A Study of the Performance of the Department of Defense Weapons Systems Acquisition Using Multiple Regression Analysis Open Access
Downloadable ContentDownload PDF
Department of Defense (DOD) weapon acquisition programs often suffer from schedule slips and cost overruns associated with unanticipated performance failures found in the latter part of the programs. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) claims that cost and schedule estimates based on limited knowledge about system requirements and technology, design, and manufacturing maturity level can lead to schedule slips and cost overruns. Numerous studies conducted on DOD acquisition programs suggest that the utilization of knowledge-based acquisition processes including cost and schedule planning ensures the success of weapon system development. Knowledge-based realistic cost and schedule estimation is one of the most effective ways to provide stability not only to the program but also to the entire DOD acquisition system. This dissertation presents the results of a quantitative analysis method to better predict cost and schedule performance of DOD acquisition programs compared to the Milestone B (MS B) estimate, in order to mitigate the risk of program failure.