] "Dai 2 no 2(2): Bunmin keisatsu katsudo (2-2 (2): Civil Police Activities)," in (NPA, Outline for the Promotion of International Cooperation 2005, 5)
[38] "Dai 11 (1) a: Yoi tochi (11 (1) a: Good Governance)," in (NPA, Outline for the Promotion of International Cooperation 2005, 2)

4). Although this report does not mention democracy as a regime type they should aim to create in the nation-building efforts, second-generation peacekeeping operations assume democratic regime type as the one for them to build. Since Japan's civil police dispatch is to be a part of these second-generation peacekeeping operations, this report can be considered to assume Japan's effort of civil police dispatch as a type of democracy assistance. In a seminar on Japan-Indonesia cooperation for police reform, which was held in 2005, the recognition that establishment of democratic police institution is a most significant social underpinning for a country's development and the achievement of good governance was shown from the Japanese side (Yoshimura and Takeuchi 2005, 25-26).

On the other hand, when it comes to the improvement of central functions of democratic police such as combating corruption and increasing transparency, Japan is very careful in choosing projects due to its political nature in addition to the difficulty of achieving results in a short-term (JICA, Towards Democratic State-Building Assistance 2003, 16-17).[39]

Although Japan has shown connections between democracy assistance and the country's police assistance, the main drive for Japan's police assistance seems to be in the necessity of improving police capabilities in other countries for the security in Japan. This is due to the increased crime rate of foreigners in Japan and the number of suspects' defection. In addition, international terrorism requires the improvement of the capacity of foreign police by which to smooth international cooperation (Hirohata and Eguchi 2005, 4-5). The Police White Paper of 1987, which mentioned Japan's police assistance for the first time in the history of Japan's Police White Paper, explains the necessity of police

[39] Similar understanding appears in p.28 as well.

assistance from the viewpoints of Japan's internationalization and the increased needs for Japan's police assistance from overseas.[40] While it does not mention the direct impact of police assistance to the security in Japan, it states that "Japan is required to take actions for various issues caused by the deepened internationalization," and implies that Japan's police assistance is a type of action to deal with the internationalization of crimes.[41] In the Third Subcommittee of the Audit Committee of the House of Representatives held on May 31, 1996, Hiroyuki Kuramochi, Chair of the National Public Safety Commission, explained that Japan's police assistance abroad would increase security of Japan and the Japanese.[42] Similar recognition was shown in the Police White Paper of 2005 as well, which states that "Japan has increased its security by strengthening partner countries' capacities to deal with crimes through various cooperation and aid."[43]

Outline for the Promotion of International Cooperation of the National Police Agency, which states the importance of the acceleration of police assistance, was created based on such recognitions. In its introduction, the Outline finds the necessity of international cooperation in the worsened crime rate in Japan due to "the increased move of criminals and human trafficking without borders, smuggling of prohibited products, concealment of crime proceeds, and the strengthened linkage among international crime

[40] But the Police White Paper of 1987 did not use the term "police assistance," but used the term "international cooperation of the police."
[41] "Dai 1 sho Kokusaika shakai niokeru keisatsu no yakuwari: Kokusaika no shinten ni taio suru keisatsu katsudo (Chapter 1 The Role of Police in the Internationalized Society: Police Activities Responding to the Deepening of the Internationalization)," in (NPA, Police White Paper of 1987 1987)
[42] Home Affairs Minister Hiroyuki Kurata's remark in the House of Representatives, Audit Committee, Third Subcommittee (May 31, 1996).
[43] "Dai 2 sho Kokusai shakai niokeru nihon keisatsu no katsudo (Chapter 2 Activities of Japanese Police in the International Society)," in (NPA, Police White Paper of 2005 2005)

groups and terrorist groups."[44] Even when the Outline mentions the importance of international cooperation for the achievement of good governance, it explains Japan's police assistance as a security measure for Japan along with it.[45]

Based on such perspectives, the Outline regards international cooperation with Asian countries as especially important. Explanation about international cooperation for Asian countries constitutes an individual section within the basic principle of the Outline, which shows the importance of police assistance for Asian countries for the security of Japan.[46]

Legislative Assistance

According to Table 1, legislative assistance typically seeks to build the capacities of legislators and legislative staff, strengthen infrastructure, and bolster input and scrutiny from NGOs and media. Among these, Japan's legislative assistance has been provided for the capacity building of legislators and legislative staff, although the method of assistance is not ambitious.

Japan's legislative assistance has focused on holding seminars on the functions and roles of the legislature. The contents include explanation about Japan's democratization process, the roles and functions of the Japanese Diet, and democratic management of the legislature (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 23, 39).

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[44] "Hajimeni (Introduction)," in (NPA, Outline for the Promotion of International Cooperation 2005)
[45] "Dai 1 no 2: Waga kuni no chian taisaku tono kankei (1-2: Relations with Public Safety Measures in Japan)," in (NPA, Outline for the Promotion of International Cooperation 2005, 3)
[46] "Dai 2 no 1 (2): Ajia shokoku ni taisuru senryakuteki na kokusai kyoryoku (2-1-(1): Strategic International Cooperation toward Asian Countries)," in (NPA, Outline for the Promotion of International Cooperation 2005, 4)

Table 67 is a list of Japan's legislative assistance from 1992 to 2002. All the assistance was provided as seminars.

Table 67 List of Japan's Legislative Assistance, 1992-2002

Fiscal Year	Seminar Names	Number of Participants	
		Legislators	Legislative Staff
1992	Democratization Research Seminar / African Region	0	9
	Democratization Research Seminar / Central and South American Region	0	7
1993	Democratization Research Seminar: Based on Japanese Experience / A Course for the Regions of Africa, Central and South America, and Southwest Asia	0	10
	Seminar on Democratic Political and Administrative Institutions in Japan / A Course for Asia	0	7
1994	Democratization Research Seminar / A Course for South African Republic	1	10
	Democratization Research Seminar / A Course for Southern Africa	1	9
	Democratization Research Seminar / A Course for Central Asia and Caucasus	0	5
1995	Democratization Research Seminar / Central America and Caribbean Region	2	9
	Seminar on Democratic Politics and Administrative Institutions in Japan / Indochina countries	0	4
1996	Democratization Research Seminar / Anglophone Africa	0	10
1997	Seminar for the Promotion of Civil Society and Democratic Governance / El Salvador	3	5
	Democratization Research Seminar / Francophone Africa	1	10
1998	Democratization Research Seminar / Anglophone Africa	0	9
	El Salvador Democratization Seminar (National Finance)	5	10
	Democratization Research Seminar / Tajikistan	0	10
1999	Africa Democratization Seminar (East Africa)	15	15
	Tajikistan Democratization Seminar	3	10
2000	Africa Democratization Seminar (Kenya, Zambia, South African Republic, and Madagascar)	12	12

Fiscal Year	Seminar Names	Number of Participants	
		Legislators	Legislative Staff
	Tajikistan Democratization Seminar	3	9
	Africa Democratization Seminar (Tanzania, Mozambique)	6	6
	Nigeria Democratization Seminar	0	9
2001	Africa Democratization Seminar I (Anglophone countries) (Kenya, Tanzania, South African Republic, Botswana)	11	11
	Peru Democratization Seminar (on the Implementation of Democratic Elections)	0	10
	Tajikistan Democratization Seminar	5	10
	Africa Democratization Seminar II (Francophone countries) (Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Mali)	12	12
2002	Tajikistan Parliamentary Management Seminar	5	10
	Peru Democratization Seminar (on the Implementation of Democratic Elections)	0	10
	Africa Democratization Seminar II (Francophone countries) (Guinea, Togo, Republic of Congo)	9	9

Source: Japan International Cooperation Agency, *JICA ni okeru gabanansu shien: Minshuteki na seido zukuri, gyosei kino nokojo, hoseibi shien (JICA's Governance Assistance: Democratic Institution Building, Administrative Functional Improvement, and Legal Assistance)*, (November 2004), p. 137.

Africa Democratization Seminar started in 1999, and was provided for African legislators. Within two weeks period, lectures are provided on such themes as parliamentary system, political and administrative reform, local self-governance, and Japan's modernization and democratization. In addition, participating legislators meet and have discussions with Japanese Diet members and citizens, and visit Japanese countryside and mass media (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 39). Political neutrality is sought by inviting legislators both from governing and opposition parties excluding cabinet members. However, the participating members are decided by African governments (JICA, Towards Democratic State-Building Assistance 2003, 65), which cannot exclude the possibility that the member choice is not politically neutral.

In the Tajikistan Parliamentary Management Seminar started in 1998, lectures about the functions and the roles of democratic parliament, and democratic management of the parliament are held for legislators, legislative staff, and executive staff. This seminar is said to have been more fruitful than others because staff of the Legislative Bureau and the General Affairs Department of the House of Representatives participated and provided lectures (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 39-41).

In seminars conducted for El Salvador in 1997 and 1998, members of the two biggest parties and two other parties were invited to have exchange with the Japanese side. Follow-up on the state of the country's democratization was conducted as a short-term project in March 1999, when Japan sent two experts on democracy promotion to El Salvador (JICA, Towards Democratic State-Building Assistance 2003, 45).

