Flexibility vs. Formality
Open Access DepositedThe Role of Multilateral Negotiations in U.S. Federal and EU Procurement Practices
This paper examines why competitive multilateral negotiations are the dominant default in U.S. federal procurement yet remain underutilized in the European Union (EU). Drawing on a comparative analysis of legal frameworks and qualitative interviews with procurement experts, the study argues that the divide is rooted in fundamental differences regarding institutional trust and the operationalization of discretion. In the U.S. federal government, the best-value continuum empowers contracting officers to use negotiations as a strategic tool to leverage private-sector expertise and optimize outcomes. Conversely, the EU’s prioritization of market integration and the principle of equal treatment have fostered a risk-averse culture characterized by over-specification and a reliance on mechanical, formula-based scoring systems. The findings reveal that even when flexible procedures are available in the EU, they are often hindered by a formalistic mindset and a lack of professional courage to exercise discretion. The paper concludes that while the EU could benefit from the U.S. federal model’s focus on dialogue and iterative problem-solving, meaningful reform requires addressing the cultural and structural barriers that equate procedural rigidity with legal safety.
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