Bank Disclosure and Incentives Open Access
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In this working paper, Korok Ray proposes a microeconomic model of a bank that acts as a financial intermediary engaging in maturity transformation, borrowing short-term debt from a market of investors to fund a long term loan to a firm. The bank installs a manager who exerts costly effort to reduce the credit risk of the loan portfolio. Disclosing this credit risk to the market increases the manager’s incentives for risk management. The market rewards the manager’s early efforts to manage risk with a lower future cost of debt. When paid on bank equity, the manager is induced to better manage risk. Disclosure therefore helps resolve the moral hazard problem inside banks.
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