In March 2003, research group was sent to Africa in order to form a framework for Japan's mid- to long-term legislative assistance, and conducted research on the issues in the legislature of African countries and needs for Japan. It especially studied the role of the legislature in the political equation, their involvement in policy-making, its relationships with other actors such as media and NGOs, and the state of other donors' legislative assistance. However, the results of the research have not led to a formation of new framework on technical assistance projects, but only have recommended holding a regional workshop (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 40).

Local Government Assistance

Demand for local government assistance has been in increase in Asia since the 1990s due to the trends of decentralization among Southeast Asian countries in the

process of democratization and market-oriented economic reform after the end of the Cold War. The Philippine established the Local Government Act in 1991 under the Aquino administration after Marcos. Indonesia established two laws concerning decentralization in 1991 in its democratization process, which went into effect in 2001. Thailand has strengthened the functions of local governmental organizations based on its Constitution of 1997 and Decentralization law of 1999. Cambodia has been in the process of decentralization to strengthen local governments (JICA, Effective approach to developmental issues 2007, 51). The necessity for the capacity development of local governments has increased for better provision of public services and local development in countries such as authoritarian Vietnam and Laos (JICA, Effective approach to developmental issues 2007, 51).

While the cases of local government assistance was only few until the mid 1990s, it has been increasingly conducted after then (JICA, Participatory Development and Good Governance 1995, 21). This was a reflection of the decentralization in many countries, in addition to the increased recognition about decentralization as a factor to promote good governance (JICA, Towards Democratic State-Building Assistance 2003, 16).

JICA's local government assistance consists of seminars, dispatch of professionals, and technical cooperation projects. The first instance of Japan's local government assistance was conducted back in 1964, when group seminars started being provided from the Japanese governmental agencies to mid- or high-ranking officers of the central governments of recipient countries. Table 29 shows examples of JICA's group seminars for the purpose of local government assistance in the 2000s. While the

number of local government assistance was limited in the late 1990s, the 2000s has seen a large number of such projects and diversity in seminar contents. Recent courses focus such areas as duties of local provinces and municipalities, civil society activities, participatory regional development, and industry revitalization. From the late 1990s, country-based seminars have been being conducted in order to respond to various different needs from different countries (JICA, Effective approach to developmental issues 2007, 6).

Table 68 Group Seminar Projects of JICA's Local Government Assistance in the 2000s

Fiscal Year	Seminar Names
1998-1999 2001-2003	Administrations of Local Governments
2004	Administrations of Local Governments (Participatory Local Development)
2005-2007	Administrations of Local Governments (Participatory Local Development) II
2000-2004	Local Governance Training
2005-2009	Local Governance Training II
2003-2009	Interaction Seminar with Top Officials of Local Governments
2004-2008	Promotion of the Activities of Civil Society and Community Development
2005-2009	Seminar on Private Industry Revitalization by Local Governments
2006-2010	Local Finance

Source: "Hyo A1-2: 2000 nendai chiho gyosei kanren shudan kenshu anken (Figure A1-2: Group Training Projects related to Local Governments in the 2000s)," Training Center for International Cooperation, JICA, Kaihatsu ni taisuru kokateki apurochi: Chiho gyosei (Effective Approach for Developmental Issues: Local Governance) (August 2007), pp.43-44.

Japan's local government assistance has been mainly technical cooperation projects in recent years. Appendix 3 shows examples of Japan's local assistance technical cooperation projects. While there were only a few technical assistance projects conducted

in the 1990s, much larger number of projects has been conducted in the 2000s. While target countries are mainly in Asia, some assistance has been provided for Latin American and African countries as well. The greatest number of local assistance projects has been conducted in Indonesia. As to contents, the 2000s started seeing projects aiming to build local governmental capacities. It is a reflection of the decentralization trends in Asia in addition to the increased recognition about the importance of local government assistance on the Japanese side out of the accumulated experiences of such assistance (JICA, Effective approach to developmental issues 2007, 6).

Japan's local government assistance has been conducted mainly as technology transfer to governmental agencies of recipient countries which aims to build the capacity of the governmental agencies and its human resources. Some projects not only target central and local governmental agencies but also create partnership with NGOs, universities, and local citizens in order to better spread the impact of Japan's local government assistance (JICA, Effective approach to developmental issues 2007, 6-7). In some instances local government assistance is provided as a program which consists of multiple projects (JICA, Effective approach to developmental issues 2007, 7).

Challenges for Japan's local assistance abounds. While most assistance intends to improve local government officers' capacity, local government management, and the relations between local governmental agencies and citizens through seminar provisions, assistance directly aiming to establish or reform local institutions is extremely limited. When assisting the establishment of institutions, Japan does not assist the establishment directly but remain providing information about the possible choices of institutions

through adviser dispatch and research cooperation, or provide financial assistance (JICA, Effective approach to developmental issues 2007, 7-8).

While the areas of assistance on local government are fostering system-level change, building the institutional capacities of local government, and increasing citizen input according to Table 1, Japan has almost solely conducted capacity building for local government employees. Examples include assistance for Indonesia for the improvement of developmental policy-making capacity of local governments, and assistance for Thailand for the creation of local-government-related laws, research on cooperation among municipalities, and institution-building based on the research (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 77). Assistance for the creation of network between local governments and their communities has been conducted as well in South Sulawesi of Indonesia (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 77).

While most of Japanese local government assistance has mainly been acceptance of trainees since the beginning of Japan's local government assistance, assistance expanded in 1995 due to the establishment of the Guideline concerning the Establishment of Charter on the Promotion of International Cooperation of Local Governments (Jichitai kokusai kyoryoku suishin taiko no sakutei ni kansuru shishin) from the Ministry of Home Affairs and the establishment of Subsidy for Organizations Promoting Overseas Technical Cooperation (kaigai gijutu kyoryoku suishin dantai hojokin). In 1996 two project schemes for local government assistance were established as well. The Local Government Officials Training Program (LGOTP, Jichitai shokuin kyoryoku koryu jigyo), supported by MIC and CLAIR, was a program for the acceptance of trainees from foreign local governments to Japanese local governments. Local Government

International Cooperation Promotion Project (Jichitai kokusai kyoryoku sokushin jigyo) was established as well in which MIC and CLAIR support pioneering international cooperation projects of Japanese local governments, certifying them as model projects.

Civil-Military Relations

While Japan has been increasing its assistance on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former soldiers of civil war in recent years, there has been no assistance for democratic civil-military relations so far.

Summary of State Institutions Assistance

In sum, Japan is active in state institutions assistance, and most of Japan's democracy assistance goes for this sector. The largest share among state institutions assistance goes for governmental agencies assistance, being followed by rule of law assistance and local government assistance. Not much assistance is provided for the legislature, and no assistance is provided in the area of civil-military relations.

Japan's assistance in each area shows one-sidedness. While quite a lot of assistance is provided for capacity building of governmental staff, assistance is rarely provided for institutional reform. The only type of assistance loosely related to institutional reform is seminar provisions which convey information on the choices of institutional reform. Almost no assistance has been provided for NGOs and media to increase their input, access, and monitoring of governmental agencies (Table 69).

Table 69 Record of Japan's State Institutions Assistance

Sectors	Assistance Types	Program Contents	Record of Japan's Assistance
State Institutions	Rule of Law assistance	Reforming institutions	Some
		Rewriting laws	Yes
		Upgrading the legal profession	Some
		Increasing legal access and advocacy	No
	Legislative Assistance	Building the capacities of legislators	Some
		Building the capacities of legislative staff	Some
		Strengthening infrastructure	?
		Bolstering input and scrutiny from NGOs and media	No
	Local government assistance	Fostering system-level change	No
		Building the institutional capacities of local governments	Yes
		Increasing citizen input	No
	Civil-military relations	Civilian-run trainings	No
		Military-run trainings	No
	Governmental Agencies assistance	Reforming institutions	Few
		Upgrading the capacity of governmental staff	Yes

Source: Created by the author.

Civil Society Assistance

As shown in the data above, Japan has not been active in the assistance for the civil society sector. Until the mid 1990s, civil society assistance was not considered to be a method to expand citizen's participation in politics – only such methods as legal assistance, administrative assistance, local government assistance, and assistance for institutions of market economy, all of which are state institutions assistance, were considered as methods to facilitate political participation of citizens.

Even in the 2000s, JICA has not provided technical assistance to governmental projects that are outsourced to the private sector. It has not changed even after aid framework which civil society organizations of developing countries can utilize

expanded, such as Grant Aid for Grass-Roots Groups (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA, 2004, p. 111; Obayashi, 2007, p. 40). Japan does not seem to be interested in empowering the citizens in terms of politics.

NGO Building

Civil society assistance such as assistance for advocacy NGOs, and legislative assistance which is a part of state institutions assistance, were not of Japan's choices in the 1990s (JICA, Participatory Development and Good Governance 1995, 41). Japan did not consider that empowering oppositions to the government was a way to expand citizens' participation in politics.

Although MOFA has grant frameworks for NGOs such as Grant Aid for Grass-Roots Groups, it clearly articulates that it does not provide assistance to political projects and recipient organizations' capacity building (MOFA, Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects 2010). It limits Japan's civil society assistance projects, and NGO capacity building altogether. Although JICA is aware of the increasing importance of the civil society in developing countries and the assistance for them (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 101), JICA does not acknowledge the importance of their watchdog and advocacy functions.

