Collateral Duration
Open Access DepositedExternal Intervention and Interstate War Duration
How does external intervention by third parties influence interstate war duration? This question has seen many iterations of exploration in civil war literature, but the question has gone largely unexamined in interstate war literature. Because the incidence of civil war has been much greater since 1945, the topic of external intervention has received significant attention, including its effects on war duration. But, given the extraordinary consequences of interstate war, there has been a surprising dearth of focus on external intervention. When states opt to intervene, they do so to protect or pursue their national interests, in the hopes that their supported side will prevail in the conflict. But does their support help bring about a quick end to the conflict, or does their interference make for longer wars, and if so, why? My central claim is that external intervention in interstate wars results in chronic uncertainty among one or both belligerents, preventing them from updating their assessments of the relative military balance and accurately calculating the likelihood of achieving their war aims. I use the bargaining model to develop my theory, contending that support from third parties effects the information environment in two ways. First, external benefactors change and continue to change the private information of their beneficiary’s capability and resolve, preventing the two belligerents to come to a mutual understanding of their relative strength and possible bargaining range. Second, external actors maintain their own private information regarding their commitment to their protégé about how much and how long they would be willing to intervene, private information which is difficult to reveal on the battlefield. This uncertainty keeps the belligerents from accurately updating their understanding of the relative military balance and the likelihood of accomplishing their strategic goals. Since their war aims diverge from the reality on the battlefield, they fail to find overlapping bargaining space, resulting in an increased duration of interstate wars. I also propose an exception to the rule, in which early or prewar intervention can create an incontrovertible advantage for one side that uncertainty is quickly resolved, resulting in shorter wars. The theory is tested using process tracing in four case studies
the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020, and the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022. The findings indicate that intervention of external actors affected the information environment or private information of the belligerents, preventing them from making accurate assessments of the true military balance. In turn, this kept them from updating their war aims that would allow the two sides to find a bargaining space that could bring an end to the war.
- All rights reserved
Notice to Authors
If you are the author of this work and you have any questions about the information on this page, please use the Contact form to get in touch with us.