Rational Choice Restraint: Making a Grand Strategy Alternative More Politically Viable
Open AccessLiberal hegemony, also called primacy, has caused the United States to create a host of problems that have caused the foreign policy community to question its continued operability. Failed wars of democratization on nearly every continent have cost American taxpayers trillions of dollars, leading to resentment from both allies dragged into these operations and the local populations that find themselves caught in warzones. While many scholars have offered alternative plans, enacting restraint while remaining a member of international organizations (IOs) would enable the greatest benefits. The United States could achieve this position by adding elements of rational choice institutionalism to the “classic” definition of restraint to replace ending alliances for which many restrainers advocate. This new strategy is called rational choice restraint.The first case hopes to prove North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s relevance and show how rational choice restraint could reduce its U.S.-centric agenda. The U.S.-Japan alliance – where a rising China thwarts the ability to fully terminate the security guarantee and push Tokyo out from under the nuclear umbrella – will serve as the second case and will show that Japan is strong enough to make its military more autonomous. The last case will be for the United Nations, showing that IOs also play an important role in rational choice restraint given organizational reforms.
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