Table 70 shows the allocation of funding among civil society sector assistance as of 2008. Although the utility of this table is limited because it does not correspond to the categorization shown in Table 1, it shows an interesting phenomenon. The small amount of Japan's assistance for civil society mainly is provided for strengthening civil society (39.57%) and free flow of information (48.92%). However, whether the projects for

strengthening civil society can be categorized as democracy assistance is dubious. Japanese projects for strengthening civil society targets those civil society associations that function in the development sector. And thus although these projects do intend to strengthen civil society organizations, their long-term purpose is not democracy assistance.

Table 70 Japan's Civil Society Assistance Allocation by Category, 2008

Assistance Category	
Strengthening civil society	39.57%
Human rights	7.19%
Free flow of information	48.92%
Women's equality organisations and institutions	4.32%

Source: OECD, Creditor Reporting System.

Although Japan does not officially exclude assistance for such categories as human rights protection, Japan states that it provides assistance for it only under consultation with the government of the recipient country (JICA, Participatory Development and Good Governance 1995, 42). Since cooperation with the recipient government is assumed, assistance for anti-governmental advocacy NGOs is not provided. Unlike the United States and European countries which support counter-balancing and watchdog functions of advocacy NGOs, Japanese assistance is naturally unlikely to be provided for such organizations because Japan's aid is provided based on requests from recipient governments. Categorizing the spheres in which citizens potentially participate into political, economic, and social spheres, JICA states that it would promote citizen's participation in economy and society ahead of political participation, which shows Japan's weak will to assist building participatory democracy (JICA, Participatory Development and Good Governance 1995, 42). Reflecting that,

JICA's assistance for civil society is targeted to socio economic areas such as micro finance, development, and healthcare. Japan's assistance to combat corruption is provided only for state institution sector such as police and legal institutions, and no assistance has ever provided to civil society organizations for the purpose of advocacy and watchdog to combat and prevent corruption in government (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 100-101).

Civic Education

There is no record of Japan's support for civic education concerning democracy and human rights (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 51).

Media Strengthening

Most of Japan's civil society assistance target media. JICA's policy guideline on peace-building assistance regards media-assistance as one of the target categories of Japan's democracy assistance (JICA, Guidance by Issue: Peace-Building 2009). International Peace Cooperation Council (Kokusai Heiwa Kyoryoku Kondankai), which was established within the Cabinet Office, recommended the activation of media assistance in its report published in December 2002 (Kokusai Heiwa Kyoryoku Kondankai [International Peace Cooperation Council] 2002, 42). Japan has assisted media through grant, technical assistance, expert dispatch, expert training, and the provision of materials related to broadcasting (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 50).

Table 71 shows examples of Japan's media assistance. Japan has provided media assistance mainly to TV and radio stations, and 127 TV media assistance projects and 56 radio assistance projects have been conducted as of September 2005, according Masakazu Sakashita. On the other hand, Japan has never provided media assistance to printing media such as newspapers and magazines (Sakashita 2006, 122). This is because Japan regards telecommunication and broadcasting technology as its comparative advantage, and thus focused on those projects that require it. Sakashita also points out that, the number of media assistance projects has been in decline since the 1980s (Sakashita 2006, 122). Given the fact that it has not accelerated its media assistance reflecting the increase of democracy assistance in the international aid community after the end of the Cold War, Japan's media assistance has not aimed to assist democratic media abroad.

Table 71 Examples of Japan's Media Assistance

Target Countries	Project Contents	Year of Implement ation	Assistance Method
Afghanistan	Media assistance	2002	Emergency Assistance Study, Trainee Acceptance
	Emergency Loya Jirga national assembly broadcasting	2002	Emergency Assistance Study
Iraq	TV Broadcasting techniques	2004-2005	In-Japan-Training
Nepal	Seminar on election and democratization (in relations with media)	2008-2009	By-Country-Training
East Timor	Election assistance (Election PR and PR human resource development)	2001	Specialist Dispatch
Bhutan	National broadcasting assistance project	2005-2007	Technical Cooperation Project
	National broadcasting capacity building project	2007- 2010	Technical Cooperation Project

Source: Japan International Cooperation Agency, "Kadaibetsu shishin: "Heiwa kochiku" (Guideline by Themes: Peace-Building)," (September 2009), p.4. http://gwweb.jica.go.jp/km/FSubject0501.nsf/ff4eb182720efa0f49256bc20018fd25/8aba36065fec4a3149256e66002b8fd5/$FILE/%E6%8C%87%E9%87%9D_%E5%B9%B3%E5%92%8C%E6%A7%8B%E7%AF%89.pdf

In the media assistance to Kosovo from 2000 to 2003, Japan consulted with OSCE, which was in charge of media development in the country, and conducted media assistance in cooperation with UNDP and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Aiming to improve technical capacity and facilities of TVs and Radio stations, Japan contributed $14.5 million on this project. Project contents were the improvement of the capacity of program-making and broadcasting skills of private media and Radio Television of Kosovo (RTK, Kosovo's public broadcaster), repair of ground communication system, and provision of studio equipments. Seminars were provided to teach how to use and maintain the devices provided through this project as well (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 50).

Japan has provided media assistance to Afghanistan as well. The history of Japan's media assistance to the country is long, and Japan has conducted construction of a TV station, provision of broadcasting devices, dispatch of TV and radio experts, and training of Afghan media professionals in Japan from 1975 and 1976. In recent example of Japan's media assistance to Afghanistan, two Afghan media experts were invited to Japan in 2002 and received training on TV program-making and broadcasting (JICA, Governance Assistance at JICA 2004, 51).

The characteristic of Japan's media assistance is that the assistance focuses on facilities such as information and telecommunication networks instead of media contents. The Information and Telecommunication Technology Division of JICA is in charge of media assistance, which shows that Japan's media assistance is conducted mainly as broadcasting technical assistance, rather than democracy assistance as Sakashita argues (Sakashita 2006, 122). Expert trainings have been conducted for countries such as Indonesia and Sri Lanka in addition to broadcasting infrastructure assistance and provided trainings for program-making. However, not only the cases of such training projects are limited, but also these trainings tend to be supplements to broadcasting infrastructure assistance projects (Sakashita 2006, 122).

Sakashita points out three reasons why Japan tends to assist media infrastructure instead of its contents. First, Japanese companies and broadcasting stations such as the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nippon Hoso Kyokai: NHK) have developed broadcasting techniques and devices after the end of the World War II quite to a high level, and thus Japan has comparative advantage in this field. On the other hand, secondly, Japan does not have accumulation of knowledge on media due to the lack of

professional schools on journalism unlike in the United States and Europe. Thus systematic educational know-how lacks in this field. Thirdly, while assistance for contents requires high-level communication and foreign language skills, agents who can provide technical assistance on media in foreign languages are limited in Japan (Sakashita 2006, 122-123).

Japan started media assistance which aims to assist democracy in the 2000s. Japan's media assistance to Afghanistan in 2002 assisted broadcasting the country's *Loya Jirga*, or national assembly, on TVs through satellite system. Its aim was to show the discussion at the national assembly and the process of choosing the interim President of the country by which to increase the legitimacy of the new administration (JICA, Final Report of the Emergency Reconstruction Assistance Study in Kabul, Afghanistan 2004). Such political characteristic of the assistance was distinct compared to Japan's media assistance before then. However, it assisted only a public broadcasting station, and did not intend to increase the capacity of private media's watchdog functions. In this sense, this assistance project was leaning toward supporting the government, but not civil society.

Although this assistance to Afghanistan had political characteristics unusually as a Japan's media assistance, the contents of the assistance was to upgrade broadcasting infrastructure, provide devices and training on how to use the devices. No assistance was provided in terms of contents of the broadcasting. There was no expert of free and fair broadcasting in its preliminary study group and all the experts were of broadcasting techniques according to Sakashita, which shows the weakness of Japan's interest in supporting the role of media for democratic governance (JICA, Preliminary Report of the

Emergency Reconstruction Assistance Study in Kabul, Afghanistan 2002). Its project document did not set contribution for democratic governance as evaluation criteria of the project either (Sakashita 2006, 124).

Union Building

Japan's assistance toward unions is provided by Japan International Labor Foundation (JILAF), utilizing funding from MOFA (through the funding scheme of Grant Aid for Japanese NGO's Projects) and subsidies of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (Table 72). JILAF is an NGO established in 1998 in order to help nurture democratic labor movements in developing countries by which to contribute to stable employer-employee relationships. Mainly conducted are invitations of leaders of labor movements in developing countries to Japan to inform them of labor conditions in Japan. In addition, seminars are held in recipient countries, aiming to strengthen the leadership of labor union executives and labor union activities. Informal educational institutions on child labor are managed in such countries as India and Nepal as well. In cooperation with Institute for Science of Labour, programs for nurturing trainers for the improvement of safety and health initiated by labor unions. Special emphasis is placed on capacity building rather than material provision (Kagawa and Kaneko, Legal Assistance Studies 2007, 229).

