Resilient Post-Quantum Software Updates for Critical Infrastructure Systems

Rapid advances in quantum computing technology pose a grave threat to the methods currently used to protect remote software updates against the introduction of malicious code. This threat is particularly challenging for critical infrastructure systems that are frequently in service for many decades. Addressing this threat will require the adoption of new algorithms for digital signatures. While these new algorithms are believed to be secure against future attacks, they introduce design challenges due to a larger size for each signature and additional computational effort required to validate signatures. The transition to these new algorithms provides an opportunity to also address a long-standing risk due to a hidden single point of failure that exists in the software update workflow for many systems. The development of advanced software update frameworks makes it possible to address several vulnerabilities that have been observed in the software supply chains of modern systems. These frameworks support features such as the use of multiple digital signatures, eliminating a single point of failure and improving software update resilience. This research examines the combination of The Update Framework (TUF) with the approved set of post-quantum algorithms known as Stateful Hash-Based Signatures (SHBS). A probabilistic model is developed to show the benefit of using multiple signatures for each update in terms of the relative risk when compared to a single signature. Simulation results are introduced to show the impact of using TUF with SHBS in terms of cumulative network bandwidth consumed and total computational resources required to validate update packages. A genetic algorithm optimization technique is also demonstrated as a method for automating the selection of an optimal or near-optimal set of operating parameters for the integrated system. This work shows that the combination of TUF with SHBS is a practical option for a resilient post-quantum software update solution.

Author

• Romansky, Brian

Language

• en

Keyword

• Software Supply Chain Security
• Stateful Hash-Based Signatures
• The Update Framework (TUF)
• Post-Quantum Cryptography

Date created

• 2026

Type of Work

• Dissertation

License

• All rights reserved

Rights statement

• In Copyright

GW Unit

• Systems Engineering

Degree

• Ph.D.

Advisor

• Sarkani, Shahram
• Mazzuchi, Thomas

Committee Member(s)

• Etemadi, Amir
• Islam, Muhammad

Persistent URL

•  https://scholarspace.library.gwu.edu/etd/js956g90v