A Comparative Case Study of Romania
Open Access DepositedPredicting Security Elite Behavior during the Collapse of the North Korean Regime
This thesis examines how North Korean security elites might perceive and respond in the event of a regime collapse. Drawing on Albert Hirschman’s theory of exit, voice, and loyalty, it analyzes the 1989 collapse of Nicolae Ceausescu’s regime in Romania as a comparative case. The findings suggest that, under crisis conditions, North Korean security elites are likely to adopt one of four behavioral responses—defection(exit), coup (voice), loyalty, and foot-dragging—depending on their situational context and cost-benefit calculations. The Romanian case demonstrates that as the costs of continued loyalty rise and the perceived benefits decline, elites tend to defect. Those motivated by a desire to restore regime stability may attempt a coup. High-ranking elites, equipped with information and authority, are more likely to engage in defection, coup plotting, or foot-dragging, whereas mid- and lower-ranking elites tend to remain loyal due to their limited decision-making capacity. Given the structural and political similarities between North Korea and Ceausescu’s Romania, the study anticipates similar behavioral patterns among North Korean security elites in a collapse scenario. In particular, initial defections may emerge from the General Staff Department, while the State Security Department may be positioned to lead a potential coup.
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