Table 72 JILAF's Project Cost funded by Japanese Governmental Organizations, FY2009

(Unit: yen)

Project Schemes	Budget	Financial Results
(1) Projects commissioned by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW)	174,483,000	174,483,000
1. Invitation of individuals from developing countries	113,244,000	94,943,388
2. Local seminars	53,035,000	46,502,808
● Multi-country seminars	6,579,000	6,472,762
● Local seminars	41,089,000	34,864,546
● Promotion seminars	5,367,000	5,165,500
3. Worker-Employer Conflict Prevention Network Project	5,120,000	4,951,932
4. PR	3,084,000	2,985,400
5. Return of FY2009 Income Commissioned by MHLW	0	25,099,472
(2) MOFA Grant Aid for Japanese NGO's Projects	16,270,000	16,270,000
1. Income from MOFA Grant Aid for Japanese NGO's Projects	16,270,000	14,858,157
2. Return of the income commissioned by MOFA Grant Aid for Japanese NGO's Projects	0	1,411,843

Source: Japan International Labour Foundation, "Shushi keisan sho (Heisei 21 nen 4 gatsu 1 nichi kara heisei 22 nen 3 gatsu 31 nichi made) (Financial Statement (From April 1, 2009 to March 31, 2010))." http://www.jilaf.or.jp/about/data/h22/syushi.html (accessed on November 5, 2010)

However, projects conducted through ODA from MOFA do not seem to empower labor unions, but specialize on assisting technical contents. Among the labor union assistance conducted in FY2009 through funding from MOFA, two seminars for nurturing HIV/AIDS trainer in Thailand and a workshop and an evaluation meeting for creating textbooks on the improvement of work environment in Vietnam were held (JILAF n.d.).

Assistance is provided for employers associations as well. Such assistance is mainly provided by NICC with subsidies from, or contracting projects with, the Ministry

of Health, Labor and Welfare. The purposes here are the healthy development of employers associations in developing countries, interaction among corporate executives and leaders of employers associations, and fostering corporate executive human resources. In FY2009, 211,121,000 yen was provided from the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare as project contracts and 36,996,000 yen as subsidies (NICC n.d.). NICC is a private organization established in 1994, and provides various trainings and seminars. Training and seminar contents include trainings on human resource and labor services, labor management, objectives management, occupational safety and health, work environment management, wage systems, competitiveness, total quality management, and medium and small enterprises. Special emphasis is placed on capacity building of human resource and labor services (Kagawa and Kaneko, Legal Assistance Studies 2007, 229-230). Except for these two organizations (JILAF and NICC), however, no private organization seems to be providing assistance for labor unions or employer associations except for the cases of NGOs assisting empowering women.

Summary of Civil Society Assistance

In sum, Japan has been a reluctant player in the civil society sector. The country's democracy assistance allocation to the civil society sector is the smallest among all the DAC member countries. Almost no assistance has been provided for NGO- and union-building, and the record of civic education remains extremely rare. The only area which has received Japan's assistance is the media. However, here again, no assistance has been provided to strengthen the independence and the watchdog functions of media, and

almost all the assistance is directed to technical sphere such as communication and broadcasting technologies.

Table 73 Record of Japan's Civil Society Assistance

Sectors	Assistance Types	Program Contents	Record of Japan's Assistance
Civil Society	NGO building	Technical assistance	No
		Direct funding	No
		Organizing coalition of NGOs in recipient countries to tackle particular issues	No
		Strengthening the legal frameworks within which NGOs operate	No
	Civic Education	Elections	Few
		General democracy education	No
	Media Strengthening	Training and technical assistance for journalists	Some
		Stimulating the establishment or strengthening of journalist associations	No
		Supporting new media watchdog groups	No
		Organizational development	No
		Help modify the legal and regulatory framework in which the media operate	No
		Funding for infrastructure and equipments	Some
	Union Building	Training union activists	No
		Underwriting salaries of union officials	No
		Contributing equipment and other materials	No

Source: Created by the author.

Conclusion

In sum, Japan has been inactive in democracy assistance compared to other developed democracies. Not only is its democracy assistance amount small, the share of its democracy assistance amount in overall ODA is small as well. Although the country's democracy assistance amount has increased over the years, the increase was mainly driven by the increase of grant aid, although the substantial knowledge transfer on

democracy requires technical assistance instead. Japan's democracy assistance is mostly provided for state institutions, and the share of state institutions assistance in democracy assistance is the highest among all DAC member countries.

Table 74 shows the record of Japan's democracy assistance in each sector and program contents. Although JICA created a similar table and published in 2004, the table here did not strictly follow the table for two reasons. First, while the JICA table strictly relies on the categorization on the sectors and program contents of democracy assistance created by Carothers, this dissertation modified Carothers' and thus has slightly different categories. Second, while JICA's table does not examine whether the contents of assistance can be considered as democracy assistance, this dissertation does.

Table 74 Record of Japan's Democracy Assistance by Sectors and Program Contents

Sectors	Assistance Types	Program Contents	Record of Japan's Assistance
Election	Electoral Assistance	Electoral system design	No
		Administration of elections	Some
		Voter education	Few
		Election observation	Yes
		Election mediation	No
	Political Party Assistance	Party aid relating to a particular election campaign	No
		Party aid between campaigns	No
State Institutions	Rule of Law assistance	Reforming institutions	Some
		Rewriting laws	Yes
		Upgrading the legal profession	Some
		Increasing legal access and advocacy	No
	Legislative Assistance	Building the capacities of legislators	Some
		Building the capacities of legislative staff	Some
		Strengthening infrastructure	?
		Bolstering input and scrutiny from NGOs and media	No
	Local government	Fostering system-level change	No
		Building the institutional capacities of local	Yes

Sectors	Assistance Types	Program Contents	Record of Japan's Assistance
	assistance	governments Increasing citizen input	 No
	Civil-military relations	Civilian-run trainings Military-run trainings	No No
	Governmental Agencies assistance	Reforming institutions Upgrading the capacity of governmental staff	Few Yes
Civil Society	NGO building	Technical assistance Direct funding Organizing coalition of NGOs in recipient countries to tackle particular issues Strengthening the legal frameworks within which NGOs operate	No No No No
	Civic Education	Elections General democracy education	Few No
	Media Strengthening	Training and technical assistance for journalists Stimulating the establishment or strengthening of journalist associations Supporting new media watchdog groups Organizational development Help modify the legal and regulatory framework in which the media operate Funding for infrastructure and equipments	Some No No No No Some
	Union Building	Training union activists Underwriting salaries of union officials Contributing equipment and other materials	No No No

Source: Created by the author with revisions based on information in Japan International Cooperation Agency, *JICA ni okeru gabanansu shien: Minshuteki na seido zukuri, gyosei kino nokojo, hoseibi shien (JICA's Governance Assistance: Democratic Institution Building, Administrative Functional Improvement, and Legal Assistance),* (November 2004), p.32.

As shown in Table 74, assistance is provided mainly for capacity building, and not for designing, reforming, and building of institutions. Assistance for the civil society sector is strikingly weak even when the assistance is purposed to contribute to the election or state institution sectors. These characteristics show that Japan is reluctant in

contributing to fundamental changes, politically sensitive areas, and power-balancing actors against the government.

The next two chapters will examine the background factors of the characteristics of Japan's democracy assistance, with paying attention to the political nature and the role of agents in democracy assistance.

Appendix 2 Election Observer Dispatch Not based on PKO Law

Country Name	Election Type	Election Date	Number of Personnel Dispatched
Panama	Presidential election	May 7, 89	2
Namibia	Constituent assembly election	Nov. 7-11, 89	27
Nicaragua	General election	Feb. 25, 90	6
Haiti	Presidential, Parliamentary and local elections	Dec., 90	2
		Dec., 90	1
Bangladesh	General election	Feb. 27, 91	9
El Salvador	Parliamentary election	Mar. 10, 91	4
Nepal	Lower house general election	May 12, 91	9
Surinam	Parliamentary election	May 25, 91	2
Ethiopia	Local election	Jun. 21, 92	2
Ghana	Presidential election	Nov., 92	3
Peru	Constituent assembly election	Nov. 22, 92	2
Kenya	Presidential and Parliamentary elections	Dec. 29, 92	4
Eritrea	Referendum	Apr. 23-25, 93	2
Djibouti	Presidential election	May 7, 93	1
Paraguay	Presidential election	May 9, 93	2
Burundi	Presidential and general elections	Jun., 93	1
Nigeria	Presidential election	Jun. 12, 93	1
Malawi	Referendum on the introduction of multi-party system	Jun. 14, 93	2
Madagascar	Parliamentary election	Jun. 16, 93	1
Central Africa	Presidential and Parliamentary elections	Aug. 22, 93	120
		Sep. 19, 93	
Peru	Referendum on new constitution	Oct. 31, 93	1
Russia	Federal parliamentary election	Dec. 12, 93	22
Uganda	Constituent assembly election	Mar. 28, 94	2
South Africa	Constituent assembly election	Apr. 26-28, 94	22
Malawi	Presidential and parliamentary elections	May 17, 94	3
Ethiopia	Constituent assembly election	Jun. 5, 94	2
Mexico	Presidential and parliamentary elections	Aug. 21, 94	5
Nepal	Lower house general election	Nov. 15, 94	2
Namibia	National elections	Dec. 7-8, 94	3
Peru	Presidential and parliamentary elections	Apr. 9, 95	2
Ethiopia	National and local elections	May 7, 95	3
Guinea	Parliamentary election	Jun. 11, 95	1

