Contracting a Better Bureaucrat: A Case For Using Personal Services Contracts To Circumvent Systemic Barriers To Competitive Performance And Accountability In The Federal Civil Service
Open Access DepositedToo many Americans have lost faith in the federal government’s ability to competently and competitively deliver valuable public service. Since the federal government is predominately staffed by unelected, executive branch bureaucracy, the best way to improve government is to reform the system under which federal civil servants are recruited, retained, and removed. Systematically organizing government to maximize competition is the best way to achieve value in government. Unfortunately, the legal foundation of the modern civil service system reinforces mediocrity and inefficient accountability, which permeates every part of government operations. A lack of competition during the hiring process, lack of competition to maintain incumbency, collective bargaining protections, and excessive rights preventing removal—are symptomatic of a system that is more focused on self-interested protectionism than agency mission and public service. The importance of cultivating and sustaining competitive performance and accountability is more readily accepted in federal procurement policy and procedure than in federal personnel management. Thus, this paper proposes a non-legislative, procurement-based solution—personal services contracting—as a preferred means for sourcing the government’s human capital.
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