Country Name	Election Type	Election Date	Number of Personnel Dispatched
Haiti	Parliamentary and local elections	Jun. 25, 95	5
Armenia	Parliamentary election	Jul. 5, 95	1
Equatorial Guinea	Local election	Sep. 17, 95	1
Cote d'Ivoire	Presidential election	Jan., 95	5
Tanzania	Presidential and parliamentary elections	Oct. 29, 95	6
Guatemala	Presidential and general elections	Nov. 12, 95	1
Kazakhstan	Upper and lower house elections	Dec. 5 and 9, 95	1
Russia	Federal parliamentary election	Dec. 17, 95	8
Haiti	Presidential election	Dec. 17, 95	2
Guatemala	Presidential election, 2nd vote (final vote)	Jan. 7, 96	3
Palestine	Elections for the parliamentary and chiefs of administrative agencies	Jan. 20, 96	77
Uganda	Presidential and parliamentary elections	May 09, 96 Jun. 27, 96	4
Bangladesh	General election	Jun. 12, 96	8
Russia	Federal presidential election	Jun. 16, 96	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	National and local elections	Sep. 14, 96	36
Nicaragua	Presidential and parliamentary elections	Oct. 20, 96	6
Bulgaria	Presidential election	Oct. 27, 96	2
Madagascar	Presidential election	Nov. 3, 96	1
Rumania	Presidential and parliamentary elections	Nov. 3, 96	4
Rumania	Presidential election (final vote)	Nov. 17, 96	4
Niger	Parliamentary election	Nov. 24, 96	1
Madagascar	Presidential election (2nd vote)	Dec. 29, 96	1
Pakistan	General election	Feb. 3, 97	4
Eastern Slavonia	Upper house and local elections	Apr. 13, 97	1
Bulgaria	Parliamentary election	Apr. 19, 97	3
Croatia	Presidential election	Jun. 15, 97	1
Liberia	Presidential and parliamentary elections	Jul. 19, 97	3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Local election	Sep. 13-14, 97	29
Kenya	Presidential and parliamentary elections	Dec. 29-30, 97	3

Country Name	Election Type	Election Date	Number of Personnel Dispatched
Dominica	General election	May 16, 98	2
Lesotho	Lower house general election	May 23, 98	4
Ecuador	Presidential election	May 31, 98	1
		Jul. 12, 98	1
Cambodia	General election	Jul. 26, 98	32
Panama	Referendum on constitutional revision	Aug. 30, 98	10
Central Africa	Parliamentary election	Nov. 22, 98	2
		Dec. 13, 98	
Nigeria	Federal parliamental and presidential elections	Feb. 20, 99 (Parliament)	3
		Feb. 27, 99 (Presidential)	6
Djibouti	Presidential election	Apr. 9, 99	1
Panama	Presidential and parliamentary elections	May 2, 99	10
Nepal	Lower house general election	May 3, 99	None
		May 17, 99	8
South Africa	General election	Jun. 2, 99	6
Indonesia	General election	Jun. 7, 99	20
Malawi	General election	Jun. 15, 99	1
Macedonia	Presidential election	Oct. 31, 99	1
		Nov. 14, 99	1
Guatemala	Presidential election	Nov. 7, 99	6
		Dec. 26, 99	4
Mozambique	Presidential and parliamentary elections	Dec. 3-5, 99	1
Russia	Federal parliamentary election	Dec. 19, 99	2
Croatia	Lower house election	Jan. 3, 00	1
Tajikistan	Presidential election	Feb. 27, 00	5
El Salvador	Parliamentary and Mayor elections	Mar. 12, 00	5
Peru	Presidential election	Apr. 9, 00	3
		May 28, 00	5
Ethiopia	Lower house and local parliamentary elections	May 14, 00	3
Dominican Republic	Presidential election	May 16, 00	4
Zimbabwe	Parliamentary election	Jun. 24-25, 00	5
Uganda	Referendum on the introduction of multi-party system	Jun. 29, 00	4
Macedonia	Local election	Sep. 10, 00	1

Country Name	Election Type	Election Date	Number of Personnel Dispatched
Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	Local election	Oct. 28, 00	2
Tanzania	Presidential, Parliamentary, and local elections	Oct. 29, 00	5
Nicaragua	Nationwide local elections	Nov. 5, 00	4
Azerbaijan	General election	Nov. 5, 00	1
Azerbaijan	General election (re-run)	Jan. 7, 01	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	National and local elections	Nov. 11, 00	2
Rumania	Presidential and parliamentary elections	Nov. 26, 00	1
Ghana	Presidential election	Dec. 7, 00	3
Ghana	Parliamentary election	Dec. 28, 00	
Yugoslavia	Parliamentary election	Dec. 23, 00	1
Pakistan	Local election	Dec. 31, 00	2
		Mar. 21, 01	1
Uganda	Presidential election	Mar. 12, 01	4
Peru	Presidential and parliamentary elections	Apr. 8, 01	3
Fiji	General elections	Aug. 25-Sep. 1, 01	10
Bangladesh	General elections	Oct. 1, 01	7
Nicaragua	Presidential, parliamentary, and Central American Parliamentary elections	Nov. 4, 01	7
Solomon	General elections	Dec. 5, 01	5
Cambodia	Local council election	Feb. 3, 02	18
Zimbabwe	Presidential elections	Mar. 9-10, 02	5
Ukraine	Parliamentary election (4^{th})	Mar. 31, 02	3
Lesotho	General election (re-run of 1998 general election)	May 25, 02	1
Azerbaijan	Referendum on constitutional revision	Aug. 24, 02	1
Macedonia	Parliamentary general election	Sep. 15, 02	3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	National and local elections	Oct. 5, 02	3
Pakistan	General election	Oct. 10, 02	10
Madagascar	Parliamentary election	Dec. 15, 02	2
Tanzania	Parliamentary by-election in Zanzibar	May 18, 03	1
Nigeria	Presidential election	May 19, 03	4
Tajikistan	Referendum on constitutional	Jun. 22, 03	2

Country Name	Election Type	Election Date	Number of Personnel Dispatched
	revision		
Cambodia	Parliamentary (lower house) general election	Jul. 27, 03	26
Rwanda	Presidential election	Aug. 25, 03	2
Rwanda	Upper and lower house elections	Sep. 29, 03 –Oct. 2, 03	2
Azerbaijan	Presidential election	Oct. 15, 03	4
Guatemala	Presidential and parliamentary elections	Nov. 9, 03	8
Guatemala	Presidential election (final vote)	Dec. 28, 03	5
Georgia	Presidential election	Jan. 4, 04	3
Georgia	Parliamentary election (proportional-representation constituency, re-run)	Mar. 28, 04	2
Sri Lanka	General election	Apr. 2, 04	12
Indonesia	General election	Apr. 5, 04	23
Malawi	General election	May 18, 04	1
Indonesia	Presidential election	Jul. 5, 04	44
Venezuela	Referendum on the amotion of president	Aug. 15, 04	2
Kazakhstan	Parliamentary election	Sep. 19, 04	2
Indonesia	Presidential election (final vote)	Sep. 20, 04	42
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Local election	Oct. 2, 04	2
Afghanistan	Presidential election	Oct. 9, 04	5
Pakistan	Overseas Voting, Presidential election of Afghanistan	Oct. 9, 04	4
Iran	Overseas Voting, Presidential election of Afghanistan	Oct. 9, 04	2
Cameroon	Presidential election	Oct. 11, 04	4
Ecuador	Local election	Oct. 17, 04	1
Belarus	Parliamentary election	Oct. 17, 04	1
Ukraine	Presidential election (1st vote)	Oct. 31, 04	7
Macedonia	Referendum on the revision of local government law	Nov. 7, 04	1
Ukraine	Presidential election (final vote)	Nov. 21, 04	10
Mozambique	Presidential and parliamentary elections	Dec. 1-2, 04	1
Bolivia	Local election	Dec. 5, 04	1
Ghana	Presidential and parliamentary elections	Dec. 7, 04	2
Azerbaijan	Local parliamentary election	Dec. 17, 04	1

Country Name	Election Type	Election Date	Number of Personnel Dispatched
Ukraine	Presidential election (re-run)	Dec. 26, 04	26
Uzbekistan	Parliamentary election	Dec. 26, 04	4
Palestine	Self-ruled government election	Jan. 9, 05	23
Iraq	Overseas Voting for the transitional parliament	Jan. 28-30, 05	23
Kyrgyzstan	Parliamentary election	Feb. 27, 05	2
Tajikistan	Parliamentary election	Feb. 27, 05	2
Moldova	Parliamentary election	Mar. 6, 05	2
Kyrgyzstan	Parliamentary election	Mar. 13, 05	2
Zimbabwe	Parliamentary election	Mar. 31, 05	4
Ethiopia	National election	May 15, 05	3
Papua New Guinea	Election for autonomy in Bougainville	May 20-27, 05	3
Mongolia	Presidential election	May 22, 05	3
Burundi	Local parliamentary election	Jun. 3, 05	1
Kyrgyzstan	Presidential election	Jul. 10, 05	3
Uganda	Referendum on constitutional revision	Jul. 28, 05	5
Afghanistan	Lower house and local parliamentary elections	Sep. 18, 05	4
East Timor	Mayor elections in Dili and Liquiçá	Sep. 20, 05	1
East Timor	Mayor elections in Dili and Liquiçá	Sep. 30, 05	1
Tanzania	Presidential and parliamentary elections	Oct. 30, 05 (in Zanzibar) Dec. 14, 05 (in mainland)	3
Azerbaijan	Parliamentary election	Nov. 6, 05	1
Kenya	Referendum on constitutional revision	Nov. 21, 05	5
Honduras	Presidential election	Nov. 27, 05	3
Venezuela	Parliamentary election	Dec. 4, 05	1
Kazakhstan	Presidential election	Dec. 4, 05	4
Bolivia	General election	Dec. 18, 05	2
Democratic Republic of Congo	National referendum on a draft constitution	Dec. 18-19, 05	8
Palestine	Legislative Council election	Jan. 25, 06	22
Haiti	Presidential and parliamentary elections	Feb. 7, 06	3
Uganda	Presidential and parliamentary	Feb. 23, 06	2

Country Name	Election Type	Election Date	Number of Personnel Dispatched
	elections		
Belarus	Presidential elections	Mar. 19, 06	4
Ukraine	Presidential elections	Mar. 26, 06	7
Solomon	National election	Apr. 5, 06	4
Peru	Presidential and parliamentary elections	Apr. 9, 06	2
Haiti	Parliamentary election (final vote)	Apr. 23, 06	3
Costa Rica	Presidential and parliamentary elections	May 5, 06	3
Serbia-Montenegro	Referendum	May 21, 06	1
Peru	Presidential election (final vote)	Jun. 4, 06	1
Mauritania	National referendum on constitutional revision	June, 06	2
Mexico	Presidential and federal parliamentary elections	Jul. 2, 06	2
Macedonia	Parliamentary election	Jul. 5, 06	1
Zambia	General election	Sep. 28, 06	1
Bosnia And Herzegovina	National and local elections	Oct. 1, 06	2
Ecuador	Presidential election (1st vote)	Oct. 15, 06	1
Mauritania	Local and national parliamentary elections	Nov. 06	2
Nicaragua	Presidential, parliamentary, and Central American Parliamentary elections	Nov. 5, 06	5
Tajikistan	Presidential election	Nov. 6, 06	2
Madagascar	Presidential election	Dec. 3, 06	3
Indonesia	Governor election in Aceh	Dec. 11, 06	6
Nigeria	Governor election	Apr. 14, 07	8
Nigeria	Presidential election	Apr. 21, 07	8
Armenia	Parliamentary election	May 12, 07	2
Philippines	2007 Mid-term election (upper house, lower house, and local elections)	May 14, 07	26
Sierra Leone	Presidential election	Aug. 11, 07 (1st)	2
		Sep. 7, 08 (final)	
Kazakhstan	Lower house election	Aug. 18, 07	2
Guatemala	Presidential and parliamentary elections	Sep. 9, 07 (1st)	4
		Nov. 4, 07 (final, presidential	1

Country Name	Election Type	Election Date	Number of Personnel Dispatched
		election only)	
Ukraine	Parliamentary election	Sep. 30, 07	6
Columbia	Local election	Oct. 28, 07	1
Kyrgyzstan	Parliamentary election	Dec. 16, 07	2
Kenya	Presidential and parliamentary elections	Dec. 27, 07	13
Georgia	Presidential election	Jan. 5, 08	2
Pakistan	Lower house and state parliamentary elections	Feb. 18, 08	15
Armenia	Presidential election	Feb. 19, 08	2
Macedonia	Presidential and local elections of former Yugoslavia	Mar. 22, 08	1
Bhutan	Lower house election	Mar. 24, 08	3
Zimbabwe	Presidential, lower house, and upper house elections	Mar. 29, 08	3
Georgia	Parliamentary election	May 21, 08	1
Cambodia	Parliamentary election	Jul. 27, 08	23
Angola	Parliamentary election	Sep. 5, 08	6
Belarus	Lower house election	Sep. 28, 08	1
Bosnia And Herzegovina	Local election	Oct. 5, 08	3
Maldives	Presidential elections	Oct. 8, 08 (1st)	3
		Oct. 28, 08 (final)	3
Azerbaijan	Presidential election	Oct. 15, 08	1
Zambia	Presidential by-election	Oct. 30, 08	5
Guinea-Bissau	Parliamentary election	Nov. 16, 08	1
Ghana	Presidential election	Dec. 7, 08 (1st)	8
		Dec. 28, 08 and Jan. 2, 09 (final)	
Bangladesh	The 9th General election	Dec. 29, 08	7
Iraq	Local election	Jan. 31, 09	5
El Salvador	Presidential election	Mar. 15, 09	5
Moldova	Parliamentary election	Apr. 5, 09	2
Maldives	Parliamentary election	May 9, 09	2
Malawi	Presidential and parliamentary elections	May 19, 09	5
Guinea-Bissau	Presidential election	Jun. 28, 09 (1st)	1
		Jul. 26, 09 (final)	
Kyrgyzstan	Presidential election	Jul. 23, 09	2
Iraq	Kurdistan local parliamentary election	Jul. 25, 09	2
Moldova	Parliamentary election (re-run)	Jul, 29, 09	1

Country Name	Election Type	Election Date	Number of Personnel Dispatched
Afghanistan	Presidential and local parliamentary elections	Aug. 20, 09	9

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Kokusai heiwa kyoryoku ho ni yoranai senkyo kanshi katsudo (Election Observations not based on the International Peace Cooperation Law)," (September 2009). http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pko/pdfs/senkyo.pdf (accessed on October 1, 2010)

Appendix 3 Examples of Technical Assistance to Local Governments

Country	Project Name	Duration
Technical Cooperation Projects		
Indonesia	Project on Strengthening Sulawesi Rural Community Development to Support Poverty Alleviation Programmes	3/1997 – 2/2002
Indonesia	Regional Development Policies for Local Government	4/2001 – 3/2005
Indonesia	Project for Human Resource Development for Local Governance	4/2002 – 3/2005
Indonesia	Policy Advisor on Regional Development	4/2005 – 3/2007
Indonesia	Phase II of Project for Human Resource Development for Local Governance	4/2005 – 4/2005
Indonesia	Policy Advisor on Regional Development in South Sulawesi Province	8/2005 – 8/2006
Indonesia	Community Development Technical Cooperation Project with the Participation of Civil Society	1/2004 – 12/2006
Indonesia	ICT Capacity Improvement of Governmental Officers	1/2005 – 1/2006
Indonesia	Project Planning and Management of Participatory Regional Societal Development	8/2006 – 3/2007
Indonesia	Decentralization and the roles and functions of the Diet and Diet Secretariat in Japan	3/2007 – 4/2007
Indonesia	Project on Self-sustainable Community Empowerment Network Formulation in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) Province	3/2007 – 9/2007
Philippines	Project for Establishment and Implementation of Environmental Conservation Plans in Local Government Units in the Province of Cavite	2/2002 – 2/2005
Philippines	Participatory Workshop on Local Governance with the Participation of the Agricultural Sector in a way to make Agricultural Reform Sustainable	8/2004 – 3/2007
Philippines	Project to Assist the Improvement of ARMM's Administrative Capacity	12/2004 – 3/2007
Philippines	Local Governance and Rural Empowerment Project for Davao Region	7/2007 – 6/2010
Thailand	Capacity Building for Planning Management of Local Authorities	7/2003-11/2004
Thailand	Local Management Cooperation Program	9/2003 – 9/2004
Thailand	Project for Local Management Cooperation and the Improvement of Local Administrative Service	20/2005 – 10/2008
Cambodia	Improvement of Local Government Administration	1/2007 – 1/2010

Country	Project Name	Duration
Laos	Project for Capacity Building in PIP Management	11/2004 – 10/2007
Laos	Creation of Administrative Orders and Rules concerning Local Governance, and Local Governance Training Plan	1/2007 – 1/2009
Kyrgyzstan	Community empowerment in Issyk-Kul Oblast	1/2007 – 9/2010
Bhutan	Local Governance and Decentralization Project (Phase 1)	3/2004 – 10/2006
Bangladesh	Assistance for Agricultural Development Administration with Residents' Participation	4/2000 – 4/2004
Bangladesh	Participatory Rural Development Project (PRDP-2)	6/2005 – 5/2010
Pakistan	Improvement of Public Administration for Local Governments in Punjab	8/2004 – 7/2009
Papua New Guinea	Integrated Community Development in Settlement Areas in NCD	3/2005 – 3/2008
Turkey	Human Resource Development for Participatory Local Development in DOKAP region	4/2005 – 3/2009
Honduras	Development Capacity Building in the Western Region of Honduras	9/2006 – 3/2009
Paraguay	Project for Improvement in the Administrative Procedures for the Transfer of Royalties in the Ministry of Finance	6/2006 – 4/2007
Argentina	Project for capacity building grass-root organisations to strengthen civil society	3/2004 – 9/2006
Bolivia	Training Course on Municipal Administration	7/2003 – 3/2006
Peru	Local Activation through the Experience shared among the Municipalities	1/2007 – 1/2010
Columbia	Local and Regional Administrative Development Plan	4/2003 – 12/2007
Ghana	Capacity Development of government administration	2/2007 – 2/2010
Ghana	Promotion of Education Policy Development	5/2005 – 5/2008
Tanzania	Local governance reform adviser	3/2000 – 10/2007
Tanzania	Technical Cooperation in Capacity Development for Local Government Training	10/2007 – 3/2009
Tanzania	Project for Strengthening District Health Services in Morogoro Region	4/2001 – 3/2007
Zambia	Capacity Building Program for local government to build functional PRSP monitoring system in Zambia	9/2004 – 3/2007
Zambia	Capacity Development for Provision of Decentralized Services	7/2006 – 3/2009
Palestine	Improvement in Local Governance System in Palestine	9/2005 -8/2008

Country	Project Name	Duration
Bulgaria	Kazanlak Area Revitalization Project	10/2004 – 10/2007
Development Study		
Kyrgyzstan	Study on Integrated Development Plan of Issyk-Kul Zone	10/2003 – 2/2006
Kenya	Regional Development Programme in Nayndo and Homa-Bay Districts	6/2005 – 5/2007
Tanzania	Rural and Agricultural Sector support program	3/2001 – 3/2005
Tanzania	Socio-economic data management system operation planning study	1/2004 – 3/2004
Tanzania	Study on Improvement of O&OD methodology	6/2006 – 3/2008
Senegal	Education System Improvement Program	11/2005 – 11/2007
Country- and Issue-based Planning		
Indonesia	Local Development Study by Resident Representative Office of Indonesia (Study on Current Status and Needs Assessment of Local Governments for Implementing Decentralization and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia)	12/2001 – 3/2002
Indonesia	Study on Civil Servant Personnel System	3/2004 – 12/2004
Indonesia	Decentralization Assistance	4/2005 – 3/2006
Philippines	Improvement of Local Development and the Administrative Capacity of Local Government	4/2005 – 3/2006
Cambodia	Administrative Reform Assistance (Project formation)	10/2004 – 3/2005
Mongolia	Local Development Assistance Program Formation	4/2005 – 3/2006
Paraguay	Establishment of Financial Statement database of Municila Offices	2/2004 – 3/2004
Senegal and Mali	Decentralization Basic Information Study in Senegal and Mali	2/2005 – 3/2005
Jordan	Administrative Service Improvement Program	4/2005 – 3/2006
Grassroots Technical Cooperation		
Indonesia	Local Nursing Empowerment Project in Decentralization Era: Local Nursing Coordinator Development	9/2005 – 9/2007
Philippines	Cebu Socio-Economic Empowerment and Development Project	3/1999 – 2/2004
Philippines	Local infrastructure improvement (drinking water) assistance project through empowerment of self-governance in the city of Legazpi	3/2005 – 2/2007
Mongolia	One Village, One Product Campaign Local Revitalization	11/2003 – 9/2004
Local Technical Trainings		
Tanzania	Grassroots Leaders Training	4/2001 – 3/2006
Individual Experts Dispatch		

Country	Project Name	Duration
Indonesia	Eastern Region Development Policy Planning and Implementation Assistance	11/1995 – 10/1998
Research Cooperation		
Thailand	Research Cooperation on Local Governmental Administrative Capacity Improvement	8/2000 – 8/2002
Sri Lanka	Establishment of Participatory Agricultural Development Methods: Utilization and Management of Local Resources	7/1998 – 6/2001

Source: "Hyo A1-1 Chiho gyosei kanren anken risuto (Daihyoteki na rei) (Table A1-1 Local Administration Related Project List (Representative Cases))," in Institute For International Cooperation, JICA, *Kaihatsu kadai ni taisuru kokateki apurochi: Chiho gyosei (Effective Approach to Developmental Issues: Local Administration)* (Tokyo: Institute for International Cooperation, JICA, August 2007), pp. 34-42.

Appendix 4 Examples of Local Government Assistance Technical Projects

Country	Project Name	Duration	Inputs from Japan (1) Human Resource, 2) Seminars, 3) Equipments, 4) Others)
Technical Cooperation Projects			
Indonesia	Project on Strengthening Sulawesi Rural Community Development to Support Poverty Alleviation Programmes	3/1997-2/2002	1) 6 long-term experts and 45 short-term experts 2) Accepted 27 trainees 3) Equipments 4) Local cost
Indonesia	Regional Development Policies for Local Government	4/2001-3/2005	1) 6 long-term experts and 8 short-term experts 2) Accepted 44 trainees
Indonesia	Project for Human Resource Development for Local Governance	4/2002-3/2005	1) 5 long-term experts and short-term experts 2) Accepted trainees 3) Equipments (audiovisual equipments) 4) Established an Assistance Committee in Japan
Indonesia	Policy Advisor on Regional Development	4/2005-3/2007	1) 1 long-term expert 2) N/A 3) Equipments 4) Local operation cost
Indonesia	Phase II of Project for Human Resource Development for Local Governance	4/2005-3/2007	1) 3 long-term experts and 8 short-term experts 2) Accepted 6 trainees in Counterpart Training, and 24 in Country-based training on "Local Governance" 3) Necessary equipments 4) Domestic training cost
Indonesia	Policy Advisor on Regional Development in South Sulawesi Province	8/2005-8/2006	1) 1 short-term expert 2) N/A 3) Equipments
Indonesia	Community Development Technical Cooperation Project with the Participation of Civil Society	1/2004-12/2006	1) 1 long-term expert and 3-5 short-term experts per year 2) Accepted several trainees per year 3) Equipments necessary for dispatched experts 4) Cost for local training, seminars, and pilot

Country	Project Name	Duration	Inputs from Japan (1) Human Resource, 2) Seminars, 3) Equipments, 4) Others)
			projects
Indonesia	ICT Capacity Improvement of Governmental Officers	1/2005-1/2006	1) Short-term experts 2) N/A 3) Equipments 4) Cost for local training
Indonesia	Project Planning and Management of Participatory Regional Societal Development	8/2006-3/2007	1) N/A 2) Accepted trainees
Indonesia	Decentralization and the roles and functions of the Diet and Diet Secretariat in Japan	3/2007-4/2007	1) N/A 2) Accepted 15 trainees
Indonesia	Project on Self-sustainable Community Empowerment Network Formulation in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) Province	3/2007-9/2007	1) 1 chief adviser and 3 other advisers 2) Conducted training 3) Equipments
Philippines	Project for Establishment and Implementation of Environmental Conservation Plans in Local Government Units in the Province of Cavite	2/2002-2/2005	1) Dispatched experts 2) N/A 3) Provided Equipments (computers and peripheral equipment, monitoring equipments, compost equipments, videos and monitors)
Philippines	Participatory Workshop on Local Governance with the Participation of the Agricultural Sector in a way to make Agricultural Reform Sustainable	8/2004-3/2007	1) N/A 2) N/A 3) N/A 4) 8 million yen (=$72 thousand) a year for 3 years
Philippines	Project to Assist the Improvement of ARMM's Administrative Capacity	12/2004-3/2007	1) N/A 2) N/A 3) N/A 4) Cost for local training (contracted out), local operation cost. It also established a project operation team in the Philippines
Philippines	Local Governance and Rural Empowerment Project for Davao Region	7/2007-6/2010	1) Experts 2) N/A 3) Equipments (electric

Country	Project Name	Duration	Inputs from Japan (1) Human Resource, 2) Seminars, 3) Equipments, 4) Others)
			detection machine, office equipments, computers, and vehicles)
Thailand	Capacity Building for Planning Management of Local Authorities	7/2003-11/2004	1) 8 experts 2) Accepted 13 trainees (accepted 23 during preparation period) 3) N/A 4) Conducted local training for 9 times
Thailand	Local Management Cooperation Program	9/2003-9/2004	1) 7 experts
Thailand	Project for Local Management Cooperation and the Improvement of Local Administrative Service	10/2005-10/2008	1) Long-term experts and short-term experts 2) Held training seminars in Japan 3) N/A 4) Cost for local consultants
Cambodia	Improvement of Local Government Administration	1/2007-1/2010	1) 8 short-term experts 2) Accepted 10 trainees per year for the seminar on local government, and 2-3 trainees per year for the seminar on top management. It also held other local trainings. 3) Equipments (Computers, LAN server and peripheral devices, software, printer, audiovisual equipments, photocopy machines, and vehicles)
Laos	Project for Capacity Building in PIP Management	11/2004-10/2007	1) 2 long-term experts and some short-term experts 2) N/A 3) All the necessary equipments 4) N/A

Country	Project Name	Duration	Inputs from Japan (1) Human Resource, 2) Seminars, 3) Equipments, 4) Others)
Laos	Creation of Administrative Orders and Rules concerning Local Governance, and Local Governance Training Plan	1/2007-1/2009	1) Long-term experts 2) Conducted training seminars in Japan
Kyrgyzstan	Community empowerment in Issyk-Kul Oblast	1/2007-9/2010	1) 4 experts in total 2) Accepted 2 trainees 3) Provided equipments (office equipments) 4) Cost for pilot project and other project operations
Bhutan	Local Governance and Decentralization Project (Phase 1)	3/2004-10/2006	1) Long-term and short-term experts 2) Accepted 20 trainees 3) Provided equipments 4) Established assistance committee in Japan
Bangladesh	Assistance for Agricultural Development Administration with Residents' Participation	4/2000-4/2004	1) Long-term and short-term experts 2) Accepted trainees 3) Provided equipments (Jeeps, motorcycles, bicycles, photocopy machines, computers, printers, fax machines, mimeograph, Bengalee typewriter, calculators, OHPs, air conditioners, ceiling fans, desks and chairs)
Bangladesh	Participatory Rural Development Project (PRDP-2)	6/2005-5/2010	1) Long-term and short-term experts 2) Accepted trainees 3) Provided equipments 4) Cost for project operation
Pakistan	Improvement of Public Administration for Local Governments in Punjab	8/2004-7/2009	1) 2 long-term experts, in addition to 3-4 short-term experts per year 2) Accepted 4-5 trainees per year 3) N/A 4) Cost for local operations, local consultants,

Country	Project Name	Duration	Inputs from Japan (1) Human Resource, 2) Seminars, 3) Equipments, 4) Others)
			research, and training
Papua New Guinea	Integrated Community Development in Settlement Areas in NCD	3/2005-3/2008	1) Short-term experts 2) Conducted trainings in Japan and in a third country 1) Provided equipments (computers, audiovisual equipment, vehicles) 2) Cost for research, pilot project operation, workshops, training, and safety measures
Turkey	Human Resource Development for Participatory Local Development in DOKAP region	4/2005-3/2009	1) 2 experts 2) Accepted 40 trainees in Japan
Honduras	Development Capacity Building in the Western Region of Honduras	9/2006-3/2009	1) 2 long-term experts per year, and 4 short-term experts a year when necessary 2) Conducted training 3) Provided equipments
Paraguay	Project for Improvement in the Administrative Procedures for the Transfer of Royalties in the Ministry of Finance	6/2006-4/2007	1) 1 short-term expert, 1 consultant, and 1 short-term expert from the Ministry of Finance
Argentina	Project for capacity building grass-root organisations to strengthen civil society	3/2004-9/2006	1) Short-term experts
Bolivia	Training Course on Municipal Administration	7/2003-3/2006	1) N/A 2) N/A 3) N/A 4) Dispatch and travel cost for Japanese experts and JICA staff
Peru	Local Activation through the Experience shared among the Municipalities	1/2007-1/2010	1) Short-term experts 2) N/A 3) N/A 4) Local operation cost (workshop, textbooks, and local consultants)

Country	Project Name	Duration	Inputs from Japan (1) Human Resource, 2) Seminars, 3) Equipments, 4) Others)
Columbia	Local and Regional Administrative Development Plan	4/2003-12/2007	1) N/A 2) N/A 3) Seminars in Japan (10 trainees per year) and local seminars (3 years)
Ghana	Capacity Development of government administration	2/2007-2/2010	1) Long-term experts and short-term experts 2) Accepted trainees (in Japan and a third country) 3) Provided equipments (A vehicle, computers, photocopy machines, projectors, and other equipments) 4) Local operational costs (local consultant, research, and training costs)
Ghana	Promotion of Education Policy Development	5/2005-5/2008	1) Long-term and short-term experts 2) Accepted 2 trainees per year 3) Provided general equipments 4) Local costs (training and workshop costs)
Tanzania	Local governance reform adviser	3/2000-10/2007	1) 1 long-term expert
Tanzania	Technical Cooperation in Capacity Development for Local Government Training	10/2007-3/2009	1) Long-term and short-term experts 2) N/A 3) Provided equipments
Tanzania	Project for Strengthening District Health Services in Morogoro Region	4/2001-3/2007	1) Long-term and short-term experts 2) Accepted trainees 3) Provided equipments (vehicles, textbooks, computers, photocopy machines, small generators, and audiovisual equipments) 4) Local operational costs

Country	Project Name	Duration	Inputs from Japan (1) Human Resource, 2) Seminars, 3) Equipments, 4) Others)
			(operational costs, manpower cost, consumable supplies, and office rental costs)
Zambia	Capacity Building Program for local government to build functional PRSP monitoring system in Zambia	9/2004-3/2007	1) Planning and research staff 2) N/A 3) N/A 4) Training cost in Japan and Zambia
Zambia	Capacity Development for Provision of Decentralized Services	7/2006-3/2009	1) Long-term experts, JOCV, and local consultants 2) Training in Japan and Zambia
Palestine	Improvement in Local Governance System in Palestine	9/2005-8/2008	1) Short-term and long-term experts 2) Accepted 8 trainees in Japan per year and 10 trainees per year in Amman 3) Provided equipments (training center equipments and vehicles) 4) Conducted training seminars, workshops, research, questionnaires, workshops, pilot projects, and training needs assessment
Bulgaria	Kazanlak Area Revitalization Project	10/2004-10/2007	1) N/A 2) Conducted trainings 3) N/A 4) Decided on the items of cooperation and assistance plan, concluded contract, utilized ICT, collaboration with volunteer projects
Development Study			

Country	Project Name	Duration	Inputs from Japan (1) Human Resource, 2) Seminars, 3) Equipments, 4) Others)
Kyrgyzstan	Study on Integrated Development Plan of Issyk-Kul Zone	10/2003-2/2006	1) Dispatched a study team of 26 people 2) Accepted 8 trainees 3) N/A 4) Operation monitoring and technical evaluation
Kenya	Regional Development Programme in Nayndo and Homa-Bay Districts	6/2005-5/2007	1) Consultants
Tanzania	Rural and Agricultural Sector support program	3/2001-3/2005	1) 4 experts
Tanzania	Socio-economic data management system operation planning study	1/2004-3/2004	N/A
Tanzania	Study on Improvement of O&OD methodology	6/2006-3/2008	1) Japanese and local consultants
Senegal	Education System Improvement Program	11/2005-11/2007	1) Consultants 2) Conducted counterpart training
Country- and Issue-based Planning			
Indonesia	Local Development Study by Resident Representative Office of Indonesia (Study on Current Status and Needs Assessment of Local Governments for Implementing Decentralization and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia)	12/2001-3/2002	1) 3 Japanese and 1 foreign service-providing consultants
Indonesia	Study on Civil Servant Personnel System	3/2004-12/2004	1) 5 local consultants and 6 researchers
Indonesia	Decentralization Assistance	4/2005-3/2006	1) 1 long-term researcher and 1 project-formation researcher
Philippines	Improvement of Local Development and the Administrative Capacity of Local Government	4/2005-3/2006	1) Planning and research staff
Cambodia	Administrative Reform Assistance (Project formation)	10/2004-3/2005	1) 6 researchers for project formation research (10 days)

Country	Project Name	Duration	Inputs from Japan (1) Human Resource, 2) Seminars, 3) Equipments, 4) Others)
Mongolia	Local Development Assistance Program Formation	4/2005-3/2006	1) 1 planning staff, 1 embassy staff, 4 local consultants, and 1 service-providing consultant
Paraguay	Establishment of Financial Statement database of Municila Offices	2/2004-3/2004	1) Local consultants
Senegal and Mali	Decentralization Basic Information Study in Senegal and Mali	2/2005-3/2005	1) 1 local consultant each in Senegal and Mali
Jordan	Administrative Service Improvement Program	4/2005-3/2006	1) 2 Japanese civil servants and 1 consultant
Grassroots Technical Cooperation			
Indonesia	Local Nursing Empowerment Project in Decentralization Era: Local Nursing Coordinator Development	9/2005-9/2007	1) 2 experts 2) Accepted 4 trainees
Philippines	Cebu Socio-Economic Empowerment and Development Project	3/1999-2/2004	1) 5 long-term experts and short-term experts 2) Accepted 4-5 trainees per year 3) Provided equipments (4WDs, construction machines, and computers)
Philippines	Local infrastructure improvement (drinking water) assistance project through empowerment of self-governance in the city of Legazpi	3/2005-2/2007	1) Experts 2) N/A 3) Equipments (construction supplies for securing drinking water)
Mongolia	One Village, One Product Campaign Local Revitalization	11/2003-9/2004	1) 1 project manager, 5 staff in Japan, and 5 staff in Mongolia 2) N/A 3) Equipments for production technology and for repair of greenhouse
Local Technical Trainings			

Country	Project Name	Duration	Inputs from Japan (1) Human Resource, 2) Seminars, 3) Equipments, 4) Others)
Tanzania	Grassroots Leaders Training	4/2001-3/2006	1) N/A 2) N/A 3) N/A 4) Training cost
Individual Experts Dispatch			
Indonesia	Eastern Region Development Policy Planning and Implementation Assistance	11/1995-10/1998	1) Long-term and short-term experts 2) Accepted trainees 3) Provided equipments (computers, printers, and fax machines)
Research Cooperation			
Thailand	Research Cooperation on Local Governmental Administrative Capacity Improvement	8/2000-8/2002	1) 6 members from Japan and 1-2 JICA officers
Sri Lanka	Establishment of Participatory Agricultural Development Methods: Utilization and Management of Local Resources	7/1998-6/2001	1) N/A 2) Accepted 16 trainees

Source: "Hyo A1-1 Chiho gyosei kanren anken risuto (Daihyoteki na rei) (Table A1-1 Local Administration Related Project List (Representative Cases))," in Institute For International Cooperation, JICA, *Kaihatsu kadai ni taisuru kokateki apurochi: Chiho gyosei (Effective Approach to Developmental Issues: Local Administration)* (Tokyo: Institute for International Cooperation, JICA, August 2007), pp. 34-42.